NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0202n.06 No. 08-5750 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. HAROL D N. MARTI

N, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

Be for e : M AR TIN , SI LER , a nd M OORE, C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge . D e fe nd ant- Ap pe ll ant Har old N. Mart in appea ls his sentence f

ollowing a

conviction on one count of ca rjac king a nd sever al counts re lating to his possession and use of a f irea rm. The district cour

t sentence d Martin to 218 months of imprisonment. On a

ppeal, Martin argues that the district court improper ly deleg ated to the B urea

u of Pr iso ns (“ B OP” ) t

he qu e sti on

of wh e the r his fe de ra l se nte nc e sh ou ld ru n c on c ur re nt t o h is s ta te sentenc es. Martin furthe r ar g ues that, eve n if the district court did impose a c onsecutive se ntence , its decision was still procedura lly unrea sonable because it provided a n inadequate explanation for doing so. For

the re asons stated be low, we VA CA TE Martin’s sentence a nd REMAND for f

urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.2 I. BACKG ROUND On M ar ch 2 7 , 2 0 0 7 , M ar t i n wa s i n d i ct ed b y a fe d er al gra n d j u ry o no n e c o u n to f c ar

j ac k i n g, one count of

dischargin g a fi re ar m during the ca rjac king, one count of possessing a fire arm a fter being convicted of

a fe lony , and one c ount of possessing a stolen firea rm. On Fe bruar

y 19, 2008, Martin enter ed into a plea ag ree ment with the United St at es Attorney under w hich the ag ree d sentenc e wa s twenty

y ear s of imprisonment. Accor ding to t h e Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR” ) pr e pa

re d fo r the U. S. Di str ic t Court , Ma rt in ple a de d g uil ty in Ma

y 20 08 in state c ourt to multipl e counts of r obbery , attempted robbery , and agg ravated burglar y . The state c ourt sentenc ed him to eight y ear s in prison on eac h conviction, and his sentenc es we re to run c oncurr ent with one

ano the r. Ac c or din g to t he PSR, so me of

tho se state con vi ctions inv olv e d “ re le va nt c on du c t” de sc ri be d in

the “ Of fe ns e Con du c t” se c tio n o f t he PSR. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

held a se nte nc inghe ari ngon June 9, 20 08 . D ur ingthat he ari ng , M a rt in

argue d th a t he sh ou ld r e c e ive c re dit fo r t he tim e th at he h a d s pe nt i n s ta te pr iso n a s a re su lt o f h is state c on vic tio ns inv olv ing re le va nt co nd uc t and tha

t his f e de ra l se nte nc e sh ou ld r

un c on c ur re nt w ith his state sentenc es. The g overnme nt sta ted that it had no objection to Martin’s f eder al sentenc e running concur

rent with the state se ntence s that involved rele vant conduc t, but the gove rnment argued that Mar

tin’s se ntence should run consec utive to the other unre lated sente nces. The district court re sponded by

noting that makingsome of Mar tin’s state sen t en ce s co n curr ent and other s

consec utive would have no “ prac tical ef fec t” on the amount of time Martin would spend in prison. Record on A

ppeal, Sent. Hr ’g Tr. (“ROA Tr.”) at 18. Martin responded t hat he wanted his fe dera l sentenc e to run c oncurr ent with all of the state se ntence s. The district cour t r eplied by observingthat3

the state trial c ourt had re marke d that the stat e s en t ences should be conse cutive to the fe dera l sentenc e. After Martin made a

statement, the district cour t p roceede d to determine his sente nce, weig hing sever al consider ations. The district cour t noted that Martin had a

leng thy criminal re cord that included many

“ser ious” offe nses. Id. at 23. There fore , the court conclude d, a long sentenc e

was ne ce s s ar y t o p rotec t the community and to provide de terre nce. T he cour t also observe d that M art i nw a s s u f

f e r i n g f r o m d e p r e s s i o nan d

t h a th e h a d

b e e n r e c e i v i n g t r e a t m e n tw h i l e i nc u s t o dy. Finally , the court acknowle dg ed that Mar tin’s son was “in nee d of g uidance ,” id. at 24–25, but that this factor did not “ove rcome [] the ot her serious consideration that must be a part of the sentenc ing reg imen.” Id. at 25. The district c ourt then dete rmined that the plea ag ree ment’s re commendation of 240 months of imprisonment was re asonable , but it decided to g ive Martin the c red i t t h at he soug ht f or the time he had alre ady serve d in state prison, there by reduc ing his se ntence to 218

mon ths of

imp ri so nme nt. After pronouncing Martin’s sentenc e, the district c ourt asked whether there were a ny questions. Martin’s attorne y responde d b y p o i n t i n g out that the district judge had “not state [d] whether [Martin’s sentence ] would be run concur rent or c onsecutive w ith the state ca ses.” Id. at 27. The district cour

t replied: TH E CO UR T: I ’m

no t in c lin ed to ru

n it —I a [m] no t in c lin e d to ru

n it c on c ur re nt. Idid not speak to it beca

use I ’m not g oing to—to run t hat—I mean, if the Bur eau of Pr iso ns fo r s ome re a so n lo ok ed at th os e —lo ok a t it sil e nt a nd ma de so me de te rm inatio n, that’ s— [Martin’s attorney ]: Yes, Your Honor. T H E C O U R T : — o n e p o i n t , b u tI’ m n o ti n c l i n e d t o r u ni tc o n c u r

r e n t l y.4

Id. The he aringwas c oncluded shortly there afte r. II. AN AL YSI S Unde r 1 8 U. S.C. § 3584(a), a district c ourt may order that a fe dera l sentence and an undischarg ed state se ntence run either concur rently or conse cutively

. Martin first arg ues, howe ver, that the district court e rre d by not actually

ruling o n wh et h er his fe dera l sentence should run

concur rent with his state sentenc es, but r ather improperly deleg ating this task to the B OP. We do not believe that the district c ourt relied on the BO P to decide whe ther Mar tin’s sentence was to run

concur rent with the state se ntence s. Although the district court did contemplate some later “dete rmination” on the B OP’s part, ROA Tr . at 27, this was likely just a ref ere nce to the B OP’s authority to c redit prior time serve d. See U nited States v. W

ilson , 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (holding that “it is the Att orney Gene ral who computes t he amount of t he credit” under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b))

. There is no indication that the district court ac tually expected the BO P to run Martin’s sente nces

concur rently , and bec ause the district court stated that it was “ not inclined” to do so itself, ROA Tr.

a t 27 , M art i n ’ s s e n t e n c e i s c o n s e c u t i v e b y v i rtu e o f t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e o f § 3 5 8 4 ( a )

. 1 8 U .S. C. §3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at differ ent times run conse cutively unless the court orde rs that the ter

ms are to r

un concur rently .”). No ne the le ss, g ive n M art in’ s e xplic it r e qu e st f or a c on c ur re nt se nte nc e , we a g re e wi th M a rt in that the district court wa s require d to rule explicitl y on whether his f

eder al and state se ntence s were to run concur

rently and to provide a more thoroug h explanation for that ruling . Whether a se ntence is to run co n s ec u t i v e to or c oncurr ent with a state se ntence is a question left to the district court’ s discretion. United States v. Johnson , 553 F.3d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 2009). That discre tion, however , is not “unfetter ed.” Id. a t 9 98 . Rathe r, a dis tr ic t c ourt

mus t “ make [] g e ne ra lly

c le ar t he ratio na leAl tho ug h Mart in argue d be low that § 5G 1. 3( b) wa s a pp lic a ble , o n a pp e a l he po int s o nly

to 1 § 5G1.3(c ). Ac cording ly , we do not addr ess § 5G1.3(b) here . Section 5G1.3(c ) st ates that the district court, in deciding whether to impose a conc urre nt or consec utive sentenc e, should deter mine what is nece ssary “to achie ve a r easona ble punishment for the instant off ense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). Application Note 3( A) fur ther e x plains that the court should consider : (i) the f ac t o rs s et forth in 18 U.S.C. 3584 (ref ere ncing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)); ( ii) the ty pe (e .g ., deter

mi n a te, indeter minate/parola

ble) a nd leng th of the prior undischa rg ed sentenc e; (iii) the time serve d on the undischar g ed sente nce a nd the time likely

to be serve d befor e re lease ; (iv) the fa ct t h at t h e prior undischa rg ed sente nce ma

y have been imposed in state court rather than f eder al cour

t, or at a diff

ere nt time before the same or dif

fer ent fe deral court; and ( v) any other c ircumstance rele vant to the deter mination of an appr opriate se ntence for the instant off ense. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) c mt. n.3(A) (2007)

. 5 under w hich it has imposed the conse cutive sentenc e and seek[] to ensure an appr opriate inc reme ntal p e n a lt y f o r th e in s ta

n t o f f e n s e.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n particula r, § 3584(b) instructs “[t] he cour

t, in determining whether

[prison] terms imposed are . . . to run conc urre ntly or

consec utively , [t o] consider

. . . the factors set for th in [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) .” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). Section 3 5 5 3 (a )( 5 ) requires sente ncing courts to consider any applicable policy

statements in the Guidelines. Ther efor e, “the rec ord on appea l should show that the di strict court turned its attention to” U.S. SentencingGuidelines Manual (“U .S.S.G.”) § 5G1.3 in deter mining what ty

pe of se ntence to impose. Johnson , 553 F.3d at 998 (interna l quotation mar ks omitted). Evidence that the district

1 court c onsidered § 5G 1.3 normally involves some expli cit ref ere nce to that pr ovision. See U nited States v. Coleman , 15 F.3d 610, 613 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (vac ating a conse cut i v e s entence whe n the d i s t ri ct j u d ge d i d

n o t“e x p re s s l y tu rn h i s at t en t i o n t o § 5 G1

. 3 (c ) a n d Ap p l i ca t i o nNo t e 3 , ” a l t h o u gh applyingan o lde r v e rs ion of § 5 G1 .3 ); Un ite d S

tat es v . W atf or d , 4 6 8 F

. 3 d 8 9 1 , 9 1 5

– 1 7 ( 6 th Cir. 2006) (uphold in g th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s im p o s it io no f

a c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c e w h e nit ma d e a “ b r ie f ref ere nce to the statutory

and Guidelines f

actor s,” althoug h noting that e ven that explanation was “somewhat cursory”), cert. de nied , 5 50 U. S. 9 70 (2 00 7) ; Un ite d S tat es v . Co v e rt , 117 F.3d 940, 9466

(6th Cir.) (upholding a conse cutive sente nce w hen “the court specific ally stated bef ore imposing the

consec utive sentenc e that it c onsidered ‘the pertinent policy statements
. . . and the c ommentary of the sentenc ing commission’” (quoting the district court)) , cert. de nied , 522 U. S. 880 (1 99 7) . In th is

case , howeve r, althoug h the district judge considere d sever al of the f actor s listed under § 3553(a ), the jud g e did

no t on c e re fe re nc e § 5 G1 .3 or its a pp lic a tio n n ote s. The lac k of an e x press re fer ence to § 5G1.3, by itself, is not necessa

rily dispositi ve. A district court nee d not “e x p l i ci t ly ref ere nce the § 5G1.3 consider ations” if ther e is some other evidenc e in the rec ord that it considere d that section. Se e Un ite d Stat es v . B e rry , 565 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 130 S. Ct. 275 (2009). These circumstanc es are not prese nt here , howeve r. I ndeed, se vera l of the district court’ s comments at the sent en ci n g h earing only g ener ate f

urther confusion. For

instance, w hen addr essing Martin’s re quest that his fede ral sente nce r un concur rent with his state sentence s, the district court re marke d that the state trial c ourt h ad i n d i ca t ed that the state se nte nc e s sh ou ld r

un c on se c uti ve to t he fede ra l se nte nc e . A s Ma rt in’ s atto rn e y

c or re c tly pointed out at the hea

ring , howeve r, a state trial court ha s no authority to determine w hether

a future fede ral sente nce is to run c onsecutive to a st ate se ntence . Fur thermore , it is di fficult to re concile the district court’s de cision to make Martin’s sentenc e consec utive to the state sentenc es with the district court’s de cision to give Martin twenty -two months of cre dit for the time that he had alrea dy serve d

on the state se nte nc e s. Whate ve r c on sid e ra tio ns we ig he d in

fa vo r o f h a vin g Ma

rt in’ s p re vio us state incar cer ation count towar d his feder al sentenc e pre sumably would be applica

ble t o his subsequent state i n c ar c e r a ti o na s w e ll

. T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt c o u ld h a v e r e s o lv e d

th e s e a mb igu it ie s e a s il y

when Martin’s attorne y

reque sted clar ification at the e nd of the he aring . I nstead, howe ver, the district

c ourt g a ve a re sp on se that pr ov ide d li ttl e ins ig ht i nto its ratio na le

. As a res ult , it is d if fi c ult toThe g overnme nt repe atedly cha ra ct erizes the last sentenc e of § 3584( a) a s a statutory 2

“ pr e su mpt ion .” Ap pe lle e B r. a t 8– 10 . Ins of ar as th e go ve rnme nt i s su g g e sti ngthat th e statut e somehow favor s consec utive sentenc es, howe ver, it is incorre ct. Un ite d S tat es v . M ill e r, 903 F.2d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Section 3584(a) does not cre ate a presumption meant to favor conse cutive se nte nc e s bu t me re ly a ru le of co ns tr uc tio n. ” ); se e als o Un ite d S tat es v . Q uin te ro , 157 F.3d 1038, 1041 (6th Cir. 1998) (also observing that § 3584(a) establishes a “‘rule of construc tion in the cases in which t h e co u rt i s silent as to whether sentenc es ar e conse cutive or c oncurr ent’” (quoting leg islative history)). 7 discern the “rationale under which [the district court] has imposed the co n s ec u t ive sentenc e.” Johnson , 553 F.3d at 998 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). The go v er n m en t argues, howe ver, that the district court wa s not require d to give any

e xplanatio n. I n p art ic ula

r, the g ov e rnme nt ar g ue s tha t a dis tr ic t c ourt

is a lw ay s p e rm itt e d to re fr a in from makingan aff

irmative ruling on whether sentenc es will r un consec utively

or conc urre ntly

and instead may

rely on what it char ac t erizes as § 3584(a )’s “ presumption” in favor of c onsecutive sentenc es, in which c ase the court ne ed not say any thing. We disag ree . The last sente nce of

§ 3584(a) does contemplate some scena rios when a district court may

rema in silent with respe ct t o whether a fe dera l sentence should run concur rent with or c onsecutive to a state se nte nc e . In th os e insta nc e s, the fe de ra l se nte nc e “ ru n[s] c on se c uti ve ly .” 18 U. S.C. § 3584(a) . For

instance, w hen the possibility of a se ntence running concur rently was simply

never raise d b e f

o r e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt, th e la s t s e n te n c e o f § 3 5 8 4 ( a ) p r o v id e s a c o n v e n ie n t “ r u le of construction” that would avoid unnecessar y litigation. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 127 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3310. But when, as was the ca se her e, the de fenda nt specifica lly

and 2 repe atedly

reque sts a concur

rent sente nce, district courts should not be per mitted to hide behind a

mere rule of construction. Were it other wise, the statute would shield district c ourts that ignor e the

argume nts of

de fe nd ants wh il e su bj ect in g to r e ve rs a l c ourt s th a t a c tua lly tr y to r e sp on d to tho seTh e g ov e rnme nt c ite s Un ite d S tat es v . Ca mp be ll , 309 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2002), in which a 3 panel of this court explained that “[ w ] hen a dis t ri ct co u rt exercises its discre tion to im pose a concur rent or c onsecutive se ntence ,” it must provide an adequate explanation. Cam pb e ll , 309 F.3d a t 93 1 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he g ov e rnme nt a lso c ite s W atf or d , in w hich a panel of this court stated t h a t“ a d i s t r i c tc o u rtg e n e r a l l y may order that [ p ri s o n] t erms run e ither conc urre ntly or consec utively .” W

atf or d , 4 68 F .3 d at 91 5 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he g ov e rnme nt argue s that the us e of the wo rd s “ wh e n” and “ may ” so me ho w de mon str a te s that the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re spon si bi li ty to explain it s decision to impose a conc urre nt or consec utive sentenc e appli es only when the district co u rt ch o o s e s t o m ak e a naf fi rm at i v e r

u l i n g. W e d o n o tb el i ev e t h at t h e q u o t edo p i n i o nl an gu age support s s u ch a co u n terintuitive interpre tation of § 3584(a) . I nstead, we rea d these two c ases a s say ingsim

ply that, a lth ou g h the qu e sti on of wh e the r a fe de ra l sen te nc e sh ou ld run c on c ur re nt w ith another sentenc e may

not alway s arise, when it doe s, the dis tr ic t c ourt may selec t either a

consec utive or a c o n c u r r e n ts e n t e n c e , an d

i t s c h o i c e b e t w e e nth e t w o m u s tb e a c c o mp an i e d b y a de qu a te re as o n i n g. 8 arguments. I n other wor ds, under the g overnme nt’s proposal, district c ourts would have a n incentive to r emain silent. The g overnme nt points t o no case law in support of such a n illogica l result, and 3 ind e e d, its po sit ion c on fl ic ts wi th the nume ro us de c isi on s in thi s Cir c uit that re qu ir e dis tr ic t c ourt s to respond to all of a d ef

en d an t’s nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a lower sentenc e. See, e .g. , United States v. Gapinski , 5 61 F .3 d 4 67 , 4 74 (6 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; Un ite d S tates v . R e c la , 560 F.3d 539, 547 (6th Cir. 2009). There fore , we c onclude that the district court failed t o explain adequately its decision to have Mart in’ s f

e de ra l se nte nc e ru

n c on se c uti ve to h is s ta te se nte nc e s. III . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons stated a

bove, we VA CA TE M arti n ’ s s e n te n c e an d RE MAND for f urther proce eding s consistent with this o p i n i o n . On re mand, the district cour t should rule expli citly

on whether Martin’s fe dera l sentence is to run concurre nt with or conse cutive to his state sentenc es and should p r o v id e ana d e qu a te e xp la n a ti o nf o r th a t r u li n g . I ts e xp la

n a ti o ns h o u ld

p ay p artic ular attention to the considera tions embodied in § 5G1.3.