# FILED
March 24, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9807-CC-00230 ) Appellee, ) Carroll County ) v. ) Honorable C. Cree d McGinley, Judge ) ROBERT THOMAS MORTON, ) (Aggravated Burg lary, Arson, ) Setting Fi re to Pers onal Prop erty) Appellant. )

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Billy R. Roe, Jr. John Knox Walkup Assistant District P ublic Defender Attorney General & Repor ter 117 North Forrest Avenu e 425 Fifth Avenue North Camden, TN 38320 Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Clinton J. Morgan Assistant Attorney Gener al 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 G. Robert Radford District Attorney General 111 Church Street P. O. Box 686 Huntingdon, TN 38344-0686 Eleanor Cahill Assistant District A

ttorney General 111 Church Street P. O. Box 686 Huntingdon, TN 38344-0686

OPINION FILED: ____________________________
AFFIRMED JAMES C. BEASLEY, SR., S PECIAL JUDGE


### O P I N I O N-2- The appellant, Robert Thomas Morton, wa s found guilty by a Carroll County ju ry of aggravatedburglary, arson, and two counts of setting fire to personal property. In this appeal as of right, the appella nt challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evi dence.

This case involves the bur glary and burning of a house trailer located at 105 Green Valley Road in Huntingdon, Tennessee. The trailer was ow ned byCharles and Irene Pinkley who lived next door. The trailer was rented by Ma ria Morton, the appellant’s estranged wife, and Kanya Knight. T he two wome n, along wit h Mrs. Mort on’s two children, had been living in the t railer for a “couple of months” at the time of the fire.

On November 21, 1997 at approx imately 8 p.m., as Sandra Lei gh Sherrod was leaving the

Pinkley residence she noticed a flicker of light in a window of the trail er. She walked closer to the trailer and saw a curtain b urning. Sh e alerted her aunt, Mrs. Pinkle y, and they c alled 911 and Mrs. Mo rton who was visiting ne arby.

Ms. Sherrod testified that, after calling 911, she ran back to the trailer and attempted to move Kanya Knight’s car but was unable to do so because the car was locked. As she walked back across the yard, she saw the appellant and a girl drive by in a blue or gray car. After the fire trucks arri ved, she saw the appell ant and the girl driv e by again.

Michelle Leigh Davis testified that she was with the appellant on the day of the fire. She drove him to the po lice st ations in Bruceton and Holl ow Rock. She thought he was trying to get police assistanc e in recovering some personal items from his wi fe. Later, they drove to the trailer where the appellant requested her to knock on the door an d ask for Maria or Kanya. She did so, but n o one came to the door. Late that afternoon, s he dropped appellant of f at his home i n Bruceton. An hour or so la ter, she picked the ap pellantup and drove him to the intersection of Green Valley and Grooms R oad. Th e appellantgot out of the car at this point after

telling her “that he w

as getting some clothes or something, or see if the cops had showed up out there yet .” Sometime later, she-3-

returned to the intersection and found the appellant waitin g there. She testified that the appellanttold her he broke the wi ndow because hewanted to g et someof his belongings. He could not get his things, but his fingerprints were on the window , so he took a lighter and burned the curtain. Ms. Davis and the appellant then drove by the burning trailer twice before leaving the area.

Robert Pollard, an investigator with the State Fir e Marshall’s Office, testified that the fire’s point of origin was the center of the trailer in the

area of the windows. H e found no evidence of an accelerate or an electrical involv ement. The investigator to ok a statement from the appellant who admitted be ing let off at t he stop sign at the intersection of Grooms and Green Valley and walking up the street to see if the “la w” or his wife w

ere athis wife’s house. He said this only too k a couple of m inutes and the n he returned to the stop sign and met Michelle. He denied s etting the fire.

It was established that t he sit e of the bu rned tr ailer w as less than one -fourth

of a mile fro m the sto p sign at th e interse ction of Grooms an d Green Va lley.

Irene Pin kl ey testified that she and her husband owned the subject trailer. Maria Morton , her tw

o child ren, and

Kanya K

night w ere liv ing the re. Late

in the af

t ernoon o n November

21, Mrs. Pinkley s

awthe appella nt sitting in a car i n Maria’s drivew ay and a woman knocking on Maria’s door. The appellant and the woman left, but dr ove by later while the trailer was bu rning.
Kanya Knight testif ied that her perso nal property, including clothes, jewelry, furniture and dishes, was in the tr ailer at the time of the fire. While the trailer was burning, she saw the appellant and a woman drive by twice in a “little gray-blue looking” car.
Joyce Maria Self testified that on N ovember 21, 199 7 she was m arried to, but separated from, the appel lant. A t the time of trial, they w ere divorced. She liv

ed in the trailer on Green Valley Road w ith her two children and Kanya Kn ig ht. She said her-4-

husband had never

lived in that trailer and denied that he had any personal items there. There was a n ongoing dispute about the ow nership of a washing machi ne which the witness had brought

from her former

residence. She claimed it had been given to her by the son-in-law

of the appellant’s sister; how ever, thesister claimed that it s till belonged to her.
Appellant’s former wife further testified that everything she ow

ned was lo st in the fire, including her dog, clothes, pictures, and furnitur e. She stated that while she and her two children were standi ng by theroad crying, the appel lant drove by and “w aved a peace sign.”
Kay

Darnell testifiedthat her brother, the appellant, and his former wife, Maria, had previouslylived in a

family-owned trailer. She stated that when Maria moved out, “she took stuff that was mine

and stuff that wasmy brother’s.” Ms. Darnell had contacted the police foradvice as to the steps sh e sho uld t ake in recovering her property. On crossexamination, the witness admitted she had never been in the tr ailer on Green Valley Road and coul d not def initely sa y that it co ntained any of her brother’ s propert y.

When an appellant challenges the su f ficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could h ave found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Vi rginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The rule governing o ur review of the facts is applicable to findings of guilt based upon direct ev idence, circumstantial ev idence, or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. B rown , 551 S.W.2d 329 (Te nn. 1977)).
Questions concerning the credibi lity of witnesses, the wei ght and value to be given to the evidence, as well as factual issues raised by the evidence are resolv ed by the trier of fact, not this Court. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978). A guilt y verdict-5-

rendered by the jur y and approved by the t rial judge accredits the testimony of the witnesses

for the State, and a presumption of guilt repl aces the presumption of innocence. State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1973). On appeal, the convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evi dence is insufficient. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1982).

In his challenge to the sufficie ncy of the evidence, the appel lant d oes n ot contest the proof o

f the essent ial elements of these crimes, but claims that the evidence is insufficientto establish that he is the per son who committed them. He argues that the jury disregarded every

possible alternative in accepting the State’s theory, even though logic would dictate that the appellant did not burn the trailer. In s upport of this claim, the appellantalludes to the opportunity of his estranged wife to frame him and clai ms that he
w ould have let his dog out before burning the trailer, would not have burned his sister’ s washing machine, and w ould never have driv

en by the trailer

during the fire. Finall

y, the appellantquestionswhy would he have committed these crimes knowing he would be the primary suspect.

The record reflects that these al ternatives and this reas oning was presented to an d rejected by the jury and the trial judge. In approv

ing the jury’s v

erdict and overruling

the motion for a new trial, the t rial jud ge described the proof in this case as absolutely overwhelming.

For its consideration, the

jury had proof of the appellant’ s acts and conduct at and near the scene immediately before and shortly after the burglary and fire. Most da maging, however, was the unimpeached testimony of Michelle Davis relating the admissions made to her by th e appella nt. By its ver dict, the jury obviou sly credite d her test imony.

Gr eat weight is giv

en to the result reached by the jury in a crimi nal trial , and th e appellanthas the burden of overcoming the presumption of guilt. State v. Ma tthews , 888 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1993).-6- In our view, the

appellant ha s failed to carry his burden of proof in demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient . Accordingly, w e must and do affirm the judgment s of conviction.

_________________ ________________

______ _ JAMES C. BEASLEY, SR., S PECIAL JUDGE CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDG E

___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE