IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0849

Filed August 5, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF E.A. and F.A.,

Minor Children,

T.D., Mother,

Appellant,

J.A., Father,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, William Owens, 

Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their respective parental 

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Sarah Wenke, Ottumwa, for appellant mother.

Ryan J. Mitchell of Orsborn, Mitchell, Goedken & Larson, P.C., Ottumwa, 

for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Mary B. Krafka, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal from the termination of their 

respective parental rights to their children, E.A. and F.A. Both argue termination 

is not in the children’s best interests, request additional time to work toward 

reunification, and argue the juvenile court should have established a guardianship 

instead of terminating their parental rights. We affirm.

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 

(Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights where there is 

clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Evidence 

is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the 

correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re T.S., 868 

N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 

(Iowa 2010)).

We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of parents’ 

rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We must determine: 

(1) whether grounds for termination have been established, (2) whether 

termination is in the children’s best interests, and (3) whether we should exercise 

any of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73. Finally, we 

consider any additional arguments raised by the parents.

Typically we begin by determining whether the State established statutory 

grounds authorizing termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2020). See 

id. But neither parent challenges the statutory grounds for termination established 

under subsection 232.116(1). So we need not address this step. See In re G.V., 

No. 20-0080, 2020 WL 1310261, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2020).
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Our next step requires us to consider the best interests of the children. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, 

to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the 

child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the 

child[ren].” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is wellsettled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved 

a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will 

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.

We find termination of both parents’ rights to be in the children’s best 

interests. Both parents struggle with substance abuse. Neither parent has a stable 

home. At the time of the termination hearing, the mother was staying with the 

paternal grandparents and the father was in jail on a parole violation and awaiting 

transfer to a halfway house. And neither parent has a job. Considering the 

parents’ history of instability as we look ahead, we think it unlikely either parent 

would be able to adequately meet the children’s needs in the future. See In re 

C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). And we recognize the children’s 

current foster placement is willing to adopt the children. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2)(b). Termination is a necessary step in the adoption process. See In 

re S.G., No. 19-1876, 2020 WL 2065946, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Next, we consider whether to apply a section 232.116(3) exception to 

termination. Section 232.116(3) exceptions are permissive, not mandatory. In re 

A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). And the burden of establishing 

a section 232.116(3) exception rests with the parent contesting termination. See

A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. Here, neither parent presents an argument as to why 
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we should apply an exception to preclude termination of their respective parental 

rights. So we decline to apply any section 232.116(3) exception to either parent.

Finally, we address the parents’ additional arguments. Both parents 

request additional time to work toward reunification. The juvenile court may defer 

termination for a period of six months if it is able to “enumerate the specific factors, 

conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the 

determination that the need for removal of the child[ren] from the child[ren]’s home 

will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.104(2)(b). But neither parent identifies a “specific” improvement that would 

occur within six months. See id. (emphasis added). Instead, both simply suggest 

they would make progress if given the opportunity. These generalized statements

do not provide a sufficient basis to grant additional time to work toward 

reunification.

We note the mother argues the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in 

appointment cancellations and modified visitations. Because this hampered her 

progress, she claims she should get more time to work toward reunification. We 

disagree. Life is unpredictable. Parents must adapt to unplanned situations and 

overcome unexpected challenges. We will not delay permanency for the children 

simply because of unexpected changes in services offered to the mother. 

Moreover, we note this case began in November 2018—over a year before the 

COVID-19 pandemic impacted services. Yet the mother made little progress 

during that time. This is not a parent whose hard work placed her on the threshold 

of reunification only to be thwarted by a once-in-a-lifetime event. This is a parent 
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who was given ample time to gain the skills necessary for reunification but simply 

failed to progress, pandemic or no pandemic.

The parents are not entitled to additional time to work toward reunification.

Finally, both parents argue the juvenile court should have established a 

guardianship rather than terminating their parental rights. But “a guardianship is 

not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477 

(quoting In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017)). By their very nature, 

guardianships can be modified or terminated. See id. at 477–478 (discussing the 

practical realities of guardianships). So placing the children in a guardianship 

would prevent the children from reaching much deserved permanency. And 

neither parent presents a compelling reason why this is an exceptional case 

warranting establishment of a guardianship instead of termination. We agree with 

the juvenile court that a “guardianship would not be an appropriate permanency 

option” in this case. 

The juvenile court was correct in terminating the mother’s and the father’s 

respective parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.