Present: All the Justices 

DORIAN LEE-KIRK SHACKLEFORD 

v. Record No. 001795 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 June 8, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Dorian Lee-Kirk Shackleford, a juvenile and citizen of 

Jamaica, was charged with delinquency in petitions alleging 

that he had committed three drug-related offenses. The 

juvenile and domestic relations district court (juvenile 

court) subsequently transferred Shackleford to the circuit 

court. There, the court tried Shackleford as an adult in a 

bench trial and convicted him of possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248, 

transporting one ounce or more of cocaine into the 

Commonwealth with the intent to sell or distribute in 

violation of Code § 18.2-248.01, and possession of a 

firearm with intent to distribute a controlled substance in 

violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B).1 Shackleford then 

appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. That 

court affirmed the convictions. Shackleford v. 

 1

 The circuit court sentenced Shackleford to a total of 

23 years, with 16 years suspended; a fine of $2,500; and a 

suspension of his operator’s license for a period of six 

months. 
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 307, 329, 528 S.E.2d 123, 134, 

(2000). 

On appeal to this Court, Shackleford challenges the 

jurisdiction of the circuit court because his parents did 

not receive notice of certain proceedings, the 

voluntariness of his statement to police, the seizure of 

certain physical evidence, and the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals. 

FACTS 

We will recite the evidence presented at trial in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 

party before the circuit court. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 

259 Va. 654, 662, 529 S.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, ___ 

U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 432 (2000); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 

Va. 54, 60, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1999), cert. denied, 528 

U.S. 1125 (2000). We also accord that evidence all 

inferences fairly deducible from it. Horton v. 

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 S.E.2d 258, 259 

(1998) (citing Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 

352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). 

Two law enforcement officers with the Virginia State 

Police, Special Agent J.C. Miers, III, and Trooper Mike 

Hall, were conducting an undercover drug interdiction at 

2
the Greyhound bus station in Lynchburg. At approximately 

10:15 a.m. on January 7, 1998, Miers and Hall observed 

Shackleford exit a bus that had just arrived. At some 

point after Shackleford entered the bus terminal, he 

approached Miers, who was wearing civilian clothes, and 

asked for the telephone number of a local taxicab company. 

Miers found a listing for taxicabs in a telephone directory 

and pointed it out to Shackleford. After Shackleford made 

a telephone call, Miers displayed his police badge to 

Shackleford and asked to speak with him. Shackleford 

agreed and accompanied Miers to a corner inside the bus 

terminal where they engaged in further conversation. 

During that conservation, Miers asked Shackleford why 

he was in Lynchburg. In response, Shackleford stated that 

he was traveling from New York to Lynchburg to visit his 

sick aunt in the hospital and that there were things in his 

carry-on bag that she needed.2 According to Miers, 

Shackleford then changed his story by stating that his aunt 

was not in the hospital but at her residence, and that he 

was going to take a taxicab to some other location where 

his aunt would pick him up later. Miers testified that he 

then became suspicious and asked Shackleford for permission 

 2

 That carry-on bag was the only luggage that 

Shackleford had with him. 

3
to search the bag. Shackleford did not consent, stating 

that the bag contained his aunt’s personal items and that 

he did not know what was in the bag. 

The taxicab arrived then, and Shackleford told the 

taxicab driver to take him to a motel just north of the 

city limits of Lynchburg. After Shackleford got into the 

taxicab with his bag, the taxicab left the bus terminal; 

Hall and Miers, traveling in separate vehicles, followed 

the taxicab. En route, Miers and Hall both observed 

Shackleford shifting from side to side in the taxicab and 

leaning over. When the taxicab arrived at the motel, 

Shackleford exited on the passenger side, set his bag on 

the ground, and left the back door of the taxicab open. 

Miers then advised Shackleford that he was free to go but 

that his bag had to remain there long enough for a dog 

trained in the detection of narcotics (K-9 unit) to sniff 

it.3 Miers testified that Shackleford then stated, “you can 

go ahead and search my bag, there’s no drugs or anything in 

it.” 

While Miers was talking with Shackleford at the motel, 

Hall requested and received permission from the taxicab 

 3

 Prior to arriving at the motel, Hall called another 

law enforcement agency and requested that a K-9 unit be 

taken to the motel. When Shackleford arrived at the motel, 

a uniformed police officer was already there with the dog. 

4
driver to search the taxicab. During that search, Hall 

discovered a semi-automatic weapon “under the lip part of 

the backseat” on the passenger side of the taxicab. The 

weapon was in a white, opaque shopping bag. Hall then 

requested the uniformed officer “to run” the K-9 unit on 

the vehicle, and when he did so, the “dog alerted” on a 

package wrapped in tape. That package was located 

underneath the front, passenger seat and contained 14 

plastic baggies, each of which contained an off-white 

substance later determined to be a total of 194.96 grams of 

cocaine. The taxicab driver testified that he had cleaned 

his taxicab the previous night and that Shackleford was his 

first fare that day. The driver further stated that he 

heard what sounded like someone sticking a bag or paper 

under the seat while en route from the bus terminal to the 

motel, although he admitted he did not see Shackleford 

doing so. 

After the gun and cocaine were discovered, Miers 

placed Shackleford under arrest and transported him to the 

police station. At the station, Miers advised Shackleford 

of his Miranda rights, and because Shackleford had already 

told Miers that he was 17 years old, Miers also advised him 

that he could have his parents present during questioning. 

Shackleford signed a waiver-of-rights form and, without 

5
requesting the presence of either a lawyer or his parents, 

stated that he was a naturalized citizen and was staying in 

New York. He also told Miers that his father and mother 

were estranged, that his father lived in Jamaica, and that 

his mother had taken a trip to that country. 

In a hand-written statement, Shackleford said that he 

had received an anonymous telephone call advising that he 

could earn some money if he did as he was told. According 

to Shackleford, the caller knew Shackleford needed money. 

The caller directed Shackleford to pick up a bag at a 

certain location and never to look inside the bag. After 

writing out that statement, Shackleford told Miers that he 

picked up the bag at a city park in the borough of the 

Bronx in New York City and that he then purchased a one-way 

bus ticket from New York City to Lynchburg with money that 

he found in an outside pocket on the bag.4

The petitions filed in the juvenile court charging 

Shackleford with the drug-related offenses listed 

Shackleford’s mother’s name and address. They also 

contained the name of Shackleford’s father and listed his 

address as Kingston, Jamaica. Pursuant to Code § 16.1-

269.1, the Commonwealth moved to transfer Shackleford to 

6
the circuit court. After a hearing on that motion, the 

juvenile court found probable cause to believe that 

Shackleford had committed the delinquent acts alleged, see

Code § 16.1-269.1(A)(2); and that Shackleford was 14 years 

of age or older, was competent to stand trial and was “not 

a proper person to remain within the jurisdiction of the 

juvenile court.” Code § 16.1-269.1(A)(4). Accordingly, 

the juvenile court transferred Shackleford to the circuit 

court to be tried as an adult. 

Shackleford appealed the transfer decision to the 

circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4. Prior to the 

hearing on that appeal, Shackleford moved to continue the 

proceedings because his mother had not been notified of the 

hearing. The circuit court denied the motion, and 

subsequently advised the Commonwealth that it could seek 

indictments. See Code § 16.1-269.6(B). 

After the grand jury returned a three-count indictment 

against Shackleford, he moved to dismiss that indictment, 

in part, because of the lack of notice to his parents. He 

argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because 

neither of his parents was notified of the hearing in 

circuit court regarding his appeal of the transfer 

 4

 At trial, Shackleford testified that he followed the 

caller’s instructions because the caller threatened harm to 

7
decision. He also objected to the court’s jurisdiction 

because his father was not notified of either the 

initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court or the 

transfer hearing in that court. The circuit court 

overruled the motion. 

Prior to trial, Shackleford moved to suppress his 

statement and the physical evidence found in the taxicab. 

The circuit court also overruled that motion. 

ANALYSIS 

Shackleford’s assignments of error raise three 

separate questions: (1) whether the circuit court had 

jurisdiction to try Shackleford on the indictment because 

his parents did not have notice of certain proceedings, (2) 

whether his statement to law enforcement officials was 

voluntarily given and the physical evidence was legally 

seized, and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support his convictions. We will address these questions 

in that order. 

I. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION 

The question of parental notification involves 

different facts and issues with regard to each of 

Shackleford’s parents. Hence, we will consider each parent 

separately. 

 

Shackleford’s family if he did not do so. 

8
First, as to Shackleford’s mother, he contends that 

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try him on the 

indictment because his mother was neither notified of nor 

present at the hearing before the circuit court on his 

appeal of the transfer decision.5 In making this argument, 

Shackleford relies on the provision in Code § 16.1-263(B) 

requiring that “[n]otice of subsequent proceedings shall be 

provided to all parties in interest.” According to 

Shackleford, the hearing in circuit court on his appeal of 

the transfer decision was a “subsequent proceeding[],” 

about which his mother should have received notice. 

 We do not accept Shackleford’s contention that his 

mother did not have notice of that hearing in circuit 

court. At the transfer appeal hearing, Shackleford’s 

juvenile probation officer testified that he spoke with 

Shackleford’s mother on the morning of that hearing. She 

 5

 Shackleford makes only a jurisdictional argument with 

regard to the lack of notice to his mother. He does not 

contend that he was prejudiced in any other way because of 

her failure to attend the hearing on his appeal of the 

transfer decision. 

Shackleford also does not contest the fact that his 

mother received notice of the petitions and initiation of 

proceedings in the juvenile court, and a summons advising 

her of the time, date, and place of the initial hearing on 

those petitions. Additionally, Shackleford’s counsel 

acknowledged to the circuit court that Shackleford’s mother 

received notice of and was present at the transfer hearing 

conducted in juvenile court. 

9
told the probation officer that she could not travel from 

New York to attend the hearing because of her financial 

situation and work schedule. The probation officer 

testified similarly at a subsequent hearing on 

Shackleford’s motion to dismiss the indictment. At that 

hearing, the circuit court made a factual finding that 

Shackleford’s mother had notice of the transfer appeal 

hearing in circuit court. That factual finding is 

supported by sufficient evidence. See Schneider v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736 

(1985) (factual findings of court will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

them). Accordingly, we hold that Shackleford’s mother had 

actual notice of the transfer appeal hearing in circuit 

court and that such notice satisfied any statutory notice 

requirements of Code § 16.1-263(B). Roach v. Director, 

Dep’t of Corrections, 258 Va. 537, 544-45, 522 S.E.2d 869, 

872 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965 (1999); see also

Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 668, 222 S.E.2d 517, 

519 (1976).6

 6

 Because Shackleford’s mother had actual notice, we do 

not reach the question whether a hearing in circuit court 

on an appeal of a transfer decision by the juvenile court 

is a “subsequent proceeding[]” under Code § 16.1-263(B). 

Nor do we decide whether the absence of such notice has any 

10
 We now turn to the issue regarding notice to 

Shackleford’s father. Unlike his mother, Shackleford’s 

father received neither notice of the petitions and 

initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court nor the 

summons specified in Code § 16.1-263(A). The father also 

did not have notice of the hearing in circuit court on the 

transfer appeal, nor did he voluntarily appear at any of 

the proceedings in either the juvenile court or the circuit 

court. Relying on the decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 

258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam), aff’g 28 Va. 

App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998), Shackleford argues that 

the lack of notice to his father divested the circuit court 

of its jurisdiction to try him on the indictment after his 

transfer from juvenile court. 

 Pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E), Shackleford raised 

the lack of notice to his father in his motion to dismiss 

the indictment, which he filed and the circuit court heard 

before Shackleford’s arraignment.7 Nevertheless, the Court 

of Appeals held that, because the offenses were committed 

after July 1, 1996, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) 

 

jurisdictional or constitutional implications as argued by 

Shackleford. 

7

 Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that “[a]ny objection 

to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to this 

article shall be waived if not made before arraignment.” 

11
are controlling. That section states that “[a]n indictment 

in the circuit court cures any error or defect in any 

proceeding held in the juvenile court except with respect 

to the juvenile’s age.” In Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth, 

259 Va. 405, 410, 527 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2000), this Court 

held that a defect caused by failure to notify a 

defendant’s biological father of the initiation of juvenile 

court proceedings was cured by a grand jury indictment. 

Citing Dennis Moore, the Court of Appeals concluded that, 

since Shackleford did not raise the failure to comply with 

the parental notification provisions in Code §§ 16.1-263(A) 

and –264 before the indictment was returned in circuit 

court, that indictment cured any defect resulting from the 

lack of notice to his father. Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 

318, 528 S.E.2d at 129. The Court of Appeals reached the 

same conclusion regarding the failure to notify 

Shackleford’s father of the hearing in circuit court on the 

transfer appeal. Id. at 319, 528 S.E.2d at 129. 

Shackleford contends that our decision in Dennis Moore

is inapposite. In that case, the juvenile court certified 

felony charges to the grand jury after conducting a 

preliminary hearing under Code §§ 16.1-269.1(B) and (C). 

Dennis Moore, 259 Va. at 408, 527 S.E.2d at 416-17. In 

contrast, Shackleford’s transfer to circuit court was under 

12
Code § 16.1-269.1(A), and he then appealed that transfer 

decision pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4. The provisions of 

Code § 16.1-269.4 authorize an appeal only from a transfer 

decision made under subsection A of Code § 16.1-269.1. 

Shackleford argues that the procedural posture of his case 

is, therefore, different from that in Dennis Moore. Noting 

what he terms as a conflict between the provisions of Code 

§§ 16.1-269.1(E) and –269.6(E), he argues that Code § 16.1-

269.1(E) does not cure the notice defects because he timely 

raised his objection before arraignment in accordance with 

Code § 16.1-269.6(E). 

Shackleford is correct about the procedural 

distinction between his case and the circumstances in 

Dennis Moore. However, that distinction is not 

dispositive. The terms of Code § 16.1-269.6(E) establish a 

deadline before which any objections to the jurisdiction of 

the circuit court based on defects in the transfer process 

must be raised. See David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 

431, 440, 527 S.E.2d 406, 410-11 (2000) (holding that 

waiver prescribed by Code § 16.1-269.6(E) applies only to 

defects in transfer proceedings conducted pursuant to 

Article 7). According to the provisions of that section, 

the deadline for making such objections is the date of 

13
arraignment. If they are not raised before arraignment, 

the objections are waived. 

In contrast, Code § 16.1-269.1(E) is not a “waiver” 

provision but rather a “curative” one. This section states 

that an indictment “cures any error or defect in any 

proceeding held in the juvenile court.” (Emphasis added.) 

Although Shackleford timely raised his objection to the 

jurisdiction of the circuit court before his arraignment 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E), the alleged defect based 

on the failure to comply with the notice requirements of 

Code §§ 16.1-263(A) and –264 with regard to his father was 

cured by the indictment. In other words, the indictment 

cured the defect raised in Shackleford’s objection before 

he made the objection. 

As this Court noted in David Moore, 259 Va. at 440, 

527 S.E.2d at 411, “the legislature has the authority to 

provide for a waiver of a defect in the transfer 

proceeding.” Likewise, the legislature has the authority 

to create a cure for any defect in the proceedings in 

juvenile court, thereby eliminating certain objections 

before the deadline by which they would otherwise have to 

be raised. Thus, we hold that any alleged defects in the 

juvenile proceedings with regard to Shackleford’s father 

were cured by the indictment and that the circuit court, 

14
therefore, was not in any manner divested of its 

jurisdiction to try Shackleford on the charges set forth in 

the indictment. 

This holding also applies to the lack of notice to 

Shackleford’s father about the hearing in circuit court on 

the transfer appeal. While we recognize that Code § 16.1-

269.1(E) speaks in terms of curing defects in the 

proceedings in the juvenile court, an appeal from a 

transfer decision under Code § 16.1-269.4 is the final step 

in the transfer process commenced under Code § 16.1-

269.1(A). We believe that the legislature intended for an 

indictment to cure any defects in that entire process. 

Thus, the indictment also cured the failure to notify 

Shackleford’s father of the hearing in circuit court on the 

transfer appeal.8

II. STATEMENT AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 

In this assignment of error, Shackleford asserts three 

reasons why the circuit court should have suppressed his 

statement and the physical evidence. Two of those reasons 

relate solely to his statement: (1) that his rights under 

 8

 At the hearing in circuit court on the transfer 

appeal, Shackleford did not object to the lack of notice of 

that hearing to his father, as he did with regard to his 

mother. Shackleford did not raise the lack of notice to 

his father with regard to the transfer appeal hearing in 

15
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional 

Protocol on Disputes (Vienna Convention), 21 U.S.T. 77, 

T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Apr. 24, 1963), and the Due Process 

Clause of the Constitution of the United States were 

violated because he was never advised of his right to speak 

with an official of the Jamaican Embassy, and (2) that he 

was improperly advised of his Miranda rights because the 

police officer modified the waiver-of-rights form to say 

that Shackleford had a right to have a lawyer “or parents” 

present during interrogation. 

The third reason pertains to his statement as well as 

the seizure of the firearm and cocaine. Shackleford claims 

that he was detained at the motel when Miers told him that 

his bag had to remain there until the K-9 unit sniffed it. 

According to Shackleford, that detention was without 

“reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot” and 

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, argues 

Shackleford, suppression of the evidence is required under 

the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine because the 

illegal detention led to both his statement and discovery 

of the physical evidence. We find no merit in any of these 

arguments. 

 

circuit court or the proceedings in juvenile court until he 

filed his motion to dismiss the indictment. 

16
First, in Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 419, 508 

S.E.2d 57, 64 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999), 

this Court addressed a defendant’s claim that a violation 

of his rights under the Vienna Convention required 

suppression of a confession. There, we held, contrary to 

Shackleford’s argument, that the provisions of the Vienna 

Convention create no legally enforceable individual rights. 

Id. Continuing, we stated that Article 36, the same 

provision upon which Shackleford relies, “merely deals with 

notice to be furnished to the consular post of a national’s 

state when the national is arrested or taken into custody 

in a foreign state.”9 Id. Accordingly, we conclude that 

any failure to advise Shackleford about his purported right 

to speak with an official of the Jamaican Embassy did not 

violate the Vienna Convention or any rights secured to him 

by the Constitution of the United States. Likewise, to the 

extent that Shackleford suggests that he would not have 

pled guilty if he had been advised that he could contact 

the Jamaican Embassy, that contention is, at best, 

speculative. See id.

 9

 After the Commonwealth learned that Shackleford was a 

Jamaican citizen, it sent a letter dated March 9, 1998, to 

an official of the Jamaican Embassy, detailing the charges 

that had been placed against Shackelford and advising where 

Shackleford was being detained. The Commonwealth also 

17
Next, with regard to the waiver-of-rights form, 

Shackleford contends that Miers’ addition of the words “or 

parents” to that form minimized the importance of the right 

to counsel and caused him to believe that he had the right 

to have either counsel or his parents present during 

interrogation, but not both. In pertinent part, the 

modified, preprinted form that Shackleford signed contained 

the following information: 

 YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER OR PARENTS 

FOR ADVICE BEFORE WE ASK YOU ANY QUESTIONS AND TO HAVE 

A LAWYER OR PARENTS WITH YOU DURING QUESTIONING. 

Miers testified that he told Shackleford that, since 

Shackleford was a juvenile, he had the right to have his 

parents present “in addition to or in substitute for a 

lawyer.” 

 We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that 

“Shackleford voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth 

Amendment rights to remain silent and to have counsel 

present during a custodial interrogation.” Shackleford, 32 

Va. App. at 323, 528 S.E.2d at 131. The modification to 

the waiver-of-rights form did not diminish Shackleford’s 

right to counsel. Considering Miers’ additional 

explanation to Shackleford, we fail to see how Shackleford 

 

explained the proceedings then pending in the juvenile 

court. 

18
could have been misled into believing that, if he asked to 

have his parents present during the questioning, he could 

not also have counsel present. Moreover, Shackleford did 

not request to have either present during the 

interrogation; so, the options presented to Shackleford 

regarding his rights did not, in fact, lead to any election 

that even arguably affected his right to counsel. Miers 

also testified that Shackleford acknowledged that he 

understood his rights and so indicated by checking the 

appropriate box on the waiver form and signing it. 

Therefore, we find that Shackleford was fully advised of 

his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them. The Court 

of Appeals did not err in upholding the circuit court’s 

refusal to suppress Shackleford’s statement. 

 Last, we do not decide whether Miers’ statement at the 

motel that Shackleford was free to go but that his bag had 

to remain there long enough for the narcotics dog to sniff 

it was tantamount to detaining Shackleford. The physical 

evidence that Shackleford claims should have been 

suppressed was not found on his person or in the bag. 

Rather, the weapon and cocaine were found in the taxicab 

that Shackleford had exited. At that point, Shackleford 

had no expectation of privacy in the items that he left in 

the taxicab. See Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 

19
274, 513 S.E.2d 400, 408, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 

(1999) (defendant had no expectation of privacy in box left 

at sister’s home). And, Hall searched the taxicab only 

after the taxicab driver consented to the search. See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (search 

conducted pursuant to valid consent does not implicate 

Fourth Amendment). 

 Once the firearm was lawfully seized and the package 

was discovered in the taxicab, probable cause existed to 

place Shackleford under arrest. Consequently, 

Shackleford’s statements were made after his lawful arrest 

and after he had been advised of his Miranda rights. Thus, 

as the Commonwealth argues, there simply was no “fruit” 

from the allegedly “poisonous tree.” Neither the physical 

evidence nor Shackleford’s statement was obtained in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a 

conviction, we consider that evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, and we affirm the conviction 

unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it. Horton, 255 Va. at 614, 499 S.E.2d at 262 (citing 

Higginbotham, 216 Va. at 352, 218 S.E.2d at 537)). The 

circuit court sitting without a jury in this case acted as 

20
the fact finder; hence, the court’s judgment is accorded 

the same weight as a jury verdict. Evans v. Commonwealth, 

215 Va. 609, 613, 212 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1975). As the fact 

finder, the court “need not believe the accused’s 

explanation and may infer that he is trying to conceal his 

guilt.” Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 

S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981). 

After reviewing the evidence and considering 

Shackleford’s arguments, we conclude, as did the Court of 

Appeals, that there is sufficient evidence to support his 

convictions. We need not repeat all the evidence and 

reasons outlined by the Court of Appeals that warrant this 

conclusion. See Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 324-29, 528 

S.E.2d at 132-34 for a discussion of these points. 

However, we will emphasize some key reasons why the Court 

of Appeals did not err in finding sufficient evidence to 

support the convictions. In doing so, we reiterate that 

the circuit court, as the fact finder, was not bound to 

accept Shackleford’s explanation and may have concluded 

that he was lying to conceal his guilt. See Black, 222 Va. 

at 842, 284 S.E.2d at 610. 

First, in regard to his conviction for possession of 

cocaine with the intent to distribute, Shackleford asserts 

that he had no idea what was in the bag that he brought to 

21
Lynchburg from New York City at the request of an allegedly 

anonymous telephone caller. He claims that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that he was aware of the 

presence and character of the substance, and that he was 

intentionally and consciously in possession of it. See

Gillis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 298, 301, 208 S.E.2d 768, 

771 (1974) (“[t]o establish possession of a controlled 

substance, it generally is necessary to show that the 

defendant was aware of the presence and character of the 

particular substance and was intentionally and consciously 

in possession of it”). 

Relevant to this issue is the fact that Shackleford 

gave several inconsistent statements. He first told Miers 

that his aunt was in the hospital but later said that she 

was at her residence. Then, after removing the firearm and 

package of cocaine from his bag, hiding them in the 

taxicab, and exiting the taxicab, he declared to Miers, 

“you can go ahead and search my bag, there’s no drugs or 

anything in it.” However, at the bus terminal, Shackleford 

would not consent to a search of the bag on the pretext 

that it contained his aunt’s personal items. 

 Shackleford also asserts that the Commonwealth did not 

establish that he intended to distribute cocaine. This 

argument overlooks the fact that a police officer, who 

22
testified as an expert in the use and distribution of 

narcotics, stated that illegal drugs are routinely packaged 

in individual bags to facilitate distribution. The package 

found in the taxicab contained 14 plastic baggies, each 

containing cocaine, which, according to the expert, has a 

street value of approximately $100 to $150 per gram. 

As to the conviction for transporting more than one 

ounce of cocaine into the Commonwealth, Shackleford attacks 

the testimony of the forensic scientist who tested the 

substance in the 14 baggies. Shackleford claims that, 

since the forensic scientist did not determine what portion 

of the 194.96 grams of substance was actually cocaine, the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that he transported the 

requisite one ounce. He also challenges the fact that the 

circuit court took judicial notice of the fact that 194.96 

grams is more than one ounce. 

 Contrary to Shackleford’s argument, a conviction under 

§ 18.2-248.01 does not require the Commonwealth’s forensic 

scientist to test each gram of the substance to determine 

its purity. That section provides that “it is unlawful for 

any person to transport into the Commonwealth . . . with 

intent to sell or distribute one ounce or more of cocaine, 

coca leaves or any salt, compound, derivative or 

preparation thereof . . . .” We agree with the Court of 

23
Appeals that the plain terms of this statute “mandates that 

the quantity of the mixture—the ‘compound’ or 

‘preparation’—rather than the purity of the cocaine in the 

mixture” is to be used to determine the weight of the 

substance transported into the Commonwealth. Shackleford, 

32 Va. App. at 328, 528 S.E.2d at 134. We also conclude 

that the circuit court did not err in taking judicial 

notice of the conversion ratio between grams and ounces. 

See Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 439, 445, 247 S.E.2d 698, 

703 (1978) (“[c]ourts may take judicial notice of generally 

known or easily ascertainable facts”). 

Finally, on the conviction for possession of the 

firearm, Shackleford posits that the evidence did not 

establish that he was in possession of the firearm while 

also knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine. He 

concedes that he was in possession of the firearm once he 

opened the bag and found the weapon inside, but argues 

that, after he hid the firearm under the seat of the 

taxicab, he no longer possessed it. During the brief time 

of admitted possession, Shackleford claims that he was not 

simultaneously aware of the character and presence of the 

cocaine. 

 Since we have already concluded that the evidence was 

sufficient to convict Shackleford of possession of cocaine 

24
with intent to distribute, the evidence is likewise 

sufficient to support his conviction for possession of the 

firearm. Shackleford concedes that he possessed the 

weapon. 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of 

Appeals did not err in affirming Shackleford’s convictions. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, dissenting. 

 I respectfully dissent. I do so because, in my view, 

the majority effectively usurps for this Court an authority 

that properly rests exclusively with the General Assembly 

by altering the meaning of the express language of the 

statutes pertinent to this appeal. Specifically, in the 

context of this case the majority expands the meaning of 

the express language of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) to render 

meaningless the equally express language of Code § 16.1-

269.6(E). 

 Code § 16.1-269.1(E) provides, in pertinent part, 

that: “An indictment in the circuit court cures any error 

or defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court

25
except with respect to the juvenile’s age.” (Emphasis 

added). Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that: “Any 

objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant 

to this article shall be waived if not made before 

arraignment.” (Emphasis added). 

 Undoubtedly, with regard to an offense committed by a 

juvenile on or after July 1, 1996, we have held that “an 

indictment by a grand jury cures any defect or error . . . 

which has occurred in any juvenile court proceeding” 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(E). Dennis Moore v. 

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 410, 527 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2000). 

However, that case, unlike the present case, did not 

involve an appeal pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4 of a 

transfer decision by the juvenile court under Code § 16.1-

269.1(A). Moreover, in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 

Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000), we explained that “[t]he 

plain language of [Code § 16.1-269.6(E)] clearly manifests 

legislative intent that any defect in the transfer 

proceedings conducted in the juvenile court as provided in 

Article 7 is waived such that the circuit court acquires 

the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction 

over the offenses charged against the juvenile unless the 

juvenile raises an objection based on a defect in the 

juvenile court transfer hearing prior to arraignment in the 

26
circuit court.” (Additional emphasis added). Id. at 440, 

527 S.E.2d at 410-11. 

 In the present case, Dorian Lee-Kirk Shackleford 

challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court based on a 

defect in the juvenile court transfer hearing and he did so 

prior to his arraignment in the circuit court in accord 

with Code § 16.1-269.6(E). The defect created by the lack 

of the required notice to his father of that transfer 

hearing is not disputed. Nevertheless, the majority 

concludes that, notwithstanding the provisions of Code 

§ 16.1-269.6(E), under Code § 16.1-269.1(E) “the indictment 

cured the defect raised in Shackleford’s objection before 

he made the objection.” To support this conclusion the 

majority reasons that although “Code § 16.1-269.1(E) speaks 

in terms of curing defects in the proceedings in the 

juvenile court, an appeal from a transfer decision under 

Code § 16.1-269.4 is the final step in the transfer process 

commenced under Code § 16.1-269.1(A)” and that “the 

legislature intended for an indictment to cure any defects 

in that entire process.” Under this reasoning, for all 

practical purposes, any objection to the jurisdiction of 

the circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E) could 

never be effective, even though timely asserted, once an 

indictment has been returned against the juvenile 

27
defendant. Certainly, the legislature did not intend to 

create a right under Code § 16.1-269.6 without a remedy.∗

 It should be self-evident that the proceeding held in 

the circuit court on an appeal of a transfer decision is 

not a “proceeding held in the juvenile court.” Moreover, 

Code § 16.1-269.1(E) makes no reference to a “final step in 

the transfer process;” the majority simply adds that 

language, as it must, in order to support its expanded 

interpretation of the express terms of this statute. But, 

“[c]ourts are not permitted to add language to a statute 

nor are they ‘permitted to accomplish the same result by 

judicial interpretation.’ ” Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 

Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001) (quoting Harbor 

 ∗

Code § 16.1-272.1, enacted in 2000, further undermines 

the majority’s conclusion with regard to the legislative 

intent embodied in Code § 16.1-269.1(E). This statutes 

provides, in pertinent part, that: 

In addition to any other curative provisions, 

waivers, procedural defaults, or requirements for 

timely objections, including but not limited to 

those in . . . subsection E of § 16.1-269.1 and 

subsection E of § 16.1-269.6, any claim of error 

or defect under this chapter, jurisdictional or 

otherwise, that is not raised within one year 

from the date of final judgment of the circuit 

court or one year from the effective date of this 

act, whichever is the later, shall not constitute 

a ground for relief in any judicial proceeding. 

If the majority’s expanded interpretation of Code § 16.1-

269.1(E) is correct, then the inclusion of that Code 

28
Cruises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 458, 461, 230 S.E.2d 

248, 250 (1976)). 

 In my view, under Code § 16.1-269.1(E) the effect of 

an indictment in the circuit court is to cure defects in 

the juvenile proceedings for purposes of establishing the 

subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, and not 

to divest the circuit court of its authority under Code 

§ 16.1-269.6 to consider objections to and appeals of a 

transfer decision by the juvenile court made prior to 

arraignment on that indictment. See David Moore v. 

Commonwealth, 259 Va. at 437, 527 S.E.2d at 409 

(distinguishing between the power of a court to adjudicate 

a specified class of cases and the authority of a court to 

exercise that power in a particular case). Where, as here, 

the record shows that the Commonwealth failed to provide 

both of Shackleford’s parents with notice of the 

proceedings in the juvenile court as then required by Code 

§§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, Code § 16.1-269.6(E), in addition 

to the other provisions of Code § 16.1-269.6, provided 

Shackleford the right to assert that defect in the 

subsequent proceedings held in the circuit court. 

Moreover, that defect caused the transfer of jurisdiction 

 

section in Code § 16.1-272.1 would have been entirely 

unnecessary. Clearly the legislature concluded otherwise. 

29
from the juvenile court to the circuit court to be 

ineffectual and Shackleford’s subsequent convictions to be 

void. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 1, 2, 516 S.E.2d 

219, 220 (1999) (per curiam), aff’g Baker v. Commonwealth, 

28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998). The circuit court 

erred in failing to exercise its authority to remand the 

case to the juvenile court for further proceedings in order 

to ensure that both of Shackleford’s parents were provided 

with the then required notice of the proceedings against 

him. 

 For these reasons, I would reverse Shackleford’s 

convictions and remand the case for further proceedings. 

Accordingly, I would not reach the other issues raised by 

Shackleford in this appeal. 

30