United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives

October 1994 MILITARY

READINESS

DOD Needs to Develop

a More Comprehensive

Measurement System

GAO/NSIAD-95-29

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-258015 

October 27, 1994

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Spence:

This report addresses your concerns that declining defense budgets are

increasing the potential for a return to the days of “hollow forces” that

prevailed during the 1970s. More specifically, you asked that we conduct a

review to determine (1) whether the definition and indicators of readiness

adequately reflect the many complex components that contribute to

overall military readiness and (2) whether there are current readiness

indicators that can predict positive or negative changes in readiness.

Background During the past several years, service chiefs and commanders in chief

(CINC) have expressed concerns about the effect on current and future

readiness of (1) the level of current military operations, (2) contingency

operations, (3) the shifting of funds to support these operations, and

(4) personnel turbulence. Related to these concerns is a question about

the ability of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) readiness reporting

system to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall readiness.

DOD’s current system for reporting readiness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) is the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). This system

measures the extent to which individual service units possess the required

resources and are trained to undertake their wartime missions. SORTS was

established to provide the current status of specific elements considered

essential to readiness assessments, that is, personnel and equipment on

hand, equipment condition, and the training of operating forces. SORTS’

elements of measure, “C” ratings that range from C-1 (best) to C-4 (worst),

are probably the most frequently cited indicator of readiness in the

military.

Results in Brief The DOD definition and indicators for measuring readiness provide

valuable information, but this information is limited and cannot signal an

impending change in readiness. Moreover, the SORTS system was never

intended to provide the comprehensive assessment of overall military

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

readiness that has become increasingly important in today’s national

security environment. For example, SORTS measures only individual service

readiness; there are no indicators currently available to measure joint

readiness.1

 Nor does SORTS address all the factors that JCS considers critical

to a comprehensive readiness assessment, such as operating tempo and

morale.

To supplement data reported in DOD’s system and facilitate readiness

assessments at the unit level, the military commands independently

monitor numerous additional indicators. These indicators are generally

not reported to higher command levels. We visited 39 military commands

and other DOD agencies and compiled a list of over 650 such indicators.

Discussions with military commanders in all four services and outside

defense experts revealed that many of these indicators are not only critical

to a comprehensive readiness assessment at the unit level but also have

some degree of predictive value. The indicators do require, however, some

further refinement to improve their usefulness.

DOD’s Current

Approach to

Measuring Readiness

Has Limitations

According to JCS and DOD officials, the definition and measures of

readiness that are currently available in SORTS are no longer adequate in

today’s national security environment. Specifically, SORTS does not

(1) address all the factors that JCS considers critical, (2) provide a warning

of impending decreases in readiness, and (3) provide data on joint

readiness. In addition, SORTS includes subjective assessments of training

proficiency.

Figure 1 shows those elements reported under SORTS and all the elements

that JCS believes would make up a more comprehensive assessment.

1

Joint readiness is the level of preparedness of combatant commands and joint task forces to integrate

ready combat and support units into an effective joint and combined operating force.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
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Figure 1: Factors Important to a

Comprehensive Readiness

Assessment

Information reported under SORTS is a snapshot in time and does not

predict impending changes. Units report readiness monthly or, for some

units, upon a change of status. These reports provide commanders and JCS

with status information only for that point in time. Commanders have

stated that in today’s environment of force reductions and increasing

commitments, there is a need for indicators that can predict readiness

changes.

Some elements of SORTS are not based on objective data. The C-rating for

training, for example, is based on a commander’s subjective assessment of

the number of additional training days the unit needs to reach a C-1 status.

This assessment may be based on any number of factors, including

completion of required or scheduled training or personal observation. In

the past, we have found that Army training assessments have not been

reliable. For example, in 1991 we reported that training readiness

assessments of active Army units may have been overstated.2

 We reported

that the information provided to higher commands and JCS was of limited

value because the assessments (1) were based on training conducted

2

Army Training: Evaluations of Units’ Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb. 15,

1991).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

primarily at home stations rather than on results of more realistic

exercises conducted at combat training centers and (2) may not have

adequately considered the effect that the loss of key personnel had on

proficiency.

Likewise, in our reviews pertaining to the Persian Gulf War, we noted that

readiness reports for Army support forces and National Guard combat

forces were often inflated or unreliable.3

 For example, in a

September 1991 report, we noted that when three Army National Guard

combat brigades were mobilized for Operation Desert Shield, their

commanders were reporting readiness at the C-2 and C-3 levels, which

meant that no more than 40 days of post-mobilization training would be

needed for the brigades to be fully combat ready. However, on the basis of

their independent assessment of the brigades’ proficiency, active Army

officials responsible for the brigades’ post-mobilization training developed

training plans calling for over three times the number of days that the

readiness reports stated were needed.

Finally, SORTS does not provide data with which commanders can

adequately assess joint readiness. There is no clear definition of areas of

joint readiness that incorporates all essential elements, such as individual

service unit readiness, the deployability of forces, or en route and theater

infrastructure support.4

The need for joint readiness information was demonstrated by the Persian

Gulf War and reaffirmed by contingency operations in Somalia and Bosnia.

Officials at four joint commands told us that SORTS, the primary source of

readiness data, was inadequate for assessing joint readiness. Although the

Joint Staff recently developed its first list of joint mission tasks, it has not

developed the training conditions for conducting joint exercises and

criteria for evaluating them. It may be several years before JCS completes

these efforts.

DOD Efforts to

Improve Readiness

Assessments

Recognizing the limitations of SORTS and the need for more reliable

readiness information, DOD and the services have initiated actions to

improve readiness assessments.

3

National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War

(GAO/NSIAD-91-263, Sept. 24, 1991) and Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing

Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).

4

Recently published findings of a DOD Defense Science Board task force support this.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

In June 1994 the Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force, which is

composed of retired general officers, issued its report to the Secretary of

Defense on how to maintain readiness. The Task Force identified major

shortcomings in assessing joint readiness and noted that while the services

have increased their commitment to joint and combined training since

Operation Desert Storm, such training requires greater emphasis. The Task

Force recommended improvements in the measurement of joint readiness,

stating that “real readiness must be measured by a unit’s ability to operate

as part of a joint or combined task force.”

More recently, DOD created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council to

evaluate and implement the recommendations of the Readiness Task

Force and to develop new ways to measure combat readiness. The

Council, whose membership includes high-level military and civilian

officials, is focusing on three main ways to improve readiness:

(1) developing better analytical tools for determining the relationship of

resources to readiness and predicting the potential impact of budget cuts

on readiness, (2) developing analytical tools for measuring joint readiness,

and (3) taking advantage of computer simulation to improve readiness,

especially joint readiness.

The Army implemented its Readiness Management System in June 1993.

This system allows the Army to project for 2 years the status of elements

reported under SORTS. The system integrates the reported SORTS data with

other databases that contain future resource acquisition and distribution

information. The Army can, for example, compare a unit’s reported

equipment shortages with planned acquisition and distribution schedules,

and the system can then forecast when those shortages will be alleviated

and the unit’s readiness posture improved.

In September 1993, the Air Force began to develop a computer model,

called ULTRA, to forecast readiness. ULTRA is intended to measure four

major elements: (1) the ability to deploy the right forces in a timely

manner to achieve national objectives; (2) the ability to sustain operations;

(3) the personnel end strength, quality, and training of people; and (4) the

availability of facilities. If successful, the system will allow the Air Force to

estimate the effect that various levels of funding have on readiness. The

project is still under development, and the Air Force estimates it will be

about 2 years before the system will provide credible, widely accepted

forecasts.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
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A More

Comprehensive

Assessment of

Readiness Is Possible

To supplement data currently reported in SORTS and facilitate readiness

assessments at the unit level, the military commands in all four services

independently monitor literally hundreds of additional indicators. These

indicators are generally not reported to higher command levels. Military

commanders and outside defense experts agreed that many of the

indicators are not only critical to a comprehensive readiness assessment at

the unit level but also have some degree of predictive value regarding

readiness changes within the services.

We compiled a list of over 650 indicators that 28 active and reserve service

commands were monitoring in addition to SORTS. To further refine these

indicators, we asked the commands to rate the indicators in three areas:

(1) the importance of the indicator for assessing readiness, (2) the degree

of value the indicator has as a predictor of readiness change, and (3) the

quality of the information the indicator provides.

Table 1 shows the readiness indicators that service officials told us were

either critical or important to a more comprehensive assessment of

readiness and that also have some predictive value. The indicators that are

shaded are those rated highest by at least one-half of the commands

visited.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

Table 1: Readiness Indicators Critical or Important to Predicting Readiness

1 Personnel deployability status

Total commands in study by service

Number of commands reporting indicators

5

Air


Force

6 10 7 28

Army Navy Marine


Corps

Total

Indicator Definition

Category/subcategory

Personnel

Data showing numbers of personnel by grade who are not


deployable due to medical or dental problems, personal


hardship, or lack of essential training

1 4 9 6 20

2 Projected personnel trends Comparisons of future personnel requirements with projected


personnel availability

10517

3 Crew manning Percentage of crews fully qualified, grades of crew members, and


experience of crew members

23005

4 Recruiting shortfalls Number of personnel recruited and placed in units compared to


recruiting goals

02002

5 Personnel stability Personnel turnover, attrition, and retention rates 0 4 4 5 13

6 Personnel tempo Numbers of personnel deployed to meet assigned missions or


unit taskings

02024

7 Borrowed manpower Number of personnel (1) performing duties at bases in the


continental United States that are not the same as required by


their assigned Military Occupational Specialty and (2) not


consistently training with their assigned units

03104

8 Crew turnover Percentage of crews by weapon system type where crew


members were transferred, replaced, or interchanged

02204

9 Personnel morale Subjective assessment based on indicators such as incidences of


article 15a, court martials, drug/alcohol abuse, spouse/child


abuse, reenlistment rates, unit climate assessments, days


deployed per individual, pay comparability, promotion rates, and


career advancement opportunities

0 3 5 3 11

10 Unit readiness and proficiency

Training

Inspections, evaluations, and exercises including Combat Training


Center rotations used to assess how well the unit is prepared to


perform its mission

3 5 6 5 19

11 Operational tempo Level of operational and training activity against specific


standards

4 6 4 4 18

a

a

a

b

Other

Personnel turbulence

Personnel strength

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

2 2 5 4 13

00044

11204

00022

00022

32038

3 1 7 0 11

01001

3 4 6 4 17

Logistics

14 Completion of required and


specialty training

Numbers and/or percentages of personnel completing required or


specialty training in a specific period

15 Commitments and deployments Number and types of missions/commitments that (1) require all or


part of a unit's resources or (2) do not provide an opportunity to


train in all essential unit tasks

16 Accidents Percentage of accidents in relation to standard measures, e.g.,


accidents per 100,000 flying hours

18 Equipment distribution Excess equipment made available by downsizing of the force


compared to shortages or old equipment requiring replacement

17 Deployed equipment Numbers and percentages of equipment that are pre-positioned or


deployed in relation to authorized equipment

20 Equipment availability Present and projected equipment availability rates

19 Not mission capable rate Percentages of not mission capable equipment due to supply,


maintenance, or both

21 Fully mission capable rate for


non-pacing equipment

Fully mission capable rates for equipment not reported in SORTS


but nevertheless necessary for mission accomplishment

22 Unit and intermediate


maintenance performance

Performance of unit level and intermediate maintenance activities


compared to established standards. Indicators include (1) number


of items in maintenance over a set number of days, (2) scheduling


effectiveness, and (3) average number of items processed

a

Total commands in study by service

Number of commands reporting indicators

5

Air


Force

6 10 7 28

Army Navy Marine


Corps

Total

Indicator Definition

Category/subcategory

Training (Continued)

12 Weapon systems proficiency Certifications, qualifications, and other indicators of individual


and crew proficiency in military operations and weapons


employment

3 5 7 1 16

13 Funding Current and projected funding available for operations, training,


and maintenance in units

2 3 7 3 15

a

Equipment fill

Equipment condition

Equipment maintenance

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

10023

03306

24 Depot maintenance


performance

Performance of depot level maintenance activities compared to


established standards. Indicators include (1) number of items in


maintenance over a set number of days, (2) scheduling


effectiveness, and (3) average number of items processed

23 Maintenance backlog The number and dollar value of maintenance actions that were not


accomplished when needed

25 Supply performance Performance of unit-level supply activities compared to established


standards, such as percent of requests filled from on hand stock or


cannibalizations per 100 flying hours to identify inventory trends


and needed items

32319

26 Availability of ammunition and


spares

On-hand assets compared with prescribed or authorized levels 01258

c

d

Total commands in study by service

Number of commands reporting indicators

5

Air


Force

6 10 7 28

Army Navy Marine


Corps

Total

Indicator Definition

Category/subcategory

Equipment maintenance (Continued)

Supply

aIndicators especially critical for the reserve components.

bData should also be maintained on individuals with Combat Training Center experience.

cReadiness Task Force commented that maintenance backlogs should be purged of irrelevant

items to make this a more useful indicator.

dReadiness Task Force commented that on-hand and programmed purchase of precision-guided

munitions should be specifically monitored.

We asked the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness to examine

the indicators presented in table 1. Task Force members agreed with the

commands’ ratings and said that the indicators are an excellent beginning

for developing a more comprehensive readiness measurement system. The

Task Force suggested four additional indicators: (1) the use of simulators

to improve individual and crew proficiency on weapon systems; (2) the

quality of recruits enlisted by the services; (3) equipment readiness based

on fully mission capable rates rather than on mission capable rates, which

permit a weapon system to be reported as mission capable even though it

cannot fully perform its mission; and (4) the extent to which

readiness-related information in DOD is automated. In commenting on a

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

draft of this report DOD pointed out that it is useful to know if a system

having a multimission capability can perform parts of the mission,

therefore, it believes that both fully mission capable and mission capable

rates are useful indicators. Also, DOD said that the extent to which

readiness-related information is automated is not an indicator of readiness

but that it might be helpful in obtaining an understanding of automation

requirements. We agree with DOD’s position on these two issues.

As table 1 shows, some indicators are supported more by commanders of

one service than by the others. For example, information on commitments

and deployments (Training, item 15) and deployed equipment (Logistics,

item 17) were assessed as critical by Marine Corps commanders because

of the manner in which its forces and equipment are deployed. They were

not listed as critical by any of the commands from the other services.

By examining a group or series of indicators, one may gain a broader

insight than is possible from a single indicator. To illustrate, changes in the

extent of borrowed manpower (Personnel, item 7) may be related to

proficiency on weapon systems (Training, item 12) or crew turnover

(Personnel, item 8). Also, table 1 identifies indicators that because of

restricted training time and opportunities are especially critical to the

reserve components.

Several of the indicators that commanders rated as critical to readiness

assessments relate to major readiness concerns recently expressed by

service chiefs and CINCs. For example, while in the midst of downsizing,

U.S. military forces are being called upon for operational

contingencies—delivering humanitarian aid in Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and

Somalia and enforcing “no-fly” zones in Bosnia and Iraq, to name just a

few. Unusually high operating tempos required for these contingencies

have exacerbated the turbulence inherent in a major downsizing of U.S.

forces. Several senior service leaders have raised concerns about the

impact of this situation on morale, retention, and the ability to maintain

readiness for traditional warfighting missions. Among the indicators

suggested by some of the command officials we interviewed were

personnel tempo, a measure of the frequency and number of personnel

deployed on assigned missions, and crew turnover, a measure of

personnel turnover within weapon system crews. Similarly, the services

report that they were required to shift funds from operations and

maintenance appropriations to support contingency operations, and,

according to officials of each of the services, some scheduled training

exercises were canceled and others were postponed. Several commanders

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

suggested readiness indicators related to operating tempo, funding levels,

and individual/unit proficiency.

Related to the feature of predictive capability is the ability to conduct

trend analyses based on the most important indicators. Assuming that

relevant data is available, the services can identify trends in the additional

indicators over time. However, no criteria are currently available to assess

the meaning of a trend in terms of its impact on readiness. During our

visits to the military commands, we noted an unevenness in the availability

of historical data, depending on the indicator being monitored. Also, the

commands reported that there is unevenness in the quality of the data

available for measurement. While some indicators were rated high in

importance, they were rated low in quality.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a more comprehensive

readiness measurement system to be used DOD-wide. We recommend that

as part of this effort, the Under Secretary

• review the indicators we have identified as being critical to predicting

readiness and select the specific indicators most relevant to a more

comprehensive readiness assessment,

• develop criteria to evaluate the selected indicators and prescribe how

often the indicators should be reported to supplement SORTS data, and

• ensure that comparable data is maintained by all services to allow the

development of trends in the selected indicators.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of our report, DOD generally agreed with

our findings and recommendation (see app. I). The Department said that it

plans to address the issue of using readiness indicators not only to

monitor force readiness but also to predict force readiness. In response to

our recommendation, DOD said that it is developing a specification for a

readiness prediction system and that it has already used the indicators

presented in our report as input to that process.

DOD did not agree with our assessment of the overall value of SORTS

information and the reliability of training ratings contained in SORTS. First,

DOD said that it did not agree that SORTS information provided to higher

commands and JCS is of limited value. We agree that SORTS provides

valuable information on readiness. Nevertheless, the system does have

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

several limitations. The matters discussed in the report are not intended as

criticisms of SORTS but rather as examples of limitations that are inherent

in the system. For example, C-ratings represent a valuable snapshot of

readiness in time but by design they do not address long-term readiness or

signal impending changes in the status of resources. Second, DOD said that

it did not agree that SORTS may not adequately consider the effect that the

loss of key personnel has on proficiency. DOD may have misinterpreted our

position on this issue. Although SORTS recognizes the loss of key personnel,

it does not always consider the impact of replacing key personnel with

less experienced personnel. Lastly, DOD cited a number of factors that it

believes make it infeasible to base training readiness on the results of

combat training center exercises. This report does not propose that DOD

take this course of action. Reference to the fact that training readiness is

based primarily on training conducted at home stations rather than on

results of more realistic exercises conducted at combat training centers is

intended only to illustrate how the reliability of SORTS training information

can be effected.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the adequacy of the current definition and indicators of

readiness, we examined military service and JCS regulations, reviewed the

literature, and interviewed officials from 39 DOD agencies, including active

and reserve service commands, defense civilian agencies, unified

commands, and the Joint Staff (see app. II). To identify indicators that are

being monitored to supplement SORTS data, we asked the 39 agencies to

identify all the indicators they use to assess readiness and operational

effectiveness.5

 After compiling and categorizing the indicators by type,

that is, personnel, training, and logistics, we asked the commands to rate

the indicators’ significance, predictive value, and quality. Indicator

significance was rated as either critical, important, or supplementary. The

commands’ opinions of predictive value were provided on a five-point

scale ranging from little or none to very great. The quality of the indicator

was rated on a three-point scale—low, medium, and high.

We asked the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Readiness to

(1) review and comment on the indicators that the commands rated the

highest in terms of their importance and predictive value and (2) identify

additional indicators that, in their judgment, were also critical to a

comprehensive readiness assessment.

5

Of the 39 DOD agencies, 28 monitored additional readiness indicators.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
B-258015 

We conducted our review from May 1993 to June 1994 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce this report’s

contents earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from its issue

date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the Senate and

House Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations; the

Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Defense Infrastructure, Senate

Armed Services Committee; and the Subcommittee on Readiness, House

Armed Services Committee; and to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army,

the Navy, and the Air Force. Copies will also be made available to others

on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

16

Appendix II 

Locations Visited

22

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

26

Figures Figure 1: Factors Important to a Comprehensive Readiness

Assessment

3

Table 1: Readiness Indicators Critical or Important to Predicting

Readiness

7

Abbreviations

CINC commanders in chief

DOD Department of Defense

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 1.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2-4.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-6.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-11.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 11.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Locations Visited

Army Secretary of the Army

Washington, D.C.

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Fort Carson, Colorado

18th Airborne Corps

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

24th Infantry Division

Fort Stewart, Georgia

Corps Support Command

18th Airborne Corps

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Headquarters, Forces Command

Fort McPherson, Georgia

Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

National Guard Bureau

Washington, D.C.

U.S. Army Reserve Command

Atlanta, Georgia

Navy Secretary of the Navy

Washington, D.C.

Carrier Air Wing Three

Norfolk, Virginia

Destroyer Squadron Two

Norfolk, Virginia

Naval Air Force

U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, Virginia

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Locations Visited

Naval Air Reserve Force

New Orleans, Louisiana

Naval Reserve Force

New Orleans, Louisiana

Naval Surface Force

U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, Virginia

Naval Surface Reserve Force

New Orleans, Louisiana

Submarine Force

U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, Virginia

Submarine Squadron Eight

Norfolk, Virginia

U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, Virginia

Air Force Secretary of the Air Force

Washington, D.C.

1st Tactical Fighter Wing

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

375th Air Wing

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Air Combat Command

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

Air Force Reserve

Washington, D.C.

Air Mobility Command

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Locations Visited

Marine Corps Office of the Inspector General

Washington, D.C.

Headquarters, Marine Forces Atlantic

Norfolk, Virginia

Marine Reserve Force

Fleet Marine Force

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

New Orleans, Louisiana

Second Force Service Support Group

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Second Marine Air Wing

Marine Corps Air Station

Cherry Point, North Carolina

Second Marine Division

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Second Marine Expeditionary Force

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Second Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Unified Commands Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Commander in Chief, Central Command

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

Camp Smith, Hawaii

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix II 

Locations Visited

Other Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, D.C.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Norman J. Rabkin, Associate Director

Charles J. Bonanno, Jr., Assistant Director

Norfolk Regional

Office

Ray S. Carroll, Jr., Evaluator-in-Charge

James E. Lewis, Evaluator (Data Analyst)

James K. Mahaffey, Site Senior

Robert C. Mandigo, Jr., Site Senior

Jeffrey C. McDowell, Evaluator

Jeffrey L. Overton, Jr., Site Senior

Susan J. Schildkret, Evaluator

Lester L. Ward, Site Senior

(703014) Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-29 Military Readiness
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