[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Kerr v. Collier, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-457.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O

. 2020-O HIO -457

T HE S TATE EX REL

. K ERR , A PPELLANT , v . C OLLIER , J UDGE , A PPELLEE

. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Kerr v. Collier, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-457.] Prohibition—Court of common pleas had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter charging order and appoint receive r—Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing complaint affirmed. (No. 2019-0888—Submitted November 13, 2019—Decided February 13, 2020.)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Henry County, No. 7-19-05.

__________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} This appeal involves a request by appellant, Jeremy Kerr, for a writ of prohibition to vacate charging orders and receivership order s concerning Kerr’s membership interests in two limited-liability companies. The T hird District Court of Appeals dismissed Kerr’s complaint, concluding that appellee , Henry County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Collier, did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the orders. After Judge Collier did not file a merit brief inS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 this appeal, Kerr filed two motions asking this court to revers e the court of appeals’ judgment under S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.07(B). We affirm the court of a ppeals’ judgment and deny Kerr’s motions as moot. Background {¶ 2} In 2011, Kerr Buildings, Inc., of which Kerr was the president, sued Scott Bishop regarding a contract dispute in the Henry County C ourt of Common Pleas, with Judge Collier presiding. Bishop asserted a counter claim against Kerr Buildings and a third-party complaint against Kerr individually , and the lawsuits resulted in a monetary judgment of almost $80,000 against Kerr Buildings and Kerr. In May 2013, at Bishop’s request, Judge Collier entered a charg ing order concerning Kerr’s membership interests in two limited-liability companies. See R.C. 1705.19. The charging order required that any payments to which Kerr wou ld be entitled from the limited-liability companies be paid to Bishop. In January 2018, Judge Collier entered a nunc pro tunc charging order. In August 2013, also a t Bishop’s request, Judge Collier appointed a receiver over Kerr and Kerr Buildings . In March 2014, Kerr filed a motion asking Judge Collier to set aside the recei vership order, arguing that the order violated Kerr’s due-process rights because he wa s not properly served with Bishop’s motion asking for the order. Judge Collier denie d the motion, and the

Third District affirmed. See Kerr Bldgs., Inc. v. Bishop , 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-14-07,

2014-Ohio-5391. {¶ 3} In April 2018, Judge Collier entered an order titled “Amended O rders to Receiver.” Kerr alleges that he filed multiple motions aski ng Judge Collier to vacate the amended receivership order and that he appealed Judg e Collier’s decisions denying those motions. He alleges that the court of appeals di smissed his appeals sua sponte as improper requests for reconsideration. In April 2019, Kerr filed in the Third District a complaint for a writ of prohibition against Ju dge Collier seeking to invalidate the charging order, the nunc pro tunc charging order , the receivership order, and the amended receivership order. In general terms, K err’s complaintJanuary Term, 2020

3 alleges that the orders were entered in violation of his due-pr ocess rights, that some of the powers granted to the receiver are unauthorized by law, and that the charging orders exceed Judge Collie r’s authority under R.C. 1705.19. {¶ 4} Judge Collier moved to dismiss Kerr’s complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The court of appeals granted the motion, holding tha t Judge Collier did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to enter a cha rging order or to appoint a receiver. {¶ 5} Kerr appealed to this court as of right. Analysis {¶ 6} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which re lief can be granted tests the suffi ciency of the complaint.” Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc. , 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11. Di smissal of a prohibition complaint unde r Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate “if, after presuming the truth of all factual allegations of the complaint and makin g all reasonable inferences in [the relator’s] f avor, it appears beyond doubt th at he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary writ of p rohibition.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Burnham Unruh , 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 8. {¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator generally mu st show that a court is about to exercise judicial power without authority a nd that there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham

Unruh , 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7. But Kerr argues that he need not show that he lacks an adequate remedy at law b ecause Judge Collier patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter the ord ers. See State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals , 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. Therefore, based on the allegations in the c omplaint, Kerr’s prohibition claim can succeed only if he establishes that Judge Collier patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 8} Kerr challenges the propriety of the charging orders and the receivership orders, but even if ce rtain aspects of the orders are improper, he has not shown that Judge Collier patently and unambiguously lacked juri sdiction to enter them. R.C. 1705.19(A) authorizes a common pleas court to enter a charging order against a judgment debtor’s membership interest in a limited-li ability company. And R.C. 2735.01(A)(4) authorizes a common pleas court to appoint a receiver “after judgment, to carry the judgment into effect.” “Typically, a co urt will deny relief in prohibition when a respondent jud ge has general subject-matter jurisdiction and will deem any error by the judge to be an error in the exercise of j urisdiction.” State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein , 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 24. {¶ 9} Because Judge Collier had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a charging order and to appoint a receiver, Kerr has not shown th at the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdi ction. The court of appeals, t herefore, correctly dismissed Kerr’s complaint. {¶ 10} As a final matter, Kerr filed two motions asking us to reverse the court of appeals’ judgment becau se Judge Collier did not file a merit brief in this case. S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.07(B) provide s that if the appellee fail s to timely file a merit brief, we “may accept the appellant’s statement of facts and is sues as correct and reverse the judgment if the appellant’s brief reasonably appear s to sustain reversal.”

Because Kerr has not shown that we should reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, we deny his motions as moot. Judgment affirmed.

O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Jeremy Kerr, pro se.

_________________