This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 GEORGE R. SCHWARTZ, M.D., 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 31,303 4 NEW MEXICO MEDICAL BOARD, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 7 Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge 8 George R. Schwartz, M.D. 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Pro Se Appellant 11 Brennan & Sullivan, P.A. 12 James P. Sullivan 13 Frank D. Weissbarth 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VANZI, Judge. 182 Plaintiff George Schwartz appeals th e district court’s grant of summary 1 judgment in favor of Defendant New Mexico Medical Board (Board). We affirm. 2

BACKGROUND 3 The undisputed facts in this case are as follows. In July 2005, the Board issued 4 a notice of contemplated action (NCA) agains t Schwartz stating that it had sufficient 5 evidence to restrict, revoke, or suspend hi s medical license. The NCA alleged that 6 Schwartz had failed to maintain adequate medical records for at least 55 patients, that 7 he had obtained and could not account for over 1,000 dos es of controlled substances, 8 and that he was not justified in prescribi ng large amounts of controlled substances for 9 certain patients. 10 A hearing was scheduled in mid-December that the Hearing Officer continued 11 at Schwartz’s request on the condition that Schwartz agree to cease prescribing all 12 Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 drugs until the Board reached a final decision. At the 13 subsequent public hearing on January 26, 2006, the Hearing Officer allowed the Board 14 to amend the NCA to add allegations thatSchwartz had continued to prescribe 15 Schedule 2 drugs during the period of the continuance, which he later admitted to 16 doing. On March 31, 2006, the Board entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, 17 and order (Decision) revoking Schwartz’s li cense to practice medicine. Schwartz 183 appealed the Decision to the district court. The district court reversed the Board and 1 found that it should have gran ted Schwartz additional continuances to retain counsel 2 and remanded the matter for a new hearing. 3 After the case was remanded, but befo re a new hearing took place, Schwartz 4 retained attorney Steve Aarons. Aarons and the Board’s prosecutor negotiated an 5 Agreed Order (Order) that Schwartz signe d and the Board approved. The Order noted 6 that the Board had entere d a Decision revoking Schwartz’s license to practice 7 medicine and that, on appeal to the district court, the Decision was set aside as 8 arbitrary and capricious, and remanded for another hearing where Schwartz would be 9 afforded a fair opportunity to be represen ted by counsel. The Order also provided that 10 Schwartz, after consulting with Aarons , agreed “to surrender [his] New Mexico 11 license to practice medicine, and not to prac tice medicine or seek an active license to 12 practice medicine anywhere inthe United States, now or in the future[.]” Finally, 13 Schwartz stated that he understood that th e Order would be reported to the National 14 Practitioner Data Bank and the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank. 15 It is the Board’s usual and customary practice to allow the public access to 16 NCAs, orders, and decisions through links on its website. Consistent with this 17 practice, documents relating to Schwartz ’s licensing issues were available for 18 inspection through the website within 24 to 48 hours after the documents were filed. 194 They include the NCA, Decision, various di strict court orders including the order 1 reversing the Decision, and the Order. It is the posting of these documents that is the 2 basis of the current lawsuit and app eal. That history is as follows. 3 On July 1, 2009, Schwartz filed a complaint in district court alleging claims for 4 defamation and breach of contract arising out of the Order. The Board filed a motion 5 to dismiss on the defamation claim and a motion for summary judgment on the 6 contract claim. The district court grante d the motion to dismiss but found that there 7 was an issue of fact that precluded summaryjudgment on the breach of contract claim. 8 Schwartz subsequently filed an amended complaint for breach of contract alleging that 9 the breach resulted from the Board’s publication of “damaging defamatory 10 communications regarding Dr. Schwartz on the internet.” 11 After discovery, the Board again moved for summary judgment. The district 12 court held a hearing on the matter and, after requesting additional factual information 13 from the Board—which Schwartz had an oppo rtunity to respond to—the court granted 14 the Board’s motion. Schwartz filed a moti on for reconsideration that was denied by 15 written order. This appeal followed. 16 DISCUSSION 17 Standard of Review 185 “Summary judgment is appropriate wh ere there are no genuine issues of 1 material fact and the movant is en titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United 2 Parcel Serv., Inc. , 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “An appeal 3 from the grant of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law and is 4 reviewed de novo.” Montgomery v. Lomos Altos, Inc. , 2007-NMSC-002, ¶ 16, 141 5 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971. “All reasonable infere nces are construed in favor of the non6 moving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 Before we turn to the issues in this case, we note that Schwartz’s brief in chief 8 fails, in large measure, to conform to th e New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure. 9 The brief fails to cite the record, and itfails to present th e evidence as a whole. 10 “Although pro se pleadings are viewed with tolerance, a pro se litigant, having chosen 11 to represent himself, is held to the same standard of conduct and compliance with 12 court rules, procedures, and orders as are members of the bar.” Newsome v. Farer , 13 103 N.M. 415, 419, 708 P.2d 327, 331 (1985) (emphasis and citation omitted). Thus, 14 in order to properly support a challenge to the district court’s grant of summary 15 judgment, the argument section of the brief in chief must include “citations to 16 authorities, record proper, transcript of proceedings or exhibits relied on.” Rule 12- 17 213(A)(4) NMRA. This Court has no dutyto review an argument that is not 18 adequately developed. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 196 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to entert ain a cursory argument that relied on 1 several factual assertions that were made without citation to th e record). Further, 2 where a party fails to cite any portion of th e record to support its factual allegations, 3 we need not consider its argument on appeal. Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil 4 Conservation Comm’n , 114 N.M. 103, 108, 835 P.2d 819, 824 (1992). 5 Although the deficiencies in Schwartz’s brief make it difficult to address many 6 of his assertions, we consider his argumen ts where we can. Schwartz raises four 7 issues on appeal. He asserts that (1) th e posting of the NCA, orders, and other papers 8 on the Board’s website violates the Order, and they are not public records subject to 9 inspection; (2) the law of the case doctrin e precluded the district court from granting 10 summary judgment; (3) the settlement is illegal and arose from fraud in the 11 inducement; and (4) the Order is not supported by consideration. We address each 12 argument in turn. 13 The Order Does Not Require the Board toRefrain From Making the Documents 14 Public and Doing So Would Violate IPRA 15 Although not entirely clear, Schwartz app ears to be arguing that the Order he 16 entered into with the Board contemplated that none of the documents from the 17 proceedings against him would be made available to the public, that agreeing to do so 18 does not violate the New Mexico Inspec tion of Public Records Act (IPRA), NMSA 19 1978, §§ 14-2-1 to -12 (1947, as amended through 2011), and that publication of the 207 documents itself is a violation of IPRA. We agree with the district court that nothing 1 in the Order prohibits the Board from maki ng the documents public and that the Board 2 cannot agree to violate IPRA. 3 To the extent that Schwartz contends th at the Order provides that the Board will 4 not publish the documents relating to his licensing case on its website, we see nothing 5 in the Order that supports this assertion. Schwartz’s own attorney agreed that there 6 is “nothing in that Order that says the Bo ard is prevented from publicizing information 7 about [Schwartz.]” Further, Schwartz does not direct us to any place in the Order that 8 either supports his contention that records relating to the matter of his license will not 9 be available to the public, no r does he point to any place in the record that raises an 10 issue of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment. 11 We note that the Board’s March 31, 2006 Decision specifically stated that the 12 documents created in the action were a public record pursuant to IPRA. Schwartz 13 took no action against the Board for this assertion, never asked th at it be addressed in 14 the Order, and never requested that the administrative record s be sealed during or after 15 the hearings before the Board. We further note that the documents at issue were part 16 of the record in the prior litigation and are part of the record inthe case currently on 17 appeal. We have found nothing in the recordsuggesting that Schwartz requested any 18 court proceedings or documents in this matter or the prior litigation be sealed, and the 198 documents are therefore currently available for public inspection. See Rule LR1- 1 208(A) NMRA (noting that the policy of the First Judicial District is to allow free 2 public access to official court file s for each case docketed and filed); see also Rule 3 LR1-208(B) (“No court file, except those matters required by law to remain 4 confidential, shall be ordere d sealed from public inspecti on, except in extraordinary 5 cases to be determined by the court[.]”) ; Rule 1-079(A) NMRA (“Court records are 6 subject to public access unless sealed by order of the court or otherwise protected 7 from disclosure under the provisions of this rule.”). There is simply no basis for 8 Schwartz’s contention that the Board agreed not to publish the documents relating to 9 his licensing case, particularly whenthe documents were—and continue to 10 be—available for public inspection through av enues other than the Board’s website. 11 We are also not persuade d by Schwartz’s argument that the pleadings and 12 orders filed in the Board’s licensing proceeding are confidential under the Medical 13 Practice Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 61- 6-1 to -35 (1923, as amended through 14 2011), and that, as a result, the documents relating to his case should not have been 15 made available for public inspection on the Board’s website. Whether documents 16 filed in a licensing case are public records subject to disclosure is a question of 17 statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review 189 de novo. See Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria , 1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5, 124 1 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066. 2 IPRA provides that “[e]very person has a right to inspect public records of this 3 state.” Section 14-2-1(A). Consistent w ith IPRA’s policy that the public is entitled 4 to the greatest possible information, the Board has adopted regulations that provide 5 that certain records, including licensing in formation and disciplinary actions taken by 6 the Board, will be available to the pub lic on the internet. 16.10.1.9(C) NMAC 7 (7/15/2001). In fact, like the Board, every professional licensing board that operates 8 under the Uniform Licensing Act treats notices of contemplated action, motions and 9 other pleadings, and board decisions as publicrecords. Schwartz did not dispute this 10 fact below and does not dispute it on appeal. 11 Instead, Schwartz’s argument is premisedon Section 61-6-34(B) of the Act that 12 provides that “[a]ll written and oral communications made by any person to the board 13 relating to actual and potential discip linary action shall be confidential 14 communications and are not public records fo r the purposes of [IPRA].” The Board’s 15 regulations similarly state that complain ts, investigative reports, and legal opinions 16 are confidential and shall not be disclosed. 16.10.1.9(D) NMAC. In this case, the 17 Board posted a series of documents, includi ng the Order, the NC A, and the two orders 18 related to the NCA on its website. In keep ing with confidentiality provisions of the 1910 Act and its own regulations, our review of the record establishes that the Board never 1 made any complaints or communications relating to potential disciplinary actions 2 regarding Schwartz accessible on its website . We therefore conclude that the 3 documents relating to Schwartz, and whic h were posted on the Board’s website, were 4 public records subject to public inspection. The district court properly granted 5 summary judgment in favor of the Board. 6 Law of the Case Doctrine 7 The doctrine of law of the case “relates to litigation of the same issue recurring 8 within the same suit.” Cordova v. Larsen , 2004-NMCA-087, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 87, 94 9 P.3d 830. “Under the law of the case doctrine, a decision on an issue of law made at 10 one stage of a case becomes a binding preced ent in successive stages of the same 11 litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citati on omitted). “The law of the case 12 generally applies to questions of law, not ‘purely fact’ questions.” State ex rel. King 13 v. UU Bar Ranch Ltd. P’ship , 2009-NMSC-010, ¶ 21, 145 N.M. 769, 205 P.3d 816. 14 Our review of “[w]hether law of the case applies, as well as how it applies, are 15 questions of law subject to de novo review.” Id. ¶ 20. 16 Schwartz contends that Judge Hall’ s ruling denying the Board’s motion for 17 summary judgment on the breach of contr act claim prevented Judge Singleton from 18 considering the Board’s second motion for summary judgment. We disagree. The 1911 law of the case doctrine does not apply here. In the first motion for summary 1 judgment—before any discovery was conducted—Judge Hall was asked to determine 2 whether the Board had met its burden of proving that there were no material facts in 3 dispute thereby entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. Based on the facts adduced 4 at that time, Judge Hall orally held that the Board had not met its burden with respect 5 to the breach of contract claim. Th e motion was therefore denied. The case 6 proceeded, and the parties completed discovery. The Board then filed a second 7 motion for summary judgment that included additional facts that were not before the 8 district court on the Board’s first motion. Further, at the district court’s request, the 9 Board filed a supplemental statement of undis puted material facts, which Schwartz did 10 not respond to or refute in any way. 11 In State ex rel. Udall v. Public Employees Retirement Board , we stated that 12 “[t]he grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order and, 13 therefore, the district court could properly reconsider its previous ruling 14 notwithstanding the fact that a different judge had issued that ruling.” 118 N.M. 507, 15 510, 882 P.2d 548, 551 (Ct. App. 1994) (footnote and citation omitted), rev’d on other 16 grounds , 120 N.M. 786, 907 P.2d 190 (1995). Although that case involved the 17 constitutionality of a pension plan and did not have any factual issues to consider, the 18 ruling is instructive. Here, issues of fact distinguish the two motions for summary 1912 judgment. Accordingly, the law of the cas e doctrine has even less applicability, if any 1 at all. We conclude that, although the district court denied th e Board’s first motion 2 for summary judgment, when the Board re newed its motion and provided sufficient 3 additional undisputed facts, it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 4 on Schwartz’s breach of contract claim. The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 5 Legality of the Order 6 Finally, we address Schwartz’s last two related arguments. He asserts that the 7 Order is illegal and that it arose from fraud in the inducement and, therefore, 8 rescission of the contract is the equitable remedy. However, “[t]o preserve an issue 9 for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial 10 court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.” Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc. , 11 106 N.M. 492, 496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct. App. 1987). “Where the record fails to 12 indicate that an argument was presented to the court below, unless it is jurisdictional 13 in nature, it will not be considered on appeal.” Id. “It is well established in this state 14 that theories, defenses, or other objections will not be considered when raised for the 15 first time on appeal.” Wolfley v. Real Estate Comm’n , 100 N.M. 187, 189, 668 P.2d 16 303, 305 (1983). Because Schwartzdoes not indicate where he raised this issue below 17 and because we are unable to locate where it was preserved, we decline to address his 18 arguments regarding fraudulent inducement here. See In re Doe , 98 N.M. 540, 541, 1913 650 P.2d 824, 825 (1982) (noting that an appe llate court should not reach issues that 1 the parties have failed to raise). 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________________________ 6 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

_________________________________ 9 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 10

_________________________________ 11 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 12