(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CULLEY ET AL. v. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF ALABAMA, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22–585. Argued October 30, 2023—Decided May 9, 2024 

Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled 

over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of 

marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was 

stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking 

methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under 

an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “incident to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed 

forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13 

days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action

complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C.

§1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by

retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioners’ claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate 

preliminary hearing is constitutionally required. 

Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a

separate preliminary hearing. Pp. 5–14.

(a) Due process ordinarily requires States to provide notice and a 

hearing before seizing real property. But States may immediately

seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture when the property 

(for example, a car) otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before a forfeiture hearing. When a State seizes personal property, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing. See 
 

 

 

2 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Syllabus 

United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 249–250; United States 

v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 562–565. 

The Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann make crystal

clear that due process does not require a separate preliminary hearing 

to determine whether seized personal property may be retained

pending the ultimate forfeiture hearing. In $8,850, the Court addressed the process due when the Customs Service seized currency 

from an individual entering the United States but did not immediately

file for civil forfeiture of the currency. The Court concluded that a postseizure delay “may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property 

owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful

time,” 461 U. S., at 562–563, and prescribed factors for courts to consider in assessing whether a forfeiture hearing is timely. Id., at 564– 

565. In Von Neumann, a property owner failed to declare the purchase 

of his new car upon driving it into the United States, and a customs 

official seized the car after determining that it was subject to civil forfeiture. The plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in 

essence, a request under federal law that the Government exercise its 

discretion to forgive the forfeiture—which the Government did not answer for 36 days. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the Government’s 

delay in answering the remission petition violated due process. The 

Court rejected that claim, broadly holding that due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing remission procedure in the first place. 

See 474 U. S., at 249–250. Instead, Von Neumann held that a timely 

forfeiture hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases, and 

that $8,850 specifies the standard for when a forfeiture hearing is 

timely. 

Petitioners’ argument for a separate preliminary hearing appears to

be a backdoor argument for a more timely forfeiture hearing to allow 

a property owner with a good defense to recover her property quickly.

But the Court’s precedents already require a timely hearing, and a 

property owner can raise $8,850-based arguments to ensure a timely

hearing. Petitioners’ efforts to distinguish Von Neumann on the 

ground that the statutory remission procedure in that case was discretionary fail because that fact played no role in the Court’s constitutional analysis. Petitioners also cannot distinguish the relevant language in Von Neumann as dicta, as the Court ruled for the 

Government on the ground that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due process” in 

civil forfeiture cases. 474 U. S., at 249. Similarly, petitioners’ contention that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, should govern petitioners’ request for a preliminary hearing fails given that this Court decided $8,850 and Von Neumann after Mathews. 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

Syllabus 

In addition, petitioners point to the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions in the criminal context to support their contention that a preliminary hearing is required in the civil forfeiture context. That analogy fails. Fourth Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and 

address only whether probable cause supports the arrestee’s detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119–122. Here, petitioners

argue that the immediate seizure of personal property requires adversarial preliminary hearings, and they assert that those hearings must

address their affirmative defense of innocent ownership. But the Due 

Process Clause does not require more extensive preliminary procedures for the temporary retention of property than for the temporary 

restraint of persons. Pp. 5–10.

(b) Historical practice reinforces the Court’s conclusions in $8,850 

and Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Since the Founding era, many federal and 

state statutes have authorized the Government to seize personal property and hold it pending a forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary hearing. Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal or state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required 

preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Some States have recently enacted laws requiring preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture 

cases, but those recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate

for preliminary hearings in every State. History demonstrates that 

both Congress and the States have long authorized law enforcement to 

seize personal property and hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—

from the Founding until the late 20th century—is weighty evidence

that due process does not require such hearings. Pp. 11–13. 

Affirmed. 

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, 

J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, 

J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–585 

HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF ALABAMA, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[May 9, 2024]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. 

When police seize and then seek civil forfeiture of a car 

that was used to commit a drug offense, the Constitution

requires a timely forfeiture hearing. The question here is 

whether the Constitution also requires a separate

preliminary hearing to determine whether the police may 

retain the car pending the forfeiture hearing. This Court’s 

precedents establish that the answer is no: The 

Constitution requires a timely forfeiture hearing; the

Constitution does not also require a separate preliminary 

hearing. 

I 

Halima Culley loaned her car to her college-aged son. On 

February 17, 2019, police officers in Satsuma, Alabama, 

stopped the car while the son was driving, and the officers

discovered marijuana and a loaded handgun in the car. The 

officers arrested Culley’s son and charged him with

possessing marijuana. The officers also seized the car 

incident to the arrest. 

At about the same time in 2019, Lena Sutton loaned her 
 

2 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

car to a friend. On February 21, 2019, police officers in 

Leesburg, Alabama, stopped the car while Sutton’s friend

was driving, and the officers discovered a large amount of 

methamphetamine in the car. The officers arrested 

Sutton’s friend and charged him with trafficking 

methamphetamine and possessing drug paraphernalia. 

The officers also seized the car incident to the arrest. 

At the time of the seizures of the two cars, Alabama law 

authorized the civil forfeiture of a car used to commit or 

facilitate a drug crime. See Ala. Code §20–2–93(a)(5)

(2015). Officers could seize the car “incident to an arrest” 

so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture 

case. §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). In the interim before the 

forfeiture hearing, the car’s owner could recover it by

posting bond at double the car’s value. See §20–2–93(h); 

§28–4–287 (2013). At the forfeiture hearing, the owner 

could prevail and recover the car under Alabama’s 

“affirmative defense” for “innocent owners of property 

subject to forfeiture.” Wallace v. State, 229 So. 3d 1108, 

1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). That defense required the

owner to show that the owner lacked knowledge of the car’s 

connection to the drug crime. See Ala. Code §20–2–93(h) 

(2015).

The State of Alabama filed a forfeiture complaint against 

Culley’s car on February 27, 2019, just 10 days after the 

seizure of the car. But Culley waited six months before

answering that complaint. And she waited another year— 

until September 21, 2020—before raising an innocent

owner defense in a motion for summary judgment. Soon 

thereafter, on October 30, 2020, an Alabama state court 

granted Culley’s motion and ordered the return of her car. 

Sutton similarly moved slowly in her forfeiture 

proceeding. Alabama brought a forfeiture case against 

Sutton’s car on March 6, 2019, just 13 days after the seizure

of the car. Sutton initially failed to appear in the case,

causing the state court to enter a default judgment for 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Alabama. Sutton later requested that the state court set 

aside that judgment, and the state court did so. Sutton then 

submitted a brief answer and served discovery requests on

Alabama, but Sutton otherwise took no action until the 

state court set a date for the forfeiture trial. On April 10,

2020, three weeks before the scheduled trial date, Sutton 

finally moved for summary judgment on the ground that 

she was an innocent owner. Soon thereafter, on May 28, 

2020, the state court granted her motion, and she recovered 

her car. 

While those forfeiture cases were ongoing, Culley and

Sutton filed purported class-action complaints in federal 

court. Culley sued in the U. S. District Court for the 

Southern District of Alabama. Sutton sued in the U. S. 

District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Both 

sought money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming 

that the state officials violated their due process rights by 

retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without

holding preliminary hearings. Culley and Sutton argued

that a preliminary hearing (also referred to as a retention 

hearing) is required under the Mathews v. Eldridge due 

process test, which balances the private interests at stake, 

the value of added procedures, and the burdens on the 

government from the added procedures. See 424 U. S. 319, 

334–335 (1976).

The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama 

dismissed Culley’s complaint. Culley v. Marshall, Civ. 

Action No. 19–701 (Sept. 29, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 

58a. Relying on this Court’s decisions in United States v. 

$8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983), and United States v. Von 

Neumann, 474 U. S. 242 (1986), the District Court held that

due process requires a timely forfeiture hearing but not a

separate preliminary hearing. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 

44a–46a. The District Court then assessed the timeliness 

of Culley’s forfeiture hearing under the four-factor test set 

forth in $8,850, which looks to (i) the length of the delay of 
 

4 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

the forfeiture hearing, (ii) the reason for the delay,

(iii) whether the claimant requested a timely hearing, and 

(iv) whether the delay was prejudicial. See id., at 46a–47a 

(citing $8,850, 461 U. S., at 563–565). The District Court 

concluded that Culley’s forfeiture hearing was timely under

those factors because she played a “significant role” in

delaying her own case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 

similarly entered summary judgment against Sutton on her 

due process claim. Sutton v. Leesburg, Civ. Action No. 20– 

91 (Sept. 13, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. The District 

Court determined that Sutton’s claim depended on whether 

she received a timely forfeiture hearing within the meaning

of $8,850. See id., at 66a–70a. The District Court ruled 

that Sutton’s forfeiture hearing was timely and satisfied

due process, in part because Sutton never asked for an

earlier hearing. See id., at 70a–71a. 

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

consolidated the two cases and affirmed. Culley v. Attorney 

General, No. 21–13805 etc. (July 11, 2022), App. to Pet. for 

Cert. 1a–2a. The Court of Appeals agreed with the two

district courts that a timely forfeiture hearing affords

claimants due process and that no separate preliminary

hearing is constitutionally required. See id., at 6a–8a. The 

Court of Appeals rested its conclusion on circuit precedent,

which in turn relied on this Court’s decisions in $8,850 and 

Von Neumann. See ibid. 

Because of a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over

whether the Constitution requires a preliminary hearing in

civil forfeiture cases, this Court granted certiorari. See 598 

U. S. ___ (2023). Compare App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–8a, with 

Ingram v. Wayne County, 81 F. 4th 603, 620 (CA6 2023); 

Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 44 (CA2 2002).1 

—————— 1Before the entry of judgment by the Court of Appeals, Alabama

amended its forfeiture laws to allow an innocent owner to request an 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

II 

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment as interpreted by this Court, States ordinarily

may not seize real property before providing notice and a 

hearing. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real 

Property, 510 U. S. 43, 62 (1993). But States may 

immediately seize personal property (for example, a car) 

that is subject to civil forfeiture when the property

otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before 

a forfeiture hearing. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 

Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 679–680 (1974). 

When States seize and seek civil forfeiture of personal 

property, due process requires a timely post-seizure

forfeiture hearing. See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 

U. S. 242, 247–250 (1986); United States v. $8,850, 461 

U. S. 555, 562–565 (1983). In this case, petitioners Culley

and Sutton do not challenge the timeliness of their 

forfeiture hearings. Rather, they argue that the Due

Process Clause requires States to also hold a separate

preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing. 

A 

Culley and Sutton argue that a preliminary hearing is

constitutionally necessary to determine whether States 

may retain seized personal property pending the ultimate 

forfeiture hearing. As petitioners envision it, the 

preliminary hearing would focus on the “‘probable 

validity’” of the forfeiture. Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 

48 (CA2 2002) (quoting Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S. 

—————— 

“expedited hearing” “at any time after seizure of property and before

entry of a conviction” in a “related criminal case.” Ala. Code §15–5–63(3) 

(2018); §20–2–93(l) (Supp. 2023); see also Ala. Act 2021–497 (effective 

Jan. 1, 2022). That amendment did not moot this case because Culley’s 

and Sutton’s requested relief includes money damages against the 

municipalities of Satsuma and Leesburg. See Culley v. Attorney General, 

No. 21–13805 etc., App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. 
 

6 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

614, 629 (1976)). The preliminary hearing would be 

adversarial, the parties could introduce evidence and crossexamine witnesses, and property owners could raise 

affirmative defenses, including innocent ownership. In 

essence, the preliminary hearing would be an earlier 

version of the forfeiture hearing itself.

Alabama and its amici, including the United States,

disagree. They argue that a preliminary hearing is not 

constitutionally required. To begin, they emphasize that 

most States and the Federal Government do not currently

provide preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. So 

requiring a preliminary hearing as a matter of 

constitutional dictate would necessitate a major change in 

the States’ and the Federal Government’s longstanding

practices. Alabama and its amici also contend that a 

property owner’s post-seizure rights are already protected

by the constitutional requirement that the forfeiture 

hearing be timely. They further assert that requiring a

“hearing before a hearing” in every case, as petitioners 

want, would interfere with important law-enforcement

activities that must occur after the seizure and before the 

forfeiture hearing—including identifying and contacting 

potential claimants of the property; coordinating forfeiture

proceedings with related criminal investigations and 

prosecutions; and ensuring that property is not removed,

destroyed, or put to illegal use before the forfeiture hearing. 

Ultimately, we need not reweigh the competing due

process arguments advanced by the parties because this 

Court’s decisions in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 

(1983), and United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242 

(1986), already resolved the issue. After a State seizes and 

seeks civil forfeiture of personal property, due process

requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a

separate preliminary hearing.

The dispute in $8,850 arose when the Customs Service 

seized currency from an individual entering the United 
 

 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

States, but then waited before filing for civil forfeiture of

the currency. See 461 U. S., at 558–561. The property

owner argued that the delay violated due process. See id., 

at 562. 

This Court concluded that a post-seizure delay “may

become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner 

has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful 

time.” Id., at 562–563. The Court elaborated that 

timeliness in civil forfeiture cases must be assessed by 

“analog[izing] . . . to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial” 

and considering four factors: the length of the delay, the

reason for the delay, whether the property owner asserted

his rights, and whether the delay was prejudicial. Id., at 

564 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (1972)). 

Those factors are appropriate guides in the civil forfeiture

context, the Court explained, because the factors ensure 

that “the flexible requirements of due process have been

met.” 461 U. S., at 564–565. 

In Von Neumann, the Court addressed whether a timely

forfeiture hearing, without more, provides the process that 

is due in civil forfeiture cases. See 474 U. S., at 249–251. 

The property owner there failed to declare the purchase of 

his new car upon driving it into the United States. See id., 

at 245. A customs official determined that the car was 

subject to civil forfeiture and seized it. See ibid. The 

plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in 

essence, a request under federal law that the Federal

Government exercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture.

See id., at 245–246. The Government did not respond to 

that petition for 36 days. See id., at 246. The plaintiff sued,

arguing that the Government’s 36-day delay in answering 

the remission petition violated due process. See id., at 246– 

247. 

Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court broadly held that

due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing

remission procedure in the first place. See id., at 249–251. 
 

8 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

Citing $8,850, the Court ruled that a timely “forfeiture 

proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing 

required by due process” to protect the plaintiff ’s “property

interest in the car.” 474 U. S., at 249. The Court explained 

that the plaintiff ’s “right to a forfeiture proceeding” that

meets the $8,850 timeliness test “satisfies any due process 

right with respect to the car.” 474 U. S., at 251. A separate

remission hearing is not “constitutionally required.” Id., at 

250.2 

This Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann 

resolve this case. As the Court stated in Von Neumann, a 

timely forfeiture hearing “satisfies any due process right” 

with respect to a “car” that has been seized for civil 

forfeiture. 474 U. S., at 251; see also id., at 249. The Due 

Process Clause does not require a separate preliminary

hearing.3 

Culley and Sutton’s argument for a separate preliminary

hearing appears in many respects to be a backdoor 

argument for a more timely hearing so that a property

owner with a good defense against forfeiture can recover 

her property more quickly. But the Court’s precedents

already require a timely hearing, and a property owner can 

of course raise $8,850-based arguments in an individual

case to ensure a timely hearing.

Culley and Sutton (echoed by the dissent here) try to

brush aside Von Neumann on the ground that the statutory

remission procedure in that case was discretionary. See 

—————— 2At oral argument in Von Neumann, Justice O’Connor asked the 

United States whether the “forfeiture proceeding itself provides all the 

process that’s due” to protect the “property interest in the car.” Tr. of 

Oral Arg. in United States v. Von Neumann, O. T. 1985, No. 84–1144, 

p. 18. The United States answered, “that is our position.” Ibid.; see also 

id., at 26–27. The Court subsequently agreed with that position. See 

Von Neumann, 474 U. S., at 249–251. 3 In this opinion, we do not address any due process issues related to 

civil forfeiture other than the question about a separate preliminary

hearing. 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

474 U. S., at 244, and n. 2 (citing 19 U. S. C. §1618 (1982 

ed., Supp. III)); see also post, at 8–9 (SOTOMAYOR, J., 

dissenting). But the discretionary nature of the remission 

procedure played no role in the Court’s constitutional 

analysis. See 474 U. S., at 249–251. Culley and Sutton also 

try to characterize the language in Von Neumann as dicta. 

We disagree. The Court ruled for the Government in Von 

Neumann on the ground that a timely “forfeiture 

proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing 

required by due process” in civil forfeiture cases. Id., at 249. 

No separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally

required.

Culley and Sutton also contend that Mathews v. Eldridge

should be the test for deciding when additional process is 

due and that, under Mathews, a preliminary hearing would 

be required in civil forfeiture cases. 424 U. S. 319 (1976). 

But this Court decided $8,850 and Von Neumann after 

Mathews, yet in those two cases, the Court did not apply the 

Mathews test. In any event, there is no good reason to think

that the Mathews balancing test would yield a different

result here. A timely forfeiture hearing protects the

interests of both the claimant and the government. And an 

additional preliminary hearing of the kind sought by

petitioners would interfere with the government’s

important law-enforcement activities in the period after the

seizure and before the forfeiture hearing. 

In arguing that the Constitution requires a preliminary 

hearing, Culley and Sutton also point to this Court’s Fourth

Amendment decisions in the criminal context. That 

analogy is flawed. The Fourth Amendment requires that 

any person who is arrested without a warrant be brought 

before a neutral magistrate within 48 hours, absent 

extraordinary circumstances. See County of Riverside v. 

McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 53, 56–57 (1991). But the Fourth 

Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and they address

only whether probable cause supports the arrestee’s 
 

10 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119–122 

(1975). Here, Culley and Sutton do not request a mere 

probable cause hearing of the kind described in Gerstein. 

Rather, they argue that the immediate seizure of property 

requires adversarial preliminary hearings, and they assert 

that those hearings must address their “affirmative

defense” of innocent ownership. Wallace v. State, 229 So. 3d 

1108, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). Culley and Sutton 

therefore contend that the Due Process Clause requires

more extensive preliminary procedures for the temporary 

retention of property than for the temporary restraint of 

persons. The Due Process Clause does not demand that 

incongruity. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 

615–616 (1989).

Finally, the dissent here relies heavily on United States 

v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43. See post, 

at 10. There, this Court held that the government must

ordinarily provide notice and a hearing before seizing real

property that is subject to civil forfeiture. See 510 U. S., at 

62. The Court emphasized that real property, unlike

personal property, “can be neither moved nor concealed”

during the forfeiture process. Id., at 52–53; see also id., at 

56–57. That case did not purport to disturb the rule that 

the government may seize and retain personal property, 

such as a car, that is subject to civil forfeiture when the 

property otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or 

concealed before a forfeiture hearing. See id., at 57 (citing 

Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 679). And more to the point, 

that case did not alter Von Neumann’s holding that a timely

forfeiture hearing provides the process that is due following

the immediate seizure of personal property. 

In sum, Von Neumann held that a timely forfeiture

hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases, and 

$8,850 specified the standard for when forfeiture hearings

are timely. Culley and Sutton have not asked the Court to

discard those precedents in this case. And those precedents 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

make crystal clear that due process does not require a 

separate preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing. 

B 

Historical practice reinforces the holdings of $8,850 and 

Von Neumann that due process does not require 

preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases.

Since the Founding era, statutes have authorized the

Government to seize personal property and hold it pending 

a forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary 

hearing. For example, the first federal forfeiture law, the 

Collection Act of 1789, authorized the civil forfeiture of 

ships, goods, and merchandise involved in suspected

violations of the customs laws. See, e.g., Act of July 31,

1789, ch. 5, §§12, 22–24, 34, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 42–43, 46; see

generally C. Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil 

Forfeiture, 125 Yale L. J. 2446, 2464–2466 (2016). The 

Act’s forfeiture process began with the seizure of property

by a customs collector. See, e.g., §25, 1 Stat. 43. The 

collector then filed a forfeiture action, which a court would 

“hear and determine . . . according to law.” §36, id., at 47. 

While that action was pending, the seized property could

“remain in the custody of the collector.” §25, id., at 43. A 

claimant could also recover the property on bond. See §36, 

id., at 47. 

The Collection Act did not require a separate preliminary 

hearing before the forfeiture hearing. Rather, the forfeiture 

“trial” supplied the opportunity for the property owner to 

challenge the collector’s case. Ibid. 

In 1790 and 1799, Congress revised and reenacted the

Collection Act. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627; 

Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145. The revised versions 

of the Act contained similar forfeiture provisions and 

likewise lacked anything resembling a separate

preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, §§69, 

89, 1 Stat. 678, 695–696; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§49, 67, 1 
 

12 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

Stat. 170, 176–177. 

Many state forfeiture statutes from the Founding period 

similarly did not require a preliminary hearing before the 

forfeiture hearing. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 11, 1787, ch. 81, in 

2 Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Sessions of 

the Legislature Held in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787 and 

1788, Inclusive pp. 514–515, 517–520 (1886); Act of Oct.

1785, ch. 14, in 12 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection 

of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the

Legislature, in the Year 1619 pp. 46–47 (1823). For 

example, a New York customs statute from that era 

provided that a property owner could recover his seized 

goods by either prevailing at a forfeiture “trial” or executing 

a “bond” for an appraised amount. Act of Apr. 11, 1787, at 

517–518. The statute did not allow property owners to

challenge the validity of the seizure through a separate

preliminary hearing or any similar procedure. See id., at 

517–520. 

In addition, when the Fourteenth Amendment was 

ratified in 1868, Congress did not require preliminary 

hearings. In 1864, for example, Congress provided that

goods seized under a new revenue law should “remain” in

the “care and custody” of the government “until final 

judgment” in a forfeiture trial. Act of Mar. 7, 1864, ch. 20, 

§2, 13 Stat. 14, 15. Although that revenue law provided for 

bond, it did not grant property owners a right to

preliminary hearings. See ibid. Similarly, in 1866,

Congress required that goods and vessels seized under a 

new customs law “remain in the custody” of a customs

official pending “adjudication by the proper tribunal.” Act 

of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, §31, 14 Stat. 178, 186.

Many state forfeiture laws from around the time of the

Fourteenth Amendment likewise did not provide for a 

preliminary hearing. For example, a New Hampshire

statute required that a state official “detain” personal 

property that was seized for civil forfeiture until the 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

property was “legally disposed of ” through either bond or a 

forfeiture trial. The General Statutes of the State of NewHampshire, ch. 249, §§3, 6–7, pp. 503–504 (1867).

Likewise, a Vermont statute authorized the seizure of 

liquor that was intended for sale, required the seizing

officer to “keep” the liquor “until final action is had

thereon,” and limited the conditions in which a claimant 

could recover the liquor. The Revised Laws of Vermont, 

1880, §3818, p. 738 (1881); see §3827, id., at 740. 

 Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal or

state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required 

preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. To be sure, 

some States have recently enacted laws requiring 

preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. See, e.g., Ala. 

Act 2021–497, p. 9; 2021 Minn. Laws pp. 2064–2065; 2017

Ill. Laws pp. 6854–6855; 2017 Wis. Laws p. 815; 2012 Colo. 

Sess. Laws pp. 856–857; 2001 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 1159. But 

those recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate 

for preliminary hearings in every State.

In short, both Congress and the States have long

authorized law enforcement to seize personal property and 

hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate

preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—from

the Founding until the late 20th century—is weighty

evidence that due process does not require such hearings. 

Cf. United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267, 274, 287–288 

(1996); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 446–448 (1996); 

Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 680–690. The historical 

practice in civil forfeiture proceedings thus reinforces 

$8,850 and Von Neumann: In civil forfeiture cases involving 

personal property such as cars, the Due Process Clause 

requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a

preliminary hearing. 
 

14 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

To balance the interests of the government and 

individuals in civil forfeiture cases involving personal 

property, the States and Congress have adopted a wide 

variety of approaches. For example, some States require 

that the forfeiture hearing occur within a fixed period of

time. Others require a jury trial. Still others condition civil 

forfeiture on a successful criminal prosecution. And a few 

now require preliminary hearings. See Brief for State of 

Georgia et al. as Amici Curiae 5–21. 

Our decision today does not preclude those legislatively 

prescribed innovations. Rather, our decision simply

addresses the baseline protection of the Due Process 

Clause. 

In civil forfeiture cases, the Due Process Clause requires

a timely forfeiture hearing, but does not require a separate 

preliminary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the U. S.

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–585 

HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF ALABAMA, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[May 9, 2024]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring. 

I agree with the Court that, at a minimum, the Due Process Clause requires a prompt hearing in civil forfeiture 

cases. Ante, at 5. I agree that no legal authority presented 

to us indicates a prompt hearing must necessarily take the 

form Ms. Culley and Ms. Sutton suppose. Ante, at 6. I 

agree, too, that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), 

does not teach otherwise. Ante, at 9. Under its terms, 

judges balance “the private and governmental interests at

stake,” Mathews, 424 U. S., at 340, to determine “what procedures the government must observe” when it seeks to 

withhold “benefits” “such as welfare or Social Security,” 

Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U. S. 128, 141 (2017) (ALITO, J., 

concurring in judgment). That test does not control—and 

we do not afford any particular solicitude to “governmental 

interests”—in cases like this one where the government

seeks to deprive an individual of her private property. But 

if all that leads me to join today’s decision, I also agree with

the dissent that this case leaves many larger questions unresolved about whether, and to what extent, contemporary 

civil forfeiture practices can be squared with the Constitution’s promise of due process. I write separately to highlight some of them. 
 

 

 

2 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

I 

The facts of this case are worth pausing over because they 

are typical of many. Halima Culley, a Georgia resident,

bought a 2015 Nissan Altima for her son to use while he 

was away studying at the University of South Alabama. 

App. 58, ¶¶22–24. The car belongs to her and she pays for

its registration and insurance. Ibid., ¶¶25–26. The plan

was for her son to bring the car home during the summer 

for the family to share. Id., at 60, ¶37. But before that 

could happen, a police officer in Alabama pulled her son 

over and arrested him for possessing marijuana and drug

paraphernalia. Id., at 59, ¶27. The officer also took the car. 

Ibid., ¶28. Eventually, law enforcement officials learned

that the Nissan belonged to Ms. Culley, not her son. But 

instead of returning it, they initiated civil forfeiture proceedings in the hope of keeping the vehicle permanently. 

Ibid., ¶¶30–33. It took a lawsuit and a 20-month wait for 

the car to make its way back to her. App. to Pet. for Cert. 

3a. 

For Alabama, this was business as usual. Often, the 

State’s law enforcement agencies may take and keep private property without a warrant or any other form of prior 

process. Ala. Code §20–2–93(d) (2023 Cum. Supp.). Instead, only after taking the property must the agency file a

civil forfeiture action in court. Once there, the agency need

present only a “prima facie” case that the property in question represents proceeds “traceable” to a drug crime or property used to “facilitate” one. §§20–2–93(b)(3), (b)(5); 

Ex parte McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677, 681 (Ala. 2005). If the 

agency proves just that much, the burden sometimes shifts

to the property’s owner to prove she was an “innocent 

owner” who did not know about or consent to the conduct 

that caused the property to be taken. §§20–2–93(w), (a)(4).

Should the agency prevail in the end, it may keep the property for its own use or sell it and keep the money. §20–2–

93(s). 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Laws like Alabama’s exist in many States and at the federal level. But as commonplace as these civil forfeiture laws

may be, most are pretty new. As part of the War on Drugs, 

in the 1970s and 1980s Congress began enacting sweeping

new civil forfeiture statutes allowing the government to

seize and keep the proceeds of drug crimes and the personal 

property used to facilitate them. See S. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States §2–4, p. 48 (3d ed. 2022). 

Since then, the federal government has extended similar

civil forfeiture rules to most federal offenses. Id., at 49. Today, it appears, “[w]hite-collar and firearms crimes” now 

“accoun[t] for larger shares of all [federal] forfeitures than 

drug crimes.” L. Knepper, J. McDonald, K. Sanchez, & E.

Pohl, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture 26 (3d ed. 2020) (Knepper). Following the federal government’s lead, many States have adopted similar laws of 

their own. See id., at 170–185. 

These new laws have altered law enforcement practices

across the Nation in profound ways. My dissenting colleagues catalogue a number of examples, see post, at 3–6 

(opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), but consider just a few here. To 

secure a criminal penalty like a fine, disgorgement of illegal

profits, or restitution, the government must comply with

strict procedural rules and prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 363 

(1970). In civil forfeiture, however, the government can 

simply take the property and later proceed to court to earn

the right to keep it under a far more forgiving burden of

proof. See Knepper 39. In part thanks to this asymmetry, 

civil forfeiture has become a booming business. In 2018, 

federal forfeitures alone brought in $2.5 billion. Id., at 15. 

Meanwhile, according to some reports, these days “up to

80% of civil forfeitures are not accompanied by a criminal 

conviction.” Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 

14 (Buckeye Brief ). 
 

 

 

4 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Law enforcement agencies have become increasingly dependent on the money they raise from civil forfeitures. The 

federal government shares a large portion of what it receives with state and local law enforcement agencies that

aid its forfeiture efforts. Dept. of Justice & Dept. of Treasury, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State, Local, and Tribal 

Law Enforcement Agencies 3, 12 (Mar. 2024). At one time 

or another, “[o]ver 90% of the agencies serving jurisdictions

with populations” above 250,000 have participated in this 

“equitable sharing” scheme. E. Jensen & J. Gerber, The 

Civil Forfeiture of Assets and the War on Drugs: Expanding

Criminal Sanctions While Reducing Due Process Protections, 42 Crime & Delinquency 421, 425 (1996). And it 

seems that, when local law enforcement budgets tighten, 

forfeiture activity often increases. B. Kelly, Fighting Crime 

or Raising Revenue? Testing Opposing Views of Forfeiture 

15 (2019).

Not only do law enforcement agencies have strong financial incentives to pursue forfeitures, those incentives also

appear to influence how they conduct them. Some agencies,

for example, reportedly place special emphasis on seizing 

low-value items and relatively small amounts of cash, hopeful their actions won’t be contested because the cost of litigating to retrieve the property may cost more than the 

value of the property itself. See Knepper 9. Other agencies

seem to prioritize seizures they can monetize rather than 

those they cannot, posing for example as drug dealers rather than buyers so they can seize the buyer’s cash rather 

than illicit drugs that hold no value for law enforcement. 

See Buckeye Brief 7–8.

Delay can work to these agencies’ advantage as well. See 

Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 16. 

Faced with the prospect of waiting months or years to secure the return of a car or some other valuable piece of property they need to work and live, even innocent owners sometimes “settle” by “paying a fee to get it back.” Knepper 36. 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Contributing to the inducement to settle is how little proof

the agencies must produce to win forfeiture, the cost of litigation, and the need to appear in court—sometimes, as Ms. 

Culley learned, in a different State. And if these tactics and 

burdens work against all affected individuals, can it be any 

surprise “the poor and other groups least able to defend 

their interests” often suffer most? Leonard v. Texas, 580 

U. S. 1178, 1180 (2017) (statement of THOMAS, J., respecting denial of certiorari); see post, at 4–5. 

II 

To my mind, the due process questions surrounding these

relatively new civil forfeiture practices are many. Start 

with the most fundamental one. The Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments guarantee that no government in this country 

may take “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 

law.” As originally understood, this promise usually meant 

that a government seeking to deprive an individual of her

property could do so only after a trial before a jury in which

it (not the individual) bore the burden of proof. See, e.g., 1 

W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 134–

135 (1765) (Blackstone); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 

Dall. 304, 315 (CC Pa. 1795) (Patterson, J.); Wilkinson v. 

Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J.). So how is it that, 

in civil forfeiture, the government may confiscate property 

first and provide process later? 

The answer, if there is one, turns on history. If, as a rule, 

the Due Process Clauses require governments to conduct a

trial before taking property, some exceptions are just as 

deeply rooted. And for just that reason, these exceptions,

too, may be consistent with the original meaning of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As this Court has put

it, “a process of law . . . must be taken to be due process of 

law” if it enjoys “the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 

516, 528 (1884); see, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
 

 

 

6 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

& Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 278–280 (1856). 

But can contemporary civil forfeiture practices boast that

kind of pedigree? In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), this Court noted that English

and early American admiralty laws allowed the government to seize a vessel involved in “piratical” or other maritime offenses and later initiate postdeprivation civil forfeiture proceedings. Id., at 684. The Court observed that 

similar legal rules existed for cases involving “objects used

in violation of the customs and revenue laws.” Id., at 682; 

see also K. Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 Colum. 

L. Rev. 1449, 1466 (2019). After emphasizing the existence 

of those traditions, the Court proceeded to uphold the civil

forfeiture of a boat. Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 682, 690. 

Later and proceeding on much the same basis, the Court 

approved various aspects of civil forfeiture practice in the 

context of customs enforcement actions. See United States 

v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 562, n. 12 (1983); United States v. 

Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 249, n. 7 (1986).

These historical traditions suggest that postdeprivation 

civil forfeiture processes in the discrete arenas of admiralty,

customs, and revenue law may satisfy the Constitution.

But as the Court stressed in Von Neumann, “the general

rule” remains that the government cannot “‘seize a person’s

property without a prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified.’” Id., at 249, n. 7. And it is far from clear 

to me whether the postdeprivation practices historically tolerated inside the admiralty, customs, and revenue contexts

enjoy “the sanction of settled usage” outside them. Hurtado, 110 U. S., at 528. 

The reasons for the law’s traditionally permissive attitude toward civil forfeiture in those three contexts may 

merit exploration, too. From a brief look, it seems they were 

sometimes justified for reasons particular to their fields. In 

the early Republic, for example, once a ship involved in violations of the Nation’s piracy or customs laws slipped port 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

for a foreign destination, American courts often could not

exercise jurisdiction over it or its crew, let alone its owners. 

See R. Waples, Proceedings in Rem §19, p. 22 (1882) 

(Waples). In many instances, the law recognized that seizing the ship, subject to postdeprivation procedures, represented “the only adequate means of suppressing the offence

or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party.” 

Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 233 (1844) (Story,

J.); see also 3 Blackstone 262 (1768) (justifying civil forfeiture in customs cases as necessary “to secure such forfeited

goods for the public use, though the offender himself had 

escaped the reach of justice”). But if history sanctions that

line of thinking, it’s hard not to wonder: How does any of 

that support the use of civil forfeiture in so many cases today, where the government can secure personal jurisdiction

over the wrongdoer? And where seizing his property is not 

the only adequate means of addressing his offense? 

Even supposing some modern civil forfeiture regimes are 

able to claim the sanction of history, I wonder whether all 

their particulars might. In the past, it seems the government could confiscate only certain classes of property. So, 

for example, admiralty statutes regularly authorized the

government to seize and pursue the civil forfeiture of “the 

instrument[s] of the offence,” say, a ship used to engage in

piracy. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 75 (1855); see Harmony, 2 How., at 233. But statutes like that did not necessarily mean forfeiture extended to the vessel’s cargo, and

courts were loath to assume they did. Id., at 235. Today,

by contrast, civil forfeiture statutes routinely permit governments to confiscate not just instruments used in an offense, but other “facilitating” property as well. See supra, 

at 3. (In this respect, Alabama’s statute is again illustrative.) And if that difference seems a small one, it is anything but: It is the difference between being able to confiscate the materials and equipment used to produce an illicit 

drug and being able to confiscate someone’s car after he 
 

 

8 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

used it as the site to conduct a single drug transaction as

either buyer or seller. See Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 

602, 627–628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Even in the areas where the law tolerated civil forfeiture, 

earlier generations tempered some of its harshest features. 

Courts, for example, ordinarily entertained “overwhelming

necessity” as a defense to “the violation of revenue laws” 

that might otherwise justify forfeiture. 1 J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law §697, p. 575 (1856) 

(Bishop); see Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 363 (1808) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[A] forfeiture can only be applied to those 

cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed”). Some statutes 

permitted the owner to avoid forfeiture by proving that the

violation “proceeded from accident or mistake.” 1 Stat. 677; 

see United States v. Nine Packages of Linen, 27 F. Cas. 154, 

157 (No. 15,884) (CC NY 1818); Bishop §697, at 575; cf. 3

Stat. 183 (no forfeiture of goods from “bona fide purchaser”).

Others empowered the Treasury Secretary himself to afford

the same remedy—and evidence suggests officials “were exceedingly liberal in their use of the . . . power, granting relief in the overwhelming majority of cases presented to 

them.” Arlyck, 119 Colum. L. Rev., at 1487; see also The 

Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 414–415 (1885). These days, meanwhile, many civil forfeiture statutes lack some or all of these

mitigating features. I acknowledge that this Court has suggested an innocent owner defense is not always constitutionally required. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 443 

(1996); see id., at 455–457 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (discussing limits to the Court’s holding); id., at 457–458 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (same). But even putting that debate 

aside, what of early forfeiture’s other ameliorative attributes? 

It appears, too, that time was often of the essence in traditional civil forfeiture practice. So, for example, an early 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

federal statute permitting forfeiture for nonpayment of internal duties “enjoined” the “collector” “to cause suits for

[forfeiture] to be commenced without delay, and prosecuted

to effect.” 3 Stat. 242. In an admiralty case, Chief Justice

Marshall remarked, “If the seizing officer should refuse to 

institute proceedings to ascertain the forfeiture, the district 

court may, upon the application of the aggrieved party,

compel the officer to proceed to adjudication, or to abandon

the seizure.” Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1, 10 (1817).

And in many instances owners could recover their property

while the forfeiture proceedings were ongoing by posting a 

bond. See, e.g., 3 Stat. 242; United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 

35, 36 (1879); Waples §81, at 112; ante, at 12. It’s another 

feature of historic practice that raises questions about current ones in which even innocent owners can wait for 

months or years for forfeiture proceedings to play out. 

III 

Why does a Nation so jealous of its liberties tolerate expansive new civil forfeiture practices that have “led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses”? Leonard, 580 U. S., at 

1180 (statement of THOMAS, J.). Perhaps it has something 

to do with the relative lack of power of those on whom the 

system preys. Perhaps government agencies’ increasing dependence on forfeiture as a source of revenue is an important piece of the puzzle. Cf. Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 

679 (indicating, over 50 years ago and before the rise of 

many modern innovations, that “self-interes[t]” did not motivate the forfeiture of the vessel at issue). But maybe, too, 

part of the reason lies closer to home. In this Nation, the 

right to a jury trial before the government may take life,

liberty, or property has always been the rule. Yes, some 

exceptions exist. But perhaps it is past time for this Court

to examine more fully whether and to what degree contemporary civil forfeiture practices align with that rule and 

those exceptions. 
 

 

10 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Really, it’s hard not to wonder whether some current civil

forfeiture practices represent much less than a revival of 

the archaic common-law deodand. The deodand required

the forfeiture of any object responsible for a death—say, a

knife, cart, or horse—to the Crown. See 1 Blackstone 290. 

Today, the idea seems much the same even if the practice

now sweeps more broadly, requiring almost any object involved in almost any serious offense to be surrendered to 

the government in amends. 

The hardships deodands often imposed seem more than

faintly familiar, too. Deodands required forfeiture regardless of the fault of the owner, himself sometimes the deceased. Not infrequently, the practice left impoverished 

families without the means to support themselves, faced 

not only with the loss of a loved one but also with the loss 

of a horse or perhaps a cart essential to their livelihoods. 

See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 

472 (1895); E. Burke, Deodand—A Legal Antiquity That

May Still Exist, 8 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 15, 17, 19–20 (1930). 

Sometimes grieving families could persuade authorities or 

juries to forgo a deodand, but often not, and generally the 

burden to avoid a deodand was on them. See M. Foster, 

Crown Law 266 (1762). 

As time went on, too, curiously familiar financial incentives wormed their way into the system. Originally, the

Crown was supposed to pass the deodand (literally, a thing 

given to God) onto the church “as an expiation for the sou[l]”

of the deceased. 1 Blackstone 290. Over time, though, the 

Crown increasingly chose instead to sell off its rights to deodands to local lords and others. These recipients inevitably wound up with a strong interest in the perpetuation of 

the enterprise. See id., at 292. Ultimately, the deodand’s

appeal faded in England, and this Court has held that it

“did not become part of the common-law tradition of this

country.” Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 682; see id., at 681, 

n. 19. But has something not wholly unlike it gradually 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

reemerged in our own lifetimes? 

* 

In asking the questions I do today, I do not profess a comprehensive list, let alone any firm answers. Nor does the 

way the parties have chosen to litigate this case give cause 

to supply them. But in future cases, with the benefit of full 

briefing, I hope we might begin the task of assessing how 

well the profound changes in civil forfeiture practices we 

have witnessed in recent decades comport with the Constitution’s enduring guarantee that “[n]o person shall . . . be 

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 

law.” 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–585 

HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF ALABAMA, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[May 9, 2024]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and 

JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting. 

A police officer can seize your car if he claims it is connected to a crime committed by someone else. The police 

department can then keep the car for months or even years 

until the State ultimately seeks ownership of it through

civil forfeiture. In most States, the resulting proceeds from 

the car’s sale go to the police department’s budget. Petitioners claim that the Due Process Clause requires a 

prompt, post-seizure opportunity for innocent car owners to

argue to a judge why they should retain their cars pending

that final forfeiture determination. When an officer has a 

financial incentive to hold onto a car and an owner pleads 

innocence, they argue, a retention hearing at least ensures

that the officer has probable cause to connect the owner and 

the car to a crime. 

Today, the Court holds that the Due Process Clause never

requires that minimal safeguard. In doing so, it sweeps far 

more broadly than the narrow question presented and hamstrings lower courts from addressing myriad abuses of the 

civil forfeiture system. Because I would have decided only 

which due process test governs whether a retention hearing 

is required and left it to the lower courts to apply that test

to different civil forfeiture schemes, I respectfully dissent. 
 

2 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

I 

A 

Civil forfeiture occupies a murky space between criminal

forfeiture and ordinary government deprivations of property. Criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant’s criminal 

punishment. The government must therefore proceed 

against the person (in personam) to obtain someone’s property via criminal forfeiture, which generally requires notice

of intent to forfeit the property in a criminal indictment and

full criminal procedural protections for the defendant. At 

the outset, the government must typically prove that it has

probable cause to seize the person for a specific crime and 

therefore to hold any property related to that crime. See 

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975).

Outside the criminal context, the government usually 

must provide a hearing before depriving someone of essential property. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 

264–266 (1970) (public assistance); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 

535, 542–543 (1971) (driver’s license); Fuentes v. Shevin, 

407 U. S. 67, 96–97 (1972) (household goods to which a creditor lays a claim). In some circumstances “the necessity of 

quick action by the State” may prevent a predeprivation

hearing. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327 

(1986). Then, however, the government must make

“availab[le] . . . some meaningful means by which to assess 

the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the 

initial [seizure], [to] satisfy the requirements of procedural

due process.” 451 U. S., at 539. 

Civil forfeiture is a hybrid, where prosecutors proceed 

against any property (in rem) they believe is connected to a 

crime, even when the owner is innocent. Unlike criminal 

forfeiture, civil forfeiture proceedings are untethered from 

any criminal prosecution. In fact, as many as 80% of civil

forfeitures are not accompanied by any ultimate criminal

conviction. Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

14. Civil forfeiture is unnecessary where the government 

pursues criminal forfeiture in an indictment and sustains a 

conviction. Only if an officer seizes property that he believes is connected to a crime, but does not belong to a defendant charged with that crime, must prosecutors bring 

civil forfeiture proceedings outside a criminal case. Even 

when the State abandons the prosecution that formed the

basis for the seizure, an innocent property owner can be left 

in civil forfeiture proceedings trying to get her property

back. 

B 

The Federal Government, States, and localities set their 

own rules for civil forfeiture, subject only to the limits of the 

Due Process Clause. This lack of standardized procedural

safeguards makes civil forfeiture vulnerable to abuse. In 

32 States and the federal system, when law enforcement

agencies forfeit property, the proceeds go to their own budgets. Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 4. 

As a result, police agencies often have a financial incentive

to seize as many cars as possible and try to retain them. 

The forfeiture revenue is not a supplement; many police

agencies in fact depend on cash flow from forfeitures for 

their budgets. See, e.g., J. Worrall & T. Kovandzic, Is Policing for Profit? Answers From Asset Forfeiture, 7 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 219, 222 (2008) (“[M]ore than 60% of 

police agencies surveyed reported dependence on asset forfeiture”). These cash incentives not only encourage counties to create labyrinthine processes for retrieving property 

in the hopes that innocent owners will abandon attempts at 

recovery, they also influence which laws police enforce, how 

they enforce them, and who they enforce them against. See 

Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (detailing empirical studies on the effect of fiscal incentives in civil

forfeiture on law enforcement decisionmaking). 

Police officers have an incentive to enforce the law in a 
 

 

4 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

way that leads to the recovery of fungible property, like

cash or cars. For example, officers might pose as drug dealers instead of buyers in a sting operation, because “it allows

police to seize a buyer’s cash rather than a seller’s drugs 

(which have no legal value to the seizing agency).” E. Blumenson & E. Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s

Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 67 (1998).

Similarly, police officers might target low-level drug possession in cars instead of drug transactions on the street, so

that they can seize the vehicle. In this case, police officers

pulled over petitioner Halima Tariffa Culley’s college-age

son while he was driving a car registered to her, charged

him with possession of marijuana, and seized the car. A 

police officer cannot sell recovered marijuana and a prosecutor’s office does not ordinarily pursue low-level marijuana

offenses. When a police department can recover the proceeds from a car civilly forfeited in connection to a low-level 

marijuana offense, however, targeting that offense becomes 

more appealing.

Moreover, officers have a financial incentive to target

marginalized groups, such as low-income communities of

color, who are less likely to have the resources to challenge

the forfeiture in court. See A. Crawford, Civil Asset Forfeiture in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure and 

Its Impact on Indigent Property Owners, 35 Boston College 

J. L. & Soc. Justice 257, 274–277 (2015) (“[O]ne way for law 

enforcement agencies to generate profits is to target lowincome parties who are financially incapable of challenging 

seizures”). A 2019 study found that “the seizure of nonnarcotic property from black and Hispanic arrestees increases 

with the size of the [budget] deficit in states where police 

departments can retain revenue from seized property.” M. 

Makowsky, T. Stratmann, & A. Tabarrok, To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement, 48 J. Legal Studies 189, 208–209 (2019). 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

“[T]hese same groups are often the most burdened by forfeiture,” because “they are more likely to suffer in their

daily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item 

of property, such as a car.” Leonard v. Texas, 580 U. S. 

1178, 1180 (2017) (statement of THOMAS, J., respecting denial of certiorari). For many people, loss of access to a car,

even temporarily, is significant. Over 85% of Americans 

drive to work. J. Hirsch & P. Jones, Driver’s License Suspension for Unpaid Fines and Fees: The Movement for Reform, 54 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 875, 881 (2020). Unsurprisingly, studies have found a link between the inability to 

drive and the loss of a job. For example, “[i]n New Jersey,

42% of people lost their jobs after their driver’s license was 

suspended.” Ibid. Loss of a car not only “takes away one’s

ability to commute” but also imposes a barrier to “buy[ing] 

necessities, access[ing] healthcare, and visit[ing] family

members, pharmacies, grocery stores, hospitals, and other 

essential services.” Ibid. 

Given these burdens, low-income communities are also 

the most vulnerable to pressure from unchecked prosecutors, who can use coercive civil forfeiture processes to extract settlement money from innocent owners desperate to

get their property back. See Brief for Institute for Justice 

et al. as Amici Curiae 19–20 (detailing examples). In Detroit, to take one example, car owners recently alleged that

Wayne County seizes vehicles in areas generally associated

with crime and holds on to the vehicles and their contents 

unless the owners pay steep redemption fees: $900 for the

first seizure; $1,800 for the second; and $2,700 for the third. 

See Ingram v. Wayne Cty., 81 F. 4th 603, 606 (CA6 2023). 

If the owner is unwilling or unable to pay this fee, she must

either abandon the vehicle or wait for county prosecutors to

decide whether to initiate forfeiture proceedings. Before 

such proceedings are brought, however, the owner allegedly 

must attend four or more pretrial conferences during regular work hours, during which the owner typically will not 
 

 

6 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

get to plead her case to a judge. Instead, prosecutors will

attempt to persuade her to pay the redemption fee, towing

costs, and storage fees. Missing just one conference allegedly will result in automatic forfeiture and transfer of title

to the county.

Similarly, in Massachusetts, one investigation found over 

500 instances in a single county where law enforcement

held property for a decade or more before officials finally 

commenced forfeiture proceedings. S. Datar & S. Dooling,

Massachusetts Police Can Easily Seize Your Money. The 

DA of One County Makes It Nearly Impossible To Get It

Back, ProPublica (Aug. 18, 2021), www.propublica.org/article/massachusetts-police-can-easily-seize-your-money.-theda-of-one-county-makes-it-near-impossible-to-get-it-back. 

In other words, those owners had to wait more than a decade for the chance to explain to a judge why they should get 

their property back. In one instance, prosecutors ran a 

newspaper notice four years after a seizure, at which point 

the property owner had only 20 days to file a claim to avoid 

forfeiture. Similar delays have been reported in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. See Brief for Institute 

for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 16 (collecting studies). 

In short, law enforcement can seize cars, hold them indefinitely, and then rely on an owner’s lack of resources to forfeit those cars to fund agency budgets, all without any initial check by a judge as to whether there is a basis to hold 

the car in the first place. 

II 

This Court granted certiorari to address which of its tests 

should govern due process challenges that seek a retention

hearing after an officer seizes a car.1 Now, the Court 

—————— 1See Pet. for Cert. i (“In determining whether the Due Process Clause

requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable 

cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if

so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the 
 

 

 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

reaches far beyond that question to hold that people whose 

cars are seized by the police never have a due process right 

to a retention hearing. The Court arrives at this conclusion 

by relying on two customs cases from the 1980s and historical practice that purportedly reinforces their application. 

Its reasoning is deeply flawed. 

A 

The majority says that “[t]his Court’s decisions in $8,850 

and Von Neumann resolve this case.” Ante, at 8. These 

cases, however, have little to say about what due process

requires when an innocent owner seeks to retain her car

pending an ultimate forfeiture determination in schemes 

like those described above. Instead, the claimants in these 

cases argued that the United States Customs Service took 

too long to resolve forfeiture proceedings against property 

seized at the border as part of the claimants’ own alleged 

violations of customs law. 

In United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 558 (1983), a 

customs inspector seized $8,850 in cash from Mary Josephine Vasquez, who had declared she was carrying less 

than $5,000. Vasquez was charged with a felony and a misdemeanor, with the indictment seeking forfeiture of the

$8,850 as part of the misdemeanor charge. When a jury

ultimately convicted Vasquez of only the felony count,

which did not contain the forfeiture allegations, the Government finally filed civil forfeiture proceedings against the

cash. Vasquez argued only that the Government’s 18-

month delay in filing civil forfeiture proceedings was unconstitutionally long. To evaluate her claim, the Court borrowed the Barker v. Wingo multifactor test from the speedy-

—————— 

‘speedy trial’ test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 

(1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh 

Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits”). 
 

 

 

8 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

trial context and held that “the balance of factors indicate[d] that the Government’s delay . . . was reasonable” in

the circumstances. 461 U. S., at 569; see id., at 564 (citing 

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972)). In so holding, the 

Court emphasized that the Government had “diligent[ly]” 

pursued the pending criminal proceedings against Vasquez.

461 U. S., at 568. Because a conviction on the misdemeanor 

count could have rendered civil forfeiture unnecessary, the 

Government’s delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding 

was understandable. Ibid.

 In United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 245 

(1986), Von Neumann failed to declare a newly purchased

Jaguar Panther car to customs officials when he drove it

back to the United States. United States Customs seized 

the car, and Von Neumann filed a petition for administrative remission proceedings the same day. Two weeks later, 

he posted a bond and regained possession of the car. Thirtysix days after he filed his remission petition, Customs resolved it by reducing Von Neumann’s penalty for failure to 

declare to $3,600. 

Von Neumann argued that the 36-day delay in responding to his administrative remission petition violated due 

process. The Government responded that “due process considerations do not govern the Secretary’s disposition of [administrative] remission petitions.” Id., at 249. The Court 

agreed with the Government. “Implicit in this Court’s discussion of timeliness in $8,850 was the view that the [regular civil] forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the

postseizure hearing required by due process to protect Von

Neumann’s property interest in [his] car.” Id., at 249. The 

administrative proceedings did not trigger a separate due 

process right, the Court continued, because they were discretionary and “not necessary to a forfeiture determination.” Id., at 250. 

The Court then declined to address the argument that the 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

remission statute “itself creates a property right which cannot be taken away without due process.” Ibid. “[E]ven if 

respondent had such a property right,” the Court explained,

“any due process requirement of timely disposition was

more than adequately provided here.” Ibid. The Court had 

“already noted that his right to a forfeiture proceeding

meeting the Barker test satisfies any due process right with 

respect to the car and the money.” Id., at 251. Von Neumann had also failed to show “what prejudice [he] suffered 

from the 36-day delay in the response” to his remission petition. Id., at 250. 

The majority takes Von Neumann’s imprecise categorical

language out of this vital context to hold that “a timely forfeiture hearing ‘satisfies any due process right’ with respect 

to a ‘car’ that has been seized for civil forfeiture.” Ante, at 

8 (quoting Von Neumann, 474 U. S., at 251).2 In doing so, 

it extends the holdings of both Von Neumann and $8,850 to 

situations neither Court contemplated. In both, the Government sought to forfeit property tied to the claimants’ unlawful conduct. The claimants were not, and did not claim 

to be, innocent owners of property used for criminal ends 

without their knowledge. Unlike petitioners here, neither 

the claimant in $8,850 nor the claimant in Von Neumann 

had argued that a retention hearing was necessary to test

Customs’ justification for seizing their property at the outset. Instead, both argued only that the Government took

too long to resolve their proceedings: in $8,850 through a 

statutory process, and in Von Neumann through a discretionary administrative one. The majority’s reading here 

improperly resolves a constitutional challenge that the 

Court in those cases had no cause or reason to address. 

—————— 2 Perhaps recognizing that it stretches the reasoning of the opinion, the

majority relies in a footnote on statements made at oral argument. See 

ante, at 8, n. 2. 
 

 

 

10 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

B 

With the sole exception of the Eleventh Circuit, every 

court of appeals has rejected Von Neumann’s application to

state and county civil forfeiture schemes concerning claimants’ cars.3 Indeed, this Court has distinguished Von Neumann in contexts where officers have a financial incentive 

to seize property and owners may assert innocence of the

underlying crime as a defense. In United States v. James 

Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 46 (1993), for example, this Court held that the Government must conduct

a predeprivation hearing before it seizes real property connected to criminal conduct through civil forfeiture. Four 

years after James Daniel Good pleaded guilty to state

charges based on drugs found in his home, the Federal Government filed civil forfeiture proceedings against his home. 

Even though Good did not assert innocence, the Court emphasized that proceedings without a predeprivation hearing created an unacceptable risk of error for property owners asserting an “innocent owner” defense, because waiting 

until the final forfeiture hearing “‘would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented.’” Id., at 56. Crucial to the Court’s reasoning was 

the fact that “the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding” when it is entitled to

forfeit the property. Id., at 55–56. 

This reasoning applies directly to due process challenges 

where police seize the cars of innocent owners and use forfeiture proceeds to fund department budgets. The narrow 

holdings of $8,850 and Von Neumann should not determine 

the due process claims of every claimant deprived of access 

—————— 3See Ingram v. Wayne Cty., 81 F. 4th 603, 616–617 (CA6 2023); Serrano v. CBP, 975 F. 3d 488, 500 (CA5 2020) (per curiam); Smith v. Chicago, 524 F. 3d 834, 837–838 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v. 

Smith, 558 U. S. 87 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 52, n. 12 

(CA2 2002) (Sotomayor, J.); cf. Booker v. St. Paul, 762 F. 3d 730 (CA8 

2014) (declining to reference Von Neumann). 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

to her car by state prosecutors on untested grounds for

months or years. 

III 

The majority’s categorical rule that due process never requires a retention hearing also cannot be squared with the

context-specific analysis that this Court’s due process doctrine requires. “‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is 

not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to

time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria & Restaurant 

Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961) (alteration in 

original). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). 

The Court granted this case to resolve which of two flexible due process tests should govern, not to resolve whether

due process ever requires a retention hearing in civil forfeiture schemes. That difference is important. An appropriately context-specific due process test should not always

yield the same result when applied to different schemes. Of 

the six Circuits that have applied the test from Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), to various civil forfeiture 

schemes, three have held that due process requires a retention hearing, Ingram, 81 F. 4th, at 620; Smith v. Chicago, 

524 F. 3d 834, 838 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v. 

Smith, 558 U. S. 87 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 

67–68 (CA2 2002) (Sotomayor, J.), and three have held that

it does not, Serrano v. CBP, 975 F. 3d 488, 500–502 (CA5 

2020) (per curiam); Booker v. St. Paul, 762 F. 3d 730, 736– 

737 (CA8 2014); United States v. One 1971 BMW, 652 F. 2d 

817, 820–821 (CA9 1981). That result is consistent with the 

flexible dictates of any due process test, which should take

into account all the component parts of an individual

scheme. 

For instance, petitioners had the right to post a bond to 
 

 

12 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

get back their vehicles, the right to move for summary judgment in the forfeiture proceeding itself, and the opportunity

to seek separate relief under the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure for an illegal seizure. The adequacy of those alternative procedures was never briefed below because the 

only question was which test should apply. By contrast, the 

New York City scheme that the Second Circuit concluded 

violated due process lacked all of those procedures. See 

Krimstock, 306 F. 3d, at 55, 59–60. Differences in the adequacy of available procedures can and should result in different due process outcomes.

Instead of answering the question presented and then remanding to the lower court to apply the appropriate test, 

the majority instead holds that due process never requires

a retention hearing. The majority acknowledges that “the 

States and Congress have adopted a wide variety of approaches.” Ante, at 14. Yet it prescribes a categorical constitutional rule for all of them. The Court today hamstrings 

federal courts from conducting a context-specific analysis in

civil forfeiture schemes that are less generous than the one 

here. 

IV 

The majority’s holding relates only to retention hearings.

It does not foreclose other potential due process challenges

to civil forfeiture proceedings. See ante, at 8, n. 3. People

who have their property seized by police remain free to challenge other abuses in the civil forfeiture system. For instance, such claimants could challenge notice of a forfeiture

posted only in a newspaper, the lack of a neutral adjudicator at an initial hearing, or the standard of proof necessary 

to seize a car. Lower courts remain free to apply Mathews 

to those claims. See ante, at 9. Due process also still “requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing,” ante, at 5, 
 

 

 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

so claimants may continue to challenge unreasonable delays.4 

The abuses of many civil forfeiture systems are well documented. See, e.g., supra, at 3–6. I commend States or localities that have adopted retention hearings as a way of

guarding against those abuses. See, e.g., Brief for Legal Aid

Society as Amicus Curiae (detailing the benefits of New

York City’s prompt postseizure hearings). Other States and 

localities should not view today’s decision as precluding 

them from following suit and adopting similar measures. 

* * * 

The majority today holds that due process never requires

the minimal check of a retention hearing before a police officer deprives an innocent owner of her car for months or 

years. Given the diverse schemes adopted by States, some 

with adequate safeguards and some without, the Court 

should have just answered the question presented. Instead, 

it announces a universal rule for all schemes without heeding the dictates of this Court’s due process precedents that

require a scheme-specific analysis. Because I instead would 

—————— 4Courts applying the Barker factors to due process challenges of unreasonable delay should not apply a narrower version of that test than 

the one this Court articulated in $8,850. The $8,850 Court emphasized

that Barker is a “flexible” test, and “none of [its] factors is a necessary or 

sufficient condition for finding unreasonable delay.” United States v. 

$8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 564–565 (1983); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 

514, 533 (1972) (“[T]hese factors have no talismanic qualities; courts 

must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process”). The 

factors are merely “guides in balancing the interests of the claimant and

the Government to assess whether the basic due process requirement of

fairness has been satisfied in a particular case.” $8,850, 461 U. S., at 

565. In the civil forfeiture context, “the balance of the interests, which 

depends so heavily on the context of the particular situation, may differ

from a situation involving the right to a speedy trial.” Ibid., n. 14. Recognizing that the Barker and Mathews balancing tests have similar aims

and factors, the Government notes that the tests are not necessarily mutually exclusive. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, at 20– 

22. 
 

14 CULLEY v. MARSHALL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

have answered the question presented and left lower courts

the flexibility to apply the appropriate test in these myriad 

circumstances, I respectfully dissent.