J-S21023-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSHUA A. RUSE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1317 WDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-30-CR-0000094-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 08, 2018

Joshua A. Ruse (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On February 13, 2013, at docket number CP-30-CR-0000094-2013 (94-

2013), Appellant was arrested by the Waynesburg Borough Police Department

after he was stopped for various Motor Vehicle Code violations, and charged 

with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), general impairment; DUI –

high rate of alcohol; driving under suspension (DUS), DUI-related; fraudulent 

use or removal of a registration plate; operation of a vehicle without financial 

responsibility; operation of a vehicle in violation of the general lighting 

requirements; and operation of a vehicle without an official certificate of 
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inspection.

1

 At the time of his arrest, Appellant’s BAC was measured at .114% 

from a breathalyzer.

On July 31, 2013, Appellant pled guilty to each of the aforementioned 

violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. According to his 

Presentence Investigation Report, Appellant had seven prior DUI convictions, 

including three in the preceding ten years. Appellant failed to appear for his 

sentencing hearing on October 1, 2013 and the trial court issued a bench 

warrant for his arrest.

On August 2, 2014, at docket number CP-30-CR-0000275-2014 (275-

2014) Appellant, following a motor vehicle accident, was arrested by the 

Southwest Regional Police Department and subsequently charged with DUI, 

general impairment; DUI – highest rate of alcohol; DUS, DUI-related; 

operation a vehicle without financial responsibility; operation a vehicle without 

the required registration and certificate of title; operation of a vehicle without 

a valid certificate of inspection; failure to drive on the right side of the 

roadway; and failure to drive at a safe speed.2 After consenting to a blood 

draw, Appellant’s BAC was measured at .203%. Prior to the blood draw, 

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1

 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b), 1543(b)(1.1)(ii), 7124, 1786(f), 4303(a), 

4703.

2

 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (c), 1543(b)(1), 1786(f), 1301, 4703, 3301, 

3361.
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Appellant received warnings indicating that he would receive enhanced, 

mandatory penalties if he did not consent to the blood draw.

On December 15, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to each of the 

aforementioned violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at docket 

number 275-2014. The same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant at both 

docket numbers 94-2013 and 275-2014 pursuant to a negotiated plea 

agreement that included an aggregate sentence of 32 months to 11 years of 

incarceration. Appellant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea and did not 

file a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.

On September 21, 2016, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition and the 

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent him for his PCRA proceedings. On 

January 27, 2017, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition in which he 

argued that the court should vacate his judgment of sentence because he is 

entitled to the retroactive application of Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. 

Ct. 2160 (2016), which held that a blood draw incident to a DUI arrest cannot 

be administered without a warrant and that police cannot seek consent to 

conduct a blood draw under the threat of enhanced criminal penalties for 

refusing consent. Id. at 2185-86. Appellant further asserted that because 

his consent to a blood draw at docket number 275-2014 was elicited in an 

unconstitutional manner, his guilty plea was unlawfully induced. Appellant 

also argued that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pre-trial 

motion challenging the constitutionality of his blood draw.
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On May 4, 2017, the PCRA issued notice of its intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition pursuant to Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, based on its determination that Appellant failed to 

preserve a challenge the constitutionality of his blood draw before the trial 

court. Trial Court Order, 5/4/17, at 4. On June 30, 2017, the PCRA court 

formally dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in finding that Appellant was 

not entitled to a new trial under the law announced by the United 

States Supreme Court in Birchfield v. North Dakota.

2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in finding that Appellant’s 

[plea] counsel was not ineffective for failing to properly seek 

suppression of inadmissible evidence, and allowing that evidence 

to be used against [Appellant] to induce a guilty plea.

3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in finding that [Appellant]’s 

plea was not unlawfully induced, where the circumstance[s] make 

it likely that the inducement caused [him] to plead guilty and [he] 

is innocent.

4. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant]’s 

[PCRA] Petition.

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quotations and 

citations omitted). “To be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must 

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, his conviction or sentence 
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resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9543(a)(2)[.]” Id.

We address Appellant’s first and third issues together because they are 

related. For these issues, Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his 

guilty plea and proceed to trial. Appellant contends that his guilty pleas at 

docket numbers 94-2013 and 275-2014 were unlawfully induced because in 

the case at docket number 275-2014, he consented to a blood draw after 

receiving unconstitutional warnings from the police that improperly informed 

him he would be subject to mandatory, increased penalties if he did not 

consent to the blood draw. Appellant, therefore, asserts that he is entitled to 

retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court’s Birchfield

decision.

This Court recently explained the Birchfield decision as follows:

Birchfield involved challenges to the use of both warrantless 

breath tests and warrantless blood tests to determine the [BAC]

of an individual arrested for DUI. . . . [T]he Court engaged in a 

familiar balancing analysis, “examin[ing] the degree to which [the 

tests] intrude upon an individual's privacy and ... the degree to 

which they are needed for the promotion of legitimate 

governmental interests.” Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2176 (quoting 

Riley v. California, [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484] (2014)) (internal 

quotation marks and some internal brackets omitted)[.]

First, the Court addressed the impact of each test on an 

individual’s privacy interests. As to breath tests, the Court 

reasoned that: they involve an “almost negligible” physical 

intrusion, id. at 2176; “[e]xhalation is a natural process,” id. at 

2177; the tests “are capable of revealing only one bit of 

information, the amount of alcohol in the subject’s breath,” id.; 

and the tests are unlikely “to cause any great enhancement in the 

embarrassment that is inherent in any arrest,” id. Accordingly, 
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the Court concluded that “breath test[s] do[ ] not implicate 

significant privacy concerns.” Id. at 2178 (internal quotation 

marks omitted; some alterations in original).

In contrast, the Court found that blood tests are “significantly 

more intrusive.” Id. at 2184; see also id. at 2178. It reasoned 

that: the tests “‘require piercing the skin’ and extract[ing] a part 

of the subject’s body”; unlike exhaling air, “humans do not 

continually shed blood”; and a blood sample may be preserved by 

the police and contains “information beyond a simple BAC 

reading.” Id. at 2178.

The Court next addressed “the States’ asserted need to obtain 

BAC readings for persons arrested for drunk driving,” id., and the 

relationship between that need and “[t]he laws at issue in the 

present cases – which make it a crime to refuse to submit to a 

BAC test,” id. at 2179. Noting that state and federal governments 

have a “paramount interest ... in preserving the safety of ... public 

highways,” id. at 2178 . . . , and that alcohol continues to be a 

leading cause of traffic fatalities and injuries, id., the Court 

concluded that laws “designed to provide an incentive to 

cooperate” in DUI cases “serve a very important function.” Id. at 

2179.

The Court then weighed the intrusion occasioned by each test 

against the government’s interest. As to breath tests, it concluded 

that “the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests 

incident to arrests for drunk driving” because the “impact of 

breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is 

great.” Id. at 2184.

The Court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to 

warrantless blood tests. Id. at 2185. In part because the 

reasonableness of blood tests “must be judged in light of the 

availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test,” id. at 

2184, which “in most cases amply serve[s] law enforcement 

interests,” id. at 2185, it concluded that warrantless blood tests 

are not permissible as searches incident to arrest.

* * *

The Court next addressed whether a warrantless blood test is 

permissible under the implied-consent exception to the warrant 

requirement. The Court noted that its “prior opinions have 
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referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent 

laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on 

motorists who refuse to comply” with BAC tests, and emphasized 

that “nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them.”

Id. at 2185. It found, however, that it is “another matter ... for 

a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to 

impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.” 

Id. (emphasis added). It explained: “[t]here must be a limit to 

the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have 

consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads.” Id.

The Court, therefore, concluded that “motorists cannot be deemed 

to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing 

a criminal offense.” Id. at 2186.

Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167 A.3d 716, 718-21 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some 

quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted).

After Birchfield, this Court has held that Pennsylvania’s impliedconsent law unconstitutionally “impose[s] criminal penalties on the refusal to 

submit to” a blood test. Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 331 (Pa.

Super. 2016). Thus, where a defendant consented to a blood draw after 

receiving Pennsylvania’s pre-Birchfield implied consent warnings, the blood 

draw was unconstitutional because consent was elicited following the 

reception of warnings relating to the now-invalidated increased, mandatory

penalty for failing to consent. Id. We emphasized that “Birchfield makes 

plain that the police may not threaten enhanced punishment for refusing a 

blood test in order to obtain consent, . . . whether that enhanced punishment 

is (or can be) ultimately imposed is irrelevant to the question whether the 

consent was valid.” Ennels, 167 A.3d at 724.
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Nevertheless, in this case, we conclude that Appellant, whose arrest, 

guilty plea, and judgment of sentence all occurred prior to the Supreme 

Court’s issuance of its Birchfield decision, is not entitled to relief. 

Preliminarily, we point out that Birchfield is wholly inapplicable to Appellant’s 

guilty plea to the charges at docket number 94-2013, as his BAC in that case 

was determined using a breathalyzer. See Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2185.

With respect to Appellant’s guilty plea to the charges at docket number 

275-2014, where Appellant consented to a blood draw after receiving 

Pennsylvania’s now-invalidated implied consent warnings, our Court has 

determined that Birchfield is inapplicable. In Commonwealth v. Olson, --

- A.3d ----, (Pa. Super. February 14, 2018), this Court recently held that 

“Birchfield does not apply retroactively in Pennsylvania to cases pending on 

collateral review.” Id. at *4. Therefore, because our Court has held that 

Birchfield does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, Appellant 
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cannot now withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of that decision through the 

PCRA.

3

 Appellant’s first and third issues do not merit relief.4

Finally, in his second issue, Appellant argues that his plea counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of his blood draw prior 

to his guilty plea. This claim is entirely meritless. “The law is clear that 

counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law.” 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 702 (Pa. 2009). The United States 

Supreme Court decided Birchfield more than six months after Appellant 

pled guilty and was sentenced by the trial court. Appellant cannot now claim 

that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of 

his blood draw when the Birchfield decision did not exist. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s second issue is meritless.

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3

 We also note that the trial court PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s 

Birchfield claim because he at no point challenged the voluntariness of his 

consent to the blood draw before the trial court. See Commonwealth v. 

Wilcox, 174 A.3d 670, 674 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that Appellant was not 

entitled to relief under Birchfield because, inter alia, the defendant did not 

challenge his consent to submit to a blood draw at any stage of the 

proceedings before the trial court). Our Court’s decision in Olson was issued 

several months after the denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

4

 Moreover, we point out that in the argument section of his appellate brief, 

Appellant has failed to make even a bare assertion of innocence. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(stating that a PCRA petitioner is entitled to relief 

where a guilty plea was unlawfully induced and “the circumstances make it 

likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the 

petitioner is innocent”) (emphasis added).
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Because we have determined that Appellant’s first three issues are 

meritless, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition, which is Appellant’s fourth issue.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/8/2018