IMPACT OF THE WAR ON TERROR ON CERTAIN 

ASPECTS OF US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

A Medium-Term Assessment 

December 27, 2001 

Prepared for The National Intelligence Council by 

Paul Jabber 

President, Globicom Inc. 

The purpose of this analysis is to assess the likely impact that the US campaign 

against global terrorism launched in the wake of the attacks of September 11th, 2001, will 

have on key American interests in the Middle East over the medium term (next 12 months). 

The main focus will be on the expected perceptions and reaction to US policy of selected 

important Middle East actors, regime stability and changing regional alignments. 

To render the analysis relevant to policy-making and policy assessment, the approach 

here will be parsimonious, not comprehensive. The United States presently maintains an 

extensive and continually growing presence in the Middle East, with diplomatic, military, 

commercial and cultural dimensions. The region contains long-identified vital US national 

interests, and security commitments toward several key states, all well known to the reader. 

My intent in what follows is not to parse or review all the important sets of bilateral 

relationships that constitute our Middle East policy, but to structure the analysis tightly 

around two core questions: 

1) How will the region absorb and react to the USG's war on terrorism in its 

regional manifestations, given that by necessity the Middle East will turn out to 

be the main theater of operations? 

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2) Which US policy choices are more likely to be effective in limiting the threat of 

terrorist strikes against the homeland in particular and other countries generally? 

I. General Policy Context

As repeatedly enunciated by the President and senior Cabinet officials in the wake of 

September 11th, confronting and ultimately stamping out "terrorism with a global reach" has 

become the single most important objective of US national policy for the foreseeable future. 

Because of the magnitude of the September attacks, the nature of the targets, and the 

possibility that future strikes may use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on national 

territory, the USG is now engaged in a campaign of indefinite duration, of global scope, 

utilizing all instruments of power, against states, organizations and individuals engaged in, 

hosting, or otherwise supporting, terrorism. Since the perpetrators of the September attacks 

acted at the behest of and with the active training and support of Osama bin Laden's AlQa'eda organization, the Al-Qa'eda and its network of associated groups as well as the 

fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan which provided it with sanctuary and support 

became the targets of the first phase of the War. 

Al-Qa'eda's explicitly stated objectives, as repeatedly articulated by its leader and 

founder, include the expulsion of US and other Western military forces from Arab lands, 

most particularly Saudi Arabia, and forcing the retreat of the Western political influence and 

commercial presence from major Islamic countries, as a prelude to the overthrow of existing 

regimes in favor of the creation of virtuous Islamic systems ruled under Shari'a law. To 

fulfill these goals, the stated strategy of Al-Qa'eda is to launch repeated and escalatory acts of 

violence against the West and its regional allies, and, in recent years, explicitly and principally 

against US targets, both military and civilian. These blows are intended to (a) sap the will of 

the USG and the support of the American public for current US Middle East policy; (b) 

provide an example and a goad to similarly minded groups throughout the Islamic world to 

join the struggle; and, (c) provoke Western countermeasures that would further strain and 

ultimately rupture relations with Islamic nations. The attacks in New York and Washington 

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came in the wake of earlier strikes against US diplomatic and military targets abroad, and 

represented in terms of expected number of casualties and importance of the value targets a 

major step up the escalation ladder, with higher rungs to follow. Bin Laden's declarations 

after the deed clearly articulated a vanguard role for Al-Qa'eda as the spark for an epochal 

conflagration between Islam and the West. 

As it assembled a broad international coalition and mobilized its military assets for 

the War against Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban regime, the USG has strenuously sought to draw 

a clear-cut distinction between odious global terrorism on the one hand, and Islam as a 

benevolent major world religion with millions of US adherents on the other. Key US allies, 

including British and other European leaders, have articulated this strongly and often as well. 

The eventual coalition became very broad-based, and eventually included most relevant 

Islamic countries worldwide. 

In the Middle East, most governments have long recognized the threat to their own 

stability and the economic cost to their societies represented by militant Islam. They were 

quick to denounce the 9/11 perpetrators, dissociate themselves from any support for terror 

tactics or strategy and provide intelligence cooperation. They have also cooperated in some 

degree with the US-led effort to drain the financial resources of international terrorism. 

They generally have refrained from vocal support for US policy in Afghanistan, however, 

and, perhaps more importantly, they have done little to discourage the expression of strong 

anti-Western, anti-US and pro-militant Islamic views in the media, the educational system or 

the mosques. Even in Egypt, highly influential organs of the print media, including the most 

important daily newspapers--have been stridently anti-American in their editorial coverage. 

This is despite the fact that Egypt is a top recipient of US aid, a "close friend and ally" in the 

region, and one of two Islamic countries (the other being Algeria) that has been the most 

heavily affected by Islamic terrorism over the past quarter century, 

The disconnect between the privately stated support of most Arab governments for 

US policy against terror and the lending of intelligence and other assistance out of the public 

eye, on one hand, and the half-hearted, clear reluctance to openly promote such support or 

act to shore up its public foundations, on the other, does not come as a surprise, and has 

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antecedents in pre-9/11 behavior. It is important, however, that familiarity not breed an 

under-estimation of the dynamics that fuel this syndrome, and of the severe limitations such 

dynamics could impose on the will and ability of these governments to provide the level of 

cooperation and support we may wish to see as the main focus of our counterterrorism 

operations shifts to the Arab heartland. 

Negative Factors

The tepid Arab support for US policy, likely to slide in coming months into passive 

resistance, flows from five main sources: 

1. Absence of demonstrable progress toward achieving a resolution of the 

Palestinian-Israeli conflict that redeems the Palestinians' national rights 

in a manner minimally acceptable to them. This point requires no 

belaboring here, except to emphasize that, in the eyes of 99.9% of all Arabs--

including their heads of state and senior officials--it is an article of faith that the 

USG has ultimate power of decision over Israeli policy, not in every nuance or 

detail, and not in all immediate circumstances, but certainly in terms of drawing 

clear red lines, and structuring critical outcomes with long-term regional 

consequences. In other words, it is an immutable reality of our Middle East 

policy context that the USG is held responsible for Israel's behavior and policies. 

While we may strenuously deny this reality in our declarative posture and other 

public fora, to overlook it when designing policy is simply self-defeating. 

2. A stalemated Western policy toward Iraq that appears to be of indefinite 

duration, has not proved effective in weakening Saddam Hussein's hold 

on power, and offers no reprieve to the awful suffering of the Iraqi 

population, now in its tenth year. The attitude of Arab officials and other 

influentials toward Iraq is rife with inner contradictions and crosscurrents. 

Absent the very visible, well-documented and continuing hardships visited on the 

Iraqi people by the seemingly interminable present impasse, the US policy of 

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"keeping Saddam in his box" might well be acceptable to them. Caught between 

the Scylla of Western armies bombing Baghdad into oblivion and then occupying 

the country's heartland to uproot a despot burrowed deep in his nuclear-proof 

bunkers, and the Charybdis of an unfettered Saddam able to coerce his neighbors 

and give vent to his regional leadership ambitions, Arab leaders find the middle 

ground of a neutered Iraq under tight international supervision to be 

considerably attractive. But the prevailing combination of frequent air strikes, 

civilian deprivation and indefinite stalemate has generated widespread revulsion 

at all levels of Arab society, particularly as undoctored independent public media 

such as satellite television and the Internet bring coverage of Iraqi suffering to 

public consciousness in frequent and vivid detail. Our current policy on Iraq is 

casting a pall on US ties with all friendly Arab governments (with the exception 

of Kuwait), and has done very serious damage to the American image in the eyes 

of the public, for it is taken as prima facie evidence of blatant disregard for the 

value of Arab life. 

3. Weak and continuously deteriorating macro-economic conditions in the 

region are limiting the regimes in their ability to muster support from 

important constituencies. The early and mid-1990's marked a period of 

economic promise. Several trends and events combined to offer hope that a 

much-needed regional economic takeoff was finally under way. They included 

the end of the Lebanese civil war; the onset of the Oslo peace process with its 

promise of eventual peace and Arab-Israeli joint venturing in trade and 

investment; relatively stable oil prices; significant progress on the part of 

important Arab economies such as Egypt's in debt-restructuring and budgetary 

rationalization; and the emergence of several viable local stock markets that 

encouraged private sector capital formation and inflows of foreign investment on 

the back of a promised wave of privatization of public enterprises 

Grim realities have reasserted themselves in recent years. Not only have peace 

prospects been dealt a serious setback; continued military confrontations and 

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terrorist activities throughout the Levant and in Egypt have seriously constricted 

key revenues from tourism and frightened foreign capital away; GDP growth 

rates have not kept pace with population increases; educational systems and 

other infrastructural components have deteriorated (with the partial exception of 

telecommunications); and, not least, the global economic slowdown has seriously 

diminished oil revenues. 

The looming possibility of a major influx of Russian and Central Asian oil and 

gas supplies into world markets in the years ahead is exacerbating anxieties in the 

Arab Gulf over future revenue prospects. Although in the past it was easy to 

draw a clear distinction between Arab haves and have-nots in terms of oil 

revenues, per-capita income, economic growth rates and other indicia of 

development, the picture has become significantly more muddled. Saudi Arabia 

provides the prime example of the deteriorating trend in regime stability. This is 

not because the overthrow of the House of Saud is in any way imminent. In 

relative terms, however, of all pivotal Arab governments, in one short decade the 

Kingdom has traveled the furthest down the road from unassailable stability and 

unquestioned legitimacy into a social and economic landscape fraught with 

shadows and potential pitfalls. 

4. Fairly rapid and continuing deligitimization of the current Arab political 

order, an order that is generally perceived as abetted and sustained in 

large measure by US military presence and economic might. An easy bet 

to make at low odds: were a sorcerer's magic wand to enable genuinely free 

elections in the Arab Middle East today, the overwhelming majority of Arab 

regimes, and their sustaining institutions, would be swept from office. This was 

not always the case. For several decades in the wake of decolonization, even 

rulers who grabbed power by military coup were accorded broad support as 

harbingers of economic modernization and champions of independence from 

foreign influence. In countries with traditional dynastic rulers, a social compact 

based on ancient tribal practices and norms, whereby allegiance was traded for 

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pious, just governance and fair resource distribution, undergirded the legitimacy 

of the rulers. This landscape has been convulsed in the last quarter century. 

Beginning with the disastrous performance of the leading Arab nationalist 

regimes in the 1967 Six-Day War, and ending with the sorry record tallied up by 

regional governance over the past thirty years in the provision of material 

comforts, satisfying jobs and improving standards of living for the average 

citizen, the march of events has turned the excitement, hope and support of early 

times into sullen, resentful resignation. The litany of bitter disappointments that 

is frequently rehearsed among politically relevant elites includes the cynical use 

by a multitude of Middle Eastern parties of the fratricidal and blood-soaked 

fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon as an arena for their regional power games; the 

squandering of much oil wealth accruing to the region during the petrodollar era 

of the 1970's in corruption and mismanagement; the ruinous Iraq-Iran war, soon 

to be followed by the invasion and despoiling of Kuwait, and in the reestablishment of foreign military bases on Arab soil; and the growing intolerance 

of political opposition or the mere expression of dissent by intellectuals and the 

media, enforced by increasingly efficient and pervasive internal security organs. 

The malaise has been further accelerated and magnified in the 1990's and into the 

new millennium by the synergistic impact of globalization and the information 

revolution on perceptions and expectations. The average citizen of the Middle 

East knows that much of the rest of the world is gliding down the path of 

economic development and political participation at a faster rate than he is, and 

is increasingly pointing the finger of blame at his own government. 

5. The undiminished specter of Jihadist Fundamentalism. Finally, despite the 

major setback that Jihadist fundamentalism is suffering in Afghanistan with the 

demise of the Taliban regime and of a significant portion of the Al-Qa'eda 

infrastructure and leadership, the political challenge that it poses to the legitimacy 

and hold on power of current Arab officialdom is not significantly weakened, 

and in fact may be growing more robust. The complex of issues and grievances 

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that have provided the motivation for Al-Qa'eda's activities is likely to persist for 

some time to come, and socioeconomic conditions prevailing in much of the 

Islamic world continue to deteriorate. Equally critical is the fact that Al-Qa'eda 

is not the fount of Jihadist activism, but only its most effective and successful 

current manifestation. 

This needs to be stressed, as there is an inclination among many (within the USG 

but also elsewhere) to believe that Al-Qa'eda and similar radical fundamentalist 

groups are a major engine--if not the key engine--fueling anti-US sentiment. In 

fact, Osama bin Laden's version of reality is derived from, and fully mirrors, the 

Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic scripture, history, global mission and 

current state of relations between Islam and the world. To the increasing dismay 

of many moderate Muslim scholars and community leaders, this version of reality 

is fervently accepted by a growing segment of Muslim opinion. 

Al-Qa'eda's only distinguishing characteristic at this point--admittedly an 

important one--is the willingness to resort to mass violence against civilians, but 

this may prove to be a function of opportunity and tactical choice, not 

ideological differentiation. It follows that, bin Laden's likely personal demise 

notwithstanding and despite the end of the Taliban regime and the sanctuary it 

represented, the threat is not significantly diminished. Arguably, the threat is 

enhanced by the success itself of the 9/11 attacks, and this "triumph" (even 

perhaps embellished in the future by the legend of bin Laden's and Ayman alZawahiri's martyrdom) may serve as a paragon and motivational tool for 

individual recruitment and popular proselytizing for the cause. 

Positive Factors

Despite the difficulties inherent in this policy context, they are somewhat balanced 

by a variety of positive elements in the picture, of which three are of primary importance: 

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1. Existence of a broad international coalition--inclusive of many Middle 

East countries--committed to the campaign against terror, and visibly 

active in it. For obvious historical reasons, a US effort that may require 

significant covert or overt operations carried out by conventional military assets 

or special forces within the territory of several Middle Eastern states in all 

probability will meet stiff resistance even from our closest allies in the region if it 

is attempted unilaterally, or if it is backed only by a handful of Western 

countries. The broad coalition formed prior to the Afghanistan operations, 

which includes strong Russian support, China's backing and the endorsement of 

many Islamic countries, will make it far easier for the Yemeni, Somali, Sudanese, 

Algerian or even Syrian governments to acquiesce in foreign operations on their 

soil or, in the case of Syria--however reluctantly--on the territory of its Lebanese 

client-state. This will be particularly the case if anti-terrorism operations are 

also seen to be carried out by the coalition against some non-Islamic targets. 

Inevitably, some coalition partners will peel off as targets become more complex 

and controversial. The Afghan case was perhaps the easiest around which a 

global coalition could coalesce: the Taliban regime was widely despised and had 

minimal international recognition; the enormity of the 9/11 attacks and the 

pervasiveness of the Al-Qa'eda network's presence in dozens of countries 

created a clear and present danger for many governments worldwide; and the 

determined posture of the USG provided no wiggle room for potential fencesitters. In subsequent phases, coalition management is likely to require 

strenuous ongoing diplomatic efforts and the exercise of political and economic 

leverage. Despite strong rhetoric to the contrary, most regional governments 

will be supportive of US military action provided the case is carefully prepared 

and substantively persuasive, collateral damage is minimal, and the host 

government is cooperative. 

In the longer run, international agreement on a set of fairly precise definitions of 

what constitutes "terrorist" behavior may become a potentially critical 

requirement for successful coalition maintenance. The emergence of such 

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broadly accepted international norms, most likely through the United Nations, 

would subject any non-complying state actor--either as perpetrator or as 

supporter--to pariah status. More importantly, it might limit the need to mount 

strenuous efforts every time to build a different international coalition among 

parties that may agree on branding a particular event as an act of terror but not 

another. 

2. The rapid, decisive and unconditional US victory in Afghanistan as a 

demonstration of US resolve and overwhelming military supremacy. 

Successful conclusion of the war against the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda's Afghan 

presence will reap many subsidiary benefits for US policy in the Middle East. 

Most importantly, it will erase a record of hesitation, tepid response and rapid 

retreat if faced with loss of life when confronting difficult Middle Eastern 

challenges that began with the Marines' withdrawal from Lebanon in the mid1980's. This perceived "loss of nerve" by an indulgent civilization seemingly 

devoted to the exclusive pursuit of materialistic creature comforts persuaded 

Jihadist fundamentalists that the West could be pushed around with impunity, 

and eventually pushed out of Islamic lands (just as that other erstwhile 

superpower, the USSR, had been expelled from Afghanistan). Perhaps more 

critically, regional governments came to share a similar perception of US 

unwillingness to pursue tough policies to their requisite conclusion. This was a 

principal reason for the vanishing support by Arab regimes for US military 

activities against Iraq that "neither fish nor cut bait." Despite public 

protestations to the contrary, a US-led military effort to end Saddam's reign will 

face far less resistance in the Arab world following the Afghan victory, provided 

it is carefully prepared and carried out with minimal civilian casualties. 

Second, the deterrent effect of our Afghan action will be felt for a long time in 

Middle East capitals that have in the past directly sponsored or lent varied levels 

of assistance to terrorist organizations. It is extremely unlikely that Syria, Libya, 

or the Sudan will engage in any terrorist-related activities that may be remotely 

traceable to their government services in the foreseeable future. 

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Third, the very positive response of the Afghan population to their liberation 

from the Taliban yoke, and the generous and rapid commitment by the 

international community to rise to the challenge of rebuilding Afghan 

infrastructure and economic institutions, if sustained, will be instrumental in 

repairing to some degree the battered US/Western image in the region and in 

countering the appeal of those who maintain that "Islam is the [only] solution." 

3. The abhorrent nature of the 9/11 outrage and the catastrophic loss of 

innocent life as a potential turning point in the internal battle for hearts 

and minds within the Islamic world community. Even a tragic event of the 

magnitude of 9/11 may have its silver lining. Within the Islamic world, it may 

catalyze a long-overdue reaction on the part of modernizing; reformist forces 

against the fundamentalist trend on the ascendant since the Khomeini-led 

revolution in Iran a quarter-century ago. 

As already observed, the fundamentalist trend, although representative of a 

minority of Muslims, remains in an expansionary mode. In recent years, it has 

been abetted by strong financial and political support by the Saudi establishment, 

in a misguided efflorescence of Wahhabi religious zeal and nouveaux riche 

hubris, combined with the ruling family's imperative to guard against the Shiite 

challenge for Islamic leadership represented by Khomeini's Iran, and the need to 

mollify crucial domestic religious constituencies opposed to the continued 

presence of foreign military forces and uncomfortable with the incipient 

cosmopolitanism of Saudi society. This Wahhabi push reinforced and 

complemented a renewed assertiveness by the Muslim Brotherhood and similar 

movements long active in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Sudan, Lebanon and North 

Africa, as well as like-minded organizations in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia and 

the newly independent states of central Asia. Against this rising tide of austere 

Sunni religiosity that asked for Jihad and offered up the hope of a return to the 

glory days of earliest Islam when the "Salaf" (the Predecessors) quickly forged 

the most powerful and advanced empire of the age, the mild, accommodationist, 

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state-controlled (and therefore compromised) religious establishments could 

offer little challenge. 

Jihadist fundamentalism bred Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda coalition, 

however, and their extreme interpretation of Jihadi tactics and strategy led to the 

Pyrrhic victory of 9/11, followed in short order by the threatened use of 

weapons of mass destruction against the "non-believers." As Arab opinion 

gradually came to terms with the reality that Muslims indeed were the 

perpetrators of the 9/11 outrage, and began to tally up the costs and 

consequences, a noticeable recoiling from the fundamentalist message is taking 

place, even within many conservative Arab circles. Furthermore, the Taliban 

regime has offered the Islamic world a sobering vision of what an 

uncompromisingly pure Sunni Islamic state true to the most literal reading of 

scripture could end up like. Combined with the increasingly vocal repudiation of 

clerical rule in Shiite Iran by the younger generations and a growing spectrum of 

disenchanted intellectual and economic elites, sufficient elements are falling into 

place for the emergence of an Islamic reformation movement bent on salvaging 

the Muslim community from a chain of events that could perhaps trigger an 

epochal confrontation carrying untold social and economic risks, not just with 

secularizing and modernizing forces within Islamic lands, but with the rest of the 

world as well. 

Certainly, the probability that such a reformation movement will emerge is much 

higher after 9/11 than would have been the case in its absence. At the World 

Trade Center in New York bin Laden succeeded far beyond his expectations, 

but in so doing he overreached, perhaps fatally. What he planned as the 

potential spark of the ultimate Jihad by Muslims against the infidel West may 

turn out to be the pivotal catalyst of a historic struggle within the House of 

Islam itself for the right to chart its future. 

On balance, the outlook for US policy on counterterrorism is constructive. In 

reaching this important conclusion, a critical distinction must be drawn between words and 

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deeds. At the declaratory level, evolving conditions in the region are currently exacerbating 

the resistance that an active US anti-terror campaign will elicit in the Arab Middle East. This 

resistance is likely to manifest itself not just among the vast majority of the intellectual and 

religious elite that is critical in shaping mass political opinion throughout the region, and on 

the part of political parties, professional associations, trade groups and similar mobilizational 

institutions, and even segments of the officer corps. It will also affect the statements of 

political leaders and senior government officials, whose hold on power is becoming, in their 

own eyes, progressively less secure in the current environment. At the action level, 

however, our efforts are unlikely to meet such severe opposition as to dissuade us from 

pursuing vigorously the war against terror, or jeopardize other vital US interests in the 

region. In the presence of a common stance by the United States, the Europeans and other 

important international players, and at a time of generalized economic weakness and 

increased dependence on foreign financial inputs, fear of the threat that the Islamists pose to 

the legitimacy of the ruling elites will trump their concern over public unrest or the criticism 

of some opinion-makers. 

II. Major Issues/Relationships Likely to Affect US Policy in the Medium Term

1. Israel/Palestine Conflict

It has become a truism that the regional environment for our anti-terror operations, and 

US policy generally, will become significantly more benign (defined in terms of level of 

cooperation by governments and acceptance by their populace) if a resumption of the peace 

process can be achieved. An older truism that is part of the historical lore of the Arab-Israeli 

confrontation, and has proven repeatedly true, is that there is no standing still. If we are not 

moving forward we are moving back, and possibly stepping right into the void. Events since 

the outbreak of the second Intifada in late 1999, the interruption of the Oslo process, and 

the subsequent election of Israel's current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had by midDecember 2001 certainly reached the edge of the abyss. 

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The factual background is well known and need not be detailed here. No better or more 

pithy diagnosis of the current impasse can be found than the Report issued on 21 May 2001 

by the international Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee headed by former US Senator 

George Mitchell. Based on the current state of play, the following may be postulated: 

• Palestinian Authority/Arafat: Both the USG and Israel believe 

Chairman Yasser Arafat and his PA have at their command sufficient 

coercive capacity to subdue all actors within the Palestinian arena 

engaged in acts of violence against Israeli targets. Such actors include 

Islamist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and secular 

organizations such as the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of 

Palestine) and rogue elements within the PLO. Arafat's failure 

heretofore to control these organizations is a conscious act of choice. 

Equally volitional was Arafat's decision in the fall of 2000 to tolerate first 

the outbreak and then the continuation of the Intifada, despite ongoing 

efforts to forge ahead with the peace process, culminating in the Taba 

negotiations of January 2001. Tolerating "armed struggle" spared Arafat 

the domestic dangers and uncertainties of a crackdown on increasingly 

popular forces that could potentially escalate into a full-fledged 

Palestinian civil war, and simultaneously applied wearying pressures on 

the Israeli body politic that--as in South Lebanon--might produce 

tradeoffs and concessions. 

Should a stable cease-fire be achieved in the medium term and the peace 

process resume, terms minimally acceptable to any viable Palestinian 

interlocutor (meaning one able to negotiate a peace agreement to its 

conclusion and implement it) include a Palestinian state with control over 

the entire West Bank and Gaza (with border adjustments and some 

territorial exchanges that preserve large Israeli settlements near the 1967 

Green Line); no Israeli military presence in the Jordan River valley and 

other strategically valuable points or IDF protection for Israeli 

settlements that may remain on Palestinian territory; a capital seat in a 

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Jerusalem with divided (or shared) sovereignty; and a definitive 

resolution to the refugee problem implementing right-of-return 

provisions. On this last, most difficult of all issues, PA negotiators have 

stated that they do not seek to endanger the demographic viability of 

Israel as a Jewish state, and have described ideas for implementation that 

would result in a minimal repatriation of Palestinians to Israel proper. In 

essence, the terms mutually agreed to by PA and Israeli negotiators at 

Taba in January 2001--the culmination of an excruciating eight-year long 

Oslo process--are, though incomplete, a high-watermark that the PA will 

consider as an irreducible starting point for any renewed peace talks. 

• Israel: Labor-led Israeli governments have often proven willing to forge 

ahead with the peace process despite periodic Palestinian terrorist attacks 

on Israeli civilians. Likud governments have not and will not. No 

meaningful progress was achieved during the Netanyahu period despite 

the heroics at the Wye Plantation, and Sharon's election in February 2001 

brought the process to a complete halt. Israeli governments controlled 

by the Right have no intrinsic interest in the success of a process that will 

eventuate in the large-scale dismantling of existing settlements and the 

surrender of most of the West Bank. A significant portion (possibly a 

majority) of the Likud constituency, representing not less than 15-20% of 

the total Jewish Israeli population, is opposed to such a solution on 

strongly held ideological and religious grounds. An even larger 

proportion of the population feels great ambivalence because of deepseated security concerns. Despite the Begin/Sinai precedent, no Likudled government will negotiate terms minimally acceptable to any 

Palestinian interlocutor under any currently foreseeable circumstances. 

After repeatedly voicing serious concerns about the course of US Middle 

East policy post-9/11, warning that appeasement of the Muslim world at 

Israel's expense would not be acceptable, Prime Minister Sharon has 

responded to the escalated Hamas campaign of violence with harsh 

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military counterattacks that have targeted not only terrorist suspects but 

also the PA's security infrastructure, important Palestinian assets such as 

the Gaza Airport, and Arafat's own private air transportation. This 

strategy is aimed at pressuring Arafat into effectively curtailing terrorist 

operations, and is highly popular among the traumatized Israeli public. It 

does have the added benefit from the perspective of the Israeli Right of 

decreasing chances for an early resumption of substantive peace 

negotiations beyond the narrowly defined security arena. 

• US Policy: Following a period of non-engagement after the failure of 

Camp David and the change of US administrations, the USG in the wake 

of 9/11 is seeking to re-start the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. This is 

viewed correctly as important for long-term regional stability and, more 

immediately, as critical for maintaining broad Arab support in the war on 

terror in its post-Afghan phases. In a departure that has been well 

received in the Arab World, the President has explicitly described a "State 

of Palestine" as an ultimate component of a peaceful solution, and 

signaled sustained future engagement in the process with the 

appointment of the Zinni mission. Secretary of State Powell has even 

intimated that American proposals may be forthcoming. But the PA 

must first assert its effective control over Palestinian terror, to be 

followed by implementation of the Mitchell Report. 

Confounding expectations, however, reinvigorated US engagement has 

produced a paroxysm of violence. General Zinni's mission has been 

engulfed in a sea of Palestinian suicide bombings of Israeli civilians and 

sundry acts of violence against settlers and Israeli military positions, 

countered by heavy use of Israeli armor and air power in incursions 

within Area A territories controlled by the PA with equally heavy loss of 

Palestinian civilian lives and continued assassination of Hamas and other 

operatives. The survival itself of the PA as a viable structure of 

governance on the West Bank and Gaza is in jeopardy. Why? 

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• Hamas: The clear reason is that a strategic decision has been reached by 

Hamas to challenge the political primacy of the PA, even if this leads to 

the unraveling of the gains of Oslo and a restoration of direct Israeli 

control over portions of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas is capitalizing 

on a surge in popularity that has drawn it even with support for Arafat (at 

approximately 30%), and is determined to preempt a US/Israeli/PA 

effort to defang it, or worse. 

In the past, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both spawned by the Muslim 

Brotherhood and animated by Islamist Jihadist ideology, have made it 

abundantly clear that they are committed to opposing any final peace 

with Israel. They have only gone along with the PA's role in the peace 

process as an interim step, pending the emergence of a more favorable 

balance of forces between the Arab world and Israel down the road. 

With the escalation of hostilities during the Intifada and the hard-line 

position taken by the Sharon government, the defiant stance of the 

Islamist groups has earned them much popular support, even among the 

uncommitted. Hamas has determined that the time has come for a 

fateful challenge of the PLO's mandate to lead the Palestinian people. 

USG steps to tighten the noose on Hamas and other similar groups in 

the wake of 9/11 render any further delay unwise. The arrival of General 

Zinni heralded the beginning of a determined US effort to bring about 

enforcement of the Mitchell Report security provisions, to be followed 

by serious peace efforts. With frustration within the occupied territories 

at a peak and Israeli countermeasures at full throttle (short of outright 

invasion, which is unwanted for it could cripple Hamas activities within

the PA), conditions may never be riper for an effective challenge. Hence 

the escalation of suicide bombings and other attacks, in the expectation 

that a PA clampdown will eventually spark a broad revolutionary 

uprising. Part of Hamas' calculus is that loyalty to Arafat within the PA 

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security establishment generally and even within Fatah itself has been 

eroded significantly in the past two years. 

Against this background, how is the US anti-terrorism campaign likely to affect 

prospects for peace negotiations over the medium term? The likely impact is mixed. On 

the positive side, the need to maintain Arab support for the campaign practically dictates a 

strong push by the USG and the international community to get talks going again, if and 

when the Mitchell Report recommendations are implemented. Also, the new zero tolerance 

for terror will make it impossible for Arafat to continue his two-pronged strategy. 

Henceforth, he will have to drop the gun and seize the olive branch with both hands. If he 

is able to prevail in taming the Hamas opposition, the pressure on Israel to re-engage with 

the PA will become intense. This, in turn, will force the Sharon government into significant 

concessions on the settlements issue (as part of the Mitchell process), or bring about the fall 

of the current coalition government. 

On the negative side, the hardening of the US attitude toward any terrorist acts is 

forcing the pace of the confrontation between the PA and Hamas and other Islamist forces, 

to whom anti-Arafat secular and nationalist elements also may be tactically allied. What the 

outcome may be is highly uncertain. Reliable polls indicate that fully one-third of Palestinian 

opinion in the territories is presently uncommitted, and could lean in either direction. Nor is 

it possible to forecast when the situation will stabilize. In addition to the uncertainties 

surrounding the actual strength of either camp in a showdown, events such as the 

assassination of Arafat (whose mantle cannot be assumed by any one of his lieutenants) or 

of the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, could have incalculable 

ripple effects. Should circumstances dictate that we become heavily engaged on several 

Middle East fronts at once in the counterterrorism effort, this may trigger counter-punches 

by targeted parties such as Iraq, Iran, or Syria through aid to surrogates in the Palestinian 

theater. In the current environment, it would be foolhardy to believe that the situation in 

the West Bank and Gaza can be carefully controlled or calibrated by any party, foreign or 

domestic. 

18
On balance, the highest probability (60%) medium-term projection is as follows: 

under unrelenting US/European/Israeli pressure, the PA clamps down hard on Hamas, 

Islamic Jihad, rogue Fatah elements and other parties engaged in violence against Israel. 

While terror operations against civilians in Israel proper are significantly reduced, the internal 

confrontation gathers strength, verging on civil war. Acts of violence against Jewish settlers 

and Israeli military units beyond the Green Line occur periodically, but the PA is held to 

have curbed violence enough that implementation of Israel's share of the Mitchell 

recommendations is now required. In this volatile environment, and under strong pressure 

from Arab governments and European allies, the USG finds itself compelled to lean on the 

Sharon government for a complete freeze on settlement expansion, lifting of restrictions on 

movement within the territories, transfer of PA tax revenues, and a commitment to 

resumption of the peace talks. A political crisis in Israel over the fate of the governing 

coalition and settlements policy delays the onset of peace talks. In any case, deep mutual 

mistrust on the part of all Palestinians and Israelis makes progress on substantive issues 

extremely difficult in a crisis environment within both societies. To keep the lid on bubbling 

destabilizing forces and provide some momentum, the USG becomes more forthcoming 

with American proposals designed to put the moral and political weight of the United States 

behind final status compromises both sides need to make but are unable domestically to 

produce on their own. 

Under this scenario, the primary impact of the counterterrorism campaign on IsraeliPalestinian affairs is: (a) to force an extended and defining showdown between the PA and 

Hamas within the Palestinian camp, and (b) thrust the USG into a leading role in the peace 

process for the first time as a "definer" of final status compromise solutions. 

A less likely projection (30%) finds Hamas gradually emerging with the upper hand 

in the political arena that forces the PLO into a power/sharing arrangement with Islamist 

forces. This development postpones the onset of peace negotiations beyond the medium 

term, even if optimally the Mitchell plan is unfolding as Hamas temporarily refrains from 

violence against Israel proper. Intense US and Israeli opposition to the further 

entrenchment of Hamas in the power structure is expressed in a variety of ways, including 

diplomatic, financial and possibly (Israeli) military measures. Such opposition does not 

19
prove decisive, however, as the US in particular is hampered and distracted by the needs of 

higher priority theaters in the war against terror in other parts of the Middle East and in 

South Asia (e.g., the year 2002 could be dominated by a highly dangerous Indian-Pakistani 

confrontation over Pakistan-supported Mujahedeen groups that will deeply engage the 

USG). In the longer run, this is clearly not a stable equilibrium in the Israeli/Palestinian 

arena, but assuming a cease-fire that holds and continuity in the current Israeli governing 

coalition, an uneasy stalemate could evolve that lasts several years. Paradoxically, from 

Sharon's perspective, this may turn out to be the preferred outcome. 

Finally, a low but not negligible probability (10%) must be assigned to a worst-case 

scenario, in which a combination of virtual civil war within the PA that becomes prolonged 

and inconclusive, and one or more acts of terror against Israeli civilians resulting in a very 

high number of casualties prompt Israel to cut the Gordian knot and reoccupy PAcontrolled territories, dismantle the PA and return the situation basically to the status-quo 

ante 1994. Although such a drastic step would likely prompt Egypt and Jordan to suspend 

diplomatic relations and might unleash a wave of random attacks on US property and 

citizens in a number of Islamic countries, military retaliation by any Arab state would not 

occur. Nor is it at all likely that the "oil weapon" would be resorted to in any systematic 

fashion, in view of the current state of oil markets and the very heavy dependence of the oilproducing states on already reduced export revenues. US relations with friendly Arab 

governments would be severely damaged, however, as Washington will be perceived to have 

given a green light for any such far-reaching Israeli move. Egyptian, Saudi or Jordanian 

participation in any joint campaign with the US against Iraq or support for our efforts in 

other countries within or outside the region would not be forthcoming, nor would we be 

able to use US military facilities in the Gulf for counterterrorism purposes. Whether the 

USG would be willing to condone or condemn Israel's behavior might depend on the nature 

of the terrorist action that triggered the Israeli invasion. In light of our current global 

mission and stated policy priorities, and the state of mind of the US public and Congress, a 

terrorist strike that took, say, 200-300 Israeli civilian lives in the context of a chaotic situation 

within the PA, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator, would make it very difficult for 

the USG not to back the Israeli action. 

20
2. Relations with Key Friendly States 

Broadly speaking, our counter-terror campaign is unlikely to destabilize our ties with 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Jordan. All three governments share a strong purpose with the US in 

containing Islamist extremism, and their substantial dependence on US financial and/or 

security inputs, coupled with the convincing demonstration of American resolve in seeing 

this struggle through as a vital national interest, make any breach highly unlikely. The only 

contingency that might produce serious discord would be developments along the lowestprobability scenario (described above) in the Palestinian/Israeli arena (particularly for 

Jordan, where the spillover impact of events within the PA could be far-reaching). For 

reasons both of Arab solidarity and religious identity, the "Palestinian Cause" historically has 

exerted an influence on the behavior of all Arab governments that transcends narrowly 

defined state interests. This characteristic may become even more pronounced in the period 

ahead. The religious significance of any events impinging on the current status or future of 

the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem takes on particular resonance at times of stress in 

relations between Islam and the rest of the world. 

Strong rhetoric notwithstanding, a US-led move against Iraq will not be seriously 

opposed by Arab allies. A persuasive case must be made, but not for Saddam Hussein's 

culpability in sponsoring terrorism. Sufficient grounds exist on the WMD front alone to fit 

the bill, and no one in the Middle East, even at the street level, harbors any illusions about 

the tender mercies of Saddam toward his own people. What Arab capitals will require is a 

persuasive case that the drive against Baghdad will be carried through to successful 

conclusion. 

Such a case can be made much more easily in the wake of Afghanistan, but it must be 

made explicitly and in detail. Particularly critical will be the military strategy to be pursued in 

any anti-Iraq campaign, and the political formula to be proposed for a post-Saddam Iraq, 

since the principal fear of Saudi Arabia and Turkey in particular is of the emergence of 

autonomous Shiite and Kurdish entities in a post-Saddam environment that cannot be kept 

in check by a strong central government. 

21
On the military level, the success of the Afghan model may favor a gradual-buildup 

approach based on strengthening the opposition forces within a protected northern Iraq 

sanctuary in the Kurdish areas that would then be used as a launch pad for a mixed 

air/ground onslaught. Any ground offensive that relies heavily on indigenous components 

would still face a formidable opponent in the Iraqi army. Inevitably, if Saddam is to be 

dislodged by military force (rather than by palace coup or revolution), a massive air 

campaign will need to be mounted that will bear the major burden of destroying Iraq's 

military assets, internal security apparatus, and installations that are known or suspected of 

having WMD potential. Clearly, such a campaign runs the risk of inflicting serious collateral 

damage on the civilian population and the country's economic infrastructure. Perhaps more 

ominously, it may unleash lethal biological, chemical or nuclear agents locally and regionally 

in the course of destroying them. Not to target such agents, at least partially, may prove 

unacceptably risky since they may be put to use by the Iraqis. In such circumstances, to gain 

the cooperation of neighboring states, particularly if bases and military assets stationed on 

their territory will be involved, will require close prior consultation with them and even some 

degree of participation in operational planning. This may be demanded by other actively 

participating non-Middle East members of the coalition as well, such as NATO countries. 

As for the political end-game, it is highly probable that prior agreement will need to be 

marshaled around a mutually agreed structure for Iraq's governance that allays regional fears 

of a partitioned or highly decentralized regime resulting from the war that would allow much 

room for dangerous gamesmanship by a variety of interested parties, especially Iran. Such 

prior agreement may not be realistically achievable beyond the level of some general 

principles and commitments, but a significant amount of pre-campaign diplomacy will be 

required. 

The difficulties inherent in all this preparatory work, on both the military and political 

levels, underscores the challenge for the USG that confronting Iraq represents. 

Nonetheless, a major upside is that the process itself will serve the critical purpose of 

demonstrating incontestably to the regional governments concerned our determination to 

put an end to Saddam Hussein's rule. Such "educational" effect will be sufficient both to 

22
ensure that opposition to our policy will be limited and confined to traditional critics of the 

US, and that our regional allies do provide a measure of active support to the campaign. 

Such support is likely to be forthcoming from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while Jordan 

may choose to keep the lowest profile possible in light of its vulnerability to destabilizing 

pressures from its mixed demographics. 

Iraq aside, the only other theater of the anti-terror war that may elicit a measure of 

coordinated opposition by our regional friends is Lebanon. Unquestionably, the absence of 

a strong authority in Beirut and the legacy of the long civil war have allowed a variety of 

armed factions and political movements to act independently of government control. The 

Syrian presence has provided shelter to some of these groups, even though they have not 

been particularly active in recent years. The most important of them, however, Hizballah, 

has emerged lately as perhaps the most potent and certainly the most disciplined and 

effective political force in the country. Among all the organizations that appear on the State 

Department's list of terror groups, it is the only one that has substantial political 

representation in its home country's parliament and maintains an infrastructure of social, 

educational, medical and charitable institutions that are fully recognized by the state and 

integrated into the structural fabric of the country. As the only group that fought Israeli 

control of southernmost Lebanon throughout the 1990's and is credited with having 

succeeded in forcing Israel's withdrawal, Hizballah has acquired a stature domestically that 

transcends its Shiite base. Its role as liberator of South Lebanon has legitimized its almost 

total transformation from a small, armed faction created by a foreign entity (Iran) and using 

hijackings, kidnappings and other forms of armed violence as its main modus operandi in 

1982 into a respected and full-fledged participant in the Lebanese political system. 

Hizballah thus exhibits several unique characteristics among the designated targets of our 

anti-terror campaign. This poses some differentiated challenges in case of a decision to 

move against this organization, absent a major terrorist act attributable to it on nonLebanese territory. For one, strong opposition could be expected on the part of Lebanon's 

government and most of the public at large, including the leadership of non-Shiite 

communities. Syria and Iran would naturally object vehemently, but there would be 

considerable opposition as well among most of our Arab allies. Their objections would be 

23
based on justifiable concerns that the still fragile and complex Lebanese social and political 

construct could be seriously destabilized, and on the inescapable link that would be made 

with US support for Israel. There would be considerable sympathy for these arguments 

among our European allies as well. Europeans have recently sought to draw a distinction 

between Hizballah's political and military arms, and have engaged in dialogue with it at 

official levels in an effort to persuade the group to lay down its weapons and become a 

purely political movement. Such an evolution is unlikely in the medium term, and for as 

long as Syria remains deadlocked with Israel over the disposition of the Golan Heights and is 

able to dictate events in Lebanon. 

On targets other than Iraq and the Lebanese Hizballah, our regional allies should be 

expected to provide meaningful support in intelligence-sharing, tracking of financial assets, 

and even military assistance where needed, the latter particularly on the part of Egypt in 

areas like the Sudan and Somalia. In Cairo and in Amman, whatever reluctance we may 

encounter will be motivated not by substantive disagreement with our policies but by 

concern over how the "street" may react, a calculus that may vary depending on the general 

regional political temperature at the time, but which should not prove an impediment to the 

limited and largely covert types of assistance we may require of these two governments. 

Although socioeconomic conditions in Egypt may deteriorate further over the medium term, 

President Mubarak will keep any challenges from the Islamist forces well in hand within this 

time frame. 

Our relationship with Saudi Arabia could face some rough patches, however, and merits 

more detailed treatment. Three principal arenas of discord can be identified, in rough 

ascending order of combined sensitivity (from the Saudi perspective) and probability of 

occurrence. First is oil pricing issues. The margin of flexibility on the pricing of crude for 

the Kingdom has been rapidly disappearing. Historically, a fairly safe assumption could be 

made that, in situations where an irreducible conflict existed between higher prices for 

OPEC crude and vital economic interests of the United States and its major industrial allies, 

Saudi Arabia would eventually opt for an accommodative stance on production levels that 

would ease price pressures. There were periods when the Saudis would take a on a "swing 

24
producer" role to maintain price stability, and periods when they would produce at much 

higher levels than their income needs required in order to keep prices from escalating. 

The era of bountiful revenue surpluses and large financial reserves has now been over 

for quite some time. During the second half of the 1990's, high average economic growth 

rates, particularly in the industrial countries ex-Japan, served to camouflage the Kingdom's 

increasingly tenuous financial condition. Should the current economic weakness in the 

United States and Europe prove longer-lived than currently anticipated, and a relatively mild 

winter compound the depressed demand for crude, the Saudis are likely to opt for a hawkish 

stance on pricing that will mark a sharp departure from conventional policies. 

A second arena for medium-term frictions may be created by the USG's aggressive 

campaign to curtail financial support for international terrorist networks. Riyadh should be 

expected both to facilitate intelligence assistance and to cooperate in opening up to 

inspection the records of financial institutions on specific suspect names provided by the 

USG. Of course, the Saudis profess--and clearly believe--that this is in their own selfinterest, as their regime is indeed a primary intended target of Al Qa'eda and similarly 

minded groups. Stiff resistance is likely to be offered, however, to any demands for a more 

comprehensive, blanket surveillance of and accountability for the sources and ultimate uses 

of charitable contributions and other donations by the Saudi private sector. Cultural 

dissonance may leads us to expect and demand of the Saudi system more than it can bear to 

provide, and we should guard against ultimately counterproductive efforts on this front. 

Western models of accountability and transparency in financial transactions will find 

limited acceptability in the context of Saudi Arabia (or other Gulf states), even in a diluted 

form and despite a foundation of good will on all sides. The root of such ultimate 

intractability lies in the fact that charitable giving, or Zakat, in Islam is one of the five 

fundamental fara'ed (plural of faridah) or religious duties that must be performed by all 

faithful believers, and is second in importance only to prayer. In Saudi Arabia and other 

countries governed solely by the Shari'a, where no taxation system in the Western sense of 

the term exists, Zakat is the functional equivalent of the income tax. The amount of Zakat 

25
owed is determined by specific and variable percentages of income and revenue provenance, 

and is levied by the individual on himself/herself as a matter of honor and religious duty. 

 Consequently, for all Saudis of means, the amounts to be given away to charitable 

institutions annually are very substantial, and in the aggregate represent billions of dollars. 

These large sums are donated to and distributed through a dense network of mosques, 

religious societies, cultural and educational associations and institutions, down to the level of 

multitudinous individual recipients (both domestic and foreign, since distinctions based on 

national citizenship are irrelevant within an Islamic religious context) that lies at the heart of 

the country's social fabric. To bring all such activities under some form of centralized 

accounting system that would make more than a token dent in the flow of that minimal 

fraction of total charitable giving that ends up in terrorist hands would be practically 

infeasible and politically intolerable. 

The third and potentially most contentious set of issues is also the most sensitive. It 

relates to the jarring disparity between the official stance of the Saudi ruling family and 

government toward the United States and the West, on one hand, and the cultural values and 

norms that govern Saudi Arabia's place in and relationship to the non-Islamic world--i.e. the 

weltanschauung that guides and inspires Saudi society--on the other. The official stance, and 

most of its policy manifestations, has been, with very few exceptions, one of friendship and 

cooperation, sometimes bordering on outright alliance. It culminated in the course of the 

1990-91 Gulf War with the return of a long-term US military presence to the Kingdom as 

part of an operation that cemented the American role as ultimate guarantor of the security of 

the Saudi State. This close relationship is further cemented in the commercial sphere by the 

presence of upwards of 20,000 US citizens who live and work in the Kingdom within the 

energy industry, as advisors to governmental bodies and financial institutions, and as middle 

and senior ranking management throughout the private sector. The recent opening of the 

Saudi gas sector to participation by US and other Western energy companies, and 

negotiations under way for the Kingdom's accession to the World Trade Organization, are 

evidence of a growing tolerance for openness to the outside world on pivotal economic 

issues. 

26
In sharp contrast to the political/diplomatic and commercial facets of the relationship 

stand the social and cultural facets. In the latter, the controlling descriptive terms would be: 

distancing, antagonistic, dismissive, segregative. From the almost total social separateness of 

foreigners residing in the Kingdom from Saudi nationals (residentially, educationally, and at 

practically all levels of interaction beyond the workplace and retail shopping), to the 

inculcation of Wahhabi values into Saudis at home, at school and in daily life that discourage 

openness to anything not strictly Islamic, warn against fraternization with "unbelievers," and 

demand shunning of, if not active opposition to, practices and institutions deemed 

incongruent with the one true path, the Saudi system is designed to cognitively and 

experientially isolate the good Muslim as much as possible and protect him/her from the 

corrupting influence of the alien Other. This strong ethos of Wahhabi exceptionalism was 

nurtured for two centuries in a tribal environment largely isolated from the outside world by 

the vastness of the Arabian desert, and became enshrined in the practice and institutions of 

the new state after the unification of the Saudi kingdom by a ruling dynasty dependent for its 

legitimacy on the support of venerated religious scholars. It can become lethal when mated 

to politically inspired causes that justify extreme violent action by reference to Qoranic texts 

and other religious injunctions. 

Propelled by oil-generated state wealth and the charitable contributions of the private 

sector, the Wahhabi worldview has been propagated throughout the Sunni Islamic world, 

and continues to gain adherents. Over the past several decades it has breathed new life into 

the Muslim Brotherhood in many Arab countries, and co-opted the Deobandi movement in 

South Asia. It is what motivates the Saudi Osama bin Laden, the Egyptian Ayman AlZawahiri, the Pakistani Moulana Mazhoor Azhar, and the Philippine Salamat Hashim. 

Defanging Al Qa'eda in its Afghanistan home base is a significant step forward. But the long 

march against Islamic fundamentalist violence is unlikely to make the wide strides required 

to reach the goal of neutralizing this threat on a permanent basis unless a theological battle is 

waged within Islam itself that shrinks the universe of potential recruits to a very small 

number that can be effectively contained through military preemption, highly vigilant 

intelligence work, and technological defenses. 

27
In this theological battle, the Saudi religious establishment (along with key leading 

Islamic religious centers such as Al-Azhar in Egypt), must be engaged in the front ranks for 

the effort to have a reasonable chance of success. It will be a painful and extended process 

of engagement. It will require by necessity tortured theological skirmishes among senior 

religious scholars on important matters of faith. It will force fundamental soul-searching on 

the part of Wahhabi 'ulama about the role of long-held doctrinal beliefs and their impact on 

how Muslims will accommodate to increasingly invasive global forces in a shrinking and fastchanging world. In a religion where no clerical hierarchy exists that can impose an 

authoritative and mandatory version of interpretive dogma on all believers, a laborious 

process of argumentation, re-education and outright "deprogramming" will be required if 

fundamentalist Islam is to succeed in casting off the strains of violent Jihad against the 

infidel Other that have been woven into its fabric 

If the presumption that such a "detoxification" of Wahhabism and its variants is a 

prerequisite for effective containment of international terrorism by Islamic Jihadists is 

correct, at some point it will have to be incorporated into the USG's strategy for waging the 

current struggle. This means that we must see to it that the curricula of religious schools 

(Madrassas) in certain Islamic countries are vetted for content, that incitement to Jihad is 

expunged from the Friday sermons of preachers recruited and employed by government 

agencies who are sent abroad to minister in mosques built with government or ruling family 

funds, and that Fatwas issued by militant scholars are not left unchallenged. If and when 

counterterrorism measures adopted by the US-led coalition come to include such tactics, the 

impact on relations between the Saudi government and the West could be highly corrosive, 

since the Al-Saud may be forced to risk a confrontation on religious grounds with the 

Wahhabi establishment that has bestowed on them the mantle of political legitimacy. This 

would be a dangerous exercise even under ideal conditions, and the ruling family will shy 

away from it unless confronted with overwhelming pressures. 

 

 

28
3. Effect of the Counterterrorism Campaign on Regional Alignments 

The Arab world today is more divided politically and its component states are more 

likely to act and react to events in a more differentiated and individualized fashion according 

to narrowly defined state interests than at any time in the past half-century. Despite the 

warning issued at the recent Arab League meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Damascus 

that the US would lose all support should it expand its counterterrorism efforts to any 

member states, a coordinated pan-Arab response in highly improbable. The only likely 

exception would be in reaction to an Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza that 

eliminates the Palestinian Authority. 

In fact, beyond the Palestine question, no one issue has served as a rallying point for 

united action by all pivotal regional powers since the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 

1950's. Other patterns of alignment that held sway for certain periods of time in later years, 

such as Revolutionary Radicals vs. Conservative Monarchies, or Egypt-led bloc vs. Iraq-led 

bloc, or Soviet client states vs. Western client states, are no longer relevant. As the regional 

state system has matured with the passage of time, and economic pressures and demands 

have come to the fore, and particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise, stable 

regional alignments have practically disappeared. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 dealt the 

coup de grace to any remaining notions that a supra-state national solidarity or commonality 

of interest overrode narrow state or regime considerations. The integrationist pan-Arab 

ideal had already been dealt a body blow by the emergence of the Islamic republic of Iran on 

the ruins of the Pahlavi throne and the impetus the Khomeini victory gave to the forces of 

political Islam. For the committed fundamentalist in particular, but also for the vast majority 

of Middle Easterners who continue to find in religion their core identity, the only Ummah 

that commands allegiance is the Islamic one. 

Sub-regional blocs, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, do provide a forum for a 

limited amount of coordination. But even within a homogeneous grouping such as the 

GCC, important divisions characterize foreign and security policy. The prime example is the 

split between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on Iraq policy. In another instance of the intense 

disunity that reigns in the area today, despite continuous efforts by Egypt to reassert its 

29
leadership role in regional affairs, it is remarkable indeed, in light of the size, location and 

historic role of this country, that it cannot count on the secure allegiance or support of any 

other state in the region at this time, except perhaps as a temporary alignment over a specific 

issue. 

Highly propitious from an American perspective is the fact that the most important 

matter on which a large majority of key Arab countries have acted with synchronicity in the 

past decade is the repression of domestic Islamic fundamentalism. A tacit alliance on this 

matter has existed among Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia. The 

violent domestic terror campaigns directed at state institutions and civilians by 

fundamentalist groups in Egypt first and later in Algeria represented a challenge that could 

not be tolerated. Even in "fundamentalist" Saudi Arabia, the three-week takeover of the 

holiest of holies in Mecca in 1979 by religious zealots rang an alarm in Riyadh that continues 

to reverberate today. The mere presentation of a letter of protest to King Fahd in 1994 by a 

group of respected religious scholars and community leaders resulted in their prompt 

incarceration and a severe tightening of internal security and surveillance of religious 

activists. It is a safe conclusion that this alignment will hold in support of USG-led 

counterterrorism efforts in the region in the medium term, and will be expanded by the 

inclusion of countries such as Yemen and the Sudan where the Jihadists have a substantial 

presence. Despite much grinding of teeth by intellectuals in the media, government support 

for our efforts will be accepted with general passivity by the public at large, for reasons 

explained earlier in this paper. 

Most problematic from a forecasting perspective is the question of what regional 

alignments may emerge in response to a coalition move against Iraq. As indicated above, 

despite repeated rhetorical warnings against military action, it is highly probable that most 

regional states will back a carefully planned and persuasively determined campaign to remove 

the Hussein regime. Turkish, Saudi and Kuwaiti support will be essential from a military 

standpoint, and we are unlikely to go forward without the participation of these countries. 

 

The main questions revolve around the degree of backing to be expected from Iran, 

Syria, Egypt and Jordan. To a substantial degree, the positions they take will depend on the 

30
specific circumstances they face domestically and internationally at that point in time, which 

clearly lies at the far end of our time frame, if not beyond it. Will Iran be consumed 

domestically by the reformist-conservative struggle for power? Will Syria's relations with the 

coalition have been reshaped in the interim by counterterrorism measures in Lebanon's 

Beqaa valley, and what will be the status of peace talks/confrontation between Syria, Israel 

and the PA? Will Egyptian and Jordanian anxieties over domestic unrest prompt Mubarak 

and King Abdallah to opt for a neutral stance? Will the overall international context prove 

to be an overriding factor in the wake of another large-scale terrorist attack that causes 

thousands of casualties, perhaps through the use of a weapon of mass destruction? 

 

In the absence of clarity on any of these potentially critical variables, any prediction on 

the ultimate regional makeup of an anti-Iraq coalition would be fatuous. A more important 

question perhaps is: would it matter? In the current state of regional affairs in the Middle 

East, and in the wake of the successful conclusion of the Afghan military campaign, no 

regional alignment of forces can be identified that would be expected to successfully resist 

the prosecution of our counterterrorism campaign in the region or of a military effort to 

remove the Iraqi regime from power. 

4. The Gathering Crisis in Iran 

The evolving situation within Iran merits priority attention by the USG. Perhaps no 

single event in the medium-term could deal a more severe blow to the forces of Islamist 

fundamentalism in the Middle East and beyond than the fall of the conservative Mullahs 

from power in Tehran. Clerical rule has failed resoundingly in promoting economic 

development, and continues to fall further behind the curve of Iranian population growth. 

Young Iranians, now accounting for two-thirds of the total population, increasingly chafe 

under a system that offers a mediocre education and meager chances for economic 

advancement, while imposing severe restrictions on personal behavior and freedom of 

expression. Well into his second term, the reformist Prime Minister Khatami and his nonconfrontational strategy are losing support as conservative repression intensifies. It is only a 

matter of time before Khatami is forced into a more aggressive stance. The only 

31
development that could abort the eventual showdown between the Khatami camp and the 

conservative forces led by Ayatollah Khamene'i is a drastic upturn in the country's economic 

fortunes, an unlikely eventuality which the USG should do nothing to encourage. 

As the looming crisis in Iran deepens, the most worrisome aspect from Washington's 

perspective may be the fall-out effect on our interests of attempts by the conservative camp 

to goad the USG into actions that might bring discredit upon the reformist camp or cause it 

to fissure. The litmus issue of relations with the US could turn out to be a critical vector in 

the showdown. Timing may play an important role, as events within Iran interact with the 

regional reverberations of our anti-terror activities. 

Two tentative, and partly contradictory, projections suggest themselves: (a) the more 

intense and widespread our counter-terror campaign within the Middle East, the more 

ammunition will the conservatives have to stoke anti-US sentiment within Iran and siphon 

support away from the reformist camp; (b) if Iraq becomes the target of a concerted US 

effort to end Saddam Hussein's rule, and on the assumption that such an effort will 

necessarily require coalition-building among anti-Ba'th forces, including strong 

representation by the Shi'as of southern Iraq, Tehran's desire to play a role in influencing 

events in post-Saddam Iraq will enhance chances for improvement in US-Iran relations and 

thereby strengthen the Khatami reformist faction. It may be counterintuitive but worthy of 

some consideration that US interests in Iran may be set back by an activist campaign against 

terrorism on a region-wide basis, but may be significantly assisted by a campaign to take 

down the Hussein regime in Baghdad. 

III. Summary Conclusion

As the US-led campaign against terror shifts from central Asia to the Middle East, 

we should expect to find at official levels a political environment characterized by high

anxiety caused by growing insecurity, and at the popular levels a pervasive sentiment of 

resentment and urgent desire for change, certainly of current domestic conditions, and 

32
failing that, of the reigning political order. Anti-American sentiment beyond the ruling 

circles and the small entrepreneurially oriented business sectors is near an all-time high, 

among both traditional groups with strong Islamic religious leanings and the more secularly 

oriented, urban sectors of society. Regional socioeconomic conditions continue to 

deteriorate, and are not being adequately addressed by the current regimes, while repression 

is on the ascendant. 

Nonetheless, chances for viability of the anti-terror campaign are moderately good. 

They have been enhanced by the decisive victory in Afghanistan, both as a demonstration of 

US resolve and for its deterrent effects; by the emerging sense--based on the reaction of the 

Afghan population and on the assumption that the peaceful normalization and 

reconstruction of the country will proceed generally well--that the US action was one of 

"liberation," not "aggression against Muslims"; and by the potential role of 9/11 (and 

perhaps future major acts of terrorism exacting large-scale civilian casualties) as a trigger for 

a broad-based reformist movement within mainstream Islam. 

As for the interaction between the campaign against terror and the Palestinian/Israeli 

conflict, a Damoclean sword hangs over the Palestinian/Israeli arena. In the absence of an 

active peace process, one well struck terrorist blow within Israel that compels the Sharon 

government to retake the West Bank and Gaza, or the essentially uncontrollable ripple 

effects of the civil war within the Palestinian Authority could potentially cripple cooperative 

efforts under wayagainst a variety of terrorist targets and could undermine our relastions 

with countries throughout the Middle East. Curbing terrorism directed at Israel proper is an 

essential first step toward stabilization. An equally important second step is an active peace 

process. 

Despite strong cautionary statements by Arab governments, a US-led effort to eliminate 

the Saddam Hussein regime will not be seriously opposed by Arab allies, provided it is 

carefully prepared, US resolve is credibly demonstrated, and collateral damage to civilians is 

minimized. Close consultation with pivotal countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and 

clear prior agreement on a post-Saddam governing structure that strongly discourages any 

fissiparous tendencies by Kurds and southern Shi'as will be essential for the emergence of a 

reluctant but permissive regional environment. 

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At the bilateral level, paradoxically, relations with our historically closest Arab ally, 

Saudi Arabia, could be the most negatively affected by the aggressive pursuit of a 

counterterrorism campaign, and deserve the most delicate handling by US diplomacy. 

Demands on Riyadh for broad accountability of private Saudi financial flows domestically 

and abroad that may provide a "money trail" to Islamic groups and fund some of their 

activities are simply impractical except in limited, well-defined cases, and ultimately 

counterproductive. Military cooperation and improved exchange of intelligence information 

are obtainable if kept at the lowest profile compatible with effectiveness. On the other hand, 

and in a clear-cut departure from traditional US policy, the Saudi rulers will need to be 

pressed with vigor for proactive leadership in the religious doctrinal battle between radical 

Jihadism and mainstream non-violent Islam that must be waged if the war against this 

particular variant of international terrorism is to be won. In this effort, the USG would be 

well advised to recruit the help of its own domestic Islamic community and international 

partners, including both public and private. Certainly, direct USG interventions with the 

Kingdom on these matters should be kept completely out of the public realm, but should be 

persistent and involve the highest US levels, if they are to prove effective. To have to delve 

into the realm of the religious is utterly discomforting for any secular society, but vital 

national interests are at stake, and the Al-Saud represent the main gate on which we must 

knock if we are to see the House of Islam reform itself. 

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