IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-08-00014-CR

GARY LAWAYNE BELL,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 13th District Court

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. 31,223

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Gary Lawayne Bell was convicted of the felony offense of possession 

of a controlled substance (Penalty Group One—cocaine, less than one gram) in a drugfree zone and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. He appeals, asserting in one 

issue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient. We will affirm.

When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish 

the elements of a penal offense, we must determine whether, after viewing all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have 
Bell v. State Page 2

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adelman v. State,

828 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Any inconsistencies in the evidence are 

resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000).

In a factual sufficiency review, we ask whether a neutral review of all the 

evidence, though legally sufficient, demonstrates either that the proof of guilt is so 

weak or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the factfinder’s verdict clearly 

wrong and manifestly unjust. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d. 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The court reviews the 

evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in 

dispute and compares it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.” Johnson, 23 

S.W.3d at 7. The appellate court “does not indulge in inferences or confine its view to 

evidence favoring one side of the case. Rather, it looks at all the evidence on both sides 

and then makes a predominantly intuitive judgment. . . .” Id. (quoting William Powers 

and Jack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 69 TEXAS L.

REV. 515, 519 (1991)). The nature of a factual sufficiency review authorizes an appellate 

court, although to a very limited degree, to act as the so-called “thirteenth juror” to 

review the factfinder’s weighing of the evidence and disagree with the factfinder’s 

determination. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 416-17.

Bell argues that the evidence is insufficient to affirmatively link him to the 

contraband. The Court of Criminal Appeals has provided the following explanation for 
Bell v. State Page 3

the “so-called ‘affirmative links’ rule”:

[I]n a possession of a controlled substance prosecution, “the State must 

prove that: (1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over 

the substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was 

contraband.” Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or 

circumstantial, it must establish that the defendant’s connection with the 

drug was more than fortuitous. This is the so-called “affirmative links” 

rule which protects the innocent bystander—a relative, friend, or even 

stranger to the actual possessor—from conviction merely because of his 

fortuitous proximity to someone else’s drugs. Mere presence at the 

location where drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish 

actual care, custody, or control of those drugs. However, presence or 

proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or 

circumstantial (e.g., “links”), may well be sufficient to establish that 

element beyond a reasonable doubt. It is, as the court of appeals correctly 

noted, not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical 

force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial.

Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Evans v. State, 185 

S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005)) (footnotes omitted). Thus, we examine 

the record for direct or circumstantial evidence that established that Bell exercised 

control, management, or care over the controlled substance and knew it was 

contraband. See id. at 161-62.

The evidence shows that Bell and about fifteen to twenty others were standing 

on the property of the Corsicana Housing Authority at approximately 11:30 p.m. in the 

vicinity of a streetlight when four Corsicana police officers arrived to execute an arrest 

warrant for Bell. Most of the group, including Bell, fled. Officer Williams pursued Bell 

on foot, and Officer Morris pursued him in a patrol car to where they were able to 

surround Bell at a row of parking spaces. Bell stopped briefly next to a parked car, and 

Morris stopped his car, got out, and ordered Bell to show his hands and get on the 
Bell v. State Page 4

ground. Bell then ran around the parked car, ran along a sidewalk, and then ran back 

in between some other parked cars. Williams and Morris were closely behind Bell and 

both said that they saw him remove a cellophane packet from the waistband of his 

trousers and throw it on the ground. As Bell continued to flee, he collided with a third 

officer, Officer Hudson, and was taken into custody. Morris then retrieved the 

discarded cellophane packet, and it was later determined to contain cocaine.

Williams and Morris each testified that they personally saw Bell reach into his 

waistband and discard the cellophane packet as he ran between two cars and just 

seconds before he ran into Hudson. Morris recovered the packet about thirty seconds 

after Bell was detained, and all three officers testified that no one else was between the 

two cars in that brief period.

Bell called four witnesses who testified favorably for him. Laketha Lusk, who 

had four theft convictions, was on probation for theft, and was sitting in a car with two 

cars between her and the location where the cocaine was recovered, testified that she 

was able to see Bell when the officers claim that he discarded the cocaine and that she 

did not see Bell reach into his waistband or discard anything. Chiquita Reese, whose 

family had been friends with Bell’s mother for some time, said that she saw Bell fleeing 

and that she did not see him throw anything on the ground.

Joshua Ellison, Bell’s cousin, had been sitting in a car parked in the row of 

parking spaces and got out and stood on the sidewalk when the police arrived. He said 

that he did not see anything in Bell’s hands during the pursuit and that Bell kept his 

hands up as he ran from the police. Loretta Beachum, Bell’s mother, said that she did 
Bell v. State Page 5

not see Bell reach into his waistband or discard anything and that Bell kept his hands 

up as he ran from the police. There was at least one car between her and the location 

where Bell was arrested.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a 

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bell exercised 

control, management, or care over the cocaine. The evidence is legally sufficient.

Bell’s factual sufficiency challenge focuses primarily on the discrepancy between 

the two officers’ testimony and his four witnesses’ testimony, arguing that the “greater 

weight” of the evidence was in Bell’s favor. As we have stated:

The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the 

witnesses, and the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony. Jaggers 

v. State, 125 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. 

ref’d) (citing Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1981)). The jury may believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. 

Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jaggers, 125 

S.W.3d at 670. As the reviewing court, we “should not substantially 

intrude upon the jury’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility 

of witness testimony.” Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002); see also Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614; Jaggers, 125 S.W.3d at 670.

The degree of deference a reviewing court provides must be 

proportionate with the facts it can accurately glean from the trial 

record. A factual sufficiency analysis can consider only those few 

matters bearing on credibility that can be fully determined from a 

cold appellate record. Such an approach occasionally permits some 

credibility assessment but usually requires deference to the jury’s 

conclusion based on matters beyond the scope of the appellate 

court’s legitimate concern. See GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON,

42 TEXAS PRACTICE—CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 36.69 

(Supp. 1999). Unless the available record clearly reveals a different 

result is appropriate, an appellate court must defer to the jury’s 

determination concerning what weight to give contradictory 

testimonial evidence because resolution often turns on an evaluation 
Bell v. State Page 6

of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were in attendance 

when the testimony was delivered.

Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Childress v. State, 285 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. filed).

By finding Bell guilty, the jury obviously believed the police officers and 

disbelieved Bell’s witnesses, and the record in this case warrants our deference to the 

jury’s credibility determination. As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the 

evidence, the jury bore the burden of accepting or rejecting Bell’s witnesses’ version of 

the events. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Therefore, 

considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the evidence is factually 

sufficient to support the jury’s guilty finding. The proof of guilt is not so weak nor the 

conflicting evidence so strong as to render the jury’s verdict clearly wrong and 

manifestly unjust.

We overrule Bell’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Reyna, and

Justice Davis

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 26, 2009

Do not publish

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