FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF NEVADA,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION;

BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION; BAC HOME LOANS

SERVICING, LP; RECONSTRUCT

COMPANY, N.A.; COUNTRYWIDE

FINANCIAL CORPORATION;

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.;

FULL SPECTRUM LENDING, INC.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 12-15005

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00135-RCJWGC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 8, 2012

Pasadena, California

Filed

Before: REINHARDT, WARDLAW, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge WARDLAW:

FILED

MAR 02 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

The State of Nevada, through its Attorney General, Catherine Cortez Masto,

filed this parens patriae lawsuit against Bank of America Corporation and several

related entities (collectively, “Bank of America”) in Clark County District Court. 

Nevada alleges that Bank of America misled Nevada consumers about the terms

and operation of its home mortgage modification and foreclosure processes, in

violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat.

§§ 598.0903-.0999. Nevada also alleges that Bank of America violated an existing

consent judgment (“Consent Judgment”) in a prior case between Nevada and

several of Bank of America’s subsidiaries, entered in Clark County District Court. 

Bank of America removed this action to federal district court, asserting

federal subject matter jurisdiction as either a “class action” or “mass action” under

the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and as arising

under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Denying Nevada’s motion to remand, the

federal district court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this action as a CAFA

“class action,” but not as a “mass action,” and that it also has federal question

jurisdiction because resolving the state claims will require an interpretation of

federal law.

 We granted Nevada’s request for leave to appeal the district court’s denial of

its motion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). We conclude that
3

because parens patriae actions are not removable under CAFA, and the action

does not otherwise satisfy CAFA’s “mass action” requirements, the district court

lacks jurisdiction under CAFA. We also exercise our interlocutory appellate

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) to review the district court’s determination

that it has federal question jurisdiction because the complaint references the federal

Home Affordable Mortgage Program and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

We conclude that the district court lacks federal question jurisdiction. Because

there is no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, this case must be remanded

to Nevada state court.

I.

The Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) authorizes the Nevada

Attorney General to “bring an action in the name of the State of Nevada” against

any person whom the Attorney General “has reason to believe . . . has engaged or

is engaging in a deceptive trade practice.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0963(3). The

State of Nevada filed its amended complaint (“Complaint”) in the Clark County

District Court on January 19, 2011. The Complaint alleges that Bank of America

violated the DTPA by misleading Nevada consumers who sought modifications of

residential mortgages. It also alleges that Bank of America violated the terms of a

February 24, 2009, Consent Judgment between Nevada and several of the bank’s
The Home Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”), 12 U.S.C. § 5219a, is 1

a federal program whereby the United States government privately contracts with

banks to provide incentives to enter into residential mortgage modifications. “In

March 2009, the United States Department of Treasury announced the details of

the Home Affordable Modification Program as part of the Making Home

Affordable Program. Under HAMP, individual loan servicers voluntarily enter

into contracts with Fannie Mae, acting as the financial agent of the United States,

to perform loan modification services in exchange for certain financial incentives.” 

Newell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 27783, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2012).

4

subsidiaries. The Clark County District Court entered the Consent Judgment and

retains enforcement jurisdiction.

This action is based on complaints Nevada has reviewed and investigated

from more than 150 consumers, housing counselors and other industry sources. 

The Complaint alleges that Bank of America has engaged in a pattern of

misconduct in which it has and continues to:

a. Mislead consumers with false promises that it will act on their

modifications within a set period of time, but keeps them waiting for

months, and sometimes more than a year, beyond the promised term;

b. Mislead consumers with assurances that they will not be foreclosed

upon while the Bank considered their requests for modifications. 

However Bank of America has sold the homes of some Nevada

consumers and sent foreclosure notices to many more while their

requests for modifications were still pending;

c. Misrepresent to consumers that they must be delinquent on their

loans in order to qualify for assistance, even though neither Bank of

America’s proprietary programs nor the federal HAMP program

1

requires that homeowners have missed payments;
5

d. Mislead consumers with false promises that their initial, trial

modifications would be made permanent if and when they made the

required three payments on those plans, but then failed to convert

those modifications;

e. Tell consumers their modifications were denied for reasons that

were untrue, such as that: (i) the owner of the loan refused to allow the

modification when Bank of America had full authority to modify the

loan without the investor’s approval; (ii) the Bank had tried

unsuccessfully to reach the consumer, even though the consumer

repeatedly called the Bank; (iii) the loan was previously modified

when it was not; (iv) the borrower failed to make trial payments, when

they made all payments; and (v) the borrower was current on his or

her loan, when delinquency is not a condition of a modification;

f. Falsely notify consumers or credit reporting agencies that

consumers are in default when they are not;

g. Mislead consumers with offers of modification on one set of terms,

and then provide agreements with materially different terms, or

inform consumers that their modifications had been approved, but

then tell them that their requests were denied, often months before.

The Complaint also alleges that Bank of America is in contempt of the

Consent Judgment because of its failure to offer loan modifications to eligible

consumers and its practice of conducting foreclosures while consumers are being

considered for modifications. The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief, civil penalties, restitution for defrauded Nevada consumers, attorney’s fees

and the costs of investigation.
6

Bank of America removed the case to the United States District Court for the

District of Nevada on February 23, 2011, asserting three theories of federal

jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under CAFA, as both a “class action,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2)-(10), and a “mass action,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11); (2) federal

question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(b); and (3) bankruptcy jurisdiction,

28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 1452. On March 22, 2011, Nevada moved to remand the

case to state court.

The district court denied Nevada’s remand motion on July 5, 2011,

concluding that the case was a “class action” under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 

As an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court concluded that the

case presented a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court also

determined that the case did not satisfy CAFA’s “mass action” prong, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(11). On July 15, 2011, Nevada timely requested permission to appeal

the denial of the remand motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). We held the

petition for permission to appeal in abeyance pending disposition of Washington v.

Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2011), which presented the question

of whether a state Attorney General parens patriae action is a “class action” as

defined by CAFA, and then accepted the appeal on January 3, 2012.

II.
7

“Determinations regarding subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de

novo.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted). “We review the ‘construction, interpretation, or

applicability’ of CAFA de novo.” Chimei, 659 F.3d at 846-47 (quoting Bush v.

Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)). “We review de novo a

district court’s denial of a motion to remand to state court for lack of federal

subject matter jurisdiction.” Chapman, 651 F.3d at 1043 (citation omitted). 

Removal statutes are to be “strictly construed” against removal jurisdiction. 

Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (citation omitted).

III.

We first consider whether the district court correctly concluded that this case

was removable under CAFA. CAFA provides for the removal of class actions and

mass actions involving parties with minimal diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 

Under CAFA, a “class action” is defined as “any civil action filed under Rule 23 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial

procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons

as a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). A “mass action” is defined as “any

civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
8

proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve

common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).

A.

 Since the district court issued its order holding that this action is a CAFA

“class action,” we have held to the contrary. In Washington v. Chimei Innolux

Corp., we held that attorney general enforcement actions are not removable as

“class actions” under CAFA. 659 F.3d at 847. In Chimei, the attorneys general of

Washington and California brought parens patriae suits under their states’ antitrust

laws, alleging that a group of manufacturers and distributors engaged in a

conspiracy to fix the prices of certain liquid crystal display panels. Id. at 846. The

defendants removed the cases to federal court, arguing that “consumers were the

real parties in interest for the monetary relief claims, and that therefore the States’

parens patriae claims were disguised class actions removable under CAFA.” Id. 

We rejected this argument, noting that “[p]arens patriae suits lack the defining

attributes of true class actions. As such, they only ‘resemble’ class actions in the

sense that they are representative suits.” Id. at 850. See also LG Display Co., Ltd.

v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2011) (parens patriae suit not a “class

action” because the “case was brought by the Attorney General, not by a

representative of a class”); West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
9

646 F.3d 169, 174-76 (4th Cir. 2011) (West Virginia Attorney General’s parens

patriae action to enforce consumer protection statute not removable under CAFA

because state statute lacked the procedural requirements of Rule 23).

Our decision in Chimei, which Bank of America concedes controls our

decision as to whether this action is a CAFA class action, makes clear that it cannot

be so characterized. 

B.

Bank of America next argues that Nevada’s action is nevertheless removable

as a “mass action” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11). A mass action is defined as

“any civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are

proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve

common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over

those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the [$75,000] jurisdictional

amount requirement” set forth in § 1332(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).

The district court ruled that this action does not qualify as a “mass action”

under the “event or occurrence” exclusion in CAFA, which expressly provides that

the term “mass action” excludes any civil action in which “all of the claims in the

action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed,

and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
Nevada did not argue below for application of the “event or occurrence” 2

exclusion, and does not attempt to justify the district court’s conclusion on appeal.

10

§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). The district court reasoned that it lacked mass action

jurisdiction because “the claims all allegedly arise from activity in Nevada and all

injuries allegedly resulted in Nevada.” This was a misapplication of the “event or

occurrence” exclusion. 

The “event or occurrence” exclusion applies only where all claims arise

from a single event or occurrence. “[C]ourts have consistently construed the

‘event or occurrence’ language to apply only in cases involving a single event or

occurrence, such as an environmental accident, that gives rise to the claims of all

plaintiffs.” Lafalier v. Cinnabar Serv. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 1486900, at *4 (N.D.

Okla. Apr. 13, 2010). Moreover, the legislative history of CAFA supports this

interpretation, making clear that the exception was intended to apply “only to a

truly local single event with no substantial interstate effects” in order to “allow

cases involving environmental torts such as a chemical spill to remain in state court

if both the event and the injuries were truly local.” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 41

(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44. The Complaint in this case alleges

widespread fraud in thousands of borrower interactions, and thus this action does

not come within the “event or occurrence” exclusion. Therefore, we hold that the 2
11

“event or occurrence” exclusion, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III), does not

apply to this action. 

We have not yet had occasion to decide whether a state’s parens patriae

action is removable as a mass action. The two circuits that have addressed this

question, the Seventh and Fifth, have reached conflicting results. See Madigan,

665 F.3d at 772 (parens patriae suit not a mass action because the Attorney

General is the only plaintiff); Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536

F.3d 418, 429 (5th Cir. 2008) (state’s parens patriae antitrust action against

insurance companies qualifies as mass action because insurance policyholders are

the “real parties in interest”). 

In Madigan, the Illinois Attorney General filed an action in state court

against manufacturers of liquid crystal display panels for violations of the Illinois

Antitrust Act. 665 F.3d at 769. The complaint sought injunctive relief, civil

penalties, and treble statutory damages for the state as a purchaser and, as parens

patriae, for injured residents. Id. Concluding that the suit was not a mass action,

the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it did not involve “monetary relief claims of 100

or more persons . . . proposed to be tried jointly,” as required by CAFA, because

“only the Illinois Attorney General makes a claim for damages (among other

things), precisely as authorized by the IAA.” Id. at 772. The Seventh Circuit also
12

reasoned that a suit is not a “mass action” if “‘all of the claims in the action are

asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants

or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing

such action,’” quoting the statutory language of § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III). Id.

The Madigan defendants argued, like Bank of America here, that the court

should apply a “claim by claim” analysis to conclude that the action was “really” to

recover damages for the hundreds of persons who purchased the unlawfully priced

LCD panels and that those purchasers were the real parties in interest for the nonenforcement-related claims in the suit, thus satisfying the “mass action”

requirements. Id. at 772-73. The Seventh Circuit rejected this approach, instead

looking at the complaint as a whole, and concluding that the State was the real

party in interest. Id. at 774. It reasoned, “Whether a state is the real party in

interest in a suit ‘is a question to be determined from the essential nature and effect

of the proceeding.’” Id. at 773 (quoting Nuclear Eng’g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241,

250 (7th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In Caldwell, on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit adopted this “claim-byclaim” approach to identify the real party in interest in a parens patriae action

brought by the State of Louisiana. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 430. Louisiana filed an

antitrust suit in state court against several insurance companies, seeking to enforce
13

the Louisiana Monopolies Act and to recover treble damages, among other relief. 

Id. at 423. The Fifth Circuit dissected the claims to “conclude that as far as the

State’s request for treble damages is concerned, the policyholders are the real

parties in interest,” because the plain language of the Monopolies Act authorized

only injured individuals to recover for treble damages. Id. at 429. Louisiana’s

argument that it was the real party in interest was belied by the language in the

complaint, which sought recovery of “damages suffered by individual

policyholders.” Id. at 428 (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit also relied

upon the essential nature of an antitrust proceeding, reasoning that “given that the

purpose of antitrust treble damages provisions are to encourage private lawsuits by

aggrieved individuals for injuries to their business or property,” it had no reason to

believe that individual policyholders were not the real parties in interest. Id. at 430

(citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)).

As both sides agree, the characterization of this case as a “mass action” thus

turns on whether the State of Nevada or the hundred-plus consumers on whose

behalf it seeks restitution are the real party(ies) in interest. This determination

affects both CAFA’s numerosity requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), and

its minimal diversity requirement, § 1332(d)(2)(A), because defendants are not
14

citizens of Nevada and Nevada is not a citizen for purposes of diversity analysis,

Dyack v. N. Mariana Islands, 317 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Relying on our recent decision in Department of Fair Employment and

Housing v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 642 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2011), the district

court, though recognizing that “district courts are mainly in agreement that when a

state attorney general brings such a case, the fact that a discrete class of individuals

will receive restitution does not defeat the fact that the gravamen of the action is

protection of the public welfare,” nevertheless concluded that the individual

consumers are the real parties in interest for the restitution, declarative and

injunctive claims for relief.

In Lucent, we considered whether the district court had diversity jurisdiction

over an action filed by the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”) on behalf of a single aggrieved employee. Id. at 735. This question

turned on whether DFEH or the employee was the real party in interest, because if

the State had only the general interest it holds on behalf of all its citizens and their

welfare, it would not satisfy the “real party to the controversy requirement for the

purposes of defeating diversity” jurisdiction. Id. at 737. Though the statute at

issue, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12900 et seq., declares the State’s interest in protecting all persons from
15

employment discrimination, that governmental interest was too “general” to render

the State a real party in the controversy. Lucent, 642 F.3d at 738. Moreover, the

relief sought included reinstatement and payment of compensatory and punitive

damages to the aggrieved individual, who was also able to secure the equitable

relief sought by the State. Lucent, 642 F.3d at 739. Any relief that was unique to

DFEH was “tangential” to the relief sought for the employee, and thus could not

render DFEH a real party in interest. Id.

Our rationale for finding that the aggrieved individual was the real party in

interest in Lucent compels the conclusion that Nevada is the real party in interest

here. Unlike the California DFEH, which sued on behalf of a single aggrieved

employee, here, the Nevada Attorney General sued to protect the hundreds of

thousands of homeowners in the state allegedly deceived by Bank of America, as

well as those affected by the impact of Bank of America’s alleged frauds on

Nevada’s economy. In Lucent, we addressed whether there was a “substantial state

interest” separate and distinct from the relief sought on behalf of the individual;

there, the interests that were unique to the State were merely “tangential.” Id.

Furthermore, in Lucent we adopted the approach of looking at the case as a whole

to determine the real party in interest, rather than the claim-by-claim approach

adopted in Caldwell and advocated by Bank of America. Id. at 740 (quoting
16

Geeslin v. Merriman, 527 F.2d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1975), for the proposition that

“[t]he question as to whether or not the state is the real party in interest must be

determined by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding as it appears from

the entire record”). 

We therefore examine “the essential nature and effect of the proceeding as it

appears from the entire record,” Lucent, 642 F.3d at 740, and conclude that

Nevada—not the individual consumers—is the real party in interest in this

controversy. Nevada brought this suit pursuant to its statutory authority under the

DTPA because of its interest in protecting the integrity of mortgage loan servicing.

Unlike in Caldwell, there is no doubt that the Attorney General has statutory

authority to pursue such claims. Foreclosures work a widespread and devastating

injury not only to those borrowers who are defrauded, but also on other Nevada

residents and the Nevada economy as a whole. Nevada has been particularly hardhit by the current mortgage crisis, and has a specific, concrete interest in

eliminating any deceptive practices that may have contributed to its cause. Cf.

Lucent, 642 F.3d at 738 (state’s interest too “general” to render it a party in

interest). The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that from 2009 to 2012,

foreclosures on neighboring homes will result in lost home equity in nearly one

million homes across Nevada, amounting to total lost home equity of $54.5
Ctr. for Responsible Lending, The Cost of Bad Lending in Nevada (Aug. 3

2011), available at www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/toolsresources/factsheets/nevada.html. 

Debbie Bocian, et al., Lost Ground 2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending 4

and Foreclosures at Appendix 2 (Nov. 2011), available at

www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/lost-ground2011.html.

17

billion. The city of Las Vegas has the second highest foreclosure rate in the 3

nation. Considering the devastating effect of the foreclosure crisis on Nevada, it is 4

unsurprising that the Attorney General would exercise her statutory right to “bring

an action in the name of the State of Nevada” against any person whom she “has

reason to believe . . . has engaged or is engaging in a deceptive trade practice”

related to mortgage-financing. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0963(3). 

Nevada’s sovereign interest in protecting its citizens and economy from

deceptive mortgage practices is not diminished merely because it has tacked on a

claim for restitution. See, e.g., Madigan, 665 F.3d at 773-74 (parens patriae suit

not removable under CAFA despite claim for treble damages on behalf of harmed

residents). In Chimei, although we did not reach the issue of whether a claim for

restitution in a consumer protection action rendered the consumers the real parties

in interest, the district court had concluded that “the States of California and

Washington are the real parties in interest because both States have a sovereign
18

interest in the enforcement of their consumer protection and antitrust laws . . .

[and] in securing an honest marketplace and the economic well-being of their

citizens.” In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 560593, at *5

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011). Here, as in Chimei, the restitution that Nevada seeks,

“while on behalf of its consumers, would first be paid to the State and distributed

on an equitable basis.” Id. That individual consumers may also benefit from this

lawsuit does not “negate [Nevada’s] substantial interest[] in [this] case[].” Id. See

also City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“In this case, as in every case involving restitution, a successful result

for the governmental entities may well result in money being paid to private parties

. . . . However, the . . . restitution claims filed by the governmental entities in this

case are fundamentally law enforcement actions designed to protect the public.”)

Similarly, any award of restitution damages here would be paid directly to Nevada

and then distributed to individual consumers. See Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 598.0975(3)(b). 

In a virtually identical action brought by the Arizona Attorney General

against Bank of America, the District Court of Arizona also reasoned that the fact

“[t]hat some private parties may receive restitution does not negate the State’s

substantial interest or render the entire action removable.” Arizona ex rel. Horne v.
19

Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. CV-11-00131-FJM, 2011 WL 995963, at *3 (D. Ariz.

Mar. 21, 2011). As in the Arizona case, the State of Nevada is the real party in

interest because of its “interest in ‘protecting the integrity of the residential

mortgage loan business’ and preventing consumer fraud in loan modifications and

foreclosures.” Id. Moreover, “the State has an interest in the enforcement of its

own state court judgment and its consumer fraud laws.” Id.

The state’s strong and distinct interest in this litigation is further

strengthened by the other forms of relief it seeks. Unlike in Lucent, where the

interests that were unique to DFEH’s lawsuit were “tangential,” here Nevada seeks

substantial relief that is available to it alone. First, it seeks enforcement of the

Consent Judgment, which explicitly disclaims a private right of action. Second, it

seeks civil penalties under the DTPA, which are not available to individual

consumers. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0999(2). Third, it seeks injunctive relief,

with respect to which the State faces a much lower standard of proof than would be

required for a lawsuit brought by individual consumers. Under Nevada law, “[t]o

obtain injunctive relief in a statutory enforcement action [alleging a deceptive trade

practice], a state or government agency need only show . . . a reasonable likelihood

that the statute was violated.” Nevada ex rel. Office of the Att’y Gen. v. NOS

Commc’ns, Inc., 84 P.3d 1052, 1055 (Nev. 2004). A private party, on the other
Because we conclude that this case is not a mass action, we need not decide 5

whether it falls under the “general public” exception to mass action jurisdiction. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III) (providing that the term “mass action” does

not include any action in which “all of the claims in the action are asserted on

behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members

of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such

action”).

20

hand, would be required to satisfy the higher burden of demonstrating irreparable

harm and an inadequate legal remedy. Id. at 1054. Fourth, Nevada seeks to recoup

the costs of its substantial investigation into Bank of America’s practices.

The Complaint, read as a whole, demonstrates that Nevada is the real party

in interest in this action. Therefore, neither CAFA’s minimal diversity

requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), nor its numerosity requirement, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), is satisfied. The State of Nevada is the real party in interest,

so the action falls 99 persons short of a “mass action.”5

IV.

As an alternative basis for its exercise of jurisdiction over this action, the

district court held that it had federal question jurisdiction because resolution of the

State’s claims “necessarily requires the construction of federal law.” Although the

Complaint alleges purely state law claims, the district court concluded that it would

be required to construe HAMP to determine whether Bank of America

misrepresented what the HAMP program permits or requires. Bank of America
21

contends that our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction does not extend to review of

this jurisdictional basis. We disagree, and conclude that the district court lacks

federal question jurisdiction over this action.

A.

Under CAFA, “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a

district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State

court from which it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not

more than 10 days after entry of the order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). Section

1453(c) modifies 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which sets forth the general rule that “[a]n

order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not

reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Bank of America contends that § 1453(c)(1)

confers appellate jurisdiction limited to the CAFA issues in the district court’s

order, and that Nevada’s failure to also seek certification under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b) of the district court’s decision that it has federal question jurisdiction

precludes appellate review.

We have not previously addressed whether we possess appellate jurisdiction

over a non-CAFA issue decided in an order appealable under § 1453(c)(1),

although the question seems straightforward. The plain language of § 1453(c)(1)

confers jurisdiction over “an order of a district court granting or denying a motion
22

to remand a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). The Tenth Circuit recently

“concluded that it was ‘free to consider any potential error in the district court’s

decision, not just a mistake in application of the Class Action Fairness Act.’”

Coffey v. Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold, 581 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.

2009) (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 451-52 (7th

Cir. 2005)). We are also guided by the Supreme Court’s conclusion that an

appellate court’s interlocutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) permits it to

“address any issue fairly included within the certified order because it is the order

that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.” 

Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996). Moreover, it is well

established that “a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua

sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal.” Snell v.

Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Bank of America’s reliance on Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390 (7th

Cir. 2010), and Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 448 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2006), is

misplaced. In each of those appeals, the circuit courts reviewed orders by the

district courts that had remanded to state court cases removed under CAFA for

failure to satisfy CAFA’s removal requirements. On appeal, the Fifth and Seventh

Circuits affirmed the district courts’ remand orders, and determined that they
23

lacked jurisdiction to consider other jurisdictional bases for removal to federal

court because orders granting remand are generally non-reviewable under 28

U.S.C. § 1447(d). See Anderson, 610 F.3d at 394; Patterson, 448 F.3d at 742. 

Each circuit decision reasoned that it would be statutorily prohibited from

reviewing the non-CAFA issue if that had been the district court’s sole basis for

remand. See Anderson, 610 F.3d at 394 (“Typically, federal courts of appeal are

barred from reviewing district court orders remanding removed cases to state

court.”); Patterson, 448 F.3d at 742 (after concluding that CAFA is inapplicable,

“[a]ll that remains is an order equitably remanding these actions under § 1452(b),

which we cannot reach without contravening a plain statutory command”). 

Conversely, here, we review an order denying remand on both CAFA and federal

question grounds. There is no equivalent statutory constraint on our power to

exercise appellate jurisdiction over an order denying remand. See, e.g., Sheeran v.

Gen. Elec. Co., 593 F.2d 93, 97 (9th Cir. 1979). 

We therefore conclude that because § 1453(c)(1) permits appellate review of

remand orders “notwithstanding section 1447(d),” we have the discretion to

entertain the issue of whether another basis for federal jurisdiction exists that

would justify the district court’s denial of Nevada’s motion. Given the wellestablished principle that we may affirm the district court’s order on any ground
24

fairly presented in the record, Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 994

(9th Cir. 2009), we exercise our discretion to consider whether the district court

correctly concluded that it had federal question jurisdiction. See Coffey, 581 F.3d

at 1247 (“There is no language [in § 1453(c)(1)] limiting the court’s consideration

solely to the CAFA issues in the remand order.”). 

We reject Bank of America’s suggestion that, in these circumstances,

Nevada could only obtain interlocutory review of the issue of federal question

jurisdiction through the certification process as both impractical and contrary to the

purposes of CAFA. As the legislative history of CAFA demonstrates, the purpose

of § 1453(c) “‘is to develop a body of appellate law interpreting [CAFA] without

unduly delaying the litigation of class actions.’” Coffey, 581 F.3d at 1247 (quoting

S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 49, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 46) (alterations in

original). To secure expedited review, § 1453(c)(2) requires that once the appellate

court accepts the appeal of the order, it “shall complete all action on such appeal,

including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date on which such

appeal was filed . . . .” Section 1292(b) does not contain a similar time constraint

for review. Requiring compliance with the certification process for review of an

independent basis for the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction could delay the

litigation indefinitely, thus undermining the very purpose of CAFA. While the
25

CAFA issues would be resolved within 60 days, the district court and the parties

would remain in the dark as to whether they should proceed in state or federal

court. In enacting CAFA, Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.

B.

Declining to exercise our discretion to determine whether the district court

has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over this case would

result in wasted judicial resources where, as here, we conclude that there is no

federal question jurisdiction. 

The Supreme Court has never stated a “single, precise, all-embracing test for

jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse

parties.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314

(2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A state cause of action

invokes federal question jurisdiction only if it “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal

issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain

without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state

judicial responsibilities.” Id. This type of federal question jurisdiction applies to a

“special and small category” of cases, into which this case does not fall. Empire

Healthchoice Assurance v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006).
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Here, the Complaint raises exclusively state law claims. Nevada alleges that

Bank of America violated the DTPA and the Consent Judgment. The Complaint

does allege misrepresentations about the federal HAMP program and violations of

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. 

Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Bank of America “[m]isrepresent[ed] to

consumers that they must be delinquent on their loans in order to qualify for

assistance, even though neither Bank of America’s proprietary programs nor the

federal HAMP program requires that homeowners have missed payments.” The

Complaint also alleges that Bank of America’s misrepresentations to credit

agencies concerning consumers’ credit history “violate the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A) & (8), and, as a result, the Nevada

Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”

By so alleging, Nevada does not “necessarily raise a . . . substantial” issue of

federal law. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. The “mere presence of a federal issue in a

state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” 

Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). The federal

issues here are not “pivotal” to Nevada’s case. Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin.

Servs. Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). The gravamen of the Complaint

is that Bank of America violated Nevada’s DTPA through numerous
27

misrepresentations, some about the HAMP program, and some which also violate

the FDCPA. For example, Nevada alleges that Bank of America violated the

DTPA by: “promising to act upon requests for mortgage modifications within a

specific period of time” and then failing to do so; giving consumers “false

assurances that their homes would not be foreclosed while their requests for

modifications were pending”; providing “inaccurate and deceptive reasons for

denying . . . requests for modifications”; and “misrepresenting that consumers

[had] been approved for modifications.” “When a claim can be supported by

alternative and independent theories—one of which is a state law theory and one of

which is a federal law theory—federal question jurisdiction does not attach

because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim.” Rains v. Criterion

Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Nor does the Complaint’s reference to the FDCPA necessarily raise a

substantial issue of federal law. The Nevada DTPA includes a “borrowing”

provision, making it a violation of the DTPA to “[v]iolate[] a state or federal

statute or regulation relating to the sale or lease of goods or services.” Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 598.0923(3). California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 17200, contains a similar “borrowing” provision, and “California

district courts have held that mere references to federal law in UCL claims do not
28

convert the claim into a federal cause of action.” Guerra v. Carrington Mortg.

Servs. LLC, 2010 WL 2630278, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (citations omitted);

see also Garduno v. Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (D. Ariz.

2010). Bank of America concedes that the mere use of a federal statute as a

predicate for a state law cause of action does not necessarily transform that cause

of action into a federal claim, but asserts that this case is an exception to the

general rule because it poses substantial questions about the scope and applicability

of the FDCPA—specifically, whether the FDCPA applies at all to mortgage loan

servicers. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned against finding federal

question jurisdiction on the ground that a case presents a novel issue of federal

law: “We do not believe the question whether a particular claim arises under

federal law depends on the novelty of the federal issue.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at

817. Therefore, Nevada’s glancing reference to federal law is insufficient to confer

federal jurisdiction over Nevada’s state law claims.

Even where a state law claim does necessarily turn on a substantial and

disputed question of federal law, removal is subject to a “possible veto” where

exercising federal jurisdiction is not “consistent with congressional judgment about

the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the

application of § 1331.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. The exercise of federal
29

jurisdiction must not “disturb[] any congressionally approved balance of federal

and state judicial responsibilities.” Id. at 314. The Supreme Court has instructed

federal courts to approach 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “‘with an eye to practicality and

necessity.’” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.

Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20 (1983)). The Court has “consistently

emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about

federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial

power, and the federal system.” Id. 

Here, unlike in Grable, exercising federal question jurisdiction would have

more than a “microscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor.” Grable,

545 U.S. at 315. State courts frequently handle state-law consumer protection suits

that refer to or are predicated on standards set forth in federal statutes. Exercising

federal question jurisdiction over any state law claim that references a federal

consumer protection statute would “herald[] a potentially enormous shift of

traditionally state cases into federal courts.” Id. at 319. 

The Nevada Attorney General brought this parens patriae action in state

court to enforce its own state consumer protection laws. Nevada alleges only state

law causes of action, brought to protect Nevada residents. Under these

circumstances, the “claim of sovereign protection from removal arises in its most
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powerful form.” McGraw, 646 F.3d at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[C]onsiderations of comity make [federal courts] reluctant to snatch cases which a

State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it.” 

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21 n.22. Removing a state’s action from its own

courts must “serve[] an overriding federal interest.” McGraw, 646 F.3d at 178. 

Bank of America has not demonstrated that any “clear rule demands” removal, nor

that removal “serves an overriding federal interest.” Therefore, Nevada’s strong

sovereign interest in enforcing its state laws—and its state-law-created Consent

Judgment—in the courts of its own state weighs in favor of remand to its state

court system.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying

Nevada’s motion to remand. The district court is instructed to remand this case to

the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada.

REVERSED.
31

COUNSEL

Catherine Cortez Masto, Binu Palal, Jeffrey Segal, Office of the Nevada Attorney

General, Las Vegas, NV, Linda Singer, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,

Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant State of Nevada.

Matthew W. Close, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Leslie Bryan

Hart, John D. Tennert, Lionel Sawyer & Collins, Reno, NV, for DefendantsAppellees Bank of America Corporation et al.

Bernard A. Eskandari, Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, for

Amici Curiae State of California, State of Oregon, and State of Arizona.

Nina F. Simon, Center for Responsible Lending, Washington, DC, for Amici

Curiae Center for Responsible Lending, AARP, and Consumer Law Center.