Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ARLISHA WILLIAMS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

KATHY BRADLEY

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ARLISHA WILLIAMS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) No. 93A02-1211-EX-959

)

REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )

DEVELOPMENT and UPS GROUND )

FREIGHT, INC., )

)

Appellees. )

APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

Cause No. 12-R-4211

July 3, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Senior Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Arlisha Williams appeals the determination by the Review Board of the Indiana 

Department of Workforce Development (“the Board”) that she is not entitled to 

unemployment benefits. We affirm. 

ISSUE

Williams claims that the evidence does not support the Board’s decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 30, 2012, Williams began working for UPS Ground Freight, Inc.

(“UPS”), in Indianapolis as a part-time truck loader. She worked until May 2, 2012, and 

then she did not return to work. Williams told a supervisor that she had a medical 

condition, had concerns about working in the trucks in the heat, and would speak to her 

doctor about it. The following week, she called in each day to report she would not be 

there. She did not call at all during the week after that, and UPS deemed her employment 

to be terminated.

Williams applied for unemployment benefits. A deputy determined that she was 

entitled to benefits. UPS appealed. An administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) held a 

hearing, at which Williams and a UPS representative appeared and submitted evidence. 

After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Williams voluntarily left her employment 

without good cause and reversed the deputy’s determination.

Williams requested review by the Board. The Board did not hold a hearing or 

accept additional evidence. After its review, the Board adopted and incorporated the 
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ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. This 

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Williams claims the Board erred in determining that she voluntarily left 

employment without good cause. As an initial matter, the Board asserts that Williams 

has waived her claims for appellate review because: (1) Williams did not file an 

Appellant’s Appendix and (2) Williams’s Appellant’s Brief lacks citation to authority and 

cogent argument. We hold pro se litigants such as Williams to the same standard as 

trained attorneys. T.R. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 950 N.E.2d 792, 

795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). At the same time, we prefer to resolve cases on the merits 

whenever possible. Id. Here, despite the defects in Williams’s brief and the absence of 

an Appendix, there is a sufficient record for us to address the merits of Williams’s appeal. 

Thus, we reject the Board’s claim of waiver.

The Board’s decision is conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Ind. 

Code § 22-4-17-12(a) (1995). On appeal, the standard of review is threefold: (1) 

findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed 

questions of law and fact—ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal 

propositions are reviewed for correctness. Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of 

Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011). When reviewing findings of basic 

fact, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. J.M. v. 

Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012). Rather, 
4

we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Board’s findings, and we reverse 

only if there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. Id. 

The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to provide benefits to 

those who are involuntarily out of work, through no fault of their own, for reasons 

beyond their control. Davis v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 900 N.E.2d 

488, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Consistent with this purpose, a stricter standard is 

imposed upon those who voluntarily quit working. Id. An employee who has voluntarily 

left his or her employment without good cause in connection with the work is ineligible 

for unemployment benefits. Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(a) (2009). The question of whether 

an employee quit without good cause is a question of fact to be determined by the Board. 

S.A. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 936 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). The claimant has the burden to prove that good cause existed. Id. The reason for 

quitting must be job-related and objective in character, excluding purely subjective and 

personal reasons. Id. at 337-38.

Here, Williams contends that she received permission from a supervisor to stay 

home from work on May 3, 2012, due to a death in the family. She further contends that

she was unable to reach the supervisor on subsequent days and instead later spoke to a 

human resources employee, who told her that her employment would be terminated. 

These contentions are a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The 

evidence most favorable to the ALJ’s findings, which the Board adopted, is that Williams 

called in on a daily basis for a week to report that she could not return and thereafter did 

not communicate with her supervisor. She never spoke with her supervisor about 
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whether she was terminated. Although she had expressed concerns about whether the 

nature of the work posed a threat to her health, she never went to the doctor. This is 

sufficient evidence from which the Board could determine that Williams left her 

employment without good cause.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Board’s decision.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., and PYLE, J., concur.