NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1753

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MARTIN GREENBLATT;

MARTHA GREENBLATT,

Appellants

v.

HOWARD KLEIN

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-04575)

District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 1, 2015

Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 14, 2015)

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OPINION*

 ___________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM

Martin and Martha Greenblatt, husband and wife, appeal from an order of the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted the 

Defendant’s summary judgment motion. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, we will 

recount the events in summary fashion. The Greenblatts’ amended complaint asserted 

constitutional and state law claims against Howard Klein, who was the Construction 

Code Official and Building Sub-Code Official for the Borough of North Plainfield, 

Somerset County, New Jersey, during the period relevant to the complaint. The 

Greenblatts’ claims stemmed from two incidents when Klein issued a Notice of Violation 

and Order to Terminate (“NOVOT”) for violations he observed at property owned by 

Martha Greenblatt and managed by Martin Greenblatt. The first NOVOT was served on 

the Greenblatts for “construction of retaining wall without permits,” because the 

Greenblatts had erected a cinder block wall on their property without obtaining a permit 

(the Greenblatts asserted that it was a fence rather than a wall, and that it was compliant 

with height requirements). The second was served on them for “use of a rear portion of 

the building as a place of worship without permits or certificate of occupancy.” The 

Greenblatts admitted that they had rented the area to a pastor, but argued that he was 

simply storing furniture in the space, and that Klein had illegally entered the building.

The Greenblatts appealed the NOVOTs to the Somerset County Construction 

Board of Appeals (SCCOBA), but the Board upheld the NOVOTs and ordered Martha 

Greenblatt to pay $4000 in fines. The Greenblatts filed suit in the Superior Court of New 
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Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, against Klein and others. That court affirmed 

the SCCOBA’s decision, holding that the Greenblatts did not have standing to raise a 

Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of the church portion of the building, as 

the property had been rented to a third-party tenant, the Greenblatts did not occupy the 

property, and they had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to that portion of the 

property. The New Jersey court also held that the SCCOBA’s decision to uphold the 

NOVOTs was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

In the meantime, the Greenblatts filed the federal complaint at issue here, raising 

five claims: (1) harassment; (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) violation of the 

exclusionary rule; (4) violation of the Takings Doctrine; and (5) violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001 for fraud and false statements. Klein filed a motion for summary judgment. The 

Greenblatts opposed the motion and cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings. The 

District Court granted Klein’s motion, holding that: (1) the Fourth Amendment claim 

and the related exclusionary rule claim were precluded by the Superior Court’s decision; 

(2) the Greenblatts had not identified any federal cause of action for harassment, and the 

claim would fail if construed as a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress; (3) the Takings claim was without merit; and (4) there is no private right of 

action under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which is a criminal statute. The Greenblatts timely 

appealed.

We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the order 

granting summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the District Court. See

Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate 
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when the movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The District Court properly granted summary judgment as to the Fourth 

Amendment claims of illegal entry and search of the property. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 

a federal court is required to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that 

those judgments would be given in that state’s own courts.1 Kremer v. Chem. Constr. 

Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982). In New Jersey, issue preclusion is appropriately 

invoked when: (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the 

issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding; (3) the prior court issued a final 

judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior 

judgment; and (5) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in 

privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of 

Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 (3d Cir. 2002). Additionally, the prior proceedings must have 

satisfied the minimum procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause, which 

requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pa. 

Public Utility Comm’n, 767 F.3d 335, 351 n.22 (3d Cir. 2014). 

Here, the Greenblatts seek to raise the same Fourth Amendment claims that they 

raised (and had a full opportunity to litigate) in state court. The state court determined 

that the Greenblatts lacked standing to raise the claim. The claim was integral to the state 

 

1 Section 1738 has long been understood to encompass the doctrine of issue 

preclusion. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336 

(2005).
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court decision, and Klein was a defendant in the prior action. Thus, the Greenblatts were 

precluded from relitigating the Fourth Amendment claims against Klein in the federal 

court. And because the Greenblatts lost on the Fourth Amendment claims, there could be 

no meritorious exclusionary rule claims.

Next, we agree with the District Court that the Greenblatts failed to identify any 

federal or state cause of action for “harassment.” We further agree that to the extent the 

complaint could be construed as raising a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 

stress, such a claim would fail, as the Greenblatts did not allege any physical injury or 

serious psychological damage from Klein’s alleged actions. See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 

706 A.2d 685, 696 (N.J. 1998) (cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress requires that emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was so severe that no 

reasonable person could be expected to endure it). 

As for the Takings claim, we agree that the claim is without merit.2 As the state 

did not directly appropriate the Greenblatts’ property, the District Court properly 

construed the Greenblatts’ claim as a regulatory taking claim, see Am. Express Travel 

Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 370-71 (3d Cir. 2012); however, 

the Court noted that the Greenblatts had not alleged the existence of any government 

regulation that gave rise to the claim. Instead, they argued that Klein’s harassment 

 

2 Further, it appears that any Takings Clause claim was unripe, as it does not 

appear that the Greenblatts availed themselves of New Jersey’s procedures for obtaining 

compensation pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of 1971, N.J.S.A. § 20:3-1 et seq. 

See also Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 

473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985).
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diverted them from seeking rental income, and pressured them to sell the property. But 

as the District Court noted, the Greenblatts did not allege total economic deprivation, as 

they were still able to rent the property to a variety of tenants during the period at issue. 

See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] regulatory taking 

occurs only when the government’s action deprives a landowner of all economically 

viable uses of his or her property.”) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 

1019 (1992). The District Court correctly determined that the Greenblatts were in a 

position to know about applicable building codes and regulations when they bought the 

property, and that the character of the enforcement action here did not warrant any 

compensation to them. Thus, the Greenblatts did not show that any of Klein’s actions 

constituted a “taking” as opposed to a legitimate enforcement of Borough or County laws 

and regulations. 

Finally, we agree that there is no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 

And to the extent the Greenblatts sought to raise a state-law civil claim for fraud, that 

claim is precluded because the claim is simply an attempt to relitigate the facts 

underlying the New Jersey court’s decision.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.