“Squaring the Circle”: 

Cooperative Security and 

Military Operations 

Jeffrey D. McCausland 

INSS Occasional Paper 45 

July 2002 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department 

of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US 

Government. The paper is approved for public release; distribution 

is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 

Dr. Jeffrey D. McCausland holds the Class of 1961 Chair of 

Leadership at the United States Naval Academy. He completed his 

active duty service as a Colonel in the United States Army in 2001 

culminating his career as Dean of Academics, U.S. Army War 

College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the 

United States Military Academy at West Point in 1972 and was 

commissioned in field artillery. He is also a graduate of the U.S. 

Army airborne and ranger schools as well as the Command and 

General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds both a 

Masters and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 

Tufts University. Colonel McCausland served in a variety of 

command and staff positions both in the United States and Europe 

throughout his military career. This includes the position of 

Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National 

Security Council Staff during the Kosovo crisis. He also worked on 

the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a 

member of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

US Army Staff, the Pentagon. Following this assignment he 

assumed command of a field artillery battalion stationed in Europe 

and deployed his unit to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield 

and Storm in 1990 and 1991. He has published broadly on 

leadership, military affairs, European security issues, the Gulf War, 

and arms control. He has been a visiting fellow at the Center for 

International Affairs, Harvard University; Stiftung Wissenshaft und 

Politk, Ebenhausen, Germany; George C. Marshall Center for 

European Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany; and the 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. He served as a 

member of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Blue Ribbon Panel on 

Training and Leader Development and provided advice and 

assistance to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s Aerospace Leader 

Development Panel. 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 
iv

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

Existing Agreements and Their Limitations 6 

 Vienna Document 6 

 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 

 in Europe (CFE) 8 

 Open Skies 19 

 The Ottawa Treaty 21 

 Arms Control in the Balkans—the 

 Dayton Accords 24 

Arms Control During War and Conflict 

 Resolution—Kosovo and Beyond 28 

Conclusions and Recommendations 32 

Notes 39 
vi
vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-fifth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). We consider this to be an 

important paper for at least three reasons. First, it provides a 

pointed overview of conventional arms controls. So much of the 

focus in arms control literature is exclusively on strategic 

agreements that this important arena is overlooked. Second, this 

paper addresses the interaction effects of multiple arms control 

agreements. These second order consequences—often unforeseen 

and potentially negative—raise a warning flag for future multilateral 

and theater arms control and cooperative security efforts. Third, 

and closely related, the paper highlights the potential for the 

“offensive” use of arms control provisions by the full range of state 

parties to arms control agreements. Agreements are negotiated with 

a particular target state or group of states in mind and toward the 

bounding or control of specific behaviors and capabilities. Seldom 

do we really consider the second and subsequent order potential in 

compliance and verification monitoring that are highlighted here. 

Such indirect consequences clearly must be anticipated today and 

factored into a whole range of national security planning. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 

23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the Army Environmental 

Policy Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate 

(XPXP). The research leading to the papers in this volume was 

sponsored by OSD/NA, DTRA, and XONP. The mission of the 

Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, 

and to support national security education.” Its research focuses on 

the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms 

control and strategic security; counterproliferation, force protection, 

and homeland security; air and space issues and planning; 
viii

information operations and information warfare; and regional and 

emerging national security issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide 

range of private and government organizations. INSS provides 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. 

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research 

products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
ix

“SQUARING THE CIRCLE”: COOPERATIVE SECURITY 

AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This paper examines the real and potential tensions that exist 

between military operations and existing arms control agreements. 

It focuses on conventional arms control since military operations 

during hostilities is where limitations have potentially the greatest 

effect. This focus on conventional arms control further implies that 

the agreements examined are primarily (though not exclusively) 

those relating to possible operations in Europe or originating from 

there since the majority of the existing agreements apply to the 

European theater. Finally, the paper is presented from the 

perspective of the United States. Arms control and military 

operations are both addressed as “means” to accomplish American 

strategic objectives or “ends.” 

The study consists of three areas. First, it summarizes existing 

agreements, the limitations they place on military operations, 

instances where these restrictions affect operations, and possible 

issues with respect to each treaty in the future. Second, it discusses 

in detail how arms control inspections affected military operations 

in Kosovo during and after the conflict. This includes a review of 

the inspections/observations that occurred in Italy, Macedonia, and 

Albania during the crisis as well as arms control efforts within 

Kosovo itself and subsequently in Macedonia. Finally, the study 

draws conclusions and makes six recommendations for the future. 

• Arms control expertise must be more widely available, both 

in NATO and nationally, to ensure that such expertise can be 

deployed at all levels of military command. 

• Advance generic planning should be undertaken by the US 

and all NATO allies to shorten the political decision-making process 

and ensure appropriate and timely execution of Vienna Document 

activities relating to any unusual build-up of NATO forces during 

periods of increased tension or crisis. 

• The application of arms control responsibilities should be 

included in the scenarios of command post and field training 

exercises. 

• Compliance with arms control responsibilities needs higher 

visibility within the NATO and American military command. 
x

• The Kosovo experience underscored the critical importance 

of JCS and OSD experts’ participation in the interagency process. 

• There is a greater need for immediate military advice and 

expertise at State, CIA, and the National Security Council in order 

to assess quickly the impact of arms control inspections on current 

and planned military operations. Furthermore, careful examination 

should be made of potential changes to existing agreements as well 

as the full impact of the implementation of new treaties that may 

enter into force. 
“Squaring the Circle”: 

Cooperative Security and Military Operations 

INTRODUCTION 

On 28 May 1999 Russian inspectors arrived at Aviano Air 

Force Base in Italy to conduct an inspection of NATO forces 

located there in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (CFE). While such reviews had occurred for 

many years, this particular inspection was unusual. It occurred in 

the midst of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, and 

Aviano was a principal base in that effort. This inspection and 

others that occurred during the seventy-eight day air campaign were 

unprecedented, as they are perhaps the only examples of armed 

forces being inspected by a foreign power under the terms of an 

arms control agreement while conducting combat operations. It 

underscores the duality of NATO’s current strategy of attempting to 

maintain a cooperative security approach while conducting military 

operations. Finally, it begs the question of the role for arms control 

as part of American military strategy in the future. This problem 

has acquired a new urgency based on the attacks of September 11th

and the ongoing global war that the United States has undertaken 

against terrorism. 

This paper will examine the real as well as potential tensions 

that exist between military operations and existing arms control 

agreements. Several limitations to this analysis are important at the 

onset. First, it will focus on conventional arms control since 

military operations during hostilities is where limitations have 

potentially the greatest effect. A focus on conventional arms 

control further implies that many of the agreements examined will 
2

primarily (though not exclusively) be those relating to possible 

operations in Europe or originating from there since the majority of 

the existing agreements apply to the European theater. Some might 

argue that this is now of less significance in light of the fact that the 

overall American preoccupation with European security has been 

reduced with the end of the Cold War and, more importantly, due to 

the advent of the war on terrorism. This would be a shortsighted 

view, since Europe has gained a new importance as a base for 

American power projection and the fact that the principal American 

allies in the current hostilities are European. Finally, the effort will 

be presented from the perspective of the United States. Arms 

control and military operations are both “means” to accomplish 

American strategic objectives or “ends.” Consequently, tensions 

such as those that occurred during the Kosovo crisis must be viewed 

in that strategic context. 

The study will consist of three areas. First, it will summarize 

existing agreements, the limitations they place on military 

operations, instances where these restrictions affected operations, 

and possible issues with respect to each treaty in the future. Second, 

it will discuss in detail how arms control inspections affected 

military operations in Kosovo during and after the conflict. This 

will include a review of the inspections/observations that occurred 

in Italy, Macedonia, and Albania during the crisis as well as arms 

control efforts within Kosovo itself and subsequently in Macedonia. 

Finally, the study will draw conclusions and make 

recommendations for the future. 

Definitions are key in this analysis, and the following are 

essential from the very beginning.1 Arms Control is any legally or 

politically binding agreement between sovereign states which (1) 
3

provides transparency and predictability of military activities; (2) 

constrains or prohibits certain military operations; or (3) limits the 

holdings of military equipment and/or personnel. Overall arms 

control agreements that the United States is a signatory to place 

restraints on the use, possession, or size of conventional, biological, 

chemical, and nuclear weapons. Transparency is the act of making 

known the organization, composition, activities, and holdings of a 

state’s armed forces to include its budget and military doctrine. 

This is usually accomplished through notifications, exchanges of 

information, and military-to-military contacts. Predictability is the 

ability of a participating state based on transparency measures to 

understand the pattern of military activities of another state 

participating in the agreement. Many military experts might well 

argue that this aspect is key in determining the value of any arms 

control agreement during a crisis. Constraints include restrictions 

on the frequency, size, duration, and location of military activities. 

Limits are ceilings or maximum levels of holdings/inventory of 

categories of military equipment or personnel that a participating 

state has committed itself not to exceed. These limits can be 

specified in terms of national, territorial (applying to specified 

region that includes multiple states), or geographic locations. A 

military operation includes any military action or the carrying out 

of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or 

administrative military mission. This includes conducting combat, 

movement into and within a theater, supply, and any other 

maneuvers required to achieve the objectives of a battle or 

campaign.2

It is also important to establish a clear distinction between 

"arms control" and "disarmament." "Arms control" (as suggested 
4

above) refers to agreements between two or more sovereign states 

to limit or reduce certain categories of weapons or military 

operations in order to diminish the possibility of conflict. During the 

Cold War, conventional arms discussions resulted in the ratification 

of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) plus 

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) agreed to as 

part of the ongoing discussions of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). CFE was a “hard arms control” 

agreement that required reductions in military hardware for the 

members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. During the period 

from 1993 to 1996 over 58,000 pieces of equipment were destroyed 

and 2700 compliance inspections conducted as part of its 

implementation. CSBM’s are described in the so-called “Vienna 

Document” for the members of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They include a series of 

transparency measures including information exchanges and 

observation of military exercises. With this in mind it is important 

to remember that the United States has gained a great deal from 

arms control. A fundamental tenet of arms control remains the 

principle of reciprocity. Consequently, while this study will 

examine how such agreements may restrict American operational 

flexibility, these same restraints apply to all signatories. American 

military and intelligence organizations have received an enormous 

wealth of information about the size, character, equipment, doctrine, 

and deployment of other nation’s armed forces through these and 

other agreements. 

"Disarmament" is normally imposed by a state or group on one 

or more states at the conclusion of a war. Examples are the limits 

imposed on Germany at the end of World War I and II, or the 
5

restrictions placed on Iraq by the United Nations at the conclusion 

of the Gulf War. This distinction is important because while an 

arms control regime is maintained by a harmony of interests among 

the participants, disarmament requires external pressure to ensure 

implementation and compliance. Some of the agreements discussed 

(i.e., the Dayton Accords) may have a distinct “disarmament” 

context, and in some cases the United States may be drawn into 

maintaining such accords or even (in the case of Macedonia) have 

disarmament of a group as an objective of military operations. 

Finally, it is critical to recall that arms control is a "method or 

means" to achieve the "objective" of improved security. But arms 

control is not an objective in isolation. Though the focus of any 

negotiation is the details of the prospective agreement, the arms 

control process must always be consistent with the direction of 

national or alliance security strategy. Consequently, arms control is 

a political activity and cannot be divorced from other aspects of a 

nation's security or foreign policy. Domestic events, other issues 

between states, and the bureaucratic process of the participating 

parties have a direct bearing on how arms control agreements are 

negotiated and complied with. 

During the Cold War arms control was placed in the context of 

the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. 

It was viewed as a means to prevent conflict and assist in crisis 

management. This is important to remember as we consider these 

agreements within the framework of the emerging security 

environment, consider how they should be modified, and negotiate 

future arrangements in an environment that may now seek 

cooperative security as a means to prevent conflict and deal with its 

aftermath. 
6

EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Vienna Document 

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or 

CSCE (later renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe or OSCE) convened in 1973. This negotiation was a 

Western concession to the Soviet Union in return for their 

participation in the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 

talks, as it closely approximated an earlier Eastern request for a 

European-wide security conference. It also embodied the idea of 

detente that had been enunciated in the Harmel Report that placed 

political efforts on par with NATO military activities. The thirtyfive participants signed the concluding document or Helsinki Final 

Act on 1 August 1975.3

 This launched the so-called "CSCE 

process" that sought balanced progress in three areas—security; 

cooperation in science, economics, technology, and the 

environment; and human rights (often called "Baskets One, Two, 

and Three" respectively). 

Basket One resulted initially in modest agreements on 

"confidence and security building measures" (CSBM's) that are also 

referred to as the Vienna Document. CSBM's were designed to 

reduce the "dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or 

miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to 

apprehension."4

 CSBM’s were a significant shift from technical 

arms control focusing on reductions to an emphasis on transparency 

in military operations. The successful conclusion of this agreement 

was in many ways a compromise by the Soviet Union. The USSR 

had long insisted that restrictions on military activities could not be 

agreed upon until reductions had first taken place, while the 
7

Western position had always been to seek such CSBM's before 

reductions. 

The first of these was a commitment to provide twenty-one 

days advance notification to all signatories of any military exercise 

involving more than 25,000 troops. It also encouraged voluntary 

notification of smaller military training events, major military 

movements, and the invitation of observers to maneuvers. These 

provisions have evolved and the thresholds reduced subsequently, 

and now include the following as described in the Vienna 

Document 1999:

• Annual exchange of military information 

• Consultation regarding unusual military activities 

• Provisions for military contacts and cooperation 

• Prior notification for exercises 

• Observation of military activities 

• Exchange of annual calendars for military exercises 

• Compliance and verification measures 

• Direct communication network between capitals 

• Annual implementation assessment meetings 

• Stabilizing measures during crisis situations 

• Principles governing arms transfers 

As mentioned at the onset several OSCE members (most notably 

Russia and Belarus) requested information on NATO force 

deployments or exercised their right to observe military exercises 
8

during the Kosovo crisis in accordance with these agreements. 

These events will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 

OSCE members also agreed to a Military Code of Conduct in 

1994. This code reaffirmed the principles in the Helsinki Final Act 

and established norms regarding the role of armed forces in 

democratic societies. The United States and its European allies 

formally cited Russia for violations of this code during its 

operations in Chechnya and requested observation of military 

activities there in accordance with the Vienna Document. Russia 

has steadfastly resisted an observation but did allow a very limited 

visit by the German military. Since September 11th Western states 

have not renewed requests for such visits. Furthermore, some 

American experts have expressed a concern that signatories to the 

Vienna Document could request observation of American military 

operations in Turkmenistan or at future air bases planned in 

Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan under the terms of these agreements since 

all of these Central Asian states are signatories. 

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 

The twenty-two members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 

signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 

on 19 November 1990. It established limits on the aggregate total 

of conventional military hardware for the two blocs, required 

substantial reductions in each nation’s conventional arsenal, and 

created an intrusive regime of inspections and verification. 

The talks commenced in January 1988 and established the goals 

of strengthening stability and security in Europe through a 

conventional force balance while eliminating the capability for 

surprise attack. The final agreement required alliance or "group" 

limitations on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat 
9

aircraft, and attack helicopters—known collectively as Treatylimited Equipment (TLE)—in an area stretching from the Atlantic 

Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Each bloc was allowed the 

following: 

Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)) Group 

Limit

Tanks 20,000 

Artillery 20,000 

Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV’s) 30,000 

Attack Helicopters 2000

Combat Aircraft 6800 

Bloc limitations for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact were 

further restrained by a series of five geographic nested zones for 

land-based TLE. Limitations on helicopters and attack aircraft only 

applied to the entire area of application due to their ability to 

reposition rapidly. This zonal approach was a derivative of the 

mandate’s intent to reduce the possibility of surprise attack by 

precluding excessive force concentrations by either side. 

Subsequent national limits for each treaty signatory were 

determined in negotiations among the members of the two 

organizations. The successor states of the Soviet Union (within the 

area of application) determined their respective limits from the total 

allocated to the Soviet Union in May 1992. 

New negotiations began after the signing of the treaty focusing 

on personnel strength of armed forces. This resulted in the 

Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (referred to as the CFE-1A 
10

agreement). It was signed on 6 July 1992 and established limits on 

the personnel strength of military forces with the exception of seabased naval units, internal security forces, or those assigned to UN 

duties. CFE1A (unlike the CFE Treaty) is a politically binding 

arrangement as opposed to a legally binding treaty. It provided that 

the ceilings announced by each signatory would take effect forty 

months after entry into force and further contained provisions for 

information exchange, notification, and verification. 

Though the reduction agreement was signed in 1990, 

implementation was delayed until 1992 by the end of the Warsaw 

Pact, demise of the Soviet Union, and problems associated with 

Soviet TLE. Despite this delay, over 58,000 pieces of TLE were 

destroyed and approximately 2,700 inspections conducted to insure 

compliance by November 1995 (the end of the implementation 

period).5

 The Russian Federation had the greatest burden for 

destruction—roughly twenty per cent of this total. By the end of 

2000 over 70,000 pieces of TLE had been destroyed and 3500 

inspections conducted.6

 

In retrospect, however, many experts believe the inspection 

regime may have contributed more to reducing tensions than actual 

reductions. The treaty proved valuable in assuaging concerns about 

German reunification and providing transparency during the 

withdrawal of massive Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. These 

withdrawals occurred following the signing of the treaty on the 

German reunification (12 September 1990) by the Federal Republic, 

German Democratic Republic (East Germany), France, the United 

Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States.7

 This agreement 

also contained significant restraints on military operations. 

Germany agreed to only deploy territorial units that were not 
11

integrated in the NATO command structure on the territory of the 

former East Germany. Bonn further agreed that no foreign troops 

would be stationed in its eastern states or “carry out any other 

military activity there” while the withdrawal of Soviet forces was 

ongoing. The treaty also specified that “foreign armed forces and 

nuclear weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part of 

Germany or deployed there” though Germany did insist on the 

ability to interpret “deployed.” 

The value of the transparency measures associated with this 

accord was demonstrated as American forces prepared for 

deployment to the former Yugoslavia following the signing of the 

Dayton Accords. Short-notice inspections in accordance with CFE 

were conducted of US forces in Germany by Russian inspectors as 

they prepared to depart for Bosnia in 1995. In fact the agreement’s 

greatest value may be the entire CFE system that encourages 

confidence through transparency and provides a forum for the major 

European states to debate, agree, and maintain a set of rules about 

conventional military power on the continent.8

 

Full and final compliance with the CFE Treaty was endangered 

in late 1995 due to Russian insistence that it could not comply with 

limits on its forces in the so-called flank zone—an area that includes 

both the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts. A final 

compromise was achieved at the first Review Conference (May 

1996) that permitted Russia higher force levels in the flank zone, 

established a May 1999 deadline for Moscow to meet these adjusted 

levels, and reduced the overall size of the flank zone.9

 Despite this 

effort the flank “problem” would continue. It was exacerbated by 

Russian military operations in Chechnya (which is in the flank 
12

region), and Moscow’s desire to maintain influence over the North 

Caucasus states. 

The West indicated its willingness to consider adjustments to 

the treaty during the 1996 Review Conference. Actual discussions 

began in the winter of 1997 and progressed slowly throughout the 

next year. As spring 1999 arrived it was clear that adaptation would 

be affected by ongoing developments in European security. In this 

regard the period from 12 March through 24 April 1999 was a 

watershed in NATO history due to four significant events. First, on 

12 March three new nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) 

entered the Alliance. From the Russian perspective an adjusted 

CFE Treaty provided legal assurances about the size and 

deployment of NATO forces critical to Moscow’s assessment of 

regional security.10 Consequently, while treaty modifications were 

warranted based on the dramatic change that had occurred since 

1990, the enlargement process gave this effort an additional 

resonance. Second, the Alliance began the bombing of the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 26 March. Third, the states 

participating in the negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty reached a 

major political agreement despite the ongoing hostilities on 30 

March.11 This was particularly noteworthy as Moscow had severed 

or suspended its other political ties with NATO (such as the NATORussia Council) once hostilities began. Furthermore, these ongoing 

negotiations were focused on the conventional force balance in 

Central Europe during the first actual conflict involving all NATO 

members and the largest air campaign in Europe since World War 

II. Finally, NATO issued its new Strategic Concept during the 

Washington Summit that was held 23-24 April. 
13

On 19 November 1999 (the ninth anniversary of the CFE 

Treaty) now thirty national leaders signed an adapted treaty.12 It 

confirmed a new structure based on a system of national and 

territorial ceilings to replace the zonal approach. This adjustment 

was a clear reflection of the greater multilateral character of the 

emerging security environment. The adapted treaty further noted 

that the presence of foreign forces on any state’s territory was only 

allowed consistent with the principle of “host nation consent.” This 

was critical to newly independent democracies throughout Eastern 

Europe and the former USSR. 

NATO also declared unilateral limitations on force 

deployments early in the enlargement process. The Alliance 

announced that it saw no need to station significant forces 

permanently on the territory of new members. While this both 

acknowledged the security situation and attempted to ease Russian 

disquiet, the new members (Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland) 

were concerned that the Alliance goal of military sufficiency could 

be undermined. They worried that should they be threatened in the 

future, NATO would not be able to come to their aid without 

violating the treaty. Consequently, NATO negotiated operational 

flexibilities such as the right to deploy equipment temporarily on 

the territory of an ally during a crisis. 

The accord also made changes to the flank regime in order to 

reconcile this portion of the original treaty to a revised structure. It 

noted that the existing flank regime remained legally binding on all 

parties but allowed Russia modest force increases in this area. 

Moscow also began bilateral discussions on the reduction of its 

forces from Georgia and withdrawal from Moldova consistent with 

the principle of host nation consent. Finally, the adapted agreement 
14

concluded key verification enhancements and contained important 

national statements. For example, Russia pledged to restrain its 

force levels adjacent to the Baltic Republics and Poland. Overall 

the United States accepted a reduction of over 45% in the amount of 

ground TLE it was authorized to have in the region. While this 

would appear to be a significant reduction, in reality American 

forces deployed in Europe had undergone enormous cuts in the 

period following the end of the Cold War. As a result the United 

States could accept these adjusted force levels without having to 

make any additional reductions. Finally, each state accepted a 

moderate increase in its annual inspection requirements and 

commitments to pursue continued reductions. 

The final negotiations and eventual ratification were 

complicated by Russia’s failure to meet the revised flank totals 

agreed at the Review Conference by the June 1999 deadline.13 

While Moscow remained within its overall national limits for all 

categories of TLE, it exceeded its allocation in the North Caucasus 

area significantly. This was further exacerbated as hostilities 

recommenced in Chechnya in October 1999. Moscow did, 

however, formally announce its deployment to the region in excess 

of treaty limits to meet the emerging crisis that demonstrated some 

commitment to the agreement.14 Still Russian failure to comply 

with treaty provisions coupled with its continued presence in 

Georgia and Moldova made final ratification of the adapted treaty 

problematical. President Clinton announced at the conclusion of the 

summit that he would not submit the agreement for ratification by 

the Senate until Russia had fully complied.15 All NATO members 

supported this action, and Senator Jesse Helms (then Chairman of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) forwarded two letters to 
15

President Clinton recommending against signing the adapted 

agreement or submitting it for ratification due to continued Russian 

non-compliance.16

Russia’s inability or unwillingness to resolve these issues 

continued in 2001. This issue was raised during the Review 

Conference (28 May 2001) by the United States as well as Georgia 

and other Caucasus states. Some observers believed that due to the 

uncertain situation in Chechnya Russia military leaders resisted 

complying with force limitations that might have to be violated 

subsequently if hostilities escalated. Russia’s continued presence in 

Georgia (roughly 7000 troops deployed on two bases) beyond the 1 

August 2001 deadline they had announced indicated a desire to 

maintain influence over the Georgian government and contribute to 

securing their border with Chechnya. Some experts also believe the 

Russian military is concerned that NATO or some other third party 

might occupy these bases if they were vacated. These 

apprehensions and the overall question of Russian and foreign troop 

presence more generally in this Caucasus state may be taking on a 

new significance. The US has decided to deploy small military 

forces to Georgia to train and equip local units to combat a growing 

terrorist threat in that country.17

At the onset of 2002 several issues with respect to CFE will 

affect the relationship between this agreement and future military 

operations. The first issue is the status of ratifying the adapted 

treaty. At the beginning of 2002 Russia claimed that it had met the 

established limits for the flank but continued to insist that the issue 

of Russian troop presence in Georgia and Moldova was solely a 

bilateral issue with each of those states. Consequently, Moscow 

will likely submit the adapted treaty to the Duma for ratification in 
16

the coming months. Several NATO allies have also indicated their 

desire to follow suit once Moscow’s compliance with the flank 

limitations is verified through inspections. Due in large measure to 

political realities such as the impending national elections in 2002 it 

could take up to three years for the United States Congress to 

consider the adapted treaty and vote on its ratification. Still it is 

important for American planners to consider the impact of the 

adapted treaty as well as other emerging issues with respect to CFE 

as we seek to maintain a consistent approach with our European 

allies. This includes such issues as the effect on power projection 

by American forces stationed in Europe, NATO enlargement, and 

new weapons technologies. 

Ratification would institute the new system of 

national/territorial ceilings consistent with post-Cold War 

geography. It would also establish the concept of “host nation 

consent” as legally binding on all signatories while reducing 

Russian anxiety over its conventional inferiority with respect to the 

West. Still military planners would have to contend with the fact 

that the adapted treaty could subject forces deployed to NATO 

territory or in transit through Europe to additional potential 

inspections and associated transparency measures. These would 

permit inspections of twenty percent of so-called “objects of 

verification.” This includes military equipment down to regimental 

level and storage, repair, and reduction locations that contain treaty 

limited equipment. In addition, all signatories are required to 

submit annual and quarterly reports of their equipment allocations 

and locations in the treaty area of application. Changes of thirty 

tanks or ACVs or ten artillery weapons on the territory of any state 

must also be reported. Any increase of eighteen or more combat 
17

aircraft or attack helicopters in a country’s holdings throughout the 

entire area of application must also be reported to all signatories. 

Issues of transparency for American forward-deployed forces in 

Europe and those transiting the continent have assumed a greater 

saliency due to the fact that the power projection has been a key 

mission since the end of the Cold War, and this requirement 

received renewed emphasis following the attacks of September 11th. 

Obviously, the treaty in its current or adapted form must be 

consistent with the decisions NATO leaders take on enlargement 

later this year. Clearly the adapted treaty is more in line with an 

enlarged NATO and the altered geography of Europe following the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. It allows for accession, and this could 

have positive ramifications for both the Baltic and Balkan regions. 

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia announced they were not party to 

CFE upon regaining their independence in 1991. This was 

primarily an issue of sovereignty as Baltic leaders argued that they 

were neither signatories to the original agreement nor successor 

states to the Soviet Union. Consequently, they were unwilling to 

participate in the Tashkent Conference that negotiated residual 

national ceilings from the entitlements of the USSR. It seems 

logical that their accession to an adapted CFE regime could 

underscore their respective sovereignty, offer additional security 

reassurances, and be viewed as a prerequisite to their entry into 

NATO. Several Baltic States have begun analyzing the impact of 

accession and have conducted preliminary discussions with the 

Alliance.18 In the Balkans (as discussed later) the arms control 

agreements that were derived from the requirements in the Dayton 

Accords were modeled after CFE and the Vienna Document in 
18

order to afford these states the opportunity to accede to CFE in 

particular at a future date. 

Finally, questions have arisen over whether new weapons 

technologies should be included in the categories of military 

equipment limited by CFE. In its current form the CFE Treaty 

provides clear technological advantages to the United States and the 

West in general. The limitations are solely “quantitative” and not 

“qualitative” in character. As a result the oldest tank in the 

inventory of any of the former Soviet states is counted as the 

equivalent of the most modern M1 tank in the NATO arsenal. This 

could change in the future, however. For example, some European 

arms control experts believe that unmanned combat air vehicles 

(UCAVs) should be included in the category of combat aircraft 

limited by the treaty. This issue arose in the Joint Consultative 

Group (JCG) in the fall of 2000. The JCG consists of 

representatives of all signatories to the agreement. Under the terms 

of the agreement this body reviews and monitors the execution of 

the treaty. This attempt to include the UCAV under the category of 

“combat aircraft” resulted in an angry public letter from Senator 

Helms to President Clinton that such an examination was 

“premature” and potentially inconsistent with US national security. 

The issue could reappear following the war in Afghanistan at 

the initiative of Russia or even some European states since the RQ-1 

Predator was armed with Hellfire missiles and used to attack 

various targets in Afghanistan.19 Some experts have suggested that 

unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with both sensors and missiles 

have emerged as the leading “transformational” weapon system 

following the conclusion of this conflict. Secretary of Defense 

Rumsfeld has requested $141 million in funding for this effort in the 
19

defense budget for fiscal 2003.20 Still at this point the use of 

UCAVs as “attack” aircraft will not be subject to treaty restrictions 

until they become part of deployed military formations. 

Open Skies 

The Treaty on Open Skies was proposed by then President 

George Bush in 1989 though the idea had been discussed during the 

Eisenhower administration in 1955. The members of NATO and 

the former Warsaw Pact signed the treaty in Helsinki on 24 March 

1992. Following the demise of the Soviet Union the governments 

of the Russian Federation, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine 

acknowledged their support for the agreement and submitted it for 

review and a vote of ratification by their respective parliaments. 

The treaty was scheduled to enter into force sixty days after the last 

state deposited its instruments of ratification. The United States 

ratified Open Skies in 1993, but the treaty languished in 

parliamentary committees in Belarus and Russia. These last two 

signatories finally ratified it, and they deposited their instruments of 

ratification in November 2001. As a result the treaty entered into 

force on 1 January 2002. 

Open Skies is of unlimited duration and the United States has 

no right of refusal to overflights allowed under the treaty. The 

agreement covers the national territory of all signatories including 

territorial waters and islands. The treaty has four primary 

objectives.21 First, it seeks to promote greater openness and 

transparency of military activities. Second, the treaty is designed to 

improve the monitoring of current and future arms control 

arrangements. Third, Open Skies is intended to strengthen the 

capacity of crisis prevention and crisis management. Finally, it 
20

provides aerial observation based on equity and effectiveness for all 

signatories. 

Each participating state has the right to conduct, and the 

obligation to receive, flights over its territory based on an 

established quota.22 The United States has a quota of forty-two 

overflights per year; however, during the initial three years only 

thirty-one are permitted in any single year. Any signatory to the 

treaty may receive the results from any overflight. Such flights are 

to be conducted by unarmed fixed-wing observation aircraft. They 

are authorized to carry still and video cameras, infrared scanning 

devices, and side-looking radars. Since signing the agreement many 

countries have developed appropriate aircraft in accordance with the 

limitations in the treaty. Numerous “practice flights” over the 

territory of participating states have also been conducted in order to 

insure all were fully prepared for implementation. Fifty-four such 

“practices” involved American territory, and thirty of these efforts 

were joint trial flights that included foreign participation. During 

the hostilities in Kosovo, for example, Ukraine requested to conduct 

a “practice” Open Skies flight over Italy. Obviously, this caused 

significant anxiety among NATO military planners since Italian 

airfields were some of the principal bases used to conduct air 

attacks against Serbia. Fortunately, the flight was cancelled at the 

last moment due to problems with the Ukrainian aircraft. 

Obviously this agreement has the potential to provide 

significant transparency of American military forces and operations 

on US soil as well as the territory of any member state. This could 

even include, for example, such locations as the island of Diego 

Garcia (British island territory) that has played an important role in 

the conflict in Afghanistan, forces preparing for deployment in the 
21

United States or abroad, as well as formations enroute to a foreign 

destination. The treaty also provides that for six months after it 

enters into force any of 55 members to OSCE may apply for 

accession. This could expand the area of application enormously 

and include countries in areas with unique security problems such 

as the Baltic states, Balkans, and Cyprus. After 1 July 2002 any 

country may ask to join. No country can accede to this agreement, 

however, if any existing signatory objects. Still the American 

intelligence community has provided an assessment that Open Skies 

is manageable if timely and accurate notifications of overflights are 

provided and awareness/training is conducted by US forces. 

The Ottawa Treaty 

The Ottawa Treaty establishes a global ban on anti-personnel 

landmines (APL). The so-called “Ottawa process” and a feeling by 

some states and non-governmental organizations that insufficient 

attention was being played to the problem of landmines resulted in a 

“fast track” arms control approach led by Canada and a coalition of 

NGO’s that resulted with this agreement. The umbrella 

organization for this effort was the International Campaign to Ban 

Landmines (ICBL) that consisted of six NGO’s that had launched 

an effort for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines beginning in 

1992.23

In 1996 a conference of seventy countries and fifty NGOs took 

place in Ottawa. Participants agreed to sign a treaty the following 

year in order to ban all anti-personnel landmines by 2000. The 

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, 

and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction that is 

commonly referred to as the Ottawa Treaty was signed in 1997 and 

entered into force in March 1999. By June 2001 140 countries had 
22

signed the agreement and over a hundred had ratified it. All NATO 

members with the exception of the United States and Turkey are 

signatories to this agreement. While the treaty prohibits states from 

possessing anti-personnel landmines, it places no restraints on antitank mines or their associated handling devices. 

Supporters of the agreement would argue that it has significant 

strengths. The treaty and associated publicity have galvanized 

attention to this problem that is of global significance. This was 

particularly important for states that had not been affected by 

previous conventions limiting APL such as Cambodia, 

Mozambique, Bosnia, and Croatia. Since it entered into force 

enormous stockpiles of mines have been destroyed. According to 

the ICBL over twenty million mines have been destroyed from the 

arsenals of over fifty countries. Several NATO countries to include 

Britain, France, and Germany have completely destroyed all of their 

anti-personnel landmine stockpiles.24

The agreement does have significant weaknesses. Most notably 

is the fact that the largest military powers—the United States, 

Russia, and China are not signatories to the agreement. American 

opposition to the Ottawa Treaty is in large measure due to US 

security responsibilities particularly on the Korean peninsula. Antipersonnel landmines play a crucial role in the defense of Korea and 

the capital of Seoul that lies only twenty-seven miles from the 

Demilitarized Zone that separates North from South Korea. Due to 

the deployment of massive North Korean conventional forces along 

the DMZ, American military planners rely on pre-planned and 

emplaced minefields to counter and slow any possible North Korean 

offensive. The Clinton Administration stated that the United States 

would seek to find suitable alternatives to current anti-personnel 
23

landmines and mixed anti-tank systems by 2006. This might allow 

the US to sign this agreement at that time. In 1999 $23.2 million 

dollars was appropriated for research on alternatives and an 

additional $38.1 million dollars was included in the fiscal year 2000 

proposal. In addition, the United States has destroyed over 3.3 

million non-self-destructing mines since 1996 except for those 

emplaced in Korea. The George W. Bush Administration is 

conducting a review of American landmine policy and has not 

officially endorsed or refuted the 2006 goal. Administration 

officials have suggested that it will not sign the Ottawa Treaty under 

any circumstances but will likely continue research on alternatives. 

The Ottawa Treaty has several key provisions in addition to 

each signatory’s willingness never to use anti-personnel mines. 

Each also agrees never to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 

stockpile, retain, or transfer, directly or indirectly antipersonnel 

mines.” Furthermore, the treaty prohibits assisting, encouraging, or 

inducing any activity prohibited under the convention. This has 

caused serious problems for NATO military planners. At the time 

of its signing the United States stockpiled mines in five NATO 

countries. This included Norway, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 

United Kingdom. A literal interpretation of the treaty would 

suggest that the seventeen signatory states from NATO may not 

cooperate with or assist the US or Turkey to plan for the use of such 

weapons during a combined operation or to allow such stockpiles to 

remain on their territory.25

In June 1998, the French Minister of Defense declared that his 

nation would “unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty.” He added, 

“France will prohibit the planned or actual use of anti-personnel 

mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military 
24

personnel. Furthermore, France will refuse to agree to rules of 

engagement in any military operation calling for the use of antipersonnel landmines.”26 Even Great Britain (arguably America’s 

closest ally) noted that being on opposite sides with Washington on 

this issue caused a “profound operational problem for the 

Alliance.”27 As a result the United States removed its stockpiles of 

these weapons from most of the territory of its allies. Though 

several states appended memorandum when signing the Ottawa 

Treaty that would allow them to conduct military operations with 

“non-signatories,” the planning for the use of these weapons was 

restricted during all NATO combined exercises, training, and 

computer models. It has also been reported that several European 

nations expressed concern that the United States might use APL 

during the conflict in Kosovo, and it has likely been a question 

during the initial phase of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. 

Arms Control in the Balkans—the Dayton Accords 

The Dayton Accords were signed in November 1995 ending the 

conflict in Bosnia. Annex 1A of the agreement included ambitious 

arms control and confidence building proposals for the signatories 

to be negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE. Under Article II 

states agreed to commence immediately negotiations on confidence 

and security building measures. They also agreed (Article III) to 

restrictions on the importation of light arms for ninety days and 

heavier weapons for 180 days, and (under Article IV) to begin 

negotiations to establish reduced levels of armament and military 

manpower. Article IV also established a deadline of 11 June 1996 

to achieve an agreement. Finally, the agreement called for 

subsequent negotiations (Article V) with the goal of establishing a 

regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. 
25

Surprisingly, the parties achieved agreement on a package of 

CSBMs by 26 January 1996. The accord used existing CSBMs 

contained in the Vienna Document as a model, and these measures 

were effective upon signature.28 All of the states of the former 

Yugoslavia were also subject to the CSBMs listed in Vienna 

Documents as well as the Military Code of Conduct upon achieving 

membership in the OSCE. Eventually this applied to all parties 

with the exception of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 

Belgrade’s OSCE membership was suspended in July 1992 as the 

war in the region intensified and not restored until the demise of the 

Milosevic government in 2000. 

While success in achieving an agreement on confidence 

building measures was significant, final settlement of the Article IV 

reduction accord proceeded slowly. If the states parties failed to 

agree by the deadline, Dayton established limits based on 

population that would automatically apply. The allocation for 

Bosnia and Herzegovina was further subdivided between the 

component entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

the Republika Srpska). Consequently, the arms control process 

could not occur in isolation. Success for these negotiation was 

dependent upon the outcome in other areas of the accord and the 

emerging political climate between the former warring parties. 

Failure of IFOR, for example, to implement the physical movement 

of forces required, or a breach in the agreement to conduct elections 

would have made these negotiations moot. As a result though these 

agreements placed no restraints on NATO peacekeeping forces, 

IFOR became involved in the actual implementation and 

maintenance of these agreements much to the chagrin of many 

military leaders. IFOR continued to be the best source of 
26

information on the size and disposition of the three armies in Bosnia 

as well as having supervision of any military training exercises by 

these forces. In many ways the arms control agreements in the 

Balkans suggested a new approach that moved from using arms 

control as a tool for conflict prevention (as during the Cold War) to 

becoming a tool for post-conflict resolution. 

During these discussions a serious disagreement existed among 

the Contact Group over the American plan to assist in the training 

and reequipping of Croatian and Muslim forces for the Federation 

Army.29 European participants argued that this effort could 

potentially undermine the negotiations and were akin to pouring 

“gasoline on smoking embers.” American negotiators argued that 

Bosnian Muslim leaders would have refused any treaty until “train 

and equip” was well underway. Furthermore, continued US 

congressional support for the overall effort was dependent upon 

“leveling the military playing field,” and Washington was 

successful in using “equip and train” as leverage to force 

particularly the Sarajevo government to fulfill certain political 

obligations. This divergence between the United States and its 

allies demonstrated not only a differing approach to cooperative 

security in this case but also the beginning of a more united 

European security perspective. This development has continued 

subsequently with the advent of the European Security and Defense 

Identity (ESDI). 

An agreement was achieved in the final moments prior to the 

deadline in June 1996. The parties eventually accepted the default 

ratios described in Article IV. They also made “politically binding” 

pledges to reduce military manpower not unlike CFE-1A.30 These 

troop reductions did, however, more reflect economic necessity than 
27

strict military analysis. Furthermore, while this had great political 

significance, the verification and definition of actual military 

manpower levels (particularly in states with large paramilitary 

forces) are virtually impossible. Implementation proceeded slowly 

with widespread complaints by all about cheating and the costs 

associated with destruction. These efforts as well as the preceding 

negotiations also underscored some of the essential coordination 

difficulties based on the structure of the Dayton Accords that 

required cooperation between the OSCE, the European Union, and 

the UN. This caused a certain degree of friction between OSCE 

representatives that were involved in the verification of arms control 

agreements and IFOR who had intelligence and oversight of the 

forces remaining in Bosnia as previously mentioned. 

All parties held a Review Conference in June 1998 following 

the verification of reductions. At this meeting the states parties 

declared the agreements successfully implemented and began 

discussions for an Article V mandate.31 Article V prescribed that 

the OSCE should assist the parties to achieve the goal of 

"establishing a regional balance in and around the former 

Yugoslavia" and included states (i.e., Hungary and Romania) that 

had not been directly involved in the wars in Yugoslavia.17 No 

agreement, however, was achieved due to the onset of hostilities in 

Kosovo and the desire by some Balkan states to eventually accede 

to CFE. With the impending entry into NATO of several states 

from the Balkans (including potentially Slovenia) and the 

possibility at least of the adapted CFE Treaty entering into force, 

American planners need to consider now whether or not they wish 

this region to be part of the CFE area of application. Should 

countries accede this would place additional restrictions on the size 
28

of American forces that could operate in the Balkans and subject 

them to additional transparency measures. 

Still arms control efforts in the Balkans may have established 

conditions at this point that make further political developments 

feasible. Clearly there can be no final resolution to the problems in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as three separate armies (Croat, 

Republika Srpska, and Bosnian Muslim) remain on its territory. In 

the last few years external support to the Croat forces emanating 

from Zagreb and assistance by Belgrade to Srpskan forces have 

largely disappeared. The factional armies’ capabilities continue to 

dissipate that makes not only their merger more feasible but also 

makes it more urgent as the residual Croat and Serb forces are 

overtaken by criminal activity. 

ARMS CONTROL DURING WAR AND CONFLICT 

RESOLUTION—KOSOVO AND BEYOND

As the Kosovo war unfolded in the spring of 1999 conventional 

arms control demonstrated inherent value as well as potential 

problems and pitfalls. On 30 March 1999 Belarus requested 

clarification from the United States, Britain, France, and others 

about military operations in and around the former Yugoslavia 

consistent with Chapter 2 of the Vienna Document. These countries 

and the host states of Albania and Macedonia also provided 

required reports when NATO forces operating on their territory 

exceeded certain prescribed levels at the end of April. On 5 May 

Russia formally notified all OSCE members of its intention to send 

observers to Macedonia and subsequently Albania to view the 

activities of NATO forces in these two countries under Chapter 8 of 

the Vienna Document. This was accepted on 6 May by the 

government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 
29

the inspections were conducted from 7 to 9 May. Inspections in 

Albania were conducted by Moscow from 16 to 19 May.32 

NATO (largely at the insistence of the United States and 

SACEUR) severely restricted the area observers could enter in 

Macedonia. General Clark argued that he feared these observations 

would be a serious violation of NATO operational security. He 

believed that “Russian observers could report sensitive locations 

back to the Serbs, who could then use their long-range rocket 

systems to strike us inside Macedonia.”33 Moscow formally 

demarched the NATO countries for this as a violation of the Vienna 

Document and argued that access had been so limited as to imply 

that the observation had in fact not occurred. The Macedonian 

observation also caused serious disagreements within NATO, as 

many European allies indicated their willingness to allow thorough 

observations. A German federal official publicly blamed the 

difficulties in Macedonia solely on the American military.34 During 

the visit by Russian military observers in Albania it was clear that 

allied forces were directed to follow the instructions provided by 

their national capitals and comply with the provisions of the 

CSBMs as opposed to orders coming from SACEUR. 

Russia also requested so-called “challenge inspections” of 

NATO airbases in Italy and Hungary in late May consistent with the 

provisions of the CFE Treaty. This included the NATO base at 

Aviano, Italy that was one of the primary facilities in mounting the 

air campaign against Belgrade. While this was difficult given the 

circumstances of an ongoing air offensive, NATO accepted these 

requests as legally binding under the treaty, and military officials 

complied appropriately. As NATO forces grew to exceed an 

additional threshold established under the Vienna Document the 
30

Macedonian government invited all OSCE states to an observation 

of deployed forces on 7 June, and this was conducted from 5 to 8 

July. 

Clearly the role that conventional arms control played in the 

Kosovo crisis was mixed. In the case of the Vienna Document 

observations, it did not fully achieve its purpose of eliminating 

tensions with countries that were not immediately involved in a 

crisis. It also revealed serious disagreement between the United 

States and its allies over the role of arms control as part of 

cooperative security. In its aftermath American policy has changed 

to argue that Vienna Document reporting and observations do not 

apply during periods of “armed conflict.” Still application of this 

revised policy will remain subject to interpretation particularly by 

American allies absent a clear declaration of war or if applied to US 

forces in transit. These agreements also had no direct bearing on 

preventing the conflict between NATO and the FRY, since 

Belgrade was neither a signatory to CFE nor an active OSCE 

member at that time and, therefore, not susceptible to the Vienna 

Document. Still the transparency provided about the NATO 

operations in particular from the inspections in Italy and Hungary 

underscored the value of conventional arms control as a means to 

reassure neighboring states during a crisis and to reduce tensions. 

At the conclusion of hostilities NATO forces conducted 

negotiations with leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (referred 

to as the “UCK”) on the disposition of their forces and equipment. 

The resulting agreement entitled “Undertaking of Demilitarization 

and Transformation of the UCK” was signed on 20 June 1999. 

Curiously, this agreement contained an arms control component. 

This was particular unusual because not only did it continue the 
31

tendency begun in Bosnia to use arms control as a part of the overall 

approach to conflict resolution, but the agreement was with a nonstate actor, in this case the Kosovo Liberation Army. 

The agreement required the UCK to establish secure weapons 

storage sites within seven days that would subsequently be 

registered and verified by KFOR. After thirty days the possession 

of an automatic weapon had to be approved by the KFOR 

commander. Otherwise having a weapon would be considered 

illegal, and they would be confiscated by KFOR. In the ensuing 

weeks KFOR took possession of over 11,000 weapons and 

significant quantities of ammunition, mines, and grenades as part of 

this agreement. Many of the weapons were old and in some cases 

unserviceable. KFOR troops also discovered that in some cases the 

retention of mines or explosives by Kosovar Albanians was more 

important, since they were the “weapon of choice” in order to 

intimidate remaining Serbs. 

NATO officials remained skeptical that they had garnered the 

majority of the weaponry, and many were subsequently stored in the 

Presevo Valley by former members of the UCK. This region was 

immediately across the border in the demilitarized zone between 

KFOR and Serb forces. This resulted in continuous smuggling of 

weapons across the border by the Albanians, and fighting between 

Albanians and Serb forces or police. Consequently, KFOR 

commenced operations to enforce these arms control arrangements 

in order to reduce the possibility of renewed hostilities. By the 

spring of 2000 KFOR started conducting raids in order to seize 

large quantities of “illegal” weaponry from the Albanians as part of 

this effort.35
32

Most recently NATO undertook a mission in the Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia solely focused on arms control. 

Operation Essential Harvest was designed to collect over 3300 

weapons from ethnic Albanian militants in Macedonia. This was 

part of an overall political settlement whereby the Macedonian 

government agreed in return to grant ethnic Albanians greater 

constitutional rights. The operation began on August 27, 2001 and 

was completed within the prescribed thirty-day period. NATO 

claimed it collected 3875 weapons including 33,210 assault rifles 

and a total of four tanks and armored personnel carriers. Allied 

troops also gathered 397,625 mines, explosives, and ammunition 

from rebel forces.36 Seven hundred NATO troops remain in 

Macedonia to monitor the results of this operation and promote 

peace and stability. At this point, however, it is uncertain whether 

or not hostilities may recommence. Many experts believe that 

despite the fact that the operation exceeded its expectation, large 

quantities of arms remain in the hands of the Albanian population in 

the northwestern portion of the country.37

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 

States which shall be made in Pursuance 

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 

be made under the Authority of the United 

States, shall be the supreme law of the Land.... 

--Article VI, The Constitution of the United 

States (emphasis added) 

This paper has focused on both real and potential tensions that 

exist between arms control and military operations now and in the 

future. Particularly in light of the advent of the war on terrorism 

and the fact that American military forces will likely be engaged in 

hostile action in several regions of the world in the coming years, 
33

the question may in reality be much greater. There is no question 

that arms control will restrict military operations in size, character, 

or transparency. This is inherent in its very definition. As a result 

American military and political leaders must determine how to deal 

with existing agreements and what role arms control has as part of 

US national security strategy in this new security environment. 

In managing existing agreements as a component of the current 

security architecture, certain realities cannot be ignored. First, as 

noted above, existing agreements must be adhered to until such time 

as the Congress or Executive abrogates American participation or 

negotiates appropriate adjustments. If the United States should do 

otherwise it could exacerbate real or imagined concerns about 

American “unilateralism,” undercut American credibility around the 

world, and complicate our relationships with friends and allies. If 

the United States determines after careful review that a treaty 

should be abrogated or changed markedly, it must initiate that 

process to include action by the Senate. Second, as part of that 

consideration it must be recognized that while focusing on the 

restrictions such measures enforce on American forces, these 

agreements also provide the United States a wealth of intelligence, 

mechanisms for crisis management, and in recent years even 

contributions to conflict resolution. Finally, in many cases these 

agreements are not “static” but are actually “dynamic.” As 

currently designed they will change or evolve in content or 

membership. For example, several states have argued for additions 

to the weapons restrained under the CFE Treaty, and the entry into 

force of the Open Skies Treaty has occurred under a totally different 

security climate than when it was first negotiated nearly a decade 

ago. 
34

As American policymakers consider how to deal with existing 

arrangements and the current environment the following 

recommendations are appropriate: 

• Arms control expertise must be more widely available, both 

in NATO and nationally, to ensure that such expertise can be 

deployed at all levels of military command. For example, 

USCENTCOM (currently involved in hostilities in Afghanistan) has 

no resident arms control expertise even though some of the 

agreements discussed here (i.e., Vienna Document and Open Skies) 

could affect ongoing operations. 

• Advance generic planning should be undertaken by the US 

and all NATO allies to shorten the political decision-making 

process and ensure appropriate and timely execution of Vienna 

Document activities relating to any unusual build-up of NATO 

forces during periods of increased tension or crisis. 

• The application of arms control responsibilities should be 

included in the scenarios of command post and field training 

exercises. Planners should either include an arms control annex to 

operations orders or integrate such considerations more carefully 

throughout the planning process. 

• Compliance with arms control responsibilities needs higher 

visibility within the NATO and American military command. 

Commanders should not be surprised to learn that their planned 

operations may be affected. Military leaders must consider that 

compliance with legal obligations and political responsibilities is 

not incompatible with operational security and force protection 

requirements. In fact such efforts may assist in preventing conflict 

or limiting the scale of a conflict in terms of scale or number of 

participants. 
35

• The Kosovo experience underscored the critical importance 

of JCS and OSD experts’ participation in the interagency process. 

At the same time the level of experience in arms control issues 

particularly for military officers has atrophied in the past decade. 

This is further complicated by the rapid turnover of officers on the 

Joint Staff in comparison to their civilian counterparts in State and 

the intelligence community. 

• There is a greater need for immediate military advice and 

expertise at State, CIA, and the National Security Council in order 

to assess quickly the impact of arms control inspections on current 

and planned military operations. Furthermore, careful examination 

should be made of potential changes to existing agreements as well 

as the full impact of the implementation of new treaties that may 

enter into force (i.e., Open Skies). 

In determining the role for arms control in the emerging 

security environment a new paradigm may be in order. Traditional 

approaches to security that emphasize “collective defense” or 

“collective security” may now be inappropriate. Policymakers may 

wish to adopt an approach of “cooperative security” that seeks to 

introduce measures that reduce the risk of war, mitigate the 

consequences should conflict occur, and establish measures that 

assist in conflict resolution while forestalling reoccurrence. Such 

measures my not necessarily be directed against any specific state 

or coalition.38 

Obviously, such an approach must remain consistent with 

agreed allied policy or seek to alter it. NATO members agreed in 

the new Strategic Concept that arms control continues to have “a 

major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security and 

objectives in future.”39 As this study has argued these efforts have 
36

now shifted in Europe at least from challenging the status quo to 

"locking it in place." Corresponding deterrence strategies are less 

focused on deterring a specific adversary, and more concerned with 

deterring a "condition." They also seek to facilitate conflict 

resolution and the continued development of European security 

architecture. This evolution will undoubtedly include further 

refinement of the European security identity and its relationship to 

NATO in future. 

Some might argue that this revised strategic concept is no 

longer relevant in light of the war on terrorism. In fact little if any 

reference is made to “terrorism” in this document. Still the ultimate 

determination of the role (if any) for arms control has longer-term 

strategic implications for the United States as it considers whether 

or not it must depend on multilateral approaches to conflict. As 

David Gompert and Dick Kugler have observed, “As long as we 

choose not to depend on Allies, we will fail to make joint 

preparations needed to ensure effective coalition operations.” 

Furthermore, Eliot Cohen has noted that a smaller military, “will 

have to concede that some missions are simply too big for it to 

handle alone. Indeed, one of the chief strategic choices that the 

United States faces is that between unilateral and multilateral 

capabilities.”40 The frustrations that some American leaders 

ascribed to arms control activities during the Kosovo conflict were 

in reality irritation with the realities of fighting a war as an alliance. 

The Alliance will, however, continue to confront issues of 

military sufficiency as both its purpose evolves, it accepts new 

members, and its relationships develop. As formal military threats 

to Europe decline some European policymakers could determine 

that American forces in Europe are less intended for Alliance 
37

defense and more focused on power projection. As a result, 

Europeans may become less concerned about ebbing Russian 

military strength and more focused on limiting American 

operational flexibilities that they construe to be provocative. This 

“Gulliver syndrome” in Europe cannot be ignored, as some experts 

believe arms control may now have greater relevance in restraining 

the “hyper power” (a term used to refer to the United States) as 

opposed to the traditional attempt to restrain the Soviet Union. This 

can be seen in proposals to adjust existing agreements as well as 

consider new treaties on such things as information warfare.41 The 

Alliance must also consider how arms control affects the expanded 

military requirements brought about by enlargement particularly if 

states such as those in the Baltic region are admitted to the Alliance 

and join the CFE regime.42 Consequently, greater care must be 

taken to insure that arms control policy reflects a common view of 

cooperative security and does not portend divisions in the transAtlantic relationship. 

Efforts to preserve and adapt conventional arrangements will 

continue to affect the nuclear relationship and the evolving role of 

Russia. The Russian Federation will likely continue to reduce its 

conventional forces consistent with available resources.43 Some 

Russian leaders have argued that this growing conventional military 

vulnerability demands increased reliance on nuclear weapons.44 

The entry of new members into the NATO coupled with the 

commencement of the Kosovo conflict two weeks later simply 

underscored this perceived Russian weakness. Reports that Russia 

had moved tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad (in violation of 

a 1991 commitment not to deploy such weapons to the Baltic 

region) could be in response to these events and reflect this change 
38

in policy.45 Conventional arms control could serve to reduce these 

concerns, forestall a corresponding greater reliance on nuclear 

weapons by Moscow, and encourage progress in other areas. These 

would be important issues to consider even if the attacks of 

September 11th had not occurred. In their aftermath conventional 

arms control may serve as part of a renewed effort to achieve a 

strategic relationship between America and Russia that deemphasizes confrontation and finds new areas for cooperation. 

The Balkan wars of the 1990’s are sad reminders that Europe is 

not immune to conventional conflict despite nearly fifty years of 

peace following World War II. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 

arms control and disarmament efforts have made a positive 

contribution to stability. They can continue to assist in the 

resolution of future conflicts, forestall conflict reoccurrence, and 

contribute to crisis management. Consequently, such approaches 

should be considered in the aftermath of the regional conflicts that 

appear to be a logical result of the war on terrorism. They could 

also serve as a brake on future wars and help eventually to resolve 

others such as the ongoing struggle between Armenia and 

Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. Due to the continued 

regionalization of conflict Western policymakers should also 

examine how the lessons learned from efforts in Europe could be 

applied appropriately in other regions (such as the Middle East, 

Korea, or South Asia) and encourage their use.46 

Many noted historians have argued that the immediate cause of 

World War I in 1914 was the decision by European leaders to begin 

mobilizing their armies. This caused a chain reaction as potential 

adversaries reacted to avoid being vulnerable to attack. It is 

impossible to calculate whether arms control arrangements such as 
39

those discussed might have provided sufficient restraint at these 

tense moments and precluded conflict. Still, arms control 

arrangements potentially offer transparency mechanisms, force 

limits, and reassurances that might serve to reduce tensions between 

potential protagonists during a crisis. Furthermore, should conflict 

occur such measures might serve to confine the conflict in terms of 

geography or weaponry, and contribute to post-conflict resolution. 

This is not an issue of altruism but rather the search for an 

appropriate balance that continues the use of arms control for these 

purposes within a security environment that has dramatically 

changed since September 11th. 

This new conflict is unique in our nation’s history in many 

ways. It is global in character and has uncertain objectives. The 

capture of a capital, destruction of an army or fleet, or occupation of 

specific territory will not define ultimate victory. American 

territory is directly threatened for the first time since the Civil War, 

and the risks are enormous due to the use of weapons of mass 

destruction. Consequently, our strategy for dealing with this 

conflict must be comprehensive in nature and integrate all of the 

tools available to a great power (military, economic, diplomatic, 

etc.) in a fashion that will be unprecedented. Arms control remains a 

tool in our diplomatic efforts that is in concert with our allies in this 

struggle and consistent with an approach of cooperative security. 

NOTES

 

1

 Michael Miggins, Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters, 

Brussels, Belgium, “Verification and Implementation Coordination 

Section (VICS),” lecture presented at the NATO School, 

Oberammergau, Germany, Spring 2000. 

2

 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington: United States Joint 

Staff Headquarters, April 2001), 309. 
40

 

3

Richard Schifter, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe: Ancient History or New Opportunities?” The Washington 

Quarterly (Autumn, 1993): 123. 

4

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agreements (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1990), 319-320. 

5

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Final 

Document of the First Conference to Review Operations of the CFE 

Treaty" (Vienna: OSCE, 1996), 2. 

6

Department of Defense, Strengthening Transatlantic Security – A U.S. 

Strategy for the 21st Century (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 2000), 41. 

7

 “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,” NATO 

Review 5 (October 1990): 30-32. 

8

Sherman Garnett, “The CFE Flank Agreement” (Washington: The 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 1. 

9

 Dr. Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security Policy, Testimony before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 29 April 

1997. 

10Dr.Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, (New York: 

Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), 61-63. See also Frederick 

Hammersen, “The Disquieting Voice of Russian Resentment”, 

Parameters XXVIII:2 (Summer 1998): 39-55. 

11 U.S. Department of State, “Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Decision of the Joint 

Consultative Group on Treaty Adaptation” (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 6 April 1999). See also Wayne Boese, “CFE Parties 

Outline Adapted Treaty; Limits to Allow NATO Growth,” Arms 

Control Today (March 1999): 28. 

12 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Adaptation of the Treaty 

on Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE),” Istanbul, Turkey, 19 

November 1999. 

13Wayne Boese,“Russian Compliance with CFE Flank Limit in Doubt,” 

Arms Control Today, July 1999, 46. 

14 Bill Gertz, “Russia Tells U.S. It Will Violate Arms Pact,” 

Washington Times, 7 October 1999, A1. 

15 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Statement by the 

President,” The White House, Washington, DC, 19 November 1999. 
41

 

16 “CFE Adapted at OSCE Summit in Istanbul,” Arms Control Today, 

November 1999, 23. 

17 Sharon LaFraniere, “U.S. Military in Georgia Rankles Russia,” 

Washington Post, 28 February 2002, A16. 

18 Klaus Bolving, Baltic CFE Membership (Copenhagen: Danish 

Institute of International Affairs, 2001). 

19 New York Times, “War’s Surprises Force U.S. to Shift Military and 

Political Strategy,” 8 November 2001, B5. 

20 Vernon Loeb, “New Weapon Systems Are Budget Winners,” 

Washington Post, 8 February 2002, A29. 

21 Allen B. Williams, “Treaty on Open Skies”, briefing prepared by 

Science Applications International Corporation, 10 September 1992. 

22 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray, ed. Arms Control Toward 

the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). See 

also US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Treaty on Open Skies

(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1992). 

23 The National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Landmines: 

Clearing the Way (New York: Huntington Associates, 2001). 

24 Ibid. 

25 Bernard Brown, “NATO Hits a Land Mine,” in American Foreign 

Policy Interests (New York: National Committee on American Foreign 

Policy, February 2000), 1. 

26 Ibid, 2. 

27 Paul Bowers, Tom Dodd, and Tim Youngs, Research Paper 98/74: 

The Landmines Bill (London: British House of Commons Library, 

1998), 27. 

28 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Press 

Release, “Parties Sign Agreement on Confidence and Security Building 

Measures for Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 26 January 1996. 

29 Bryan Bender, “Alliance’s Bosnian Train and Equip Project Will 

Resume,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 June 1998, 22. 

30 Michael O’Hanlon, “Arms Control and Military Stability in the 

Balkans” Arms Control Today (August 1996): 5. 

31 OSCE, “Regional Stability—Article V of Annex 1B of the General 

Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 13 November 1998. 

32 Ambassador Lynn Hansen, “Conventional Arms Control—Has It a 

Future?” paper delivered at DTRA Eighth Annual International 

Conference on Controlling Arms, Norfolk, Virginia, 2 June 1999, 7. 
42

 

33 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public 

Affairs, 2001), 293-294. 

34 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “The Kosvo Crisis Is Straining 

Europeans,” 19 May 1999, 9. See also Christopher Donnelly, “Russia 

After Primakov,” paper delivered at the Finnish National Defense 

College, 10 June 1999, 4. 

35 Jon R. Anderson, “Kosovo Raid Yields Bittersweet Results,” Stars 

and Stripes, 5 April 2000, 3. 

36 “NATO Ends Weapons Collection in Macedonia,” Arms Control 

Today 31:8 (October 2001): 24. See also Carlotta Gall, “NATO Chief 

Urges Macedonia to Carry Out Terms of Peace Pact,” New York Times, 

26 September 2001. 

37 Daniel Williams, “Ethnic Divide Remains in Macedonia,” 

Washington Post, 5 February 2002, p. A11. 

38 Dr. Jeff Larsen, “Chapter 1—An Introduction to Arms Control” in 

Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 

39 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic 

Concept, Press Communique NAC S(99)65, 1999, 10. 

40 James P. Thomas, Adelphi 333: The Military Challenges of 

Transatlantic Coaltions (London: International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, May 2000), 29-31. 

41 Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, “Future of Conventional Arms Control 

Under George W. Bush,” paper presented to the Joint Arms Control 

Workshop, Berlin, Germany, March 2001. 

42 Klaus Bolving, Baltic CFE Membership (Copenhagen, Denmark: 

Danish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 12. 

43 Alexi G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: 

Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya (Garmisch, Germany: 

George C. Marshall Center, 2000). 

44 Dr. Alexander A. Pikayev, “After Yugoslavia: Shifting Russian 

Priorities on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,” presentation at the 

North Atlantic Council, 8 June 1999, 12. See also Richard F. Staar, 

The New Military in Russia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Proceedings, 1996), 29-37, 192. 

45 Philipp C. Bleek, “Moscow Reportedly Moves Tactical Nuclear 

Arms to Baltics,” Arms Control Today (January 2001), 33. 

46 James Brown, editor. New Horizons and Challenges in Arms Control 

and Verification (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), 53-56.