A statement on the 

Posture of the United States Army 2005

by

The Honorable Francis J. Harvey

and 

General Peter J. Schoomaker

Presented to 

The Commi ees and Subcommi ees

of the 

UNITED STATES SENATE

and the 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 109th CONGRESS

The annual Army Posture Statement is an unclassifi ed summary of Army roles, 

missions, accomplishments, plans and programs.

Designed to reinforce the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff , Army’s posture 

and budget testimony before Congress, the Army Posture Statement serves a broad 

audience as a basic reference on the state of the Army.

This document is available on the Army web site at www.army.mil/aps

It is a product of the Offi ce of the Chief of Staff , U.S. Army, Executive Offi ce of the 

Headquarters Staff Group

Email: Eric.Ashworth@us.army.mil
February 6, 2005

America remains a nation at war, fi ghting adversaries who threaten our civilization and 

way of life. The most signifi cant aspect of our current strategic reality is that the Global 

War on Terror in which we are now engaged will be a protracted one. 

The Army’s primary mission is to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. We have 

more than 300,000 Soldiers deployed or forward stationed today to support operations in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of war and to deter aggression, while securing the 

homeland. We are fi ghting today while simultaneously preparing for tomorrow. 

To continue to accomplish our mission, we are aggressively restructuring the Army. We 

are transforming from a force designed for contingency operations in the post-Cold War 

era to a force designed for continuous operations in a new era that presents challenges to 

the Nation ranging from traditional to potentially catastrophic. 

The Army is dependent upon the resources requested in the fi scal year 2006 President’s 

Budget, coupled with emergency supplemental appropriations, to support current operations. These funds will also enable the force to recover from the stress placed on 

equipment and Soldiers during combat and continually “reset” itself for future deployments. Moreover, these resources are required to continue to transform the Army into 

a larger, more powerful force built on self-suffi cient brigade-based modules. This force 

will be more fl exible, more rapidly deployable and be er able to sustain the protracted 

military campaigns and conduct the joint, expeditionary operations required by the 21st

century security environment. 

We are sustaining our global commitments while making tremendous progress in our 

transformation. We will need the continued support of the Congress, the President, and 

the American people to accomplish our mission today and tomorrow, while providing 

for the well-being of our All-Volunteer Soldiers, their families and our civilian workforce 

who are serving the Nation in this time of war.

_____________________ _____________________

Peter J. Schoomaker Francis J. Harvey

General, United States Army Secretary of the Army

Chief of Staff 
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE 

POSTURE STATEMENT

The 2005 Army Posture Statement provides an overview of today’s Army. Focusing on the 

Soldier, our centerpiece, it provides a perspective on the 21st century security environment. 

This environment provides the context for reaffi rming our overarching Strategic Goal and our 

enduring Mission. The Posture Statement describes how the Army is executing four overarching, 

interrelated strategies – centered on people, forces, quality of life and infrastructure – needed 

to accomplish this Mission. Our initiatives, posture, progress, and requirements are explained 

within the context of these strategies. Army transformation is described not as an end in itself, 

but rather in terms of how it is already contributing to accomplishing the Mission today, while 

preparing the force to accomplish its Strategic Goal – to remain relevant and ready to meet the 

Combatant Commanders’ needs — today and tomorrow. A discussion of Risk and an examination 

of future security challenges are furnished to complete this assessment of our current posture as 

we continue to serve the Nation today, while preparing for the uncertainties of tomorrow.

i
2005 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

each deployed year for active forces, four years 

at home following each deployed year for the 

Army Reserve and fi ve years at home following 

each deployed year for National Guard forces. 

Implementing this program will provide more 

time to train, predictable deployment schedules, and the continuous supply of landpower 

required by the Combatant Commanders and 

civil authorities. 

 The force, above the brigade level, will be supported by similarly modular supporting brigades that provide aviation, fi res, logistics, and 

other support. Our headquarters structure will 

also become far more versatile and effi cient as 

we eliminate an entire echelon of command 

— moving from three to two levels. Similar innovations will occur in the logistics and intelligence organizations that support our forces and 

other Services. 

 Our restructuring is already well underway. The 

3rd Infantry Division, the vanguard of the invasion of Iraq, will return to Iraq as a restructured, 

modular force. 

▪ Second, we are rebalancing our active and reserve forces to produce more units with the skills 

in highest demand. This will realign the specialties of more than 100,000 Soldiers, producing a 

50 percent increase in infantry capabilities, with 

similar increases in military police, civil aff airs, 

intelligence, and other critical skills. We have 

already converted more than 34,000 spaces. 

▪ Third, Soldiers are being stabilized within units 

for longer periods to increase combat readiness 

and cohesion, reduce turnover and eliminate 

many repetitive training requirements. With 

fewer Soldiers and families moving, more Soldiers will be available on any given day to train 

or to fi ght. This initiative, started in 2004, also 

transitions our Army from an individual replacement manning system to a unit focused 

system – to prepare Soldiers to go to war as vital 

members of cohesive units.

▪ Fourth, we are working to complement our 

operational transformation by ensuring that 

our business, force generation and training 

21st Century Security Environment: An Era of Uncertainty and 

Unpredictability 

Operating within an uncertain, unpredictable environment, the Army must be prepared to sustain 

operations during a period of persistent confl ict 

— a blurring of familiar distinctions between war 

and peace. 

To improve our ability to provide forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders for the 

foreseeable future, the Army is undergoing its most 

profound restructuring in more than 50 years.

With the support of the Congress, the President, 

and the Department of Defense, we are making 

tremendous progress. 

Transforming to Accomplish the 

Mission: Modularity, Rebalancing, 

and Stabilization

Army Transformation is focused to improve the capability of the Soldier, who remains the centerpiece 

of our formations. It has four primary goals. 

▪ First, we are restructuring from a division-based 

to a brigade-based force. These brigades are 

designed as modules, or self-suffi cient and standardized Brigade Combat Teams, that can be 

more readily deployed and combined with other 

Army and joint forces to meet the precise needs 

of the Combatant Commanders. The result of 

this transformational initiative will be an operational Army that is larger and more powerful, 

fl exible and rapidly deployable. 

 This program, which we call modularity, will 

increase the combat power of the Active Component by 30 percent as well as the size of the 

Army’s overall pool of available forces by 60 percent. The total number of available brigades will 

increase from 48 to 77 with 10 active brigades 

(three-and-a-third divisions in our old terms) 

being added by the end of 2006. Our goal for 

this larger pool of available forces is to enable the 

Army to generate forces in a rotational manner 

that will support two years at home following ii
Focusing Resources on 

Wartime Requirements: 

 Major Decisions in 2004

The Army benefi ted from three major decisions in 

2004, all providing resources to address immediate wartime needs. The Army also restructured or 

adjusted 126 programs. First, the Army cancelled 

the Comanche Program and reinvested the savings 

into other urgent aviation requirements. This decision enabled us to begin purchasing new airframes, 

fi x many equipment shortfalls, enhance survivability, and begin modernizing our fl eet. Second, we 

modifi ed the schedule for fi elding Future Combat 

Systems to put be er capabilities into the hands of 

our fi ghting Soldiers. Third, Congress provided 

the authority to increase Active Component end 

strength by 30,000 Soldiers to support the war and 

the Army’s conversion to modular formations. 

Our Army at War — Relevant and 

Ready ... Today and Tomorrow

Our Nation remains at war. Soldiers understand 

their mission. They are well equipped and trained 

for the fi ght. They are well led by excellent leaders. 

Our transformation is already enhancing our capabilities today, while ensuring our preparedness for 

tomorrow. These eff orts, however, will require full 

support of the base budget and supplemental.

iii

functions improve how we support a wartime 

Army and the other Services. We are divesting 

functions no longer relevant and reengineering 

business processes to increase responsiveness to 

the Combatant Commanders. Other improvements include developing a joint, interdependent end-to-end logistics structure, and fostering 

a culture of innovation to increase institutional 

agility. We seek to improve eff ectiveness and 

identify effi ciencies that will free human and fi -

nancial resources to be er support operational 

requirements.

Balancing Risk: The Tension 

Between Current and 

Future Demands

The Army is grateful for the support of the Congress, the President, the Department of Defense, 

and the American people as we fi ght the Global 

War on Terror. Continued support — fi nancial 

and moral — is vital. This year, like previous years 

since September 11, the Army’s base budget supports force generation and sustainment operations 

and the supplemental budget request supports 

wartime eff orts. The combination of these spending measures is needed to enable the Army to:

▪ Recruit and retain the All-Volunteer Force and 

their families by enabling the establishment of 

equitable rotation plans and improving qualityof-life programs; 

▪ Generate and sustain a force that is properly 

manned, trained and led, in order to prevail in 

the Global War on Terror, while sustaining other 

global commitments; 

▪ Enhance Soldiers’ ability to fi ght by rapidly spiraling promising technologies that are ready 

now into the Current Force; and 

▪ Reset the force by repairing and recapitalizing 

equipment that is aging rapidly — far faster than 

projected — due to sustained combat operations 

in severe environmental conditions. 

The scale and the pace of Army transformation is 

essential to improve the ability of American Soldiers to defeat adversaries who will pose complex, 

irregular challenges that are becoming increasingly 

more sophisticated and dangerous than those we 

now face.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Purpose and Organization of the Posture Statement ..............................................................i

2005 Army Posture Statement Executive Summary ................................................................ii

21st Century Security Environment: 

An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability ............................................................................1

Strategic Goal: Remaining Relevant and Ready ... Today and Tomorrow ..........................2

Mission: Supporting the National Security and Defense Strategies ....................................3

Accomplishing the Mission Today: Sustaining Global Commitments ...............................3

Enabling Mission Accomplishment: Four Overarching, Interrelated Strategies ................5

Providing Relevant and Ready Landpower to Support the Combatant Commanders ......6

Building a Campaign-Quality Force 

with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities ...................................................................6

Enhancing Joint Interdependence ..................................................................................6

Rese ing the Force ............................................................................................................6

Converting to a Brigade-Based, Modular Force ...........................................................7

Rebalancing Active and Reserve Component Units and Skills .................................9

Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability ..................9

Leveraging Army Science and Technology Programs ..............................................10

Spiraling Future Combat Systems Capabilities into the Current Force ..................10

Restructuring Army Aviation ........................................................................................11

Training and Equipping Soldiers to Serve as 

Warriors and Growing Adaptive Leaders ...............................................................................11

Reinforcing Our Centerpiece: Soldiers as Warriors ..................................................11

Recruiting and Retaining Soldiers ................................................................................13

Equipping Our Soldiers .................................................................................................13

Training Soldiers and Growing Adaptive Leaders ....................................................14

Enhancing the Combat Training Centers ....................................................................16
A aining a Quality of Life and Well-Being for 

Our People that Match the Quality of Their Service ..............................................................16

Maintaining the Viability of the All-Volunteer Force ................................................16

Caring for Army Families and Soldiers .......................................................................17

Providing Infrastructure to Enable the

Force to Fulfi ll Its Strategic Roles and Missions .....................................................................18

Business Transformation ................................................................................................18

Maintaining Our Installations as “Flagships of Readiness” .....................................19

Improving Global Force Posture ...................................................................................19

LandWarNet ....................................................................................................................20

Balancing Risk: The Tension Between Current and Future Demands ...............................21

“Buying Back” Capabilities ...........................................................................................21

Major Decisions in 2004 ..................................................................................................21

Meeting Today’s Demands While Preparing for Tomorrow ....................................22

Remaining Relevant and Ready in Service to the Nation .....................................................23

ADDENDUM A (Data Required by NDAA 1994) .............................................................. A-1

ACRONYMS ..............................................................................................................................B-1

The 2005 Army Posture Statement with addenda can be found at 

h p://www.army.mil/aps
21st Century Security 

Environment: An Era 

of Uncertainty and 

Unpredictability 

We remain an Army at War. It is a 

war unlike any other in our Nation’s 

history, prosecuted not by states, but 

by extremists employing irregular 

means to erode our power and 

resolve. Our adversaries threaten the 

ideas that form the bedrock of our 

society, endangering our freedoms 

and way of life. Fueled by an ideology 

that promotes intractable hatred, this 

war will endure in some form for the 

foreseeable future. The Army, in 

service to the Nation, must therefore 

be prepared to sustain operations 

during a period of persistent confl ict 

 — a blurring of familiar distinctions 

between war and peace. This is the 

most signifi cant aspect of the 21st

century security environment. 

The emergence of unconventional 

and asymmetric threats, such as 

radical Islamic terrorist eff orts 

aimed at the United States and other 

developed countries, has stretched 

the U.S. military. Protection aff orded 

by geographic distance has decreased, while 

challenges and threats from extremists using 

weapons of mass destruction and a acks on civilian, 

military and economic targets have increased. 

While the current trend toward regional and global 

integration may render inter-state war less likely, 

the stability and legitimacy of the conventional 

political order in regions vital to the United States 

are increasingly under pressure. 

There are now new actors, methods and capabilities 

that imperil the United States, its interests and 

its alliances in strategically signifi cant ways. 

The Defense Strategy has identifi ed four types 

of emerging security challenges for U.S. forces: 

irregular, traditional, catastrophic and disruptive. 

The “Four Challenges,” described in Figure 1, 

categorize many of the issues expected in the future 

security environment. In many situations, these 

challenges may overlap, may occur simultaneously 

and may off er no easily discernible transition from 

one to another. 

The Defense Strategy still recognizes the traditional 

threat paradigm, focused primarily on other states 

and known enemies. In the a ermath of September 

11, 2001, however, it is no longer suffi cient to 

be prepared to defend only against this type of 

threat. Our old concepts of security, deterrence 

and warning, developed through traditional 

1

 Figure 1
intelligence approaches, do not apply suffi ciently 

in this new strategic environment. While we 

must remain ready to sustain the full range of our 

global commitments, our overwhelming military 

superiority no longer serves as an adequate 

deterrent against many emerging threats, especially 

those of radical fundamentalist terrorists. 

The implications of our environment are clear. We 

must understand the character of the irregular 

warfare we now face and adapt accordingly. In 

waging this war against determined adversaries, 

we have arrayed a vast, hierarchical organization 

against an elusive, adaptive network. Consequently, 

the Army is adapting to eliminate irrelevant 

policies, processes and doctrines. We must move 

beyond marginal improvements in our eff orts to 

strengthen interdependencies with other Services 

and other agencies and reinforce a culture that 

fosters innovation and agility.

To respond to the challenges presented in this era 

of uncertainty and unpredictability, the Army has 

accelerated its transformation. During times of 

peace, change is generally slow and deliberate — at 

a pace supported by limited resources. In wartime, 

however, change must occur faster; a measured 

approach to change will not work. 

We must remain ready to sustain the full range of 

our global commitments beyond those associated 

with the Global War on Terror. At the same time, 

the Army must be prepared to conduct sustained 

operations during a period of protracted confl ict. 

Strategic Goal: Remaining 

Relevant and Ready ... 

Today and Tomorrow

In light of the uncertainty and the challenges inherent to the 21st century security environment, the 

Army’s overarching strategic goal is to remain relevant and ready by providing the Joint Force with 

essential capabilities to dominate across the full 

range of military operations. The Army will be: 

 

▪ Relevant to the challenges posed by the global 

security environment as evidenced by the organization and training of our forces, the innovation and adaptability of our leaders and the 

design and practices of our institutional support 

structures. 

▪ Ready to provide the Combatant Commanders with the capabilities — principally wellled, trained and equipped forces — required to 

achieve operational objectives across the range 

of military operations. 

To meet this goal, the Army must position itself in 

terms of mindset, capability, eff ectiveness, effi ciency, training, education, leadership and the overall 

culture of the Service for the context in which it will 

operate for the foreseeable future. 

The American Soldier remains our primary focus – the centerpiece of all that we do as an Army. 

Throughout our history, Soldiers have answered 

the call to end tyranny, to free the oppressed and to 

light the path to democracy for struggling nations. 

Soldiers — imbued with the ideals of the Warrior 

Ethos, a commitment to defend the freedoms that 

America enjoys and an unwavering belief that they 

will be victorious — are, and will remain, the foundation of the Army.

2
— fi erce, well trained, well equipped and well led 

— who serves as the ultimate expression of the capabilities the Army provides to the Joint Force and 

to the Nation. As always, we remain dedicated to 

the well-being of our Soldiers, their families and 

our civilian workforce.

The character and skill of our Soldiers, leaders and 

civilian workforce and the a itudes and actions of 

our family must refl ect our military and organizational challenges. Like any large, complex organization commi ed to achieving transformational 

change, our eff orts to change our culture will prove 

to be our true measure of success. 

Guided by the compelling requirement to accomplish our mission in service to the Nation, the Army 

is changing now — and making tremendous progress. With the continued support of Congress and 

the Department of Defense, we will maintain the 

momentum we have established, through our collective eff orts, to transform capabilities, processes, 

leadership and culture.

Accomplishing the Mission Today: 

Sustaining Global Commitments 

The Army’s fi rst priority is to sustain its increasing global commitments that extend across the 

full range of military missions, well beyond those 

associated with the Global War on Terror. Today, 

our Current Force is engaged, across the range of 

military operations, in ways we could never have 

Mission: Supporting the National 

Security and Defense Strategies

The Army exists to serve the American people, to 

protect enduring national interests and to fulfi ll 

national military responsibilities. Our mission is 

enduring: to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of 

the National Security and Defense Strategies. The 

Army is charged to provide forces able to conduct 

prompt, sustained combat on land as well as stability and reconstruction operations, when required. 

Moreover, the Army is charged to provide logistical and other capabilities to enable other Services 

to accomplish their missions. 

To achieve its mission, the Army is providing the 

Joint Force with capabilities required to prevail in 

the protracted Global War on Terror and sustain the 

full range of its global commitments. At the same 

time, the Army is undergoing one of its most profound transformations since World War II. Army 

Transformation will meet the needs of Joint Force 

Commanders today and tomorrow, by providing a 

campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. A continuous cycle of innovation 

and experimentation, informed by experience, is 

improving the forces and capabilities we are providing today and ensuring that we are well postured for tomorrow’s challenges. 

We are working to create a unique synergy from 

both of our tasks, fi ghting today while transforming for tomorrow, to ensure we “get it right.” The 

size and mix of our components and capabilities 

must be in balance. Our global posture, both at 

home and abroad, must enhance agility and readiness to conduct expeditionary operations on short 

notice. In addition, the force must be designed, 

equipped, sustained and supported in a manner 

that will enable us to continue to be eff ective partners, with the other Services and the armed forces 

of other nations, in the conduct of sustained, protracted military campaigns. 

Soldiers remain at the center of our transformation focus. Soldiers are the Army. It is the Soldier 3
forecasted before September 11, 2001, operating at 

a very high pace that will likely continue for some 

time. 

The Army is providing forces and capabilities for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, for Operation Enduring Freedom and for other global requirements. 

The Army continues to deter aggression and keep 

peace on the Korean Peninsula, on the Sinai Peninsula, in the Balkans and elsewhere around the 

world. In addition, the Army supports numerous 

humanitarian assistance missions and supports 

organizations such as Joint Task Force Bravo in 

Central America to counter illicit narcotics traffi cking. 

Today, approximately 640,000 Soldiers are serving on active duty. 315,000 Soldiers are deployed 

or forward stationed in more than 120 countries 

to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and 

other theaters of war and deter aggression, while 

securing the homeland. These Soldiers are from 

all components: Active (155,000), Army National 

Guard (113,000) and Army Reserve (47,000). Soldiers participate in homeland security activities 

and support civil authorities for many diff erent 

missions within the United States. A large Army 

civilian workforce (over 250,000), reinforced by 

contractors, supports our Army — to mobilize, deploy and sustain the operational forces — both at 

home and abroad. 

Soldiers from the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserve are making a vital contribution. 

150,000 Soldiers are mobilized and performing a diverse range of missions worldwide. In addition to 

their duties overseas, Soldiers from both the Guard 

and the Reserve supported civil authorities during 

disaster relief operations, such as those which occurred in Florida following four major hurricanes. 

On any given day, the Army National Guard has 

more than 10,000 Soldiers on duty to protect key 

assets across the Nation, including Air Force bases. More than 24,000 Soldiers provided security 

for both the Democratic and Republican National 

Conventions and the Group of Eight Summit. National Guard Soldiers are also promoting stability 

in Iraq and in the Balkans, while performing complex, vital tasks such as U.S. Northern Command’s 

ballistic missile defense mission. Guard Soldiers, 

operating in an unprecedented role, are organizing 

4
and training a multicomponent brigade in Colorado and a ba alion in Alaska to execute the newly 

assigned mission. 

The Army Reserve, in addition to providing vital 

support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is 

providing a wide range of response capabilities in 

the event of an a ack on the homeland. This support includes almost 200 emergency preparedness 

liaison offi cers that interact with local communities. 

The Reserve has also fi elded and trained 75 chemical decontamination platoons with more than 2,400 

Soldiers for mass casualty operations and more 

than 250 fully equipped hazardous material technicians to train with local fi rst responders. 

Enabling Mission Accomplishment: 

Four Overarching, 

Interrelated Strategies 

To enable mission accomplishment, the Army 

is executing four overarching, interrelated 

strategies. These strategies seek to accomplish the 

Army’s mission, consistent with the requirements 

prescribed by the National Security and Defense 

Strategies. These strategies are enabling the 

Army to continue to accomplish its mission today

— in service to the Nation — while building and 

maintaining the capabilities to ensure the Army 

remains relevant and ready to the needs of the 

Combatant Commanders tomorrow. The Army is:

▪ Providing Relevant and Ready Landpower in 

support of the Combat Commanders and the 

Joint Force to sustain the full range of our global 

commitments;

▪ Training and Equipping our Soldiers to Serve 

as Warriors and Growing Adaptive Leaders

who are highly competent, fl exible and able to 

deal with the 21st century challenges they now 

confront;

▪ A aining a Quality of Life and Well-Being for 

Our People that match the quality of the service 

they provide; and

▪ Providing Infrastructure to Enable the Force 

to Fulfi ll its Strategic Roles by establishing and 

maintaining the infrastructure and the information network required to develop, to generate, to 

train and to sustain the force. 

These interrelated strategies serve to unify our 

collective eff orts. Relevant, Ready Landpower depends on Soldiers who are well trained, equipped 

and led. Soldiers must be supported by high 

Standards for Quality of Life and modern infrastructure to Enable the Force to Fulfi ll its Strategic 

Roles and Missions. 

The Army’s current posture, initiatives and progress are described within the context of these 

interrelated strategies. The initiatives demonstrate 

how the strategies are being executed and, in a 

broader sense, the resources required to execute 

them. Transformation is the central thread which 

runs through each of these strategies.

Army transformation represents much more than 

improvements in equipment or warfi ghting methods. It is a multidimensional, interdependent 

process that involves:

▪ Adapting new technologies and business operations; 

▪ Improving joint warfi ghting concepts and business processes; 

▪ Changing organizational structures; and 

▪ Developing leaders, people and culture that refl ect the realities of our operating environment.

5
Providing Relevant and Ready 

Landpower to Support the 

Combatant Commanders

Building a Campaign-Quality Force with 

Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities

“Campaign qualities” refers to the Army’s ability 

not only to win decisively in the conduct of combat 

on land but also in its ability to sustain operations. 

The Army supports the Combatant Commanders 

and the Joint Force, other agencies and coalition 

partners, for as long as may be required. 

The Army continues to improve strategic responsiveness in two ways. First, the Army is becoming 

more expeditionary. We are improving our ability to deploy rapidly to conduct joint operations in 

austere theaters. Our enemies are elusive, adaptive 

and seek refuge in complex terrain, o en harbored 

by failed or failing states. They fully leverage many 

of the same technologies we do such as the Internet and satellite communications. To improve on 

our joint warfi ghting profi ciency we are embracing 

these conditions in deployment scenarios, training 

and education. 

Second, we have improved our review and resourcing procedures to anticipate and support the 

Integrated Priority Lists developed by the Combatant Commanders. Likewise, we are continuing to 

anticipate and respond with urgency to our commanders’ needs.

Enhancing Joint Interdependence

Each branch of the Armed Forces excels in a different domain — land, air, sea and space. Joint 

interdependence purposefully combines each 

Service’s strengths, while minimizing their vulnerabilities. The Army is ensuring that our systems 

are fully complementary with the other Services.

We are working aggressively with the other Services to improve the ability to dominate across the 

range of military operations. Our eff orts embrace 

two characteristics of modern warfare. First, technology has extended the reach of modern weapon 

systems to the extent that collective force protection and anti-access techniques are necessary, even 

in facing irregular, asymmetric challenges. Second, 

the other Services’ capabilities to dominate air, sea 

and space have direct impact on ground forces’ 

ability to dominate on land. 

Our new modular formations will operate be er in 

joint, multinational and interagency environments. 

These formations are designed to enhance joint 

concepts for ba le command, fi res and eff ects, logistics, force projection, intelligence, as well as air 

and missile defense. Our joint training opportunities will continue to improve as we work with Joint 

Forces Command and the other Services to develop 

a Joint National Training Capability. The planning, 

scenarios, connectivity and overall realism we are 

working to create will enhance critical joint operations skills for commanders and Soldiers. 

The ultimate test of joint initiatives is the Soldier. 

If a concept does not empower Soldiers, then we 

have to question its relevance. We are continuing 

our work to ensure that emerging capabilities and 

training requirements are created joint from the 

outset. 

Resetting the Force

Major combat and stability operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan are placing tremendous demands on 

our equipment and our Soldiers. As a result, we 

must reset those units — by preparing Soldiers and 

their equipment for future missions — o en as part 

of new modular formations. We use this opportunity 

to reset our units forward to the future — not to return 

6 them to their legacy designs.
The major elements of our Reset Program include: 

▪ Providing considerable training and professional development for Soldiers and leaders;

▪ Bringing unit readiness back up to Army standards; 

▪ Reorganizing returning units into modular unit 

designs; 

▪ Retraining essential tasks to incorporate lessons 

learned from Iraq and Afghanistan; and

▪ Adjusting pre-positioned stocks of ammunition 

and equipment to support the force. 

Rese ing the force refl ects how we care for our 

people and prepare units for upcoming training 

and deployments, while positioning the Army to 

be more responsive to emerging threats and contingencies. Today, the standard for Active and 

Reserve Component reset is six and twelve months, 

respectively. Through a focused eff ort, our reset 

processes are becoming considerably more effi cient 

in terms of both time and resources. The Army’s 

depot capability and eff orts to partner with industry are critical to this eff ort.

The Reset Program is designed to reverse the effects of combat stress on our equipment. Amidst 

the constant demands of war, our equipment is 

aging far more rapidly than projected. Because of 

higher operational tempo, rough desert environments and limited depot maintenance available in 

theater, our operational fl eets are aging four years 

for every year in theater — dramatically shortening 

their life. Over 6,500 tracked and wheeled vehicles 

must be recapitalized this year alone. An additional 500 aviation systems must also be recapitalized. 

We will require additional funding to “buy back” 

some of this age through extensive recapitalization 

programs as well as replacing combat losses.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3rd Infantry Division and 129 of the more than 500 Army 

Reserve units (over 25 percent) have already completed the Reset Program. The 4th Infantry Division, 

the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Mountain 

Division, the 1st Armored Division, the 76th Infantry 

Brigade (Indiana), the 30th Infantry Brigade (North 

Carolina), the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault) are in various stages of the Reset Program. 

Rese ing units is not a one-time event. It is required for all redeploying units. A window of 

vulnerability exists at the end of our current operations. We project that it will take close to two years 

a er the return of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan 

to completely refi t our forces and to reconstitute 

the equipment held in our fi ve pre-positioned sets. 

Only through an appropriately funded Reset Program can we extend the life of the operational fl eet 

to remain ready to support and sustain protracted 

confl ict. Congress has greatly helped the Army by 

providing supplemental funding to meet this critical need. We will continue to require additional 

resources to complete this essential work.

Converting to a Brigade-Based, 

 Modular Force

Modular conversion will enable the Army to generate force packages optimized to meet the demands 

of a particular situation, without the overhead and 

support previously provided by higher commands. 7
Modular units are tailored to meet the Combatant 

Commanders’ requirements. These units, known 

as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), are more robust, 

require less augmentation and are standardized in 

design to increase interoperability. They are, in essence, a self-suffi cient, stand-alone tactical force, 

consisting of 3,500 to 4,000 Soldiers, that is organized and trains the way it fi ghts. 

Modular BCTs will serve as the building blocks 

of Army capabilities. There are three common 

organizational designs for ground BCTs and fi ve 

for support brigades. The three designs include 

a heavy brigade with two armor-mechanized infantry ba alions and an armed reconnaissance 

ba alion; an infantry brigade with two infantry 

ba alions and an armed reconnaissance and surveillance ba alion; and a Stryker brigade with 

three Stryker ba alions and a reconnaissance and 

surveillance ba alion. Four of the fi ve types of 

support brigades perform a single function each: 

aviation; fi res; sustain; and ba lefi eld surveillance. 

The fi  h, maneuver enhancement brigade, is organized around a versatile core of supporting units 

that provide engineer, military police, air defense, 

chemical and signal capabilities. 

By creating a modular, brigade-based Army, we are 

creating forces that are more rapidly deployable 

and more capable of independent action than our 

current division-based organization. Their strategic 

responsiveness will be greatly improved. Modularity increases each unit’s capability by building 

in the communications, liaison and logistics capabilities needed to permit greater operational 

autonomy and support the ability to conduct joint, 

multinational operations. These capabilities have 

previously been resident at much higher organizational echelons.

We are also eliminating an entire echelon of command above the brigade headquarters, moving 

from three levels to two. Doing so removes redundancies in command structure and frees additional 

personnel spaces for use elsewhere. We are also 

eliminating several layers of logistics headquarters 

to increase responsiveness, further reduce redundancy and improve joint logistics integration. 

In addition, the new higher-level headquarters 

will become signifi cantly more capable and versatile than comparable headquarters today. These 

modular headquarters will be able to command 

and control any combination of capabilities: Army, 

joint or coalition. Their design, training and mindset will allow them to serve as the core of joint or 

multinational task force headquarters, with signifi cantly reduced personnel augmentation. This 

will relieve stress on the force by eliminating a 

continuing demand to fi ll headquarters manning 

requirements on a temporary basis. 

The Army is also transforming its Reserve Component structures to the new BCT organization. 

We are applying the lessons learned in Iraq and 

Afghanistan to be er train, equip, support and 

generate these units from their home stations. 

The Army Reserve is developing Army Reserve 

Expeditionary Packages to be er generate and distribute critical force capabilities. This rotational 

force model streamlines mobilization, training 

and equipping of units; enhances readiness; and 

improves predictability for Soldiers, families and 

civilian employers.

Execution of this transformation is already well 

underway. As units redeploy from fi ghting, their 

conversion process begins. The 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division have already 

reorganized their existing brigades and created 

a new brigade each. The 3rd Infantry Division 

is the fi rst converted unit returning to Iraq. The 8
10th Mountain Division and the 4th Infantry Division 

will soon follow. By the end of 2006, we will have 

added 10 new brigades. Potentially, we will create fi ve more in 2007. The Army National Guard is 

converting 34 BCTs or separate brigades to modular designs. At the end of our eff ort, the Army will 

have 77 and potentially 82 total BCTs. 

Rebalancing Active and Reserve Component 

Units and Skills

Our current Active and Reserve Component structure is not optimized for rapid deployment and 

sustainment. We are restructuring the force to increase units with special skills that are routinely 

in high demand by the Combatant Commanders, 

such as infantry, military police, transportation 

and civil aff airs. Rather than requesting additional 

force increases, we are decreasing force structure 

in less demand. When completed, we will have 

restructured and rebalanced more than 100,000 

positions. We have already converted more than 

34,000 of these positions. 

We are also placing more combat support and 

combat service support structure into the Active 

Component to improve deployability and the ability to sustain operations during the fi rst 30 days 

of a contingency. This increase in high-demand 

sustainment units will reduce the requirements 

for immediate mobilization of Reserve Component 

units. 

The Army Reserve’s Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative is another program that is helping 

to resource units at higher levels by converting or 

eliminating current force structure and specialties in low demand to increase those in greatest 

demand. This initiative relieves stress on units in 

higher demand and adds depth to the Army’s operational forces.

Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance 

Cohesion and Predictability

To improve unit cohesion and readiness, while reducing both turbulence in units and uncertainty 

for families, we are changing how we man our 

units. Our objective is to keep Soldiers in units 

longer to reduce chronically high turnover rates 

of Soldiers and leaders, improve cohesion within 

units and increase training profi ciency and overall 

combat readiness. Units that stay together longer 

build higher levels of teamwork, understand their 

duties and their equipment be er, require less periodic retraining and tend to perform be er during 

deployments. Fewer moves of Soldiers and their 

families also saves the Army money. 

These assignment policies, now being implemented, will also improve quality of life and 

predictability for Soldiers, families and civilian 

employers. Stabilizing Soldiers, which in certain 

cases, will be challenging to achieve in the near 

term, will allow their families to build deeper roots 

within their communities and enjoy be er opportunities for spouse employment, continuity of 

healthcare, schooling and other benefi ts. This program also reduces the chance of a Soldier moving 

from a unit that recently redeployed to a unit preparing to deploy. The Army gains more cohesive, 

more experienced units while Soldiers and families 

benefi t from greater predictability, stability and access to stronger support networks that enhance 

well-being. 

The 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade, in Alaska, was 

the fi rst unit to implement unit stability. The Army 

will man four more brigades using this method this 

year. The Army will continue to implement stabilization policies as units redeploy to their home 

stations.

9
Leveraging Army Science and 

Technology Programs

The focus of Army science and technology is to 

accelerate maturing technologies with promising 

capabilities into the Current Force faster than expected. These technologies include:

▪ Networked ba le command and logistics systems; 

▪ Networked precision missiles and gun-launched 

munitions; and

▪ Improved intelligence sensors, active and passive protection systems, unmanned ground and 

air systems and low-cost multispectral sensors. 

Many of these technologies are already being 

fi elded to our front-line Soldiers to dramatically 

improve their capabilities. Specifi c science and 

technology initiatives will improve existing capabilities to:

▪ Detect and neutralize mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs);

▪ Identify friendly forces in combat;

▪ Develop medical technology for self-diagnosis 

and treatment;

▪ Identify hostile fi re indicators; and

▪ Enhance survivability, training systems and robotics. 

We are working to harness the full potential of our 

science and technology establishment to improve 

the capability of our forces to defeat opponents 

in complex environments, which include urban 

terrain, triple-canopy jungle conditions, desert terrain, mountainous environments and caves. 

Spiraling Future Combat Systems Capabilities 

into the Current Force

Our largest, most promising, science and technology investment remains the pursuit of Future 

Combat Systems (FCS) technologies. The FCSequipped force will add crucial capabilities to the 

Future Force to achieve Department of Defense 

transformation goals. FCS is not a platform. It is 

a family of 18 networked air and ground-based 

maneuver, maneuver support and sustainment 

systems. 

Networked FCS capabilities will provide unprecedented levels of situational awareness by 

integrating communications, sensors, ba le command systems as well as manned and unmanned 

reconnaissance and surveillance systems. FCSequipped units, operating as a system of systems, 

will be more deployable and survivable than our 

current units and will enhance joint capabilities. 

They will also be be er suited to conduct immediate operations, over extremely long distances, with 

other members of the Joint Force, to produce strategic eff ects. 

In July 2004, the Army restructured the FCS program 

to accelerate the introduction of ba le command, 

the Army network and other crucial capabilities 

to the Current Force, while we continue to build 

our initial FCS-equipped BCT. Improvements to 

the Army network, known as LandWarNet, are 

focused on applying lessons learned from Iraq 

and Afghanistan to improve our forces’ ability 

to see fi rst, understand fi rst, act fi rst and fi nish 

decisively. LandWarNet, designed to support all 

Joint communications architectures, will apply the 

most mature technologies commercially available 

and support the fi elding of the Joint Network Node, 

the Warfi ghter Information Network and the Joint 

Tactical Radio System. 

10
The Network provides the backbone for introducing the key FCS capabilities identifi ed to be fi elded 

early which include: 

▪ Una ended ground sensors;

▪ Intelligent munitions;

▪ Non-line-of-sight launch systems and cannon 

artillery; and

▪ A range of unmanned aerial platforms. 

These systems provide greater target detection, 

force protection and precision-a ack capabilities 

than we have today. Specifi c programs will enhance protection from enemy mortars, artillery 

and rockets and improve Soldiers’ ability to communicate in urban and other complex se ings. 

The acceleration of selective FCS technologies is 

providing immediate solutions to critical problems 

our Soldiers face today. The technologies we spiral into the Current Force today, coupled with the 

doctrinal and organizational concepts being developed to enable them, will also help to improve the 

decisions we make concerning the Future Force. 

Restructuring Army Aviation

The Army is also transforming its aviation forces 

to develop modular, capabilities-based forces optimized to operate in a more joint environment. This 

past year, the Army cancelled the Comanche Program and redirected its resources into other Army 

aviation programs. The technologies developed by 

the Comanche Program are being used in our current Army aviation platforms. 

The reallocation of funding allowed the Army 

to modularize, modernize and improve its force 

protection capabilities. The Army is accelerating 

aircrew protection and fi elding Aircra Survivability Equipment. Our modular structure reduces the 

number of brigade designs from seven to two. Over 

the next six years, we are purchasing more than 800 

new aircra that include 108 a ack, 365 utility and 

368 armed reconnaissance helicopters. We are also 

modernizing an additional 300 helicopters. These 

initiatives will enable the Army to extend the life 

of its critical aviation assets beyond 2020. This will 

greatly reduce the age of our aviation fl eet, improve 

readiness rates and reduce maintenance costs. 

As a result of the Comanche termination decision, 

the Army will:

▪ Accelerate the modernization of Reserve Component aviation;

▪ Accelerate the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Light 

Utility Helicopter and Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter programs;

▪ Focus additional resources on the Future Cargo 

Aircra program designed to improve intratheater li capacity;

▪ Develop a common cockpit for cargo and utility 

aircra ;

▪ Field improved deployability and sustainment 

kits; and 

▪ Purchase and install advanced avionics packages. 

This restructuring will result in dramatic Armywide effi ciencies by reducing training costs and 

standardizing both maintenance and logistics 

requirements.

Training and Equipping Soldiers 

to Serve as Warriors and Growing 

Adaptive Leaders

Reinforcing Our Centerpiece: Soldiers as 

Warriors

Human skills may change as technology and 

warfare demand greater versatility. No ma er 

how much the tools of warfare improve, it is the 11
Soldier who must exploit these tools 

to accomplish his mission. The Soldier 

will remain the ultimate combination 

of sensor and shooter. 

The Army prepares every Soldier to 

be a Warrior by replicating, to the 

maximum degree possible, the stark realities of combat to condition Soldiers 

to react instinctively. We have changed 

our training systems to refl ect the realities of war and to be er prepare our 

Soldiers. Our goal is to build Soldiers’ 

confi dence in themselves, their equipment, their leaders and their fellow 

Soldiers.

The biggest change is in our initial 

military training for new Soldiers. 

Initial-entry Soldiers are now being prepared to operate in an environment that knows no boundaries. 

They are receiving substantially more marksmanship training, hand-to-hand combat instruction, 

an increased emphasis on physical fi tness, live-fi re 

convoy training and more focus on skills Soldiers 

need to operate and survive in combat.

Our Soldiers are smart, competent and totally 

dedicated to defending the Nation. All are guided 

by Army Values (Figure 2). They commit to live 

by the ideals contained in The Soldier’s Creed 

(Figure 3). This creed captures the Warrior Ethos 

and outlines the professional a itudes and beliefs 

desired of American Soldiers. 

Mental and physical toughness underpin the beliefs embraced in the Soldier’s Creed and must be 

developed within all Soldiers — without regard to 

their specialty, their unit or their location 

on the ba lefi eld. The Warrior Ethos engenders the refusal to accept failure, the 

conviction that military service is much 

more than just another job, and the unfailing commitment to be victorious. It 

defi nes who Soldiers are and what Soldiers must do. It is derived from our 

long-standing Army Values and reinforces a personal commitment to service. 

Soldiers join the Army to serve. Our 

Soldiers know that their service is required to secure our Nation’s freedoms 

and to maintain the American way of 

life. We will never take for granted the 

personal sacrifi ces our Soldiers and their 

families endure, which include facing 

the hardship of war, extended periods of 12

Figure 2

 Figure 3
separation and, in the case of our Reserve Component Soldiers, concerns over continued employment 

and advancement in their civilian jobs. 

Recruiting and Retaining Soldiers

The Army continues to a ract highly qualifi ed and 

motivated young people to serve. To maintain our 

high-quality Army, we must recruit and retain good 

Soldiers. We are proud of the men and women who 

come into the Armed Forces to make a diff erence, 

to be part of something larger than themselves and 

to “give something back” to their country. 

In 2004, we met our Active and Reserve recruiting 

goals. The Army National Guard fell just short 

of its overall recruiting goal. While the recruiting environment is a challenging one, we have not 

lowered our standards. Our reenlistment rates refl ect a positive outlook toward continued service. 

In 2004, the Active Component far exceeded its retention goal (107 percent) while the Army Reserve 

and Army National Guard achieved 99 percent of 

their goals.

Our continued success is a testament to the citizenpatriots of America who enlist and reenlist in our 

ranks, yet we know that our operational situation 

could negatively impact recruiting and retention. 

We are therefore resourcing several incentives to 

help a ract and retain the right people. We continue to off er options for continued service while 

meeting Soldiers’ individual goals. Moreover, we 

continue to adjust policies and incentives to access 

new Soldiers, reenlist current Soldiers and reduce 

unit a rition rates. This ensures that our Army is 

manned with top-quality people and capitalizes on 

investments in training, education and mentoring. 

In light of the challenges we foresee, we will need 

the best minds within the Army, Congress, industry and academia to create the environment and 

to devise and implement strategies to sustain our 

ranks with the high-quality men and women that 

are our centerpiece.

Equipping Our Soldiers

Our Soldiers rely on and deserve the very best protection and equipment we can provide. To equip 

them for the challenges they face, one of the most 

critical issues we are addressing is vehicle armor. 

With the support of Congress, acting in full partnership with industry, the Army has dramatically 

increased the pace of both production and fi elding. By March 2005, the current requirement of 

approximately 32,500 tactical wheeled vehicles in 

the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters will be protected 

either with integrated, add-on or locally fabricated armor. By June 2005, we will have replaced all 

fabricated armor with add-on armor. This rapid 

delivery schedule has increased the number of armored vehicles in theater one-hundred-fold since 

August 2003. 

Figure 4 lists eight key Soldier protection areas 

ranging from providing body armor for Soldiers to 

armor for HMMWVs, trucks and other key vehicles. 

Our enemies will continue to adapt their tactics; we 

will remain steadfast in our commitment to protect 

our Soldiers by meeting and exceeding theater requirements in all areas. 

In addition to protecting Soldiers, the Army is 

working aggressively to provide them the best 

possible equipment. The Army has established 

two programs to anticipate Soldiers’ needs and respond quickly to those identifi ed by commanders. 

Through emergency supplemental appropriations, 

Congress has been particularly helpful in funding 

these vital programs.

13
The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) is designed to 

fi ll Soldier equipment shortfalls by quickly fi elding commercial off -the-shelf technology rather 

than waiting for standard acquisition programs to 

address these shortages. RFI is increasing Soldier 

capabilities at an unprecedented pace. Since September 2002, we have equipped 36 Brigade Combat 

Teams. In 2004 alone, the Army equipped more 

than 180,000 Soldiers. 

We are equipping deploying National Guard, 

Army Reserve and Active Component Soldiers to 

a common standard. Current plans call for equipping about 258,000 Soldiers in 2005 and the entire 

operational force by September 2007. We are using 

fi elding teams at home stations and in theater to ensure that every Soldier receives 49 items including 

body armor, advanced ballistic helmets, hydration systems, ballistic goggles, kneepads, 

elbow pads and other items. The equipment 

being issued to units refl ects the lessons 

learned during three years of fi ghting in complex environments, including optical sights 

for weapons, grappling hooks, door rams and 

fi ber optic viewers to support Soldiers’ ability 

to observe from protected positions.

The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) typically 

uses commercial and fi eld-engineered solutions to quickly meet operational needs. REF 

has executed numerous initiatives to support the Army’s Improvised Explosive Device 

(IED) Task Force and the requirements of the 

other Services. REF solutions meet immediate 

needs and are then assessed for wider fi elding 

and incorporation into standard acquisition 

processes. 

REF teams in Afghanistan and Iraq interact 

with commanders at brigade and ba alion 

levels. Equipment provided ranges from lock 

shims to open padlocks nondestructively to 

far more sophisticated, remote-controlled 

reconnaissance devices to explore caves, tunnels, wells and other confi ned spaces without 

endangering Soldiers. REF also provides predeployment and in-theater training on the 

technological solutions it provides. 

Training Soldiers and Growing 

Adaptive Leaders

A balance of training and education is required to 

prepare Soldiers to perform their duties. Training

prepares Soldiers and leaders to operate in relatively certain conditions, focusing on “what to think.” 

Education prepares Soldiers and leaders to operate 

in uncertain conditions, focusing more on “how to 

think.” We are developing more rigorous, stressful training scenarios to prepare leaders to be more 

comfortable while operating amidst uncertainty. 

Our programs develop leaders with the right mix 

of unit experiences, training and education needed 

to adapt to the rigors and challenges of war. We 14

EQUIPPING OUR SOLDIERS: 

SOLDIER PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN 

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Area

Where We Were 

August 2003

Where We Are In 

January 2005

Soldier Body 

Armor

Estimated 109,000 

Soldiers equipped; Deltoid 

Auxiliary Protectors not 

fi elded

All Soldiers and DoD 

civilians in theater equipped; 

plus 60,000 Deltoid 

Auxiliary Protectors issued

Up-Armored 

HMMWVs

Approximately 250 in 

theater 

More than 6,400 HMMWVs 

fi elded

Tactical 

Wheeled Vehicle 

Add-on Armor 

Kits

Developing plan to equip 

more than 10,000 vehicles

More than 19,000 vehicles 

in theater have add-on armor 

kits

Armored 

Security Vehicles 

(ASV)

ASV program cancelled 

during the 2003 budget and 

programming decision

82 ASVs in theater; total 

requirement of 872 approved

Bradley Reactive 

Armor Tiles 

(BRAT)

140 vehicle sets delivered

592 sets delivered; 

acceleration plan in 

execution

Counter-IED 

Device

Minimal capability in 

theater 1,496 systems in theater

Tactical and 

Small Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle 

(UAV)

Two systems deployed to 

theater; requirement is 194

128 systems deployed; 

requirement remains 194

Aircraft 

Survivability 

Equipment (ASE)

No Fixed Wing ASE; 

in process of upgrading 

CH-47 Chinook and 

UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft 

with basic ASE

All theater aircraft upgraded 

with basic ASE. In 

process of upgrading to an 

advanced Common Missile 

Warning System/Improved 

Countermeasure Munitions 

Dispenser (CMWS/ICMD)

Figure 4
continue to adjust training, across the Army, to 

refl ect the joint operating environment by incorporating the lessons learned from current operations. 

We are also implementing the National Security 

Personnel System, an innovative new approach 

to civilian personnel management and leader 

identifi cation. This will help to transform our 

management and development of critical Army civilians and achieve our desired objectives for the 

overall mindset and culture of the force.

In light of the challenges posed by the 21st century 

security environment, the Army is moving from 

an “alert — train — deploy” training model to a 

“train — alert — deploy — employ” model. We recognize that, in an increasing number of situations, 

we will have li le time to train prior to deploying. 

For this reason, Army transformation is focused on 

providing key training and education to increase 

readiness for no-notice expeditionary operations. 

We have incorporated lessons learned into all of our 

systems and training scenarios at our mobilization 

stations and combat training centers. This adaptation is having an immediate, tangible impact on 

the streets of Iraq, the ba lefi elds of Afghanistan 

and in other places around the world. Other key 

improvements include:

▪ Increased funding to adapt ranges and facilities 

to refl ect likely combat situations;

▪ Adjusted Defense Language Institute requirements to meet immediate operational needs for 

Arabic translators;

▪ Increased ammunition allocations to improve 

every Soldier’s live-fi re weapons training; and

▪ Required live-fi re training to ensure all Soldiers 

and units develop profi ciency in the key ba le 

drills needed to conduct safe convoy operations 

and other tasks.

To ensure our leaders learn from our veterans, we 

have implemented formal assignment guidelines 

to make best use of Soldier and leader experiences. We are assigning veterans to key joint billets 

as well as to key instructor and doctrine development positions. In addition, our most experienced 

offi cers and noncommissioned offi cers will return 

to operational units to apply their experiences in 

leading our fi ghting units. 

The Army remains commi ed to the education of 

our leaders even during this period of war. In fact, 

we are more aggressively pursuing leaders’ education now than during any other period of confl ict 

in our history. We are educating our leaders to expand their minds, increase their cultural awareness 

and to promote a “lifetime of learning.” These initiatives to our professional military education are 

based on three pillars — institutional education, 

self-study and experience. The synergy created by 

the combination of these three forms of education 

provides our leaders with enhanced capabilities to 

adapt to an increasingly ambiguous security environment. 

To facilitate excellence in our leaders at every 

level, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 

is embedded throughout Army learning. Joint 

awareness is introduced in precommissioning 

education and training of all offi cers, as well as the 

mid-level noncommissioned offi cer courses. Our 

training and education systems further emphasize 

a more in-depth understanding of joint principles 

and concepts beginning at the Captain/Major 

level for offi cers and the Sergeant Major level 

for our noncommissioned offi cers. Our seniorlevel JPME programs develop our civilian leaders 

and further educate military leaders on the joint, 

multinational and interagency processes. This 15
education is reinforced by experiences obtained in 

joint assignments. This increased understanding 

of the capabilities of other Services and external 

organizations signifi cantly improves our leaders’ 

ability to support the Joint Force in achieving 

national objectives. 

Our military education programs teach our leaders 

critical thinking skills in “how to think” versus “what 

to think.” Supported by Army Values, the Warrior 

Ethos and the experiences obtained through training and combat, Army leaders at all levels continue 

to hone the skills required to win in the complex 

environment of the 21st century. 

Enhancing the Combat Training Centers

The Combat Training Center (CTC) Program provides highly realistic training to prepare Soldiers 

and leaders to execute our doctrine for operating 

with other Services, the military forces of other nations and other agencies of the U.S. Government. 

This training is essential as we become increasingly more interdependent with other Services, 

allies and the interagency community. The training centers include the Ba le Command Training 

Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Joint 

Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; 

the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at 

Hohenfels, Germany.

These training centers are agents of change. Training scenarios are constantly updated to refl ect 

changing ba lefi eld conditions and incorporate 

lessons learned. In all scenarios, Soldiers and leaders are presented with complex, cross-cultural 

challenges by large numbers of role players who 

act as both combatants and foreign citizens. 

Additionally, each of the training centers is building extensive urban combat training facilities, as 

well as cave and tunnel complexes, to simulate 

wartime environments. As the Army transforms 

to a modular force, the CTCs will improve their 

ability to export a CTC-like training experience to 

home stations to reduce deployment requirements 

for training. The CTCs will continue to adapt to 

meet the training requirements to best serve a 

modularized Army.

Attaining a Quality of Life and WellBeing for Our People that Match the 

Quality of Their Service

Maintaining the Viability of the 

 All-Volunteer Force

The United States Army owes its success to the AllVolunteer Force, which provides the high-quality, 

versatile young Americans we depend on to serve 

as Soldiers. This is the fi rst time in our history in 

which the Nation has tested the All-Volunteer Force 

during a prolonged war. The quality-of-life programs that support our Soldiers and their families, 

as well as our civilian workforce, will play a major role in maintaining the overall viability of this 

concept. Determining what kind of All-Volunteer 

Army we need and developing the environment, 

compensation, education and other incentives to 

keep it appropriately manned may well be the 

greatest strategic challenge we face.

Maintaining the viability of this force will depend 

on several factors. First, American citizens must 

remain convinced that the Army is a great place to 

serve. While Soldiers perform their duties to meet 

Army expectations, the Army, in turn, must provide 

an environment in which individual aspirations can 

be met. To concentrate on the challenges they face, 

Soldiers must understand the frequency and cycle 

of projected deployments. Likewise, they must believe that their families will be provided for in their 

absence. Similarly, programs to encourage civilian 

employer support to Reserve Component Soldiers, 

who comprise more than half the Army force, are 

required to recruit and retain Reserve Component 

Soldiers. 

The Army is executing a full, diverse range of programs and activities that will help us to a ract and 

retain the quality people we need to maintain a volunteer force during a time of war. It is of national 

interest to retain these dedicated Soldiers to sustain the overall viability of our All-Volunteer Army. 

The support of Congress and the American people 

is vital to this eff ort. 

16
Caring for Army Families and Soldiers

Army Well-Being programs contribute to the Army’s ability to provide trained and ready forces. 

These programs enable leaders to care for their 

people while accomplishing the missions assigned to their units. Providing for the well-being 

of Soldiers’ families is a fundamental leadership 

imperative that requires adequate support and 

resources. We are pursuing numerous programs 

designed to improve spouse employment, ease the 

transitioning of high school students during moves 

and extend in-state college tuition rates to military 

families. We are also examining how best to expand support for veterans and National Guard and 

Army Reserve Soldiers. For example, TRICARE 

policies now allow for the eligibility of National 

Guard and Reserve Soldiers and their families.

Housing programs are another way in which we 

manifest our care for Soldiers and their families. 

We continue to focus considerable eff ort on our 

Residential Communities Initiative and Barracks 

Modernization Program. Congressional support 

for these initiatives has had a dramatic eff ect on 

improving the quality of life for our Soldiers and 

their families. The Army has already privatized 

more than 50,000 housing units and will eventually privatize over 32,000 more. 

Programs like the Residential Communities Initiative, when reinforced with other ongoing programs, 

will greatly help in our ability to retain Soldiers 

and families. These programs include:

▪ Improvements in healthcare, child care, youth 

programs, schools, facilities and other wellbeing initiatives; and

▪ Investments in new barracks for Soldiers without families, new centers for Reserve Component units and signifi cant improvements in 

training ranges. 

We support our Soldiers who have become casualties during war through the Disabled Soldier 

Support System (DS3). This initiative provides 

our Army’s most severely disabled Soldiers and 

their families with a system of follow-up support 

beyond their transition from military service. DS3 

provides support to families during the initial casualty notifi cation, tracks the Soldier’s return trip 

home and provides appropriate assistance in coordinating pertinent local, federal and national 

agencies. For the Soldier, this support includes 

rehabilitation, support at the medical and physical 

evaluation boards (which embrace unprecedented 

ways for severely injured Soldiers to continue to 

serve) and integration with veterans aff airs organizations, as required. 

The Army will continue to look for ways to improve 

on our DS3 initiative and deliver on our unfailing 

obligation to care for our people. To monitor and 

to report on the care being aff orded to our Soldiers 

in the DS3 program, we have enlisted the support 

of our voluntary Civilian Aides to the Secretary of 

the Army. These aides are notifi ed when disabled 

Soldiers are released from active service. They 

support the transition of these Soldiers to civilian 

life and work closely with civic leaders to assist in 

job placement, continued rehabilitation, education 

and other services to benefi t these Soldiers and 

their families. 

The resilience of the young men and women and 

their spouses, who have sacrifi ced so that others 

might have a brighter future, is humbling and exemplary. We will honor their service and sacrifi ce 

by remaining steadfast in our support to them. 17
Providing Infrastructure to Enable 

the Force to Fulfi ll Its Strategic Roles 

and Missions

Business Transformation

Transformation of our business, resourcing and 

acquisition processes promotes the long-term 

health of the Army. It will free human and fi nancial resources that can be be er applied towards 

accomplishing our warfi ghting requirements and 

accelerating other aspects of transformation. 

We are working aggressively to streamline our 

business processes and practices by taking advantage of industry innovation through commercial 

off -the-shelf (COTS) products, outsourcing and 

partnering. We are also adopting electronic business operations and a portfolio management 

approach to information technology requirements, 

while continuing to pursue U.S. Government 

guidelines for competitive sourcing. These reform initiatives will remain congruent with other 

Department of Defense transformation initiatives, 

such as the Defense Integrated Military Human 

Resources System.

One key business initiative is the General Fund 

Enterprise Business System, an integrated COTS 

system that will replace the Army’s 30-year-old 

accounting systems. The objective is to meet legislative requirements, while helping the Army to 

obtain an unqualifi ed audit opinion of its annual 

fi nancial statements. 

Additionally, the Army Review and Resourcing 

Board is helping to validate and resource requirements, to accelerate the “requirements to solutions” 

cycle time and to make recommendations to the 

leadership on resource adjustments. The Army 

intends to make our processes more fl exible, transparent and responsive to both immediate and 

future requirements of the Joint Force.

To meet the needs of the Future Force and to improve both eff ectiveness and effi ciency, we are also 

adapting the Institutional Army. The Institutional 

Army helps to accomplish our Title 10 functions to 

recruit and train our Soldiers, generate and sustain the force and other Services with materiel 

and equipment, and prepare the force for the future through doctrine development, research and 

experimentation. It represents about one-third of 

the Army in the form of Active, National Guard, 

Army Reserve units, Department of the Army civilians and contractors. It includes Headquarters, 

Department of the Army; Training and Doctrine 

Command; Forces Command; Army Medical Command; Army Materiel Command; Army Corps of 

Engineers and numerous other organizations. 

The idea of adapting the Institutional Army is not 

new. Driven by strategic, operational and fi scal necessities of war, the time to do it is now. The Army 

Campaign Plan communicates the scope of adaptation that is required to:

▪ Identify and divest ourselves of functions no 

longer relevant to current missions;

▪ Develop a joint, interdependent, end-to-end 

logistics structure that integrates a responsive 

civil-military sustaining base to be er meet 

Army operational requirements;

▪ Foster a culture of innovation to signifi cantly increase institutional agility; and

▪ Convert military positions to civilian positions, 

where appropriate, to improve the availability 

of Soldiers for deploying units. 18
We are incorporating these objectives into a comprehensive plan for adapting the Institutional 

Army, process-by-process, structure-by-structure, 

over a multiyear period. This plan will provide 

context, direction and a general vector to support the immediate adaptation of the Institutional 

Army to refl ect our wartime focus. The Army will 

develop this plan during this fi scal year. 

Maintaining Our Installations as 

 “Flagships of Readiness”

Our installations are an essential component in 

maintaining the premier Army in the world. Our 

installations are the platforms from which we 

rapidly mobilize and deploy military power and 

sustain our military families. Installations also 

play a vital role in training the force and reconstituting it upon return from deployment. They also 

provide deployed commanders with the ability 

to reach back for information and other support 

through advanced communications technology.

To enable the creation of new modular brigades, 

the Army has greatly accelerated the normal planning, programming and budgeting cycle, requiring 

installation commanders to fi nd innovative solutions to support additional Soldiers training and 

living on our installations. The Army is using 

existing facilities when available and making renovations and modifi cations, where feasible. O en, 

we must acquire temporary structures to satisfy 

facility shortfalls. We are also funding site preparation work, permanent utility infrastructure and 

renovation projects. Each installation has unique 

requirements to support and sustain the Army’s 

new modular force structure. 

The condition of our installation infrastructure, 

such as vehicle maintenance and physical fi tness 

facilities, continues to present challenges due to the 

compounding eff ects of many decades of underfunding. Investment in the installations that are 

homes to our Soldiers and families, and the workplace for our civilians, will continue to play a vital 

role in a racting and retaining volunteers to serve.

Improving Global Force Posture

The Army is adjusting its global posture to meet the 

needs of Combatant Commanders. The objective is 

to increase strategic responsiveness while decreasing its overseas footprint and exposure. As part 

of a larger Department of Defense program, these 

adjustments will have a fundamental impact on 

our facilities and our ability to surge forces when 

needed. In place of traditional overseas bases with 

extensive infrastructure, we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with pre-positioned 

equipment and rotational presence of personnel.

Parallel with the Base Realignment and Closure 

process, the Army is identifying critical joint power 

projection installations to support the mobilization, 

demobilization and rapid deployment of Army 

forces. We are also enhancing force reception and 

deployed logistics capabilities to quickly respond 

to unforeseen contingencies.

To complete the transition to an expeditionary 

force, we will reposition ground forces to meet 

emerging challenges and adjust our permanent 

overseas presence to a unit-rotation model that is 

synchronized with force generation initiatives. In 

Europe, both heavy divisions will return to the 

United States. They are being replaced by expanding 

the airborne brigade in Italy, enhancing the Army’s 

training center in Germany and establishing a 19
possible rotational presence in Eastern Europe. We 

will maintain a rotational presence in the Middle 

East while eliminating many of our permanent 

bases. In the Pacifi c, we will maintain smaller 

forward-presence forces, but will station more agile 

and expeditionary forces capable of rapid response 

at power projection bases. Finally, we will leverage 

our improved readiness to increase our rotational 

training presence among our security partners. 

LandWarNet

LandWarNet is the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense’s Global Information Grid. 

LandWarNet, a combination of infrastructure and 

services, moves information through a seamless 

network and enables the management of warfi ghting and business information. 

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the 

power of a highly mobile communications network 

and network-centric operations. A network-centric 

force has dramatically improved situational awareness and quality of information which, in turn, leads 

to dramatic improvements in military eff ectiveness 

across the range of vital functions including operational cycle times, command and control, force 

application, force protection and logistics. These 

improvements combine to create unprecedented 

levels of fl exibility and agility.

The 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Armored Division have demonstrated this agility in their 

operations. Using the power of networked communications, they have been able to move information 

at unprecedented rates which has shortened the 

time required to conduct tactical and operational 

updates. This has accelerated the speed of command by enabling faster planning and execution 

of operations. Using this technology, Stryker 

units were able to move from northern locations 

to the south and fi ght two ba les within 48 hours, 

demonstrating a signifi cant improvement in both 

fl exibility and agility.

Equipping Soldiers with world-class communications capabilities is also improving the ability to 

provide logistical support. For example, the 3rd

Infantry Division was fi elded, prior to their redeployment to Iraq this year, with the Joint Network 

Transport Capability-Spiral, which includes the 

Joint Network Node, Trojan Spirit and the Combat Service Support Very Small Aperture Terminal. 

These systems provide versatile satellite communications that improve the ability to sustain 

operations over extended distances in complex terrain by reducing gaps in current capability. Three 

other divisions will receive these systems this year. 

We are also fi elding commercial solutions available 

now to expand communications capabilities and to 

increase self-suffi ciency.

The Network will also help to provide “actionable 

intelligence” for commanders and Soldiers in a 

more timely manner than today. The Network will 

improve situational awareness and the quality and 

speed of combat decision making. It will leverage 

the Army’s initiatives to expand human intelligence 

and improve analytical capabilities for deployed 

forces. Moreover, it will enable improvements in 

collaboration and analysis, while making it possible to share intelligence products more readily 

with the commanders and Soldiers that have the 

greatest need for them. 

Accelerating the fi elding of Ba le Command 

capabilities to establish a more capable and 

reliable network will support the Department of 

20
Defense goal to bring the joint community closer 

to a common operational picture. LandWarNet 

will integrate joint maneuver forces, joint fi res 

and actionable intelligence to produce far greater 

capability and responsiveness. The combined eff ect 

of our Ba le Command and Network programs 

will be to improve combat capability today, while 

enhancing the relevance and readiness of the 

Future Force.

Balancing Risk: The Tension 

Between Current and 

Future Demands

To reduce the risk associated with operations in 

support of the Global War on Terror, in the a ermath of September 11, we have made numerous 

decisions to allocate resources to immediate, urgent wartime needs. These decisions, made prior 

to and during 2004, have be er enabled our Soldiers to accomplish their missions. Our challenge, 

in the months and years ahead, will be to establish 

a balance between current and future investments 

that will keep risk at moderate levels as we support 

the execution of the full scope of our global commitments while preparing for future challenges. 

“Buying Back” Capabilities

Prior to September 11, the Army’s strategic investment decisions were based on a prevailing view 

that, in the absence of a peer competitor, risk could 

be accepted in numerous areas of procurement for 

the Current Force to facilitate substantial investment in the Future Force. 

In the a ermath of September 11, Army requirements changed dramatically. Army decisions made 

during 2004 refl ect the need to “buy back” many 

of the capabilities, forsaken in recent years, now 

required to support the Combatant Commanders. 

Buying back these capabilities has reduced operational risk, improved force protection and supports 

evolving priorities. While these decisions have 

produced dramatic, immediate improvements for 

our Soldiers and for our capabilities in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the costs, in excess of $6.5 billion, 

have been substantial. 

Major Decisions in 2004

During 2004, the Army restructured or cancelled 

126 programs to free resources for more pressing 

wartime requirements. The most signifi cant of 

these decisions are described below.

▪ In May 2004, as highlighted earlier, the Army 

cancelled the Comanche Program. We are reinvesting the $14.6 billion in savings into pressing Army aviation requirements and correcting 

many chronic equipment shortfalls. 

▪ In July 2004, the Army restructured the Future 

Combat Systems (FCS) Program to accelerate the introduction of crucial new capabilities 

to the Current Force. By accelerating FCS, the 

Army will be able to spiral promising technologies into the hands of Soldiers and leaders to 

give them the tools they need now. 

Other decisions made by Congress or the Department of Defense acted to signifi cantly enhance the 

Army’s capability to accomplish its assigned missions.

▪ In October 2004, the Army was authorized by 

the National Defense Authorization Act to raise 

Active Component end strength by 20,000 Soldiers and, between 2005 and 2009, increase by 

an additional 10,000 Soldiers. This increase is 

intended to provide the personnel strength 21
needed to implement our modular conversion 

and rebalancing initiatives. The increase in end 

strength also expands the potential options for 

operational tour lengths, which we are fully 

evaluating in the larger context of the Army’s 

ability to generate the combat and sustainment 

forces needed to support operations in multiple 

theaters of war. 

▪ During Fiscal Year 2004, in addition to supporting these critical decisions, the Department of 

Defense and the other Services supported Army 

operations and helped to maintain transformational momentum, by reprogramming signifi -

cant resources to Army accounts. The Army 

also received more than $15.4 billion of a $25 billion contingency reserve fund appropriated by 

Congress. 

Meeting Today’s Demands While 

Preparing for Tomorrow

We have done much to mitigate risk, in all dimensions, but particularly in operational risk. Creating 

modular units; fi elding of Stryker Brigade Combat 

Teams; restructuring of Army Aviation following 

the cancellation of the Comanche Program; establishing the Reset Program and initiating rapid 

fi elding; and rapid equipping programs are all 

helping to meet demands for Army forces, while 

reducing levels of operational risk. 

Due to dramatically increased operational tempo, 

the operational fl eet’s condition and age are 

aff ecting current equipment readiness. Increased 

mileage and fl ight hours, coupled with the severe 

environmental conditions encountered in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, have placed greater stress on the fl eet 

than expected. The Army will require assistance 

to address the risk. As part of the Reset Program, 

increased repair, recapitalization and replacement 

of systems will be required to ensure our fl eet is 

maintained and fully capable. 

Numerous initiatives are focused to reduce force 

management risk. These include:

▪ Establishing a larger pool of rotational forces 

through modularity; 

▪ Rebalancing the Active and Reserve Components; 

▪ Eliminating redundant capabilities; 

▪ Executing a comprehensive military-to-civilian 

conversion program; 

▪ Stabilizing the force; 

▪ Enhancing recruiting and retention by adding 

recruiters and creating special incentives; and

▪ Increasing the personnel strength of the operational Army. 

In addition, congressional approval of increases in 

Active Component personnel strength is helping 

the Army to man its transforming modular Brigade 

Combat Teams now undergoing activation or conversion. 

Our Army is focusing resources on spiraling higher 

payoff technologies into the Current Force to minimize future risks. Our investment accounts will 

be critical to our ability to maintain technological 

superiority and ensure the development and fi elding of the Future Force. We will need assistance 

to maintain these investment accounts to strike the 

proper balance between supporting current operations and readiness and investing in capabilities 

required to ensure future success.

To reduce institutional risk, we are continuing to 

refi ne our resourcing processes to make them more 

agile and responsive to the immediate require22 ments of the Combatant Commanders and to help 
prepare the Army for future challenges. Our investments in LandWarNet (to facilitate real time, 

common understanding of dynamic situations) are 

improving our installations’ ability to project and 

sustain forces. This result is a more rapidly deployable force that requires less logistics overhead 

structure and a greater capacity to reach back to 

their home stations for intelligence, medical and 

other essential support.

Increased funding will be required to accomplish 

our current tasks and simultaneously prepare 

for the future. Reduced funding would have a 

signifi cant impact on procurement; repair, recapitalization and replacement of the heavily utilized 

operational fl eet; rese ing the force; and Soldier 

programs, while preparing the force to accomplish 

the full range of future requirements, projected in 

an uncertain, unpredictable era.

Remaining Relevant and Ready in 

Service to the Nation

Our commitment to the Nation is certain and unwavering. The Army has defended the Nation for 

230 years. We continue to remain vigilant in this 

fundamental task by providing the Nation unique 

capabilities to complement those provided by the 

other Services.

The Army remains a values-based organization 

commi ed to the ideals of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, 

Selfl ess Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal 

Courage. These ideals are embodied in the Soldier’s 

Creed and the Warrior Ethos and are ingrained into 

the fi ber of every American Soldier. We remain 

dedicated to preparing every Soldier to face the realities of combat and positioning the Army to face 

the challenges of the future.

Even as we fi ght the Global War on Terror and 

sustain our other strategic commitments, we must 

continue to focus on tomorrow. We are challenging our institutional practices and our assessment 

of current and future warfi ghting capabilities by 

asking key questions and continuing to validate 

our answers to them: 

▪ What are the strategic requirements of the 21st

century security environment?

▪ What are the characteristics and capabilities of 

a truly joint, interdependent, network-centric 

force, designed to dominate across the full range 

of military operations?

▪ Will Army and joint transformation activities 

produce the capabilities required to dominate 

across the range of military operations in the environment where they will most likely occur?

▪ Are joint land forces (Army, Marines and Special 

Operations Forces) properly sized, structured 

and trained to perform the full scope of missions 

required now and in the future?

▪ What are the optimal roles for the Army’s Active 

and Reserve Components and the Joint Force in 

homeland defense?

▪ What will the impact of sustained, protracted 

confl ict be on the All-Volunteer force?

▪ What combination of quality of life, 

compensation, incentives, service options and 

other tools will be required to recruit and retain 

the All-Volunteer Force of the future?

We continue in our determination to achieve our 

overarching strategic goal: to remain relevant and 

ready by providing the Combatant Commanders 

with the capabilities required to dominate across 

the range of military operations. 

With the support of the Department of Defense 

and Congress, we are sustaining our global commitments while making tremendous progress in 

our transformation — the most dramatic restructuring of the Army in more than 50 years. We will 

need your continued support in order to provide 

relevant and ready forces and other capabilities to 

the Combatant Commanders, while providing for 

the well-being of our All-Volunteer Soldiers and 

their families who are serving the Nation in this 

time of war.

23
Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY94 require the 

information in this addendum (Note: 521 of the 

NDAA has been codifi ed in 10 U.S. Code 10542). 

The information is presented in the order and 

depth as required by the act. Section 517 requires 

a report relating to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of 

the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA for 

Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a 

detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to 

the implementation of the Army National Guard 

Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of 

Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum 

as ‘ANGCRRA’). Section 521 reporting was later 

amended by Section 704, FY96 NDAA. U.S. Army 

Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b)(2)(A). (See Figure A-1) The promotion rate for offi cers considered for promotion 

from within the promotion zone who are serving 

as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance 

with that program) compared with the promotion 

rate for other offi cers considered for promotion 

from within the promotion zone in the same pay 

grade and the same competitive category, shown 

for all offi cers of the Army. 

Section 517 (b)(2)(B). (See Figure A-2) The promotion rate for offi cers considered for promotion 

from below the promotion zone who are serving 

as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance 

with that program) compared in the same manner 

as specifi ed in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph 

above).

Section 521(b).

1. The number and percentage of offi cers with at 

least two years of active duty before becoming 

(Data Required by NDAA 1994)

A

AC

in RC*

Army 

Average**

Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)

Major 87.4 93.8

Lieutenant Colonel 40.5 79.6

Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)

Major 93.4 96.9

Lieutenant Colonel 38.9 79.0

*Active Component (AC) offi cers serving in Reserve Component (RC) assignments at time of 

consideration.

**Active Component offi cers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at the time of 

consideration.

AC

in RC*

Army 

Average**

Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)

Major 3.6 7.5

Lieutenant Colonel 0 7.2

Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)

Major 4.6 7.5

Lieutenant Colonel 3.4 7.5

* Below-the-zone, active-component offi cers 

serving in Reserve Component assignments at 

time of consideration.

** Below-the-zone, active-component offi cers not 

serving in Reserve Component assignments at 

the time of consideration.

ADDENDUM

A-1

Figure A-1

Figure A-2
a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. 

Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:

a. Army National Guard (ARNG) offi cers: 

20,653 or 56.3 percent.

b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) offi cers: 9,828 or 

25.47 percent.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National 

Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve 

units:

a. ARNG enlisted: 129,985 or 42.5 percent.

b. USAR enlisted: 36,396 or 21.64 percent.

3. The number of offi cers who are graduates of 

one of the service academies and were released 

from active duty before the completion of their 

active duty service obligation. Of those offi cers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining 

period of their active duty service obligation 

as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

 In FY04, no offi cers were released to the 

selective reserve to complete their obligation. 

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) 

of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for 

each waiver: 

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the 

Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of offi cers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Offi cers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released 

from active duty before the completion of their 

active duty service obligation and, of those offi cers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining 

period of their active duty service obligation 

as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY04, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their 

active duty service obligation.

In FY04, no waivers for distinguished 

ROTC graduates were granted. 

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) 

of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for 

each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the 

Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of offi cers who are graduates of 

the Reserve Offi cers’ Training Corps program 

and who are performing their minimum period 

of obligated service in accordance with section 

1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) 

two years of active duty, and (B) such additional 

period of service as is necessary to complete the 

remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those offi cers, the number 

for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance 

with that section was granted during the preceding fi scal year:

In FY04, four ROTC graduates were released 

early from their active duty obligation. Of 

this number, none are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the 

Army National Guard, and none through 

service in the U.S. Army Reserve. 

6. The number of offi cers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fi scal 

year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade 

above fi rst lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were 

concurred in by an active duty offi cer under 

section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of offi cers 

set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with 

U.S. Army Reserve data also reported):

a. ARNG. 1,490 ARNG offi cers from units were 

recommended for unit vacancy promotion 

A-2
and promoted. An active duty offi cer concurred with 100 percent.

b. USAR. 178 USAR offi cers from units were 

recommended for unit vacancy promotion. 

121 were favorably considered.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding 

fi scal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA 

of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for 

noncommissioned offi cers and the reason for 

each such waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown 

for each State, of personnel in the initial entry 

training and nondeployability personnel accounting category established under section 

1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army 

National Guard who have not completed the 

minimum training required for deployment 

or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information 

pertaining to the U. S. Army Reserve is also provided):

a. ARNG. In FY04, the number of ARNG nondeployable personnel was 38,221. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the 

detailed information by State.

b. USAR. In FY04, the total number of USAR 

non-deployable personnel was 34,318. The 

United States Army Reserve Command 

maintains non-deployable Soldier statistical 

information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fi scal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not 

completing the minimum training required for 

deployment within 24 months a er entering the 

National Guard (and Army Reserve):

a. ARNG. The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during the previous fi scal year 

pursuant to section 11115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA 

for not completing the minimum training 

required for deployment within 24 months 

a er entering the ARNG is 30 Offi cers and 

10,285 enlisted, which includes all 54 States 

and territories. The breakdown by each State 

is maintained by NGB.

b. USAR. The number of USAR Soldiers discharged in FY04 due to not completing required military Initial Entry Training (IET) 

includes 109 offi cers and 415 enlisted. Those 

Soldiers who have not completed the required 

IET within the fi rst 24 months are discharged 

from the Army Reserve. The United States 

Army Reserve Command maintains statistical information on non-completion of IET by 

Army Reserve Soldiers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, 

that were granted by the Secretary during the 

previous fi scal year under section 1115(c)(2) 

of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 

1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph 

(9), together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, 

shown for each State (and the number of U.S. 

Army Reserve members), who were screened 

during the preceding fi scal year to determine 

whether they meet minimum physical profi le 

standards required for deployment and, of 

those members: (a) the number and percentage 

who did not meet minimum physical profi le 

standards required for deployment; and (b) the 

number and percentage who were transferred 

pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the 

personnel accounting category described in 

paragraph (8):

a. Screened during the preceding fi scal year 

to determine whether they meet minimum 

physical profi le standards required for deployment:

A-3
 ARNG. In FY04, approximately 70,068 

ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of 

these personnel, 2,068, or 3 percent, did 

not meet the minimum physical profi le 

standards required for deployment.

USAR. In FY04, approximately 20,864 

USAR Soldiers underwent a retention 

physical. Of these, 2,086, or 10 percent, 

were identifi ed for review.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA 

to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8):

ARNG. In FY04 - 6,223 Soldiers were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

USAR. In FY04 - 312 Soldiers, or less than 

1 percent of the Army Reserve Selected 

Reserve, were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12. The number of members, and the percentage 

total membership, of the Army National Guard, 

shown for each State, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fi scal year as 

provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA: 

 Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA. 

13. The number of members, and the percentage 

of the total membership, of the Army National 

Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a 

dental screening during the previous fi scal year 

as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA: 

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA. 

14. The number of members, and the percentage 

of the total membership, of the Army National 

Guard, shown for each State, over the age of 

40 who underwent a full physical examination 

during the previous fi scal year for purposes of 

section 1117 of ANGCRRA: 

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA. 

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard 

that are scheduled for early deployment in the 

event of a mobilization and, of those units, the 

number that are dentally ready for deployment 

in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA: 

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time 

for each Army National Guard combat unit 

(and U.S. Army Reserve Force Support Package (FSP) unit), and a description, displayed in 

broad categories and by State, of what training 

would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) in a post-mobilization period 

for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA:

a. ARNG. Estimated time for post-mobilization 

training is reported through the Unit Status 

Report, is classifi ed, and is maintained by the 

Department of the Army, G-3:

Information on the type of training required by units during post- mobilization 

is maintained by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Continental 

United States Armies (CONUSAs).

Post-mobilization training for enhanced 

Separate Brigades (eSB)/ ARNG Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) can be categorized 

as maneuver, a ack, defend, command 

and control, gunnery, NBC defense, and 

sustainment. Theater specifi c training requirements to include Antiterrorism (AT) 

and Force Protection (FP) training are also 

conducted during the post-mobilization 

training period. 

b. USAR. To meet the on-going operational requirements of OIF and OEF, Army Reserve 

training is now based on a higher readiness 

requirement to meet the train-alert-mobilize deploy model, which reduces emphasis A-4
 members and units of the Army National Guard 

(and the U.S. Army Reserve):

a. ARNG. During the preceding fi scal year the 

ARNG made signifi cant progress towards incorporating Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) as an integral 

part of its training strategy and supported 

numerous units at mobilization stations with 

virtual and constructive training tools. In addition, the ARNG training division teamed 

with the Army G3 to validate virtual maneuver simulators for the entire ARNG heavy 

force.

The ARNG is fi elding the Advanced 

Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation 

Trainer (AB-FIST) that provides full crew 

precision gunnery for the M2 and M3 family of vehicles. The system underwent a 

rigorous Limited User Test (LUT) with 

the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) 

and the Army Research Institute (ARI). In 

FY04, the AB-FIST was approved by the 

USAIS Commanding General, as a training device that can be used for Bradley 

gunnery crew training in addition to the 

Conduct of Fire Trainer to meet established live fi re prerequisites as outlined 

in DA PAM 350-38. To support maneuver 

training the ARNG is fi elding updated 

Simulations Network (SIMNET) virtual 

maneuver simulators for the M1A1 and 

M2A2 vehicles. The upgraded SIMNET 

modules feature a new PC-based visual 

system, host computer, and a sound system. These tank and mechanized infantry 

platoon sets have upgraded A er Action 

Review (AAR) stations. 

ARNG Ba le Staff Trainers are being updated with the Army’s latest approved 

Janus so ware versions. Janus so ware 

operates on portable PCs. The ARNG continues to procure new hardware to ensure 

these systems can operate the Objective 

One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF) 

on post mobilization training. The Army 

Reserve force must be ready before mobilization. This change requires a new training 

strategy and increased resource requirements 

for additional individual and unit training:

Army Reserve units with signifi cant numbers of cross-leveled or Individual Ready 

Reserve (IRR) Soldier fi lls require additional collective training time at the Mobilization Stations. Current mobilization 

timelines o en do not allow for a Mission 

Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) for deploying 

combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units to the same standard 

as deploying combat units. However, 

these units receive home station training 

to compensate for this shortfall.

To continue providing capabilities to support the Army in sustained joint and expeditionary operations and to provide 

predictability for Soldiers, families and 

employers, the Army Reserve is implementing the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). Beginning in 2005, ten 

like-structured deployable organizations 

called Army Rotational Expeditionary 

Packages (AREPs) will be formed. Units in 

each AREP will plan to mobilize to deploy 

for up to twelve months once every fi ve 

or six years. Unit capabilities and readiness within an AREP will be formally validated as it approaches the employment 

window. The Army Reserve will implement the AREF in 10 phases. As the Army 

Reserve transforms, early AREP rotations 

and their timelines will be condensed. As 

the concept is fully implemented, the rotations and their phases will become more 

distinct and sequential. 

17. A description of the measures taken during 

the preceding fi scal year to comply with the 

requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to 

expand the use of simulations, simulators, and 

advanced training devices and technologies for 

A-5
so ware when it is fi elded in FY07. Additionally, the Engagement Skills Trainer 

(EST 2000) continued to be fi elded in FY04. 

The EST 2000 is the Army’s approved collective marksmanship training device. 

EST 2000 is used by the ARNG to provide 

unit collective gunnery and tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, Military 

Police Squads, and Combat Support and 

Combat Service Support elements. These 

systems also support units conducting the 

homeland defense and airport security 

missions assigned to the ARNG. 

During FY04, the ARNG experienced a 

signifi cant increase in the number of Soldiers mobilized for OIF. The National 

Guard Bureau procured TADSS sets for 

deployment to mobilization sites such 

as Camp Shelby, MS, Fort Bliss, TX, Fort 

Hood, TX, and Fort Drum, NY. These 

sets consist of M1 and M2 precision gunnery training devices, rifl e marksmanship 

trainers and other unit specifi c TADSS. 

Most importantly in FY04, the ARNG led 

the way in the development of a Virtual 

Combat Convoy Trainer (VCCT) system. 

To keep costs low the ARNG required the 

contractor to leverage existing technology 

developed for the M1 and M2 virtual gunnery systems. The National Guard Bureau 

funded the procurement of convoy simulators that train tasks associated with the 

execution of a convoy. Soldiers train in the 

simulator prior to executing a convoy live 

fi re exercise.

Through the ARNG Distributed Ba le 

Simulation Program (DBSP) commanders, 

staff s and Soldiers receive assistance from 

“graybeard” mentors and TADSS facilitators. DBSP is a contractor organization 

that provides trained and experienced civilians to ensure the ARNG is using all of 

the TADSS in a meaningful way to execute 

annual training requirements. DBSP ba le 

staff training teams provide exercise support during the planning, preparation, 

and execution of computer-mediated battle staff training. This support augments 

the support provided by Training Support 

XXI Soldiers.

b. USAR. The Army Reserve has continued 

to work with the U.S. Army Infantry School 

and Army Training Support Command to incorporate the Laser Marksmanship Training 

System into a training strategy that supports 

initial entry and unit sustainment training. 

In 2004, Army Reserve eff orts with Beamhit Corporation, makers of the laser training system, resulted in the development of 

full-scale laser targets that support convoy 

counter-ambush training. These targets permit the Army Reserve’s use of current roads 

and buildings for greater realism in tactical 

marksmanship training. Soldiers can fi re 

the lasers with blanks from moving vehicles 

while engaging targets that represent an ambush. Army Reserve units conduct this training at home station rather than waiting to arrive at mobilization stations:

The Army Reserve also uses simulation 

devices like the EST 2000 and the VCCT 

systems at consolidated training sites, to 

include mobilization stations. The Army 

Reserve has fi elded seven EST 2000s and 

is working with proponents, such as the 

Military Police School, to leverage its use 

in MOS reclassifi cation. The Army Reserve mobilized 73 small arms instructors 

to support CONUSA mobilization operations. At some mobilization stations, ammunition consumption dropped nearly 

200 percent of Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) ammunition authorizations to 75 percent. A second mobilization 

of small arms instructors began in October 

2004.

A-6
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for 

each State, (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), and 

drawn from the unit readiness rating system as 

required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information 

and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information shown in the 

table:

 Unit readiness reporting information and 

summary tables are classifi ed. This information is maintained by the Department of the 

Army, G-3. 

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the 

deployability of units of the Army National 

Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve), including 

a discussion of personnel defi ciencies and 

equipment shortfalls in accordance with such 

section 1121:

 Unit readiness summary tables and overall 

assessments are classifi ed. Department of 

the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and the 

U.S. Army Reserve), of the results of inspections 

of units of the Army National Guard (and Army 

Reserve) by inspector general or other commissioned offi cers of the Regular Army under the 

provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together 

with explanations of the information shown 

in the tables, and including display of (a) the 

number of such inspections; (b) identifi cation 

of the entity conducting each inspection; (c) the 

number of units inspected; and (d) the overall 

results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit 

of whether the unit met deployability standards 

and, for those units not meeting deployability 

standards, the reasons for such failure and the 

status of corrective actions. Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by State 

for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for the USAR units are available from 

U.S. Army, FORSCOM:

a. ARNG. During FY04, ARNG State level Inspector General (IG) conducted extensive 

inspections throughout the United States. 

State level IGs conducted approximately 336 

inspections during the year, visiting 538 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on 

fi ndings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of individual inspections conducted by an IG may be 

requested for release through The Inspector 

General of the Army. Operational Readiness 

Evaluation Data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as 

requirements in 1997. Data available under 

the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not 

available in an unclassifi ed format. TAM 

data is maintained at the State level and is 

available upon request from State level training readiness offi cials. 

b. USAR. In accordance with AR 1-201, the 

United States Army Reserve Command 

(USARC) conducts inspections of Regional 

Readiness Commands (RRCs) and Direct 

Reporting Units (DRUs) within the USARC 

Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). 

USARC maintains the results of all OIPs. 

The OIP focuses on fi ndings and recommendations. Units do not receive pass/fail 

ratings. During FY04, fi ve OIPs were scheduled, but none were conducted. Units were 

not inspected because of the high OIF/OEF 

OPTEMPO. However, the Army Reserve did 

conduct 12 Ba le Focus Readiness Reviews, 

which involved a review of over 180 brigade 

and below units. The Army Reserve also conducted 400 command inspections, which represents more than one-third of USAR units. 

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 

maintains the results of unit TAMs and the 

data for Reserve Component FSP unit inspections. 

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of A-7
the active duty combat units (and other units) 

associated with that Army National Guard (and 

U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for 

each such Army National Guard unit (and for 

the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment 

of the commander of that associated active duty 

unit of the manpower, equipment, and training 

resource requirements of that National Guard 

(and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with 

section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) 

the results of the validation by the commander 

of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army 

Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

 The listing described above is contained in 

FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 – Active Component/Reserve Component Partnerships. Detailed assessments of specifi c RC units by associated active duty commanders are maintained 

within FORSCOM at the two CONUSAs and 

three CONUS-based corps. General comments 

of manpower, equipment and training resource 

requirements in accordance with ANGCRRA 

follow:

 a. ARNG. For Army National Guard divisions 

and BCTs:

Manpower. Several BCTs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior offi cers. Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualifi cation (DMOSQ) is a training 

challenge because Military Occupational 

Specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in 

schools that are o en taught simultaneously. Within the BCTs, Full-Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently fi lled at approximately 55 percent of 

requirements. In ARNG divisions, recent 

force structure changes and rebalancing 

actions are causing short-term shortfalls 

in fi ll percentages.

 Equipment. The Army is making extraordinary eff orts to fully equip all units deploying to theater in terms of vehicles, 

weapons, communications, force protection equipment and other areas. However, the lack of modernized equipment 

continues to hamper the BCTs. Shortages 

in chemical defense equipment and night 

vision devices limit the full range of capabilities for training of the BCTs. The BCTs 

continue to receive the bulk of any new 

equipment fi elded to the ARNG.

Training. Adequate training resources in 

FY04 enabled BCTs to sustain platoon premobilization training profi ciency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the 

availability of adequate maneuver areas 

continue to challenge most units. Virtual 

and constructive simulation systems combine with live training to provide multiechelon collective profi ciency.

b. USAR. Within the Army Reserve, use of the 

Force Support Package (FSP) unit model is 

in the process of being replaced by the Army 

Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) 

force management model:

Manpower. The Army Reserve is continuing to improve its operations and training 

management by building FTS manning as 

a result of the Congressionally approved 

Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) and Military Technician (MILTECH) ramps. However, sustaining DMOSQ is impacted in 

some cases by limited school spaces that 

are based on class size and student to instructor ratio (2:1 for some course phases). 

To address this situation, Army Reserve 

schools have begun to mobilize qualifi ed 

Army Reserve instructors to teach only 

in RC schools. The Army Reserve is also 

starting to accelerate the conduct of courses and use web-based training whenever 

feasible. Some MOSs require extensive 

training, for example 15N, 25B, 45G, 91W, A-8
and 97B, and sequential schools require a 

Soldier’s absence from their civilian employment for extended periods.

Equipment. Prior to September 11, the Army’s strategic investment decisions were 

based on a prevailing view that, in the 

absence of a peer competitor, risk could 

be accepted in numerous areas of procurement for the Current Force to facilitate substantial investment in the Future 

Force. The impact of these decisions has 

been evidenced across all components. 

In the case of the Army Reserve, this has 

resulted in not fully fi elding force modernization equipment. Today, the Army 

Reserve has approximately 78 percent of 

its authorized end items. New procurement and cascading of older equipment 

from the Active Component (AC) is only 

keeping pace with ba le losses and a rition. The shortage of modern equipment 

and the retention of obsolete and obsolescent items to maintain equipment on-hand 

readiness have begun to adversely impact 

the Army Reserve’s ability to continue to 

support the Army’s sustained joint and expeditionary operations. 

 Today almost 76 percent of on-hand Army 

Reserve equipment is deployed, mobilizing, demobilizing or assigned as “Stay 

Behind Equipment “(SBE) in theater. Replacement of SBE for the Army Reserve 

is an immediate force multiplier for the 

Army. The Army Reserve continues to 

support subsequent OIF/OEF rotations 

and other requirements by using assets 

from its stateside-based institutional training structure. Much of the equipment 

returning from OIF/OEF has rapidly expended its service life under combat conditions and must be replaced. The concept 

of a transformed, modular Army of “plug 

and play” units demands that all units, 

regardless of component, be equipped to 

the same levels and with compatible and 

interoperable systems. Current Army 

procurement planning, with the assistance 

of Congressionally directed procurement 

within the Total Obligation Authority and 

the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA), are the 

keys to achieve this goal.

 Training. Some Equipment Readiness 

Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages 

inhibit eff ective training. High levels of 

SBE and backlogs at reconstitution and 

depot sites further exacerbate the problem. Army Reserve units o en have a signifi cantly older generation of equipment 

on which to train. Units will require additional training time a er mobilization 

to achieve profi ciency on collective tasks, 

especially if modernization equipment is 

provided a er mobilization. 

 The results of the validation by the commander 

of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army 

Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with ANGCRRA are maintained by the 

Department of the Army, G-3. General comment follows:

For ARNG divisions, BCTs, ARNG Force Support Package (FSP) Units and Army Reserve 

FSP Units: Lack of Force Modernization equipment within the Reserve Component (RC) is 

the foremost AC compatibility issue. Until the 

RC units are modernized and supported at the 

same level as the AC units, most RC units will 

not be fully compatible with AC units until after mobilization. Decreased mobilization to deployment and/or employment timelines makes 

it imperative that RC units be modernized and 

equipped at the same level as the Active Component prior to mobilization. As Modifi ed 

Tables of Organization and Equipment in units 

are updated and unit reorganization continues, 

the compatibility issue will improve.

21. A specifi cation of the active duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense 

A-9
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 

1993 (10 U.S. Code 261 note), shown (A) by State 

for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. 

Army Reserve), (B) by rank of offi cers, warrant 

offi cers, and enlisted members assigned, and 

(C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment:

As of September 30, 2004, the Army had 4756 

Active Component Soldiers assigned to Title XI 

positions. The Army goal is 100 percent of the 

total (offi cer and enlisted authorizations) 5000 

personnel authorized for the AC/RC Program. 

Although constrained by ongoing support to the 

Global War on Terror, the Active Army is maintaining AC/RC program strength and plans to 

maintain not less than an aggregate strength 

level of 90 percent (offi cer and NCO) during the 

FY05 period as addressed in the FY05 NDAA. 

Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources 

Command carefully tracks fi ll of Title XI positions (See Figure A-3).

A-10

Title XI FY04 Authorizations

Offi cers

Enlisted

Soldiers

Warrant

Offi cers

Total

PERSCOM 0 5 0 5

USAR 39 332 2 371

TRADOC 110 275 0 385

FORSCOM 1428 2471 153 3899

GFR 0 2 0 2

USARPAC 32 62 1 94

TOTAL 1609 3147 156 4756

Figure A-3
ACRONYMS

AAR A er Action Review 

AB-FIST Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer 

AC Active Component

AGR Active Guard and Reserve

ANGCRRA Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act

AREF Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 

AREPs Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages 

ARNG Army National Guard

ASE Aircra Survivability Equipment

ASV Armored Security Vehicle

AT Antiterrorism

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BRAT Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles

CH Cargo Helicopter

CONUSAs Continental United States Armies

COTS Commercial-Off -the-Shelf

CS/CSS Combat Support and Combat Service Support

CTC Combat Training Center

DBSP Distributed Ba le Simulation Program 

DMOSQ Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualifi cation 

DOD Department of Defense

DRUs Direct Reporting Units 

DS3 Disabled Soldier Support System

ERC Equipment Readiness Code

eSB enhanced Separate Brigades

EST 2000 Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 

FCS Future Combat Systems

FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command

FP Force Protection

FSP Force Support Package 

FTS Full-Time Support 

FY Fiscal Year

GFR Ground Forces Readiness

HMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IET Initial Entry Training 

IG Inspector General 

B-1
B-2

IRR Individual Ready Reserve

JNTC Joint National Training Capability

LMTS Laser Marksmanship Training System 

LUT Limited User Test 

MILTECH Military Technician

MOS Military Occupational Specialties 

MRE Mission Rehearsal Exercise

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NCO Noncommissioned Offi cer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NGB National Guard Bureau

NGREA National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OIP Organizational Inspection Program 

OneSAF Objective One Semi-Automated Forces 

OPTEMPO Operational Tempo

PERSCOM Personnel Command

RC Reserve Component

REF Rapid Equipping Force

RFI Rapid Fielding Initiative

ROTC Reserve Offi cer Training Corps

RRCs Regional Readiness Commands 

SBE Stay Behind Equipment 

SIMNET Simulations Network 

STRAC Standards in Training Commission

TADSS Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 

TAM Training Assessment Model 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army

UA Unit of Action

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UH Utility Helicopter

US United States

USAIS U.S. Army Infantry School 

USAR United States Army Reserve

USARC United States Army Reserve Command 

USARPAC U.S. Army Pacifi c Command

VCCT Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY94 require the 

information in this addendum (Note: 521 of the 

NDAA has been codifi ed in 10 U.S. Code 10542). 

The information is presented in the order and 

depth as required by the act. Section 517 requires 

a report relating to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of 

the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA for 

Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a 

detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to 

the implementation of the Army National Guard 

Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of 

Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum 

as ‘ANGCRRA’). Section 521 reporting was later 

amended by Section 704, FY96 NDAA. U.S. Army 

Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b)(2)(A). (See Figure A-1) The promotion rate for offi cers considered for promotion 

from within the promotion zone who are serving 

as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance 

with that program) compared with the promotion 

rate for other offi cers considered for promotion 

from within the promotion zone in the same pay 

grade and the same competitive category, shown 

for all offi cers of the Army. 

Section 517 (b)(2)(B). (See Figure A-2) The promotion rate for offi cers considered for promotion 

from below the promotion zone who are serving 

as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance 

with that program) compared in the same manner 

as specifi ed in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph 

above).

Section 521(b).

1. The number and percentage of offi cers with at 

least two years of active duty before becoming 

(Data Required by NDAA 1994)

A

AC

in RC*

Army 

Average**

Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)

Major 87.4 93.8

Lieutenant Colonel 40.5 79.6

Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)

Major 93.4 96.9

Lieutenant Colonel 38.9 79.0

*Active Component (AC) offi cers serving in Reserve Component (RC) assignments at time of 

consideration.

**Active Component offi cers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at the time of 

consideration.

AC

in RC*

Army 

Average**

Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)

Major 3.6 7.5

Lieutenant Colonel 0 7.2

Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)

Major 4.6 7.5

Lieutenant Colonel 3.4 7.5

* Below-the-zone, active-component offi cers 

serving in Reserve Component assignments at 

time of consideration.

** Below-the-zone, active-component offi cers not 

serving in Reserve Component assignments at 

the time of consideration.

ADDENDUM

A-1

Figure A-1

Figure A-2
a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. 

Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:

a. Army National Guard (ARNG) offi cers: 

20,653 or 56.3 percent.

b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) offi cers: 9,828 or 

25.47 percent.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National 

Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve 

units:

a. ARNG enlisted: 129,985 or 42.5 percent.

b. USAR enlisted: 36,396 or 21.64 percent.

3. The number of offi cers who are graduates of 

one of the service academies and were released 

from active duty before the completion of their 

active duty service obligation. Of those offi cers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining 

period of their active duty service obligation 

as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

 In FY04, no offi cers were released to the 

selective reserve to complete their obligation. 

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) 

of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for 

each waiver: 

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the 

Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of offi cers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Offi cers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released 

from active duty before the completion of their 

active duty service obligation and, of those offi cers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining 

period of their active duty service obligation 

as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY04, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their 

active duty service obligation.

In FY04, no waivers for distinguished 

ROTC graduates were granted. 

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) 

of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for 

each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the 

Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of offi cers who are graduates of 

the Reserve Offi cers’ Training Corps program 

and who are performing their minimum period 

of obligated service in accordance with section 

1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) 

two years of active duty, and (B) such additional 

period of service as is necessary to complete the 

remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those offi cers, the number 

for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance 

with that section was granted during the preceding fi scal year:

In FY04, four ROTC graduates were released 

early from their active duty obligation. Of 

this number, none are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the 

Army National Guard, and none through 

service in the U.S. Army Reserve. 

6. The number of offi cers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fi scal 

year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade 

above fi rst lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were 

concurred in by an active duty offi cer under 

section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of offi cers 

set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with 

U.S. Army Reserve data also reported):

a. ARNG. 1,490 ARNG offi cers from units were 

recommended for unit vacancy promotion 

A-2
and promoted. An active duty offi cer concurred with 100 percent.

b. USAR. 178 USAR offi cers from units were 

recommended for unit vacancy promotion. 

121 were favorably considered.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding 

fi scal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA 

of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for 

noncommissioned offi cers and the reason for 

each such waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown 

for each State, of personnel in the initial entry 

training and nondeployability personnel accounting category established under section 

1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army 

National Guard who have not completed the 

minimum training required for deployment 

or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information 

pertaining to the U. S. Army Reserve is also provided):

a. ARNG. In FY04, the number of ARNG nondeployable personnel was 38,221. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the 

detailed information by State.

b. USAR. In FY04, the total number of USAR 

non-deployable personnel was 34,318. The 

United States Army Reserve Command 

maintains non-deployable Soldier statistical 

information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fi scal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not 

completing the minimum training required for 

deployment within 24 months a er entering the 

National Guard (and Army Reserve):

a. ARNG. The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during the previous fi scal year 

pursuant to section 11115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA 

for not completing the minimum training 

required for deployment within 24 months 

a er entering the ARNG is 30 Offi cers and 

10,285 enlisted, which includes all 54 States 

and territories. The breakdown by each State 

is maintained by NGB.

b. USAR. The number of USAR Soldiers discharged in FY04 due to not completing required military Initial Entry Training (IET) 

includes 109 offi cers and 415 enlisted. Those 

Soldiers who have not completed the required 

IET within the fi rst 24 months are discharged 

from the Army Reserve. The United States 

Army Reserve Command maintains statistical information on non-completion of IET by 

Army Reserve Soldiers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, 

that were granted by the Secretary during the 

previous fi scal year under section 1115(c)(2) 

of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 

1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph 

(9), together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, 

shown for each State (and the number of U.S. 

Army Reserve members), who were screened 

during the preceding fi scal year to determine 

whether they meet minimum physical profi le 

standards required for deployment and, of 

those members: (a) the number and percentage 

who did not meet minimum physical profi le 

standards required for deployment; and (b) the 

number and percentage who were transferred 

pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the 

personnel accounting category described in 

paragraph (8):

a. Screened during the preceding fi scal year 

to determine whether they meet minimum 

physical profi le standards required for deployment:

A-3
 ARNG. In FY04, approximately 70,068 

ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of 

these personnel, 2,068, or 3 percent, did 

not meet the minimum physical profi le 

standards required for deployment.

USAR. In FY04, approximately 20,864 

USAR Soldiers underwent a retention 

physical. Of these, 2,086, or 10 percent, 

were identifi ed for review.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA 

to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8):

ARNG. In FY04 - 6,223 Soldiers were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

USAR. In FY04 - 312 Soldiers, or less than 

1 percent of the Army Reserve Selected 

Reserve, were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12. The number of members, and the percentage 

total membership, of the Army National Guard, 

shown for each State, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fi scal year as 

provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA: 

 Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA. 

13. The number of members, and the percentage 

of the total membership, of the Army National 

Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a 

dental screening during the previous fi scal year 

as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA: 

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA. 

14. The number of members, and the percentage 

of the total membership, of the Army National 

Guard, shown for each State, over the age of 

40 who underwent a full physical examination 

during the previous fi scal year for purposes of 

section 1117 of ANGCRRA: 

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA. 

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard 

that are scheduled for early deployment in the 

event of a mobilization and, of those units, the 

number that are dentally ready for deployment 

in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA: 

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, 

Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, 

repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time 

for each Army National Guard combat unit 

(and U.S. Army Reserve Force Support Package (FSP) unit), and a description, displayed in 

broad categories and by State, of what training 

would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) in a post-mobilization period 

for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA:

a. ARNG. Estimated time for post-mobilization 

training is reported through the Unit Status 

Report, is classifi ed, and is maintained by the 

Department of the Army, G-3:

Information on the type of training required by units during post- mobilization 

is maintained by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Continental 

United States Armies (CONUSAs).

Post-mobilization training for enhanced 

Separate Brigades (eSB)/ ARNG Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) can be categorized 

as maneuver, a ack, defend, command 

and control, gunnery, NBC defense, and 

sustainment. Theater specifi c training requirements to include Antiterrorism (AT) 

and Force Protection (FP) training are also 

conducted during the post-mobilization 

training period. 

b. USAR. To meet the on-going operational requirements of OIF and OEF, Army Reserve 

training is now based on a higher readiness 

requirement to meet the train-alert-mobilize deploy model, which reduces emphasis A-4
 members and units of the Army National Guard 

(and the U.S. Army Reserve):

a. ARNG. During the preceding fi scal year the 

ARNG made signifi cant progress towards incorporating Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) as an integral 

part of its training strategy and supported 

numerous units at mobilization stations with 

virtual and constructive training tools. In addition, the ARNG training division teamed 

with the Army G3 to validate virtual maneuver simulators for the entire ARNG heavy 

force.

The ARNG is fi elding the Advanced 

Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation 

Trainer (AB-FIST) that provides full crew 

precision gunnery for the M2 and M3 family of vehicles. The system underwent a 

rigorous Limited User Test (LUT) with 

the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) 

and the Army Research Institute (ARI). In 

FY04, the AB-FIST was approved by the 

USAIS Commanding General, as a training device that can be used for Bradley 

gunnery crew training in addition to the 

Conduct of Fire Trainer to meet established live fi re prerequisites as outlined 

in DA PAM 350-38. To support maneuver 

training the ARNG is fi elding updated 

Simulations Network (SIMNET) virtual 

maneuver simulators for the M1A1 and 

M2A2 vehicles. The upgraded SIMNET 

modules feature a new PC-based visual 

system, host computer, and a sound system. These tank and mechanized infantry 

platoon sets have upgraded A er Action 

Review (AAR) stations. 

ARNG Ba le Staff Trainers are being updated with the Army’s latest approved 

Janus so ware versions. Janus so ware 

operates on portable PCs. The ARNG continues to procure new hardware to ensure 

these systems can operate the Objective 

One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF) 

on post mobilization training. The Army 

Reserve force must be ready before mobilization. This change requires a new training 

strategy and increased resource requirements 

for additional individual and unit training:

Army Reserve units with signifi cant numbers of cross-leveled or Individual Ready 

Reserve (IRR) Soldier fi lls require additional collective training time at the Mobilization Stations. Current mobilization 

timelines o en do not allow for a Mission 

Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) for deploying 

combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units to the same standard 

as deploying combat units. However, 

these units receive home station training 

to compensate for this shortfall.

To continue providing capabilities to support the Army in sustained joint and expeditionary operations and to provide 

predictability for Soldiers, families and 

employers, the Army Reserve is implementing the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). Beginning in 2005, ten 

like-structured deployable organizations 

called Army Rotational Expeditionary 

Packages (AREPs) will be formed. Units in 

each AREP will plan to mobilize to deploy 

for up to twelve months once every fi ve 

or six years. Unit capabilities and readiness within an AREP will be formally validated as it approaches the employment 

window. The Army Reserve will implement the AREF in 10 phases. As the Army 

Reserve transforms, early AREP rotations 

and their timelines will be condensed. As 

the concept is fully implemented, the rotations and their phases will become more 

distinct and sequential. 

17. A description of the measures taken during 

the preceding fi scal year to comply with the 

requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to 

expand the use of simulations, simulators, and 

advanced training devices and technologies for 

A-5
so ware when it is fi elded in FY07. Additionally, the Engagement Skills Trainer 

(EST 2000) continued to be fi elded in FY04. 

The EST 2000 is the Army’s approved collective marksmanship training device. 

EST 2000 is used by the ARNG to provide 

unit collective gunnery and tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, Military 

Police Squads, and Combat Support and 

Combat Service Support elements. These 

systems also support units conducting the 

homeland defense and airport security 

missions assigned to the ARNG. 

During FY04, the ARNG experienced a 

signifi cant increase in the number of Soldiers mobilized for OIF. The National 

Guard Bureau procured TADSS sets for 

deployment to mobilization sites such 

as Camp Shelby, MS, Fort Bliss, TX, Fort 

Hood, TX, and Fort Drum, NY. These 

sets consist of M1 and M2 precision gunnery training devices, rifl e marksmanship 

trainers and other unit specifi c TADSS. 

Most importantly in FY04, the ARNG led 

the way in the development of a Virtual 

Combat Convoy Trainer (VCCT) system. 

To keep costs low the ARNG required the 

contractor to leverage existing technology 

developed for the M1 and M2 virtual gunnery systems. The National Guard Bureau 

funded the procurement of convoy simulators that train tasks associated with the 

execution of a convoy. Soldiers train in the 

simulator prior to executing a convoy live 

fi re exercise.

Through the ARNG Distributed Ba le 

Simulation Program (DBSP) commanders, 

staff s and Soldiers receive assistance from 

“graybeard” mentors and TADSS facilitators. DBSP is a contractor organization 

that provides trained and experienced civilians to ensure the ARNG is using all of 

the TADSS in a meaningful way to execute 

annual training requirements. DBSP ba le 

staff training teams provide exercise support during the planning, preparation, 

and execution of computer-mediated battle staff training. This support augments 

the support provided by Training Support 

XXI Soldiers.

b. USAR. The Army Reserve has continued 

to work with the U.S. Army Infantry School 

and Army Training Support Command to incorporate the Laser Marksmanship Training 

System into a training strategy that supports 

initial entry and unit sustainment training. 

In 2004, Army Reserve eff orts with Beamhit Corporation, makers of the laser training system, resulted in the development of 

full-scale laser targets that support convoy 

counter-ambush training. These targets permit the Army Reserve’s use of current roads 

and buildings for greater realism in tactical 

marksmanship training. Soldiers can fi re 

the lasers with blanks from moving vehicles 

while engaging targets that represent an ambush. Army Reserve units conduct this training at home station rather than waiting to arrive at mobilization stations:

The Army Reserve also uses simulation 

devices like the EST 2000 and the VCCT 

systems at consolidated training sites, to 

include mobilization stations. The Army 

Reserve has fi elded seven EST 2000s and 

is working with proponents, such as the 

Military Police School, to leverage its use 

in MOS reclassifi cation. The Army Reserve mobilized 73 small arms instructors 

to support CONUSA mobilization operations. At some mobilization stations, ammunition consumption dropped nearly 

200 percent of Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) ammunition authorizations to 75 percent. A second mobilization 

of small arms instructors began in October 

2004.

A-6
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for 

each State, (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), and 

drawn from the unit readiness rating system as 

required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information 

and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information shown in the 

table:

 Unit readiness reporting information and 

summary tables are classifi ed. This information is maintained by the Department of the 

Army, G-3. 

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the 

deployability of units of the Army National 

Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve), including 

a discussion of personnel defi ciencies and 

equipment shortfalls in accordance with such 

section 1121:

 Unit readiness summary tables and overall 

assessments are classifi ed. Department of 

the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and the 

U.S. Army Reserve), of the results of inspections 

of units of the Army National Guard (and Army 

Reserve) by inspector general or other commissioned offi cers of the Regular Army under the 

provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together 

with explanations of the information shown 

in the tables, and including display of (a) the 

number of such inspections; (b) identifi cation 

of the entity conducting each inspection; (c) the 

number of units inspected; and (d) the overall 

results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit 

of whether the unit met deployability standards 

and, for those units not meeting deployability 

standards, the reasons for such failure and the 

status of corrective actions. Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by State 

for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for the USAR units are available from 

U.S. Army, FORSCOM:

a. ARNG. During FY04, ARNG State level Inspector General (IG) conducted extensive 

inspections throughout the United States. 

State level IGs conducted approximately 336 

inspections during the year, visiting 538 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on 

fi ndings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of individual inspections conducted by an IG may be 

requested for release through The Inspector 

General of the Army. Operational Readiness 

Evaluation Data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as 

requirements in 1997. Data available under 

the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not 

available in an unclassifi ed format. TAM 

data is maintained at the State level and is 

available upon request from State level training readiness offi cials. 

b. USAR. In accordance with AR 1-201, the 

United States Army Reserve Command 

(USARC) conducts inspections of Regional 

Readiness Commands (RRCs) and Direct 

Reporting Units (DRUs) within the USARC 

Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). 

USARC maintains the results of all OIPs. 

The OIP focuses on fi ndings and recommendations. Units do not receive pass/fail 

ratings. During FY04, fi ve OIPs were scheduled, but none were conducted. Units were 

not inspected because of the high OIF/OEF 

OPTEMPO. However, the Army Reserve did 

conduct 12 Ba le Focus Readiness Reviews, 

which involved a review of over 180 brigade 

and below units. The Army Reserve also conducted 400 command inspections, which represents more than one-third of USAR units. 

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 

maintains the results of unit TAMs and the 

data for Reserve Component FSP unit inspections. 

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of A-7
the active duty combat units (and other units) 

associated with that Army National Guard (and 

U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for 

each such Army National Guard unit (and for 

the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment 

of the commander of that associated active duty 

unit of the manpower, equipment, and training 

resource requirements of that National Guard 

(and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with 

section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) 

the results of the validation by the commander 

of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army 

Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

 The listing described above is contained in 

FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 – Active Component/Reserve Component Partnerships. Detailed assessments of specifi c RC units by associated active duty commanders are maintained 

within FORSCOM at the two CONUSAs and 

three CONUS-based corps. General comments 

of manpower, equipment and training resource 

requirements in accordance with ANGCRRA 

follow:

 a. ARNG. For Army National Guard divisions 

and BCTs:

Manpower. Several BCTs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior offi cers. Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualifi cation (DMOSQ) is a training 

challenge because Military Occupational 

Specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in 

schools that are o en taught simultaneously. Within the BCTs, Full-Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently fi lled at approximately 55 percent of 

requirements. In ARNG divisions, recent 

force structure changes and rebalancing 

actions are causing short-term shortfalls 

in fi ll percentages.

 Equipment. The Army is making extraordinary eff orts to fully equip all units deploying to theater in terms of vehicles, 

weapons, communications, force protection equipment and other areas. However, the lack of modernized equipment 

continues to hamper the BCTs. Shortages 

in chemical defense equipment and night 

vision devices limit the full range of capabilities for training of the BCTs. The BCTs 

continue to receive the bulk of any new 

equipment fi elded to the ARNG.

Training. Adequate training resources in 

FY04 enabled BCTs to sustain platoon premobilization training profi ciency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the 

availability of adequate maneuver areas 

continue to challenge most units. Virtual 

and constructive simulation systems combine with live training to provide multiechelon collective profi ciency.

b. USAR. Within the Army Reserve, use of the 

Force Support Package (FSP) unit model is 

in the process of being replaced by the Army 

Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) 

force management model:

Manpower. The Army Reserve is continuing to improve its operations and training 

management by building FTS manning as 

a result of the Congressionally approved 

Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) and Military Technician (MILTECH) ramps. However, sustaining DMOSQ is impacted in 

some cases by limited school spaces that 

are based on class size and student to instructor ratio (2:1 for some course phases). 

To address this situation, Army Reserve 

schools have begun to mobilize qualifi ed 

Army Reserve instructors to teach only 

in RC schools. The Army Reserve is also 

starting to accelerate the conduct of courses and use web-based training whenever 

feasible. Some MOSs require extensive 

training, for example 15N, 25B, 45G, 91W, A-8
and 97B, and sequential schools require a 

Soldier’s absence from their civilian employment for extended periods.

Equipment. Prior to September 11, the Army’s strategic investment decisions were 

based on a prevailing view that, in the 

absence of a peer competitor, risk could 

be accepted in numerous areas of procurement for the Current Force to facilitate substantial investment in the Future 

Force. The impact of these decisions has 

been evidenced across all components. 

In the case of the Army Reserve, this has 

resulted in not fully fi elding force modernization equipment. Today, the Army 

Reserve has approximately 78 percent of 

its authorized end items. New procurement and cascading of older equipment 

from the Active Component (AC) is only 

keeping pace with ba le losses and a rition. The shortage of modern equipment 

and the retention of obsolete and obsolescent items to maintain equipment on-hand 

readiness have begun to adversely impact 

the Army Reserve’s ability to continue to 

support the Army’s sustained joint and expeditionary operations. 

 Today almost 76 percent of on-hand Army 

Reserve equipment is deployed, mobilizing, demobilizing or assigned as “Stay 

Behind Equipment “(SBE) in theater. Replacement of SBE for the Army Reserve 

is an immediate force multiplier for the 

Army. The Army Reserve continues to 

support subsequent OIF/OEF rotations 

and other requirements by using assets 

from its stateside-based institutional training structure. Much of the equipment 

returning from OIF/OEF has rapidly expended its service life under combat conditions and must be replaced. The concept 

of a transformed, modular Army of “plug 

and play” units demands that all units, 

regardless of component, be equipped to 

the same levels and with compatible and 

interoperable systems. Current Army 

procurement planning, with the assistance 

of Congressionally directed procurement 

within the Total Obligation Authority and 

the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA), are the 

keys to achieve this goal.

 Training. Some Equipment Readiness 

Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages 

inhibit eff ective training. High levels of 

SBE and backlogs at reconstitution and 

depot sites further exacerbate the problem. Army Reserve units o en have a signifi cantly older generation of equipment 

on which to train. Units will require additional training time a er mobilization 

to achieve profi ciency on collective tasks, 

especially if modernization equipment is 

provided a er mobilization. 

 The results of the validation by the commander 

of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army 

Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with ANGCRRA are maintained by the 

Department of the Army, G-3. General comment follows:

For ARNG divisions, BCTs, ARNG Force Support Package (FSP) Units and Army Reserve 

FSP Units: Lack of Force Modernization equipment within the Reserve Component (RC) is 

the foremost AC compatibility issue. Until the 

RC units are modernized and supported at the 

same level as the AC units, most RC units will 

not be fully compatible with AC units until after mobilization. Decreased mobilization to deployment and/or employment timelines makes 

it imperative that RC units be modernized and 

equipped at the same level as the Active Component prior to mobilization. As Modifi ed 

Tables of Organization and Equipment in units 

are updated and unit reorganization continues, 

the compatibility issue will improve.

21. A specifi cation of the active duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense 

A-9
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 

1993 (10 U.S. Code 261 note), shown (A) by State 

for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. 

Army Reserve), (B) by rank of offi cers, warrant 

offi cers, and enlisted members assigned, and 

(C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment:

As of September 30, 2004, the Army had 4756 

Active Component Soldiers assigned to Title XI 

positions. The Army goal is 100 percent of the 

total (offi cer and enlisted authorizations) 5000 

personnel authorized for the AC/RC Program. 

Although constrained by ongoing support to the 

Global War on Terror, the Active Army is maintaining AC/RC program strength and plans to 

maintain not less than an aggregate strength 

level of 90 percent (offi cer and NCO) during the 

FY05 period as addressed in the FY05 NDAA. 

Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources 

Command carefully tracks fi ll of Title XI positions (See Figure A-3).

A-10

Title XI FY04 Authorizations

Offi cers

Enlisted

Soldiers

Warrant

Offi cers

Total

PERSCOM 0 5 0 5

USAR 39 332 2 371

TRADOC 110 275 0 385

FORSCOM 1428 2471 153 3899

GFR 0 2 0 2

USARPAC 32 62 1 94

TOTAL 1609 3147 156 4756

Figure A-3
Addendum B: Well-Being Initiatives

Army Well-Being is directly linked to the relevance and readiness of our Army. This addendum 

provides additional information on Well-Being programs that support the needs of the Total 

Army Family before, during and after deployment. The Total Army Family includes: 

• Soldiers (Active Duty, Army National Guard and Army Reserve); 

• Department of the Army Civilians; 

• Veterans; 

• Retirees; and 

• Families. 

In the past, the Army’s programs concentrated only on the quality of life of our people – defined 

as a standard of living to which individuals, communities, and nations strive to meet or exceed. 

Army Well-Being organizes and integrates those quality of life initiatives and other programs into 

a Well-Being “framework”. This “framework” provides a way to measure success in the Army’s 

people programs and to address emerging needs of our transforming Army. 

Army Well-Being is the “bridge” that connects Army needs with individual needs and centers 

around four strategic goals. These goals address the primary and basic needs of each member 

of the Total Army Family; To Serve, To Live, To Connect, and To Grow. The objective of 

Army Well-Being is to address the physical, material, mental and spiritual needs of each 

member of the Total Army Family. The Army is providing the opportunity of its members to 

achieve individual goals and therefore enhancing the members’ preparedness to perform and 

support the Army’s mission. More detailed information about these goals and Army Well-Being

can be found at the web site. 

The requirements of the Total Army Family are critical to Army Well-Being Programs. Services 

such as Health Care, Family Programs, Morale Welfare and Recreation, Pay and Compensation 

and Housing benefit the Total Army Family. Additionally, three emerging programs directly 

support the on-going Global War on Terror: 

• Deployment Cycle Support (DCS); 

• Disabled Soldier Support System (DS3); and 

• The U.S Central Command Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program. 

– 

To learn more about these initiatives and other Army Family programs go to the Army Families 

Online Web site: 

 
Addendum C: Chemical Demilitarization

Title 50, United States Code, section 1521 directs the Department of Defense to destroy the 

United States' chemical weapons stockpile. This statute also provides for the establishment of a 

management organization within the Department of the Army to carry out this mission. In 

addition, the United States is a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an 

international treaty prohibiting development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical 

weapons and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles and demolition of chemical 

weapons production facilities. 

The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency manages this nationally important and internationally 

significant program to safely store and destroy all U.S. chemical warfare materiel with joint 

oversight from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) and 

the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command. Two chemical stockpile disposal 

facilities in Colorado and Kentucky are managed by the Program Manager for Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Alternatives, who directly reports to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

in accordance with Public Law 107-248. 

In November 2000, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System completed the 

destruction of the last munitions stored at the atoll, and closure operations were completed in 

November 2003. The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Utah has destroyed more 

than 52 percent of the chemical agents and 87 percent of the munitions stored at Deseret 

Chemical Depot, Utah. 

The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Alabama has destroyed more than 10 percent 

of the chemical agent and 6 percent of the munitions stored at Anniston Army Depot, including 

the entire stockpile of nerve agent GB M55 rockets. 

The Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Oregon began operations in September 2004 

and has destroyed 12 tons of chemical agent. The Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility 

in Maryland has destroyed more than 64 percent of the chemical agent stored at Edgewood 

Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, and is scheduled to complete agent destruction in 2005. 

Chemical stockpile disposal facilities in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Newport, 

Indiana are scheduled to begin destruction operations in 2005. As of February 2, 2005, the 

Army has destroyed more than 11,076 tons of chemical agent, some 35.1 percent of the United 

States' stockpile. The United States continues to comply with all CWC requirements. 

The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project has met all CWC requirements to date and is on 

track to meet future milestones. More than 83 percent of former chemical weapons production 

facilities have been destroyed and demolition is ongoing at remaining former production facilities 

in Newport, Indiana and Pine Bluff, Arkansas. A number of mobile systems are available for 

assessment and disposal of recovered chemical warfare materiel. These include the Mobile 

Munitions Assessment System (three units), the Rapid Response System (one unit), the Single 

Chemical Agent Identification Set Access and Neutralization System (multiple units) and the 

Explosive Destruction System (three phase 1 units and one phase 2 unit). 
Addendum D: Sustaining the Joint Expeditionary Force

The critical task for Army logistics is to sustain the combat readiness of deployed forces and to 

maintain the materiel readiness of the current force. This requires a joint expeditionary mindset, 

a fundamental shift from supply based to distribution based logistics and conversion to modular 

support structures. Logisticians must be able to see requirements in real time, to respond to 

those requirements with speed and precision, and to rapidly establish forward sustainment 

capabilities. 

To meet this requirement, the Army logistics community is focusing on the following areas: 

• Connect Army Logisticians: Connecting logisticians is the linchpin of a strategy to 

dramatically improve the Army’s ability to support joint war fighting. 

• Modernize Theater Distribution: To meet the requirements of today’s operating 

environment, an effective distribution system must guarantee delivery on time, every 

time. 

• Improve Force Reception: The Army must have a force reception organization 

capable of performing the major tasks critical to open a theater regardless of the type 

of environment we are required to operate in. 

• Integrate the Supply Chain: The Army, as part of the Joint Force, requires support 

from a flexible, response, and lean distribution-based logistics system. 

• Modernize the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Fleet: Crucial to supporting our 

commitment to the future is the health of the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet and strategic 

use of the depot infrastructure. We must have a long term consistent commitment of 

resources that will cyclically modernize existing fleets while developing new systems. 

Each of these initiatives is represented by a button below. By clicking on a specific button, 

additional information is provided on each of these topics. 

• Connect Army Logisticians: Connecting logisticians is the linchpin of a strategy 

to dramatically improve the Army’s ability to support joint war fighting. 

• Modernize Theater Distribution: To meet the requirements of today’s operating 

environment, an effective distribution system must guarantee delivery on time, 

every time. 

• Improve Force Reception: The Army must have a force reception organization 

capable of performing the major tasks critical to open a theater regardless of the 

type of environment we are required to operate in. 

• Integrate the Supply Chain: The Army, as part of the Joint Force, requires 

support from a flexible, response, and lean distribution-based logistics system. 

• Modernize the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Fleet: Crucial to supporting our 

commitment to the future is the health of the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet and 

strategic use of the depot infrastructure. We must have a long term consistent 

commitment of resources that will cyclically modernize existing fleets while 

developing new systems. 

The Army, and specifically the Army G-4, appreciates your interest in these key functions to 

support our Soldiers. With the support of Congress and the American people, the Army has 

made significant progress in these areas with both materiel and process solutions and will 

continue to develop new means to meet our mission.