United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1995 ARMY RESERVE

COMPONENTS

Cost, Readiness, and

Personnel Implications

of Restructuring

Agreement

GAO/NSIAD-95-76

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259379 

March 7, 1995

Congressional Requesters

On December 10, 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced a major

restructuring of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve (we refer to

these collectively as reserve components). Specifically, he laid out the

terms of the Offsite Agreement, which specified how personnel reductions

would be distributed between the reserve components.

In response to your concerns about the effects of the agreement, we

evaluated (1) its cost of implementation, (2) its impact on the reserve

components’ readiness, and (3) reserve components’ efforts to absorb

displaced personnel. Because the agreement is in the initial stages of

implementation, we can only estimate its impact on these areas.

Finally, as you requested, we assessed the agreement’s impact on the

implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986.1

 Specifically, we determined whether the

agreement decreases the Special Operations Command’s control over

training of special forces in the Guard.

Background The Department of Defense’s bottom-up review concluded that the Army’s

reserve components should be reduced to 575,000 positions by 1999—a

201,000 decrease since fiscal year 1989. A group of senior officers of the

Army, its reserve components, and organizations that represent Army

component issues was tasked with providing a recommendation to the

Secretary of the Army on the allocation of the 575,000 positions between

the Guard and Reserve.2

 The group, through the Offsite Agreement,

allocated the positions as follows: 367,000 positions to the Army National

Guard and 208,000 to the Army Reserve.

The agreement also included a realignment of functions between the

Guard and Reserve. This is to be accomplished through three separate

approaches—swap, migration, and reallocation.

1

Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986, 10 U.S.C. 161-166.

2

The group (called the Offsite group) was established in 1991 to advise the Army leadership on key

issues affecting the reserve components and to circumvent potential disputes between them. Its

deliberations are outside normal Department of Defense channels. The organizations were the

National Guard Association of the United States, Adjutant General Association, Senior Army Reserve

Commanders Association, Reserve Officers Association, and Association of the U.S. Army.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

• The swap involves about 10,000 authorized positions in each reserve

component. The Guard agreed to inactivate 128 combat support and

combat service support units such as medical, military police, and

transportation units and transfer about 10,000 authorized positions

associated with these units to the Reserve. The Reserve agreed to

inactivate 28 units, including most of its remaining combat units and its

last remaining special forces units, and transfer about 10,000 positions

associated with these units to the Guard. According to the Army, the swap

will more clearly concentrate combat support and combat service support

functions in the Reserve and combat functions in the Guard.

• The migration involves the transfer of about 4,300 authorized positions

and over 250 helicopters from the Reserve to the Guard. The Reserve

agreed to nearly deplete its helicopter resources by inactivating 11 utility

helicopter aviation and aviation maintenance units and 15 medical air

ambulance units. According to Guard officials, the migration and other

initiatives will provide enough helicopters for the Guard to cover the

needs of each state. Without the migration, this objective would have been

jeopardized because the Guard is scheduled to lose helicopters as part of

the Army’s general downsizing.

• The reallocation allows the Guard to keep about 7,700 authorized

positions for engineer and military police units that otherwise would have

been inactivated. According to a Guard official, this will enable the Guard

to better support its state missions. Other units were eliminated so the

positions could be reallocated within the Guard. The reallocation does not

affect the Reserve, nor does it affect the personnel end strength of the

Guard.

Results in Brief Implementation of the Offsite Agreement could cost over $180 million. The

Army’s latest cost estimate is about $85 million. However, we believe that

the Army’s estimate excludes training costs that the Guard will likely incur

and includes savings in operating costs that would have resulted

regardless of the agreement.

It is too early to tell how the agreement will affect readiness for most

units. The Guard did not identify specific units that will assume the

missions of 20 inactivating Reserve units; another 107 Reserve units are

new and have 1 year to establish their readiness ratings. We estimated the

readiness impact for some units. Thirteen units will be replaced by units

with lower readiness ratings, while 18 units will be replaced by units

having the same or higher readiness ratings.

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The Guard and Reserve have primarily left it up to the reserve component

commands and individual units to help affected persons find new units. In

three areas already affected by the agreement—the 157th Separate

Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and special operations units—some of the

commands’ and units’ initiatives appear to be working well. Others,

however, appear to discourage the transfer of personnel, even if a transfer

would result in a more effective use of their skills. Senior and experienced

officers and enlisted persons in inactivating units appear to have the most

difficulty obtaining positions in other units in the Reserve and the Guard.

Reserve helicopter pilots and technicians are also experiencing

difficulties.

We found no evidence indicating that the Special Operations Command

will have problems exercising control over the training of Guard special

operations forces.

Army and Reserve

Components

Understated the Cost

of Implementing the

Agreement

The Army and its reserve components considered several factors in

calculating the cost to implement the agreement. The factors include the

percentage of personnel who would separate from military service and

receive benefits, the number of facilities that would have to close, and the

amount of goods and equipment that would have to be moved. In

March 1994, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army testified that the short-term cost to

implement the agreement was less than $100 million. According to Army

officials, this was a rough estimate because the Army could not be certain

how many military persons would transfer or leave. Also, the Army could

not determine the actual cost of closing facilities and transporting goods

until the reserve components identified which units would be affected.

However, when we began our audit work in June 1994, the Army estimated

the total cost of implementing the agreement at about $38 million from

fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 1999.

In response to our audit questions, the Army revised some of its estimates

and, on the basis of these revisions, increased it to about $85 million. For

example, Army officials projected that transition benefits for Reservists

whose units will deactivate would probably be greater than originally

estimated.3

 It also estimated that the Reserve will need more funds for

training and construction of facilities and that the operations costs for

units involved in the swap would be more than anticipated.

3

Pay and benefits for reserve component members who are involuntarily or voluntarily separated from

military service due to downsizing or unit inactivation.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

However, we believe that this revised estimate is understated by about

$100 million because it excludes training costs that are related to the

agreement and includes savings that are not a result of the agreement. In

table 1, we compare our estimate with the Army’s initial and revised

estimates.

Table 1: Cost Estimates of

Implementing the Offsite Agreement

Cost category

Army’s initial

estimate

Army’s revised

estimate Our estimate

Transition benefits $92.5 $109.0 $109.0

Training 15.7 24.5 38.5

Operations (107.8) (96.2) (13.7)

Transportation 5.9 5.9 5.9

Facilities 31.7 41.7 41.7

Total $38.0 $84.9 $181.4

We accepted the Army’s revised estimates for transition benefits,

transportation of equipment, and costs of facilities because we had no

basis to question their reasonableness. However, we found that the revised

estimate excluded training costs that the Guard will likely incur and

included savings in aircraft operating costs that resulted from another

initiative.

The Guard will receive the missions of five Reserve assault helicopter

battalions that were being modernized with Blackhawk helicopters. The

Reserve had trained the equivalent of 3-1/2 battalions for the Blackhawk

systems. The Guard did not include in its estimates the cost to train a like

amount of personnel. We estimate this training cost to be about

$14 million because the Guard units that will take over the Blackhawk

missions have only a few Blackhawk trained personnel. Also, most

Blackhawk qualified Reserve personnel may not join the Guard. The Guard

will also have to train the remaining 1-1/2 battalions, but we do not

consider this a cost of the agreement because it is an expense that the

Reserve would have had if it were not for the agreement.

The Army estimated that the Guard will avoid about $82.5 million in

operating expenses by turning in excess nonmodern aircraft once the

Blackhawks arrive. We believe the savings should not be attributed to the

agreement because these aircraft have been programmed for disposal for

several years. Consequently, we deleted the $82.5 million savings from the

operations cost category, leaving an anticipated savings of $13.7 million.

According to Guard officials, the $13.7 million savings to the federal

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

government is that part of the Guard’s operating costs that is paid by state

funds.

Agreement’s Impact

on Readiness Cannot

Be Estimated Yet for

Most Units

The Department’s current system for reporting readiness to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff is the Status of Resources and Training System.4

 This

system measures the extent to which individual service units possess the

required resources and training to undertake their wartime missions. The

system compares the current status of specific elements considered

essential to unit readiness—personnel and equipment on hand, equipment

condition, and the training of operating forces—with those needed to

undertake wartime missions.

We compared the readiness levels (as of April 1994) of the inactivating

units with the readiness levels of the units assuming the missions of the

inactivating units. Table 2 shows the results of that comparison.

Table 2: Readiness Comparison of

Units as of April 1994 No

degradation Degradation

Cannot be

estimated Total

Swap

Guard to Reserve 9 11 108 128

Reserve to Guard 8 • 20 28

Migration

Utility helicopter • 2 9 11

Air ambulance • • 15 15

Total 17 13 152 182

We could not estimate the agreement’s impact on readiness for 152 of the

182 units affected by the swap and migration. However, we estimated the

readiness impact for some units. Thirteen units will be replaced by units

with lower readiness ratings, while 17 units will be replaced by units

having the same or higher readiness ratings.

We do not have estimates for the agreement’s readiness impact on 

152 units because new units are being created or individual units have not

been designated to replace inactivating units. For example, we cannot

identify the readiness impact for 20 of the 28 Reserve to Guard transfers

involved in the swap because the Guard did not designate specific units

4

We reported in Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement

System (GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994) that this system provides valuable information on readiness

but that the information is limited and cannot signal an impending change in readiness.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

that will assume the missions of the 20 Reserve units. In all but one of the

108 Guard to Reserve transfers, we could not estimate the readiness

impact because they involved the establishment of new Reserve units.

The 107 new Reserve units have up to 1 year to organize and build up their

readiness ratings before the Guard units are inactivated. During this year,

the Reserve units’ readiness ratings can be expected to improve as the

units obtain personnel and equipment and train their personnel, while the

Guard units’ ratings can be expected to decrease as these units lose

personnel and equipment. Hence, the impact on readiness could vary over

time. For some units, this time could be very short. For example, 

37 Reserve units are being established within 50 miles of existing

inactivating Guard units to utilize Guard personnel, equipment, and

facilities. We were told that in some of these cases, Guard units will

convert to Reserve units.

In 13 instances, some degradation in readiness may occur. For example,

two Guard units that will take on the missions of Reserve Blackhawk

helicopter units do not have enough Blackhawk helicopters or trained

personnel to satisfy unit requirements. Reserve unit personnel told us that

it may take 3 to 5 years before these Guard units reach the readiness level

of the Reserve units that are deactivating. According to Army officials, the

Army plans to convert these units within a 3-year period, and they

anticipate, on the basis of National Guard historical data, that unit

readiness will not be degraded longer than 1 year during the conversion. In

the other 11 instances, Guard units had higher overall readiness ratings

than existing Reserve units taking on their missions.

In 17 instances, we noted either little impact on readiness or an

improvement in readiness. For example, nine inactivating Guard units had

the same or higher overall readiness ratings as existing Reserve units

taking on their missions. Similarly, six of the eight Guard field artillery and

armor units taking on the missions of Reserve units had higher overall

readiness ratings than the inactivating Reserve units.

Contingency Force Pool

Units

Contingency force pool units support a crisis response force, serve as

follow-on forces, or serve as forces in a separate contingency. It is

important for these units to maintain a high state of readiness because

these units often deploy to military conflicts early—sometimes even

before some active units. Fifty-eight inactivating Guard units in the swap

and seven inactivating Reserve units in the aviation migration portion of

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

the agreement had contingency force pool designations. These

designations did not always transfer to the units that assumed the

missions of the inactivating units. We found that the agreement’s impact

on readiness varied on a unit-by-unit basis.

Most of the Guard’s contingency force pool designations transferred to the

Reserve as of November 22, 1994. For 44 of the 58 units, existing Reserve

units assumed the contingency force pool assignments previously assigned

to the Guard, while for 14 units, new Reserve units will take on the

assignment. We found that 29 of the 44 Guard units had higher overall

readiness ratings than the Reserve units taking on the contingency force

pool assignment. For the remaining 15 units, the overall readiness ratings

for the Reserve units are equal to or higher than those of the Guard units.

We could not ascertain the impact on readiness for the 14 new Reserve

units.

The Reserve aviation units’ contingency force pool designations

transferred to the Guard as of November 22, 1994. In six of the seven

cases, the Guard units had the same or higher overall readiness ratings as

the Reserve units they are replacing. In the remaining case, the Guard unit

had a lower readiness rating.

Initiatives to Reassign

Displaced Personnel

Have Mixed Results

Most of the Reserve troops facing inactivation will be released during

fiscal year 1995, while most of the affected Guard troops will not be

inactivated until subsequent years. Table 3 shows the number of units and

authorized positions that will be affected in fiscal years 1994-95 and

1996-97.

Table 3: Comparison of Units

Inactivated in 1994-95 and Units to Be

Inactivated in 1996-97

1994-95 1996-97

Units

Authorized

personnel Units

Authorized

personnel

Guard 16 2,265 112 8,682

Reserve 24 7,352 30 6,705

Total 40 9,617 142 15,387

Because we cannot anticipate what future actions the reserve components

will take to accommodate displaced personnel, we focused our attention

in three primary areas affected in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 by the

agreement—the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

special operations units. These account for 23 of the 40 units and about

6,900 of 9,600 authorized personnel.

157th Separate Infantry

Brigade

We found that the Army Reserve Command is helping inactivated soldiers

find new positions in other Reserve units but is not helping them switch to

the Guard even though the available Guard positions are more consistent

with their occupational skills and offer greater longevity. For example, the

Reserve Command in eastern Pennsylvania has offered assignments to

nearly all the troops in the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade. These

positions generally are in other Reserve units within a 50-mile range of the

soldiers’ homes. These include several new units in eastern Pennsylvania

established to accommodate troops from the 157th. But many of the offers

will be for overstrength positions that can only be held for 1 year, and few

will be for assignments in the soldiers’ current occupational skills.

According to reserve officials, they expect few permanent positions to

become available to senior officers and enlisted personnel.

Reserve and Guard officials told us that many soldiers in the 157th would

rather switch from the Reserve to the Guard because they are combat

soldiers and the Guard is the only reserve component with combat units.

We were also told that the Reserve will release some troops to the Guard

but is doing several things that will make switching unattractive. For

example, soldiers transferring to Reserve positions and requiring new

occupational skills will immediately begin training for the new positions,

while soldiers who elect to join the Guard will be used to close out the

Brigade and will not be released until the inactivation date for the 157th,

which is scheduled for September 1995.

Pennsylvania Army National Guard officials told us that, except for senior

officers and enlisted persons, they would welcome the transfer of troops

from the 157th. To make the transfer to the Guard more attractive, the

Guard recently announced that it would honor most Reserve bonus

contracts and student loan repayment plans.

Aviation Units Most Reserve helicopter pilots, technicians, and civilians associated with

aviation units will have difficulty finding new units in the Guard. The

Guard already has personnel for most of these positions, except for the

Blackhawk units where the Guard has few qualified Blackhawk personnel.

However, even for these units, we do not anticipate that many Reserve

aviators will transfer to the Guard because the Guard is training its own

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

personnel to fill available positions. For example, in Illinois, the Guard has

assigned the Blackhawk mission to a unit some distance away from the

inactivating Reserve unit and is training Guard personnel to become

Blackhawk qualified.

The National Guard Bureau has requested that the state adjutant generals

establish assignment advisory boards for aviation personnel, which would

match available Reservists and Guard personnel with available positions

and select those who are best qualified. As of January 1995, most states

affected by the agreement have scheduled advisory boards.

Special Forces Units The Army National Guard recruited inactivating Reserve special forces

personnel and added them to existing Guard units or to special temporary

detachments it created. For example, the Guard created three

detachments with an authorized strength of 83 persons each to

accommodate personnel of the Reserve 12th special forces group. This

arrangement places the Guard in an overstrength position with too many

units, a situation that Army officials stated will be remedied in 18 months.

During this time, the Guard plans to assess all Guard special forces units

and retain those units having the highest readiness ratings and

sustainability at the end of the test period.

Other Initiatives We learned of other initiatives to accommodate displaced personnel. For

example, the Reserve is establishing 37 new units within 50 miles of

inactivating Guard units. It plans to recruit the deactivating Guard

personnel for these units. Included in the 37 are 6 watercraft units in

Washington State, which are to assume the missions of deactivating Guard

units.

Legislation Requires Army

Report on Displaced

Personnel

The Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1995 directed the Secretary

of the Army to ensure that members of units inactivating as a result of the

agreement be reassigned to remaining units to the maximum extent

practicable. It further directed the Secretary to submit semi-annual reports

to the congressional defense committees on the number of members

reassigned while the agreement is in effect.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

Special Operations

Command Can

Control Training of

National Guard

Special Forces

The Offsite Agreement places all reserve component special forces in the

Guard, which is generally state-controlled during peacetime. We found no

evidence that the Guard’s status would hinder the Special Operations

Command’s training responsibilities under the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

authorizes combatant commands to exercise command and control over

their forces. As a combatant command, the U.S. Special Operations

Command is responsible for preparing active and reserve component

special operations forces to carry out assigned missions, including the

training of assigned forces.

As we reported in March 1994,5

 special operations forces have become an

integral part of the combatant commanders’ peacetime mission. Overseas

training exercises are held frequently in support of this mission, and

according to Command officials, reserve component forces are often

called upon to participate in this training. For example, troops from the

Mississippi, Maryland, and Alabama National Guards conducted training

programs for military personnel and provided assistance to local citizens

in Honduras in 1994. Further, the Guard’s participation in overseas

training exercises is ensured as a result of a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court

decision.6

 This decision affirmed a federal law restricting governors from

withholding consent for overseas training for Guard units put on active

duty.

The Department of Defense is formulating policy guidance that will clarify

the relationship between the Guard and the combatant commands as

established by law and will ensure the authority of Governors will not be

limited over their National Guard forces when these forces are not in

federal service. An Army National Guard official told us that the policy

guidance should more clearly give combatant commands authority over

training and readiness of assigned reserve component forces.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation.

In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Defense agreed

with all of our findings except for our cost estimate to implement the

Offsite Agreement. Specifically, the Department said that the $82.5 million

in cost avoidance for the early inactivation of aviation units is attributable

5

Special Operations Forces: Force Structure and Readiness Issues (GAO/NSIAD-94-105, Mar. 24, 1994).

6

Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

to the agreement and should be included in our estimate. We continue to

disagree with the Department’s position.

In February 1993, 10 months prior to the Agreement, the Army’s Aviation

Restructuring Initiative directed the National Guard to inactivate over 

600 helicopters because they were no longer needed to support National

Guard missions. The Department said that the National Guard agreed to

turn in helicopters earlier than required by the Initiative because of the

agreement. The Department further said that the $82.5 million is

attributable to savings in operations and maintenance due to the early

turn-in schedule. The Department was not able to produce convincing

evidence that the agreement had any impact on the National Guard’s

turn-in schedule. Since the Guard was already required to turn in these

aircraft, we continue to believe that the savings should not be attributed to

the agreement. The Department’s comments are shown in appendix I.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed the provisions of the agreement and the actions taken by the

Army and reserve components to implement it. We spoke with Department

of the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officials to obtain

documents and other information pertaining to the cost and readiness

implications of the agreement, the reserve components’ efforts to absorb

displaced personnel, and the agreement’s impact on control of special

forces in the reserve components. We also spoke with officials of the U.S.

Special Operations Command to discuss the Command’s control over

Guard units.

We visited National Guard and Army Reserve Command offices and units

in Pennsylvania and Illinois and an Army Reserve Command office in

Missouri to discuss actions planned or underway to assist displaced

personnel in finding new units. We also met with Army Reserve

Association officials to discuss their views on the agreement. The

association is not represented in the Offsite group.

Our review was conducted between May and December 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the

Secretary of the Army, appropriate congressional committees, and other

interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

The major contributors to this report are Robert Pelletier, 

Donald Campbell, Mae Jones, Paul O’Brien, and Frances Scott. Please

contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
B-259379 

List of Requesters

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg

The Honorable Richard J. Santorum

The Honorable Arlen Specter

United States Senate

The Honorable Robert E. Andrews

The Honorable Robert A. Borski

The Honorable Michael N. Castle

The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

The Honorable Thomas M. Foglietta

The Honorable Bob Franks

The Honorable George W. Gekas

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

The Honorable William F. Goodling

The Honorable James C. Greenwood

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

The Honorable Ron Klink

The Honorable Paul McHale

The Honorable Martin T. Meehan

The Honorable Bud Shuster

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith

The Honorable Robert S. Walker

The Honorable Curt Weldon

The Honorable Dick Zimmer

House of Representatives

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-5.

See comment 1.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-7.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7-9.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 10.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is a GAO comment on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated February 10, 1995.

GAO Comment 1. The $22.6 million for the early inactivation of overstructured aviation

units is included in the $82.5 million we deleted from Army’s savings

estimates.

(701043) Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-76 Army Reserve Components
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