Filed 5/27/15 In re R.B. CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re R.B., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B255002 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. VJ43802) 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

R.B., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Fumiko 

Hachiya Wasserman, Judge. Affirmed. 

Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

—————————— 
2

A minor argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found him 

unsuitable for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) and instead declared him a ward of the 

court. We find no error and affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On the afternoon of September 23, 2013, a high school security officer found 

appellant R.B. crouched behind a car in the school parking lot around 2:00 p.m., when 

appellant was supposed to be in class. The security officer escorted appellant to the vice 

principal’s office where appellant’s backpack was searched. A knife with a four-inch 

blade was found inside the backpack. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021 wardship petition filed on 

December 5, 2013, alleged that appellant possessed a knife on school grounds in 

violation of Penal Code section 626.10, subdivision (a)(1), a felony. Appellant denied 

the allegation. 

 The juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the knife recovered from 

his backpack. Appellant requested that the court reduce the alleged offense to a 

misdemeanor. The court granted that request and appellant admitted the truth of the 

allegation. The matter proceeded to disposition and the court sustained the petition. The 

court found appellant suitable for DEJ, pursuant to section 725. Nevertheless, the court 

declined to order DEJ and declared appellant a ward of the court under section 6022 and 

ordered him placed home on probation. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated. 

2 In pertinent part, section 602, subdivision (a) states: “[A]ny person who is under 

18 years of age when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any 

ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance 

establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, 

which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.” 
3

DISCUSSION 

 Appellant maintains that once the juvenile court reduced the allegation to a 

misdemeanor, it should have imposed a nonwardship probation under section 725, 

subdivision (a), instead of declaring him a ward of the court and ordering him home on 

probation. We conclude otherwise. 

 We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse of discretion, 

indulging all reasonable inferences to support the decision. It is the juvenile court’s duty 

to determine the most appropriate placement for the minor. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 

Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329–1330; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) 

Under this standard, we “‘“indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the 

court and will not disturb its factual findings when there is substantial evidence to support 

them.”’” (In re Robert H., at p. 1330; In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 

1135 [juvenile court determination will be reversed only if court acted beyond the scope 

of reason].) 

 Section 725 states that: 

“After receiving and considering the evidence on the proper disposition of the 

case, the court may enter judgment as follows: 

“(a) If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section . . . 602, 

by reason of the commission of an offense other than any of the offenses set forth in 

Section 654.3, it may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor 

on probation, under the supervision of the probation officer, for a period not to exceed six 

months . . . . If the minor fails to comply with the conditions of probation imposed, the 

court may order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court. 

 “(b) If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section . . . 602, 

it may order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.” 
4

It is undisputed that appellant was both eligible and suitable for DEJ under section 

790.3 Appellant argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in declaring him a ward of 

the court under section 602 and placing him on probation because numerous positive 

circumstances weigh in favor of nonwardship probation. Namely, he was 17 years old at 

the time of this, his first and only criminal offense; his crime was minor and nonviolent; 

he admitted that he simply “fail[ed] to think before he act[ed]”; he does not use drugs and 

is not involved in gang activity; his family actively supports him; he has good grades 

notwithstanding his learning disability; and several teachers wrote letters on his behalf to 

the court. The probation report acknowledged these positive factors and recommended 

that appellant be “placed on 790 DEJ grant of probation.” 

The juvenile court did not specify the positive or negative factors that impacted its 

decision. Nevertheless, we conclude the court reasonably could have been concerned by 

negative aspects of appellant’s case. For example, in urging the court not to reduce the 

 

3 A minor is eligible for DEJ under section 790, subdivision (a) if all the following 

circumstances exist: 

“(1) The minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the 

commission of a felony offense. 

“(2) The offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) 

of Section 707. 

“(3) The minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. 

“(4) The minor’s record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked 

without being completed. 

“(5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing. 

“(6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal 

Code. 

“(7) The offense charged is not rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or an act of sexual 

penetration specified in Section 289 of the Penal Code when the victim was prevented 

from resisting . . . , or when the victim was at the time incapable . . . of giving consent, 

and that was known or reasonably should have been known to the minor at the time of the 

offense.” 
5

alleged offense to a misdemeanor, the district attorney argued that appellant appeared to 

lack “remorse and a willingness to admit the offense.” Further, as evidenced in the 

probation report, appellant made contradictory representations about why he took the 

knife to school in the first place. At one point he claimed to “use[] the knife for 

protection,”––which, by implication, meant he carried it regularly and was prepared to 

wield it defensively, if necessary. Later, he contradicted that statement, saying he had 

mistakenly left the knife in his backpack after a camping trip. Appellant also conceded 

that “not thinking ha[d] gotten him in trouble” on more than one occasion, and said his 

“plan” for the future was to “think before he act[ed].” 

On this factual record, we cannot conclude the court’s implicit conclusion that 

appellant was unsuitable for DEJ was an abuse of discretion. Based on apparent 

contradictions in appellant’s statements and his youthful impetuosity, the court could 

reasonably conclude he would benefit from more restrictive measures than are afforded 

under DEJ and a longer period of supervision than the maximum of six months available 

for a nonwardship DEJ probation under section 725, subdivision (a). After all, “[t]he 

purpose of the juvenile court is to protect both the minor under its jurisdiction and the 

public . . . . [Citations.] Central to the juvenile court’s mission are the care, treatment, 

guidance, and rehabilitation of the delinquent juvenile. [Citation.]” (In re Walter P. 

(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99, fn. omitted.) The question of whether a minor deemed 

eligible for DEJ is also suitable for DEJ rests within the juvenile court’s discretion. (In re 

R.C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1441 [after prosecution determines “minor is eligible 

for DEJ[, and] court finds . . . minor [both] suitable for DEJ and [will] benefit from 

education, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts, it may grant DEJ”].) 

While another court might have found otherwise on this record, we cannot 

conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying DEJ and declaring 

appellant a ward of the court. The trial court retains the ultimate discretion in deciding 

whether it is appropriate to grant DEJ to an eligible minor. (In re Sergio R. (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 597, 603; § 602, subd. (a).) Even if the prosecuting attorney finds the minor 

eligible for DEJ and the probation department finds the minor suitable, the court’s 
6

disposition is based on its independent determination. (In re Sergio R., at p. 604; Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.800.) 

 We also find that the juvenile court considered the circumstances that may have 

mitigated appellant’s conduct. These circumstances were contained in his probation 

report and/or were brought to the court’s attention by appellant’s counsel. The court 

considered them; it just did not find them persuasive. “‘Sentencing courts have wide 

discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors [citations], and may balance 

them against each other in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.’ [Citation.] One 

factor alone may warrant imposition of the upper term [citation] and the trial court need 

not state reasons for minimizing or disregarding circumstances in mitigation [citation].” 

(People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401.) These principles are equally 

applicable to a juvenile court’s decision whether to grant a juvenile DEJ. Thus, we reject 

any contention that the court abused its discretion in denying DEJ because mitigating 

circumstances may outnumber aggravating circumstances. 

DISPOSITION 

 The order is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 JOHNSON, J. 

We concur: 

 ROTHSCHILD, P. J. 

 CHANEY, J.