NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ABIGAIL THOMPSON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. LOS ROBLES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, a California corporation; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 20

- 55771
D.C. No. 2:19

- cv - 04876

- GW

- SK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 18, 2021

Pasadena, California Before: CALLAHAN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and AMON, * * District Judge.
Plaintiff

- Appellant Abigail Thompson appeals from the district cour t’s
dismissal without leave to amend of her hybrid action brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sittin g by designation. 

# FILED

OCT 28 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to allow Thompson to
file an amended complaint

. A district court should give leave to amend “ freely ” but may deny leave to
amend when amendment would be futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(2) ; Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty. , 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013)

. Amendment is futile only if “ no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Missouri
ex rel. Koster v. Harris , 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) ( quoting Miller v. Rykoff

S exton , Inc. , 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988 ) )

. C iting Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. , 715 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983) , the
district court issued a tentative ruling conclud ing that Thompson’s claim was untimely

. Specifically, the district court determined that Thompson should have been on notice that her grievance was dropped after certain procedural deadlines specified in the applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA) were missed. See
Teamsters Union Local 315 v. Great W. Chem. Co. , 781 F. 2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1986)

. Thompson disputed the tentative ruling , arguing she had no reason to know her grievance had been dropped because it was “common knowledge” that Appellees routinely ignored the CBA’s deadlines

. She further argued she should be a llowed to amend to show that her claim was timely under principles of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling

.3

Rather than allowing Thompson to amend, the district court gave her 10 days

to file an offer of proof showing her claim was timely , which she fi led

. But the
district court did not accept Thompson’s factual allegations as true and constru e them in her favor in deciding whether the allegations constituted a set of facts that
could possibly establish timeliness. See Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. , 559 F.3d 1028, 1029

– 30 (9th Cir. 2009) . Instead, it considered the merits of her assertions , including questioning the “reliability” of the declarations that Thompson submitted
and seemingly requiring Thompson to provide evidence in support of her a llegations

. This was improper at the pleading stage. Although we do not opine on the likelihood of success of Thompson’s claims , t ak ing as true h e r allegations that Appell ees routinely ignored the CBA deadlines and that this practice was wid ely known raises a possibility that she did not have
reason to know more than six months before s he filed suit that her g rievance had been dropped

. See Huseman v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. , 471 F.3d 1116, 1120

– 21 (9th
Cir. 2006 ) (discussing equitable doctrines related to timeliness )

. Thus, we cannot

say defini tively at this point that there is no set of facts that would establish for pleading purposes that Thompson’s claim is timely.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.