United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

January 1995 BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

Analysis of Key DOD

Assumptions

GAO/NSIAD-95-56

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259314 

January 31, 1995

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

This report discusses the Department of Defense’s (DOD) bottom-up review and examines

assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they

reasonably support DOD’s conclusions that the projected force, with capability enhancements,

can execute the strategy. The information in this report should be useful to your Committees in

their deliberations on the future size and composition of DOD forces and capabilities. The report

contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the congressionally

mandated report on the bottom-up review that must be completed by May 1995.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine

Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available

to others on request.
B-259314 

If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

Purpose In its bottom-up review of the nation’s defense needs, the Department of

Defense (DOD), among other things, judged that it is prudent to maintain

the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional

conflicts, and determined the forces, capability improvements, and

funding necessary to do so. DOD used the results of the bottom-up review

to develop its fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years Defense Program.

Because the bottom-up review is the basis for DOD’s planning,

programming, and budgeting for the foreseeable future, GAO examined

DOD’s assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict strategy to

determine whether they reasonably support DOD’s conclusion that the

projected force, with capability improvements, can execute the strategy.

GAO did not review the rationale for DOD’s decision to select the

two-conflict strategy.

Background In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review—an assessment of

U.S. defense needs in the post-Cold War security environment. In

particular, the review outlined an overall defense strategy for the new era,

specific dangers to U.S. interests and strategies for dealing with each

danger, and force structure requirements. Chief among the dangers was

the threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers. DOD

evaluated various strategy and force options for countering regional

aggression. It also considered requirements for conducting (1) peace

enforcement or intervention operations in smaller-scale conflicts or crises,

(2) overseas presence, and (3) deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass

destruction.

DOD selected the two-conflict strategy option and determined the force

structure capable of executing the strategy and meeting requirements for

overseas presence and smaller-scale operations, as shown in table 1.

According to its Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD also estimated the

cost of the bottom-up review program and matched it against the

President’s objective for reducing the defense budget by $104 billion. DOD

estimated that the program would achieve $91 billion in total savings

during fiscal years 1995 to 1999 and that additional savings would be

identified during DOD’s normal program and budget review.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

Table 1: DOD’s Bottom-Up Review

Force Structure Force Requirement

Army 10 active divisions

15 Army National Guard enhanced

 readiness (combat) brigadesa

Navy 11 active aircraft carriers 

1 reserve/training aircraft carrier

45-55 attack submarines

346 ships

Marine Corps 3 Marine expeditionary forces

174,000 active personnel

42,000 reserve personnel

Air Force 13 active fighter wings

7 reserve fighter wings

Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)

Strategic nuclear forces 18 ballistic missile submarines

Up to 94 B-52H bombersb

20 B-2 bombersb

500 Minuteman III intercontinental

 ballistic missiles (single warhead)

aThese enhanced brigades will be existing Guard combat brigades with improved readiness.

bThese bombers are included in the 184 bombers listed under the Air Force.

DOD also determined it would need to make specific enhancements to

force capabilities, such as improving strategic mobility—airlift, sealift, and

prepositioning—and the lethality of U.S. firepower. DOD estimated that the

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces would be in place by

1999, strategic nuclear forces would be in place by 2003, and most

enhancements would be done by 2000.

The Secretary of Defense’s defense planning guidance for fiscal years

1995-99 and 1996-2001, issued in September 1993 and May 1994,

respectively, implemented the bottom-up review’s findings. The 1994

guidance included an illustrative planning scenario covering two nearly

simultaneous regional conflicts for DOD to use in developing program and

budget requirements. In general, this scenario described force levels,

deployment schedules, and other aspects of a situation involving two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

Because of concerns about the results of the bottom-up review, the

Congress, in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act,

requires the Secretary of Defense to reexamine the bottom-up review’s

assumptions and conclusions regarding force and budgetary requirements

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

and report on the review to the President and the Congress in May 1995.

DOD must describe the force structure required to execute its two-conflict

strategy in light of other ongoing or potential operations and may also

address possible adjustments to the two-conflict strategy.

Results in Brief DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the

availability of forces, supporting capabilities, and enhancements that it

concluded were necessary for executing the two-conflict strategy.

Furthermore, some of DOD’s assumptions are questionable. DOD assumed

the following:

• Forces would be redeployed from other operations, such as peacekeeping,

to regional conflicts, and forces would be redeployed between regional

conflicts. However, critical support and combat forces needed in the early

stages of a regional conflict may not be able to quickly redeploy from

peace operations because (1) certain Army support forces would be

needed to facilitate the redeployment of other forces and (2) logistics and

maintenance support needed for specialized Air Force aircraft would have

to wait for available airlift.

• Certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from one

conflict to another. However, two war-fighting commands, in an on-going

study of the two-conflict strategy, have raised questions about shifting

assets between conflicts.

• Sufficient strategic lift assets, prepositioned equipment, and support

forces would be available. However, the Army lacks sufficient numbers of

certain types of support units to meet current requirements for a single

conflict.

• Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed within

90 days of being called to active duty to supplement active combat units.

However, National Guard combat brigades are currently experiencing

difficulty meeting peacetime training requirements critical to ensuring

their ability to deploy quickly in wartime.

• A series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic mobility and

U.S. firepower, are critical to implementing the two-conflict strategy and

would be available by about 2000. However, some enhancements, such as

additional airlift aircraft, may not be available as planned.

In addition, war-fighting command officials believe that DOD’s concept for

responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts—included in DOD

guidance for developing program and budget requirements—may not be

the best approach. For example, their estimates of key characteristics of

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

how two nearly simultaneous conflicts might evolve and how forces

should be deployed differ significantly from DOD’s estimates, including the

timing between the two conflicts and the timing of force deployments. In

February 1994, the commands initiated a study to examine options for

deploying forces and supporting capabilities they believe could maximize

the use of U.S. capabilities. Command officials emphasized that, in

initiating the study, they are not suggesting that the United States cannot

accomplish the two-conflict strategy. Their analysis is addressing many of

the variables that DOD made assumptions about during the bottom-up

review and could therefore provide useful insights to the validity of DOD’s

assumptions.

In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work

needs to be done. DOD has since begun to examine the redeployment of

forces from other operations, shifting of assets between conflicts,

availability of strategic mobility and support forces, and use of enhanced

brigades. In general, these analyses will not be complete until sometime in

1995. Until DOD fully analyzes its bottom-up review assumptions and

considers the war-fighting commands’ options, it will not have a firm basis

for determining the forces, supporting capabilities, and funding needed for

the two-conflict strategy or if the strategy should be changed.

Principal Findings

DOD Has Not Fully

Analyzed Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions, and

Some Are Questionable

DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the

availability of forces, supporting capabilities, and enhancements that it

concluded were necessary to execute the strategy to fight and win two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. GAO questions some of DOD’s

assumptions.

Since the bottom-up review, DOD and two war-fighting commands began

analyzing key aspects of the two-conflict strategy that are related to DOD’s

bottom-up review assumptions (see table 2).

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

Table 2: Status of DOD’s Analyses of Key Aspects of the Two-Conflict Strategy

Aspect of the two-conflict strategy

Related DOD bottom-up review

assumption Status of DOD analyses (as of Jan. 1995)

Redeployment

of forces from other operations

Forces involved in other operations, such

as peacekeeping, would be redeployed to

a regional conflict.

In June 1994, the Army began a study of

the feasibility of redeploying forces from

peace operations to regional conflicts. It

expects to complete this analysis in early to

mid-1995.

Shifting assets from one conflict to another Certain specialized units or unique assets

would be shifted from the first regional

conflict to the second conflict.

In 1994, the Air Force, Air Mobility

Command, and two war-fighting

commands initiated studies of the

two-conflict strategy, including examining

shifting assets between conflicts. The first

two studies were completed in August and

May 1994, respectively, and follow-on

efforts are planned. These efforts and the

commands’ study will not be completed

until sometime in 1995.

Availability of strategic

mobility

Sufficient airlift, sealift, and prepositioning

would be available for deploying forces to

two regions.

In October 1993, DOD initiated a detailed

analysis of mobility requirements for the

two-conflict strategy. DOD expects to

identify overall requirements by February

1995 but will not identify the specific

numbers and types of airlift aircraft until

November 1995.

Availability of support forces Sufficient support forces would be

available for combat operations in two

conflicts.

In July 1994, the Army began analyzing

support requirements for the two-conflict

strategy. It expects to complete this

analysis in mid-1995.

Deployability of reserve forces Army National Guard enhanced combat

brigades could be deployed within 90 days

of being called to active duty and would

supplement active combat units.

In November 1993, the Army began to

study the concept of enhanced brigades,

including equipment and training needs.

The Army expects to complete the

equipment study in February 1995 and the

training study in mid-1995. Use of the

brigades is being considered as part of the

two war-fighting commands’ study.

As table 2 shows, DOD assumed that forces committed to other operations

such as peacekeeping would be redeployed to a major regional conflict.

However, some of the same Army support forces and specialized Air Force

combat aircraft used in peace operations, such as the F-4G and F-15E, are

needed in the early stages of a conflict, and it may be difficult to disengage

and redeploy these forces quickly. Support forces, such as transportation

units that move personnel and cargo through ports, could not immediately

redeploy because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other

forces from the peace operation. While specialized Air Force aircraft and

their aircrews could easily redeploy, the supplies, equipment, and

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

personnel needed to support the aircraft would have to wait for available

airlift. Finally, forces might need to upgrade their training, equipment, and

supplies before redeploying. The Army is currently analyzing the feasibility

of redeploying forces from peace operations to a major regional conflict

and does not expect to complete this analysis until early to mid-1995.

DOD further assumed that certain assets, such as B-2 bombers and F-117

stealth fighters, would be shifted between conflicts. The bottom-up review,

however, did not analyze the specific types and numbers required to be

shifted, redeployment timing, or logistical requirements. In 1994, the Air

Force and its Air Mobility Command, using the 1994 defense planning

guidance scenario covering two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts,

completed preliminary studies of specific aspects of the two-conflict

strategy that they began after the bottom-up review. Preliminary results of

these analyses identified the number of assets that would possibly shift

from one conflict to another and requirements for refueling support. The

Air Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for the two-conflict

strategy, including the shifting of assets. In February 1994, two

war-fighting commands began studying options for executing the

two-conflict strategy, using a different concept for deploying forces and

supporting capabilities from that reflected in the defense guidance

scenario. Among other things, this study will examine requirements for

shifting assets between conflicts. The commands do not expect to

complete this study until sometime in 1995.

DOD relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements study in assessing

mobility requirements during the bottom-up review. This study analyzed

mobility requirements for various scenarios involving single regional

conflicts and a scenario involving two concurrent conflicts. Based on the

requirements for the single conflict scenario deemed to be most

demanding, the study recommended the acquisition of additional C-17

aircraft and sealift ships and the prepositioning of Army equipment on

ships. It stated that this recommendation did not provide sufficient

capability to handle a second conflict. The bottom-up review endorsed the

study’s recommendation and called for additional prepositioning of

equipment on land. However, after completing the bottom-up review, DOD

initiated a detailed analysis to validate the bottom-up review’s conclusions

about mobility requirements for the two-conflict strategy. This study,

according to DOD, was required because of significant changes resulting

from the bottom-up review and delays in DOD’s mobility program. DOD

expects to identify overall mobility requirements by February 1995 but will

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

not identify the specific numbers and types of airlift aircraft until

November 1995.

In addition, DOD assumed that it would have sufficient support forces for

two conflicts and did not consider the numbers and types of support units

needed. For example, in modeling force options, DOD used notional Army

support forces. The Army plans to complete an analysis of specific support

requirements in mid-1995. Current indications are that it would be difficult

for the Army to support two conflicts. A 1992 Army analysis shows that the

Army cannot support its current active force of 12 divisions. Although the

bottom-up review active force of 10 divisions is smaller, the Army’s total

number of personnel is also smaller, leaving fewer people to fill support

units. Army officials therefore anticipate that its analysis of support

requirements for the bottom-up review force will also reveal shortfalls.

Analysis of two U.S. plans for responding to regional conflicts shows that

the Army has insufficient numbers of certain units, such as transportation

and quartermaster companies, to meet the requirements of one plan for

responding to a regional conflict and the combined requirements of both

plans. However, using existing support resources in Army National Guard

units may be an option for augmenting the Army’s support capability.

Finally, DOD assumed that 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades

would be trained, organized, and equipped to deploy within 90 days of

being called to active duty to augment active combat units. However,

during the bottom-up review, it did not determine the brigades’ specific

roles during wartime, required enhancements, and ability to deploy quickly

or when the brigades would actually be needed. As of January 1995, the

Army was still developing training and equipment requirements, and the

two war-fighting commands were studying how and when the brigades

would be needed in wartime. GAO concluded on the basis of 1992 and 1993

training data for seven existing Guard combat brigades that none have met

premobilization training and readiness goals critical to ensuring timely

deployment in wartime.

DOD’s bottom-up review emphasized the importance of several

enhancements; however, some may not be available by 2000, as projected.

For example, to improve strategic mobility, DOD assumed that by fiscal

year 1999, 80 of 120 planned C-17 aircraft would be available and

additional equipment would be prepositioned in the Persian Gulf area to

accelerate the arrival of ground forces. Because of cost and technical

problems, however, in December 1993, the Secretary of Defense limited

the procurement of C-17s to 40 and deferred a decision to buy more C-17s

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

until November 1995. In addition, according to DOD officials, while DOD had

prepositioned equipment on ships and nearly completed prepositioning

the first of two planned brigade sets on land in the Persian Gulf, it had

obtained only a small portion of the funds required to preposition the

second brigade set.

To improve the lethality of U.S. firepower by about the year 2000, DOD

planned, among other things, to continue developing antiarmor

precision-guided munitions, such as the tri-service standoff attack missile,

and to add limited air-to-ground capability to the Navy’s F-14 aircraft,

referred to as the Block I upgrade. Because of significant developmental

difficulties and growth in expected unit cost, DOD has canceled the

tri-service standoff attack missile program. The Congress has also denied

funding for the Block I upgrade. GAO has reported extensively on problems

with the tri-service standoff attack missile and has raised questions about

the justification for the Block I upgrade.

War-Fighting Commands

Question DOD’s Concept

for Responding to Two

Nearly Simultaneous

Conflicts

Officials from two war-fighting commands believe that DOD’s concept of

how a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts would evolve

and how the United States would respond—outlined in a May 1994 defense

planning guidance illustrative planning scenario that is being used to

develop program and budget requirements—may not reflect the best

approach. Their estimates of the characteristics of two nearly

simultaneous conflicts differ significantly from DOD’s estimates, such as

the amount of warning time and amount of time separating the two

conflicts. The commands also have a different concept of how U.S. forces

and supporting capabilities should be allocated and deployed, including

the (1) mix of combat forces needed in each conflict, (2) timing of force

deployments, and (3) allocation of strategic mobility assets.

The commands are not suggesting the strategy cannot be accomplished

but that DOD’s concept may not reflect the best approach. They therefore

believe that options other than those depicted in DOD’s scenario may

maximize the use of U.S. combat and support capabilities and may reduce

the risks involved in simultaneously engaging in combat operations in two

regions. In February 1994, the commands initiated a study to examine

options for responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts with the

bottom-up review force based on a scenario that differs from the defense

planning guidance scenario. This study will address many of the same

aspects of the strategy that DOD made assumptions about during the

bottom-up review and is currently analyzing, including shifting assets from

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

one conflict to another, sufficiency of strategic mobility and support

forces, and the use of enhanced brigades. (Specific details of the

commands’ concerns about the scenario and their deployment concept are

classified.) As of January 1995, the commands had reached preliminary

conclusions and did not expect to complete the study until sometime later

in 1995.

Recommendations GAO recommends that in the congressionally mandated examination of the

bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the

assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other

operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic mobility

assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army National Guard

enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to strategic lift and

firepower and (2) consider the options being examined by the war-fighting

commands.

Agency Comments DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are included in

appendix I. Although DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations and

partially concurred with the report, it disagreed with GAO’s overall

conclusion that it did not adequately analyze assumptions used in

conducting the bottom-up review. DOD said that its leadership recognized

practical limitations on the scope of analysis that could be conducted in

the time available and fully considered these limitations in making

decisions about the defense program. DOD further stated that, in raising

questions about the bottom-up review’s assumptions, GAO did not

recognize the difference between conceptual force planning and

war-fighting commands’ operational planning for using specific forces to

undertake specific operations.

GAO recognizes that the bottom-up review was a broad force planning

effort that did not develop actual war plans for using specific forces. It did,

however, make the judgment that the United States would maintain the

capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional

conflicts and decided the size and composition of the force capable of

meeting this strategy. In making these decisions, DOD made critical

assumptions about factors that are key to the successful execution of the

two-conflict strategy without performing sufficient analyses to test the

validity of its assumptions. In fact, DOD and the war-fighting commands,

through studies initiated after the bottom-up review, are now examining

DOD’s assumptions.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Executive Summary

DOD also disagreed with GAO’s specific findings that (1) it did not assess

requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts, (2) it did not

fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army would be challenged

in supporting two major regional conflicts. DOD’s specific comments on

these findings and our evaluation are discussed in chapter 2.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Contents

Executive Summary 3

Chapter 1 

Introduction

16

The Bottom-Up Review Outlined a Defense Strategy and New

Dangers in the Post-Cold War Era

16

The Secretary of Defense’s Planning Guidance Implemented

DOD’s Bottom-Up Review Conclusions

20

The Congress Is Requiring DOD to Reexamine the Bottom-Up

Review

20

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 20

Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully

Analyze Key

Bottom-Up Review

Assumptions

22

The Two-Conflict Strategy Changed the Basis of Military Planning

for Responding to Regional Conflicts

22

Forces Involved in Other Operations May Not Be Immediately

Available for a Regional Conflict

23

The Bottom-Up Review Did Not Assess Requirements for Shifting

Assets Between Regional Conflicts

24

The Bottom-Up Review Did Not Fully Assess Mobility

Requirements for the Two-Conflict Strategy

25

The Army Would Be Challenged in Supporting Two Major

Regional Conflicts

27

DOD Has Not Fully Defined the Concept of Enhanced Reserve

Brigades, and Questions Remain About Their Deployability

31

Some Bottom-Up Review Enhancements May Not Be Completed

When Planned or at All

34

Conclusions 36

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37

Chapter 3 

War-Fighting

Commands Question

DOD’s Concept for

Responding to Two

Nearly Simultaneous

Conflicts

40

The May 1994 Defense Planning Guidance Outlines DOD’s

Concept for Responding to Two Nearly Simultaneous Conflicts

40

War-Fighting Commands Question Several Aspects of the

Defense Planning Guidance Scenario

41

Conclusions 43

Recommendations 43

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 46

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 69

Tables Table 1: DOD’s Bottom-Up Review Force Structure 4

Table 2: Status of DOD’s Analyses of Key Aspects of the

Two-Conflict Strategy

7

Table 1.1: The Bottom-Up Review’s Strategy and Force Options

for Responding to Major Regional Conflicts

18

Table 2.1: Army Units in Short Supply for a Single Regional

Conflict and Tasked to Deploy to Two Conflicts

30

Table 2.2: Shortfall of Medical, Engineer, Quartermaster, Military

Police, and Transportation Units for Two Major Regional

Conflicts

31

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In light of the significant changes in the international security environment

resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and declining resources

available for defense needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been

reexamining U.S. defense strategy, force levels, and budgetary

requirements for the post-Cold War era. In 1990, the President presented a

defense plan reflecting a shift in U.S. strategy from preparing for a global

war in Europe against the Soviet Union to preparing for major regional

conflicts against uncertain adversaries. This plan proposed a significantly

reduced force structure, or base force, but retained sufficient forces to

counter a possible reemergence of the Soviet threat.

Following the change in administrations in 1993, the new Secretary of

Defense reassessed U.S. defense requirements in an effort referred to as

DOD’s bottom-up review. This review, completed in October 1993,

examined the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization,

infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the post-Cold War

era. As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD continued to focus U.S.

strategy on regional threats; however, it de-emphasized the possibility of a

reemerging Soviet threat and reduced U.S. forces to levels smaller than the

base force. According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense called for

the bottom-up review to be completed in time to be considered in

developing DOD’s fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years Defense

Program. Therefore, the review was completed in about 7 months. In the

Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work had to

be done.

The Bottom-Up

Review Outlined a

Defense Strategy and

New Dangers in the

Post-Cold War Era

According to DOD’s bottom-up review, the United States must pursue an

overall defense strategy characterized by continued political, economic,

and military engagement internationally. This strategy of engagement

advocates (1) preventing the emergence of threats to U.S. interests by

promoting democracy, economic growth, free markets, human dignity, and

the peaceful resolution of conflict and (2) pursuing international

partnerships for freedom, prosperity, and peace.

The bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing U.S. interests in the

post-Cold War era and a specific strategy for dealing with each one. These

dangers included (1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other

weapons of mass destruction; (2) regional dangers, posed primarily by the

threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers with opposing

interests; (3) dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union,

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and (4) economic dangers to national

security.

In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, the Secretary of Defense cited

regional aggression as chief among the new dangers. To deal with regional

aggression and other regional dangers, DOD’s strategy is to (1) defeat

aggressors in major regional conflicts; (2) maintain a presence

overseas—the need for U.S. forces to conduct normal peacetime

operations in critical regions—to deter conflicts and provide regional

stability; and (3) conduct smaller-scale intervention operations, such as

peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

DOD Judged That the

United States Must Be

Capable of Winning Two

Nearly Simultaneous

Regional Conflicts

To deal with the threat of regional aggression, DOD judged that it is prudent

for the United States to maintain sufficient military power to be able to

fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly

simultaneously.1

 The bottom-up review determined the specific forces,

capabilities, and improvements in capabilities for executing the

two-conflict strategy. In reaching its conclusions, DOD examined various

strategy and force options for major regional conflicts, as shown in table

1.1.

1

For planning purposes, DOD defined “nearly simultaneous” to be a certain number of days between

the time that enemy forces mobilize in each conflict. The number of days is classified.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: The Bottom-Up Review’s Strategy and Force Options for Responding to Major Regional Conflicts

Option

Military service Win one conflict

Win one conflict with

hold in second

Win two nearly

simultaneous conflicts

Win two nearly

simultaneous conflicts

plus conduct smaller

operation

Army 8 active divisions

6 reserve division

equivalents

10 active divisions

6 reserve division

equivalents

10 active divisions

15 reserve

enhanced-readiness

brigades

12 active divisions 

8 reserve enhanced

equivalents

Navy 8 carrier battle groups 10 carrier battle groups 11 carrier battle groups

1 reserve carrier

12 carrier battle groups

Marine Corps 5 active brigades

1 reserve division

5 active brigades

1 reserve division

5 active brigades

1 reserve division

5 active brigades

1 reserve division

Air Force 10 active fighter wings

6 reserve fighter wings

13 active fighter wings

7 reserve fighter wings

13 active fighter wings

7 reserve fighter wings

14 active fighter wings

10 reserve fighter wings

Force enhancements

Source: DOD’s Report on the Bottom-Up Review.

For assessment purposes, DOD focused on two specific scenarios involving

regional aggression. In evaluating the strategy and force options, DOD also

considered requirements for conducting (1) peace enforcement or

intervention operations in smaller-scale conflicts or crises, (2) overseas

presence, and (3) deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.

DOD, for various reasons, chose the strategy of fighting and winning two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and related forces with

enhancements—the third option shown in table 1.1. For example, DOD

believed that this option would possibly deter a second regional aggressor

from attacking its neighbors while the United States was responding to

another regional conflict. In addition, fielding forces sufficient to win two

wars nearly simultaneously would provide a hedge against the possibility

that a future adversary might one day confront the United States with a

larger-than-expected threat.

Finally, DOD believed that this strategy option, forces, and enhancements

were affordable within expected budget constraints. According to its

Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD also estimated the cost of the

bottom-up review program and matched it against the President’s

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Introduction

objective for reducing the defense budget. DOD estimated that the program

would achieve $91 billion in total savings and that additional savings

would be identified during DOD’s normal program and budget review. DOD

estimated that the projected force would be available by fiscal year 1999.

DOD used the results of the bottom-up review to develop its fiscal year 1995

budget and Future Years Defense Program.

DOD Made Several Key

Assumptions About Its

Chosen Force Option

In concluding that the forces selected for the third option could implement

its strategy, DOD made several key assumptions about the forces’

deployability and capabilities, including that

• forces involved in other operations, such as peacekeeping, would be

redeployed to a regional conflict;

• certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from one

conflict to another;

• sufficient strategic lift assets and support forces would be available;

• Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed within

90 days of being called to active duty to supplement active combat units;

and

• a series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic mobility and

U.S. fire power, were critical to implementing the two-conflict strategy and

would be available by about 2000.

The specific enhancements included improving (1) strategic mobility,

through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift;

(2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers; (3) the lethality of Army

firepower; and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to deliver

conventional precision-guided munitions. Completing these

enhancements, according to DOD, would both reduce overall ground force

requirements and increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of its

power projection forces.

In most cases, the projected enhancements involved ongoing programs to

upgrade existing capabilities. For example, the bottom-up review cited the

need for additional airlift and sealift assets to improve strategic mobility.

DOD had previously identified this need in its 1991 mobility requirements

study and had already programmed funds to procure some of the specific

assets.

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The Secretary of

Defense’s Planning

Guidance

Implemented DOD’s

Bottom-Up Review

Conclusions

According to the Secretary of Defense, the bottom-up review was a

comprehensive reassessment that set the framework for defense planning

for the next 5 years and beyond. In September 1993 and May 1994, the

Secretary issued his defense planning guidance for fiscal years 1995 to

1999 and fiscal years 1996 to 2001, respectively. This guidance formally

directed the military services and defense agencies to implement the

bottom-up review’s conclusions.

The May 1994 guidance included an illustrative planning scenario

reflecting DOD’s concept of how the United States would respond to two

major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. Among other

things, the scenario detailed the amount of time between the outbreak of

hostilities in both conflicts, number and types of forces deployed to each

conflict, timing of deployments, and projected time for completing various

combat phases. DOD directed military planners to use this scenario, along

with other guidelines in the September and May guidance, in developing

program and budget requirements for DOD’s selected strategy and forces.

The Congress Is

Requiring DOD to

Reexamine the

Bottom-Up Review

In considering DOD’s portion of the President’s budget for fiscal year 1995,

Members of the Congress raised questions about the bottom-up review,

including the accuracy of its assumptions and affordability of its projected

force. As a result, in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization

Act, the Congress is requiring the Secretary of Defense to review the

assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up

review, and the Future Years Defense Program. The Secretary is required

to submit a report on the results of its review to the President and the

Congress in May 1995. Among other things, this report must describe the

force structure required to execute DOD’s two-conflict strategy in light of

other ongoing or potential operations and may also address possible

adjustments to the strategy.

Objective, Scope, and

Methodology

We examined DOD’s bottom-up review assumptions about key aspects of

the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably supported

DOD’s conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute

the strategy. In conducting our assessment, we did not examine DOD’s

rationale for selecting the two-conflict strategy, the capabilities of

potential regional aggressors, and the extent to which allied support could

reduce the need for U.S. forces.

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To determine DOD’s assumptions and conclusions about executing the

two-conflict strategy, we interviewed knowledgeable officials involved in

the bottom-up review at the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Strategy, Resources, and Requirements; the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Army, Air

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps headquarters.

We also reviewed relevant documentation, including the final report on the

bottom-up review and the Secretary of Defense’s planning guidance, and

received briefings on regional dangers from DOD officials. We did not

examine DOD’s rationale for selecting the two-conflict strategy; rather, we

focused on examining DOD’s assumptions on key aspects of the strategy.

DOD denied us access to specific information on the inputs and results of

its analysis of force options. However, we obtained considerable

information on DOD’s analysis through interviewing knowledgeable

officials and reviewing available documentation.

To analyze whether DOD’s assumptions reasonably supported DOD’s

conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute the

two-conflict strategy, we interviewed officials at the headquarters of the

four military services, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S.

Transportation Command, the Air Combat Command, the Army National

Guard Bureau, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command. We also reviewed

relevant documentation on (1) the use of U.S. forces engaged in

peacekeeping operations, (2) Army support capability, (3) training of Army

National Guard enhanced combat brigades, and (4) DOD plans for

improving strategic mobility and the lethality of U.S. firepower.

We interviewed officials at two war-fighting commands to obtain their

views on DOD’s assumptions in the bottom-up review, the feasibility of

conducting the two-conflict strategy, and the defense planning guidance

implementing the bottom-up review’s findings.

We conducted our review from October 1993 to October 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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Under the bottom-up review’s two-conflict strategy, military planners, for

the first time, are required to plan to deploy forces to respond to two

nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. However, in doing the review, DOD

did not fully analyze its assumptions regarding key aspects of the strategy,

such as the ability of forces to redeploy from other operations to regional

conflicts or between conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support

forces, and deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades.

Furthermore, we question some of DOD’s assumptions. For example,

certain support forces needed in the early stages of a regional conflict

could not immediately redeploy from peace operations because they

would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces. The Army currently

lacks sufficient numbers of certain support forces for a single conflict, and

National Guard combat brigades are experiencing difficulty meeting

peacetime training requirements that are critical to ensuring timely

deployment in wartime. Finally, some enhancements may not be available

as planned.

The Two-Conflict

Strategy Changed the

Basis of Military

Planning for

Responding to

Regional Conflicts

The bottom-up review’s strategy of maintaining the capability to fight and

win nearly simultaneous conflicts changed the basis for U.S. military

planning. Specifically, the base force was required to be capable of

conducting a decisive offense in response to one conflict and still be

capable of mounting a credible defense against an aggressor in another

region before the first crisis ended. As a result, war-fighting commanders

prepared operational plans for regional conflicts with the assumption that

no other conflict was ongoing or would occur after their conflict began.

They therefore assumed that combat and support forces, strategic mobility

assets, and other capabilities required to execute their plan would be

available.

The bottom-up review’s strategy envisions that U.S. forces could be

engaged in offensive operations in two conflicts nearly simultaneously.

This strategy requires DOD to meet the requirements of two war-fighting

commanders at the same time. DOD officials stated that extensive analysis,

beyond that conducted during the bottom-up review, is required to

consider the implications of responding to two nearly simultaneous

conflicts. Since the bottom-up review, DOD has begun additional analyses.

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Forces Involved in

Other Operations May

Not Be Immediately

Available for a

Regional Conflict

According to the bottom-up review, if a major regional conflict occurs, DOD

will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the United States

and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence missions. If DOD

believes it is prudent to do so, it will keep forces engaged in smaller-scale

operations, such as peacekeeping, while responding to a single conflict. If

a second conflict breaks out, DOD would need to deploy another block of

forces, requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any

forces still engaged in smaller-scale operations, and most of the remaining

U.S.-based forces.

In determining force requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD

assumed that forces already engaged in other operations could redeploy to

a regional conflict. However, DOD did not analyze the feasibility of or

requirements for such a redeployment during the bottom-up review. For

example, DOD did not consider (1) requirements for readiness upgrades for

forces before redeployment, (2) requirements for diverting airlift and

sealift assets to pick up personnel and equipment from the operation, and

(3) the impact on the war-fighting commander involved in a regional

conflict if combat and support forces engaged in other operations were

not immediately available.

DOD did not begin to analyze its assumption on redeploying forces from

operations other than war until after completing the bottom-up review. In

June 1994, the Army initiated a study of the impact of peace operations on

Army requirements, including the implications of redeploying combat and

support forces from such operations to regional conflicts. The Army does

not expect to complete this analysis until early to mid-1995.

Our work on the impact of peace operations on U.S. forces suggests that it

would be difficult for certain support and combat forces to disengage and

quickly redeploy to a major regional conflict. For example, certain Army

support forces and specialized Air Force combat aircraft, such as the F-4G

and F-15E, deployed to peace operations are the same forces needed in the

early stages of a regional conflict. However, some support forces, such as

transportation units that move personnel and cargo through ports, could

not immediately redeploy because they would be needed to assist in

redeploying other forces. Furthermore, while Air Force aircraft and

aircrews could easily fly from the peace operation to a regional conflict,

the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft

flying—supplies, equipment, and personnel—would have to wait for

available airlift. Obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy forces from a peace

operation would be challenging because already limited airlift assets

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committed to deploying forces to the regional conflict would have to be

diverted to pick up these forces.

Finally, forces may need to upgrade their training, equipment, and supplies

before redeploying. For example, according to Air Force officials, peace

operations tend to degrade the overall combat readiness of Air Force flight

crews. Similarly, naval aviators also find that they lose proficiency in some

combat skills through prolonged participation in peace operations. We are

reporting separately on the impact of peace operations on U.S. forces.

The Bottom-Up

Review Did Not

Assess Requirements

for Shifting Assets

Between Regional

Conflicts

According to the bottom-up review, certain specialized units or unique

assets would be dual-tasked—shifted from the first regional conflict to the

second conflict. In prior years, the Air Force had enough fighter and

bomber aircraft to meet the war-fighting requirements of two regional

conflicts. DOD believes that it may not have certain assets, such as B-2

bombers, F-117 stealth fighters, and EF-111 aircraft, in sufficient quantities

to support two conflicts, and it therefore may need to shift aircraft from

one conflict to another.

Although DOD assumed that dual-tasking would occur, it did not analyze

how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another. For example, in

determining force requirements, DOD did not determine what specific types

and numbers of assets would be required to be dual-tasked and when they

could be redeployed, or whether sufficient logistical support, such as

airlift, refueling aircraft, air crews, or spare parts kits, would be available

for the redeployment.

DOD officials explained that because a model for two nearly simultaneous

conflicts does not exist, the modeling to determine force requirements

during the bottom-up review did not simulate the shifting of assets from

one conflict to another. Rather, DOD identified the specific number of

assets required for each conflict and assumed that dual-tasking would

compensate for any shortfalls.

After the bottom-up review, the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command

began analyzing the implications and requirements for dual-tasking based

on assumptions contained in the Secretary of Defense’s May 1994 defense

planning guidance. Among other things, these analyses—completed in

August and May 1994, respectively—identified the specific assets that

would be dual-tasked, the timing of redeployment, and refueling aircraft

needed to support the redeployment from one conflict to another.

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The Air Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for dual-tasking,

including the availability of aircrews and spare parts kits. Furthermore, in

November 1994, at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, DOD began a war game analysis of several variables of the

two-conflict strategy, including requirements for dual-tasking. This

analysis is expected to be completed sometime in 1995.

As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting commands are analyzing the

two-conflict strategy using a different scenario and deployment concept

from those outlined in the defense planning guidance. They, too, are

examining dual-tasking, including how many and what type of assets

would need to shift and at what point in the conflict such a shift could

reasonably occur. Until this analysis is completed, currently projected for

sometime in 1995, and its results are reconciled with ongoing Air Force

and DOD studies, the specific requirements for dual-tasking will not be

known.

The Bottom-Up

Review Did Not Fully

Assess Mobility

Requirements for the

Two-Conflict Strategy

According to the bottom-up review, the illustrative planning scenarios that

DOD used in determining force and strategy options for regional conflicts

assumed that a well-armed regional power would initiate aggression

thousands of miles from the United States. On short notice, U.S. forces

from other areas would be rapidly deployed to the area and enter the

battle as quickly as possible. Because DOD assumed that most of these

forces would not be in the region when hostilities begin, it emphasized

that sufficient strategic mobility—airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of

equipment at forward locations—would be needed to successfully execute

the two-conflict strategy.

The bottom-up review called for specific enhancements to DOD’s existing

strategic mobility capability—most of which DOD had identified in its 1991

mobility requirements study. This congressionally required study

determined future requirements for airlift, sealift, and prepositioning and

recommended a program to improve DOD’s mobility capability. In

conducting the study, DOD analyzed various scenarios involving single

regional conflicts and a scenario involving two concurrent conflicts. Based

on the requirements for the single conflict scenario deemed to be most

demanding, the study recommended

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• increasing sealift capacity for prepositioned equipment and rapid

deployment of heavy Army divisions1

 and other U.S. forces by

(1) acquiring—through new construction and conversion—additional

capacity equal to 20 large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships; (2) leasing

two container ships; (3) expanding the Ready Reserve Force from 96 to

142 ships (an increase of 46 ships); and (4) increasing the overall readiness

of the Ready Reserve Force;2

• increasing U.S. capability to respond within the first few weeks of a

regional conflict by prepositioning Army combat, support, and

port-opening equipment aboard nine of the newly constructed or

converted large, medium-speed ships (by fiscal year 1997);3

• improving airlift by continuing the C-17 aircraft program, acquiring up to

120 aircraft; and

• improving the capability of the U.S. transportation system to move combat

and support units from their peacetime locations to ports of embarkation

by, among other things, purchasing 233 additional heavy-lift rail cars and

developing an ammunition loading facility on the U.S. west coast.

According to the mobility study, the recommended program reflected a

moderate-risk and affordable mobility force for a single regional conflict

that would enable DOD to move 4-2/3 Army divisions in 6 weeks. It also

concluded that its recommended program was not sufficient to handle a

second concurrent major regional conflict.

During the bottom-up review, DOD relied heavily on the results of the

mobility study when considering mobility requirements for the

two-conflict strategy. The bottom-up review endorsed the mobility study’s

recommendations, and called for increasing the amount of equipment

prepositioned on land in the Persian Gulf area. At the time of the

bottom-up review, DOD had a battalion-sized set of equipment ashore in the

Persian Gulf and planned to increase this prepositioning to two brigade

sets. DOD believed that the prepositioning was necessary because the

bottom-up review envisioned that forces would need to deploy more

quickly than provided for in the 1991 study.

1

The Army has heavy and light forces. Heavy forces include armor, mechanized infantry, and cavalry

units, and light forces include nonmechanized infantry, airborne, and air assault units.

2

DOD now plans to acquire 19, rather than 20, large, medium-speed ships, and to expand the Ready

Reserve Force by 21, rather than 46, ships.

3

DOD has since determined that 8, rather than 9, ships were needed for this prepositioning. These 

8 ships will replace 7 of the 12 ships the Army is currently using for prepositioning and add additional

capacity.

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After completing the bottom-up review, DOD initiated a detailed analysis of

mobility requirements for the two-conflict strategy to validate its

recommendations in the 1991 mobility study and the bottom-up review.

According to DOD, this study was required because of significant changes

resulting from the bottom-up review and delays in DOD’s mobility program.

For example, the bottom-up review and related defense planning guidance

presented a new military strategy, changed the overall force structure, and

called for enhancements in war-fighting capability. Furthermore, as

discussed later, DOD experienced delays in acquiring C-17 aircraft.

By February 1995, DOD expects to complete its study, identifying any

changes in mobility requirements and necessary adjustments to its

mobility program. DOD will then identify the appropriate mix of specific

airlift aircraft—C-17 and alternatives to the C-17. DOD plans to complete

this mix analysis by November 1995. Until the two studies are complete,

DOD will not know the overall mobility requirements and related costs for

its two-conflict strategy.

The Army Would Be

Challenged in

Supporting Two Major

Regional Conflicts

During the bottom-up review, DOD assumed that sufficient support units

would be available to support combat operations in two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts.4

 However, the Army currently does

not have the units needed to support its overall combat force.

Furthermore, analysis of current U.S. plans for responding to regional

conflicts indicates that the Army lacks sufficient units for a particular

conflict and would have even more difficulty supporting two conflicts.

The Bottom-Up Review

Assumed That Sufficient

Support Forces Would Be

Available for Two Conflicts

The bottom-up review did not analyze the specific types and quantities of

Army support units needed to execute the two-conflict strategy. In

modeling force and strategy options, DOD used notional numbers to

simulate the support forces that would typically deploy to support an

Army division. It assumed that the Army would deploy with all of the

specific support units needed to support its combat forces. According to

DOD officials, they did not thoroughly analyze support requirements

because of the short time frame to complete the bottom-up review.

In September 1994, the Army began analyzing support requirements for its

two-conflict combat force of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National

Guard enhanced brigades—existing Guard combat brigades with improved

4

Support units include detachments, companies, and teams that maintain equipment, transport and

distribute supplies, provide personal services, and otherwise sustain combat operations.

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readiness. This analysis was part of its biennial process for determining

support needs. The process, referred to as the Total Army Analysis,

identifies the numbers and types of units needed to support a given

combat force in a designated scenario and the personnel and equipment

needed to fill these units. The Army then assesses other priorities, such as

combat requirements, risks involved if support requirements are not fully

met, and decides on how many support units to fill, given available

funding. The Army planned to complete by mid-1995 its Total Army

Analysis of support requirements for the two-conflict strategy based on the

bottom-up review force.

Army Does Not Have

Sufficient Forces to

Support Its Current

Combat Force

Although the bottom-up review assumed that the Army would have

sufficient support forces, the Army cannot support its current active force

of 12 divisions, and Army officials anticipate that shortfalls will also exist

for the two-conflict combat force. In an earlier Total Army Analysis of

support requirements for the 12-division force, the Army was unable to fill

838 support units, including engineer, medical, quartermaster, and

transportation units. Although these 838 units, as a whole, represent a

small portion of the Army’s total support units, they reflect key capabilities

that the Army has determined are required to support combat operations.

While the number of active divisions in the two-conflict force is smaller

than the current force, the total number of personnel allotted to the Army

under the bottom-up review is also smaller, leaving fewer people to fill

support units. Army officials involved in the ongoing Total Army Analysis

therefore believe the analysis will reveal that the Army cannot fully fill all

support units needed for the two-conflict strategy and force.

The Army Would Have

Difficulty Providing All

Required Support Even for

a Single Conflict

In the past, the Army has had difficulty generating sufficient support units

for deployed combat forces, and it currently does not have certain types of

units called for in plans for a single regional conflict. In 1992, we reported

that in trying to support a combat force of about eight divisions during the

Persian Gulf War, the Army deployed virtually all of some types of support

units and exhausted some units.5

 For example, the Army deployed

virtually all prisoner-handling, postal, and medium truck units and all

graves registration, pipeline and terminal operation, heavy truck, and

water supply units.

5

Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces

(GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).

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Because of favorable conditions, such as a long lead time for deployment,

extensive host nation support from Saudi Arabia, a ground offensive of

short duration, and the lack of a second conflict requiring a U.S. response,

the Army was able to mitigate most of the adverse impact of its support

shortfalls during the Gulf War. The bottom-up review strategy and force

present a greater challenge because the Army may need to generate

support forces for at least 10 active divisions deployed nearly

simultaneously, with little warning time, to two major conflicts.

Analysis of current U.S. plans for two particular regional conflicts

indicates that the Army would face the same types of difficulties it

encountered during the Gulf War. Our examination of the requirements for

17 types of support units6

 contained in the plans showed that the Army

(1) lacks a total of 238 units to meet the requirements of a single conflict

and (2) has tasked 654 units to support combat operations in both

conflicts. Table 2.1 shows the number of units, by type, that the Army

lacks for a single conflict and that are assigned to both plans.

6

These types represent the types of units that the Army was unable to fill during its 1992 Total Army

Analysis process.

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Table 2.1: Army Units in Short Supply

for a Single Regional Conflict and

Tasked to Deploy to Two Conflicts

Type of unit

Shortfall of units

for a single

regional conflict

Number of same

units tasked to

deploy to two

conflicts

Aviation 4 40

Chemical 3 32

Engineer 33 94

Medical 84 96

Ordnance 9 32

Quartermaster 20 94

Signal 6 25

Adjutant General 1 20

Chaplain 3 0

Finance 0 9

Military police 40 45

Military law 0 1

Psychological operations 0 1

Military intelligence 2 4

Maintenance 4 22

Headquartersa 0 4

Transportation 29 135

Total 238 654

aThese units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in

wartime.

As shown in table 2.1, the largest shortfalls in units required for a single

conflict occurred in five types—medical (84 units), engineer (33 units),

quartermaster (20 units), military police (40 units), and transportation 

(29 units), totaling 206 units. For two plans—each covering a different

conflict—the shortfall would increase to 338 units. Table 2.2 shows a

breakdown of this shortfall.

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Table 2.2: Shortfall of Medical,

Engineer, Quartermaster, Military

Police, and Transportation Units for

Two Major Regional Conflicts

Type of unit

Shortfall of units for

two conflicts

Medical 96

Engineer 59

Quartermaster 59

Military police 52

Transportation 72

Total 338

We are reporting separately on the Army’s ability to provide support forces

for the two-conflict strategy, including options for alleviating possible

shortfalls. The bottom-up review called for 15 Army National Guard

enhanced brigades to execute the two-conflict strategy and about 22 other

National Guard brigades—now organized as 8 divisions—for other

purposes, including providing the basis for rotational forces in extended

crises and fulfilling domestic missions. We believe that these divisions

include support units, personnel, and equipment that the Army may be

able to draw upon to augment its support capability.

DOD Has Not Fully

Defined the Concept

of Enhanced Reserve

Brigades, and

Questions Remain

About Their

Deployability

The Army’s portion of the forces for the two-conflict strategy consists of

10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades. The

bottom-up review stated that the enhanced brigades were needed to

execute the two-conflict strategy and assigned them the broad mission of

reinforcing active divisions in regional conflicts. For example, DOD

envisioned that these brigades would deploy to one or both conflicts if

operations did not go as planned or would replace overseas presence

forces redeployed to a regional conflict.

The bottom-up review further stated that, in the future, Guard combat

brigades would be organized and filled so that they could be mobilized,

trained, and deployed more quickly. It committed the Army to focus on

readiness initiatives directed toward the enhanced brigades and

established a specific goal to have these brigades ready to begin

deployment within 90 days of being called to active duty. In April 1994, the

Army Chief of Staff approved the 15 Guard brigades selected—8 heavy

brigades and 7 light brigades—as the enhanced brigades.

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The Bottom-Up Review

Did Not Fully Define the

Concept of an Enhanced

Brigade

Although DOD assumed that the enhanced brigades would deploy quickly

to reinforce active divisions in a regional conflict, it did not analyze the

specific wartime requirements for these brigades. DOD officials stated that

in analyzing force options for responding to regional conflicts, they used

active notional Army brigades and did not test the impact on the war fight

of deploying reserve enhanced brigades. Furthermore, DOD did not

determine basic factors such as the (1) specific wartime missions of the

enhanced brigades and the timing for deploying the brigades, (2) ability of

National Guard combat brigades to deploy quickly and fulfill combat

missions given readiness problems experienced during the Gulf War, and

(3) specific capability enhancements needed to improve the brigades’

readiness.

Because fundamental questions remained about the brigades, the Army

formed a task force in November 1993 to do an in-depth study of

alternatives for organizing, tasking, training, and equipping the brigades. In

April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff confirmed, based on the task force’s

findings, the bottom-up review’s assertion that the enhanced brigades

would reinforce active forces. However, the brigades’ specific missions,

such as whether the brigades would conduct combat maneuvers, provide

security, or perform other tasks, are still undefined. As discussed in

chapter 3, war-fighting commands are just beginning to analyze how and

when the enhanced brigades might be used in a regional conflict.

The Army Chief of Staff also determined that the brigades would

• maintain personnel and equipment at the highest readiness level during

peacetime and be ready to deploy at this level no later than 90 days after

being called up;

• train with specific divisions or corps in peacetime, but maintain the

flexibility to operate with any division or corps in wartime;

• focus their training on mission-essential tasks involving movement

(maneuvering) to contact with the enemy, attacks on enemy positions, and

defense against enemy attacks;

• be of standard Army design for heavy and light brigades and armored

cavalry regiments; and

• be equipped and modernized in a manner compatible with active divisions.

The U.S. Army Forces Command was tasked to develop and test a training

strategy to ensure that the enhanced brigades meet the 90-day deployment

goal. This strategy will include any necessary adjustments to the Army’s

current training program for Guard combat brigades. Army headquarters

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elements were tasked to identify the requirements and costs associated

with equipping the brigades. As of January 1995, the Army expected to

complete the equipment study in February 1995 and the training strategy

in mid-1995. Once the training strategy is completed, the Army envisions

that by 1999 it will be tested on only 3 of the 15 brigades. Based on the test

results, the Army will decide whether to apply the training strategy to the

remaining brigades.

Ability of Enhanced

Brigades to Meet 90-Day

Deployment Goal Is

Uncertain

The bottom-up review’s goal to have enhanced brigades ready to deploy

within 90 days of being called to active duty is based on Army estimates

that the brigades will need 90 days of post-mobilization training to achieve

proficiency in more complex skills at higher echelons, such as companies

and battalions. However, these estimates assumed that the brigades will

have achieved proficiency in basic skills at the individual soldier, crew,

and platoon level during peacetime training.

During the Persian Gulf War, three Guard combat brigades were activated,

but the Army did not deploy any of these brigades. Instead, they remained

in training status until the war was over. As we reported in November

1992,7

and testified in March 1994,8 the brigades experienced problems in

achieving proficiency in basic skills at the time of mobilization. For

example,

• many Guard soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs,

• many tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews were not proficient in

gunnery skills, and

• many commissioned and noncommissioned officers had not completed

required leadership courses.

As a result, Guard brigades were trained to achieve proficiency in many

basic skills, rather than more complex skills, after mobilization. Because

the Army believed the brigades were not ready to deploy, it substituted

active brigades. Contributing to the brigades’ training problems was the

fact that reserve forces generally train only about 39 days each year, and a

considerable portion of this time can be taken up by administrative

matters or in traveling long distances to reach training ranges.

7

Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades

(GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov. 4, 1992).

8

Military Training: Lessons Learned and Their Implications for the Future (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-128,

Mar. 10, 1994).

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions

Because of the Gulf War experience, the Army significantly changed its

strategy for training Guard combat brigades, including implementing an

initiative called Bold Shift. This project, initiated in September 1991, was

designed to focus brigade training during peacetime at the

basic—individual, crew, and platoon—level. Prior to this initiative,

peacetime training encompassed both basic and complex skills.

Our ongoing work on the Bold Shift program suggests that Guard combat

brigades are still continuing to experience problems in achieving

proficiency in basic skills. For example, as we stated in our March 1994

testimony, 1992 training data for seven existing Guard combat brigades

showed that none had reached pre-mobilization training and readiness

goals. Our analysis of 1993 training data confirmed that this trend is

continuing. We are reporting separately on the specific training problems

and progress of Guard combat brigades under Bold Shift.

Some Bottom-Up

Review

Enhancements May

Not Be Completed

When Planned or at

All

As discussed in chapter 1, the bottom-up review described several specific

enhancements to U.S. capabilities as key to the projected force’s ability to

fight and win two nearly simultaneous conflicts, including improving

strategic mobility and the lethality of U.S. firepower. According to DOD,

these improvements would compensate for the loss in capability resulting

from reductions in forces required in the bottom-up review. Although DOD

estimated that most enhancements would be done by about 2000, some

may not come on line as planned or at all.

Availability of Certain

Strategic Mobility

Improvements and

Prepositioned Equipment

Is Uncertain

To improve strategic mobility, DOD’s plans included procuring C-17 airlift

aircraft, increasing the number of sealift ships available, improving the

responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force, and prepositioning additional

equipment on land. At the time of the bottom-up review, DOD assumed that

by 1999, 80 of 120 C-17s and 21 additional Ready Reserve Force

roll-on/roll-off ships would be available as planned. By the same time, DOD

expected to preposition equipment on ships and increase the amount of

equipment prepositioned on land in the Persian Gulf area from a

battalion-sized set to two brigade sets, located in two different locations.

War-fighting command officials stated that prepositioning this equipment

is critical to executing the two-conflict strategy. As of January 1995, DOD,

as we reported in November 1994,9

 had made progress in improving the

responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Fleet. It had also prepositioned a

9

Ready Reserve Force: Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other Concerns Remain (GAO/NSIAD-95-24,

Nov. 8, 1994).

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions

brigade set of equipment on ships and nearly completed prepositioning a

brigade set of equipment on land in the Persian Gulf area.

DOD has encountered some problems or funding uncertainties in acquiring

additional airlift and sealift and prepositioning the second brigade set on

land. Specifically, DOD’s assumption that 80 C-17 aircraft would be

available by fiscal year 1999 was overly optimistic. Since its inception, the

C-17 program has been plagued with cost, schedule, and performance

problems. We testified in April 1994 that total costs continued to grow,

delivery schedules had slipped, and aircraft had been delivered with

unfinished work or known deficiencies.10 In December 1993, the Secretary

of Defense decided to limit the program to 40 aircraft unless the

contractor significantly improved management and productivity.

Furthermore, as discussed previously, the Secretary also decided to study

alternatives for a mixed airlift force of C-17s and

nondevelopmental—commercial or military—aircraft. DOD expects to

complete the study in November 1995 and at that time will decide whether

to procure additional C-17s. As of October 1994, the contractor had

delivered 15 C-17 aircraft and planned to deliver the remaining 25 aircraft

by September 1998.

As of October 1994, the Department of Transportation had acquired 14 of

the 21 Ready Reserve Force ships planned to be available for DOD’s

mobility program by fiscal year 1999. It planned to acquire the remaining

seven ships with funds remaining from fiscal year 1994 and requested for

fiscal year 1995. However, during fiscal year 1995 deliberations, the

Congress rescinded $158 million in fiscal year 1994 funds programmed for

the seven ships, but provided $43 million in fiscal year 1995 funds. DOD

believes that this funding will be sufficient to procure two ships and plans

to program funds for the remaining five ships in its budgets for 1996 to

1998.

DOD’s plans to preposition the second of two brigade sets of equipment

ashore in the Persian Gulf are also uncertain. As of January 1995, the U.S.

Central Command had identified a location for the second set of

equipment and reached necessary agreements with the host country.

However, according to DOD officials, the Army had obtained funding only

for the site survey and the project’s design. The Army plans to request

funding in its fiscal year 1996 budget submission for the remainder of the

project over a 3-year period covering fiscal years 1996-98.

10Military Airlift: The C-17 Proposed Settlement and Program Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-172, 

Apr. 28, 1994).

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions

Certain Improvements to

U.S. Firepower Have Not

Been Funded as Expected

The bottom-up review called for various improvements to the lethality of

U.S. firepower, including development of precision-guided munitions and

the addition of air-to-ground attack capability to the Navy’s F-14 aircraft

(referred to as the Block I upgrade). At the time of our review, these

improvements were part of DOD’s ongoing programs and therefore

reflected capabilities that were already planned. DOD assumed that

sufficient quantities of precision munitions for the two-conflict strategy

would be available by about the year 2000 and the Block I upgrade would

be completed by the year 2003.

The bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided munitions already

in the U.S. inventory, as well as new types of munitions still under

development, are needed to ensure that U.S. forces can operate

successfully in future major regional conflicts and other operations. It

noted that they hold the promise of dramatically improving the ability of

U.S. forces to destroy enemy armored vehicles and halt invading ground

forces, as well as destroy fixed targets at longer ranges, thus reducing

exposure to enemy air defenses. Specific antiarmor precision munitions

cited included the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile.

The Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile will not come on line as planned.

Because of significant developmental difficulties and growth in the

expected unit cost, DOD canceled the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile

program. We reported extensively on cost, schedule, and performance

problems with the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile.11 Furthermore, we

concluded that the Navy did not adequately justify the need for the Block I

upgrade.12 During deliberations on DOD’s fiscal year 1995 appropriation, the

Congress canceled funding for the F-14 Block I upgrade because of

questions about its affordability.

Conclusions The strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous conflicts will

require a significant change in military planning for the deployment and

use of U.S. forces. However, in the bottom-up review, DOD determined the

strategy, forces, capability enhancements, and estimated costs for

accomplishing the strategy without sufficiently analyzing key assumptions

to ensure their validity. Until DOD fully analyzes basic factors, such as

whether forces engaged in other operations that are needed in the early

stages of a regional conflict can quickly redeploy, sufficient mobility and

11Missile Development: TSSAM Production Should Not Be Started as Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-52,

Oct. 8, 1993) and four classified reports issued in 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993.

12Naval Aviation: F-14 Upgrades Are Not Adequately Justified (GAO/NSIAD 95-12, Oct. 19, 1994).

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions

support forces exist, reserve brigades can deploy when needed or

improvements in capabilities will be available, it will not have a firm basis

for determining the forces, supporting capabilities, and funding needed for

the two-conflict strategy or if the strategy should be changed.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD disagreed with our overall conclusion that DOD did not adequately

analyze the assumptions used in the bottom-up review. DOD said that DOD’s

leadership recognized practical limitations on the scope of analysis that

could be done in the time available and fully considered these limitations

in making decisions about key aspects of the long-term defense program.

DOD further stated that, in raising questions about the bottom-up review’s

assumptions, we did not recognize the difference between broad

conceptual force planning and detailed operational planning. DOD said that

it did not develop actual war plans, but rather identified broad, but

comprehensive, requirements that U.S. forces should be able to meet to

carry out crucial elements of DOD’s defense strategy. DOD also stated that to

ensure adequate force planning, it recognized the need to continually

refine and update its assessments. DOD noted that, to date, follow-on

analyses have upheld the basic tenets and findings of the bottom-up

review. We were unable to confirm DOD’s statement regarding the results

of the follow-on analyses because DOD will not make these results available

until the studies are completed.

We recognize that DOD was faced with time limitations in doing the

bottom-up review, and was therefore restricted in the extent of analyses

that could be done. We also agree that the bottom-up review was a broad

force planning and programming effort rather than a war-planning effort.

In fact, in chapters 1 and 3, we clearly distinguish between the bottom-up

review and detailed future operational planning.

However, in the bottom-up review, DOD made a specific judgment that the

United States would maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts and decided the specific size and

composition of the force capable of meeting this strategy. In making these

decisions, DOD made critical assumptions about factors that are key to the

successful execution of the two-conflict strategy without performing

sufficient analyses to test the validity of its assumptions. In fact, DOD and

the war-fighting commands are now exploring basic questions about DOD’s

assumptions, such as whether forces involved in smaller-scale operations

can actually be available when needed to deploy to a regional conflict,

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions

whether the same combat forces would be needed at the same time in

both regional conflicts and whether the Army has sufficient support for

nearly simultaneous combat operations in two conflicts.

DOD also disagreed with our specific findings that (1) it did not assess

requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts, (2) it did not

fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army would be challenged

in supporting two major regional conflicts. First, DOD stated that it has

ample experience in rapidly deploying forces, particularly combat and

support aircraft, from one theater to another. DOD said that in its

bottom-up review analysis, it made judgments about its future ability to

shift assets based on that experience.

We agree that DOD has ample experience in redeploying forces from one

theater to another. We note, however, that DOD’s experience has not

included redeployments from one major regional conflict to another, as

envisioned in the bottom-up review and defense planning guidance

scenario. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, the war-fighting

commands’ study has raised questions about shifting assets between

conflicts. For these reasons, we continue to believe that the bottom-up

review did not adequately assess requirements for shifting assets between

conflicts.

Second, DOD stated that in assessing mobility requirements during the

bottom-up review, it relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements study.

DOD believes that it understands the vast majority of its basic lift

requirements and capabilities for responding to two nearly simultaneous

conflicts. We agree that the 1991 study provided a useful baseline;

however, the bottom-up review resulted in significant changes in mobility

assumptions. DOD did not begin to analyze these changes until after the

bottom-up review. Furthermore, the 1991 study concluded that its

recommended mobility program was not sufficient for two concurrent

conflicts. Until DOD’s reassessment of mobility requirements is complete,

we continue to believe that DOD will not know the extent of strategic airlift,

sealift, and prepositioning needed to support two major regional conflicts.

Finally, DOD stated that the Army demonstrated, as recently as Operation

Desert Storm in 1991, that it can fully support large-scale combat

operations in a single major regional conflict. DOD also believes that it is

premature to draw conclusions regarding Army support shortfalls until the

Army completes its ongoing analysis of support requirements for the

two-conflict strategy. We recognize that the Army was able to support

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 2 

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up

Review Assumptions

combat operations during Operation Desert Storm; however, as discussed

in chapter 2, the Army did encounter difficulties. Also, the operation was

conducted under several favorable circumstances; for example, there was

no second conflict at the same time. Furthermore, we did not conclude

that the Army could not support two major regional conflicts. Rather, we

showed that DOD did not analyze the validity of its assumption that

sufficient support forces would be available and that various factors

suggest that the Army would be challenged in meeting this requirement.

We agree that the Army’s ongoing analysis will identify specific

requirements and shortfalls.

Additional annotated evaluations of DOD’s comments are presented in

appendix I.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 3 

War-Fighting Commands Question DOD’s

Concept for Responding to Two Nearly

Simultaneous Conflicts

War-fighting command officials believe that DOD’s concept for responding

to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts—detailed in defense

planning guidance that is being used to develop program and budget

requirements—may not be the best approach. Their estimates of key

characteristics of a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts

and the deployment of forces differ significantly from DOD’s estimates,

including the amount of warning time for both conflicts and time between

the onset of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each

conflict, and timing of force deployments. As a result, the commands are

examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S. capabilities.

Command officials emphasized that they are not suggesting the United

States cannot accomplish the two-conflict strategy. Their study is

analyzing many of the variables that DOD made assumptions about during

the bottom-up review, such as shifting assets between conflicts and the

sufficiency of strategic lift.

The May 1994 Defense

Planning Guidance

Outlines DOD’s

Concept for

Responding to Two

Nearly Simultaneous

Conflicts

In May 1994, the Secretary of Defense issued his defense planning

guidance for the 5-year planning period 1996 to 2001. This guidance

provided several illustrative planning scenarios depicting the challenges

U.S. forces might face during the planning period and generic force

packages representing the types of military capability needed to address

these challenges. The specific scenarios covered single regional conflicts,

two nearly simultaneous conflicts, and various smaller-scale operations.

They included a detailed summary of the situation, enemy objectives and

forces, U.S. objectives and forces, projected warning times of enemy

attack, a schedule for the deployment of U.S. forces to the conflict area,

and assumptions governing the circumstances depicted in the scenario.

According to the defense guidance, the illustrative scenarios, among other

things, (1) provide a “technical yardstick” to help focus, develop, and

evaluate defense forces and programs in further detail and (2) enable

service components to formulate detailed programs that provide levels of

readiness, sustainability, support, and mobility appropriate to the

bottom-up review’s two-conflict strategy. For example, DOD is using the

defense planning guidance scenario for two nearly simultaneous conflicts

as a basis for its study of mobility requirements, and the Air Force and its

Air Mobility Command used the scenario in examining requirements for

dual-tasking assets and refueling aircraft (see chap. 2). The Joint Chiefs of

Staff will use the defense planning guidance and scenario in apportioning

specific forces, strategic lift, prepositioning, and other assets to

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 3 

War-Fighting Commands Question DOD’s

Concept for Responding to Two Nearly

Simultaneous Conflicts

war-fighting commanders for accomplishing assigned missions, including

responding to regional conflicts.

In general, the defense planning guidance scenario for nearly simultaneous

conflicts depicted a situation in which a second conflict breaks out while

the United States is engaged in and preoccupied with a major regional

conflict a considerable distance away. The scenario envisioned that U.S.

combat and supporting capabilities, including strategic mobility, would

first be focused on responding to the first conflict until indications of a

second conflict were recognized. It made several key assumptions,

including the anticipated warning time, number of days separating the two

conflicts, forces sufficient to respond to each conflict, additional forces

available to the war-fighting commanders if adverse conditions developed,

and the timing of various combat phases. Specific details about the

scenario and assumptions are classified.

War-Fighting

Commands Question

Several Aspects of the

Defense Planning

Guidance Scenario

Two war-fighting commands with responsibility for responding to major

regional conflicts question whether the defense planning guidance

scenario being used to develop program and budgetary requirements for

the two-conflict strategy reflects the best approach. Specifically, they

believe that the guidance may not best reflect how two nearly

simultaneous conflicts would evolve and how the United States should

respond. Their overall concern is that the scenario focuses on responding

to the first conflict and then the second conflict and does not sufficiently

recognize the value of taking significant action to deter the second conflict

when the first conflict occurs. The specific details of the commands’

concerns are classified.

The commands are also concerned about specific aspects of the scenario

and its assumptions, including the following:

• The warning time for both conflicts and the separation time between the

two conflicts are likely to be shorter than DOD envisions.

• DOD’s concept for deploying forces may not provide the mix of combat and

supporting capability that the two commands believe is necessary to

successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous conflicts.

• The scenario does not recognize that both commands have operational

requirements for some of the same air, ground, and naval forces and

prepositioned equipment that if deployed to the first conflict may not be

available when needed for the second conflict.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 3 

War-Fighting Commands Question DOD’s

Concept for Responding to Two Nearly

Simultaneous Conflicts

• The apportionment of strategic airlift and sealift assets is inadequate and

should be based on a different concept for deploying forces.

• Both commands will likely require many of the same support forces;

however, the scenario only addresses combat forces.

• A higher level of mobilization of reserve forces than called for in the

scenario will likely be required.

Because of these concerns, the two commands, in February 1994, initiated

a joint study to assess the feasibility of responding to two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts with the bottom-up review force.

They are using a scenario and deployment concept that differs from the

defense planning guidance scenario. Command officials emphasized that,

by initiating the study, they are not suggesting that the United States

cannot accomplish the two-conflict strategy. Rather, they are examining

options that they believe (1) lessen the possibility that U.S. forces will be

required to engage in two major regional conflicts at the same time and

(2) put U.S. forces in a better position to be successful in both conflicts if

deterrence fails. This study will examine various aspects of the

two-conflict strategy, including the number and type of assets required to

shift between conflicts and at what point such a shift could reasonably

occur.

As of January 1995, the commands had reached preliminary conclusions

and did not expect to complete the study until sometime later in 1995.

However, according to command officials, the study thus far has validated

many of their concerns about the defense planning guidance scenario and

raised questions about DOD’s bottom-up review assumptions, including the

availability of strategic airlift and support forces, shifting assets between

conflicts, and how and when enhanced brigades would be needed. Based

on their preliminary study results, the commands hope to influence DOD

and Joint Staff thinking in apportioning forces and preparing future

defense planning guidance for developing program and budgetary

requirements.

Command officials emphasized that their study will not address detailed

operational planning for executing the two-conflict strategy or determine

specific operational requirements. This process will occur after the Joint

Staff formally apportions forces and missions in the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan—expected to be issued in early 1995. Command officials

expect the plan to task them to develop plans and deployment schedules

for a single regional conflict scenario in their respective areas, assuming

no other conflicts are occurring, and for two nearly simultaneous

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 3 

War-Fighting Commands Question DOD’s

Concept for Responding to Two Nearly

Simultaneous Conflicts

conflicts, assuming that their command is involved in the second of the

two conflicts. In the past, commands have been tasked only to prepare a

concept summary on how they would respond if they were in the second

conflict.

Based on the tasking, the commands will develop operational plans

followed by detailed deployment schedules for their respective regional

conflicts. As part of this process, the commands will determine their

specific requirements for executing the plans and schedules, such as

combat forces, mobility, sustainability, and munitions. The commands

estimate that it would take about 18 months, from the time the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan is issued, to complete the plans and deployment

schedules.

DOD officials agreed that the commands’ concept of executing the

two-conflict strategy differs from the defense planning guidance and that

the commands’ study could generate a different baseline for determining

defense requirements, budgets, and plans. They stated that reconciling the

differences when the study becomes available may be necessary, but until

then, the defense planning guidance remains the basis of DOD planning for

the two-conflict strategy.

Conclusions In developing the defense planning guidance scenario that military

planners will use to develop program and budget requirements for the

two-conflict strategy, DOD used a specific concept for deploying forces and

supporting capabilities. Key war-fighting commands believe that the

scenario may not reflect the most effective deployment and use of U.S.

capabilities and are analyzing alternatives. Their analysis is addressing

many of DOD’s key bottom-up review assumptions regarding key aspects of

the two-conflict strategy and could provide useful insights for determining

the validity of these assumptions.

Recommendations We recommend that in the congressionally mandated examination of the

bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the

assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other

operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic mobility

assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army National Guard

enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to strategic mobility and

U.S. firepower and (2) consider the options being examined by the

war-fighting commands.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Chapter 3 

War-Fighting Commands Question DOD’s

Concept for Responding to Two Nearly

Simultaneous Conflicts

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our recommendations and noted that it is conducting

detailed studies to address many of the issues raised. DOD stated that it will

reflect the results of these studies in its response to the congressionally

mandated report on the bottom-up review. As discussed in chapter 2, DOD

stated that in raising questions about the bottom-up review’s assumptions,

we did not recognize the difference between broad conceptual force

planning and operational planning for using specific forces to undertake

specific operations. We note that DOD’s comments imply that the

war-fighting commands’ study is similar to detailed operational planning.

As discussed in chapter 3, the commands are examining options for

executing the strategy on a macro scale rather than developing specific

detailed plans and requirements.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-5.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 7-8, 

and 23-24.

See comment 1.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 8, and

24-25.

See p. 38.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 8-9, 

and 25-27.

See page 38 and 

comment 4.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 9, and

27-28.

See comment 5.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 9, and

28-31.

See pp. 38-39.

See comment 6.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 9, and

31-33.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 9, and

33-34.

See comment 7.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 9-10, and

34-35.

See comment 8.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 10, and 36.

See comment 10.

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6, 10-11,

and 40-43.

See pp. 37 and 44.

See comment 11.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 12.

Now on pp. 11 and 43.

Now on pp. 11 and 43.

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated January 17, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. As discussed in chapter 2, our work showed the bottom-up review did

not analyze in detail the feasibility or requirements of redeploying forces

engaged in smaller-scale operations to a major regional conflict. As

discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the war-fighting commands, as part of their

joint study, are reviewing force requirements for different stages of both

regional conflicts, and the Army is studying the impact of redeploying

forces from peace operations. DOD agrees that it did not analyze the

problem of redeploying assets in detail, and we believe that the ongoing

studies will provide a better understanding of the feasibility and

requirements for redeploying forces, including when specific forces and

support capabilities might be needed in either conflict.

2. We agree that redeploying forces from one operation to another may not

necessarily increase lift requirements. However, until DOD examines the lift

requirements for such redeployments, we believe that the specific impact

is unknown.

3. Until the Army completes its study on the impact of redeploying forces

from smaller-scale operations, the specific support shortfalls will not be

known. Until DOD knows the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most

appropriate options for addressing them.

4. We agree that the 1991 mobility requirements study addressed two

concurrent regional conflicts and was a useful source of analysis during

the bottom-up review. We note, however, that the 1991 study concluded its

recommended mobility program was not sufficient to meet the mobility

requirements for two concurrent conflicts. Furthermore, the bottom-up

review resulted in significant changes affecting mobility requirements,

such as a new military strategy, a different force structure, and

enhancements in war-fighting capability. In fact, because of these changes,

DOD initiated a study to update the 1991 study to validate its conclusions in

the bottom-up review about strategic mobility.

5. The changes in end strength have decreased the Army’s flexibility to

provide more support units in areas of need. The 13,000 person decrement

represents a net decrease in end strength for the active component and the

U.S. Army Reserve—those components that provide most of the Army’s

support units—and an increase in the Army National Guard’s end strength.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Within its increased end strength, the Guard is retaining more combat

positions than it retained under the base force. Because of the decreases

in end strength in the active and U.S. Army reserve components and the

fact that the increased Guard end strength is being used to retain combat

positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing more support units

within its end strength.

6. Our work showed indications that the Army would be challenged in

supporting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. We agree

that the extent of actual shortages will not be determined until the Army

completes its ongoing Total Army Analysis. Until DOD knows the shortfalls,

it cannot identify the most appropriate options for addressing them.

7. We agree that the bottom-up review defined some parameters of the

enhanced brigades. Although the bottom-up review stated that these

brigades were needed to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, our work

showed that DOD did not determine basic factors about the brigades, such

as their wartime missions, deployability, or required enhancements.

Although DOD states that the brigades will be fielded in significant numbers

by the end of the decade, the Army currently envisions that by 1999 the

training strategy being developed will be tested on only 3 of 15 brigades.

8. We modified the text to reflect improvements in the Ready Reserve

Force. Chapter 2 already notes that DOD has prepositioned a brigade set on

ships and nearly completed prepositioning a brigade set on land.

Availability of sufficient lift, including 80 of 120 C-17 aircraft by 1999, was

a key bottom-up review assumption. Since its inception, the C-17 program

has encountered cost, technical, and schedule problems that DOD was

aware of at the time of the bottom-up review. In fact, because of these

problems, the Secretary of Defense was contemplating limiting

procurement of the aircraft and in December 1993 decided to do so. For

these reasons, we believe that DOD’s assumption was overly optimistic. In

its comments, DOD states that delivery of the full complement of airlift

aircraft may very well be late.

9. We modified the text to reflect DOD’s comment.

10. While DOD states that most other enhancement programs remain on

track, DOD officials agreed, in discussing their comments, that schedules

have been delayed in some of these programs such that they will not come

on line until sometime after 2000. (The specific dates are classified.)

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

11. We modified the text to reflect DOD’s comment regarding the two

phrases.

12. We do not suggest that the bottom-up review rules out taking actions to

deter a second conflict. In chapter 3, we are merely relaying the views of

the war-fighting commanders that the defense planning guidance scenario

does not sufficiently recognize the value of taking significant deterrent

action. (The specific basis for their views is classified.) We agree that the

bottom-up review recognized that some assets would be needed in both

conflicts, as reflected in our discussion on dual-tasking in chapter 2 of the

report. Furthermore, in chapters 1 and 3, we specifically distinguish

between the bottom-up review and the defense planning guidance

implementing the bottom-up review. We therefore do not agree that the

report implies that the bottom-up review proffered specific guidance to

the commands.

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven Sternlieb, Assistant Director

Sharon Pickup, Evaluator-in-Charge

William Wood, Senior Evaluator

Barbara Gannon, Senior Evaluator

Samuel Hinojosa, Senior Evaluator

Nancy Ragsdale, Communications Analyst

Norfolk Regional

Office

Richard Payne, Senior Evaluator

(701022) Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-95-56 Bottom-Up Review
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