96-291

 No. 96-291

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

BILLINGS POST NO. 1634,

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

OF THE UNITED STATES,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 James P. Healow; Sweeney & Healow, Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 R. Bruce McGinnis, Montana Department of Revenue,

 Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: March 20, 1997

 Decided: August 1, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Billings Post No. 1634, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW),

appeals from the judgment entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, 

Yellowstone

County, on its order granting the Montana Department of Revenue's motion for summary

judgment. We affirm.

 The VFW raises the following issues on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the Department of Revenue was

not equitably estopped from refusing to classify the VFW's current all-beverage 

license

as transferable and assignable and reissue the VFW's lapsed liquor and beer licenses?

 2. Did the District Court err in refusing to order the Department of Revenue to

classify the VFW's current all-beverage license as transferable and assignable and 

reissue

the VFW's lapsed liquor and beer licenses as a matter of equity? 

 The material facts in this case are undisputed. The VFW is a Billings, Montana,

post of a nationally chartered veterans' organization. It operated a bar under 

licenses

to serve liquor and beer from approximately 1941 through 1974. Prior to 1947, no 

quota

system existed in Montana regarding liquor licensing. In 1947, the Montana 

legislature

enacted a quota law limiting the number of beer and liquor licenses which could be 

issued

for each city or town. See 1947 Mont. Laws Chs. 225 and 226. Two years later, the

legislature exempted certain fraternal and veterans' organizations from the quota 

system

limitations on the number of beer and liquor licenses. The exemption provided that

the foregoing limitations shall not prevent the granting of non-transferable

and non-assignable licenses to posts of nationally chartered veterans'

organizations, and lodges of recognized national fraternal organizations,

which said national organizations have been in existence for five (5) years

or more prior to January 1st, 1949.

1949 Mont. Laws Chs. 164 and 165. After 1949, the Montana Liquor Control Board and

its successor, the Montana Department of Revenue (Department), endorsed the liquor 

and

beer licenses of fraternal and veterans' organizations as nontransferable and

nonassignable. The renewals of the VFW's pre-1947 liquor and beer licenses were so

endorsed.

 In 1974, the VFW experienced financial difficulties which ultimately resulted in

the sale of its premises located on Lewis Avenue in Billings. According to the VFW, 

it

never considered selling its liquor and beer licenses due to the nontransferability 

and

nonassignability endorsements on the licenses; instead, it allowed the licenses to 

lapse. 

 The VFW subsequently reopened in a different Billings location. In 1979, five

years after allowing its pre-1947 licenses to lapse, the VFW applied for and 

received its

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present nontransferable and nonassignable all-beverage liquor license under the 

statutory

exemption from the quota system for beer and liquor licenses.

 In 1991, this Court concluded that liquor and beer licenses issued prior to 1947

were not subject to the quota system limitations enacted in 1947 and, therefore, 

that those

licenses remained transferable and assignable. As a result, we held that the 

legislature's

1949 restrictions on the transfer and assignment of licenses issued to fraternal and

veterans' organizations did not apply to the Helena Eagles Club's pre-1947 beer 

license. 

 See Helena Aerie No. 16 v. Mont. D. of Rev. (1991), 251 Mont. 77, 82, 822 P.2d

1057, 1060.

 According to the VFW, it accepted an offer to buy its lapsed pre-1947 licenses 

for

$165,000 shortly after Helena Aerie. The VFW contacted the Department and was

informed that its pre-1947 licenses were not governed by Helena Aerie because they 

had

been allowed to lapse. On June 27, 1994, the VFW demanded that the Department issue

its 1994-1995 all-beverage liquor license as a "quota all beverage license," stating 

that

the Department's failure to do so would result in the VFW losing approximately

$250,000. The Department refused on the basis that the VFW's all-beverage license 

was

a nontransferable and nonassignable veterans' organization license under 16-4-201

(4),

MCA. On June 30, 1994, the VFW filed a declaratory judgment action against the

Department requesting the District Court to declare that the VFW's current allbeverage

liquor license is a transferable and assignable quota license and that the VFW is 

entitled

to reinstatement of its lapsed liquor and beer licenses.

 The VFW and the Department subsequently filed cross-motions for summary

judgment in which each party agreed that the material facts were undisputed. The

District Court determined that the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and denied the VFW's

motion for summary judgment. The VFW appeals.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issues of material fact exist and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.

P. We

review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same Rule

56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Matter of Estate of Lien (1995), 270

Mont. 295, 298, 892 P.2d 530, 532 (citation omitted). Ordinarily, such a review

requires that we first determine whether the moving party met its burden of 

establishing

both the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a

matter of law. Jarrett v. Valley Park, Inc. (1996), 277 Mont. 333, 338, 922 P.2d 

485,

487. 

 In this case, however, the parties agree that there are no disputed issues of 

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material

fact. Thus, our review is limited to whether the District Court properly concluded 

that

the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review a district 

court's

conclusion of law to determine whether the interpretation of the law is correct. 

Carbon

County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686

(citation omitted).

 DISCUSSION

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the Department was not

equitably estopped from refusing to classify the VFW's current all-beverage

license as transferable and assignable and reissue the VFW's lapsed liquor

and beer licenses?

 The VFW contended in the District Court--and contends on appeal--that the

Department misrepresented the transferability and assignability status of its pre1947

liquor and beer licenses and that it relied on that misrepresentation to its 

detriment in

allowing the licenses to lapse in 1974. As a result, according to the VFW, the

Department should be equitably estopped from denying that its current all-beverage

license is a transferable and assignable quota license and from refusing to reissue 

its

lapsed licenses. The Department responds that, prior to Helena Aerie in 1991, it 

neither

knew nor could have known, that its interpretation regarding the liquor license 

quota law

was erroneous and that the VFW's pre-1947 licenses were transferable and assignable. 

The District Court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply 

in this

case. We agree.

 Equitable estoppel has long been recognized in Montana and is invoked to promote

justice, honesty and fair dealing; the purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel 

is to

prevent a party from taking unconscionable advantage of his or her wrong while 

asserting

a strict legal right. In re Marriage of K.E.V. (1994), 267 Mont. 323, 331, 883 P.2d

1246, 1251 (citation omitted). The six elements of equitable estoppel are:

 1. the existence of conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to

a representation or a concealment of a material fact;

 2. these facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his

conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them

is necessarily imputed to him;

 3. the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other

party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time it was acted upon by

him;

 4. the conduct must be done with the intention, or at least the

expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under

circumstances both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon;

 5. the conduct must be relied upon by the other party and, thus

relying, he must be led to act upon it; and

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 6. he must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his

position for the worse.

Elk Park Ranch, Inc. v. Park County (Mont. 1997), 935 P.2d 1131, 1137-38, 54 St.Rep.

293, 297-98 (citations omitted). All six elements must be established before the 

doctrine

can be invoked. Elk Park Ranch, 935 P.2d at 1138 (citation omitted). Moreover, clear

and convincing evidence is necessary to establish equitable estoppel. Beery v. Grace

Drilling (1993), 260 Mont. 157, 163, 859 P.2d 429, 433 (citations omitted).

 Here, the VFW has not established the first and second elements of equitable

estoppel. With regard to the first element, equitable estoppel requires a 

misrepresentation

or concealment of a material fact. Elk Park Ranch, 935 P.2d at 1138 (citations 

omitted). 

The alleged misrepresentation of material fact in the present case is the 

Department's

erroneous endorsement of the VFW's pre-1947 liquor and beer licenses as 

nontransferable

and nonassignable.

 As indicated above, we first addressed the status of pre-1947 liquor and beer

licenses held by fraternal and veterans' organizations in Helena Aerie. There, we

determined that the Department's classification of the Eagles Club's pre-1947 beer 

license

as nontransferable and nonassignable conflicted with the 1947 quota law providing 

that

such licenses were renewable; as a result, we concluded that the Eagles Club's pre1947

beer license remained renewable under the 1947 quota law with its original 

transferability

and assignability characteristics. Helena Aerie, 822 P.2d at 1060. Thus, pursuant 

to

Helena Aerie, the Department's interpretation of the 1947 quota law and the exemption

thereto enacted in 1949 was incorrect. As a result, it is clear in this case that 

the

Department erroneously classified the VFW's pre-1947 liquor and beer licenses as

nontransferable and nonassignable.

 We recently clarified, however, that "[b]ecause the imposition of equitable 

estoppel

is premised on a misrepresentation of fact, it is inapplicable when . . . the conduct

complained of consists solely of legal representations." Elk Park Ranch, 935 P.2d at

1138. Here, the classification of the VFW's lapsed liquor and beer licenses as

nontransferable and nonassignable was an erroneous legal interpretation of the 1947 

quota

law by the Department. That incorrect classification constitutes a 

misrepresentation of

law; it does not constitute a misrepresentation of fact. Therefore, the VFW has not

established the first element of equitable estoppel, which requires a 

misrepresentation of

fact.

 Moreover, the second element of equitable estoppel requires that the party to be

estopped have actual or imputed knowledge of the alleged misrepresentation of fact. 

Elk

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Park Ranch, 935 P.2d at 1137. Here, nothing in the record before us establishes, or 

even

suggests, that the Department's legal misrepresentation regarding the status of the 

VFW's

pre-1947 licenses was knowing. Nor does anything in Helena Aerie suggest that the

Department should have known that its legal interpretation was incorrect for 

purposes of

imputing knowledge to the Department and establishing the second element of equitable

estoppel.

 The VFW relies on Mellum v. Kalispell Laundry (1989), 237 Mont. 439, 774 P.2d

390, in support of its argument that the Department should be charged with imputed

knowledge of the transferability and assignability of its lapsed liquor and beer 

licenses. 

That reliance is misplaced. 

 In Mellum, the Workers' Compensation Court dismissed an appeal from a denial

of Marie Mellum's occupational disease benefits claim by the Division of Workers'

Compensation (Division) on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal

because Mellum failed to request a rehearing with the Division as required by 39-

72-

612, MCA. Mellum, 774 P.2d at 390-91. On appeal, we observed that Mellum's failure

to strictly comply with Montana Occupational Disease Act (MODA) procedures by filing

a "Request for Rehearing" was caused by the Division's orders which incorrectly set 

forth

the MODA procedures to be followed by Mellum in pursuing her claim for occupational

disease benefits. See Mellum, 774 P.2d at 391. Moreover, the record in Mellum

reflected that, while Mellum did not file a document entitled "Request for 

Rehearing,"

the Division considered her exceptions to the Division hearing examiner's findings 

of fact

and conclusions of law as a request for rehearing in accordance with 39-72-612, 

MCA. 

 See Mellum, 774 P.2d at 391-92.

 We likened the Division's confusing and inconsistent orders and responses to

Mellum's inquiries regarding how to proceed and protect her rights to misstatements 

by

an employer or insurer in the workers' compensation context which prevent a claimant

from timely filing a claim or mislead the claimant into believing that no claim can 

or

need be filed; we observed that, under such circumstances, we had applied equitable

estoppel to toll the statute of limitations and allow the filing of a claim. 

Mellum, 774

P.2d at 391-92 (citation omitted). Because a failure to apply equitable estoppel 

would

have permitted the Division's own misstatements to foreclose the availability of any

remedy to Mellum, we concluded that knowledge of the proper MODA procedures could

be imputed to the Division. Mellum, 774 P.2d at 392. 

 Mellum does not help the VFW here. First, Mellum predated Elk Park Ranch,

and its continued viability in light of that recent case clarifying that legal

misrepresentations do not satisfy the first element of equitable estoppel may be 

called

into question in some future case. Second, the present case is distinguishable from

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Mellum in that no statement or representation of law or of fact by the Department

interfered with legal remedies available to the VFW to challenge the Department's

interpretation regarding the nontransferability and nonassignability of the pre-1947

licenses before they were allowed to lapse in 1974. In other words, the VFW could 

have

challenged the Department's legal interpretation at any time after 1949--as the 

Helena

Eagles Club did later in Helena Aerie--and it was not prevented from doing so by the

legal "misrepresentation" at issue here.

 Finally, the knowledge imputed to the Division in Mellum was of straightforward

procedural requirements about which no questions of interpretation were raised. 

Here,

the knowledge the VFW seeks to impute to the Department--namely, that the

Department's interpretation of the pre-1947 licenses as nontransferable and 

nonassignable

was erroneous--simply is not established by clear and convincing evidence and, given 

that

a trial court had determined in Helena Aerie that the Department's interpretation was

correct, no basis for imputing such knowledge exists in the present case.

 All six elements of equitable estoppel must be established before the doctrine 

can

be applied. Elk Park Ranch, 935 P.2d at 1138. Having concluded that the VFW did not

establish the first two elements, we hold that the District Court did not err in 

concluding

that the Department is not equitably estopped from refusing to classify the VFW's 

current

all-beverage license as transferable and assignable and reissue the VFW's lapsed 

liquor

and beer licenses. 

2. Did the District Court err in refusing to order the Department to classify

the VFW's current all-beverage license as transferable and assignable and

reissue the VFW's lapsed liquor and beer licenses as a matter of equity?

 The VFW contends that the State of Montana, acting through the Department,

induced it to allow its pre-1947 liquor and beer licenses to lapse through years of

misrepresentation as to the transferability and assignability of those licenses. On 

that

basis, it argues that the District Court should have invoked its equitable powers and

restored the VFW to "its status quo position." The District Court concluded that

equitable relief was not warranted. We agree.

 It is well-settled in Montana that a court may accept jurisdiction in equity 

only

where no statutory or legal remedy is available. See Eagle Watch Inv., Inc. v. Smith

(1996), 278 Mont. 187, 192, 924 P.2d 257, 260; Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial 

Accident

Bd. (1952), 126 Mont. 411, 413, 252 P.2d 1046, 1047. As Helena Aerie illustrates,

however, the VFW had a legal remedy available at all times with regard to the

Department's classification of its licenses; it could have brought a declaratory 

judgment

action prior to allowing its pre-1947 licenses to lapse, as did the Helena Eagles 

Club. 

See Helena Aerie, 822 P.2d at 1058. That the VFW it did not avail itself of that 

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remedy

by challenging the Department's interpretation of the 1949 exemption from the quota

system for fraternal and veterans' organizations does not negate the existence of 

the legal

remedy. Moreover, here, the VFW filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to 

27-

8-202, MCA, seeking its legal remedy thereunder. Had it succeeded in the declaratory

judgment action, whatever supplemental relief deemed "necessary or proper" could have

been granted. See 27-8-313, MCA. The VFW having initiated an action at law

pursuant to Montana statute and under which all appropriate relief was available, the

District Court could not properly have accepted jurisdiction in equity in this case.

 The VFW contends that the District Court should have accepted jurisdiction in

equity pursuant to State ex rel. Barker v. Town of Stevensville (1974), 164 Mont. 

375,

523 P.2d 1388. In Barker, however, the facts established the applicability of 

estoppel. 

On that basis, we addressed the issue of whether a municipal corporation could be 

bound

by the acts or statements of its agents where third parties relied thereon to their

detriment. See Barker, 523 P.2d at 1390-91. Observing that the great weight of

authority held that a municipality could not be bound by acts or statements of its 

agents

in excess of their authority, we rejected such a harsh and inflexible rule; instead, 

we

joined other jurisdictions in adopting a qualification to the general rule. We then 

applied

the qualification to the facts before us in order to fashion appropriate relief. 

Barker, 523

P.2d at 1390-91.

 Unlike the situation before us in Barker, we determined above that equitable

estoppel is not applicable in the present case because the VFW did not establish the

necessary elements. Thus, the premise upon which Barker was decided does not exist

here.

 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in refusing to order 

the

Department to classify the VFW's current all-beverage license as transferable and

assignable and reissue the VFW's lapsed liquor and beer licenses as a matter of 

equity. 

Having concluded above that equitable estoppel is inapplicable here, we further hold 

that

the District Court did not err in concluding that the Department is entitled to 

judgment

as a matter of law.

 Affirmed. 

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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