Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (3d) 190131

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

JOEL JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District 

No. 3-19-0131

Filed August 23, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 18-CF-648; 

the Hon. Norma Kauzlarich, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Miriam Sierig, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Dora A. Villarreal, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Patrick Delfino, 

Thomas D. Arado, and Mark A. Austill, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justice Daugherity concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Presiding Justice McDade specially concurred, with opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 A jury found defendant, Joel Jones, guilty of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. 

The court sentenced defendant to a term of nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant 

argues that the State failed to make a prima facie case of proper chain of custody of the 

narcotics in question, such that the admission of narcotics into evidence amounts to reversible 

error. Separately, he argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to 

request a jury instruction pertaining to the evaluation of eyewitness testimony. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State charged defendant via indictment with a single count of unlawful delivery of a 

controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2) (West 2016)). The indictment alleged that 

defendant knowingly delivered to a law enforcement agent less than one gram of a substance 

containing heroin. 

¶ 4 Defendant’s jury trial commenced on October 30, 2018. Officer Justin Holmes testified 

that he was working undercover on August 16, 2016, when he placed a phone call to defendant 

in which he arranged to purchase two bags of heroin. After Holmes arrived at the agreed 

location, defendant entered his vehicle and placed two bags of heroin on the floor. Holmes 

handed defendant money. At defendant’s direction, Holmes drove a block away, at which point 

defendant exited the vehicle. Holmes next drove to another location to meet with his 

supervisor. They “tested the narcotic to make sure [they] didn’t get ripped off.” 

¶ 5 Holmes said the transaction occurred at 4 p.m. and that he had a good opportunity to 

observe defendant and his physical features. Such observation was part of his training. Further, 

he was well aware that he would likely have to make an identification of defendant at a 

potential future trial. 

¶ 6 Holmes identified State’s exhibit No. 1 as the heroin he purchased. Holmes had sealed the 

two bags of heroin inside a larger evidence bag. He recognized his handwriting and his 

signature on the bag. Holmes agreed that the evidence bag itself and one of the bags of heroin 

had been opened and opined that this had been done by the Illinois State Police crime 

laboratory. The bags of heroin were otherwise in the same condition as when he purchased 

them. 

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Holmes estimated that he had made 50 controlled purchases of 

narcotics between 2016 and 2018. Approximately four or five of those purchases were from 

young black males. Holmes did not take any steps to procure any records relating to the phone 

number he called to arrange the transaction. There were no photographs or video recordings of 

the controlled purchase. Holmes did not recall that defendant had any physical features or 

clothing that made him particularly distinctive. 

¶ 8 On redirect, Holmes said that the encounter on August 16, 2016, was not the first time he 

had seen defendant. 

¶ 9 Joni Little testified that she was a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police forensic 

science laboratory. Little recognized State’s exhibit No. 1 as a package received by her 

laboratory on September 26, 2016. The bag was in a sealed condition when she received it. 

Little opened the bag and performed two tests on the contents of one of the inside bags. The 
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tests were positive for heroin. State’s exhibit No. 1 was entered into evidence without 

objection. 

¶ 10 Officer John Johnson testified that he conducted surveillance during the controlled 

purchase. Using binoculars from approximately 11⁄2 blocks away, Johnson identified defendant 

as the man who entered Holmes’s vehicle. Like Holmes, Johnson had been especially focused 

on identifying the individual and remembering what he looked like. On cross-examination, 

Johnson said that he had been involved in hundreds of controlled purchases, some of which 

involved young black males.

¶ 11 Officer Jose Vargas also conducted surveillance during the controlled purchase. He saw 

defendant exit Holmes’s vehicle. He observed defendant walk approximately a block before 

entering a residence. Vargas had no doubt that defendant was the person involved in the 

controlled purchase. 

¶ 12 In closing, defense counsel argued that the State’s evidence that defendant was the person 

who participated in the controlled purchase with Holmes was insufficient. He argued that the 

identification testimony of the three officers was uncorroborated and was rendered less 

credible by the significant passage of time between the event and trial. 

¶ 13 The jury found defendant guilty; the court sentenced him to a term of nine years’ 

imprisonment.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to make a prima facie showing of a 

sufficient chain of custody of the heroin entered into evidence as State’s exhibit No. 1. He also 

argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction pertaining 

to the evaluation of eyewitness testimony. We address each argument in turn.

¶ 16 A. Chain of Custody

¶ 17 Defendant argues that the State’s chain-of-custody evidence was deficient in a number of 

respects. He points out that Holmes did not testify to any facts relating to the transportation, 

handling, or storage of the evidence in the 41 days between its collection and its receipt at the 

crime laboratory. He also asserts that neither Holmes nor Little described the evidence with 

sufficient specificity or utilized a unique inventory number. Defendant concedes that he has 

forfeited this issue by failing to object at trial and raising it in a posttrial motion. However, he 

argues that this court should reverse his conviction because the admission of the evidence 

amounted to plain error. 

¶ 18 The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to bypass normal forfeiture rules and 

consider a claim of error despite the appellant’s failure to preserve that error below. People v. 

Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). A party asserting plain error must first show that a

clear or obvious error was committed. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). From 

there, the party must prove that he suffered prejudice as a result of the error, either by showing 

that the evidence in the case was closely balanced or by showing that the error itself was 

structural, such that prejudice must be presumed. See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 182, 185. 

Accordingly, we begin by considering whether a plain error—that is, a clear or obvious error—

was committed. 
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¶ 19 Where the State has charged a defendant with a controlled substance offense, “[i]t is 

axiomatic that the State must prove that the material recovered from the defendant and which 

forms the basis of the charge is, in fact, a controlled substance.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 

455, 466 (2005). In order for recovered narcotics—as well as the results of testing of those 

narcotics—to be admitted into evidence, the State must first make a prima facie showing that 

the chain of custody was sufficient. 1 Id. at 468. To make that showing, “the State must 

demonstrate *** that reasonable measures were employed to protect the evidence from the 

time that it was seized and that it was unlikely that the evidence has been altered.” Id. at 467. 

Further, “a sufficiently complete chain of custody does not require that every person in the 

chain testify, nor must the State exclude every possibility of tampering or contamination.” Id.

¶ 20 The prima facie showing of sufficient chain of custody is a necessary foundation for the 

introduction of that evidence. Id. at 471. As such, a challenge to the chain of custody is an 

evidentiary issue, rather than a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. Where properly 

preserved, a claim of insufficient chain of custody is, like any other evidentiary challenge, 

subject to an abuse of discretion standard on review. E.g., People v. Blankenship, 406 Ill. App. 

3d 578, 588 (2010). That is, the circuit court’s admission of the evidence over defense objection 

will only be deemed error where the court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. 

People v. Johnson, 361 Ill. App. 3d 430, 440 (2005).

¶ 21 Of course, that same standard does not apply in the plain error context, where we consider 

not merely whether an error was committed but whether a clear, obvious, or plain error was 

committed. Our supreme court in Woods described the scenarios in which insufficient chain of 

custody evidence may rise to this level:

“[I]n those rare instances where a complete breakdown in the chain of custody occurs—

e.g., the inventory number or description of the recovered and tested items do not 

match—raising the probability that the evidence sought to be introduced at trial was 

not the same substance recovered from defendant, a challenge to the chain of custody 

may be brought under the plain error doctrine. When there is a complete failure of 

proof, there is no link between the substance tested by the chemist and the substance 

recovered at the time of the defendant’s arrest. In turn, no link is established between 

the defendant and the substance. In such a case, a failure to present a sufficient chain 

of custody would lead to the conclusion that the State could not prove an element of 

the offense: the element of possession.” Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471-72.

¶ 22 In the instant case, Holmes testified that he purchased two small bags that purportedly 

contained heroin from defendant, immediately thereafter met with his supervisor, field-tested 

the contents, and placed the two purchased bags into a larger evidence bag. Holmes sealed the 

evidence bag and signed his name. Little testified that she received the evidence bag in sealed 

condition and that it contained therein two individual bags. Both Holmes and Little testified 

that State’s exhibit No. 1 was the package they had dealt with. 

1

Even where the State has made the required prima facie showing, a defendant may rebut that 

showing by presenting evidence of actual tampering, substitution, or alteration. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 

468. As defendant has made no such claim in this case, the admissibility of the heroin turns only on 

whether the State made the required initial showing. 
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¶ 23 While defendant emphasizes the 41 days between collection of the narcotics and testing in 

the crime laboratory, and the purportedly myriad possibilities that interlude created for 

tampering, it is well settled that

“when no positive evidence of tampering or other contamination exists, the proponent 

of the evidence can replace a missing link, created when one or more custodians of the 

evidence do not testify, with evidence (1) that the evidence left the hands of one 

testifying custodian in a sealed envelope or other container and arrived in the hands of 

the next testifying custodian still in a sealed container, and (2) that the identifying 

number or code on the container sent out matches that on the container received.” 

Johnson, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 441-42. 

To be sure, the bag in this case was apparently marked only with Holmes’s signature, rather 

than a unique identifying number. Nevertheless, the sealed bag, that signature, and the similar 

description of two smaller bags served to tie the evidence collected by Holmes with that tested 

by Little. Accordingly, we cannot say that there was “a complete breakdown in the chain of 

custody” or that there is “no link between the substance tested by the chemist and the substance 

recovered.” Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471-42. It follows that no clear, obvious, or plain error was 

committed. See People v. Echavarria, 362 Ill. App. 3d 599, 604 (2005) (“We conclude the 

issue of the sufficiency of the chain-of-custody evidence has been forfeited and the actual 

evidence presented in this case to have met the bare minimum standard for sufficiency 

enunciated in Woods.”).

¶ 24 In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that defendant has relied heavily on People 

v. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d 997 (2009), and People v. Cowans, 336 Ill. App. 3d 173 (2002), 

in making his argument—both cases in which the reviewing court found the chain of custody 

insufficient. In Howard, the court held that the failure to use a unique identification number 

rendered the chain of custody insufficient, despite the presence of the officer’s initials and 

badge number and the date on the sealed evidence bag, as well as the recording of the weight 

of the bag. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1005. The court expressed concern that the officers 

might “have handled another bag of white powder of similar weight on that day.” Id. In 

Cowans, the court found the chain of custody insufficient where the forensic scientist provided 

no description of the “size, shape, or color of the items received,” even though there was 

evidence that the inventory number matched. Cowans, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 178. 

¶ 25 Initially, both Howard and Cowans have been roundly criticized by other courts. People v. 

Anderson, 2013 IL App (2d) 111183, ¶ 46; Blankenship, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 593-96; People v. 

Scott, 2019 IL App (1st) 163022, ¶¶ 22-23; Johnson, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 442-43; People v. 

Foster, 354 Ill. App. 3d 564, 570 (2004). More importantly, neither of those cases concerned 

unpreserved claims, and thus neither applied the Woods standard as we do here. It is therefore 

not strictly necessary that we join the chorus of courts condemning those decisions. It is 

sufficient to say that they are not relevant to the instant appeal. Having found no plain error, 

we must honor defendant’s forfeiture.

¶ 26 B. Jury Instructions

¶ 27 Defendant also argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial for failing to 

request a jury instruction relating to eyewitness identification. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 

Criminal, No. 3.15 (approved July 28, 2017) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.15) instructs the 

jury as follows:
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“When you weigh the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider all 

the facts and circumstances in evidence, including, but not limited to, the following:

[1] The opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the offense.

[2] The witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense.

[3] The witness’s earlier description of the offender.

[4] The level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant.

[5] The length of time between the offense and the identification confrontation.”

Defendant argues that defense counsel was deficient for failing to request this instruction 

because his primary defense was that the officers had misidentified defendant. He contends 

that a reasonable probability exists that he would have been found not guilty had the jury been 

so instructed. 

¶ 28 To demonstrate that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, a defendant 

must demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant 

suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In 

determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient, a reviewing court must indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s performance was the product of a sound trial strategy. Id. at 

689. Prejudice is shown where a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. 

¶ 29 The decision whether to request a certain jury instruction is generally a matter of trial 

strategy. E.g., People v. Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B, ¶ 97. Here, defense counsel’s 

strategy in not requesting IPI Criminal No. 3.15, while still challenging the credibility of the 

officers’ identification, is obvious. IPI Criminal No. 3.15 lists five factors to be considered in 

evaluating an eyewitness identification. Three of those factors clearly favor the State. Holmes 

had an opportunity to observe defendant up close and for an extended period when he shared 

a front seat with him (factor 1). Each of the three officers testified that they were paying 

especially close attention to defendant, knowing that they would likely have to identify him in 

court (factor 2). And none of the officers expressed any uncertainty or equivocation in their 

identification (factor 4). By intentionally declining to have that instruction delivered, defense 

counsel was able to argue the shortcomings of the identifications (factors 3 and 5) while not 

calling any attention to factors that would actually hurt his case. As this was plainly a sound 

trial strategy, we cannot say that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

¶ 30 We would note in closing that, even if counsel’s failure to request the jury instruction could 

be deemed deficient performance, defendant would be unable to demonstrate any prejudice. 

As explained, the factors listed in the jury instruction actually do more to bolster the officers’ 

identifications than to undermine it. Defense counsel, through his cross-examinations and 

arguments, made the credibility of those identifications the central issue in the case. In turn, 

those identifications were presumably the central question in the jury’s deliberations. The jury 

concluded that the identifications were credible and found defendant guilty. Nothing about IPI 

Criminal No. 3.15 raises a probability, reasonable or otherwise, that the jury would have 

reached a different conclusion had that instruction been delivered.
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¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island 

County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

¶ 34 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 35 I concur with the affirmance of defendant’s conviction because we reach that result by 

following established precedent. I write separately to note that this decision is a textbook 

exercise in the employment of technicalities and presumptions (supra ¶¶ 17-25) that insulate 

the State from its failure to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance confiscated 

from the defendant is the same substance that was tested in the crime lab, while simultaneously 

holding defendant to the letter of the applicable forfeiture and plain error precedent (People v. 

Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), and its progeny). The State failed to follow the appropriate 

chain of custody of the contraband, and as a result of that failure and of defense trial counsel’s 

failure to preserve the issue for this court’s consideration, defendant stands convicted of 

unlawful delivery of a substance he has not been proven to have possessed.