Implementing Joint Vision 2010

A Revolution in Military Affairs

for Strategic Air Campaigns

CHRISTOPHER G. WARNER, Lt Col, USAF

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1999
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Warner, Christopher G., 1954–

Implementing Joint Vision 2010 : a revolution in military affairs for strategic air

campaigns / Christopher G. Warner.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. United States. Air Force. 2. United States. Air Force—Operational readiness. 3.

Air warfare. I. Title.

UG633 W325 1999

358.4’03’0973—dc21 99-14427

CIP 

ii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

About Revolutions in Military Affairs

 and Disproportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2 DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR

CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . 8

Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . 10

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR

STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR

STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Operational Concepts for Offensive

 Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Operational Concepts for Global-Mobility

 Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

iii
Chapter Page

5 TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR

CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Technology for Offensive Strategic

 Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Technology for Global-Mobility Strategic

 Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Appendix

A The Theory of Low-Observable Technology

and Penetrator Aircraft Design . . . . . . . . . . 33

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Illustrations

Figure

1 Joint and Service Vision Progression to

Core Competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 Core Competencies Merge to Form Strategic

Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3 Strategic Air Campaigns Applied Disproportionally

Result in an RMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4 Notional Detection Signature of a Typical

Aircraft Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

5 Readily Detectable Characteristics of a

Typical Combat Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

iv
Figure Page

 6 Variations in RCS with Angle . . . . . . . . . . . 38

 7 All-Azimuth Plot of an Aircraft RCS . . . . . . . . 39

 8 Three-Dimensional Viewing Angle Aspects

and Geometries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 9 Evolution of the RCS Concept . . . . . . . . . . . 41

10 Radar Wave Scattering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

11 Specular Radar Scattering . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

12 Radar Wave Diffraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

13 Surface Traveling Waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

14 Two-Sided Corner Reflector on an Aircraft . . . . 47

15 Radar Reflection of a Conventional

Aircraft Planform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

16 Radar Reflections from Aircraft Planform

with Increased Wing Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

17 Radar Reflection from an Aircraft Planform

with a Curved and Swept Leading Edge . . . . . . 53

18 Radar Reflection from an Aircraft Planform

with a Highly Swept Straight Leading Edge . . . . 54

19 Radar Reflection from an Aircraft Planform

with a Highly Swept Leading Edge and a

Curved Trailing Edge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

20 Basic Aircraft Fuselage Section . . . . . . . . . . 56

21 Aircraft Fuselage with Symmetrical Chine . . . . 56

22 Aircraft with Chine and Fuselage Blended . . . . 57

v
Figure Page

23 LO Aircraft Design with Fuselage and

Wing Shaping Applied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

24 Circuit-Analog Absorber Patterns . . . . . . . . . 61

25 Frequency Selective Surface Geometries . . . . . 63

26 Paint Reflectance Concept Examples . . . . . . . 67

27 Contrails as a Detection Factor . . . . . . . . . . 70

Table

 1 Radar Frequency Bands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 2 Radar Frequency Bands and Common Uses . . . 37

 3 Relationship between RCS Measurements

of Decibel Square Meters and Area

Square Meters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 4 Typical Radar Frequencies, Applications,

and Wavelengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

 5 Luminous Reflectance of Typical

Terrain/Background Materials . . . . . . . . . . 68

 6 Minimum Altitude for Ground-Shadow

Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

vi
About the Author

Col Christopher G. “Jake” Warner is the director of Doctrine

Applications, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center,

Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. He received a

Bachelor of Science degree in physics in 1976 from the

University of Southwestern Louisiana and a commission from

AFROTC. He also earned a Masters in Management degree

from Embry–Riddle University in 1988.

His initial assignment was to undergraduate pilot training,

Class 97-02, at Vance AFB, Oklahoma. Graduating as a

fighter-recommended pilot, he trained as an OV-10A pilot and

forward air controller (FAC). Assigned in 1979 to 704th

Tactical Air Support Squadron at Sembach Air Base,

Germany, he served as a flight lead and instructor pilot and

was named the Seventeenth Air Force FAC of the year. In

1982 he returned to the United States and completed training

in the F-15 as a distinguished graduate. He served in the 27th

Tactical Fighter Squadron and as the 1st Tactical Fighter

Wing’s assistant director of training.

After completing training as a B-52 aircraft commander and

a distinguished graduate, he was assigned in 1984 to Griffis

AFB, New York. He served as a flight lead in the 668th

Bombardment Squadron and as wing tactics officer and

tactics branch chief in the 416th Bomb Wing.

In 1987 he was assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air

Command (SAC), Omaha, Nebraska, where he served as a

bomber-tactics developer and project officer for the first US Air

Force (USAF) Bomber Weapons School. Assigned double duty

as SAC’s command-sponsored research fellow and as a

full-time Air Command and Staff College residence student in

1989 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, he finished as a distinguished

graduate and completed research on his low-observable

penetrator employment.

After graduation in 1990, he was selected as a tactics

developer at the new 99th Strategic Weapons Wing, Ellsworth

AFB, South Dakota. He was assigned duties as the SAC

vii
Tactics School bomber flight commander and 25th Tactics

Training Squadron operations officer and was requalified as a

B-52 instructor and evaluation pilot.

In 1993 he was selected as the first commander of the 99th

Operations Support Squadron and later as commander of the

25th Training Squadron where his unit provided

tactical-employment academic and flight training to all USAF

B-52 and B-1 instructors.

After completing his squadron closure, he was assigned in

July 1994 to the Joint Staff/J-7 at the Pentagon, Washington,

D.C., where he served as a strategic planner developing the

Joint Training System, Joint Vision 2010, and the Joint

Simulation System. Selected for Air War College attendance,

he graduated in 1997 and was selected as executive officer in

the new Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center and moved to

his current position in May 1998.

Colonel Warner is a command pilot with more than 2,300

hours in the OV-10, F-15, and OH-58 aircraft. His decorations

include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Force

Meritorious Medal (two Oak Leaf Clusters), and the Air Force

Commendation Medal (two Oak Leaf Clusters). He is married

to the former Ann Louise McMahon of Lake Charles,

Louisiana, and they have three children, Matthew, Stephen,

and Katherine.

viii
Preface

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has a

requirement to provide his vision and guidance to the unified

commanders and services to meet the national military

strategy. Gen John Shalikashvili has met this responsibility

with his Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010). JV2010 is the conceptual

template for how the military services should develop and

merge United States (US) resources, war-fighting skills, and

new technologies to achieve higher levels of joint war-fighting

effectiveness. An implementation strategy is key to realizing

the impact of JV2010. Such a strategy is a process in which

future war-fighting operational concepts are developed into

fielded war-fighting capabilities.

JV2010 implementation has begun, with the Joint

Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe, Virginia, coordinating the

effort among the combatant commanders, services, and the

supporting battle laboratories. The United States Air Force

(USAF), along with the other military services, will play a

major role in implementing JV2010 as well as developing and

implementing its own service vision, Global Engagement. This

process begins with the broad JV2010 concepts and continues

into service concepts that are expanded, tested, and fielded in

JV2010 as joint and service core competencies, operational

doctrine, and capabilities.

Using the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff’s JV2010

operational concepts and the USAF’s Global Engagement’s

core competencies for guidance, I will propose a concept for a

2010 strategic air campaign. I will describe how the campaign

will impact our national resources, improve our war-fighting

skills, and require new technologies. This concept is described

in four structural parts: doctrine, operational concepts,

organizational structures, and technology. I will conclude with

a discussion of how such an air campaign is also a potential

revolution in military affairs.

Of some interest—a revelation perceived during my research —

is the strategic impact of the United States’s national resources

ix
in comparison with those of potential adversaries around the

world. I expected to find that operational doctrine and

technology would be the keys to a revolution in military

affairs. I was surprised to discover that the ability to maintain

approximate levels of national investment and military

funding in research, development, and operational tempo is

the true key, when teamed with evolving doctrine and

technology, to a revolution in military technology (RMA) with

the United States at the lead. This ability to maintain national

investment in a capable military and in research and

development, while the other world-power centers continue to

reduce their spending, is termed disproportionality, the true

key to a US-led RMA.

x
Acknowledgments

This project was based on a long-term personal interest in

airpower doctrine, history, strategy, and new technology. The

synergy of these interests, brought into focus by a tour on the

Joint Staff while working the chairman’s JV2010, combined

with the airpower strategy, doctrine, and history studies from

the Air War College core curriculum and electives, has

enabled and energized me to assemble these thoughts.

I would like to acknowledge the contributions of several

people whose efforts played a significant role helping me

complete this research project. The list is long since this

project has been in varying stages of development since 1989.

Special thanks go to Maj Gen John Borling, who provided the

early support to begin the project, and Lt Col Joe Bowden, Lt

Col Don Bryant, Col Lou Buckner, Col Al Dunlap, Lt Col Mike

Gentry, Col “Scotty” Scott, and Lt Col Paul Thomasson for

their direction, support, guidance, and covering for me when I

was needed elsewhere. Dr. Glenn Morton, Lt Col Mannie

Koczur, Tom Lobenstein, Gladys Peavey, and members of the

Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education staff helped me begin my thesis and researchingskill development and performed yeoman’s duty with an

excellent editing of my convoluted thoughts. Dr. David Blair,

Dr. Lawrence Grinter, and Dr. Jim Mowbray provided expert

academic advice, terrific knowledge, and encouragement. Dr.

Dave Sorensen, empowered by much patience, guided my

thinking and research, continually pulling me back to reality,

and challenging me to continue the academic development of

the strategic air campaign concept. Lt Gen John Sams

expanded my concept of the strategic air campaign to include

global air mobility. My greatest thanks and love go to my wife,

Ann, and my children, Matthew, Stephen, and Katherine, for

their unselfish support and sacrifices so I could devote myself

to this project and to an exciting and successful year at the

Air War College.

xi
Abstract

Implementation of the CJCS’s Joint Vision 2010 and the

United States Air Force’s Global Engagement will lead to a

strategic air campaign revolution in military affairs. The

strategic air campaign of 2010 is one in which national

military power is used to achieve national objectives across

the spectrum of conflict. A strategic air campaign can perform

worldwide mobility to deter aggression or win battles and wars

with application of combat power. These future air campaigns

should achieve strategic objectives that prevent crisis

escalation, enhance deterrence, or support other nonmilitary

national objectives with timely delivery of logistical resources

and people worldwide. The synthesis of today’s airpower

doctrine; tomorrow’s dominant battle-space knowledge;

JV2010 operational-concepts development; rapid and effective

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; high-penetration, low-observable aircraft employing

precision weapons, rapidly, disproportionately, and against

parallel target sets; and strategic airlift providing critical

resources and supporting worldwide mobility will give the joint

force commander and the US military significant long-range

strategic airpower capabilities to achieve national security

objectives. As we complete this synthesis, the United States

will experience a strategic air campaign revolution in military

affairs.

xiii
Chapter 1

Introduction

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a

joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential

today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint

Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for

the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and

uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service

and Unified Command visions.

—John M. Shalikashvili 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Our national security strategy’s first goal is to enhance US

security with military forces that are ready to fight. 1 Ensuring

our military forces’ readiness is a prime responsibility of the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). As the nation’s

senior military leader and advisor to the National Command

Authorities (NCA), he provides vision and guidance to the services and the regional and functional commands to achieve

the national military strategy. The CJCS recently met this

responsibility with his Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010). JV2010 is

the conceptual template for how the military should develop

and merge our resources, war-fighting skills, and new tech -

nologies to achieve higher levels of joint war-fighting effective -

ness.2 JV2010 is the lead joint effort that prepares the path for

development of the service visions.

While JV2010 is remarkable for its operational concepts, it

is not intended to be the single, definitive source. The JV2010

implementation process proposes that the services have the

primary responsibility to develop the operational capabilities,

service doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and tech -

nologies to achieve the chairman’s broad operational concepts.

Along this path to producing these new service core competen -

cies, the associated joint doctrine and employment development must also proceed. The result will be new operational

capabilities that a joint force commander (JFC) can call for

from the service components to provide effectively and effi -

1
ciently in the joint environment to win wars, support growing

democracies, or prevent humanitarian crises from developing

into military conflicts.

The CJCS seeks to implement JV2010 by providing broad

guidance to the services and to regional and functional com -

manders in chief when they are developing their long-term

investment and modernization plans. The JV2010 implemen -

tation strategy is a process in which future war-fighting opera -

tional concepts are developed into fielded war-fighting capa -

bilities. These operational concepts should lead to doctrine

refinements, operational plans, new war-fighting organiza -

tions, and weapons-system development via statements of

need, operational-requirements documents, and even system

specifications.3 While JV2010 speaks to new capabilities

across the service core competencies, this project will focus on

the air component. Using the CJCS JV2010 operational con -

cepts for guidance, the author will describe a 2010 strategic

air campaign employing low-observable penetrating aircraft,

precision-guided munitions, and global airlift mobility assets.

As the chairman has led with his vision, the services are

now taking the next step. The United States Air Force (USAF)

is contributing to our long-range view of decisive application of

national power through war fighting, critical resource delivery,

and information dominance. The USAF describes the following

contributions as its six core competencies: rapid global mobility, precision engagement, global attack, air and space superiority, information superiority, and agile combat support. 4

As part of our nation’s armed forces, the USAF’s primary

task is first to deter and then to fight and win our nation’s

wars if deterrence fails. The fundamental strategic concept to

accomplish this task is power projection. 5 Effective US powerprojection capabilities must span the spectrum of conflict. At

the low level of conflict, these 2010 capabilities should include

peacetime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to

prepare for future threats, to anticipate crises around the

world, and to be able to surgically apply logistical support

and/or firepower in a third world conflict. US national capa -

bilities must also span to a major regional conflict or theater

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

2
war in which the strategic air campaign is a primary means to

project combat power and resources.

Air campaign planners and employers have traditionally

viewed strategic airpower as sky-filled bombing and air superiority battles that win world wars. Today’s and tomorrow’s

strategic air campaigns will have increasing applicability for

attaining strategic, war-winning, and decisive goals across the

spectrum of conflicts described previously. Airpower offers

speed, range, freedom of maneuver, and perspective. 6 Airpower can be massive or surgical by providing time-sensitive

options, capturing and disseminating crucial intelligence, delivering critical resources, or striking time-sensitive targets

accurately—all with rapid global reach. This ability is increasingly important in a world with few overseas forward-basing

opportunities, decreasing logistical support infrastructure,

and strategic mobility limitations of powerful heavy ground

forces.7

The USAF should continue developing the strategic air campaign, within the broad guidance of JV2010 and Global Engagement, to support the national military strategy. Developing this strategic air campaign concept depends on a reasoned

Figure 1. Joint and Service Vision Progression to Core Competencies

INTRODUCTION

3
look at four primary factors: doctrine, operational concepts,

organizational structures, and technology. 8 This paper will fo -

cus on these factors for future strategic air campaigns using

airlift and refueling, low-observable (LO) aircraft, and precisio n -

guided-munitions technologies. The discussion will examine

whether these technologies are underwriting a potential “revo -

lution in military affairs.” This revolution in military affairs

(RMA) potential rests on the USAF’s ability to develop JV2010

operational concepts with detailed requirements and system

specifications and the USAF’s ability to produce a decisive

military capability for the JFC and the NCA. 9

About Revolutions in Military Affairs

and Disproportionality

Historically, an RMA occurs when the incorporation of new

technologies into military systems combines with innovative

operational concepts and organizational adaptations to

fundamentally alter the charter and conduct of military

operations.

—William J. Perry, PhD

Stanford University 

The RMA concept is based on a complementing structure of

doctrine, operational capabilities, organizational structure,

and technology. 1 0 While discussion of a potential RMA usually

focuses on the new, exciting technology, the doctrine, opera -

tional capabilities, and organizational structures are the true

keys to turning cutting edge combat power and weapons into

a true revolution. Col Jeffrey Barnett, in his Future War, An

Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010, provides a his -

torical example supporting this point.

The French and German employment of tank technology at

the beginning of World War II was quite different and ultimately decisive. The Germans developed and tested the opera -

tional capability of the blitzkrieg doctrine and the panzer division organizational structure in Poland in 1939. The results

were used very effectively against the French and the Russian

armies when the Germans swept across vast territories and

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

4
achieved quick victories. The French, on the other hand,

added the new tank technology to their existing structure and

doctrine with less satisfying results.

It would be difficult to realize a strategic air campaign RMA

by simply adding stealth, precision munitions, and globalmobility technologies over existing doctrine, operational capa -

bilities, and organizations. The result would be evolutionary

progression, not revolution. The true path to an RMA is usually blocked by well-intentioned but entrenched bureaucracies

and organizational structures whose own inertia and desire

for self-protection and comfort slows the journey. A significant

discontinuity between technology and its employment can be

the catalyst that advances the progression to a revolutionary

state. That catalyst for the strategic air campaign of 2010 is

disproportionality.

The lack of a peer competitor today places the United States

in the enviable position of unquestioned military superiority

worldwide. Examining the defense budget expenditures of

other countries also supports this fact. The US military spending greatly exceeds that of any other potential future peer

competitor and also is greater than the next eight countries’

defense budgets combined. 1 1 This resource advantage not only

supports military superiority today, but will support orders-ofmagnitude greater research and development funding in the

future. The United States cannot only overwhelm any adver -

sary with disproportional combat power in the field, but it also

has the ability to maintain and expand its technology lead into

the future.

Competing European powers have waged economic and

military warfare against each other since the discovery of the

New World. England, France, Germany, and Russia battled as

the peer competitors at first. The nineteenth century added

the United States as a global competitor. Today the end of

World War II and especially the end of the cold war in 1991

has left the United States as the single remaining superpower.

While this status will eventually change, for the near future

the United States has the economic and military power advantages that, in concert, permit the disproportional application

of national power globally. Disproportionality, tied with the

INTRODUCTION

5
synergy of doctrine, operational capabilities, organizational

structures, and technology, has the potential to produce a

strategic air campaign in 2010.

Notes

1. President William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement” (Washington, D.C.: The White House,

February 1996), i.

2. Gen John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint

Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman, July 1996), 1.

3. Robert Holzer, “One on One, An Interview with General Joseph

Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Defense News, The

Worldwide Weekly 11, no. 38 (Springfield, Va.: 23–29 September 1996): 46.

4. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the USAF, and Gen Ronald R.

Fogleman, chief of staff, USAF, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st

Century Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, November 1996).

5. Shalikashvili, 4.

6. Briefing, Headquarters USAF/XO Maj Gen Charles Link, subject:

Airpower, An Airman’s Perspective, 7 November 1995.

7. Jeffrey Record, “Force Projection/Crisis Response,” Turning Point: The

Gulf War and US Military Strategy, ed. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J.

Mazarr (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 37–60.

8. Col Jeffrey R. Barnett, USAF, Future War: An Assessment of

Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 (Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: Air

University Press, January 1996), xx.

9. Allan R. Millett, “Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar

Period,” Innovation in the Interwar Period (Washington, D.C.: Office of Net

Assessment, The Pentagon, June 1994), 621–22; and Adm William A.

Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Introduction,” Dominant

Battlespace Knowledge (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University,

October 1995).

10. Barnett, 14.

11 . The Military Balance 1994–1995 (London: The International Institute

of Strategic Studies, Brassey’s, 1994).

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

6
Chapter 2

Doctrine for Strategic Air Campaigns

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the

central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory.

Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge

reinforced by experience, which lays the pattern of the

utilization of men, equipment and tactics. It is the building

material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay

Airpower pioneers such as Giulio Douhet, William “Billy”

Mitchell, Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold, Ira Clarence Eaker, and

John Warden have long espoused the doctrine that aircraft

can overfly two-dimensional obstacles. Their doctrine stated

that airpower would overcome the enemy’s air defenses, strike

directly at vital centers in the enemy’s heartland, and accom -

plish strategic, war-winning objectives. 1 Prior to Desert Storm,

proving this airpower doctrine correct had been difficult and

costly. Historical evidence from World War II shows—through

high-altitude, unescorted US daylight bomber raids against

Germany (1942–44)—that a robust air defense can prove a

formidable threat to bomber aircraft and the validity of a stra -

tegic air campaign. The German air defenses inflicted signifi -

cant losses on US offensive airpower and forced the United

States to make operational structure changes. In spite of these

operational setbacks, the basic strategy was proved sound—

that Allied airpower was decisive in Germany and Japan during World War II. 2

The decisiveness of the strategic air campaigns against Ger -

many and Japan was significant enough to support the formation of a separate air force distinct from and equal to the Army

and Navy as a separate service. Since the end of World War II

and the onset of nuclear deterrence, the development of air -

power doctrine has stagnated.3 Until the Persian Gulf War,

AirLand Battle had been the primary focus of USAF conven -

tional doctrine, and some identified this operational concept

as the basic airpower doctrine rather than as an operational7
doctrine concept. This operational concept, while effective at

supporting ground forces, limits the strategic air campaign’s

fundamental breadth, depth, timeliness, scope, and ability to

impact national objectives. The strategic air campaign doc -

trine of JV2010 must emerge from the limitations of AirLand

Battle thinking. A first step was provided by the strategic air

campaign’s decisive success of Desert Storm.4

As any employer of combat airpower learns, knowing one’s

own capabilities is as important as knowing the enemy’s. The

doctrinal concepts we value today are being linked to the

operational concepts and organizational structures for

JV2010. Today’s weapons systems and technological capabilities will be phased out and replaced eventually. Our challenge

is to link new technologies with our doctrine, operational con -

cepts, and organizations. How we fight tomorrow depends on

how we think today. 5

Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns

Strategic air doctrine for JV2010 is a distillation of the timeless concepts of our airpower pioneers. Today, that doctrine

says that speed, range, freedom of maneuver, and perspective

Figure 2. Core Competencies Merge to Form Strategic Air Campaigns

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

8
can employ national power globally via critical logistics or

precision-weapons delivery. 6 US vital national interests will

require the USAF to operate at long distances from the continental United States (CONUS) and the few available theater

bases. The long-range staging may continue for weeks or

months until sufficient theater forces can be bedded down.7

JV2010 airpower will deliver disproportionately very large

numbers of highly accurate weapons against the most critical

and parallel enemy target sets in a rapid or near-simultaneous

time frame. The resulting direct physical destruction and psychological shock will synergistically destroy the adversary’s

war-making abilities and reduce him to sufficiently marginal

levels that follow-up operations will easily complete the overall

military campaign’s goals. The indirect nature of such an air

attack may produce long-lasting changes to the enemy’s warfighting and material production plans. These may be altered

to divert forces and war production away from offensive victory

initiatives towards increased air defense requirements. 8 The

ferocity, rapidity, destructiveness, and disproportionality of attacks against parallel target sets by a US-led strategic air

campaign, to the exclusion of an adversary to match it in

return or successfully defend against it, is an RMA.

Realizing the war-winning and decisive goals of a US-led

strategic air campaign will come as a result of having achieved

direct and indirect effects against an adversary’s leadership,

command and control (C2), military forces, industrial capacity,

national infrastructure, and national and military plans. Such

a strategic air campaign cannot be solely and simply defined

via linear mathematics or quantitative analysis. 9 The decisive

nature of any military campaign is its ability to effect a “state

change” in the ability of the enemy to adapt to the attack.

Once the threshold of such a change is reached and main -

tained, the adversary will be unable to stop the collapse of his

system.1 0 Exactly determining “how much” and “how long”

military operations will take to reach this threshold is not

knowable. However, the ferocity, rapidity, destructiveness, and

disproportionality of attacks against parallel target sets by a

US-led strategic air campaign beyond which an adversary can

adapt is the essence of winning wars.

DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

9
A strategic air campaign RMA requires that the United

States be willing to fund, develop, train, and employ a military

with an offensive global-reach capability that far exceeds the

national capability of that of any of our adversaries.1 1 Four key

technologies are emerging that will permit us to project power

easily, a key factor in realizing the revolutionary impact of a

JV2010 strategic air campaign. These technologies are information, C2

, penetration, and precision.1 2

Information advances at the strategic level will provide better

intelligence on the vital centers, structures, and centers of gravity of enemy power. C2

 will use information filtered and fused as

dominant battle-space knowledge. 13 Using this knowledge, the

commander can rapidly plan and execute the air campaign to

strike those centers of enemy power and quickly react to the

results. The low-observable technology linked with precisionguided missile/munitions (PGM) provides our military with revolutionary abilities to penetrate enemy airspace and strike those

vital centers of gravity. Successful strategic air campaign penetration of enemy airspace is based on localized air superiority

produced by the penetrator’s stealthy signature. Flexible em -

ployment of PGMs, with overwhelming and disproportionate

mass, will deny the enemy use of many of his vital centers of

national power. Employing these technologies—broad in target

scope, compressed in time, and with disproportionately, devastating mass and accuracy—will paralyze the enemy’s leadership

and defensive reaction. To fully optimize the airpower doctrine,

strategic air campaigns must be planned to expect in-flight

modification/adaptation of execution parameters while still

achieving broad mission and campaign objectives. Using these

new technologies to conduct a parallel war to simultaneously

attack enemy centers of gravity will require equally innovative

advances in organizational structures to realize the RMA

promise/potential in such a strategic air campaign.1 4

Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns

While employing national combat power is the armed forces’

core role, the United States, as the world’s single superpower,

has national interests that must be met by a strategic air

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

10
campaign providing rapid global-mobility-delivering deter -

rence/peacekeeping forces, humanitarian supplies, assistance

to disaster victims or domestic authorities, or key technolo -

gies. Today’s multipolar world is more dynamic and requires

that the United States, in its leadership role, respond with

global mobility to crises worldwide. A global-mobility strategic

air campaign supports national objectives by delivering the

majority of time-critical forces and supplies.1 5 Global mobility

will require that peacetime operations may overfly former en

route locations, maintain a high operations tempo, compete

with normal airlift and air refueling requirements, and operate

in hostile areas. 1 6

The air expeditionary force (AEF) is designed to rapidly deploy worldwide and can be tailored to meet the needs of the

joint force commander for military or nonmilitary operations.1 7

The AEF, tailored as a combat force, provides a deterrent to

regional aggression, demonstrating the United States’s global

reach and power. Another role for the AEF, tailored for lift and

sustainment, would be to operate in a region for a period of

time, replacing, augmenting, or providing a transportation in -

frastructure to deliver key logistics and resources to meet a

regional humanitarian crisis. Global mobility can lift critical

supplies and equipment that are hazardous, too large for civilian aircraft, or so time-critical to the war fighter that they can

not wait for surface transportation. 1 8

Prime historical examples of a global-mobility strategic air

campaign are the Berlin airlift in 1948 and the resupply of Israel

during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.1 9 A more recent example of

a global-mobility strategic air campaign’s achieving national ob -

jectives was Operation Sapphire, during which the USAF C-5

transport aircraft rapidly and safely moved large quantities of

weapons-grade nuclear fuel to US control and the transport of

water purification equipment to save hundreds of thousands of

Central African refugees from disease and death.

Notes

1. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, USAF, “Aerospace Doctrine—

More Than Just a Theory,” speech presented to the USAF doctrine seminar,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 30 April 1996; Maj Victor B. Anthony, USAF, and Wing

DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

11
Commander R. A. Mason, RAF, The Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe;

Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm,

1917–1941 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies

Institute, Air University, 1955); and John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988).

2. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (European War), Summary

Report (London: Office of the Royal Historical Society, 1981).

3. “The Future of Strategic Aerospace Warfare: Messages to the Chief of

Staff of the Air Force,” a White Paper from the Strategic Aerospace Warfare

Study Panel.

4. Fogleman speech.

5. Jeffrey Record, “Force Projection/Crisis Response,” Turning Point: The

Gulf War and US Military Strategy, ed. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J.

Mazarr (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 26.

6. Briefing, Headquarters USAF/XO, Maj Gen Charles Link, “Airpower,

An Airman’s Perspective,” 7 November 1995.

7. New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, USAF

Scientific Advisory Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

December 1995), 5.

8. Burton H. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 232–33; and James G. Roche

and Barry D. Watts, “Choosing Analytic Measures,” The Journal of Strategic

Studies (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., June 1991), 181.

9. Barry D. Watts, “Reality Ignored,” a review of Robert Pape’s Bombing

to Win (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 26 November 1996).

10. Ibid., 63.

11. Dr. David Blair, How to Defeat the US: The Operational Military

Effects of the Proliferation of Weapons of Precise Destruction (Maxwell AFB,

Ala.: Air War College, January 1996).

12. Col Jeffrey R. Barnett, USAF, Future War: An Assessment of

Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

January 1996), 12.

13. Adm William A. Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

“Introduction,” Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, ed. Stuart E. Johnson and

Martin C. Libicki (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,

October 1996), 3.

14. Barnett, 12–13.

15 . 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Air

Mobility Command, October 1996).

16 . New World Vistas, 5.

17. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the USAF, and Gen Ronald R.

Fogleman, chief of staff, USAF, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st

Century Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, November 1996).

18. 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan, 1–11.

19. Briefing, Carl H. Builder to the Air War College, subject: Keeping the

Strategic Flame, 19 November 1996.

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

12
Chapter 3

Organizational Structures for

Strategic Air Campaigns

The joint force air component commander (JFACC) will plan

and execute the strategic air campaign. Planning and executing an offensive strategic air campaign requires an organiza -

tional structure that can rapidly gather all source information

and fuse it into intelligence, develop strike plans, task opera -

tional units, and execute the missions. Real and near-realtime information gathering, fusion, and timely and accurate

intelligence production are critical factors in a successful stra -

tegic air campaign. The “bandwidth” or size of the electronic

pipe needed to transfer the large information and intelligencedata volumes potentially required by a regional JFACC to run

an offensive strategic air campaign can exceed the communication and data-connectivity resources available to the war

fighter now and possibly well into the future. This limitation

on intelligence and communication may suggest that a strate -

gic air campaign’s early stage, across the spectrum of conflict

in either logistical or combat operations, should be planned

and executed from the United States.

At least the initial stages of a long-range strategic air campaign may well be best planned and executed by the JFACC

located in the CONUS. The CONUS JFACC has many resource

advantages: access to limited aerospace strategists, exercised

connectivity with logistic and combat mission planners, allsource intelligence, and databases for combat units. A

CONUS-located JFACC removes a fixed, in-range, high-value

theater target for enemy counterstrikes or terrorism. The in -

creased access to rapid information flow in future conflicts

presents opportunities to the operational commander. Rapid

decisions can be made on resource options, timing, targeting,

and weapon choices. Potentially, the commander may be able

to move his decision loop faster, making our forces more effi -

cient and effective, while forcing on the opponent errors based

on old information decisions.1

13
The global-mobility strategic air campaign requires a cen -

tralized command and control to support airlift and air refueling operations worldwide. A centralized control and execution

system must provide a flexible, responsive, secure, survivable,

integrated global information system. 2 Such a system provides

the force-management decision makers the two-way connectivity and flexibility to reroute critical aircraft or resources,

rapidly establish en route stations, or support operations in

austere environments.3

Notes

1. Jeffrey Record, “Force Projection/Crisis Response,” Turning Point: The

Gulf War and US Military Strategy, ed. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J.

Mazarr (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), xxii–xxiii.

2. 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Air

Mobility Command, October 1996).

3. Ibid., 1–14.

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

14
Chapter 4

Operational Concepts for

Strategic Air Campaigns

Today’s planners will develop the operational concepts for a

2010 war; how US aerospace forces fight tomorrow will be

guided by how US aerospace planners think today.

—Col Jeffrey Barnett 

Future War, January 1996

JV2010 provides broad new operational concepts, dominant

maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection,

and focused logistics. 1 Focused logistics, dominant maneuver,

and precision engagement are the concepts that most readily

lend themselves to the JV2010 strategic air campaign design.

Long-range precision capability to deliver critical resources,

combat power, or weapons on target is the primary synthesis of

these operational concepts for future strategic air campaigns.

Operational Concepts for

Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns

Stealth aircraft are a key for airpower to penetrate defended

airspace and achieve strategic and operational campaign objec -

tives. Stealth or low-observable penetrating (LOP) aircraft have

unique doctrinal capabilities, attributes, and operational requirements. Effective strategic air campaign design must be

based on the doctrine and employment concepts that LO air -

craft offer. Understanding the strategic air campaign RMA requires a discussion of these proposed LO-operational concepts.

Low-Observable Penetrators

Low-observable penetrators have a high probability of penetrating enemy airspace by providing their own local air superiority. The LOP’s most significant doctrinal capability is its

very high probability to penetrate successfully an adversary’s

air defense net and accurately deliver logistical resources or

15
weapons without large-scale, expensive support from other

aircraft , such as fighter escort or electronic-warfare aircraft.

This ability is based on revolutionary low-observable technology and a dramatically reduced LO-aircraft signature. Main -

taining the LO signature is, therefore, a high priority to successfully employ these aircraft. Maintaining the LO signature

includes mission planning, tactical employment of the aircraft,

and aircrew training. The LO-employment doctrine may call

for mission planning and execution flexibility in routing, mis -

sion timing, and target prioritization. The product of LO tech -

nology and flexible employment allows LOPs to exercise passive

air superiority. This passive air superiority is revolutionary for

offensive aircraft and realizes the long-held visionary doctrine

of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell on “command of the air”

and the survivability of penetrating aircraft to counterdefens es.2

The LOP gains its revolutionary advantages from the low

probability that enemy defenses will be able to detect and

successfully perform an intercept. While the LOP is not invis -

ible to defense sensors, its stealth characteristics allow it to

break the engagement hierarchy: detection, correlation, tracking, weapon guidance, and warhead fusing. Any break in this

sequence of events will allow the LOP to survive, escape,

and/or recloak to an undetected status and continue the mis -

sion. Some of the major sources of signature detection are

active search by radar, passive detection of the infrared and

acoustic emissions of an aircraft’s engine, visual detection of

the aircraft (shape, shadow, color, or contrail), and passive

detection of an aircraft’s self-generated emissions (radar, ra -

dio, or navigation aids). 3 Maintaining an LO signature depends

on the design, construction, and aircraft maintenance quality

as well as on smart mission planning and in-flight tactics.

Active Signature Management

LOPs must have autonomy of action and mission execution

flexibility to preserve stealth advantage by active signature

management. The ability to penetrate air defense systems successfully and deliver key logistic resources or weapons requires that LOP signature management have a high mission

priority. Dominant battle-space knowledge of threat-systems

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

16
numbers, locations, and abilities will factor into mission planning. During the flight phase, mission updates from offand/or onboard sensors may require that the route of flight,

timing, target, and weapon selection be changed for LOP signature management. This level of autonomy of action and

flexibility in mission execution is key to the effectiveness of a

JV2010 strategic air campaign.

Tactical surprise, deception, situation awareness (SA), com -

bat judgment, and aircrew initiative are critical skills to mis -

sion success. The choice of employment tactics will determine

whether the LOP is to be used as either an evolutionary or a

revolutionary weapons system. Evolutionary employment

would occur where stealth technology is simply used to decrease the detectability of a penetrating aircraft. Revolutionary

employment would consist of flexible mission parameters that

allow the aircrew to combine innovative penetration tactics

and stealth technology to provide a significantly more effective

weapons delivery platform. The tactical philosophy for a lowobservable penetrator has four basic tenets as follows:

1. Avoid detection.

2. If detected, evade and escape.

3. If engaged, survive.

4. Recloak to an undetected status.

Threat-System Detection

Low-observable penetrators will detect and identify active

air defense systems before those systems can detect the penetrators. The high priority of signature management and the

means to achieve it, using autonomy of action and missionexecution flexibility, is based on this ability to see and counter

threats before you are seen. The reduced signature of LOPs

will degrade the ability of an air defense’s command and con -

trol system to easily identify the flight path, route timing, and

intended targets. Knowing that an attacking force is probably

penetrating its airspace, yet unable to identify when, where, or

what targets are threatened, can fracture the defensive C2

network and make it more susceptible to deception, disruption, and paralysis.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

17
Revolutionary Employment of LOPs

Revolutionary employment of LOPs requires dominant battle -

space knowledge. JV2010 strategic air campaigns must heed

Sun Tzu’s advice: “Know your enemy and know yourself, in a

hundred battles you will never be in peril.”4 To achieve LOPemployment success, mission planning must support signatu remanagement priority, high mission-planning effectiveness,

in-flight SA, and combat-judgment skills. Effective mission

planning prepares the aircrew for the best routing, expected

defensive order of battle, and mission objectives. Once the

battle begins, however, the fog and friction of war will make

these best-laid plans nothing more than a place from which to

make changes. Situation awareness and combat judgment are

the key in-flight skills LOP aircrews must use to make those

smart changes and take maximum advantage of their stealth

technology. 5 Aircrews must observe, orient, decide, and act

during penetration flight profiles. Just as our LO doctrine is

based on airpower flexibility, the enemy cannot be expected to

follow a set list of actions.6 The LOP aircrew must use dominant battle-space knowledge to build and maintain SA and

make smart combat judgments to take advantage of the tactical situation. The LOP aircrew must use these skills to main -

tain their LO signature and, if detected, break the engagement

hierarchy to escape, survive, and recloak.

LOP Passive Attack

LOPs inflict a “passive attack” to deceive and confuse enemy

command and control systems, which are the center of gravity

of the enemy’s air defenses. LOPs can passively provide their

own local air superiority by minimizing detection and breaking

the engagement sequence early. Successful LOP employment

will degrade defensive C2 nets. While air defense technology

will continue to advance, a radar system that would be capa -

ble of detecting and tracking stealth aircraft would require a

computational and data-fusion ability several orders of magnitude greater than any that exists today. 7

 Today, no contemporary air defense system can detect and intercept a strike force

of LOPs.8 Air defense forces may be depleted in unsuccessful

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

18
searches and intercept attempts. LOPs can choose to unmask

their aircraft intentionally or use uninhabited air vehicles to

intentionally decoy air defenses, then recloak and leave inter -

ceptors out of position, degrading further defensive action.

These LO deception-employment doctrines can be phrased as

a passive attack. An air defense system would have significant

difficulty correlating numerous spurious-position and trackinformation inputs. A C2

 center subject to confusion and dis -

ruption could misallocate interception assets. The LO passive

attack is a weapon whose antiweapons impose the greatest

possible strain on the production facilities and military efforts

of the opponent.9

Nighttime Employment Is a Force Multiplier

While LOPs have the potential for all-weather employment,

the threat to the visual portion of their detectable signature is

so increased that daytime missions should be greatly restricted and used only when the threat is very low or the

national need is great. Penetration of air defense at night

balances signature-management concerns, aids surprise, en -

hances deception efforts, and degrades interception.

Operational Concepts for Global-Mobility

Strategic Air Campaigns

The single biggest deficiency in the Department of Defense

is lift.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, CSAF

Address to JV2025 Participants

Long-range transport aircraft must increasingly operate

from the CONUS to rapidly project power that establishes or

reinforces US or multinational regional presence. JV2010’s

Focused Logistics and Global Engagement’s Rapid Global Mo -

bility and Agile Combat Support require operational concepts

that can deliver critical resources to worldwide locations, some

of which are very austere.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

19
Precision Airdrop

Precision airdrop is the most rapid means to deliver equip -

ment, resources, and personnel anywhere. Airdrop transports

troops and material from an aircraft in-flight when the airland option is not available and an immediate response is

required. Many forced-entry operations require airdrop. Some

peacetime operations in remote areas require airdrop to meet

timelines or to deliver equipment that can prepare airfields for

air-land operations.1 0

Air Refueling

Air refueling permits rapid deployment of national military

power or humanitarian resources without the requirement for

staging bases. Tanker aircraft supports the rapid deployment

of combat and transport aircraft to achieve national objectives.

This force-projection capability decreases reliance on intermediate stops at refueling or staging bases that may be increasingly denied to us or if time requirements force a direct deliv -

ery. Air refueling increases payload capacity by minimizing

take-off fuel loads that decrease available cargo weight. Com -

bat operations require air refueling to increase sortie duration

and range that permit staging high-cost assets at safe airfields

and multiplying the available combat power applied on target.

1 1

Delivery of Critical Resources

Airlift delivers critical resources and personnel that achieve

national objectives to help our allies and friends when assisting people, relieving crises, deterring aggression, and winning

battles. Global airlift delivers supplies, equipment, and per -

sonnel that cannot wait for surface transportation modes. Our

national security strategy of defense, engaging our friends and

potential adversaries, and supporting democracies around the

world is directly supported by airlift. USAF airlift assets are

specifically designed to meet the toughest requirements such

as transporting outsized cargo or special items to austere loca -

tions. Airlift supports special operations for covert or overt

NCA missions. 1 2

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

20
LO and PGM technology and timely, accurate logistics deliv -

ery meld classic airpower doctrine of Douhet and Mitchell with

the unique attributes of stealth penetrators’ high probability to

penetrate, autonomy of action, mission-execution flexibility,

and signature-management flexibility, striking vital centers

massively, rapidly, and destructively. Disproportionality and

parallel war are prime factors in successful deterrence and

early conflict resolution. Strategic air campaigns provide this

potential without the costly requirement to mass ground forces

in close combat as the prime military coercive force. LOPs,

paired with PGMs and global-mobility systems, have reener -

gized the discussion on the value of strategic air campaigns to

meet national security and military strategy objectives.

Notes

1. Gen John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint

Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman, July 1996), 19.

2. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann,

1942); and Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power

(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975).

3. Bill Sweetman, Stealth Aircraft (Osceola, Mich.: Motorbooks

International, 1986), 58.

4. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and introduction by Samuel B.

Griffith (England: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

5. Robert L. Shaw, Fighter Combat, Tactics, and Maneuvering (Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 291.

6. Gen Larry D. Welch, commander in chief, Strategic Air Command,

comment on SAC’s mid-1980’s Aircrew Tactical Doctrine.

7. Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Integrated

Long-term Strategy, January 1988), 41.

8. Thomas A. Kearney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary

Report (Washington, D.C.: USAF, 1993), 224.

9. Oskar Moreganstern, The Question of National Defense (New York:

Random House, 1959), 22.

10 . 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Air

Mobility Command, October 1996), 1–10.

11. Ibid., 1–11.

12. Ibid., 1–13.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

21
Chapter 5

Technology for Strategic Air Campaigns

Because of earlier investments, particularly in technologies,

our military capability is improving rapidly, and these

improvements point toward a qualitative jump in our ability

to use military force effectively. We will be the first nation to

pass through the revolution, emerging with different

strengths that can give us an edge across the entire

spectrum of contingencies against which the nation may

need to commit its military.

—Adm William A. Owens

High Seas, 1995 

New tools of war have limited impact on the way of war

without corresponding modifications in doctrine, operational

concepts, and supporting organizational structures. A brief ex -

ample is the impact of the new tank technology on pre-World

War II German and French military organizations. The Ger -

mans developed doctrine and employment concepts (i.e., blitzkrieg) and supporting organizational structures (i.e., panzer

division in a combined arms corps) that made them victorious

through 1942 on the Eastern and Western Fronts. The French

employed their tank technology in existing infantry units with

little employment changes and suffered rapid defeat.1

The technology environment for a JV2010 offensive and

global-mobility strategic air campaign will have significant im -

provements in reconnaissance, communications, data-transfer

rates and volume, information production, LO aircraft with

penetration-enhancing electronic-warfare systems, accurate

navigation and delivery systems, and PGM with all-weather

and automatic target-recognition capabilities.2

Technology for Offensive

Strategic Air Campaigns

Low-observability technology applied to aircraft design and

on-board electronic-warfare penetration aids will severely limit

23
the ability of enemy air defenses to detect, neutralize, and

intercept our attacking aircraft. Thus, the enemy’s most highly

valued and critical targets will become vulnerable to our offen -

sive airpower.

Successful strategic air campaigns in the arena of tough

integrated air defense systems are dependent on stealthy or

low-observable aircraft. Stealth technology, accurate delivery

techniques, and PGMs, when applied to the design of a com -

bat aircraft, will result in weapons systems that can maintain

deterrence well into the future and, if needed, will allow the

United States to employ combat power anywhere in the world.

As with any new technology, the military must develop and

constantly refine effective operational concepts, organizational

structures, and doctrine to put these technological advances

to their best use. The air campaign planner employing LOPs

with critical resources or PGMs must understand LO doctrine,

technology, and how these weapons systems penetrate/

counter the enemy’s defensive systems, deliver focused logis -

tics, or strike targets. Learning the employment fundamentals

is critical to effective offensive strategic air campaigns. Additional detailed information on LO technology is available in

appendix A.

LO allows us to finally achieve the long-held doctrinal beliefs that the “bombers will get through” and strike strategic

targets. Strong enemy defenses have caused airpower strate -

gists to give more weight to supporting penetration aspects of

a mission than to offensive initiative and freedom of action in

making operational and tactical employment decisions. Decisions about ingress points, penetration routing, routing corridor width, timing constraints, and weapon load versus penetration aids are examples of how the defense has limited

offensive initiative and freedom of action. The ability to limit

detection and degrade interception to acceptably low levels

allows LOPs to slip through gaps in air defense systems. Sim -

ply stated, the LOP has the potential to enter hostile airspace,

strike targets, and survive to fly again. The impact of this

airpower doctrinal belief on strategic air campaigns is enormous. The challenge for airpower employers will be to merge

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

24
these LO doctrinal beliefs with the inherent potential of air -

power for expansive flexibility.

Technology for Global-Mobility

Strategic Air Campaigns

Global-mobility strategic air campaigns also require superio r

technologies. Long-range transport aircraft should be dualroled to provide both airlift and air refueling capability. High

levels of reliability are an increasing technology requirement to

match operating tempos with decreasing aircraft resources

and availability. Precision navigation and redundant communication electronics are required to operate in austere environ -

ments and to enhance true worldwide mission flexibility. Fu -

ture airlift aircraft should have the following characteristics:

1. Reliable, cost-effective delivery of large cargo payloads over long

distances using air refueling support.

2. Direct worldwide delivery from the CONUS to austere environments.

3. Delivery of outsized cargo that cannot be carried by commercial

technology.

4. Roll-on and roll-off capability.

5. Routine low-threat-environment survivability.

6. All-weather airdrop and air-land operations.3

Air refueling also is a fundamental part of a global-mobility

strategic air campaign. Transport aircraft configured in a

tanker role should have the following capabilities:

1. Refuel the entire range of US and allied aircraft.

2. Support very large offensive strategic air campaigns such as the

single integrated operational plan (SIOP) or Desert Storm.

3. Survive in a wartime threat environment.

4. Provide large fuel offload with maximum flexibility. 4

Future mobility aircraft can also benefit from advanced

technologies available today or that are linked to a JV2010

vision. Low-observable technology applied to unmanned aerial

vehicle (UAV) airlift or refueling aircraft could greatly decrease

their radar cross sections by eliminating the cockpit. Very

high speed aircraft operating at supersonic or hypersonic

speeds could efficiently deliver critical logistics or personnel

around the world within minutes. Very large aircraft with gross

TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

25
weights exceeding one million pounds would increase the effi -

ciencies of airlifters up to 1.5 times our capabilities tod ay. 5

Technology superiority can be a tenuous advantage. Ad -

vances in science and engineering applications are seldom

kept secret for long. The US military should expect advanced

application and exploitation of our technology and new ideas

to emerge worldwide. Keeping our technology superiority requires large, diverse, and continuing investment in new con -

cepts. Equally important is investing in our own counter-US

technology effort. We should fund research into those defense

technologies that have the potential to defeat our information

gathering, C2 connectivity, penetration, and target vulnerability abilities. Recognizing our vulnerabilities before our enemies

or potential competitors do is an important factor in enhancing our deterrence and war-fighting abilities.

Technology is an equal contributor in pursuit of a strategic

air campaign RMA. We perceive that the quality of technology,

that is, innovative ideas employed to achieve military objectives, is its important single benefit. In a single-superpower

world where the US military budgets far exceed the combined

financial outlays of many of the next largest country’s military

expenditures, “technology mass” is a new emerging factor. The

ability to outspend our nearest competitors by several orders

of magnitude in technology development, weapons procurement, leading-edge operational conceptual development, and

realistic training will give the United States a lasting military

superiority in both deterrence and war winning; this is the

fundamental disproportionality concept.6

Projecting global power across the spectrum of conflict via

global-mobility or offensive strategic air campaigns and military superiority has very real limitations and does not guarantee or imply US world dominance. The United States remains

very much dependent on our allies and on crisis coalitions for

legitimacy and assistance. The United States will seldom em -

ploy military power unilaterally. We rely on our allies and

“situational friends” for political and financial support. While

the United States is clearly the world’s superpower, political

and economic power will continue to reign as the chief tools of

the combined nation’s power on the world stage. 7

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

26
Notes

1. Jeffrey Record, “Force Projection/Crisis Response,” Turning Point: The

Gulf War and US Military Strategy, ed. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J.

Mazarr (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 14–15.

2. Ibid., 27.

3. 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Air

Mobility Command, October 1996), 1–30.

4. Ibid., 1–31.

5. Airlift 2025: The First with the Most (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 2025 Support

Office, Air University, August 1996).

6. Dr. David Blair, How to Defeat the US: The Operational Military Effects

of the Proliferation of Weapons of Precise Destruction (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

War College, January 1996).

7. William J. Taylor and Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Gulf

War (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,

November 1991).

TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS

27
Epilogue

As we implement the chairman’s vision via service core

competencies, as those expressed in the US Air Force’s Global

Engagement, we will attain a new airpower-employment syn -

thesis. The new synthesis will blend airpower doctrine; new

operational capabilities; high-operational-tempo organiza -

tional structures; and high-penetration, low-observable, and

long-range aircraft technology to deliver critical resources or

employ precision weapons rapidly and disproportionately

against a parallel set of targets. This tool of national military

power gives the JFC and the NCA a global-mobility or offensive

strategic air campaign, in peace and war, with decisive capa -

bilities across the spectrum of conflict.

The direct and indirect nature of such an offensive strategic

air campaign may produce long-lasting changes to the enemy’s

ability or will to continue the fight. The combination of the air

campaign’s doctrine, operational capability, organizational

structure, and technology has the decisive ability to effect a

“state change” in the enemy’s ability to react or adapt. Once this

state-change threshold is achieved, the adversary’s war-fighting

ability will fail, and our national objectives can be achieved.

Global-mobility strategic air campaigns can also achieve national objectives by the timely and precise delivery of key logis -

tical support and resources to aid our allies, friends, and

humanitarian efforts around the world in pursuit of the en -

gagement and enlargement of national security strategy. The

Berlin airlift and logistical support to Israel during the Yom

Kippur War are clear examples that peacetime strategic air

campaigns can decisively achieve national objectives. This is

equally true for the global-mobility strategic air campaign.

Precise, timely delivery of critical resources worldwide can prevent humanitarian crises from escalating into a conflict or be

the enabling action that permits US national power and influ -

ence to achieve combined and coalition goals. Global-mobility

strategic air campaigns provide a strong deterrent—timely, accurate power projection worldwide. 1

29
The conflict between the concepts of future strategic air

campaigns as revolutionary or evolutionary is complex and

can be argued persuasively for either position. The combination of an RMA’s four components alone may be perceived as

advancing technology leading doctrine, capabilities, and organizations. Just as the reality of an RMA is not decided solely

by new technology, so the value of any national-power tool

must be tested and proved in the world’s political, economic,

and military environments. Hence, the addition of disproportionality to the discussion, provided by quantitatively and

qualitatively vastly superior US military power, must then

throw the decision to the revolutionary side. As we complete

this RMA-component synthesis of service core competencies

employed by the joint force commander, the United States will

be the first nation to experience a revolution in military affairs

via a strategic air campaign (fig. 3).

Notes

1. 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Air

Mobility Command, October 1996), 1–33.

Figure 3. Strategic Air Campaigns Applied Disproportionally Result in

an RMA

IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010

30
Appendix A

The Theory of Low-Observable Technology and

Penetrator Aircraft Design
Strategic air campaigns using LO aircraft require commanders, planners, and aircrews who can effectively design and

execute missions. These operators must understand LO doc -

trinal concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This appendix provides a small introduction to this area for those

readers interested in more detailed information.

Aircraft can be detected by active radars, infrared detectors,

human visual observation, acoustic “ears” (i.e., both human

and electronic), and sensors that detect aircraft-generated ra -

dio, radar, and other telltale electronic emissions. LO technology permits aircraft designers to build aircraft that are hard to

locate and intercept; that is, they have small “signatures.” The

signature (fig. 4) of an aircraft consists of those specific clues

that betray its presence and may even identify its specific

type. To make an aircraft truly LO, the design of the aircraft

must minimize possible sources of detection and emissions,

and future means of detection must be anticipated. The com -

manders, planners, and aircrews who operate these aircraft

must understand the design and construction as well as the

employment doctrine and tactics if they are to effectively employ such advanced aircraft.

Figure 4. Notional Detection Signature of a Typical Aircraft Design

33
The Hows and Whys of Aircraft Detection

Making an LO penetrator truly difficult to detect is an im -

posing technical and operational task. A look at the design of

a typical aircraft (fig. 5) shows that conventional military air -

craft produce complex and strong radar returns from the flat

slab sides of the fuselage, wings, and control surfaces. The

engine compressor and exhaust turbine are also excellent reflectors and produce very identifiable radar returns. An after -

burning engine produces a strong source of infrared emissions

for detection, tracking, and weapons guidance. Visual detection of aircraft is dependent on their size, color, and maneu -

vering tactics. Aircraft can also be readily detected by their

own self-generated emissions from radio, radar, and naviga -

tion equipment. Noise, while not a major detection medium

today, must be minimized when an LO aircraft is designed

and operated. Reducing and then managing these readily detectable aircraft characteristics require not only major design

changes, but also revolutionary new employment tactics.

Radar was first used during World War II and has since

become the primary method of detecting airborne targets. Ra -

dar has achieved its predominance because radar waves are

not as easily affected by atmospheric conditions as are visible

light waves; clouds and rain can block visible-spectrum light

waves. Moreover, lower-frequency radar waves can bend

around the horizon, thus increasing the range of detection of

Source: Doug Richardson, Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air (New York: Orion

Books, 1989).

Figure 5. Readily Detectable Characteristics of a Typical Combat Aircraft

34
previously unseen targets. Radar also works at night when

visual means of target detection are quite limited. Radar detection has another advantage over visual observation in that

it provides its own source of illumination, whereas human

vision depends on other light sources to illuminate objects

(e.g., sun or bright moon). Radar is also very useful because it

provides a ready means of determining the range, elevation,

and azimuth to the desired target.

Military radars have different uses such as surveillance,

long-range target acquisition, target tracking, and weapons

guidance. A basic difference between these functions is the

operational frequency of the radar. Low-frequency radars are

used for long-range surveillance and acquisition. These radar

antennas are necessarily large and therefore are normally in

fixed facilities. Higher-frequency radars are used for target

tracking and weapons guidance. These radars maintain highquality target-position information such as angle, elevation,

and range. These high-frequency radar antennas are smaller

and can be mobile. Air defense networks use the basic targetposition information to direct the interception and destruction

of penetrating aircraft. Radars of all types can be based at sea,

in the air, or on land and can detect targets in the midst of

background clutter or electronic countermeasures. Radar frequencies fall between three megahertz (MHz) and three hundred gigahertz (GHz) on the electromagnetic spectrum (table 1).

Each radar band has specific uses, some of which are reserved for military use, others for civilian use (table 2). For

example, the very high frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) radars are used for surveillance, acquisition,

and looking beyond the horizon. The target tracking radars

operate in higher bands, commonly E through I bands. The

highest radar frequencies are used for weapons fire control

and missile seeker guidance.

Radar detects targets by transmitting electromagnetic en -

ergy waves and receiving a part of one of the energy waves

after its reflection or scattering off the radar target. The size of

the target with respect to how it reflects or scatters the incom -

ing radar wave is a basic definition of radar cross section

(RCS). The larger a target’s RCS, the more incident radar en -

35
ergy it reflects back towards the transmitting site and, consequently, the easier the target is to detect by that radar receiver. Conversely, the smaller the target’s RCS, the less en -

ergy it will redirect toward the “listening” radar receiver and

the harder it will be to detect. Therefore, the primary factor in

decreasing the detectability of an aircraft by radar is to reduce

the RCS of that aircraft. RCS is expressed in terms of area and

is measured in square meters (m 2) or decibel square meters

(dBsm) (table 3).

The RCS of an aircraft can be difficult to predict and deter -

mine accurately and rigorously. The RCS of an aircraft depends on the physical design aspects of the aircraft (e.g.,

shape, size, or material); the transmitting frequency of the

radar (e.g., 100 MHz or 10 GHz); the degree of polarization of

the incident and reflected radar wave; the angular orientation

Table 1

Radar Frequency Bands

STANDARD RADAR BANDS ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE

BANDS

Band Designation Frequency Range

(MHz)

Band Designation Frequency Range

(MHz)

HF 3–30 A 0–250

VHF 30–300 B 250–500

C 500–1,000

UHF 300–1,000 D 1,000–2,000

E 2,000–3,000

L 1,000–2,000 F 3,000–4,000

S 2,000–4,000 G 4,000–6,000

H 6,000–8,000

C 4,000–8,000 I 8,000–10K

X 8,000–12K J 10K–20K

KU 12K–18K K 20K–40K

L 40K–60K

K 18K–27K M 60K–100K

KA 27K–40K

Millimeter 40K–300K

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 16.

36
Table 2

Radar Frequency Bands and Common Uses

BAND DESIGNATION FREQUENCY RANGE GENERAL USAGE

VHF 50–300 MHz Very Long Range Surveillance

UHF 300–1,000 MHz Very Long Range Surveillance

L 1–2 GHz Long-range Surveillance and

En Route Traffic Control

S 2–4 GHz Moderate-range Surveillance and

Terminal Traffic Control

C 4–8 GHz Long-range Tracking and Airborne

Weather Detection

X 8–12 GHz

Short-range Tracking, Missile

Guidance, Mapping, Marine Radar,

and Airborne Intercept

KU 12–18 GHz High-resolution Mapping and

Satellite Altimetry

K 18–27 GHz Little used due to water vapor

absorption

KA 27–40 GHz Very High Resolution Mapping and

Airport Surveillance

Millimeter 40–100+ GHz Target Typing

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 17.

Table 3

Relationship between RCS Measurements of

Decibel Square Meters and Area Square Meters

Decibel Square Meters (dBsm) Square Meters (m2)

 50 dBsm 100K m2 (aircraft carrier)

 40 dBsm 10K m2 (frigate)

 30 dBsm 1K m2 (large transport aircraft)

 20 dBsm 100 m2 (bomber)

 10 dBsm 10 m2 (fighter)

 0 dBsm 1 m2 (cruise missile)

–10 dBsm .1 m2 (reduced signature aircraft)

–20 dBsm .01 m2 (large bird)

–30 dBsm .001 m2 (small bird)

–40 dBsm .0001 m2 (insect)

–50 dBsm .00001 m2 (?)

37
of the target’s physical dimensions compared to the incident

radar wave (e.g., aspect or viewing angle) (fig. 6); and the

mission profile of the aircraft (e.g., high-, medium-, or low-altitude profile). 1

An aircraft does not present a single RCS value that remains

constant for all situations or observation orientations. Early con -

cepts of an aircraft radar return were regarded as a point source

that reflected the radar energy uniformly back towards the

transmitter; measuring the physical area of the target aircraft

gave the aircraft’s RCS expressed in square meters. This sim -

ple concept of RCS is useful for basic discussions, but the

physics of RCS are more complex. Rotating the aircraft to

Figure 6. Variations in RCS with Angle

38
expose different orientations—viewing or aspect angles—to the

searching radar reveals that the RCS will vary with the aspect

angle (fig. 7).

Even this polar or all-azimuth plot oversimplifies the true

picture of RCS for different azimuths. The radar returns will

vary due to mutual-phase interference and polarization of the

radar reflections. The value of RCS also changes, sometimes

quite significantly, for succeeding radar pulses. The better solution is to express RCS in terms of the radar return’s statistical parameters (e.g., mean value, percentiles, and probability

densities). Moreover, as radar resolution improves, the radar

Figure 7. All-Azimuth Plot of an Aircraft RCS

39
engineer finds that a target is not just a point source of reflected energy; rather, it consists of a group of radar-scattering

centers. This increased level of complexity produces RCS

measured in terms of three-dimensional (i.e., azimuth and ele -

vation) plots of grouped scattering centers, where RCS values

are a function of the transmitted radar frequency, radar wave

polarization, and viewed aspect angle of the target (fig. 8).

Aircraft produce complex RCSs. The complex returns are the

result of many scattering centers: engine intakes, compressor/

turbine blades, flat-wing pylons, and the right angles where the

wing and the fuselage are joined. Small radar scatterers such as

rivet heads and skin seams add to an aircraft’s RCS. As the

aircraft’s orientation to the illumination radar changes, the

Source: The Camouflage Handbook, AAFWAL-TR-86-1028 (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Force Wright

Aeronautical Laboratories, 1986), chap. 5, C-9.

Figure 8. Three-Dimensional Viewing Angle Aspects and Geometries

40
strength of the RCS returns varies greatly and rapidly. The

rapid RCS variation is termed glint and scintillation. Figure 7

shows how with a small change in viewing angle the intensity of

the RCS increases rapidly. Figure 8 depicts viewing angles used

to describe aircraft detection geometries.

Radar Cross Section and Scattering Fields

The RCS of an object or an aircraft results from the scatter -

ing of radar waves—the reflection, transmission, or diffraction

of the incoming radar wave (fig. 9). The scattering that occurs

depends on the shape, size, and material characteristics of the

aircraft and the parameters of the incoming radar energy. The

scattering angles or lobes of most concern to the LO aircraft

designer are monostatic and bistatic scattering (fig. 10).

Monostatic scattering and detection occurs when the radar

wave is reflected directly back toward the collocated transmit -

ter and receiver site. Bistatic scattering takes place when the

incident-radar energy is scattered away from the transmitting

Source: The Camouflage Handbook, AAFWAL-TR-86-1028 (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Force Wright

Aeronautical Laboratories, 1986), 69.

Figure 9. Evolution of the RCS Concept

41
source, the scattering angle is less than 180o

, and any potential

radar-reflection receiver is not collocated with the transmitt er.

Basic radar wave scattering can be described as three frequency regions: the Rayleigh region, the resonant region, and

the high-frequency region (table 4). Scattering can occur when

the aircraft dimensions reradiate radar energy that has approximately the same dimension as the incident-radar wave -

length. The Rayleigh region consists of radar energy wave -

lengths that are longer than the aircraft’s physical dimensions

of fuselage length and wing span (i.e., very low radar frequen -

cies). The Rayleigh region may not contribute much to the

observed RCS of most manned aircraft. 2

Radar energy in the resonant region has wavelengths that

are between .1 to 10 times the aircraft’s dimensions; approximately the same size as the aircraft’s wingspan, fuselage

length, and engine configuration. In this frequency region, the

shape, design, and material used in the aircraft does not apSource: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 52.

Figure 10. Radar Wave Scattering

Table 4

Typical Radar Frequencies, Applications, and Wavelengths

Frequency Application Wavelength

150 MHz Long-range Surveillance 2 m (6.5 ft.)

 2 GHz Surveillance 15 cm (6 in.)

 10 GHz Tracking 3 cm (1.2 in.)

42
preciably affect the aircraft’s RCS because the entire aircraft

body or individual wavelength-sized aircraft sections will act as a

reradiating antenna of the incident-radar wave. The geometry of

the viewing aspect of the illumination radar is important because the reflected wave’s mutual-phase interference will cause

an RCS in this frequency region to fluctuate greatly.

In this high-frequency region, where the radar wavelength is

much shorter than the aircraft’s physical dimensions, distinct

scattering centers, such as engine intakes and corner reflections from the wing and fuselage joint and gaps in skin panels

and access doors, add significantly to the RCS. The mutualphase interference is not as significant as these wavelengths.

High-frequency scattering comprises the most significant com -

ponent of RCS and has specific characteristics that must be

understood to design and operate an LO aircraft. This scatter -

ing consists of specular reflection, edge and corner reflection,

aircraft skin seam and gap reflection, surface-traveling wave

reflection, shadow-boundary reflection from creeping waves,

and reflection from ducts, intakes, cavities, and corners. 3

Specular reflection occurs when radar waves strike a

smooth, flat surface or boundary, and a large part of the radar

wave is reflected at an angle that is equal to its incoming

angle. This specular reflection is similar to reflection from a

mirror (see fig. 7). Specular reflection from a curved edge

tends to radiate in all directions (i.e., isotropically). Specular

reflection generally comprises the larger part of an aircraft’s

RCS, giving rise to efforts to reduce an aircraft’s RCS focus on

this area during the designing of LO aircraft. Reducing the

RCS is a matter of using certain aircraft shapes to redirect the

reflected waves away from the transmitting radar. The direction of the reflection can be predicted using computer modeling determined on RCS ranges. A simple diagram, using basic

optical-ray physics, demonstrates the reflection principle (fig.

11). The part of the radar wave that is not reflected will be

absorbed by the surface or will move along the surface, assuming a continuous electrical conductivity.

Scattering by diffraction is the tendency for incident radar

waves to bend around or scatter from the edge of an obstacle

43
or boundary that they strike. The surface features that easily

diffract radar are edges, corners, and tips (fig. 12).

Surface traveling waves (STW), part of the high-frequency

region, also contribute to the RCS of aircraft. STW result when

Figure 11. Specular Radar Scattering

Source: Doug Richardson, Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air (New York: Orion

Books, 1989), 29.

Figure 12. Radar Wave Diffraction

44
a portion of the incoming radar wave strikes the aircraft skin at

a near-grazing angle and travels along the surface of the aircraft

until it reaches the far end of the aircraft structure or encounters a surface or electrical discontinuity such as a seam or gap

in the skin of the aircraft. The STW will then split into two waves

of approximately equal magnitude but opposite direction. These

seemingly small surface discontinuities are large in comparison

to the wavelength of the radar frequency and make good radar

reflectors. This first part of the STW is called the forward traveling wave. When the far end of the aircraft structure is reached or

a surface or electrical discontinuity is struck, part of the forward

traveling wave reflects, reverses direction, and becomes a backward traveling wave. This backward traveling wave will then

move back along the surface of the aircraft toward the transmit -

ting radar source. When it reaches the edge of the aircraft surface, this backward traveling wave will radiate in an “end-fire”

fashion toward the transmitting radar (fig. 13). Hence the backward component of the STW can contribute greatly to the RCS of

an aircraft. A properly polarized STW contributes strongly to an

RCS in cases where an aircraft has long smooth structures,

where the incident radar waves are of a high frequency and

when the radar strikes the surface at low angles.

Creeping waves may also contribute significantly to an air -

craft’s RCS. Creeping waves occur when the incident radar

Source: Doug Richardson, Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air (New York: Orion

Books, 1989), 31.

Figure 13. Surface Traveling Waves

45
energy strikes the “shadow boundary” or edge of the illuminated

object. The creeping wave will travel around the back or hidden

part of the aircraft surface, then return towards the transmitting

radar (see fig. 13). For conventionally designed aircraft, the

creeping wave’s RCS contribution is not significant relative to

other stronger contribution components of the RCS. For an LO

aircraft, however, the contribution to the RCS from creeping

wave reflection may be significant since the other contributing

RCS components have been reduced. This is true, though, only

if the ratio between the size of the specific part of the aircraft

structure considered a creeping wave-reflection producer and

the incident radar’s wavelength is less than 15 to 1.4

Comprehending aircraft design RCS requires understanding

the radar scattering of basic shapes such as a three-sided

corner reflector, a two-sided corner reflector, a flat plate, a

cylinder, and a sphere. These shapes are arranged in descending order of the degree to which they reflect radar energy. This

order assumes that these shapes are arranged with respect to

the illuminating radar so as to produce the strongest specular

return when the flat side plate face is perpendicular to the

direction of the incoming radar energy.

Corner reflectors produce large radar returns. In much the

same way that a billiard ball will bank off the adjacent rails

and return to the player, any radar wave entering the corner

reflector will come out and cover a broad scattering angle,

thus increasing the possibility of detection by a searching

radar (fig. 14). Thus, corner reflectors can make small vehicles

appear very large to a radar. Anytime two or three sides of an

object are joined together at right angles, they will produce a

strong reflector. One of the main concerns in designing LO

aircraft is elimination of corner reflectors to reduce the RCS.

Given the pattern of radar scattering by simple shapes, an

LO aircraft design should not have any flat surfaces that could

be perpendicular to a searching radar. In practical terms, this

goal is not possible since useful aircraft design requires flat

surfaces. In addition, the orientation of the aircraft to the

threat radars cannot always be optimized to decrease an RCS.

In the nose-on viewing angle, RCS is predominantly from

the engine intakes, since they act as corner reflectors. Radar

46
antenna in the nose of the aircraft and the cockpit also

make a large RCS contribution. Leading edges of the wings

are major RCS contributors and reflect radar much as a

cylinder does when viewed on its longitudinal axis. In the

broadside view, the fuselage, tail, and engines act as major

scattering centers. The corners formed by the wing-fuselage

joint and the tail assembly also act as strong radar reflec -

tors. The trailing edges of the wings reflect radar, and in the

tail-on aspect, the contributions of the engine exhaust to

the RCS are significant. It is important to note not only what

the sources of strong RCS contributions are but also that

these contributions vary greatly with the viewing aspect azimuth and elevation.

The major and minor scattering centers of an aircraft

teamed with the mutual interference of adjacent radar reflection result in RCS measurements that vary markedly

over small changes in viewing angle. The glint and scintilla -

tion of conventionally designed aircraft can vary as much as

80 decibels, which is like saying that the target radar return

can be 100 million times larger than the smallest return.

Source: Doug Richardson, Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air (New York: Orion

Books, 1989), 31.

Figure 14. Two-sided Corner Reflector on an Aircraft

47
Radar Cross Section Reduction Techniques

Since radar is the primary method an air defense system

uses to detect and direct interception of penetrating aircraft,

designers of combat aircraft have a vested interest in reducing the RCS of aircraft. Some of the specific benefits of radar

cross section reduction (RCSR) are listed.

1. Prevent, delay, or degrade the enemy’s radar-detection

ability.

2. Force the enemy radar to increase its own transmitting

power and, in doing so, making it easier for the penetra -

tion aircrew to detect the enemy’s presence via their

onboard electronic support measures.

3. Prevent easy target classification of the penetrating air -

craft through characteristic radar “hot spots.”

4. Reduce the electronic countermeasures (ECM) power required to defend the penetrating aircraft.

5. Increase the effectiveness of onboard jamming systems.

6. Reduce the amount of chaff expended to hide the air -

craft.

7. Increase the deception opportunities by intentionally

unmasking the low RCS with off-and-on-again radar

returns that can confuse and disrupt an air defense

system.

8. Increase the vulnerabilities of the searching radars to

background and false radar returns, both of which will

degrade their tracking loops.

RCSR can be achieved by managing the scattering centers

on the aircraft. There are four methods to manage those cen -

ters. The methods in decreasing order of effectiveness are

shaping, using radar-absorbing materials, employing passive

cancellation, and transmitting matching radar waves to effect

active cancellation.5

Shaping

Shaping is the most effective means of reducing RCS and

generally works by redirecting the incident radar energy away

from a threat radar. The reflecting surfaces (e.g., edges, en -

48
gines, flat surfaces, intakes, and other reflectors) are made so

that as the aircraft performs its planned mission, they reflect

the incident radar energy in other directions rather than creating a strong scattering lobe back toward the threat radar.

The RCS of an aircraft is made up of many individual scatter -

ing centers. The greatest success in RCSR has been made by

identifying those strongest radar reflectors and using shaping

techniques to reduce their RCS contribution. After an LO shape

is designed, additional RCSR steps can be taken with radar

absorbent material (RAM) and radar cancellation techniques.

The first step in shaping is to undertake a mission analysis

to determine the offensive mission requirements (e.g., payload,

range, and so on) and the enemy threat system’s order of

battle. The threat analysis will determine the most likely and

most threatening engagement sectors or specific fields of view.

Aircraft shaping must provide for cargo and/or weapons car -

riage, fuel capacity, and effective sensor employment while

seeking to move the radar reflections and returns out of these

engagement sectors and fields of view and into another sector

that is not so easily detected or threatening if the reflected

radar is observed. This shaping strategy has its challenges.

While the most dangerous frontal sector’s radar returns

have been minimized, the less threatening beam and tail aspect detection sectors must also be reduced to achieve an

aspect or viewing-angle-balanced RCS. Assuming that the

greatest threat to detection and interception will come from

the frontal aspect, the incident radar energy that is reflected

will be redirected, due to shaping, away from the radar receiver location and into a different set of viewing angles not

covered by radar detection sites. This redirection will work if

the threat analysis is correct, a thorough strike route has

been planned, and flexible tactics are employed.

There are several shaping methods for this radar energy

reflection redirection. The first method of reducing RCS is to

sweep the wings back at a very large angle and avoid long

constant curves that will reflect radar into many viewing angles. The specular reflections from the leading edge will be to

the side of the aircraft’s flight path into tight viewing angles.

Minimizing the effects of the engine intakes is another method

49
of reducing RCS. The mission profile of the aircraft may make

observation of its intakes highly unlikely if it operates at high

altitude. In this case, the intakes could be placed on the upper

surfaces of the aircraft and hidden from the enemy’s ground

radars. Next, wing and fuselage joints can be smoothed to

reduce corner reflections. The emphasizing of these lowerthreat engagement sectors by redirection of additional radar

reflections or “spikes” can be acceptable if our mission profile

and threat analysis are correct.6 It is to the benefit of the LO

aircraft if these spikes can be narrow so as to provide the

redirection of the reflected radar energy into a viewing angle

that has a lower threat potential for detection and engage -

ment. The LO penetration potential can be further enhanced

through smart flight planning and mission employment tactics

that will also control the detection opportunities of other sen -

sors in an enemy integrated air defense system (IADS).

A discussion of the shaping design progression will be useful to understand how controlled reflection of incident radar

energy is a major contributor to the LO qualities of an aircraft.

In a conventional planform (fig. 15) where the leading edges of

the wings have a small taper or sweep and the trailing edges

are perpendicular to the aircraft’s longitudinal axis, the major

RCS contributor in the forward aspect will be the leading

edges of the wing, especially where the radar’s line of sight

strikes the leading edge in a 90° angle. When looking at this

aircraft design from the rear and at small angles above or

below, the major RCS contributor will be the trailing edges.

The first attempts at RCSR for this aircraft design would be

to sweep the wings further back (fig. 16). The RCS reflection

from both the leading and trailing edges would shift away from

a direct frontal or rearward reflection viewing angle.

In the next design step, the major RCS contribution from

the wing’s leading edges could be further lessened by sweeping with wings even more aft. The length of the wings in -

creases as their sweep increases, and the new length also

increases the strength of a threat radar return. One way of

spreading that strengthened RCS return over a greater viewing

angle would be to shape the wing’s leading edge with a curve

(fig. 17). This curve would not decrease the strength of the

50
RCS return lobe, but would spread the energy out over a

larger viewing angle.

It is considered more advantageous to maintain an LO

signature if shaping moves the radar returns into specific,

less threatening and detectable viewing angles. The curved

leading edge defeats this goal by increasing the radar return’s viewing angles while only slightly decreasing the

strength of the return.

As the LO design development continues, a highly swept,

straight leading edge is chosen (fig. 18). It has a strong radar

return that is tightly restricted to a narrow set of viewing

angles. These radar return spikes are well away from the

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 213.

Figure 15. Radar Reflection of a Conventional Aircraft Planform

51
nose-on high-threat viewing angle, and their exposure to other

threats during a mission can be controlled with smart route

planning and tactical maneuver.

To design an effective LO aircraft, the remaining nonspecu -

lar RCS contributors must also be considered and reduced.

These nonspecular RCS reflection, “fuzzballs,” radiate and reflect in many viewing angles. 7

 On a conventional design, these

fuzzball contributors—aircraft skin and electrical conductivity

discontinuities such as seams, gaps, and changes in the material’s electrical properties—produce a very detectable surface

traveling-wave-radar return. The STW moves from the wing

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 213.

Figure 16. Radar Reflections from Aircraft Planform with Increased

Wing Sweep

52
leading edge to the sharp discontinuity at the trailing edge

and the wing tips. The STW reflection off the straight trailing

edge returns back toward the nose-on, high-threat forward-aspect viewing angle. To decrease this STW contribution, we can

reduce the strength of the reflection into the high-threat noseon forward aspect by curving the trailing edge and rounding

the sharp wing tips to shift their return into viewing angles

other than the nose-on, high-threat sector (fig. 19). Using RAM

in the ends of the aircraft structure will also reduce the STW

intensity.

Surface and electrical discontinuities such as skin seams

and joint gaps serve as great reflectors of the STW. Improved

design, construction, and maintenance practices can eliminate these skin reflections, present a long, smooth, and electrically consistent surface to the STW, and allow the RAM at

the ends of the fuselage to attenuate and diminish the traveling wave’s intensity, resulting in a very low radar reflection.8

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc. 1985), 214.

Figure 17. Radar Reflection from an Aircraft Planform with a Curved

and Swept Leading Edge

53
The shaping design efforts described here have centered on

decreasing the aircraft’s total radar signature by redirecting

the existing radar returns into other areas that are not as

easily detected by the highest threat systems the aircraft may

most likely encounter. The most dangerous radar returns have

now been redirected into front quartering and beam aspects.

Detection of these returns, while not as threatening, is still a

concern and a goal for the design engineer to decrease and for

the mission planner and aircrew to handle with smart planning and in-flight tactical execution.

These redirected radar reflections combine with the returns

from such scattering centers as the engine pods, wing pylons,

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 214.

Figure 18. Radar Reflection from an Aircraft Planform with a Highly

Swept Straight Leading Edge

54
and wing/fuselage joint to produce large radar reflections.

Shaping also allows us to decrease the fuselage RCS contribu -

tion. A standard fuselage design produces strong radar returns in the beam aspect and also into a broad number of

viewing angles (fig. 20).

The addition of a chine that blends the wing into the fuselage and can flatten the beam aspect of the fuselage greatly

diminishes the radar returns in the beam aspect (fig. 21).

Figure 19. Radar Reflection from an Aircraft Planform with a Highly

Swept Leading Edge and a Curved Trailing Edge

55
The design can be taken further by blending the chine into

a wing that is flat along the lower surface (fig. 22). The result

would be an LO aircraft optimized for stealth operations at

high altitudes. The flat wing blended into the fuselage chine

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 215.

Figure 20. Basic Aircraft Fuselage Section

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 215.

Figure 21. Aircraft Fuselage with Symmetrical Chine

56
RCSR would shield and redirect spike reflection away from

searching ground or airborne radars.

The logical extension of these wing and fuselage shaping

designs from the forward- and beam-aspect viewing angles

can be combined into a single integrated design (fig. 23). Here,

the wings are highly swept with straight edges. The wing tips

and trailing edges are rounded and curved. The wing is flat on

the bottom, low mounted, and blended into the fuselage with a

chine above. The vertical fins are canted inward to redirect

beam-aspect radar illumination into another elevation viewing

angle, and, in this instance, the engine intake is mounted on

top of the aircraft to reduce its exposure to radar energy from

ground threats during high-altitude penetration.

The design of cavities such as engine intakes and exhausts

is very important to RCSR. These cavities can function as

three- or two-sided corner reflectors, and the face of the en gine

fan, compressor, or turbine is a perfect radar reflector and an

identification target for advanced radars. Some solutions to

the intake question are placement and masking. If an LOP

operates mainly at high or low altitudes, then placing the

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 215.

Figure 22. Aircraft with Chine and Fuselage Blended

57
engine intake and exhaust above or below the wing will shield

those cavities and engine compressor or turbine blades from

radar illumination/reflection. The engine intakes can also be

masked by serpentine air passages that will allow the radar

waves to enter but not reflect nor exit. This trapping is done

using an S-curved intake path and positioning baffles so the

incident radar cannot directly strike the intake walls or engine

fan nor exit. Once trapped, the radar energy can be absorbed

by RAM coating and materials in the intake structure.

Aircraft cockpits can also produce tremendous radar reflection. Since windscreens are invisible to radar energy, the

many angles and flat radar-reflecting surfaces inside the

cockpit make it a significant RCS hotspot. When the canopy

is coated with transparent but electrically conductive substances such as a thin layer of metal, the radar waves will

not penetrate the canopy surface. The radar waves will follow the windscreen surface or reflect with a lower average

intensity into wide viewing angles from this curved surface.

Visible light can enter and leave easily, permitting unaffected flight operations; but radar will not pass through and

reflect off the many flat surfaces and corner reflectors within

the cockpit.

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 216.

Figure 23. LO Aircraft Design with Fuselage and Wing Shaping Applied

58
On-board aircraft ground mapping or intercept radar is another challenge for the LO aircraft designer. Besides producing

the high radar reflections typical of a cavity, the radar antenna itself also adds greatly to the RCS. However, new radar

antenna designs such as a flat plate or planar arrays can be

tilted to reflect and redirect incident radar energy. The anten -

nas can still function effectively by electronically steering their

beams. Another RCSR technique is to build a radome that is

made of material that allows specific frequency bands to pass

through it. This concept will be discussed in more detail in the

section on passive cancellation.

Proper shaping to achieve an LO RCS also depends on making small surface details such as the skin seams, gaps, and

rivet heads less visible. This RCSR major effect is on reducing

back-scattered STW. If RCSR, by large-scale shaping, is successful at redirecting specular or spike reflections from flat

surfaces and external features of the aircraft, then the RCS

contributions from STW may not be a significant RCS con -

cern. The assembly tolerances and maintenance practices will

have to be improved by several orders of magnitude above

today’s conventional aircraft standards to meet and maintain

an LOP’s radar-performance specifications.

Radar-Absorbing Materials

While shaping achieves the highest reduction in aspectdependent RCS, RAM can further reduce the amount of incident radar energy that an aircraft will reflect. These materials

do just as their name implies: they reduce reflected radar

energy by absorbing the incident radar energy. Basically,

these materials dissipate electromagnetic radar energy much

as an electric circuit resistor transforms the electricity passing

through it into heat, but what little heat is created will not be

enough to be detected with infrared sensors. The heat pro -

duced from energy absorption in RAM is insignificant and undetecta ble when compared to that from engine exhausts, intake,

jet plume, or even aerodynamic heating of the aircraft skin.

Some materials absorb the electrical component; others, the

magnetic-wave component. For example, carbon is a dielectric

or a poor conductor of electricity and thus will absorb the

59
electrical component of the radar wave. However, materials

that primarily absorb the electrical wave must usually be several inches thick to work against the complete radar frequency

band, especially at the low frequencies. The bulk of materials

needed for effective absorption would add too much weight to

the aircraft. 9

The molecular structure of compounds that contain oxides

of iron (ferrite) make excellent material for absorbing the

magnetic component of the radar wave. It can be made thin

enough to be effective and therefore will not add restrictive

weight to the aircraft. Metals that absorb the magnetic com -

ponent of radar waves need only be one-tenth as thick as

dielectric RAM to provide the necessary frequency-band coverage. Magnetic RAM can also reduce the intensity of STW.

By using graduated thicknesses of magnetic RAM on the nose

and on the leading and trailing edges of the wing and tail

section, the STW strength will be diminished and absorbed.

Any backward STW that remains will be of relatively too low

intensity for easy detection.

Iron-based RAM can be applied to the aircraft in several

ways. The RAM can be made into small tiles and bonded to

the aircraft’s structure or skin. The RAM can also be applied

in support material such as rubber matrix sheets and

molded or glued to the aircraft. Another technique for apply -

ing RAM includes spray painting with an iron-based paint.

This technique requires special equipment, and several layers must be applied to achieve the desired radar absorption.

This “iron paint” has advantages over tiles or matrix RAM

sheets, because it can more easily cover irregular or doublecurved surfaces.

Protecting the aircraft cockpit from radar is an important

task. An aircraft cockpit contains many two- and threesided corner reflectors and is a strong contributor to the

RCS of an aircraft. The coating used on the cockpit transparencies, while preventing the radar transmission from en -

tering into and reflecting out of the cockpit, reflects too

much radar energy itself into broad viewing angles. A RAM

technique to solve this problem is embedding a circuit-analo g

absorber grid in the canopy windscreen material. By embed -

60
ding a network or grid of thin wires of certain design and

dimensions (based on radar wavelengths to be absorbed) in

the windscreen or canopy material, the grid can effectively

absorb incoming radar energy and prevent its entering or exit -

ing the aircraft cockpit. The advantage of using this technique

is that the grid is light and has marginal volume. The difficulty

is that a special pattern is required for each band of frequency

to be absorbed.

Hybrid RAM can be made from layers of magnetic and

dielectric absorbers. Magnetic RAM functions best at lowradar frequencies, and materials are most effective when

they absorb across a desired band of frequencies. These

types of RAM are called broadband RAM. Materials that also

absorb a small band of frequencies are called resonant RAM.

RAM is usually applied by using layers of varying thickness

and different absorbing characteristics separated by free

spaces. The material compounds and degree of thickness

used vary for the particular position on the aircraft where

the RAM is to be mounted.

Source: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 259.

Figure 24. Circuit-Analog Absorber Patterns

61
Reinforced carbon-carbon can be used as economically as

RAM. These compounds are good radar absorbers and have

high-heat resistance. These qualities make it very useful for

shielding high-temperature areas such as engine exhaust

cavities.1 0 Recent advances permit the use of polyanaline

plastics and Schiff-based salts as radar-absorbing materials. The polyanaline plastics can be manufactured into different shapes, and their electrical conductivity can be varied

with the application of low-voltage electricity. This property

allows these plastics to either transmit or stop particular

radar energy bands. Compounds made of Schiff-based salts

absorb radio and radar waves well and weigh much less

than traditional dielectric or magnetic radar-absorbing ma -

terials. These salts can be embedded and applied in a supporting matrix.

Passive Cancellation

Passive cancellation of incident radar energy is a tech -

nique of employing specifically constructed aircraft body

cavities to reflect radar waves in such a way that they will

mutually interfere with and continually cancel out incoming

radar, thus reducing an aircraft’s RCS. In reality, this RCSR

technique is not particularly effective. The large spectrum of

radar frequencies used by threat radars and the precise

body cavities required on aircraft—design features intended

to cancel out radar returns—may instead reinforce the radar

signal.

One offshoot of passive cancellation that has useful application is the frequency selective surface (FSS). The surface

masks a cavity such as an internally mounted sensor and

the highly radar-reflective material within from scattering

incident radar energy. The FSS is made up of certain geometric patterns that can be tuned to allow only a very precise frequency that matches the aircraft’s radar to be transmitted or received through the surface (fig. 25). Any other

out-of-band incident radar energy will not penetrate the FSS

and scatter off the many radar reflective surfaces inside the

radome. 1 1

62
Active Cancellation

The physics of electromagnetic radiation and also of radar

waves permits the cancellation of a reflected radar wave by

actively transmitting a radar wave that matches the frequency

and amplitude and is exactly 180° out of phase with the reflected wave. This technique, while simple in concept, is a tech -

nical challenge. Extremely high-speed electronics are required to

detect, analyze, and transmit the cancellation signal. The can -

cellation radar wave must also be transmitted in the proper

azimuth and time frame. The trade-off between LO benefits ver -

sus the cost and quantity of available aircraft equipment storage

space for the required electronics makes active cancellation an

RCSR technique whose time has not yet come.

Merging RCSR Techniques with Aircraft Design

Reducing the RCSR of an existing aircraft or one under

design is a process of compromise. The main factor is balancSource: Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1985), 259.

Figure 25. Frequency Selective Surface Geometries

63
ing cost with higher levels of RCSR, flight qualities, weight,

mission performance, and increased LO maintenance proc -

esses. This new area of aircraft engineering will break ground

not only in the design of LOPs but also in the production and

operation of such vehicles. Some sacrifice in flight performance may be necessary. The possible design impacts of RCSR

are reduced aerodynamic performance, added weight, reduced

payload, reduced range, and increased maintenance to preserve the LO qualities of the aircraft skin and structure. Addition of RAM will increase the aircraft’s LO properties but will

not improve fuel capacity, payload, or range.

Besides making compromises on cost and performance, we

must adopt design production techniques to build these new

types of aircraft. Traditional aircraft have not been developed

and manufactured to achieve LO quality. New levels of skinseam and gap tolerances are required to reduce the reflection

contributions of STW. Improved flight-line maintenance practices are required to sustain the LO qualities during normal

and combat operations. For example, aircraft skin panels are

routinely opened and closed for system checks and repairs.

For that reason, the seams and fasteners must be designed

not only to provide a very tight fit and smooth finish, but they

must also be able to stand a high-use rate without losing their

LO qualities. The smoothness of the skin, the radar-absorbing

qualities of the RAM, and the special paints applied may require protecting the aircraft from the environment as much as

possible. Operators should provide suitable basing facilities

and potential restrictive operational training guidelines to

maintain an LO aircraft’s low-radar signature.

Infrared Detection

As the ability to detect an LO aircraft by radar is reduced by

the previously discussed RCSR techniques, other portions of

an aircraft’s signature must be reduced to maintain the balance throughout the detection spectrum. Another significant

area to detect aircraft is by its infrared (IR) emissions. The

sources of IR radiation are the hot metal parts of the engine(s)

(e.g., fan, compressor, turbine blades, and exhaust nozzle),

the hot jet exhaust plume, reflected solar radiation, and the

64
aerodynamic heating of the aircraft’s leading edges. These IR

sources must also be considered against the ambient heat of

the environmental background. Engineers who design LO air -

craft must analyze and reduce or mask these IR energy sources.

The IR sensors or detectors used by an IADS are of a passive type. That is, the sensors receive only the emitted IR

radiation from the target. One of the challenges to defeat these

IR sensors is knowing when they are active and when detection has occurred or is about to occur. The general solution is

to greatly reduce the IR signature of an LO aircraft at all times

since knowing when the sensors are active is difficult.

The primary source of infrared radiation on an aircraft is

the hot engine parts. It is possible to reduce the observed heat

by using a lower-thrust power setting or by limiting use of the

afterburner. An aircraft can be initially designed with or modified to use a high-thrust turbofan, nonafterburning engine;

the use of such a turbofan will produce a cooler overall engine

installation and exhaust stream due to the bypass air’s shield -

ing the hot engine and exhaust plume.

Hot engine parts can be shielded from the most likely view -

ing angles by enclosing the exhaust nozzles in the aircraft’s

fuselage or in the wing and tail surfaces. The engine exhaust

nozzles also can be designed with louvers that will limit the

viewing sectors to a small set of viewing angles directly behind

and above or below the aircraft, depending on the most likely

mission profile. RAM air can also be channeled through the

engine bay to prevent hot spots from developing on the aircraft

skin and structure. The mixing of engine bypass or RAM cooling air with the hot exhaust stream can reduce the intensity of

the exhaust plume as a source of IR emissions. The turbofan

engine is effective at this task. The greater the bypass ratio—

the total amount of air pumped through the fan and the turbine versus the amount of air that passes only through the

turbine (hot section)—the greater the cooling benefits. The use

of elliptical or rectangular exhaust nozzles will also spread the

hot gases over a greater area, thus increasing the cooling of

the exhaust and reducing the IR detectability of the aircraft at

longer ranges.

65
Reflected solar radiation as an IR source can be decreased

by using special paints that do not readily reflect heat. The

aerodynamic heat produced by high-speed flight could be diminished by using the fuel stored in the fuselage and wings as

a leading-edge heat sink or by operating the aircraft at subsonic speeds when the mission profile would be susceptible to

IR detection. Another option may be to use heat sinks and IR

absorbers to reradiate heat from aerodynamic friction and to

operate the aircraft’s avionics and environmental control sys -

tems in IR frequencies that the atmosphere’s water vapor will

readily absorb and mask. Heat from these sources will then

not contribute to the detection of the aircraft by IR sensors.

Visual Detection

Several characteristics of an aircraft contribute to its visual

detection. These features include size, shape, point color(s),

contrast, movement and maneuver, contrails, canopy, body

glint and glare, exhaust smoke, and ground shadows. 1 2

Size

The size of an aircraft is one of the greatest factors in deter -

mining the range at which an observer can first see the air -

craft. The aircraft’s size is generally determined by the required

aircraft performance and mission requirements such as range,

payload, and flight characteristics at high and low speeds.

Operational consideration should be given to flying the LO

aircraft in a manner that presents the smallest dimension or

planform view to the most likely IADS observer or sensor.

Shape

The shape of an aircraft contributes markedly to its visibility

and is determined mainly by design requirements. As LO becomes more of an operational need and a design requirement,

then aircraft shapes will change to favor a balanced LO signature. Long, thin, smooth shapes with a low-profile cockpit,

integrated fuselage and engine intakes, and exhaust have a

smaller probability of visual detection than do squat, thick

aircraft that use many sharp angles, have large surface dis -

66
continuities such as engine pods, and are configured with

external stores. Gently curved designs have a smaller visual

signature than boxy aircraft. An angular aircraft shape pro -

duces many shadows and, consequently, many areas of dark

to light contrast that may attract an observer’s attention.1 3

Paint Color

Blending patterns of various shades of paint in a camou -

flage scheme is an accepted method of reducing visibility of

military aircraft. Since an LO aircraft’s high priority is to avoid

detection, camouflage paint selection and scheme design

should emphasize blending with the background. Air Force

labs have determined that the “brightness” or reflectance of

aircraft paint, not necessarily the color or the pattern, is the

major factor in reducing the range at which the human eye

first acquires, then focuses, on an airborne object. The labora -

tories recommend using a specific reflectance paint that

matches the most likely characteristics of the ground and sky

backgrounds against which aircraft will fly in order to make

an attacking aircraft less detectable (table 5) (fig. 26).

A secondary decision in camouflaging aircraft usually is to

match the predominant background color. The color of paint

selected can differ, based on the observer’s position. Therefore,

we often choose one color paint for the top and a different one

for the bottom or side of the penetrating aircraft.1 4 The final

determining factor on which color, reflectance, or design

scheme is chosen should be based on whether visual detec tion

Source: The Camouflage Handbook, AAFWAL-TR-86-1028 (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Force Wright

Aeronautical Laboratories, 1986), chap. 1, 4–8.

Figure 26. Paint Reflectance Concept Examples

67
Table 5

Luminous Reflectance of Typical Terrain/Background Materials

Background Feature Approximate Reflectance (Percentage)

Water

Bay 3–4 

Bay and River 6–10

Inland Waters 5–10

Ocean 3–7 

Deep Ocean 3–5 

Vegetation

Jungle 3–6 

Forest 4–10

Plowed Fields 20–25

Green Fields 3–6 

Wheat Fields 7–10

Soil/Snow

Bare Ground 10–20

Very White Ground 11–15

Some Trees 7–10

Dry Sand 24–31

Rock 12–30

Snow 70–86

Man-made

Concrete 15–35

Blacktop 8–9 

Clouds

Dense and Opaque 55–78

Thin 36–40

Source: The Camouflage Handbook, AAFWAL-TR-86-1028 (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Force Wright

Aeronautical Laboratories, 1986), chap. 1, 3–14.

68
is probable and on scenarios where the benefits of a camou -

flage paint scheme are the greatest.

Movement and Maneuver

LO penetrating aircraft can greatly increase their visual detectability if they perform significant maneuvers. The maneu -

vers most likely to attract visual attention are steep climbs or

dives and large turns where a wing flashes or the planform of

the aircraft is exposed to a head/tail-on, quartering, or beam

observer. Also a maneuvering aircraft may appear larger and

therefore increase its visual detectability. A balanced signature can be maintained by limiting maneuver during LO operations.

Contrails

The elongated, tubular-shaped cloud of ice crystals or water

vapor made by the rapid cooling of an aircraft engine exhaust

that forms a few hundred feet behind the aircraft can easily

reveal the aircraft’s presence during day or night operations.

US air combat experience shows that when contrails were

visible, losses greatly increased. Generally, a ground observer

can see an aircraft “conning” more than 30 miles away. The

same aircraft, when not leaving a contrail, would be visible

only up to six miles. An observer in a threat aircraft can

normally see another aircraft at seven miles without contrails.

If the same aircraft is producing contrails, the aerial observer

may see the aircraft up to 60 miles away (fig. 27).

The length and intensity of a contrail depends on the atmospheric conditions, aircraft type, and aircraft velocity. Typical contrails vary in length from five to 15 nautical miles (NM)

and are generally a few hundred feet in diameter. Contrails

usually occur between 25,000 and 60,000 feet in altitude and

in very cold temperatures (below 40° C). In very cold climates

such as the polar regions, contrails can form much closer to

the earth’s surface. In the equatorial climates, contrails may

form only above 75,000 feet. How long contrails remain visible

depends on the air density and turbulence available to dis -

perse the ice crystals. Studies have indicated two approaches

69
to reducing or eliminating contrails. Since the quantity of

water produced by the combustion of fuel is the most important factor in contrail formation, most efforts in this area are

directed at fuel research. One approach is to reduce the

amounts of water vapor produced in the combustion of fuel by

using fuels low in hydrogen. A second approach is to reduce

the size of the water vapor particles in the engine exhaust by

adding chemicals to the exhaust plume. These chemicals will

not only reduce the amount of water vapor exhausted but may

also decrease the size of the water droplets, thus diminishing

the amount of light reflected or refracted by the smaller ice

crystals.1 5

Figure 27. Contrails as a Detection Factor

70
Canopy and Body Glint

Canopy and body glint occurs when sunlight is reflected in

a narrow, concentrated viewing angle by windscreens, win -

dows, glossy paint, and metallic surfaces. Canopy glint is a

momentary cue that attracts an observer. It does not last long

enough for target tracing or weapons employment. Glint is still

a problem for LOPs because minimizing initial detection is

almost as important as preventing weapons guidance. Curved

windscreens reflect sunlight through a great number of view -

ing angles. These isotropic reflections contribute significantly

to an aircraft’s visual signature. The most effective technique

to minimize canopy glint is to replace curved transparencies

with clear, flat plates. While the flat transparencies will all

have glint, the viewing angles of the reflection will be greatly

reduced, thus limiting the possibilities for detection by observers. Using low-reflectance, lusterless paints can also reduce body or fuselage glint.

Body Glare

Body glare is of a much lower intensity and is spread out

over a greater viewing angle than glint. The application of

lusterless paint will greatly reduce body glare.

Exhaust Smoke

Reducing exhaust smoke is an important factor in minimizing detection of combat aircraft. Experience shows that large

aircraft with old-technology turbojet engines can leave a

smoke trail that is easily detectable 20 to 30 miles behind the

lead aircraft. How long the smoke trail persists will depend on

atmospheric turbulence or wind currents. Reducing exhaust

smoke is a factor of engine efficiency and increasing combustion temperatures.

Ground Shadows

Aircraft produce ground shadows when flying close to the

ground. These shadows are easily detectable by airborne ob -

servers (table 6). Backgrounds that provide a high, uniform con -

trast are most likely to display a detectable shadow. Examples

71
of these uniform backgrounds are dry lake beds, snow cover,

and undercast or desert areas. Shadows result from direct

illumination from the sun or bright moonlight on the aircraft.

When these shadows fall upon a high-contrast background,

an interceptor pilot can easily detect the presence of a penetrating aircraft.

Miscellaneous Visual Signatures

Other important contributions to maintaining a low-visual

profile come from minimizing the effect of the bright light and

heavy smoke trail that results from launching weapons or

firing guns, aircraft navigation and anticollision lights, and

cockpit lights or helmet reflections. Randomly exposed open -

ings such as speed-brake or flight-control wells and interiors

should be painted with camouflaged or low-reflectance paints.

These openings will contrast if painted a color different from

the aircraft skin. Other surfaces such as the interior of the

weapons-bay doors and air intakes should also be painted.

Aircraft markings and insignias should be reduced in size and

painted to match the general color and reflectance of the air -

craft paint.

Decreasing the number of external stores is another impor -

tant factor in maintaining a low-visual signature. Aircraft

stores, such as fuel tanks, weapons, or mission support

equipment should be carried internally. If this is not possible,

then the stores should be carried conformally to minimize any

increase in the visual size of the aircraft and any change in

Table 6

Minimum Altitude for Ground-Shadow Avoidance

Aircraft

Type

Aircraft

Planform

Area (Ft2)

Minimum Altitude (Feet) vs. Solar Elevation

 90° 70° 40° 20°

Helicopter 200 1,300 1,300 900 500

Fighter 800 2,300 2,200 1,900 1,000

Bomber 5,000 7,700 7,200 5,000 2,600

Transport 11,000 11,000 10,800 7,400 3,900

72
the shape of the fuselage. These conformal external stores

should not produce right angles, high-contrast surfaces, nor

easily detected shadows. Any external stores must be painted

an appropriate color and reflectance factor to match that of

the aircraft.

Acoustic Detection

The major source of detectable noise from an aircraft is from

its engine intakes and exhausts. Intake engine noise comes from

the fan and compressor, while the exhaust noise comes from the

fast-moving exhaust plume. Acoustic-reduction techniques em -

ployed by high-bypass turbofan engines produce minimum

sound for the thrust available. The exhaust roar is minimized by

the large, cool layer of bypass fan air surrounding the hot jet

plume. Jet engine intake noise can be minimized with the application of “hush kits” that use sound-absorbing material and

surface features in the intake construction.

Notes

1. Fulvio Bessi and Francesco Zacca, “Introduction to Stealth,” Military

Technology, May 1989.

2. Doug Richardson , Stealth: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the

Air (New York: Orion Books, 1989), 25–30.

3. Eugene F. Knott, Radar Cross Section (Dedham, Mass.: Artech House,

Inc., 1985), 52.

4. Ibid., 30.

5. Nicholas C. Currie, Techniques of Radar Reflectivity Measurement

(Norwood, Mass.: Artech House, Inc., 1989), 190.

6. Knott, 208.

7. Ibid., 419.

8. Ibid., 149, 267–69.

9. Richardson, 44.

10. Ibid., 42.

11. Knott, 258.

12 . The Camouflage Handbook, AAFWAL-TR-86-1028 (Wright-Patterson

AFB, Ohio: Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories, 1986), chap. 1, 4–8.

13. Ibid., 17.

14. Ibid., 1.

15. Ibid., 1–12.

73
Glossary

AEF air expeditionary force

AU Air University

AWC Air War College

C

2

command and control

CADRE College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research,

 and Education

CONUS continental United States

CJCS chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DOD Department of Defense

dBsm decibel square meters

ECM electronic countermeasures

FSS frequency selective surface

GHz gigahertz

IADS integrated air defense system

IR infrared radiation

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JV2010 Joint Vision 2010

LO low observable

LOP low-observable penetrator

MHz megahertz

m

2

square meters

PGM precision-guided munitions

75
NCA National Command Authorities

NM nautical miles

radar radio detection and ranging

RAM radar absorbent material

RCS radar cross section

RCSR radar cross section reduction

RMA revolution in military affairs

SA situation awareness

STW surface traveling waves

UAV uninhabited air vehicle

USAF United States Air Force

US United States

AirLand Battle. The US military operational concept developed by the US Army and US Air Force to employ coordinated

ground and airpower to defeat a Soviet and Warsaw Pact inva -

sion of West Germany.

circuit-analog absorber. A radar-absorbing-material tech -

nique applied via special design of thin wires within the canopy structure. This grid of wires absorbs radar energy and

prevents its transmission into and out of the aircraft cockpit.

Desert Storm. The coalition military operation, led by the

United States with European, Asian, and Middle Eastern par -

ticipation, that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait in January

through March 1991.

disproportionality. The objective sense where a force can em -

ploy weapons in numbers and lethality in greater orders of magnitude than the opposing force is able to achieve. The resulting

destruction is also far greater than that inflicted on us or expected by an adversary’s political and military leadership.

dominant battle-space knowledge. A state of awareness that

provides all militarily significant information in any theater we

choose. It results from fusing real-time, all-weather informa76
tion continuously and rapidly processed into usable knowledge and intelligence.

dominant maneuver. A JV2010 operational concept in which

the multidimensional application of information engagement

and mobility capabilities are used to position and employ

widely dispersed joint forces to accomplish the assigned operational task.

engagement hierarchy. The tactical sequence used to find and

engage penetrating aircraft in the following order: detection, cor -

relation, tracking, weapon guidance, and warhead fusing.

execution parameters. Factors or attributes that describe an

aircraft attack mission or sortie. These factors include routing

to and from the target, timing requirements, target order/priority for multiple targets, and weapon choice/options.

frequency selective surface. An aircraft surface that is made

up of certain geometric patterns whose purpose is to either

prevent or allow transmission of specific radar frequencies

through the surface material.

gigahertz. One billion cycles per second. A term used to describe the frequency of electromagnetic radiation such as ra -

dio or radar waves.

glint. A flash of reflected radar energy.

integrated air defense system. A defensive net that merges

aircraft detection, interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and

antiaircraft artillery with command and control assets to detect, track, and engage penetrating aircraft into a protected

airspace.

joint force air component commander. The military com -

mander, chosen by the joint force commander, who plans,

coordinates, and executes air operations in a specified area of

responsibility.

large-scale support. Traditional force packaging where the

strike aircraft are matched with fighter escort/sweep, suppres -

sion of enemy air defenses, stand-off jamming, airborne warning

and control squadron, and the inherently large air refueling

77
requirements. LOPs (i.e., F-117s) required minimum support

against a dense and well-integrated Iraqi air defense net.

megahertz. One million cycles per second. A term used to

describe the frequency of electromagnetic radiation such as

radio or radar waves.

parallel war. A term introduced by Col John Warden that

describes targeting across a spectrum of targets in a com -

pressed time period. The goal is to simultaneously attack en -

emy centers of gravity across all levels of war (strategic, opera -

tional, and tactical) at rates faster than the enemy can repair

and adapt to.

passive attack. An attack that decoys, deceives, and degrades

an integrated air defense system by smart employment of LO

signature management where you permit detection of your

aircraft at a place and time of your own choosing followed by

recloaking and escape.

precision engagement. A JV2010 operational concept that

consists of target locations, effective command and control,

accurate weapons delivery, and efficient weapons effects.

radar. A method of detecting distant objects and determining

their position, velocity, or other characteristics by analysis of

very high frequency radio waves reflected from their surfaces.

radar cross section. The measure of an object’s ability to

reflect incident radar energy back to the transmitting site. RCS

is expressed in terms of area and in units of square meters or

decibels above or below one square meter (see table 3).

radar cross section reduction. A process in which the RCS

of an object is reduced by shaping, using radar-absorbing

materials, and passive and active cancellation of incident ra -

dar energy.

reflectance. The measurement of how much or what per -

centage of ambient environmental light is reflected by a cer -

tain material—natural or man-made. A high-reflectance surface or color is glossy and a low-reflectance surface is dull and

lusterless.

78
revolution in military affairs. A recent term that describes

the concept in which militaries fundamentally change both

their concept of operations and their organization structures

to best employ radically new technologies. An RMA gives us a

superior set of military strengths that are not available to

other competitors.

scintillation. The sparkling of a radar return due to mutual

interference phasing of the radar reflections.

signature. The telltale characteristics of a particular object

that gives away its presence (e.g., radar, self-generated electronic emissions, infrared, visual, and acoustic).

signature management. The ability to limit enemy awareness

of your location, routing, and intentions. Signature manage -

ment can be obtained by a combination of aircraft characteristics, mission planning, and in-flight tactics.

situation awareness. The tactical state where the aircrew

maintains knowledge of enemy location/intentions and their

own aircraft status and performance.

surface traveling waves. Type of reflected radar wave that

strikes an object at a near-grazing angle and travels along the

surface. Once reaching the end of the object or upon encountering a surface discontinuity, the wave will split into two

waves of equal magnitude, but opposite directions.

79
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83
Implementing Joint Vision 2010

A Revolution in Military Affairs

for Strategic Air Campaigns

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Dr. Glenn Morton

Copy Editor

Debbie Banker

Book Design and Cover Illustration

Steven C. Garst

Cover Design

Susan Fair

Illustrations

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Linda C. Colson