## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . A P - 75, 933

Ex par t e FR A N K G A R C I A H ER N A N D EZ, JR. , A ppl i c ant

ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US I N CAUS E N O. 2 2 0 4 8 - 0 2 - A I N T HE 4 7 TH DI S TR I CT COURT POTTER CO UNTY K ELL ER , P .J ., de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t h e C ou rt i n w hi c h W OMACK , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B and C OCHR AN , J J . , j o i n e d . K EASLER , J., file d a con cu rri ng o pinio n. J OHN S ON , J. , fil e d a di sse nt ing opi nio n in whic h P RI CE , J., joined. M E YE RS , J. diss e nt e d.
We filed and set this habea s application to determine whethe r a pe rson re lease d on parole or mandatory su

p e r v is io nis e n ti tl e d

to c r e d it f o r “ s tr e e t t im e ” o nh is o r ig in a l s e n te n c e u n d e r T e xas Gover nment Code §508.283(c) if, afte r re lease but be fore revoc ation, he beg ins serving a sente nce
o na n e w c o n v ic ti o nf

o r an o f f e n s e th a t is d e s c r ib e d b y T e xa s G o v e r n me n t C o d e § 5 0 8
. 1 4 9 ( a )
. We
c on c lud e that su c h a

pe rs on is n ot e nti tle d to the §5 08 .2 83 (c ) t ime c re dit
.

I. BACKG ROUND I n 1 98 3, a

pp lic ant w a s c on vic te d o f t he of fe ns e of un a uth or ize d u se of

a mot or ve hic leHERNANDEZ — 2

(UUMV) and sente nced to twe nty -five y ear s of imprisonment. He was rele ased on parole in F ebrua ry of 1987. O n A u g u s t 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 , a p p li c an t c o mm itte d a r o b b e r y . A p ar o le v io lato r w ar r an t for the UUMV off

ense issued on Aug ust 30. On Dec ember 28, applicant wa s convicted of robber y , and on J anuar y 25, 2005, his parole f

or the UU MV conviction was revoke d. Taking into account c redit for pretria l incarc eration, applicant’s “be g in date” for the robber y sentenc e wa s set at Aug ust 27, 2004. I n a n a pp lic a tio n f

or a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s, a pp lic ant c on te nd e d th a t he wa s d e nie d c re dit , in vio la tio n of §5 08 .2 83 , fo r tim e sp e nt on pa ro le
. We re mand e d the a

pp lic a tio n to the tr ia l c ourt to
make fi nd ing s o n wh y a

pp lic ant wa s no t re c e ivi ng su c h c re dit . T he tr ia l c ourt fo un d th a t, o n th e date that applicant’ s parole w as revoked, he was serving a sentence for, or ha d been pr eviously convicted of , a n o ff e ns e lis te d in

§5 08 .1 49 (a ) a

nd was th eref

or e no t e nti tle d to c re dit

fo r t ime sp e nt o n e a rl y rele ase. Conseque ntly , the trial cour t rec ommended that re lief be de nied. I n h is b ri e f o n s ub mis sio n, a pp lic ant c on tin

ue s to argue that he is e nti tl ed to cred it on h is UUMV sente nce f

or time spent on parole
. He first contends that the law in e ffe ct on the date that he
was c onvicted of U UMV dete rmines whethe r he is an inmate descr ibed by §508.149(a) , and robbe ry was not listed within that section or its predec essor in 198 3
. I n t h e alter native, applica

nt contends that, even if

he is curr ently

an inmate de scrib ed by

§508.149(a) beca

use he is “se rving a sente nce” for a robber y offe nse, whe n the robbe ry sentenc e expires, he will no longe r be a n inmate desc ribed by §508.149(a) and will at that time be entitled to cr edit for his “stre et time.” II. AN AL YSI S Under §508.283(c) , a per son is entitled to cre dit f or time se rved while re lease d to parole orHERNANDEZ — 3

T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §508.283(b), ( c). 1 Id. , §508.283(c)
. 2 See id. , §508.149(a)
. 3 Se e Ex pa rteFo rwa rd , 2 58 S.W. 3d 15 1, 15 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); T EX . C ODE C R IM . 4 P R OC . art. 42.18, §8(c )(1985)
. Ex pa rteBy rd , 162 S.W .3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 5 Ex pa rteNoy ola , 215 S.W .3d 862, 866-67 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007). 6 mandatory

supervision if he mee ts two conditions: (1) he is not “a person desc ribed by §508.149(a) ,” 1 and (2) on the date that the war rant or summons i nitiating the r evocation process issued, the
rema ining por

tion of his s en t en ce wa s less than the time he spe nt on parole. I t is undisput ed that 2 applicant ha s met the second c ondition, so t he only question is whether he is “a person de scribed by §508.149(a) .” Thoug h §508.283 incorpora tes §508.149(a) by

ref ere nce, the most dire ct function serve d by §508.149(a) is to describe persons who are not e ligible for mandatory supervision. Be fore 1987, the 3 only inmates who we re c ateg orica lly ex cl u d ed from mandatory supervision wer e those who w ere sentenc ed to death. Eligibility for manda

tory supervision is determined by the law in ef

fec t on the 4 date that th e inm a te c omm itt e d th e of fe ns e . B ut e lig ibi lity

un de r § 50 8. 28 3( c ) f

or c re dit fo r t ime 5 spent on ea

rly rele ase is dete rmined by the law in ef

fe ct o n t h e date that the re lease e’s pa role or mandatory

supervision was r evoked – inc luding the ve rsion of §508.149(a ) in eff ect on the date of
revoc ation. So it i s entirely possible for a convicted person to be elig ible for mandatory supervision 6HERNANDEZ — 4

Se e By rd , 162 S.W .3d at 252 (discussing implications of rule later adopted in Noy ola ). 7 T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §5 08 .1 49 (a )( 11 )( e mph a sis a dd e d)
. We a lso no te that §5 08 .2 83 wa s la st 8 amende d in 2003, so the 2005 version is identical to the cur rent ve rsion of the statute. Ex parte Keller , 173 S.W .3d 492, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 9 Id. at 493. 10 Id. at 493, 495. 11 Id. at 496. 12 but ineligible f

or the time cr edit and vice -ver sa. To deter mine whether applicant is elig ible for the 7 tim e c re di t, the n, we mus t lo ok , n ot t o th e law o f 1 98 3, wh e n a pp lic ant c omm itt e d th e UU MV offe nse, but to the law of 2005, w hen applica nt’s parole on the UUMV of fense was re voked. Th e rel evant p or

tio n o f § 50 8. 14 9( a ) i s th e same tod ay a s th e 20 05 ve rs ion , a

nd it p ro vid e s: “An inmate ma

y not be re lease d to mandatory supervision if the inmate is serving a sentenc e for or h a s b e e np r e v i o u s l y

c o n v i c t e d

o f
. . . a s e c o n d d e g r e e f

e l o n y un d e r S e c t i o n 2 9
. 0 2 , P e n a l C o d e . ” In 8 Ex parte Keller , we he ld that the phrase “pre viously convicted of

” re fer s to a conviction that occ urs befor e the inmate’ s “holding conviction,” the “holding conviction” be ing the on e fo r wh i ch the 9 inm a te is s e rv inga

se nte nc e . In th a t c a se , th e inm a te wa s r e le a se d to pa ro le on a burg lary -o f- a -v e hic le conviction, and while on pa role, committed the offe nse of indec ency with a child, for w hich he wa s
c on vic te d. Som e tim e a ft er hi s paro le had be e n r e vo ke d a

nd he ha d s e rv e d th e e nti re ty of his 10 indece ncy offe nse, the inmate w as re lease d on mandatory supervision for the burg lary offe nse. He

11
was e ligible f

or the c redit for “stree t time” when his mandatory supervision was r evoked be cause the indece ncy conviction occ urre d after (not befor e) the burg lary

conviction. Significa

ntly , the Keller 12HERNANDEZ — 5

Id. 13 We n ote that w e are ob lig a te d to c on str ue a statut e in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he pla in 14 meaningof its tex t unless the plain meaningleads to absur d results that the L eg islature could not have possibly

intended. Bo

y k in v . S tat e , 8 1 8 S
. W
. 2 d

7 8 2 , 7 8 5 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 1 ). T h o u gh we do not view the plain meaningas produc ing a n absurd r esult, we note that the leg islative history provides no g uidance on the question befor e us. See H.B . 1585, House Comm. on Correc tions, 77th L eg ., R.S. (Mar. 6, 2001) (a udio at http:// www.house .state.tx .us./committ ees/a udio77/200.htm beginning at 1:17:25). op ini on state d, “ On ly

if the ind e c e nc y

c on vic tio n w e re the ho ldi ngof fe ns e (o r if

the ho ldi ngof

fe ns e
wer e one c ommitt ed af

ter the 1997 inde cenc y

conviction) would a

pplicant be a

person ‘ descr ibed by §508.149(a) .’” But the inde cenc y conviction could not be the h olding c onviction beca use the 13 sentenc e had alr eady

been disc harg ed, so the inmate w as not “ser ving a sentenc e” f

or that convic tion. I n the pre sent case , if the UUMV conviction were view ed as the “holding ” convic tion, then applicant’ s subsequent robbe ry conviction could not qua lify as a “ previous” c onviction under Keller beca use it oc curr ed afte r the “holding ” convic tion. But under Keller , nothing pr events the r obbery conviction from qua lifying a s a “holdin g ” c o nviction, beca use applica

nt was in fac t serving a sente nce for the r obbery on the date of his U UMV revoc ation. Nothing in the languag e of §508.149( a) r equire s that some sort of limit ation be re ad into the phra se “se rving a sente nce,” and we see no c ompelling
re a so n to do so . We c on c lud e tha t, b e c a us e a pp lic ant wa s se rv inga

se nte nc e fo r r ob be ry

a t th e tim e 14 of his UUMV re vocation, he w as a pe rson desc ribed by §508.149(a)
. All that remains is applica nt’s contention that he may later obta in cre dit for his street time on the UUMV of

fense when he completes his r obbery sentenc e. We r ejec t that c ontention be cause theHERNANDEZ — 6

T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §508.283(b)( “I f the pa role, mandatory

supervision, or conditional 15 pardon of a per son descr ibed by

Section 508.149(a) is revoked . . . .” ), (c )(“ I f the pa role, mandatory

supervision, or conditional par don of a pe rson other tha n a per son descr ibed by Section 508.149(a) is revoked . . . .” ). time cre dit statute focuse s on the rele asee ’s status at the time of revoc ation. The re lease e is either 15 a per son descr ibed by

§508.149(a) at the time of re vocation or he is not. His st atus at t h e t i m e of
re vo c a tio n d e te rm ine s w he the r h e g e ts the tim e c re dit
. We deny relief
. Deliver ed: J anuar

y 28, 2009 Publis h