United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

April 1995 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Concurrency in

Development and

Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be

Reduced

GAO/NSIAD-95-59

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259204 

April 19, 1995

Congressional Committees

As called for by the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, we assessed the

concurrency between the development and production phases of the Air

Force’s F-22 fighter program and the risk associated with that

concurrency.

Background Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between development and

production of a system. The stated rationale for concurrency is to

introduce systems in a more timely manner or to fulfill an urgent need, to

avoid technology obsolescence and/or to maintain an efficient industrial

development/production work force. For measuring the degree of

concurrency in this report we used a statutorily required guide issued by

the Department of Defense (DOD) in April 1990 for assessing concurrency

and associated risk in major acquisition programs. Its measure of

concurrency is the amount of initial operational testing and evaluation

(IOT&E) completed before entering production of a system.

Initial operational tests are field tests intended to demonstrate a system’s

effectiveness and suitability for military use. IOT&E is a key internal control

to ensure that decisionmakers have objective information available on a

weapon system’s performance and to minimize risks of procuring costly

and ineffective systems.

In the late 1980s, the Congress found that DOD was acquiring a large

portion of total program quantities, using the low-rate initial production

(LRIP) concept, without successfully completing IOT&E. As a result,

legislation was enacted in 1989 to limit LRIP quantities for major systems.

The law, 10 U.S.C. 2400, defined LRIP as the minimum production quantity

needed to provide production representative articles for IOT&E, establish

an initial production base, and permit an orderly increase in the

production rate sufficient to lead to full-rate production after completion

of IOT&E.

In the conference report supporting the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-189), the conferees indicated

that LRIP quantities should not total a significant percentage of a total

planned procurement. Later, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
B-259204 

1994 prescribed new controls for LRIP. The act states that the Secretary of

Defense must specifically explain to the Congress why any planned LRIP

quantities exceed 10 percent of a planned production quantity of a system,

as defined at the milestone II or development decision. This provision,

however, was not in effect when the F-22 program reached milestone II.

The F-22 passed milestone II in 1991. At that time, the Air Force planned to

acquire 648 F-22 operational aircraft at a cost of $86.6 billion. After the

Bottom Up Review, completed by DOD in September 1993, the planned

quantity of F-22s was reduced to 442 at an estimated cost of $71.6 billion.

We recently reported that aircraft systems, including the T-45 trainer

aircraft, B-1B bomber, and the C-17 cargo aircraft, as well as many other

smaller systems, entered LRIP before successfully completing any IOT&E.

1

This resulted in the purchase of systems requiring significant and

sometimes costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance,

acceptance of less capable systems than planned, and in some cases

deployment of substandard systems to combat forces.

The LRIP contract award is scheduled for September 1997. LRIP aircraft are

those to be procured during the period of concurrency.

Results in Brief Although the F-22 program involves considerable risk because it embodies

important technological advances that are critical to its operational

success, the F-22 program exhibits a high degree of concurrency because

the program will enter production well before commencement of IOT&E.

This concurrency will permit procurement of a significant quantity of

F-22s before many of the technology advances are flight tested and before

completion of IOT&E. Historically, there have been numerous examples of

the adverse consequences of concurrent development and production, that

is, buying weapon systems before they demonstrate, through testing, that

they perform as required.

The Air Force plans to procure 80 F-22s under LRIP, or 18 percent of the

total planned procurement, at an estimated cost of $12.4 billion, before

completing IOT&E. Although the F-22 program entered the engineering and

manufacturing development phase before the Federal Acquisition and

Streamlining Act was passed, the F-22 LRIP quantities substantially exceed

the 10-percent guideline included in the act which requires the Secretary

1

Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely

(GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 1994).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
B-259204 

of Defense to submit a specific explanation to the Congress. The

percentage of F-22s to be committed to production before completion of

IOT&E is higher than most recent fighter programs.

F-22 production rates in the LRIP phase of the program are planned to

accelerate so that 75 percent of the full-production rate, or 36 aircraft a

year, will be achieved under the LRIP phase of the program. We believe the

planned rate of acceleration exceeds the amount that is needed to

successfully complete the LRIP phase of the program and essentially

represents a plan to commit to a full-rate production schedule before IOT&E

is completed. Limiting LRIP quantities to about six to eight aircraft a year,

or the production rate that can be supported by the first set of tooling,

appears to be a more prudent approach, given the high degree of

concurrency now incorporated in the program and the potential problems

associated with technological advances.

Technology advances and innovations that are critical to the F-22’s

operational success include an advanced architecture for the integrated

avionics system, a propulsion system that will allow cruising at supersonic

speeds without the afterburners current fighters need, and low observable

(stealth) technologies in an aircraft that is both highly maneuverable and

can travel at supersonic speeds.

The need for the F-22, based on our analysis, is not urgent. Our recent

report concerning planned replacement of F-15s with F-22s amply

demonstrated that the initial operational capability planned for the F-22

could be deferred.2

 Moreover, engine and stealthiness problems already

disclosed by DOD, and the potential for avionics and software problems,

underscore the need to demonstrate the weapon system’s performance

through flight testing before significant commitments are made to

production.

Concurrency in the

F-22 Program

In 1990, DOD performed a statutorily required analysis of the concurrency

in acquisition programs partly to define the appropriate measures for

evaluating the degree of concurrency and associated risk in programs. The

2

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature As Currently Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25,

1994).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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Office of the Secretary of Defense defined a highly concurrent program3 as

one that proceeds into LRIP before significant IOT&E is complete.

Using DOD guidelines, concurrency in the F-22 program is high because the

F-22 program is scheduled to proceed into LRIP well before any IOT&E is

started. Further, considering the new technology advancements being

developed for use in the aircraft, the level of concurrency increases the

cost, schedule, and technical risks of the program. We found that

development flight tests of critical F-22 technology advances are not

scheduled to begin until about 1 year after LRIP is scheduled to start and

over $2 billion will have been committed to procure F-22 aircraft.

According to the F-22 acquisition plan, the Air Force will commit to LRIP

quantities that increase from 4 aircraft a year to 36 a year (an 800-percent

increase), totaling 80 aircraft, before completion of IOT&E. Production of 36

aircraft a year under LRIP represents 75 percent of the planned

full-production rate. The estimated cost of those 80 aircraft is $12.4 billion.

Figure 1 shows the planned schedule of commitments to procurement of

F-22 aircraft and the estimated cumulative costs prior to completion of

IOT&E.

3

Definition in Report on Guidelines for Determining the Degree of Risk Appropriate for the

Development of Major Defense Acquisitions Systems, and Assessing the Degree of Risk Associated

with Various Degrees of Concurrency; and Concurrency in Major Acquisition Programs, April 1990.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
B-259204 

Figure 1: Planned Commitments to

Procure F-22 Aircraft and Estimated

Cumulative Costs Prior to Completion

of IOT&E (dollars in billions) Total


aircraft quantity


started

Total 


dollars 


committed


Total aircraft procured under LRIP


Total dollars committed for LRIP


10

11

13

7

8

9

6

5

4

3

2

1

FY97 FY98 FY99 FY2000 FY2001

100

70

80

90

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

FY96

12

A first set of hardened tooling is required initially to produce the

developmental aircraft for testing. Program office officials told us that the

maximum quantity of F-22s that can be produced with the first set of

tooling is about 6 to 8 aircraft a year.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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The concurrency of development, testing and production in the F-22

program is shown in figure 2, which shows concurrent development and

production from September 1997 through February 2002.

Figure 2: Concurrent Development and Production of the F-22

Development

IOT&E

LRIP

Activity

Sept.


2001

Aug. 1991

24

Feb. 2002

4 4 12

Sept.


1997

1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002

Fiscal Year

1992 2001 2003

36

Dec.1999

Long lead for


full rate production

Concurrency


Aircraft production rate


Long lead


48

Low-rate production of the F-22 is scheduled to begin in September 1997.

However, IOT&E is not scheduled to take place until December 1999

through February 2002.4

 Thus, the testing is not scheduled to be complete

until over 4 years after the start of production and the commitment at an

estimated cost of $12.4 billion to procure 80 aircraft5

 (4 preproduction

4

Dedicated IOT&E, which is the independent operational testing and evaluation made by an Air Force

test organization, is not scheduled to start until March 2001.

5

In addition to the 80 aircraft planned under low-rate production, the Air Force plans to initiate long

lead effort on 48 full-rate production aircraft in September 2001.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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aircraft and 76 production aircraft), or 18 percent of all 442 aircraft to be

procured.

Flight Tests of Critical

Technology Not Planned

Until Well After Production

Start

Although laboratory tests are underway and simulations of the avionics

are planned, the Air Force does not plan to flight test several of the critical

F-22 technology advances on an F-22 until well after the start of

production in September 1997. Flight tests of low observability are not

scheduled to begin until September 1998. Although the highest risk

element of the F-22 program was reported to be the integrated avionics,

the first flight test of an F-22 equipped with a complete integrated avionics

system is not scheduled to begin until September 1999, 2 years after the

start of production. By the time that testing begins, the Air Force will have

already made commitments to procure 20 aircraft and long lead materials

for an additional 24.

Plan for F-22

Low-Rate Production

Compared With 1994

Congressional

Guidelines

For programs entering the engineering and manufacturing phase of the

acquisition cycle, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994

requires the Secretary of Defense to explain to the Congress any plans to

procure more than 10 percent of the total procurement quantity in the LRIP

phase. This provision of the act is not retroactive to the F-22 program.

In 1991, when milestone II was approved for the F-22 program, the total

aircraft procurement quantity planned was 648. Accordingly, 10 percent

would have been 65 aircraft. Currently, 442 aircraft are to be procured,

meaning 10 percent would be 44 aircraft. The number of F-22 LRIP aircraft

currently planned is 80, exceeding 10 percent, in either case.

Commitments to

Production of F-22s

Prior to IOT&E

Completion Is Higher

Than Most Prior

Fighter Programs

The Air Force’s planned commitment to production of F-22’s prior to

completion of IOT&E, as a percentage of total production, exceeds the

commitments made for recent fighter programs except the F-15, in which

the percent is about the same as the F-22. Figure 3 compares the planned

percentage of aircraft committed to production before completion of IOT&E

for the F-22 and percentages committed for other recent fighter programs.6

6

The total aircraft for the F/A-18 includes aircraft to be procured through fiscal year 1997. Production

is complete on all other aircraft.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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Figure 3: Aircraft Committed to

Production Before Completion of

IOT&E as a Percentage of Total

Aircraft

Percentage of Aircraft Committed

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

F-14 F-15 F-16 F/A-18 F-22

Aircraft Programs

Although the actual number of F-22 aircraft to be acquired before

completion of IOT&E is lower than in the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18, the

other fighters were acquired before the end of the Cold War when a

greater degree of urgency existed for procuring aircraft.

Development Risks

With High Technology

Systems and

Subsystems

The Air Force plans to use advances in technologies and innovations to

provide high performance and increased reliability and maintainability for

the F-22. The integrated avionics, engine, and stealth characteristics are

the primary areas that increase the cost, schedule, and technical risk in the

F-22 program. After reviewing the program, the DOD Defense Science

Board (DSB) concluded that concurrency was acceptable and risks were

readily controllable, but noted that the F-22 program is very ambitious

technically. Descriptions of some of the problems that have occurred in

the development program are included below. The purpose of these

descriptions is to illustrate that there remain important cost, schedule, and

technical risks in the F-22 program.

The F-22 Program Office has taken a number of steps to reduce the

technical risks of the program, including a 54-month

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
B-259204 

demonstration/validation phase using an F-22 prototype, and a risk

management program for engineering and manufacturing. Some

deficiencies associated with the higher risk features of the F-22 have been

experienced during ground tests, requiring expensive redesigns.

Avionics and Software Risk The F-22’s integrated avionics are expected to provide unprecedented

situational awareness to the pilot. The F-22 is the first aircraft to use

integrated avionics, that is, critical systems such as the radar, the weapons

management system, and electronic warfare sensors that work as one unit.

The key to achieving the necessary performance is the successful

development of highly advanced integrated computer processors, known

as the common integrated processors, and large amounts of software.

Avionics and software integration has been characterized by the DOD

Defense Acquisition Board as one of the highest risks to the successful

development of the F-22. The risk assessment was prepared for the DOD

Defense Acquisition Board to evaluate the readiness of the F-22 to begin

the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the acquisition

cycle in 1991. This report in June 1991 explained that the estimated

1.3 million single lines of software code needed for the F-22 represented

the largest software task ever for an attack/fighter onboard software

program. Further, the DSB in 1993 rated the integrated avionics as the

highest technical risk in the F-22 program. Program managers for the F-22

agreed in October 1994 that the avionics and software integration are the

most risky tasks facing the contractors.

In a separate report, we concluded in 1994 that although the Air Force’s

planned strategy for the F-22 software was generally sound in concept,

some significant features of the strategy were not being followed.7

 For

example, the independent verification and validation of software

products—part of the quality assurance process—was less rigorous than

planned. In addition, the technical risks being encountered with the

system/software engineering environment and common integrated

processor were not being formally reported to DOD management. Finally,

we indicated that the Air Force had begun actions to respond to our

concerns.

DOD responded to that report in February 1995, indicating that the quality

assurance program is now being complied with as planned. DOD also stated

that common automated tools had matured and would support completion

7

Air Force F-22 Embedded Computers (GAO/AIMD-94-177R, Sept. 23, 1994).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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of the software development effort through the engineering and

manufacturing development phase of the program. We have not verified

the DOD response.

Engine Problems The F-22’s engine has not been flight tested, but has experienced problems

during ground tests. The F-22’s engine is expected to be the first to provide

the ability to fly faster than the speed of sound for an extended period of

time without the high fuel consumption characteristic of aircraft that use

afterburners to achieve supersonic speeds. It is expected to provide high

performance and high fuel efficiency at slower speeds as well.

Problems with performance of the F-22’s engine first surfaced after the

initial engine ground tests began in December 1992. The contractor is

conducting a series of interim tests, with a goal of having a complete

engine with a redesigned turbine and other changes qualified for flight by

December 1996 if tests now planned for 1995 are successful. If not, F-22

flight tests will be started with an engine that is not fully representative of

the current approved configuration.

An Executive Independent Review Team was formed to provide advice on

engine development issues, including a turbine problem. The team stated

that it did not consider the nature and number of engine problems to be

excessive for a highly sophisticated engine at this stage of development.

They also stated that the proposed solutions can only be proven by

exposing authentic hardware to the full range of realistic testing.

Through November 1994, the Air Force had identified engine problems

that may cost as much as $479 million to remedy. The Air Force increased

the target cost of the engine development contract by $218 million to

design and test solutions to the engine problems. The incorporation of

corrective modifications to future production engines is expected to

increase production costs by $123 million. The Air Force believes its

current program estimate can cover the $341 million increase 

($218 million plus $123 million), but the Air Force has identified other

potential design changes that may add $138 million to development and

production costs. The other potential design changes are not currently

part of the planned program.

Problems With Stealthiness The low observability or stealth characteristics of the F-22 is another risk

area. The F-22 is to be the first supersonic, highly maneuverable fighter

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
B-259204 

that uses low observable technologies to reduce radar, infrared, acoustic

and optical signatures of the aircraft, making it difficult for an adversary to

detect.

An evaluation of the complete F-22 radar signature using computer models

and a scale version of the aircraft concluded that the aircraft’s radar

signature did not meet the Air Force’s operational requirement. Although

DOD advised us that these problems were not considered major, design

changes, such as reducing the number of aircraft maintenance access

panels and fuel drain holes, and reshaping the airframe were evaluated

through December 1994 to determine if these changes were successful in

reducing the signature. DOD further stated that the contractual

specifications are being revised. The estimated development cost to

resolve these problems is about $20 million according to the F-22 program

office. Additional production costs of about $110 million could also be

required, however, program officials told us the total estimated cost

($71.6 billion) of the F-22 program should not be affected.

Other Technical Risks The DSB, in its review of the F-22 program’s concurrency and technical

risks, identified a number of other concerns. Examples of concerns

mentioned by the DSB include

• control of excess aircraft weight;

• use of new materials and fabrication processes;

• uncertain durability of composite materials in the F-22 application;

• probable inability of the engine to meet performance and durability goals

before first flight;

• design of certain low observable features and applicable manufacturing

processes;

• very challenging development of electronic warfare system;

• late scheduling of tests relative to increasing production to 12 aircraft a

year; and

• the need for a long, evolutionary software development.

Overall, the DSB characterized the F-22 program as very ambitious

technically.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reduce the degree of

concurrency in the program because

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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• independent testing of technology advances (IOT&E), will not be completed

before significant commitments are made to produce F-22s;

• the percentage of planned F-22s to be committed to production before

completion of IOT&E is higher than most recent fighter programs; and

• the need for the F-22 is not urgent.

To minimize commitments to production of F-22s until after successful

completion of IOT&E, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense limit

LRIP quantities to that which can be produced using the first set of hard

tooling, about six to eight aircraft a year.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially agreed with the findings in this report, but disagreed with the

recommendations. DOD indicated it believed that the F-22 program had an

acceptable degree of concurrency based on the DSB’s evaluation that risks

associated with premature entry into successively higher rates of

production were readily controllable through insistence on meeting

certain key events and test criteria already built into the F-22 plan.

The record shows, however, that DOD has often been unwilling or unable to

curtail production of other systems after it starts, despite discovery of

significant problems in development or operational tests. We believe the

degree of concurrency in the program should be addressed now, because

(1) independent testing of important technology advances is not planned

until after commitments are made to produce F-22s, (2) program

concurrency is high according to DOD’s prescribed measure, and (3) the

need for the F-22 is not urgent.

DOD disagreed with (1) our use of the completion of IOT&E as a measure of

concurrency and risk in the program, (2) our positions on the level of risk

in the F-22 program, and (3) the comparison of the F-22 to prior fighter

programs using the percentage of planned aircraft procured during LRIP as

a measurement.

We first applied DOD’s own guidance for measuring the degree of

concurrency in the program, that is, the amount of IOT&E completed prior

to entering productions. We also used other metrics, such as the percent of

the total program committed to production before completion of IOT&E.

Further, DOD’s comments appear to discount the risks in the program

identified by the DSB. Our comparison of the F-22 to recent fighter

programs, although not the same as comparisons made by the DSB,

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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provides an important historical perspective that DOD’s planned LRIP meets

or exceeds the fighter programs undertaken during the Cold War.

Scope and

Methodology

In conducting our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DSB, and Air Force

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; F-22 System Program Office,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Air Force Air Combat

Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; and the Air Force Operational

Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

We interviewed officials in charge of program management, the operation

of tactical fighter aircraft, risk assessment and the operational testing of

Air Force weapon systems. We reviewed documents, including program

office briefings, program schedules, test plans and reports, technology risk

assessments, requirements documents and cost reports. We used these

interviews and documents to determine the program management

philosophy, the amount of program concurrency, the planned flight testing

of F-22 technologies, program technology requirements and program risk

assessments.

We also reviewed DOD instructions, Air Force regulations, Office of

Secretary of Defense guidance, publications from the Defense Systems

Management College, our prior reports, a report of another audit

organization, congressional reports, an Institute for Defense Analyses

report, a DSB report, a report prepared for the Defense Acquisition Board,

executive summaries, and monthly program reports.

In addition, we interviewed officials from the Air Force’s Air Combat

Command and examined the F-22 System Operational Requirements

Document, Statements of Need, and the Mission Element Need Statement

for new fighter aircraft.

We performed our work from August 1994 through February 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Copies will also be made available to others on request.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
B-259204 

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

18

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

32

Figures Figure 1: Planned Commitments to Procure F-22 Aircraft and

Estimated Cumulative Costs Prior to Completion of IOT&E

5

Figure 2: Concurrent Development and Production of the F-22 6

Figure 3: Aircraft Committed to Production Before Completion of

IOT&E as a Percentage of Total Aircraft

8

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DSB Defense Science Board

IOT&E initial operational testing and evaluation

LRIP low-rate initial production

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 1-3 and 7-8.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-8.

See comment 5.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 8.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 9-12.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 9.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 10.

Now on p. 12.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comments 3 and 5.

See comments 2 and 3.

Now on p. 12.

See comment 11.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated February 24, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. These comments are dealt with on pages 12 and 13 of the report and in

our responses to the DOD specific comments that follow.

2. For the most part, the risk/concurrency guidelines listed in the Office of

the Secretary of Defense’s April 1990 guide are specific requirements that

should be met before a program progresses. We are aware of many of

those requirements that are incorporated in the F-22 program. However,

the only assessment provided for in the guide for measuring the degree of

concurrency is the amount of initial operational testing and evaluation

(IOT&E) completed at the time low-rate initial production (LRIP) begins. By

that measure, the F-22 program clearly has a high degree of concurrency.

In our opinion, the ramp up of production from 4 a year to 36 a year under

the LRIP phase, and initiation of long lead for 48 a year essentially

represents a plan to achieve a full-rate production schedule (now defined

as 48 a year) before IOT&E is completed.

3. The F-22 program, as currently planned, schedules procurement of 80

LRIP aircraft at an estimated cost of $12.4 billion. We believe that exceeds

the minimum needed to successfully complete the LRIP phase of the

program and that the production rates should be restricted during LRIP.

Although many important F-22 development tests are scheduled prior to

the acceleration of production rates, many other critical developmental

tests and most IOT&E testing are not scheduled to be complete until after

significant commitments are made to production.

4. We adjusted the report to reflect this information. However, it should be

noted that the total number of each type of aircraft produced was much

higher than planned for the F-22. This results in a higher degree of

concurrency in the F-22 program when using the percentage of aircraft

procured at completion of IOT&E as a measure of concurrency.

5. Our report does not, either explicitly or implicitly, suggest “total

avoidance” of concurrency.

6. The Defense Science Board (DSB) portrayal of the F-22 program as

relatively conservative was based on the amount of development testing to

be completed at early production decision points. However, using the

measure called for by DOD’s own 1990 guidance—the amount of IOT&E

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

completed at the time LRIP begins—shows that the F-22 program is far

from conservative.

7. Production ramp up from 4 aircraft a year to 36 aircraft a year appears

to provide a more rapid acceleration than we believe is necessary in the

LRIP phase of the program. In our opinion the ramp up of production from

4 a year to 36 a year under the LRIP phase, and initiation of long lead to

support 48 a year, essentially represents a plan to achieve a full-rate

production schedule before IOT&E is completed.

8. This material has been deleted from the report.

9. Additional information concerning this matter has been added to the

body of the report.

10. DOD response to our prior report on embedded computers has been

recognized in the body of this report.

11. We did not attempt to quantify potential cost growth in the F-22

program that may result from a change in the program schedule. However,

the thrust of the LRIP legislation is to authorize only minimum necessary

quantities. DOD acquisition profiles created for other weapon programs

have often proven to be optimistic and are rarely carried out as initially

planned because of technical, financial, or test problems. If the baseline

against which to compare potential growth of costs is optimistic, an

estimate of cost growth would have limited meaning at this point because

those problems are likely to occur in highly concurrent programs that

involve substantial advances in technology.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Robert D. Murphy, Assistant Director

Cincinnati Regional

Office

Richard L. Strittmatter, Evaluator-in-Charge

Edward R. Browning, Evaluator

Don M. Springman, Evaluator

Norfolk Regional

Office

Brenda Waterfield, Evaluator

(707023) Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-59 Tactical Aircraft
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