FILED

September 17, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JULY 1997 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9701-CC-00010

)

Appellant, ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY

)

VS. ) HON. JOE H. WALKER, III

) JUDGE

)

LUCKY HUMPHREYS, )

) (DUI)

Appellee. )

FOR THE APPELLEE: FOR THE APPELLANT:

WILLIAM K. RANDOLPH JOHN KNOX WALKUP

P. O. Box 611 Attorney General and Reporter

Dyersburg, TN 38025-0611

DEBORAH A. TULLIS

Assistant Attorney General

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

ELIZABETH T. RICE

District Attorney General

MARK E. DAVIDSON

Assistant District Attorney General

302 Market Street

Somerville, TN 38068

OPINION FILED: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

JOE G. RILEY, 

JUDGE
2

O P I N I O N

The state appeals the dismissal of an indictment for driving under the influence

of an intoxicant. The trial court found that the post-arrest detention of the defendant

constituted punishment and dismissed the indictment based upon a finding of double

jeopardy. We reverse and reinstate the indictment. 

FACTS

Defendant, Lucky Humphreys, was arrested for driving under the influence of

an intoxicant. Upon arrival at the jail, defendant refused a breathalyzer test. Under

the sheriff’s policy, DUI arrestees were detained at the jail for approximately eight

hours before being allowed to make bail. If an arrestee was highly intoxicated, he or

she was sometimes allowed to be released to a family member. The rationale for the

detention policy was the safety of the arrestee as well as the safety of the general

public. 

The defendant was held for approximately eight hours before being allowed

to make bail. During this time he was not allowed to make a phone call. 

The trial court found no showing by the state of the need to keep this

defendant for an eight-hour period for public safety purposes. Although the trial court

recognized the remedial, public safety reasons for detention, the trial court found that

defendant’s detention resulted from the failure to allow him to call a family member

to pick him up and make bond. The trial court ruled that the detention, therefore,

constituted punishment. In summary, the trial court found that the defendant’s

detention was “punishment” for the “same offense” for which he was indicted; to-wit:

driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court dismissed the DUI

indictment finding it to constitute double jeopardy.
3

ANALYSIS

The detention policy was intended, at least in part, to protect not only the

arrestee but also the public from someone who had been recently arrested for driving

under the influence of an intoxicant. This is a remedial purpose, not a punitive one,

and does not trigger double jeopardy protection. State v. Pennington, S.W.2d 

 (Tenn. 1997). If the confinement is remedial and imposed pursuant to a legitimate

governmental purpose, then the confinement is not considered punishment for

double jeopardy purposes. See Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1988); State

v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coolidge, 915 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1995). We further find that the detention was not excessive in the

accomplishment of the remedial purpose. See Coolidge, 915 S.W.2d at 824. The

fact that the defendant was not allowed to post bond nor make a phone call to secure

a relative to pick him up does not convert his detention into “punishment.” 

For the above reasons, we reinstate the indictment for driving under the

influence of an intoxicant and remand for further proceedings. 

 

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

CONCUR:

 

JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE

 

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE