“All Our Tomorrows”: 

A Long-Range Forecast of Global 

Trends Affecting Arms Control 

Technology 

James M. Smith and Jeffrey A. Larsen 

INSS Occasional Paper 44 

June 2002 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department 

of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US 

Government. The paper is approved for public release; distribution 

is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: 

Dr. James M. Smith is Director, USAF Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS) and Professor of Military Strategic Studies 

at the United States Air Force Academy. He is a graduate of the Air 

Force Academy and a retired USAF officer. He holds an MS from 

the University of Southern California and a Doctorate in Public 

Administration (Public Policy) from the University of Alabama. 

Relevant to this publication, he is the editor of Nuclear Deterrence 

and Defense: Strategic Considerations (INSS, 2001), is a chapter 

author in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds. 

Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and 

Opportunities (INSS, 2001), and is coauthor (with Jeffrey A. Larsen) 

of The Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament

(Scarecrow Press, forthcoming). 

Dr. Jeffrey A. Larsen, the founding Director of INSS, is a Senior 

Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation. He is 

a graduate of the Air Force Academy and a retired USAF officer. 

He holds a Masters Degree in national security affairs from the 

Naval Postgraduate School and both Masters and PhD from 

Princeton University. His relevant publications include editor (with 

Gregory J. Rattray) Arms Control: Toward the 21st Century (Lynne 

Rienner, 1996), editor (with Thomas D. Miller) Arms Control in the 

Asia-Pacific Region (INSS, 1999), editor (with Kurt J. 

Klingenberger) Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 

Obstacles and Opportunities (INSS, 2001), editor, Arms Control: 

Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment (Lynne Rienner, 

2002), and coauthor (with James M. Smith) The Historical 

Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament (Scarecrow Press, 

forthcoming). 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 
iv

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Implementation of the Study 1 

 Phase One Faculty Regional and Functional 

 Forecasting Offsites 1 

Phase Two Arms Control Technologies 

 Requirements Workshop 2 

Phase Three Final Report Preparation 2 

Context 2 

 Overview 4 

The Evolving International Security Environment 5 

 Economics 5 

 Technology 6 

 Politics 7 

 Military 7 

 International Actors 7 

 The Future of the Regions 9 

 Implications for Arms Control 10 

Arms Control Futures in 2015 11 

 The Future Nuclear Arms Control Environment 11 

 Future Chemical/Biological Arms Control 

 Environment 14 

Future Conventional Arms Control Environment 15 

Space Arms Control Environment 16 

Information Arms Control Environment 18 

Arms Control Technology Requirements for 

 Compliance, Verification, and Monitoring 19 

 Biological Weapons Monitoring Technology 

 Requirements 24 

Remote Sensing Arms Control Environment 25 

Non-Traditional Arms Control Requirements 25 

Major Findings and Implications 26 

 The National Security Environment and 
vi

 Arms Control 26 

 Arms Control Forms and Focus 31 

 Arms Control Compliance, Verification, and 

 Monitoring Technology Requirements 40 

Conclusion 44 

Appendix One: USAFA Faculty Chairs of Phase One 

 Study Groups (Spring 2001) 47 

Appendix Two: Phase Two Conference Agenda and 

 Participants (August 2001) 48 
vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-fourth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This paper reports the results of a 

project that takes INSS back very close to its founding vision. Two 

primary rationale for the establishment of a policy research institute 

within the military academic community were to tap into the crossdisciplinary capabilities existent within the faculties of military 

education institutions and to foster and leverage the ready collegial 

networks that exist across and beyond these institutions and their 

faculties and students. This project brought the combined efforts of 

the technical and social sciences faculties of the Air Force 

Academy, selected members of the faculties from the US Military 

Academy, the Air War College, and the Air Force School of 

Advanced Airpower Studies, and representatives from centers of 

expertise such as Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories, the 

Department of Defense, and the Department of State all together to 

forecast trends and project requirements for arms control in 2015. 

As INSS as an Institute both sponsored and completed the paper 

published here, we deflect further overview to the Executive 

Summary that follows. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 

23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the Army Environmental 

Policy Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate 

(XPXP). The research leading to the papers in this volume was 

sponsored by OSD/NA, DTRA, and XONP. The mission of the 

Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, 

and to support national security education.” Its research focuses on 

the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms 

control and strategic security; counterproliferation, force protection, 

and homeland security; air and space issues and planning; 
viii

information operations and information warfare; and regional and 

emerging national security issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide 

range of private and government organizations. INSS provides 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. 

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research 

products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
ix

“ALL OUR TOMORROWS”: A LONG-RANGE FORECAST 

OF GLOBAL TRENDS AFFECTING ARMS CONTROL 

TECHNOLOGY 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This report summarizes a three-phase research project 

undertaken by the USAF Institute for National Security Studies on 

behalf of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to forecast longrange global trends affecting arms control technologies. The report 

projects the international political, economic, and scientific 

environments to the year 2015. It posits economic and 

technological drivers as shaping the system, including its military 

and political dimensions. The result will be a two-tiered system, 

with great danger arising from significant proliferation in the second 

tier and the transition zone between tiers. The report next draws 

conclusions from this likely future for the scope, value, and practice 

of arms control. Arms control will be focused less on limitation and 

reduction of existing weapons, although the endgame there between 

the United States and Russia will remain a significant effort. The 

focus will shift to the less well-defined realm of 

counterproliferation, and to marginal, failing, and failed states as 

well as non-traditional and non-state actors. New dimensions will 

be added, including control efforts toward small arms, advanced 

conventional weapons, military space, and information operations. 

The report then extrapolates from this future to assess the likely 

arms control technology requirements in cooperative, noncooperative, intrusive, and non-intrusive regimes. The projection 

here is continuing requirements for each of these specialized sets of 

technologies, with particular emphasis on multiple-use technologies 

for remote arms control compliance and verification monitoring as 

well as for intelligence detection and collection. Similarly, area 

arms control monitoring systems must be capable of application for 

force protection applications. Data management/knowledge 

management will become a top priority for arms control, as will the 

continuing development of human expertise in this advanced area of 

specialization. 
x
All Our Tomorrows: A Long-Range Forecast of Global 

Trends Affecting Arms Control Technology 

In 2001 the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies 

(INSS) assisted the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in 

its long range arms control planning efforts by conducting a 

comprehensive forecast of likely national security environments for 

2015, potential arms control environments indicated by that 

analysis, and the resulting technology requirements for verification 

and monitoring to support arms control in 2015. DTRA asked that 

the study identify global events and trends that, in varying degrees 

of likelihood, may have a substantive effect on the arms control 

environment. We also considered the unanticipated consequences 

of existing or contemplated strategies affecting the arms control 

environment and the element of covert proliferation (to include 

catastrophic military and technological surprise). We looked for 

both individual and synergistic effects. We specifically enumerated 

the effects upon the arms control environment and the resultant 

technology requirements arising from these effects. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY 

The project was completed in three sequential phases: 

Phase One: Faculty Regional and Functional Forecasting 

Offsites

During the spring semester of 2001 INSS asked members of the 

US Air Force Academy (USAFA) faculty to undertake a number of 

brainstorming sessions specifically aimed at projecting disciplinary 

trends and the resulting effects on the international security 

environment of 2015. Rather than single trend lines and forecasts, 

the teams were asked to develop the most likely alternative futures 
2

and the relative likelihood and critical determinants of the 

realization of each future. INSS consolidated all Phase One inputs 

into a preliminary forecast report to serve as a foundation for the 

invited papers and panel discussions at the Phase Two Workshop. 

USAFA panels, chairpersons, and faculty affiliations are listed in 

Appendix One. 

Phase Two: Arms Control Technologies Requirements 

Workshop

Phase Two built on the regional and functional forecasts from 

Phase One to produce a consolidated set of alternative arms control 

future projections and their associated technology requirements for 

the United States for 2015. Findings were reported at a workshop 

conducted at USAFA 24-25 July 2001. The agenda and list of 

participants are found in Appendix Two. 

Phase Three: Final Report Preparation 

Phase Three consisted of the preparation of the preliminary 

results briefing and the final project report. INSS staff prepared 

these products with selected input from the Phase One and Phase 

Two participants. 

The remainder of this paper summarizes and builds on the 

findings of Phases One and Two of the study. It begins by setting 

the stage—assessing the likely political, economic, technological, 

and military environment almost 15 years hence. It then assesses 

what that world will mean for arms control in various areas. 

Context 

The INSS departure point for this study is based in a view of 

“arms control” as it was viewed in the early Cold War era. The 

classic description of arms control as a strategic policy construct 

remains that of Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in their 

seminal 1961 work, Strategy and Arms Control. 
3

We believe that arms control is a promising . . . 

enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. 

It rests essentially on the recognition that our 

military relation with potential enemies is not one 

of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong 

elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a 

war that neither side wants, in minimizing the 

costs and risks of the arms competition, and in 

curtailing the scope and violence of war in the 

event it occurs. 

This definition firmly established arms control within the overall 

context of national security strategy. As a strategy instrument, arms 

control is an integral element of national efforts to enhance security, 

in this case as both a complement to and substitute for more 

confrontational strategy elements. This construct assumed that 

security strategy involved both conflict and cooperation, side by 

side and often simultaneous, as overlapping stages of a single 

continuum. For this study, then, “arms control” is considered any 

cooperative measure intended to reduce the likelihood of war, to 

limit the costs of preparing for war, or, in the event of war, to 

reduce its severity and to more quickly bring hostilities to an end. 

This includes traditional bilateral nuclear arms control, the broader 

range of unilateral reciprocal and bilateral cooperative threat 

reduction measures, multilateral arms controls and prohibitions, and 

a range of cooperative and reciprocal efforts to counter or limit the 

effects from proliferation of advanced and mass destruction/ 

disruption weapons and systems. This construct fully encompasses, 

and even extends, the existing DTRA and USAF “arms control” 

charters to capture the current and possible future mission sets of 

the study sponsors and participants. 
4

Overview 

This summary report is presented in four sections. The report 

first addresses the international security environment of 2015 and its 

broad implications for arms control. It presents a summary of the 

international system’s likely security situation and how outside 

influences might shape US arms control efforts. This then serves as 

a foundation for identifying arms control compliance verification 

and monitoring (CV&M) technology requirements. 

Second, the report looks at a range of arms control futures 

within the international security environment of 2015. It forecasts 

the status of arms control programs and their implementation with 

special emphasis on nuclear, chemical, and biological arms 

controls—the current DTRA areas of charter. It also addresses 

conventional, information, and space “arms control” not only as 

potential future expansions of the DTRA mission, but as areas of 

particular interest to the Air Force. This section emphasizes how 

these efforts might impact CV&M technologies or their 

developments in technical areas that might spur future technology 

requirements. 

The third section of this report addresses requirements for arms 

control CV&M technologies in 2015. It includes a summary of the 

current and projected CV&M technological focus and capabilities, 

and their adequacy for meeting CV&M requirements. It also 

identifies some specific CV&M requirements not met by current 

and projected technologies. The final section lists the study’s major 

findings and implications, including the main themes and 

requirements of the overall study. 
5

THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

ENVIRONMENT 

A number of overlapping and interconnected drivers—

economic, technical, political, and military—will shape the 

international security environment to 2015, significantly impacting 

the future arms control arena and the requirements for arms control 

verification and compliance monitoring technology. Economic and 

technical drivers will play the lead role in creating that future 

security environment. Political and military drivers will be shaped, 

in large part, by global economic interactions and rapidly evolving 

technology developments. Trends and interactions creating the 

2015 environment could be found in four fields: economics, 

technology, politics, and the military. 

Economics 

The world economy will continue to grow and provide 

increased wealth to its participants. Major growth engines over the 

next 15 years include technology advances, open global trade, and 

increased access to information. The rich will get richer and the 

poor, while less poor than before, will fall further behind. 

Globalization and interdependence will enable rich states to exert 

power and influence over poorer states, and the growing gap 

between the two will breed instability and internal conflict. 

Intertwined financial systems and trade will be severely disrupted in 

the event of long-term recessions or economic depression. Poorer 

states, constrained by trade ties, will be limited in their ability to 

manage their own economies and security environments. Richer 

states will have a greater chance of maintaining stability because 

they can provide resources in exchange for the instruments of 

internal security. Corporations will gain power at the expense of 

states as they seek stable, cost-effective environments for 
6

manufacturing and distribution facilities. Intellectual capital and 

educated work forces will provide significant competitive 

advantage. 

Technology

The United States, with its incredibly robust commercial and 

military research and development (R&D) capability, will remain 

the global leader in this realm, which will affect the kind of 

technology that will be developed, as well as the pace of that 

development. Russia’s ability to export technology will 

dramatically decrease. Likely breakthroughs or major advances can 

be predicted in several scientific areas: 

• Chemistry and Biology. The chemical and biological weapons 

fields will benefit from advances in targeted agents, improved 

detection, advances in biotechnology, improvements in 

batteries and portable electrical power, and new rocket 

propellants. 

• Physics. Unmanned aerial vehicles will continue to take on 

more tasks and missions as advances in the fields of 

hyperspectral sensors, moving target indicator technologies, 

global positioning satellite guided munitions, and directed 

energy weapons come on line. These will be mated to similar 

advances in micro-electric-mechanical systems and broadband 

free space communications. 

• Conventional weapons. Radical changes in conventional 

weapons are not forecast for technical and fiscal reasons, but 

existing cutting-edge technologies will proliferate throughout 

the globe. The trend will be toward smaller, smarter munitions 

that have the potential to give the possessor a means to more 

rapidly prosecute a war. 
7

Politics

The nation state will continue to be the dominant player on the 

international scene, but will confront fundamental tests of effective 

governance from globalization and increasingly vocal and organized 

publics. Non-state actors, criminal networks, and the rising 

dynamics of ethnic and religious groups will also confront the state. 

The United States should remain above many—but not all—of these 

troubles, and will remain the leader of the democratic free-market 

economies. 

Military

A number of states will continue to develop or maintain 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs to help control their 

security environment, including Israel, India, Pakistan, China, and 

Russia, among others. The central focus in Northeast Asia will be 

Korean integration and the resultant repercussions for Japan and 

China. 

International Actors 

Interaction among these drivers will deepen the trend toward a 

two-tier world, with the developed free-market countries of the first 

tier displaying growth, stability, cooperation, and peaceful 

economic competition and cooperation. Many of the second-tier 

states will experience internal divergence, decline, and conflict. 

Given its internal political problems and economic weakness, 

Russia is not included in the tier-one states. Several other states 

may transition from tier two to one, and there will always be a 

number of failed states, primarily in Central Asia and Africa. Nonstate actors, including terrorist organizations, will continue to play a 

critical role, contributing significantly to further environmental 

complexity. The United States will remain a global leader, helped 
8

in large part by the world’s strongest economy and a commercial 

and military R&D infrastructure second to none. 

In this rapidly evolving, complex environment, arms control 

will have to contend with an increasing number of actors and 

potential adversaries. Improvements in adversary technology will 

be aided by a network of technology trading among rogue states, 

exports from developed countries, the availability of dual-use 

technology, and improvements in indigenous technology capability. 

Indigenous technology capability will improve, and will less likely 

be constrained by arms control treaties. 

Motivations to acquire WMD will vary. States may acquire 

these weapons as a means to gain national prestige, to dominate a 

region, to make a statement, or to respond to an outside threat. 

Advancements in threat technologies for the international security 

environment in 2015will include: 

• WMD and means of WMD delivery 

• Information warfare 

• Critical infrastructure attacks 

• Anti-access strategies 

• Hiding forces in populated centers 

• Denial and deception 

In addition, the second-hand conventional arms marketplace (legal 

and illegal) will grow significantly, making it harder to control these 

weapons and to stem third party transfers and sales. This will 

exacerbate and extend the length of conventional conflicts in tiertwo nations. 

The current United States approach is to reassure allies, 

dissuade new threats from developing, deter current threats, and 

defeat threats or aggression when required. Potential adversaries 
9

will be dissuaded from developing threat technologies through 

robust US research and the development and prototyping of superior 

military technologies to meet, deter, and combat new threats. 

The United States will rely on tier-one states and regional 

players to provide broad stability in various regions. There could, 

however, be a divergence between the United States and Europe, 

creating a number of regional blocs. This would have a major 

impact on arms control, export controls, and general security 

cooperation. 

The Future of the Regions 

The United States and Europe (indeed, all the G-7 nations) will 

continue to exhibit economic growth, world leadership, and relative 

peace and stability. Other parts of the world will not be so lucky. 

Sub-Saharan Africa will witness the transition of many of its states 

to authoritarian regimes, the continuing outbreak of internal 

conflicts in many states, failed governments, recurring humanitarian 

and natural disasters, the pandemic of AIDS, and the possible rise of 

anti-Western Islamic leaders. 

Compared to those problems, the rest of the world will not look 

so bad. Latin America, for example, will continue its slow 

movement toward legitimate democracies and economic 

development. Northeast Asia will continue to develop into an 

economic powerhouse, particularly given the inevitable eventual 

rise of China, but questions remain about the future of Korea and 

China’s aspirations. Russia will still be trying to figure out its 

identity and overcome four generations of Soviet ineptitude; only its 

residual nuclear arsenal will make it worth notice by the West. The 

Middle East faces serious problems, but unlike Africa most of them 

are self-caused: the proliferation of WMD, conventional conflict 
10

among neighboring states, terrorism and the rise of indigenous 

factions, and weapons trafficking. 

Notably, the Middle East, with its heightened and proliferationbased danger, may be of lower significance on the list of United 

States national interests as renewable and other alternative energy 

sources begin to replace western reliance on petroleum-based 

sources. After 11 September 2001, however, this trend is more 

difficult to forecast. In the long term, following the United States’ 

global war on terrorism, this may yet prove true. Even as the 

Middle East represents lowered security significance to the United 

States, South Asia will take on increased significance. India's rise 

as a regional power, the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship, and the 

inevitable increase in India-China contact and potential conflict will 

demand US attention. 

Implications for Arms Control 

As threats and adversaries become less clear and more 

numerous, a premium will be placed on enhanced intelligence 

capabilities to better determine adversaries, their weapons, threats, 

and intentions. Maintaining leading edge technology will be a key 

factor in transforming the US military and making it relevant for the 

21st century. 

Arms control will remain an important tool that can dampen the 

tendencies for WMD proliferation. Increasing numbers of 

adversaries, many with improved indigenous technologies, are less 

likely to be constrained by traditional arms control and formal 

treaties. This will result in traditional arms control applying 

primarily to tier-one countries and those in the transition zone 

between tiers, and nonproliferation strategies will apply to tier two. 

These tendencies will alter the position of formal arms control, but 
11

they will also bring closer coordination and synergy between arms 

control and non- and counterproliferation toward meeting overall 

US national security needs. These new strategies will retain, and 

eventually expand, requirements for "arms control" technologies, 

especially those that also serve as intelligence platforms. 

Intelligence collection and monitoring requirements will be the 

primary drivers of future technology standards. 

The potential for both state and non-state actors undertaking 

cyber attacks will make efforts to control cyber warfare extremely 

challenging. This may require an arms control shift from a 

diplomatic model to a law enforcement model that would provide 

better, more discrete, and binding standards. Information operations 

and protection will, with or without applicable arms control action, 

become an even more central dimension of United States defense 

practice. Information assurance and monitoring technology 

requirements will increase in importance. 

ARMS CONTROL IN 2015 

Arms control is a tool that can stem the proliferation of 

weapons, prevent weapons improvements, and reduce or eliminate 

weapons outright. It can also be a method of establishing norms. 

These are not mutually exclusive. 

The Future Nuclear Arms Control Environment 

Nuclear arms control will remain primarily a bilateral USRussian affair through 2015. While the formal arms control process 

provides symbolic rights to nuclear parity, Russia will possess 

fewer strategic nuclear weapons than the United States. However, 

the gross asymmetry in tactical nuclear weapons in Russia’s favor 

will take on even greater significance. High cost and the impact of 

missile defense systems may well preclude Britain and France from 
12

being able to sustain a viable nuclear force. They may decide to 

denuclearize, unless the European Union wants to maintain an 

independent nuclear capability. China, though it will be more 

economically mature and more globally integrated, will not yet be a 

strategic nuclear challenger. 

Formal arms control agreements will be considered essential 

and will continue through 2015. Long-term political stability and 

verifiability will be more important, increasing the emphasis on 

negotiated agreements to help maintain stability, verifiability, and 

transparency in the US-Russian relationship. The value of informal, 

unilateral agreements has been overblown—they do not create the 

required stability. 

Offensive nuclear arms will still be a component of US 

deterrence strategy and, as a result, the United States will require a 

sufficient number of nuclear weapons to guarantee its own security 

and that of its allies. However, the trend toward further strategic 

arms reductions is clear, with a 1,500-1,800 floor of strategic 

warheads expected. With fewer than 2,000 warheads it will be very 

difficult for the United States to maintain the traditional Triad. 

Accordingly, it is possible that all fixed land-based MIRVed ICBMs 

may revert to a single reentry vehicle configuration and only mobile 

MIRVed missiles will remain. But the United States is on the 

threshold of a fundamental transition in offense-defense integration, 

and there will be a defacto meta-Triad consisting of missile 

defenses, offensive nuclear forces, and strategic conventional 

forces. 

Verification will remain critical with large stockpiles of nondeployed, dismantled, withdrawn warheads and fissile material to 

be accounted for. Additionally, there will be an increased focus on 
13

limiting nuclear force operations, requiring strict verification 

measures. Notions about “deployed” vs. “attributed” warheads will 

eventually be phased out, as the emphasis shifts to actual nuclear 

weapons loads. 

Implications for Arms Control: Future compliance, 

verification, and monitoring will be challenged by the shift in 

emphasis from counting deployed warheads to counting the total 

stockpile, a greater focus on the operational aspects of deployed 

forces, the need to distinguish between space-launch vehicles and 

ICBMs, and between ABMs and ICBMs, and increased pressure to 

monitor strategic conventional weapons. Once the stockpile goes 

below 2,000 weapons it will be very difficult to retain the traditional 

Triad. And some argue that a stockpile of fewer than 1,500 

weapons could actually encourage proliferation as other states (such 

as China) find it attractive to build up as the United States reduces 

its force levels. 

Missile defense will be integrated into the Single Integrated 

Operations Plan and will cover theater, regional, and homeland 

areas. MIRVed ABM interceptors may be deployed in converted 

silos, fundamentally altering the offensive-defensive relationship. 

Freedom to mix offensive and defensive forces will be allowed as 

states transition to the new paradigm. In addition, the issue of 

tactical nuclear weapons may be linked to follow-on agreements 

with strategic nuclear weapons. 

The United States may pursue the following objectives in a 

future negotiation: 

• No further reductions beyond the floor of 1,500-1,800 

warheads 

• Integration of missile defenses into the strategic force 

posture 
14

• Verifiable elimination of excess warheads and delivery 

vehicle stockpiles 

• Dismantlement of non-deployed delivery vehicles or 

conversion to space launch vehicles 

• Reduction of risk and protection against accidental or 

unauthorized launch 

• Broadened stockpile transparency and ensured reliability 

and predictability of monitoring 

• Monitor de-alerted force postures to guard against the 

reconstitution of a first strike capability 

• Continued attention to address tactical nuclear weapon 

asymmetries 

Future Chemical/Biological Arms Control Environment 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is touted as the 

most enforceable, intrusive, and verifiable arms control regime. 

The treaty’s strength lies in its verification provisions, while its 

weakness centers on the difficulties in verifying and monitoring 

dual-use chemicals. And while the treaty allows for challenge 

inspections, none have been conducted. 

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the 

development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and use of 

biological warfare agents; however, it lacks many of the provisions 

of the CWC. It has no mechanism for compliance and verification 

and lacks a dedicated organization to implement and police the 

regime. Though in recent years the United States was involved in 

international negotiations to develop a verification protocol, it 

opposed the resulting draft document because of inadequate 

protection of proprietary and national security information. 

Allegations and documented cases of cheating, the role of nonsignatories and non-state actors, and advances in biotechnology and 
15

dual-use materials will continue to pose problems for the BWC in 

the future. 

Implications and Technical Requirements: Failures or 

shortcomings, especially in the enforcement mechanisms of these 

regimes, do not portend their abandonment, but rather should 

stimulate thinking for new technical and procedural approaches. In 

the future, increasing reliance may have to be placed on non-treaty 

means—nonproliferation and counterproliferation—to address 

chemical and biological weapons (CBW), cheaters, and rogue 

players. There is a need for a portable area inspection system that 

incorporates micro- and nano-analytic instrumentation with robust 

agent identification capabilities. In addition, development should 

proceed on enhanced remote sensor capabilities (fluorescent 

biosensors and chemical tracers among them), agent neutralization, 

and better controls on delivery and dissemination technologies. 

Stronger information barriers must be developed in order to protect 

proprietary information. This is critical to the success of any future 

control regime. 

Future Conventional Arms Control Environment 

Currently it is difficult to find arms control specialists who 

focus on conventional weapons. However, by 2015 this will be a 

critical area of concern. First, conversion of some nuclear systems 

to "strategic conventional" roles will require a hybrid strategic and 

conventional approach to arms control efforts as an adjunct to 

nuclear efforts. Of much wider applicability, another reason for 

concern will be that except for the wealthiest states, few will be able 

to afford new advanced conventional weapons systems, and the 

market for system upgrades will grow significantly. The secondhand legal and illegal conventional arms marketplace will flourish 
16

and rogue suppliers will multiply dramatically, fueling and 

extending conflicts in tier-two states. Covert and clandestine arms 

movements will exacerbate the difficulty of trying to control this 

environment. 

Implications and Control Recommendations: While controlling 

this environment will be difficult at best, both traditional and nontraditional arms control approaches should be used. One effective 

strategy will be to solve one distinct issue at a time—such as antipersonnel landmines—and use these successes as the foundation for 

new agreements. Another approach could be to link arms 

trafficking to war crimes, prosecuting a number of high profilecases to dissuade other would-be traffickers. However, identifying 

perpetrators would require the intelligence community to refocus on 

small arms trafficking. 

A number of existing technologies, such as electronic global 

positioning system (GPS) tagging or “jarking” could be used to 

track weapons movement and gather evidence against proliferators 

and traffickers. Another method to handle proliferation is to add 

degrading chemicals to small arms ammunition. 

Space Arms Control Environment 

From a national security standpoint, US military space has 

evolved considerably—from spying on the USSR and Cold War 

arms verification to supporting the tactical warfighter during recent 

conflicts. Presently, there are four areas of space use considered 

most vital to the United States and growing in importance to the rest 

of the world: civil space (NASA); commercial space (telecom 

satellites); military space (support to DoD); and intelligence. Of the 

four, commercial space has grown the most rapidly, but it is the 
17

dual-use aspect of most commercial space technology that underlies 

the importance of future arms control in this arena. 

Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is the most 

comprehensive agreement on space to date, it falls far short on 

creating a viable verification regime. While it does ban WMD in 

space, it lacks strong definitions regarding what is meant by 

“peaceful purposes” or “where space begins.” The 1972 ABM 

Treaty, on the other hand, prohibited space-based anti-ballistic 

missile systems and, some believe, established a regime on antisatellite systems (ASAT) by prohibiting interference with National 

Technical Means (NTM) of verification. Distinguishing between 

ASAT and NTM interference is an example of just how difficult it 

would be to monitor a true space arms control treaty. 

Future Issues in Space Arms Control: Greater transparency of 

space activity is critical. Monitoring and tracking orbital debris will 

become increasingly important and especially difficult for items 

further out in orbit. This requires an orbital debris regime that could 

be fashioned along the lines of space traffic control. 

Advances in the resolution of commercial imaging systems, 

radar, and electronic surveillance are impacting the US military’s 

ability to maintain secure operations. The US currently plans to 

deal with this issue by “shutter control”—requiring industry to shut 

off data streams in the interest of national security. In the future, 

this might instead be controlled through arms control and remote 

sensing agreements. A far tougher challenge will be dealing with 

high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) radiation emitted from 

nuclear detonations in space. HEMP could incapacitate every 

satellite in the area and damage others as they pass through the 

residual radiation belt. One alternative is to enhance the hardening 
18

of space systems circuits and other hardware. Another vague 

distinction is the differentiation between activities in space and 

activities through space. 

Regardless of whether the United States pursues the 

weaponization or increased militarization of space in the future, 

space arms control will loom as a larger potential constraint to US 

actions. Rather than avoiding space arms control all together, the 

United States should determine what kinds of agreements would be 

most beneficial to its interests. 

Information Arms Control Environment 

Information operations are actions taken to affect an enemy’s 

information systems while protecting one’s own. These systems 

can be weapons as well as targets. The United States is the most 

advanced information state, but that also makes it the most 

vulnerable. The Russians, too, are quite concerned about the threat 

information operations pose to their command and control 

networks; they desire strict controls on what they view as a WMD 

threat. On the other hand, the Chinese view information operations 

as a “people’s war” where every Chinese citizen would be 

encouraged to engage in attacks. Both countries perceive 

information operations as highly destabilizing because they would 

disrupt the dynamics of deterrence. 

The current US perspective is that information operations can 

be sufficiently governed by existing principles of the laws of armed 

conflict. However, current international agreements place few 

restrictions on information operations. The international community 

has only recently drafted a definition of computer crime and begun 

working on a cybercrime convention. Russia recently proposed a 
19

UN resolution seeking secure systems that could be protected from 

computer crime, terror, and cyberwarfare. 

Future Issues in Information Arms Control: In the future, broad 

international cooperation will be critical in order to strengthen and 

protect information infrastructures. This should be a critical topic 

on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A variety of 

potential information operations will warrant such controls: 

cyberwar (political/military attack); cyberterror (political 

disruption); cybercrime (financial/non-political); and cyberactivism 

(political). While there may be advantages to arms control in areas 

of cyberspace where a state is most vulnerable, the biggest control 

issue is policing any agreement, a difficult task to accomplish with 

any certainty. 

The best place to start establishing control may be in the realm 

of cybercrime, where there would be the least international 

resistance to a control regime. The results could then be used to 

establish precedents and procedures for other areas where it would 

be more difficult to establish consensus. 

The United States should carefully consider entering into an 

information operations no-first-use pledge, but it should not miss 

the opportunity for engagement in this area. If it does, it runs the 

risk of being surprised by a treaty in which it had little influence. 

Arms Control Technology Requirements for Compliance, 

Verification, and Monitoring 

Outlining arms control technical requirements in a rapidly 

evolving international environment is an inexact science at best. 

Space and information operations introduce entirely new arenas, 

exacerbating the predictive difficulty and increasing uncertainty. 

However, many of the current target technologies are already 

relatively mature, making major advances less likely. At the end of 
20

the day, practitioners must define what is practical, leveraging other 

areas when possible to enhance resource efficiencies and the 

likelihood for success. For example, many of the technologies that 

are relevant for arms control are also relevant to intelligence 

monitoring. Another approach for new technology is to enhance 

sensors and take advantage of a combination of systems, leveraging 

information technology, system management, and system 

integration. A promising approach may lie in knowledge creation 

and management, establishing a single, central repository for all 

"arms control" information input; processing and analysis of the 

data into usable knowledge (requiring advanced computing 

technologies and applications); and analysis and dissemination of 

that knowledge to further a wide variety of national security 

programs and objectives. However, that will require compliance 

verification and monitoring technologies to create the relevant data. 

In the future, new technologies must provide more effective 

verification capability and be less expensive, less intrusive, and 

more automated. Generating knowledge from massive amounts of 

collected data will also require a new level of trust in software 

programs. The one area where we have no verification experience 

is biological weapons, and the community needs new ideas and a 

paradigm shift. What that paradigm will look like, no one yet 

knows. Our Phase Two workshop panelists assumed a relatively 

straight line continuation from existing arms control regimes and 

requirements for the next 15 years; they presumed few radical 

changes in direction. 

Intrusive Arms Control Environment: An “intrusive” inspection 

is one where an inspector is on-site and impeding operations to 
21

some extent. From a nuclear arms control standpoint, inspection 

activities include materials, weapons, and delivery platforms. 

While today’s arms control agreements are predominately 

bilateral, in the future they could become multilateral and expand to 

include both warhead and facility monitoring. By 2015 there will 

be a large declared inventory of special nuclear material, possibly 

including neptunium and americium in addition to plutonium and 

enriched uranium, further complicating monitoring issues. 

Classification issues will continue to impede free information 

exchange, and a variety of warhead limitation treaty scenarios may 

emerge, including dismantlement verification to identify a weapon’s 

class and reconcile facility throughput; warhead fingerprinting to 

establish a weapon’s unique identity; and exclusionary monitoring 

to verify whether a container actually holds a weapon. 

Over the next 15 years, inspectors will continue to be the key 

element in verification and will be expected to accomplish more 

activities at lower cost. Inspection tools will often be supplied by 

the host country, which may raise reliability concerns. New 

technology will be required for evolving monitoring requirements 

such as warhead verification. 

Commercial and military technology development will 

significantly impact future inspection capabilities. Some of the new 

items on the horizon include the following: 

• Quantum computing in both desktops and laptops, 

improved data generation/handling, and lower power 

requirements. These will enable robust authentication and 

encryption capabilities and allow inspectors to more 

quickly transform large amounts of data to knowledge. 

• More effective and flexible power sources will enhance 

mobility and wireless communication. 
22

• Smart antennas with full directional control will be 

introduced. 

• A micro-machining revolution will emerge. 

• New information barriers will ensure protection of sensitive 

information providing more transparency to inspectors. 

• Tamper indicating materials (active and passive), seals, and 

tags will aid in tamper indication and unique identification. 

• New field-portable material characterization methods, 

techniques, and tools will be critical in identifying nondisclosed activities. 

Non-Intrusive Arms Control Environment: Arms control 

agreements have tended to control either nuclear materials or 

delivery vehicles rather than weapons or warheads. As weapons 

and warheads are incorporated into the regime, transparency issues 

will apply throughout the production and deployment phases. 

Technology offers the potential of replacing on-site inspections, 

providing a more palatable alternative for future arms control 

regimes. There are four key topic areas for non-intrusive measures 

in the future—reactor materials, weapon-source materials, weapons 

and platforms, and pits and warheads. 

 Reactor Materials: Atomic reactors are the most common 

source of special nuclear material, but because the raw material 

going into the reactor is not classified, little attention is paid to 

reactor operations. However, signatories to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty have agreed to allow monitoring of their 

facilities. This is critical because such an effort would require 

placing monitoring equipment in very specific locations throughout 

a facility. The technical requirements for facility monitoring are 

unclassified and non-intrusive and must be conducted in a moderate 

radiation environment. New technologies to consider in this area 

include tags, diversion detection, tracking, and a global information 
23

database. A good example of new facility monitoring technology is 

an anti-neutrino detector which shows changes in the relative 

percentage of uranium and plutonium in a reactor core, thereby 

indirectly indicating whether plutonium has been removed. 

 Weapon Source Materials: Classification issues on weapon 

design and materials composition coupled with highly intrusive onsite inspections make verification and monitoring of dismantled 

weapons material very difficult. Areas for future research include 

developing an information barrier that protects classified 

information and creating alternative non-intrusive detection 

methods. 

Weapons and Platforms: This is the area that in most past 

and existing treaties required very intrusive verification methods. 

Moving to a technology-based, non-intrusive monitoring regime 

would require a fundamental trust in technology that does not exist 

today. Because platform location and weapons information cannot 

be revealed, future technology requirements will include secure tags 

that do not compromise location and reliable data authentication 

that does not disclose classified information. 

 Pits and Warheads: This is the most difficult area in which 

to direct future, non-intrusive verification technologies, and no 

current agreement covers the highly sensitive area of nuclear 

warhead monitoring and dismantlement operations. Trusted 

technologies must be developed to replace intrusive on-site 

inspections in order to open a future path to pit and warhead 

transparency. Close cooperation with Russia is essential. Areas for 

future technology development include radiation monitoring to 

fingerprint warheads; reliable data authentication, protection, 
24

encryption and dissemination; information barriers; and reliable, 

non-intrusive facility monitoring. 

Reactor monitoring provides the least controversial activity and 

would be a good place to begin building expertise and trust. 

Weapons/platform monitoring, currently highly intrusive, is not 

likely to change dramatically by 2015. Pit and warhead monitoring 

may become more transparent, but will face formidable challenges 

and concerns. 

Biological Weapons Monitoring Technology Requirements 

A requirement exists for medical practitioners to be able to 

identify and differentiate a biological attack from a naturally 

occurring outbreak of disease. Sandia National Laboratories has 

developed a prototype system that relies on data entry by medical 

professionals to create a database and identification program that 

does just that. 

There are tremendous difficulties involved in monitoring 

biological weapons materials. The level of intrusiveness required to 

be successful goes well beyond what most nations would find 

politically acceptable. The United States recently rejected the draft 

BWC Protocol because of a number of issues: questions of 

ambiguity, high hurdles for challenge inspections, and no means of 

identifying or tracking international diseases. Sandia’s Rapid 

Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP), a biological anomaly 

detection and tracking project for the medical community, provides 

a tool and methodology for differentiating between a BW attack and 

a naturally occurring disease outbreak. The eventual goal of this 

project is to map the global biological background, then map 

diseases, and finally be able to identify a disease signature that 

stands out against the background. Sandia is working to set up 
25

possible collaboration with biological labs in the former Soviet 

Union. 

Remote Sensing Arms Control Environment 

While current technology provides us with the ability to 

conduct long-range standoff monitoring of selected WMD and 

conventional weapons, there is currently no good approach to longrange monitoring of biological agents. Remote sensing provides 

large area coverage, can provide temporal coverage in situations 

that would otherwise require frequent re-visits or continuous 

coverage, and can also complement on-site visits. 

In the future the United States will continue to use many of the 

existing remote sensing methods, including seismic, acoustic, 

hydro-acoustic, air sampling, optical, electro-magnetic pulse, xrays, neutrons, and gammas. Chemical and nuclear weapons 

development will continue to be monitored using spectral sensing, 

imagery, and sampling. Conventional weapons monitoring will be 

done with spectral sensing, infrared sensing, and imagery. 

However, enhanced spectral sensing will be developed to 

characterize effluents, identify objects, and read tags on treatylimited items. Radio-frequency sensing will be enhanced to identify 

objects by their electronic emissions. Automated feature 

recognition tools will be deployed to assist with the analysis of huge 

amounts of data. 

Non-Traditional Arms Control Requirements 

There is a need for small, inexpensive sensors that can track and 

monitor the huge quantities of material left over from the Cold War. 

Current technology, much of it developed for the INF Treaty, can 

solve a number of verification issues, such as distinguishing 

between nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, and identifying how 
26

many warheads are hidden behind a shrouded reentry vehicle. The 

real difficulty will be creating an agreement to allow this 

technology to be put into use. 

Is it possible to develop a web technology that filters out the 

background and raises a red flag when required? Miniaturization 

and nano-technologies are fairly advanced in the nuclear testing 

arena. 

MAJOR FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 

The National Security Environment and Arms Control 

Continuing Bifurcation: Under the increased influence of 

globalization, the international system will continue and deepen its 

trend toward bifurcation. The international system of the future will 

be shaped primarily by economic drivers. Globalization will 

continue to advance among the states of the first world—Western, 

industrialized, free-market states. At the same time, the benefits of 

globalization will bypass, to greater or lesser degrees, much of the 

second world. These states will be exploited for resources and 

labor, but will not advance at nearly the same rate as the continually 

growing first world. However, some states at the top end of the 

second world, those that are economically advanced and/or resource 

rich enough to find themselves entering the transition zone between 

the second and first worlds, will become the focus of special 

attention and concern. 

Technological factors will also influence the security 

dimensions of the international system. The first world is today the 

home of high-tech innovation and development, and it will remain 

so. The second world will continue as technology users, and it will 

host assembly operations for some high-tech components, but it will 

not experience technological innovation or development. The 
27

transitional states will host co-production facilities with first-world 

states for high-end commercial and conventional military 

technologies, and some level of reverse engineering is possible 

here—either with or without first-world permission. Innovation in 

systems will also be seen here, and innovation in applications will 

be common. 

Thus, the international system of 2015 will consist of three 

different sets of security relationships for the United States. First, 

the relationship between the United States and the other states of the 

first world will, for the most part, be cooperative and peaceful. A 

high degree of economic integration and industrial internationalization will be the norm. Areas and issues of lingering 

competition will be addressed through consultation. Political and 

security consultation, and most often coalition action or toleration, 

will characterize this relationship. The one wild card identified here 

is the possibility of a degree of competition and mild divergence 

between the United States and Western Europe focusing on 

competitive economic practices and a weakening of NATO bonds. 

United States relations with the second world will be shaped by 

the degree of stability of the individual state and its economic 

linkages to the first world. Those exhibiting even mild growth, 

possessing at least moderate amounts of desired resources, and 

attempting to institute or stabilize nascent democracies will be the 

focal point of United States policy. At the same time, some of these 

states’ neighbors will likely include failing and failed states—those 

stagnating or regressing economically, without sufficient resources 

to exploit for survival, and facing internal chaos and disintegration. 

The worst cases are likely to spawn and host criminal and terrorist 

organizations, to be on the receiving end of weapons proliferation 
28

for use by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or by desperate 

failing governments, and perhaps to instigate regional conflict. The 

relative degree of global economic stability and growth will 

determine the degree of threat posed to United States security 

interests from this world. 

Finally, security relations with the transitioning states will 

represent the focal point of much of the national security efforts of 

the United States. These states possess resources, economic 

linkages, and security interests important to the United States, and 

they represent both likely partners and protagonists. It is this area 

that we will not be able to avoid, nor will we be able to unilaterally 

predetermine the exact nature of the ties nor the relationships 

involved. If the less developed mass of the second world represents 

the failing state and non-state conflict threat, the transition zone 

represents the highest potential for state-level threats to United 

States interests. 

Arms Control as an Umbrella Concept: This system will shape 

United States arms control. "Arms control" will be a broad, 

umbrella construct within United States national security policy that 

includes the full range of cooperative and coercive efforts to 

enhance security through controlling, limiting, reducing, and 

eliminating weapon systems and military capabilities. 

Arms control efforts within the first world will center on 

forging a cooperative front toward the second world and transition 

states, and on securing a continuing and productive future for firstworld institutions such as NATO and what is today the G-7. The 

major issue here, besides establishing a consensus on objectives and 

burden-sharing for the implementation of second-world and 

transition zone controls, will be overcoming the residual national 
29

competition to establish meaningful and enforceable export controls 

to stem proliferation. Such cooperation will become ever more 

difficult to arrange or enforce as competition endures—particularly 

between the United States and its US-dominated international 

corporations on one side and European and EU-dominated 

corporations on the other—and most particularly in the 

conventional arms and delivery systems arenas. 

The United States arms control relationship with the second 

world will center on non- and counterproliferation efforts toward 

weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional arms, and 

on disarmament activities within broader peace operations. Many 

of these efforts will necessarily be unilateral and non-cooperative, 

seeking to impose arms limitations and transfer restrictions on 

unwilling states, groups, and networks. 

Most of the formal arms control focus, and much of the United 

States’ broader arms control effort, will fall to the transitioning 

states between the two worlds. The "endgame" of the US-Russian 

START and Cooperative Threat Reduction programs will continue, 

with any new strategic systems and warhead reductions—either 

negotiated or unilateral—requiring cooperative safeguards and 

monitoring. Non-strategic nuclear weapons will also be added to 

the equation, and this set of programs will expand greatly, with 

significantly greater requirements for inspections and monitoring. 

Increased United States arms control presence is also probable 

in Northeast Asia, with informal (and largely bilateral) efforts to 

forge confidence building and other foundational cooperative 

measures with China, Japan, and a likely unified Korea. This will 

be a slow, long-term effort, relying to a large extent on US 

monitoring technologies to provide transparency and neutral 
30

reliability. United States monitoring technologies could also be 

central to equally tentative steps toward transparency and nascent 

cooperation in South Asia between India and Pakistan. Such 

nuclear "peacekeeping" could also play a role in the Middle East by 

2015, although the major arms control focus in that region will 

continue to be on non- and counterproliferation. 

Today's increasing emphasis on dealing with the problems of 

proliferation—of weapons, of technologies, and of delivery 

systems—will continue, with increasing coordination between 

nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts across the 

spectrum. The balance within this effort will shift toward 

counterproliferation, combining active and cooperative efforts to 

restrict and eliminate potentially hostile capabilities. Detection, 

tracking, and monitoring technologies will be needed in both 

intelligence and arms control roles. 

Finally, these complicating developments will be multiplied by 

the continuing problems of non-cooperation among first-world 

actors on arms controls implementation and compliance 

verification. Both the continuing military systems development and 

sales competition between first-world states and the growing power 

of the multinational corporation even outside of state control will 

render such cooperation as effective export control regimes 

unattainable or unenforceable. Even now we see European states 

moving toward reliance on simple "pledges of compliance" as the 

verification vehicle for export controls on missile technologies, and 

this inability to forge effective multinational verification 

methodologies will only deepen. Unilateral verification and 

monitoring capabilities are also indicated here, with a further 

blending of arms control and intelligence systems requirements. 
31

Arms Control Forms and Focus, 2015 

Continued Preeminence of Nuclear Issues: The period between 

now and 2015 will see significant focus on the endgame of Cold 

War bilateral nuclear arms control between the United States and 

Russia, as well as continuing emphasis on nuclear non- and 

counterproliferation. Formal strategic nuclear arms control remains 

today the bilateral provenance of the United States and Russia. 

That formal dimension is supplemented by the cooperative threat 

reduction focus of United States arms control efforts. Russia sees 

its nuclear capability as both symbolic of residual major power 

status and essential as its conventional capabilities continue to 

decline and age. Therefore, it will preserve this capability even as 

others—notably Britain and France—consider denuclearizing their 

forces. China, while it might possibly expand its systems, is 

unlikely to seek nuclear first-tier status through 2025. Other 

second- and third-tier nuclear states will not become factors in the 

strategic nuclear equation by 2025, and indeed may opt for at least 

some level of limited reductions. 

For Russia, both unilateral and reciprocal cuts are inevitable, 

perhaps below a floor of 1800-2000 warheads. This implies a 

heightened requirement for effective CV&M to guard against 

cheating as the United States reduces its arsenal toward similar 

levels. It also implies an expanded requirement for monitored 

stockpile management and materials disposition for withdrawn and 

decommissioned warheads. Any formal arms control agreements in 

this drawdown will require on-site inspections and intrusive 

compliance monitoring regimes. 

Given the vast disparity between US and Russian inventories of 

non-strategic weapons, it could also become a United States 
32

imperative to incorporate these weapons into the strategic weapons 

mix. The result will likely be a significant increase in on-site and 

weapons destruction monitoring requirements, as well as greatly 

increased requirements for both permanent and periodic nonintrusive verification monitoring. Further, with likely replacement 

of strategic by conventional warheads on both operational and 

strategic delivery systems, requirements must specifically address 

warhead verification capabilities. 

A third complicating factor between the United States and 

Russia will be the introduction of defenses, with a move in arms 

control toward limits on combined offense-defense mixes. This 

may require new verification capabilities and systems, and 

highlights one particularly challenging feature of this future 

environment: offensive uses of arms control such as shielding. As 

both formal and informal cooperative controls on strategic systems 

move toward aggregate limits—on strategic offense/defense mixes, 

for example—and strategic systems conversions become 

common—from ICBM to space launch vehicle, or from nuclear 

ICBM to conventional ICBM—it will become standard practice to 

shield systems deployed in identical silos as a security measure. 

The same problem will be present in operational systems with both 

non-strategic nuclear and conventional warheads. The silo could 

house a strategic or a conventional weapon, an ICBM or an 

interceptor, a warhead or a penetration aid, or even a decoy. 

Verification and monitoring capabilities will be needed to 

differentiate payloads, certainly utilizing non-intrusive systems but 

also often using remote platforms. 

An important and expanded requirement for nuclear arms 

control in 2015 will be increased monitoring of operational aspects 
33

of Russian nuclear systems and strategy rather than strictly the 

hardware dimension. The many systems mixes imply complex 

employment strategies and doctrines, complex command and 

control systems, and complicated deployment, exercise, and testing 

regimes. This situation presents a requirement for monitoring and 

verification systems that have both technical and human component 

requirements and that differ greatly from traditional nuclear system 

verification technologies. These systems will need to be able to 

identify, translate, collate, analyze, and create usable knowledge 

from diverse technical signals and operational materials. They lie 

as much in the realm of information processing and knowledge 

creation/management as they do in the more widely identified world 

of arms control, and they require vastly different human skills than 

do technical nuclear monitoring systems. 

Beyond US-Russian nuclear arms controls, one potentially new 

application of nuclear CV&M technologies by 2015 could be 

"nuclear peacekeeping." The potential exists for regional 

cooperative regimes between second-tier nuclear states—

particularly between India and Pakistan—that could possibly 

require an interposition of United States systems for transparency 

and agreement CV&M. Systems developed for use in US-Russian 

arms control will likely suffice, but will need to be deployable into 

different operating environments. 

Nonproliferation and counterproliferation will also be 

increasingly emphasized in 2015. The focus in Russia will be on 

stockpile surety and conversion monitoring of the withdrawn 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads. It may also include a 

broader "systems" focus on the proliferation of nuclear weaponsrelated hardware, software, and technical expertise. This implies a 
34

shift in emphasis to vigilance monitoring from more narrow 

verification monitoring, with a mix of both more traditional 

hardware-focused technologies and software and knowledge 

management technologies. 

Nuclear CV&M, then, will remain a centerpiece of United 

States arms controls through 2015. Both the criticality and the 

scope of the nuclear CV&M requirement will increase, with 

expanded stockpile monitoring requirements that reflect a shift from 

deployed to aggregate warheads, and from discrete strategic systems 

to aggregate, mixed systems—strategic and non-strategic, strategic 

nuclear and conventional, and strategic offense and defense. The 

landscape will also take on added dimensions from the addition of 

operational factors as well as systems hardware, from increased 

focus on proliferation concerns broadly defined, and from 

expansion from the US-Russian nuclear relationship to include at 

least some application within the second- and third-nuclear tiers. 

Dual Use Issues in the Chemical and Biological Arenas: 

Chemical arms control and non- and counterproliferation will 

receive increased focus, and will continue to be plagued by the 

dual-use dilemma as it complicates compliance verification and 

monitoring. The control of biological weapons will require 

meaningful arms controls and enhanced non- and 

counterproliferation efforts. This arena will face dual-use and 

proprietary barriers, as well as technical difficulties, in developing 

meaningful compliance verification and monitoring capabilities. 

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention bans the production, 

acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It also 

specifies the most extensive and intrusive compliance verification 

and monitoring regime of any arms control agreement—one based 
35

upon on-site inspections and including a formal implementation and 

monitoring organization and program. However, verification today 

fails to reach that promise because of dual-use and corporate 

proprietary concerns that greatly complicate the design of 

discriminating technologies, and because state parties cannot agree 

how to address further cooperation and enforcement. Continuing 

displacement of state power by corporate power and economic 

integration across borders will only exacerbate these problems. 

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention similarly bans the 

development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and use of 

biological warfare agents. However, it lacks almost all provisions 

for compliance verification and monitoring, and it has no dedicated 

implementation organization outside of the United Nations. 

Biological weapons verification also faces dual-use and proprietary 

issues within the highly competitive international bio-medical 

community. 

The chemical and biological arenas require both a new 

generation of technologies and new procedural approaches to 

CV&M. Both sets of approaches must be developed in full 

recognition of the strong and broad opposition to intrusive controls 

(impediments that are certainly not going to go away in the next 

decade or two), the complications of discriminating in a dual-use 

situation, and the absolute requirement for portable area systems 

and remote monitoring systems. Developing either effective 

procedural or technical information barriers to allow more direct 

and intrusive CV&M inspection access while also protecting 

essential proprietary dimensions would help strengthen the 

cooperative approaches to controlling these threats. Outside of such 

cooperative approaches, systems are needed to enhance both non- 
36

and counterproliferation efforts—particularly those adaptable to 

force protection monitoring and warning for forward-deployed and 

deploying units and systems. 

Growing Significance of Conventional Weapons: Conventional 

weapons will be an arena of greatly increased significance for arms 

control efforts on three fronts: strategic conventional weapons, 

advanced conventional weapons, and small arms proliferation and 

controls. 

Converted strategic-to-conventional weapons raise issues of 

verification discrimination among offensive strategic nuclear 

systems, defensive ABM systems, strategic conventional systems, 

and strategic decoys/penetration aids all sharing similar silos and 

often identical launch vehicles and deployment shielding. In 

addition to those significant problems—and the use of converted 

ICBMs for space launch vehicles, as well—these strategic 

conventional systems raise issues of operational control such as 

launch notification, shared warning centers, and observer-monitored 

command and control systems. Technologies and programs to 

screen use doctrines, monitor field communications, and remotely 

ascertain system characteristics are needed. 

Advanced conventional weapons and weapon delivery systems 

are not currently subject to formal arms controls. One primary issue 

here is that even first-world allies, caught in the combination of 

domestic economic imperatives to reduce defense spending and the 

post-Gulf War belief that Western conventional systems are so 

superior as to not require upgrades, are beginning to raise indirect 

issues that would impinge on United States weapons development 

or use. Redefining justifiable collateral damage and other 

restraining rules of engagement would limit even NATO 
37

operational and weapons options, and this arena is one that will 

require constant United States attention and vigilance. One possible 

technological answer here would be improved battle damage 

assessment technologies—perhaps derivative from arms control 

verification systems—that would allow continued operational 

flexibility and assurance of effects to overcome blanket prohibitions 

against advanced conventional system employment. 

Small arms controls are an arena of popular effort both inside 

and outside of the standard state system and the UN Conference on 

Disarmament (CD) process. The one major formal agreement in 

this field, the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel land mines, was 

reached though the combined efforts of NGOs and selected 

governments outside of the normal arms control channels. Parallel 

efforts to address landmines were under discussion in the CD at the 

same time, but were stalled because some nations were uninterested 

in major operational or system changes in their use of mines. That 

same lack of urgency currently applies to small arms in general; 

however, continuing proliferation of large supplies may gradually 

build pressures to act. The widespread proliferation and relative 

low technology of these weapons effectively precludes traditional 

export controls. Arms control efforts here, including monitoring 

stockpiles of weapons cached under disarmament programs within 

peace operations, will focus on tagging and tracking arms 

movements using electronic or chemical tagging. Effective 

operational and strategic monitoring systems are needed. These 

procedures and systems will also have application in non- and 

counterproliferation programs beyond the small arms arena. 

Demands for Space Arms Control: The United States 

commercial and military reliance on space systems will lead to an 
38

ever-growing importance of space defense and control. There will 

be, by 2015, a growing impetus for "arms controls" in military 

space operations. These efforts represent two-edged swords for 

DoD. Controls on threatening space systems and activities will, 

nonetheless, become a major United States interest. 

The commercial/governmental space relationships will grow in 

size, scope, and depth by 2015. This projection was made by all 

three of the most recent national space commissions. Space use has 

been shifting from the military toward clear civilian dominance, and 

almost all space activities are or could be dual-use. As space 

continues to become primarily commercial, several implications are 

clear that relate to arms control in 2015. 

Military space control will be an ever more significant military 

mission. The ability to monitor space systems of others—to 

discriminate system capabilities remotely—is a clear requirement as 

strategic capabilities migrate from air to space. Cataloging and 

tracking on-orbit and trans-orbital systems, as well as space debris, 

is imperative. Real-time tracking of commercial imaging systems—

which already provide users with a militarily significant 

capability—is also needed to either exercise “shutter control” or to 

provide warning to allow masking of activities on the ground. This 

situational awareness is a foundational requirement for both space 

control and enforcement of potential space regulation regimes that 

are likely as multiple nations vie for expanded space access. 

Space control imperatives could lead to a national decision to 

weaponize space. The few treaties and agreements that today 

address space place few restrictions on such systems, but many 

states and groups will oppose any such move. An attempt to bypass 

the United States, isolating it in world opinion, by banning such 
39

weapons should be anticipated, complicating the US use of space. 

Any agreement here, as well as the more formal arena of space arms 

control discussions, will likely focus on regulating broad military 

uses of space as opposed to specific systems and capabilities. Any 

such proposals or agreements will certainly have broad externalities. 

Arms control CV&M in and from space will become more 

complicated politically and legally. Regardless, NTM and 

dedicated CV&M systems will require space access and the ability 

to operate. Space-based monitoring and reporting will characterize 

virtually every arms control activity. Finally, the arms control 

community should continually investigate advances in commercial 

capabilities for potential adaptation to its needs. 

Demands for Controls on Information Operations: The years to 

2015 will see a continuation and deepening of the centrality of 

information to all United States commercial and defense activities. 

As is true for space arms control, international "cyber arms control" 

efforts will have dual-edged implications for DoD. However, 

information infrastructure assurance, protection against cyber 

attack, and controls on international information operations will be 

of critical importance to the nation. 

The protection and operational assurance of critical 

infrastructure is today essential to virtually all arms control 

implementation activities, particularly CV&M. That dependence 

will not decrease between now and 2015. It characterizes all 

military and commercial operations for the United States today and 

into the future. Because of this dependence, infrastructure 

protection has become a primary concern, and several draft 

agreements are on the table to address cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, 

and cyber-warfare. 
40

As with space arms control, the United States has several 

significant concerns about the carry-over implications of these 

drafts for military information operations and legitimate national 

information warfare operations. Progress will be very slow as we 

identify and discuss needed arms control exemptions, but the nation 

will continue to pursue this path as well as unilateral protection and 

controls. As defensive technologies and practices are developed, 

the arms control community must immediately incorporate them 

into its systems to ensure timely and continuous CV&M 

implementation. As with space, commercial and other military 

R&D efforts should provide the technologies here. The arms 

control community, however, must identify useful applications and 

initiate any adaptations for its unique environments. 

Arms Control Compliance, Verification, and Monitoring 

Technology Issues 

Continued Role for Inspections: On-site inspections and 

associated intrusive technologies will continue to be essential tools 

for nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional compliance 

verification and monitoring. Technical advances are needed in 

sensor capabilities, globally adaptable power systems, and system 

operation and reporting capabilities to allow less intrusive 

applications and unmonitored, automated operations. 

The expansion of the scope of United States-Russian nuclear 

stockpiles to be monitored, a shift from materials and weapons 

monitoring to warhead monitoring, the expanded application into 

the chemical and biological monitoring arenas, and the potential 

addition of multilateral applications of these systems will require 

both quantitative and qualitative improvements in current systems 

and capabilities. Specific areas to target for development include 

miniaturization of systems for global mobility, field encryption and 
41

secure transmission capabilities, reliable and enduring internal 

power sources, tamper-indicating systems, and expanded field 

monitoring and characterization capabilities to allow applications in 

monitoring a wider variety of materials and activities. 

Non-Intrusive Technologies: Cooperative controls and nonintrusive technologies will assume greatly increased significance. 

Technical advances are needed to address problems of warhead 

monitoring and to assure dependable, deployable global operations. 

As with intrusive technologies, area-monitoring systems must 

be adapted to expanded applications, including warhead monitoring 

capabilities, and to chemical and biological weapons. As regimes 

specifying on-site inspections expire and new agreements shift 

toward less intrusive monitoring, this area must become a central 

focus of arms control technology development. Within the nuclear 

arena, improvements are needed to allow monitoring of reactor 

operations in a moderate radiation environment. Systems are 

needed to provide information barriers to protect classified aspects 

of weapons source materials while simultaneously allowing 

detection and monitoring. Mixing of diverse weapon systems 

between silos and other operational trends also require effective 

tagging and warhead “fingerprinting” that does not compromise 

exact location, as well as selective information barriers to ensure 

effective transparency and security. Informational technologies and 

knowledge management capabilities are as essential in the nuclear 

monitoring arena as are traditional technical hardware systems. 

Finally, a miniaturized, portable and multi-agent capable chemical 

(and eventually selected biological) agent detection and 

identification system is essential both for arms control and force 

protection applications. 
42

National Technical Means: Remote monitoring and 

compliance verification via national technical means will link 

intelligence and arms control even more closely together and will be 

at the heart of year 2015 United States efforts in this entire arena of 

controlling weapons and threats. 

Several findings have noted shared technology requirements for 

arms control CV&M and intelligence. The expanded focus outward 

from nuclear to chemical, biological, conventional, space, and 

information will necessarily move arms control efforts from formal, 

treaty-based regimes to less formal, multilateral, and unilateral 

efforts. These changes in focus all increase the requirements for 

area and global systems for effective CV&M. Remote monitoring 

of nuclear testing is today very well developed; efforts should begin 

there to expand from those systems and concepts into the new 

arenas. The full range of sensing systems and capabilities must be 

investigated for effective applications to nuclear and chemical 

proliferation, to conventional weapons tracking and space systems 

transparency, and to biological and informational process 

applications. Hardware development here must also be 

accompanied by effective informational system development to 

allow and ensure full capability utilization. 

Special Requirements for Biological Weapons Monitoring: 

Monitoring and compliance verification associated with the 

biological threat represents a special case for technology and 

systems development. Given the limitations faced today, this is an 

area that requires increased attention and resources. 

Requirements to develop an enhanced biological agent 

detection and identification capability for arms control, and for 

counterproliferation and force protection applications, have already 
43

been noted. Beyond that, there is the requirement to track national 

(and eventually global) disease vectors to differentiate natural 

occurrences from biological attacks and to project disease 

progression and plan responses. Prototype systems are being 

demonstrated on a smaller scale. As these systems mature, data 

processing and decision-support systems capable of enduring realtime access to and analysis of huge amounts of data will be 

required. Development of those informational systems must 

proceed apace with the maturation of the monitoring systems. 

The Human Dimension of Technology: The success of United 

States compliance verification and monitoring programs—and 

indeed of all arms control and national security efforts—depends 

directly on the critical and often overlooked human dimension of 

technology. 

The Department of Energy has noted a growing and critical 

shortage of nuclear engineering expertise that is already affecting 

their ability to support the DoD nuclear weapons programs. This 

specific shortage also will increasingly affect nuclear arms control 

efforts. Similar shortages—or the inability of government to 

compete with industry for chemical engineering and 

biological/medical expertise—will negatively affect other arenas of 

arms control. The development of more sophisticated CV&M 

systems as envisioned throughout this report will also increase the 

requirement for capable technicians to employ these systems and 

technologies in the field. In addition, the military services are 

already facing both personnel shortages and the direct elimination 

or reduction of programs that have traditionally supplied personnel 

with experience and expertise in the strategic-level 

conceptualization and integration of nuclear strategy and arms 
44

control. Such human shortfalls—plus probable equivalent 

requirements for space and information strategic expertise—must be 

specifically addressed. This includes deliberate requirements 

definition, development program specification, and resources 

allocation. 

Data and Knowledge Management: Singular attention must 

also be given to arms control data handling, knowledge creation, 

and knowledge management. Year 2015 efforts, programs, and 

technologies will require greatly expanded capabilities. 

Data security from fixed and mobile CV&M systems—

permanently deployed, temporarily deployed, and remote—must be 

assured for effective monitoring. And data identification within a 

flood of diverse technical and operational electrons, translation and 

collation into useable information, tailored analysis into useful 

knowledge, and management and presentation of that knowledge 

into decisionmaking format is essential. This requires advanced 

supercomputing capabilities for data handling and processing, 

enhanced software to discriminate and compile that data into 

information, and sophisticated knowledge management and decision 

support systems to display and manipulate the knowledge toward 

strategic program management. It also requires human skill 

development and procedural system design to make optimal use of 

the potential that hardware and software developments will create. 

CONCLUSION 

The international security environment in the year 2015 is 

likely to place less emphasis on traditional arms control, with a 

concomitant increase in emphasis on countering WMD 

proliferation. The net result will be continued requirements for 

arms control technologies, and increased requirements for new 
45

applications of arms control verification and monitoring 

technologies in counterproliferation and intelligence applications. 

Further, the national security policy of dissuasion will emphasize 

continued US R&D efforts in basic sciences and technology, many 

of which will have potential spillover utility for the arms control 

community. 

Arms control will remain a central instrument of United States 

national security policy in 2015. It will incorporate many more 

informal and unilateral approaches than were employed across the 

Cold War and its immediate aftermath, as well as formal 

mechanisms from that earlier period. 

Less intrusive area monitoring technologies and remote systems 

will predominate. This requirement and these systems will even 

more closely link cooperative means of arms control with more 

unilateral approaches such as counterproliferation and force 

protection, and with national technical means and other more 

general intelligence efforts. 

Advances in the wide array of science and technology—

particularly micro- and nano-technologies and almost unforeseeable 

advances in computing—can both greatly facilitate CV&M systems 

and greatly complicate CV&M problems, as can new arms control 

arenas such as space and information. The United States must make 

a strategic effort to lead these advances and manage their impacts 

toward enhancing rather than detracting from US security interests. 

Both the human dimension of technology and the treatment of 

geometrically increasing cascades of data will pose major 

challenges to any 2015 arms control effort, regardless of the 

capabilities of CV&M systems. A deliberate and strategic effort is 

also essential here, both to grow a competent and capable bench of 
46

scientists, technicians, and strategists to oversee and implement 

these controls, and to ensure that wisdom and strategic vision can be 

applied in light of conclusions drawn from critical elements of 

useable knowledge drawn from focused and fully informed analysis. 

As recent events have underscored, the world of the early 

twenty-first century presents us with a full spectrum of dangers—

enemies both new and old; weapon systems both high-tech and low; 

applications both traditional and innovative; attacks both abroad and 

at home. Arms control efforts, enabled by effective CV&M 

technologies used in both cooperative and unilateral applications, 

must be a central focus of threat reduction, force protection, 

homeland defense, and overall security enhancement. 
47

Appendix One 

USAFA Faculty Chairs of Phase One Study Groups 

(Spring 2001) 

Global and Regional Political and Economic Trends and 

Military Futures 

Europe: Dr. Charles Krupnick, Military Strategic Studies 

Russia and Its Neighbors: Maj David Wilkins, Foreign 

Languages 

Middle East and North Africa: Maj Brent Talbot, INSS 

Sub-Saharan Africa: Dr. Fran Pilch, Political Science 

East Asia: Dr. William Berry and Col Thomas Drohan, 

Military Strategic Studies 

The Americas: Col Douglas Murray, Political Science 

Global and Regional Economic Futures: Lt Col Steven 

Slate, Economics 

Basic Science Trends and Military Futures 

Chemistry and Biochemistry: Maj Susan Hastings, 

Chemistry 

Physics and Nuclear/Radiological Science: Lt Col Geoff 

McHarg, Physics 

Conventional and Non-Conventional Weapons and 

Delivery: Lt Col Peter Van Wirt, Astronautical 

Engineering 
48

Appendix Two 

Phase Two: Conference Agenda and Participants 

(August 2001)

Panel 1: National Security Environment 2015 

 Chair: James Smith, INSS 

 Economic Environment 

 John Basso and Michael Meese, US Military Academy 

 Technological Environment 

 Steve Maaranen, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

 Discussant: James Smith, INSS 

Panel 2: Arms Control Environment 2015 

 Chair: Jeffrey Larsen, Science Applications International 

Corporation 

 Nuclear Arms Control Environment 

 Kerry Kartchner, Department of State 

 Chemical/Biological Arms Control Environment 

 James Smith, INSS 

 Conventional Arms Control Environment 

 Christopher Carr, Air War College 

 Space Arms Control Environment 

 Peter Hays, School of Adavanced Airpower Studies 

 Information Arms Control Environment 

 Gregory Rattray, US Air Force 

 Discussants: Jeffrey Larsen, SAIC 

 Kurt Klingenberger, US Air Force 

Panel 3: Arms Control Technology Requirements 2015 

Chair: Joseph Pilat, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Intrusive Technologies 

Dianna Blair, Sandia National Laboratories 

Non-Intrusive Technologies 

Mark Grohman, Sandia National Laboratories 

Special Case—Biological Technologies 

Al Zelicoff, Sandia National Laboratories 

Remote Technologies 

Tim Murphy, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Discussants: Joseph Pilat, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

 Dennis Mangan, Sandia National Laboratories