Naval Doctrine Publication 1

Naval Warfare
DOCTRINE

“The only satisfactory method of ensuring unity of effort

lies in due preparation of the minds of the various

commanders, both chief and subordinate, before the outbreak

of hostilities. Such preparation comprehends not only

adequate tactical and strategic study and training, but also a

common meeting ground of beliefs as to the manner of

applying principles to modern war.”

  LCDR Dudley W. Knox, USN

“The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 1915
FOREWORD

Naval doctrine is the foundation upon which our tactics, techniques, and procedures are built. It articulates operational concepts

that govern the employment of naval forces at all levels. A product of

more than 218 years of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps experience in

warfighting, it incorporates the lessons of history, learned in both the

flush of success and the bitterness of failure.

This publication outlines the principles upon which we organize, train, equip, and employ naval forces. It explains how naval

forces attain both enduring and evolving national objectives, emphasizing our participation in joint and multinational operations. It presents broad guidance for the total Navy and Marine Corps team, active

and reserve. Every naval professional must understand its contents.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

AND

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001

28 March 1994

C. E. MUNDY, JR.

General, U. S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

F. B. KELSO, II

Admiral, U. S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

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INTRODUCTION

The success of an organized military force is associated directly

with the validity of its doctrine. Doctrine is the starting point from

which we develop solutions and options to address the specific

warfighting demands and challenges we face in conducting operations

other than war. Doctrine is conceptual  a shared way of thinking

that is not directive. To be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known

and understood. With doctrine we gain standardization, without relinquishing freedom of judgment and the commanders need to exercise initiative in battle.

Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component

of our nations military strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval Warfare Publications and

Fleet Marine Force Manuals. A commander, however, cannot operate

solely under the guidance of broad strategy. Neither can he make

appropriate mission decisions if guided only by tactics and techniques.

Doctrine guides our actions toward well-defined goals and provides

the basis for mutual understanding within and among the Services

and the national policymakers. It ensures our familiarity and efficiency in the execution of procedures and tactics.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare, provides a framework for detailed Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. It

describes the character and employment of our naval forces, highlighting the distinctiveness of warfare in the maritime environment.

Its concepts apply to all who serve in or work with the Naval Services.

The United States, the most powerful nation on earth, depends upon transoceanic links  commercial and military  to

allies, friends, and interests. Our nations maritime strength has

enabled us to endure more than two centuries of global crisis and

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confrontation that have reflected the worlds unending religious,

ethnic, economic, political, and ideological strife. Whenever these

crises have threatened our national interests, our leaders traditionally have responded with naval forces.

This publication introduces who we are, what we do, how we

fight, and where we must go in the future. It examines the importance

of readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility in expeditionary operations. It shows how these characteristics make naval forces

inherently suitable for maintaining forward presence and responding

to crises. NDP 1 outlines the varied missions naval forces routinely

execute and the wide range of capabilities that naval forces possess.

Naval forces alone however, never were intended to have every

military capability needed to handle every threat or crisis that our

nation may face. Just as using complementary capabilities within our

naval forces compounds our overall strength, combining the capabilities and resources of other Services and other nations in joint and

multinational operations can produce overwhelming military power.

In future conflicts and calls for major assistance, our nation will

answer with joint forces in most cases. To be prepared for those challenges, we must maintain our ability to conduct day-to-day operations

with other Services and other nations. NDP 1 emphasizes the importance of honing the teamwork needed to operate efficiently in the

joint and multinational environment.

NDP 1 describes the ways naval forces accomplish their missions and execute their roles as part of the joint military team of the

future. It reviews the principles of war from the naval perspective,

and describes how naval forces focus their resources to attain operational superiority. The ultimate source of peacetime persuasive power,

however, lies in the implied guarantee that both the intent and capability to protect our national interests are present just over the horizon, with the fortitude and staying power to sustain operations as

long as necessary.

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This introductory publication is the first in a series of six

capstone documents for naval forces that translate the vision and

strategy of the White Paper  . . . From the Sea into doctrinal reality.

The top-down focus will help ensure consistency between naval and

joint doctrine, increase fleet awareness and understanding, and provide standardization for naval operations. The full series is composed

of the following:

lNDP 1, Naval Warfare, describes the inherent nature

and enduring principles of naval forces.

l NDP 2, Naval Intelligence, points the way for intelligence support in meeting the requirements of both regional conflicts and operations other than war.

l NDP 3, Naval Operations, develops doctrine to reaffirm the foundation of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps

expeditionary maritime traditions.

l NDP 4, Naval Logistics, addresses the full range of

logistical capabilities that are essential in the support of

naval forces.

l NDP 5, Naval Planning, examines planning and the

relationship between our capabilities and operational

planning in the joint and multinational environment.

l NDP 6, Naval Command and Control, provides the

basic concepts to fulfill the information needs of commanders, forces, and weapon systems.

Clearly, the uses of military force are being redirected toward

regional contingencies and political persuasion, moving away from

the prospect of all-or-nothing global war with another superpower.

Nevertheless, a significant theme of this publication is that our Naval

Services fundamental missions have not changed. Our nations continued existence is tied to the seas, and our freedom to use those seas

is guaranteed by our naval forces.

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Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE

Who We Are: The Nature of Naval Services .............................. 3

Establishment of the Naval Services................................................................. 4

The Character of Naval Forces......................................................................... 7

CHAPTER TWO

What We Do: Employment of Naval Forces .............................. 15

Deterrence ..................................................................................................... 17

Forward Presence ........................................................................................... 20

Naval Operations  Other Than War............................................................ 21

Sealift ............................................................................................................. 24

Joint Operations............................................................................................ 24

Naval Operations in War .............................................................................. 26

CHAPTER THREE

How We Fight: Naval Warfare ................................................... 31

Two Styles of Warfare.................................................................................... 31

The Conduct of War ..................................................................................... 35

The Principles of War.................................................................................... 43

Preparation for War...................................................................................... 50

CHAPTER FOUR

Where We Are Headed: Into the 21st Century ......................... 59

Command, Control, and Surveillance............................................................ 61

Battlespace Dominance................................................................................... 63

Power Projection ........................................................................................... 64

Force Sustainment.......................................................................................... 68

CONCLUSION............................................................................ 71

GLOSSARY ................................................................................. 72
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Collage of people
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CHAPTER ONE

Who We Are -

The Nature of Naval Services

“Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.”

— Themistocles (524 - 460 B.C.)

We are a maritime nation with many interests, global

economic interdependence, and a heritage

inextricably tied to our geography. Routine

intercontinental commercial flights and instantaneous worldwide

communications have created new trade opportunities and brought

nations closer together, yet we still rely on the oceans to serve as both

a defensive barrier and a highway to commerce abroad. World economic stability depends upon vigorous transoceanic trade. Today,

90% of the worlds trade and 99% of our import-export tonnage is

transported on the sea. Although the U.S. economy, with vast industrial, technological, agricultural, and resource components, is one of

the most powerful in the world, it is not self-sufficient. We depend on

the continued flow of raw materials and finished products to and

from our country. Ensuring that the worlds sea lanes remain open is

not only vital to our own economic survival; it is a global necessity.
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Establishment of the Naval Services

In both war and peace, the oceans and coastal waters of the world

have been the lifelines of supply and communications. Recognizing the

strategic importance of British resupply by sea during the American

Revolutionary War, General George Washington initiated Americas first

sea-based offensive against the British. Washingtons armed vessels provided significant support to colonial efforts, demonstrating the value of

military operations at sea.

We assembled the initial continental fleet from converted

merchantmen. As Congress continued to commission ships, notable

leaders such as John Paul Jones helped to develop a proud and capable

Navy. It was not long before that force was able to capture the worlds

attention by displaying its ability to carry the fight overseas, far from

American shores.

Historical Painting

In manning their early fleets, American commanders provided for Marines as part of their ships crews. In essence, the first

Marines were soldiers detailed for sea service. Convinced that crews

with Marines could fight successfully at sea and also mount military

Bonhomme Richard versus Serapis, 1779
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operations ashore, Congress passed an Act stating That, in addition

to the present military establishment, there shall be raised and organized a Corps of Marines. Congress continued to provide for Marines as long as there was one Navy ship still at sea. After the

Revolutionary War, however, both the Continental Navy and Marine

Corps were disbanded.

Marines Landing Historical Painting

The government of the United States soon recognized new

threats to our young nation. Smuggling was diverting desperately

needed tax money from our almost empty treasury. Alexander

Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, proposed, and the Congress authorized in 1790, a fleet of ten boats for the collection of

revenue. It became commonly known as the Revenue Marine, precursor to the U.S. Coast Guard.1

 Another threat was the seizure of U.S.

merchant shipping by predatory French privateers and pirates from

U.S. Marines Land at New Providence, Bahamas, 1776

1

 The United States Coast Guard was established in 1915 as the functional successor to the

Revenue Marine of the 1790s, which later had become known as the Revenue Cutter

Service. The Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the armed forces at all

times. It is also a federal maritime law enforcement agency that operates under the

Department of Transportation. In time of war, or when the President directs, the Coast

Guard operates as a Service in the Navy, reporting to the Secretary of the Navy and the

Chief of Naval Operations as guided by wartime directives.
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the Mediterraneans Barbary coast. In addition to their Treasury duties, the ten boats, or Revenue Cutters, constituted the sole seaborne

defense of the United States until Congress exercised its constitutional

power and voted to establish and maintain a Navy. For the next few

years, struggling with postwar debts, the nation still was not united in

supporting the costly venture. In 1794, however, Congress authorized

the Department of War to construct six frigates, for the protection of

American merchantmen against the Barbary corsairs. Four years later,

in response to renewed aggression by France during its war against

Great Britain, Congress finally established the Department of the

Navy, authorized the Marine Corps, and began the first significant

buildup of naval forces2

 as we know them today.

“The palpable necessity of power to provide and maintain a navy has

protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure

which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among

the greatest blessings of America that as her Union will be the only

source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of

her security against danger from abroad.”

— James Madison, The Federalist Papers, 1788

Our three maritime Services  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast

Guard  conduct operations in the worlds oceans and littoral

regions.3 With such capable naval forces, we view the oceans not as

an obstacle, but as our base of operations and our maneuver space,

which we either can control or deny to an opponent. Whenever we

face an adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense. As important though, the oceans provide the

United States avenues of world trade and military lines of communication with allies and friends  when they are protected by our

strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime environment, it is necessary to understand the distinctive character of

naval forces.

3

 The term littoral, as it applies to naval operations in this publication, is not restricted to

the limited oceanographic definition encompassing the worlds coastal regions. Rather, it

includes that portion of the worlds land masses adjacent to the oceans within direct

control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces.

2

 Hereafter, the term naval forces will mean both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and

when under Navy operational control, the Coast Guard.
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The Character of Naval Forces

We are, first, American fighting men and women. We take

ships and submarines to sea, fly aircraft, land on foreign shores, stand

watches around the clock and around the world and, when required,

engage the enemy at sea and ashore. Our people are our most valued

resource and provide the element of will against adversity, supply

essential creativity amid the uncertainties of conflict, and combine

inspiration, reason, and experience to achieve our national objectives

in peace and in war.

Every day, dedicated Sailors and Marines make countless sacrifices while supporting our national objectives. At the heart of this

selflessness are core values that drive personal standards of excellence

and moral strength. Our nation places special trust and confidence in

these men and women while giving them the sobering responsibility

of properly exercising military power that is greater than any in history. This trust is warranted by our continued competence in carrying out roles, absolute integrity in actions and relationships, and

personal courage that overcomes moral dilemmas and physical obstacles through an unyielding sense of duty and commitment. This

professional ethic, shared by every member of our naval forces, enhances cohesion and promotes teamwork. It establishes an environment in which we are able to share and delegate responsibilities in

working toward a common goal.

Naval forces reflect the partnership among our active, reserve,

and civilian components. Our planning is predicated on each component contributing its part in day-to-day support operations, mobilization, and force augmentation. Our reservists and civilian employees

share the same sense of dedication and purpose, and fill critical positions in carrying out our operations. Working and training together,

the active, reserve, and civilian components permit naval forces to

maintain readiness to respond effectively to a wide array of demands

on short notice.
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Naval forces have been organized for fighting at sea  or from

the sea  for more than two thousand years. The qualities that characterize most modern naval forces as political instruments in support of

national policies are the same as those that define the essence of our naval

Services today. These qualities arereadiness, flexibility, self-sustainability,

and mobility. They permit naval forces to be expeditionary  that is,

being able to establish and maintain a forward-based, stabilizing presence

around the world. Naval expeditionary operations are offensive in nature, mounted by highly trained and well-equipped integrated task forces

of the Navy and Marine Corps, organized to accomplish specific objectives. Naval expeditionary forces draw upon their readiness, flexibility,

self-sustainability, and mobility to provide the National Command

Authorities4

 the tools they need to safeguard such vital national interests as the continued availability of oil from world producers and

maintenance of political and economic stability around the globe.

Through these qualities, naval forces reassure allies and friends, deter

aggressors, and influence uncommitted and unstable regimes.

A Ready Force

“A man-of-war is the best ambassador.”

— Oliver Cromwell, 1650

To be effective instruments of power, our naval forces must be

available and credible  not just when crises occur but daily, wherever

our allies and friends rely on our presence and wherever potential

adversaries must perceive our firm commitment to defend our interests. Since the early 1800s, the United States consistently has made

naval forces readily available to defend its vital interests abroad by

maintaining a forward naval presence. Naval forces first deployed to

South America, the Mediterranean, the Far East, and the Caribbean

to protect our sea lines of commerce from pirates. Today, our national

4

 Joint Publication 1-02 defines the National Command Authorities (NCA) as the President andSecretary of Defense together or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in

their execution of military action. Both the movement of troops and execution of military action must be directed by the NCA; by law, no one else in the chain of command

has the authority to take such action.
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economic interests are still tied directly to sea-based commerce, and

the United States accepts certain responsibilities with respect to the

health of the global economy. Our ready force promotes regional

stability and safeguards the flow of resources among trading partners,

helping preserve our national well-being.

We are operational; in keeping with the National Military

Strategy,5

 forward-deployed naval forces help deter conflict and attain

a rapid, favorable end to hostilities if conflict should occur. A strength

of our naval forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to

contingencies through tangible readiness. Our deploying forces certify

their proficiency in their advertised capabilities by demonstrating their

ability to carry out specific tasks and missions prior to departure.

When they arrive in the operating theater, they are ready to operate;

trained and organized to function as a cohesive force. It is no

coincidence that naval operations in war  especially in supporting

roles such as construction, medical functions, and logistics  are

similar to peacetime operations. To maintain our readiness, we design

many peacetime operations to parallel wartime operations as closely

as possible.

Operating in forward regions of the world enables us to

maintain a situational awareness that is critical in gaining the upper

hand during any conflicts early stages. By training in the places and

climates where we expect to fight, we also gain familiarity with the

operational environment and its effects on our people and equipment. Because the transition from peace to conflict in an unstable

theater can occur quickly, the Commander-in-Chiefs assets in the

region are likely to form the core of the initial response. The readiness

and presence of deployed naval forces provide the Commander-inChief the enabling force he needs to respond decisively and without

the limitations of lengthy transit times.

5

 The National Military Strategy conveys the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders,

to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense regarding

how the military supports attaining national security objectives. It is combined with

political, diplomatic, and economic strategies to support the National Security Strategy.

The National Military Strategy is published as needed, when changes in the strategic

environment dictate.
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Operating forward from the sea has long been a characteristic

of the Navy-Marine Corps team. With limited overseas basing, naval

forces become especially relevant in meeting national forward presence requirements. National policymakers rely upon forward presence to display U.S. commitment and resolve to allies and friends.

This presence is called upon to deter aggression, to participate in

regional coalition-building and collective-security efforts, to further

regional stability, to promote U.S. access and influence over critical

areas, and to provide initial crisis response wherever necessary. Forward deployed naval forces, including selected Coast Guard forces,

demonstrate that the United States is involved and committed to

shaping events in the best interests of itself, its friends, and its allies.

A Flexible Force

“The seas are no longer a self-contained battlefield. Today they are a

medium from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are

the base of operations from which navies project power onto land

areas and targets. The mission of protecting sealanes continues in

being, but the Navy’s central missions have become to maximize its

ability to project power from the sea over the land and to prevent the

enemy from doing the same.”

 — Timothy Shea: Project Poseidon, 1961

Naval forces have been on scene independently or as part of

joint task forces time and again, assisting those in distress. Since 1945,

U.S. naval forces have been involved in more than 280 crises, including 75 since 1976, and 80% of all post-World War II incidents. The

flexibility of naval forces enables us to shift focus, reconfigure, and

realign forces to handle a variety of contingencies.

We provide our commanders and decisionmakers a wide range

of weapon systems and military options, supported by a core of trained

professionals equipped as a sea, air, and land team. Capable of adapting to a variety of situations, naval forces can support the many

challenges facing our theater Commanders-in-Chief. Our ability to

fight other naval forces or land-based air forces, to conduct air strikes,
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to battle ground forces inland, or to evacuate noncombatants creates

uncertainty in the adversarys mind about what our naval forces

might do in any given situation. The combination of a robust amphibious ready group integrated with a carrier task force, for example,

provides both a perception and a potential for offensive action ashore

without committing such forces.

NEO Operation Photograph

Carriers, amphibious task forces, surface combatants, cutters,

submarines, aircraft, and their associated Navy, Marine Corps, and

Coast Guard equipment, vehicles, and personnel are the building

blocks of our multidimensional operating capability. Naval forces

provide the National Command Authorities the tools to respond to

a full range of needs, from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance

to forcible entry and strike operations. Naval flexibility  as shown in

our forward deployed posture, mobility, and self-sustainability  enables us to control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage, in peace

or time of crisis.
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A Self-sustaining Force

When we operate in forward areas at the end of long supply

lines without a significant land-based supply structure, we need the

ability to resupply at sea. Consequently, naval forces carry their own

ammunition, spares, and consumables  as well as support and repair

facilities for use early in a crisis or throughout a protracted conflict.

This self-sustainability provides the National Command Authorities

critical time to create an environment that will bring success. Our

ships are designed to travel significant distances without replenishment. They carry the striking power of aircraft, guns, missiles, and

Marine forces that can execute operations ashore immediately, without an assembly period or a lengthy logistics buildup. If conflict should

continue over an extended period, naval forces can remain on station

through augmentation and resupply by combat logistics ships. With

provisions made for on-station replacement of personnel and ships,

such operations can be continued indefinitely.

A Mobile Force

Naval forces, with their strategic and tactical mobility, have

the ability to monitor a situation passively, remain on station for a

sustained period, respond to a crisis rapidly, and maneuver in combat

with authority. Naval forces can respond from over the horizon,

becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries, as needed.

If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, our agility

permits us to withdraw promptly from the area without further action or buildup ashore.

Mobility enables naval forces to respond to indications of

pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of the theater to

another or from one theater to another, independent of fixed logistics. Operational speed is part of our flexibility. Maintaining control

of the seas permits us to exercise our mobility in positioning naval

forces to meet the crisis of the moment, then moving on to other

potential crisis locations. Naval mobility ensures that an adversary

cannot take offensive action with any confidence that the expanse of

the oceans will protect him from the long reach of U.S. retaliation.
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Our mobility makes naval forces difficult to target and

severely taxes the enemys ability to launch a credible attack.

Mobility complicates the enemys efforts to prepare adequate defenses because he cannot be certain of our attack axis. To cover all

possibilities, the enemy may be forced to spread his defenses too

widely, thus exposing vulnerabilities.

Mobility is a key to decisive naval operations. The ability to

maneuver ships into position to strike vulnerable targets, or to

threaten amphibious assault at multiple locations along an extended

coastline, is a significant tactical and operational advantage. After we

have launched our strikes, our ships can press the advantage, maneuver out of range, or reposition themselves for the next strike phase. In

amphibious operations, we place troops in a position to attack the

weakness of the enemy while avoiding his main strength. A landing

forces ability to maneuver from attack positions over the horizon

through designated penetration points  without a slowdown or loss

of momentum  could be critical to the success of the landing. When

the Marines have accomplished their mission ashore, they can

backload to await the next contingency.

Supported by a rich maritime heritage, the strength of our

naval Services continues to reside in our well-trained, high-quality

people  active duty, reserves, and civilian. They remain at the heart

of our force readiness and warfighting effectiveness. As a team, operating at sea and in the worlds littorals, naval forces are able to shift

quickly from low-profile, passive, forward-deployed operations to

high-tempo crisis response. In this environment, we are expeditionary

in character, a force whose readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and

mobility is capable of deterring and, if necessary, winning regional

battles, resolving crises, or serving as the naval component of joint

task forces to protect our national interests.

— § — § — § —
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Collage of naval forces
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CHAPTER TWO

What We Do -

Employment of Naval Forces

Congress assigns the armed forces of the United States

specific roles.6

 The basic roles of our naval forces are

to promote and defend our national interests by maintaining maritime superiority, contributing to regional stability, conducting operations on and from the sea, seizing or defending advanced

naval bases, and conducting such land operations as may be essential

to the prosecution of naval campaigns. Naval forces accomplish these

roles through deterrence operations and specific peacetime operations,

while maintaining warfighting readiness through continuing forward

deployed presence, exercising a robust sealift capability, and developing our interoperability with all Services.

Fundamentally, all military forces exist to prepare for and, if

necessary, to fight and win wars. To carry out our naval roles, we must

be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations  to

fight and win at sea, on land, and in the air. Defending the United

6

 Roles, missions, and functions often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions between the terms is important. Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which

the Services were established in law. Missions are the tasks assigned by the National Command Authorities to the combatant commanders. Functions are specific responsibilities

assigned by the National Command Authorities to enable the Services to fulfill their legally

established roles. Thus, the primary function of the Services is to provide forces organized,

trained, and equipped to perform a role  to be employed by a combatant commander in the

accomplishment of a mission. The cited roles of the Navy and Marine Corps are a consolidation of Title 10 U.S.C, DOD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major

Components, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions,

and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993.
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States and controlling its seaward approaches are the first requirements. Gaining and maintaining control of the sea and establishing

our forward sea lines of communication are our next priorities. As we

operate in littoral areas of the world on a continuing basis, naval

forces provide military power for projection against tactical, operational, and strategic targets. In both peace and war, we frequently

carry out our roles through campaigns. A campaign, although often

used only in the context of war, is a progression of related military

operations aimed at attaining common objectives. Campaigns focus

on the operational level of war.

Historic Photograph of Nimitz Signing Japanese Surrender

The concept of levels of war can help us visualize the relative

contribution of military objectives toward achieving overall national

goals and offer us a way to place in perspective the causes and effects

of our specific objectives, planning, and actions. There are three levels:

tactical, operational, and strategic  each increasingly broader in

scope. Although the levels do not have precise boundaries, in general

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz signs the acceptance of

Japanese surrender on board USS Missouri, 1945.
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we can say that the tactical level involves the details of individual

engagements; the operational level concerns forces collectively in a

theater; and the strategic level focuses on supporting national goals.

World War II, for example, a strategic-level and global war, included

operational-level combat in the Pacific theater consisting primarily of

U.S. led maritime, air, and supporting allied land campaigns. Within

each specific campaign were a series of important and often decisive

battles. At the tactical level, each contributed to the achievement of

that campaigns objectives. The culmination of these campaign objectives resulted in overall victory in the Pacific theater.

The naval contribution in the Pacific in World War II exemplifies all the strategies of campaigning: protection of U.S. ports;

maneuver warfare at sea to check the advance of the Japanese Navy;

submarine warfare against Japanese shipping; war at sea to gain control of the sea; and amphibious assault of enemy-held islands, pushing

the enemy back and forcing his final unconditional surrender. Campaigning is not an activity seen only in war. In peace, naval forces

actively engage in forward presence and peace-support campaigns.

Today, campaigns range from supporting economic sanctions imposed by United Nations and other international organizations, to

maintaining a visible deterrent to regional aggression, and to efforts

that stem the flow of illicit drug traffic.

Deterrence

It is our nations policy to deter aggression. Deterrence is the

state of mind brought about by a credible threat of retaliation, a

conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a

belief that the costs of the action will exceed any possible gain. Thus, the

potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, costs, and

consequences. The presence of naval forces or their movement to a

crisis area are two of the strongest deterrent signals we can send. They

are unequivocal evidence that a fully combat-ready force stands poised

to protect our national interests, and that additional force  whatever

it takes  will be forthcoming. Our naval forces are the leading edge

of the worlds most capable military, and their well-understood ability

to project power is a key factor in deterrence. Forward deployed naval
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forces are available to respond quickly, require minimal support,

and are not restricted in their movements. They are available for

diplomatic, political, and economic deterrent actions that can influence, persuade or pressure uncooperative governments around the

world to choose peaceful means of achieving their goals.

Nuclear Deterrence

Deterring nuclear war is a cornerstone of our national security strategy. Credible nuclear deterrence is based on adequate capability and the certitude that our nation can and will inflict

unacceptable losses on any adversary that uses nuclear weapons to

attack the United States or its allies. Although the risk of a global

nuclear conflict has diminished significantly, proliferation of nuclear

weapons is continuing, and the danger of attack from an unstable,

hostile, and irresponsible maverick state or terrorist organization

cannot be discounted. Since deterring nuclear attack remains the highest defense priority of the nation, we maintain a credible, survivable,

sea-based strategic deterrent capability through continued deployment

of ballistic-missile submarines.

SSBN Photograph
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Conventional Deterrence

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  including

chemical and biological weapons  and other threats such as terrorism directed against U.S., allied, and other friendly nations interests

dictate that we maintain a full array of retaliatory capabilities. Our

nations clear willingness to employ its military might against adversaries who may consider employing such weapons will remain our

primary deterrent to their use. Chemical or biological weapons are so

repulsive to world society that most major countries are signatories to

international treaties banning the production, storage, and use of

such weapons. The United States is a party to these treaties. Yet, chemical and biological weapons already exist in many countries and they

are still proliferating. Our nations continuing involvement with

friends, allies, and potential coalition partners is helping to dissuade

further proliferation and buildup of these arsenals. By being able to

depend on the strength and commitment of the United States, friendly

nations should not feel the need to own weapons of mass destruction

for their defense. Our continued regional naval presence is helping to

provide assurance to our friends and is an important part of our

nations conventional deterrence.

Naval forces provide U.S. military presence around the world

and can be tailored to meet these growing regional threats. Our

nations use or threatened use of our conventional military force in

the past has contributed to deterrence by showing national interest,

resolve, and capability to influence events. Naval forces can move

rapidly to a specific area to influence political action. In such a show

of force, we establish credibility by demonstrating our readiness to use

force if necessary. A show of force can be particularly effective when

conducted with allies to prove solidarity and resolve. Limited use of

force includes counterterrorist operations, self-defense, retaliatory

raids, rescue operations, or a direct attack to achieve a specific objective.

In this sense, it is the employment of military force by the National

Command Authorities without a formal declaration of war.
NDP 1 20

Forward Presence

Overseas presence promotes national influence and access to

critical global areas, builds regional coalitions and collective security,

furthers stability, deters aggression, and provides initial crisis-response

capability. Naval presence is more than the day-to-day operation of

our forces in a forward region. Those operations have crucial significance, but governments, like individuals, react to change. The sortie of

powerful forces such as the repositioning of a highly visible carrier

battle group or an amphibious ready group sends a powerful signal to

the political leaders of nations or regimes who might seek to press

their temporary advantage against U.S. interests. Routine presence

includes our permanently based forces overseas and periodic deployment of naval forces, as well as port visits and participation in a broad

range of regional, bilateral, or multilateral training exercises.Crisis

response, the emergent, timely dispatch of naval forces to a specific

area, allows us to render assistance or exert military force. Forward

deployed Navy ships, aircraft, and Marine forces are essential to permit the United States to act quickly in meeting any crises that affect

our security. Such a forward presence enables us to support our security interests and is a critical element in encouraging regional stability

and continuing world confidence in Americas leadership.

Forward presence assures our nation that potential partners

will join with us when the time comes. In addition to assured U.S.

response, an adversary may be deterred from conducting hostile

actions if he perceives that regional neighbors will actively oppose

him. A strong balance of power in a region can isolate an aggressor.

One way to establish this deterrent environment is through coalitions and alliances. Our nation promotes stability throughout the

world by establishing supportive relationships with responsible nations to ensure that the balance of power discourages aggression. In

the face of enemy threats, these allies and coalition partners need the

assurance of knowing they are joining the side that will win. We

establish and strengthen this assurance in our day to day relationships with these partners through a robust program of exercises and

operations designed to enhance and improve our capability to work

with them in that region.
21 NDP 1

Naval Operations — Other Than War

“Sea power in the broad sense . . . includes not only the military

strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but

also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military

fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.”

— Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1890

Our nation routinely calls upon naval forces  independently

or as part of joint task forces  to exercise two fundamental elements

of our national military strategy: forward presence and crisis response. Our operations include rendering assistance in such peacetime

activities as providing disaster relief and assistance to civil authorities.

We support U.S. law-enforcement agencies, as illustrated by the close

cooperation between Navy and Coast Guard units in counterdrug

operations. Additionally, naval forces may be tasked to conduct such

contingency activities as shows of force, freedom-of-navigation operations, combat operations associated with short duration interventions, and post-combat restoration of security.

Photograph of Operations with Coast Guard
NDP 1 22

Under international law, nations have a right to use force for

individual or collective self-defense against armed attack, and to help

each other in maintaining internal order against insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Naval forces operating under the direction of

the National Command Authorities and unified commanders implement this international right to:

l Conduct contingency operations.

l Evacuate noncombatant personnel.

l Combat terrorism.

l Aid host nations through security assistance and foreign

internal defense.

l Assist other nations in defending themselves.

l Enforce United Nations economic sanctions.

l Participate in peace-support operations.

l Intercept vessels to prevent uncontrolled immigration.

l Plan and conduct disaster relief, humanitarian assistance,

and civil support operations.

l Coordinate public health operations.

l Assist interagency counterdrug operations.

Naval forces are organized, trained, and equipped to defend

our nation and its interests. We defend our nation by maintaining a

visible and credible capability both to fight and to take that fight

abroad. Application of our expertise in operations other than war

also exercises many of our wartime capabilities and our ability to

accomplish our Service roles in defense of our nation.
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OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Former Yugoslavia/Adriatic Sea, 1993/1994 - Supporting United

Nations Security Council resolutions, NATO Standing Naval Forces and other

U.S. and Western European Union naval forces in a cooperative effort join to

form combined task forces. In the Adriatic Sea, destroyers, frigates, attack

submarines, and support ships from 11 nations conduct maritime patrols for

Operation Sharp Guard. In the airspace over the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina, five nations support Operation Deny Flight  enforcing a No-Fly

Zone with shore and carrier-based fighter and attack aircraft.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

Liberia, 1990 - Increasing internal unrest threatens U.S. diplomats

and civilians. Elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked in the USS

Saipan(LHA-2) amphibious ready group provide support to the U.S. Embassy

and stood by to evacuate American citizens and others from 2 June to 5 August.

They evacuate a total of 2,609 people between 5 August and 9 January 1991.

DISASTER RELIEF

Bangladesh, 1991 - A tropical cyclone sweeps a wall of water nearly

20 feet high across the coast of Bangladesh and three miles inland, killing as

many as 140,000 and rendering 1.7 million people homeless. Within 24 hours

of a request for support from the government of Bangladesh, Operation Sea

Angel is launched, and advance teams from the III Marine Expeditionary Force

arrive in country for initial liaison. A fifteen-ship amphibious task force

composed of Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade,

homeward bound from five months of operations in the Persian Gulf, is

diverted to the Bay of Bengal to assist. Over the next month, 6,700 Navy and

Marine Corps personnel working with U.S. Army, Air Force, and multinational

forces, provide food, water, and medical care to nearly two million people.

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

United States, 1989 and ongoing - Congress declares illicit drug

trafficking a threat to national security. The Department of Defense takes the

lead in federal detection and monitoring efforts against illegal drug traffic into

the United States. Joint task forces are formed that include U.S. Navy and Coast

Guard ships, aircraft and personnel, dedicated to stop the influx of illegal drugs

into our country. Naval forces continue to provide surveillance of smuggling

routes and to assist in the search of suspect vessels and seizure of illegal drugs.
NDP 1 24

Sealift

Sealift is a national asset, providing the majority of support

for large-scale deployment, reinforcement, and resupply. As military operations have progressed, sealift has accounted historically

for 90 - 95% of the total cargo delivered over their duration. To

meet these requirements, strategic sealift forces include ships in

three broad categories:

l Prepositioning - This capability allows us to place

sustainment supplies  e.g., large quantities of petroleum products, ammunition, and fleet hospitals  near

crisis areas for delivery to contingency forces. (The

Maritime Prepositioning Force is not considered a part

of sealift. It consists of complete equipment sets to support Marine Corps operations in theater. The Maritime

Prepositioning Force is discussed in Chapter Four as a

power projection asset.)

l Surge - The initial deployment of U.S.-based equipment and supplies in support of a contingency, transported in rapid-reinforcement shipping.

lSustainment- Shipping that transports resupply cargoes to stay abreast of force consumption rates and to

build up theater reserve stock levels.

Joint Operations

“Campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces are joint . . . Modern war fighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on

land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and

harmonized . . .”

— Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 1991

We are committed to full partnership in joint operations.

The value of naval forces operating and fighting in concert with

our Army and Air Force has been underscored throughout the 20th

century from the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 to the 1991

liberation of Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. By routinely

operating with other Services, we establish common procedures and
25 NDP 1

mutual credibility, reinforcing bonds of partnership. The many successes achieved by joint forces in carefully planned and intricate operations remind us not only of the importance of interservice

cooperation, but also of the inherent complexities involved in coordinating such major efforts.

USAF refueling F-14s

Joint Operations Photograph

In refining our ability to operate as a completely integrated

force we face many challenges, but we remain committed to achieving

success in conducting the full range of joint operations. To bring this

about in a confluence of complex warfighting needs, we focus on

standardization and improving our interoperability with other Services. This may require rethinking our force organization and even

our warfighting methodologies. Members of each Service  from

warfighter to planner  must be thoroughly trained to gain expertise

in each others doctrine and capabilities. Training, education, and

experience developed in frequent joint operations and exercises 

where we explore and develop innovations and new doctrine  advance our understanding of ways to work with each other efficiently.

This knowledge permits us to integrate basic warfighting principles

properly and to support effectively the Joint Force Commanders

intent and focus of effort. Success in joint warfare depends on mutual

understanding and cooperation. Coherent joint doctrine is the catalyst for this essential cooperation between Services. Our naval doctrine must fully support and be a logical extension of joint doctrine.
NDP 1 26

Naval Operations in War

Control of the sea is fundamental to accomplishing our naval

roles. It supports directly our ability to project power ashore by encompassing control of the entire maritime area: subsurface, surface,

and airspace, in both the open oceans and the littoral regions of the

world. Control of the sea allows us to:

l Protect sea lines of communication.

l Deny the enemy commercial and military use of the seas.

l Establish an area of operations for power projection

ashore and support of amphibious operations.

l Protect naval logistic support to forward deployed battle

forces.

Control of the sea can be accomplished through decisive operations by:

l Destroying or neutralizing enemy ships, submarines,

aircraft, or mines.

l Disabling or disrupting enemy command and control.

l Destroying or neutralizing the land-based infrastructure

that supports enemy sea control forces.

l Seizing islands, choke points, peninsulas, and coastal

bases along the littorals.

l Conducting barrier operations in choke points that prevent enemy mobility under, on, and above the sea.

By establishing control of the sea in every dimension, thus

ensuring access to an adversarys coast from the sea, we open opportunities for power projection, insertion and resupply. Control of the

sea, however, has both spatial and temporal limits. It does not imply

absolute control over all the seas at all times. Rather, control of the

sea is required in specific regions for particular periods of time, to

allow unencumbered maritime operations.
27 NDP 1

War From the Sea

Control of the sea is usually a prerequisite for larger strategies

involving a land-based objective. Our national well-being may require

that we direct military power or threaten its use against an adversarys

vital interests or homeland. War from the sea is the extension of our

naval influence through power projection over the shore. Amphibious

assault capability is an integral component of our overall naval forces.

Maritime forces provide not only sea lines of communication to

bring men and materiel to the area of concern, but also mobile bases

from which to conduct military operations. Naval forces may be

tasked to spearhead joint and multinational power projection operations, as part of a larger sea-air-land team.

Amphibious Landing Photograph

Power projection takes the battle to the enemy. It means applying high-intensity, precise, offensive power at the time and place of

our choosing. We provide commanders with a full range of power

projection options that include: employment of long range, accurate

cruise missiles; Marines conducting high-speed maneuver across the

shore and inland aided by naval surface fire support; and a great

variety of weapons released from naval strike aircraft.
NDP 1 28

In some cases, power projection by naval forces alone may

be sufficient to meet national objectives. But, the teamwork and

diversity that enable naval forces to dominate all dimensions of the

battlespace simultaneously while conducting strike operations also

facilitate the addition of joint, multinational, or coalition forces.

Arriving at the scene of a crisis with a flexible command and control structure already in place and operating, a naval forces commander can command a Joint Task Force afloat or shift command

ashore, depending on the tactical situation. When acting as an

enabling force,7

 the naval component may conduct operations

initially to seize a hostile port facility or airfield as a precursor to

the arrival of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned assets. After achieving maritime and air superiority, naval forces can continue to

operate as an integrated part of a larger joint organization or

disengage to respond to another need for their presence.

War at Sea

War at sea is the application of decisive offensive force to

achieve control of the sea. It conjures visions of classic struggles for

dominance between battle fleets armed with short-range weapons and

maneuvering within sight of each other  relics of a past when the

most heavily armed ship was the arbiter of national power. Today, the

accuracy, lethality, and range of modern weaponry favor the force

that first detects its enemy, launches an effective strike, and counters

incoming weapons. Battles between heavily armed and armored battle

lines have given way to short, sharp, and usually decisive engagements

which may have been preceded by periods of increasing tension and

substantial diplomatic effort.

7

 The term enabling refers to our ability to respond rapidly to a crisis and take the action

necessary to control its escalation, while facilitating the introduction of a larger joint force.

This may include establishing a lodgment or seizing usable ports and airfields.
29 NDP 1

The ability to engage the enemy at sea decisively will always

remain paramount to our naval forces. Dominating the enemy at sea

permits our forces to maintain a forward presence and is the first step

in establishing our superiority in any region. War at sea emphasizes

the offensive, bringing to bear information, intelligence, and tactical

initiative against an adversary. It requires appropriate and well-understood rules of engagement at the brink of war to win the first clash

of arms. But offensive action is incomplete without full consideration

of defensive requirements. Success in engagements at sea demands

preparation to counter an adversarys gunfire, missiles, torpedoes,

and mines. Additionally, we must thwart the enemys information

base  his capability to control his forces and to locate and target ours

 while enhancing our own. War at sea involves fully integrated

offensive and defensive tactics that span the subsurface, surface, air,

space, and electromagnetic environments.

In accomplishing our assigned roles, naval Services prepare to

fight and win wars. We also play an important role in preventing

them. Routine forward presence establishes and maintains regional,

economic and political stability and deters aggression. We further

strengthen positive relations with our world neighbors day-to-day by

providing humanitarian assistance and supporting operations other

than war. Naval presence is an important factor in minimizing regional conflict, but, when hostilities threaten U.S. interests, naval forces

can provide the initial crisis response, projecting decisive military

power from the sea to land if necessary, and an enabling capability to

support follow-on joint forces. These daily, on-going operations significantly promote the worlds confidence in Americas leadership.

— § — § — § —
NDP 1 30
31 NDP 1

CHAPTER THREE

How We Fight - Naval Warfare

“The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will

cover the whole ground he has traveled, but for those who come after

him and would profit by and extend his knowledge, his map is the first

thing with which they will begin. So it is with strategy . . . It is for this

reason that in the study of war we must get our theory clear before we

can venture in search of practical conclusions.”

— Sir Julian Corbett, 1911

War is an instrument of a nations power, initiated to

achieve national objectives when other means to

resolve differences have failed. Our fundamental

military purpose is to attain national policy objectives through our

capacity to wage war successfully. How well we in the Naval Services

accomplish our mission depends on how thoroughly we understand

both the nature and the conduct of war and learn wars many lessons.

Only through such understanding can we prepare ourselves for its tests.

Two Styles of Warfare

Naval forces have followed several styles or philosophies of

warfare throughout history. Two specific types  attrition and

maneuver  have evolved in response to particular needs and force

capabilities. Although they vary significantly in efficiency, flexibility,

and decisiveness, each type of warfare has its own utility, depending

on circumstances, and both types are conducted today.
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THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Using Attrition Warfare

In World War II, allied naval forces engaged in attrition warfare by

employing their resources against the German undersea fleet. Analyzing the

effectiveness of submarine warfare, the former Soviet Union Admiral of the Fleet,

Sergei Gorshkov, noted in his study of this period that German submarines nearly

ended the war through the rapid destruction of the allied merchant fleet. German

forces, especially U-boats, were credited with sinking more than 2,800 merchant ships

 68% of all tonnage sunk by Nazi Germany in the war. So devastating was this

weapon that, at the height of the allied counteroffensive, for each German U-boat,

there were 25 U.S. and British warships and 100 aircraft in pursuit. For every German

submariner at sea, there were 100 American and British antisubmariners. A total of

six million men, 5,500 specially constructed ships, and 20,000 small craft were

dedicated to the antisubmarine war. As the allies pressed their offensive, Germanys

losses exceeded its war industrys capacity to keep pace. At the same time, the allies

were able to replace their damaged merchant fleet and even expanded it by adding

replacements numbering twice the losses suffered. In the Battle of the Atlantic, the

threat of the U-boat was checked by overwhelming allied response. This resourceintensive, time-consuming effort was an effective use of attrition warfare.

Battle of the Atlantic
33 NDP 1

Attrition Warfare

A key difference between attrition warfare  the wearing

down of an enemy  and maneuver warfare  a high tempo, indirect

philosophy  is our method of engaging the enemy. In the days of

sail, fleet line tactics were much less involved. Ships in single lines

exchanged heavy broadsides against an enemy similarly arrayed, all

within sight of each other. Their simple doctrine called for sailing

directly to the enemys location and systematically engaging his fleet.

Attrition warfare is the application of our strength against an

enemys strength. It is typically a linear or two-dimensional style of

fighting that is frequently indecisive and inherently costly in terms of

personnel, resources, and time. When success in war on the operational and strategic levels depends on our ability to destroy or deny

the enemy crucial resources faster than he can recover, we are employing classic attrition warfare techniques. We attrite the enemy

through systematic application of overwhelming force that reduces

his ability or capacity to resist.

Maneuver Warfare

Naval forces also have used the preferable and more effective

 albeit more difficult to master  fighting style known as maneuver

warfare. Closely associated with the writings of Sun Tzu and used by

the great practitioners of expeditionary, naval, and land war, maneuver warfare is a philosophy, rather than a formula  an approach,

rather than a recipe. Like attrition warfare, it has long served as common doctrine for naval forces. It emphasizes the need to give the

commander freedom to deal with specific situations. Maneuver warfare is further characterized by adaptability and is not limited to a

particular environment. Though enhanced by a variety of technologies, it is not dependent upon any one of them.

Maneuver warfare emphasizes the indirect approach  not

merely in terms of mobility and spatial movement, but also in terms

of time and our ability to take action before the enemy can counter

us. Maneuver warfare requires us to project combat power. Unlike

attrition warfare, however, this power is focused on key enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities that allow us to strike the source of his

power  the key to his existence and strength as a military threat.
NDP 1 34

INCHON - SEOUL

Using Maneuver Warfare

 “The Navy and the Marines have never shone

more brightly than this morning .”

— General Douglas MacArthur, 15 September 1950

The amphibious operation at Inchon in the Korean War was a

classic example of how the naval Services have employed maneuver warfare.

Prior to the operation, the North Korean Peoples Army had driven the

U.S. and allied forces into a constricted corner of South Korea and

threatened to push them from the peninsula altogether. Even though his

forces were in dire straits, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme

Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, recognized that the

naval Services in his command had the ability to reverse dramatically the tide

of the battle. A landing on the Korean peninsula north of the enemy lines,

he reasoned, would allow his forces to sever the critical north/south rail and

road supply lines running through nearby Seoul that provided vital support

to the North Korean siege of the Pusan perimeter. By 15 September 1950,

U.S. Navy surface combatants and carrier air squadrons, along with shorebased Marine and Air Force air units, had cleared Korean waters and air

space of North Korean opposition. Thus protected and concealed from the

enemy, Vice Admiral Arthur D. Strubles nine-navy, 260-ship, Joint Task

Force Seven transported Army and South Korean ground units and the

amphibious-trained 1st Marine Division to the strategically important port

of Inchon, north of enemy lines. These troops stormed ashore via lanes

cleared of obstructions by naval underwater demolition teams and behind

the gunfire of four cruisers, eight destroyers, and the aircraft of six carriers.

Amphibious support ships soon brought in reinforcements and the supplies

needed to maintain and expand the beachhead. This bold, surprise maneuver

severed the lines of communications to 90% of the enemys ground forces

positioned far to the south opposite the UNs Pusan perimeter. By the end

of September, faced with entrapment and almost certain destruction, the

North Korean Peoples Army fled the Republic of Korea, a nation they had

invaded so eagerly only a few months before.
35 NDP 1

The Conduct of War

“Hold the attention of your enemy with a minimum force, then

quickly strike him suddenly and hard on his flank or rear with

every weapon you have.”

— General A.A. Vandegrift, USMC

Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders, 1944

Success in war often is the result of decisive action that destroys

the enemys will or capacity to resist. Because protracted war can cause

high casualties and unwanted political and economic consequences, the

rapid conclusion of hostilities is a key goal. Maneuver warfare, based on

the twin pillars of decisiveness and rapidity, is our preferred style of

warfighting. It is as applicable today in the maritime environment as it

has been in traditional land warfare. Modern maneuver warfare requires

integration and understanding of four key concepts  center of gravity,

critical vulnerability, focus of effort, and main effort. We convey these

concepts in context to our forces using a mechanism called the

commanders intent.

Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability

The center of gravity is something the enemy must have to

continue military operations  a source of his strength, but not necessarily strong or a strength in itself. There can only be one center of

gravity. Once identified, we focus all aspects of our military, economic,

diplomatic, and political strengths against it. As an example, a lengthy

resupply line supporting forces engaged at a distance from the home

front could be an enemys center of gravity. The resupply line is something the enemy must have  a source of strength  but not necessarily

capable of protecting itself. Opportunities to access and destroy a center of gravity are called critical vulnerabilities. To deliver a decisive blow

to the enemys center of gravity, we must strike at objectives affecting

the center of gravity that are both critical to the enemys ability to fight

and vulnerable to our offensive actions. If the object of a strike is not

critical  essential to the enemys ability to stay in the fight  the best

result we can achieve is some reduction in the enemys strength. Similarly, if the object of a strike is not vulnerable to attack by our forces,

then any attempts to seize or destroy it will be futile.
NDP 1 36

YORKTOWN

Exploiting A Critical Vulnerability

During the Revolutionary War, British forces in North America

depended on free use of the adjacent seas to move and resupply their

ground troops. This became especially critical to the British ability to

continue fighting in August 1781, on the peninsula between Virginias York

and James Rivers, when American land forces successfully severed the British

Army under General Lord Cornwallis from their ground-based resupply. At

this location, British resupply by sea was vulnerable because access to the

Yorktown port could be denied by controlling entry at the mouth of the

Chesapeake Bay. The French West Indian Fleet under Rear Admiral François

de Grasse positioned itself at this strategic location in advance of the British

fleet. When British Admiral Thomas Graves arrived to support Cornwallis,

de Grasse maneuvered his ships to engage the enemy outside the bay. His

actions not only denied Cornwallis his needed support, but permitted

another French squadron sailing from Rhode Island to enter the bay and

reinforce American and French land forces. As a result, the British succumbed

at Yorktown surrendering their entire Army of 7,600 men. The FrancoAmerican alliance was effective in blocking British access to and from the sea

and thereby exploiting this critical vulnerability. Losing their ability to

sustain their forces by sea doomed the British war effort in North America.

Battle of Yorktown Chart
37 NDP 1

The appearance of critical vulnerabilities depends entirely

upon the situation and specific objective. Some  such as electrical

power generation and distribution facilities ashore or the fleet oilers

supporting a task group  may be obvious. On a strategic level,

examples may include a nations dependence on a certain raw material imported by sea to support its warfighting industry, or its dependence on a single source of intelligence data as the primary basis for

its decisions. Alternatively, a critical vulnerability might be an intangible, such as morale. In any case, we define critical vulnerabilities by

the central role they play in maintaining or supporting the enemys

center of gravity and, ultimately, his ability to resist. We should not

attempt to always designate one thing or another as a critical vulnerability. A critical vulnerability frequently is transitory or time-sensitive. Some things, such as the political will to resist, may always be

critical, but will be vulnerable only infrequently. Other things, such

as capital cities or an opponents fleet, may often be vulnerable, but

are not always critical. What is critical will depend on the situation.

What is vulnerable may change from one hour to the next.

Something may be both critical and vulnerable for a brief time only.

The commanders challenge is to identify quickly enemy strengths

and weaknesses, and recognize critical vulnerabilities when they appear. He must rapidly devise plans to avoid the strengths, exploit

the weaknesses, and direct the focus of effort toward attacking the

critical vulnerabilities so that he can ultimately collapse the enemys

center of gravity.

Focus of Effort and Main Effort

The focus of effort is the paramount objective to be accomplished by the force and is therefore always on the critical vulnerability that will expose the enemys center of gravity. Since we concentrate

all our resources and energy on that objective, designating the focus

of effort is an important decision requiring the acceptance of risk.

Responsibility for attaining the focus of effort lies with the main

effort. A commander unifies the force toward the focus of effort by

assigning one unit or group as the main effort.
NDP 1 38

The main effort is supported directly and indirectly by all

parts of the force. When all elements of the force are focused, the

strengths of each element can be brought to bear on the enemy effectively. There is only one main effort at a time and it is always directed

against the focus of effort. Designating a main effort does not imply

that the offensive is limited to a single attack or series of attacks. A

commander may shift designation of the main effort as necessary and

that designation may assign the bulk of the force or only a small

fraction of the resources available. Whatever the size, designation as

the main effort means that this element is central to the complete

success of the operation and supporting units are obligated to do

everything they can to ensure that the main effort succeeds. Supporting units are crucial to the success of mission. Leaders of supporting

units, guided by the commanders intent, choose actions aimed at

doing all they can to support the main effort.

Commander’s Intent

Decisive action requires unity of effort  getting all parts of

a force to work together. Rapid action, on the other hand, requires a

large degree of decentralization, giving those closest to the problem

the freedom to solve it. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory

requirements, we use our understanding of the main effort and a tool

called the commanders intent.

The commanders intent conveys the end state, his desired

result of action. The concept of operations details the commanders

estimated sequence of actions to achieve this end state and contains

essential elements of a plan  i.e., what is to be done and how the

commander plans to do it. A commander issues the concept of

operations as part of a formal operation plan or order. The

commanders intent differs from the concept of operations; a significant change in the situation that requires action often will alter the

concept of operations, but the commanders intent is overarching

and usually remains unchanged. The commanders intent reflects his

vision and conveys his thinking through mission-type orders, in

which subordinates are encouraged to exercise initiative and are given

the freedom to act independently.
39 NDP 1

Mission-type orders define the contract that the commanders

intent establishes between the delegating commander and his subordinates. We achieve unity of effort by promulgating the commanders

intent, designating a focus of effort, and training subordinates to

think in terms of the effect of their actions two levels up and two

levels down in the chain of command. Since stereotyped actions are

inherently predictable and thus easily countered, commanders must

tailor their actions to the situation at hand, using initiative, imagination and experienced judgment.

Arleigh Burke on Ship

Effective commanders at all levels neither expect nor attempt

to control every action of their subordinates. Nor do they profess to

foresee or attempt to plan for each contingency. Two great commanders in naval history, Admirals Horatio Nelson and Arleigh

Burke, rarely issued detailed instructions to their subordinate

CAPT Arleigh A. Burke, Commander of Destroyer Squadron 23, reading on

the bridge wing of his flagship, USS Charles Ausburne (DD-570), 1943
NDP 1 40

commanders. Instead, they frequently gathered their captains to discuss a variety of tactical problems. Because of these informal discussions, the captains became aware of what their commanders expected

to accomplish and how they planned, in various situations, to accomplish it. Thus prepared, they later were able to act independently,

following their commanders intent, even though formal orders either were brief or nonexistent.

The commanders intent is particularly important in cases

where the situation that gave rise to orders has changed and, as a

result, the original orders are no longer applicable. In such cases,

subordinates can structure their decisions by asking such questions as

What would my commander want me to do in this situation? and

What can I do to help my commander attain the objectives?

Tempo

Using the philosophy of maneuver warfare, we destroy or eliminate an adversarys center of gravity indirectly by attacking weaknesses or vulnerabilities that are vital to his source of power. One

method of indirect attack is to create a dilemma, by putting the

enemy in a situation where any step taken to counteract one threat

increases his vulnerability to another. This is an indirect approach.

Through rapid high-tempo actions, we present him with a series of

unexpected situations and developments, each of which demands a

response. In the ideal situation, the enemy would find that his best

counter in one situation puts him at unacceptable risk in another 

a no-win situation.

A powerful enemy can protect his critical vulnerabilities. A

skillful enemy may disperse them. In each case, there is little chance of

striking a decisive blow unless such an enemy can be forced to expose

one or more of his critical vulnerabilities. One way of doing this is to

exploit the dynamics of warfighting by maintaining a high tempo.

Tempo is the pace of action  the rate at which we drive events. A

rapid tempo requires that commanders be provided timely, accurate

intelligence to find enemy weaknesses, enough decentralization to

allow subordinate commanders to exploit opportunities, and clearly

understood and well-rehearsed procedures at the lowest levels.
41 NDP 1

The decision cycle is a vital aspect of tempo. Forces with rapid

decision cycles enjoy an advantage over those whose leaders need more

time to gather and process information before making decisions.

Tempo is more than a means to employ weapons better; it is a weapon

itself. Directed against an enemy with a slower decision cycle, a series

of rapid and unexpected attacks on critical vulnerabilities can be

overwhelming, depriving him of his power to react effectively and

ultimately destroying his center of gravity.

As in the martial art of judo, the objective in fighting with

a high tempo is to take action that sets in motion a series of

actions and reactions, each of which potentially exposes  if only

for a brief time  a critical vulnerability. In such a contest, we

achieve victory by making the most rapid and unpredictable moves

specifically selected to catch the enemy in a vulnerable position

long enough to deliver a decisive blow. It is an aggressive style of

warfare in which we gain advantage by observing the enemy, orienting ourselves to these surroundings, deciding on a move, and

acting more rapidly than the enemy.

On a tactical level, this warfighting technique, formally noted

in the extraordinary success enjoyed by U.S. pilots during the Korean

War,8 also served as the root of success in similar experiences of naval

aviators during the latter stages of the Vietnam War.

8

 A discussion of air-to-air combat in the Korean War can be found in Boyd, John R.

Col. USAF (Ret.), Patterns of Conflict, an unpublished lecture cited in William S.

Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985), pp 4-6.
NDP 1 42

AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING

Tactical Use of Tempo

During the early stages of the Vietnam War, our aircraft exchange

rate in combat was only two to one. Air-to-air missiles, thought to be the

technological answer to future aerial combat, were ineffective in many cases.

Our pilots needed to develop close-in maneuvering skills and proficiency in

the use of their missiles as well as newly installed guns to counter the principal

communist fighters, the MiG-series.

In several traditional measures of aircraft performance the MiG was

superior to the U.S. F-4. However, following the lessons taught at Top Gun

 the Navy Fighter Weapons School established to study and improve air

combat maneuvering skills  fighter crews improved the kill ratio sixfold in

the skys over Vietnam. The F-4 crew forced its opponent into a series of

tactical actions designed to gain and maintain advantage after each maneuver.

The F-4 crew quickly saw how the situation changed and immediately

followed with new actions. With each change, the MiGs actions became

more inappropriate, until it gave the F-4 an acceptable firing opportunity.

Occasionally, the MiG pilot realized what was happening to him, panicked,

and ultimately made the F-4 crews job that much easier. Success resulted

from conducting a series of sudden unexpected moves to which the enemy

could not adjust.

Shootdown Photograph
43 NDP 1

Because tempo is so important in maneuver warfare, commanders must have the freedom of action to make decisions and

execute them without any externally imposed delay. Commanders

must be allowed to seize the initiative and respond to rapidly changing situations. Response time is a key to maneuver warfare. Activity

at the operational level must contribute directly to the military strategic aim. Such aims, broadly set, demand that the operational commander have wide-ranging independence to exercise creativity and

originality. Such freedom allows him to gain and retain the initiative

and adapt to the developing situation. Mission-type orders, specifying

a result but leaving open the methods of attaining that result, allow

the decentralization necessary for local rapid response.

Success in war depends upon properly implementing our overall warfighting philosophy which includes understanding the

commanders intent and the concepts center of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, focus of effort, and main effort. Additionally, we must

correctly apply the basic tenets or principles of war.9

 The principles of

war are based on hard-won and often bitter experience gained in

conflict. These important lessons emphasize its nature and form the

basis for our warfighting doctrine.

The Principles of War

An important issue throughout military history has been the way

a military organization addresses the qualities that war demands from its

participants. Military leadership has dealt best with the intractable problems of war as a form of military and naval art. In the maritime environment, with its distinctive factors, we fight using the principles that apply

to combat everywhere. Wisdom gained from study of the basic principles

of war underscores that war is not the business of managers with checklists; it is the art of leaders.

9 Nine principles of war are discussed in such authoritative publications as Joint Publication

0-1 Basic National Defense Doctrine, Joint Publication 1 Joint Warfare of the U.S.

Armed Forces, FM 100-5 Operations, and FMFM 1 Warfighting.
NDP 1 44

l Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly

defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The naval Services

focus their operations to achieve political purposes defined by

the National Command Authorities. With national strategic

purpose identified, we can select theater military objectives

and form operational and tactical objectives based on specific

missions and capabilities. Whether the objective is destroying

an enemys armed forces or merely disrupting his ability to

use his forces effectively, the most significant preparation a

commander can make is to express clearly the objective of the

operation to subordinate commanders.

l Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive time and

place. Use strength against weakness. A force, even one smaller

than its adversary, can achieve decisive results when it concentrates or focuses its assets on defeating an enemys critical

vulnerability. A naval task force, using the sea as an ally, can

compensate for numerical inferiority through the principle of

mass. Mass further implies an ability to sustain momentum

for decisive results.

Historic photograph showing concentration of forces
45 NDP 1

l Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage

through the feasible application of combat power. Use of

maneuver (mobility) capitalizes on the speed and agility of

our forces (platforms and weapons) to gain an advantage in

time and space relative to the enemys vulnerabilities. Whether

seen in historic warships crossing the T, or modern ground

forces enveloping an enemy, or forcing the tempo of combat

beyond an adversarys ability to respond, maneuver allows us

to get ahead of the enemy in several dimensions. Our advantage comes from exploiting the maneuver differential  our

superiority in speed and position relative to our adversary.

SSN Burke Class

l Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Since the

days of sail  racing an opponent for the upwind advantage

to take the initiative  offensive action has allowed us to set

the terms and select the place of confrontation, exploit vulnerabilities and seize opportunities from unexpected developments. Taking the offensive through initiative is a philosophy

we use to employ available forces intelligently to deny an

enemy his freedom of action.
NDP 1 46

lEconomy of Force. Employ all combat power available in the most

effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. With many more available targets than assets, each

unit must focus its attention on the primary objectives. A successfully coordinated naval strike at an enemys critical vulnerability

 for example, knocking specific command-and-control nodes

out of commission  can have far more significance than an

attempt to destroy the entire command-and-control system.

l Unity of Command. Ensure unity of effort for every objective

under one responsible commander. Whether the scope of responsibility involves a single, independent ship at sea or the

conduct of an amphibious landing, we achieve unity in forces

by assigning a single commander. After he expresses his intent

and provides an overall focus, he permits subordinate commanders to make timely, critical decisions and maintain a

high tempo in pursuit of a unified objective. The result is

success, generated by unity in purpose, unit cohesion, and

flexibility in responding to the uncertainties of combat.

l Simplicity. Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting military operations. The implementing

orders for some of the most influential naval battles ever fought

have been little more than a paragraph. Broad guidance rather

than detailed and involved instructions promote flexibility and

simplicity. Simple plans and clear direction promote understanding and minimize confusion. Operation Order 91-001, dated 17

January 1991 summarized the allied objectives for the Desert

Storm campaign into a single sentence: Attack Iraqi politicalmilitary leadership and command and control; sever Iraqi supply

lines; destroy chemical, biological and nuclear capability; destroy

Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait. These objectives were succinct, tangible, and limited.
47 NDP 1

l Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for

which he is unprepared. Catching the enemy off guard immediately puts him on the defensive, allowing us to drive events. The

element of surprise is desirable, but it is not essential that the

enemy be taken completely unaware  only that he becomes

aware too late to react effectively. Concealing our capabilities and

intentions by using covert techniques and deceptions gives us the

opportunity to strike the enemy when he is not ready.

SEALS landing on beach Photograph

l Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Protecting the force increases our combat power. The alert

watchstander, advanced picket, or such measures as electronic

emission control all promote our freedom of action by reducing

our vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Tools such

as gaming and simulation allow us to look at ourselves from the

enemys perspective. We enhance our security by a thorough understanding of the enemys strategy, doctrine, and tactics.
NDP 1 48

MIDWAY

 The Principles of War Applied at Sea

After the Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942, Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, learned from signals

intelligence that a large Japanese naval force, led by Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto

and Chuichi Nagumo, would attack Midway, a strategic atoll west of the

American fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Other enemy forces would make

a feint toward the Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific. The priceless advantage

afforded by intercepting Japanese communications gave the Americans

unprecedented knowledge of enemy intentions and force dispositions.

Every available carrier and escort the United States could muster was

assigned to the operation  including the carrier Yorktown, which made a

hasty sortie after repairs thought impossible by the Japanese Naval Staff.

Nevertheless, the U.S. force was numerically inferior to the Japanese striking

group. Nimitz assigned Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, a veteran of battle

who had recently faced Japanese carrier forces at Coral Sea, as the officer in

tactical command. Nimitzs objectives were clear and simple: hold Midway

and inflict maximum damage on the enemy by strong attrition tactics. Nimitz

further added In carrying out the task assigned . . . you will be guided by the

principles of calculated risk. Fletcher had unity of command and broad

latitude in executing his tasks. He directed Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance,

 Fletcher Spruance

Commander Task Force 16, to attack the enemy carriers as soon as the ships

were located. Fletcher, embarked in the carrier Yorktown with Task Force 17,

would follow soon afterward. Early in the battle, when enemy air attacks placed

his flagship out of action, Fletcher transferred that unity of command to

Spruance who retained tactical control for most of the fight.

Knowledge of the Japanese plan allowed Nimitz to invoke economy

of force by deploying minimal forces in front of a Japanese diversion toward

the Aleutian Islands while massing his most effective combat power  his

three aircraft carriers  against the main enemy thrust at Midway. Also, knowing

that the Japanese would use submarines and long-range flying boats to determine

if the U.S. fleet had sortied from Pearl Harbor, Nimitz used maneuverto

frustrate the operation of these enemy units. With our intelligence advantage,

Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher Admiral Raymond A. Spruance
49 NDP 1

the U.S. carriers were able to deploy and were in place well in advance of the

enemy fleet. To retain their advantage, U.S. units maintained securitythrough

radio silence and darken-ship procedures at night. The fact that the U.S.

carriers had departed the base before the battle was not known to Yamamoto.

The Japanese were also conscious of the need for security and surprise. In

contrast, however, excessive emphasis on security and surprise actually worked

against Yamamoto and Nagumo. Convinced that the invading force would

catch the island of Midway unprepared, the Japanese admirals failed to assess

fully the size and location of their opposing forces. Complete reconnaissance

would have shown that the U.S. Navy did not have adequate fleet strength at

the time to win in a direct at-sea confrontation. The Japanese could have

concentrated their efforts against Fletchers and Spruances forces and then

attacked the lightly defended Midway later.

On the morning of June 4, 1942, Nagumo launched a routine,

limited dawn air search, convinced that the Americans could not be in the

vicinity. He then followed with his initial attack against Midway, opposed only

by the relatively few ground-based Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps

search, attack, and fighter aircraft on the island. By the time Japanese

reconnaissance aircraft did discover the presence of the American force, it

was too late. After the Japanese aerial assault, Spruance and his staff reasoned

that Yamamotos force might be in the process of recovering their aircraft and

preparing for additional land attacks. Seizing the initiative, Fletcher and

 Yamamoto Nagumo

Spruance immediately attacked the Japanese carriers with every aircraft available.

Although outnumbered, Fletcher and Spruance maintained an aggressive

offensive. Japanese combat air patrol intercepted the U.S. attack, but became

preoccupied with low-flying torpedo planes. When the dive bombers from

Yorktown and Enterprise arrived at the battle site, the fight was taking place

at low altitude, allowing them to attack Yamamotos force unimpeded. In fact,

the American air strike did surprise the Japanese carriers in an exceptionally

vulnerable situation  with unstowed ordnance and bomb- and torpedo-laden

planes on deck being refueled. In the fighting that followed, the Japanese lost

the carriers Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi, and Kaga and their scores of veteran aviators.

Deprived of air cover, Admiral Yamamoto canceled the planned invasion of

Midway Island. The Japanese never regained the initiative in the Pacific.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
NDP 1 50

The principles of war have been proven effective in preparing for combat, but the complexities and disorder of war preclude

their use as a simple checklist. Instead, we must be able to apply

these principles in wars turbulent environment, to promote initiative, supplement professional judgment, and serve as the conceptual framework in which we evaluate the choices available in

battle. These principles provide a solid basis for our warfighting

doctrine, that complements the experience and operational skill of

our commanders by describing a flow of action toward objectives,

rather than prescribing specific action at each point along the way.

In a chaotic combat environment, doctrine has a cohesive effect on

our forces, while enabling us to create disorder among our adversaries. It also promotes mutually understood terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes, thus freeing the

commander to focus on the overall conduct of war.

Preparation for War

Success in naval warfare is founded on properly applying

sound doctrine and understanding the principles of war. With a

foundation established and reinforced through a continuing education

and training program, we are able to plan our operations and readily

adapt when situations change.

Doctrine

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements

thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

— Joint PUB 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Doctrine is the heart of naval warfare. It governs our actions

beyond the ordered execution of military operations, but is not

prescriptive. Within the broader guidelines of national strategy, doctrine provides the basis for mutual understanding and trust within

our naval Services as well as with other Services and our national
51 NDP 1

leaders. It is not a set of concrete rules, but rather a basis of common

understanding throughout the chain of command. Composed of

shared convictions that guide naval forces as a whole, it fuses our

Service-unique tactics, techniques, procedures, and warfighting

philosophies.

Tactics is the art of selecting the right tools for the job. A

technique describes a way systems or units can be employed in combat. Our choice of specific techniques  as well as ways we might

combine them  depends on many factors, including the overall

operating situation and surrounding environment. Techniques specify

ways to use various systems. Procedures provide us with instructions

for specific systems and equipments. Techniques and procedures are

tools a commander employs in his tactics. For example, procedures

tell us how to maintain a particular weapon system; a technique

describes ways to employ it against an enemy threat; and tactics is the

art of choosing the right systems and techniques for the situation.

Doctrine is the underlying philosophy that guides our use of tactics

and weapons systems to achieve a common objective.

Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component

of our nations military strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval Warfare Publications and

Fleet Marine Force Manuals. A commander, however, cannot operate

solely under the guidance of broad strategy. Neither can he make

appropriate mission decisions if guided only by tactics and techniques.

Doctrine guides our actions toward well-defined goals and provides

the basis for mutual understanding within and between Services and

our national policymakers. It ensures our familiarity and efficiency in

the execution of procedures and tactics.

Our training and education are based on doctrine. Within

this common framework of understanding, we maintain readiness

for war by tasking forces with day-to-day missions and exercising our

tactics, techniques, procedures, and planning.
NDP 1 52

Training and Education

“It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, and especially in

modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has

been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the

beginning of war.”

— President Theodore Roosevelt,

Graduation address at the U.S. Naval Academy, 1902

The primary means for improving and displaying our readiness to fight and win is training, which includes basic military, skillspecific, and weapons-specific training (both hardware and tactical),

as well as formal education. We train at each level of employment:

individual, unit, task force, and joint or multinational force.

Damage Control

Training and education build proficiency, cohesion, and teamwork while providing opportunities to supplement limited combat

experience. In this post-Cold War era, naval professionals may never

experience general war. A realistic training program is the best means,
53 NDP 1

short of actual combat, of preparing our force and generating confidence in and knowledge of our plans, tactics, and procedures. Through

large-scale free-play exercises, including war gaming, and commandpost exercises  enhanced by simulation  we involve all elements of

naval forces and connect people to their missions before they are

actually employed. We focus our training and education on maintaining a capability to fight, as if war were imminent. This goal should not

change when naval forces are involved in operations other than war.

The same organizational structure, procedures, command and control, equipment, and thinking apply. The keys to combat effectiveness

are realistic training and relevant education.

Training provides us with skills, abilities, and a base of knowledge that supports our development of tactics. It should provide all

members of our naval forces an understanding of the roles of each

group and of how each group supports the force. Naval training does

not seek to turn Marines into capable Sailors, nor does it seek to

prepare those who operate our ships to land across a beach; but within

limits, training is fundamental to achieving unity of effort. We master

ways to employ our basic skills, abilities, and knowledge through professional military education.

Education hones our thinking and ability to make decisions.

The foundation of knowledge developed early in a career supports the

leader  officer or enlisted  in applying experience and understanding to the complex relationships of our naval forces as a whole. Professional military education focuses on the science and art of

warfighting. Such art challenges the professional to analyze, reaffirm,

and perhaps rethink truths; to seek innovations through new and

varied application of conventional guidance that has been successful

in the past; and to recognize the cases when the paths taken in history

no longer apply. Education refines our ability to see more than the

final statistics of a conflict or operation. It enables us to see wars

lessons and the thinking of its masters, as well. The refined tools of

education may be provided by the experience of instructors in an

academic environment, but can be advanced only by individual commitment and self-discipline.
NDP 1 54

Naval Warfare Planning

When military action is one of the potential responses to a

situation threatening U.S. interests, a plan is prepared using either the

joint deliberate-planning process or crisis-action procedures.10 Although military flexibility demands a capability to conduct shortnotice crisis planning when necessary, U.S. military strength is best

enhanced by deliberate peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises.

An operation plan is a commanders complete description of

a concept of operation. It is based on the commanders preparation

of the battlespace,11 a formal evaluation, supported by intelligence,

that integrates enemy doctrine with such factors as physical and environmental conditions. From this evaluation, the commander identifies the forces and support needed to execute the plan within a

theater of operations. Naval forces operation plans are integrated

into the complete inventory available to the Joint Force Commander.

For execution, plans become operation orders. Operation plans include: the theater strategy or general concept and the organizational

relationships; the logistics plan shows ways the force will be supported;

and the deployment plan sequences the movement of the force and its

logistical support into the theater. Elements of planning that produce

a concept of operations include the commanders estimate, deciding

possible courses of action, preparation of the mission statement and

its execution strategy, situation analysis, and formulation of the

commanders intent. These elements are applicable up, down, and

across chains of command.

Effective deliberate and crisis-action planning is essential and

should be complementary at all levels in the chain of command. For

example, where a joint campaign plan coordinates all available land,

sea, air, space, and special-operations forces, each component of those

10 Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 1993) has additional discussion of joint planning.

11 Commanders Preparation of the Battlefield is a term used by the Marine Corps and

Army. In a naval context, we use battlespace to mean analysis of the physical and environmental characteristics of a geographic area and its effects on our ability to establish superiority in

every dimension of this space. It includes a detailed study of enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable enemy courses of action.
55 NDP 1

forces must plan for its particular assets to support the focus of effort.

Additionally, commanders must account for the operational limits of

logistics and transportation and the associated risks to their units.

By its nature, the uncertainty of war invariably involves the

acceptance of risk. This is especially true when we employ high-tempo

operations characteristic in maneuver warfare. High tempo involves

risks when all possible information is not available at the time decisions must be made and executed. We are sometimes placed in a position of weighing certainty in outcome against the benefits of taking

prompt action. We have seen how prompt, decisive action can have

significant advantages in keeping ahead of the enemys decision-andaction cycle. The risk of uncertainty in our decisions must be balanced

by the gains of striking during a fleeting window of opportunity. Every

commander can expect to be faced with accepting a certain level of risk

in conflict. We assess risk to the overall mission and to the individuals

involved in the task continuously during execution as well as during

formal advanced planning.

Risk management and risk assessment are formal, essential

tools of operational planning. Sound decisionmaking requires the use

of these tools both in battle and in training. Naval commanders

evaluate risk by using combinations of real-time, deliberate, and indepth assessments to determine the cumulative effect on the mission

and seek ways to eliminate or control unnecessary hazards to their

forces. Go/No-Go criteria are one form of evaluating our tolerance

to risk. A mission may not be initiated, for example, if the base of

operations is in jeopardy or would be unprotected when the force

departed. Because risk is often related to gain, leaders weigh the risks

against the benefits to be obtained from an operation, recognizing

that unnecessary risk can be as great a hindrance to mission success

as enemy action. On the other hand, carefully identifying the risks,

analyzing and controlling as many factors as possible, and executing

a supervised plan that accounts for these factors have contributed to

the success of some of the greatest military operations in history.
NDP 1 56

NORMANDY

Accounting for Risk in Warfare

An excellent application of risk assessment and risk management is

illustrated in the largest amphibious operation ever conducted  the Allied

landing at Normandy, June 6, 1944. Operation Overlord was one of the

most intricately planned invasions in history. One uncertainty however, the

weather, threatened its success. General Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, recognized that high winds, low

clouds, and heavy seas converging in the objective area presented

unacceptable risk to his forces. He therefore delayed the operation, despite

the realization that this might upset the precise timing of the enormous

military undertaking. Carefully monitoring the situation, Eisenhower

sought a balance where the advantage of attacking under adverse physical

conditions, which might surprise the enemy not expecting him to take this

risk, would offset the hazards associated with the poor weather itself. After

24 hours the weather had only moderately improved, but Eisenhower felt he

had found that balance. With the risk now warranted, he made his irrevocable

decision, launching a force of more than 5,000 vessels, 11,000 aircraft, and

700,000 men, in one of the most significant joint and multinational

operations of the war.

Normandy Landing
57 NDP 1

How well we fight depends upon how we think about fighting.

Our thinking is shaped and reinforced by a continuing professional

military training and education process drawing upon:

l Sound military doctrine  the framework and

philosophy for our approach to fighting, which complements the principles of war.

l The principles of war  precepts developed from

experience that, when applied with judgment, have led

to success.

l Planning  formal, detailed analysis of options and

contingencies for known situations.

But theory alone does not win battles. Our ability to fight is

also dependent upon the physical means we have to fight making the

best use of our technology and having the ability to sustain our forces

in conflict and day-to-day operations  and our ability to lead and

motivate our forces to fight as a team. Leadership, the foremost quality of command, enhances our physical ability to fight by inspiring

unit cohesion and sense of purpose. It is the means by which we draw

upon the courage, fortitude, and dedication within our people.

Confident in our ability to fight and win as a team with the Army

and Air Force, we are ready to carry out our assigned roles supporting

our nations objectives into the 21st century.

— § — § — § —
NDP 1 58

View from Space
59 NDP 1

CHAPTER FOUR

Where We Are Headed -

Into the 21st Century

The United States is and will remain a maritime nation,

relying on the day-to-day forward presence of strong

naval forces that can project power as required to execute national policy. Our extensive security commitments and vital

global interests will not diminish in the next century. Presence forces,

both deployed periodically and permanently stationed, are essential

elements in extending U.S. influence, enhancing stability, promoting

interoperability among allies and potential coalition partners, deterring aggression and providing rapid response to crises. The challenge

facing U.S. defense planners today is to provide forces that are flexible,

capable, and able to dominate in a broad array of scenarios.

While naval forces are built to fight and win wars, perhaps as

important, is their contribution to deterring conflict. They are significant contributors to this aim because they represent a credible, survivable, and timely crisis response capability on a daily basis in critical

regions of the world. . . . From the Sea, published in September 1992,

forms the basis of the naval input to the National Military Strategy.

Its philosophy replaces the Maritime Strategy12 and sets the direction

12 The Maritime Strategy/Amphibious Warfare Strategy was, for the 1980s, our White

Paper  that is, an official statement of policy  on how naval forces, in combination

with other Services and the forces of our allies, would prepare for, fight, and terminate war

on favorable terms. The U.S. Naval Institute published an unclassified version of these

strategies as a special supplement to Proceedings in January 1986.
NDP 1 60

of naval forces in the 1990s by reemphasizing their expeditionary role.

It is a shift from the global struggle envisioned under the Cold War

maritime strategy  which called for independent blue-water, openocean naval operations on the flanks of the Soviet Union  to preparation for regional challenges. Though we retain our Service roles of

deterrence, sea superiority, and the protection of maritime trade, our

naval focus has shifted to the worlds unstable regions holding critical

and vital interests of the United States, placing a new emphasis on

littoral operations. Naval expeditionary forces play a central role in

safeguarding national interests. To maintain a strong peacetime forward presence capable of projecting sustainable power from the sea,

these forces possess a full range of naval combat capabilities.

 Naval expeditionary forces are cohesive, self-sustaining, and

tactically and strategically mobile. These task-organized, forward deployed teams can execute a broad range of options initiated from the

sea. The specific composition of naval expeditionary forces is tailored

by operational need to become one of the basic building blocks for

maritime joint and multinational options ordered by the National

Command Authorities. Such options range from what has become our

day-to-day peacetime employment  forward presence, humanitarian,

and peacekeeping operations  to fighting in regional conflicts.

Naval expeditionary forces can respond to crises unilaterally

or provide the initial enabling capability for joint and multinational

operations. These forces capitalize on the expanding capabilities of

modern naval forces to project power in an increasingly sophisticated and lethal environment. Our continuing challenge is to enhance U.S. naval warfare superiority and contribute to our nations

campaigns, through teamwork and cooperation  particularly in

joint and multinational operations. Our nations interest in remaining engaged with other nations of the world forges special bonds with

regional leaders. Naval presence is used to provide a regional stabilizing influence, foster strong alliances, and encourage multinational

friendships. This spirit of cooperation is desirable in deterring or

confronting crises.
61 NDP 1

In most contingencies, naval forces complement the capabilities and resources of the Army and Air Force, and possibly forces of

other nations. Although we have many inherent capabilities that can

be used independently, naval forces simply cannot perform independently every military function that our nation may require. However,

the critical operational capabilities naval expeditionary forces can

provide include:

l Command, Control, and Surveillance

l Battlespace Dominance

l Power Projection

l Force Sustainment

Command, Control, and Surveillance

Command, control, and surveillance encompasses the gathering, processing, and distribution of information vital to the conduct

of military planning and operations. It forms the foundation of unity

of command and is essential to the decision process at all levels. In

peacetime, command, control and surveillance systems permit us to

monitor situations of interest, giving us indications and warnings

that allow us to position our forces when necessary. In humanitarian

relief and other support operations, our command and control system becomes part of the overall network by tying together diverse

government and non-government agencies, as well as the many international and interservice forces that may join the operation.

Warfare in every dimension of the battlespace  and even

within many weapon systems  requires external information. Commanders and their forces have many requirements for information

such as navigation, meteorology/oceanography, mapping/charting,

communications, and evaluated information  intelligence. Because

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

(C4

I) is so important, commanders also seek to degrade or interrupt

an adversarys information support systems and structure. At the

same time, operations security is essential to deny the enemy knowledge of our capabilities and intentions. It also contributes to our
NDP 1 62

ability to exercise the element of surprise. Intelligence identifies key

enemy information vulnerabilities and can allow the commander to

focus his resources against the enemys center of gravity.

Good intelligence results from collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning potential adversaries. It produces timely indications

and warnings, locations, identifications, intentions, technical capabilities, and tactics of potential enemies and other countries of interest. Current and relevant intelligence permits commanders to make

decisions based on accurate estimates of the enemys forces, capabilities, and intentions.

Combat Decision Center

Intelligence is central to the decisionmaking process. Proliferation of technology increases the complexity of joint battlespace

information management, and compresses the time cycle for

decisionmaking. Space systems rapidly collect and distribute large

volumes of information. They also provide services that link widely

separated forces and provide an important advantage to naval

forces in all areas of the world. Intelligence estimates, disseminated

in a timely fashion, center on the focus of effort, identify critical

vulnerabilities, and enhance combat effectiveness.
63 NDP 1

Integrating global C4I systems that directly link and support

naval forces and joint forces will provide us an accurate picture of the

battlespace. Some C4

I operational capabilities include: enhanced battle

management systems; fully interoperable, user centered, multimedia

(voice, video, and data) links; embedded cryptographic security; and

the ability to collect, evaluate, disseminate, and receive near-real-time,

all-source, fused intelligence and surveillance data.

Technologically advanced equipment is available to any nation or individual that can afford to pay for it. It presents our potential adversaries with new capabilities through off-the-shelf

information-management systems, global navigation, and commercial communications. Nevertheless, these capabilities, though modern,

are still vulnerable to exploitation through information warfare.

Control of information exploitation is so important that it has become a warfare objective in its own right. Battlespace dominance and

projection of power ashore are intricately linked with and dependent

upon effective C4

I capabilities.

Battlespace Dominance

Modern battlespace is multidimensional. Navy and Marine

Corps operations encompass air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and

time. Dominance of these dimensions continues to be an important

factor in the survival and combat effectiveness of our force. Command and control integrates ships, submarines, aircraft, and ground

forces, so their full range of capabilities can be extended effectively

throughout our battlespace.

The battlespace in which naval forces operate is neither fixed

in size nor stationary. We can visualize it as zones of superiority,

surrounding one or more units or even the entire force, that are

shifted as the situation requires. The zones are regions in which we

maintain superiority during the full period of our operations by detecting, identifying, targeting, and neutralizing anything hostile that

enters or passes through. The battlespace is our base of operations

that we position over any area of concern and from which we can
NDP 1 64

project power. We can establish multiple zones of superiority as specific task forces are separated from the main force. All these zones are

regions into which we receive information and support from outside

sources, and from which we project power. Theater commanders may

direct naval forces to conduct a mission independently if the size of

the battlespace they can dominate adequately covers the region of

concern. By combining complementary capabilities of units working

together  including the U.S. Army and Air Force, allied, or coalition

capabilities in joint or multinational operations  we effectively extend the range and geographic influence of our battlespace.

What distinguishes naval forces among armed forces is the

combination of operational readiness and agility that creates these

zones of superiority. These zones, based on the capabilities of our

sensor and weapon systems, can reach out for hundreds of nautical

miles and protect other entities such as convoys, amphibious groups,

and land masses. We maintain our protective zones of superiority

around us, establishing them not just upon arrival, but enroute to our

objective area. The battlespace moves with the force. By extending

zones of superiority over landing forces, naval commanders protect

those forces while they are accomplishing their missions and establishing their own defensive zones. This concept applies both in war and

in operations other than war.

Power Projection

Our ability to project high-intensity power from the sea is the

cornerstone of effective deterrence, crisis response, and war. In peacetime, the recognized and credible capacity to project power underpins

our nations ability to influence events, deter potential aggressors,

promote regional stability, and provide, in conjunction with friends

and allies, a means of collective security. In war, the capacity to

develop sustained and lethal power rapidly stems from the use of

combined arms to generate concentrated offensive power at the time

and location of our choosing. Combined arms include, but are not

limited to: bombs, bullets, missiles; the synergy of sea, ground, and air
65 NDP 1

operations; electronic warfare operations; deception and ruses; psychological operations; and special warfare operations. The ability to

take the fight to the enemy is a strength enjoyed by naval forces and

has always been one of our nations primary objectives in war.

Naval expeditionary forces provide the National Command Authorities with the operational depth of naval power projection, independently or as part of a joint or multinational operation, by using:

lCarrier-based Strike Aircraft.These tailored air wings

are equipped with heavy payloads of advanced precision-guided munitions, capable of long-range strikes

over hundreds of nautical miles. They provide a variety

of power projection and crisis response options.

Photograph of F/A 18s launching missiles

l Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. These forces, the

most capable of their kind in the world, are task-organized, self-sustaining, rapidly deployable air, ground,

and logistic units. They provide a wide range of power
NDP 1 66

projection options from short-duration raids to largescale forcible-entry operations. Amphibious forces provide the ultimate conventional demonstration of power

by landing on an adversarys sovereign territory.

l Long-Range Sea-launched Cruise Missiles. These

precision-guided munitions launched by our surface

ships and submarines are a key element of power projection and provide a flexible and powerful application

of force at ranges to nearly a thousand nautical miles.

TLAM Launch

lSpecial Warfare Forces.These forces, capable of operating clandestinely, are task organized to provide advance-force operations, hydrographic and near-shore

reconnaissance in advance of a landing, direct-action

missions, combat search-and-rescue missions, and the

ability to degrade enemy lines of communications.
67 NDP 1

l Naval Surface Fire Support.This support provides

accurate, all-weather fire support responsive to the task

force commander, augmenting air-delivered strike munitions in the destruction of enemy emplacements,

systems, and personnel.

l Command and Control Warfare. This warfare discipline provides the capabilities and organization needed

to disrupt, neutralize, and deceive the enemys command

and control systems while protecting our own. A classic

example is the suppression of enemy air defenses through

overt electronic warfare.

l Maritime Prepositioning. These forces, while often

thought of as force sustainment, are integral to our

operational power projection and provide the United

States with a rapid, sustainable, global-response capability. By employing maritime prepositioning ships that

are maintained in-theater, naval expeditionary forces

can travel directly to conflict areas, joining with these

ships to build a potent fighting force.

Power projection takes the battle to the enemy. This is best

done before the enemys influence can become established, developed, or expanded. Even if no offensive action is planned, naval

forces can be used as a credible show of force that can influence a

potential adversarys actions by providing unequivocal evidence

that a fully combat-ready force stands poised to inflict unacceptable losses upon him.
NDP 1 68

Force Sustainment

UNREP/VERTREP

Sustained naval and joint operations are made possible by a

logistic support system that has two major components: fleet-based

sustainment assets and strategic sustainment assets. Fleet-based

sustainment assets include replenishment ships of the combat logistics

force providing direct fleet support, combat service support units,

mobile repair facilities, and advanced logistic support hubs. Strategic

sustainment is provided by air and sea assets that are shared by all

Services. Successful global response to contingencies depends upon

our ability to project and sustain U.S. forces in all theaters of operations. Integrated support resources in the form of fleet-based

sustainment assets and strategic assets provide naval expeditionary

forces and joint and multinational forces the ability to operate in

peacetime and in war wherever and whenever our national interests

demand. Our ability to move and sustain forces at great distances

from our shores is critical to the forward presence component of our

military strategy.
69 NDP 1

The same sustainment system that makes it possible for us to

conduct operations in war also allows our nation to extend its influence in the form of credible U.S. presence in operations other than

war. Naval forces can provide critically needed support personnel and

relief supplies in the earliest stages of need.

Sustainment starts with combat-ready forces that are provided

with effective, reliable and maintainable weapon systems, trained operators and maintenance personnel, and the necessary consumable

supplies, spare parts, and facilities to be operationally self-sufficient.

Naval forces bring a significant organic logistic capability  afloat

with the Navys Combat Logistics Force ships and ashore with the

Marine Corps force service support groups  providing a task-organized combat service support element. Our naval logistical support

systems are built around six areas of operational logistics:

l Supply. From the producer to the user, the supply system

provides our forces with the requisite materiel for conducting

naval operations.

l Maintenance. From normal upkeep to damage repair to

updating and upgrading capabilities, maintenance activities

afloat and ashore keep equipment operating. Private and

public shipyards, aviation depots, and logistic bases form the

core of our industrial support.

l Transportation. Coordinated transportation is required to

get personnel, equipment and supplies from point of origin to

destination. The Navy is responsible for the management, operation, and protection of all strategic afloat assets.

l General Engineering. Such specialized units as Marine

Corps engineer support battalions and naval construction

battalions construct temporary or permanent facilities such

as roads, airfields, and port facilities to support combatforces operations.
NDP 1 70

lHealth Services.Afloat and ashore, the Navy provides medical and dental care for the naval Services to maintain, preserve,

or restore personnel combat readiness. Assets include fleet

hospitals, hospital ships, and organic Marine Corps assets.

lOther Services. Filling the administrative, security, and personnel-support requirements of combatant forces is necessary

to keep them fully operational.

Logistic support provides assured delivery of the materiel required

for U.S. forces to remain on station, combat ready, for as long as necessary. These forces are served by a support organization that begins at the

loading dock of the manufacturer in the United States and ends when the

needed materiel is put in the hands of the user. Their delivery depends

upon our ability to maintain open sea lanes of communications to ensure

the unimpeded flow from origin to destination.

As we move forward into the 21st century, naval forces will continue to play a significant role in providing peacetime influence and

safeguarding our nations interests around the globe. Alone or as part of

a joint or multinational force, naval forces provide critical operational

capabilities that include:

l Command, Control, and Surveillance

l Battlespace Dominance

l Power Projection

l Force Sustainment

These capabilities will be increasingly relevant in facing future

regional threats and challenges to U.S. interests. They allow naval forces

to maintain a strong forward presence to deter and react effectively to

armed aggression with the ability to project sustainable power from the

sea in time of crisis.

— § — § — § —
71 NDP 1

CONCLUSION

NDP 1, Naval Warfare, describes our warfighting philosophy,

distinctive characteristics, capabilities, and basic missions. Our

warfighting philosophy incorporates the principles of war while

making the best use of the inherent characteristics and advantages of

our naval forces. The enduring characteristics of readiness, flexibility,

sustainability, and mobility make us uniquely suited to be our nations

first response to crises of all sizes at sea and along the worlds littorals.

Through the effective employment of sensors and weapons, and

supported by a comprehensive intelligence and logistics infrastructure, naval forces dominate the battlespace from which we project

power ashore.

The intent of this introductory publication is to reaffirm the

readers sense of identity and purpose in the naval Services. The varied

seniority, experience, and employment of its readers influences what

each person will gain from its concepts. For some, NDP 1 may prompt

a search for essential elements of our warfighting philosophy  such

as identification of the commanders intent  in their review of

operation orders and procedures. For others, it might suggest a review

of other Service doctrines. If it stimulates discussion, promotes further

study, and instills in readers a feeling of ownership as contributing

members of a coordinated Navy/Marine Corps team, then NDP 1

will have properly served its purpose.

Our naval forces contribute decisively to U.S. global leadership

and are vital to shaping an environment that enhances our national

security. A strong naval team  capable of deterrence, war at sea and

from the sea, and operations other than war  is essential to that

effort. Our forward presence, timely crisis response, and sustainable

power projection provide naval and joint force commanders a broad

and flexible array of combat capability.
NDP 1 72

GLOSSARY

Area of Influence: A geographical area in which a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or

fire support.

Area of Interest: That area of concern to the commander,

including the area of influence, areas adjacent, and areas extending

into enemy waters or territory to the objectives of current or planned

operations. This also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that

could jeopardize the mission.

Attrition Warfare: The application of overwhelming combat power that reduces the effectiveness of an enemys ability to fight

through his loss of personnel and materiel.

Battlespace: All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land,

space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of

influence and area of interest.

Battlespace Dominance: The degree of control over the

dimensions of the battlespace that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy freedom of action. It permits power projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential

missions.

Center of Gravity: That characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of

action, physical strength, or will to fight.

Coalition Force: A force composed of military elements of

nations that have formed a temporary alliance for a specific purpose.

Combined Arms: The use of several arms or branches of

one military Service together in an operation such as Marine Corps

infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation.
73 NDP 1

Crisis Response: The ability to maintain the forces and

agility to respond quickly and decisively to regional crises with a range

of options.

Focus of effort: The most important task to be accomplished by the force. It is the critical vulnerability we have chosen to

exploit, the paramount objective we desire to accomplish. All our

actions should be oriented on that task. If we focus our effort on the

destruction of an enemy capability, then the destruction of that capability becomes our focus of effort.

Force Sustainment: Capabilities, equipment, and operations

that ensure continuity, freedom of action, logistic support, and command and control.

Forward Presence: Maintaining forward deployed or stationed forces overseas to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen

alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and enhance the ability to

respond quickly to contingency operations.

Joint: Activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Lines of Communication: The routes (sea, air, and land)

that connect a military force with a base of operations and along

which military forces and logistics support move.

Littoral: Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or

coastal region, within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking

power of naval expeditionary forces.

Main Effort: The friendly unit or group (controlled by a

single designated commander) that constitutes the principle means by

which we will accomplish an objective. The commander ensures the

success of the main effort by providing it the preponderance of the

support and by alerting supporting units to reinforce  or, if necessary, assume  the main effort.
NDP 1 74

Maneuver Warfare: A philosophy that seeks to collapse the

enemys cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and

unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation, with which he cannot cope.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A task organization of

Marine forces (ground combat, air, and combat service support elements)

under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific mission.

The MAGTF will also include Navy support elements.

Multinational: An alliance, coalition, or other international

arrangement.

Multi-Service: Two or more Services in coordination.

National Command Authorities: The President and the

Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

Commonly referred to as the NCA.

Naval Special Warfare: A designated naval warfare specialty

that conducts operations generally accepted as being unconventional in

nature and, in many cases, covert or clandestine in character. These operations use specially trained forces to conduct unconventional warfare,

psychological operations, beach and coastal reconnaissance, operational

deception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastal and river

interdiction, and certain special tactical-intelligence-collection operations,

in addition to intelligence functions normally required for planning and

conducting special operations in a hostile environment.

Naval Surface Fire Support: Fire provided by Navy surface

gun, missile, and electronic-warfare systems in support of a unit or units

on land.

Power Projection: The application of offensive military force

against an enemy at a chosen time and place. Maritime power projection

may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets

ashore, or support of sea control operations.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READING

OKeefe, Sean, Frank B. Kelso, II, and Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

 ... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992).

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U. S. Armed Forces

(Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991).

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting (Washington,

D. C.: Department of the Navy, 1989).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, The Role of the Marine

Corps in the National Defense (Washington, D. C.: Department of

the Navy, 1991).

Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D. C.:

Department of the Army, 1993).

Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the

United States Air Force (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Air

Force, 1992).

Clausewitz, Karl von. On War. Ed. and trans. Michael Howard

and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Corbett, Sir Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

(Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy 2nd Revised Edition. (New York:

Dutton, 1991).
Wylie, Joseph. C. Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.) Military Strategy:

A General Theory of Power Control. (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute

Press, 1989).

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. Mahan On Naval Strategy. Ed. J.B.

Hattendorf. (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Ed. and trans. Samuel. B. Griffith.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Naval Doctrine Command was established by the Department of

the Navy in 1993. Its primary missions are to develop naval concepts

and integrated naval doctrine; provide a coordinated Navy-Marine

Corps voice in joint and multinational doctrine development; and

address naval and joint doctrine with respect to training, education,

operations, exercises, simulations, and war games. To ensure doctrine

remains relevant we encourage your feedback on this publication and

other doctrinal issues. Address your comments to:

This publication may be purchased by non-government personnel by writing to:

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 or

ASO/NPFD Attn: Cash Sales Code 1013, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia PA 19120-5099.

Additional copies of this publication may be obtained through

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