[Cite as Makse v. Summit Cty. Executive , 2021-Ohio-2026.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
DORA MAKSE Appellee

v. SUMMIT COUNTY EXECUTIVE Appellant C.A. No. 29747

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CV-2019-09-3512
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: June 16, 2021

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Appellant, the Summit County Executive (“the Executive”), appea ls from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, reversing in part and modifying the decision of the Summit County Human Resource Commission (“the C ommission”). This Court affirms.
I. {¶2} Appellee, Dora Makse, worked as a Social Programs Supervisor fo r the Summit County Department of Job and Family Services (“JFS”). She was responsible for supervising between eight and ten employees and worked alongside two co-sup ervisors who likewise supervised eight to ten employ ees. In February 2019, two separ ate incidents involving Ms. Makse came to the attention of her superiors. During the first incid ent, Ms. Makse ignored an employee who came to her office for assist ance and, when the employee wa lked away, Ms. Makse made an unprofessional comment about her in the presence of another emp loyee and a co-supervisor.2 During the second incident, Ms. M akse slammed her door while em ployees were congregated in the hallway outside her office. {¶3} Ms. Makse was notified that a pre-disciplinary conference would be held based on charges that she had violated the Executive’s Policies and Proc edures. The notice she received charged her with willfully or deliberately neglecting her assig ned duties, including her supervisory duties, and engaging in unprofessi onal and inappropriate behavi or. The notice summarized the two foregoing incidents, but also referenced “a trend of unprof essional behavior” that had been documented in prior performance re views and past disciplinary a ctions. The notice advised Ms. Makse that she was facing termination. {¶4} A hearing officer from the Executive’s Department of Human Reso urces conducted Ms. Makse’s pre-disciplinary conference. At the conference, th e Executive introduced evidence about the two specific incidents referenced in Ms. Makse’s noti ce as well as evidence about her past discipline, performance re views, and trainings. Upon revi ew of the evidence, the hearing officer determined that just cause for discipline existed on al l charges. JFS then terminated Ms. Makse. {¶5} Ms. Makse appealed her termination to the Commission. An offic er for the Commission conducted a hearing on her appeal and issued a repor t and recommendation. Citing the Executive’s Policy and Procedure Manual, the hearing office r refused to consider any disciplinary history that predated February 2017. She confined her review to evidence of conduct and discipline that occurred after that date. Further, she ref used to consider disciplinary action that had been taken against Ms. Makse in the spring of 2017, as it had been overturned by the Commission. The hearing officer determined that the Executive had proven, by a preponderance3
of the evidence, that Ms. Makse h ad violated its policies and p rocedures as charged. She concluded that termination was justified a nd made a recommendation to tha t effect. {¶6} Ms. Makse filed written objections to the hearing officer’s rep ort and recommendation. The Executive f iled a response. Members of th e Commission held a hearing on the objections and heard arguments from Ms. Makse and the Execu tive. The Commission then issued an order affirming the he aring officer’s findings and co nclusions but modifying her recommendation of termination. T he Commission determined that Ms. Makse would be suspended for six months without pay, demoted to a non-supervis ory role, and required to take part in cultural sensitivity, race neutral, and implicit bias t raining as deemed appropriate by the Executive’s Director of Human Resources. {¶7} Ms. Makse appealed the Commission’s order to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. She filed a written brief, following which the E xecutive filed a responsive brief, and Ms. Makse filed a reply. Upon review of the record and the written briefs, the trial court issued its decision. The trial court determined that the Commission’s order was not supported by a preponderance of substantial, r eliable, and probative evidence, as the Executive had not proven that termination or suspension w ithout pay was warranted. The court modified the Commission’s decision by removing Ms. Makse’s six-month suspension without p ay and demotion to a nonsupervisory role. The court lef t intact the Commission’s order for additional training. {¶8} The Executive now appeals from the judgment of the court of com mon pleas and raises one assignment of error for our review.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE CLEARLY DELINEATED4
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ITS DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF RELIABLE, PROBATIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND IT SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMISSION. {¶9} In its sole assignment of error, the Executive argues that the trial court erred when it reversed in part and modified the decision of the Commission . Specifically, the Executive argues that the trial court (1) failed to clearly delineate its factua l findings and conclusions of law, (2) reached a decision that was not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and (3) substituted its own judgment for that of the Commission. For the following reasons, we reject the Executive’s arguments. {¶10} Under R.C. 2506.04, a trial court c onsidering an administrative appeal reviews the order at issue to determine whether it is “unconstitutional, il legal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantia l, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.” The trial court may not simply substitut e its judgment for that of the administrative agency, but it may weigh the evidence in determi ning whether the record supports the agency’s decision. Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive , 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, ¶ 13. Conversely, the scope of an appella te court’s review of the trial court’s decision is “narrower and more deferential.” Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, ¶ 25. It is “designed to strongly favor affirmance” and focuses on questions of law. Id. at ¶ 30. [T]he court of appeals may not weigh the evidence. Apart from deciding purely legal issues, the court of appeals can determine whether the co urt of common pleas abused its discretion, which in t his context means reviewing wh ether the lower court abused its discretion in deciding that an administrative order was or was not supported by reliable , probative, and substantial evidence.5 (Internal citations omitted.) Shelly Materials, Inc. v. City of Streetsboro Planning and Zoning
Comm. , 158 Ohio St.3d 476, 2019-Ohio-4499, ¶ 17. {¶11} The trial court found that Ms. M akse supervised nine individual s and held that position for about one year before this disciplinary action com menced. The court found that multiple complaints had been lodge d against her. The court set forth a non-exhaustive list of those complaints, including that Ms. Makse had reviewed an employee’s work prior to its completion, had made inappropriate comments to that same employee, had deli berately ignored a different employee, had made a sarcastic r emark about that same employee, had directed inappropriate comments toward a superior, had avoided Black staff members, an d had failed to timely complete employee evaluations. The trial court further found that prior trainings Ms. Makse had received “had not achieved the desired results.” The court acknowledged that willful or deliberate neglect in the performance of assigned duties could, in certain instanc es, constitute a “major offense” that would justify a termination or suspension under the Executive’s Policy and Procedure Manual. Yet, the court found that Ms. Makse’s actions did not rise to t hat level. Because “her failures did not rise to the level that warran ted termination or a six month suspension without pay[,]” the trial court determined that the Co mmission’s decision was not support ed by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and proba tive evidence. The court remov ed Ms. Makse’s suspension without pay and demotion and only affirmed the order for additional tra ining. {¶12} The Executive first argues that the trial court committed an er ror of law when it failed to issue an order “with cl ear findings of fact and concl usions of law * * *.” Yet, the trial court detailed the c onduct that led JFS to take disciplinary ac tion against Ms. Makse. It also specifically found that her conduc t did not constitute a “major offense” warranting termination or suspension under the Executive’s own Policy and Procedure Manua l. The Executive has failed to6 set forth any authority that woul d have required the trial cour t to issue more detailed findings. See App.R. 16(A)(7). This Court will not construct an analysis on the Executive’s behalf. See id. ; Cardone v. Cardone , 9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (May 6, 1998). Absent any authority in support of the Executive’s argument, this Cour t will not reverse the trial court’s decision on the basis that it ne glected to issue more detailed findings or conclusions. {¶13} The Executive’s remaining arguments are interrelated. The Exec utive argues that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a decision tha t is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The Executiv e maintains that the trial court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the Commiss ion. Citing evidence and testimony introduced at the hear ing before the Commission’s hea ring officer, the Executive argues that it proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Ma kse engaged in egregious misconduct such that her suspensi on and demotion was warranted. Thus, the Executive maintains that the trial court erred whe n it rejected the Commission’s de cision. {¶14} Unfortunately, this Court is unable to address the Executive’s remaining arguments on their merits. That is because the record is incomplete. It does not contain the f ull report of the hearing officer who heard Ms. Makse’s appeal to the Commission. The third page of her fourpage report is missing. Though our primary concern on appeal i s the decision of the trial court, our standard of review calls us to decide whether the trial cou rt “abused its discretion in deciding that [the Commission’s] order was or was not supported by relia ble, probative, and substantial evidence.” Shelly Materials, Inc. , 158 Ohio St.3d 476, 2019-Ohio-4499, ¶ 17. The findings and conclusions of the Commission are necessarily relevant to that determination. Without a complete record of the proceedings conducted by the Commission, this Cou rt cannot conduct a meaningful review.7
{¶15} It is unclear to this Court whether the trial court had in its possession a complete copy of the hearing officer’s report. We would note, however, that Ms. Makse included several footnotes in her brief before t he court of common pleas, wherei n she cited to or quoted from the missing page of the report and specifically noted that it was m issing from the record as filed. Neither she, nor the Executive acted to remedy that deficiency, and the trial court did not address it. This Court will not engage in speculation regarding the tr ial court’s review of the report, particularly when the Executive has not addressed that issue on appeal. Because the record is incomplete and the par ties were aware of tha t fact while this m atter was pending with the court of common pleas, we have no choice but to presume regularity in th e proceedings below and affirm the trial court’s judgment on that basis. See Brimer v. Kichner , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010890, 2017-Ohio-7012, ¶ 7-8. Compare In re Holmes , 104 Ohio St.3d 664, 2004-Ohio-7109 (reversing appellate court’s decision to pres ume regularity where the cler k failed to file exhibits with the appellate court and neither party discovered the deficiency pri or to the issuance of the court’s decision). For the foregoing rea sons, the Executive’s sole ass ignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶16} The Executive’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The jud gment of the Summit County Court of Comm on Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.8 Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

THOMAS A. TE ODOSIO FOR THE COURT

CALLAHAN, J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARRETT W. HANNA, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant. NANCY GRIM, Atorney at Law, for Appellee. WILLIAM T. WHITAKER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.