-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 12, 2015 

v No. 319256 

Wayne Circuit Court 

DEBORAH ANN LILLIARD, LC No. 13-005450-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals by right her convictions after a bench trial of assault with a dangerous 

weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82(1), and possession of a firearm during the commission 

of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ 

imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction and a concurrent two-year term of probation for 

the felonious assault conviction. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 This case arises from an incident in Detroit, Michigan. Defendant was driving an SUV, 

along with two passengers, attempting to find and recover a car. Although the car was not titled 

in defendant’s name, defendant believed that she had a valid claim of ownership in the vehicle. 

 During her search, defendant happened to locate the car and began to follow it. 

Eventually, defendant pulled next to the car and motioned for the victim driver (a woman 

defendant did not know or recognize) to stop. When the car did not stop, one of defendant’s 

passengers rolled down a rear window and used a handgun to shoot out the car’s front, right tire. 

The victim testified at trial that a second shot was fired and that the SUV angled over into the 

car’s lane, cutting off the car. The victim then fled on foot, leaving the car keys behind. 

Defendant subsequently took the car. 

 After her arrest, defendant made two statements to the police. She admitted her first 

statement contained numerous lies. In her second statement, defendant admitted that she cut the 

car off during the assault, but at trial she denied several times that she had done so. 

 After defendant’s bench trial, the lower court found that defendant was unaware that her 

passenger had a firearm until after the first shot was fired. But the court further found that 
-2- 

defendant continued to engage in affirmative actions to threaten the victim after the first shot was 

fired and after defendant knew that her passenger had a gun and was using it to threaten the 

victim. Therefore, under an aiding and abetting theory, the trial court concluded that defendant 

was guilty of both felonious assault and felony-firearm. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Defendant raises two issues on appeal: first, whether sufficient evidence existed to 

support defendant’s convictions under an aiding and abetting theory and, second, whether the 

trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. 

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a bench trial de novo. 

People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). The evidence is viewed in 

the “light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the 

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Robinson, 

475 Mich 1, 5; 715 NW2d 44 (2006). All conflicts regarding the evidence must be resolved in 

favor of the prosecution. Wilkens, 267 Mich App at 738. This Court reviews issues of statutory 

interpretation de novo. People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 254; 794 NW2d 9 (2011). 

 Aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense; it is a theory of prosecution that 

permits imposing vicarious liability on accomplices. Robinson, 475 Mich at 6; MCL 767.39. 

Conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting has three elements: (1) the crime charged was 

committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave 

encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended to aid 

the charged offense, knew the principal intended to commit the charged offense, or, alternatively, 

that the charged offense was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the 

intended offense. Robinson, 475 Mich at 6, 14-15. To be found guilty under an aiding and

abetting theory, the defendant need not have the same intent as the principal; the defendant 

simply must have the intent described in the third element above. Id. at 15. 

1. FELONIOUS ASSAULT 

 Pursuant to MCL 750.82(1), “a person who assaults another person with a gun, revolver, 

pistol . . . or other dangerous weapon without intending to commit murder or to inflict great 

bodily harm less than murder is guilty” of felonious assault. There are three elements for 

felonious assault: “(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure 

or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” People v Avant, 235 

Mich App 499, 511; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). 

 Defendant argues that because the trial court found that defendant was unaware her 

passenger had a gun until after it was fired, insufficient evidence existed to conclude that 

defendant had the intent necessary to be found guilty of felonious assault under an aiding and 

abetting theory. But looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we agree that sufficient evidence 

supported that conclusion. In explaining its reasoning, the trial court found that the victim’s 

testimony was credible, that two shots were fired, and that defendant continued to engage in 
-3- 

actions that threatened the victim after the first shot was fired and defendant knew that her 

passenger had a gun and was threatening the victim with it. Likewise, by her own admission, 

defendant cut the victim off and was beginning to exit the SUV while her accomplice was firing. 

This evidence supports the inference that defendant continued in affirmative acts that aided and 

abetted the assault after she was aware that her passenger was armed and assaulting the victim. 

 Furthermore, it is incontrovertible that a felonious assault took place: defendant’s 

accomplice shot out the tire of the moving car, then fired another shot ostensibly aimed at the 

victim or the vehicle while defendant cut the victim off with a larger vehicle. The victim then 

fled in fear and ran away up the freeway service drive, leaving the car running with her personal 

possessions inside. Any claim that defendant or her accomplice were legally privileged to use 

such force to recover the car is untenable; it was unreasonable to use potentially lethal force to 

protect mere property rights under these circumstances. See, e.g., People v Shaffran, 243 Mich 

527, 528-529; 220 NW 716 (1928) (no right to inflict great bodily harm to protect farmland); 

People v Doud, 223 Mich 120, 131; 193 NW 884 (1923) (no right to point gun at another to 

protect against mere trespass to property). 

 Accordingly, under the deferential standard of review applicable to this issue, there was 

sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felonious assault under an aiding and abetting theory. 

2. FELONY-FIREARM 

 “The felony-firearm statute applies whenever a person carries or has a firearm in his 

possession when committing or attempting to commit a felony.” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 

62; 679 NW2d 41 (2004) (discussing MCL 750.227b). A person aids or abets felony-firearm if 

that person “procures, counsels, aids, or abets in [the commission of a felony-firearm offense].” 

Id. at 74 (alteration in original). To prove a defendant aided and abetted a felony-firearm 

offense, the prosecution must establish 

that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or 

some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that 

assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant 

intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that 

the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and 

encouragement. [Id. at 70-71.] 

It must be determined on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant performed acts or gave 

encouragement that assisted the carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission of a 

felony. Id. at 71. “Implicit in the use of a firearm is the possession of that firearm.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). 

 Defendant again argues that because defendant did not know her passenger had a gun 

until after it was fired, it necessarily follows that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s conclusion that defendant aided and abetted felony-firearm. But viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the verdict, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported that conclusion. Defendant 

admitted in a statement to the police that she cut the victim off during the commission of the 

assault. By cutting the victim off, defendant engaged in specific acts that aided her accomplice 
-4- 

in the carrying or possession of a firearm during the accomplice’s commission of a felonious 

assault. Moreover, it is a reasonable inference that defendant gave that aid after she knew that 

her accomplice was assaulting the victim with the firearm. 

 Therefore, sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm under 

an aiding and abetting theory. 

B. REVIEW OF FACTUAL FINDINGS 

 This Court reviews a lower court’s factual findings for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). A 

finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made. Wilkens, 267 Mich App 733. 

 Defendant first argues that the prosecution offered no evidence to support the trial court’s 

finding that defendant took affirmative action in furtherance of the assault after defendant was 

aware that her passenger was armed. But as already discussed above, in her statement to the 

police defendant admitted she cut the victim off and was beginning to exit the SUV while her 

accomplice was firing. 

 Defendant further argues that it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 

had time to aid and abet the assault between the two gunshots or whether a second shot was fired 

at all. On this particular point, the credibility of the witnesses is paramount. 

 The trial court found the victim credible and believed her testimony that two shots—not 

one—were fired. The trial court also explicitly stated that it did not “believe [defendant’s] 

testimony that only one shot was fired.” A thorough review of the record, particularly the facts 

that defendant had admitted to lying during her first interview with the police and varied her 

story each time she told it, bolsters the trial court’s decision to find the victim a more credible 

witness than defendant. Again, it is important to note that defendant admitted to cutting the 

victim off during the assault. 

 Therefore, after a comprehensive review of the record on appeal, this Court is not left 

with a definite or firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. As such, the trial court’s 

factual findings must not be disturbed because those findings were not clearly erroneous. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions. Likewise, the factual findings of 

the trial court were not clearly erroneous. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello