ORIGINAL 

KERRITH DUVALL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

Defendant. 

No. 18-313C 

Filed June 5, 2018 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

JUN - 5 2018 

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U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

Prose; RCFC 12(b)(l); Subject-Matter 

Jurisdiction; Money-Mandating Source Of 

Law; In Forma Pauperis; Habeas Corpus; 

Section 1983. 

~~ ~~~~~ ~~-) 

Kerrith Duvall, Robert Cotner, and Dennis Martin, Lexington, OK, plaintiffs prose. 

Albert S. Iarossi, Trial Attorney, Lisa L. Donahue, Assistant Director, Robert E. 

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for 

defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

GRIGGSBY, Judge 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs pro se, Kerrith Duvall, Robe1t Cotner, and Dennis Ma1tin, brought this action 

seeking to enforce a judgment allegedly entered in their favor by this Cou1t in a prior case and to 

recover, among other things, monetary damages from the government. See generally Compl.; 

Am. Compl. The government has moved to dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

("RCFC"). See generally Def. Mot. Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have also moved to proceed in 

this matter informa pauperis. See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Feb. 27, 

2018, at Entry No. 4; Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Mar. 13, 2018, at Entry No. 6. 

7017 1450 DODD 1346 1970 
For the reasons discussed below, the Court: (1) GRANTS the government's motion to 

dismiss; (2) GRANTS plaintiffs' motions to proceed informapauperis; and (3) DISMISSES 

the amended complaint. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 

A. Factual Background 

As background, plaintiffs prose, Ken·ith Duvall, Robert Cotner, and Dennis Martin are 

currently incarcerated in the Joseph Harp Correctional Center located in Lexington, Oklahoma. 

SeeDuvallv. United States, No. 17-1788C, 2018 WL617641, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2018). 

Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this matter on February 27, 2018, and subsequently filed an 

amended complaint on March 13, 2018. See generally Comp!.; Am. Comp!. Plaintiffs' 

handwritten complaint and amended complaint are difficult to follow. But, it appears that 

plaintiffs seek to enforce a judgment allegedly entered in their favor by this Court in a prior case. 

See generally Comp!.; Am. Comp!. As relief, plaintiffs seek, among other things, $3 billion in 

monetary damages from the government and various forms of injunctive relief. See Comp!. at 1; 

Am. Comp!. at 1. 

1. Plaintiffs' Claims 

Plaintiff Kerri th Duvall alleges in the amended complaint that he has suffered more than 

$1 billion in losses "because of defendant's refusal to protect his rights and because of laws, 

policy and acts of defendant's agents." Am. Comp!. at 1. Mr. Duvall alleges that, because the 

Court "found true" his allegations in a previous case before the Court, the only remaining issue 

to be resolved by the Court is a judgment awarding him compensation and damages. Id. As 

relief, Mr. Duvall requests that, among other things, the government: (1) pay $1 billion "directly 

on the principle [sic] of the national debt;" (2) pay him an additional $10,000 "cash;" and (3) 

permit him to open an Indian casino. Id. 

1 The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from the complaint ("Comp!."); the 

amended complaint ("Arn. Comp!."); and the government's motion to dismiss ("Def Mot."). Unless 

otherwise noted herein, the facts recited are undisputed. Due to plaintiffs' prose status, the Court 

considers the allegations set fmth in both the complaint and amended complaint for the purpose of 

resolving the government's motion to dismiss. 

2 
In the amended complaint, plaintiff Robert Cotner alleges that he is entitled to recover 

more than $1 billion from the government, due to the government's "refusal to protect the 

church's rights in Creek County, [Oklahoma]" because of"laws, policy, and acts of defendant's 

agents." Id. Mr. Cotner further alleges that he suffered a loss as a result of the government's 

"breach of social contract, policy, practices, acts of its agents, [impediments] and refusal to 

protect [his] Federal rights in [Oklahoma] state courts." Id. at 2. As relief, Mr. Cotner requests 

that, among other things, the government: (1) pay $1 billion "directly on the principle [sic] of 

the national debt;" (2) pay him an additional $30,000; and (3) provide "consideration by the 

Pentagon-Defense Intelligence Agency" for an intelligence services contract. Id. at 2. 

Lastly, plaintiff Dennis Martin seeks judicial review of"the merits of his Federal 2241 

habeas" petition. Id at 3. 

In plaintiffs' response to the government's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs make a number of 

additional claims against the federal government, the State of Oklahoma, and other individuals 

and entities. See generally Pis. Resp. Plaintiffs also allege violations of various provisions of 

the United States Constitution and the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

See Pis. Resp. at 1-4, Ex. A at 1, Ex.Bat 3.2 

2. Plaintiffs' Prior Litigation 

On November 13, 2017, plaintiffs filed an action in this Court seeking monetary and 

injunctive relief alleging that the federal government and state government of Oklahoma denied 

certain rights afforded by the "anti-slavery clause" of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. See Duvall v. United States, 2018 WL 617641, at * 1. The Court dismissed 

plaintiffs' case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on January 30, 2018. Id. at *3. After 

plaintiffs appealed the Court's dismissal decision, they moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, 

and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted the motion on April 26, 

2018. Duvall v. United States, No. 17-1788C (Fed. Cl. April 26, 2018), at Entry No. 22. 

2 Plaintiffs further allege the denial of veterans' benefits and social security benefits in their response to 

the government's motion to dismiss. See Pis. Resp. at Ex. A at I. 

3 
B. Procedural History 

Plaintiffs commenced this action on February 27, 2018. See generally Comp!. On 

February 27, 2018, Mr. Cotner filed a motion to proceed in this matter informa pauperis. See 

generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Feb. 27, 2018, at Entry No. 4. On March 13, 

2018, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. See generally Am. Comp!. On March 13, 2018, 

Mr. Duvall filed a motion to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis. See generally Pl. Mot. to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Mar. 13, 2018, at Entry No. 6. 

On April 25, 2018, the government filed a motion to dismiss this matter, pursuant to 

RCFC 12(b)(l). See generally Def. Mot. On May 8, 2018, plaintiffs filed a response and 

opposition to the government's motion to dismiss. See generally Pis. Resp. On May 22, 2018, 

the government filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. See generally Def. Reply. 

These matters having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motions. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

A. Pro Se Litigants 

Plaintiffs are proceeding in this matter prose, without the benefit of counsel. And so, the 

Court applies the pleading requirements leniently. Beriont v. GTE Labs., Inc., 535 F. App'x 919, 

925-26 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501F.3d1354, 1356 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007)). When determining whether a complaint filed by a prose plaintiff is sufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss, this Court affords more leeway under the rules to pro se plaintiffs 

than plaintiffs who are represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. 

Ct. 594 (1972) (holding that prose complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); Matthews v. United States, 750 

F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But, there "is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a 

claim which [the plaintiff! has not spelled out in his pleading." Lengen v. United States, 100 

Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (brackets existing) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scogin 

v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995)). 

While "a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff 

represented by an attorney ... the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing 

the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 

4 
163, 165 (2010) (citing Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). And so, 

the Court may excuse ambiguities, but not defects, in the complaint. Colbert v. United States, 

617 F. App'x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 

(2002) ("[T]he leniency afforded prose litigants with respect to mere formalities does not relieve 

them of jurisdictional requirements."). 

B. RCFC 12(b)(l) 

When deciding a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Court does not possess 

subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l), this Court must assume that all 

undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the 

non-movant's favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also RCFC 12(b)(l). But, 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and he must do so by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 

(Fed. Cir. 1988). Should the Comt determine that "it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it 

must dismiss the claim." Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006). 

In this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction 

and "possess[ es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute .... " Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Tucker Act grants the Court 

jurisdiction over: 

[A ]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any 

Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express 

or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated 

damages in cases not sounding in tmt. 

28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). The Tucker Act is, however, "a jurisdictional statute; it does not create 

any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages .... [T]he Act 

merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the 

substantive right exists." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (alterations original). 

And so, to pursue a substantive right against the United States under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff 

must identify and plead a money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or regulation; an 

express or implied contract with the United States; or an illegal exaction of money by the United 

States. Cabral v. United States, 317 F. App'x 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Fisher v. United 

5 
States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 

1302 (Fed. Cir. 2003). "[A] statute or regulation is money-mandating for jurisdictional purposes 

ifit 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of the 

breach of the duties [it] impose[ s]. "' Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 

463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)). 

Specifically relevant to this matter, it is well-established that the Tucker Act does not 

grant the United States Court of Federal Claims subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the federal 

criminal code, or to grant relief sounding in a writ of habeas corpus. Canuto v. United States, 

651 F. App'x 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see, e.g., Ledfordv. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1381 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). The Court also does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to review or to 

consider criminal law matters. Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The 

comt has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal 

code .... "); Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 306, 311-12 (2012) (holding that this Court 

cannot review criminal matters). 

It is also well-established that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider claims brought under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Osborn v. United States, 47 

Fed. Cl. 224, 232 (2000). The Court also does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider 

social security benefits or veterans' benefits claims. See 38 U.S.C. § 51 l(a) ("The Secretary [of 

Veterans Affairs] shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the 

Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the 

dependents or survivors of veterans."); Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 

1990) (stating this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims related to social security 

benefits); see also Trevino v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 204, 209 (2013), ajf'd, 557 Fed. App'x 

995 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has exclusive 

jurisdiction over claims related to veterans' benefits). 

In addition, simply citing to a provision of the United States Constitution is not enough to 

establish this Court's jurisdiction over claims based upon that provision. See Calhoun v. United 

States, 32 Fed. Cl. 400, 405 (1994), ajf'd, 61F.3d918 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating "not every claim 

involving, or invoking, the Constitution necessarily confers jurisdiction on this comt"); see also 

6 
Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he mere recitation of a basis for 

jurisdiction by either party or a court, is not controlling .... "). 

Lastly, the United States is the only proper defendant in cases brought in this Court. 

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (stating that this Court "is without 

jurisdiction of any suit brought against private parties"); Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 

330, 331 (2014) (stating that this Court is without jurisdiction "over any claims alleged against 

states, localities, state and local government entities, or state and local government officials and 

employees; jurisdiction only extends to suits against the United States itself'). 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

The government has moved to dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

upon the grounds that: (1) plaintiffs fail to identify a money-mandating source of law to 

establish subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider plaintiffs' civil rights claims; (3) the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction 

to consider Mr. Martin's habeas claim; (5) the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction 

to review plaintiffs' criminal convictions; and ( 6) the Cornt may not entertain claims against 

patties other than the United States. See Def. Mot. at 5-6; Def. Reply at 2. 

Plaintiffs counter that the Cornt possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider their 

claims under various constitutional provisions and the United Nations' Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights. See Pis. Resp. at Ex. Bat 1-3. Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have also moved to 

proceed in this matter informa pauperis. See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, 

Feb. 27, 2018, at Entry No. 4; Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Mm. 13, 2018, at Entry 

No. 6. 

For the reasons discussed below, the most generous reading of plaintiffs' complaint and 

ainended complaint makes clear that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider any of plaintiffs' claims. Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have, however, shown that they 

satisfy the statutory requirements to proceed in this matter without paying the Court's filing fee. 

And so, the Court: (1) GRANTS the government's motion to dismiss; (2) GRANTS plaintiffs' 

motions to proceed informapauperis; and (3) DISMISSES the complaint. RCFC 12(b)(l). 

7 
A. The Court Does Not Possess .Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiffs' Claims 

1. Plaintiffs Fail To Identify A Money-Mandating Source Of Law 

As an initial matter, plaintiffs fail to identify a money-mandating source of law that 

would confer jurisdiction upon the Court to consider their claims that they have suffered losses 

due to (1) the government's alleged "refusal to protect [their] rights" and (2) the government's 

"breach of social contract, policy, practices, acts of its agents." Am. Comp!. at 1-2. To establish 

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, plaintiffs must identify and plead a money-mandating 

constitutional provision, statute, or regulation; an express or implied contract with the United 

States; or an illegal exaction of money by the United States. Cabral, 317 F. App'x at 981; see 

also Martinez, 333 FJd at 1302. But, plaintiffs do not identify a money-mandating federal 

statute, constitutional provision, or regulation that could form the legal basis of these claims in 

the complaint or the amended complaint. See generally Comp!.; Am. Comp!. And so, the Court 

must dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(b)(l). 

2. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction To 

Consider Plaintiffs' Habeas And Criminal Law Claims 

The Comt is also without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' habeas and criminal law 

claims. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that Mr. Maitin has been imprisoned for 35 

years "without ever having been arrested, tried, or convicted" and requests that "some federal 

comt ... hear the merits of his federal 2241 habeas." Am. Comp!. at 3. Given this, plaintiffs 

appear to asse1t a habeas corpus claim on behalf of Mr. Martin. 

The Federal Circuit has long recognized that this Court does not possess subject-matter 

jurisdiction to grant relief sounding in a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Ledford, 297 F.3d at 

13 81. This Court also does not have the authority to overturn criminal convictions. Humphrey 

v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 593, 596 (2002); Cooper, 104 Fed. Cl. at 311-12 (holding that this 

Court cannot review criminal matters); see also Salman v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 36, 39 

(2005) (quoting Dethlefa v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 810, 814 (2004)) (stating that this Court 

does not have the authority "to review and overturn convictions entered by a court of competent 

8 
jurisdiction"). And so, the Court must dismiss plaintiffs' habeas and criminal law claims for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b )(1 ).3 

3. The Court May Not Consider Plaintiffs' Civil Rights, 

Veterans' Benefits, And Social Security Benefits Claims 

The Court also may not consider plaintiffs' civil rights, veterans' benefits, and social 

security benefits claims. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs appear to assert a claim based 

upon Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Am. Comp!. at 3. But, Congress has committed 

jurisdiction over such claims to the United States district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4); 

Doe v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 794, 798 (2006). And so, the Court must dismiss plaintiffs' 

civil rights claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(b )(1 ). 

Plaintiffs' social security and veterans' benefits claims are also jurisdictionally precluded 

under the Tucker Act. In their response to the government's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs appear 

to assert claims related to social secUl'ity benefits and veterans' benefits. Pis. Resp. at Ex. A at 1. 

But, it is well-established that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider 

claims for social security benefits or veterans' benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 51 l(a); Trevino, 113 

Fed. Cl. at 209; Marcus, 909 F.2d at 1471. And so, the Court must also dismiss plaintiffs' social 

security and veterans' benefits claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b)(l). 

4. The Court May Not Consider Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claims 

And Any Claims Against Parties Other Than The United States 

Lastly, to the extent that plaintiffs rely upon the United States Constitution to bring this 

action, the Court is also without jurisdiction to entertain these constitutional claims because the 

constitutional provisions that plaintiffs rely upon are not money-mandating. See Fisher, 402 

F.3d at 1172. In their response and opposition to the government's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs 

cite to Article I§§ 9 and 10; Article III§§ 2 and 3; Article IV§§ 2 and 4; and Article VI of the 

United States Constitution to provide a jurisdictional basis for their claims. Pis. Resp. at 1-4. 

3 Jn addition, to the extent that plaintiffs seek to asse1t an unjust conviction claim in this matter, they fail 

to state a plausible claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1495. To bring such a claim here, plaintiffs must 

allege that either, (1) their convictions have been reversed or set aside by a court; (2) on new hearing or 

new trial they were found not guilty; or (3) that they have been pardoned. 28 U .S.C. § 2513; Salman, 69 

Fed. Cl. at 39; Lott v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 852, 853 (1987). But, plaintiffs make no such allegation. 

See generally Comp!.; Am. Comp!; RCFC 12(b)(l). 

9 
But, none of the constitutional provisions upon which plaintiffs rely are money-mandating. See 

Olajide v. United States, No. l 6-l 594C, 2017 WL 3225048, at *4 (Fed. Cl. July 31, 2017) 

(discussing Article I§§ 9 and 10); Ivaldy v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 633, 636 (2015), ajj'd, 

655 F. App'x 813 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing Article IV§ 2); El v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 

707, 709 (2015) (discussing Article VI); Gibson v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 215, 217 (2015) 

(discussing Article III § 2). 

Indeed, plaintiffs simply cite to a litany of provisions of the United States Constitution in 

their response and opposition without providing any basis for how these constitutional provisions 

could establish the Court's jurisdiction to consider the claims alleged in the complaint and 

amended complaint. See Calhoun, 32 Fed. Cl. at 405 (stating "not every claim involving, or 

invoking, the Constitution necessarily confers jurisdiction on this court"); see also Livingston, 

959 F .2d at 225 ("[T]he mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction by either party or a court, is not 

controlling."). Given this, the Court must dismiss plaintiffs' constitutional law claims for want 

of subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(b)(l).4 

Lastly, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' claims against parties other 

than the United States. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs appear to asse1t claims against the 

State of Oklahoma and Oklahoma state officials, as well as individuals. See Am. Comp!. at 1-4. 

However, the jurisdiction of this Cou1t is limited to claims brought against the United States. 

Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Anderson, 117 Fed. Cl. at 331. And so, the Court must also dismiss 

plaintiffs' claims against the State of Oklahoma and its government officials, or any private 

parties for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(b)(l). 

B. Transfer Of This Matter Would Be Futile 

Given the frivolous nature of plaintiffs' claims, the Court also concludes that a transfer of 

this matter to a United States district court would be inappropriate. A transfer of this matter 

would be appropriate if: "(!) the transferor court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the action could have 

4 To the extent that plaintiffs rely upon the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights to 

bring this action, this Comt similarly lacks jurisdiction to ente1tain their claims. See El, 122 Fed. Cl. at 

71 0 (2015) (stating this Co mt does not have jurisdiction over claims based on the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights absent specific statutory provision stating otherwise). 

10 
been brought in the transferee court at the time it was filed; and (3) transfer is in the interest of 

justice." Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1631. In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that 

the phrase "in the interest of justice" refers to claims that are "nonfrivolous and as such should 

be decided on the merits." See Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. 

Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). And so, the decision to transfer rests within the discretion of the 

transferor court, and the court may decline to transfer if doing so would be "futile given the 

weakness of plaintiffs case on the merits." See Faulkner v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 54, 56 

(1999) (quoting Siegal v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 386, 390-91 (1997)). 

In this case, plaintiffs' claims are fundamentally based upon the alleged right to enforce a 

previous judgment of this Court. See generally Comp!.; Am. Comp!. But, there can be no 

genuine dispute that this Court has not previously entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs. To 

the contrary, the Court dismissed plaintiffs' previous case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

See Duvall, 2018 WL 617641 at *3. Given this, transfer of this matter to a United States district 

court would not be in the interest of justice. 

C. The Court Grants Plaintiffs' Motions To Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

As a final matter, Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have moved to proceed in this matter in 

forma pauperis. See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Feb. 27, 2018, at Entry 

No. 4; Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Mar. 13, 2018, at Entry No. 6. This Court may 

authorize the commencement of a lawsuit without prepayment of fees when a plaintiff submits 

an affidavit including a statement of all assets, a declaration that plaintiff is unable to pay the 

fees, and a statement of the nature of the action and a belief that plaintiff is entitled to redress. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l); see also id. § 2503(d). When the plaintiff is a prisoner, as is the case 

here, the plaintiff must also submit "a certified copy of [his] trust fund account statement (or 

institutional equivalent) ... for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the 

complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 

In this matter, Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have both submitted an application for leave to 

proceed in this matter in forma pauperis and the necessary statements regarding their respective 

assets and liabilities, statements of the nature of this action, and statements that they are "unable 

to prepay the costs of this action ... because of [their] poverty." See generally Pl. Mot. to 

11 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Feb. 27, 2018, at Entry No. 4; Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis, Mar. 13, 2018, at Entry No. 6. Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have also submitted copies 

of their respective trust fund account statements. See Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, 

Feb. 27, 2018, at Entry No. 4; Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Mar. 13, 2018, at Entry 

No. 6.5 Because of the Court's summary disposition of this case upon jurisdictional grounds, and 

plaintiffs' pro se status, the Court finds that Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have satisfied the 

statutory requirements to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose of resolving the 

government's motion to dismiss. And so, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs' motions to proceed in 

forma pauperis. 

V. CONCLUSION 

In sum, the most generous reading of plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint makes 

clear that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider any of plaintiffs' 

claims. Mr. Duvall and Mr. Cotner have, however, shown that they satisfy the statutory 

requirements to proceed in this matter without paying the Court's filing fee. 

And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

1. GRANTS the government's motion to dismiss; 

2. GRANTS plaintiffs' motions to proceed informa pauperis; and 

3. DISMISSES the complaint. 

5 Mr. Martin has not filed an application to proceed in Jonna pauperis, nor has he submitted a statement 

of his assets or liabilities, or any copy of his trust fund account statement. 

12 
The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of the government, 

DISMISSING the complaint. 

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

13