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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:

DEVELOPMENTS, TRENDS AND POLICY CHOICES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 2005

Serial No. 109–110

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Vice Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LISA M. WILLIAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN M. DONALD, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Eric John, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 15

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Material submitted for the record ........................................ 4

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 10

The Honorable Joseph Crowley, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 12

Mr. Eric John: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 19

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 37

Responses from Mr. Eric John to questions submitted for the record by 

the Honorable James A. Leach ........................................................................... 38

Responses from Mr. Eric John to questions submitted for the record by 

the Honorable Earl Blumenauer, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Oregon ..................................................................................................... 40

(1)

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 

DEVELOPMENTS, TRENDS AND 

POLICY CHOICES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Committee will come to order. The Chair would 

ask unanimous consent that his statement and those of all Members be placed in the record in full. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

On behalf of the Subcommittee, let me express a warm welcome 

to Mr. Eric John, who is making his inaugural appearance before 

the Committee as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

I have a number of comments that will be covered in the unanimous consent request. I just want to say that there are obviously 

a number of very important countries in the region with a very different set of perspectives and policy challenges. But I would also 

like to suggest that it is self-evident, but not self-apparent in the 

policy priorities of the United States Government, or any government in the world today, that the greatest foreign policy issue in 

the world is not necessarily the issue of war and peace nor necessarily the issue of terrorism, but is the potential life-threatening 

terror involved in disease control. 

In Southeast Asia, we have the issue that is growing of 

HIV/AIDS that has killed 20 million people in the last 20 years, 

and possibly the emerging problem of avian flu. And I would like 

to have a perspective on that at some point in the Q&As of your 

testimony. But it is quite conceivable that all other subject matters 

pale in significance to the issue of disease control. And I know this 

is this is not historically the principal issue of the United States 

Department of State. But I think we are going to have to think 

through how it might become more central. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

2

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to express a warm welcome to Mr. 

Eric John, who is making his inaugural appearance before the Committee as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. We 

look forward to your testimony. 

We meet this morning to survey recent developments in Southeast Asia, and 

United States policy toward the region. As the nexus of important political, economic, and strategic factors, Southeast Asia holds great promise and also faces significant challenges. While I know that many of our friends were disappointed that 

Secretary Rice was unable to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum this past July, I 

want to assure them that the United States—including the Congress—remains committed to robust engagement in the region. 

I hope that our witness will be able to address two broad questions during our 

discussion today. The first is how best to address the challenges of terrorism and 

radical Islam: In addition to the transnational activities of Jemaah Islamiya, some 

countries also face threats from indigenous militants. The second is how the United 

States should regard the growing role of China in the region. Some observers question whether China’s initiatives—such as the East Asia Summit scheduled for December 2005—are attempts to marginalize U.S. influence. 

In addition to these general, region-wide dynamics, I hope that today’s hearing 

might also explore some of the following, specific circumstances, and proper U.S. 

policy responses:

• Indonesia continues its remarkable process of democratization and decentralization, and we join the Indonesian government in welcoming the prospect 

of durable peace in Aceh. At the same time, concerns persist about accountability for ongoing abuses by some Indonesian security forces, particularly in 

Papua.

• As exemplified by the visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minister earlier this 

year, the United States and Vietnam are developing an unprecedented and 

warming bilateral relationship, with growing trade, security, and people-topeople ties. However, the depth of the relationship is constrained by continuing human rights violations, such as the jailing of dissidents, the attempt 

to control religious practice, and brutal crackdowns in the Central Highlands.

• Inside Burma, political and humanitarian conditions remain deplorable. I am 

interested in the State Department’s thinking on policy options toward 

Burma, including recent, innovative proposals to explore these issues within 

the context of the UN Security Council.

• In the Philippines, President Arroyo remains politically embattled due to allegations of electoral impropriety, while her country faces challenges from violent insurgents, including Islamist terrorists in Mindanao.

• During his July visit to Washington, Singapore Prime Minister Lee signed a 

security framework agreement with the United States that should further bolster our robust defense relationship, which already serves as a touchstone of 

stability in the region.

• On a side issue, I would like to hear more about Cambodia’s forced repatriation of Vietnamese Montagnard asylum seekers earlier this summer, and 

about U.S. efforts to halt or mitigate that circumstance. As you may know, 

these were issues that I raised in correspondence with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

• Finally, and most importantly, it is self-evident but not self-apparent in U.S. 

governmental priorities that the greatest foreign policy issue of our times is 

neither the problem of war and peace between nation states nor the problem 

of terrorism, but rather is the very human vulnerability we all share to disease. It is the HIV virus and a potential avian flu pandemic that are more 

grave life and death issues than those related to armaments and evil intents 

of mendacious minds. An update on these two issues as they relate to Southeast Asia is critical.

Again, Mr. John, thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee this morning. 

We look forward to your testimony.

Mr. LEACH. Let me turn to Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you have any 

opening statements? 

3

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would defer to you, Mr. Chairman, if you 

have an opening statement. 

Mr. LEACH. I have just given it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In that case, Mr. Chairman, I will. I do have 

an opening statement. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and I also 

would like to offer my personal welcome to our Deputy Assistant 

Secretary, Mr. Eric John, whom I have had the privilege of meeting 

a couple of times in previous visits to the Republic of Korea. Also 

I want to offer my commendation to Assistant Secretary Hill for his 

honest efforts, hopefully, in trying to break the situation in the negotiations going on now with North Korea, and my apologies, Mr. 

Chairman, for not being able to accompany you and the members 

of our delegation for your recent visit to North Korea. I had, unfortunately, a conflict in the schedule. 

Mr. Chairman, Southeast Asia is of strategic, political and economic importance to the United States. Yet there is debate about 

whether the United States is losing credibility in this important 

part of the Asia-Pacific region. 

As reported recently by Newsweek magazine, the East Asian 

Summit will be held in December of this year, which will include 

Southeast Asian countries, but also China, Japan, South Korea, 

India, New Zealand, and Australia. Despite being the dominant 

military and political player in this part of the region, the United 

States has not been invited. This is the first time, in my understanding, that we have been excluded in such discussions. I would 

be interested to find out from Secretary Rice and our State Department, why the snub? I suppose our position may be, ‘‘Oh, we don’t 

need to be there, oh, it is not worth our time to be there knowing 

that China will become the central focus and figure among the nations attending that important summit.’’ I suppose one might say, 

‘‘Are we missing something here?’’

Also, recently, according to the Newsweek magazine article, the 

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, recently made a speech in 

Singapore where he complained about China’s rising military budget. Regional newspapers, including Singapore’s Straits Times, 

quickly pointed out that the United States’ military budget consumes more than $400 billion annually—closer to $500 billion, if 

you add Iraq and Afghanistan—and accounts for almost half of the 

global defense spending. China, in contrast, spends between $50–

90 billion of its defense budget and now, instead of talking about 

China’s military growth, Newsweek reports that ‘‘Asians are talking 

about Rumsfeld’s paranoia.’’

In turn, Mr. Chairman, to support the war on terror, the Bush 

Administration has turned to Indonesia. While I applaud the people of Indonesia for demanding a more democratic form of government, and commend President Yudhoyono (SBY) for his efforts to 

rid Indonesia of Islamic extremism, I remain very concerned, Mr. 

Chairman, in shifting its focus to promote conflict between Christian and Muslim communities within Indonesia. I also remain 

deeply concerned about Indonesia’s brutal military record and history of atrocities, human rights violations committed against the 

people of West Papua. Our own State Department has stated about 

Indonesia, and I quote:

4

‘‘Security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat and 

arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements in Papua.’’

I also wish to submit, as a matter of record, two reports that I 

believe must be brought to the attention of the Congress and to the 

United Nations. The first report, published only last month in August, is entitled ‘‘Genocide in West Papua?’’ and was prepared over 

a course of 4 years by the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies 

at the University of Sydney. The second report was done 2 years 

ago by the Yale Law School’s Allard K. Lowenstein International 

Human Rights Clinic, entitled ‘‘Indonesian Human Rights Abuses 

in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History 

of Indonesian Control.’’ Both reports strongly suggest that the Indonesian Government has committed proscribed acts with the intent to destroy the West Papuan people. 

Let me also emphasize, Mr. Chairman, these reports are written 

by third parties with no vested interest in West Papua, unlike the 

reports being circulated by the Indonesian Government and the 

United States-Indonesian society in response to H.R. 2061, the 

State Department Authorization bill, which includes language 

which would require the U.S. State Department to submit to the 

Congress a report analyzing the results of the 1969 Act of Free 

Choice, detailing also the implementation of the so-called Special 

Autonomy Law that was supposed to be for the benefit of the West 

Papuan people. I ask that these reports be included and made part 

of the record. 

Mr. LEACH. Without objection so ordered. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I also ask that 

President Bush’s January 2005 Inaugural Address be included as 

part of the record. In his Inaugural Address President Bush said 

that, and I quote:

‘‘. . . [I]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support 

the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every 

nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny 

in our world.’’

[Excerpts from the information referred to follows. The full 

versions are filed with Subcommittee records.]

Excerpts from Genocide in West Papua? The role of the Indonesian state apparatus 

and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people, John Wing and Peter King 

(The University of Sydney Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005): 

Page 7—

The TNI is behind numerous incidencts which result in military operations catastrophic for local communities. These incidents are also used to justify the deployment of new troop reinforcements which in turn lead to greater human rights 

abuses, reaction from aggrieved Papuans, then further militarization. A dangerous 

and destructive spiral is this perpetuated. 

Page 11—

Types of acts of apartheid in West Papua include the following:

• Freedom of movement in many regions is very difficult due to arbitrary acts 

of security apparatus

• People have to have a surat jalan, or travel permit, when traveling to their 

home villages

5

• People are detained with no clear reason for unspecified periods, for months 

or even years, and tried with no clear charges

• Papuans who are members of the military apparatus of the Republic of Indonesia will sometimes not be given any arms to equip themselves to handle 

crowds, whereas those coming from Indonesia will always be fully equipted 

with rifles, and/or pistols

• The Indonesian newcomers to Papua looking for jobs can easily get one, often 

within a week. Meanwhile, Papuans have to wait for years to get one. This 

is a form of deliberate or ‘‘structural’’ discrimination over the right to work

• Papuan churches and schools in the military-targeted or military operation 

areas always become targets of vandalism and arson by the security apparatus

• The security apparatus uses terms of denigration that degrade the dignity of 

West Papuans, e.g., that Papuans are animals (e.g., monkeys). A clear example can be found in the Abepura case of 2000

• HIV/AIDS has never been seriously handled, even though the Province of 

Papua records the highest number of victims in Indonesia. Especially in regions rich with gaharu [sandalwood], the military is involved as pimps bringing in HIV/AIDS affected prostitutes from Java and other parts of Indonesia. 

Excerpt from Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the 

Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control, Elizabeth Brundige, Winter 

King, Priyneha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan (The Allard K. Lowenstein 

International Human Rights Clinic Yale Law School, April 2004): 

Page 6—

Since Indonesia secured control over West Papua in 1963, and established formal 

soveigenty over the territory in 1969 through the so-called Act of Free Choice, West 

Papuans have lived as second-class citizens in their own land, deprived of their 

right to self-determination and subjected to serious human rights abuses at the 

hands of Indonesian authorities. Violent military campaigns and extrajudicial 

killings have claimed the lives of thousands of West Papuans. Thousands more have 

been subject to torture, disappearance, arbitrary detention, rape, or other forms of 

serious mental and bodily harm. The government of Indonesia has forced West 

Papuans off their land, exploited their resources, destroyed their property and crops, 

denigrated and attacked their culture, and excluded them from the upper levels of 

government, business, and education. 

Excerpt from President Bush’s Inaugural Address, January 2005:

‘‘So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 

democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’

‘‘Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world: 

All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will 

not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your 

liberty, we will stand with you.’’

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I believe the President’s great mission of 

American diplomacy today should include West Papua’s plight and 

their right for self-determination, just as our country has given and 

supported the United Nations’s commitment in giving the people of 

East Timor the right of self determination, and that country is now 

becoming an independent and sovereign nation. 

Mr. Chairman the issue of West Papua New Guinea is not an internal matter or an issue of territorial integrity. West Papua was 

a former Dutch colony, just as East Timor was a former Portuguese 

colony, just as Indonesia was a former colony of the Netherlands. 

The historical evidence is clear, Mr. Chairman, that this matter—

and this is why East Timor achieved its independence from IndoVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:30 Jan 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\092105\23608.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

nesia 3 years ago, through a referendum sanctioned by the United 

Nations and supported by our own Nation. 

On the other hand, in what became known as the Act of No 

Choice, some 1,022 West Papuan elders, under heavy military surveillance and threats on the lives of their families, voted 100 percent—100 percent—to join Indonesia. In spite of serious violations 

of the UN Charter and the cries for help from the West Papuans, 

the West Papuan people were handed over to Indonesia in 1969. 

Mr. Chairman, the West Papuans have suffered blatant and brutal human rights abuses at the hands of the Indonesian military 

time and time and time again. And I say enough is enough. 

In the spirit of America’s great mission of diplomacy to end tyranny in our world, I am hopeful that the United States will stand 

with the people of West Papua and support their right to self determination that was done for the good people of East Timor, not at 

the barrel of a gun, but by casting of a vote. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our witness. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

Mr. Chairman: 

I thank you for holding this hearing and I welcome our witness, Mr. Eric John, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

Southeast Asia is of strategic, political and economic importance to the United 

States. Yet, there is debate about whether the United States is losing presence and 

credibility in the region. 

As reported by Newsweek, the East Asian Summit will be held in December of 

this year and will include the Southeast Asian countries plus China, Japan, South 

Korea, India, New Zealand and Australia. Despite being the dominant military and 

political player in the region, the United States has not been invited and this is the 

first time we have been excluded in such discussions. 

Also, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently made a speech in Singapore 

where he complained about China’s rising military budget. Regional newspapers, including Singapore’s Straits Times, quickly pointed out that ‘‘the U.S. military budget consumes more than $400 billion annually [closer to $500 billion if you add in 

Iraq and Afghanistan] and accounts for almost half of global defense spending.’’ ‘‘China,’’ in contrast, ‘‘spends between $50 billion and $90 billion on defense,’’ according to the same source. Now instead of talking about China’s military growth, 

Newsweek reports that ‘‘Asians are talking about Rumsfeld’s paranoia.’’

In turn, to support the war on terror, the Bush Administration has turned to Indonesia. While I applaud the people of Indonesia for demanding a more democratic 

form of government and commend President Yudhoyono for his efforts to rid Indonesia of Islamist extremism, I remain concerned that the JI is shifting its focus to 

provoke conflict between Christian and Muslim communities within Indonesia. I 

also remain deeply concerned about Indonesia’s brutal military record in West 

Papua. 

Our own U.S. State Department has stated that Indonesia ‘‘security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained civilians and members 

of separatist movements in Papua.’’ I also wish to submit as a matter of record two 

reports that I believe must be brought to the attention of Congress and the United 

Nations. The first report published only last month in August 2005 is entitled Genocide in West Papua and was prepared over the course of 4 years by the Centre for 

Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney. The second report published 

in December 2003 by Yale Law School’s Allard K. Lowenstein International Human 

Rights Clinic is entitled Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control. Both reports 

strongly suggest that the Indonesian government has committed proscribed acts 

with the intent to destroy the West Papuans. 

Let me also emphasize that these reports are written by third parties with no 

vested interest in West Papua unlike the reports being circulated by the Indonesian 

government and the US-Indonesian society in response to H.R. 2061, the State Department Authorization bill which includes language which would require the U.S. 

7

State Department to submit to Congress a report analyzing the 1969 ‘‘Act of Free 

Choice’’ and detailing implementation of Special Autonomy for Papua and Aceh. I 

ask that these reports be included in the record. 

In closing, I also ask that President Bush’s Inaugural Address in January 2005 

be included as part of the record. In his Inaugural Address, President Bush said 

that ‘‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate 

goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’ I believe the President’s great mission of 

American diplomacy today should include West Papua’s right to self-determination. 

The issue of West Papua is not an internal matter or an issue of territorial integrity. West Papua was a former Dutch colony just as East Timor was a former Portuguese colony just as Indonesia was a former colony of the Netherlands. The historical evidence is clear on this matter and this is why East Timor achieved its independence from Indonesia in 2002 through a referendum sanctioned by the United 

Nations (UN). 

On the other hand, in what became known as the Act of No-Choice, 1,025 West 

Papua elders under heavy military surveillance were selected to vote on behalf of 

809,327 West Papuans on the territory’s political status. In spite of serious violations of the UN Charter and the cries of help from the Papuans, West Papua was 

handed over to Indonesia in 1969. 

Since this time, West Papuans have suffered blatant and brutal human rights 

abuses at the hands of the Indonesian military time and time and time again and 

enough is now enough. In the spirit of America’s great mission of diplomacy to end 

tyranny in our world, I am hopeful that the U.S. will stand with the people of West 

Papua and support their right to self-determination as was done for the people of 

East Timor not at the barrel of a gun but by the casting of a vote. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witness and I look forward to our discussions today.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher, do you have anything? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and I am looking forward to the testimony today. Hopefully, you 

will convince me that my impression is wrong and the impression 

that I have of America’s position in Southeast Asia is they have a 

policy of benign neglect about Southeast Asia. And this, as compared to other times in our history when we were intensely engaged in Southeast Asia, so, we should—well, I guess we will have 

a little discussion on that as your testimony proceeds. 

Let me just note that the Australians have, Mr. Chairman, had 

an exemplary leadership in that area of the world and they are engaged dramatically, and we should be grateful that our Australian 

friends, who have been friends in helping us in Iraq, et cetera, and 

every other conflict we have ever been in, are engaged in and making up, perhaps, for America’s lack of engagement in that region. 

I would hope that the Deputy Assistant Secretary will be able to 

tell us about the dramatic advances and the cause of democracy in 

Vietnam, because we were told that with the free trade treaty with 

Vietnam that there would be a liberalization that we would be able 

to visualize by now. Of course, it didn’t happen in Communist 

China, and I don’t believe it has happened in Vietnam, either. 

So perhaps we can have a report on that. In terms of Indonesia, 

my good friend, Mr. Faleomavaega, I understand the points he has 

made and some of them are very valid points about past sins committed by the Indonesian Government. Mr. Faleomavaega, I would 

hope that we also recognize that there have been some positive 

trends recently. And, the fact that, I mean Indonesian seems to be 

going in a better direction now than it did in the past, while we 

recognize that there were sins in the past, and our own country, 

of course, has had sins in the past, as well. 

8

And Mr. Faleomavaega and I are very committed to making sure 

that people in the Marshall Islands, for example, are treated fairly 

when they weren’t treated fairly in the past, et cetera. 

Let me just say I want to thank the people of Thailand officially 

for reaching out and trying to help our people who are in desperate 

situations after Katrina and here, over the years, again, the people 

of Thailand or the Royal Family, especially of Thailand, has indicated that they are good friends of the United States, and were 

willing to help out, even though the resources of the people of Thailand are meager and they themselves went through a massive disaster with a tidal wave just not too long ago. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I think that the United States always forgets our best friend in Southeast Asia. And it just seems 

that we are not engaged at all with our very best friends. I mean 

we are willing to try to focus economic activity on Vietnam, which 

is run by people who have no commitment to democracy and brutalized their people, while we have a very democratic regime and 

people are struggling to make democracy work in the Philippines, 

and the Philippines have always been America’s very best friend. 

And yet there is so little to show in that relationship. And I 

would hope that we should be partners with the Filipinos in that 

part of the world, because they are committed to democracy. And 

if there is any country that demonstrates democratic principles 

even though they themselves have some pretty serious problems 

right now, and maybe we should be exerting a much more positive 

influence in helping them through those problems. 

With that said, I am looking forward to the testimony. Thank 

you for this hearing today, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Let me turn to, I guess, Mr. Wexler. Did 

you have any comments you wanted to make? 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I wanted 

to just talk a moment, if I could, about Indonesia. I had the opportunity of spending some time there in August, and visiting with 

President Yudhoyono. The comments both of the Ranking Member 

and Mr. Rohrabacher, I think, are entirely appropriate. The Ranking Member’s comments are extremely compelling. But I do think 

that there is a new day in Indonesia, and it presents, I think, 

maybe the most ripe opportunity for the United States to both engage and develop and grow a relationship that will reap enormous 

rewards if tended to properly from both the United States and Indonesia. 

My impressions of President Yudhoyono is that we could not 

hope for a better partner, ‘‘we’’ meaning the United States. We 

could not hope for a better partner in Indonesia. Other than the 

obvious, which is that he is the first democratically-elected leader 

of Indonesia, he brings a perspective of both a true democrat and 

somebody who is thirsty for greater cooperation with the United 

States. 

I find at times our policy related to Indonesia almost unlike any 

other country, in that we seem to be in a time warp, as legitimate 

and as compelling as past grievances are, and they need to be dealt 

with, it shouldn’t thwart appropriate policy toward a country, as 

that country presents itself now. 

9

What President Yudhoyono accomplished in Aceh is nothing 

short of historically remarkable, and that ought to give us hope 

that he has positioned the Indonesian Government in a positive 

light so as to peacefully resolve issues regarding separatist movements. 

The peace treaty that was signed with the Free Aceh Movement 

is, in my mind, nothing short in terms of the degree of the accomplishment than resolving the conflict in northern Ireland and resolving the Palestinian/Israeli/Arab conflict, in resolving conflicts 

that still exist in the Balkans. And this guy did it on the heels of 

the greatest humanitarian crisis that the world has seen in years. 

Having spent some time in Aceh, and seeing the extraordinary 

role that the American military played, and the dividends that it 

has reaped with public opinion in Indonesia, it would be a crime 

if we did not follow that wonderfully extraordinary role that the 

American military played after the tsunami, with a true aggressive 

policy. President Yudhoyono, I think rightfully, says that Indonesia 

may be the second largest democracy actually, not the third, because apparently, more Indonesians voted in their Presidential 

election than actually voted in ours. And all of this just begs the 

question, and I am very, very respectful of the efforts the Administration has made in the last several months, in many ways, respectfully to the Congress, the Administration has led the Congress. 

The Congress has been slow to engage on military-to-military relationships with Indonesia. The Administration has led the way. 

The Administration has led the way on greater economic contact. 

We have the largest Muslim nation in the world that has now 

elected a democratically positive President that is thirsting for a 

stronger, better relationship with the United States. And for some 

reason, we haven’t responded as fully as we could. 

Just the other day, Congressman Burton and I wrote a letter to 

Speaker Hastert asking him to invite President Yudhoyono to address a joint session of Congress. It should happen. 

The President of Indonesia should be given the respect that we 

rightfully give to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to officials 

in India and the like. 

And if I could just close, Mr. Chairman, with this observation: In 

the last 2 weeks, we saw two extraordinary developments, one with 

respect to Pakistan, one with respect to Indonesia. The Pakistani 

Foreign Minister met with the Israeli Foreign Minister in Turkey, 

an extraordinarily positive development, which was followed by a 

less formal interaction between the Indonesian Foreign Minister 

and the Israeli Foreign Minister, I believe in New York. 

Indonesia and Pakistan, as the leading non-Arab Muslim states, 

had the opportunity and the ability to create an environment of 

peace in the middle Middle East that has not been existent before. 

And, again, credits to the Administration for encouraging those 

interactions. But this also is an opportunity where our growing relationship with Indonesia can pay extraordinary dividends, not just 

in Southeast Asia, but in the Middle East as well. Both countries 

can gain. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing and enabling 

me to speak. 

10

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Thank you, Mr Chairman, I will be brief. I wanted to talk for a moment if I could 

about Indonesia. 

I had the opportunity to spend some time there in August and visit with President Yudhoyono. I think that the comments made by the Ranking Member and Mr 

Rohrabacher are entirely appropriate and the Ranking Member’s comments are extremely compelling. But I do think that there is a new day in Indonesia. It presents 

the ripest opportunity for the United States to engage, develop and grow a relationship that will reap enormous rewards, if tended to properly, for both the United 

States and Indonesia. My impression is that we in the United States could not hope 

for a better partner in Indonesia than President Yudhoyono. Other than the obvious, 

which is that he is the first democratically elected president of Indonesia, he brings 

a perspective of both a true democrat and somebody who is thirsting for a greater 

cooperation with the United States. I find at times that our policy towards Indonesia, almost unlike that any other country, is stuck in a time warp. As legitimate 

and as compelling as past grievances are—and they need to be dealt with—they 

should not warp appropriate policy toward a country, as that country presents itself 

now. What President Yudhoyono accomplished in Aceh is nothing short of historically remarkable, and that ought to give us hope that he has positioned the Indonesian government in a positive light so as to peacefully resolve issues involving 

separatist movements. In my mind, the peace treaty that was signed with the Free 

Aceh Movement is—in terms of the degree of the accomplishment—equivalent to resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Israeli Arab conflict or the conflict that 

still exists in the Balkans. And President Yudhoyono accomplished this in the midst 

of the greatest humanitarian crisis the world has seen in years. Having spent some 

time in Aceh and having seen both the extraordinary role the American military 

played and the dividends it has reaped with the public opinion in Indonesia, It 

would be a crime if we did not follow the wonderful humanitarian role the military 

played after the tsunami with a truly aggressive policy. 

President Yudhoyono, I think rightfully, has said that Indonesia may be the second largest democracy, not the third, because apparently more people voted in the 

Indonesian presidential election than in our own. I am very respectful of the efforts 

of the Administration has made in the last several months, in many ways actually 

leading Congress on this issue. The Congress has been slow to engage on militaryto-military relations with Indonesia, while the Administration has led the way. The 

Administration has led the way on greater economic contact. We have the largest 

Muslim nation in the world, which has now elected a democratically positive president who is thirsting for a stronger better relationship with the United States. And 

for some reason we have not responded as fully as we could have. Just the other 

day Congressman Burton and I wrote a letter to speaker Hastert asking him to invite President Yudhoyono to address a joint session of Congress. This should happen. The President of Indonesia should be afforded the respect that we rightfully 

give to the Prime Minister of England and to Indian officials. 

And if I may close, Mr Chairman, with this observation: in the last two week we 

have seen two extraordinary developments, one with respect to Pakistan and one 

with respect to Indonesia. The Pakistani Foreign Minister met with the Israeli Foreign Minister in Turkey. This meeting is clearly an extraordinary development, 

which was followed by a less formal interaction between the Indonesian Foreign 

Minister and the Israeli Foreign Minister in New York. Indonesia and Pakistan, as 

the leading non-Arab Muslim states, have the opportunity and the ability to create 

an environment of peace in the Middle East that has not existed for generations. 

Again, we must give credit to the Administration for encouraging those interactions, 

but this also is an opportunity for our growing relationship with Indonesia to pay 

dividends not just in Southeast Asia, but in the Middle East as well.

Mr. LEACH. I have a second non-Member of the Subcommittee, 

Mr. Crowley. Do you wish to speak? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing today and to your esteemed guest for spending his 

time with us today. I want to welcome our good friend, Representative Faleomavaega, back to work here. And it is good to see him 

looking sharp and as neat as can be. 

11

I have had the opportunity to travel, myself, to Southeast Asia. 

And I have been extremely impressed with how that region of the 

world has bounced back since the crisis of their tsunami. But what 

I am most pleased to see is the change in the policy the ASEAN 

has taken in regards to Burma. 

I would like to focus my remarks today on the situation in 

Burma and the continued atrocities occurring under the oppressive 

State Peace and Development Council, also known as the SPDC. 

And the so-called SPDC has done nothing to help the people of 

Burma and is consistently isolating their country and hindering the 

process of peace and democracy in Burma. In fact, just this week, 

a report was released by President Havel, former President of 

Czech Republic, and Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, 

calling for an urgent new and multi-lateral diplomatic initiative at 

the UN Security Council. This 70-page report details the countless 

reasons why it is time for the global community to take a new approach to the generals in Burma. 

The United States and our allies must continue to pressure the 

military regime and work to ensure that multi-lateral pressure increases so that freedoms we enjoy here in the States every day can 

finally be experienced by the people of Burma. We have all heard 

the empty promises of the generals for almost 15 years, but we still 

see no movement to bring freedom and democracy to the people of 

that country. While the SPDC continues to thumb their noses at 

the international community and specifically the UN, I was pleased 

to see that many of our friends in ASEAN, like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, are making sure that the regime knows they will never, never be a leader in ASEAN, while 

they continue to limit the rights and freedoms of their own people. 

Members of ASEAN have said that the SPDC must work with 

the UN to bring about a peaceful change within Burma. 

Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement in Burma are 

making reasonable demands. They have sought democracy through 

nonviolence and dialogue. The repressive SPDC continues to do the 

opposite by forcefully displacing its people and spreading drugs and 

disease across Asia. Supporters of the freedom and democracy 

movement have tried their best to work through the United Nations system and to date, the UN has passed a total of 27 consecutive resolutions in the UN General Assembly and UN Commission 

on Human Rights. This has gone on for far too long. And it is time 

for the issue of Burma to be brought to the Security Council. 

The UN has put forth a commendable effort over the past several 

years to try to bring about a diplomatic solution toward national 

reconciliation. All the efforts by the UN have, unfortunately, failed, 

not because the UN has not worked hard enough, but because the 

SPDC refuses to work with the UN. The SPDC has even gone as 

far as to deny a visa to the Secretary General’s Special Envoy. We 

need to take a new approach to this regime, and I believe it is imperative that we work with our allies to see that this issue is 

brought before the Security Council. And I look forward to hearing 

your position on this, as well as what may have been said by President Bush to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on Burma this 

week. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again. I yield 

back. 

12

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crowley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Chairman Leach—thank you for holding this important hearing today. 

Congressman Faleomavaega it’s so good to see you and I hope you are feeling 

well. 

I would also like to thank our esteemed guests for testifying before the committee 

this morning. 

I have had the opportunity to travel to South East Asia and been extremely impressed with how the region has bounced back from the Asian financial crisis and 

the manner in which they handled the tsunami. 

But what I am most pleased to see is the change in policy ASEAN has taken in 

regards to Burma. 

I would like to focus my remarks today on the situation in Burma and the continued atrocities occurring under the repressive State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC). 

The so called SPDC has done nothing to help the people of Burma and is consistently isolating their country and hindering the progress of peace and democracy in 

Burma. 

In fact, just this week a report was released by Vaclav Havel, former president 

of the Czech Republic, and Desmond M. Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate calling 

for an urgent, new, and multilateral diplomatic initiative at the UN Security Council. 

This 70 page report details the countless reasons why it is time for the global 

community to take a new approach to the generals in Burma. 

The United States and our allies must continue to pressure the military regime 

and work to ensure that multilateral pressure increases so the freedoms we enjoy 

everyday can finally be experienced by the people of Burma. 

We’ve all heard the empty promises of the generals for almost 15 years, but we 

still see no movement to bring freedom and democracy to the people of Burma. 

While the SPDC continues to thumb their noses at the international community 

and specifically the UN, I was so pleased to see that many of our friends in ASEAN 

like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are making sure that the 

regime knows they will never be a leader in ASEAN while they continue to limit 

the rights and freedoms of their people. 

Members of ASEAN have said that the SPDC must work with the UN to bring 

about a peaceful change within Burma. 

Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement in Burma are making reasonable demands—they have sought democracy through nonviolence and dialogue. 

The repressive SPDC continues to do the opposite by forcefully displacing its people and spreading drugs and disease across Asia. 

Supporters of the freedom and democracy movement have tried their best to work 

through the United Nations system and to date the UN has passed a total of 27 

consecutive resolutions in the UN General Assembly and UN Commission on 

Human Rights. 

This has gone on for too long and it is time for the issue of Burma to be brought 

to the Security Council. 

The UN has put forth a commendable effort over the past several years to try and 

bring about a diplomatic solution towards national reconciliation. 

All the efforts by the UN have failed—this is not because the UN has not worked 

hard enough but because the SPDC refuses to work with the UN 

The SPDC has even gone as far as to deny visa’s to the Secretary General’s special envoy. 

We need to take a new approach to this regime and I believe it is imperative that 

we work with our allies to see that this issue is brought before the Security Council. 

I look forward to hearing your position on this as well as what was said by President Bush to Prime Minister Thaksin on Burma this week. 

Thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Mr. Crowley. And as Chair, let me 

just say I appreciate the thoughtful comments of all Members on 

the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to associate 

myself with remarks of my colleagues from New York and Florida, 

both of whom I believe have grown greatly as Members of this 

13

Committee and are demonstrating not only a knowledge, but a maturity that is very exemplary. And I appreciate it. And I am learning a lot from you fellows. Thanks. 

Mr. CROWLEY. We are a little bit concerned over here now. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Will the Chairman yield? I also want to express my appreciation to my colleagues, Mr. Crowley and Wexler, 

for their insights of the problems dealing with Indonesia. It seems 

like the problem here is that absolutely have I ever said anything 

against the fact that the people of Indonesia has achieved this tremendous measure of democracy. 

But as Dana has said, these are sins of the past, we don’t need 

to recall what happened in the brutal military dictatorships of both 

Sukarno and Suharto. This is history. This is Faleomavaega rewriting history. The fact that almost 1 million Indonesian people were 

part of that genocide committed by these two military dictatorships, the fact that over 100,000 West Papuans were also brutalized and murdered and tortured by the Indonesia military for the 

past 30 years, the fact that the act of free choice was no choice, the 

fact that our own Government was party to the problem because 

of the height of the Cold War, we wanted Sukarno and Suharto to 

play with us, be on the side of the Western allies, and not with the 

Soviet Union Communist bloc. 

And for that reason, we sacrificed the rights of the people of 

West Papua for right of self-determination, which we were never 

given, was denied for all these years. And that is all I am simply 

saying. And I applaud the efforts by President SBY of what he is 

trying to do right now in bringing about a greater measure of democracy to the good people of Indonesia. But I say this, if there are 

any people who can appreciate more what it means to be living 

under repressive regimes without any sense of democracy, it would 

be the people of Indonesia themselves. For some 300 years, the 

Dutch was not exactly a very prudent and good colonial master, if 

you will. 

So we have in this instance some 1.5 million West Papuans who 

have suffered, lived in poverty and tremendous—to this day as I 

speak, Mr. Chairman, people of West Papua continue to suffer. 

And I think it is beholden not only to the absolute failure of the 

United Nations to take a proper course of action at the time when 

these things had happened in the historical—this is historical fact, 

this is not Faleomavaega revising history. All I am saying, give the 

people of West Papua the right of self-determination the same way 

that East Timor, also a former province of Indonesia, was given 

that right because of the United Nations and because of our support. 

So why are we—why have we given the people of East Timor, a 

former colony of the Dutch and of Indonesia, the right of self-determination and a plebiscite, and now a sovereign nation, but we are 

denying the same privilege, and I consider a moral, inherent right 

as the people of West Papua deserve to have. 

That is all I am trying to raise here as an issue. And again, to 

my good friend from Florida, I have the highest respect for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), what he is trying to do. It 

is not easy. But at the same time, we cannot ignore the facts of hisVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:30 Jan 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\092105\23608.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

tory. And I think once we come to grips with that reality, for which 

we were a party, these people have been treated like animals, with 

all due respect, to my colleagues for the history of the presence of 

the Indonesia military and what they have done to these people. 

I think they deserve a chance. 

And here, again, I want to say by all means, I am so happy to 

hear President SBY recently announce, to address the issues affecting West Papua, and my understanding, the media reports of 

$500,000,000 supposedly was to be given to help the special autonomy law that was passed 4 years ago to help the West Papuans. 

And guess what? Not one penny went to the West Papuans. It went 

to the military. So these are some of the issues, Mr. Chairman, 

that I think need to be brought for a good public discussion and 

debate. I have nothing against the people, and for their achievement, people of Indonesia for what they have achieved. But they 

cannot ignore the fact that history is history. 

And what the military regimes of Sukarno and Suharto have 

done to the people of West Papua, I think they simply deserve a 

break and a sense of fairness, if we are really serious about what 

President Bush said in January of this year about giving democracy and getting rid of tyranny. Sometimes democracies can also be 

in the form of tyranny, Mr. Chairman. And I am not against what 

President SBY is trying to do with this country. I support him. I 

want to do everything I can to be helpful to bring Indonesia to that 

level. But you cannot ignore this fact of history, 1.5 million West 

Papuans, and some 300,000–400,000—according to other reports—

were murdered, tortured and butchered by the Indonesian military—and who trained the Indonesian military by the way? We did. 

So these are some of the contradictions and some of the facts 

that I want to share with my colleagues in the Committee and to 

know, I have nothing but compassion and appreciation for what the 

people of Indonesia have achieved. But you cannot ignore the fact 

of what has happened to West Papua. And I sincerely hope that the 

Congress, as well as the Bush Administration, will give more serious consideration of the plight of these people. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. The Chair would like to get on to the witness, but 

he is compelled to note that a very non-PC observation was made 

by Mr. Crowley, but it was very accurate in that the Distinguished 

Ranking Member is looking sharp. He is also thinking sharp, Mr. 

Crowley. 

And in turning to Mr. John, I want to also comment that the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Hill, has just returned. And we are pleased 

to have the Deputy Assistant Secretary. But I want to go on record 

as saying that I think the policy of the United States toward North 

Korea has taken a positive step forward and that Mr. Hill is to be 

commended for his recent efforts in Beijing. 

We all know the most difficult part of the negotiations are ahead, 

not behind, but a very positive step has been taken. 

Deputy Secretary John, please proceed. 

15

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC JOHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. JOHN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee and, other Members, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you 

today. I have had the opportunity to meet many of you in travels 

to Asia, particularly Korea, and it has always been an honor to 

work with you, and all of you have a very distinguished record. So 

it is a very good opportunity. 

I am particularly excited to speak about our policy priorities in 

Southeast Asia today and know that you and other colleagues are 

very concerned and engaged on Southeast Asia because this Administration is. And I think this government should be. It is, as 

Mr. Rohrabacher pointed out, it is of critical importance, all of you 

pointed out it is of critical importance to our Nation’s interests. 

And our goals in Southeast Asia are pretty clear. There are four 

main goals that we are looking at. The first is we see Southeast 

Asia as a partner that is committed to democratization and human 

rights and to be an engine of economic growth. 

The second, we want to see nations whose varied ethnic and religious groups live together and flourish in peace. Third, we want to 

see countries that cooperate fully with us in battling the evils of 

terrorism, proliferation and infectious diseases. And fourth, we 

want to see a region where the United States plays a positive role 

in harmony with other powers. 

There is no doubt that Southeast Asia will continue to be of 

greatest importance to the United States. The region’s combined 

gross domestic product is over $750 billion and growing quickly. 

Our two-way trade with the region totaled over $136 billion in 2004 

and continues to grow. It is home to over 500 million people and 

is the fifth largest market for U.S. exports. U.S. direct investment 

in the area is over $90 billion. And strategically, the region sits 

astride the sea routes from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to 

the Pacific, through which much of the world’s trade and energy 

shipments flow, and through which our assistance to numerous 

other friends and allies passes. Achieving our goals in the region 

is going to require intensive active engagement at all levels. And 

I am going to try to address, both in my statement and questionand-answer period, a lot of the issues that Members raised during 

your opening statements. 

And I would like to start with the positive trends that we see in 

Southeast Asia and move on to what we see as the challenges. 

After that, look at how we are going to address those. The most important and encouraging trend in recent years has been the 

strengthening of democracy in the region with recent elections taking place not only in established democracies like Thailand and the 

Philippines, but also newly-democratized Indonesia and East 

Timor. Concurrent with the spread of democracy, prosperity is 

growing as regional economies move toward greater economic openness and integration. We are also seeing policies and initiatives to 

expand regional integration, both bilaterally and through the region’s major institutions. 

16

Southeast Asia is largely at peace. And there has been widespread rejection of terrorism, although terrorism certainly does remain a challenge and we are engaged on that front. 

We see increased attention to global issues such as human trafficking, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, human 

rights and religious freedom. Emphasizing these positive trends 

and opportunities, I don’t want to minimize the challenges, which 

include the danger of terrorism, very negative trends in Burma, 

and the risk of the spread of infectious diseases, most notably 

avian influenza. 

Although Southeast Asia has generally rejected the extremist 

forms of Islam that spawn terrorism, our challenge remains to root 

out all vestiges of this menace. Burma is the one country of the region that is moving in a direction very much opposed to our interests. And as Mr. Crowley pointed out, it is one we should be very 

concerned with. 

We remain deeply worried about the safety and welfare of Aung 

San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners in Burma. We continue 

to press the Burmese leadership to release them immediately and 

unconditionally and to engage the democratic opposition and ethnic 

minority political groups in a meaningful dialogue aimed at genuine national reconciliation and democracy. And I have seen the report that President Havel and Bishop Tutu released this week. And 

it is a very compelling account of the atrocities in Burma. And we 

are working at the—we have started working last week—we have 

been working on Burma for many years, but we started working 

last week at the United Nations General Assembly with bringing 

this again to the United Nations Security Council. It is a very serious issue, and it is one that is only getting worse and demands 

even more involvement by the United States. 

Another area that we are working on is fighting infectious diseases such as malaria and AIDS. But we also have to prepare for 

new threats such as highly pathogenic avian influenza. President 

Bush announced a new international partnership on avian and 

pandemic influenza at the United Nations General Assembly earlier this month to enhance preparedness, prevention, response and 

containment. 

Another important factor for the United States and Southeast 

Asia is the influence of China in the region. China’s rapid economic 

development over the past two decades has brought new challenges 

and opportunities to the countries of Southeast Asia. Beijing is 

using its economic power to advance its interests in the region. Our 

goal is to help China identify those interests in ways that support 

United States objectives. The United States plays and will continue 

to play a central role in the region built on our alliance relationships, our active participation in regional organizations, and the access we grant to our open and transparent markets that helps 

drive both China’s and the region’s economies. 

Earlier this year, Secretary Rice articulated our goals in region, 

security, opportunity, freedom. 

Against a backdrop of the favorable trends that I outlined as well 

as the challenges, we seek to promote policies to achieve the Secretary’s goals through both multi-lateral and bilateral engagement. 

And I would like to look first at the multi-lateral. Economically, we 

17

seek to open markets, facilitate trade, promote transparency and 

fight corruption. And we are working effectively through regional 

multi-lateral institutions to create opportunities for American business and enhance the prosperity of the region. Strengthening relations with ASEAN is of vital importance to the U.S. since we share 

a common interest in promoting democracy, prosperity and stability. 

We will be engaged in developing enhanced partnership with 

ASEAN over the next year. This partnership was proposed by 

ASEAN last June because it, too, is interested in putting its relationship with us on a par with the relationships it has with China, 

Japan, Korea, and India. 

The United States is a leader in APEC, a forum that brings together 21 economies from both sides of the Pacific, including seven 

Southeast Asian nations. The ASEAN regional forum, the ARF, is 

the only multi-lateral institution in the Asia-Pacific region that is 

devoted solely to security issues. ASEAN created the ARF and remains its driving force. 

United States participation, therefore, is both an opportunity to 

articulate and pursue our security interests and a mode of engagement with ASEAN. Because terrorism in Southeast Asia is a regional problem, we are working regionally, as well as bilaterally, 

to support counterterrorism training and intergovernmental cooperation. The ASEAN community has vigorously supported expansion of regional counterterrorism capacities as envisioned in the 

2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, 

and the U.S.-ASEAN Counterterrorism Work Plan is the blueprint 

for U.S. engagement in this effort. 

Now I would like to look at our bilateral ties and how we are 

pursuing our policies there. I think, as the discussion by the Distinguished Members pointed out, the most exciting and biggest challenge that we have right now is with Indonesia. In the 7 years 

since President Suharto resigned, Indonesia has undergone a remarkable democratic transformation. President Yudhoyono seeks to 

reform and modernize Indonesia’s Government institutions, fight 

systemic corruption and reduce poverty. His administration has 

also signed an historic peace agreement to end the conflict in Aceh. 

We now have an opportunity to strengthen our partnership with 

this tremendously important and dynamic country, and I would be 

very happy to answer questions about that. 

In Malaysia, Prime Minister Abdullah has described relations 

with the United States as ‘‘the best they have ever been.’’ And we 

are confident they will improve even further in the years ahead. 

We look forward to working with Malaysia to build mutual understanding between Islam and the West. 

President Bush emphasized a strengthening and revitalization of 

alliances in our ties with two key allies—Thailand and the Philippines—and one key partner—Singapore—have been improved 

significantly since 2001. 

The Philippines was among the first coalition partners to send 

forces to Iraq. And in 2003 we designated it a Major Non-NATO 

Ally. While we were disappointed at its subsequent withdrawal 

from Iraq, our alliance remains strong and we want to continue to 

cooperate on a broad range of issues such as the ongoing Mindanao 

18

peace process and the jointly funded Philippine Defense Reform 

program designed to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine’s 

armed forces. 

We look forward to working closely with the Philippines when it 

assumes the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006. 

Our relationship with Thailand has strengthened over the past 

several years. Thailand has been a staunch partner and ally, contributing troops to coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It provides crucial access to its facilities, including allowing us to use 

Utapao Naval Air Station for the tsunami relief operations last December. The President has designated Thailand, too, a Major NonNATO Ally. 

Singapore, although it is not a treaty ally, is a strong supporter 

of a continued United States security presence in Southeast Asia. 

Our strategic framework agreement builds upon and expands a robust wide-ranging security and economic partnership between our 

nations. 

Our relations with other countries of the region, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and East Timor, continue to grow, giving us 

the opportunity to promote mutual interests and address bilateral 

issues. 

I reserve for last the dramatic refocusing of American attention 

on the region as a result of the December tsunami disaster. Our 

response was massive and we can look back on this as one of the 

proudest moments of our history. We will continue to work closely 

with the countries concerned and the international community on 

long-term reconstruction assistance. And as Representative Rohrabacher noted, Thailand stepped in with a very generous offer of 

aid, both from its government, its King, and its people, and it is 

interesting to note that virtually every other country in Southeast 

Asia has also stepped forward, from small donations up in the communities of Madan in Indonesia, which gave $10,000 despite being 

hit by tsunami last December, to Brunei, which donated a million 

dollars, to the people of Vietnam, donating privately, donated thousands of dollars directly to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi. All of these 

contributions, I think, signify the partnership that we have in 

Southeast Asia. 

As I said in the beginning, Southeast Asia is undergoing dramatic change. We hope that our involvement will move the countries of the region toward the goals articulated by Secretary Rice: 

Security, opportunity and freedom. 

The trends in the region appear to be moving in these positive 

directions, and we will do all that we can to ensure they continue. 

And I think I would like to refer back to Representative 

Faleomavaega’s insertion of President Bush’s inaugural address, in 

which the President asserted that we are determined to support democracy and root out tyranny in the world. And I think if you look 

at our policy in Southeast Asia, we very much are doing that. And 

if you look at the case of Indonesia in particular, it is Exhibit A 

in the dramatic, positive force that democratization can do in a 

country. With that, I would like to close and open myself for questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. John follows:]

19

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC JOHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU

OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mister Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am very pleased to have this 

opportunity to speak to you about current U.S. interests and foreign policy priorities 

in Southeast Asia. This Administration is working aggressively to take advantage 

of significant opportunities to advance American interests in the region. Our goals 

are clear: we want to see a Southeast Asia that is a partner in the promotion of 

democracy and human rights and an engine of economic growth; a group of nations 

whose varied ethnic and religious groups live together and flourish in peace; countries that cooperate fully with us in battling the evils of terrorism, proliferation, and 

infectious diseases; and a region where the United States plays a positive role, in 

harmony with other powers. 

There can be little doubt that Southeast Asia is—and will remain—of the greatest 

importance to the United States. The region’s combined gross domestic product is 

over $750 billion and is growing quickly. U.S. two-way trade with the states of 

Southeast Asia totaled over $136 billion in 2004 and continues to grow. Home to 

over five hundred million people, Southeast Asia is a multi-billion dollar market for 

U.S. agricultural products and supports, directly and indirectly, millions of American jobs in all sectors of our economy. It is the fifth largest market for U.S. exports. 

U.S. direct investment in the area reached over $90 billion in 2003. 

In addition to its economic importance, Southeast Asia holds great strategic importance to our national interests. It sits astride the sea routes from the Persian 

Gulf and Indian Ocean to the Pacific, through which much of the world’s trade and 

energy shipments flow and through which our assistance to numerous other friends 

and allies passes. Our interests in the region are bolstered as well by the presence 

of two of our treaty allies—Thailand and the Philippines—and a free trade partner—Singapore. 

Achieving our goals in the region will require intensive, active engagement at all 

levels. Fortunately, there are some positive trends that present us with significant 

opportunities to move forward, and we are doing all we can to take advantage of 

them. 

SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY

The most important and encouraging trend in recent years has been the strengthening of democracy. In the last few years, elections have taken place not only in 

established democracies—the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand—but also in 

newly democratized Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, 

and in East Timor, a new nation and new democracy. As democracy has taken on 

deeper roots, it has brought with it an enhanced respect for civil society and the 

rule of law. 

INCREASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND GREATER PROSPERITY

Concurrent with the spread of democracy, prosperity is growing throughout the 

region. Regional economies are moving toward greater economic openness, lower 

trade barriers, and regional integration. Income levels have climbed, and extreme 

poverty has generally declined. Southeast Asian nations are looking increasingly beyond their borders for markets, investment capital, higher education, and ideas. 

INCREASED REGIONAL COOPERATION

We are also seeing policies and initiatives to expand regional integration. This is 

happening politically, economically, and culturally, both bilaterally and through the 

region’s major institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 

INCREASED SECURITY AND STABILITY

Southeast Asia is an area largely at peace. The region has not seen a single major 

military conflict for more than 25 years. There has been widespread rejection of terrorism, and we are working effectively with governments to enhance our mutual security. With some notable exceptions, governments and people have recognized the 

advantage of resolving differences through dialogue and the ballot box and of maintaining political stability as an essential ingredient of economic prosperity. 

INCREASED ATTENTION TO GLOBAL ISSUES

We are also seeing increased attention paid to global issues. Encouraged by U.S. 

leadership and with our cooperation, governments throughout the region are beginning to work to combat human trafficking, environmental degradation, infectious 

20

diseases, narcotics trafficking, and international crime, while advancing human 

rights and religious freedom. 

Challenges 

In emphasizing these positive trends and opportunities, I don’t want to minimize 

the challenges, including the continuing danger of terrorism, the negative trends in 

Burma, and the risk of the spread of infectious diseases, most notably avian influenza. 

Terrorism 

Although Southeast Asia has generally rejected the extremist forms of Islam that 

spawn terrorists, our challenge remains to root out all vestiges of this menace. 

There is a growing realization throughout the region that terrorism threatens all 

governments and that the best way to confront this threat is by working together. 

Regional capacity building and cooperation offers us the opportunity to find the terrorists wherever they hide and bring them to justice. 

Burma 

One country of the region stands out as moving in a direction antithetical to our 

interests: Burma. The Burmese regime remains exceptionally repressive and is becoming even harsher in its treatment of its people. Burma’s failure to cooperate with 

the international community is reprehensible. The regime has set back international 

efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to a population that is in dire need. 

We continue to look for ways to put the deteriorating situation there before the 

international community, including within the UN system. In June, we raised 

Burma during Security Council consultations under ‘‘other matters.’’ The United 

Kingdom, France, Greece, Denmark and Romania supported this effort. We are also 

working with our partners to support efforts to place Burma on next month’s Security Council agenda. Burma’s junta must take steps that allow the international 

community to put relations on a normal footing, such as bringing its deplorable 

human rights practices into conformity with international standards. 

We remain deeply concerned about the safety and welfare of Aung San Suu Kyi 

and other political prisoners. We continue to press the Burmese leadership to release them immediately and unconditionally and to engage the democratic opposition and ethnic minority political groups in a meaningful dialogue. We are working 

tirelessly with our partners to help the Burmese people achieve genuine national 

reconciliation and democracy in Burma. 

PANDEMIC DISEASE AND HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA

As we strengthen our commitments to fighting malaria and AIDS, we must also 

prepare for new threats to public health such as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 

(HPAI). I’m sure you are well aware that humans have died in countries of the region after contracting HPAI from birds and that the mortality rate is unusually 

high. HPAI has already devastated the poultry industry in the affected countries. 

If left unchallenged, this virus could become the first pandemic of the 21st century. 

President Bush announced a new International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza at the United Nations General Assembly meeting earlier this 

month aimed at enhancing preparedness, prevention, response, and containment activities. The Partnership will improve global readiness by elevating the issue on national agendas; coordinating efforts among donor and affected nations; mobilizing 

and leveraging resources; increasing transparency in disease reporting and surveillance; and building capacity to identify, contain, and respond to a pandemic influenza. We are asking affected and at-risk countries to strive for cooperation across 

sectors and ministries and with international health organizations to prevent an influenza pandemic and to mitigate its effects should one occur. We are asking potential donor countries to coordinate their activities to most effectively make use of limited resources and avoid duplication. We are urging all countries to place influenza 

pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response as high priorities. 

Many nations have already joined this partnership, including Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 

CHINA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

An important factor for the U.S. in Southeast Asia is the influence of China in 

the region. China’s rapid economic development over the past two decades has 

brought new opportunities and challenges to the countries of Southeast Asia. While 

most have benefited from the expanded trade and investment opportunities that 

China’s growing economy represents—China’s trade with ASEAN grew 30% last 

year alone—there has been considerable debate in Asia over how China’s economic 

21

rise will change the political landscape in the region. China has focused on developing robust trade and investment relationships in the region to fuel its own domestic development. At the same time, China is also clearly interested in matching its 

economic power with political influence, thereby giving it an opportunity to advance 

its own interests in the region. Our goal is to help China increasingly identify these 

interests in ways that support and advance U.S. objectives. Deputy Secretary 

Zoellick is doing just that in his ongoing Senior Dialogue, established by agreement 

between the President and President Hu at APEC last year. U/S Dobriansky’s Global Issues Forum also seeks to respond to China’s emergence as a global player by 

demonstrating cooperation on a host of transnational issues. It is important to remember in this context that America’s role in the region has increased at the same 

time China has sought to invest further in Southeast Asia. We play, and will continue to play, an essential role in the region, built on our alliance relationships, our 

active participation in ASEAN and APEC fora, and the access we provide to our 

open and transparent markets that helps drive both China’s and the region’s economies. 

ACHIEVING OUR POLICY GOALS IN THE REGION

Earlier this year, Secretary Rice articulated our goals in the region: security, opportunity, freedom. Against this backdrop of favorable trends and challenging 

issues, we seek to promote policies to achieve the Secretary’s goals through strong 

multilateral and bilateral engagement. 

MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

Our challenge is to open markets, facilitate trade, promote transparency, and 

fight corruption. We have reached out bilaterally to the dynamic economies of the 

region and are working effectively through APEC and other regional multilateral 

fora to create opportunities for American business and enhance the prosperity of the 

region. 

ASEAN 

All Southeast Asian countries except the newly founded East Timor are members 

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN. Strengthening relations 

with ASEAN is of vital importance to the United States because ASEAN serves as 

a force to promote stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Through 

ASEAN, neighboring countries—diverse and sometimes with historical tensions—

are joined together with the common aim of achieving peace, stability, democracy, 

and prosperity in the region. The United States has a strong national interest in 

working with ASEAN. We are cooperating to advance our common interests across 

a full range of economic, political, and security issues, including tackling 

transnational problems such as terrorism, infectious diseases like Avian Flu and 

HIV/AIDS, trafficking in persons, and narcotics trafficking. In addition, since October 2002 we have been working under President Bush’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative to enhance our economic ties with ASEAN. 

One area in which we would like to see greater ASEAN effectiveness, though, is 

Burma. Our view, frankly, is that ASEAN has not done all it could or should to promote democracy. We have worked with ASEAN members to promote democracy in 

Burma, and we felt ASEAN made the right decision by having Burma relinquish 

its turn to be the Chair of ASEAN in 2006–2007. More needs to be done, however. 

We will build on our solid relations over the next year to develop a comprehensive 

Enhanced Partnership with ASEAN. This Partnership was proposed by ASEAN last 

June because they too are interested in putting their relations with us on a par with 

their relations with China, Japan, Korea, and India. More specific elements of the 

Enhanced Partnership are now being developed. 

APEC 

The United States is a leader in APEC, a forum that brings together 21 economies 

from both sides of the Pacific, including the Southeast Asian nations of Thailand, 

the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei. Since 

APEC’s founding in 1989, its work has focused on expanding trade, investment, 

growth, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Support for trade liberalization 

by advancing progress in the WTO Doha Development Agenda continues to be the 

top U.S. goal in APEC in 2005. The June meeting of APEC trade ministers and the 

September meeting of APEC finance ministers both gave the process a good push, 

and this year’s APEC meetings are timed perfectly for APEC to continue to lend 

its weight to this cause. APEC Leaders and Ministers, when they meet in November, can help pave the path to a successful WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong. 

22

U.S. business executives routinely list piracy of intellectual property as one of the 

greatest challenges their companies face. In response to this concern, the United 

States has also made Intellectual Property Rights a major goal in APEC for 2005. 

Protecting the public from fraud and often even physical harm caused by counterfeit 

or pirated goods is increasingly seen as a security goal as well. 

Recent tragic events have led the APEC leaders to recognize that there can be 

no prosperity without security. They have dedicated APEC not only to promoting 

the prosperity of the APEC economies, but also to ensuring the security of people 

in the APEC region. The United States is pursuing security initiatives in the context of APEC ranging from counter-terrorism and non-proliferation to pandemic and 

disaster preparedness. 

ASEAN Regional Forum 

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only multilateral institution in the 

Asia-Pacific region that is devoted solely to security issues. ASEAN created the ARF 

and remains its driving force. The United States was a founding member and remains deeply involved. U.S. participation in the ARF is both an opportunity to articulate and pursue our security interests and a mode of engagement with ASEAN. 

The ARF is becoming an increasingly active and vital body with a stronger institutional character and a deeper level of engagement in important security issues 

such as maritime security, nonproliferation of WMD, peace arrangements and 

counterterrorism. This year, the U.S. has a chance to demonstrate its continued 

ARF commitment and engagement when it co-chairs, with the Philippines, the 

ARF’s main working-level gathering, the Inter-sessional Support Group. We are preparing to host a meeting of this group in Honolulu in mid-October and hope to use 

this opportunity to promote cooperation in areas like Avian Influenza and to press 

for a greater focus on concrete results from ARF events. 

ARF participants are increasingly willing to look at sensitive issues of importance 

to the United States, as evidenced by ARF approval of a U.S.-sponsored seminar on 

missile defense that will be held in Bangkok, Thailand, October 6–7. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker will lead the interagency U.S. delegation to this 

event, which aims to highlight the threat of missile proliferation and the contribution missile defense can make to counter that threat. 

I should note here that at its 12th Meeting in Vientiane, Laos, this past July, 

ARF accepted East Timor as its 25th member. We welcome this development, which 

we view as another sign of East Timor’s increasing integration into the region and 

the international community. 

Regional Security 

The Southeast Asia region continues to be an attractive theater of operations for 

al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu 

Sayyaf Group. Because terrorism in Southeast Asia is a regional problem, we are 

working regionally, as well as bilaterally, to support counterterrorism training and 

intergovernmental cooperation. The ASEAN community has vigorously supported 

expansion of regional counterterrorism capacities as envisioned in the 2001 ASEAN 

Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, and the U.S.-ASEAN 

Counterterrorism Work Plan is the blueprint for U.S. engagement on this effort. 

ASEAN members have reached out to neighboring countries to expand cooperation 

in areas of information exchange and law enforcement cooperation, as well as increasing counterterrorism finance and law enforcement capacity-building efforts 

through training and education. At a meeting with ASEAN Senior Officials in June, 

we agreed on a series of steps to move forward with practical implementation of the 

U.S.-ASEAN Counterterrorism Work Plan. Through centers like the Southeast Asia 

Regional Center for Counterterrorism in Malaysia and the U.S.-Thailand International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, we cooperate by supporting 

counterterrorism training for law enforcement officers throughout the region. Recently established as a joint project by Australia and Indonesia, the Jakarta Center 

for Law Enforcement Cooperation presents another valuable venue for cooperative 

capacity building in the region. 

Numerous U.S. cooperative initiatives in the region aim to improve education systems, increase employment opportunities, and enhance understanding of U.S. policies and objectives. Throughout Southeast Asia our Embassies are expanding cultural outreach and exchange programs, frequently focusing on moderate Muslim 

groups and organizations to reduce alienation and anti-U.S. attitudes. Similarly, police training programs and support for structural reforms aim to reduce the incidence of police corruption and the consequent public disillusion and lack of support 

for national law enforcement efforts. Our ultimate goal is a significant degradation 

of terrorist capabilities, elimination of sanctuaries, institutionalized regional coVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:30 Jan 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092105\23608.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
23

operation, effective legal systems, and progress on contributing factors, including 

poverty and limited employment prospects, poor education, and corruption. 

We are also continuing to look for ways to help regional states that have sovereign responsibilities for ensuring security of the vital Strait of Malacca trade route 

to enhance their maritime law enforcement capabilities and cooperation. 

BILATERAL

In parallel with out multilateral engagement efforts, we are advancing our bilateral ties with the countries in the region. 

NEW OPPORTUNITIES

Indonesia 

We have a remarkable window of opportunity with Indonesia. In the seven years 

since authoritarian President Suharto resigned, Indonesia has undergone a democratic transformation. It is the world’s third largest democracy and the largest majority Muslim country, with more people of Islamic faith than Egypt, Iran, Iraq and 

Saudi Arabia combined. Last year, an estimated 60 percent of eligible voters directly 

elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who seeks to reform and modernize 

Indonesia’s government institutions, fight systemic corruption, and reduce poverty. 

We have established a productive dialogue under our bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. President Yudhoyono has recognized the need to make 

changes necessary to attract foreign direct investment to partner in development of 

infrastructure projects and fuel needed economic growth. President Yudhoyono is 

committed to military reform, including increasing civilian control over the military, 

and improving budget transparency. President Yudhyono’s administration has also 

signed an historic peace agreement that we hope will end the longstanding conflict 

in Aceh. 

There is no question that President Yudhoyono is leading a new era in Indonesia, 

one that promises to separate Indonesia from its repressive past. This does not 

mean, however, that challenges do not remain. As our 2004 Human Rights Report 

indicates, Indonesia’s human rights record has been poor, and there is much to be 

done, particularly in the area of accountability for abuses committed by members 

of the security services. But we cannot overlook the flourishing of democracy. We 

now have an opportunity to resolve—not ignore—our differences with Indonesia, 

while strengthening our partnership with this tremendously important and dynamic 

country. 

Malaysia 

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has described U.S.-Malaysian relations as ‘‘the 

best they have ever been,’’ and we are confident that they will improve even further 

in the years ahead. Prime Minister Abdullah has pledged a more open, consultative 

style of government, free from the strident anti-Western rhetoric of his predecessor. 

He has articulated a modern and tolerant vision of Islam—Islam Hadhari (literally 

‘‘civilizational Islam’’) that helps shape Malaysia’s domestic and foreign policies. Malaysia currently chairs the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and we look forward to working with Malaysia to build mutual understanding between Islamic 

communities and Western cultures. Malaysia has recently shown an increased willingness to work with its neighbors to provide air patrols of the critical Malacca 

Strait. We welcome this move and look forward to working with Malaysia on this 

effort and other cooperative efforts to improve regional security and nonproliferation. 

STRENGTHENING OF ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

President Bush has emphasized the strengthening and revitalization of alliances, 

and in East Asia, alliance sustenance is work that is never complete. The ties we 

have with our two key allies—The Philippines and Thailand—and one key partner—

Singapore—have been improved significantly since 2001, but the challenge of continuing this progress will occupy us in the coming years. 

The Philippines 

We continue to strengthen our bilateral ties with the Philippines, particularly in 

the Global War on Terrorism. The Philippines was among the first coalition partners to send forces to Iraq, and in 2003 we designated it a Major Non-NATO Ally. 

While we were disappointed at its subsequent withdrawal from Iraq, our alliance 

remains strong, and we continue to cooperate on a broad range of issues. We are 

supporting the ongoing Mindanao peace process between the Philippines government and Muslim insurgents, particularly through USAID programs designed to 

24

make Mindanao a welcoming place for development and investment, not terrorists. 

We have also offered the support of the U.S. Institute for Peace to assist the peace 

process. We are strengthening our defense ties through the jointly funded Philippine 

Defense Reform program, a comprehensive multi-year effort designed to enhance the 

capabilities of the Philippine armed forces. President Arroyo’s recent impeachment 

hearings prove that much more must be done to promote good governance and 

transparency. We are working together in multilateral fora such as the UN, where 

just last week the Security Council—under Philippine chairmanship—unanimously 

adopted UNSCR 1624 against the incitement of terrorism. We also look forward to 

working closely with the Philippines when it assumes the Chairmanship of ASEAN 

in 2006. 

We have a significant trade and investment relationship with the Philippines, and 

its economic growth of 5–6% in recent years has been a bright spot. However, the 

Philippines faces some major economic challenges. To achieve fiscal sustainability, 

it must modernize its tax and customs bureaucracies and undertake effective anticorruption measures. The Philippines imports over 90 percent of its oil, and higher 

oil prices mean higher inflation as well as constraints on GDP growth and job creation. Rising interest rates on its large debt stock signal further challenges ahead 

on the financial and fiscal front. 

To help meet these challenges, in addition to our USAID programs we are initiating further concrete engagement on anti-corruption efforts and fiscal reform 

through the Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Program. Through 

our bilateral Trade and Investment Council, we have also encouraged the Philippines to liberalize trade. 

The Philippines is an Intellectual Property Rights Priority Watch List country, 

and we have intensified our work with them in strengthening Intellectual Property 

Rights enforcement. The Philippine government has shown leadership and taken a 

more activist approach on Intellectual Property Rights issues by increasing the 

number of raids on pirating operations and retail outlets. However, progress on arrests and prosecutions remains difficult because of serious bottlenecks in the judicial 

sector, which they are also attempting to address. 

Thailand 

We have steadily strengthened our bilateral relationship with Thailand over the 

past several years. In the war against terrorism, Thailand has also been a staunch 

partner and ally, contributing troops to coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Thailand hosts Cobra Gold, our largest multi-national military exercise in Asia, and 

provides crucial access to its facilities, including allowing the U.S. Government to 

use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for regional relief operations in response 

to the December 26, 2004 tsunami that devastated the region. The President has 

designated Thailand, too, as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Our economic and trade relationship grows stronger every day. We are negotiating a Free Trade Agreement and, 

on September 19, signed an Open Skies Agreement to liberalize passenger air travel 

between our countries. With respect to the situation in Southern Thailand, we continue to closely follow the violence and other developments in that region. We are 

encouraged by the work of the National Reconciliation Commission and their efforts 

to protect human rights. 

One issue on which we disagree is our policy toward Burma. Thailand’s continuing engagement strategy with Burma has achieved little progress in addressing 

Burma’s narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, cross-border migration, and 

other issues. We will continue to press the Thai to use their influence with the junta 

to push for positive change. 

Singapore 

President Bush and Singapore Prime Minister Lee signed a bilateral Strategic 

Framework Agreement in July, reflecting our shared desire to address such threats 

as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Though not a 

treaty ally, Singapore is a strong supporter of a continued U.S. security presence 

in Southeast Asia, which it sees as a prerequisite to continued regional stability. 

The Strategic Framework Agreement builds upon and expands a robust, wide-ranging security and economic partnership between our nations, also reflected in the 

U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, our first in Southeast Asia. In the year after 

the FTA took effect in January 2004, U.S. exports to Singapore increased 18%. In 

fact, the value of U.S. exports to Singapore, which has a population of only 4 million, total more than half that of our exports to China. Our relationship with Singapore is among our most productive in all of Asia; we share many strategic perspectives and have very successfully turned this shared vision into practical, concrete 

achievements. Singapore’s contribution to the Global War on Terror through its 

25

military forces in Iraq is further evidence of our shared strategic perspective and 

close cooperation. 

PROMOTING CLOSER TIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION

Vietnam 

Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai’s visit to Washington in June and his 

meeting with President Bush were the culmination of a decade-long effort to increase bilateral understanding and cooperation. We now share a robust $6.4 billion 

trade relationship with Vietnam, good cooperation in achieving the fullest possible 

accounting for Americans missing from the Vietnam War, increasing educational 

and cultural exchanges, and an expanding mutual effort to combat trade in illicit 

narcotics. We have also concluded an International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) agreement, which reflects Vietnam’s decision to establish closer defense ties 

with the United States. The United States supports Vietnam’s WTO accession on 

the basis of sound commercial terms and full implementation of WTO rules and obligations. We remain concerned over the Government’s poor human rights record, specifically in the area of international religious freedom. The last U.S.-Vietnam 

Human Rights Dialogue was held in 2002, but the U.S. Government refused for over 

two years to schedule another round of dialogue because of the Government of Vietnam’s failure to make tangible progress. However, recent positive steps by the Government of Vietnam have led to scheduling a new round of dialogue, tentatively in 

the fall of 2005. Vietnam is also emerging as a regional player, a role that will be 

increasingly important to U.S. interests in East Asia in the coming years. 

Cambodia 

We have enjoyed excellent cooperation with Cambodia in combating terrorism and 

in achieving the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing from the Vietnam 

War. We have serious human rights and democracy concerns, but continue to press 

for positive change. We urge the Government to strengthen Cambodia’s democratic 

institutions, fight corruption, and respect basic human rights. 

Laos 

We enjoy good cooperation with the Lao in achieving the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing from the Vietnam War and seek new areas of engagement in connection with our Bilateral Trade Agreement. We continue to call on Laos 

to improve its respect for internationally recognized human rights, particularly visa`-vis its ethnic minority populations. 

Brunei 

Despite its small size, Brunei has been a valuable partner in promoting regional 

peace and stability. Its armed forces helped deliver relief to Aceh in the wake of 

last year’s tsunami, and Brunei contributed to the international monitoring team in 

the Philippine island of Mindanao. Our militaries cooperate closely in exercises, and 

we share an interest in expanding economic opportunity and prosperity through free 

trade. We continue to work under our 2001 bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement to improve our economic relationship. 

East Timor 

East Timor is a strong supporter and friend of the United States, which remains 

one of the new nation’s largest bilateral donors—almost $25 million in total assistance in FY2004. Our strategic objective is to help assist East Timor in becoming 

a stable, prosperous, and vibrant democracy. 

Tsunami Relief 

I have reserved for last the dramatic refocusing of American attention on the region as a result of the tsunami disaster of December 26, compounded by the massive 

earthquake of March 28 that caused further destruction in Indonesia. Drawing upon 

the $656 million that the Congress has appropriated for the Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Fund, we have supported and continue to support reconstruction efforts. These include rebuilding damaged infrastructure, such as the reconstruction 

of up to 240 kilometers of road and 110 bridges to re-open the Banda AcehMeulaboh road and facilities at the Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh. We cannot yet predict the long-term impact our humanitarian assistance will have on our 

relations with the affected countries and their neighbors, but our response was massive, and we can look back on this as one of the proudest moments of our history. 

We will continue to work closely with the countries concerned and the international 

community on long-term reconstruction assistance. 

26

CONCLUSION

As I said at the beginning, Southeast Asia is undergoing dramatic change. We 

hope that our involvement will move the countries of the region toward the goals 

articulated by Secretary Rice: security, opportunity, freedom. We would like to see 

in the region sustained economic growth, advancement toward full democracy and 

respect for human rights, and cooperation in counterterrorism and nonproliferation. 

And we would like all of the Southeast Asian governments to do what some are already doing—allowing a varied tapestry of ethnicities and religions to flourish and 

prosper within their national borders. The trends in the region appear to be moving 

in these positive directions, and we will do all we can to ensure they continue.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and I 

might note for the record that you have a very short but distinguished background in the United States foreign service, and we 

are pleased that you are appearing before us. As a fellow midwesterner, I think that is very appropriate. 

Let me, though, move to what I think the world is becoming increasingly concerned about, and this is disease. Coughs may be 

more dangerous than missiles. 

How prepared are we, how prepared is Southeast Asia, what 

interrelationships are we having? How many countries have now 

had any individuals that have died of the avian flu? And what is 

their numbers at this point in time? 

Mr. JOHN. I will focus on a lot of that in generalities and I think 

I would like to get back to you with specific numbers to answer the 

detailed part of the questions. But the most important issue I 

would like to convey, is that the President himself is very much engaged on this issue and sees it as a very potentially significant 

threat to the United States as well as United States interests in 

Southeast Asia. 

The Administration has put together an interagency group that 

is being coordinated by Under Secretary of State Dobriansky, 

which is looking at pulling together the international effort that is 

needed to counter avian influenza. The President, as I noted, announced last week a global initiative to fight the disease. And we 

are working also through APEC to fight the disease. 

Indonesia. Yesterday, the President announced a very serious effort to move forward. They have suffered already potentially five 

deaths related to avian influenza. 

The details of the program, I would prefer to answer—we can 

take a written question and answer to that. But it is one that we 

do remain engaged on and are taking very seriously. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. ERIC JOHN TO QUESTION ASKED DURING

THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH

According to the WHO, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have had 

cases of human deaths due to avian influenza. Four people have died in Cambodia, 

three people have died in Indonesia, twelve people have died in Thailand, and fortyone people have died in Vietnam.

Mr. LEACH. All I can say is that when we look at the natural disaster that we have just gone through, which I consider to be a 

major foreign policy blow for the United States of America, the 

issue of contingency planning really comes to the fore. And I do not 

have a sense of great contingency planning if this disease starts to 

spread rapidly. And I think that if I were to have any advice to the 

27

Executive Branch today, it would be that contingency planning has 

got to be put on place in a massive scale. 

Let me just turn to one other, what I consider to be a kind of 

macro foreign policy circumstance. 

Arguably, the United States is the only superpower, arguably we 

have an emerging superpower in China. And it may be a superpower today. It looks to me as if we have two contrasting foreign 

policies, the great democracy in the world is emphasizing international relations politics. That is political issues, and the great 

nondemocracy that is the emerging superpower is emphasizing economics. 

As you put these two models together, we, the ‘‘Great Democracy,’’ appear to be putting weight on a series of issues that is diminishing our respect in the world. And China is putting weight 

on economics, which appears to be increasing their strength in 

international relations. 

If this is the case, do we not want to go through some self-assessment of the priorities we are giving in our foreign policy? And I 

would like to hear your comments on that. 

Mr. JOHN. Sure, and I would speak to how we and China, I hesitate to say, compete for interest. But to focus your question on 

Southeast Asia and the region of Southeast Asia, China—and I 

agree, I think that China has made major economic gains over the 

last 2 decades; if you look at just last year alone, China’s trade 

with the ASEAN nations grew 30 percent—the positive side of that 

is that China’s economic engagement has actually helped the 

economies of most Southeast Asian nations. As China’s economy 

grows, it offers other opportunities, greater enhanced opportunities 

to Southeast Asian nations. 

When I am in the region, I believe that Southeast Asians, both 

the governments and the people, see the United States in a very 

different light than they see China, that although they recognize 

that China is very engaged economically, that the interests that 

guide a person’s daily life of freedom of expression, freedom of 

movement, democratization, are best exemplified by the United 

States. We would like to be engaged more. I think it is very difficult to compete with China on the level of engagement sheerly by 

the geographic distance that we face. 

But if you look at how Southeast Asians and their governments 

see us, I still believe that the United States offers a very different 

model, and one that appeals still much more to the people of Southeast Asia than that of China. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, in conclusion, what you say is a model, of 

course, that is correct. As a foreign policy set of initiatives, I am 

impressed that the emphasis in economics has increased China’s 

political influence and our emphasis in politics may have decreased 

our economic influence, which is a really odd set of juxtapositions. 

In any regard, I would just like to conclude with a reference to 

the tsunami where the American response was so profoundly appropriate and extraordinary, and expressed from a Committee’s 

point of view, that my appreciation for—and I think I am confident 

of the Committee’s appreciation for the support of Southeast Asian 

countries to our dilemma related to our hurricane. We may have 

another one today. And so things are awkward in terms of natural 

28

disasters. But this conjunction of manmade and natural disasters 

in terms of how we in the world community, and the United States 

in particular, deals with our issues that, I think, will be decades 

in analysis. And it is going to be very interesting to see how societies rise or don’t perfectly rise to the occasion. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

Secretary John for his statement, and certainly very comprehensive 

understanding also, the situation here in Southeast Asia. 

I just wanted to ask Secretary John about our situation where 

Myanmar, or Burma, I believe we currently have as our matter of 

stated policy of putting economic sanctions against Burma along 

with the European allies, yet on the other side of the coin, China, 

I think, exports some $1 billion worth of gas and economic aid to 

Burma, along with other countries that are investing in Burma like 

China, India, and other members of ASEAN. Every year, China 

gives about $200 million in economic aid to the Burmese military 

regime. And I believe some 60 percent of the Burmese economy is 

controlled by China. 

So, how effective are economic sanctions, given the fact that our 

own allies are the ones giving blood, or, continuation of this military regime to function economically and with whatever they are 

doing right now? 

And I just wanted to ask, what is the Administration’s policy 

given the fact it appears, in my humble opinion, that we have 

failed in this economic sanctions policy? 

And yet, Burma is, I believe, a member of ASEAN, with all the 

rights and privileges as a fellow member ASEAN among the 

ASEAN countries. So we have in place an economic sanctions policy. In my humble opinion, it has not been very successful. So 

where do we go from here? 

Mr. JOHN. Well, I would agree that, by any measure, you know, 

Burma is not heading in the right direction. I think that one country you left off the list was Thailand as well, which has followed 

a policy of constructive engagement with Burma, which I think I 

would call an oxymoron. You can’t constructively engage the regime 

in Burma. 

And it is unfortunate that other nations have such strong economic and other ties to Burma. It presents a very serious threat 

to the region. It is the drug-running, the human trafficking, not to 

mention the very severe oppression of its own people. 

I would hesitate to say, though, that sanctions should be dropped 

simply because the SPDC has continued to oppress its people. I believe that we are looking at options again to further strengthen 

those sanctions, at working with international partners to make 

that—to make our policy—to make a more effective international 

policy, working with the UN Security Council this week. And it is 

something that—I have only been here for 3 months, unfortunately, 

but it is something I am very focused on in terms of moving forward. I would very much like to continue consulting with this Subcommittee as we do that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have mentioned earlier about the upcoming economic summit that is going to be held in December and the 

fact that we are being snubbed and not being invited to be a member, even given the fact that we are the largest economic and miliVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:30 Jan 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\092105\23608.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
29

tary power throughout the whole Asian-Pacific region, and we are 

not being invited to this summit. 

What is the Administration’s position on this? I hinted earlier, 

well we don’t care. Are we not that important, even though China 

and Japan and other major economic powers are invited among the 

Asian countries, but we are not? 

Is the Administration taking this to heart? Or maybe it is just 

not that important for us to consider seriously. This summit, it has 

substance, or is this a matter of form? 

Mr. JOHN. Well, it is a question we get all the time, which is, 

what is our policy on the East Asian Summit? And quite frankly, 

we haven’t determined a policy because the East Asian Summit is 

really, as you look at it, just a black box. Nobody knows what the 

East Asian Summit is other than leaders coming together. We don’t 

know if it is to discuss security issues, economic issues, we don’t 

know the direction of it. What we are doing in the absence of those 

key facts is working with allies in the region, working with other 

partners in the region to try and determine first of all, what the 

East Asian Summit is, continue to observe and then once we figure 

out what it is, then we move on to determine what our policy would 

be toward the EAS. 

Putting the EAS aside though, I would submit that the other 

multi-lateral fora, which we are engaging, are quite effective, the 

ASEAN regional forum, APEC, these cover security and economic 

issues. And we are very much engaged in those. And once EAS begins to take form, we will continue to study that and look at how 

we engage and what we want to do with the EAS. But until that 

time, it is—I would hesitate to push for an invitation to an organization when we don’t even know what it does. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think I join the Chairman in expressing 

the view that the greatest danger, enemy of the world today, is not 

guns and bullets, but disease and poverty and hunger and genocide, if you will, and natural disasters is what we are having to 

deal with. How committed is the Bush Administration in these 

areas? I know that we have made commitments about giving aid 

concerning AIDS and this very serious disease. Is this definitely 

part of the very high priority list of the Administration in these 

areas? 

Mr. JOHN. Very high priority. I think you covered a broad range 

of issues. We are engaged on all of those. I think, as I inadequately 

tried to describe our engagement on avian influenza, that is being 

operated at a very high level in the government and is being 

worked at, regardless of political ideology, with Southeast Asian 

countries, from Vietnam to China, Indonesia, and others. The poverty reduction, the threat of HIV and AIDS, we are looking, and 

again we are working those bilaterally and through multi-lateral 

and investing significant resources in that. 

And in terms of poverty reduction, which contributes significantly to the spread of disease—well, poverty contributes significantly to the presence and spread of disease. We are working very 

much with the partners in Indonesia, Philippines, others on programs both for eradicating poverty in certain regions as well as 

helping institute fiscal responsibility that allows the government to 

have an adequate budget to address health and education issues. 

30

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I don’t want to be redundant about the situation in Indonesia. The issues that I have raised were about Papua 

New Guinea. When Secretary Rice first appeared in our Committee, for the whole 5 minutes that I had my little piece to say, 

I wanted to raise with our Secretary of State the issue of West 

Papua. I will be happy to give you the copy of the dialog that I had 

with Secretary Rice, and I kind of thought that maybe she did take 

interest and concern about the issues that I raised with West 

Papua. And I certainly would appreciate if you could find out exactly what is the Bush Administration’s policy toward that. 

I know it is respecting the territorial integrity of Indonesia about 

this issue, but when you talk about human rights violations, when 

you talk about the acts of free choice, when you talk about the nonimplementation of the special autonomy law, it gets to real serious 

reasoning that, with all due respect to President SBY and his Government, there seems to be no action taken to this day by the Indonesian Government to address this very serious issue of the people 

of West Papua. You don’t need to respond, but I just wanted to 

pass that on to you. 

We talked about China earlier. I remember years ago I talked to 

a Chinese Ambassador about why China has full-fledged Embassies 

in the small island nations not only throughout the Pacific, but 

throughout other parts of the world. And the Ambassador’s response to me was, ‘‘Well, sir, we treat small nations and big nations alike. We don’t measure our attention to a country simply because of the numbers and economics. We feel that these people are 

just as important, whether your small island nation is 170,000 people or 300 million.’’

I just saw last night, news about the presence of Wal-Mart in 

China. Giving some calculation, they are looking at the fact that 

the Chinese are very intrigued and attracted to this concept of buying things in the store. And some calculation, if Wal-Mart gets 3 

percent of the market out of 1.3 people billion in China, there is 

about $20 billion in gross sales. So Wal-Mart plans to establish 90 

stores throughout China because of this tremendous—and I have 

always wanted to ask you, sir, there seems to be a conflicting idea, 

and I suppose this is even true within the Administration. My 

question is: Are we to treat China as a monster or as a partner? 

Mr. JOHN. I think we should treat China as a fact. It is a significant factor in Southeast Asia or throughout the world. I mean, I 

would hesitate to characterize China in terms of how we operate 

in Southeast Asia, the United States as either a threat or ally. It 

is just a very significant factor. I think a lot of Chinese interests 

run very much counter to what United States interests are. They 

are not there to promote democratization, they are not there to promote human rights, they are not there to promote freedom of expression and movement. On the other hand, as I noted earlier, they 

are there to engage economically. And as economies improve in 

Southeast Asia, so do the livelihoods of Southeast Asian people 

themselves. That is almost always a good thing. 

To move toward China, therefore, in Southeast Asia as either 

confronting it or using it as an ally is perhaps a bit too black and 

white. But you are going to find areas where you have common interests and push them forward, and you are going to have areas 

31

where you do not and where there are political conflicts between 

the two of us. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I have 

taken way beyond my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. LEACH. You may have a second round. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you 

might surmise by the remarks, there is a strong sentiment in Congress that the President of the United States should do something, 

perhaps do everything possible, to overthrow the dictatorship that 

now controls the people of Burma. And I would suggest that there 

would be considerable support in Congress for the United States to 

be supportive of resistance movements and the democratic opposition in Burma, and perhaps even supportive of covert operations 

designed to eliminate the stranglehold of the dictatorship Burma 

has on their people. 

I would note that the United States Government cannot do this 

on their own. I mean, we, the people of the United States, and the 

United States Government can do so much, but the people of 

Burma also have to actively involve themselves in overthrowing 

that dictatorship or it is not going to happen. 

And we called on especially the rank-and-file of the military in 

Burma to turn their guns in the opposite direction, away from the 

people, who are, after all, their families and their fellow citizens of 

Burma, and they should be turning their guns in the opposite direction on the dictators and gangsters that are raping that country. 

And perhaps they could join with Aung San Suu Kyi and do away 

with this monstrous dictatorship that has been holding Burma 

back. And I would hope that if they do that, that this Administration would be very supportive of any revolt against tyranny in 

Burma. And I would assure you there is lots of support in Congress 

for that, and there is lots—of course, the people of the United 

States would always be on the side of those who are struggling for 

democracy and freedom. 

That leads me to China, which is, of course, the unseen hand behind the dictatorship in Burma. The Chinese Government has—

and I think that in your testimony you do not differentiate something that we should think about. The difference between the people of China—what China is doing through its people economically 

is one thing, and the policies of the Chinese Government, which is 

still a Communist dictatorship, is another. And the Chinese dictatorship has armed the Burmese military, and they have—what 

they have done is they have taken these gangsters in Burma and, 

along with other countries, I might add, for example, like Laos and 

Cambodia, and armed the dictators and at the same time put those 

regimes in debt, which are being repaid by those regimes at the expense of their own people, expense of the people of Burma and Laos 

and Cambodia. 

So your comments about China, I appreciate some of the things 

you said, but I think that we have to be much more in opposition, 

and not just in competition, but in opposition, morally, to the effect 

the Chinese Government is having on Southeast Asia. 

Mr. JOHN. Right. Thank you. I think that is absolutely correct. 

As I tried to say, there are some areas where China’s work runs 

32

counter, directly counter, to our interests, and in the case of Burma 

runs very much counter to the interests of the Burmese people. I 

mean, I promised all the Members here that I and this Administration are going to work very hard on increasing our efforts to help 

bring about democratic change in Burma. It is something that my 

Bureau, the State Department, and the Administration are very 

much committed to. 

If you look at the—one of the cornerstones of the second term of 

this Administration, it is democratization. Just as on one hand we 

have what I would call Exhibit A on success in Indonesia, we have 

on the other hand Exhibit A of where it is not succeeding, and that 

is Burma. And I think you very correctly highlighted the strong 

need for work on that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Chinese are having a negative; in terms 

of the Chinese Government’s negative influence on these other 

countries, the United States, however, has been trying to engage 

Vietnam, and I do know that there was an agreement that the Vietnamese now were going to respect at least that one element of 

freedom, freedom of religion. How has that understanding worked 

out? Has there been any demonstrable progress? I, in fact, have 

heard that we have got problems in the Central Highlands with 

Protestants, the Christians in the Montagnard community being 

brutalized. 

Mr. JOHN. I served in Vietnam from 1999 to 2001 at the consulate in Ho Chi Minh City. I think if you look at the 10-year history of our relations, the last 5 years, religious freedom has improved. I would say we are far short of a goal, though, where there 

is absolute religious freedom for the Vietnamese to practice religion 

as they see fit. But what Vietnam needs to do, there are recent legislative changes in Vietnam, but they need to fully implement them 

so religious practitioners can practice freely. 

They have released a number of prominent religious prisoners including religious dissident Father Nguyen Van Ly, and they have 

begun to permit the registration and reopening of churches that 

had previously been closed. As you referred to on May 5th, the 

United States and Vietnam concluded an agreement on religious 

freedom that specifically commits the Government of Vietnam to 

fully implement its new legislation on religious practice, to render 

previous contradictory legislation obsolete, and make other specific 

improvements in religious freedom. As I said, we are not there yet 

on where Vietnam should be for religious freedom, but it is one 

that we are continuing to work on. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note that we are not there anywhere 

with Vietnam when it comes to any freedom. And religious freedom 

would be the easiest thing for them to reform, and I am looking 

very closely at that. The day that they permit religious broadcasting in Vietnam or major publication by religious entities in 

Vietnam, that will be the day that we know that they are committed to religious freedom, instead of just letting a few people out 

of jail who never should have been jailed in the first place or opening up churches that never should have been closed in the first 

place. 

So let us make sure that we hold them to a high standard because these are people’s lives, and these are the things that we 

33

cherish as a people of the United States, that make us the people 

of the United States, because we cherish freedom, freedom of religion and freedom of speech, et cetera. 

Thank you very much. And thank you for focusing so much and 

bragging so much, as you should, on the successes that we have 

had in Indonesia that, as Mr. Faleomavaega pointed out, has a 

very checkered background. That is a great success. It looks good. 

In Malaysia, again you have had a transfer of power peacefully; 

and another country that has a strong Islamic influence so that we 

can demonstrate to the world that democracy and Islam are not 

contradictory, another goal of this Administration. 

So thank you very much. It was very good testimony today. 

Mr. JOHN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LEACH. I am going to ask Mr. Faleomavaega if he has any 

questions in a second, but let me comment for just a minute on 

challenges that go beyond where we have political differences. 

The truly positive news on Vietnam is that Vietnam and the 

United States are developing closer relations. And we were at war 

three decades ago. It is actually an extraordinary model for North 

Korea that you can have better relations despite a past of war, and 

Vietnam symbolizes this. 

Burma is even a greater challenge. But there are human problems that exceed or overwhelm political differences. One that the 

United States responded to with great professionalism and great 

compassion and great care was the tsunami. We may have a disease tsunami. We don’t know. If we do have a disease tsunami with 

the avian flu, one of the areas the State Department is going to 

have to think through is, do we respond in different ways to 

Burma, and do we put aside certain differences to seek cooperation 

for the sake of the Burmese people, also for the sake of everybody 

else in the world, and whether it be directly through the United 

States or through China? 

And the extraordinary aspect of our China relations is that there 

are quite a number of areas of mutual self-interest, others of great 

challenge, and our challenge is to increase the mutual self-interest. 

But I think that is an area that we ought to be talking with China 

about vis-a-vis Burma. If they have greater influence there, if problems develop, how can educative and other efforts take place? But 

I think we are going to have to think through strategies in that regard unrelated to whether it be policy change or regime change 

that we might like or not, like in a particular country. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would be curious, Secretary John, I would be interested to 

know if the State Department can establish a list of known military regimes or dictatorships currently in existence in the world. I 

mean, we were able to destroy the axis of evil: Iran, Libya, North 

Korea, I believe. I would be very curious what countries in the 

world do have similar set-ups like Burma or Myanmar as we currently have. 

As the Chairman and my good friend from California had mentioned earlier, I put a little note here that diplomacy is full of contradictions. It appears, in my humble observation, that if it is not 

in our national interest, whether it be a government-to-government 

34

relationship with other nations, we don’t take much interest in it. 

And defining that national interest, whether it be security or economic, I believe those are probably the two basic issues that we 

would look on in defining how our relationship should be with that 

country. So it appears to me that the level of our attention, if you 

will, toward Burma is not in our national interest. So we just put 

economic sanctions, and has been the case for all these years, but 

never really seriously address other issues. 

As I recall years ago when we did confront the Foreign Minister 

of Thailand, I don’t know if it is the same Foreign Minister, his 

criticism of our policy toward Burma was, how are you going to get 

the people to know if we don’t engage the military regime in 

Burma even though, as it may, it be nondemocratic, just as we are 

currently engaging Musharraf, who committed a coup d’etat 

against a duly-elected President of Pakistan? As much as we have 

also patted ourselves on the back for getting rid of Saddam Hussein, yet completely on the other side of the coin, we are in bed 

with Musharraf, which led to all the evils and problems that we 

are now faced with, proliferation issues and nuclear weapons. 

So I do share the Chairman’s concern. I just wanted to ask—our 

colleague from New York wanted me to raise this issue with you—

that apparently our President met with the Prime Minister of Thailand in New York and wanted to know if there was any substance 

discussed concerning Burma, because it appears that Thailand also 

has a very direct interest or involvement with Burma. And I assume there was no public statements made as far as Burma is concerned in that light. Are you aware of anything? 

Mr. JOHN. The President hosted a bilateral meeting here in 

Washington on Monday with Prime Minister Thaksin from Thailand. The statement they made at the end of a meeting, the joint 

statement, called for democratization in Burma, and the two did 

address the issue of Burma. 

Going back to the first part of your question about whether we 

engage in Burma because it doesn’t seem to fit our national interests, I think I would say that Burma very much fits our national 

security interests probably in three areas: Security, economic, and, 

very important, the area of democratic principles, which is a very 

important national interest of the United States. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. We have been saying that for how many 

years now? 

Mr. JOHN. Well, as I note, I am personally committed to ramping 

up how we deal with Burma, and I think you will see that in this 

term of the Administration, we are working. Now, I am not going 

to promise that we are going to bring down the SPDC with a great 

action plan over the next 7 months or 12 months, but there is a 

determination to promote democratization there. And in terms of 

national security interests, disease, HIV, avian influenza very 

much affects our national security interest, and it is an area that 

we do want to seek maximum cooperation with neighbors of Burma 

and, as necessary, bilaterally in order to prevent that from affecting our interests. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again. 

35

Mr. LEACH. I would like to raise first a couple of refugee issues. 

The North Korea Human Rights Act contemplates resettlement of 

possible North Korean refugees in the United States as well as assistance elsewhere. I am aware that there are a number of North 

Koreans in Southeast Asia, and at the moment they have been directed to UNHCR instead of consideration of asylum under the 

North Korean Human Rights Act. Have you given consideration to 

implementing the law in this regard with regard to refugees in 

Southeast Asia? 

Mr. JOHN. The State Department and DHS, we are reviewing 

ways that North Korean refugees would have access to United 

States refugee admissions programs in a secure way that doesn’t 

heighten their vulnerability. Our concern is that USG involvement 

could increase their vulnerability by revealing their current locations or otherwise drawing attention to them. 

We are reaching out to governments in Southeast Asia and working with UNHCR in an effort to develop a mechanism to facilitate 

the applications of North Korean refugees, and the main concern 

of the United States is preventing the return to the DPRK of North 

Korean asylum seekers. The situation they face presents us with 

unique challenges. The international community has limited ability 

to access them because most of them are in China, and the PRC 

does not recognize them as refugees. Furthermore, UNHCR does 

not process North Korean refugees due to their eligibility for ROK 

citizenship. To date, North Koreans have not been referred to the 

United States for resettlement through this traditional channel. 

The UNHCR refers them to ROK for resettlement there. Last year 

through informal and under-the-radar arrangements, more than 

2,000 North Koreans reached the ROK. 

Initial indications are that governments hosting North Korean 

refugees have indicated they oppose direct United States-funded 

humanitarian assistance and U.S. refugee admissions programs on 

their territories. We believe that the primary reason for this reluctance is that these host countries believe that such a program 

would cause a magnet affect for more North Koreans to come to 

those countries. In addition, some of these governments have relationships with Pyongyang that they are unwilling to complicate by 

involving the United States Government in the movement of North 

Koreans. 

When we can access the refugees, we have to find a way of determining precisely who they are so we can address our serious national security concerns that come into play when admitting nationals from a state that sponsors terrorism, and we also are very 

happy to provide a classified briefing on this issue if you wish. 

Mr. LEACH. Fair enough. 

Let me turn to another subject. I understand there are about 

5,700 Hmong refugees in Thailand today that may be repatriated 

to Laos beginning almost immediately. Are you aware of this situation. Has the United States Government taken a position on this? 

Mr. JOHN. I was looking at that Monday and Tuesday. I think 

it first came to our attention on Monday. We immediately contacted the Embassy in Bangkok who worked with the Thai Government and international groups and international NGOs in Thailand. As of yesterday the information I have is that the group that 

36

you referred to is not about to be returned, and there is no movement to send them out. We will continue to monitor and, if necessary, weigh in with the Thai Government. 

Mr. LEACH. That is good news. 

One final question. A year or so ago, our Government proposed 

the establishment of a regional maritime security initiative for the 

Straits of Malacca. What is the status of that? 

Mr. JOHN. Last week, I believe it was last week, the Governments of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia started the program 

Eyes in the Sky, which is an aerial monitoring of the Malaccan 

Straits. And it is significant in the fact that this is the first time 

that these three nations have cooperated in a way to patrol the 

Straits of Malacca for primarily piracy, but there is the potential 

of terrorism. 

I can’t speak to the status of our involvement with that because 

I am not sure. In terms of the Eyes in the Sky program, that is 

just those three nations. We continue to work on ways that we can 

support the Malaccan Straits security working with the littoral 

straits. 

I would note Eyes in the Sky is still in its infant stages. It is 

something that needs a lot of improvement, but the significant step 

is the fact that they are working together, and it has actually literally taken off. 

Mr. LEACH. Good. Thank you very much. Let me thank you for 

your testimony, and we appreciate your views and your service. 

The Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(37)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this timely and important hearing to 

highlight the recent developments, trends, and U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. I am 

particularly interested in hearing the views of our witnesses today on democratization, security, Islamisation and human rights. I appreciate that you are also looking 

closely at the real risk that Southeast Asia is becoming part of the Chinese sphere 

of influence, at the expense of weakening American ties to the region. 

As Co-chairman of the Congressional Indonesia Caucus I have a keen interest in 

our bilateral relationship with Indonesia. The post-Tsunami relief and reconstruction afforded major new opportunities to strengthen our relationship with Indonesia 

and Thailand. We responded with a public and private mobilization of aid, and our 

military’s emergency role in the early post disaster period was greatly appreciated. 

Several months ago I was concerned about the inability of ASEAN to forge a policy on Burma. Yet, after growing political pressure from the ASEAN community and 

the international community—the Burmese Government relinquished the rotating 

ASEAN Chairmanship during the Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane. We must continue pressure on Rangoon to address human rights violations. I have joined with 

other members of Congress to support efforts to refer Burma to the UN Security 

Council. The UN General Assembly has passed 12 consecutive resolutions calling for 

the authorities in Burma to engage in ‘‘national reconciliation’’ and the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) has passed 13 consecutive resolutions calling for 

the ruling junta to cease its brutal human rights abuses. However, Burma’s military 

regime has refused to work with the Secretary General’s office, barring his envoy 

from entering the country since 2003; the junta has also barred the special 

rapporteur on human rights appointed by the Human Rights Commission. 

Burma has recruited more child soldiers than any other country in the world, destroyed over 2,500 villages in eastern Burma alone; Burma is the only country in 

history to be a target of sanctions as called for by International Labor Organization 

(a United Nations agency); the military regime uses rape as a weapon of war 

against its own citizens. The junta presents a threat to international peace and security that must be confronted by the United Nations Security Council. 

Last week, I—along with several other colleagues—sent a letter to President 

Bush, calling on the President to urge Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to 

end his support for Burma’s military government. While other ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have actively sought to 

increase pressure on Burma, the Thai government has become Southeast Asia’s 

chief supporter of the Burmese military dictatorship. In the months ahead I sincerely hope that ASEAN nations continue to put pressure on Burma as well as create a stronger dialogue with the Thai government. 

ASEAN must now look to the future and redouble efforts to strengthen legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks, as well as work towards the goal of integration. In fact, during their most recent meeting, the leaders of ASEAN discussed the 

importance of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and how the developed 

and economically stable Member Countries will play an integral role in providing 

the less developed Member Countries with bilateral technical assistance in order to 

facilitate the regional integration of ASEAN. 

Furthermore, I was pleased to see that issues of well-being and health are a major 

focus for the nations of ASEAN, who recently ‘‘. . . expressed [their] concern over 

the serious threat to human health posed by the evolving, unprecedented spread of 

avian influenza . . . and reaffirmed [their] commitment to developing national panVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:30 Jan 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092105\23608.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
38

demic influenza preparedness plans and implementing surveillance of human and 

avian influenza in order to provide an early warning of, and a timely response to 

outbreaks in poultry and in humans.’’ President Bush—during his September 14th 

address at the United Nations—announced the formal creation of the International 

Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, which will enhance medical readiness to contain—and more importantly, prevent—a global influenza pandemic. This 

announcement came hours before Indonesian health officials confirmed the fourth 

human death from bird flu. 

It is also my sincere hope that the United States will continue to directly engage 

the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations directly, and work on 

strengthening and expanding cooperation on counterterrorism and other 

transnational crime efforts, developing work plans to improve the exchange of information, build law-enforcement capacity, and protect land, sea, and air transport. 

Not only will these efforts help in combating the ruthless and murderous thugs who 

are bent on destroying the emerging democracies of Southeast Asia, but will also 

foster strong political will and cooperation. Already we have witnessed ASEAN 

Members reaching out and expanding cooperation in areas of information exchange, 

and law enforcement capacity-building efforts through training and education. 

As we have all witnessed—especially in the wake of Hurricane Katrina—there has 

been increased speculation and concern over the impact of the rising oil prices, and 

this poses a significant challenge to the region of Southeast Asia—and no where is 

this more evident than the country of Indonesia, where oil subsidies have increased 

to over one-fourth of the Government’s 2005 budget. In fact—this year alone—the 

Indonesian Rupiah has lost more than 5% of its value, and is currently at its lowest 

level since March 2002. While the potential cutting of the fuel subsidy in Indonesia 

remains a major hurdle, I am positive that President Yudhoyono will carefully balance the economic concerns of the government with the needs of the country’s poorest citizens. 

Along those same lines, as the Co-Founder and Co-Chairman of the Congressional 

Indonesia Caucus, I wish to comment briefly on my observations with regards to the 

world’s largest Muslim country, and third largest democracy. As you are well aware, 

Indonesia has embarked on a dramatic transition to democratic governance over the 

past six years, culminating in the country’s first directly-elected President. Indonesia serves as a role model for democracies throughout the world. Economic growth 

and political reforms can and must occur in tandem. More foreign investment in this 

resource-rich country—with a population of 230 million—will not only create new 

employment opportunities, but it will also help improve the standard of living for 

many Indonesians. And, as you can imagine, the positive role that U.S. foreign policy, business and investment can play is enormous. 

Furthermore, I was pleased that—during last week’s Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee Hearing—Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric John reaffirmed that the 

United States supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia. The Papuans and Indonesian government must build a solid and stable partnership of cooperation and find 

an equitable and peaceful solution to the situation in Papua. I believe that Special 

Autonomy offers the best chance for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, following 

in the model of the agreement in Aceh, Indonesia. This law offers the Papuans 

greater economic benefits and political independence and control over their local affairs. It is my hope that President Yudhoyono continues to aggressively pursue negotiations to bring this conflict to a peaceful resolution; moreover, let me stress that 

this situation must be resolved by the Papuans and Indonesian government—this 

is not the place for the United States Congress. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Well into the future, 

ASEAN’s active and important role in trade, investment, counterterrorism and security cooperation will not only benefit the policy goals of the United States Government, but serve as a source of stability and vibrant economic activity. I look forward 

to hearing the testimony of all of our witnesses today. 

RESPONSES FROM MR. ERIC JOHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST

ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA

AND THE PACIFIC

Question: 

What are the procedures presently followed by U.S. diplomatic posts when people 

claiming to be North Koreans present themselves, seeking protection and resettlement 

as refugees? 

39

Response: 

The Department of State has developed general principles to guide access and 

screening of North Koreans who seek resettlement in the U.S. Such persons should 

first be designated ‘‘persons of concern’’ by the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR), be entitled to receive protection from refoulement by host 

governments obligated under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Additional Protocol, and receive assistance from UNHCR and/

or non-governmental organizations. These individuals do not require support from 

the U.S. nor have any time limits on their stays in the host countries while undergoing the often lengthy process for U.S. resettlement. 

Before determining to process an individual, including North Korean nationals, 

for resettlement in the U.S., our primary objectives when such individuals approach 

our diplomatic posts seeking protection or resettlement as refugees are to facilitate 

their contact with UNHCR and to encourage adequate protection and attention from 

host governments. We cooperate with UNHCR to facilitate the movement of North 

Korean asylum seekers. UNHCR’s role is to prevent the forcible repatriation 

(refoulement) of individual asylum seekers and determine/facilitate the most appropriate solutions for them. The Department of State has worked successfully with 

UNHCR and host governments in preventing refoulement of North Korean refugees 

who surface in third countries. 

The resettlement destinations of asylum seekers are not governed by the individuals’ stated preferences, but rather by UNHCR’s determination of the most appropriate resolution under all of the attendant circumstances. Because North Koreans 

receive South Korean citizenship upon resettlement in the Republic of Korea (ROK) 

under the ROK constitution, UNHCR does not make a determination as to whether 

North Koreans are ‘‘refugees.’’ Instead, UNHCR designates North Koreans as ‘‘persons of concern,’’ i.e., asylum seekers, and does not refer these cases to the USG 

or other countries for refugee resettlement, but simply facilitates their movement 

to the ROK. However, the USG does not require a referral from UNHCR to commence processing North Koreans who might be eligible for U.S. resettlement under 

the above criteria. Processing refugees for resettlement in the U.S. requires the approval of the governments hosting those asylum seekers. We are exploring with 

other countries the possibility of the United States interviewing certain North Koreans for resettlement to the U.S. 

Since 2001, the Department of State has dealt with several cases where North 

Koreans have gained unauthorized entry to U.S. diplomatic facilities. Although 

under certain extremely limited circumstances ‘‘temporary refuge’’ may be granted 

to North Korean asylum seekers who enter U.S. diplomatic facilities, such a grant 

does not have any bearing on a decision to consider such individuals for resettlement in the U.S. Ideally, those qualifying for resettlement in the U.S. would not 

have illegally entered a U.S. diplomatic facility. 

Question: 

What is the Department doing to implement U.S. Public Law 108–333, which directs the Secretary to ‘‘facilitate the submission of applications . . . by citizens of 

North Korea seeking protection as refugees’’? 

Response: 

Over the last year, the Department of State has taken numerous steps to implement P.L. 108–333, the North Korea Human Rights Act (the Act), which directs the 

Secretary to ‘‘facilitate the submission of applications . . . by citizens of North 

Korea seeking protection as refugees.’’ The Department, working closely with other 

USG agencies, has held consultations with the United Nations High Commission for 

Refugees (UNHCR) and other governments on our requirements under the Act. The 

Department would be pleased to offer a classified briefing on these discussions and 

their results. 

Question: 

Have U.S. diplomats in Southeast Asia demarched host governments regarding the 

requirements of P.L. 108–333 and the desire of the U.S. to screen and process North 

Korean refugees for resettlement in the U.S.? Is so, when and at what level were such 

demarches made? (Please provide this information on a country-by-country specific 

basis.) 

Response: 

The U.S. surveyed governments in the region about their position on several aspects of the North Korean refugee issue in September 2005. The results of this survey indicated that many host governments are reluctant to allow the USG to process 

North Korean refugees for resettlement in the U.S. from within their territory. The 

40

Department would be pleased to offer a classified briefing on the country-specific implementation and results of this survey, as well as other country specific issues. 

Question: 

The Congress remains concerned about the apparent poisoning of Indonesian 

human rights advocate Munir Said Thalib on a September 2004 flight to the Netherlands. Credible justice for his murder will be an important indicator of reform and 

transparency in Indonesia’s emerging democracy. What is the current status of the 

Indonesian investigation into Munir’s murder? Has the Indonesian State Intelligence 

Agency (BIN) cooperated fully with that investigation? Has the Indonesian government released the contents of the report by the official fact-finding team, which reported to President Yudhoyono in June of this year? 

Response: 

The Administration has followed closely this case from the beginning. Upon news 

of his death last year, we released a press statement expressing our shock and sadness, acknowledging Munir’s status as an internationally respected human rights 

activist, and stating our hope that the investigation would reveal the facts about 

the circumstances surrounding his death. 

As the investigation began, our Embassy met quickly with the Indonesian police 

investigating the case and communicated our interest in seeing justice for Munir’s 

death to the highest levels in the Indonesian government, including to President 

Yudhoyono. Ambassador Pascoe met early on with Munir’s widow, Suciwati, and 

members of the Fact Finding Team established by President Yudhoyono. Embassy 

officials have followed closely developments in both the police investigation and Fact 

Finding Team, and Embassy efforts continue. Under Secretary Dobrianksy met earlier this summer with Suciwati in Washington, and other State Department officials 

have met with NGOs to discuss the ongoing case. During meetings in Jakarta in 

July, we impressed upon the Indonesian government that we view the pursuit of 

justice in this case as a critical issue. 

We believe that it is critical for the Indonesian government to pursue a thorough 

investigation and seek justice in this case. A credible investigation and related prosecutions would demonstrate to the world that Indonesia seeks accountability for this 

horrendous crime. We believe that the President’s appointment and support for the 

Fact Finding Team is a positive step. Although the team’s report has not been officially released, much of its content has found its way into the press. It would not 

be appropriate for me to comment on the details of the current trial of one suspect, 

Pollycarpus, or the ongoing police investigation, but we continue to closely monitor 

both. 

RESPONSES FROM MR. ERIC JOHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST

ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUB- MITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, A REPRESENTA- TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

Question: 

Of the many important developments occurring in Indonesia, one of the most overlooked is the signing of a memorandum of understanding in Helsinki on August 15th 

between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to end the 

long-standing conflict and human rights abuses in Aceh. However, much of the difficult work of implementation is still to come. Does the administration support the 

Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding? What do you believe is necessary to ensure 

that the implementation is successful and what role is the United States playing to 

promote that success? 

Response: 

We fully support the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding and commend the 

Indonesian Government and the GAM—the Aceh separatist movement—for their 

courage to seek lasting peace for the people of Aceh. Both sides made significant 

concessions to reach mutually agreeable terms. The MoU is comprehensive, and contains provisions to address security, political, and economic issues. 

Early progress in implementation has been excellent. As stipulated in the MoU, 

GAM has already completed the first of four scheduled weapons turn-ins that are 

to be completed by the end of this year. The Indonesian military has simultaneously 

begun to withdraw troops and equipment, and the level of violence in the province 

has decreased significantly. Successful implementation of the security provisions of 

the MoU is essential for the political and economic provisions of the agreement to 

be implemented. I traveled to Banda Aceh September 1 through Ocotber 1 and met 

41

with the EU and ASEAN members of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the Indonesian 

military, and GAM. All expressed optimism with implementation though they acknowledged much trust needs to be built between TNI and GAM. 

We intend to support several key aspects of MoU implementation with U.S. funding, including support for public information campaigns, public dialogue, technical 

assistance and capacity-building for key provincial/local government offices charged 

with MOU implementation, and assistance related to the reintegration of GAM excombatants into mainstream society. In coordination with other key donors and 

partners, USAID plans to support community-based development programs in village clusters that are accepting the reintegration of amnestied political prisoners or 

demobilized GAM fighters or have been identified as a highly conflict-affected community. In addition, at the Indonesian government’s request, during the first week 

in October 2005, we plan to broaden our existing International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement (INL) bureau managed Indonesian police reform assistance program to 

include civil disturbance management and human rights police training in Aceh. 

The police are in the process of taking over security duties in the province from the 

military, and this training will help to ensure that in doing so they are properly 

trained and sensitized to human rights issues. 

Question: 

When I visited the tsunami-affected region in January of this year, and in the 

months since, I have been struck by some of the innovative and far-sighted actions 

taken by both the United States and the governments in the region, such as cashfor-work programs, discussion of including environmental standards in reconstruction as a way of reducing vulnerability to future disasters, and an insistence that 

reconstruction activities be planned out in advance. As the United States deals with 

recovering and rebuilding from our own natural disaster, are there any lessons from 

how Southeast Asia dealt with the tsunami that we may be able to apply to future 

disaster responses? As we recognize the role that lack of preparedness and effective 

mitigation strategies played in our own tragedy, what can the State Department do 

to promote disaster mitigation efforts abroad, as the House requests in the FY06–07 

Foreign Relations Authorization Bill? 

Response: 

Among the lessons learned are that the most effective responders are those who 

are already operational on the ground in affected areas and which have pre-exisiting 

relationships with local communities, NGOs and government entities. We also 

learned that promoting restoration of livelihoods at an early stage through cash-forwork and other initiatives is critical to successful recovery and return of self-sufficiency to affected disaster areas. 

The creation of a Tsunami Early Warning System (TEWS) will be necessary to 

promote disaster risk reduction by community-based disaster preparedness. When 

complemented by hazard mitigation programs and alerts, TEWS should allow communities to mobilize effectively. 

In some tsunami-affected countries, imposition of new land use policies has delayed assistance, generated inefficiencies, and left unresolved issues that could 

plague tsunami survivors for years. Engaging in land policy discussion early and 

often can result in appropriate, effective and timely interventions. 

To promote disaster mitigation efforts abroad, we need a multi-year commitment 

to disaster preparedness and to build on ongoing successful USG-supported initiatives. In Asia, for example, USAID/ OFDA has invested $43.8 million in disaster 

preparedness and mitigation since 1995. In Latin America, USAID/OFDA disaster 

management and training assistance has reached 40,000 participants and certified 

3,500 instructors in 26 countries since 1989. These programs require a minimum of 

2–5 years to develop. 

In light of recent events, community-based preparedness and hazard mitigation 

programs, including evacuation planning, should be a major feature of any USG 

post-tsunami funding activity. This would begin to reduce vulnerability to hazards 

in coastal settlements. 

Question: 

As was raised during the hearing, former Czech President Vaclav Havel and Archbishop Desmond Tutu released a report yesterday prepared by DLA Piper Rudnick 

Gray Cary entitled, ‘‘Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act 

in Burma.’’ They make the case that Burma should be referred to the United National (sic) Security Council as Burma’s regime has produced at least 700,000 refugees, is the leading producer of methamphetamines in Southeast Asia, has recruited 

more child soldiers than any other country in the world, has been virtually kickedout of the UN’s International Labor Organization, and destroyed 2,700 villages in 

42

eastern Burma alone in recent years. Does the administration support referring 

Burma to the UN Security Council? What specific efforts is the administration making to gather the necessary votes to include Burma on the Security Council agenda? 

Response: 

The United States is exploring with other Security Council members bringing the 

situation in Burma before the Council. We have approached UN missions in New 

York to seek their views on the matter, and are making similar inquiries in capitals. 

It is not clear yet whether Council members will support this initiative. 

We continue to look for ways to highlight the situation in Burma before the international community, including within the UN system. In June, we raised Burma 

during Security Council consultations under ‘‘other matters.’’ The United Kingdom, 

France, Greece, Denmark and Romania supported this effort. We also sponsored resolutions critical of Burma’s human rights record at the 2004 UN General Assembly 

and the 2005 UN Commission on Human Rights. We look forward to working with 

the European Union and other partners and allies to ensure that this year’s UNGA 

resolution accurately reflects the deteriorating situation on the ground in Burma. 

Question: 

I noted in the background memo prepared by Chairman Leach that the U.S. is engaged in efforts to clean up unexploded ordnance in Laos. What is the extent of these 

efforts? Who is actually carrying out the remediation efforts? What technology is 

being used? 

Response: 

We provided assistance to several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that 

work with UXO Lao, the quasi-independent government agency charged by the GOL 

with conducting clearance operations. UXO Lao cleared over 1,255 hectares of land 

(exceeding targets by 11 percent) and destroyed more than 25,300 items of UXO. 

We also support programs aimed at increasing the awareness of local people to the 

danger of UXO; we reached over 300,000 people in 2004 and the first quarter of 

2005. We have requested $3 million in Humanitarian Demining funding (NADR–

HD) for FY2006 and FY2007 to support clearance operations; for FY2005, Congress 

earmarked $2.5 million for these efforts. 

Clearance operations are still conducted using manual demining technology. Currently, we are working with donors and the involved NGOs to improve the precision 

of identifying the location of UXO, thereby reducing the area the operators have to 

cover and expediting the process. We also work with UXO Lao to improve its management operations through the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement’s Integrated Mine Action Services contractor. The contractor has recently completed a 

country-wide evaluation of the UXO removal process in Laos. We intend to begin 

a full-scale implementation plan in 2006 based on findings from this study contingent on the availability of funding. 

The Lao government recently created a National Regulatory Authority (NRA) to 

oversee UXO Lao and clearance operations. After a year-long search, the Lao government has designated a candidate to serve as director of the NRA. We continue 

to press the Lao government to complete this process so the NRA can begin its important work. 

Question: 

We had a hearing in this Subcommittee last fall where we heard from experts on 

a broad range of the environmental challenges facing Asia. What do you believe are 

the most pressing short-term and the most important long-term environmental issues 

in Southeast Asia and what efforts is the administration making to mitigate the adverse effects? 

Response: 

The Asian tsunami has led to a number of environmental problems in the region, 

particularly in the areas of health and access to safe water. Access to drinking 

water and sanitation continues to be a pressing problem in the region. Even before 

the tsunami, eighty percent of the global population without access to improved 

sanitation, and almost two-thirds without access to improved water supply, live in 

Asia. In addition to our traditional work through bilateral assistance programs, the 

Department has launched a number of recent multilateral partnerships to increase 

access to drinking water and sanitation. These partnerships are focused on increasing political will and catalyzing action in four key areas: water and health, 

transboundary water, integrated water resources financing, and mobilizing domestic 

capital for water-related infrastructure. Examples of some of this work within the 

region include a partnership between USAID’s Development Credit Authority and 

43

the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation on joint financing programs in the 

Philippines; working with the Global Water Partnerships to support the implementation of national water plans in Indonesia; and supporting the distribution of technologies for disinfecting and safely storing water at the household level in Laos, Indonesia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Southeast Asia’s growing population and energy needs have led to a number of 

opportunities and initiatives in the region. We are working with major partners in 

the region to develop the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which will undertake a broad range of activities to promote cleaner and more 

efficient energy technologies. During the US–ASEAN dialogue in June, co-chaired 

by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick and Thai Foreign Minister Kantathi, both 

sides agreed to advance cooperation in the field of energy. As part of our commitment, we have begun exploring with USAID and others in the region the possibility 

of co-hosting a clean energy financing workshop for ASEAN countries. The purpose 

of the workshop is to promote the efficient and sustainable use of modern energy 

services. We are also working with the World Bank Country Office in the Philippines on their May 2006 Country Development Marketplace which will highlight 

access to energy as a means to ensure development with equity. 

The continued spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza among wild and domestic birds in Southeast Asia, and the confirmation of new human cases in the region, have raised concerns that the ongoing outbreak could spark a human pandemic. In July USDA hosted a meeting of the APEC Health Task Force to help 

member economies consider how best to work with international organizations dedicated to animal and human health in preventing an influenza pandemic. 

Finally, wildlife trafficking remains a serious concern, both because of the threat 

it poses to many of the world’s most endangered species and because of to its potential to spread animal-borne diseases such as SARS and avian influenza. The US has 

created an international wildlife initiative, the centerpiece of which is the newly announced Coalitition Against Wildlife Trafficking (CAWT) initiative. Environmental 

crime is one of the most profitable and fastest growing areas of crime, with wildlife 

trafficking alone comprising an estimated $10 billion a year. CAWT is focusing its 

initial efforts in Asia, where ASEAN environment ministers are expected to launch 

the development of a regional law enforcement network when they meet in Bangkok 

in November, 2005. 

Question: 

The process of massive urbanization that we’re witnessing around the world is particularly acute in Southeast Asia. I am concerned that as metropolitan areas 

throughout the developing world experience a greater strain on natural resources, 

health and education infrastructures, and economic capacity, we will begin to see 

failed cities as sources of instability and insecurity. What efforts is the United States 

undertaking to promote investment in transportation and other key infrastructure 

systems, and the coordination of these investments with sound land use and economic development planning, that will be necessary to deal with the growth of megacities? 

Response: 

The United States Government works closely with the World Bank, and the regional multilateral development banks to partner with developing countries on appropriate development policies. We utilize our board membership, through the presence of the U.S. Executive Director at each bank, to advocate for country strategies 

that identify the necessary investments for all aspects of development, including 

ways to deal with urbanization. Most strategies call for investment in road networks, power sector projects, water supply and wastewater management, as well as 

educational sector development. Specific investment projects are then developed, addressing land use and economic development considerations as needed. Three other 

vital elements, all of which the US vigorously promotes, are investment in people, 

economic freedom, and democracy. Progress requires decent education for all, the 

freedom for businesses to be created and to operate, and opportunities for people 

to exercise control over their local and national political processes. 

One example of our efforts in SE Asia is our work in Indonesia where the government has self-identified $72 billion in infrastructure investment necessary over the 

next five years. The USG actively engages the GOI on business climate reform, legal 

reform and macroeconomic policy in a concerted effort to assist the GOI in attracting foreign direct investment and enhancing the investment climate for both domestic and foreign investors. Bilaterally the USG, through USAID, provides technical 

assistance and resources in a number of areas that help promote better urban policies. USAID provides training to strengthen Indonesia’s natural resource manageVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:30 Jan 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092105\23608.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
44

ment capacity at the national, provincial and local levels. Additionally, Embassy Jakarta supports efforts of the GOI, NGOs, universities and the international community and the private sector to protect Indonesia’s natural resources; ensure that development occurs in a transparent, sustainable, and environmentally sound manner; 

and promote policies and technologies that minimize environmental impacts.

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