RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0712-17T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANANCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

G.P.,

Defendant-Appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF T.P.,

a Minor.

Argued March 4, 2019 – Decided March 28, 2019

Before Judges Messano and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, 

Docket No. FN-16-0128-16.

Amy E. Vasquez, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Amy E. Vasquez, on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Peter D. Alvino, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Sara M. Gregory, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Danielle Ruiz, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney; Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; Danielle Ruiz, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant G.P. and his paramour, S.S., are the biological parents of one 

child: T.P., born in January 2016. In March 2016, the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency (Division) filed a complaint for custody, care and 

supervision of T.P. 

This appeal has its genesis in defendant's stipulation to a finding of abuse 

or neglect of T.P., following the conclusion of evidence presented by the 

Division at a fact-finding hearing. Thereafter, a Family Part judge denied 

defendant's applications to withdraw his stipulation. Defendant now appeals 

from a June 28, 2016 stipulation order and an August 30, 2017 order terminating 

litigation.1 He claims the judge failed to make the requisite findings of abuse or 

 

1 Following entry of defendant's stipulation, the Division amended its finding 

against S.S. from substantiated to unfounded. S.S. is not part of this appeal.
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neglect; the factual basis provided for his stipulation did not establish a finding 

of abuse or neglect; and the judge abused his discretion in denying defendant's 

motion to withdraw his stipulation. We affirm.

I.

We derive the salient facts from the evidence presented by the Division at 

the first day of the hearing on June 27, 2016. That evidence included the 

testimony of three witnesses: Dr. Medesa Espana, who qualified as an expert in 

pediatric emergency medicine and child abuse and neglect; Passaic County 

Prosecutor's Office (PCPO) Detective Tabitha Thompson, who interviewed 

defendant; and Division caseworker Carmela Pappa. The Division also entered 

into evidence, without objection, several documents, including its summary 

reports, photographs, and T.P.'s medical records. Defendant and S.S. appeared 

at the hearing and were represented by separate counsel.

The precipitating event that led to the Division's involvement with the 

family occurred on March 4, 2016, when T.P. was admitted to the hospital with 

"severe head trauma." T.P. presented with a visible "linear red mark" on his 

upper eyelid and "a broken blood vessel on the surface of the globe of the eye."

T.P.'s treating physicians diagnosed the child with brain and retinal 

hemorrhaging. They reported to the Division that both parents denied T.P. had 
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suffered a recent fall or trauma, and the retinal hemorrhaging indicated T.P. had 

been "shaken." T.P. remained on life support for approximately one week until 

he was able to breathe on his own.

Dr. Espana detailed T.P.'s injuries and testified they were consistent with 

Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), which results from "a forceful acceleration, 

deceleration movement of the eyeball . . . in its socket." According to Dr. 

Espana, "the presentation of the clinical manifestations indicate[d] that an injury

that occurred within a [twenty-four to forty-eight] hour time frame." Dr. Espana 

specifically refuted any suggestion that T.P.'s injuries could have been caused 

by a prenatal condition contracted from S.S., or trauma during childbirth. T.P.'s 

lack of neck and spinal injuries had no impact on Dr. Espana's opinion that T.P.'s 

brain and retinal hemorrhaging resulted from SBS.

The Division introduced a segment of Thompson's video-recorded 

interview of defendant. Among other things, defendant acknowledged T.P. was 

in his sole care the day before the child was admitted to the hospital. Thompson 

presented defendant with an anatomically-correct doll and asked him to 

demonstrate the manner in which he played with his son. Defendant "toss[ed]" 

the doll in the air with "his hands . . . removed from the [doll]'s body, and then 

he grasped the baby again once the baby came down[.]" Thompson "would [not] 
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describe [the toss] as gentle, . . . bear[ing] in mind the baby was [two-]and[-]a 

[-]half months with an unsupported neck, and [as such Thompson could not] 

. . . judge how gentle that toss would have been for a baby that age." Defendant 

tossed the doll "just over his head . . . several times."

Significantly, Thompson testified she filed her report and the PCPO was 

preparing the matter for presentation to a grand jury. At the time of the hearing, 

no formal complaints had yet been filed. 

Pappa's investigation confirmed no one else resided with the family. 

T.P.'s maternal grandmother had cared for the child during the week of February 

21, 2016, and T.P.'s great maternal grandmother had cared for him three days 

prior to his hospitalization. Notably, Pappa was not asked whether she or anyone 

on behalf of the Division told the parents criminal charges would not be pursued. 

At the conclusion of the Division's case, the judge determined Dr. Espana

was a "highly credible witness" and based on her testimony, T.P.'s injuries were 

"not spontaneous injuries[,]" but rather "the result of severe trauma," occurring 

twenty-four to forty-eight hours before they were inflicted. Citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.46(a)(2),

2

the judge determined the Division presented prima facie evidence 

 

2 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(2):
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that T.P. suffered non-accidental injuries, and defendant and S.S. were "the only 

two [people] who had access to the child" during the twenty-four to forty-eight 

hour period prior to infliction of his injuries. On that basis, the judge determined 

the Division satisfied its burden of production, thereby shifting the burden of 

proof to the parents to prove non-culpability. See In re D.T., 229 N.J. Super. 

509, 517 (App. Div. 1988) (recognizing where, as here, there is limited access 

to a child in a Title Nine litigation, especially an infant, the burden shifts to 

those with access to prove non-culpability); see also N.J. Div. of Youth &

Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App Div. 1994). 

The next day, in lieu of presenting evidence to demonstrate he was not 

responsible for T.P.'s injuries, defendant submitted to the court a "voluntary 

stipulation[/]admission to child abuse or neglect" form, which he signed after 

reviewing the form with counsel.3 After extensive colloquy with defendant to 

ensure he understood the nature and import of his decision, defendant admitted 

 

[P]roof of injuries sustained by a child or of the 

condition of a child of such a nature as would ordinarily 

not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or 

omissions of the parent or guardian shall be prima facie 

evidence that a child of, or who is the responsibility of 

such person is an abused or neglected child[.]

3 Defendant did not include the form in his appendix. 
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he "engaged in acts that resulted in injuries to [his] son that constituted abuse or 

neglect[.]" Following the testimony, the judge held defendant's conduct was 

sufficient to sustain a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(b). A stipulation order consistent with the judge's findings was 

entered that day.

In February 2017, defendant filed a motion to vacate the stipulation. 

Because the motion failed to include an "affidavit[] made on personal 

knowledge" pursuant to Rule 1:6-6, the judge denied the motion without 

prejudice by order entered on March 6, 2017. In doing so, however, the judge 

also found the record supported the factual basis for defendant's stipulation. 

Noting the Division presented extensive testimony the day before defendant 

entered his stipulation, the court recognized T.P.'s injuries were "fresh in 

everyone's mind" when G.P. "stipulate[d] that he handled the child in such a way

as he caused injury to the child." 

On March 24, 2017, defendant filed a second motion to vacate his 

stipulation, which was supported by his affidavit.4 During the permanency 

hearing conducted that date, defense counsel informed the court that he had 

"learned two days [prior] that [defendant] was indicted [by a] Passaic County 

 

4 Defendant did not include the affidavit in his appendix.
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[grand jury] for two counts of cruelty and neglect of children." Apparently, the 

indictment had been returned in January 2017. Defense counsel told the judge 

he would not have permitted defendant to stipulate to a finding of abuse or 

neglect had he known defendant was facing criminal charges. He further 

claimed the Division misled defendant to believe criminal charges would not be 

pursued. On the return date for the motion, the judge rejected defendant's 

argument, citing Thompson's testimony, which clearly indicated the PCPO was 

preparing the case for presentation to a grand jury. An order was entered on 

July 14, 2017.

On August 30, 2017, the judge denied defendant's ensuing motion for 

reconsideration, recognizing defendant's motions to withdraw his stipulation 

were motivated by his criminal charges, and his factual basis was legally 

sufficient. The court also terminated the litigation, and the family was reunified. 

This appeal followed.

II.

Our standard of review is well settled. We are bound by the family court's 

factual findings if supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 577-78 (App. Div. 2010). We 

accord particular deference to the family court's fact-finding because of the 
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court's "special expertise" in family matters, its "feel of the case," and its 

opportunity to assess credibility based on witnesses' demeanor. N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 

N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998). 

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4), an abused or neglected child includes: 

[A] child whose physical, mental, or emotional 

condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger 

of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his 

parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . (b) 

in providing the child with proper supervision or 

guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to 

be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof[.] 

The Division "must prove that the child is 'abused or neglected' by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and only through the admission of 'competent, 

material and relevant evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 

205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)). The statute requires a 

court to consider harm or risk of harm to the child, as opposed to the intent of 

the abuser, because "[t]he main goal of Title [Nine] is to protect children 'from 

acts or conditions which threaten their welfare.'" G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 

157 N.J. 161, 176 (1999) (citation omitted). Further, the phrase "minimum 

degree of care," as used in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), means conduct that is not 

"grossly or wantonly negligent." Id. at 178. Therefore, to show a failure to 
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exercise a minimum degree of care, negligence is not sufficient, but intentional 

behavior is not essential. Id. at 178-79. 

In New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. J.Y., 352 N.J.

Super. 245, 265-66 (App. Div. 2002), we held that a 

stipulation must be definite and certain in its terms and 

the consent of the parties to be bound by it must be 

clearly established. A factual stipulation in an abuse or 

neglect case must conform to these same standards. 

That is, the judge must be satisfied that there is a factual 

basis from which to conclude that defendants have 

committed some specific act or acts which constitute 

abuse or neglect as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) and 

that the parents willingly, knowingly and voluntarily 

agree that they have committed these acts. 

[(Citations omitted).] 

In considering defendant's contentions in light of the controlling authority, 

we begin with a review of the process by which his stipulation was obtained. At 

the onset of the June 28, 2016 proceeding, defendant advised the judge he 

wished to enter a stipulation in lieu of presenting evidence to rebut the 

presumption that T.P. only could have been injured while in his custody. At that 

point in the proceedings, the Division had presented all of its evidence. 

Prior to accepting defendant's stipulation, the judge engaged in extensive 

questioning and explanatory discussions with defendant, ensuring he understood 

the nature of his decision to stipulate. At the conclusion of the judge's inquiry, 
11 A-0712-17T4

defendant acknowledged he was "prepared to provide the [c]ourt with [a] factual 

basis for [his] admission of abuse or neglect." Clearly, at that point in the 

proceedings, defendant was well aware of the Division's complaint alleging 

abuse or neglect for the injuries sustained by T.P. in March 2016, which led to 

the child's hospitalization. Having heard the testimony of Dr. Espana the 

previous day, defendant was fully aware of the extent of T.P.'s injuries. 

Defendant also had the opportunity to view his video-recorded statement and 

hear Thompson's testimony concerning his incredible demonstration.

Against that factual and procedural backdrop, defendant admitted he 

"engaged in acts that resulted in injuries to [his] son that constituted abuse or 

neglect." While defendant correctly notes the stipulation does not reference the 

date, time, location or specific act, there can be no doubt that his stipulation 

refers to the one incident referenced in his complaint, about which substantial 

testimony was adduced at the hearing the previous day. Cf. State v. Mitchell, 

126 N.J. 565, 581 (1992) (where the Court recognized when considering a guilty 

plea in a criminal case, trial courts are permitted to consider the "surrounding 

circumstances"). 

Immediately after defendant acknowledged he abused or neglected T.P., 

the judge set forth his findings. In particular, the judge found defendant's 
12 A-0712-17T4

stipulation was made knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily. The judge 

elaborated:

[Defendant] understands that there is no promise 

that has been made to him in exchange for the 

stipulation that he [i]s offering[; t]hat he understands 

his right to a fact finding. In fact, he was here. We spent 

several hours going through the process of fact finding. 

The Division . . . put[] on witnesses[, whom c]ounsel

cross-examined. In fact, we came to the close of the 

[Division]'s case where I announced my belief that 

there had been at least a prima facie showing sufficient 

to shift the burden to the parents to come forward with 

exculpatory evidence.

The judge ultimately determined defendant's stipulation acknowledged his 

"conduct caused injury" which "constitutes abuse [or] neglect" under N.J.S.A. 

9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). 

Nonetheless, defendant claims J.Y. supports his argument that the judge 

failed "to make any specific factual findings" and "relied instead on an 

amorphous stipulation by the parties . . . ." 352 N.J. Super. at 263. This case, 

however, is unlike J.Y., where the court in an abuse or neglect fact-finding 

hearing relied on the attorneys' factual representations outside their personal 

knowledge, heard from unsworn witnesses not subject to cross-examination, and 

relied on vague and unsupported stipulations of the parties. Id. at 264. Instead, 

having heard the sworn testimony of the Division's witnesses, who were subject 
13 A-0712-17T4

to cross-examination the day before he entered his stipulation, defendant 

admitted he "engaged in acts that resulted in injuries" to T.P. "that constituted 

abuse or neglect" regarding one incident alleged in the Division's verified 

complaint.

Moreover, the record contains substantial credible evidence to support the 

judge's finding of abuse or neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.L., 

201 N.J. 210, 226 (2010); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. 

Y.A., 437 N.J. Super. 541, 546 (App. Div. 2014). Indeed, the judge summarized 

the evidence at the conclusion of the Division's case-in-chief, finding Dr. Espana 

was "highly credible." Accordingly, he found persuasive her testimony that 

T.P.'s "injuries occurred, within [twenty-four] to [forty-eight] hours" of his 

hospitalization. Further,

The parents indicated to everyone with whom they 

spoke, whether it was the P[CPO], the Division worker, 

. . . the hospital personnel, Dr. Espana, that in that 

critical [twenty-four] to [forty-eight] . . . hour time 

period, the two of them were the only two who had 

access to the child, that provided care and supervision 

for the child. . . .

Here we have that limited number of caretakers, 

in a very defined period of time, who were the only 

caretakers for the child. 

So, these injuries . . . are not spontaneous 

injuries. . . . These are injuries that [Dr. Espana] 
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believes are inflicted, or are non-accidental. That is to 

say, the result of severe trauma, acceleration and 

deceleration trauma. 

At the very least, this evidence supports a finding that defendant abused 

or neglected T.P. by failing "to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in 

providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably 

inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm" on the child. N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(b). We therefore see no reason to disturb the judge's finding that 

defendant's conduct constituted a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(b). 

We conclude the judge complied with the controlling decisional law that 

addresses stipulations in Title Nine abuse or neglect proceedings. From our 

review of the record, defendant established a factual basis for his stipulation, 

and the surrounding circumstances underscored the judge's conclusion that 

defendant committed an act which constituted abuse or neglect. 

We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and conclude they 

lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.