This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. No. 28,863 9 JERRY CASTILLO, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Albert S. “Pat” Murdoch, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney General 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 19 Karl Erich Martell, Assi stant Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 SUTIN, Judge. 242 Defendant Jerry Castillo entered into a c onditional plea of guilty for trafficking 1 methamphetamine. Based on the conditional pl ea, Defendant appeals the denial of his 2 motions to suppress physical evidence and admissions made by him during the stop 3 and detention in this case. We affirm. 4 BACKGROUND 5 While conducting a saturati on patrol on Central Avenue, in Albuquerque, New 6 Mexico, Detective Candelaria and her partners, Sergeant Campbell and Detective 7 Scrivner, observed a white SUV parked at a Long John Silver’s rest aurant with several 8 individuals huddled around the rear passenger side of the vehicle. Detective 9 Candelaria thought it was unus ual for the individuals to be huddled around the 10 vehicle, particularly because it was in th e parking lot of a sit-down eatery. The 11 location was a “high area for criminal activity ,” with “business complaints” of fights 12 and loitering. The officers were working a specific plan in the area that included 13 saturation of Central Avenue and addressing s ituations that appeared to be out of the 14 ordinary. After noticing the individuals inthe parking lot, Detective Candelaria and 15 her partners parked nearby to observe. Detective Candelari a testified that she did not 16 see any merchandise “such as a Coke or a bag from [the restaurant].” The officers 17 watched the individuals for about eight to te n minutes and then drove closer to where 18 the individuals were located and stopped about ten feet away. At that point, Detective 193 Candelaria saw one of the male individuals drinking a beer and observed him putting 1 it in the SUV. Sergeant Campbell also obs erved the same male drinking a beer. 2 Detective Candelaria and Sergeant Campbell testified that drinking in public was 3 considered a violation of a city ordinance. 4 The officers exited their vehicle. As the officers approached the group, 5 Detective Candelaria noticed two males sitting inside the vehicle. She testified that 6 for safety reasons she told everyone, includi ng the two individuals inside the vehicle, 7 to show their hands and to exit the vehicl e. The driver complied with the officer’s 8 commands, but Defendant, who was sitting in the rear passenger seat, stayed in the 9 vehicle and reached behind the seat. Du e to Defendant’s non-compliance with the 10 officer’s verbal commands, Detective Candelaria drew her weapon for her safety and 11 the other officer’s safety, out of concern that Defendant “was going for a firearm or 12 any kind of weapon.” Detec tive Candelaria had repeatedly told Defendant to show 13 his hands and to get out of the vehicle, but Defendant did not do so right away. 14 Defendant eventually put his hands out wh ere the officer could see them and exited 15 the vehicle. At this point, for safety reasons and for investigation purposes, because 16 he had not complied, the officer conducte d a patdown of Defendant, handcuffed him, 17 and had him sit on the ground. 184 While Defendant was sitting on the ground, the restaurant manager came out 1 of the restaurant and asked the female, w ho was wearing a shirt that identified her as 2 an employee of the restaurant , to change her shirt. De tective Candelaria walked the 3 female to the SUV where the female pulled a shirt out of a duffel bag. When the shirt 4 was pulled out of the bag, a plastic bag containing a white substance, as well as 5 numerous other little baggies, some of which also contained the white substance, fell 6 to the floor of the SUV. Detective Cande laria and the female individual looked at 7 each other, and Defendant yelled, “That’s mi ne. That’s all mine.” Defendant was 8 then read his Mirandarights, after which “he indicated that the substance that was 9 tangled up in the shirt was all his.” Th e white substance was identified by Defendant 10 as methamphetamine. 11 Defendant filed a motion to suppress th e methamphetamine, arguing that there 12 was no individualized suspicion that De fendant was involved in wrongdoing, and 13 therefore, he was subjected to unlawful dete ntion and seizure. Defendant also filed 14 a motion to suppress his pre -Mirandaadmissions, arguing that due to the unlawful 15 seizure, his statements should be suppresse d, that his first admission was made prior 16 to being Mirandized, and that his second admission was made too close in time to his 17
pre -Mirandaadmission. The district court issu ed an order denying both motions. The 18 district court found that the actions of the officers were justified, Defendant’s first 195 admission was voluntary and not a result of custodial interrogation, and although 1 Defendant’s standing to contest the seizure of the methamphetamine was 2 “questionable,” the methamphetamine was seized without a search when the drugs 3 were dropped in the presence of one of th e officers. Defendant entered into a 4 conditional plea and appealed the districtcourt’s judgment, sentence and order 5 partially suspending sentence. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Defendant raises two issu es on appeal: (1) whether the methamphetamine and 8 Defendant’s admissions should have been s uppressed as fruits of an unlawful stop and 9 arrest, and (2) whether Defendant’s admi ssions should have been suppressed based 10 on violation of Miranda . On appeal from a districtcourt’s ruling on a motion to 11 suppress, findings of fact are reviewed to determine if they are supported by 12 substantial evidence and legal conc lusions are reviewed de novo. See State v. Leyba , 13 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171. “We review the district court’s 14 ruling on a motion to suppress to determine whether the law was correctly applied to 15 the facts, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” State 16 v. Cline , 1998-NMCA-154, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785. 17 State Constitutional Claims 186 The State claims that Defendant failed to adequately preserve his claims under 1 the State Constitution. In both motions to suppress filed below, Defendant argued that 2 our State Constitution “provides an additional layer of protection to criminal 3 defendants than does the [F]ederal [C] onstitution.” In both motions, Defendant 4 argued that his detention was unlawful and referred to the facts to support his claim 5 and to various New Mexico cases discussi ng unlawful detention. Defendant stated 6 that he “preserves his claim[s] . . . under the [S]tate [C]onstitution” and cited to State 7 v. Gomez , 1997-NMSC-006, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. 8 In Gomez , our Supreme Court stated that “[w]here New Mexico courts have 9 taken a different path than federal courts, our precedent governs regardless of whether 10 a party cites specific cases in support of a c onstitutional principle, so long as the party 11 has asserted the principle recognized inthe cases and has developed the facts 12 adequately to give the opposing party an opportunity to respond and to give the court 13 an opportunity to rule.” Id. ¶ 30. While Defendant di d adequately develop the 14 relevant facts in this case, he did not assert any specific principle of state 15 constitutional law that might apply to this cas e. It is therefore questionable whether 16 Defendant adequately preserved his claims under our State Constitution. In any event, 17 we have reviewed the case law, and we do not believe the resu lt would be different 18 under either the New Mexico Constitution or the Federal Constitution. 197 Standing to Challenge Seizure of Drugs 1 Defendant argues that, as a result of an unlawful detention and arrest, the 2 officers engaged in “exploitation of that ille gality” or “created the situation” whereby 3 the female individual returned to the SUV and the drugs were di scovered. Defendant 4 claims that he has standing to challenge the seizure of the methamphetamine because 5 the seizure was a result of his own unlawful detention. 6 The methamphetamine was not discovere d in Defendant’s vehicle, on his 7 person, or in his personal effects. Instead, the drugs were found when they 8 inadvertently fell out of a bag belonging to a third person. Under these circumstances, 9 Defendant would not have standing to objectto the seizure of the drugs unless the 10 seizure of the drugs occurred because of police exploitation of Defendant’s own 11 unlawful detention. See State v. Sewell , 2009-NMSC-033, ¶ 16, 146 N.M. 428, 211 12 P.3d 885; State v. Hernandez , 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499. 13 In order to answer the question of whether Defendant had standi ng to challenge the 14 seizure of the drugs, we must determine first whether Defendant was unlawfully 15 stopped and detained, and s econd, whether the officers were exploiting unlawful 16 conduct with respect to Defendant in order to obtain the evidence. 17 Legality of Stop and Detention 188 In this case, the incident began as anencounter between several officers and 1 four individuals, including Defendant. Defe ndant challenges the legality of the stop 2 as to all of the individuals. In addition, Defendant claims that Detective Candelaria 3 acted unlawfully when she ordered him to show his hands and exit the vehicle, when 4 she drew her weapon while directing commands to Defendant, and when she 5 handcuffed Defendant and placed him on the ground after conducting a patdown 6 search for weapons. 7 The officers were conducting a saturation patrol, witnessed one of the 8 individuals drinking a beer, and approach ed the group. An officer may make an 9 investigatory stop if there exists reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable 10 facts and rational inferences, that the law has been or is being violated. State v. 11 Flores , 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 7, 122 N.M. 84, 920 P. 2d 1038. “In determining whether 12 reasonable suspicion exists, we examine the totality of the circumstances.” State v. 13 Cardenas-Alvarez , 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 21, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225. “This is a 14 fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” State v. Duran , 15 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. 16 We are aware that a seizure does not occur merely because officers approach 17 individuals and ask questions so long as the actions of the officers do not suggest that 18 the individuals are required to answ er the questions put to them. See id. ¶ 31. 199 However, the officers in this case did not simply approach and ask questions of the 1 group, and in fact, the officers did not pose individual questions to the person who had 2 been seen drinking the beer. Instead , immediately upon approaching the group, 3 Detective Candelaria told everyone to show their hands and exit the vehicle. 4 In a previous case decided by this Court, we discussed an encounter that, at the 5 outset, might have been characterized as a voluntary and consensual encounter, but 6 was transformed into a non-consensual enc ounter based on the officer’s primary goal 7 of investigating a criminal matter. See State v. Montaño , 2009-NMCA-130, ¶ 21, 147 8 N.M. 379, 223 P.3d 376. We held that any initial consensual encounter did not 9 surpass the officer’s actions taken for the purposes of conducting a criminal 10 investigation. Id. ¶ 22; see State v. Gutierrez , 2008-NMCA-015, ¶ 14, 143 N.M. 522, 11 177 P.3d 1096 (explaining that, despite the initial intention to merely ask a few 12 questions, the officer’s encounter with the defendant escalated into an investigatory 13 detention requiring as support an objective belief that reasonable suspicion existed 14 based on the totality of the circumstances and the information available to the officer). 15 Here, Detective Candelaria was suspic ious of the group because they were 16 “huddled behind the rear” door of the vehicle for some time, but she testified that the 17 officers approached the group in order to investigate the commission of a crime based 18 on their belief that a city ordinance was being violated. Detective Candelaria testified 1910 that, if they had not seen one individual drinking alcohol, they “probably would have 1 just kept on driving.” Clearly, the encounter was for the purpose of investigating the 2 possibility of a crime and simply does not fit within the guidelines for a consensual 3 or voluntary encounter. Therefore, in order to justify the stop in this case, the officers 4 must have had reasonable suspicion based on the circumstances and the information 5 known to the officers at the time of the stop. 6 Detective Candelaria testified that reasonable suspicion permitted the officers 7 to approach and conduct an investigation because drinking in public is illegal as a 8 violation of a city ordinance. The parties s tipulated at the suppression hearing that the 9 location of the stop was on privately owned property that was open to the public. The 10 ordinance relied on by the officer provides: 11 [Section] 12-4-8 DRINKING IN PUBLIC. 12 Drinking in public consists of drinking or consuming alcoholic 13 liquors (as the term is defined in Section 60-3A-3 NMSA 1978, as 14 amended): 15 (A) In any city-ownedpark, except a park in which drinking is 16 expressly permitted by resolution. 17 (B) (1) Inany public way, except a pub lic way within a city-owned 18 park in which drinking is e xpressly permitted by resolution. 19 (2) For purposes of this division (B), PUBLIC WAY is 20 defined as the entire width betweenthe property lines of every way 21 publicly maintained when any part th ereof is customarily open to the use 22 of the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes the street, 2311 sidewalk, and any other area between the curb lines or lateral lines of the 1 roadway and the adjacent property lines. 2 (C) In any city owned parking lot, except a parking lot in a 3 city-owned park in which drinking is expressly permitted by resolution. 4 (D) Within 100 feet of any establishment licensed to dispense 5 alcoholic liquors. 6 In the district court, De fendant argued that the male individual suspected of 7 drinking a beer had not committed a crime because he was in a privately owned 8 parking lot at the time the officers appro ached. Defendant argue d that the “police 9 misread” the ordinance, which applies only to public streets and public ways and not 10 to private property. In Defendant’s briefs , he continues to claim that the stop was 11 made on “undeniably private property,” and the officers approached the group based 12 on a mistake of law, which cannot be used as the basis for a lawful stop. The State, 13 on the other hand, contends the officers’ mistake was one of fact, not law, and 14 therefore does not affect the legality of the stop. 15 Our Supreme Court, in State v. Hubble , 2009-NMSC-014, 146 N.M. 70, 206 16 P.3d 579, discussed mistakes of law and fact in relation to reasonable suspicion. Id. 17 ¶¶ 21-25. The Court explained that a mistake of law is a “mistake about the legal 18 effect of a known fact or situation,” and a mistake of fact is a “mistake about a fact 19 that is material to a transaction; any mistake other than a mistake of law.” Id. ¶ 22 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court further recognized that a 2112 mistake of law, even a good faith and reasonable mistake cannot provide objective 1 grounds to support reasonable suspicion. Id. Detective Candelaria’s belief that one 2 individual was violating the ordinance ag ainst drinking in public was based on a 3 mistake of law. The officer testified rep eatedly that she had no idea “who owned” the 4 property, and she had no idea whether the property was privately or publicly owned 5 at the time the officers decided to appr oach the group. Significantly, she did not 6 testify that she thought the property might beowned by the city. In other words, the 7 officer was mistaken about the law in that she mistakenly believed that the individual 8 that was drinking alcohol was violating the city ordinance by drinking in public 9 regardless of whether the conduct was carried out on public or private property. 10 Because a mistake of law, even a reasonabl e or good faith mistake, does not provide 11 the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop, the belief that one individual was 12 violating a city ordinance did not provide justification for the stop. 13 We recognize that, even if a stop is ba sed on a mistake of law, the stop may still 14 be justified if facts articulated by the o fficer provide reasonable suspicion on another 15 basis. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. However, there are no facts articulated by the officers, other than 16 the belief that an or dinance was being violated, to support the stop in this case. In 17 sum, the officers’ approach cannot be characterized as a simple approach for 18 questioning, and Detective Candelaria’s mistake of law with respect to the city 1913 ordinance did not provide reasonable susp icion to approach the group based on the 1 observation that one individual was drinking alcohol. Therefore, the stop was 2 unlawful. 3 Detective Candelaria approached the vehicle and aske d that everyone, including 4 Defendant, show their hands and exit the vehicle. She tes tified that her actions were 5 out of concern for officer safety and that it was typical for her to make such requests. 6 Defendant did not comply with the officer’s requests, but instead “reached behind the 7 seat,” so that the officer was unable to see what Defendant wa s doing with his hand. 8 At that moment, the officer drew her gun and repeated her commands for Defendant 9 to show his hands and exit the vehicle. According to the officer’s testimony, 10 Defendant refused to comply for several minutes despite the fact that the officer had 11 drawn her gun and was pointing it at him. Defendant kept his arm behind the seat. 12 Ultimately, Defendant complied with the officer’s demands. 13 These facts give rise to a possible issu e as to whether, despite the illegality of 14 the initial stop, there was a sufficient break between that unlawful stop and the further 15 detention of Defendant, such that the detention was not tainted by the illegality of the 16 stop. Cf. State v. Neal , 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 34, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 17 (discussing the test for determining whether discovery of evidence as a result of 18 consent was sufficiently atte nuated from the prior illegal ac tion of police). However, 1914 the State did not make such an argument and, given our dispos ition of the case, we 1 need not address that issue. We therefore assume, for purposes of this opinion, that 2 the continued detention of Defendant, following the unlawful stop and continuing to 3 the point where Defendant was placed on th e ground, was unlawful. We now turn to 4 the question of whether the illegal detenti on of Defendant was exploited in order to 5 reveal the methamphetamine seized by the officers. 6 Exploitation of Illegality 7 The district court found that the baggies containing methamphetamine were not 8 discovered as a result of the continued detention of Defendant. According to 9 Defendant, the restaurant manager directed the female individual to cover her uniform 10 as a direct result of the “improper and unlawful” arrest of Defendant. Defendant 11 argues that the discovery of the methamphetamine “flowed” from the “exploitation” 12 of the illegal arrest. Defendant claims that all evidence obtained in this case, 13 including the drugs and Defendant’s statemen ts, must be suppressed as fruits of the 14 poisonous tree. 15 The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrin e requires suppression of all evidence 16 discovered as a direct resu lt of an illegal seizure. State v. Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, 17 ¶ 23, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine 18 prohibits evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest or dete ntion to be admitted, 1915 except in situations where there is a break in the chain be tween an unlawful arrest and 1 a subsequent discovery of evidence. State v. Hawkins , 1999-NMCA-126, ¶ 16, 128 2 N.M. 245, 991 P.2d 989 (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). In order to 3 determine whether there was sufficient attenuation between the illegality of the 4 detention and the discovery of the drugs in this case, we give consideration to certain 5 factors, including the presence of interveni ng circumstances and the flagrancy of the 6 official misconduct. See State v. Monteleone , 2005-NMCA-129, ¶ 17, 138 N.M. 544, 7 123 P.3d 777. 8 The independent source doctrine provides that not all evidence is categorized 9 as the “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but 10 for the illegal actions of the police.” State v. Wagoner , 2001-NMCA-014, ¶ 22, 130 11 N.M. 274, 24 P.3d 306 (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). Instead, even 12 if it is shown that officers engaged in a “p rimary illegality,” it must still be determined 13 whether disputed evidence was obtained through the “exploitation of that illegality” 14 or through other means that are “sufficientlydistinguishable” so as “to be purged of 15 the primary taint.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d) (relying on 16 Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)). 17 We agree with the district court’s conclu sion that the discovery of the drugs was 18 a result of a source independent of any illegality in police actions concerning 1916 Defendant. Here, the methamphetamine was discovered when the restaurant manager 1 directed the female individual to change her employee shirt. It is clear that the 2 manager’s request that the female indi vidual cover her unifo rm was sufficiently 3 distinguishable from any “primary illegality” involved in the stop or detention of 4 Defendant. The chain of events with re spect to Defendant involved an unlawful 5 detention and seizure, a patdown search for weapons, and a further detention when he 6 was placed on the ground in handcuffs. Onthe other hand, the chain of events 7 involving the female individual and leading to discovery of the drugs began when the 8 manager asked the female to change her shirt, continued when the female went to the 9 vehicle to retrieve a shirt from a duffel ba g inside the vehicle, and ended when the 10 female pulled her shirt out of the bag inadvertently causing the drugs to fall to the 11 floor of the vehicle. 12 Defendant points to no facts to support an argument or an inference that the 13 officer accompanied the female to the SUV for exploitation purposes. We are not 14 informed about why the officer followed th e female. It would be reasonable, under 15 the circumstances, that the officer could have been concerned about the female 16 obtaining a weapon from the vehicle. Nothi ng indicates that the officer was aware of 17 or anticipated that illegal contraband woul d be found in the SUV if the officer went 18 with the female to the vehicle. For that matter, nothing indicates that the female knew 1917 about the illegal contraband. There is simply no connection between the actions 1 concerning Defendant and the discovery of the drugs. See Monteleone , 2005-NMCA2 129, ¶ 17; cf. State v. Santiago , 2009-NMSC-045, ¶ 5, 147 N.M. 76, 217 P.3d 89 3 (noting that “courts have routinely held” that suppression of evidence is not required 4 in situations where a third party voluntarily provides evidence belonging to another, 5 and the direct or indirect involvement of the government in that transaction is minor 6 or nonexistent). 7 In addition, there exists no evidence of misconduct by the officers in conducting 8 the stop or placing Defendant on the ground in handcuffs. Cf. Monteleone , 2005- 9 NMCA-129, ¶ 19 (explaining that the natureof the police misconduct and the state of 10 vulnerability the defendant was placed in were an exploitation of the illegal entry and 11 holding that the defendant’s consent “was not obtained by means sufficiently 12 distinguishable as to be purged of the primary taint” (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted)). Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the officers exploited 14 the situation in this case by causing the femaleindividual to retrieve the shirt from her 15 bag located in the vehicle, which resulted inthe discovery of the drugs. The discovery 16 of the methamphetamine was completely accidental and not a result of an order, 17 request, or search by officers. In other words, the discovery of the drugs was not 18 tainted by any illegal conduct directedat Defendant by the officers. 1918 We hold that the district court wa s correct in determining that the 1 methamphetamine was discovered as a result of an independent source. We therefore 2 conclude that, because the drugs were notdiscovered as a result of actions toward 3 Defendant or as a result of exploitation by the officers, Defendant had no standing to 4 challenge the seizure of the evidence. See Hernandez , 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 17. 5 Defendant’s Admissions 6 Defendant claims that his pre and post- Mirandaadmissions should have been 7 suppressed. Defendant rais es his claims pursuant to State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 127, 8 428 P.2d 982 (1967), and State v. Boyer , 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1985). 9 Defendant was sitting on the ground in handc uffs when the methamphetamine fell to 10 the floor of the SUV as the female pulled her shirt from the duffel bag. When the 11 methamphetamine fell to the floor of the vehicle, Defendant ye lled, “That’s mine. 12 That’s all mine.” Defendant claims th at this statement was made “subject to 13 interrogation when he was in custody.” Contrary to Defendant’s claim, there is 14 nothing to indicate that the statement was made in response to any interrogation by 15 police. See State v. Greene , 91 N.M. 207, 214, 572 P.2d 935, 942 (1977). There is 16 nothing to suggest that the officers attempte d to elicit Defendant’s statement or that 17 his statement was in response to questioning by police. See State v. Fekete , 120 N.M. 1819 290, 300, 901 P.2d 708, 718 (1995). On the c ontrary, Defendant’s statement was not 1 the type of statement that the officers could have foreseen in this case. Id. 2 Defendant was subsequently provided with Mirandawarnings, and he stated 3 that he understood his rights. Defendant then admitted that the drugs belonged to him. 4 Defendant claims that there was no break in the causal chain before any purported 5 consent was obtained after the unlawful arrest, and therefore his second admission 6 should have been suppressed. However, Defendant does not sugge st that he did not 7 voluntarily waive his Mirandarights before giving his stat ement or that police coerced 8 him into giving the post- Mirandastatement. See Fekete , 120 N.M. at 301, 901 P.2d 9 at 719. The district court did not err inrefusing to suppress Defendant’s admissions. 10 CONCLUSION 11 We hold that the district court properly refused to suppress the 12 methamphetamine and Defendant ’s admissions. We affirm the judgment and sentence 13 in this case. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

__________________________________ 16 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 1720 WE CONCUR: 1

__________________________________ 2 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 3

__________________________________ 4 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 5