United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Environment, Energy, and Natural

Resources, Committee on Government

Operations, House of Representatives

December 1994 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Stability of the U.S.

Stockpile

GAO/NSIAD-95-67

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259506 

December 22, 1994

The Honorable Mike Synar

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment,

 Energy, and Natural Resources

Committee on Government Operations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since 1985, the U.S. Army has been working to implement congressional

direction to dispose of the U.S. stockpile of unitary1

 chemical weapons

and agents—a process the Army currently estimates will cost $8.5 billion.

Because the Army continues to experience delays in implementing its

disposal program and may have to store the stockpile longer than planned,

you asked us to review the Army’s (1) prediction of how long chemical

weapons can be stored safely and (2) contingency plans for disposing of

chemical weapons that become dangerous.

Background In November 1985, Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the

Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy its stockpile of unitary chemical

agents and weapons by September 30, 1994. The weapons are stored at

eight sites in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the

Pacific Ocean. (See app. I for the stockpile munitions and storage

locations.)

To comply with the congressional direction, the Army, DOD’s lead service

in chemical matters, developed a plan to burn the stockpile on-site in

specially designed high-temperature incinerators. However, because of

technical problems and strong citizen opposition to incineration, the

program was delayed. To date, two of nine planned incinerators have been

built and only one of the two is operational. In October 1992, Congress

extended the completion date to December 31, 2004.

The Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Authorization Act required the Army to

report on the physical and chemical integrity of the stockpile. This report,2

submitted in July 1993, reviewed available inspection data, laboratory

data, and historical stockpile assessment reports and determined that the

1

A unitary chemical munition is a munition containing a single, lethal, chemical agent.

2

Physical and Chemical Integrity of the Chemical Weapon Stockpile, Department of the Army,

July 1993.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
B-259506 

chemical weapons stockpile is safe for continued storage for the near and

midterm and uncertain for the long term (beyond 2004).

Threats to safe storage of the stockpile include external events such as

earthquakes, airplane crashes, and tornadoes, and internal events such as

leakage of chemical agents from the warhead, accidents during normal

handling and maintenance activities, and autoignition of propellant. An

accident involving one munition could potentially affect many munitions.

For example, Army tests have shown that the ignition of a single M55

rocket within a storage igloo could involve many of the 4,000 rockets that

are typically stored together. The effect of an accidental release on a

nearby community would depend on such things as the type and amount

of agent released, meteorological conditions, and the community’s

proximity to the storage installation. Through its Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program, the Army is working to help

communities near storage sites improve their emergency response

capabilities.

Results in Brief The Army’s assessment that the chemical weapons stockpile can be safely

stored until 2004 is subject to question based on the nature of the

supporting data. According to Sandia National Laboratories,3

 which

reviewed the Army report at our request, the data on which the Army

based its assessment were old and may no longer be representative of

munitions in actual field storage. Also, the assessment did not include an

analysis of leaking munitions. Sandia recommended that the Army

immediately expand its stockpile monitoring activities to include

propellant samples from non-leaking and leaking munitions at each

storage location. The Army has established a working group to review its

assessment and received $4.5 million in fiscal year 1995 to expand its

stockpile monitoring activities. However, the expanded monitoring

activities will not resolve all questions about the stability of the stockpile.

A contingency plan for emergency disposal of the M55 rocket is needed

because it is the only munition in the stockpile that cannot readily be

reconfigured to remove its explosive components. However, the Army has

not prepared a plan. It is studying several courses of action, but additional

information on the specific hazards is needed before a plan can be

finalized.

3

Sandia National Laboratories has knowledgeable experts responsible for ensuring the integrity of

nuclear weapons. The aging problems in nuclear weapon systems are similar to those that have been

and will be encountered in the chemical weapon stockpile.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
B-259506 

The Army Lacks Data

to Conclusively

Predict Stability

After reviewing supporting documents for the Army’s report, Sandia

identified concerns about the Army’s assessment and recommended that

the Army expand and continue its surveillance activities until the stockpile

is destroyed. The Army has partially complied and is reviewing the validity

of its prediction, but questions may still remain about the stability of the

stockpile.

Better Data Could Improve

the Army’s Predictive

Assessment

The Army’s assessment that chemical munitions are safe for continued

storage until 2004 is based on Army data on M55 rocket propellant.

Propellant samples are used to assess chemical munition stability because

propellant is an inherently unstable compound that must be stabilized to

prevent reactions that could lead to a spontaneous ignition. Propellant

manufacturers add small amounts of stabilizing compounds that

deteriorate over time, and storage life is determined by monitoring

remaining stabilizer content in the propellant samples. All munitions

stored with propellant, except the M55 rocket, are having propellant

removed from the munition.4

 Reconfiguration of the munitions should be

completed by 1998.

The Army’s assessment is based on M55 rocket propellant samples from

the time of manufacture (1959-65) and from a limited number of field

samples taken from the stockpile in 1980, 1985, and 1989. No field samples

have been taken since 1989. In some cases, the Army has only one or two

samples from a particular lot. In addition, changes in stabilizer content

cannot be verified because different collection and analysis procedures

were used for the original and more recent analyses. Sandia’s analysis

questions how representative the samples are, compared to actual

propellant stored with M55 rockets at the five storage locations. The

samples are stored at a central location and are reanalyzed every year.

However, storage conditions and climatic conditions such as temperature

and humidity vary by location and these differences can affect the rate of

propellant degradation.

As a result of these concerns and similar concerns raised by the National

Research Council, the Army convened a working group in July 1994 to

review its safe storage assessment. The panel is expected to release its

report in January 1995. According to Army officials, this report is currently

in draft but concludes that there is high confidence that none of the

non-leaking rockets in the stockpile will undergo autoignition prior to

2004.

4

The design of the M55 rocket makes separation of the propellant from the chemical warhead difficult.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
B-259506 

Additionally, the Army requested and received $4.5 million in fiscal year

1995 to expand its stockpile monitoring activities. However, the expanded

monitoring activities may still not resolve all questions about the

stockpile’s stability because the Army plans to select additional propellant

samples only from rockets stored at Tooele Army Depot, Utah. The

samples will be selected at the Tooele depot because it is the only storage

site that currently has a suitable explosive and agent containment facility.

Thus, questions about variances among storage sites will go unanswered.

Leaking Munitions May

Pose a Significant Safety

Hazard

According to the Army’s report, over time, nerve agents—particularly the

nerve agent GB—become acidic and can corrode the metal warheads of

rockets, mortars, and projectiles. In some cases, the corrosion can eat

small holes in the metal warheads that allow the agent or agent vapors to

escape. These leaks can be either external or internal to the munition.

External leaks allow an agent to escape outside the weapon or storage

container and are quickly detected by monitoring. When detected, such

leaks are controlled by placing the leaking munition in a special airtight

container and segregating it. Army reports showed that from 1983 through

1993, 1,824 chemical munitions, mostly nerve agent-filled (GB) M55

rockets, developed external leaks. Leaking munitions have been found at

all six storage sites that store munitions.5

 In 1992, the last year data were

available, 0.252 percent of M55 rockets in the total stockpile had external

leaks and 0.022 percent of other munitions in the total stockpile had

external leaks.

Internal agent leaks cannot be detected without disassembling the

munition. When a munition leaks internally, an agent can come in contact

with its explosive components. Such contact, according to Army reports,

could increase the risk of unanticipated ignitions or explosions during

handling, movement, and disassembling prior to final destruction. Possible

problems that could result from internal leaks include accelerated aging of

the propellant stabilizer, formation of sensitive explosive metal salts from

reaction of the agent on burster explosives, corrosion of metallic parts in

fuses, and formation of hazardous metallic salts in the fuse assembly.

Again, internal agent leaks are most acute with M55 rockets. In a 1985

assessment of M55 rockets, the Army estimated that 1 to 3 percent had

internal leaks. However, the limited sample size makes this estimate

uncertain.

5

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland and Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana, store only bulk

agent.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
B-259506 

The extent of the hazard posed by internal leaks is unknown. The Army

has never sampled leaking munitions because it considers them

dangerous. Consequently, the Army has not resolved the questions about

the specific hazards posed by leaking munitions. Sandia concluded that

“(w)e can not emphasize enough the importance of evaluating leaking

systems because of the questions generated and the lack of data to

validate possible problems associated with these systems.” Further, Sandia

pointed out that current Army procedures for handling leaking munitions

(e.g., placing them in a containment vessel that allows an agent to remain

in contact with the various components for long storage periods) could

make problems worse.

Army officials report that the probability of an agent reaching a propellant

is considered low, but nonetheless they plan to initiate laboratory tests to

investigate the sensitivity of an agent-contaminated propellant. These tests

should start in early 1995. However, due to the risks involved in the

selection and handling of agent-contaminated propellant samples, the

Army has no plans to analyze actual field samples because it does not have

a laboratory capable of handling such materials. Army officials

acknowledge that, depending on the outcome of the laboratory tests, they

may have to develop a capability to select, analyze, and monitor the

condition of actual agent-contaminated propellant samples.

In addition to uncertainties about problems caused by the interaction of

agent and propellant, a 1985 Army report speculated that agent contacting

fuses and bursters could also be a mechanism for unanticipated explosive

detonation, especially during munition handling and movement. While

Army officials believe the risks are minimal, they told us additional

analyses may be necessary if the Army is required to store the chemical

weapons beyond 2004.

The Army Is Not

Prepared to Deal With

Hazardous Munitions

To resolve concerns about propellant stability in M55 rockets, the Army

hired a contractor to study and prepare a report on various alternatives to

allow continued safe storage or disposal of unstable rockets. However, the

Army has not yet decided which alternative to develop. The report, issued

in February 1993, identified two possibilities: refrigeration of the rocket

storage facilities to prevent stabilizer deterioration; and separation of the

rocket warhead from the propellant-containing rocket motor by

unscrewing the two components at their juncture. Theoretically, cooling

would reduce the rate at which the propellant stabilizer is used, thus

lengthening the time a rocket could be stored; but, this has not been

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
B-259506 

scientifically demonstrated. Separating rocket components would mitigate

the effect of a spontaneous ignition, but because of the hazards involved,

the Army would likely have to design and construct remotely operated,

explosion proof, agent containment facilities at each storage site. The two

rocket sections could then be stored separately.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Army to expand the Army’s monitoring program to resolve questions

about the stockpile’s stability and develop a contingency plan for

emergency disposal of M55 rockets. The expanded program should

include an analysis and implementation of the processes that would be

necessary to safely take field samples from all storage sites and from

leaking munitions, and include milestones and required resources. The

plan should also identify specific methodologies to be used, and specific

milestones and resources.

Scope and

Methodology

To address our objectives, we reviewed Army documents on the chemical

and physical integrity of the chemical weapons stockpile and options for

dealing with M55 rockets that become unstable. We also discussed

stockpile stability with the Army’s contractor for the stability study and

with Army officials at the Army Materiel Command; the Armament,

Munition and Chemical Command; and the Armament Research,

Development and Engineering Center.

Because of the technical complexity of assessing munition stability, we

also asked the Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories to

review the Army’s report to Congress on stockpile stability along with its

supporting documentation. We asked Sandia to review key documents

used in the Army’s stockpile stability report6

 and (1) provide a critique on

the methods used and inconsistencies (if any) within and between reports

and (2) discuss any other potential hazards that exist or might exist that

were not given appropriate attention in the studies. Sandia’s report was

shared with Army officials responsible for the stockpile.

6

(1) Physical and Chemical Integrity of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Assessment of the U.S.

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Integrity and Risk Analysis, The MITRE Corporation, July 1993;

(2) Experimental Propellant Degradation Kinetics via Transient Spectroscopy, U.S. Army Armament

Research, Development and Engineering Center and Hercules Aerospace Company, July 1990;

(3) Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, 115mm: Chemical Agent (GB or VX), M55, Army

Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, October 1985; and (4) Technical Memorandum ORDBB-DR4-41,

Compatibility of GB and VX Agents with RDX, Tetryl, Composition B and 70/30 Tetrytol, Artillery,

Ammunition and Rocket Development Laboratory, April 1961.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
B-259506 

To obtain information on the Army’s plans for dealing with large numbers

of deteriorated chemical munitions, we held discussions and obtained

information from officials at the Army Materiel Command and the

contractor for the contingency study.

We conducted our work from January 1993 to December 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments on this report.

However, we did discuss our findings with agency officials, who generally

agreed. Their views are included where appropriate.

As arranged with your staff, unless you announce its contents earlier, we

plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date.

At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of

Defense and the Army and the Director, Office of Management and

Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Donna M. Heivilin

Director, Defense Management

 and NASA

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Chemical Stockpile

Munitions and

Locations

10

Appendix II 

Storage Configuration

for Some Munitions

11

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

12

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
Appendix I 

Chemical Stockpile Munitions and Locations

Storage site Weapons and agents stored

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD Ton container (H)

Anniston Army Depot, AL Projectiles & cartridges (H,GB,VX)

M23 mine (VX)

Ton container (H,GB)

M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Blue Grass Army Depot, KY Projectiles & cartridges (H,VX)

Ton container (H,GB)

M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Johnston Atoll Projectiles & cartridges

(H,GB,VX)

M-23 mine (VX)

Ton container (H,GB,VX)

M55 rocket (GB)

Bomb (GB)

Newport Ammunition Plant, IN Ton container (VX)

Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR M23 mine (VX)

Ton container (H)

M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Pueblo Army Depot, CO Projectiles & cartridges (H)

Ton container (H)

Tooele Army Depot, UT Projectiles & cartridges

(H,GB,VX)

M23 mine (VX)

Bomb (GB)

Spray tank (VX)

Ton container (H,GB,VX)

M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Umatilla Depot Activity, OR Projectiles & cartridges (GB,VX)

M23 mine (VX)

Bomb (GB)

Spray tank (VX)

Ton container (H,GB,VX)

M55 rocket (GB,VX)

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
Appendix II 

Storage Configuration for Some Munitions

Propellant

Ignition


Cartridge

Burster Agent Burster Well

Striker Nut

Body

4.2 Inch Mortar

Fuse

Body

105mm Projectile

Burster Well Agent Burster Fuse

Propellant Grain

Spring

Burster Tube

Igniter Assembly

Burster

Auxiliary Burster

Fuse

Nozzle (4)

Fin

Agent

Igniter Cable

 M55 Rocket

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David Warren

Tom Howard

Glenn Furbish

Philadelphia Regional

Office

Frederick K. German

Glenn Knoepfle

Richard Behal

Harry Shanis

Margaret Klucsarits

Travis Thomson

Mark Tremba

(393530) Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Stockpile
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