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76–802 PDF 2002

S. Hrg. 107–208

WEAK LINKS: HOW SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MANAGE AIRLINE PASSENGER AND

BAGGAGE SCREENING?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL

AFFAIRS

AND THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 25, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

SUSAN E. PROPPER, Counsel

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member

HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

ELLEN B. BROWN, Minority Senior Counsel

DAN G. BLAIR, Minority Senior Counsel

ALISON E. BEAN, Minority Professional Staff Member

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

MARIANNE CLIFFORD UPTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

ANDREW RICHARDSON, Minority Staff Director

MASON C. ALINGER, Minority Professional Staff Member

JULIE L. VINCENT, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page

Senator Durbin ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 5

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 21

Senator Thompson ............................................................................................ 27

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 55

Prepared statements:

Senator Cleland ................................................................................................ 63

Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 64

WITNESSES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2001

Monte R. Belger, Acting Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation ........................................................... 8

Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 10

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S.

General Accounting Office ................................................................................... 13

Robert W. Baker, Vice Chairman, American Airlines .......................................... 31

Rear Admiral Paul E. Busick, USCG Ret., President and Executive Director,

North Carolina Global TransPark Authority ..................................................... 34

Leonard L. Griggs, Jr., Director of Airports—City of St. Louis, LambertSt. Louis International Airport ........................................................................... 38

Aubrey ‘‘Bill’’ Harvey, Jr., Training Supervisor for Argenbright Security at

O’Hare International Airport .............................................................................. 40

Michael B. La Pier, A.A.E., Executive Director, Central Illinois Regional

Airport ................................................................................................................... 41

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Baker, Robert W.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 31

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 105

Belger, Monte R.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65

Busick, Rear Admiral Paul E.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 34

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 109

Dillingham, Gerald L.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87

Griggs, Leonard L., Jr.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 38

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 115

Harvey, Aubrey ‘‘Bill,’’ Jr.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 40

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 125

La Pier, Michael B.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 131

Mead, Hon. Kenneth M.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 74

Page

IV

APPENDIX

Chart entitled ‘‘Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large Airports, May

1998-April 1999’’ (submitted by Senator Durbin) .............................................. 140

Chart entitled ‘‘Airport Security Breaches’’ (submitted by Senator Durbin) ...... 141

Chart entitled ‘‘Actions to Improve Aviation Security’’ submitted by Mr.

Mead ...................................................................................................................... 142

Letter from Billie H. Vincent, President and CEO, Aerospace Services International, Inc., dated September 24, 2001, with an attachment ....................... 143

Responses to Questions for the Record from Senator Akaka:

Mr. Mead ........................................................................................................... 160

Dr. Dillingham .................................................................................................. 163

Mr. Baker .......................................................................................................... 165

(1)

WEAK LINKS: HOW SHOULD THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MANAGE AIRLINE

PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING?

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, AND THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

Washington, DC.

The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at

2:33 p.m., in room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.

Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, and Hon. Richard J. Durbin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Durbin, Thompson, and

Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Senator DURBIN. I would like to call this meeting of the Governmental Affairs Committee to order, and Senator Lieberman, the

Chairman of this Committee, will be here very shortly. I am going

to make my opening remarks brief in the interest of time because

we have two very good panels, and I am sure we want to have adequate time for questions.

I am glad that we are co-chairing this important hearing today.

I want to especially thank the witnesses who took a great deal of

time and sacrifice to travel to Capitol Hill in an effort to help us

make our airports and aviation system the safest in the world.

I want to particularly commend Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey of the Federal Aviation Administration for their

quick work on Tuesday, September 11. It is hard to believe it was

only 2 weeks ago. It seems like so much longer. But they took action to halt national aviation operations and to institute a groundstop for all aircraft. These prudent actions saved lives. They prevented tragedies and confusion.

This Congress and this administration has to expeditiously develop a comprehensive plan to ensure the safety of the traveling

public, the security of our airports, and the continued viability of

the aviation industry. First and foremost, I believe the Federal

Government should immediately take responsibility for the screening of passengers and carry-on luggage and the control of security

checkpoints at our Nation’s airports. The United States is one of

only three countries in the world—the other two are Canada and

Bermuda—that give the airlines the responsibility for passenger

2

1 Chart entitled ‘‘Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large Airports, May 1998-April 1999’’

(submitted by Senator Durbin) appears in the Appendix on page 140.

screening. In fact, in 100 of the 103 countries with commercial airports, screening is done by either the government or by the airport.

We can no longer rely on contractors and subcontractors nor on employees with high turnover rates. We need well-trained, professional Federal Government security experts to be the central and

first line of defense for airport security.

According to the General Accounting Office report, the average

employment turnover rate for airport screening personnel at 19

major airports in the United States is 126 percent.1 We have put

this poster up here that you can take a look at, if you can read

numbers that small from that far away. The turnover rate was as

high as 416 percent at St. Louis-Lambert airfield. Other countries

have registered employment turnover rates for airport screeners

that are less than 50 percent, including Belgium, which has a rate

of 4 percent.

The GAO has also found in most cases a security screener’s starting salary is a minimum wage $5.15 an hour or slightly higher.

Other countries pay their screeners a livable wage, and many provide health and other benefits. It is a sad testament and an alarming indicator when airport parking garage attendants and fast-food

restaurant workers make more per hour than those on the front

lines of airline passenger safety.

I have introduced legislation today, the Airline Passenger Safety

Enhancement Act, that would require these airport security checkpoints to be staffed by Federal employees and better coordinate

overall airport security. This bill would also require the FAA to immediately issue an order for uniformed armed law enforcement officers to monitor security checkpoints.

I made this point last week in a hearing, and I would like to tell

you two things that happened afterwards. It was a hearing with

Secretary Mineta, and I said if we can’t have Federal employees

there in charge, can’t we at least have a uniformed law enforcement officer on the scene right there?

By the time I returned to my office, just a few feet away, I had

a call from a gentleman who is going to testify today, Mr. Griggs

from St. Louis-Lambert airport, who said it will be done immediately. It has been done, and I have seen it, and it makes a difference. I went through Baltimore to go home on Friday, last Friday, and saw two law enforcement officers there. It was a completely different environment at that screening checkpoint.

I don’t want to suggest that there aren’t good, hard-working, and

conscientious people at these screening checkpoints already. But

there are some, and I have seen them—I bet you have, too—who

are not paying as close attention as they should, who are not taking the job as seriously as we want them to. And I think the presence of law enforcement in some capacity—until we come up with

an overall national plan—will have a dramatic and positive impact.

As we discover more about the events of September 11, it is clear

that we had some security breakdowns. The purpose of an intelligence system in our country is to avert a crisis like the one we

endured on September 11, and the purpose of good security is to

3

1 Chart entitled ‘‘Airport Security Breaches’’ (submitted by Senator Durbin) appears in the Appendix on page 141.

make sure that we have done everything conceivable to avert the

same type of crisis.

The General Accounting Office has determined that undercover

agents have been able to penetrate restricted areas of U.S. commercial airports with counterfeit or otherwise invalid badges or

other credentials, giving those agents the opportunity, if intended,

to carry weapons, explosives, other things that are dangerous to

the security of everyone.1

We will go through this in detail. It is a sobering accounting of

efforts the General Accounting Office made last year which disclosed how porous the security network was at that time.

I share concerns about the effectiveness of our entire passenger

and carry-on baggage screening. I think that passenger screening

is just the tip of the compromised airport security iceberg.

I am pleased to hear that the FAA is in the process of performing

background checks on airport employees. Double-checking backgrounds and reissuing airport security badges is certainly a step in

the right direction. Inspector General Mead will speak to that

issue, I am sure.

I don’t want to overlook an issue that will be raised by one of

our witnesses, and that is the cost of airport security, particularly

at smaller and regional airports. A lot of my downstate Illinois airports support strong airport security procedures. But we will hear

testimony today concerning one airport in Bloomington-Normal, Illinois, which may spend as much as $30,000 a month for additional

security measures. Naturally, the administrators and managers at

those airports are concerned about the source of funding.

Finally, the airline industry is still reeling from this month’s

senseless attack. While carriers are doing their best to resume operations, while implementing stringent new security procedures, it

is clear they face a significant economic loss, both short and long

term. The quickest way to put passengers back in the seats is to

ensure that every possible safety and security precaution is being

taken at our airports and on our planes.

[The prepared statement of Senator Durbin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Chairman Lieberman, thank you for agreeing to co-chair this important hearing

today. And a special thank you to our witnesses for taking the time to travel to Capitol Hill to work with us on ways to make our airports and our aviation system the

safest in the world.

I want to commend Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey for their quick

work on Tuesday, September 11, to halt national aviation operations and to institute a ground stop for all aircraft. These prudent actions likely prevented further

tragedy and confusion.

This Congress and this Administration must expeditiously develop a cooperative,

comprehensive plan to ensure the safety of the traveling public, the security of our

airports, and the continued viability of our aviation industry.

First and foremost, the Federal Government should immediately take responsibility for the screening of passengers and carry-on luggage and the control of security checkpoints at our nation’s airports. The U.S. is one of only three countries—

Canada and Bermuda are the others—that give the airlines the responsibility for

passenger screening. In fact, in 100 of the 103 countries with commercial airports,

screening is done by either the government or by the airport. We can no longer rely

on contractors and subcontractors nor on employees with high turnover rates. We

4

need well-trained, professional Federal Government security experts to be the central line of defense for airport security.

According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the average employment

turnover rate for airport screening personnel at 19 major U.S. airports is 126 percent. The turnover rate in some cases was as high as 416 percent at St. Louis Lambert Field [Chart]. Other countries have registered employment turnover rates for

airport screeners that are less than 50 percent, including Belgium, which has a rate

of 4 percent.

The GAO has also found that in most cases security screeners’ starting salary is

minimum wage—$5.15/hour—or slightly higher. Other countries pay their screeners

a livable wage and many provide health and other benefits. It is a sad testament

and an alarming indicator when airport parking garage attendants and fast food

restaurant workers make more per hour than those on the front lines of airline passenger safety.

Today, I introduced legislation—the Airline Passenger Safety Enhancement Act of

2001—that would require these airport security check points to be staffed by Federal employees and better coordinate overall airport security. This bill would also

require the FAA Administrator to immediately issue an order for uniformed, armed

law enforcement officers to monitor security checkpoints. While this proposal generally appears to be supported by the airlines and by some in the administration,

I think it’s important for Congress to act swiftly to codify these important changes.

Neither this hearing nor my legislation is intended to diminish the value of airport employees. I commend the thousands of hard-working, honest airport and airline employees who help millions of Americans travel safely every day. But, in light

of recent events, we simply can’t let our guard down or take airport security for

granted. It’s time to strengthen our resolve and our airport security.

But seamless airport security is about more than just passenger screening, it

must be comprehensive, coordinated security from the curbside to the cockpit.

As we discover more about the tragic events of September 11, it’s clear that stunning security breakdowns and breaches occurred at numerous levels. In fact, this

week’s TIME.com Website contains a story about the September 11 hijackings.

Here’s an excerpt:

‘‘The new evidence is causing officials to broaden their investigative and

security efforts to encompass not only the carry-on bag screening system

but the entire aviation security apparatus at U.S. airports. The new evidence raises the worrisome possibility that the hijackers may have had accomplices deep within the ‘secure’ areas of airports—that may include the

shops and restaurants in the terminal behind the metal detectors, or

amongst the thousands of people who work in catering, fueling or cleaning

aircraft; or anyone who might have access to the airplane before takeoff.’’ (TIME.com Website, 9/24/01)

Investigators of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General, in unannounced tests, have successfully gained access to supposedly secure

areas of U.S. airports without proper credentials in 68 percent of those tests. Investigators were then able to board aircraft unchallenged 117 times.

The GAO has determined that undercover agents have been able to penetrate restricted areas of U.S. commercial airports with counterfeit or otherwise invalid

badges or other credentials, giving those agents the opportunity—if intended—to

carry weapons, explosives, chemical/biological agents, and other dangerous materials

into those secure areas and onto aircraft.

While I share concerns about the effectiveness of U.S. passenger and carry-on baggage screening, we would be fooling ourselves if we didn’t devote the time and resources necessary to further restrict ramp and other airport operations access. Passenger screening is just the tip of the compromised airport security iceberg.

I was pleased to hear that the FAA is in the process of performing background

checks on airport employees. Double checking backgrounds and reissuing airport security badges is a step in the right direction. Inspector General Mead has noted in

his written testimony that between February 1999 and September 14, ten security

incidents occurred at major commercial airports ranging from selling false security

badges to false certification of screeners to improper use of an airport badge to gain

entry to a secured area [Chart].

Tighter and smarter airport security also has costs. I’ve heard from a number of

Downstate Illinois airports that support stronger airport security procedures. However, these airports will be asked to shoulder a heavy financial burden. For example,

the Central Illinois Regional Airport in Bloomington-Normal will likely need to

spend as much as $30,000 per month for additional security measures. These funds

are above and beyond what has been budgeted and could create a financial hardship

5

for the airport. The Department should explore ways to help smaller airports by providing resources and technical assistance to upgrade security and enhance passenger safety.

With regard to on board security, I am encouraged by the recent announcement

that Federal law enforcement officers will resume the sky marshal program. This

gives peace of mind and real safety assurances to the traveling public. I am a cosponsor of Senator Hutchison’s Emergency Aviation Security Act, which would reinstate the Federal sky marshal program.

However, I believe we can do more. Clearly, we have the technological expertise

to explore additional cockpit security, from video cameras to tamper proof transponders. While we pursue common-sense solutions like stronger and more secure

cockpit doors, we shouldn’t delay developing high-tech solutions that very well may

save lives. And when it comes to security, we shouldn’t forget about Amtrak and

the important role this passenger railroad plays in our national transportation system. I will continue to work with Amtrak President George Warrington and my colleagues to ensure that we address the security and infrastructure needs of the railroad.

Finally, the airline industry is still reeling from this month’s senseless attacks.

While carriers are doing their best to resume operations while implementing stringent new security procedures, it’s clear that they face a significant economic loss,

both short- and long-term. On Friday, I voted to send desperately needed economic

assistance, in the form of grants and loans, to our nation’s ailing airlines. I will continue to work with my Senate colleagues to keep this important sector of our economy flying while protecting airline employees from layoffs and loss of benefits.

But the quickest way to put passengers back in the seats is to ensure that every

possible safety and security precaution is being taken at our airports and on our

airplanes.

I appreciate the difficult tasks that lie ahead for the Department, the Congress,

and our nation. Together, we can craft common-sense solutions that protect passengers, secure our airports, and ensure that our aviation system is the safest in

the world.

Senator DURBIN. I want to again thank the Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and my colleague,

the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Lieberman, for scheduling

this hearing.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Durbin. Thanks for

your initiative that led to the scheduling of the hearing, and I am

really pleased that the full Committee is doing this alongside the

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, which you chair.

In light of the tragic events of September 11, the adequacy of airport screening procedures is of immediate, paramount, and very

wide concern to the American people and to Members of Congress.

I think we just have to say flat out that the system currently in

place has failed to protect the safety of the American people, and

it is our responsibility to find out what went wrong and how to correct it. This is vital from an economic as well as the obvious safety

point of view.

Last Friday, Congress approved a $15 billion assistance package

for the airlines, but this is just the beginning of a response to the

problems facing this industry that is so vital to the quality of our

lives and the health of our economy. Unless we can also rebuild

confidence among the American people, the passengers, in the safety of our skies, and in their safety when they enter an airport, the

impact on air commerce, let alone the economy generally, will only

continue to be worse and will ultimately affect every sector of our

economy. That is how important the airline industry is.

6

Since the passenger screening and carry-on baggage inspection

program was implemented nearly 30 years ago, after the first wave

of hijackings, the airlines, rather than the FAA or other government agency, as is well known, have had responsibility for hiring,

training, and supervising the screener workforce. Under this system, about 18,000 screeners, mostly hired under contract, have

been responsible for screening about 2 million passengers and their

baggage each day in the United States.

As again has been over and over said in the last 2 weeks and

before by the gentlemen sitting before us and others, this screening

workforce has been characterized as underpaid, undertrained, and

underexperienced, with turnover rates that sometimes exceed 400

percent at some of the airports in this country. Training and background checks for these employees are minimal. Indeed, although

the FAA was directed by Congress in 1996 to develop certification

regulations for screening companies, the agency has missed several

deadlines for issuing rules, including a congressional deadline of

last May.

Serious shortcomings in the quality of screening equipment make

the problem worse. Advanced detection equipment and new technologies that could improve screeners’ performance have either not

been made available or have been underused. These and other safety drawbacks have been documented over and over again by the

General Accounting Office and by the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General.

In 1996, for instance, well after a Presidential commission

formed in the wake of the 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am bombing made

comprehensive recommendations to improve airline security, the

GAO testified that domestic and international aviation systems

still had ‘‘serious vulnerabilities,’’ and that typical screening of

checked baggage offered ‘‘little protection against even moderately

sophisticated explosive devices.’’

Again, in May 1998, the GAO testified that nearly every aspect

of the aviation security system could be exploited, could be broken

through, including passenger screening, baggage inspection, and

even controlling access to secure areas of airports.

Last June, GAO reported that screeners missed as many as 20

percent of dangerous objects at screening checkpoints during tests

they carried out. This followed on the heels of a report by the DOT

Inspector General that investigators had breached secure areas of

airports in this country almost 70 percent of the time they were

testing.

The Inspector General has reported on aviation security issues

no less than 20 times in the last 4 years, finding deficiencies in everything from the administration of security guard contracts to the

FAA’s lack of policies and procedures for implementing an advanced explosives detection system.

Clearly, sadly, we had ample warning of problems with the way

security is conducted for airlines. Our job today is to look again intensely at these problems and ask questions that can help us understand what it will take to make our skies safe again, to restore

public confidence in the aviation system, and then to do exactly

that.

7

For example, what new procedures and technologies can be employed to improve screening? Why haven’t these systems been put

in place? How do we ensure that the best technology is deployed

and developed? And how do we address privacy concerns that some

of our citizens may have?

Another question is whether the certification standards that FAA

is developing for screening companies will be strong enough to be

effective, or should the very idea of contracting out screening services to private companies be jettisoned in favor of federalizing the

entire screening system, as Senator Hollings and others have proposed in legislation they introduced last Friday and which may

well come before the full Senate next week.

And, of course, we have got to decide where we draw the line between security and convenience. There is no doubt, I think, in anyone’s mind that one of the outcomes of the September 11 attacks

is that checking in at airports is going to be much more time-consuming. And it should be. Security should never take a back seat

to convenience.

I have got to tell you, I was on planes from here, from Dulles,

back and forth to Connecticut and New York over the weekend,

and I got the most thorough search of my person when I entered

the airport at Dulles that I have ever had. It took more time. It

took more time for everybody’s search because everybody was being

searched. But I think we all felt better when we got on the plane

that that had happened. So that inconvenience made us feel safer,

and I hope it continues and intensifies.

Of course, it is not enough to look only at screening passengers.

As Senator Durbin has indicated, there are so many people—cleaning crews, maintenance workers, caterers—who have unescorted

access to aircraft and secure areas of the airports. And, again, repeated investigations by GAO and the DOT Inspector General have

revealed vulnerabilities, weaknesses here, in personal background

investigations, in verifying credentials, and in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft.

Recent news reports indicate that the September 11 attackers

may have had accomplices who were able to position weapons for

them on the airplanes that were used in those attacks. These individuals might have been caught if better security procedures were

in place for ground crews and other airport employees.

So those are some of the areas of inquiry that the Committee

would like to get into this afternoon. I know that our witnesses will

be able to shed light on this very pressing concern.

I want to thank Senator Durbin again for proposing this joint

hearing, for his leadership on this issue. He has had a great interest and background in aviation matters, and this Committee is

more effective for having the benefit of his experience and his sense

of purpose. And I look forward to working with him and other

Members of the Committee as we continue our oversight role and

as we, from that oversight role, contribute and cooperate with our

colleagues as airport security—and transportation security generally—legislation comes to the floor of the Senate.

We are now ready to go to the witnesses. Senator Durbin, I

would be delighted if you would proceed.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much.

8

1The prepared statement of Mr. Belger appears in the Appendix on page 65.

Our first panel consists of three individuals who have been involved in this issue for quite some time and have a lot to present

to us in terms of their findings in an official capacity. Monte Belger

is the Acting Deputy Administrator of the FAA of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Thank you for joining us. Dr. Gerald

Dillingham is the Associate Director of the U.S. General Accounting Office on Transportation Issues. And the Hon. Kenneth Mead

is the Inspector General from the U.S. Department of Transportation.

I thank you all for joining us. Mr. Belger, would you like to start?

TESTIMONY OF MONTE R. BELGER,1 ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. BELGER. Thank you, sir. I will, with your permission, submit

my longer statement for the record and just make some brief opening remarks.

Chairman Lieberman, Chairman Durbin, I would like to begin,

if I could, just very briefly, by offering my heartfelt condolences on

behalf of all of the folks in the FAA to the families and the friends

of those who were lost on September 11 in New York City, Washington, and Pennsylvania. And I want to publicly thank the courageous rescue workers and the volunteers who have been working

so long and hard in the aftermath of these tragedies.

But even more so, I want to publicly just take a moment to

thank the staff of the FAA, and particularly our air traffic controllers, as you referred to, Chairman Durbin. In the midst of the hijackings and in the midst of the chaos, our controllers successfully

guided, working with the pilots very closely, moved aircraft out of

the area in which these hijacked aircraft were operating. The national ground-stop that we put in place on Tuesday morning, September 11, was unprecedented in the history of civil aviation in our

country. When the order to land all planes was issued, the controllers and pilots safely landed more than 5,000 flights in a little

more than 21⁄2 hours.

In the words of one editorial writer—and there have been several—the controllers, the systems people, and the management

supporting them did their jobs and brought tens of thousands of

Americans safely back to earth. I am very proud of their actions.

It is a singular honor for me to be associated with such professionals who performed such a remarkable feat.

In the aftermath of September 11, the President called on America to return to normal as quickly as possible. Our focus in the FAA

has been twofold: First, to work with airports and airlines to put

more stringent security measures in place; and only after we were

assured that these measures were implemented did we allow airports to begin operating, first to commercial operations and then to

other segments of the air transportation system.

We ordered the evacuation of every airport terminal for the airports to be inspected. Every aircraft was fully inspected before any

passenger was allowed to board. And we put into place further security initiatives that have been sustained beyond the reopening of

9

the system. Some of these initiatives are clearly visible to the traveling public, and others are less so. Some of these initiatives are:

Monitoring vehicles near air terminals; discontinuing curbside

check-in; requiring passengers to present their tickets or boarding

passes at security checkpoints, and only permitting ticketed passengers beyond the security checkpoint; reducing access points to

secure airports; reducing to an operational minimum the areas that

people have to be in; increasing random security checks and ID

checks through the entire terminal area; and as you mentioned

also, requirements to revalidate all airport identification media,

and also to check employees who have access to the secure areas

against the FBI watch list.

We have increased the number of uniformed and plainclothes security officers at the airports, and we are in the process of expanding the Federal Air Marshal Program. We are very grateful and

have received tremendous cooperation from the Attorney General

and the Justice Department in assisting us in getting access to

Federal law enforcement officers who are now in training, and

some have already started to fly as Federal Air Marshals in our

system.

Our second focus has been on restoring the system. We have

done this in a very methodical and deliberate way, in close cooperation with the aviation community, with the law enforcement community, with the Department of Defense, and with all the airlines

and airports. We are still in the process of bringing the aviation

system back up. But we are going to be cautious and we are going

to do it incrementally and in full coordination with the military.

The coordination and the cooperation among all the parties involved has just been extraordinary. We will continue to work to restore the system to its full level of service. Security is now at unprecedented levels. And as we enter what is literally a new era of

aviation, we are looking at ways to further improve security at our

airports.

As you know, the Secretary has created two rapid response

teams to address airport and airline security and the very issues

that were raised a few moments ago, as well as aircraft security

and what we can do to further strengthen and harden and prevent

access to the cockpit.

The incidents on Tuesday, September 11, have caused all of us—

airlines, airport operators, and public policymakers—to look very

closely at the balance of responsibility for civil aviation security. In

today’s world, the threat assessment has changed. Security must

change in response to that.

I think the Secretary will soon provide recommendations, perhaps even before the October 1 date that he had established for the

rapid response teams, recommendations to further improve security

at our Nation’s airports and on airplanes.

In summary, we are focusing on four areas, just to repeat, if I

could: First, to bring the air transportation system back to normal

and restore public confidence; second, to expand the use of the Federal Air Marshal Program; third, to improve airport security, including the screening function; and, fourth, to improve cockpit security.

10

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mead appears in the Appendix on page 74.

I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I will answer any

questions.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Belger. Mr. Mead.

TESTIMONY OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD,1 INSPECTOR

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. MEAD. I, too, want to express our sorrow to the many families who have lost or are missing loved ones as a result of the terrorist attacks of nearly 2 weeks ago, and also to reinforce what everybody has been saying about the President, Secretary Mineta,

the Congress, the controllers, law enforcement, and rescue relief

workers, and the many people that have pulled together in this response effort.

I would like most of my statement to be forward looking. Everything everybody has said about the General Accounting Office and

the Inspector General issuing reports and testifying many times on

this subject is correct. As a matter of fact, it goes back nearly 15

years.

I do think it is useful to overview what the different elements of

security are that we will be talking about today. One, of course, is

the passenger screening function that has received a great deal of

attention. Another function is access to what they refer to as the

sterile area or secure areas of the airport. The sterile area is the

concourse area after you have been through passenger screening.

The plane, too, is a sterile area when it is on the tarmac. A third

element is screening checked and carry-on luggage. A fourth area

is cargo that ends up in the cargo hold of the air plane. And the

fifth area is the airport ID card system. I will be saying something

briefly about each of these areas.

I should also note that we have been involved in numerous criminal investigations over the past 2 or 3 years in aspects of aviation

security, usually the falsification of airport identification, security

screener training records and background checks. I will just give

you two examples that I think illustrate a point. Most recently, a

private security company was placed on 36 months probation and

ordered to pay over $1 million in fines for failing to conduct background checks and falsifying training records on employee staffing

security stations at a major U.S. airport. Also, I believe it was September 14, we arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens with INS, who had illegally obtained security badges necessary to gain admittance to secure areas at another U.S. airport.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Those were employees or people just gaining access?

Mr. MEAD. Well, in this case they were non-U.S. citizens who illegally obtained security badges. But these types of violations actually fall into two categories. Sometimes you find people that have

falsified their credentials to become an employee, but get an ID

card that is legitimate in the sense that they are an employee. And

then you have people that illegally obtain an airport ID card, and

through the use of that ID card can obtain access to the secure

areas of the airport. We have also detailed some members of the

Inspector General’s investigative staff to the Air Marshal Program.

11

1 Chart entitled ‘‘Actions to Improve Aviation Security,’’ submitted by Mr. Mead, appears in

the Appendix on page 142.

Before I proceed, I just want to make clear that the aviation security system is not foolproof. No security system ever will be, particularly when you add the element of people who are willing to die

in the commission of their criminal schemes. And that is why I

think it is important not to lose sight of what everybody is saying—

that it is important to not only root the terrorism out, but also to

concurrently build a strong aviation security system. Many of the

efforts that Mr. Belger outlined have to do with restoring public

confidence that has been badly damaged. I think Mr. Belger did a

very good job of overviewing the measures, and there are more on

the way.

I think the Air Marshals’ Program was very important, and the

point you made about having law enforcement presence at the

screening stations, I do think restores public confidence.

I would like the remainder of my statement to focus on two

areas. One is the governance of aviation security, how we go about

delivering it in this country, and then I would like to proceed to

some immediate areas I think we can consider to tighten up security.1

Under our current system, FAA, which is charged with governing

aviation security and its regulation, and the airlines and the airports which are charged with providing the security, I think themselves face priorities and missions that are different from security.

Indeed, in some cases the security mission conflicts with another

mission, and other times I think economic priorities get in the way.

So given the scope and complexity of the security challenge as we

know it now, and the long history of problems with this aviation

security program, I think the time has come to vest governance of

aviation security, as well as its delivery, in one Federal agency or

possibly one not-for-profit Federal corporation or some combination

of the two. But that entity would have a singular focus of security.

That would be its profession. That would be its mission. It would

not be in competition with other aviation businesses. And I think

that is one way, a very effective way, of upgrading the training and

the standards for these screeners, and imposing some strict controls over the issuance of airport ID cards. That cannot be done

overnight, so now we have to turn to the task of what do we do

now to immediately restore confidence?

I would like to cover several areas. One has to do with the explosives detection machines and the use of them to screen checked

luggage. In the past we have not been using them. Taxpayers have

been spending about $1 million a copy on these machines. They are

good machines, but we are not using them. They are sorely

underused. I think FAA is going to change that in the coming

weeks.

Screening checkpoint security——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Forgive me. What do you mean they are

not being used? Are they in a warehouse somewhere, or they are

just at the location, but not being used enough?

Mr. MEAD. Actually, the situation is both. There are some in the

warehouse that could be deployed, and there are some that are

12

operational that are sorely underused. Why are they underused?

Well, the FAA has set minimum standards for using the machines.

The airlines can decide if they want to use them more. The airlines

are concerned that the usage of these machines will result in

delays. It is true it will take more time. These machines, Mr.

Chairman, are much on the principle of a Cat Scan machine, but

they detect explosives. They are greatly underused.

I would rather not, in open session here, go into the numbers. I

would be glad to share it with you later, but I think I can document the statement that they are sorely underused.

Senator DURBIN. I might just add there is such a machine at

O’Hare. I was there several years ago when they bought it. I have

seen it as I walk by many times. I do not know the criteria that

they use to refer baggage or luggage for that inspection, but it is

only used in specific instances. It is not part of the normal routine.

Mr. MEAD. I believe these machines—if you have seen them—

they are a powerful, very visible exemplar of security. A machine

sitting idle is not a powerful exemplar of security. Plus, they work.

On screening checkpoint security, I am not going to go over the

performance. I think that has been amply demonstrated for the

record. I would say though that it is important for FAA to issue

the rule. The role which is about to be issued sets some standards

on the certification of these screening companies. And they also

need standards for measuring the screener performance. Now,

what is acceptable? Is detecting a test object 6 out of 10 times, 8

out of 10, 9 out of 10 acceptable? And this is important because if

screeners are having difficulty detecting objects that are pretty obvious like a test gun or a test grenade, it is even more difficult to

detect a bomb, a test bomb that is.

Airport access control. Several steps are needed here. What you

outlined, what our work had found, and what GAO’s work had

found is accurate. I have four items on this area. The majority of

the aircraft boardings we did would not have occurred if the employees had just challenged us and said, ‘‘What are you doing here?

You do not have any business being here.’’ Just that one simple

non-costly step.

A second is technology. This is an area where I think FAA and

the airports can mutually invest in cameras and anti-piggyback devices. Piggy-backing is where an authorized employee goes through

the door, and an unauthorized one follows right behind. And there

are devices that prevent that—cameras and various technological

devices.

A third is revalidating the ID cards, which FAA has announced.

It is very important that we do an accurate accounting in who is

authorized to have these ID cards.

Finally, and I think a change in legislation will be necessary to

do this too, we need to require criminal checks on all employees at

commercial airports.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Does that happen at all now, Mr. Mead?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir. For new employees at what they refer to as

the Category X airports. They are the top 20 airports. They are required to do this with all new employees. The requirement does not

apply to employees that were established employees.

13

1The prepared statement of Dr. Dillingham appears in the Appendix on page 87.

For airports other than those 20, they are not required to do a

criminal check, including on the screeners, unless certain triggers

are met, and I think that should change. I would imagine that in

the current environment that could be changed fairly quickly.

And finally, cargo security. I am not going to go into any details

on this here, but we have recently completed some work on cargo

security, and we are going to be briefing the Secretary and Mr.

Belger and some others on the results of that soon. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mead.

Dr. Dillingham from the General Accounting Office. thank you.

TESTIMONY OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, Ph.D.,1 DIRECTOR,

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Chairman Durbin.

Although it is not fully known what actually occurred, or which

of the weaknesses in our Nation’s aviation security system contributed to the horrendous events that occurred on September 11, it is

clear that serious weaknesses do exist and that their impact can

be far more devastating than previously imagined.

Today, I would like to offer some suggestions on what might be

done to address some of the known system weaknesses. The focus

of my testimony will be on preboard screening and securing the

ramp area, reiterating some of the points that the IG has just

made.

First, based on the work that GAO and the IG has done for the

Congress, I would like to say a little bit about what we do know

about the system. We know that airport security is disbursed over

several organizations with overlapping responsibilities including

FAA, airports, and airlines. These organizations in turn may subdivide the responsibility even further, as is done with passenger

screening. We do know that there may be multiple screening contractors in a single airport, each with perhaps different quality control standards. We do know that the screening contractor on duty

is likely to be the one that submitted the lowest bid to the airline.

We do know that as far back as the late 1970’s, both FAA and the

airlines characterized the performance or lack of performance of

screening personnel as significant and alarming. Since that time

the trend in screening performance has been a downward spiral.

We also know that the extremely high turnover among screeners

not only means that there are often few skilled and experienced

screeners on the job, it also means that there are literally thousands of individuals out there that know an awful lot about how

screening works or does not work.

By and large, the efforts today to address this problem area have

been largely ineffective and too slow in coming. A case in point is

the promulgation of a rule to implement the provisions of the 1996

FAA Reauthorization Act that will establish a screening company

certification program. The rule was scheduled for issuance later

this month, more than 21⁄2 years later than originally scheduled.

14

We also know quite a bit about gaps in security related to the

ramp area. We know that some airport operators do not properly

account for IDs for employees who need to have access to secure

areas, changes or have been terminated.

We know that both the DOT, IG and GAO have been able to gain

unauthorized access time and time again to the ramp and other secure areas. The IG investigators were able to go as far as to be

seated on the aircraft and ready to take off. In the instance that

was cited before, our special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to bypass security checkpoints at two

airports, and to walk unescorted to the aircraft departure gates.

And since those agents had been issued tickets and boarding

passes, they could have potentially carried weapons, explosives or

other dangerous objects onto the aircraft.

Now, I would like to turn to some actions that could be considered to address some of what we do know about the system. I think

it is only fair to say that FAA has begun to implement remedies

for most of the problems that have been identified in access control

and many other security areas. Although a significant amount of

activity is currently underway, we believe that it is critical that a

mechanism be put in place to insure that these activities are fully

implemented in a timely fashion.

Mr. Chairman, it may also be time to consider a different organizational structure for all aspects of airport security, or minimally,

the preboarding screening operations. The preliminary findings of

a study that we have underway for House Aviation Subcommittee

identified four alternatives which are detailed in our written statement. In each alternative, FAA could continue to be responsible for

regulating screening, overseeing performance and imposing penalties for poor performance.

The first alternative is one in which the air carriers would continue to be responsible for conducting screening. This alternative

assumes that FAA will implement the pending certification rule

and the other elements of the Airport Security Improvement Act of

2000, which would enhance screener qualifications and training.

A second alternative is one in which each airport authority would

be responsible for screening.

A third alternative is based on a new DOT agency with a headquarters and field structure, created to conduct a national screening program. It would be accountable to Congress through the annual appropriations and oversight process.

And the fourth alternative is a new quasi-government corporation, also with a headquarters and field structure, created to conduct a national screening program. In this case Congress could use

its latitude to combine government and private sector features as

is done with Amtrak and TVA when they create such a corporation,

and define how it will be held accountable and financed.

Of course, there are pluses and minuses associated with each option, variations on the options, and perhaps other options that

should be considered. We also recognize that no security system is

100 percent safe, but we are certain that there is a lot that can be

done to improve the current situation. The GAO stands ready to

continue to assist this Committee in this extraordinarily difficult

challenge. Thank you.

15

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much.

I think that everyone agrees that before the flying public—the

American passengers—are going to return to airplanes, they have

to see something different. They have to walk into that airport and

understand that it is not business as usual as it was September 10.

I think some of those things are starting to take place, but some

of them are very slow, some of them are not very visible.

Mr. Belger, what do you think in terms of that visible change in

airport security? What are the plans of the administration to make

those visible changes that will really restore the confidence of the

flying public?

Mr. BELGER. Well, sir, I think the most visible change would be

more law enforcement presence. I think there are other visible

changes just in the professional way that the screening check point

is operated with more of a premium on thoroughness rather than

speed. I think the attitude, the demeanor and the professionalism

of the people doing the screening are visible to the traveler. I think

those are things that can improve.

Senator DURBIN. How many screeners are we talking about? Do

you have a round figure, a number that you can give us of people

working at screening stations in airports across America?

Mr. BELGER. Yes, sir. The numbers that we have been able to

gather are around 18,000 to 20,000.

Senator DURBIN. And that is just on the screening side of it?

Mr. BELGER. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Senator DURBIN. That would not include baggage handlers or

others?

Mr. BELGER. I think that is just the people on the front line that

are visible to the public doing the screening.

Senator DURBIN. Now, would you agree that ramp security is

also a major part of our effort?

Mr. BELGER. It might even be more important, given what happened on September 11. I mean we do not know what happened,

but as was referred earlier, it is very possible that these items did

not go through the screening check point. We do not know that yet,

but security is so integral that you cannot just focus on one piece

without focusing on the whole system.

Senator DURBIN. I think there was a newspaper report that after

they did a thorough overhaul of one of the canceled flights, they

found one of these box cutters or paper cutters in one of the seat

cushions in one of the planes, and there is no telling whether a

passenger brought it on board or it was planted at this point, but

it obviously raises this question about ramp security and security

of access to the plane.

Now, when I asked the baggage handlers at O’Hare what is the

starting salary, it is $8.50 an hour. I was surprised. I thought it

would be higher since they are employees of the airlines, but that

is the starting salary. After 5 years they can, I think, rise to $19

an hour which is a substantial improvement, but you consider what

kind of employee is attracted to $8.50 an hour.

Let me ask you also as well, if we are talking about ramp security, can you achieve ramp security without establishing a perimeter around the airport?

16

Mr. BELGER. Well, you have to have boundaries. Our whole airport security concept is built around the principle that the closer

you are to the airplane, the more stringent and thorough the security procedures must be. As that perimeter broadens, the security

procedures perhaps are less intensive than they are at the airplane. That is the principle we have used in airport security for 30

years. I think you have to define areas in which people are supposed to be and areas which they are not supposed to be, and you

have to very clear procedures to determine who is supposed to be

there and who is not, and what checks have to be done to allow

people to be there.

Senator DURBIN. Even in the smallest airports in Illinois, it is a

pretty big piece of real estate, and if you are going to allow someone to come across the meadow and across the cornfield and onto

the runway and up to the plane, then you breach the security that

you have in place around the terminal itself, and it strikes me that

is one of the elements that is inescapable here, that there has to

be some sort of perimeter security, a fence, some sort of monitoring

camera, whatever it takes, to make sure that you know who is on

that field and that they are supposed to be there. That is a big expense item we will talk about, I am sure, as we get into this as

well.

Someone mentioned the FBI watch list. Was that you, Mr.

Belger?

Mr. BELGER. Yes.

Senator DURBIN. Did the FAA have access to the FBI watch list

before September 11?

Mr. BELGER. We have access to the names that the FBI gives us

of people that would be of interest to the aviation industry or to

the carriers. We do not normally have access to the same watch list

that the FBI might have. The FBI probably does not have the same

larger list that INS or Customs might have. So FAA, which is not

an intelligence organization, relies upon the FBI and others to tell

us when there is someone that we ought to be cautious about or

looking for.

Senator DURBIN. Attorney General Ashcroft testified this morning at another hearing, and we went into this with some questions.

And it appears that there is not an integrated information network

within our government, that if there is a concern about an individual being here illegally, for example, or being a danger to our

country, that information is not necessarily shared with all of the

appropriate law enforcement agencies that might come into contact

with them, whether it is INS, the FAA, or the FBI for that matter.

All of that information is not shared at this point, and that strikes

me as another key element in avoiding another disaster.

Mr. BELGER. I think what you described is perhaps even an understatement. If we are to move, as has been suggested, to more

Federal control of the screening and the ramp security at airports,

I believe it will make it easier to consolidate and have access to the

Federal databases that exist.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Mead, and Dr. Dillingham as well, let me

ask you about some of the options we have considered. I support

federalizing. I believe that when I look at this and step back I can

see that the types of federalizing we could discuss—but it strikes

17

me that if we are going to have a national standard of national

safety for every passenger, no matter where you are flying to and

from in the United States, that it really is essential that we establish those standards here in Washington, and then work with them

on a local basis to try to implement them. Mr. Mead, is that your

feeling as well?

Mr. MEAD. I think you are absolutely on target, and I think those

should be done expeditiously without delay. It is the only way in

a system like ours, in contra distinction to Europe, where in a

country like the Netherlands, it is easy to say the airport should

run security, because you only have one or two airports. In this

country we have at least 400 commercial airports, and 3,000 if you

expand the net to cover general aviation.

So you are right that you need consistent standards, consistent

training, and consistent certification.

Senator DURBIN. Dr. Dillingham, what is your feeling on that?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I think we need a change in the system. We

certainly need to find a unified way to deal with aviation security.

I am not sure what federalization means. We have been talking to

a number of people and they have different definitions of what federalization means. So we think that it is more important to think

about some of the criteria that might be important in selecting an

alternative, and one of the criteria is indeed, to bring together this

fragmented system under one roof; second, to make sure that the

coordinating body has the authority for effective coordination of intelligence that you were talking about, data and intelligence sharing; and that it has some accountability to the Congress, as well

as to make sure that there is an identified funding source for it.

So the criteria we think will be the driving force rather than just

federalization or nationalization, but clearly, the elements that you

mentioned are important.

Senator DURBIN. I am just going to close, because my time is up

here, with one illustration of the challenge here when it comes to

small-town America. One of the cities I represent in Illinois, Quincy, Illinois, has a good airport and four commercial flights a day.

And the obvious question is, if there are to be Federal employees

or people with a Federal responsibility at that airport, is that practical? How would it work? What would they do? Who would they

answer to? How many would be necessary?

So at a large airport, O’Hare, Midway, or St. Louis-Lambert, you

can see this in the context of thousands of people coming every single day, but in a small town, whether it is Aberdeen, South Dakota,

which Senator Daschle mentioned at a meeting this morning, or

Quincy, Illinois, it does create a different type of challenge and

raises a question as to whether or not there could be a delegation,

either through the airlines or to local law enforcement, or to some

other entity we are not even discussing here at this moment.

I am open to that, but I think establishing the Federal standard,

making certain that in the large context, the large environment of

the airports, that we have the Federal presence and visibility as an

essential part of restoring confidence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Durbin, thanks very

much.

18

Mr. Mead, I want to just comment on something you said. You

were very respectful in your language, but I do think you make an

important point here as we think about what to do next in terms

of providing more airport security, which is we have previously

given that responsibility largely to the airlines, the responsibility

for providing security. As you said, graciously, I think, but directly,

that responsibility for security has very often yielded to other goals,

including profitability, or customer convenience. And the result has

been that security in the airline industry has been less than it

should have been, which is, I gather, the major reason why you are

now suggesting whichever form we choose, that we take the security function for the airline industry away from the industry, and

put it either in the government or in some quasi-public nonprofit

organization which is solely focused on security, in one sense, regardless of the cost because it is that important. Is that correct?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, it is. You know, I wonder if we all reflect

back on the different rules in aviation security that have been proposed over the years, when that cost benefit analysis is done to

support that rule and the rule is sent back for further cost benefit

analysis, if in light of the events of September 11, the cost benefit

analysis that we would use today would be materially different

than the ones we have used heretofore.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very powerful point. In other

words, none of us can sit here and say that we could have prevented what happened on September 11. I do think if security had

been higher, we could have made it a lot harder to do it, but the

normal economic calculus, when set against the vast damage that

the attacks on September 11 did to people, people’s lives, hard to

calculate, impossible to calculate ultimately. But also, more subject

to being calculated, the extraordinary adverse impact on our economy, not to mention just direct dollar loss. It is a good point.

Mr. Belger, I actually want to ask you about that in terms of the

health of the airline industry and our shared desire to get it going

again. My impression on Sunday, when I was in Dulles, Newark,

and JFK, was that they were a lot quieter than they normally are.

The planes I was on were a quarter to a half full. Does the FAA

at this point have any statistics as to what the rate of occupancy,

if I can put it that way, or usage of the airline industry is now,

2 weeks after the attacks?

Mr. BELGER. We have data on the number of flights. I think Mr.

Baker from American Airlines is on the next panel, and it would

probably be better for him to speak for the industry on the load factors. We generally just get that information anecdotally. In terms

of flights, we are operating at about 90, 92 percent in our air traffic

control centers based upon an average day last year. A lot of that

is military operations right now, but the number of flights in the

system for the air carriers is probably—and Mr. Baker could confirm this—but probably in the 65, 70 percent range of what they

operated before September 11.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This is the number of flights taking off or

the extent to which they are full, the planes?

Mr. BELGER. The number of flights.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you have any anecdotal evidence about

the extent to which the airline seats are being taken now?

19

Mr. BELGER. I would really ask that perhaps someone from the

airlines validate this—but I have been told that the load factors are

in the 55, 60 percent, some lower, some higher, but that is kind of

an average.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And normal would be what?

Mr. BELGER. Oh, I think they were averaging in the high 70’s,

low 80’s before September 11.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So we are still down. We are all hearing,

we talked about this, our colleague, Senator Durbin said it, that

confidence is returning but we have to do as much as we can visibly to get back the public’s confidence and get the airline industry

up to where it was before.

In that regard some people have suggested that we put a visible

or a covert marshal on every flight. And wonder whether you have

ever calculated, thinking about what Mr. Mead just said about

costs as compared to benefits, what that might cost and whether

it is within the range of the feasible. It is certainly one very tangible way to say to people on every flight there is going to be a

marshal armed; that is some reason for you to feel secure.

Mr. BELGER. Well, we are absolutely looking at that, sir. We

have increased the size of the Federal Air Marshal Program significantly, but we do not, obviously, now have the resources to put an

Air Marshal on every flight. There are about 7,000 commercial aircraft used daily. About 35,000 to 39,000 departures, commercial air

carrier departures every day. But even if you just looked at the

number of airplanes and assume a Federal Air Marshal can fly all

day on one of those aircraft, and if you assume they work as a

team of two, that is 14,000 people. So that is absolutely an option

we are looking at and we are looking at what we can do short of

that also.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I do not want to ask you the question because I am worried about the answer, about how many Air Marshals we have now, because I fear it might be lower than I would

like anybody to think.

Mr. BELGER. We have tried not to talk about that publicly, but

I will be glad to privately.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine. Let me pick up on a line of questioning that Senator Durbin began about the sharing of intelligence

information. Did the FAA in fact have from the FBI the names of

those two individuals on the watch list that we now believe, or

know, were involved in the hijackings and the air attacks on September 11?

Mr. BELGER. No, sir, we did not have those names.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So that was—they were not conveyed for

some reason to the FAA?

Mr. BELGER. Right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And therefore, when you said before that

the FBI shares information with the FAA, it would not necessarily

be in the category of those who are on a watch list because they

may have been associated with a terrorist organization?

Mr. BELGER. Well, I cannot speak for the FBI, obviously, and

perhaps this is a discussion we ought to have more thoroughly in

a closed session, but basically the way it works is that the FBI provides to our intelligence unit in our security organization, the

20

names of people that they have determined to be either a potential

threat, or that might pose some danger if they were flying. We give

those names to the airlines. They check those names against their

reservation systems.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you know what categories the FBI

turns over to you? In other words, what would be the basis of them

deciding they should give this to the FAA?

Mr. BELGER. Well, again, I think they would have to speak to the

process they go through, but as I said before, the FAA is not an

intelligence-gathering organization and we rely on—and I do not

mean that defensively.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood.

Mr. BELGER. We work very closely with them. We have, I think,

a very good day-to-day working relationship with the FBI and

other intelligence agencies.

But I think the main point here, if I could, I think the fundamental point is the point that Chairman Durbin raised a minute

ago. I think there is much more we can do to provide the people

responsible for screening and airport security with better access to

a larger database that is now——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me just pursue this. What do the airlines do now, what does the FAA do now with names that they get

from the FBI on a watch list?

Mr. BELGER. We provide those names to the carriers in the form

of a security directive or security alert, and the airlines look for

those names on the——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Those names on a manifest of the passengers on a flight. So, obviously, if the manifest did not reveal the

identities of the individuals, they were using false names, there

would be no match at that point.

Mr. BELGER. That is correct.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Should the FAA now be looking at deploying technology such as fingerprinting or biometrics or other identification methods to identify passengers? Is that worth pursuing at

this point?

Mr. BELGER. Absolutely it is. One of the teams that the Secretary

set up is looking at airport security. One of the things they are

looking at very closely is the use of biometric screening systems,

whether it be facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry recognition. San Francisco Airport uses, today—and it

might be the only airport, at least the only one I am aware of—

uses a hand geometry type of recognition system, and it appears

to be working. I think facial recognition is also a very promising

technology.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I appreciate it. Obviously, I

am quite surprised that the two individuals’, who were involved in

the attacks, names were not communicated to the FAA, and we

should ask the FBI why that did not happen but I appreciate that

you are now very aggressively pursuing other means of raising the

guard and protecting passengers, and I think the sooner we move

forward on that, the better. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Voinovich.

21

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to thank the Chairmen of the

Committee and the Subcommittee for holding this hearing. I apologize for not being here, but I stopped into the briefing by the Secretary of State, and our Defense Secretary.

The issue of airline security has been highlighted, not only by the

tragedies that we had in New York and here in Washington, but

it has also brought to our attention the enormous impact the airline industry has on our economy, and I think of our being so

penny wise and pound foolish, and how we often make representations. For example, securing our airports, and we do not dot the i’s

and cross the t’s. We say we are doing it, but in fact, we are not

doing it. And I think that we are at the point right now where we

realize how important it is that we have the kind of security that

we need to have.

If anyone looked at the statistics on the turnover of employees,

you would know there had to be something wrong in this country.

Atlanta, Hartsfield, 375 percent annual turnover rate. Chicago

O’Hare, Senator Durbin, 200 percent in Chicago. Denver, another

big airport, 193 percent. Houston, 237 percent. St. Louis-Lambert,

416 percent turnover rate. Someone should have read those statistics, and it should have sent a signal out to them that something

was awfully wrong.

We are grappling about how we are going to get our security job

taken care of, and Dr. Dillingham, in your testimony you talked

about a report of 102 countries with international airports, 100

have placed the airport security responsibility with the airports or

the government, and the other two, Canada and Bermuda, have

placed responsibility with the air carriers. The question I would

like to ask you, from your observations, is there any difference between the security that is being provided in those that are run by

the government and those run by the carriers, or is there not any

perceptible difference?

And then I would like all of you to comment on something that

seems to be obvious, that we do have some airports in this world

that are secure. I have been to Israel many times, and I can tell

you there is security in Israel. I have been to Frankfurt. I can tell

you, there is security at Frankfurt. And it seems to me that if we

are looking around to try and figure out how to best deal with airport security, that my best judgment always has been to go someplace where you have the best practices and see what they do, and

then figure out how they are getting it done, and maybe that is a

good model for us to follow.

So I would be interested, Dr. Dillingham, in your response to

whatever security is different depending on who controls the airport? And second of all, your comments about whether or not all

of you think that maybe what they are doing in Israel or in Frankfurt or some other places, where the security is more secure, is

something we should look into. Dr. Dillingham.

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. Most countries keep very close to the

chest their performance statistics in terms of how well the screeners perform. What we have found is that in most of the countries,

the turnover rate is considerably lower, and with that lower turnover rate, you do get more experienced screeners on the job. And

22

you have to consider the fact that in some of these other countries,

there is a much smaller system that they are dealing with, and

even if it is controlled by the airport, oftentimes it is supplemented

by having visible security, or armed forces or armed guards around

as well.

The only information that we have about performance indicates

where there was a test, a joint test between the United States and

another country. The other country performed twice as well as we

did in the screener performance area.

Mr. MEAD. I would like to make a comment about the airport situation overseas. It is plausible that the approach would work here

if we had one airport, or two airports or three. In Europe, where

you do tend to find a situation where the airport authority is responsible, and as Dr. Dillingham says, it is supplemented by the

government, but there are fewer airports that they are responsible

for. Here we have 400 different airports, and one of our objectives

now is a consistently higher standard of security, no patchwork

quilts. That is one point.

And second, the airlines’ relationships to airports in this country

are usually quite different from those in Europe. In this country

the airlines frequently have a vested financial interest in, for example, gates, terminals at the airport, through ownership or long-term

leases. And the airlines have quite a bit to say about the delivery

of services by that airport.

Mr. BELGER. I began my FAA career 30 years ago as a security

inspector, so I have had a lot of jobs since then. I have seen our

performance and I have seen Europe’s from a variety of different

perspectives.

We have thought in this country for many years that the threat

was different in other parts of the world than it was here. And I

believe that is why we have seen, particularly in Europe and other

parts of the world, the performance and the visibility of armed

guards, etc., to be much higher than we have seen here. And in

Frankfurt, for example, a lot of what you see as additional security

is a result of requirements that we have put on our carriers who

are flying out of those airports.

We have to, in this country, I believe now, really step back and

reassess all of the basic principles that we have used in determining responsibilities for aviation security. We have to completely

reassess those. What we thought might have been completely unworkable 2 weeks ago are things that we have to really consider

today.

Senator VOINOVICH. Are there security screening lessons that you

get from Europeans in terms of technology they use and procedures

they follow that would be relevant here?

Mr. BELGER. Well, from a technology standpoint, I am pretty

comfortable that our security folks know all the technology that is

available, and we have the wherewithal to test it and use it to the

extent we can.

Procedures, I think, is where we could learn a lot. As I said earlier, the premium ought to be on thoroughness rather than speed.

The premium ought to be on professional, thorough dedicated people, working at the screening points and throughout the airport enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:11 Aug 06, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 76802.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
23

vironment. And I think that is where we could perhaps learn, Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. It is also a question of cost. If it is the cost

to the airlines, then it affects their bottom line. In the event that

we decide to really make a commitment to security—which means

we are going to have to spend some money—that the Federal Government is going to have to spend it or the people who use the airlines will have to pay. The issue would be who ought to pay for it?

Should the people that use airports pay for it, or should our Federal Government, or should there be a combination thereof? And

the issue again is if they have it, and the money is not segregated

into a pot and it is on their bottom line, I think the tendency will

be to go on the cheap because it is affecting their profit situation.

Mr. BELGER. Well, the airlines have had the responsibility for

about 30 years, and they had it actually through legislation which

requires that the screening be done by the carrier or an agent of

the carrier, and it has not worked to the satisfaction of a lot of us,

so we need to do something different. If that means the Federal

Government has to figure out how to pay for it, then that is what

we would like to work with you to figure out.

Senator VOINOVICH. Any of the other witnesses want to comment

on that?

Mr. MEAD. I think your point about paying is very important. I

know you are very familiar with the Highway Trust Fund and the

Aviation Trust Fund, the history of those. If this is going to cost

money, I think the American public is willing to pay that money,

but I do think that they would expect that if they are going to pay

it and have it denominated as a security fee or something along

those lines, that they would be outraged if it went to some other

purpose.

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Just as a sort of general overall point, whatever

the Nation decides to do about aviation security, it is very important that the energy that is associated with it now not go away as

the crisis recedes in our memory. We have had aviation tragedies

before, certainly not to this degree, but not too long afterwards, the

interest and the oversight starts to become less, and we are back

in front of you again, telling you that things have not changed. So

whatever is decided, there needs to be clearly much more stringent

oversight to make sure that it happens.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Senator.

It strikes me that there are actually two contacts that every passenger runs into when they get on an airplane in America related

to security. We focused almost exclusively, when it comes to the

passenger side, on one, the screening. The second contact comes at

the ticket counter when the questions are asked, questions, ‘‘Did

you pack this bag and has it been out of your control?’’ ‘‘No.’’ ‘‘Has

any stranger given you something to carry on the plane?’’ ‘‘No.’’ I

am just kind of curious, always have been, how many people answer yes to those questions. I doubt very many.

But going to the point that Senator Voinovich made, when you

go through an international airport like Frankfurt, you are engaged in a conversation with someone, maybe with more than one

person, and it is not limited to two routine questions with routine

answers. And it struck me that what they were looking for was not

24

just the response to the questions, but my body language and

whether I looked nervous, or whether I was somebody suspicious

that they wanted to push along to somebody else to take a closer

look at. I think that is a best practice, Senator Voinovich, that I

have seen in the airports around the world that are very concerned

about security.

Now, I think the premise of the two questions that we ask at all

American airports is the following: No one would knowingly get on

a plane carrying a bomb. If I packed my own bag and it has been

under my control, then I am not bringing one on and I did not take

an object from someone. That premise exploded four times on September 11. So the question I want to ask you, Mr. Belger, and the

other witnesses to respond to, is whether there is any point to continue to ask those questions? Should we be looking at some other

kinds of questions or some other type of interrogation so that we

really try to get to the heart of this question about whether someone suspicious is getting on an airplane?

Mr. BELGER. I definitely think we ought to rethink all of our procedures in light of what happened, including the asking of those

questions. Even some of our concepts—well without getting into details, many of our concepts have been built upon the premise that

an individual would not get on the airplane with a bomb, would not

commit suicide. That is clearly, clearly no longer a valid principle.

And when I answered the question earlier about what we could

learn from procedures, that is what I was thinking about. The fact

is, in many airports in the world, speed is second to thoroughness

and doing it right.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Mead or Dr. Dillingham, any comment

about the interrogation at the airport?

Mr. MEAD. You probably know if you have been on an international flight, you also get asked a series of other questions. I

think, as Mr. Belger points out, profiling, which is used as a trigger

for various things in the aviation system, as well as that set of

questions, needs to be revisited. The profiles were based on a certain set of premises, which are no longer adequate. So they need

to be revisited. And I think if you wanted to discuss elements of

profiles, that is something we would be doing in closed session.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you.

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. I agree with what Mr. Belger said, and

I think that not only do we need to revise and enhance that procedure, the questioning procedure, more toward the discussion that

you referred to, we have to insure that the people who are asking

those questions are capable of more than accepting the answers. In

other words, you have got to look for body language, you have got

to be able to make some other determination besides what people

say yes or no to whatever the conversation is.

And I think just adding to what the IG said, we do have a computer profiling system in place, and I agree 100 percent we need

to revise that, as it needs to be connected with additional criteria,

and at the same time, perhaps linked to the screening function, because as it currently works, you could be picked as a profile person

and still not be stopped at the screening and have your hand luggage checked because the profiling refers to looking at checked

25

bags. So we have things in place that we can enhance and make

an immediate impact at that level of security.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Senator Lieberman and then Senator Thompson.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Durbin.

You know, Mr. Mead, you said something I want to draw on because it makes the point that I think Mr. Belger made before about

how we have to rethink airline security generally. It is a fact, is

it not, that passengers are subjected to a higher level of security

review going on an international flight than they are on a domestic

flight?

Mr. MEAD. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And of course, one of the painful—and

that is based, I presume, on the previous higher tendency of what

we used to know as hijacking or planting of bombs on a plane, on

international flights rather than domestic ones.

Mr. MEAD. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It leads me to the general point, you

know some people have gone so far as to say, ‘‘Well, the terrorists

struck the airline industry now. They will not strike there next

time.’’ We do not know that, and we have to therefore raise our

guard. I appreciate what you said, Mr. Belger, and I think it is important that we all focus on this, that as much as we have to raise

our guard to protect against the kinds of insane acts that occurred

on September 11, it is also critical—and this builds on the war

metaphor that we are all using, the war against terrorism—that we

not just protect ourselves or prepare ourselves to fight the last battle, which was flying planes into buildings, that we have got to

think, if you will, like the terrorists think, and then defend ourselves against what would be next, because the airline security

question basically, as the last question we talked about, has been

geared in general terms to hijackings, and at another level of taking a bomb onto a plane. Nobody ever, because in some ways we

are too sane and humane, considered the possibility that somebody

might get on the plane and commandeer it and fly it into a populated building.

Is that kind of review going on now?

Mr. BELGER. Yes, sir. I absolutely know firsthand that Secretary

Mineta and the folks in the Department and the FAA are even

thinking beyond aviation for the future, and I think we must.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Into other transportation forms?

Mr. BELGER. Other transportation modes, yes, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very important, because I think all of us

are thinking that way. Ridership on trains has gone up, and yet

people I know who get on trains, and I have been on a few in the

last couple of weeks, have a higher level of anxiety there, too, than

they had before, so I appreciate that.

Mr. MEAD. I think the point that you made is very important

about the multi-modal aspect of this, and I think the solution on

what to do with the security function ought to consider that, stop

and think about it in a transit system, many of which interconnect

with airports. In San Francisco the BART system is going to stop

in front of the international terminal. The people that are going to

the airport often take both their checked and carry-on luggage with

26

them right into the terminal, or right into the transit station, and

what is to stop them from leaving it there?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MEAD. So I am hopeful that one of the things that comes out

of this is a multi-modal consideration of security.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Me too, I hope so.

Just a final question, Mr. Belger. We referred to those regulations and rule makings that are going on regarding the screeners

receiving more training and the contractors who hire them being

certified or certificated. It may be too late in a way now. It may

be that there is a rush and a movement that is quite strong to

move toward federalizing that function and airport security generally. But nonetheless, that is not a foregone conclusion, and I

wanted to ask you when you expect that rule will become final, and

to the extent you are able, what changes would the rule make in

the standards for selecting screening contractors and training, because it is possible for those who may be skeptical about turning

this function over to the government, that a more demanding series

of requirements would make that alternative worth considering.

Mr. BELGER. Right. We are ready to issue the rule. It has been

cleared through all the processes. We have made the decision not

to issue it right now until we complete the work with the Secretary

on the types of recommendations he wants to make. And you are

absolutely right, that some of the certification criteria that we had

thought of previously in the rule probably ought to be stronger

now, even if we continue with some type of non-Federal screening

operation.

The types of things that are in the rule now that you ask about

would require the screening company to be certified by the FAA.

They would basically have to have a security program along the

same principles that airports and air carriers have. They would

have to have programs approved by the FAA that would speak to

how they would hire, train, and test their people, and we would set

performance standards that the actual screeners would have to

meet.

One of the problems we had in getting this rule out sooner, was

the fact that there was no real objective way to test the performance of the screeners other than to test objects that our inspectors

use, which really is not a good real-world way to test. So we started

with the rule making back in 1997 and came to the conclusion that

we really did not have a good way to objectively measure the performance of the screeners. About that time we were developing

what we call the threat image projection system, which superimposes on the x-ray machine the image of a real weapon. You can

do that in a very sophisticated way with perhaps thousands of different images that could pop up at any time, and actually test the

screener in a real-world environment. There are many hundreds of

those systems available throughout the country.

So once we thought we had developed an objective way to test

people, then we went forward with the rule making again, and that

is where we are now.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. Let me just share this

personal experience and point of view. It seems to me—somebody

mentioned before about the police presence in the airports now,

27

and that is encouraging. On the other hand, the most encouraging

and reassuring aspect of the air travel I have done since this occurred was not so much seeing people there but noting what they

were doing.

Mr. BELGER. Right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And this is not rocket science, so the very

same screeners who we have been very skeptical of, that we are all

talking about, when I went through the screening device at Dulles

on Sunday, they asked me and every other passenger to put the

arms out and they put the mobile screening device over and picked

up every credit card and every single item that even might have

been—I had a key in one pocket, etc.

As I said before, it was inconvenient in one sense, but that made

me feel really comfortable as I went on. And the passengers, as we

went in the van over to the other terminal to get on the plane,

were talking about it, and one man told me that they had found

a nail clipper in his pocket and took it from him. And that made

us all more comfortable, too.

So I do think as we go forward it is not only important who does

this screening and other airport security, but what they do that

will make us comfortable enough to all get back on the airplanes.

Thank you very much.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Thompson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was looking over this GAO report, which, if there is anything

in here I shouldn’t get into, stop me in a hurry. I think all of this

you have put in your statement. The conclusion seems to be that

the report consider that the problem with security is not as much

with equipment as it is with personnel, and I am sure we have all

talked about the fact that our first line of defense is in some cases

a minimum wage employee. The FAA’s testing has shown that over

the years their ability to do their job in screening has gone downhill, apparently. They are not doing as good a job as they used to

do. Is that a fair assessment?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

Senator THOMPSON. Without getting into any more detail than

that—and it seems to me that it is indicative of a larger problem

that this Committee has dealt with for a long time. Senator

Voinovich has certainly dealt with it specifically. And it has to do

with the basic management problems that government has, and it

specifically has to do with what we call the human capital problem.

We are surprised now, not all of us, that we realize that we have

people placed in strategic positions who are not particularly well

qualified and who are not performing according to our level of expectation.

The Results Act, of course, requires every department to come up

with performance reports, and develop standards they are supposed

to achieve. The DOT did not meet its certain screening goals for fiscal year 2000 and is on track not to meet those goals again this

year. In other words, the Department of Transportation has been

good in setting out appropriate goals, but the carrying out, their

ability to achieve those goals has not been good. We are not achievVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:11 Aug 06, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 76802.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
28

ing the goals that were set out, and it is endemic throughout government.

There are places throughout government that are very sensitive,

secure, security-conscious positions where we are not meeting our

performance standards, our performance goals. And we continue to

do that year after year after year after year. We have a high-risk

list that most departments, many have been on it for years and

years, and they come in here and we fuss on them a little bit, and

they go and do the same thing next year. It is not affected by budget, it is not affected by any administration, it is not affected by the

appropriations process.

The last day I was Chairman of this Committee—I never will forget it. [Laughter.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sad day for some.

Senator THOMPSON. We put out a little booklet called ‘‘Government at the Brink,’’ and it talked about some of those things, the

mismanagement throughout government. We hear it so often, it

rolls off our back. But we really need to take another look at it in

terms of these national security issues now while we have a heightened sense of awareness. Specifically, the financial mismanagement, has the inability to incorporate information technology into

the government services the way that they have in the private sector, the billions of dollars we have spent on trying to get our computers right.

I was looking at page 16, and one of the conclusions we came to:

The Defense Department’s security clearance process virtually collapsed during the 1990’s. The Department has a backlog of almost

a half million security clearance investigations for employees. The

security clearance situation has become a little more relevant lately. It takes well over a year to complete a top secret clearance. This

means that vital positions dealing with the government’s most sensitive national security data go unfilled, or the people in those positions operate with grossly outdated clearances. These problems

stem in part from productivity problems among investigators and

ill-conceived staff cuts.

We also talk about our difficulties with our computer systems.

Again, brand-new relevance in light of September 11.

On page 51, we deal with the case of the railway killer. In 1995,

the INS began to work to improve its automated systems which

were grossly inadequate. According to the IG, the program areas

that they set up were mismanaged from the very beginning. The

IG reported that the INS still cannot sufficiently track the status

of its projects to determine whether progress is acceptable. Also,

INS staff were unable to adequately explain how the funds were

spent.

In addition, explain how these deficiencies led to tragic human

consequences in the case of Rafael Menendez Ramirez, a Mexican

national who has an extensive criminal record and is accused of

committing several murders in the United States. In early 1999,

Houston police contacted INS investigators several times seeking

assistance in the search for Menendez. In June 1999, the FBI

formed a multi-agency task force in Houston to capture him and

also placed him on a list of the ten most wanted.

29

Unfortunately, if the INS had done its job, these events never

would have occurred because Menendez had been apprehended by

the Border Patrol seven times in 1998 while crossing the border illegally and had been enrolled in the computer system each time

and had been returned voluntarily to Mexico each time without formal proceedings.

I could go on and on and on and on. Why we are surprised that

we have a problem with screening and airport security should really be what surprises us. And we really need—and this is not just

an opportunity to talk about waste, fraud, and abuse again in general terms. These are security, national security issues.

We have talked about our laboratories, how vulnerable our labs

are in many different respects. Now we know about our airports.

The whole terrorist issue now has a special relevance in light of

September 11 with regard to immigration issues. That in turn has

to do with our inability to manage computer systems or information technology. It is all part of the same picture and is, once again,

indicative of gross mismanagement in the Federal Government for

many, many years, in the financial area, information technology

area, human capital area, and other things.

Now we are talking about federalizing another part of our system. I know you probably discussed that. I won’t get into that in

any detail here. I am really not sure how I feel about that except

to say that we must make sure we don’t incorporate all the other

Federal Government employee potential problems, and that is, we

don’t properly motivate them, we are losing the ones we ought to

be keeping sometimes, we oftentimes keep the ones we ought to be

losing. We have a civil service system that makes it so there cannot

be accountability most of the time.

All of those government management issues that we have swept

under the rug for so long are right back on the table again if we

are going to go down this road and consider moving in that direction.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and allowing me to make this statement.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Senator Thompson. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to build on what Senator

Thompson said. As you know, I have been working for 2 years on

the problem of the human capital crisis and will be introducing legislation soon. We can talk all we want to about getting qualified

people, but we are in deep trouble right now in the Federal Government. In fact, by the year 2005, we could lose 80 percent of our

Senior Executive Service. By the year 2004, we could lose about 55

percent of all of our employees, through either retirement or early

retirement.

If we are going to go out and try and recruit these people, we

know we are going to have to pay a lot more money for them. By

the way, you were talking about the demeanor of people. When you

look at some of the people at the security, they give you absolutely

no confidence. And if you have a conversation with them, you just

wonder.

At BWI, I had my Senate identification card. The woman there

looks at it, the first one I went through, and it was fine. I go

30

through and I was detected for having some metal. And I knew

what it was. I have steel in my shoes. And I said, ‘‘I have steel in

my shoes,’’ and I try—that is why I bought the Rockports, because

I don’t have to worry about getting stopped. But I showed her my

card that I was a U.S. Senator, and she looked at me with a blind

stare like she didn’t even know what a U.S. Senator was. And that

is the kind, too often, of impression that you get from the people

that are doing the security. And that in itself doesn’t give one very

much confidence. It means that you are going to have to upgrade

the people that you hire. You are going to have to pay them a lot

more money. You are going to have to motivate them, and you got

to have a system in order to get them into the government.

Of the agencies in the Federal Government, the only one that

has flexibility right now besides the GAO and the IRS is the FAA.

The FAA has got the flexibility to bring in people at different pay

grades and broad-banding and a lot of the other things. So if we

are going to pick an agency that could get going quickly, if we decide to federalize this thing, the agency that we ought to select is

the FAA because they have the flexibility to go out and hire these

people to get the job done.

Senator Thompson, I am glad that you brought that up because

we have neglected the human capital issue in this government for

years and years, and I want to quote Jim Schlesinger, who testified

in March before this Committee. He said solving the personnel

problem is a precondition to solving all that is wrong in the U.S.

national security edifice. All that is wrong. The precondition is the

personnel problem. And it never really gets much attention in the

Legislative Branch of government because I don’t think that too

often legislators appreciate how important it is that if you want to

win, you have to have the best and the brightest. And we are not

getting the best and the brightest in the Federal Government.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THOMPSON. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. With your indulgence for just a second on that point, I would point out the HartRudman Commission on National Security reports that the United

States is ‘‘on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in

Government’’ that reaches civilian and military personnel at all

levels. That is the much touted, and properly so, Hart-Rudman

Commission report that we have been talking about lately.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Lieberman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Durbin, very briefly, there has

not been much to smile about in the last couple of weeks, but if

I may make a vain attempt by reporting this conversation—I was

thinking about it when we were talking about the profiling that we

expect people at the screening sections to do. I think we are going

to find that the citizenry will be doing a lot of its own profiling,

and it may lead to more socialization on the aircraft.

One of our colleagues—Senator Breaux and I were talking about

this. We both had the same experience in the times we have been

on a plane since this awful incident occurred. We find we are turning to the people to either side of us, ‘‘Hello, how are you? Where

are you from?’’ [Laughter.] ‘‘What do you do? Why are you going to where we are going?’’ Anyway, thank you.

31

1The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on page 105.

Senator THOMPSON. I can understand why they do it with Senator Breaux.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, Senator Breaux was doing it.

Senator THOMPSON. Oh, I see. All right.

Senator DURBIN. I just want to comment in general. Thirteen

years ago, when I introduced the bill banning smoking on airplanes, I learned something interesting about Congress. Next to

politics, there is only one other thing that the Members of Congress

know more about, and that is flying.

Senator THOMPSON. That is true.

Senator DURBIN. And now that we talk about airports and airport security, each of us has probably logged as many miles or

more than anybody in the room, and I think that is the reason why

some of these questions are heartfelt but also get into detail.

I thank this panel for your excellent presentation today. We really hope that we can use this information to develop some good legislation. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. The next panel I would like to ask to come forward includes Robert Baker, who is Vice Chairman of American

Airlines; Paul Busick, President and Executive Director of North

Carolina Global TransPark; Colonel Leonard Griggs, an old friend

and Airport Director from Lambert-St. Louis International Airport;

Bill Harvey, Jr., not only Trainer of the Screeners at Chicago

O’Hare International Airport, but if I am not mistaken, Mr. Harvey

was 1999’s Screener of the Year. Glad to have you with us. And

Michael La Pier, Executive Director from the Central Illinois Regional Airport.

Once everybody is in place, we will let Mr. Baker start with the

testimony, and we will go right down the table in the order you are

seated.

Thank you very much for being here.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT W. BAKER,1 VICE CHAIRMAN,

AMERICAN AIRLINES

Mr. BAKER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the

Committee. Thank you.

Before I begin my remarks on the subject, on behalf of all of the

American Airlines family we would certainly like to extend our

deep sympathies and concern for the families of the crew members,

our passengers, and certainly all of the victims on the ground of

this terrible tragedy.

I would also like to thank Secretary Mineta, Administrator Garvey, and her entire team for their responsiveness beginning that

terrible Tuesday morning. It has been outstanding. It has been a

real collaborative effort between the airlines and the FAA to find

the best choices and get through this and hopefully get the system

restored.

Finally, the work of Congress last week and the airline stabilization plan is outstanding, and we thank you very much for your contributions to that effort. But now we must turn our attention to the

32

security issues that surround our industry and make some decisions about changes that are in order.

But I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the Federal Government’s role in addressing aircraft and

airport security issues. September 11 has changed world aviation

forever. We can only speculate on the precise changes that will result from this horrible event. However, I think there are two very

broad directions that we must pursue promptly to preserve our air

transportation system.

First, we must decide on specific changes to airline and aviation

security operations that will provide a higher level of deterrence

and make it much more difficult for terrorists to repeat the horrible

attacks on our country.

Second, we must make those changes which will provide confidence in our aviation system to both the traveling public and our

employees.

If we do not restore confidence in aviation, we will not as airlines

be able to restore operations, and the American public will not be

willing to travel by air. This would obviously have profound impacts on our industry and the U.S. economy since there is really

no practical alternative mode for most inter-city travel in our very

large geographical country.

A week ago Sunday, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta

announced the formation of two rapid response task forces to provide recommendations in two areas: Aircraft security and airport

security. I was honored to be asked to participate in this effort.

For the last week, we have been gathering input, examining alternatives, and establishing priorities. We are committed to provide

the Secretary with recommendations not later than October 1, and

we will meet that objective. I anticipate both short-term and

longer-term recommendations.

Let me briefly discuss two of the subjects being dealt with by

these rapid response task forces. Both of these projects enhance

aviation security and also have a positive impact on the confidence

of our employees and the traveling public.

One of our focus areas is the hardening of the cockpit to prevent

terrorist entry. This will likely involve modifications to aircraft

bulkheads and doors and the adoption of procedures to reduce the

exposure when the cockpit door must be opened in flight. We are

processing close to 100 individual ideas and suggestions in this

area.

The second area that is receiving a lot of interest and attention

is the airport security checkpoint. You often hear about the federalization of the checkpoint. The airlines have said for many years

that the operation of the checkpoint should not be the responsibility of the airlines.

If you look outside the United States, other countries typically

both operate and fund all aviation security activities. I believe that

making material changes in the checkpoint operation represents an

important opportunity to both enhance security and improve public

confidence.

There is an approach which I believe makes sense and should be

debated. I believe that there are really three security functions that

we are going to need going forward:

33

First, a high-caliber, professionally operated checkpoint that deters the unfavorable person, that is run professionally, a system

that restores passenger confidence most of all;

Second, the deployment of a sky marshal function on board domestic aircraft;

Third, an ongoing surveillance and audit process to ensure that

the security procedures and policies are adhered to by the airlines,

the airports, and all of the various vendors that do business at our

airports.

These functions could be combined and performed by a government-owned corporation made up mostly of law enforcement officers.

Now, in response to your first two inquiries regarding the airlines’ role in screening passengers and baggage, each airline is required to conduct screening in accordance with the procedures, facilities, and equipment described in its FAA-approved air carrier

security program. The program is designed to prevent or deter the

carriage of an explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or dangerous

weapon on a passenger or in their checked or carry-on luggage.

The specifics of the program are considered to be confidential by

the FAA. But, generally, the program uses various X-ray machines,

explosive trace detection, which helps to find visual inspections to

prevent the carriage of dangerous weapons or devices onboard our

aircraft.

In most instances, security checkpoint functions are performed

for the air carrier by a contract security provider in accordance

with the air carrier standard security program and regulations set

out by the FAA. Individual security screeners are hired and trained

in the specifics of this program and the use of the security equipment by the contract security provider.

The hiring standards are provided under the FAA regulations.

Background checks of the individuals’ last 10 years of employment

history are conducted. A 10-year criminal history check will similarly be conducted for those individuals with inconsistencies or

gaps in their employment history.

Local air carrier management does provide oversight of the security provider’s compliance with these Federal requirements and

specific security measures.

Mr. Chairman, I have been involved in commercial aviation for

40 years. There has never been anything that has had more impact

on our country, our industry, and our employees than the events

of September 11. I do know one important thing. We can never

have another September 11.

I would look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Baker.

Paul Busick is the President and Executive Director of the North

Carolina Global TransPark. Thank you for being here.

34

1The prepared statement of Mr. Busick with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page

109.

TESTIMONY OF REAL ADMIRAL PAUL E. BUSICK, USCG, RET.,1

PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NORTH CAROLINA

GLOBAL TRANSPARK AUTHORITY

Mr. BUSICK. Chairman Lieberman, Chairman Durbin, and distinguished Members of the Committee, my thoughts and prayers also

go out to those people who have lost their loved ones to this terrible

act of violence.

I thank you for your invitation to share my perspective on the

current aviation security process and ways to improve it. My position is not unique, although I think that very few share it. I was

personally involved in the decisionmaking process that affected the

way we provide for aviation security from 1993 through most of

1996 as the Director of Intelligence and Security for the Secretary

of Transportation. I am pleased to offer my views now in 2001 as

we revisit this important issue.

I have supplied the Committee with my written comments that

offer specific details on the evolution of aviation security procedures as we know them today. I believe you will find that my written statement will provide the background information necessary to

support my comments this afternoon. Therefore, I would like to use

my time allotted to focus on those issues I believe need your pressing attention.

First and foremost, I would like to make a clarifying statement.

While I believe that it is essential that this Committee examine the

current structure and procedures used to screen passengers and

their belongings, I would also ask that Members of this Committee

be wary of addressing only this one aspect of the aviation security

system. At this time we are not privy to all of the details of how

this heinous act of September 11 was carried out.

While passenger screening may have played a significant role

that day, it may have been only one element in a series of failures

in the system. It is important that we recognize that a multi-billion-dollar intelligence effort did not predict these events, that the

FAA had no regulation in place preventing persons from carrying

the types of weapons described. The airlines train their personnel

to respond to threat vectors of a wholly different nature. We have

an obligation to absolutely, positively get the program for security

in the air travel system right this time. Therefore, it is essential

that we look at the system as a whole and focus our efforts on improvements and not on recriminations.

Each time we have had a crisis in our national aviation system,

a task force or commission is formed, studies are conducted, recommendations are filed, the status quo shifts slightly higher, until

we face the next crisis. We can’t let that happen this time. It is

time to make drastic changes in the system in place. It is time that

we ensure that support necessary to carry out these changes does

not wane when the initial shock fades.

Given that the current approach has proven itself incapable of

providing a high-quality system, federalizing seems to me to be the

next best choice. But if we simply federalize without the establishment of thorough training programs, the deployment of high-qualVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:11 Aug 06, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 76802.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
35

ity equipment, standardized and regular measurements of performance, and decent pay and benefits, one can certainly predict failure

of the new system just as well.

If we simply make a change that has the Federal Government

contracting out to the lowest bidder and make no qualitative improvements, all we have done is change the name of the employer.

There is no panacea to this. Screening is hard, repetitive work.

It will require significant efforts in human factor analysis and

human-machine engineering to make it work well.

A key issue is the professionalism of the personnel tasked with

the responsibility to provide our first line of defense. These hardworking individuals have been asked to achieve the improbable and

are sometimes vilified for their failure to do so. Minimal training,

varied levels of equipment, low wages, long hours, constant criticism.

This is the life of the aviation security screener. The White

House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security recognize the

value of these individuals and called for a program to certify and

license security screeners based on their proficiency. Wages and

benefits would rise accordingly, as would the overall quality of the

screening process. The commissioners believe that such a program

would encourage people to seek out these positions as professional

trades.

The recommendations were not carried out. The regulation to address this issue is still in draft and, in fact, does not provide for

certification of individuals. Rather, it calls for certification of the

companies who provide these services. Screeners are not recognized

for proficiency; rather, they receive bonuses for longevity. I will expand on these themes for the duration of my allotted time.

Federalization, done properly, could address several other flaws

inherent in the current system. The Administrative Rulemaking

Procedure Act is one of the foremost reasons why good ideas don’t

find their way to implementation. The rulemaking process is slow

and rife with compromise. In my opinion, the industry has taken

advantage of their legal rights under the Rulemaking Procedure

Act to question, delay, and dilute rules intended to improve aviation security. When the distinguished Members of this body pass

a law telling the FAA to institute a new security procedure, FAA

is required to embark upon the odyssey that is rulemaking. I can’t

imagine police or military planners responsible for security engaging with others in such a manner to implement necessary security

measures.

Federalizing the security screening process would eliminate the

need to get involved in a lengthy debate over the value or cost of

a specific measure. Costs associated with them would also be

looked at differently. If they are deemed to be appropriate and necessary, they can be implemented.

While the question of who carries out this important task may

be less important than how it is done, the right agency with appropriate authorities could make a difference. While I am here today

to address the pressing need of improved aviation security, I also

foresee the necessity of addressing terrorism against all of our

transportation modes. An organization dedicated to transportation

security within DOT with limited law enforcement responsibilities

36

and direct access to information from intelligence agencies regarding all modes of transportation is, in my opinion, the ideal entity

to undertake this task for several reasons.

Intelligence received by this agency can be disseminated throughout the transportation system. A national cadre of professional

security personnel under the DOT umbrella could be dispatched to

locations of interest and heightened concern in direct response to

intelligence. R&D efforts could be directed by this office in response

to information not only on new threats and methods, but also in

response to experience gained from the utilization of equipment in

the real world.

Administrators from each of the modes of transportation would

play a vital role in determining specific procedures to be undertaken at transportation facilities. They really are the experts in

their field within government and offer valuable insight into daily

operations. Their direct functional knowledge applied in conjunction with resources of the Department’s Office of Intelligence and

Security creates a natural partnership between intelligence, operations, and oversight.

Even with a single governing entity in place, it is hard to determine the competency of an individual screener without comprehensive testing procedures. The currently approved testing devices are

standardized, rudimentary, and not at all effective in testing security under realistic conditions. In addition, with an average of at

least 8 percent turnover rate per month, it is difficult to determine

if training methods are at all effective. FAA Red Team, DOT Inspector General, and GAO methods appear to be more realistic.

Low detection rates for their tests reflect that. The electronic

threat insertion method would be a useful tool for teaching and

testing, but there are too few deployed at this time to be sure.

Test procedures should be realistic, consistent, and objective to

the degree possible. National results should be compiled as often as

practical and compared to address the question of efficacy of training and equipment. A regular and comprehensive review of test

results would allow for rapid modification in training methods,

cycles, and curriculum.

Such a review would also indicate which types of equipment are

able to provide the image clarity necessary to determine if there is

a threat object present and which are not. Armed with this information, the Secretary could amend procurement orders to purchase

only the equipment proven to be effective via rigorous testing.

Efforts to encourage competition among equipment providers

must take place within a framework that recognizes that technical

standards and the need for rapid deployment of properly certified

equipment will not be abandoned merely to create competitive markets. The most important aspect of the free enterprise system is

that success and accomplishments are rewarded by market preference. The unintended consequence of last year’s congressional direction to split funding between a fully certified system and an

EDS system that was not fully field vetted led simply to significant

slowdowns in deployment of certified EDS systems without any

benefit to either aviation security or the competitive marketplace.

Other nations have found greater success in screening performance via the use of a single entity governing the screening process.

37

We have already talked about the GAO’s look at foreign governments and those were mostly European. In short, the findings of

the report show that other nations have instituted programs that

require much more extensive qualifications and training, higher

pay, much more stringent checkpoint operations, and the assumption of overall responsibility for the screening process by a single

government entity.

It is interesting to note that France requires screeners to be citizens of an EU nation. The reasoning presented in the report is the

cooperative nature of the EU law enforcement agencies. France believes that by requiring EU citizenship, they may conduct a much

more comprehensive background check on the individuals by accessing criminal information data sources from all European Union

nations.

I think the United States should take its lead from France and

coordinate our efforts with other national governments to compile

similar information and vet security personnel against these data

sources as well.

No matter which entity assumes these tremendous responsibilities, the responsibility for funding an ongoing, dedicated effort lies

with the U.S. Congress. There must be a dedicated funding stream

to support our Nation’s security in all its many facets. I believe

both appropriated funds and a dedicated transportation security

user fee are necessary steps. I also recognize that you as Members

of Congress are elected to represent all of the people, not just those

who are using the transportation system today.

Providing for transportation security is providing for national security. The terrorists who committed this crime against the United

States were well aware of the impact it would have on our economy

as a whole. And, therefore, we as a Nation must support the ongoing effort to ensure our national security.

In conclusion, I would like to make a short personal statement.

I consider myself genuinely fortunate to have served as the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security for a whole lot of reasons. It was good, rewarding work, work that needed to be done.

But the primary reason was that people in the industry with whom

I was privileged to work, the professional, dedicated, honorable individuals on the front lines of aviation security, deserve our respect

and gratitude. These individuals struggle every day to make our

system safe and secure. They often have limited information and

resources, conflicting directives, and suffer the criticism of 20/20

hindsight following every incident.

I would ask you to join me in ending the process of selecting who

is to blame and instead appreciate the efforts of the hard-working

individuals who have accepted these awesome responsibilities as

their own, people like Al Grazier of the Port Authority of New York

and New Jersey; Joe Lawless of Mass. Port; Richard Kunicki in

Chicago; Alvie Dotson at Dallas-Fort Worth; Al Lomax of Kansas

City; Jim Welna, Minneapolis; Richard Davis, United Airlines; and

Matt Vaughn of the United Parcel Service. Each of these individuals stands out in my mind as a stellar example of professionalism

in aviation security. I applaud their effort, and I look forward to

working with them and with you to craft a more secure future for

our national aviation system. Thank you.

38

1The prepared statement of Mr. Griggs with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page

115.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much. Mr. Griggs.

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD L. GRIGGS, JR.,1 DIRECTOR OF AIRPORTS-CITY OF ST. LOUIS, LAMBERT-ST. LOUIS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. GRIGGS. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am

Leonard Griggs, Director of Airports for the city of St. Louis. I

would also like to express my profound sympathy and sorrow to all

those families and friends of those people who lost their lives.

As you well know, we served over 31 million passengers last year

and are well on the road to becoming another major hub for American Airlines as they take over from TWA.

I appreciate being invited to share Lambert Airport and Mayor

Slay’s views on how this Nation’s system can be improved so that

our citizens will have renewed confidence that our skies are safe

and that the Federal Government is adequately protecting airports

and aircraft operations from the full spectrum of possible terrorist

activities. I am pleased that the focus of this hearing is on airport

screeners since they are a key element in the defense against terrorism.

In my 5 minutes, I plan to address the following points which are

expanded upon in my written statement: First is airport police

presence at airport screening checkpoints; expansion of the Federal

Air Marshal Program and security and sanctity of the cockpit;

timely sharing of intelligence by Federal officials with local airports’ police; federalizing the passenger screening; improved cargo

and baggage screening; reduced carry-on baggage; assistance with

unfunded Federal mandates and other costs; and the possibility of

reopening Reagan Washington National Airport.

Security measures at Lambert Airport have been noticeably increased in response to the FAA directives over the past 2 weeks.

Law enforcement’s presence has been expanded with Lambert Airport police officers being stationed in patrols at all three of the passenger screening points within the terminal. I would like to thank

Senator Durbin for this suggestion—where it came from—and we

have found that an increased law enforcement presence reinforces

the seriousness of passenger screening and communicates to

screeners how important their functions are.

I have personally talked to the owners and managers of both of

the security companies on the need for professional conduct and appearance, and they have responded.

I have provided a complete listing of increased security measures

that have been implemented at Lambert Airport. Other security

measures not publicly discussed or put in here have also been put

into effect in the operation of our plan.

As a result, the airport security at Lambert Airport is very high.

I was comfortable flying out of Lambert Airport yesterday and believe that other travelers should feel safe resuming their flights

through our airport.

The city of St. Louis recommends additional actions to further

improve airport security and airline security. As for aircraft secuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:11 Aug 06, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 76802.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
39

rity, St. Louis supports a substantial expansion of the Federal Air

Marshal Program for onboard protection and improved protection

of the cockpit in airline security.

In addition, the following is a partial listing of additional security

measures that we and I believe the DOT and the Congress should

consider to further improve the on-airport portion of security:

First, better intelligence sharing by the Federal Government. We

have all read in the press accounts of how information about some

of the September 11 terrorists was never passed on to local law enforcement or airport police. Federal intelligence agencies do not

timely share their information with the FAA’s Civil Aviation Security Office and, in turn, with the local airport law enforcement.

Some have urged that expanded Federal intelligence efforts must

be approved and funded by Congress and the Executive Branch.

Having all Federal intelligence and enforcement agencies share the

same computer database would be very beneficial. In our view, it

is important that relevant, timely information must be shared with

us. Airport security is the last ground of defense to forestall terrorism against civil aviation, but that defense must be based on

timely and adequate information.

Second, federalize passenger screening. I believe, and a majority

of my colleagues believe, that the passenger screening function

should be placed under control of a Federal agency, probably within

the U.S. Department of Transportation, rather than being delegated as now to the private airlines. However, some large airports

have concerns that federalization could result in inadequate manpower levels because of budgets that have been starved over time.

This has often been the case with inspection staffing at both Customs and INS functions throughout this country.

The federalized passenger screening program could be another

branch of the Federal Air Marshal Program and could be very appropriate under the Federal Administrator of the FAA. Federalizing the passenger screening function should make it easier to

pass intelligence to law enforcement agencies that back up the passenger screening function at U.S. airports.

Next, restriction on carry-on baggage. Until a Federal agency has

taken over the passenger screening function, it would be very advisable to limit carry-on bags to one per passenger, with some exceptions, for example, people with small babies carrying diaper

bags and that kind of thing, which would help reduce the screener

workload.

Improved baggage, cargo, and mail screening. You have heard

this before. Congress should assure that adequate numbers of explosive detection systems devices and other current technology that

are available for the inspection of unaccompanied baggage, cargo,

and mail packages be made available.

Congress should help fund the new security mandates imposed

by the FAA on local sponsors. Lambert Airport is spending millions

of dollars of unbudgeted funds to implement the increased FAA security to the tune of—for example, we are spending $72,000 a week

for additional security members.

We believe that unfunded mandates should be covered by general

Federal funds or through expanded authorization from the AIP or

the Passenger Facility Charges.

40

1The prepared statement of Mr. Harvey appears in the Appendix on page 125.

Another crisis we are facing is the cancellation and/or tripling of

premiums in our liability insurance, the same as the airlines are

facing. This is something that must be addressed.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I feel it is absolutely critical to reopen

Reagan National Airport. To paraphrase Mayor Tony Williams,

Reagan National Airport is the first door to Washington, is a vital

symbol, and, therefore, keeping it closed tells the terrorists that

they have won. I am confident security measures can be put in

place to make Reagan National Airport safe. As a matter of fact,

if we do not, there is one major airline which has been already

threatened and the possibility of severe financial damage to three

of our major airports.

Again, Mr. Chairman, my mayor and I appreciate the opportunity to express my views and recommendations on this most important topic of aviation security. I have been in this industry for

25 years, and September 11 can never be allowed to be repeated.

Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Griggs, for that

excellent testimony.

Mr. Harvey, a pleasure to have you here.

TESTIMONY OF AUBREY ‘‘BILL’’ HARVEY, JR.,1 TRAINING SUPERVISOR FOR ARGENBRIGHT SECURITY, O’HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. HARVEY. Good afternoon, Senator Lieberman. I would like to

express my deepest sympathies to all those who lost someone during the tragic events of 9/11/2001.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Harvey, come forward a little bit.

Those mikes are very directional.

Mr. HARVEY. My name is Aubrey Harvey, and I am a checkpoint

security supervisor for Argenbright Security at O’Hare International Airport. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this

Committee and give you the perspective of the men and women

who work as security checkpoint screeners at our Nation’s airports.

Those of us who work hard day in and day out to protect the flying public—successfully, I might add—have found the news reports

pointing the finger of blame at screener for the events of September 11 very disheartening. From all indications, there is no evidence that any activity by a checkpoint screener—all of whom were

following FAA regulations correctly—contributed to this horrible

tragedy.

I want to thank you, Senator Durbin, and the other Members of

this Committee for taking the perspective of the security screener

in mind as Congress debates changes to the current system. As an

Air Force veteran who served with the 19th Tactical Air Strike

Squadron in Vietnam, I understand and appreciate the role that security and national security plays in our American transportation

system. I want to assure you that those of us working the checkpoints take this issue of national security very seriously as well.

Let me give you a little bit of background about myself. I was

hired as a pre-departure screener for Argenbright in November

1996. Given my interest in taking on more responsibility, I was

41

1The prepared statement of Mr. La Pier appears in the Appendix on page 131.

promoted to a checkpoint security supervisor. In 1999, I became

certified as a trainer and advanced equipment trainer and currently train new members of the O’Hare screening team. Training

new members involves both classroom instruction and on-the-job

training. The latter is particularly important, as human interaction

with passengers and attention to behavior is vital.

In 1999, I was selected as the FAA’s Screener of the Year. Candidates are chosen based on superior performances under the difficult circumstances that can present themselves at an airport

checkpoint. My nomination was the result of two events that occurred at O’Hare. The first occurred in December 1998 when a passenger attempted to board an aircraft with a 12-gauge shotgun. We

apprehended the weapon and the passenger was arrested. In August 1999, a passenger broke through the security checkpoint. I followed and contained the passenger until a police officer made the

arrest.

The activities of the individual screeners are important, but new

security measures and technology are also critical. Since my time

at Argenbright, I have seen the screening technology vastly improve. Training procedures have become more sophisticated, using

computer programs such as the TIP program and Safe Passage program to test screeners on the job. Screeners are also required to

have additional training yearly to update them on the newest technologies and procedural changes.

We are also making ongoing efforts to attract, retain, and reward

qualified employees. Since I began at Argenbright, I have received

two promotions and my wages have nearly tripled.

The events of September 11, 2001, were horrific and cruel. Yet

I believe that security screeners at the affected airports and even

those that were not affected acted with dispatch on that day and

in the days since to protect the flying public. As a trainer and a

checkpoint security supervisor, I know the difficulties and challenges of the job. I also know the value of following procedures and

the importance of training. As an individual employee of Argenbright Security, I have and will continue to work with the Federal

authorities to improve screening, security, and the safety of the flying public.

Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Harvey. I am delighted

you are here and gave us that personal and unique perspective.

Mr. La Pier.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL B. LA PIER, A.A.E.,1 EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL ILLINOIS REGIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. LA PIER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the

Committee and staff. I would like to thank the Chair for the opportunity to be here this afternoon to appear before you to give a perspective of a small airport on the current situation regarding civil

aviation security in the United States today.

I would also like to thank the senior Senator from the State of

Illinois, Senator Durbin, for inviting me to be here this afternoon,

42

but most particularly for his unyielding leadership and strong support of aviation issues in the State of Illinois.

I should tell you this is my first opportunity to testify before a

Congressional or a Senate committee. It is an opportunity that I

welcome. It is an experience that I will value forever as an American.

In the words of a song made popular against recently, ‘‘In a New

York minute, everything can change.’’ This is eerily true of the

world of civil aviation security as a result of the tragic actions of

September 11. The acts of aviation piracy and subsequent terrorism have clearly changed the face of the industry that the Central Illinois Regional Airport is a part of forever. We recognize that

change, Mr. Chairman, and, frankly, we welcome it. We clearly

don’t welcome how the change is being brought about, the reasons

for these changes, but we fully support the efforts, all efforts to

strengthen civil aviation security in our country.

Allow me for a moment to introduce you to Central Illinois Regional Airport. We serve a region of about 1.2 million people from

Bloomington-Normal, Illinois. The airport has seen unprecedented

growth in the past few years, particularly in passenger traffic but

also in commercial flights.

Since 1987, passenger traffic has grown from just over 80,000

passengers annually to nearly 500,000 last year. At the same time,

the number of scheduled daily departures has increased from 12 in

1987 to almost 50—or to over 50 last year. In fact, the number of

air carriers serving the airport has grown from two in 1987 to its

current level of five. This growth is the direct result of the robust

economy in the region, and particularly the expanded service opportunities by the airlines. I guess you could call us a true success

story in the deregulation era.

In terms of passenger traffic, we are proud that we were recognized as the fastest-growing non-hub airport in the United States

in 1997, and over the last 5 years, we have been the second fastestgrowing airport in the Nation regardless of size of airport.

Prior to the horror of September 11, Central Illinois Regional

Airport stood in full compliance with all applicable security directives and regulations put forward by the Federal Aviation Administration. I am also pleased to report that we achieved compliance,

full compliance, with all new directives issued by FAA after September 11 within 24 hours. We believe that made us one of the

first airports in the Great Lakes region to achieve that status.

If you would allow me a personal moment here, I brought with

me this afternoon my staff, members of my staff, the folks that

made it possible for us to achieve that status. They are Don

Schneider, the operations manager and principal security officer of

the Airport Authority; Fran Streebing, who is director of marketing

and public relations; and Chad Farashon, my administration manager and finance manager. They are in the audience with me this

afternoon.

It is important to note that the full compliance that we achieved

does not come without a cost. Our security budget for this year totals $125,000. The increased security dictated by September 11 actions will cost us approximately $30,000 a month or nearly triple

our budget. This expenditure, if annualized, would represent 20

43

percent of our $2.1 million annual operating budget. This, Mr.

Chairman, has the potential to become a significant financial burden.

As we have talked about this afternoon and as the Members of

this Committee are aware, there are two separate but intertwined

areas of aviation security at our Nation’s airports today. First, the

airlines are tasked with a variety of different responsibilities and

regulations under FAR Part 108. It is their responsibility to provide for trained, qualified security personnel at all airport checkpoints in the United States. Currently, in most, if not all, of those

situations, those services are provided by one or several private

companies.

Airport operators, on the other hand, support passenger security

checkpoint operations with law enforcement officers. These officers

are not trained to operate the checkpoint but are in place to support its operators if necessary.

In the case of Central Illinois Regional Airport, we meet the obligation that is put upon us by FAA through a series of alarms and

a 5-minute response from the City of Bloomington Police Department.

I don’t mean to be critical here of the current operations of the

security checkpoints in the United States. I believe that the vast

majority of the folks that operate those checkpoints are, in fact,

doing the best job they can. It is important to note, however, that

they are not members of the law enforcement community.

Whether we like it or not, the events of September 11 have

caused a change in the rules of the game. I believe that these

changes must be met with something other than simply regulatory

changes and adjustments. We must meet these changes with significant actions that will again allow us to capture control of the

safety of our skies.

There has been a great deal of discussion here this afternoon and

over the past couple of days about federalization of checkpoints. We

strongly support looking into that issue very in depth. We believe

that a parallel may exist in the Coast Guard.

Regardless of whoever is tasked with this responsibility, we believe that they must have access to all pertinent information and

intelligence so that they can become a more proactive rather than

reactive organization.

Simply put, the rules of the game have changed, and I believe

that they are going to continue to change as we go forward. We

must have all necessary information, particularly when it comes to

communication, for us to be able to respond effectively and

proactively.

The second area of responsibility is obviously airport security.

That is one that we are very familiar with. In simple terms, we are

responsible for the security of the airport facility itself and the environment within which our airlines operate.

Under the current regulations, the extent of airport security required varies depending upon the level of activity. The level required varies from complete video monitoring and law enforcement

patrols at our Nation’s busiest airports to much less stringent but

nonetheless effective security posture at some of our smaller airports.

44

When I think back to the events of September 11, and particularly those events as they occurred at Central Illinois Regional Airport, the one thing that stands out in my mind was the lack of information that we received. I fully realize that the efforts of those

in charge were probably correctly directed at larger airports, more

traffic-intensive airports than Central Illinois Regional Airport. But

I would maintain that the threats at airports the size of Central

Illinois Regional Airport are no less real.

When we go back to the Gulf War, airports and the FAA worked

together to craft a plan to implement levels of security based upon

perceived threat. Without going into specific details, all airports developed these guidelines under the direction of FAA, and there

were four levels of security that were developed. We were all to implement those levels of security and those actions of security at the

direction of FAA.

At the time this action seemed to be reactive, but it certainly

could have put us into a proactive position. Unfortunately, the one

component that failed in that system on September 11 was, again,

communication. We did not receive communication from FAA regarding increased levels of security until the next day.

I don’t wish to be critical of the individuals at FAA that were responsible for communication or for enhanced security at our airports. I believe they do a wonderful job of regulating security at our

Nation’s airports. We must, however, learn from the events and

practice that old saying, ‘‘An ounce of prevention is worth a pound

of cure.’’

I believe the agency in charge of aviation security must be provided with all of the tools necessary to allow us to be proactive, and

the communication that has to occur must involve all the partners

in aviation.

I would tell you that airports and airlines are two different types

of operations. The airlines are typically and are set up to be forprofit enterprises. Airports are, in fact, on the main, governmentsponsored agencies.

In our case, we are 38 percent tax dependent. We receive 38 percent of our operating budget from property taxes. Recently the financial markets acknowledged the gravity of the situation regarding aviation and airports and have now placed all North American

airports on credit watch. That means it is going to be more difficult

for us to raise capital to accomplish what will need to be done to

protect and to ensure security at our airport and at every airport

in the United States.

We would ask Congress to look very closely at the statement that

Standard and Poor’s made in their recent announcement in which

they said immediate and broad authority should be granted to FAA

to reimburse airports for extraordinary costs for security and to

maintain financial viability.

We looked at our airport to determine what it was that we

thought we might need to put ourselves in a posture that would be

similar to what Colonel Griggs would experience in St. Louis. Simply put, a one-time investment of $1.8 million and an annual investment of $500,000 is what our quick analysis determined. That

is a tough pill for a small airport to swallow.

45

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my time is up.

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here this afternoon not only personally but professionally as well. Often small airports are left out of discussions of this nature, and it is comforting

to know that in this case we have had the opportunity to share

them with you. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. La Pier.

I apologize for stepping out. I mentioned to Chairman Lieberman

that, coincidentally, the father of one of the victims of Flight 77

was in my office, and I obviously left to speak to him. But it was

a grim reminder that this inquiry at this Committee is certainly

not routine. It is a reflection of the solemn duty and responsibility

all of us have to do what we can to make sure this never happen

again.

Mr. Baker, since September 11, whatever you can tell us, what

has American Airlines done to do things differently in terms of security? And could you address the issue we raised earlier about the

visible changes which we think the flying public is looking for?

Mr. BAKER. Well, there are a lot of things that I probably

shouldn’t discuss, but let me——

Senator DURBIN. Understood.

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Assure you that there has been literally

an ongoing, almost 24 hours a day, back-and-forth with the FAA

security staff and the airlines collectively, making small and very

large changes to the way we operate.

We have completely taken certain parts of the exposure out of

play, for instance, by removing portions of the cargo business. They

are no longer flying on our airplanes. Not known to the general

public but, nevertheless, that has happened.

A lot more activity and requirements in and around the ticket

counters and the checkpoints. We have closed all the curbside

check-in. Checking of IDs in multiple locations, accelerating the

random wanding of passengers at checkpoints and at gates. A very

complicated procedure to deal with the nameless that you have had

some discussion about, and those lists today are nearing a thousand individuals.

Senator DURBIN. Were those available before?

Mr. BAKER. No.

Senator DURBIN. Did you receive those names?

Mr. BAKER. No, sir. This is all new territory for us.

Senator DURBIN. Let me ask you about one particular area that

you have spoken about, and you are in a special position here because of your being chosen to be part of this commission by the

Secretary. You have talked about the hardening of the cockpit

doors, and that seems so important and so clearly needed. Are you

considering other changes within the airplane? One in particular

that I have been looking at—and it is controversial with people

who have strong feelings on it—and that is the whole question of

video cameras in the airplane. After the Egypt air crash, we never

knew what happened, and the technology we have in the cockpit

now made sense 40 years ago, but it doesn’t make sense today. And

when I talked to some pilots in private about it, they said, ‘‘We

would love to have a camera that is trained on the rest of the airplane to know what is going on back there, and we would also like

46

to have one in the cargo hold so if something is going wrong, we

know what the nature of the problem is.’’

Are you looking at other changes within an airplane that might

address some of those surveillance issues you raised in your testimony?

Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. Let me talk just a minute about the door

so that you understand what we are into there. That door is not

simply a door hanging on hinges that opens and closes with a key

and a lock. That door is a very sophisticated device that must deal

with other parameters of the aircraft, specifically two.

If there were a decompression in the cockpit, we lost a cockpit

windshield, all of the air in the cabin will immediately rush forward and try to exist via that missing windshield area. That door

cannot become a projectile from that decompression activity. So the

door and that whole bulkhead must perform to allow the air to

pass through without structurally damaging the airplane.

So when we talk about hardening it, you and I could go out and

decide let’s put metal strips on, let’s put deadbolts, let’s put steel.

We can make it strong, but we are going to lose that other

functionality.

The second parameter that is in the Federal Air Regulations we

have to pay attention to is that door must be removable in the

event of an accident so the crew can exit rearward or the passengers can exit forward. So if you look at the door the next time

you get on an airplane, you will see the hinges are very carefully

designed with cables to pull the pins out of the hinges so you can

literally throw the door to one side and get out of the airplane.

So we are balancing lots of objectives here in that door, but we

have some very specific, and I think, constructive ideas, both short

and long term.

We are very concerned about the crew’s ability to know who

might be trying to get in the cockpit and make sure that whenever

that door gets opened that it is, in fact, an authorized person. A

video camera aimed at the door area is certainly one of the alternatives we are going to suggest, in addition to some other techniques for the flight attendant part of the crew to alert the cockpit

that something irregular is going on in the back of the airplane.

So I think you will see some of that.

Video cameras in the cockpit is a different subject for a different

day, I think, because if the bad guy gets in the cockpit, we have

failed.

Senator DURBIN. Yes.

Mr. BAKER. We are working to keep them out.

Senator DURBIN. I also was surprised when a pilot told me that

a camera in the cargo area might be of some value, too.

Mr. BAKER. It would be because in the case of fire, smoke, or an

animal gets loose, it could be useful.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Harvey, thank you for coming, and although I just caught the end of your testimony, I read it, and am

very happy that you joined us today and told us about your experience.

How does your company recruit those who work at the screening

stations at O’Hare?

47

Mr. HARVEY. I am not directly involved with the recruiting process, but as a company, we use standard procedures, newspaper advertisements. We also have an employee referral type program.

Senator DURBIN. How long have you worked at O’Hare on the

screenings?

Mr. HARVEY. Five years.

Senator DURBIN. And have you seen a change in the kind of employees that are being hired by the company?

Mr. HARVEY. Well, I see a broader mix. When I first started we

had quite a few very young individuals. Now I see that it is spread

out. We have a nice wide variety of people of all ages.

Senator DURBIN. And what is the starting salary for someone

working the screening equipment?

Mr. HARVEY. At O’Hare Airport, our screeners start out at $6.75

an hour.

Senator DURBIN. Any benefits with that?

Mr. HARVEY. Yes, we do have company benefits that are contributory, health insurance, life insurance, dental insurance, and

that type of thing.

Senator DURBIN. And is that a full-time, 40-hour a week job?

Mr. HARVEY. Yes. We work pretty much 8 hours a day, half an

hour for lunch, two 15-minute breaks.

Senator DURBIN. Colonel Griggs, I want to ask you about your

monitoring of screening operations at Lambert Airport. Can you

tell me, as the manager of the airport, how you monitor their activities?

Mr. GRIGGS. Well, basically we have established the presence of

one of the policemen down there who is an armed policeman. He

supervises other things, but his job primarily while he is down

there is to watch the security people, watch how they behave. If

they are doing something that is irresponsible like clowning or all

the rest, to call his attention to it. And I think probably that plus

my talking to the two managers of these companies had a profound

effect upon them, that they know we are there. They do not know

exactly where they are going to be at 24 hours a day, but I can tell

you, that doing the 16 hours, which is most of the time the checkpoints are open, we have a profound presence and will continue to

have it.

Senator DURBIN. And I can feel the difference. I can tell you, it

makes a difference. I think the environment around those screening stations has changed.

You raised a point which is important, and I am sure Mr. Baker

could testify from his perspective on this, and that is the increase

in your insurance premiums. Are those increases—you talked about

a tripling of the liability insurance for the airport—is that since the

September 11 occurrence?

Mr. GRIGGS. Since September 11. We had just renegotiated our

entire insurance. We were being offered, and I think my figures are

provided to the record, but if I am correct on this, we were offered

$350,000 worth of insurance for $78,000. We just got that turned

down, and we have now been offered $50,000 premium for $650,000

premium. We have been charted $600 million, now must pay

$600,000 for it. This is an abominable thing. This is what we

brought in our testimony, that my mayor provided to the Council

48

of Mayors. Not only is it important for the airlines to be guaranteed liability or they are not going to fly, I have got to have some

relief on this or I cannot protect the public beyond that air side to

the land side. I cannot do it.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. La Pier, have you run into the same thing?

Mr. LA PIER. We have, Senator. Recently a good portion of our

liability insurance has been canceled. We are renegotiating its reinstatement, but it was canceled for the purpose of increasing the

premiums.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Lieberman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks again, Senator Durbin.

Mr. Baker, let me ask you the question I asked Mr. Belger and

the earlier panel. Do you know—I think you called it—what the

percentage usage of planes is now since September 11?

Mr. BAKER. First of all, the industry, has, as a general statement, reduced the size of the schedule we are trying to fly by approximately 20 percent, so we are not offering as much product as

we used to. This is a relatively slow time of the year anyway. This

situation has clearly impacted us severely. Our load factors yesterday on the domestic system were just over 50 percent of the reduced schedule.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And what is the norm for this time of the

year?

Mr. BAKER. This time of the year should be in the mid 60’s.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So we are down, but not—I mean, it is

significant, but it is not overwhelming.

Mr. BAKER. Except I have 20 percent of the assets sitting.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sitting, OK.

Mr. BAKER. Now, I talked yesterday to our manager of revenue,

who looks forward 180 days, and compares the booking build every

day against a year ago, so we can tell whether we are in trouble

versus a year ago each day of the week.

He sees nothing in the advanced booking trends that suggests

that the public is returning in the form of making reservations.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is the important point. In other

words, people have not yet regained sufficient confidence to bring

the usage back to anywhere near where it was before September

11.

Mr. BAKER. Absolutely not. It fell off, and it stayed down since

September 11.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Obviously, for an industry that was

already having economic difficulties.

Mr. BAKER. Exactly.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So I know it is more complicated than

this, but it does seem to me that those numbers cry out to us, and

the Department of Transportation, the industry, everybody to take

quick and dramatic action to reassure the public that it is safe to

fly again.

Mr. BAKER. We think building confidence of both crews, and passengers, and the American public is essential, and that is why I believe when you see the recommendations we make to Secretary

Mineta, we are trying real hard to do some things right now to

build that confidence and have a demonstration of change so that

we can begin that building process.

49

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I take it from your testimony and the

three points that you said, the second one was sky marshals, that

one of the things you think we should do as quickly as possible is

to increase the number of marshals on planes.

Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. And I think by combining those three

functions that I mentioned, I think we deal with another problem.

I think part of the high screener turnover that we reviewed earlier

certainly has to do with low wages because people will always move

toward higher wages somewhere in the economy, but I also believe

that we need to deal with the content of the job. These are tough

jobs because they’re kind of monotonous, and so by combining those

three functions, it seems to me, and doing some rotation, we create

variety, which makes a job much more interesting.

And, finally, we create a promotional ladder potential so that

somebody like Mr. Harvey, who is very aggressive and capable, can

move from one part of the security function upward to another and

up a management ladder. Now we are starting to build a security

culture that is here forever.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The sky marshals now are not in uniform,

correct?

Mr. BAKER. They are not. They are in plainclothes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you think that should continue to be

so or should they be in uniform?

Mr. BAKER. I think they should be in plainclothes for maximum

effectiveness.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I suppose as a matter of—I agree

with you—as a matter of deterrence, if we say that there will be

a dramatic increase in the number of sky marshals and, in fact,

there is a dramatic increase, but we do not put them in uniform,

then anyone intending ill on a plane would have to go on assuming

that a sky marshal was on that plane.

Mr. BAKER. I think it is a very important deterrent to not disclose everything that we are doing, but to clearly state the intent

and how we are going to get there.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Under the current system, I just want to

get a fact on the record, unless I missed it up until now, the requirement that the law puts on the airlines to provide the screening at the checkpoint, am I correct, and somebody said to me in the

last couple of weeks, the airlines add $5 to every ticket to pay for

security; is that correct?

Mr. BAKER. No.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I was under the impression that there

was no fee associated with the security responsibilities that you

have been given, but it is to be taken out of your normal operating.

Mr. BAKER. That is correct, and we believe that the large carrier

industry represented by the Air Transport Association, which is 90

percent or so of all of the passengers being flown, spend about a

billion dollars a year on security at airports alone. We think that

is roughly the number.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Harvey, I wanted to ask you, from

your perspective because you have been on the front lines, and I

appreciate your testimony, at one point you said in your testimony—I want to quote it exactly—‘‘From all indications, there is

no evidence that all activity by a checkpoint screener, all of whom

50

are following FAA regulations correctly, contributed to this horrible

tragedy of September 11.’’

I do not want to contest that. I wanted to ask you—because we

do not know exactly yet. We know from the stories we have heard,

apparently, that the terrorist had either these box cutters or maybe

plastic knives. So I want to ask you, as somebody who has been

there, screened, trained, knowing now what we pieced together

about what happened, how would you guess they got those tools,

weapons, on the planes?

Mr. HARVEY. Prior to September 11, on the security checkpoints,

we had a set of guidelines regarding the length of knives, also

whether they were menacing and that type of thing. Right after

that, right after the incident, we did, FAA changed that particular

directive as a direct result of the incident.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it is possible——

Mr. HARVEY. There were several—go ahead.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am sorry. It is possible, I know some of

the stories I have seen said they might have taken plastic knives

on, that they might have gone through the system, as the FAA regulations existed at that time?

Mr. HARVEY. Exactly. Because if a person only had a plastic

knife on their person and walked through a metal detector, the

metal detector——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would not go off.

Mr. HARVEY [continuing]. Would not go off.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. How about what we have all been

describing as box cutters, would that have set the metal detector

off?

Mr. HARVEY. Possibly, in the sense that the metal detector, the

magnetometer is set up to detect a small-caliber weapon, and the

operational test piece that we use to test the metal detector functions, if the box cutter did not weigh the same as that particular

test item, then the metal detector should not alarm.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARVEY. Because it is based on density.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So we cannot say definitely that a box

cutter would have set off the magnetometer.

Mr. HARVEY. Exactly.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And, of course, the other explanation,

which we have mentioned earlier, we have seen in the media, is

that they did not go through the screening with these devices, but

some other airport personnel might have placed them on the planes

beforehand. We do not know that.

A final question for you, Mr. La Pier. We have all been absorbed

by the information and different theories about what happened

here, and I am sure you noted with more than casual interest that

the terrorists who took the plane from Logan, two of them who

took the Logan plane down, entered in Portland, Maine, went into

the airport of Portland, Maine. So the question was raised why did

they do that? Did they do that because security was less at that

regional airport, and once they got on the plane there, they were

inside the system?

51

I wonder just from your expertise and experience, it may have

been obviously a totally different reason, but how you reacted to

that pattern that they followed.

Mr. LA PIER. Let me preface my response with this. I believe that

smaller airports are equally secure as larger ones, but I do believe

that the system does not recognize that and believe that there are,

because of the way we connect passengers through regional carriers

feeding larger carriers, in our case, you clear security at Bloomington normal at Central Illinois Regional Airport, you may fly to

Paris before you see another security agent.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. LA PIER. It may well be that we need an extraordinary

amount of attention paid to airports the size of Central Illinois Regional Airport to ensure that we are not the security hole. I do believe firmly that airports our size are secure under the regulation,

but I do believe that there are things that we can do to make sure

that we are even more secure.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I appreciate that answer, and I go

back to yours, Mr. Harvey. After September 11, the FAA regulations changed, I gather, that is, in regard to the plastic knives, but

would the magnetometers now be more likely to—has something

been done with the equipment to make it more likely that they

would pick up box cutters or the box cutters would—— Mr. HARVEY. No, the directive that changed for the length of

knives and that type of thing?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARVEY. At this point in time, we are not allowing any

knives of any size to go.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. HARVEY. As far as being able to detect a plastic knife as it

comes through the metal detector, the change in the system that

was implemented after September 11, we now have to do continuous hand-held metal detector searches. As people come through

the security checkpoint—— Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARVEY [continuing]. We have to do hand-held—— Chairman LIEBERMAN. The wand.

Mr. HARVEY. Right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would that pick up the plastic knife?

Mr. HARVEY. The wand itself would not, but if they were doing

the procedure, if a screener was doing the procedure correctly, the

wand itself would sound off, not as far as alarming for metal, but

you would hear—can I demonstrate?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Sure.

Mr. HARVEY. Hear that?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARVEY. OK. If the screener is using the hand-held metal

detector correctly, if he hit the plastic or she hit the plastic, then

you should hear the sound, and then go to a pat-down in order to

detect that particular type of weapon.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I can tell you from the experience that I

described earlier at Dulles the other day, the wand picked up, I

was carrying a few credit cards loose in my coat pocket, and it

picked them up.

52

OK. Painful lessons I guess we learned from September 11.

Thank you very much.

Senator DURBIN [presiding]. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Baker, you said the airlines spend about

a billion dollars a year on security.

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would be interested, and I should know

this as the former mayor of the City of Cleveland, who hires the

security company, the director of the airport? How does that work?

Mr. BAKER. The responsibility to perform various security measures to protect our aircraft and our passengers is passed from the

FAA to the air carrier, as part of our operating certificate responsibility. We have the choice of doing that ourselves with our own people if we would choose to or hiring a contractor. So we hire the contractors.

In many airports, we share that responsibility. On a given concourse where there are multiple airlines on a concourse, one carrier

will take on the management of the checkpoint, we will split the

costs and so forth.

Senator VOINOVICH. So that the security people, in effect, they

are not answerable to the airport director, but rather they are answerable to the airlines, and if you have got a multiple concourse,

you prorate the costs.

Mr. BAKER. With the exception of the law-enforcement officer

function. That is typically provided by the airport or the city, and

those folks are at checkpoints or spread between a couple of checkpoints at each airport, and they are typically paid for by the airport

and answerable to the airport.

Senator VOINOVICH. And depending on the budget of the airport

is or the city, providing those people will depend on what that

budget situation happens to be.

Mr. BAKER. I think that is correct.

Senator VOINOVICH. Following up on the statistics here of the

turnover, were you aware of those statistics in those airports?

Mr. BAKER. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. What did the airlines do about those statistics?

Mr. BAKER. Well, it is interesting because we share those kinds

of statistics in many of the other jobs in the aviation sector during

a full-employment economy. We have had very high turnover in our

entry-level jobs, in our ticket counter positions and on the ramp,

so they are not particularly different than what we see throughout

the beginning end of aviation.

Senator VOINOVICH. But the thing that is interesting, Mr. Griggs,

is the unbelievable turnover rate in St. Louis. Were you aware of

that number?

Mr. GRIGGS. I was aware of that number with the airlines.

Senator VOINOVICH. Was it attributable to the fact that the private company that was hired, and I assume a private company

handled that, that was paying different wages, say, than what they

were paying at some other airport where the turnover is lower? Mr.

Harvey, you said they start at $6.75; is that right?

Mr. HARVEY. That is correct.

53

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. La Pier, do you know what the security

people get at your place?

Mr. LA PIER. I do not know. We are not privy to that information, sir.

Mr. BAKER. These folks, Senator, do not necessarily go from one

security company to another. They leave the industry to other

parts of the economy usually pursuing different hours of work or

slightly higher wages in the fast-food industry.

Senator VOINOVICH. But the point I am getting at is that, from

your perspective, if you see those numbers, does anybody ever say,

hey, what is the problem there? Is the salary level less at that

place, the fringe benefits, the package less and that is why we are

having the turnover, and do we need to do something about that?

Mr. BAKER. Realistically, I do not think so because they are not

unusual, and they have been that way for a number of years, and

we see it in other parts of our business, particularly in the last 2

or 3 years with a full economy.

Senator VOINOVICH. Federalize it?

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator VOINOVICH. Anybody disagree with that?

Who pays for it? If we federalize it, who pays for it? Do the airlines pay for the federalization, and do you want the Federal Government to have Federal employees do it or do you want them to

contract it out? What is your preference?

Mr. BUSICK. Mr. Voinovich, I think that if you look at the system

as a whole, there are portions of it that have to be done with general tax revenue. You have law-enforcement issues, you have intelligence issues, you have all of those issues that currently are paid

for out of general revenues, and they need to continue to be paid

for out of general revenues because they are very national security

in nature, and you cannot parse out the portions of the CIA, the

FBI or any of the other intelligence agencies to figure that out.

On the other hand, the cost of the individual, of what Mr. Harvey

does, that direct screener function, probably could be parsed out

and that probably ought to be paid for by some user fee.

Mr. GRIGGS. I do not think there is a passenger in the United

States of America that would object to paying 50 cents to a dollar

on a ticket in order to get adequate security.

Senator VOINOVICH. But the question I have is if we federalize

it, and it goes to the FAA or somebody else, you want them to do

it themselves? Should they be Federal employees or do you think

that they should hire private contractors?

Mr. GRIGGS. My personal opinion, it should be a Federal employee, and he should be paid for by that agency’s budget.

Mr. BUSICK. Sir, I do not really have a preference. My concern

is the quality of the screening process and making sure that whoever does it is required to be appropriately trained and actually be

able to find the things we are looking for. Who the employer is, is

much less important.

Mr. GRIGGS. I think Monte Belger testified, sir, that they were

looking at this, and I would wait for them to come back with what

their recommendation was. I think they are looking at that specifically.

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Mr. BAKER. Senator, our preference would be that it be a government-owned corporation so that we can gain the benefits of some

of the flexibility inherent in that approach rather than simply tack

it onto an existing department of the United States.

I think probably the costs, rightfully, should be shared between

those who use the aviation system and the General Treasury since

this is a crime against America. This is just an example of terrorism in our country. They are not mad at the airlines. The airline

was not the target, it was America. I think that we believe that is

a national priority and certainly ought to be shared by all of the

taxpayers of the country. But I think there is some sharing that

needs to happen in there. We are spending a billion dollars. That

certainly ought to be available, and if we want to do some more

with the passengers, perhaps that is another approach.

Senator VOINOVICH. And it is the cost of your ticket. I mean, you

have to build that cost in across the board.

Mr. BAKER. One thing we would very much like to see if we go

toward a surcharge of some type is that we would like to have that

as an add-on specified charge below the fare so that we can continue to advertise a $200 fare and a $1 security surcharge so the

American public sees that surcharge for what it is, and it does not

get rolled up into the fare ball, and then we cannot show the American public what we are doing with the money.

Senator VOINOVICH. Your costs went up three times. Is it because

of insurance costs or are you hiring more people or are you paying

higher wages or what?

Mr. LA PIER. That is simply personnel costs, sir. We have not—— Senator VOINOVICH. You are hiring more people then.

Mr. LA PIER. Actually, we are.

Senator VOINOVICH. So that is why it went up. You did not raise

the salary, you just hired more people.

Mr. LA PIER. Hired more people.

Senator VOINOVICH. My last question, and I have taken enough

time. I talked to somebody very high up in the government today,

and I will not mention his name, but somebody very high up, and

indicated that I am the Ranking Member of the Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia,

and the closing of Reagan National Airport has had a very negative

effect. Well, 10,000-and-some employees out there that some of the

representatives are concerned about here, and it is having a negative impact on the economy of D.C. But I think it is also having

a negative impact in terms of people’s confidence in security. And

if the premier airport in the Nation’s capital is not open because

of security reasons, do you not think that sends a very bad signal

out across the country, in terms of security, and that we ought to

be doing everything we can to, as soon as possible, understanding

how important security is, I would not want to risk that, but to get

that airport open because it sends a major message out across the

country?

I would like your reaction.

Mr. BAKER. I, clearly, would support that view. We have moved

our entire operation to Baltimore and Dulles, including the employees. I think there have to be ways that we can get a great deal

more comfort that an airplane shooting the river approach, which

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is the one they are worried about, down the river, is in the hands

of the right people before they allow it to shoot that approach. So

I would be surprised if they do not find a way to get that open in

a secure way in the next couple of weeks.

Mr. GRIGGS. I also echo that. I think it is absolutely essential.

It is the symbol of American air power and it is a symbol of the

country. And if they keep that airport closed, it remains closed,

that is a lesson that they have learned and they have won, and this

really bothers me tremendously.

Mr. LA PIER. Senator, I would fully agree. I think that the airport needs to be opened. We cannot allow the people that perpetrated this crime to shut down a premier airport in the United

States today. We need to look seriously at reopening that airport

as soon as possible, if for no other reason than to show the terrorists that they did not win.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Senator Akaka.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I regret

that I was not here earlier, but I wish to thank you, and Senator

Lieberman, and Members of the Committee for having this hearing

today. For a moment, I wish to speak particularly about Hawaii.

Without question everyone knows how much Hawaii relies on air

transportation.

Hawaii depends on the commercial airlines for mail and cargo,

as does Guam. It all stopped on September 11. There were several

days there when nothing was delivered, and as a Senator, I heard

from people who were asking for medicine and other necessities

that were not delivered. Of course these problems were a result of

what had happened. Who would ever think that somebody would

use a 757 as a missile rather than as an airplane to carry people?

This means that we must change our aviation security to make it

safer and to detect any problems that might occur, some of which

were mentioned here today.

I am glad to see you here, Mr. Baker, and others of you on this

panel representing the aviation industry.

I have some questions, and, Mr. Chairman, I also have a statement that I would like to include in the record.

Senator DURBIN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

September 11, 2001, was a day America will never forget. We have all seen the

tragic images of commercial airliners crashing into the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon. These terrorists, while aiming for symbols of our financial strength and

military might, succeeded in targeting our sense of security. We long believed that

our country was immune to such acts of violence. We now see that, with the ever

widening gaps in our security systems, our Nation is no longer secure. And while

we may never know exactly how the terrorists were able to board the planes, we

must nonetheless implement new security measures to ward off future threats.

First and foremost, we must take a critical look at our baggage screening process.

The turnover rate and lack of training for screening personnel is alarming. Although

the turnover rate for airport security personnel in Honolulu is 30 to 40 percent compared to 400 percent nationally and the employees there are well trained and tested

repeatedly every day, Hawaii cannot afford to feel immune.

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For example, International Total Services, the company contracted to manage airline security at the Honolulu International Airport and at more than 100 other airports in 34 States, tested the effectiveness of the security checkpoints in which fake

hand grenades were taped to wheelchairs. Sadly, in seven out of nine trials, the

wheelchairs with the fake grenades passed through undetected. In another incident,

just 4 days after the terrorist attacks, a person without a ticket was discovered beyond the security checkpoint at the airport in violation of FAA rules.

Although Honolulu’s airport prides itself on the training and low turnover rate

of security personnel, more must be done to increase weapon detection. This is especially true for a State like Hawaii which is so reliant on air transportation. Steps

must be taken to ensure that proper security measures are in place for large commercial airlines, small passenger planes, charter planes and cargo planes alike.

As we review the passenger and baggage screening process, we must also consider

whether we should invest in technologies such as high-resolution X-ray, cargo baggage imaging systems, or personal identification measures. However, as Congress

pushes forward with much needed security measures in the next few weeks, we

must be mindful not to erode our civil liberties. If through fear we become the military state of our enemies and cease to protect the freedom we so cherish, the terrorists would have accomplished their mission. They would have destroyed the very essence of America.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Chairman for holding today’s important hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can restore

America’s feeling of security in air travel.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker, today we have been talking about the

kind of problems that we have been facing and the cost to the airlines. When we talk about screening and security measures at the

airport, we know that the airlines have been paying that bill. My

question to you is if these systems are enhanced, and I am leaving

aside the issue of lost revenues, what impact would it have on the

carriers with this increased cost of security?

Mr. BAKER. I think that the economists that study our industry

would suggest that as our costs go up for any reason, necessitating

a fare increase to maintain the corporate entity, that the demand

for our product will go in the opposite direction. The concept of

elasticity of demand for our product is clearly there. As prices go

up, demand goes down, and vice versa. So over the long run, increased costs drive increased fares that will have an adverse effect

on demand.

Then, as you know so well in Hawaii, we work very hard with

all of the travel and tourism interests in Hawaii to try to keep the

whole package of going to Hawaii affordable because we know what

will happen if it gets out of sight—no one will go. So we are very

sensitive to—over the long run—what happens to our costs and the

effects on revenues that must come to cover those costs.

Senator AKAKA. As you know Hawaii is suffering tremendously.

When a person called me and said, ‘‘I just saw only one car in

Waikiki,’’ that gives you an idea of what is happening there. And

the airlines of course are suffering.

Mr. Harvey, you have been through the screening system, and

have trained people to do it correctly. As a trainer of screeners,

what challenges do you currently face in maintaining a competent

workforce?

Mr. HARVEY. Well, it is really not, from a recruiting and hiring

standpoint, I really do not have anything to do with that, but from

a training standpoint, my goal all of the time is to make sure that

each and every day, when we open up those security checkpoints

at O’Hare, that I have well-trained, fully capable, fully qualified

screeners on the checkpoint.

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Senator AKAKA. When people apply for the jobs of being screeners, do you take any time to screen them?

Mr. HARVEY. Again, I say that I am not in the direct hiring process of screeners for our company, but what I do and take into account when they come into the classroom setting, there are two different settings that we have for the training of screeners. One, you

have a 12-hour theoretical class. When they are in the 12-hour theoretical class, they are required not only to go through the theoretical class, but to take two X-ray image interpretation tests.

They also have to take a language competency test, which is a

20-question test, and what I really look for is attitude. If they do

not have the right attitude, then most of the time I make the decision not to let them go to our security checkpoints out at the airport. I will refer them back to our Human Resources people and see

if we have anything else available for them in order to make an

income.

Senator AKAKA. I wonder what you would suggest and recommend, since you have been a supervisor and trainer, and you

have watched people come through the process. Would you have

any thoughts or any recommendations as to how we can improve

the system?

Mr. HARVEY. Well, one of the things that we can do to improve

the system is just to make sure that we are very consistent. Everybody is talking about federalization of the screening process. The

one thing that I can see that would be beneficial from my perspective would be that we be consistent throughout the system, no matter whether you are in Central Illinois or whether you are out at

O’Hare, whether you are out at Reagan National Airport. We would

all be doing exactly the same thing. We would all be trying to make

the same decisions.

The other thing is, as far as the technological advances go, at

O’Hare, naturally, being one of the larger airports in the country,

we have available to us all of the latest technology, as far as our

X-ray machines, our walk-through metal detectors, our explosive

trace detection equipment, the wireless communication with the

threat imaging projection system, with our hand-held metal detectors. If that technology and equipment was available all the way

across the country, now that would also enhance our capabilities of

being a better screening operation.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Mr. Griggs, I want to conclude with you. Much attention has

been focused appropriately on the security screening of airline passengers, but the level of sophistication and organization involved in

the September 11 hijacks has raised concerns beyond the screening

of passengers. Today’s airports offer many conveniences. After you

get through the checkpoint, there are restaurants and gift shops.

How would the recommended security measures discussed today by

our various witnesses address the physical screening of airport employees who work beyond security checkpoints?

Mr. GRIGGS. Well, we are in the process at Lambert Airport—I

cannot speak for other airports—of going through and revalidating

everybody’s badge. For example, if you had a badge, it is going to

be revalidated. If you are like I am, can drive on the flight line,

58

you have to have a background check done on you. So these are the

kinds of things we can do.

I think one of the ways the system broke down is this sharing

of intelligence from the Federal level on down. I know, for a fact,

that our FAA Civil Aviation Office was not provided some of these

facts. We were actually getting, my chief of police was getting information from the FBI before the FAA was getting it. There is something wrong when that sort of thing happens.

So I think irrespective of what you do on the Federal checkpoint,

you have got to look at the whole system in totality—have we let

an airplane crew member go through a checkpoint, have we let the

concessionaire go through the checkpoint, have we delivered

deliverables to that checkpoint to provide that restaurant service?

And so the whole system has to be looked at.

It is not just the checkpoint, it is the entire system and the way

we operate. I think it was Monte Belger that summed it up, and

Mr. Baker, who has got more experience than any of us, and that

is the whole threat perception has changed. We had designed and

put together a system that quite frankly it was more of a deterrent

than it was an absolute guarantee we could get through this thing.

Now we are facing a faceless enemy, and how do you face that?

But it is something we have got to grow into, learn how to deal

with it, and make sure we deal with it. That is what we are all

talking about.

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

We have really focused almost all of our discussion today on commercial aviation and major airlines, and yet for most airports, almost all of the airports that I am familiar with and represented

here today, they share the airport with general aviation. And general aviation, as we know it, operates by significantly different

rules when it comes to security and screening.

I have often wondered if it is still possible, as it was September

10, for me to charter a jet at an airport, you name it, and to get

on that jet without anybody ever asking who I am, what my criminal record might be, and to carry on board a bagful of whatever—

explosives, guns—and to be in a position to take a jet plane under

the same type of control as happened on September 11.

It seems clear to me that general aviation is going to have to go

through some substantial changes for airport security and general

security. Has anyone here addressed that or considered that aspect

of this discussion? Mr. Baker, has that come up?

Mr. BAKER. Well, we have certainly talked a lot about it within

the airline circles because if the threat assessment is that airplanes

as ballistic missiles, and clearly corporate jets and other forms of

general aviation are equally capable of flying the mission. So we

are going to have to think that through. We are going to have to

understand how to prevent that, just as we are trying to do it in

commercial aviation, not only in the shared airports, but as you

know there are a tremendous number of other airfields in the country where there are no air carriers, and I am not quite sure how

to deal with that.

59

But we have really got to sit down and define the threat and

then build a plan to deal with it. But until we understand the

threat, we are not probably going to hit the mark. So I think some

hard work on that is going to come, and then the plan will flow

out of that, but it is clearly an exposure.

Mr. BUSICK. Senator, I am aware that the FAA is actually looking at airline or FAR 108-type regulations for aircraft over 12,500

pounds in the corporate fleet, charter fleet. So they are already

looking at it.

Senator DURBIN. I think that Secretary Mineta might have mentioned that last week in testimony, but clearly the customers and

personnel of general aviation are also in that same airport setting,

in that same secure setting, and they have to be viewed, I hope,

with the same level of scrutiny as anyone who would be involved

in commercial aviation. I do not think that there is much doubt or

question about that.

Let me ask you, Mr. Harvey, you have been at this for 5 years;

is that what your testimony is? And how often have you run into

a situation at your security station where you had to call law-enforcement personnel? I know there are two times you mentioned in

your testimony where you were given an award for your extraordinary service, but how often does that happen at an airport like

O’Hare?

Mr. HARVEY. We probably run into—I will just give you a classic

setting, the day of the incident—the very next day we caught a

weapon on an employee coming through the checkpoint in their

backpack. I think just last Saturday—we had three gun incidents,

in the past week since the incident. So I would probably say we run

into at least one a month, not so much because the person is trying

to do anything to the airplane.

Let me clarify that. Normally, it is a direct result of a person not

understanding the law as it involves transporting a firearm from

Point A to Point B. It is just the ignorance of the law, but screeners, at O’Hare anyway, they just do not miss weapons, not firearms, whether they are disassembled or whether they are assembled.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Griggs, I know that O’Hare has exceptional

devices that they use for bomb detection and other close scrutiny.

I do not know if Lambert Airport does, but could either one of you

tell me under what circumstances baggage or packages are referred

to that kind of a device for examination.

Mr. GRIGGS. I think, probably to be very frank, it has been on

a random basis in the past. The whole thing again was a threat.

It was a deterrent against a threat, and the threat, as we envisioned it, as the public understood it, as everybody understood it,

that was the counterintelligence we had to counter against this. I

think there could be better use of EDS systems, and I think airports are going to have to address this, and I think that the airlines are going to have to come to grips with it. If we have a system

like this, we have to do it.

Somehow we have got to get this cargo restored. Somehow the

mail has got to be delivered. So all of these are deterrents that you

can take and definite steps that would prevent some of this.

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We have the same surveillance equipment at our checkpoint that

they have. It is just a matter of how it is used. We probably detect

one or two guns a month, and basically most of it comes from just

negligence on the part of the guy going through the checkpoint. ‘‘I

forgot to take the thing out. I am going hunting. I put it in the

backpack,’’ which they know they cannot do, but they get caught

at it. Thank God they get caught at it.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like the permission of the Chairman

to submit for the record a statement that I wanted to make.

Senator DURBIN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman Lieberman and Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee Chairman Durbin for calling this hearing this

afternoon. As the Ranking Member of the Oversight of Government Management

Subcommittee, I am pleased to be able to work with Chairman Durbin on the management practices of the Federal Government. This afternoon’s joint full Committee

and Subcommittee hearing focuses on how well our aviation security is being managed at our Nation’s airports; an issue that is key to restoring faith in flying—a

faith that is essential to the economy of our country.

Mr. Chairman, the number one responsibility of the Federal Government is to ensure the safety and security of the citizens of the United States, and I am concerned

that the government is not doing everything it can to ensure the safety of air travel.

We need to determine whether allowing airports and airlines to be responsible for

such a critical piece of our national security is appropriate in light of these recent

acts of terrorism.

At a hearing on the issue of airport security in the House of Representatives last

week, Transportation Secretary Mineta announced one short-term fix that would require the imposition of stricter qualifications and training requirements for airport

security personnel. Like most of my colleagues, I believe this is a necessary first

step, however more must naturally be done. I look forward to discussing what additional steps today’s witnesses believe should be taken to increase passenger safety

and restore public confidence in air travel. I am pleased to report that this public

confidence is already beginning to return; my flight from Cleveland to Washington

earlier this week was packed. As Ranking Member of the District of Columbia Subcommittee, I understand the concerns both economically and symbolically of keeping

National Airport closed. If the security needs can be addressed completely and thoroughly, which are our first priority, we should re-open the airport.

I am also interested in discussing some of the issues raised in recent reports by

the General Accounting Office and the Transportation Department’s Office of the

Inspector General; reports that are critical of the airport security industry for its

alarmingly high rate of personnel turnover and the lack of incentives for airport security personnel. From my own experience as a chief executive of the City of Cleveland and of the State of Ohio, I know that such personnel concerns can only have

a negative effect on the productive operation of one’s enterprise. And when one’s enterprise directly impacts the safety of millions of Americans, it is of particular concern to the U.S. Congress. I believe that adequate time and attention must be refocused on improving employee incentives and addressing the high rate of turnover

that plagues this profession.

Finally, we need to remain vigilant in our effort to ensure the safety of air travel

in this country. This can’t be something that we react to during a time of crisis and

then forget about once things settle down.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you again for calling this hearing today and

I look forward to discussing how we can all work together to improve airline safety.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to get back to the cost of paying

for this federalizing of screening. Does your national organization

have some information about the percentage of your costs that go

into security? For example, the thing that I would love to see is you

have a ticket, and what portion of that ticket is attributable to security? How much of that is going for security?

61

I would also like to know, and I would, for the record, like to get

the answer, the percentage increase that you have experienced over

the last several years in your security costs, in terms of how it has

impacted upon your bottom line. I would like to see how much the

cost of living percentages have gone up. Has it been about what the

cost of living is? Because we are going to have to get a handle, I

think, on what the public is now paying as part of the ticket, in

terms of screening. It gives us an idea of how much we should earmark for that purpose.

Mr. BAKER. We can try to develop those numbers through our industry association by asking the carriers to submit what they believe. These are difficult numbers to come by because the costs fall

in lots of different buckets in the typical cost accounting system,

but we will take that off and see if we can give you those kind of

numbers.

Senator VOINOVICH. I think it is important because I know when

we finally get to this whole business, there is going to be an argument here in the Senate, and in the House, and maybe with the

administration, about how do you allocate the costs of this, and it

would be interesting to find out just how much right now the public

is paying for security and does not know it. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. I might say, Senator Voinovich, that I spoke to

Senator Hollings this morning, and most of the bills that we are

considering have a $1 surcharge on tickets. For the screening aspect of this, it is believed that the total cost, and I do not know

how they come up with this number, would require a $4 surcharge

for the screening part of this. So the question is how much would

be general revenue, how much would be a ticket surcharge, and

that has not been determined.

Senator VOINOVICH. If he says $1 for a surcharge, if you look at

what people are already paying for security, and I have no idea

what it is, they could be paying $2 right now and not even know

it or maybe it is more than that.

Senator DURBIN. That is right. I am sure we are going to explore

that further.

I want to thank the witnesses on this panel for coming forward

today and really providing extraordinary testimony for this Governmental Affairs Committee. I thank you so much. I cannot think of

anything more important for us to focus on, and you are going to

help us understand it.

The official record of the hearing will be open for Members to include statements and questions for the record, and the Committee

stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak on such an important issue

as airport security. The terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon on

September 11 forever changed the way Americans travel by air. Increased security

at the nation’s airports has become standard procedure but there is still much more

to do to protect the traveling public.

We need to ease the fears of flying Americans while we take steps to ensure that

the events of September 11 never happen again. We should adopt measures that assure the traveling public that from the moment they cross the first airport checkpoint until they reach their destination, they will have the benefit of the best technology, the most highly trained professionals, and the most secure aircraft that this

nation can provide. These measures may include the federalization of screeners as

professionally trained as our Customs agents, the use of high-tech explosives detection equipment, state-of-the-art identification and expanded background checks of

airport personnel, improved coordination of intelligence information, to name just a

few of the proposals.

In fact, I am cosponsoring Senator Hollings’ Aviation Security legislation to improve airport safety, which is one alternative which must be considered. This legislation establishes a deputy administrator at the Federal Aviation Administration for

Aviation Security; establishes an Aviation Security Council that will coordinate national security, intelligence, and aviation security information among several agencies; federalizes Airport Security Operations and improves training and testing for

screening personnel; and improves the screening procedures for passengers by

checking names against a coordinated database comprising criminal, national security, intelligence, and INS information.

This hearing will examine whether the screening of passengers and baggage

should be managed and operated by the Federal Government within an existing

agency or a newly created not-for-profit Federal corporation. This entity would have

the security of airport and air travelers as its primary focus. Such an organization

would also ensure that passenger and baggage screeners have uniform, more strenuous training and performance standards that apply throughout the nation. According to transportation and airport experts, such a system would take time to develop

even though a lot of the current proposals were suggested years ago. It is vital, now

more than ever, to do more than just authorize commissions and reports that only

define and analyze the problem. We must develop a comprehensive strategy for responding to the September 11 tragedies and we must give the appropriate agencies

the ability to implement new security measures. We must do this now.

I personally support fast tracking regulations which directly impact upon our national security. Too often and for far too long we have put on hold publishing final

airport security rules because of political pressures. In the past, more stringent security measures have been recommended and rejected due to cost or pressure to

keep fares reasonable and avoid undue inconvenience to travelers. In fact, the use

of government employees to screen passengers and baggage was considered and rejected when passenger screening procedures first were implemented in 1973.

Mr. Chairman and members of our distinguished panel, the threat of terrorism

remains as high today as it was throughout the 1990’s when a plot to destroy 12

United States airliners was discovered and thwarted in 1995. We must do better.

The future of aviation security hangs on the actions that we take today to prevent

future terrorist attacks on Americans. The American people and the world expect

us to follow through this time—God only knows what may happen if we do not.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on how

together we can achieve a safer aviation industry.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to thank our guests for being here today.

What we witnessed on September 11 illustrates just how deeply certain groups

hate America and the desperate measures they are willing to undertake to destroy

us.

I doubt there is anyone who questions whether we need to improve our airport

security.

Over the next couple of months, I expect Congress will be making many changes

to our aviation system.

We will be debating everything from hiring additional sky marshals to changing

cockpit doors to possibly allowing pilots to carry weapons.

Today, we are looking at the baggage and passenger screening system, and whether the Federal Government should play a role in this process.

As several of our witnesses will testify and many government reports have indicated, the airport screening system has many flaws.

Employees are paid low wages, with few or any benefits. Turnover is high. In fact,

a GAO study indicates that the average turnover rate at 19 of the country’s largest

airports was 126 percent during a 1-year period.

Other issues we will have to look at include the amount of training screeners receive along with the type of technology used to detect dangerous weapons.

Commercial aviation is a critical industry in this country, and we do need to make

some changes to ensure we have the best airport security possible.

The American people are looking to us for answers and solutions during this difficult time. We have already seen the horrific damage terrorists can inflict when our

airport security fails.

The challenges of balancing increased security against the economic necessity of

a vibrant airline industry is great.

However, I am confident that we can strike that balance. Today’s hearing should

be another good step toward that goal.

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