THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Richard 

Ridley, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-000527 

Appeal From Aiken County 

Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5810 

Heard November 10, 2020 – Filed March 17, 2021 

AFFIRMED 

Arthur Kerr Aiken, of Aiken & Hightower, of Columbia, 

for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 

Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, 

both of Columbia, for Respondent. 

WILLIAMS, J.: Richard Ridley appeals his commitment to the South Carolina 

Department of Mental Health (the Department) as a sexually violent predator 

(SVP). On appeal, Ridley argues the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony 

regarding his diagnosis of Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder – 

Biastophilia/Non-Consent (OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent). We affirm. 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

In 2002, Ridley pled guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature 

(ABHAN), third degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), and failure to register as a 

sex offender. Prior to his release in 2014, the State filed a petition for Ridley's 
 

civil commitment to the Department pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act1 

(the Act). The trial court appointed an evaluator who diagnosed Ridley with 

OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) 

with Narcissistic Traits and recommended commitment. Thereafter, Ridley 

voluntarily committed to the Department for treatment pursuant to the Act. 

As required by the Act, the Department evaluated Ridley's mental status in 2015, 

2016, and 2017 and determined each time that Ridley required further 

commitment. In 2017, Ridley petitioned for release against the Department's 

recommendation, and the circuit court held a trial. 

During a pretrial hearing, Ridley made a motion in limine to exclude expert 

testimony regarding his diagnosis of OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent, arguing 

the diagnosis was not scientifically reliable and was, therefore, insufficient to 

qualify as a predicate diagnosis under the Act.2

 The State proffered testimony 

from Dr. Gordon Edward Brown, Jr., an actuarial measures forensic psychologist 

for the Department. Following the proffered testimony and arguments by the 

parties, the trial court denied Ridley's motion and permitted Dr. Brown to provide 

expert testimony regarding the diagnosis before the jury. 

During trial, the court qualified Dr. Brown as an expert in forensic psychology, and 

he provided testimony summarizing his evaluation of Ridley and opining that 

Ridley suffered from OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent and APD with 

Narcissistic Traits. Ridley presented expert testimony from Dr. Selman Watson, a 

forensic psychologist, who opined that OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent was not 

a valid diagnosis for the purposes of commitment under the Act. 

At the close of trial, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ridley still 

posed a danger to society.3

 The trial court subsequently filed an order of continued 

commitment. This appeal followed. 

ISSUE ON APPEAL 

1

 S.C. Code Ann. §§44-48-10 to -170 (2018).

2

 Ridley did not challenge his diagnosis of APD with Narcissistic Traits at trial and 

does not challenge the diagnosis on appeal. 

3 See § 44-48-120(B) ("The burden of proof is upon the [State] to show beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the petitioner's mental abnormality or personality disorder 

remains such that the petitioner is not safe to be at large and, that if released, is 

likely to commit acts of sexual violence."). 
 

Did the trial court err in admitting Dr. Brown's expert testimony? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed 

absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion." State v. Prather, 429 S.C. 583, 598, 840 

S.E.2d 551, 559 (2020) (quoting State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 S.E.2d 

336, 338 (2015)). "A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony 

constitutes an abuse of discretion whe[n] the ruling is unsupported by the evidence 

or controlled by an error of law." State v. Jones, 423 S.C. 631, 636, 817 S.E.2d 

268, 270 (2018). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

Ridley argues the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Brown's expert testimony 

regarding his diagnosis of Ridley with OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent. We 

disagree. 

Pursuant to the Act, an individual is considered an SVP if (1) he "has been 

convicted of a sexually violent offense" and (2) "suffers from a mental abnormality 

or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual 

violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and 

treatment." § 44-48-30(1). Ridley asserts Dr. Brown's testimony was improper 

because OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent is scientifically unreliable and thus 

cannot serve as a predicate diagnosis under the Act. 

"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 

in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, SCRE. "Before admitting 

expert testimony, a trial court must qualify the expert and determine whether the 

subject matter of the expert's proposed testimony is reliable, as required by Rule 

702, SCRE." Prather, 429 S.C. at 599, 840 S.E.2d at 559. "The trial [court] 

should apply the Jones[4] factors to determine reliability." State v. Council, 335 

S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999). 

The Jones reliability factors take into consideration: 

4 State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979). 
 

(1) the publications and peer reviews of the technique; 

(2) prior application of the method to the type of 

evidence involved in the case; 

(3) the quality control procedures used to ensure 

reliability; and 

(4) the consistency of the method with recognized 

scientific laws and procedures. 

State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 573, 541 S.E.2d 813, 819 (2001). "Once the evidence 

is admitted under these standards, the jury may give it such weight as it deems 

appropriate." Council, 335 S.C. at 20–21, 515 S.E.2d at 518. 

During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated Dr. Brown's expert qualifications, 

and the State proffered his testimony for the trial court to perform its gatekeeping 

duties. Dr. Brown testified he evaluated Ridley for his annual review in 2017. In 

performing his evaluation, Dr. Brown testified he conducted a series of clinical 

interviews of Ridley and thoroughly reviewed Ridley's records, including his 

criminal records, prior evaluations, and treatment records. Dr. Brown confirmed 

the records he reviewed were those typically and reasonably relied upon by other 

experts in his field. Dr. Brown testified that after conducting the annual review, he 

diagnosed Ridley with two diagnoses: OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent and APD 

with Narcissistic Traits. Dr. Brown explained that in diagnosing Ridley, he used 

the fifth edition of the Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), which is 

the official, peer reviewed publication of the American Psychiatric Association. 

In its chapter on paraphilic disorders, the DSM-V lists eight specific paraphilic 

disorders but also includes two additional categories: other specified paraphilic 

disorders (OSPD) and unspecified paraphilic disorders. See American Psychiatric 

Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 685–705 (5th 

ed. 2013).5 In the introduction of the chapter, it states: 

The eight listed disorders do not exhaust the list of 

possible paraphilic disorders. Many dozens of distinct 

paraphilias have been identified and named, and almost 

any of them could, by virtue of its negative consequences 

for the individual or for others, rise to the level of a 

5

 The DSM-V replaced the previous designation of Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) 

in the DSM-IV with other specified disorder and unspecified disorder. See 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at 15–16. 
paraphilic disorder. The diagnoses of other specified and 

unspecified paraphilic disorders are therefore 

indispensable and will be required in many cases. 

Id. at 685 (emphases added). The DSM-V specifically describes OSPD as follows: 

This category applies to presentations in which 

symptoms characteristic of a paraphilic disorder that 

cause clinically significant distress or impairment in 

social, occupational, or other important areas of 

functioning predominate but do not meet the full criteria 

for any of the disorders in the paraphilic disorders 

diagnostic class. The [OSPD] category is used in 

situations in which the clinician chooses to communicate 

the specific reason that the presentation does not meet the 

criteria for any specified paraphilic disorder. This is 

done by recording "other specified paraphilic disorder" 

followed by the specific reason (e.g., "zoophilia"). 

Examples of presentations that can be specified 

using the [OSPD] designation include, but are not limited 

to, recurrent and intense sexual arousal involving 

telephone scatologia (obscene phone calls), necrophilia 

(corpses), zoophilia (animals), coprophilia (feces) 

klismaphilia (enemas), or urophilia (urine) . . . . 

Id. at 705 (emphasis added). 

Dr. Brown explained Biastophilia is when a person is "sexually aroused by the 

aspect of having nonconsensual sex with someone." He acknowledged that OSPD 

– Biastophilia/Non-Consent is not specifically listed as one of the OSPD examples 

in the DSM-V but maintained his belief that the diagnosis was valid and reliable 

because the DSM-V instructed that the list of examples was not exhaustive. Dr. 

Brown further testified biastophilia is a recognized modifier for personality 

disorders and mental abnormalities in his field. On cross-examination, Dr. Brown 

admitted there is debate within the psychological profession as to whether OSPD – 

Biastophilia/Non-Consent should be considered a valid predicate diagnosis under 

the Act because rape is considered a criminal act of control rather than the result of 

a mental abnormality or disorder; however, he maintained his belief that it was a 

valid and reliable diagnosis. He further stated practitioners, for that reason, should 
 

exercise caution in making the diagnosis and admitted it was his first time using it. 

Following the proffer, the trial court denied Ridley's motion, finding the 

disagreement within the field regarding the diagnosis did not render it scientifically 

unreliable for the purpose of serving as a predicate diagnosis under the Act. 

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Brown's 

testimony. See Prather, 429 S.C. at 598, 840 S.E.2d at 559 ("A trial court's 

decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed absent a 

prejudicial abuse of discretion." (quoting Chavis, 412 S.C. at 106, 771 S.E.2d at 

338)). Although a contentious issue, we find the trial court properly dispensed of 

its gatekeeping duties in assessing the reliability of Dr. Brown's diagnosis. See id. 

at 599, 840 S.E.2d at 559 ("Before admitting expert testimony, a trial court must 

qualify the expert and determine whether the subject matter of the expert's 

proposed testimony is reliable, as required by Rule 702, SCRE."). Dr. Brown 

testified as to his method in diagnosing Ridley, which included standard practices 

within the industry such as conducting clinical interviews; thoroughly reviewing 

criminal, evaluation, and treatment records; and consulting the DSM-V. 

Accordingly, we find Dr. Brown's approach in diagnosing Ridley met the threshold 

of reliability for admissible evidence. See State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 270, 676 

S.E.2d 684, 686 (2009) ("All expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, 

and that includes the trial court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed 

expert testimony meets a reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate 

consideration."); Council, 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518 ("The trial [court] 

should apply the Jones factors to determine reliability."). 

As to whether OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent is a valid predicate diagnosis 

under the Act, we hold the trial court properly found this was a determination 

within the jury's province. See Jones, 423 S.C. at 639–40, 817 S.E.2d at 272 

("There is always a possibility that an expert witness's opinions are incorrect. 

However, whether to accept the expert's opinions or not is a matter for the jury to 

decide. Trial courts are tasked only with determining whether the basis for the 

expert's opinion is sufficiently reliable such that it [may be] offered into 

evidence."); see also Council, 335 S.C. at 21–22, 515 S.E.2d at 519 ("This [c]ourt 

has noted that 'vigorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence and 

careful instructions on the burden of proof are the traditional appropriate means 

of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.'" (quoting State v. Dinkins, 319 S.C. 

415, 418, 462 S.E.2d 59, 60 (1995))). Furthermore, as it currently stands, we find 

the Act and the DSM-V do not expressly prohibit a diagnosis of OSPD – 

Biastophilia/Non-Consent. See McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 576 (7th Cir. 

2010) ("The Supreme Court's cases on this point teach that civil commitment upon 
a finding of a 'mental disorder' does not violate due process even though the 

predicate diagnosis is not found within the four corners of the DSM."); see also In 

re Snow, 425 S.C. 544, 549, 551, 823 S.E.2d 467, 469–71 (2019) (holding the 

diagnosis of other specified personality disorder was a legally sufficient predicate 

diagnosis under the Act). Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in denying 

Ridley's motion in limine and admitting Dr. Brown's testimony. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Ridley's commitment is 

AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.