IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Vincent Kane, :

Appellant :

: No. 862 C.D. 2020

v. :

: Submitted: August 6, 2021

Edmond Pisani, Jr. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: May 24, 2022

Vincent Kane (Kane) appeals from the May 28, 2020 order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court), granting summary judgment in 

favor of Detective Edmond Pisani, Jr. (Detective Pisani) on Kane’s claim against him 

for intentional interference of contractual relations. Upon review, we affirm. 

Background

In an apt and able fashion, the trial court set forth the background and 

factual gist of this case as follows:

This case was initiated on March 5, 2019, when [Kane] 

filed the written complaint. The complaint in this matter 

related to a defendant’s right in a criminal proceeding to 

inspect, examine, and test evidence prior to trial [and] 

raised one count [against Detective Pisani]—tortious 

interference with contractual relations.
2

. . . .

[This matter concerns] an underlying criminal case against 

[Kane] in which [Detective Pisani] was the lead detective. 

[See Commonwealth v. Kane (Del. Cnty, CP-23-CR-702-

2017, filed April 20, 2018) (unreported), slip op. at 5-6, 23-

24 (Kane I), aff’d, 210 A.3d 324 (Pa. Super.) (Kane II), 

appeal denied, 218 A.3d 856 (Pa. 2019)]. It is integral to 

this case to note that [Detective Pisani] was hired as an

employee, and remains as such, by the Delaware County 

Office of the District Attorney in 2010 as a Criminal 

Investigation Detective [] and that he is also a certified 

Forensic Examiner. [Detective Pisani] was the Affiant for 

the Affidavit of Probable Cause for [the] arrest of [Kane].

On September 22, 2016, Villanova University Police turned 

over to the Delaware County Criminal Investigation 

Division (CID) a cell phone that had been found in a 

women’s restroom. [Detective Pisani] was the [d]etective 

assigned to this case and was the [d]etective responsible for 

conducting a forensic examination of the cellular telephone.

[Detective Pisani’s] investigation led to him identifying

[Kane] as the owner of the cellular telephone. [Detective 

Pisani], during his investigation of the cellular telephone 

and in his official capacity, discovered pornographic videos 

on the phone that [Kane] had secretly recorded at Villanova 

University and Cardinal O’Hara High school bathrooms. 

[Detective Pisani] was able to obtain a search warrant for 

external hard drives that were located at [Kane’s] home and,

subsequently, additional pornography was found on a

personal laptop and home computer that was owned or used 

by [Kane].

Based upon the investigation of the cellular telephone and 

the external hard drives, on October 26, 2016, [Detective 

Pisani] authored . . . the criminal complaint against [Kane].

On March 30, 2017, an offer was proffered to [Kane’s]

criminal attorney from the Delaware County [Assistant] 

District Attorney [(ADA)] prosecuting [Kane’s] criminal 

case, Christopher Boggs (ADA Boggs). In the offer, which 

was transmitted via email, ADA Boggs states:
3

All of the discovery is ready to be viewed in 

[the] CID. To view the discovery all you need 

to do is contact the detectives on the case and 

give them some dates that you are free to come 

in. Once they confirm with you a date, please 

let me know. I will make sure that when you 

come, there will be a packet with all of the 

discovery that does not contain contraband, 

that you may take with you that day. The 

forensic report with contraband and all the 

digital discovery with contraband must be 

viewed in [the] CID. I encourage you to bring 

an expert with you to review the materials. If 

you do, [he/she] must bring [his/her] own 

equipment to do [his/her] own examination.

[Kane’s] [c]ounsel was further advised that the contacts 

regarding viewing the discovery in [the] CID were 

[Detective Pisani] and his supervisor, Detective Ken Bellis

[(Detective Bellis)].

On September 11, 2017, computer forensic experts, Loehrs 

& Associates (Loehrs)[,] were retained to provide their 

expertise in the underlying criminal case. Loehrs was paid 

ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) to produce an expert 

report to use at [Kane’s] trial. A contract with Loehrs, 

which took the form of a letter engagement, was signed on 

September 11, 2017, by [Kane].

Loehrs was advised prior to arriving on location at [the] 

CID that [it] were required to use [the] CID computers on 

the days of analysis, as this was standard practice. Loehrs

was also advised that [its] request to have the evidence 

shipped to Arizona for review was denied. The request of 

Loehrs to have the evidence shipped was denied by

[Detective Pisani’s] supervisor[, Detective Bellis,] and not 

by [Detective Pisani] himself. [Detective Pisani’s]

supervisor also made the decision that Loehrs would be 

limited to four (4) hours a day investigation time. This was 

also brought to the attention of ADA Boggs.
4

Michelle Bush [Bush], who was the investigator Loehrs 

sent to [the CID], was not supervised by [Detective Pisani] 

in any way during her examination. [Detective Pisani] did 

not set up the computer that [] Bush used to conduct the

examination. [] Bush arrived at the CID, utilized the 

computers and equipment provided by [the] CID, []

conducted whatever examination she was able to 

accomplish in the hours set forth and established, and she 

did not return for further investigations.

On November 14, 2017, two weeks before the scheduled 

criminal trial date, [Kane’s] criminal attorney filed a 

Motion to Compel based upon the belief that the defense 

should have been able to bring [its] own computer to do the 

forensic examination and that [it] should not have been 

restricted to four (4) hours examination time a day. During 

the argument on [the motion], the criminal attorney for

[Kane] argued to the [] judge that he interpreted the email 

from ADA Boggs to mean that Loehrs could bring [its] own 

computer laptop with [its] forensic software already loaded 

on to it. [However, Kane’s counsel] did not confirm this

interpretation with ADA Boggs or [Detective Pisani]. 

[Detective Pisani] testified that, in his experience, all the 

defense experts were required to use the CID computer 

because child pornography is controlled contraband and 

there would be no way to ensure that [the] contraband did 

not leave the investigation room. [Kane’s counsel] also 

claimed that the CID equipment was antiquated and 

incompatible hardware. The defense for [Kane] produced a 

declaration from Loehrs examiner, Bush, to substantiate

[its] claim.

The Motion to Compel was heard by [a judge in the 

criminal division in the court of common pleas] on

November 20, 2017. The decision by the [c]riminal [c]ourt 

found that ADA Boggs had informed [Kane] in its March 

30th letter that an expert could come to [the] CID for the

examination, yet it was not until five and a half months later 

that Loehrs’ examiner[,] Bush[,] appeared. The [c]riminal 

[t]rial [j]udge also found that the expert had to use the 

computer provided by [the] CID and, that if [it] wanted to 

conduct further examination, [it] could do so before the 

scheduled trial date of November 28, 2017. [Ultimately, the 
5

criminal court denied Kane’s Motion to Compel. See 

Kane I, slip op. at 5-6, 23-241]. 

1

In relevant part, the criminal court explained that Kane had been granted two continuances 

while he hired, through the assistance of his father, two computer forensic experts. According to 

the criminal court, one expert resigned, and the record does not reflect what transpired with the 

other expert. Eventually, Kane secured the services of a third computer forensic expert, Loehrs. 

Kane’s counsel at that time then filed a motion to withdraw, which was later granted, and the

Motion to Compel, alleging “that the Commonwealth did not provide [Kane’s] chosen forensic 

expert, Loehrs [] of Tucson, Arizona[,] adequate time, access, and the specialized equipment it 

considered necessary to perform its analysis of the electric evidence.” Kane I, slip op. at 5. In the 

Motion to Compel, Kane’s counsel requested the criminal court “to compel the Commonwealth to 

create and provide mirror forensic copies of [Kane’s] cellphone, desktop computer, and external 

hard drive.” Id. In detailing the procedural history of the criminal case, the criminal court 

continued:

On September 12, 2017, a representative of Loehrs made 

arrangements to view the electronic evidence on October 3 & 4, 2017 

in the CID offices. Loehrs was advised that [it] would be allowed 

four hours of time each day to conduct [its] examination. A Loehrs 

representative replied that the time afforded would be inadequate and 

asked that the Commonwealth ship the evidence to a secure 

government facility in Arizona. Detective Pisani responded that this 

request would not be accommodated and that the original evidence 

would be available for viewing only at [the] CID offices. [] Bush, a 

Loehrs employee, arrived at the CID offices on October 3, 2017. In 

an affidavit attached to the [M]otion to [C]ompel, [] Bush attested that 

she was unable to complete her forensic analysis and claimed that this 

was due to the fact that she “had to install software drivers and 

applications needed for basic operation and essential functions of the 

examination . . . and specialized forensic tools and licensing for the 

purpose of conducting [her] forensic examination.” [] Bush described 

her difficulties in completing her task at great length and claimed that 

Detective Pisani had “unrestricted access to [her] work product for 

several hours.” To summarize, she complained that she was offered 

inadequate, unsophisticated equipment and inadequate time and 

access to complete her task. A hearing was convened on November 

20, 2017. The Court ruled that the evidence would be made available 

to [Kane’s] expert in the CID offices for immediate inspection. 

Loehrs could choose to use its own tools or to use the tools that were 

available in [the] CID. The trial date would not be continued.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

[Kane] was subsequently convicted of five counts of 

invasion of privacy, three counts of possession of child 

pornography, and two counts of criminal use of

communication facilities following his non-jury trial on 

 

(continued...)

Id. at 5-6.

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the criminal court determined that it did not err in denying 

Kane’s request for a continuance or the Motion to Compel, reasoning as follows:

[Kane’s] [M]otion to [C]ompel was scheduled for a hearing on 

November 20, 2017. At the November 20, 2017 hearing, the court 

considered [Kane’s] request for another continuance to allow time for 

Loehrs [] to complete its forensic analysis in Delaware County. 

When denying [Kane’s] request, the Court noted that the evidence in 

question was made available to the defense in March of 2017. Six 

months later a Loehrs analyst arrived in the CID offices to conduct 

her examination. Although the [ADA] advised in March that an 

expert would have to bring the equipment necessary to conduct its 

analysis[,] the Loehrs analyst arrived unprepared and then objected to 

having to use computer software that she considered antiquated. As 

the history of this case set forth above indicates, [Kane] apparently 

had difficulty finding and retaining an expert who would provide 

evidence that he considered satisfactory. [Kane’s] inability in this 

regard was not grounds for further delay of trial.

. . . . 

Similarly, the Court did not commit an abuse of discretion when it 

denied [Kane’s] [M]otion to [C]ompel discovery. The electronic 

evidence was available to [Kane]. The Commonwealth did not act in 

bad faith when, on the eve of trial it did not agree to ship the evidence 

to Arizona. [Kane’s] alternative request that the Commonwealth, at 

great expense, create and provide mirror forensic copies of [Kane’s]

cellphone, desktop computer, and external hard drive was 

unreasonable under the circumstances.

Id. at 24-25.
7

November 28, 2017, before [the criminal trial judge]. 

[Kane] was sentenced on February 16, 2018. That 

conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal on May 9, 

2019, in [Kane II], and the Supreme Court denied [Kane’s]

petition for allocatur. This Court notes that [Kane] failed to 

raise any issue related to the denial of the Motion to 

Compel that was argued before and ruled upon by [the]

[c]riminal [j]udge. The only issues raised in the direct 

appeal were related to the Motion to Suppress; therefore, 

[Kane] is bound by the decision of [the] [c]riminal [j]udge 

related to the issue of the denial of the Motion to Compel.

The case sub judice was filed on March 19, 2019, by [Kane] 

against [Detective Pisani]. In the civil complaint, [Kane]

alleges that [Detective Pisani] intentionally and unilaterally

provided [Kane’s] experts with equipment that was 

inadequate and antiquated and unduly restricted [the 

expert’s] examination to daily limits of four (4) hours. It is 

for [these reasons] that [Kane] claims [Detective Pisani]

tortuously interfered with his and Loehrs contractual 

relations. 

(Trial court op. at 2, 4-8.) 

After the complaint was filed, the case was scheduled to proceed to an 

arbitration hearing on December 4, 2019. On March 8, 2019, Detective Pisani filed a 

preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, which was overruled per an order 

of the arbitration panel. Thereafter, on September 12, 2019, Detective Pisani filed an 

answer and new matter, and Kane replied to the new matter on September 30, 2019. 

On October 11, 2019, Kane took the deposition testimony of Detective Pisani. Then, 

on November 19, 2019, Kane filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint, 

pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033, arguing that Detective Pisani could be held jointly and 

severally liable with his direct supervisor, Detective Bellis, and seeking to add the 

latter as a party-defendant. Kane also requested a continuance. On November 21, 

2019, an order was entered denying Kane’s request for leave to amend and, also, for a 

continuance. With regard to the former, the arbitration panel cited Delaware County 
8

Rule of Civil Procedure 1303(f), which provides that “[a]ll motions, with the 

exception of applications for continuance, must be filed no later than thirty (30) days 

before the hearing date.” Id. (Trial court op. at 3; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 

233a.)

On December 4, 2019, a panel of arbitrators heard the case, at the 

conclusion of which it found in favor of Detective Pisani. Kane then appealed the 

award of the arbitrators to the trial court. On January 31, 2020, the trial court entered 

a supplemental trial assignment and case management order. In due course, 

Detective Pisani filed a motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2020, asserting 

that Kane failed to state a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual 

relations as a matter of law; Kane’s cause of action was barred by the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel; and Detective Pisani was entitled to governmental and/or 

prosecutorial immunity. Kane filed an answer and response to the motion for 

summary judgment, arguing that genuine issues of material fact precluded the entry 

of summary judgment on the intentional interference with contractual relations claim. 

Kane further argued that Detective Pisani, by way of acting willfully and 

intentionally, and due to the nature of his employment, was not entitled to either 

prosecutorial or governmental immunity. Ultimately, by order dated May 28, 2020, 

the trial court granted Detective Pisani’s motion for summary judgment. (Trial court 

op. at 4.) 

Subsequently, Kane filed a notice of appeal,

2

and the trial court ordered 

Kane to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in accordance with 

2 Kane filed his notice of appeal with the Superior Court, which, by order dated July 10, 

2020, transferred the appeal to this Court. 
9

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Kane complied, and the trial court issued an opinion as required 

under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). (Trial court op. at 4.) 

In its opinion, the trial court determined there were no issues of material 

fact; Kane failed to state a claim as a matter of law; the issues presented by Kane

were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel by virtue of the criminal court’s 

ruling on the Motion to Compel; and, even if there were an issue of material fact, and 

Kane was not collaterally estopped from raising his claim, Detective Pisani was

entitled to prosecutorial immunity or governmental immunity under sections 8541 

and 8542 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§8541-8542, commonly referred to as the 

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act). (Trial court op. at 1-2, 19.) 

Throughout its opinion, the trial court stated that, in reviewing the record, “there 

[was] no evidence that [Detective Pisani] made any of the decisions personally that 

form the basis of the present civil claim . . . or [engaged in] any willful misconduct.” 

Id. at 19. 

Discussion

Before this Court,

3 Kane argues that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of Detective Pisani in violation of the “Nanty-Glo Rule,”4

determining that his claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, finding 

3

“This Court’s standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, and our 

scope of review is plenary. We apply the same standard for summary judgment as the trial court.” 

Gior GP, Inc. v. Waterfront Square Reef, LLC, 202 A.3d 845, 852 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) “A 

grant of summary judgment is only appropriate where the record clearly shows that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Id.

4 Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 163 A. 523 (Pa. 1932). 
10

that Detective Pisani was entitled to prosecutorial and/or governmental immunity, 

and failing to grant him leave to amend the complaint.

The Nanty-Glo Rule

Kane argues that the trial court erred in relying on the testimonial 

affidavits of ADA Boggs and Detective Bellis in determining that Detective Pisani 

could not be imputed with making any decisions regarding Loehrs’ ability to conduct 

a forensic examination. In this regard, Kane asserts that the trial court violated the 

“Nanty-Glo Rule.” 

“The ‘Nanty-Glo [R]ule’ essentially means that the testimonial affidavits 

or depositions of the moving party’s witnesses are insufficient by themselves to 

establish a material fact because the credibility of the testimony is still a matter for 

the jury.” Sanchez-Guardiola v. City of Philadelphia, 87 A.3d 934, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014). Nonetheless, “when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 

as provided in the rule, the adverse party may not rest only on the mere allegations or 

denials in his pleadings, but must set forth in his response by affidavits, or as 

otherwise provided, specific facts in dispute.” Id. at 938 (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted; emphasis omitted). As explained by our Superior Court:

Initially, it must be determined whether the plaintiff has 

alleged facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. If so, 

the second step is to determine whether there is any 

discrepancy as to any facts material to the case. Finally, it 

must be determined whether, in granting summary 

judgment, the trial court has usurped improperly the role of 

the [factfinder] by resolving any material issues of fact. It 

is only when the third stage is reached that NantyGlo comes into play. 
11

DeArmitt v. New York Life Insurance Co., 73 A.3d 578, 594-95 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal citation omitted; emphasis added).

Here, our review of the record and the trial court’s opinion reveals that 

the trial court did not rely solely on the affidavits of the moving party, Detective 

Pisani. Rather, the trial court, in notable part, relied upon the factual findings and 

conclusions of law made by the criminal court in connection with the Motion to 

Compel. More importantly, the trial court pointed out that Kane failed to adduce any 

evidence to support the inference that Detective Pisani was responsible for any of the 

decisions with regard to the procedures for forensic evidence testing at the CID

facility with which Kane takes issue. Ultimately, because the trial court concluded 

that Kane did not submit sufficient evidence to support a prima facie claim for 

intentional interference with contractual relations, we conclude that the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Detective Pisani did not run afoul of the 

Nanty-Glo Rule. 

Collateral Estoppel

Kane also argues that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel to bar his claim. According to Kane, the issues of fact and law that 

were decided by the criminal court in ruling on the Motion to Compel are not 

identical to the issues raised in his civil action claim for intentional interference with 

contractual relations and, thus, collateral estoppel is inapplicable. 

“The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue 

determined in a previous action.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 

A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 2005). Typically, in order for collateral estoppel to apply, “the issue 

decided in the prior case [must be] identical to the one presented in the later action.” 
12

Id. At the same time, however, it is beyond cavil that issues of fact and/or law that 

are decided in connection with a criminal conviction are conclusive, and a criminal 

defendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating them in a subsequent civil 

proceeding. See Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996). Therefore, to the 

extent Kane relies on the dichotomy between criminal and civil actions to argue that 

collateral estoppel cannot be used in this case, we reject that argument as meritless. 

Moreover, and succinctly put, to state a claim for intentional interference 

with contractual relations, a plaintiff must, among other things, establish that a 

defendant, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third 

person not to continue a business relation with another or specifically intends to harm 

the existing contractual relation. Glenn v. Point Park College, 272 A.2d 895, 897 

(Pa. 1971); Maverick Steel Co., L.L.C. v. Dick Corp./Barton Malow, 54 A.3d 353, 

354-55 (Pa. Super. 2012). Importantly, as an essential element of the tort, it is the 

plaintiff’s burden to prove “the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the 

defendant.” Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2016). In making such a determination, “[t]he issue in each case is whether the 

[defendant’s] conduct is justifiable under the circumstances.” Restatement (Second) 

of Torts §767, Comment b (American Law Institute 1979). 

Here, Detective Pisani’s deposition testimony, coupled with ADA 

Boggs’ email to Kane’s criminal attorney, established that the ADA and/or the CID 

had a reasonable and justifiable policy in confining all digital discovery with 

contraband, specifically pornographic images, to the CID facility. While Kane 

complains that the CID facility had inadequate computer infrastructure for Loehrs to 

complete its assessment of the data and/or images, and the timeframe that it was 

allotted was unduly restrictive, the criminal court already ruled on these exact same 
13

issues and determined that the Commonwealth, particularly Detective Pisani, acted in 

good faith and in accordance with the law. See supra note 1. Moreover, in deciding 

Kane’s Motion to Compel, the criminal court found that Kane unnecessarily delayed 

in conducting a computer forensic analysis, and that Loehr’s analyst was unprepared 

and had no legal basis to object to the condition of the computer software at the CID 

facility. 

Contrary to Kane’s assertion, the underlying issues presented to and 

resolved by the criminal court are legally identical to those currently at issue in this 

case for purposes of collateral estoppel, and the above findings by the criminal court 

are entitled to preclusive effect. See supra note 1. Notably, this case did not involve 

any misrepresentations, unlawful behavior, or active interference through persuasion, 

manipulation, and/or physical destruction on the part of Detective Pisani—or anyone 

else for that matter—that is typically associated with a finding of improper 

interference with contractual relations, as opposed to justifiable conduct. See

Restatement (Second) of Torts §767, Comment c. Therefore, because Kane failed to 

submit evidence sufficient to create a material issue of fact and demonstrate that

Detective Pisani’s conduct was not privileged and/or justified, and the trial court 

correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to determine that Detective 

Pisani’s conduct was, as a matter of fact and law, privileged and/or justified, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of 

Detective Pisani. 

Leave to Amend

Kane asserts that the arbitration panel erred in denying him leave to 

amend his complaint to add Detective Bellis as a party-defendant. Initially, we are
14

hesitant to uphold the panel’s ruling under Local Rule 1303(f), due to the broad 

liberality in granting leave to amend pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033. See Horowitz v. 

Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 580 A.2d 395, 398-400 (Pa. Super. 1990). In 

any event, on the record as it stands, the Court cannot find reversable error in denying 

Kane leave to amend because “an amendment is properly refused where it appears 

amendment [would be] futile.” Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194, 203 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007). Here, even if Detective Bellis was inserted into the case as a 

defendant, and could be held solely liable or share apportioned liability with 

Detective Pisani, Kane’s claim for intentional interference with contractual relations 

would still fail as a matter of law for the reasons set forth above. 

Prosecutorial and/or Governmental Immunity

As previously stated, we conclude that Kane’s claim for intentional 

interference with contractual relations fails as a matter of law, under the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel and, also, because Kane did not adduce sufficient evidence to 

support that claim. Consequently, this Court need not decide whether Detective 

Pisani was entitled to a form of immunity that could independently bar Kane’s claim 

for intentional interference with contractual relations. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court’s 

order. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Vincent Kane, :

Appellant :

: No. 862 C.D. 2020

v. :

:

Edmond Pisani, Jr. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2022, the May 28, 2020 order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County is hereby affirmed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge