United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of the Army

March 1995 FORCE STRUCTURE

Army National Guard

Divisions Could

Augment Wartime

Support Capability

GAO/NSIAD-95-80

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259886 

March 2, 1995

The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.

Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department of Defense (DOD), in its bottom-up review of the nation’s

defense needs in the post-Cold War era, judged that it is prudent to

maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major

regional conflicts. In responding to a single conflict during Operation

Desert Storm, the Army had difficulty providing support units, even

though it deployed only a portion of its total combat force. Because of this

experience, we examined whether (1) the Army might face similar

challenges in supporting the two-conflict strategy and (2) support

capability in certain Army National Guard units could be used to alleviate

any potential shortfalls. This report discusses our detailed findings on

these issues. We reported separately on DOD’s bottom-up review.1

Background In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review. In particular, the

review outlined an overall defense strategy for the new era, specific

dangers to U.S. interests, strategies for dealing with each danger, and force

requirements. Chief among the dangers was the threat of large-scale

aggression by major regional powers.

To counter regional aggression, DOD evaluated various strategy and force

options. DOD selected the two-conflict strategy and determined the combat

forces capable of executing the strategy. For the Army, these forces

consisted of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced

readiness combat brigades.2 DOD also provided for other National Guard

combat forces, now organized as eight divisions, that it does not envision

using in a two-conflict situation. These divisions are expected to perform

missions, such as providing rotational forces for extended crises and

protracted peace operations. These forces are also called upon to meet

domestic dangers, such as natural disasters and civil unrest.

In addition to combat forces, the Army maintains support units to repair

equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide services, and

otherwise sustain combat operations. These units are (1) divisional

1

Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).

2

These enhanced brigades are existing National Guard combat brigades with improved readiness.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

support units, which are part of active and National Guard combat

divisions and provide support to divisional units, and (2) nondivisional

support units, which are separate units in the active component, National

Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve that support divisional and nondivisional

units.3

 The numbers and types of divisional support units are determined

by Army doctrine. For example, all divisions are doctrinally required to

have one military police company to provide security and law

enforcement. For nondivisional support, the Army determines the

numbers and types of units that are required for its total combat force

through a biennial process, referred to as the Total Army Analysis.4

 The

Army then identifies, based on weighing its priorities, the units that will be

allocated resources—personnel and equipment. In July 1994, the Army

began the Total Army Analysis process to determine nondivisional support

requirements for the bottom-up review force, and it expects to complete

the analysis in mid-1995.

Results in Brief The Army would be challenged to provide sufficient numbers of certain

types of nondivisional support units for two major regional conflicts. The

Army had difficulty providing such units in the Persian Gulf War—a single

regional conflict. In addition, after completing its most recent Total Army

Analysis in March 1993, the Army decided not to allocate resources to

some of the nondivisional support units required to support its current

active force of 12 divisions and allocated resources to other areas. Army

officials expect this trend to continue. Furthermore, an analysis of current

war-fighting plans for responding to two specific regional conflicts

revealed that the Army does not have sufficient types of certain units

required for these plans.

An option for augmenting the Army’s nondivisional support capability is to

use existing support capability—units, personnel, and equipment—in the

eight National Guard divisions that DOD did not include in the combat force

for executing the two-conflict strategy. These divisions contain several

support units that are functionally similar or identical to nondivisional

support units that were not allocated resources during the 1993 Total

Army Analysis. These divisions also have many of the same types of skilled

personnel and equipment that the nondivisional support units have. By

using units, personnel, and equipment in the eight divisions, the Army

3

Nondivisional support units supplement divisional support units and also provide unique types of

support, such as constructing facilities or providing specialized medical care.

4

This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the simulation of combat to generate

nondivisional support requirements, based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

could create additional nondivisional support units or augment existing

ones.

Army Had Difficulty

Providing Support

During the Persian

Gulf War

During the Persian Gulf War, a single regional conflict, the Army deployed

virtually all of some types of nondivisional support units and ran out of

some other types of units, even though it deployed only a portion of its

total active combat force—about 8 of 18 divisions. As we reported in 1992,5

the specific types of units affected included

• quartermaster units, such as water, graves registration, and pipeline and

terminal operation companies;

• transportation units, such as heavy and medium truck companies; and

• military police units, such as companies that handle enemy prisoners of

war.

DOD, for several reasons, was able to mitigate the potential adverse impact

of shortfalls; for example, (1) U.S. forces had a long lead time to deploy

before conducting a counteroffensive against Iraqi forces and the

counteroffensive was of short duration; (2) Saudi Arabia provided

extensive host nation support, such as transportation and water; and

(3) no second conflict developed at the same time requiring a U.S.

response. In a two-conflict situation, the Army may face even greater

challenges than it encountered during the Gulf War. As envisioned in the

bottom-up review, the Army, with little warning, may need to

simultaneously support at least 10 active divisions deployed to two major

conflicts in two different regions.

Army Lacks Units to

Support Total Combat

Force and Specific

Regional Conflict

Plans

The Army does not have sufficient nondivisional support units to support

its current active combat force. Based on its most recent Total Army

Analysis, the Army decided not to allocate resources to 838 nondivisional

units required to support 12 active divisions (see table 1). Although these

838 units are a small portion of the total nondivisional support

requirement, they represent important capabilities required to support

combat operations.

5

Operation Desert Storm: Army had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces

(GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

Table 1: Type and Number of

Unresourced Nondivisional Units

Type of unit

Number of

units

Aviation 1

Chemical 6

Engineering 54

Medical 31

Ordnance 100

Quartermaster 210

Signal 12

Adjutant General 26

Finance 10

Chaplain 12

Military police 1

Military law 32

Psychological

operations 10

Military

intelligence 3

Maintenance 84

Headquartersa 16

Transportation 230

Total 838

aThese units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in

wartime.

Army officials participating in the ongoing Total Army Analysis anticipate

that the Army, because of competing priorities, will probably not allocate

resources to all of the nondivisional support units required to support the

bottom-up review combat force and the two-conflict strategy. While the

bottom-up review combat force includes two fewer active divisions than

the current 12-division force, the two-conflict situation described in the

bottom-up review is similar to the war-fighting scenario used in the 1993

analysis. In addition, mandated reductions in personnel will leave the

Army with fewer personnel available to allocate to required nondivisional

support units.

We analyzed the nondivisional support requirements in two U.S. plans for

responding to regional conflicts for 17 types of units that were

unresourced in the 1993 analysis. These plans were developed by two

separate war-fighting commands, and each plan covered a specific

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

regional conflict. We found that the Army is short 238 units for one of the

two plans (see app. I). The largest shortfall—a total of 206

units—consisted of five types—medical, engineer, quartermaster,

transportation, and military police units. In analyzing the combined

requirements of the two plans for these five types of units, we found that

the shortfall would increase from 206 to 338 units (see app. II).

We also found that 654 of the same types of nondivisional support units

were assigned to both of the regional conflict plans—dual-tasked to

support combat operations in both conflicts (see app. III).6

 Like the

shortfalls previously mentioned, the largest number of dual-tasked

units—a total of 464 units—consisted of medical, engineer, quartermaster,

transportation, and military police units.

Army Has the Option

of Using National

Guard Divisions to

Augment

Nondivisional Support

Capability

The eight Army National Guard divisions that DOD does not envision using

during a two-conflict situation contain support capability that the Army

could use to fill nondivisional support needs. At our request, the Army

compared the capability in support units in a typical National Guard

division with the capability reflected in nondivisional support units that

were not allocated resources during the 1993 Total Army Analysis. This

analysis identified several examples of support units in a National Guard

Division that are similar or identical to unresourced nondivisional support

units (see table 2).

6

These 654 units relate to only the 17 types of units covered in our analysis of the single plan and,

therefore, do not equal the total number of units dual-tasked to both plans.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

Table 2: Support Units in National

Guard Divisions Identical or Similar to

Unresourced Nondivisional Support

Units

Type of unit

National Guard divisional

support unit

Unresourced nondivisional

support unit

Ordnance Ammunition transfer point

section

Ammunition account team

Aviation Attack helicopter battalion Attack helicopter battalion

Transportation Movement control team Movement control team

Military

police

Military police company Military police combat support

company

Chemical Chemical company Chemical decontamination

company

Signal Signal battalion Signal battalion

Signal support company Air defense artillery support

company

Maintenance Heavy maintenance company Engineer equipment repair team

or tactical fire repair team

Engineer support team Engineer equipment repair team

Army repair section Tactical fire repair team

In addition, we analyzed Army data on the personnel and equipment

assigned to the eight National Guard divisions and found that these

divisions have many of the same skilled personnel and equipment needed

for nondivisional support units. For example, these divisions could

provide 100 percent of the unresourced nondivisional support

requirements for

• 321 types of skilled personnel, including helicopter pilots, communications

technicians, repair personnel, military police officers, intelligence analysts,

and petroleum and water specialists; and

• 407 types of equipment, including medium trucks, trailers, tractors,

generator sets, chemical and biological masks, radio sets and antennas,

and water supply and purification systems.

Given the previously mentioned similarities, we believe that the Army

should consider using the support capability in the eight National Guard

divisions to augment its nondivisional support capability in wartime. The

Army has the option of using National Guard divisional support units that

are identical or similar to nondivisional support units to perform the

nondivisional mission. Moreover, the Army could use personnel and

equipment in divisional units to either form new nondivisional support

units or augment existing nondivisional support units, if that is required.

The Army has not considered using National Guard divisions in this

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

manner because these divisions were planned to be used as follow-on

combat forces in the event of a global war.

Army officials agreed that National Guard divisions are a potential source

for meeting nondivisional support requirements. They, however,

emphasized that a more extensive analysis is required to determine the

feasibility and cost-effectiveness of this option and the impact on the

divisions of using them in this manner.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Army’s

ongoing Total Army Analysis, (1) identify the specific unresourced

nondivisional support requirements that could be met using National

Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in these

units and (2) work with the National Guard to develop a plan for

employing this capability.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with our recommendation but partially concurred with the

report, believing that we failed to address certain concerns. Specifically,

DOD noted that (1) current low resourcing of National Guard divisions, if

unaddressed, would lead to degradations in personnel, equipment, and

training readiness for these units; (2) nondivisional support units, while

similar to divisional support units, are not trained or equipped to perform

the same missions; and (3) while it may be expedient to access divisional

support units to provide nondivisional capability, this alternative must be

weighed against the value of these divisions for other missions.

In making our recommendation, we recognized that the Army and the

National Guard would need to further examine its feasibility,

cost-effectiveness, and impact on National Guard divisions. Consequently,

we agree that DOD’s concerns merit further examination and expect that

any analysis performed by the Army and the National Guard in accordance

with our recommendation would consider these points.

DOD disagreed that the Army lacks units to support its total combat force

and specific regional conflict plans. While DOD acknowledged that support

shortfalls exist for the current 12-division force, it believes that our

analysis of these shortfalls, dual-tasked support units, and the Army’s

difficulties in providing nondivisional support units during the Persian

Gulf War implies that the Army could not support the bottom-up review

force and two major regional conflicts.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

We did not conclude that the Army could not support the bottom-up

review force and two major regional conflicts. Rather, we showed that

(1) shortfalls for the current 12-division force, a single regional conflict

plan, and the combined requirements of two regional conflict plans;

(2) dual-tasking of units; and (3) the Army’s experience during the Gulf

War suggest that the Army would be challenged in meeting this

requirement.

DOD stated that the planned aggregate active and reserve end strength will

give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need

and that using host nation support, contractors, and other resources are

available alternatives for addressing any shortfalls. DOD also stated that it

is premature to draw conclusions about possible support shortfalls until

the ongoing Total Army Analysis is completed.

We disagree that the planned end strength will provide the Army the

flexibility to provide more support forces. The changes in end strength

resulting from the bottom-up review represent a net decrease in end

strength for the active component and the U.S. Army Reserve—those

components that provide most of the Army’s support units—and an

increase in the National Guard’s end strength, which will be used to retain

combat positions. As a result, the Army has less flexibility for providing

more support units. We believe that using Guard divisional support

capability will increase the Army’s flexibility to provide more

nondivisional support in areas of need within the aggregate active and

reserve end strength. We agree that the extent of actual support shortages

will not be determined until the Army completes its ongoing Total Army

Analysis. Until DOD knows the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most

appropriate alternatives for addressing them.

DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine whether the Army might be challenged in supporting two

major regional conflicts, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and

obtained documents at the Department of the Army headquarters and the

National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C; Forces Command, U.S. Third

Army and U.S. Army Reserve Command, located at Fort McPherson,

Georgia; and two war-fighting commands responsible for developing and

executing specific U.S. plans for responding to major regional conflicts. To

document specific shortfalls, we obtained Total Army Analysis data on

unresourced nondivisional support requirements and compared actual

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

requirements for selected types of nondivisional support units in two

specific regional conflict plans with the inventory of available units.

To determine whether support capability in Army National Guard divisions

could be used to augment the Army’s nondivisional support capability, we

interviewed knowledgeable officials and obtained documents at the

Department of Army headquarters and the National Guard Bureau. At our

request, the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

provided data on support units in National Guard divisions that had similar

or identical characteristics to nondivisional support units the Army

decided not to allocate resources to during its most recent Total Army

Analysis, completed in 1993. Using this data and the data from our analysis

of personnel and equipment authorizations for National Guard divisions,

we identified specific matches of National Guard divisional units,

personnel, and equipment to unresourced nondivisional support units.

We conducted this review from October 1993 to October 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit

a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of

this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the Senate and

the House Committees on Appropriations with an agency’s first request for

appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the

Director of the Army National Guard; the Director, Office of Management

and Budget; and interested congressional committees.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
B-259886 

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are Sharon

Pickup, Barbara Gannon, and Samuel L. Hinojosa.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix I 

Shortfall of Selected Nondivisional Support

Units Required in a Specific U.S. Plan for

Responding to a Single Regional Conflict by

Number and Type

Type unit Number of unit

Aviation 4

Chemical 3

Engineer 33

Medical 84

Ordnance 9

Quartermaster 20

Signal 6

Adjutant General 1

Chaplain 3

Finance 0

Military police 40

Military law 0

Psychological operations 0

Military intelligence 2

Maintenance 4

Headquartersa 0

Transportation 29

Total 238

aThese units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in

wartime.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix II 

Shortfall of Selected Nondivisional Support

Units Required in Two Specific U.S. Plans

for Responding to Regional Conflicts by

Number and Type

Type of unit Number of units

Medical 96

Engineer 59

Quartermaster 59

Military police 52

Transportation 72

Total 338

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix III 

Units Dual-Tasked to Two Specific U.S.

Plans for Responding to Regional Conflicts

by Number and Type

Type of unit Number of unitsa

Aviation 40

Chemical 32

Engineer 94

Medical 96

Ordnance 32

Quartermaster 94

Signal 25

Adjutant General 20

Chaplain 0

Finance 9

Military police 45

Military law 1

Psychological operations 1

Military intelligence 4

Maintenance 22

Headquartersb 4

Transportation 135

Total 654

aFor certain unit types, the numbers in this table are greater than those shown in table 1. As we

reported in 1995, planning factors for nondivisional support requirements used in the Total Army

Analysis differ from those used by war-fighting commands in developing regional conflict plans.

See Force Structure: Army Support Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data

(GAO/NSIAD-95-46, Jan. 30, 1995).

bThese units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in

wartime.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 1-2.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 3.

See pp. 7-8.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-5.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 7-8.

Now on pp. 5-7.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 7.

(701058) Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a

single address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (301) 258-4097 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Mail

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100