United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1995 ARMY TRAINING

One-Third of 1993 and

1994 Budgeted Funds

Were Used for Other

Purposes

GAO/NSIAD-95-71

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260798 

April 7, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Congress has consistently supported Army requests for military training

funds—commonly referred to as operating tempo funds—to keep Army

forces at a high level of combat readiness. However, as a result of reports

that scheduled training exercises had been canceled, the former chairman

asked that we determine whether (1) operating tempo funds were spent

for purposes other than training and (2) the operating tempo funds

requested in the Army’s congressional budget submissions were consistent

with the amounts needed for training exercises necessary to meet its

readiness objectives.

Results in Brief The Army spent part of its operating tempo funds for purposes other than

training. Of the $3.6 billion in operating tempo funds that the Army

designated for the U.S. Forces Command and U.S. Army Europe1

 in fiscal

years 1993 and 1994, about $1.2 billion, or 33 percent, was used for other

purposes. For example, some of these funds were moved to other

accounts, such as base operations and real property maintenance, which

the Army stated were underfunded, and some were used to support

contingency operations in such locations as Somalia and Haiti. The Army

did not report to Congress the movement of these funds to other accounts

because (1) the operating tempo funding request is not a separately

reported amount in the budget submission and (2) movement of money

within the same budget activity group does not require approval from

Congress. As a result, Congress has lacked information on differences

between the amount of money requested for operating tempo and the

amount of money the Army actually spent. Congress has taken recent

action to direct disclosure of such differences beginning in fiscal year

1996.

1

These two commands account for about 80 percent of the operating tempo funding requirements for

the Army.

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The operating tempo funds, which are included as part of the Army’s

congressional budget submission for operations and maintenance, have

exceeded amounts needed to conduct the training exercises necessary to

achieve readiness objectives. Despite spending significantly less than the

amount of money requested for operating tempo, the four combat units we

reviewed in the U.S. Forces Command and U.S. Army Europe have, for the

most part, continued to report that they achieved readiness objectives.

During the last quarter of fiscal year 1994, two of the units reported

degraded readiness due to insufficient funding.

Budget requests have exceeded amounts needed for training because the

model used by the Army to determine operating tempo funds contained

outdated assumptions and did not consider certain factors that affect a

unit’s ability to train at its home station. Outdated assumptions involved

the type and frequency of exercises to be conducted and the number of

miles to be driven by tanks and other vehicles as units train. Factors that

affect a unit’s ability to train included the availability of gunnery range and

maneuver areas. As a result, the operating tempo funds requested in the

Army’s budget submission were neither an accurate nor a realistic

estimate of training funds needed. The Army recognizes that the model

contains outdated assumptions and has begun a project to update the

model by December 1995 to reflect current training requirements.

Successful completion of this project should improve the model’s ability to

more accurately estimate the operating tempo funds needed to conduct

the training exercises necessary to meet the Army’s readiness objectives.

Due to this action, we are making no recommendations in this report.

Background The Army uses the Training Resource Model to identify the amount of

operating tempo funds that its military units require to meet readiness

objectives. This model, which was developed about 10 years ago, employs

a three-step process to calculate funding requirements. First, it calculates

the annual number of miles that a unit’s vehicles (e.g., tanks and Bradley

fighting vehicles) are to be driven as the unit trains. Second, the model

calculates the cost of the miles that are to be driven by applying costs for

fuel, maintenance, and spare parts to total miles. These costs vary

depending on equipment type and the geographical location of a unit. Last,

the model adds certain indirect costs that are associated with training,

such as the cost of civilian pay and maintenance contracts, to determine

the total requirement.

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Information for calculating the total number of miles that vehicles are to

be driven is contained in the Battalion Level Training Model (BLTM), which

identifies (1) prescribed training exercises, (2) prescribed frequency of the

exercise, (3) the type and number of vehicles used in the exercises, and

(4) the number of miles that each vehicle is expected to be driven during

each exercise. The BLTM calculates this information for each Army

battalion in a reporting unit, such as a combat division. The Training

Resource Model then tabulates the total number of miles for the division.

For example, if a division has six armor battalions and three infantry

battalions, the model would add the armor BLTM six times and the infantry

BLTM three times to arrive at total miles for the division. In addition, the

BLTM assumes that all battalions of the same type throughout the Army

conduct identical exercises and that each vehicle type is driven an

identical number of miles in each battalion.

Once the Army determines direct (fuel, maintenance, and spare parts) and

indirect (civilian pay and maintenance contracts) costs for each reporting

unit, it aggregates operating tempo costs by major command.2

 Finally, the

Army establishes a total operating tempo cost for inclusion in the

President’s budget submission for annual congressional appropriation.

Operating tempo funding requirements are included in the Army’s

operation and maintenance appropriation account. More specifically,

operating tempo funds are included in the land forces budget activity

group. Other activities within this group include base operations, real

property maintenance, and depot maintenance.

When operation and maintenance funds are appropriated, the Army begins

an allocation process to distribute the operating tempo funds. The initial

distribution is from the Department of the Army to each of the major

commands. Along with the authority to execute the funds, the major

commands receive program budget guidance indicating how the operating

tempo funds had been budgeted at the Army level. The major commands

then forward operating tempo funds and budget guidance to major

subordinate commands, such as V Corps within U.S. Army Europe, or to

installations such as those within the U.S. Forces Command.

2

A major command is an organizational structure responsible for either a functional area, such as the

Army Materiel Command, or direction of combat forces within the Army.

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Army Spent Operating

Tempo Funds for

Other Purposes

In fiscal years 1993 and 1994, Congress appropriated $29 billion for Army

operations and maintenance. Of this amount, the Army designated 

$3.6 billion in operating tempo funds for the U.S. Forces Command and

U.S. Army Europe. However, units within these two commands spent only 

$2.4 billion of the $3.6 billion for training. Approximately $384 million and

$868 million was used in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, respectively, for other

purposes.

The movement of funds from the operating tempo to other operation and

maintenance accounts occurred at several Army levels. For example, in

fiscal year 1994, the Army distributed to the U.S. Forces Command and

U.S. Army Europe $374 million, or 18 percent, less than initially

designated. Subsequently, these two major commands distributed to their

tactical units $278 million, or 16 percent, less than they received from the

Army. Finally, the tactical units spent $216 million, or 15 percent, less than

the amount received from the major commands for operating tempo.

According to Army officials, the movement of operating tempo funds

during fiscal years 1993 and 1994 was necessary because operation and

maintenance accounts, including base operations, real property

maintenance, and depot maintenance, were funded at levels significantly

below requirements. Two factors contributed to these shortages. First, the

Army’s submission for the President’s budget included only a portion of its

requirements. For example, data provided by Army officials shows that the

administration’s 1994 budget submission for base operations, real property

maintenance, and depot maintenance represented only 70, 45, and

57 percent, respectively, of the requirements for those accounts.

Second, according to Army officials, additional reductions to the overall

operation and maintenance request were made in anticipation of future

savings or reimbursements that did not occur. For example, in fiscal year

1994, the operation and maintenance account was reduced by $117 million

for assumed savings resulting from the withdrawal of Army troops from

South Korea. However, the troops never withdrew due to political

instabilities, and funds were still spent by the Army to support those

troops.

Operating tempo funds were also spent to support contingency operations

in such locations as Somalia and Haiti. According to the Chief of Staff of

the Army, due to the unknown nature of contingency operations, operating

tempo funds must be borrowed to help pay up-front costs of the

operations. Reimbursements, received in the form of supplemental

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funding from Congress, may or may not occur in time to avoid the

postponement or cancellation of scheduled training events.

The Army has not reported the movement of operating tempo funds to

other accounts to Congress because it was not required to report them

separately in the operation and maintenance budget submission.

According to Army officials, budgeted funds may generally be moved to

other accounts without obtaining congressional approval as long as the

funds are moved to accounts within the same budget activity group.

However, in the Conference Report accompanying the fiscal year 1995

Appropriation Act for the Department of Defense (DOD), Congress directed

DOD and the military services to report differences between the amount of

money requested and the amount of money spent. Beginning in fiscal year

1996, budget justification material for each subactivity group in the

operation and maintenance account must show actual dollar amounts for

the most recent year completed, the current year estimates, and the

budget request estimate.3

Training Resource

Model Overstates the

Amount Needed to

Achieve Readiness

Objectives

The Training Resource Model calculated more money than the Army

needed to conduct the training exercises necessary to achieve readiness

objectives in 1993 and 1994. Even though we found examples in which the

model understated funds required for conducting particular training

exercises, the substantial amounts of operating tempo money moved to

other accounts by the Army each year indicated that the model produced a

net overstatement of operating tempo funds. Despite spending

significantly less for training than the amount calculated by the model,

tactical units have generally continued to report that readiness objectives

were achieved.

The training strategies incorporated in the Training Resource Model have

not been updated since its creation in 1984. To determine whether key

assumptions contained in the model are valid today, we visited four Army

combat divisions and we compared 22 training exercises prescribed in the

model with the exercises planned for seven armor and four mechanized

infantry battalions.4

 We found that the model no longer accurately

portrays how the Army trains today. Specifically, the model’s assumptions

3

Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1995,

and for Other Purposes, H.R. 103-747, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.

4

Limited data at the divisions prevented a full comparison of the exercises in the model to exercises

planned in the field. We were not able to make this comparison for the 82nd Airborne’s armor battalion

because its companies generally do not train as a full battalion.

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on the type of exercises, the number of times they are conducted, the

types of vehicles that are to be used, and the number of miles to be driven

by each vehicle are no longer valid.

Model Calculations and

Actual Spending Differ

Units have executed training plans that required significantly less

operating tempo funds than the amount calculated by the Training

Resource Model. Table 1 shows that the amount of operating tempo

funding calculated by the model was significantly higher than the amount

spent by the units.

Table 1: Operating Tempo Funds

Calculated by the Model and Spent by

Units Fiscal year 1993 Fiscal year 1994

Dollars in millions

Division

Model

calculation

Unit

execution

Model

calculation

Unit

execution

1st Cavalry $ 81 $ 52 $ 95 $ 77

1st Infantry 54 34 68 32

3rd Infantry 74 49 108 60

82nd Airborne 26 11 32 29

Total $235 $146 $303 $198

Model Separates Exercises

That Are Performed

Together at the Unit Level

The model did not recognize that some exercises are conducted together,

thereby eliminating some operating tempo costs. Funding requirements for

individual exercises that are performed as part of other exercises at the

unit level were included in the model at least 24 times. For example, the

model included two separate company-level command field exercises for

armor and mechanized infantry battalions. However, the 1st Cavalry

Division expects to conduct these exercises in fiscal year 1995 as part of a

battalion command field exercise and therefore will not incur the

$5.9 million in operating tempo costs we estimated the model calculated

for these exercises.

Likewise, armor and mechanized infantry battalions of the 3rd Infantry

Division conduct a company-level fire coordination exercise and two

iterations of a company-level live fire exercise as part of semiannual crew

weapon qualification exercises and do not incur additional costs or drive

additional miles to meet the exercise requirements. However, we

estimated that in fiscal years 1993 and 1994 the model calculated

$3.3 million and $2.6 million, respectively, more than the 3rd Infantry

Division needed for these exercises.

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Model Exercise

Frequencies Do Not Match

Unit Execution

We identified 67 instances in which exercises included in the model were

conducted more or less frequently in the field. For example, the model

calculated operating tempo funds for two weapon qualification exercises

each year for armor and infantry battalions. The armor and mechanized

infantry battalions of the 1st Infantry Division, however, conducted only

one exercise in fiscal year 1994. As a result, we estimated that the model

included $1.5 million in operating tempo funds that were not needed.

The model also calculated operating tempo fund requirements for

exercises that are not conducted in the field. For example, the BLTM

includes four battalion-level deployment exercises or alerts each year.

According to 3rd Infantry Division officials, these exercises have not been

conducted for the last 5 years due to the demise of the Eastern bloc threat.

Further, the 1st Infantry Division does not include the exercises in its

home station training budget. The 1st Cavalry division does conduct an

alert exercise four times per year but incurs operating tempo costs only

once, since vehicles participate in only one of the four exercises. As

shown in table 2, we estimated that the model calculated $5.2 million for

exercises that were not conducted.

Table 2: Fiscal Year 1994 Operating

Tempo Funds for Deployment

Exercises or Alerts That Were Not

Conducted

Dollars in millions

Division Funding requirement

3rd Infantry $2.0

1st Infantry 1.6

1st Cavalry 1.6

Total $5.2

In addition to the deployment exercises, the 3rd Infantry Division did not

conduct four other battalion- and company-level exercises that were

included in the model. As table 3 shows, we estimated that the model

calculated the 3rd Infantry Division would need $9.5 million in fiscal year

1994 operating tempo funds for these exercises.

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Table 3: Exercises Included in the

Model That Were Not Conducted by

the 3rd Infantry Division

Dollars in millions

Exercise Armor costs Infantry costs Total

Battalion movement control exercise $1.7 $0.3 $2.0

Battalion live fire exercise 1.0 0.2 1.2

Company command field exercise 4.7 1.1 5.8

Company movement control

exercise 0.4 0.1 0.5

Total $7.8 $1.7 $9.5

In contrast, some exercises that are conducted in the field are not included

in the model. For example, in 1995 the 1st Cavalry Division plans to

conduct platoon situational training exercises for both its armor and

infantry battalions. These exercises are expected to cost about $8.7 million

but are not included in the model. Similarly, the 3rd Infantry Division

executes three platoon-level field training exercises that cost about

$7.1 million but are not included in the model.

Number of Miles Incurred

Do Not Match the Model

The mileage incurred during training exercises differed at least 40 times

from the mileage estimated in the model . For example, the model

calculated operating tempo funds for two crew weapon qualification

exercises for an armor and an infantry battalion based on each tank

driving 39 miles and each fighting vehicle driving 40 miles. However, the

3rd Infantry Division only requires 30 miles per vehicle. As a result, we

estimated that in fiscal year 1994 the model overcalculated operating

tempo fund requirements for these exercises by $925,000. Similarly, the

model calculated operating tempo funds to support 31 miles per tank and

40 miles per fighting vehicle for crew weapon sustainment exercises. The

division, however, requires only 10 miles per vehicle for each exercise,

resulting in the model overcalculating operating tempo funding

requirements by $1.3 million.

In another example, the model calculated funding requirements for two

battalion command field exercises based on 22 tanks and 19 fighting

vehicles each executing 70 miles. However, the 3rd Infantry Division does

not use either weapon system during this exercise. As a result, we

estimated that the model calculated $2.6 million for miles that were not

executed in the field.

In contrast, the operating tempo fund requirements in the model were less

than the requirements for some exercises in the field. In 1994, the 3rd

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Infantry Division conducted an armor battalion field training exercise that

required more miles than the model identified. As a result, an additional

$1.6 million was needed. Similarly, the 1st Cavalry Division plans to

conduct this exercise in fiscal year 1995 with more miles at a cost of about

$480,000, which was not funded in the model.

Model Does Not Consider

Range and Maneuver Area

Constraints

The availability of training range and maneuver areas at the installations

where units conduct their training exercises varies among the Army’s

combat divisions. These factors are not reflected in the BLTM, even though

they affect a unit’s ability to conduct training. For example, the Training

Resource Model calculates operating tempo funding requirements for a

battalion-level live fire exercise for armor and mechanized infantry

battalions. However, during 1993 and 1994, ranges at Fort Hood and Fort

Riley could not accommodate this type of exercise.5

 As a result, we

estimated that the model included a total of $4.7 million in operating

tempo funds for exercises that could not be performed by units at these

installations.

Army divisions based in Europe are more constrained by training range

and maneuver area availability than divisions based in the United States.

The Europe-based divisions are only able to conduct up to platoon-level

exercises at their home station. Major training exercises are limited to one

maneuver and two gunnery rotations each year at two centrally located

training areas. In addition, the central range facility does not have

adequate space to accommodate the battalion live fire exercises. We

estimated that, by not recognizing these constraints, the model included

$1.2 million in 1994 for exercises that the 3rd Infantry Division could not

execute in the field.

Model Does Not Recognize

Nonstandard Units

Although the model resources the armor battalion at the 82nd Airborne

Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for standard exercises, the battalion

does not typically conduct these exercises. The battalion participates

incrementally in the exercises of the division’s three infantry brigades and

does not train to the exercise schedule that the model resources. For

example, companies are assigned to support infantry exercises, such as

airfield seizures, rather than standardized field exercises contained in the

model. For the most part, they do not train as a full battalion.

5

Training ranges at Fort Riley have been modified, and the 1st Infantry Division plans to conduct the

battalion-level live fire exercises at its home station in fiscal year 1995.

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Units Have Reported

Meeting Readiness

Objectives

Despite spending significantly less than the model calculated, for seven

consecutive quarters, from the first quarter of fiscal year 1993 to the third

quarter of fiscal year 1994, the four divisions we reviewed reported

achieving their readiness objectives. However, some past reports of units’

training readiness may have been overstated.6

 Military leaders told us that

some commanders might view the readiness reports as scorecards on their

capabilities and performance and thus might be reluctant to report

degraded readiness. Military leaders also told us that the reluctance to cite

degraded readiness was indicative of a “can do” spirit of optimism.

Accordingly, significant differences can exist between official readiness

reports, independent data, and informally expressed professional military

judgments.

Although the four divisions reported achieving readiness objectives during

fiscal year 1993 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 1994, two cited a

lack of funding in reporting degraded readiness during the fourth quarter

of fiscal year 1994.7

 According to Army officials, one division took a risk

by not canceling any training scheduled for the first three quarters of fiscal

year 1994, gambling that an additional $10 million from the major

command would eliminate the need to cancel scheduled but unfunded

training exercises in the fourth quarter. Although this practice had

succeeded in prior years, the anticipated funds were not provided in time

to prevent the cancellation of fourth quarter exercises. The additional

funds were used instead to buy spare parts. The other division’s degraded

readiness condition was due primarily to insufficient funds for buying

some spare parts.

Army Plans to

Improve the Training

Resource Model

Army headquarters training officials told us they recognized that the

assumptions or strategies included in the Training Resource Model did not

correlate to the unit training exercises planned or conducted in the field.

Further, the officials recognized that this disconnect caused the model to

calculate more operating tempo funds than the units spent to meet their

readiness objectives and that these excess funds were being moved to

other operation and maintenance accounts.

The Army Chief of Staff has directed that the Army reevaluate the training

requirements in the BLTM for the 10 most expensive battalion types, such as

the tank and Bradley fighting vehicle. Toward this end, the Army has

6

Army Training: Evaluations of Units’ Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb. 15,

1991).

7

Specific information on which units reported degraded readiness is classified.

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begun a project to determine the type and level of exercises that are being

conducted in the field and the funding necessary for training. On the basis

of this information, the Army plans to update the Training Resource Model

to reflect current training requirements and align its budget requests

closely with the amount units need to meet readiness objectives. In

addition, the Army plans to expand the definition of operating tempo to

incorporate factors that affect operational readiness but have not been

included in the calculation of funding requirements. These factors include

range maintenance, railhead and airfield maintenance, simulations and

other training devices that affect a unit’s ability to train and deploy. Army

officials told us that they expected to complete these initiatives by

December 1995.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We obtained written comments from DOD on a draft of this report (see 

app. I). DOD agreed with our findings regarding the Army’s movement of

operating tempo funds to other operation and maintenance accounts in

fiscal years 1993 and 1994. However, DOD did not agree that the Training

Resource Model calculated more money than the Army needed to achieve

readiness objectives or that the model was based on invalid assumptions.

According to DOD, the Training Resource Model cannot overstate the

funding needed to achieve readiness objectives because it calculates only

the cost of exercises that the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command has

determined are necessary to enable units to achieve the highest readiness

status. DOD noted, however, that it was still possible for a unit to achieve a

high readiness status even if it did not have sufficient funds to carry out all

specified exercises.

DOD’s rationale about the Training Resource Model’s calculations is faulty

in three major areas. First, DOD assumes that the model accurately

represents how the Army trains today. To the contrary, our work

conclusively shows that the model’s assumptions regarding how the Army

conducts specific training exercises, the types of vehicles that are used,

and the number of miles that are to be driven are no longer valid.

Moreover, the fact that the Army trained at a lower level of operating

tempo than funded by the Training Resource Model does not necessarily

mean that training exercises were not conducted, as DOD’s comments

imply. Rather, as evidenced by our report, the lower level of operating

tempo in many instances was due to the fact that exercises were

conducted differently or using different equipment than assumed in the

model. For example, our finding that the model calculated $2.6 million for

miles not executed during the 3rd Infantry Division’s battalion command

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exercises does not mean the division did not conduct these exercises.

Rather, it means that the division did not use the type of vehicles assumed

in the model in conducting the exercises . In addition, DOD’s belief that the

Training Resource Model is valid ignores changes in Army training that

have resulted from a changed national security environment. For example,

during the last 5 years, the 3rd Infantry Division did not conduct the

battalion-level deployment exercises or alerts assumed by the model due

to the demise of the Eastern bloc threat.

Second, DOD’s rationale infers that the entire $868 million in operating

tempo funds that the Army moved to other operation and maintenance

accounts during fiscal year 1994 was needed to enable commanders to

meet readiness objectives. We found, however, that the funding shortfall

for the degraded training readiness condition cited by Army commanders

in the fourth quarter of 1994 amounted to a small percentage of total

operating funds moved. Specifically, our review of fourth quarter

readiness reports for all Army divisions in the U.S. Forces Command and

U.S. Army Europe showed that the reported shortfall accounting for

degraded training readiness was about $30 million, or 3.5 percent of the

total operating tempo funds that the Army moved to other accounts during

the year. The significance of this disparity leaves no doubt that the

Training Resource Model calculated more money than the Army needed to

achieve readiness objectives.

Even though we reported past instances in which unit training readiness

reports may have been overstated due to commanders’ optimism about

their units’ ability to perform assigned missions, we believe it is unlikely

that this factor played a major role in reports that readiness objectives

were achieved throughout most of fiscal years 1993 and 1994. According to

Army regulations governing readiness reports, commanders are expected

to establish the overall readiness rating for their units at the lowest of the

four readiness elements assessed, that is, personnel, equipment on hand

and its condition, and training. However, commanders may upgrade the

overall rating if they believe that the calculated level does not truly

represent the unit’s status. Therefore, commanders could have reported

degraded training readiness ratings and still reflected a “can do” spirit of

optimism by upgrading overall unit readiness. However, we found that this

situation did not occur. Our analysis of overall readiness ratings for all

U.S. Forces Command and U.S. Army Europe divisions in fiscal years 1993

and 1994 showed that the overall readiness rating for each division

matched the training rating. Any commander that upgraded overall

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readiness did not do so because of a degraded training readiness

condition.

Third, DOD’s rationale implies that the exercises included in the Training

Resource Model are prescriptive and cannot be conducted without the

calculated level of funding. Yet in preparing their training plans for the

upcoming fiscal year, none of the combat divisions we visited were aware

of either the exercises contained in the model or the operating funds the

model calculated were necessary to conduct the exercises. According to

unit officials, training plans were based on their assessment of the training

exercises they believed were needed to be combat ready. In each case, the

units accomplished scheduled training exercises with significantly less

funds than calculated by the Training Resource Model and reported that

their readiness objectives were met.

DOD also commented that the Army was changing the Training Resource

Model for reasons other than those cited in our report. DOD said that the

changes were to incorporate a new methodology of operational readiness

that would reflect the total cost of preparing a unit to go to war. Even

though this statement is accurate, it is only part of the reason that Army

officials told us the model was being changed. Throughout the course of

our work, Army training officials told us that they recognized the

assumptions or strategies included in the Training Resource Model did not

correlate to the unit training exercises planned or conducted in the field.

Further, training officials said they recognized that this disconnect caused

the model to calculate more operating tempo funds than units needed to

meet readiness objectives.

Scope and

Methodology

To meet our objectives, we reviewed operating tempo funding for

divisions within the U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, and

U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany. We chose these commands

because together they represented about 80 percent of operating tempo

funding. We did not review the flying hour portion of operating tempo

funding because it is not a product of the Training Resource Model.

To determine whether the Army spent operating tempo funds for other

purposes, we reviewed accounting records and interviewed officials from

the Army Budget Office, Washington D.C.; U.S. Forces Command; U.S.

Army Europe; and V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany. At the beginning of this

review, we examined the operating tempo programs of the Air Force, the

Navy, and the Marine Corps. We found that these services were executing

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operating tempo funds at or above the amount requested or at least had

limited opportunity to move these funds from training activities.

To determine if the operating tempo funds requested in the Army’s budget

submission were consistent with the funds needed to meet readiness

objectives, we compared the BLTM with division training plans to identify

differences between the model and exercises, number of times the

exercises occurred, extent of vehicle use, and mileage executed in the

field. We used the BLTM for our comparison because the Training Resource

Model bases its mileage requirements on BLTM data. We performed our

comparison for selected armor and mechanized infantry battalions of the

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley,

Kansas; 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and 3rd

Infantry Division, Wurzburg, Germany. We selected these divisions to

encompass units with both constrained and unconstrained range and

maneuver areas, as well as units that deploy both early and late. We

focused our comparison on tanks and fighting vehicles, since they

represented 72 percent of the unit requirements at the divisions visited.

At these divisions, we reviewed training plans for a total of seven armor

and four mechanized infantry battalions. We compared the specific

exercises, including the number of times they occurred, extent of vehicle

use, and mileage contained in the battalion’s 1994 or 1995 training plans,

with the information contained in the BLTM. Limited data at the divisions

prevented a full comparison of the exercises in the model to exercises

planned in the field. To estimate the extent to which the model overstated

or understated division funding requirements for specific exercises, we

applied Army cost factors for fuel, maintenance, and spare parts to

mileage differences identified in our comparisons.

We reviewed readiness reports at the divisions and verified, through

discussions with officials, that the readiness objectives had been met for

fiscal year 1993 and for the first three quarters of 1994. For the fourth

quarter 1994, we reviewed and discussed readiness reports at the Army

Operations Center in Washington, D.C.

We also interviewed officials of and collected pertinent information from

the Army Directorate of Training, Washington D.C.; the Army’s Cost and

Economic Analysis Center, Falls Church, Virginia; CACI (the Army

contractor responsible for maintaining the model), Arlington, Virginia; and

III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. We conducted our review from

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
B-260798 

November 1993 to November 1994 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate Committee

on Armed Services and Senate and House Committees on Appropriations;

the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretaries of

Defense and the Army. We will also make copies available to other

interested parties on request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you or any of your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix Il.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2-3.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-5.

Now on pp. 5-9.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 10.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 10-11.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Charles J. Bonanno, Assistant Director

Karen S. Blum, Communications Analyst

Dallas Regional Office Jeffrey A. Kans, Evaluator-in-Charge

Penney M. Harwell, Senior Evaluator

Mary K. Muse, Senior Evaluator

Cary B. Russell, Evaluator

Jimmy Palmer, Jr., Evaluator

Norfolk Regional

Office

James K. Mahaffey, Senior Evaluator

Vincent C. Truett, Evaluator

(703047) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-71 Army Training
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