United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1994 ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

Most Air Force

ALQ-135 Jammers

Procured Without

Operational Testing

GAO/NSIAD-95-47

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-257415.2 

November 22, 1994

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

The Honorable David Pryor

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

As requested, we examined the Air Force’s $2 billion program to acquire

an upgraded version of the ALQ-135 jammer. The purpose of the jammer is

to protect F-15 aircraft against threat weapons by transmitting electronic

signals to interfere with radars used to control threat missiles and guns.

This unclassified version of a classified report being provided to you

focuses on whether the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force

took the necessary measures to ensure that the program had demonstrated

acceptable performance before the jammers were produced and deployed.

Background The upgraded ALQ-135 is a two-band system, designated as Bands 1.5 and

3, for use on newer models of the F-15 (see fig. 1). The designations refer

to two portions of the radar frequency band covered. The older F-15C

aircraft is being equipped with only the Band 3 because the original

ALQ-135, which is already installed, covers the frequency band of the 

Band 1.5. Band 3, therefore, will provide extended frequency coverage for

the F-15C. The newer F-15E, which does not have the original ALQ-135, is

supposed to be equipped with Band 1.5, as well as Band 3.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

Figure 1: ALQ-135 Jammer and F-15 Aircraft

We reported in 19901 that the Air Force had started production of several

jammers, including the upgraded ALQ-135, without adequately testing their

performance capability. We noted that the upgraded ALQ-135 units that

had been produced were in storage because of software design problems.

1

Electronic Warfare: Need to Strengthen Controls Over Air Force Jammer Programs

(GAO/NSIAD-90-168, July 1, 1990).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

We recommended at that time that the Secretary of Defense prohibit the

award of further production contracts until operational testing provided

reasonable assurance that the jammers would meet performance

requirements. We also recommended that the Secretary require that

adequate internal controls be established over Air Force jammer programs

to ensure that the jammers were satisfactorily tested and demonstrated

acceptable performance before producing and deploying them.

DOD disagreed that satisfactory performance during operational testing

should be required before further production contract awards but stated

that these jammers would not be allowed to proceed to full-rate

production without an assessment of their operational performance.

Subsequently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1991, Congress directed that the ALQ-135 production rate not exceed

minimum essential levels until the system underwent “thorough and

effective” operational testing and was determined to meet or exceed all

operational criteria.

DOD also disagreed that additional internal controls were needed, stating

that adequate internal controls were in place to ensure that systems

demonstrated acceptable operational performance before full-rate

production. However, of the total planned quantity of 514, the Air Force

has already procured 391 and will have procured 451, or 88 percent of the

total quantity, before operational testing starts.

Results in Brief The Air Force has continued procurement of the ALQ-135 Band 3 despite

its deficient performance, resulting in the premature deployment of

systems with limited capability to protect the F-15. While developmental

testing showed the Band 3 to have serious performance flaws, the Air

Force has already procured most of its total program quantity without

demonstrating acceptable operational performance. These performance

problems are compounded by other deficiencies that are discussed in our

classified report. Moreover, the Air Force has deferred further production

of the Band 1.5. Information on the impact of this deferral on the F-15E’s

survivability has been classified by DOD.

Acquiring nearly all the Band 3s before adequate operational testing is

inconsistent with DOD policy and the rationale for the requirements in the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. Furthermore, the

Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Years 1990-91 states that the conferees did not intend to condone a

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

continued reapproval of low-rate initial production quantities that

eventually might total a significant percentage of the total planned

requirement. The poor condition of the ALQ-135 program now is a direct

result of DOD’s disregard of congressional expectations, its own written

policy, and our recommendations.

Band 3 Ineffective

Against Some Threats

Developmental testing conducted after the Band 3 entered production has

shown that the system has serious performance problems. New, but

preliminary, test results compiled after the draft of this report was

prepared indicate some improvement in performance; however, significant

problems persist. The details of these matters are classified.

Most Band 3 Systems

Procured in Low-Rate

Production

DOD policy governing low-rate production, as stated in DOD Instruction

5000.2, is intended to limit the acquisition of large quantities of systems

until satisfactory operational testing is accomplished. Nevertheless, DOD

has allowed the Air Force to procure most of its Band 3 systems without

conducting any operational testing. In doing so, the Air Force has acted

within the letter of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1991, but not its spirit or the rationale for its requirements, and contrary to

congressional expectations found in the Conference Report on the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990-91.

The Fiscal Year 1991 Act limited ALQ-135 production to a rate sufficient to

sustain existing production capabilities at minimum essential levels until

thorough and effective operational testing had been conducted and

successfully completed. Previously, in the Fiscal Year 1990-91 Conference

Report, which supported revised restrictions on the uses of low-rate

production, the conferees stated that they did not intend to condone

repetitive low-rate production quantities that eventually total a significant

percentage of the total planned procurement of a system. Despite this, the

Air Force did not conduct operational testing as expected under the 1991

legislation, but continued to approve repetitive low-rate production. By the

time operational testing is scheduled to start, practically all the Band 3

systems will have already been procured.

The Air Force started production of the Band 3 in 1986 while the system

was in early development. Subsequently, because of the magnitude of the

problems detected in developmental testing, the Air Force deferred the

scheduled operational testing to mid-1995. Nevertheless, the Air Force

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

continued production of the Band 3 and started deploying the systems to

operational forces in 1990.

Much of Potential

Benefit of Band 3

Operational Testing

Has Been Lost

DOD’s policy, DOD Instruction 5000.2, emphasizes the need for timely testing

to reduce risks and to estimate system operational effectiveness and

suitability.2

 The policy provides that operational test results are an

important consideration in making key decisions to proceed with the

acquisition of systems. The DOD policy further indicates that operational

test results not only indicate how well a system will work, but can also

identify ineffective and unreliable systems before they are produced.

However, because the Air Force will have procured most of the planned

systems, the operational testing planned to start in mid-1995 will do little

to reduce risk. Much of the potential benefit of operational testing has

already been lost. The Air Force still needs to conduct some operational

testing to determine whether the system will function effectively in a

realistic operational environment. However, other aspects of the system’s

performance, such as its reliability, maintainability, and logistical

supportability, can be assessed at the operational units to which the

system has been deployed. Curtailment of planned operational testing of

the ALQ-135 Band 3 could reduce test cost, currently estimated at about

$5.8 million.

Band 1.5 Deferral

Leaves Aircraft

Vulnerable

After an initial procurement of eight units, the Air Force decided in 1988 to

defer further procurement of the Band 1.5 because of the problems

encountered on the Band 3 program. The Air Force planned to focus on

completing development of the Band 3 and then provide the Band 1.5 later.

However, solving the Band 3’s problems is taking much longer than

expected, and the Band 1.5 is still in a deferred status. Information on the

impact of this deferral on the F-15E’s survivability has been classified by

DOD.

According to Air Force officials, the Band 1.5 is a high priority, but

currently an unfunded requirement. The Air Force estimates that

completing development of the Band 1.5 would cost $43 million and

production of the required 184 units would require another $382.6 million.

2

Operational effectiveness refers to the ability of a system to accomplish its mission in the planned

operational environment. Operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be placed

satisfactorily in field use considering such factors as reliability and maintainability.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

The Air Force has jammer pods available that provide protection in the

frequencies covered by the Band 1.5. These pods can be used by other

tactical aircraft, such as the F-16. However, despite the problems with the

Band 3 and the expected cost of acquiring the Band 1.5, the Air Force does

not plan to use any other jammer alternatives, such as the ALQ-131 pod

jammer, for protecting the F-15E aircraft. The Air Force considers the

Band 1.5 the only viable option to provide the F-15E full jammer coverage.

Recommendations We affirm our previous recommendation that the Secretary of Defense

establish adequate internal controls over all Air Force electronic warfare

programs to ensure that systems are satisfactorily tested and demonstrate

acceptable performance before producing and deploying them. In

particular, we recommend that if the ALQ-135 Band 1.5 program is to

proceed, the Secretary prohibit any further procurement of the Band 1.5

until the Air Force demonstrates satisfactory performance of the system

during operational testing using the eight units it already has procured.

We also recommend that the Secretary require a cost-effectiveness

analysis to determine the best approach to provide jammer protection for

the F-15E. If the best approach is determined to be other than the

upgraded ALQ-135, to include the Band 1.5, the Secretary should stop

currently planned procurement of Band 3 systems for F-15Cs and use

existing F-15E Band 3 systems to meet the F-15C requirements.

Finally, we recommend that the Secretary limit planned operational

testing of the ALQ-135 Band 3 to effectiveness issues only, since most of

the systems have already been procured. Data needed to evaluate the

system’s operational suitability characteristics, such as reliability and

maintainability, can be obtained during exercises by the tactical units to

which it has been deployed.

Agency Comments DOD concurred or partially concurred with most of the findings and

recommendations in this report. In particular, DOD indicated that

electronic warfare programs should be properly tested before initiating

production, but acknowledged that the Air Force had procured the

majority of the ALQ-135 systems without performing an operational

evaluation.

With regard to repetitive low-rate production approvals that lead to the

acquisition of a large percentage of the total planned procurement, DOD

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

said that the Office of the Secretary of Defense was undertaking a review

to determine what steps might be taken to establish adequate controls to

ensure that systems demonstrate acceptable performance before they are

produced and deployed.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation for a cost-effectiveness analysis

to determine the best approach to provide jammer protection for the

F-15E. DOD maintained that the Band 1.5 is not a new program requiring

such an analysis. However, the fact that the Band 1.5 has been an

unfunded requirement for several years prompts the question of whether

the Air Force really considers the Band 1.5 to be high priority for the

F-15E. Because of this and the substantial cost remaining to be incurred

for the Band 1.5, we continue to believe that a cost-effectiveness analysis

should be done to examine other alternatives for adequately protecting the

F-15E.

DOD’s detailed comments and our evaluation of them are classified and,

thus, are not included in this version of the report.

Scope and

Methodology

We performed our work at the Air Force’s F-15 System Program Office,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Directorate of Electronic Combat,

and Directorate of Operational Test & Evaluation, Office of the Secretary

of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington,

D.C.; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Air Warfare

Center and Development Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;

Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; and

Northrop Electronic Systems Division, Rolling Meadows, Illinois.

In evaluating ALQ-135 performance, we reviewed developmental test

results to date. We also discussed the test results and potential

performance issues, including those relating to deferral of the Band 1.5,

with Air Force representatives responsible for acquiring, testing, using,

and logistically supporting the ALQ-135 and DOD officials responsible for

oversight of electronic warfare systems acquisition.

Our review was performed from March 1993 through August 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As arranged with your office, unless you announce the report’s contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after its issue date. At

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
B-257415.2 

that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees;

the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix I.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Charles A. Ward

Atlanta Regional

Office

Jackie B. Guin

Cincinnati Regional

Office

Terrell L. Bishop

John M. Murphy, Jr.

Terry R. Parker

(707101) Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-47 Electronic Warfare
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a

single address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (301) 258-4097 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Mail

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100