UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JERVON HERBIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHAWNITA WILKINS SEAU,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-1136 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jervon Herbin’s motions for default judgment. 

Dkt. 15; Dkt. 18. Because Herbin has not met his burden of establishing subject matter 

jurisdiction and has not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, the Court will 

DENY both motions for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will further require that 

Herbin file additional evidence regarding jurisdiction, liability, and damages.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a putative business dispute between Plaintiff Jervon Herbin and 

Defendant Shawnita Wilkins Seau. During the relevant events, Herbin was incarcerated in 

Virginia, where he remains today. See Dkt. 1 at 1. According to Herbin, he developed an idea 

for “a dating/social networking website” that would “target[] [b]lack consumers.” Id. at 3–4 

(Compl. ¶ 5). He decided to go into business with Seau, “a former college classmate,” id. at 3–4 

(Compl. ¶¶ 4–5), with whom Herbin had “reconnect[ed] after . . . a 17[-]year hiatus in their . . . 

friendship,” id. at 7–8 (Compl. ¶ 12). They “entered into a [p]artnership agreement,” and Herbin 

gave Seau a “copy of [his] business plan.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 5). Although the two friends worked 

well together at first, Herbin eventually grew dissatisfied with what he perceived to be Seau’s 
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lack of follow-through. Id. (Compl. ¶ 5). He alleges that she “failed to meet her partnership 

obligations [by] failing to execute the task[s] needed to bring the business to fruition.” Id.

(Compl. ¶ 5). In particular, Herbin asserts, Seau did not register a domain name for the website, 

skipped a workshop at the D.C. “Bar Entrepreneurship Pro Bono Program,” and failed to email 

potential investors. Id. (Compl. ¶ 5); see id. at 5–6 (Compl. ¶¶ 8–11). Disillusioned, Herbin 

asked Seau “to return his business plan,” warned her not to “steal” his idea, and “informed her 

. . . that the partnership was to be dissolved.” Id. at 3–4, 7–8 (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12). Although Seau 

agreed to return the document and said she would not compete with him, she allegedly has not 

returned Herbin’s business plan to him despite multiple requests. Id. at 7–8 (Compl. ¶ 12). 

Herbin alleges that, as a result, he has missed out on “professional assistance in launching the 

business,” including “assistance from potential investors.” Id. at 3–4 (Compl. ¶ 5).

Herbin, proceeding pro se, filed this diversity action against Seau. Dkt. 1. He asserts a 

variety of contract and tort claims based on her alleged “fail[ure] to honor the partnership 

agreement” as well as unspecified intellectual property claims stemming from her “refusal to 

return [his] business plan.” Id. at 9–10 (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17). He seeks compensatory damages in 

the amount of $152 million as well as punitive damages. Id. at 11–12 (Compl. Prayer).

Seau was served on July 24, 2017, Dkt. 11 at 3, and has failed to respond to the 

complaint. Herbin moved for a default judgment on December 4, 2017, before the Clerk of the 

Court had entered a default. Dkt. 15. Three days later, the Clerk entered the default. Dkt. 14. 

Herbin renewed his motion for default judgment on March 27, 2018. Dkt. 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of a default judgment. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 55. If a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against the action, the 
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plaintiff may “apply to the [C]ourt for a default judgment.” Id. Entry of a default judgment, 

however, “is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In particular, 

“the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a federal court of its ‘affirmative obligation’ 

to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” Cohen v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 3d 71, 79 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 

82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). In addition, the Court “should satisfy itself that it has 

personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent defendant.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 

6. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff can satisfy his 

“burden of proving personal jurisdiction . . . with a prima facie showing” based on the 

“pleadings, bolstered by . . . affidavits and other written materials.” Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted) 

(citing Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The 

plaintiff “has the burden of establishing both subject matter jurisdiction over the claim[] and 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant[].” Friends of Mayanot Inst., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2018 WL 2023498, at *3 (D.D.C. May 1, 2018) (quoting Thuneibat v. 

Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 33 (D.D.C. 2016)).

A complaint that is “filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’” and, “however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976)). A pro se plaintiff, however, still “bears the burden of establishing that the Court has 

subject matter jurisdiction.” Bickford v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). To determine whether it has jurisdiction, the Court may “consider the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record.” Coal. for Underground 
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Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of 

Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). If the complaint “fails facially to plead facts 

sufficient to establish” subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may dismiss the complaint. 

Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 170 F. Supp. 3d 164, 173 (D.D.C. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Before reaching the merits of Herbin’s motions for entry of a default judgment, the Court 

must satisfy itself that it has Article III jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Because Herbin has not established that the Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction, the Court will deny the motions without prejudice.

Herbin has invoked the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Dkt. 1 

at 1 (Compl.). “Federal diversity jurisdiction exists only in cases in which no plaintiff is a 

citizen of the same state as any defendant.” McKee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 253 F. Supp. 3d 78, 

82 (D.D.C. 2017). For purposes of assessing diversity jurisdiction, an individual is a citizen of 

the state in which she is domiciled. See Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 

1984). Domicile requires “physical presence in a state” as well as the “intent to remain there for 

an unspecified or indefinite period of time.” Id. If there are “any litigants from the same state on 

opposing sides,” then diversity jurisdiction is “lacking.” Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 55 

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Herbin is 

incarcerated in Virginia, he asserts that he is “a citizen and resident of the District of Columbia.” 

Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl.). The Court, accordingly, lacks jurisdiction if Seau resides in the District as 

well.

On this score, the record is mixed. According to the complaint, Herbin “is not exactly 

sure of where” Seau “resides” because “there is some discrepancy as to her exact address.” Dkt. 
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1 at 3 (Compl. ¶ 4). She allegedly provided Herbin with “two different addresses” located in 

Stafford, Virginia, and “also occasionally resides at her brother’s house in Alexandria, Virginia.” 

Id. (Compl. ¶ 4). Further confusing matters, Seau allegedly informed Herbin that she “use[s] . . . 

other relative[s’] address(es)” in the District of Columbia “as her place of residence.” Id.

(Compl. ¶ 4). In subsequent filings, Herbin has continued to express uncertainty as to Seau’s 

place of residence. See Dkt. 2 at 1 (“There is [a] discrepancy as to [Seau’s] residential address

. . . and the only other address [Herbin] has . . . is a work address in Alexandria, Virginia.”); Dkt. 

8 at 3 (noting that Seau “list[s] several addresses in different jurisdictions as her place of 

residence”).

The return of service affidavit, moreover, does not shed any additional light on Seau’s 

domicile. Because Herbin is proceeding in forma pauperis, the U.S. Marshals Service effected 

service. To do so, the Marshals Service looked to the addresses that Herbin provided for Seau in 

his complaint. The Marshals Service reported that Seau was served at the first of those 

addresses, but that it was her workplace in Alexandria, Virginia. Dkt. 11 at 1–2. The Marshals 

Service further reported that the second address—the Stafford, Virginia address—was Seau’s 

“old house.” Id. at 1. Beyond providing these addresses—neither of which establishes Seau’s 

domicile—Herbin has not provided any evidence that Seau is a citizen of Virginia.

In sum, it is unclear whether Seau is domiciled in Virginia, which would allow this case 

to proceed under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, or, alternatively, whether she lives in the 

District of Columbia, which would preclude this Court from considering the merits. The burden 

of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction rests with Herbin, and he has not done so. As a result, the 

Court cannot consider Herbin’s motions for the entry of a default judgment. Moreover, in order 

to permit the Court to decide whether this case is properly before it, the Court will order Herbin 
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to submit evidence regarding Seau’s domicile. If Herbin is not able to meet his burden of 

establishing the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will dismiss this action without 

prejudice.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

In addition to establishing subject matter jurisdiction, to obtain a default judgment Herbin 

must make a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Seau. The Court 

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident with respect to a claim that arises from the 

person’s

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in 

the District of Columbia; [or]

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission 

outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, 

engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial 

revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District 

of Columbia . . . .

D.C. Code § 13–423. Assuming that Seau is not domiciled in the District of Columbia, it is 

unclear from Herbin’s complaint and other filings that she is subject to personal jurisdiction in 

the District of Columbia. Herbin was incarcerated in Virginia during the relevant events, see 

Dkt. 1 at 1, and Seau’s whereabouts during the formation and dissolution of the alleged 

partnership cannot be discerned from the filings. The only (sparse) link to the District of 

Columbia appears to be Herbin’s allegation that Seau failed to attend a workshop “at the DC Bar 

. . . in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 9). Herbin, accordingly, has not made a 

prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, which provides an additional basis for denying his 

motions for default judgment. The Court will allow Herbin to provide additional allegations and 

evidence regarding personal jurisdiction.
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C. Other Matters

Even if Herbin can establish that the Court has both subject matter jurisdiction and 

personal jurisdiction, he is not automatically entitled to a default judgment. Rather, the 

“determination of whether default judgment is appropriate is committed to the discretion of the 

trial court.” CapitalKeys, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 278 F. Supp. 3d 265, 284 

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier Drywall, 

LLC, 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008)). Although the “defaulting defendant is deemed to 

admit every well-pleaded allegation in the complaint,” Fanning v. Hotel Mgmt. Advisors–Troy, 

LLC, 282 F.R.D. 280, 283 (D.D.C. 2002) (citation omitted), failure to answer or to move to 

dismiss is “not an absolute confession” of liability, Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 

2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2008). The Court may, in its discretion, “require some proof of the facts 

that must be established in order to determine liability.” 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 

Practice & Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed.). If liability is established, moreover, the Court must

make a further “independent determination” of damages. Robinson v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, 4 F. 

Supp. 3d 171, 178 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing 

damages, the court “may conduct hearings” to calculate the appropriate award, “establish the 

truth of any allegation by evidence,” or “investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); 

see CapitalKeys, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 285.

Given the nature of the claims against Seau, the size of the award that Herbin has 

requested, the fact that he has not provided any evidence in support of his claims, and serious 

questions about whether a binding contractual relationship was ever formed and, if so, what the 

terms of that agreement were, the Court will require an evidentiary submission on both liability 

and damages in the event that Herbin is able to establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction 

and personal jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for default 

judgment, Dkt. 15; Dkt. 18, are DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall, on or before September 14, 2018, (1) show cause why 

this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) submit evidence 

regarding subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, liability and 

damages; and it is further

ORDERED that the United States Marshals Service shall serve a copy of this 

memorandum opinion and order on Defendant.

SO ORDERED.

 

/s/ Randolph D. Moss

RANDOLPH D. MOSS

United States District Judge

Date: July 11, 2018