Davis & Harman LLP

September 23, 2015

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Office of Regulations and Interpretations

Employee Benefits Security Administration

Attn: Conflict of Interest Rule

Room N-5655

U.S. Department of Labor

200 Constitution Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20210

RE: RIN 1210-AB32 – Conflict of Interest Rule

Dear Sir or Madam:

On behalf of a group of firm clients, I am writing today to provide supplemental 

comments on the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) proposed new definition of a fiduciary, the 

proposed new prohibited transaction exemptions, and the proposed modifications of existing 

exemptions (together referred to as the “proposal”). Overall, while we share the belief that firms 

should act in their clients’ best interest, the DOL’s proposal, as currently drafted, is unworkable.

During the hearing held August 10-13, 2015, the DOL raised many possible issues with 

respect to the proposal. This supplemental letter focuses primarily on those issues. 

DEFINITION OF FIDUCIARY.

Education.

Plan context. During the hearing, DOL asked whether it would be helpful to modify the 

education carve-out in the following manner with respect to plans but not IRAs. Under the 

possible modification of the education carve-out raised by the DOL at the hearing, references to 

specific plan investment options would be permitted if both of the following conditions are

satisfied:

 All investment options that are in the recommended asset class and are available under 

the plan must be referenced (“first requirement”).

 The provider of the education must not have a financial interest in the investments 

referenced (“second requirement”). 

The second requirement would appear to generally prohibit most plan service providers

from providing the education, since most service providers will earn different amounts with 

respect to different investments. Accordingly, this change to the proposal would provide very 

little help. Moreover, if all the service provider is doing is listing all funds in a specified 

category, why should it matter whether the service provider has a financial interest in which 

option is chosen? The service provider is not exercising any meaningful discretion.

In most cases, the first requirement is quite workable, since a large number of plans have 

only a few investment options in each asset class. But there may be plans with, for example, 50 

options in a particular asset class. In this case, providing 50 options in each class to a participant 
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will be simply overwhelming and thus will not be helpful to the participant. Accordingly, we 

believe that there should be an exception from the first requirement where there are more than a 

specified number of investment options in an asset class (such as three). In those situations, 

examples of less than all options should be permitted, provided that the examples are chosen 

based on criteria that are fully disclosed in the educational materials. 

In short, we would recommend that DOL adopt the first requirement, as modified in the 

prior paragraph, but not the second requirement.

IRAs. Based on the hearing, it was very unclear as to whether DOL would make changes 

to the definition of education in the context of IRAs, since there is not a plan fiduciary to screen 

investment options and present a limited menu of screened options.

If changes are not made to the definition of education with respect to IRAs, here is an 

example of what would be treated as fiduciary advice. A service provider tells an IRA owner that 

he should be 30% invested in large cap funds, based on his age and risk profile. The service 

provider then provides 20 examples of large cap funds based on some type of fully disclosed 

screening process, instead of leaving the IRA owner with the overwhelming task of sorting 

through perhaps more than 1,000 large cap options. This extremely helpful screening process 

would be treated as advice subject to the prohibited transaction rules, and thus this screening 

service would not be provided – a loss for IRA owners. 

Accordingly, we urge you to apply the plan rule recommended above to IRAs also. 

Facilitating small business plans.

As explained in detail in my July 21 comment letter, much concern has been expressed 

about the inability of financial institutions under the proposal to help small businesses set up 

retirement plans and select and monitor investment options for their employees due to the 

narrowness of both the seller’s exception and the education rule. When this issue was raised at 

the hearing, DOL generally defended the provisions in the proposal, which are viewed in the 

industry as inadequate. The only mention of a solution by the DOL was a reference to the fact 

that the preamble to the proposal asked for comments on whether the best interest contract 

exemption (“BICE”) should apply to advice for small businesses. Since the BICE is not 

workable, this is not a solution. 

We urge you to revisit this issue and we offer our suggested fix, which is set forth in the 

Appendix to my July 21 comment letter. 

Selling services. 

Under the proposal, if a provider of investment services interviews to be hired by a small 

business or individual, that interaction would constitute fiduciary advice and a prohibited 

transaction. Or if such provider responds to a request for proposal issued by a small business or 

individual, any response would be fiduciary advice and a prohibited transaction. This is clearly 

not a workable rule. 
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Accordingly, we applaud DOL’s announcement at the hearing that firms and advisors 

would be permitted to promote their own services without such promotion being treated as 

fiduciary advice. This is a major step forward. Our only input on this point is that any 

modification of the position announced by DOL at the hearing would present very significant 

problems from both a policy perspective and an Administrative Procedure Act perspective. DOL 

announced a rule change at the hearing prior to the close of the comment period; if DOL were to

later modify the position announced at the hearing, the public would have relied on the 

announcement and thus would have been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to comment on 

the modified position. 

Selling products.

At the hearing, DOL seemed committed to the idea that the seller’s exception should not 

apply to selling assets to small businesses or individuals. The premise of this position appears to 

be that small businesses and individuals are not sophisticated enough to distinguish between 

selling and advising. This premise is mistaken in many respects. For example, if small businesses 

cannot distinguish selling from advising, they will not be in business very long. Business size is 

not a proxy for sophistication. 

Moreover, DOL’s position is inconsistent with the statute, which applies to advice but not 

to promotion, and with the way the commercial world functions. For example, an agent of an 

insurance company openly trying to sell an annuity – and not purporting to be an advisor -- is 

logically acting as a seller, not a fiduciary. DOL recognized this in 2010 but not in 2015.

We strongly urge you to go back to the very logical position set forth in the 2010 

proposal. However, at a minimum, we would ask you to consider the following approach.

The selling of products can be divided into two steps. The first step is to agree with the 

customer about the framework under which advice will be given. For example, if an insurance 

agent is only selling annuities of one company, that agent needs to be able to establish that 

limitation on his or her services without triggering fiduciary obligations. But then any 

recommendation of a particular annuity would be subject to a best interest standard. In this 

context, the agent would not need to show that he or she considered any other types of 

investments, but would need to show that the recommendation of the particular annuity was in 

the customer’s best interest. 

The failure to take at least the approach described in the preceding paragraph would 

simply make the proposal so incompatible with the commercial world that compliance would be 

impossible, leading to widespread non-compliance and a resulting lack of respect for the law. 

Platform exception.

Under the proposal, a recordkeeper can offer a menu of investment options for plan 

sponsors to choose from. For example, a recordkeeper may have 3,000 investment options from 

which a plan sponsor may choose the 10 or 15 to make available to the sponsor’s employees. The 
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offering of the 3,000 options is not treated as investment advice under the proposal’s “platform 

exception,” provided certain conditions are met. Many have asked for the platform exception to 

be expanded to cover IRAs. DOL appeared negative on this issue at the hearing. 

DOL’s position is clearly contrary to the needs of individuals. In the IRA context, firms 

provide limited menus for several reasons, including (1) to make the investment process less 

overwhelming for IRA owners, (2) to reflect screening processes and due diligence by the firms, 

and (3) to comply with FINRA and securities requirements. Why should this type of basic 

screening be treated as fiduciary advice? The DOL rule would effectively make this illegal, 

creating conflicts with other rules and depriving customers of a very helpful tool. In this way, the 

DOL proposal is decidedly harmful to IRA owners. 

The DOL position not only hurts individuals, it also is unsound analytically. Unless the 

limited menu is presented as reflecting a set of recommendations, these limited menus are not 

advice, any more than the platforms offered by plan service providers are advice. The limited 

menu is simply what the firm offers to customers. If IRA owners want a different limited menu, 

the IRA owner can go to another firm. This is exactly like the sale of any product. For example, 

company X offers a certain type of widget for sale. If a customer wants a different type of 

widget, the customer can go to another company. 

In effect, the DOL seems to broadly view individuals and small businesses as incapable 

of making very basic judgments and decisions, which they need to make in every aspect of their 

life. Individuals can make important decisions about where to live, what job to take, what house 

to buy, but they cannot be trusted with selecting an IRA provider with a limited menu of 

investments. This simply does not make sense.

Casual conversations as fiduciary advice. DOL indicated on several occasions during 

the hearing that casual conversations would not be treated as fiduciary advice under the proposal. 

DOL said that the definition of a recommendation was drawn from the FINRA definition, which 

involves a call to action. In fact, DOL made a point of saying that they will clarify in some way 

that they are using the FINRA definition. 

 Under the proposal, however, the definition of a recommendation is not a call to action, 

but rather is “a communication that . . . would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that 

the advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular course of action” 

(emphasis added). There is nothing in this definition about a call to action. On the 

contrary, the definition is based on “suggestions,” which certainly seem casual to me.

 Generally, in order for a recommendation to constitute fiduciary advice, the only other 

requirement is that the recommendation be rendered “pursuant to a written or verbal 

agreement, arrangement, or understanding that the advice is individualized to, or that 

such advice is specifically directed to, the advice recipient for consideration” (emphasis 

added). Almost anything said or written is intended to be considered, so that this 

requirement does nothing to prevent casual conversations from becoming fiduciary 

advice. 

 The fact that the definition of a recommendation does not involve a call to action is 

further illustrated by the fact that DOL has indicated both formally and informally that, 
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for instance, providing 20 examples – or even 100 examples -- of large cap funds would 

be treated as a recommendation when it is combined with education that the individual 

should be invested to a specified extent in large cap funds. Providing 20 examples (or 100 

examples) of large cap funds can hardly be characterized as a call to action with respect 

to any security transaction. 

DOL has repeatedly stated that to be fiduciary advice, there needs to be a “call to action.” 

That concept does not show up anywhere in the proposal. If that is really what DOL means, that 

phrase should be included in the proposal as a requirement of fiduciary advice. If the rule is 

based on “suggestions” “for consideration,” the rule will turn casual conversations into fiduciary 

advice. 

Mutual understanding.

DOL on many occasions during the hearing made it clear that they do not think that the 

definition of fiduciary advice should require a mutual understanding that advice is being given. 

DOL asked: if a recommendation is made, why is a mutual understanding needed?

As discussed above, because of the way that the proposal defines a recommendation, 

mere suggestions can give rise to fiduciary status under the proposal. Something more is needed, 

preferably a mutual understanding. Or at least a rule under which an objective person would 

reasonably view the communication as advice intended to be relied upon. 

Question often posed by DOL at the hearing.

On several occasions, DOL posed the following question. If DOL (1) applies the seller’s 

exception to individuals and small businesses, (2) preserves investment education, and (3) 

includes a mutual understanding requirement, isn’t that effectively the same as preserving the 

five-part test? 

Briefly, the answer to DOL’s question is no, it is not the same as preserving the five-part 

test. First, in 2010, DOL did numbers 1 and 2 above, and no one contended that that preserved 

the five-part test. Those are completely separate issues. So the only question is whether 

preservation of the mutual understanding requirement is effectively a preservation of the fivepart test. My answer would be preservation of the mutual understanding requirement does not 

preserve the “regular basis” requirement, nor does it preserve the “primary basis” requirement. 

Since those were the main two objections to the five-part test, it seems clear that preservation of 

the mutual understanding requirement is not at all the equivalent of preserving the five-part test. 

Interaction between basic definition and the carve-outs.

DOL indicated that it may need to clarify that the carve-outs are simply safe harbors. In 

other words, for example, the fact that education provided is not within the education carve-out 

does not mean that the education is fiduciary advice. Education that is not within the education 

carve-out may or may not be fiduciary advice, depending on whether the education otherwise 
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falls within the definition of fiduciary advice, such as including a recommendation for 

consideration. 

This clarification alone would help but it would not help a significant amount due to the 

extremely broad definition of a recommendation. If any suggestion directed to a recipient for 

consideration is fiduciary advice, almost everything is fiduciary advice. 

“For a fee or other compensation” -- clarifications

Plan sponsor employees. At the hearing, DOL expressed openness to exploring what it 

means for advice to be provided “for a fee or other compensation.” This is a very helpful 

development. Assume, for example, that a human resources employee of a plan sponsor is 

receiving his normal compensation in exchange for the performance of many duties, including 

helping 401(k) plan participants with plan issues. Assume further that the human resources 

employee gives advice to a participant about how to invest the assets in her plan account. DOL 

indicated at the hearing that such advice would not be for a fee, because the employee is only 

receiving his normal compensation. 

We had not read the proposal in that way, in part because that interpretation is 

inconsistent with the special carve-out in the proposal for plan sponsor employees who provide

advice to plan fiduciaries and only receive their normal compensation. If the positon DOL took 

at the hearing was correct, there would be no need for the employee carve-out, and there would 

certainly be no reason to limit that carve-out to advice provided to plan fiduciaries. 

It would be very helpful for DOL to formally incorporate the position described in the 

second preceding paragraph into the rule. 

Call center employees. At the hearing, DOL also indicated that call center employees 

who do not receive additional pay for advice or a referral of business may not be receiving a “fee 

or other compensation.” It would be extremely helpful for this to be clarified formally in the 

proposal. But in order for this clarification to have any effect, the compensation received by the 

financial institution employing the call center employee must not trigger fiduciary status for the 

financial institution. If this second point is not included in the rule, then the clarification about 

the call center employee has no effect. In other words, if the call center employee suggests 

consideration of an investment offered by the financial institution, and the financial benefit 

flowing to the financial institution is a fee or other compensation so that the financial institution 

is a fiduciary, then the fact that the call center employee does not receive a fee or other 

compensation is not helpful. 

“Fee or other compensation” – statutory authority. 

The focus on the requirement that a fiduciary receive a fee or other compensation for her 

advice highlights a key area where DOL has clearly exceeded its statutory authority. The statute 

expressly requires, as condition of fiduciary status, that an advisor render investment advice for a 

“fee or other compensation, direct or indirect.” Without any discussion or legal explanation, the 

proposal includes “brokerage fees” in the definition of “fee or other compensation, direct or 
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indirect.” The following examples illustrate the inconsistency between the proposal and the 

statute: 

Example 1: Customer A says to his broker/dealer, “I have $5,000 to contribute to my 

IRA. How should I invest it?” The broker/dealer recommends that Customer A invest in 

Fund XYZ. Customer A follows the recommendation and directs the broker/dealer to

invest the money in Fund XYZ. In return, the broker/dealer receives $25 from a 

combination of marketing fees, shared service fees, and recordkeeping fees. The 

broker/dealer receives no separate or additional compensation for advising Customer A 

on how to invest the $5,000.

Example 2: The broker/dealer provides the same advice as in Example 1, but Customer 

A does not follow the advice. The broker/dealer receives no compensation.

Example 3: Customer B says to her broker/dealer, “I have $5,000 to contribute to my 

IRA. Please invest the $5,000 in Fund XYZ.” The broker/dealer executes Customer B’s 

request. In return, the broker/dealer receives $25 from a combination of marketing fees, 

shareholder servicing fees, and recordkeeping fees.

In Examples 1 and 2, the broker/dealer provides the exact same advice, but only gets paid 

in Example 1. Why? Because the broker/dealer is not paid anything for providing advice. The 

broker/dealer is paid exclusively for other services (including execution services), none of which 

is advice. That is why the broker/dealer is paid the exact same amount in Examples 1 and 3 (with 

the payment attributable to equal investments of $5,000 in Fund XYZ) but is paid nothing in 

Example 2. Thus, under the statute, it is simply not possible to treat the fees received by the 

broker/dealer as being for the advice, rendering the proposal inconsistent with the statute and 

thus outside DOL’s authority to issue. 

Our position in this regard is consistent with the fundamental notion of a broker/dealer, 

another issue not addressed by the DOL. Under section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers 

Act of 1940, the term “investment adviser” does not include “any broker or dealer whose 

performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or 

dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor” (emphasis added). Under this rule, if 

a broker/dealer were to receive compensation for advice, the broker/dealer would be required to 

be treated as an investment adviser. It is well settled law that brokerage fees for execution and 

other services are not compensation for advice. Yet the proposal ignores this settled point of law 

and the facts described above, and concludes that brokerage fees are compensation for advice. 

There is no legal basis for this conclusion, which is beyond the DOL’s statutory authority. 

“For a fee or other compensation” -- in the rollover context.

The DOL has proposed to define “fee or other compensation, direct or indirect” to mean 

“any fee or compensation for the advice received by the person (or by an affiliate) from any 

source and any fee or compensation incident to the transaction in which the investment advice 

has been rendered or will be rendered” (emphasis added). The italicized language is ambiguous, 

however, because it is unclear what “transaction” DOL is referring to. But DOL’s intent seems 
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clear in the rollover context. If an advisor advises a plan participant to roll over his 401(k) 

balance from his employer’s plan to an IRA sponsored by the advisor, DOL’s view implicitly 

seems to be that a single “transaction” has occurred such that if the advisor receives 

compensation with respect to the investment of the rollover proceeds, then the compensation 

requirement of the advice definition is satisfied with respect to the rollover itself. For example, 

if the advisor receives no compensation for the distribution from the 401(k) plan per se, or from 

the rollover to the IRA, but ultimately receives compensation from investment of the distribution 

proceeds in the rollover IRA, the advisor will, under the implicit DOL view, be considered to 

have provided fiduciary investment advice to take a distribution from the plan and roll over the 

distribution, as well as fiduciary advice to invest the proceeds in the IRA.

However, this scenario actually consists of four separate transactions: (1) a 

recommendation to hire the advisor to advise on the disposition of the plan account, (2) a 

recommendation to take a distribution, (3) a recommendation to roll over the distribution to an 

IRA, and (4) a recommendation to invest the rolled over amounts in the IRA. In that case, each 

of these separate transactions should be considered separately to determine if the advice is for a 

fee or other compensation and thus fiduciary advice. This is especially true with respect to the 

fourth transaction, since an advisor may well provide advice on the first three transactions and 

not provide advice on the fourth. There is no basis in the statute or in logic to aggregate two 

separate pieces of advice and treat them as a single piece of advice unless they are inextricably 

linked together. Since advice on the fourth transaction may or may not accompany advice on the 

first three transactions, there is no inextricable link. This is most clearly illustrated by the 

common situation where a participant rolls over to a provider’s IRA, but does not retain the 

provider to provide advice on investments. 

In the example above, here is how the four transactions should be treated: 

 Advice on the first transaction is simply selling services, which DOL has recognized is 

not fiduciary advice, as discussed above. 

 Advice on the second transaction is not fiduciary advice unless the advisor’s employer 

receives compensation by reason of the distribution as a separate transaction.

 Advice on the third transaction is not fiduciary advice unless the advisor’s employer 

receives compensation for the establishment of the IRA, which may or may not be the 

case. 

 Advice on the fourth transaction is not fiduciary advice unless the advisor’s employer 

receives compensation for that advice in accordance with the principles stated in the 

prior section of this letter. 

DOL’s intent to treat compensation for advice on the fourth transaction as compensation 

for the third transaction appears to reflect a policy decision by DOL that advice regarding 

whether a participant should roll over her assets is a fiduciary act, regardless of whether the 

advisor receives any fee or other compensation with respect to such advice. That decision is 

inconsistent with the statute and thus would require a statutory change. 

Rather than seek such a statutory change, the DOL appears to take the position that 

compensation received with respect to separate advice – i.e., regarding how the IRA assets 
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should be invested – is received in connection with the rollover advice. As noted, there is no 

legal basis to aggregate the rollover transaction and the investment transaction. For example, 

what would be the DOL’s analysis if the participant managed his own assets in the IRA for a 

couple of years? In that case, would the rollover advice not be fiduciary advice, if the advisor 

does not receive any other compensation for the rollover? What if the participant makes all initial 

investment decisions in the IRA and then subsequently asks the advisor for help? Again, would 

that mean that the rollover advice is not fiduciary advice?

In short, DOL’s treating compensation for investment advice as compensation for 

rollover advice is not consistent with the statute and cannot stand up to scrutiny. 

Valuation of assets.

At the hearing, DOL seemed generally wedded to its position that asset valuations “in 

connection with” a transaction are fiduciary advice, except in the case of ESOPs. There does not 

appear to be any policy or statutory basis for this nor any economic justification for a position 

that would trigger a significant amount of cost, uncertainty, and disruption. For example, 

standard valuations of insurance products in connection with plan purchases or distributions 

would become fiduciary advice, triggering very difficult fiduciary issues and potential prohibited 

transactions for the insurer that would be asked to value its own product. 

BICE ISSUES

Scope of “Retirement Investors”

Under the proposal, the BICE is limited to advice provided to individuals and to nonparticipant-directed plans. We see no reason not to apply the BICE to advice provided to any 

recipient. 

Rollover advice.

As it has on previous occasions, DOL stated at the hearing that advice regarding rollovers 

would be covered by the BICE. We have three comments in this regard. 

 First, as currently written, the BICE does not appear to cover advice given to roll over 

assets, separate and apart from any decisions regarding plan investments. So if rollovers 

are covered by the BICE, that would need to be explicitly made clear. 

 Second, the BICE disclosures and rules are all structured to relate to asset transactions, 

not advice separate from asset transactions, such as advice to roll over assets. So if 

rollovers are to be covered by the BICE, an entire new structure is needed in the BICE.

 Third, unless the BICE is radically altered to be made workable, in the manner suggested 

in my July 21 comment letter, it does not matter what the BICE applies to, since to my 

knowledge no one will use it, as discussed below. 

Applicability of the BICE to other retirement services.
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Currently, the BICE appears to apply to advice regarding assets but not to advice 

regarding services (such as recommending an investment manager or a managed account 

program). To my knowledge, this issue was not discussed by DOL. This issue needs to be 

addressed, and the BICE requirements need to be modified to address advice regarding services. 

Arbitration.

The BICE does not currently prohibit mandatory arbitration of individual claims (though 

it does prohibit mandatory arbitration of class actions). It was clear from the hearing that DOL is 

reexamining whether the current industry arbitration procedures are appropriate in the context of 

individual claims under the BICE, or whether a different system should be explored for 

individual claims under the BICE that makes it easier for individuals to prevail. 

We will be brief. Right now, to my knowledge, no one is planning to use the BICE, 

except a very small number that are considering possibly using it, but that could not use it in a 

timely manner unless the eight-month transition were extended in a major way. The reasons 

include: too much cost, too much liability, and too little time. If the arbitration rules are modified 

to create more cost and more liability, that would further cement the existing decisions not to use 

the BICE. And if firms do not use the BICE, the result will be elimination of services to small 

accounts and small businesses. In other words, modifying the arbitration rules would simply 

make an unworkable rule even more unworkable.

In this regard, we reiterate a point made in my July 21 comment letter. The DOL 

Regulatory Impact Analysis (“DRIA”) never evaluated the workability of the BICE, a serious

deficiency in the DRIA. An evaluation of the workability of the BICE would reveal that it is 

unworkable and that adverse changes to the arbitration rule would make it even more 

unworkable.

BICE disclosure.

DOL said at the hearing that it was open to possibly simplifying the disclosure 

requirements, but very few details were provided. One detail was that, for purposes of the one, 

five, and 10-year projections, DOL might provide standardized assumptions to make the 

projections. But DOL did not signal that it might back off of the requirements that the 

projections (1) be made at the point of sale and (2) be individualized. Thus, with respect to this 

aspect of the BICE, the change being contemplated is not sufficient. 

Furthermore, to my knowledge, there was no meaningful discussion of the requirements 

(1) to provide an enormously complex webpage, (2) to provide the dollar amount of indirect 

compensation on account level, or (3) to report a massive amount of information to the DOL 

(and others). Without very significant changes to these rules, the BICE will not be used, as 

discussed above. 

BICE contract: in general.
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At the hearing, DOL seemed wedded to requiring a contract under the BICE, instead of 

the more logical and statutorily sound approach of simply treating all the substantive BICE 

requirements, such as the best interest requirement, as conditions of the exemption. We urge you 

to revisit this decision, since there are many financial institutions that will feel compelled to 

cease serving small accounts due to the potential liability of being subject to state law class 

actions on amorphous best interest claims.

BICE contract: timing and signatures.

For purposes of discussion, we assume that DOL decides not to follow our 

recommendation that the contract requirement be deleted. 

 Existing customers. At the hearing, DOL seemed open to not requiring signatures from 

existing customers, but rather, for example, permitting the use of “negative consent,” i.e., 

the contract will go into effect unless the customer receiving it objects to it going into 

effect. This would be helpful. 

 New customers. DOL seemed open to having the contract signed upon the client 

agreeing to the engagement with the advisor, as long as the contract is retroactively 

effective to apply to the pre-contract discussions.

o Flaw in the new customer approach. It was pointed out at the hearing that this 

does not work in many situations. For example, an IRA owner may seek advice 

from mutual fund family X about a particular fund that X offers, but then the IRA 

owner may buy that fund through an unrelated brokerage firm, so the IRA owner 

gets advice from X but never agrees to an engagement with X. A unilateral 

contract with all persons who contact X would address this problem. 

 Contract with which persons.

o At the hearing, DOL raised the possibility of permitting a plan sponsor to enter 

into a contract on behalf of plan participants so that every participant need not 

enter into a contract. This would be helpful. A contrary rule would simply be 

unworkable. Please note that even this may not work in some cases, especially in 

the case of participants who use a brokerage window and thus do not deal with the 

plan’s main service provider.

o The proposal requires individual advisors to sign contracts with customers, which 

is not workable because of (1) turnover among advisors, (2) a customer’s main 

advisor may be busy or out of the office when the customer calls, requiring a 

contract with other advisors, and (3) in the case of call centers, any representative 

may pick up the phone. DOL seemed to recognize the third problem at the 

hearing. All three situations would need to be addressed. 

Incentives.

In general. At the hearing, DOL seemed committed to the BICE requirement that the 

financial institution warrant that it does not provide incentives for advisors not to act in the best 

interest of the customer. Under the proposal, this requires having level fees at the advisor level, 

unless a financial institution can justify non-level fees based on “reasonable and objective neutral 

factors,” such as the time and expertise needed to provide prudent advice on a product. 
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This requirement simply does not work in its current form. There are many variations 

in advisor pay from product to product, based on a variety of important business factors, 

including the difficulty involved in selling a product and the fact that certain products are sold to 

be held indefinitely. But there is no way to equate the compensation variations in any precise 

way to any factor. For example, in order to feel comfortable that the BICE has been satisfied, the 

financial institution would have to feel reasonably certain about (1) how much extra time and 

expertise is required to sell a product and (2) how to translate that extra time and expertise into a 

precise amount of extra compensation. In the absence of any guidance on this issue at all, there is 

no way for any financial institution to feel comfortable that any variation in compensation is 

permissible.

Solution. We see no reason for this level-fee requirement in light of the existing Code 

and ERISA prohibited transaction rules requiring only reasonable compensation to be paid to 

service providers, which would include the advisor. If the advisor is only receiving reasonable 

pay, then by definition the pay is commensurate with the time and expertise needed. If the pay 

was disproportionately large compared to the time and expertise needed, the pay would not be

reasonable. The reason that the current law rule is workable and the new rule is not is that under 

current law, the determination of whether pay is reasonable can be based on commercial 

reasonableness, rather than based on the type of mechanical factors set forth in the proposal. So 

the solution here is straightforward: rely on the current law reasonable compensation rule, which 

serves the same purpose, but does so in a workable manner. 

Definition of best interest.

Concerns have been expressed about the language in the BICE that indicates that under 

the best interest standard, advice must be provided “without regard to the financial or other 

interests of the Adviser, Financial Institution or any Affiliate, Related Entity, or other party.” The 

concerns have been that this could preclude an advisor from being compensated, even if the 

advice is in the customer’s best interest. DOL indicated at the hearing that they viewed the 

quoted language as simply the equivalent of the statutory language in ERISA section 404, which 

requires fiduciary duties to be carried out “solely in the interest of the participants and 

beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and 

beneficiaries” and defraying plan expenses. 

If the DOL goes in this direction, it would help to have an explicit recognition that the 

standard would not be violated by (1) limiting advice to a subset of products, some or all of 

which are proprietary, or (2) the receipt of variable compensation. Arguably, #1 is already 

addressed in the BICE and #2 is implicitly addressed, but it would help to make this explicit.

HEALTH AND WELFARE PLANS

DOL stated that the proposal does not apply to health and welfare plans that do not have 

an investment component (referred to here as “unfunded health and welfare plans”). We 

appreciate this statement. However, most of the industry does not agree with DOL’s 

interpretation of the words of the proposal. Since it is the words of the proposal that would be 
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used in litigation with participants in unfunded health and welfare plans, we ask that the 

inapplicability to unfunded health and welfare plans be made explicit. Reliance on the current 

words of the proposal would not work for the reasons set forth in my July 21 comment letter. 

APPLICABILITY DATE

It is clear that the eight-month transition period is not workable. No major financial 

institution can be in compliance in eight months, even with the basic definition. So if that period 

is retained, there will be widespread non-compliance and confusion, causing severe harm to 

individuals trying to save for retirement. To my knowledge, no defense was offered at the 

hearing for this unrealistic deadline. As far as we can understand, the only explanation for this 

unrealistically short and harmful transition period is a political reason, i.e., so that the final rule 

can be made effective before the change in Administrations in January of 2017. There needs to 

be a three-year transition period. 

GRANDFATHER RULES

DOL indicated that they are considering a range of different grandfather rules, exempting 

certain investments or advice from the new rules. But DOL did not provide any specifics 

regarding what they were contemplating. We reiterate our requests for appropriate grandfather 

rules regarding the proposal, including (1) a provision under which the proposal would not apply 

to any advice provided prior to the applicability date, nor to any direct or indirect fees or other 

compensation received in connection with such advice, (2) a provision under which the proposal 

would not apply to any advice provided after the applicability date to the extent that such advice 

gives rise only to any compensation that would have been paid without regard to the advice, and 

(3) a provision under which the proposal would not apply to advice that was pre-paid for prior to 

the applicability date. 

STATUTORY AUTHORITY

In my letter of July 21 and above in this letter, we point out that there are a number of 

instances where DOL has gone clearly beyond its statutory authority. In this regard, we are very 

troubled by a foreshadowing of DOL’s intent to go beyond its statutory authority and attempt to 

effectuate policy changes that are exclusively within Congress’ purview. In a BNA article dated 

September 9, 2014 by Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, DOL appears to be stating very broadly, not tied 

to any specific project, that the agencies need to be the ones to make social and legal change

happen, rather than Congress. Specifically, the article includes the following:1

 “[The Assistant Secretary of Labor for EBSA] said the most significant development over 

the past 40 years might be the shift from modifying a law with legislation, to modifying a 

law with regulation and litigation.”

 “’Today, you can’t get Congress to pass a Mother’s Day resolution,’ [the Assistant 

Secretary] said. ‘So what we’ve done is we’ve shifted from the way that social change and 

 

1

In some cases the article describes what was said; in other cases, the article presents actual quotes. The 

actual quotes are presented above in italics. 
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legal change and financial change is accomplished through congressional action to two 

different avenues for making changes: The main one being regulation and the second one 

being legislation,’ [the Assistant Secretary] said.”

 “One advantage of regulation is that the agencies writing the rules are able to receive 

input from the public, something that doesn’t often happen with Congress, [the Assistant 

Secretary] said.”

 “’Legislation is a blunt instrument for sure, but believe me, litigation is not a great 

instrument either. I used to tell my law students when I taught my ERISA class that when 

you came to litigation, that was an abject failure of the system because it represented the 

biggest amount of miscommunication that you could possibly imagine,” [the Assistant 

Secretary] said.’”

This marks at least the second time this type of point has been made by the DOL. In a 

May 1, 2012 BNA article by Florence Olsen, the Assistant Secretary was cited as having 

expressed skepticism that Congress would address an issue, and the Assistant Secretary was 

quoted as stating “It's hard to imagine passing a Mother's Day resolution in this Congress”. 

To the extent that these quotes are accurate or even close to being accurate (and there is 

no indication at all that they are not accurate), it would suggest that DOL views itself as stepping 

into Congress’ shoes in making policy. We urge DOL to return to its proper role as an interpreter 

of the law, not a maker of new law and new policy. 

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ISSUES

United Kingdom experience as a lesson for this issue. 

On August 3, 2015, the United Kingdom government initiated a review of the extent to 

which investment advice for holders of accounts with small balances is being diminished 

following a 2013 rule change that has an effect identical to what the DOL is proposing. DOL 

has consistently denied what is now widely accepted in the U.K., i.e., that, following a 2013 

rule change, middle- and lower-income savers in the U.K. are being cut off from investment 

advice. Yet this move by the U.K. government signals that the advice gap for individuals with 

the greatest need to save has become a major concern.

The specific issue. The DOL’s proposed fiduciary definition rule would have the effect 

of banning third-party payments to advisors. The reason that this is true is that the only way for 

an advisor to accept such payments is to use the proposed BICE, which to my knowledge no 

financial institution can or will use, as discussed above. 

Effective January 1, 2013, the U.K. adopted a rule directly banning such third-party 

payments to advisors, i.e., the U.K. rule has exactly the same effect as the DOL proposal. The 

U.K. rule triggered a massive exodus of advisors from the small account market in the U.K., as 

documented below.
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DOL has strongly contended that the U.K. rule has not created an advice gap for small 

savers. However, as of August 3, 2015, the U.K. has launched a major review of exactly that 

advice gap.

Critical need for change to DOL proposal. It is critical that the DOL alter the 

provisions in its proposal that would have the same unintended effect on savers with low account 

balances in the U.S. as the rule change in the U.K. has had on low-balance savers there. 

Specifically, that would mean making DOL’s proposed BICE workable.

DOL’s position. In its economic analysis of its proposed rule, DOL maintained that 

“there is little evidence that investment advice has decreased significantly” in the U.K. DOL 

goes on at great lengths to paint a very favorable picture of the U.K. experience2:

For example, concerns also were expressed about the establishment of an “advice gap” 

for those with small amounts to invest.70 However, in July 2013, the FCA announced that 

six months after the effective date of the RDR, 97 percent of current advisers had attained 

the appropriate level of qualification. The remaining three percent were recent market 

entrants who are still studying within the timelines allowed by the RDR. Also, according 

to the FCA letter, a substantial decrease in the number of financial advisers did not occur. 

By the end of 2012, the number of advisers went from 35,000 to 32,100, a decline or less 

than 10 percent, which was in line with the FCA’s expectations. The FCA has indicated 

that there are currently 31,500 advisers as of October 2014. External consultants to the 

FCA, Europe Economics, issued in December 2014 an independent post RDR review, 

which found that there is little evidence that investment advice has significantly 

decreased, with the majority of existing advisers willing and able to take on more clients. 

According to this report, it appears that in the year ending March 31, 2014 advisers 

dropped about 310,000 clients who whom they no longer found profitable to serve. On 

the other hand 820,000 clients were gained in the same period. According to the authors, 

the net increase in customers served suggests that dropped clients who looked for 

replacement advisers were largely successful.

Related to this report, the FCA also commissioned research with Towers Watson to also

address whether there is an investment advice gap between demand for investment advice 

and capacity to meet that demand. In December 2014 report, Towers Watson concludes 

that there is not an advice gap because there are sufficient advisers to meet the demand 

(approximately 30,000 advisers compared to the estimated 25,000 required to meet the 

demand).

Moreover, in July, Secretary Perez testified on the DOL proposal and responded to a 

question from Senator Cassidy regarding the U.K. situation: 

 

2 Please see my July 21 comment letter for a refutation of DOL’s specific discussion below, which paints a 

favorable picture based on points that are not relevant and on arguments that omit critical facts. The reason for 

including the quote in the text is simply to illustrate the extent to which DOL has asserted that the U.K. rule is 

working well, an assertion that even the U.K. government now admits is wrong. 
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Senator Cassidy: I am told that United Kingdom put in laws similar to this in 2013 and 

that banks stopped offering investment advice to customers with less than 80K in 

assets. Now that, you know, may be that the answer to Senator Warren’s question is that 

this model worked for those lower and moderate income people, or at least those with 

moderate assets. So just comment on that. Again, I don’t know whether it is true or not –

just your thoughts on that.

Secretary Perez: It’s not true, and let me give you the facts. After the U.K. put in place 

their regulation – and by the way, their regulation bans commissions, we don’t ban 

commissions – there were – advisors dropped 310,000 clients and 820,000 new clients 

came into the market so there was a net delta increase after the regulation of over half a 

million.3

Investors with low balance accounts continued to be served – because you were 

concerned about that. And, here’s the most interesting data point about the U.K. – and I 

traveled there personally to meet with them because I heard that feedback a lot – the most 

interesting point about what happened in the U.K., Senator, is that more and more people 

are now getting in lower cost funds. . . . So the U.K. experience, I welcome further 

inquiry into it because there’s been a fair amount of incorrect information surrounding it.

Facts from the U.K. Here are the facts from the U.K.:

 Outgoing head of the U.K. regulator (the “FCA”) that instituted the 2013 rule admits 

that there is an advice gap. Martin Wheatley, the head of the FCA, is stepping down 

from his position this month after his contract was not renewed. In late July, Wheatley 

reportedly was asked what the most significant outstanding issue for the FCA was. He 

responded that more needs to be done to address the financial “advice gap” for those with 

less complex advice needs. Wheatley stated:

The gap is for the relatively smaller sized pots, as to whether – with all the 

liability that comes with giving advice – there is enough provision of service for 

those with simpler needs and less to invest. That's the gap which we are 

committed to doing some more work on. 

 As of August 3, 2015, the U.K government launched a broad new review focusing on 

“the advice gap for those people who want to work hard, do the right thing and get on 

in life but do not have significant wealth.” This major review was launched by the 

Economic Secretary to the Treasury and will be led by the new interim head of the FCA. 

The object is to put forth a package of reforms.

 

3 According to a U.K. study, there are enough advisors to serve all potential customers. But this study, 

commissioned by the U.K. regulator itself, makes two key points. First, the study concludes that there is insufficient 

data to conclude that small accounts are receiving needed advice. Second, however, the study states that anecdotal 

evidence suggests that the large number of advisors for the entire market does not help the small savers, where the 

availability of advice appears to have been reduced. See also the discussion below of the fact that two-thirds of 

advisors refuse to serve accounts under $31,200. [This note is not part of the Secretary’s quote.]
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o Widely accepted data acknowledged by the DOL itself shows that roughly twothirds of U.K. advisors refuse to provide services to individuals with less than 

$31,200 in savings (the 2015 equivalent of £20,000).

 As noted, the DOL proposal effectively bans all third-party payments to advisors 

(referred to in the U.K. as commissions, which is why the Secretary referred to 

commissions in the above quote). Under the DOL proposal, third-party payments to 

advisors are generally only permitted under the BICE. Since no financial institution that I 

am aware of can use that exemption, as discussed above, the DOL proposal effectively 

bans such payments, just like the U.K. rule.

 Facts about the $80,000 figure that Senator Cassidy asked about: In anticipation of the 

new U.K. rule, the following practices were adopted: 

o U.K.’s “big four” banks (an important source of investment advice in the 

U.K).

 HSBC: provided investment advice only for customers with at least 

$80,0004in total assets or $160,000 of annual income.

 Lloyds: provided face-to-face investment advice only for customers with 

at least $160,000 in assets.

 Royal Bank of Scotland: charged $800 to set up a financial plan, and 

made changes to gear investment advice services to high net-worth clients.

 Barclays: provided investment advice only for customers with at least 

$800,000 in assets.

o Examples of other actions taken.

 Aviva: ceased offering face-to-face investment advice.

 AXA: ceased offering face-to-face investment advice.

 Advisor firm AWD Chase de Vere: stopped accepting clients with 

$80,000 or less in assets.

 Advisor firm Towry: stopped accepting clients with less than $160,000 

in assets.

Even after the U.K. has admitted there is a problem, DOL continues to deny it. In 

late August, DOL released a new study purporting to support its proposal. Burke and Hung, 

Financial Advice Markets: A Cross Country Comparison, RAND Labor and Population (April 

21, 2015) (“Burke/Hung”). The study was prepared before the U.K. announced its major review 

of the advice gap, but DOL still released the study without any caveats or even recognition of 

this major flaw in the study, which is very troubling. The report predictably concludes that the 

advice gap is small, which is inconsistent with the facts, as recognized by the U.K. government 

itself. 

Supplemental research released by DOL.

 

4 The dollar references in this part of the document are based on 2013 pound to dollar conversion rates. 
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In addition to Burke/Hung, DOL released two other research papers in late August and 

one in September: Hung, Gong, and Burke, Effective Disclosures in Financial Decisionmaking, 

RAND Labor and Population (July, 2015) (“Hung/Gong/Burke”); Panis, Comments on a Review 

of a White House Report on Conflicted Advice, Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, Inc. 

(August 21, 2015) (“Panis”); and Burke and Hung, Do Financial Advisers Influence Savings 

Behavior? RAND Labor and Population (August, 2015) (”Burke/Hung II”).

Hung/Gong/Burke questions the effectiveness of disclosure of conflicts of interest, and 

then emphasizes very strongly that to be effective, disclosure must be simple and short:

The trends in regulation on disclosure in [financial] areas have all focused on simplifying 

disclosures. Research has shown that the longer, more detailed disclosure documents 

have not been effective at helping consumers make informed choices . . . .

Hung/Gong/Burke at 24. There is a striking inconsistency between this analysis and the proposal, 

which requires extremely detailed lengthy disclosures. 

Panis unfortunately seems to be structured as a brief, rather than as a balanced study

reflecting an objective analysis of the facts. For example:

 Panis attempts to refute the existence of an advice gap in the United Kingdom without 

ever acknowledging that the U.K. government itself has launched a major review of a gap 

that Panis says does not exist. 

 Panis states that “the academic literature offers little or no quantitative estimates of the 

benefits of broker advice.” Again, Panis just overlooks a very recent authority, an entire 

study dedicated exclusively to that question – the 2015 Oliver Wyman study. 

Burke/Hung II examines the issues underlying the findings that individuals who consult 

financial advisors have higher level of savings. The issue being examined is whether the higher 

levels of savings are attributable to the assistance provided by financial advisors or whether 

individuals who have higher level of savings and are more inclined to save are the ones who 

consult financial advisors. The authors conclude that “few papers attempt to address” this issue, 

and that “much of [the] work is correlational and unable to establish whether advisers are 

causing improvements in retirement-planning outcomes. . . .” In short, the authors conclude that 

there is no answer to the question of whether financial advisors improve savings results. 

So in its economic analysis, DOL does not take into account any benefits of financial 

advice. To back up its conclusion, it appears that the best that DOL can do is to release the 

Burke/Hung II study, which concludes that it is unclear if financial advisors produce benefits for 

savers. This is extremely troubling – a core element of the DOL analysis is completely 

unsupported. If this core element of the DOL analysis has no support, DOL’s entire economic 

analysis falls apart.

Continued omissions from DOL’s economic analysis. 
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DOL continues to move forward with the proposal despite having gaps in its economic 

analysis. Secretary Perez announced before the hearing and before the beginning of the second 

comment period that DOL would not re-propose, but would go straight to a final regulation. This 

announcement effectively indicated that comments were not necessary in deciding whether 

significant changes to the proposal were needed. Please see my letter of September 9 in this 

regard. 

This political decision is consistent with what has happened with respect to the economic 

analysis. As noted, DOL has released four more studies to support its proposal. None of the 

studies addresses the following significant gaps in the economic analysis described in more 

detail in my July 21 comment letter. Here is a list of those unaddressed gaps:

 A Quantria Strategies, LLC study estimating that the proposal would cause lost 

retirement savings of $68-80 billion annually. 

 A Quantria study demonstrating the lack of foundation for the DOL’s estimate of the cost 

of conflicted advice. 

 A 2011 DOL study estimating that the prohibited transaction rules are at least partially 

responsible for over $100 billion of losses each year, yet the DOL would massively 

expand those rules in its proposal. 

 No analysis of the sufficiency of the eight-month transition period. 

 A vastly erroneous estimate of the IT costs of complying with the BICE. In this regard, 

the answer to Mr. Piacentini’s question about the Quantria study -- set forth in his letter 

to me dated August 26, 2015 -- is contained in my July 21 letter, which states as follows: 

o “I asked major financial institutions about the number of hours and amount of 

money that they spent on implementing a far less burdensome set of DOL 

disclosure requirements: the participant disclosure rules under Regulation § 

2550.404a-5 and the service provider disclosure rules under § 2550.408b-2. Here 

are the answers I received: 

 One company spent over 100,000 IT hours implementing the two existing 

requirements at a cost of approximately $8.4 million.

 Another company spent over 90,000 hours at a cost of over $6.5 million.”

o My request described in the sub-bullet above was sent to 12 major financial 

institutions. As noted in my July 21 letter and in the Quantria study, two 

responses were received. 

o Regarding the other questions posed to me in Mr. Piacentini’s letter of August 26 

regarding the 2015 Oliver Wyman study, I previously responded to Mr. Piacentini

by e-mail. My e-mails stated that “with respect to the Oliver Wyman report, Davis 

& Harman did not retain Oliver Wyman to conduct this report. While we 

represent one or more of the companies that sponsored the report, there are other 

sponsoring companies that we do not represent. Accordingly, Davis & Harman is 

not currently authorized to respond regarding the Oliver Wyman report.”

 An unfounded assumption that all contracts under the BICE can be executed during the 

eight-month transition period. 

 A lack of any analysis of the workability of the BICE.

 An erroneous analysis of the effect of the proposal on call centers.
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 The conflict between (a) the analysis in the preamble stating that disclosures are 

“meaningless” and “ineffective” and (b) the fact that the BICE requires more disclosure 

than any other retirement regulation or statute, at least in recent history. 

 An erroneous analysis of the 2011 Oliver Wyman study. 

 The omission from DOL’s discussion of its own sponsored studies that do not support 

DOL’s proposal.

 An ineffective attempt to refute the troubling findings of the Greenwald & Associates 

small business survey. 

 An ineffective attempt to refute the analysis in the 2014 Quantria study. 

 A failure to address the very troubling analysis in the GAO’s 2013 report on distribution 

issues. 

 The failure of DOL to do any economic analysis of the effects of the major cutback in 

investment education included in the proposal. 

 The lack of any analysis of the harmful effects of the inconsistency between the proposal 

and other rules applicable to retail accounts. 

 DOL’s failure to disclose the input DOL received from the SEC.

Thank you for your consideration of the views expressed in this letter. 

Sincerely,

Kent A. Mason
Davis & Harman LLP

September 23, 2015

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