UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4776

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BILLY E. LUNSFORD, a/k/a Peg-leg,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, 

District Judge. (2:10-cr-00182-1)

Submitted: March 2, 2012 Decided: March 26, 2012

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth 

Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, William B. King, II, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Billy E. Lunsford appeals his conviction and seventyseven month sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2006). On appeal, Lunsford argues first that 

§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the Second 

Amendment and because he has an “inability to retreat” due to 

medical conditions. Lunsford next argues that his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable, asserting that the Guidelines 

enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4), 

is invalid because it does not contain a mens rea requirement. 

We affirm.

In United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 316-17 (4th 

Cir. 2012), we held that “§ 922(g)(1) [is] a constitutionally 

valid statute.” While we left open the possibility of a 

successful as-applied challenge, we noted that the Moore

defendant did not fall within the category of “law-abiding

responsible” citizens that the Second Amendment protects. Id. 

(citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 

(2008)). Similarly, Lunsford has a record of felony convictions 

for uttering, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and delivery of 

hydrocodone. Like the defendant in Moore, and notwithstanding 

his limited mobility and any difficulty he may have in defending 

himself, Lunsford’s criminal history places him outside of the 

category of non-violent, law-abiding citizens protected by the 
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Second Amendment. See United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 

110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011). Lunsford’s constitutional challenge 

to § 922(g)(1) therefore fails.

Lunsford next challenges the procedural reasonableness 

of his sentence, arguing that the enhancement applied by the 

district court is invalid. This court reviews a sentence for 

reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In 

determining procedural reasonableness, this court considers, 

inter alia, whether the district court properly calculated the 

defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 49-51. Lunsford’s 

sentencing challenge fails because it was expressly rejected in 

United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(“Taylor asks that we invalidate [USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A)] on the 

grounds that its lack of a mens rea requirement renders it 

inconsistent with federal law. This we cannot do.”). 

Lunsford’s sentence is therefore not procedurally unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm Lunsford’s conviction and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED