Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Matthew John McDowell & John Stephen Burson, Misc. 

Docket AG No. 50, September Term, 2012 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – REPRIMAND – Court of Appeals 

reprimanded lawyer who “robo-signed” large number of foreclosure-related documents. 

Such conduct violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)

8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to Administration of Justice) and 8.4(a) (Violating 

MLRPC). 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – REPRIMAND – Court of Appeals 

reprimanded managing partner who made no efforts to ensure that law firm had in effect 

measures giving reasonable assurance that lawyers did not robo-sign documents and that 

notaries public did not falsely notarize documents. Such conduct violated MLRPC 5.1(a) 

(Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.3(a)

(Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC). 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF MARYLAND 

Misc. Docket AG No. 50 

September Term, 2012 

______________________________________ 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND 

v. 

MATTHEW JOHN MCDOWELL & JOHN 

STEPHEN BURSON 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J. 

Harrell 

Battaglia 

Greene 

Adkins 

McDonald 

Watts, 

JJ. 

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Watts, J. 

______________________________________ 

Filed: June 19, 2014 

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 28110-M 

Argued: April 29, 2014
This attorney discipline proceeding involves a lawyer who “robo-signed” a large 

number of foreclosure-related documents,

1 and the managing partner of the law firm at 

which the robo-signing occurred. 

While John Stephen Burson (“Burson”), Respondent, a member of the Bar of 

Maryland, was the managing partner of the law firm that is now Shapiro Brown & Alt, 

LLP (“the Shapiro Firm”),2 Matthew John McDowell (“McDowell”), Respondent, a 

member of the Bar of Maryland and a lawyer at the Shapiro Firm, signed trustee’s deeds3

and affidavits on behalf of William M. Savage (“Savage”), another lawyer and partner at 

the Shapiro Firm. At the Shapiro Firm, paralegals (who were also notaries public) 

notarized the trustee’s deeds and affidavits. Although McDowell had signed the trustee’s 

deeds and affidavits outside the paralegals’ presence, the notary jurats stated that the 

trustee’s deeds and affidavits had been signed in the paralegals’ presence. The robosigning and notarizations at the Shapiro Firm came to the attention of the Attorney 

 1

“‘Robo-signing’ most often refers to the process of mass-producing affidavits for 

foreclosures without having knowledge of or verifying the facts. ‘Robo-signing’ may 

also refer to the mass-production of affidavits that the affiant did not sign.” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Geesing, 436 Md. 56, 58 n.1, 80 A.3d 718, 719 n.1 (2013) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 688-89, 711, 73 A.3d 161, 

163, 176 (2013) (ellipsis and some internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed 

below, this attorney discipline proceeding involves the latter type of robo-signing. 

2

The Shapiro Firm was originally named “Shapiro & Burson”; later became 

“Shapiro & Burson, LLP”; and still later became “Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP.” 

3

Through a trustee’s deed, a substitute trustee conveys title of a foreclosed 

property to the entity that purchased the foreclosed property at a foreclosure sale. After a 

trial court ratifies the foreclosure sale, the trustee’s deed is recorded among the land 

records. “[A]ny failure [by the trustee’s deed] to comply with [] formal requisites[,]” such 

as an improper affidavit of consideration, “has no effect unless [the trustee’s deed] is 

challenged in a judicial proceeding commenced within six months after [the trustee’s 

deed] is recorded.” Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. (1974, 2010 Repl. Vol.) § 4-109(b). 
- 2 - 

Grievance Commission (“the Commission”), Petitioner. 

On October 17, 2012, on the Commission’s behalf, Bar Counsel filed in this Court 

a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Burson and McDowell, charging 

Burson with violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 5.1 

(Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers) and 5.3 

(Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants); charging McDowell with violating 

MLRPC 5.2(a) (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer);4 and charging Burson and 

McDowell with violating MLRPC 1.1 (Competence) and 8.4 (Misconduct). 

On October 22, 2012, this Court designated the Honorable Marielsa A. Bernard 

(“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to hear this attorney 

discipline proceeding. On July 9, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On 

September 27, 2013, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of 

fact and conclusions of law that McDowell had not violated any MLRPC and that 

Burson: had violated MLRPC 5.1(a) and 5.3(a); had not violated MLRPC 1.1, 5.3(b), or 

8.4;5 was not vicariously responsible for McDowell’s conduct under MLRPC 5.1(c); and 

 4

MLRPC 5.2(a) states: “A lawyer is bound by the [MLRPC] notwithstanding that 

the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.” In other words, MLRPC 5.2(a) 

establishes that it is not a defense to a violation of another MRLPC that a lawyer was 

following orders. Thus, technically speaking, a lawyer cannot violate MLRPC 5.2(a) 

itself. 

5

The hearing judge did not determine whether Burson had violated MLRPC 

5.1(b); the hearing judge stated that, in the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, 

the Commission did “not allege that [] Burson failed to supervise [] Savage[.]” The 

hearing judge’s statement is accurate, and the Commission does not dispute that it did not 

charge Burson with violating MLRPC 5.1(b). Thus, below, we do not determine whether 

Burson violated MLRPC 5.1(b). 
- 3 - 

was not vicariously responsible for the paralegals’ conduct under MLRPC 5.3(c). 

On April 29, 2014, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, we reprimand 

Burson and McDowell. 

BACKGROUND 

 In her opinion, the hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.

In 1985, this Court admitted Burson to the Bar of Maryland. In June 1985, Burson 

helped form the Shapiro Firm, which represented mortgagees in foreclosure actions in 

Maryland and Virginia. Burson was the Shapiro Firm’s managing partner. 

On December 12, 2001, this Court admitted McDowell to the Bar of Maryland. In 

2009 (for present purposes), McDowell began working for the Shapiro Firm.6

 Savage 

was McDowell’s supervisor. At Savage’s direction and over the relevant period of time, 

McDowell reviewed for accuracy trustee’s deeds and affidavits in approximately 900 

foreclosure actions and signed the trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf. The 

affidavits contained averments regarding facts that trial courts had already found (e.g., 

that the mortgagors were not serving in the military). McDowell had the legal knowledge 

that was reasonably necessary to review for accuracy the trustee’s deeds and affidavits. 

McDowell was conscientious in reviewing for accuracy the trustee’s deeds and affidavits; 

McDowell did not make any errors in doing so, and none of the trustee’s deeds were 

defective or challenged in court. McDowell believed (albeit mistakenly) that it was not 

improper to sign trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf. Burson neither 

 6

McDowell had previously worked for the Shapiro Firm from January 2002 

through September 2004. 
- 4 - 

ordered nor ratified McDowell’s conduct. 

At the Shapiro Firm, paralegals (who were also notaries public) notarized the 

trustee’s deeds and affidavits that McDowell had signed on Savage’s behalf. Although 

McDowell had signed the trustee’s deeds and affidavits outside the paralegals’ presence, 

the notary jurats stated that the trustee’s deeds and affidavits had been signed in the 

paralegals’ presence. Burson neither ordered nor ratified the paralegals’ conduct; at the 

hearing, Burson testified that he believed that the notarizations at the Shapiro Firm did 

not violate Virginia law.7

 

Sometime in or before 2010, two other lawyers at the Shapiro Firm signed each 

other’s names on foreclosure-related documents. Various circuit courts issued show 

cause orders regarding the lawyers’ signatures. 

In 2011, Burson learned that McDowell had signed trustee’s deeds and affidavits 

on Savage’s behalf outside the paralegals’ presence. Until then, Burson had made no 

efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 

that lawyers did not robo-sign documents and that paralegals did not falsely notarize 

documents. After learning that McDowell had signed trustee’s deeds and affidavits on 

 7

Va. Code Ann. § 55-118.3 (1970) states: 

The person taking an acknowledgment shall certify that: (1) The person 

acknowledging appeared before him and acknowledged he executed the 

instrument; and (2) The person acknowledging was known to the person 

taking the acknowledgment or that the person taking the acknowledgment 

had satisfactory evidence that the person acknowledging was the person 

described in and who executed the instrument. 

(Paragraph breaks omitted). 
- 5 - 

Savage’s behalf outside the paralegals’ presence, Burson made timely good faith efforts 

to rectify the misconduct’s consequences and to prevent future misconduct by ensuring 

that McDowell’s past signing of the trustee’s deeds on Savage’s behalf neither created 

any problems as to title nor necessitated that the trustee’s deeds be executed again, 

requiring all employees at the Shapiro Firm to promise in writing that they would neither 

sign others’ names nor allow others to sign their names, and requiring all notaries public 

at the Shapiro Firm to promise in writing that they would not violate laws regarding 

notarizations. 

Burson is respected for his integrity. As a result of the robo-signing at the Shapiro 

Firm, Burson was sued, received adverse media coverage, voluntarily stopped the active 

practice of law, and withdrew from the Shapiro Firm, which no longer bears his name. 

Burson and McDowell have never before received attorney discipline. In the 

matter before us, they lacked dishonest or selfish motives, were cooperative with Bar 

Counsel, and showed remorse. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 

judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of 

law. See Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Reno, 436 Md. 504, 508, 83 A.3d 781, 783 (2014) (“[T]his Court 

reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact[.]” (Citations omitted)); Md. R. 

16-759(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s 
- 6 - 

conclusions of law.”). This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence 

establishes that a lawyer violated the MLRPC. See Md. R. 16-757(b) (“The 

[Commission] has the burden of proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or 

remedial action] by clear and convincing evidence.”). 

DISCUSSION 

(A) Findings of Fact 

 Burson and McDowell state that they do not except to any of the hearing judge’s 

findings of fact.8

 The Commission excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, at the 

hearing, Burson testified that he believed that the notarizations at the Shapiro Firm did 

not violate Virginia law. 

We need not rule on the exception; as Burson’s counsel conceded at oral 

argument, the hearing judge’s other findings of fact establish that the notarizations at the 

Shapiro Firm were false, regardless of whether Burson believed that the notarizations at 

the Shapiro Firm did not violate Virginia law. Specifically, the hearing judge found that, 

although McDowell had signed the trustee’s deeds and affidavits outside the paralegals’ 

presence, the notary jurats stated that the trustee’s deeds and affidavits had been signed in 

 8

Although Burson does not label his allegation as an exception to the hearing 

judge’s findings of fact, Burson alleges that, before 2011, he orally forbade lawyers at the 

Shapiro Firm from robo-signing. Burson testified in support of this contention at the 

hearing, but Burson’s allegation does not appear in the hearing judge’s opinion; indeed, 

the hearing judge expressly found that, before Burson learned that McDowell had signed 

trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf, “Burson did not take any preventative 

action” and “took no measures to ensure that [robo-signing] did not” occur. To the extent 

that Burson’s allegation constitutes an exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, 

we overrule the exception because we “give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing 

judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.” Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B). 
- 7 - 

the paralegals’ presence. Although Va. Code Ann. § 55-118.3 permits a notary public to 

notarize a document that has been signed outside the notary public’s presence, Virginia 

law does not permit a notary public to falsely represent that a document has been signed 

in the notary public’s presence. 

(B) Conclusions of Law 

Burson does not except to any of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. 

Originally, McDowell did not except to any of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, 

but the Commission excepted to the hearing judge’s conclusion that McDowell had not 

violated MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation). Later, 

however, McDowell and the Commission filed in this Court a “Joint Petition for 

Reprimand by Consent” in which McDowell and the Commission agree that McDowell 

violated MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice). 

MLRPC 1.1 (Competence) 

“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 

representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 

reasonably necessary for the representation.” MLRPC 1.1. 

Here, the hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing 

evidence did not establish that Burson had violated MLRPC 1.1. Nothing in the hearing 

judge’s findings of fact indicates that Burson failed to provide competent representation 

to any client. 

The hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing evidence 

did not establish that McDowell had violated MLRPC 1.1. McDowell had the legal 
- 8 - 

knowledge that was reasonably necessary to review for accuracy trustee’s deeds and 

affidavits. McDowell was conscientious in reviewing for accuracy the trustee’s deeds

and affidavits, and McDowell did not make any errors in doing so. Although McDowell 

signed the trustee’s deeds on Savage’s behalf, none of the trustee’s deeds were defective

or challenged timely in court. 

MLRPC 8.4(b) (Criminal Act) 

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that 

reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 

respects[.]” MLRPC 8.4(b). 

It is a crime to “willfully make a false entry in a public record[.]” Md. Code Ann., 

Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“CR”) § 8-606(b)(1). Additionally, it is a crime to 

“willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact . . . in an affidavit 

required by any state, federal, or local law[.]” CR § 9-101(a)(2). 

Here, the hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing 

evidence did not establish that McDowell had violated MLRPC 8.4(b). Although 

McDowell signed trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf, none of the trustee’s 

deeds were defective, and the affidavits contained averments regarding facts that trial 

courts had already found; thus, the signatures did not render the trustee’s deeds and 

affidavits “false entr[ies]” under CR § 8-606(b)(1). Because the affidavits contained 

averments regarding facts that trial courts had already found, that McDowell signed the 

affidavits was obviously not “material” under CR § 9-101(a)(2) for purposes of 

determinations by trial courts. 
- 9 - 

8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation) 

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]” MLRPC 8.4(c). 

Here, we refrain from reviewing the hearing judge’s conclusion that McDowell 

had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c). As noted above, originally, the Commission had 

excepted to the hearing judge’s conclusion that McDowell had not violated MLRPC 

8.4(c); later, however, McDowell and the Commission filed in this Court the Joint 

Petition for Reprimand by Consent, which contains a stipulation that McDowell violated 

MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), but does 

not contain a stipulation that McDowell violated MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, 

Deceit, or Misrepresentation). At oral argument, Bar Counsel stated that the Commission 

had not officially withdrawn its exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c). Nonetheless, Bar Counsel made it clear that 

the Commission recommends that we reprimand McDowell based on his violation of 

MLRPC 8.4(d), regardless of any conclusion as to whether McDowell also violated 

MLRPC 8.4(c). At oral argument, McDowell’s counsel advised that he believed that the 

Commission had withdrawn its exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c).

Although we acknowledge the position that Bar Counsel took at oral argument, it 

is highly unlikely that McDowell would have conceded that he had violated MLRPC 

8.4(d) (which the hearing judge concluded that McDowell had not violated) had 

McDowell not believed that the Commission had withdrawn its exception to the hearing 
- 10 - 

judge’s conclusion that he had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c). For purposes of our review, 

we are satisfied that—by filing the Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent based only 

on a violation of MLRPC 8.4(d), regardless of the outcome of any exception to the 

hearing judge’s conclusion that McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c)—the 

Commission has essentially engaged in a de facto withdrawal of its exception to the 

hearing judge’s conclusion that McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c). Although 

this Court has the discretion to do so, “[o]rdinarily, we will not look for additional 

violations where [the Commission] filed no exceptions.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Geesing, 436 Md. 56, 63 n.6, 80 A.3d 718, 722 n.6 (2013) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 707, 73 A.3d 161, 174 

(2013)). For example, in Geesing, 436 Md. at 63 n.6, 80 A.3d at 722 n.6, and Dore, 433 

Md. at 707, 73 A.3d at 174, attorney discipline proceedings that involved robo-signing, 

this Court refrained from reviewing hearing judges’ conclusions that lawyers had not 

violated MLRPC 8.4(c) where the Commission did not except to the same. Consistent 

with Geesing and Dore, here, we refrain from reviewing the hearing judge’s conclusion 

that McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c). 

MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) 

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” MLRPC 8.4(d). Generally, a lawyer 

violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct negatively “impacts . . . the public’s 

perception . . . of the . . . legal profession.” Geesing, 436 Md. at 65, 80 A.3d at 723 

(quoting Dore, 433 Md. at 696, 73 A.3d at 167) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
- 11 - 

For example, in Geesing, 436 Md. at 65, 58, 80 A.3d at 723, 719, this Court held 

that a lawyer had violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by “negative[ly] impact[ing] . . . the public’s 

perception of the legal profession” where the lawyer had “authorized [staff members] . . . 

to sign his name on documents—including affidavits—in foreclosure filings[, and had] 

instructed the staff members (who were also notaries public) to notarize the affidavits, 

even though he had not signed them.” This Court noted that the robo-signing had, among 

other consequences, “caused significant media coverage” and “prompted certain 

mortgagors to file several lawsuits arising out of the robo-signing against” the lawyer and 

the law firm. Id. at 65, 80 A.3d at 723. 

Here, the hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing 

evidence did not establish that Burson had violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Burson did not 

participate in, or know of, the robo-signing at the Shapiro Firm. Thus, Burson’s conduct 

is distinguishable from that of the lawyer who participated in robo-signing in Geesing, id. 

at 58, 80 A.3d at 719. The sole basis for concluding that Burson violated MLRPC 8.4(d)

would be that he made no efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm had in effect measures 

giving reasonable assurance that lawyers did not robo-sign documents and that notaries 

public did not falsely notarize documents. Although, under some circumstances, a 

supervisor’s failure to take reasonable preventative measures may constitute a violation 

of MLRPC 8.4(d), here, the existence of this circumstance alone, where Burson was 

unaware of McDowell’s and the paralegals’ conduct, is insufficient to establish a 

violation of MLRC 8.4(d). 

Clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge’s 
- 12 - 

conclusion that McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Paramount to this 

conclusion, as noted above, is the circumstance that McDowell concedes that he violated 

MLRPC 8.4(d). McDowell signed trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf.

9

Once it became public knowledge, the robo-signing at the Shapiro Firm prompted 

adverse media coverage and a lawsuit against the Shapiro Firm. Cf. Geesing, 436 Md. at

65, 80 A.3d at 723 (This Court held that a lawyer had violated MLRPC 8.4(d) where the 

lawyer had participated in robo-signing that had “caused significant media coverage” and

“prompted certain mortgagors to file several lawsuits arising out of the robo-signing 

against” the lawyer and the law firm.). Thus, McDowell’s conduct negatively impacted

the public’s perception of the legal profession. 

MLRPC 5.1 (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers) 

 MLRPC 5.1 states: 

(a) A partner . . . shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [law] firm 

has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the 

[law] firm conform to the [MLRPC]. 

* * * 

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the 

[MLRPC] if: 

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, 

ratifies the conduct involved; or 

 9

Although McDowell did so at Savage’s direction, it is not a defense to a violation 

of the MLRPC “that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person[,]” MLRPC 

5.2(a), unless the lawyer “act[ed] in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable 

resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.” MLRPC 5.2(b). McDowell 

does not contend that it was reasonable for Savage to believe that it was not improper for 

one lawyer to sign trustee’s deeds and affidavits on another lawyer’s behalf. 
- 13 - 

(2) the lawyer is a partner . . . and knows of the conduct at a time 

when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 

reasonable remedial action. 

“Whether an employee’s ethical breaches are due to the employee’s sub-standard 

performance or the deliberate circumvention of standard procedures, proper supervision 

must include mechanisms to determine whether the delegated tasks are being performed.” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kimmel, 405 Md. 647, 682, 955 A.2d 269, 290 (2008) 

(footnote omitted). 

Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

Burson had violated MLRPC 5.1(a). Prior to Burson’s discovery of McDowell’s and 

Savage’s conduct, two other lawyers at the Shapiro Firm signed each other’s names on 

foreclosure-related documents and were the subjects of show cause orders in various 

circuit courts as a result of the practice. As the Shapiro Firm’s managing partner, Burson 

was aware that circuit courts issued show cause orders regarding the two lawyers’ signing 

of documents. The hearing judge found that, despite being aware of the “prior incident,” 

before learning that McDowell had signed trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s 

behalf, Burson made no efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm had in effect measures 

giving reasonable assurance that lawyers did not robo-sign documents. McDowell signed 

Savage’s name in approximately 900 cases. The existence of the show cause orders

involving allegedly improper signing of documents, coupled with the number of cases in 

which McDowell signed Savage’s name, leads to the conclusion that clear and 

convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s determination that Burson made no 
- 14 - 

efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 

that lawyers did not robo-sign documents. 

The hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing evidence 

did not establish that Burson was vicariously responsible for McDowell’s conduct under 

MLRPC 5.1(c).10 As discussed above, McDowell violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by signing 

trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf. However, Burson neither ordered nor 

ratified the signatures; and, after learning about the signatures, Burson took reasonable 

remedial action by ensuring that McDowell’s signing of the trustee’s deeds on Savage’s 

behalf neither created any problems as to title nor necessitated that the trustee’s deeds be 

executed again. Thus, it is readily apparent that Burson did not vicariously violate 

MLRPC 8.4(d) through McDowell’s conduct. 

MLRPC 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) 

MLRPC 5.3 states: 

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a 

lawyer: 

(a) a partner . . . shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [law] firm 

has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the [nonlawyer]’s 

conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; 

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [nonlawyer]’s conduct is 

compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer] that would be 

 10Under certain circumstances, MLRPC 5.1(c) makes one lawyer vicariously 

responsible for another lawyer’s violation of another MLRPC; thus, technically speaking, 

a lawyer cannot violate MLRPC 5.1(c) itself. 
- 15 - 

a violation of the [MLRPC] if engaged in by a lawyer if: 

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, 

ratifies the conduct involved; or 

(2) the lawyer is a partner . . . and knows of the conduct at a time 

when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 

reasonable remedial action[.] 

Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

Burson had violated MLRPC 5.3(a). Before learning that paralegals (who were also 

notaries public) had notarized trustee’s deeds and affidavits that had been signed outside 

the paralegals’ presence with notary jurats that stated that the trustee’s deeds and 

affidavits had been signed in the paralegals’ presence, Burson—the Shapiro Firm’s 

managing partner—made no efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm had in effect 

measures giving reasonable assurance that paralegals did not falsely notarize documents. 

Just as Burson violated MLRPC 5.1(a) by negligently failing to supervise lawyers, so too 

did Burson violate MLRPC 5.3(a) by negligently failing to supervise paralegals. 

 The hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing evidence 

did not establish that Burson had violated MLRPC 5.3(b). The hearing judge did not find 

that Burson directly supervised paralegals at the Shapiro Firm. 

 The hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing evidence 

did not establish that Burson was vicariously responsible for the paralegals’ conduct 

under MLRPC 5.3(c).11 At the Shapiro Firm, paralegals (who were also notaries public) 

 11Under certain circumstances, MLRPC 5.3(c) makes a lawyer vicariously 

responsible for a nonlawyer’s conduct that, if performed by lawyers, would constitute a 

(Continued...) 
- 16 - 

notarized trustee’s deeds and affidavits that had been signed outside the paralegals’ 

presence. The notary jurats stated that the trustee’s deeds and affidavits had been signed 

in the paralegals’ presence. Thus, the paralegals falsely notarized the trustee’s deeds and 

affidavits. Had the paralegals been lawyers, they would have violated MLRPC 8.4(c) 

(Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation) by falsely notarizing the trustee’s 

deeds and affidavits. Burson, however, neither ordered nor ratified the false 

notarizations; and, after learning about the false notarizations, Burson took reasonable 

remedial action by ensuring that the trustee’s deeds did not need to be executed again. 

Thus, Burson did not vicariously violate MLRPC 8.4(c) through the paralegals’ conduct. 

MLRPC 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC) 

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate . . . the” MLRPC. MLRPC 

8.4(a). 

Here, clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge’s 

conclusion that Burson had not violated MLRPC 8.4(a). As discussed above, Burson 

violated MLRPC 5.1(a) and 5.3(a). 

Clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge’s 

conclusion that McDowell had not violated MLRPC 8.4(a). As discussed above, 

McDowell violated MLRPC 8.4(d). 

 (C) Sanctions 

Burson recommends that we reprimand him; the Commission recommends that we 

 

violation of another MLRPC; thus, technically speaking, a lawyer cannot violate MLRPC 

5.3(c) itself. 
- 17 - 

suspend Burson from the practice of law in Maryland for thirty days. Originally, 

McDowell had recommended that we dismiss the charges against him, and the 

Commission had recommended that we reprimand McDowell; later, however, McDowell 

and the Commission filed in this Court the Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent,12 in 

which McDowell and the Commission recommend that we reprimand McDowell.13 

This Court sanctions a lawyer “not to punish the” lawyer, but instead “to protect 

the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession[.]” Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 269, 85 A.3d 264, 278 (2014) (citations omitted). This 

Court protects the public by: (1) “deterr[ing]” other lawyers from engaging in similar 

misconduct; and (2) suspending or disbarring a lawyer who is “unfit to continue” to 

practice law. Id. at 269, 85 A.3d at 278 (citation omitted). 

In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this Court 

considers: “(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual 

 12In filing the Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent, McDowell apparently 

abandoned his recommendation that we dismiss the charges against him. To the extent 

that the motion to dismiss remains before us, we deny the motion to dismiss. 

13In contending that we should reprimand them, Burson and McDowell point out 

that the Commission reprimanded Savage for “permitting the execution of documents in 

his name when not personally signed by him[.]” “A reprimand by the Commission does 

not constitute precedent, and thus does not bind this Court in subsequent attorney 

discipline proceedings.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Greenleaf, __ Md. __, __ A.3d 

__, Misc. Docket AG No. 2, Sept. Term, 2013, 2014 WL 1998712, at *9 n.18 (Md. May 

16, 2014). Simply put, this Court has no control over whether the Commission 

reprimands a lawyer. Thus, at oral argument, McDowell’s counsel raised a red herring in 

contending that imposing a sanction that is greater than a reprimand would be 

inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence. The Commission’s reprimand of Savage 

plays no role in our determination of the appropriate sanctions for Burson’s and 

McDowell’s misconduct. 
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injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or 

mitigating factors.” American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) at III.C.3.0 (1992) (paragraph breaks omitted).14

Aggravating factors include: (a) prior [attorney] disciplin[e]; (b) [a] 

dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple 

[violations of the MLRPC]; (e) bad faith obstruction of the [attorney] 

disciplin[e] proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with [the 

Maryland R]ules or orders of [this Court]; (f) submission of false evidence, 

false statements, or other deceptive practices during the [attorney] 

discipline[e proceeding]; (g) refusal to acknowledge [the] wrongful nature 

of [the mis]conduct; (h) vulnerability of [the] victim; (i) substantial 

experience in the practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution; 

[and] (k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled 

substances[.] 

ABA Standards at III.C.9.22 (paragraph breaks omitted). 

Mitigating factors include: (a) [the] absence of [] prior [attorney] 

disciplin[e]; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or 

emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort[s] to make restitution or to 

rectify consequences of [the] misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to [the 

Commission] or [a] cooperative attitude toward [the attorney discipline] 

proceeding[]; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or 

reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) [a] mental disability or chemical 

dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse [where]: (1) there is 

medical evidence that the [lawyer] is affected by a chemical dependency or 

mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused 

the misconduct; (3) the [lawyer]’s recovery from the chemical dependency 

or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period 

of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct 

and recurrence of [the] misconduct is unlikely[;] (j) delay in [the attorney] 

disciplin[e] proceeding[]; (k) [the] imposition of other penalties or 

sanctions; (l) remorse; [and] (m) remoteness of prior [violations of the 

MLRPC]. 

 14“[I]n determining an appropriate sanction,” this Court often considers the ABA 

Standards. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 45, 85 A.3d 117, 143 

(2014) (citation omitted). 
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ABA Standards at III.C.9.32 (paragraph breaks omitted). 

Appropriate Sanction for Burson’s Misconduct 

As to the duty violated, Burson violated MLRPC 5.1(a) (Responsibilities of 

Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers) by making no efforts to ensure that the 

Shapiro Firm had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that lawyers did not 

robo-sign documents; additionally, Burson violated MLRPC 5.3(a) (Responsibilities 

Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) by making no efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm 

had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that paralegals did not falsely notarize 

documents. Burson’s mental state was one of negligence, “[t]he least culpable mental 

state[,]” ABA Standards at II; Burson knew neither that McDowell was signing trustee’s 

deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf, nor that paralegals were falsely notarizing 

documents. Moreover, on this record, we do not conclude that Burson blinded himself 

willfully to what was occurring. 

Burson’s neglect of his managerial duties did not cause any tangible injury; none 

of the trustee’s deeds were defective or challenged timely in court. We note only one 

aggravating factor, namely, Burson’s substantial experience in the practice of law; 

Burson has been a member of the Bar of Maryland for approximately twenty-nine years. 

We note seven mitigating factors: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the 

absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) timely good faith efforts to rectify the 

misconduct’s consequences and to prevent future misconduct by ensuring that 

McDowell’s signing of the trustee’s deeds on Savage’s behalf neither created any 

problems as to title nor necessitated that the trustee’s deeds be executed again, requiring 
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all employees at the Shapiro Firm to promise in writing that they would neither sign 

others’ names nor allow others to sign their names, and requiring all notaries public at the 

Shapiro Firm to promise in writing that they would not violate laws regarding 

notarizations; (4) a cooperative attitude toward this attorney discipline proceeding; (5) 

character, as Burson is respected for his integrity; (6) other penalties in the form of being 

sued, receiving adverse media coverage, voluntarily stopping the active practice of law, 

and withdrawing from the Shapiro Firm, which no longer bears Burson’s name; and (7) 

remorse. 

We agree with Burson that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction for his 

misconduct. Although Burson made no efforts to ensure that the Shapiro Firm had in 

effect measures giving reasonable assurance that lawyers did not robo-sign documents 

and that notaries public did not falsely notarize documents, Burson did not participate in 

(or even know of) the robo-signing and false notarizations; thus, Burson’s misconduct 

was negligent rather than knowing or intentional. Burson’s misconduct is aggravated 

only by substantial experience in the practice of law, and is mitigated by a myriad of 

significant factors, such as his voluntary cessation of the active practice of law. 

We agree with Burson and the Commission that Burson’s misconduct is 

distinguishable from that of the lawyer in Dore, 433 Md. at 727, 689, 707, 708-09, 73 

A.3d at 186, 163, 174, 175, in which this Court suspended from the practice of law in

Maryland for ninety days a lawyer who had robo-signed documents, violated MLRPC 

3.3(a)(1) (Making or Failing to Correct a False Statement to a Tribunal), and violated 

MLRPC 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) through intentional 
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misconduct. By contrast, here, Burson did not robo-sign documents, did not violate 

MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), and violated MLRPC 5.3(a) through negligence rather than intentional 

misconduct. 

Similarly, we agree with Burson and the Commission that Burson’s misconduct is 

distinguishable from that of the lawyers in Kimmel, 405 Md. at 689, 672, 955 A.2d at

294, 284, in which this Court indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in 

Maryland, with the right to apply for reinstatement no sooner than ninety days, lawyers 

who had violated MLRPC 5.1 (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory 

Lawyers) and 1.4 (Communication). The lawyers, partners at a law firm, see id. at 651, 

955 A.2d at 271, “failed to design and implement policies and procedures that reasonably 

would ensure [the lawyers’ subordinate’s] compliance with the Maryland Rules[.]” Id. at 

680, 955 A.2d at 289. This Court stated that the lawyers’ misconduct caused “egregious” 

injury to the law firm’s clients. Id. at 685, 955 A.2d at 292 (citation omitted). This Court 

noted no aggravating factors and noted two mitigating factors: (1) the absence of prior 

attorney discipline; and (2) timely good faith efforts to rectify the misconduct’s 

consequences. See id. at 687-88, 955 A.2d at 293-94. In contrast to the misconduct of 

the lawyers in Kimmel, here, Burson’s misconduct caused no tangible injury and is 

mitigated by a myriad of significant factors. 

We are unpersuaded by the Commission’s reliance on Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Goldberg, 292 Md. 650, 658, 441 A.2d 338, 342 (1982), in which this Court 

suspended for thirty days from the practice of law in Maryland a lawyer who had failed to 

“adequately supervise his employee.” In Goldberg, id. at 652, 441 A.2d at 339, the 
- 22 - 

employee “failed to prepare” certain documents and deposit checks from clients. The 

lawyer failed “to make inquiry [of the employee] when [certain] matters did not cross his 

desk for his signature.” Id. at 658, 441 A.2d at 342. Additionally, the lawyer failed to 

take “the simple precaution of running his eye over bank statements at the end of the 

month.” Id. at 656, 441 A.2d at 341. This Court found no aggravating factors and three 

mitigating factors: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) timely good faith 

efforts to prevent future misconduct; and (3) character. Id. at 658, 441 A.2d at 342. 

Although this Court noted that “there appear[ed] to have been no actual loss to [the 

lawyer’s] clients[,]” the Court suspended the lawyer for thirty days. Id. at 658, 441 A.2d 

at 342. In contrast to Goldberg, here, McDowell’s and the paralegals’ actions (i.e., robosigning and false notarizations) were not as glaring or as easily noticed as the employee’s 

failure to prepare documents and deposit checks in Goldberg; in other words, Burson’s 

failure to adequately supervise McDowell and the paralegals was less egregious than the 

lawyer’s failure to adequately supervise the employee in Goldberg. Additionally,

Burson’s misconduct is mitigated by a number of significant factors, including his 

voluntary cessation of the practice of law. 

To be clear, we caution partners—and lawyers who “possess[] comparable 

managerial authority[,]” MLRPC 5.1(a); MLRPC 5.3(a)—that our decision to reprimand 

Burson is based on this attorney discipline proceeding’s unique circumstances. Under 

other circumstances, this Court would suspend a lawyer who violates MLRPC 5.1(a), see 

Kimmel, 405 Md. at 689, 680, 955 A.2d at 294, 289, or MLRPC 5.3(a). See Dore, 433 

Md. at 727, 708, 73 A.3d at 186, 175. We recommend that partners and lawyers who 
- 23 - 

possess comparable managerial authority at law firms that represent mortgagees in 

foreclosure actions consider how to avoid Burson’s situation and ensure that their firms 

have in effect measures that will assure that the conduct of their subordinates is consistent 

with the professional obligations of the supervising lawyer. 

For the above reasons, we reprimand Burson. 

Appropriate Sanction for McDowell’s Misconduct 

In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Paul, 423 Md. 268, 293, 289, 274, 31 A.3d 512, 

527, 525, 516 (2011), this Court reprimanded a lawyer who violated MLRPC 8.4(d) 

(Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) and 3.3(a) (Candor Toward 

the Tribunal) by filing in a trial court a document onto which the lawyer had cut-andpasted another person’s signature without the other person’s knowledge. As to the 

lawyer’s mental state, this Court noted that the lawyer “honestly believed that he was 

legally authorized to” cut-and-paste the other person’s signature. Id. at 292, 31 A.3d at 

527. This Court noted that the lawyer’s misconduct “was not detrimental to his 

clients[.]” Id. at 292, 31 A.3d at 527. This Court did not note any aggravating factors, 

and noted six mitigating factors: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the 

absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) timely good faith efforts to prevent future 

misconduct; (4) character; (5) remorse; and (6) another penalty in the form of the 

lawyer’s losing his job. See id. at 292-93, 31 A.3d at 527. 

Here, as to the duty violated, McDowell violated 8.4(d) (Conduct That is 

Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) by signing trustee’s deeds and affidavits on 

Savage’s behalf. As to McDowell’s mental state, McDowell signed trustee’s deeds and 
- 24 - 

affidavits on Savage’s behalf because Savage told McDowell to do so;15 McDowell 

believed (albeit mistakenly) that doing so was not improper. As to the potential or actual 

injury that McDowell’s misconduct caused, McDowell’s misconduct tarnished the 

public’s perception of the legal profession, but did not cause any tangible injury; none of

the trustee’s deeds were defective or challenged in court. We note two aggravating 

factors: a pattern of misconduct and multiple violations of the MLRPC, as demonstrated 

by McDowell’s signing trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf in 

approximately 900 foreclosure actions. We note four mitigating factors: (1) the absence 

of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a 

cooperative attitude toward this attorney discipline proceeding; and (4) remorse. 

We agree with McDowell and the Commission that a reprimand is the appropriate 

sanction for McDowell’s misconduct. Although McDowell signed trustee’s deeds and 

affidavits on Savage’s behalf, McDowell had a relatively blameless mental state in doing 

so, as McDowell did so at Savage’s direction and believed that doing so was not 

improper. Although McDowell’s misconduct is aggravated by a pattern of misconduct 

 15As noted above, generally, it is not a defense to a violation of the MLRPC “that 

the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.” MLRPC 5.2(a). That said, in 

determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this Court considers “the 

lawyer’s mental state[.]” ABA Standards at III.C.3.0. Thus, a lawyer who engages in 

misconduct at another’s direction might receive a lesser sanction than a lawyer who 

engages in misconduct on the lawyer’s own initiative. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 

v. Sudha Narasimhan, __ Md. __, __ A.3d __, Misc. Docket AG No. 77, Sept. Term, 

2012, 2014 WL 2154057, at *8 n.9 (Md. May 23, 2014) (“[T]o the extent that [another 

lawyer]’s conduct played a role in [a lawyer’s] violation [of an MLRPC], such a fact 

could be considered in determining the appropriate sanction, but would not affect 

whether or not [the lawyer] violated a particular MLRPC.”). 
- 25 - 

and multiple violations of the MLRPC, McDowell’s misconduct is mitigated by the 

absence of prior attorney discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, a 

cooperative attitude toward this attorney discipline proceeding, and sincere remorse. 

Under rare circumstances, a reprimand may be the appropriate sanction for a violation of

MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice). See Paul, 

423 Md. at 293, 289, 31 A.3d at 527, 525. 

We agree with McDowell that his misconduct is distinguishable from that of the 

lawyer in Dore, 433 Md. at 727, 717, 710, 73 A.3d at 186, 180, 176, in which this Court 

suspended from the practice of law in Maryland for ninety days a lawyer who had robosigned documents on his own initiative, violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) (Making or Failing to 

Correct a False Statement to a Tribunal), violated MLRPC 5.3(a) (Responsibilities 

Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), and negatively impacted the courts’ operation. By 

contrast, here, McDowell signed trustee’s deeds and affidavits on Savage’s behalf at 

Savage’s direction, did not violate MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), did not violate MLRPC 5.3(a), and 

did not negatively impact the courts’ operation. 

For the above reasons, we reprimand McDowell and grant the Joint Petition for 

Reprimand by Consent.

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENTS SHALL 

PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK 

OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 

TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND 

RULE 16-761(b), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT 

IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 

GRIEVANCE COMMISSION JOINTLY AND 

SEVERALLY AGAINST MATTHEW JOHN 

MCDOWELL AND JOHN STEPHEN BURSON.