[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12062

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID ANTOINE LUSTER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:03-cr-00052-TES-CHW-2

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12062

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

David Luster, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the denial of 

a motion for a sentence reduction based on a retroactive guideline 

amendment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and a motion for a sentence reduction based on extraordinary and compelling reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). After careful review, we affirm the 

denial of his motions. 

I.

In 2004, Luster pled guilty to eight counts of bank robbery, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and two counts of brandishing a firearm during

a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Between 2002 and 

2003, Luster and an accomplice engaged in eight, armed bank robberies resulting in losses totaling more than $600,000.

When Luster was sentenced, § 924(c)(1)(C) required district 

courts to impose a 25-year mandatory minimum consecutive sentence for any “second or subsequent conviction under [§ 924(c)].” 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2002). And “[t]he Supreme Court had interpreted the 25-year mandatory minimum as applying to second 

(and third, and fourth, and so on) § 924(c) convictions within a single prosecution.” United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 1196, 1210 (11th 

Cir. 2020) (citing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131–32 (1993)). 

As a result, the district court imposed the minimum 25-year consecutive sentence for the second § 924(c) conviction. The court 

also ordered more than $600,000 in restitution. We affirmed 

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Luster’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. United States v. 

Luster, 129 F. App’x 599 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished table decision).

In 2018, § 403 of the First Step Act amended § 924(c)(1)(C) 

so that the 25-year mandatory minimum did not apply to multiple 

§ 924(c) convictions resulting from a single prosecution. See First 

Step Act of 2018 § 403(a), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–

22; see also Smith, 967 F.3d at 1210. Rather, the 25-year minimum 

applies only when a defendant violates § 924(c) “after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final.” See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i). But Congress did not make the amendment to 

the stacking provision retroactive. See First Step Act, § 403(b); see 

also Smith, 967 F.3d at 1210–13 (holding that § 403 does not apply 

retroactively).

In April 2022, Luster filed a motion to reduce his sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 599 to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.4. He contended that, because he had been sentenced both 

for carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c) and 

for the underlying crime of violence, the sentencing court impermissibly double counted conduct by applying sentencing enhancements for brandishing a firearm during the robberies.

Then, in May 2022, Luster filed a “Motion for Reduction in 

Sentence Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” He argued that he had shown 

extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction because, were he sentenced when he filed the motion, he 

would have been subject to a significantly reduced sentence in light 

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of § 403 of the First Step Act. He also contended that restitution 

would not have been authorized after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), and 

Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021).

The district court entered an order expressly denying the 

April 2022 motion under § 3582(c)(2). The court explained that 

Amendment 599 was in effect at the time of sentencing and so did 

not authorize a retroactive sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). 

The text of the order made no mention of the May 2022 motion for 

compassionate release. Nonetheless, the relevant docket entry describes the court’s order as denying both motions. Luster timely 

appealed. 

II.

We review de novo a determination of eligibility for a 

§ 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 

1251 (11th Cir. 2021); see United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255, 1258 

(11th Cir. 2013). We review the denial of an eligible prisoner’s 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). We may affirm for any 

reason supported by the record. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 

1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). 

III.

District courts lack the inherent authority to modify criminal sentences but may do so when authorized by a statute or rule. 

United States v. Edwards, 997 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2021). Luster 

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relies on two statutory provisions that permit sentence reductions 

in certain limited circumstances. 

First, under § 3582(c)(2), the district court may reduce a sentence that was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 

been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Second, under 

§ 3582(c)(1), courts may reduce the sentences of defendants when 

warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. But neither provision authorizes a sentence reduction on the facts of this case. 

Section 3582(c)(2) does not apply because Luster was not 

sentenced based on a sentencing range that was “subsequently . . . 

lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 

(emphasis added). Amendment 599 was in effect as of November 

2000, well before Luster’s sentencing in April 2004. United States v. 

Pringle, 350 F.3d 1172, 1176 (11th Cir. 2003). Even assuming the 

sentencing court erred in applying the amended guideline at sentencing, § 3582(c)(2) “does not authorize a resentencing” to correct 

mistakes in an original sentence. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 

817, 831 (2010); see also United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220 

(11th Cir. 2005). 

Likewise, Luster failed to show that a reduction was authorized under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting a reduction under 

this provision, the district court must find that (1) an extraordinary 

and compelling reason exists under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement, (2) the reduction is supported by the § 3553(a) factors, and 

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(3) granting a reduction would not endanger others. United States 

v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. 

Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). “Because all three conditions . . . are necessary, the absence of even one would foreclose 

a sentence reduction.” Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1238.

When the district court ruled on Luster’s motion in May 

2022, the commentary to § 1B1.13 outlined medical, age, and family circumstances which qualified as sufficiently “extraordinary and 

compelling.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(C) (Nov. 2021). 

While the commentary also authorized relief for “other reasons,” 

id. § cmt. n.1(D), we held in Bryant that such other reasons must be 

determined by the Bureau of Prisons, not by the courts. See Bryant, 

996 F.3d at 1262–65. So a district court could not grant a reduction 

for reasons other than those listed in § 1B1.13. Id.

In Bryant, for example, the defendant, like Luster, argued 

that he presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief 

because “he would not be subject to a 25-year mandatory minimum if he were sentenced today.” 996 F.3d at 1250–51. We rejected this ground as not consistent with § 1B1.13, explaining that 

it was not a medical, age, or family circumstance outlined in the 

commentary, and that the Bureau of Prisons had not determined it 

was an “other reason[]” warranting relief. See id. at 1262–65; see

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.(A)–(D). 

Bryant was based on the same version of § 1B1.13 that was

in effect when the district court denied Luster’s motion. So as in 

Bryant, Luster’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion, based on the First Step 

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Act’s amendments to § 924(c) “stacking” provision and another 

change in the law, not on any medical, age, or family circumstance 

outlined in the commentary, did not present an extraordinary and 

compelling reason under § 1B1.13. See id. 

Notably, in November 2023, while this appeal was pending, 

an amended version of § 1B1.13 became effective which expressly 

added new grounds for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in 

response to the First Step Act. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 

Adopted Amendments (Effective November 1, 2023), 

https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendments/adopted-amendments-effective-november-1-2023 (last visited December 21, 2023). 

In particular, the amendments added a new category in the guideline text for “Unusually Long Sentence[s],” which may qualify as 

extraordinary and compelling where, among other things, “a 

change in the law . . . would produce a gross disparity between the 

sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the 

time the motion is filed.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (Nov. 2023). 

But that substantive change, which altered the text of the 

guideline to create a new ground for relief, does not apply retroactively in this appeal. See United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 

1184 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that only “clarifying” amendments 

are given retroactive effect on appeal; “substantive” amendments 

are “not applied retroactively”); United States v. Summers, 176 F.3d 

1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]lteration of actual Guideline language strongly suggests that a substantive change was being 

made.”). Accordingly, we do not consider whether Luster can 

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establish an extraordinary and compelling reason under the new 

§ 1B1.13(b)(6). We note that nothing in § 3582(c)(1)(A) prevents 

Luster from filing a new motion for a sentence reduction based on

the new version of § 1B1.13. 

Finally, Luster maintains that the district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See, e.g., United 

States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021) (courts must

“consider all applicable § 3553(a) factors” when resolving 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions). But even assuming the court erred in 

that regard, the error was harmless because Luster’s failure to 

demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason under

§ 1B1.13 (Nov. 2021) was alone sufficient to “foreclose a sentence 

reduction.” Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38.

For these reasons, the district court properly denied Luster’s 

April 2022 motion for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and his May 

2022 motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).1 

We affirm.

AFFIRMED.

1 To be specific, we affirm the denial of the motions reflected at docket entries 

259 and 261 on the district court’s docket. We note that Luster has filed an 

array of other unsuccessful motions for a sentence reduction.

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