Naval Doctrine Publication 4

Naval Logistics
FOREWORD

Naval logistics is the sine qua non of our combat power and is

the bridge that connects our nations industrial base to forwarddeployed naval forces.

Whether appearing in the form of effective peacetime forward

presence or decisive power projection, readiness and the ability to

sustain such operations are the hallmarks of our Navy-Marine Corps

teamand both readiness and sustainability hinge upon logistic support. Certainly, effective logistic support will not always guarantee

success; lack of such support, however, inevitably will bring failure.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 4, Naval Logistics, is the

fourth in the series of capstone publications that articulate naval

doctrine. Every naval professional must understand its contents. NDP

4 discusses the basis of operational naval logistics and establishes the

foundation for development of follow-on tactics, techniques and procedures, which will be contained in a later series of logistic Naval

Warfare Publications (NWPs), 4-0.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

AND

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001

10 January 1995

NDP 4

J. M. BOORDA

Admiral, U. S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

C. E. MUNDY, JR.

General, U. S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps
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INTRODUCTION

Our nations military power always has been a reflection of

our ability to equip, train, and support our forces. Each of these

areasequipment, training, and supportis essential, a link in a chain.

Inevitably, however, our newest, most capable weapon systems will

deteriorate and even the best-trained personnel will lose their effectiveness quickly if denied proper support. Providing such support

requires a detailed, smoothly functioning infrastructureand the

experienced, dedicated professionals to make it work.

NDP 4, Naval Logistics, describes how we apply fundamental

logistic principles, functions, and elements and how we use the resources of formal planning and logistic information support to attain

the basic goal of operational force readiness. Through the metaphor

of a logistic pipeline, it takes the reader from the manufacturers

shipping terminal to the end user. At the same time, it emphasizes

that naval logistics means much more than materiel. It is a complex

weave of systems within systems, which encompasses planning, acquisition, maintenance, engineering support, training, transportation,

facilities operations, and personnel supportbacking up naval forces

day and night, in peace and war.

History records many examples of presence operations shifting

quickly into armed conflict, at much higher levels of operational intensity. Both peacetime operations and naval warfare demand that effective logistic support be in place and functioning under all conditions.

NDP 1, Naval Warfare, describes the ways naval forces accomplish their

missions and execute their roles with joint and multinational teams;

Naval Logistics explains how the support for those operations is

planned, acquired, and integrated into the operations of naval expeditionary forceswhose ability to accomplish their missions is linked

directly to the strength of the logistic chain and the quality of the

support it provides, especially when resources are limited.
1 NDP 4

Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE

The Nature of Naval Logistics ...................................................... 3

Mission of Naval Logistics ............................................................................. 6

Levels of Logistic Support.............................................................................. 7

CHAPTER TWO

Fundamentals of Naval Logistics ................................................ 11

Principles of Logistics................................................................................... 13

Functional Areas of Naval Logistics ............................................................. 18

Elements of the Logistic Process................................................................... 22

CHAPTER THREE

Naval Logistic Planning and Information Support ..................... 33

Logistic Planning .......................................................................................... 34

Logistic Information Support ...................................................................... 45

CHAPTER FOUR

Naval Logistic Operations .......................................................... 49

Sources of Logistic Support......................................................................... 51

Support Nodes .............................................................................................. 55

End Users ...................................................................................................... 61

CONCLUSION............................................................................ 74

GLOSSARY ................................................................................. 76
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3 NDP 4

CHAPTER ONE

The Nature of Naval Logistics

“Logistics provides the physical means for organized forces to exercise power. In military terms, it is the creation and sustained support

of combat forces and weapons. Its objective is maximum sustained

combat effectiveness.”

— Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, USN, (Ret.)

Naval forces contribute decisively to U.S. global leadership, and are vital in shaping the environment

needed to enhance national security. A strong naval

teamcapable of deterrence, war at sea and from the sea, and operations other than waris essential to that effort. Key to the strength

of our naval team is naval logisticsthe total integration of highly

trained and dedicated personnel within a complex network of technical support, facilities, transportation, materiel, and information links.
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Logistics enables us to carry out our assigned roles.1 It supports

our ability to conduct continuous forward presence, peacetime engagement, deterrence operations, and timely crisis response in the complex

maritime environment. Our success in the day-to-day missions that

support these roles depends on both capability and credibility. We

demonstrate capability through weapon-system design, operator training, and operations performance. Credibility hinges on our being able

to sustain this capability by supporting our forces effectively in peace

and war. Such support comes from a multitude of sources, and is an

important indicator of our combat readiness, a factor other nations

recognize and respect.

Day-to-day operations require our forces to operate in both

the open ocean and along the worlds littoralsand to be capable of

remaining in these areas indefinitely. Naval logistics lets us be expeditionary, enabling naval forces to conduct complex operations around

the world wherever needed in support of national interests and objectives. The striking power of the Navy and Marine Corps is always

available without delay, and is sustainable by virtue of an established

support system that employs organic stocks, logistic support ships,

advanced support bases, airlift, and sealift.

Sustained forward deployed operations allow our nation to

engage in regional coalition-building and collective-security efforts. In

the future, major conflicts will be dealt with by joint and multinational forces, so the naval logistic structure is designed to provide

support to other services and allies. Our forces also benefit as the

logistic infrastructure matures in theater, with added support from

multinational partners and host nations. Wherever our naval forces

may be involved, their logistic support ensures immediate readiness.

Naval logistic operations are conducted much the same in peace

as they are in war. The major differences in war are that the magnitude

of personnel-support functions and the quantity of materiel and supplies neededas well as corresponding airlift and sealift requirements

will increase, and that our systems become subject to disruption by

1

 NDP 1 Naval Warfare, discusses the basic roles of our naval forces as assigned by

Congress.
5 NDP 4

enemy action and the fog (friction and uncertainty) of war resulting in

erroneous assumptions and planning shortfalls. So in war, our basic

structure and methods of delivery must be rugged and strongmuch

more than merely adequate. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines logistics

as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. As illustrated in Figure 1-1, this science focuses on

sustained operational readiness from day onenot just preparation for

specific operations. Effective logistic support requires balancing the

commanders requirements with the resources available. Defined

broadly, naval logistics consists of products provided to the end user

equipment, supplies, facilities, services, and trained manpower; and processes used to provide and maintain those productsproduction, procurement, distribution, training, and maintenance.

With a proper understanding of the complexities of logistics, we

can employ and protect this vital component of our operational readiness

and warfighting capability. Such understanding begins with a look at the

mission of naval logistics, followed by the levels of logistic support.
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Mission of Naval Logistics

In peace and war, the mission of naval logistics is to provide

and sustain our operational readiness by getting the right support to

the right place at the right time. In peace, operational readiness stems

from the ability of our naval forces to accomplish a wide range of dayto-day taskings. In war, operational readiness is the forerunner of

warfighting effectiveness.

The philosophy of maneuver warfare focuses on attaining

victory by neutralizing the enemys centers of gravity and destroying

his will to resist. Naval forces use the sea as maneuver space, searching

for weaknesses in the enemys defenses. When the commander finds

a weakness that is both critical to the enemys existence and vulnerable to attack, he establishes this critical vulnerability as the focus of

effort. He then unifies his force toward the focus of effort by designating the main effort. Guided by an understanding of the

commanders intent, the subordinate commander leading the main

effort is able to operate independently at a high tempo that overwhelms the enemy.

A major challenge to our naval logistic system is the need to

support the main effort at its high tempo of combat while continuing

to support all other efforts adequately. Our system must anticipate

the needs of many operating forces and integrate all six functional

areas of logistics2

 in a responsive manner. This requires planners to

ensure that the logistic pipelinestretching from such sources as the

continental U.S. infrastructure to the forward-deployed end user

consistently will enable naval commanders to exploit opportunities as

they arise. The maneuver warfare philosophy encourages subordinates to exercise initiative and gives them freedom to react to wars

uncertain and fluid nature; the naval logistic philosophy complements this thinking, emphasizing that its planners must anticipate

and respond quickly to operational needs. Uninterrupted logistic flow

is essential in maintaining momentum at all levels of logistic support.

2

 The logistic functional areasSupply, Maintenance, Transportation, Engineering, Health

Services, and Other Servicesare discussed in Chapter Two.
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Levels of Logistic Support

Logistic support is provided at the strategic, operational and

tactical levels, and involves interrelated and often overlapping functions and capabilities:

Strategic logistics encompasses the nations ability to deploy

and sustain its operating forces in executing the national military

strategy. It is concerned with determining requirements, personnel

and materiel acquisition, management of air and sealift for strategic

mobility, and support of forces in distant theaters of operations. It

also includes the role of prepositioned equipment and materielboth

afloat and ashoreand our nations ability to maintain the required

support levels for operations of any duration. Long-term sustainment

is tied directly to the national industrial bases, which include the

nations manufacturing, agricultural, transportation, and health services sectors. Such organizations as the Defense National Stockpile

Center play a strategic role in maintaining raw materials that would

be needed to support a significant buildup of the industrial base. A

particular concern at the strategic level is that our industrial bases

maintain the capability, capacity, and technology to support timely

production of modern weapon systems, support equipment, health

services, munitions, stores and command-and-control systems to meet

wartime requirements.

Operational logistics involves coordinating and providing

intratheater logistic resources to operating forces, and primarily concerns the Unified combatant commanders and the Service component commanders. It includes support activities required to sustain

campaigns and major operations within a theater and is the level at

which joint logistic responsibilities and arrangements are coordinated.

Operational logistics encompasses theater support bases and facilities

and the theater surface, air, and sealift required to transport the

personnel and materiel to the supported forcesas well as managing

and protecting those assets after they have delivered their materiel

and services. It provides our linkage to the strategic level and enables

us to succeed at the tactical level.
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LEVELS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The Marianas Campaign

The American campaign to seize the Pacifics Mariana Islands group

in World War II highlighted the strategic, operational, and tactical levels

of naval logistic support.

During the second half of 1943, Allied leaders strengthened the

offensive effort against Japan. They complemented the Southwest Pacific

Commands push through the Philippine Islands with a campaign by the

Central Pacific Command to seize key island groups in its area of operations.

Capture of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas would enable the Allies to

bring devastating air and naval power directly against the Japanese home

islands. This expanded effort was possible only because American factories were

by then pouring out tens of thousands of warships, merchant vessels, landing

craft, aircraft, tanks, munitions, and supplies. At the same time, replacement

depots were sending millions of fresh troops. In short, resources were available

at the strategic level to fuel and sustain a broad, Pacific-wide offensive.

The Navys logistic resources at the operational levelin particular,

the campaign to capture the Marianasalso were critical to success in the

Central Pacific. These islands were 3,500 miles from Pearl Harbor, the

Navys major Pacific shore establishment, and 1,000 miles from Eniwetok,

the site of an advanced logistic staging area created when Admiral Raymond

A. Spruances Fifth Fleet forces stormed the Marshall Islands in January and

February 1944. To overcome the lack of close-in shore bases, the Navy

created an afloat, mobile logistic force for the Marianas campaignRear

Admiral Worrall R. Carters Service Squadron 10. Over a period of three

months in the summer of 1944, this task group provided the primary

logistic support for a Marianas invasion force of 535 combatant ships and

128,000 Soldiers and Marines. The Navy then carried out a massive air and

naval base construction program in the captured islands, employing Navy

SeaBees and Marine support units. This effort enabled U.S. B-29

Superfortress bombers and naval combatants to launch what proved to be

the final assault on Japan in the spring and summer of 1945.

The amphibious assault on Saipan, the first operation of the Marianas

campaign, displayed the versatility of naval logistic forces at the tactical level.

On hand to support and sustain the operation, which lasted from 15 June to

7 July 1944, were a host of fleet oilers to refuel at sea aircraft carriers, battleships,

and other combatants; enough repair and salvage ships to keep battle-damaged

units in the fight; seaplane tenders to serve the needs of critical long-range

reconnaissance and rescue aircraft; and provisions, stores, and ammunition

ships to provide the necessary food, clothing, and ordnance. Finally, hospital

ships were positioned close to Saipan to care for the thousands of wounded

U.S. servicemen who survived the bloody fight ashore.
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3

 The Marine air-ground task force is composed of a command element, ground combat

element, aviation combat element, and a combat service support element. The Marine

air-ground task force element is discussed further in Chapter Four.

Tactical logistics focuses on planning and support within

and among operating units of the task force or battle group. The

tactical commander at this level draws upon resources made available

at the operational level. Navy tactical logistics encompasses the logistic support of forces within a battle group, amphibious readiness

group and Navy elements ashore, from both afloat platformsincluding the Combat Logistics Forceand shore-based logistic support facilities. The tactical-level support functions include maintenance, battledamage repair, engineering, cargo handling, fueling, arming, moving,

sustaining, materiel transshipment, personnel, and health services.

Marine Corps tactical logistics, combat service support, is provided by

a combat service support elementorganized to provide maintenance,

supply, motor transport, medical, dental, engineering and landing

supportwhich complements the organic logistic capabilities of the

aviation and ground combat elements.3

This proper mix of logistic support is provided by organizations that begin with the manufacturer, training facilities, and depots,

and end with the needed products, trained personnel, transportation

assets, equipment, and services that support the user. This spans the

strategic, operational and tactical levels of logistics, consisting of support organizations that are manned with high-quality, well trained

personnel from active and reserve forces and the civilian sector. Continuity of logistic supportin providing an uninterrupted flow of

supplies, maintenance, transportation, health service, combat engineering and personnel-related servicesis paramount to success.

— § — § — § —
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11 NDP 4

CHAPTER TWO

Fundamentals of Naval

Logistics

“To be a successful commander at any echelon, you had better think

about logistics and you had better make sure that when you are ready

to go you have enough fuel, beans, bullets and bandages—all of the

things to sustain your force.”

— General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC

Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1993

P

rinciples, functions, and elements of the logistic process

are fundamental to the mission of supporting operational readiness. Combined as shown in Figure 2-1, these

fundamentals define the naval logistic processproviding the proper

products and right level of support to the fleet and force. The following discussion of these interrelated fundamentals will provide insights

into the complexity and essential capabilities of naval logistics.
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NDP 1, Naval Warfare, describes the principles of war,4 which

apply to combat everywhere. The logistic corollary to the principles of

war are: responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability,

sustainability, and survivability. They serve as a guide for planning and

conducting logistic support of naval operations. Both the operational

force commander, who needs to know the effective limits of the available logistic support, and the logistic planner, who has to ensure that

all the essential elements and full capacity of the logistic system are

incorporated, must understand these principles. They represent the

strengths we seek in our support mechanisms and illustrate potential

vulnerabilities to be exploited in attacking the enemys logistic system.

4

 The principles of war are: objective, mass, maneuver, offensive, economy of force, unity

of command, simplicity, surprise, and security.

FIGURE 2-1
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Principles of Logistics

Responsiveness. Providing the right support at the right time,

at the right place. This is the most important principle of logistics.

Ensuring that adequate logistic resources are responsive to operational

needs should be the focus of logistic planning. Such planning requires

clear guidance from the commander to his planners; also, it requires

clear communication between operational commanders and those who

are responsible for providing logistic support. The operational

commanders concept of operations must be thoroughly familiar to

the supporting elementsto ensure responsive, integrated support. Responsiveness is a product of logistic discipline, as well. Commanders and

logisticians who consistently overestimate their requirementsin quantity and priorityrisk slowing the systems ability to respond.

Simplicity. Avoiding unnecessary complexity in preparing,

planning and conducting logistic operations. Providing logistic support never is simple, but the logistic plans that utilize the basic standard support systems usually have the best chance for success. Mission-oriented logistic support concepts and standardized procedures

reduce confusion. The operational commander must simplify the

logistic task by communicating clear priorities, and forecasting needs

based on current and accurate usage data.

Flexibility. Adapting logistic support to changing conditions.

Logistics must be flexible enough to support changing missions, evolving concepts of operations, and the dynamic situations that characterize naval operations. A thorough understanding of the commanders

intent enables logistic planners to support the fluid requirements of

naval operations. In striving for flexibility, the logistic commander

considers such factors as alternative planning, anticipation, the use of

reserve assets, and redundancy. The task-organization of combat service

support units is an example of flexible tailoring of logistic support

resources to meet anticipated operational requirements.

Economy. Employing logistic support assets effectively. Accomplishing the mission requires the economical use of logistic support

resources. Logistic assets are allocated on the basis of availability and
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the commanders objectives. Effective employment further requires

the operational commander to decide which resources must be committed immediately and which should be kept in reserve. Additionally, the commander may need to allocate limited resources to support conflicting and multiple requirements. Prudent use of limited

logistic resources ensures that support is available where and when it

is most needed. Without economy, operational flexibility becomes

compromised.

Attainability. Acquiring the minimum essential logistic support to begin combat operations. Risk is defined as the difference

between the commanders desired level of support and the absolute

minimum needed to satisfy mission requirements. The commander

must determine the minimum essential requirements and ensure that

adequate logistic support levels have been attained before initiating

combat operations. In some cases time will permit building up support levels beyond minimum essential requirements. During Operation Desert Shield, for example, the coalition retained the operational

initiative and delayed the commencement of combat operations until

a six-month supply of materiel was in theater and available to the

operating forces. In this case, the commander was able to attain the

level needed to satisfy mission requirements.

Sustainability. Providing logistic support for the duration of

the operation. Sustaining the logistic needs of committed forces in a

campaign of uncertain duration is the greatest challenge to the logistician. Every means must be taken to maintain minimum essential

materiel levels at all times. This requires effective support planning that

incorporates economy, responsiveness, and flexibility. Sustainability also

is influenced by our ability to maintain and protect the ships and

aircraft that move materiel to and from the operational theater.

Survivability. Ensuring that the logistic infrastructure prevails

in spite of degradation and damage. Logistic support units and installations, lines of communications, transportation nodes, and industrial

centers are high-value targets that must be protected by both active and

passive measures. For examplesince we may not always have the

luxury of conducting replenishment in protected rearward areas
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survivability of our at-sea replenishment ships is an important factor in

maintaining logistic flow. Dispersion of installations and materiel is another element of a logistic defense plan. Easier management of resources

might favor centralized logistic locations, but the survivability of logistic

support may require decentralized locations. The dispersion of reserve

stocks, development of alternative sources of supply, and phasing of

logistic support all contribute to survivability. Alternative logistic sites and

transportation networks should be considered. Continued survivability

also requires that logistic operations not be dependent on a single source

or mode of support. The use of advanced support bases, other Services,

multinational, and host nation support also should be considered as a

means of enhancing the survivability of naval forces. In addition, we must

be prepared to restore vital logistic nodes that suffer battle damage.

Such preparation requires our ability to decontaminate, reconstruct, or

relocate key elements of the logistic infrastructure.

Logistic principles seldom have equal influence; usually, only

one or two dominate in a specific situation. At times, the principles

may seem to make conflicting demands, depending on the situation.

For example, a need for absolute responsiveness may require actions

that are not economical. As such conflicts illustrate, the principles

of logistics are meant as a guide for planning support operations,

not a checklist. Identifying the principles that must take priority in

a specific scenario is crucial, and influences the development of our

support plan.

PHOTO 1-6
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THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS

The Seoul-Inchon Operation

The amphibious assault by United Nations forces at Inchon during

the first months of the Korean War provides a classic example of observing

the principles of naval logistics for success in combat.

On 25 June 1950, armor and infantry units of the Democratic

Peoples Republic of (North) Korea invaded the Republic of (South) Korea

and within a month had driven not only South Korean but newly deployed

U.S. ground forces into the southeastern corner of the peninsula around

the port of Pusan. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who served

as U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and Commander-in-Chief, United

Nations Command, directed General Walton Walker to hold at Pusan with

the 8th Army. Understanding the relationship between war and logistics,

MacArthur also decided to execute an amphibious landing at the port of

Inchon, to be followed by the recapture of the nearby South Korean capital

of Seoul. MacArthur recognized the North Korean vulnerability, created by

their lack of consideration for the logistic principle of survivability, and

sought to exploit it. He reasoned, that by cutting the North Korean main

supply and transportation arteries passing through Seoul, U.N. forces would

be in position to cut off and destroy enemy forces or force their withdrawal

from South Korea.

MacArthur, however, had only limited combat and logistic

resources to carry out his bold plan. To strengthen the U.S. economic

picture and bolster our allies in Europe in the years before the Korean War,

President Harry S. Truman had sharply reduced the personnel, ships,

aircraft, and equipment of the U.S. armed forces. The principle of economy

strongly influenced MacArthurs operational decisions. As he planned for

the Inchon landing, codenamed Operation Chromite, he ensured that he

met the needs of his forces fighting in the Pusan perimeter and elsewhere

in the theater. For example, he pressed into service 30 tank landing ships

(LST) manned by Japanese civilians and operated by a U.S. occupation

agency in Japan. MacArthur, a veteran of many successful World War II

operations, concluded that his logistic plan was attainablethat his forces

would have the minimum essential logistic resources to launch the assault

at Inchon.

Because of the Navys inherent flexibility and mobility, the ships

of the Military Sea Transportation Service (now Military Sealift Command)

and fleet transports embarked Marine, Army, and Air Force reinforcements

in the United States and Europe and delivered them expeditiously to the

combat theater. MacArthur had the option of deploying these troops to

staging areas in Japan, plugging them into the front lines at Pusan, or
17 NDP 4

putting them ashore at Inchon. MacArthur and Rear Admiral James H.

Doyle, Commander Amphibious Group 1 and the Navys chief planner for

Operation Chromite, kept their logistic concept of operations simple. The

Navys logistic forces were expected to provide primary support for the

forces ashore and to sustain a high tempo of operations until the 8th Army

linked up with the Inchon-beachhead forces.

The aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and shorebased air units of Admiral C. Turner Joys Naval Forces, Far East Command,

were close at hand to ensure the survivability of the troop transports,

amphibious landing ships and craft, and logistic support vessels of Vice

Admiral Arthur D. Strubles Joint Task Force 7, as these units deployed into

the Yellow Sea on 13 and 14 September. The American warships, along with

British, Australian, New Zealand, Dutch, French, and South Korean

combatants, guarded against the limited threat posed by North Korean air

and naval units. The U.N. fleet also was prepared for a greater danger

intervention by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.

In a stellar example of responsiveness, the logistic forces of

Strubles task force arrived off the landing beaches at Inchon on 15

September, D-Day, fully prepared to accomplish their mission. Transports

disembarked the troops of the 1st Marine Division into landing craft and

tank landing ships, which headed for the designated assault beaches. Oilers

and an ammunition ship stood by to replenish forces afloat and ashore. In

one of the most critical preplanned actions taken at Inchon, naval leaders

beached eight LSTs, each loaded with 500 tons of food, water, ammunition,

fuel, and vehicles. These materials were of vital importance to the Marines

expected to hold precarious positions overnight before the next mornings

tide brought in more troops and supplies. Soon after the Marines secured

their beachheads, Navy Seabees moved in and erected a pontoon dock. By

mid-morning on D+1, the men of Naval Beach Group 1 and a Marine

Shore Party battalion also had landed and unloaded 4,000 tons of cargo

from the LSTs, several of which had suffered damage from enemy weapons.

These ships were replaced quickly by another nine fully loaded ships. Over

the next several days, Navy transports brought in more U.S. Marines, South

Korean Marines, and U.S. Army infantrymen. By the 19th of September,

1st Marine Division forces had captured the city of Inchon and Kimpo Air

Base, from which Air Force air transports soon operated. Meanwhile, Army

troops broke out of the Pusan perimeter. They linked up with their fellow

soldiers south of Inchon on the 27th. Seoul fell to U.N. forces the following

day. By the end of the month, only an exhausted and demoralized remnant

of the once-mighty Communist invading army had survived the hasty

retreat into North Korea. U.S. Naval logistic forces could take much of the

credit for the stunning U.N. victory at Inchon.
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Functional Areas of Naval Logistics

The most successful plans consider the application of each

logistic principle across the six broad functional areas of logistic support. The products of these six functional areas, when combined and

balanced, produce and deliver effective logistic support to our operating forces:

l Supply l Maintenance

l Transportation l Engineering

l Health Services l Other Services

Supply.Receive, store, issue, and resupply materiel for conducting

naval operations. The supply function includes design, procurement,

contracting, receipt, storage, inventory control, and issuance of end

items, repairables and consumable materiel, and eventual retrograde

or disposal. The supply system equips and sustains our operating

forces from predeployment through combat operations and subsequent redeployment. The needs of the supported naval forces drive all

supply efforts. To help manage these many needs, supplies in the

Defense Supply System are divided into ten classes.5

 Our supply system is organized to be flexible and responsive to the commanders

support requirements.

Maintenance. Those actions necessary to preserve, repair, and ensure

continued operation and effectiveness of weapon systems (e.g., ships and aircraft)

and components. It includes the policy, organization, and issues related to

the maintenance of equipment, afloat and ashore; development of

maintenance strategies; standards of performance for both preventive

5

 The Defense Supply System, containing several million different items, includes the

individual Service Supply Systems. These items are grouped into the following classes of

supply recognized in joint operations and as defined in Fleet Marine Force Manual

FMFM 4, Combat Service Support Manual and Army Field Manual FM 101-5-1, Operations, Terms, and Symbols. The classes are: I - subsistence; II - clothing, individual

equipment, tools, administrative supplies; III - petroleum, oils, lubricants; IV - construction materiel; V - ammunition; VI - personal demand items; VII - major end items: racks,

pylons, tracked vehicles, etc.; VIII - medical materiel; IX - repair parts; X - materiel for

nonmilitary programs.
19 NDP 4

and corrective maintenance; technical engineering support; and battledamage repair. The collection and analysis of materiel maintenance

data supports the procurement and acquisition processes. The levels of

maintenanceorganizational, intermediate and depotare discussed

later in this chapter (Sustainment).

Transportation.The movement of units, personnel, equipment, and

supplies from the point of origin to the final destination. Transportation

involves deploying and sustaining forces within the continental United

States to ports of embarkation, movement from those U.S. embarkation ports to the operational theater (intertheater strategic movement), and movement within the theater (intratheater movement). At

aerial and sea ports of debarkation, other responsibilities of transportation support include offload, operational control of the ports, and

management of the throughput. The theater reception and intratheater

movement of personnel and equipment, medical evacuation, and retrograde of materiel are also part of the transportation function.

Engineering.Provide the construction, damage repair, combat engineering, and maintenance of facilities. Specialized units or technically

trained personnel provide combat and civil engineering support to the

commander. The supported commanders priorities and allocations

dictate the supporting engineers actions. Marine division engineers

provide combat engineer support by carrying out missions related to

mobility, countermobility, and survivability in forward areas. This includes breaching and emplacing obstacles, maintaining lines of communications, and constructing forward arming and refueling points.

Marine combat service support engineers also provide general engineering support in the form of construction, water purification, and bulk

fuel support. Naval Construction Force units complement Marine airground task force engineer capabilities by upgrading roadway systems,

developing aviation support facilities, and erecting combat zone hospitals. Naval Construction Force units provide the additional capabilities

of well drilling, and construction and repair of expeditionary piers and

ports. Civil engineers plan, contract, construct, maintain and repair

shore facilities, manage environmental matters, construct deployable

medical facilities, store and distribute water and fuel, generate power,

provide public works, and maintain utilities.
NDP 4 20

Health Services. Support the health of the military force.

Health services are designed to preserve, promote, and improve the

health of naval personnel, as well as their families. Health services provide medical and dental materiel, blood and blood products, and facilities and services in both combat and non-combat environments. Services such as medical and dental support may be an integral element of

a shipboard medical departments sick bay, a mobile shore-based facility (e.g., a battalion aid station), or a fixed outpatient and inpatient

facility. Health services include providing emergency and routine

health care to all personnel; advising commanders on the state of

health, sanitation and medical readiness of deploying forces on a

continual basis; maintaining health and dental records; keeping a

current mass casualty plan; training personnel in basic and advanced

first aid; maintaining medical intelligence information files; implementing preventive-medicine measures; and ensuring combat readiness of health-care personnel assigned to various wartime platforms

through continuous training. Health services also provide routine

and contingency medical and surgical augmentation to selected ships

through Fleet Surgical, Medical Mobilization Augmentation Response,

and Medical Augmentation Program Teams. Naval health services

include contingency facilities such as hospital ships and fleet hospitals, and the Marine Corps medical and dental battalions. Health

service logistics provide medical and dental materiel (class VIIIA) and

blood and blood products (class VIIIB).

PHOTO 2-9
21 NDP 4

Other Services. Provide administrative and personnel support to keep combatant forces fully operational. This function includes

all aspects of personnel support, quality of life, and morale issues that are

essential to sustained combat effectiveness. A direct relationship exists

between adequate, well-orchestrated services and high morale and combat effectiveness of our forces. The function contributes to operational

readiness through direct personal support. Other services include:

l Administration. Maintains personnel records and

documents, pay entitlements, promotions, and personnel movement and assignment status.

l Billeting. Provides short- and long-term housing for

military and associated civilian support personnel.

l Disbursing. Pays naval force obligations, including

personnel and logistic support.

l Exchange Services. Provides goods and services at a

savings to military personnel and their families. Afloat

ships stores provide personal necessities as well as laundry, dry cleaning and barber facilities.

l Food Services. Furnishes meals for naval personnel.

l Legal Services. Provides legal assistance as necessary.

PHOTO 2-11
NDP 4 22

l Morale, Welfare and Recreation. Offers recreational,

sports, community, youth, and child-development programs, as well as cultural opportunities.

l Mortuary Services. Searches for, recovers and identifies deceased personnel and provides final disposition

of their remains and personal property.

l Postal Services. Provides mail services for naval forces.

l Religious Services. Enables exercise of religion and

accommodation of many faiths and practices. Religious-program personnel are stationed both ashore

and afloat to support the gamut of naval operations.

Logistics is much more than the amalgamation of its functional areas. Although all six areas must exist to enable a ship, battalion

or other unit to perform its assigned missions successfully, each area

must be properly combined and integrated into the commands planning and operations to provide the needed flexibility and adaptability.

Elements of the Logistic Process

Within each of the functional areas, four elements of the

logistic processacquisition, distribution, sustainment, and dispositionplay important roles in recasting our national resources into

the products and services we need to support our operational readiness. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, acquisition of weapons and support

systems, end items, commodities, facilities, and ordnance is the process that provides new or improved logistic support over the long

term, through formal planning, programming, and budgeting; distribution is the process in which logistic support is allocated and

delivered to maximize combat effectiveness; through sustainment we

ensure adequate logistic support to permit continuous operations

without interruption; and disposition is the process that provides for

the return of excess or not fully capable materiel for repair, redistribution, or salvage. These individual processes, operating in each functional area, constitute our overall logistic process.
23 NDP 4

6

 The Defense Logistics Agency controls the Defense National Stockpile Center, the

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, and a network of other major supply centers, depots, specialized support points, and regional contract administrative offices that

acquire, store, issue, dispose of and manage common materiel for all Services. The General Services Administration provides management functions for common consumable

materiel and non-tactical automation systems.

Acquisition. Our investment in logistic support resources

and services provides the basic building blocks of operational readiness and sustainability. Our principal acquisition organizations are

the Systems Commands for both the Navy and Marine Corps (Naval

Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, Space and

Naval Warfare Systems Command, Marine Corps Systems Command, and the Naval Supply Systems Command), the Defense Logistics Agency, the General Services Administration, the Naval Facilities

Engineering Command, the Marine Corps Logistics Bases Command,

and the Naval Medical Logistics Command.6

 These organizations are

responsible for procuring, producing, or constructing commodities:

food, clothing, petroleum, oils, and lubricants, repair parts, and consumable medical support items; facilities: real property, buildings, piers,

and wharfs; ordnance: missiles, mines, torpedoes, ammunition and

explosives; and major weapon systems and end items such as ships, aircraft, and electronic systems. In addition, the Systems Commands are

FIGURE 2-2
NDP 4 24

responsible for life-cycle management, a significant and comprehensive systems support program known as Integrated Logistic Support.7

The Integrated Logistic Support program is a composite of all

the support considerations necessary to ensure the effective and economical support of our weapon systems. Integrated Logistic Support

starts in the concept phase and continues throughout the entire life

cycle of the weapon system, ensuring a disciplined, unified, and systematic approach to acquisition logistic management.

Acquisition of operational support systems includes the research, development, procurement and production of Combat Logistics Force and other Service Force ships; naval airlift, cargo and tanker

aircraft; strategic sealift ships; related logistic delivery system equipment; and Advanced Base Functional Components.8

Distribution. The methods used to get logistic support in the

form of materiel, support services, and personnel to the operational

commander depend upon what is being moved, its origin and destination, the lift assets available, and the urgency assigned. We select the

mode of transporting logistic support based largely on the weight,

size, and urgency of need. As recently as Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm, approximately 90% of the materiel transported to the

operational theater was by sealift; nevertheless, airlift continues to be

important (especially in combination with prepositioned assets) because it provides a rapid response to urgent materiel and personnel

needs. The logistic element of distribution includes organizations such

as the Defense Logistics Agencythe Department of Defenses principal distributor for materiel stored in and shipped worldwide from key

8

 Advanced Base Functional Components are discussed further in Chapter Four.

7

 Integrated Logistic Support includes technical data; supply support; facilities; personnel;

packaging, handling, storage, and transportability; training and training support; support

equipment; computer-resources support; maintenance planning; and design interface.

Related disciplines supporting the Integrated Logistic Support process include the computer aided logistic support systemContinuous Acquisition and Life-cycle Support; acquisition and logistic funding; configuration management; post-production support; ammunition; warranties; standardization; and logistic support analysis.
25 NDP 4

distribution depotsand the management and operation of ports in

the continental United States, strategic lift, in-theater support services,

intratheater shuttle lift, and individual unit or force-wide logistic

movement.

Continental U.S. Ports. Most of our equipment, systems, and

logistic support resources destined for deploying or deployed operating forces on air and sealift assets transit through continental U.S.

ports. These ports are used by all Services and, as such, require standardized and coordinated planning and management.

Strategic Lift. Global common-user land, sea, and air transportation of systems, equipment, and logistic support resources are

managed under a single unified command, the U.S. Transportation

Command. Actual lift resources are a combination of government

owned, controlled, or managed assets of the three Service component

commands. The Navys principal resource contribution is strategic

sealift, operated by the Military Sealift Command.9

 Sealift provides

the preponderance of all joint strategic lift capacity. Most resupply

flows by strategic sealift to forces ashore and afloat, but high-priority

cargo, mail, and passengers are transported most often by strategic

airlift, a primary responsibility of the Air Force, through the Air

Mobility Command. Ground transportation by truck and rail within

the continental United States is managed by the third leg of the U.S.

Transportation Commandthe Military Traffic Management Command, a responsibility of the Army. The Military Traffic Management Command also operates most continental U.S. military ocean

terminals and some selected overseas ports.

9

 The Military Sealift Command operates Maritime Prepositioning Ships organized into

squadrons around the world, other prepositioning ships containing Army, Air Force,

Defense Logistics Agency, and Navy equipment and supplies; fast sealift ships; dry-cargo

ships; general purpose oil tankers; hospital ships, aviation logistic support ships supporting

deployed Marine Aircraft Wings; Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force ships; and Special Mission

Support Force ships (e.g., cable-laying, survey, etc.) In time of war or national emergency,

the Military Sealift Command also would require activation of Ready Reserve Force ships

and as attrition fillers ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet that are maintained

in a peacetime inactive or reduced operating status by the Maritime Administration.
NDP 4 26

In-theater Support Services. Maintenance and distribution

support requirements for forward-based afloat or ashore naval units

in the theater of operations include cargo handling, warehousing,

repair ships, floating drydocks, towing and salvage, repair-parts

stockage and distribution, and personnel and health services. This

support may be provided in port and ashore, on specifically configured strategic sealift ships, or Combat Logistics Force ships that operate primarily with battle groups. (also called station ships.)

Shuttle Lift. Intertheater as well as intratheater air and

seaborne transportation of logistic support resources is provided by

Combat Logistics Force ships and Air Force or naval organic airlift

assets. Logistic support resources transported into the theater by strategic lift are generally redirected at in-theater support nodesnaval

advanced logistic support sites or naval forward logistic sitesonto

shuttle lift assets for onward movement or delivery.

Force/Unit Logistics. At the unit level, closely coordinated

shuttle lift, in-theater support services and organic distribution assets

complete the delivery of force requirements. At the tactical level, afloat

naval forces are replenished by the Combat Logistics Force station

ships. A ships organic aircraft also transports passengers, mail, and

cargo. Once deployed ashore, a Marine air-ground task force requires

considerable tactical transportation supportboth air and ground.

This transportation is typically provided by organic elements, other

Services, and the host nation.

Transportation capability easily can become the focus of distribution, but that is only one aspect. Distribution involves overall management, inventory control, and the integration of logistic information

support. State-of-the-art advances in information management techniques and applications such as in-transit visibilitythe computerassisted ability to track and locate materiel enrouteare enhancing

distribution management and inventory control and providing improved effectiveness in both transportation and distribution.
27 NDP 4

Sustainment. When national leaders call upon naval forces in

times of crisis, they look for both responsiveness and staying power.

Forward deployed naval forces carry with them initial sustainment

stocks to support operations and they are supported by an in-place,

efficient, functioning logistic system constantly flowing materiel and

logistic support that needs only to expand its flow to accommodate

increases in operating tempo and the assimilation of additional forces.

Consequently, an early action taken in crisis response is prompt reinforcement of the naval task forces logistic support pipeline. Continuous logistic support by that pipeline is particularly critical during the

initial stages of a crisis, to support potential long-term operations.

Proper sustainment capability allows our naval forces to remain on

station as long as needed. Establishing and maintaining this reliable

flow of materiel, resources, and support services to our operating

forces is accomplished through the operation and management of

supply systems, naval maintenance assets, and bases.

Supply Systems. The mission of supply organizations is to

provide for the peacetime and wartime operational materiel and

service needs of our forces in a timely manner. Activities include

cataloging, stocking, controlling inventory, and managing and disposing of replenishment supplies. In an effort to centralize materiel
NDP 4 28

management, many of these activities are provided by the Defense

Logistics Agency, which supports all Services. At the Service level, the

Naval Supply Systems Command conducts overall supply system management through inventory control points and Fleet and Industrial

Supply Centers. The Naval Supply Systems Command is the program

manager for such areas as food service, fuel management, materiel

resale, and printing. The Marine Corps Logistics Bases Command supports the Fleet Marine Forces by providing a full range of logistic

support (less medical materielclass VIII) including depot-level maintenance, storage, and distribution of Marine Corps equipment and supplies. The Naval Medical Logistics Command provides and coordinates

health service materiel management and logistic support to the operating forces, contributing to operational readiness by making available

necessary resources to maintain and restore healthy naval forces.

Maintenance. Naval maintenance philosophy employs a capability-tiered structure, with organizational, intermediate, and depot

levels of repair, depending on the technology employed and complexity of the weapon systems involved. At any level, maintenance can be

either corrective or preventive. The frequency and extent of planned

maintenance performed by fleet units and by naval or contractoroperated depots and shipyards on major end items or weapon systems

is established by the Integrated Logistic Support10 process during that

systems or items acquisition phase.

lOrganizational-level maintenance consists of unit-level inspections, servicing, adjusting, repair, and assemblygenerally conducted

without outside assistance.

lIntermediate-level maintenance is conducted in afloat units such

as tenders and our larger combatant ships, and ashore by specialized

elements of the Marine air-ground task force and fleet and contractorsupported facilities. The goal of intermediate-level maintenance is to

10 Two key products of the Integrated Logistic Support program are the Coordinated

Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) and Aviation Coordinated Allowance List (AVCAL).

These documents, developed by the Navy inventory control points, serve to authorize and

direct the applicable levels of spares and repair parts to be maintained by naval operating

forces for equipment systems on board ships and aircraft.
29 NDP 4

have a repair capability responsive to the needs of naval units, in any

location, with specialized facilities, tools, equipment, parts, and trained

personnel. The concept of battle force intermediate maintenance

activity is discussed in Chapter Four.

lDepot-level maintenance is provided by shipyards, ship-repair

facilities, aviation depots, in-service engineering centers, naval warfare

centers, weapons stations, Marine Corps multi-commodity maintenance centers, and civilian contractors where major industrial facilities and equipment are available. Commercial facilities are used to

supplement military-owned facilities. This capability focuses on overhaul, rebuild, and unique calibration of principal end items and major

repairables.

All levels of maintenancethe depot level, in particular

represent a wartime source of skilled artisans, capable of being organized into mobile battle-damage-repair teams who, along with other

maintenance personnel, ensure vital equipment readiness.

Bases. The operation and maintenance of bases, stations, and

facilities in the continental United States and overseas provide the

foundation for support of our operating forces. In addition, we construct expeditionary bases and strengthen existing bases and logistic

nodes with appropriate combinations of naval engineers and contracted capabilities, wherever conditions in the theater are austere and

infrastructure is scarce. The contracted capability of major U.S.-based,

internationally operating engineering and construction firms is an

enormous asset; frequently it is brought to bear where there are no

hostilities or where logistic nodes are located to the rear of the battle

or otherwise out of enemy striking range. Many support services

such as major health services, engineering support, and training facilitiesoriginate from bases, which also provide maintenance, repair,

and supply services. Safety and environmental policies and practices

are critical factors in base maintenance, as are the planning and

construction of roads, bridges, and facilities necessary to keep the

bases in operation. Temporary logistic support sites channel these

services to forward deployed forces as required.
NDP 4 30

Sustainment issues also include ensuring that backup sources

of vital materiel are available and recognizing the risks in relying

upon limited means of delivery of various forms of logistic support.

Other concerns range from replenishing the stocks of materiel that

have limited useful life to maintaining an orderly personnel turnover.

Disposition. The handling, stowage, retrograde, and disposal

of materiel and resources is a logistic consideration at all levels

strategic, operational, and tactical. Disposition is a matter of fiscal

and environmental responsibility, as well as a matter of security when

dealing with classified materiel. It is a significant contributor to our

ability to sustain our forces over the long term. The Defense

Reutilization and Marketing Service, controlled by the Defense Logistics Agency, is an integral component of disposition. It fulfills a significant role by providing worldwide support to the Services. Additionally, it has responsibility for the proper disposition of environmentally hazardous materials for the Services.

A primary consideration is adherence to environmental-protection laws, local through international. Avoiding adverse environmental impact requires responsible and conscientious action at all

levels. Noise, air, and water pollution, waste disposal, hazardous-materiel stowage, and disposal of shipboard hazardous waste are only a

few of the areas of concern. Such considerations impact our day-today operations, the way we use training areas during exercises, and

even our peacetime conduct in the ports we visit around the world.

Naval responsiveness and attention to environmental considerations have prepared us with an inventory of specialized systems, equipment, materiel, trained personnel, and a capability to

react to, or assist other agencies in, environmental contingencies.

Through the Navy Supervisor of Salvage, the Navy has prepared

worldwide contingency plans for response to Navy spills of oil or

hazardous materials and has prepositioned equipment throughout

the world to respond to these contingencies. This Navy-owned oil

spill response inventory is one of the largest in existence and has

deployed to every major U.S. oil spill in the last two decades. The

Coast Guard is the primary Service responsible for oil-pollution
31 NDP 4

response. When working closely with equipment and manpower

provided by the Navy Supervisor of Salvage, the Navy/Coast Guard

team has demonstrated its capability and expertise through assistance to clean up efforts ranging from major oil spills and accidental

releases to the malicious acts of environmental terrorism perpetrated by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

The process of disposition begins with the first piece of equipment or major end item that must be removed from the operating

theater for repair, replacement, or as excess for further distribution.

During war or major peacetime operations, it may be necessary for

some major items to return to theater after retrograde and refurbishment. Retrograde, the process of removing materiel and personnel

from theater, is a coordinated operation involving lift assets and

specialized salvage capability that may be necessary for large items

such as ships and aircraft. At the conclusion of conflict or of other

major operations, naval forces are likely to be the last to leave the

region. Assigned units organize and prepare to return materiel, or

dispose of it properly.

Principles, functional areas, and elements of the logistic process are the building blocks upon which we plan and organize logistic

forces and support. Logistic principles provide the framework for

arranging logistic support, in order to enhance the commanders

probability of successeven in the presence of unforeseen difficulties.

The principles, functional areas and elements of the logistic process

are interrelated and must be considered corporately in planning the

logistic support component of naval operations.

— § — § — § —
NDP 4 32
33 NDP 4

CHAPTER THREE

Naval Logistic Planning and

Information Support

“A sound logistic plan is the foundation upon which a war operation

should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot

be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or

at best be only partially successful.”

— Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN,

Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

The dynamic process of providing logistic support to our

operational forces is one characterized by the need to

respond to continuous change: e.g., changes in support

required because actual usage exceeds expected consumption; changes in

user location to keep ahead of enemy moves; changes in quantities

needed to replace losses in transit or at the theater depot. A responsive

logistic planning system and integral information support allow naval

logistics to keep up with these necessary changes to maintain our operational warfighting readiness through uninterrupted logistic support.
NDP 4 34

Naval logistic planning and information support is designed

to answer these questions: What materials, facilities, and services are

needed? Who is responsible for providing them? How, when, and

where will they be provided? To find answers, we start with sources of

logistic planning guidance, then apply a formal process that parallels

operational planning procedures. The nature of the situation will

determine whether we apply a deliberate or a crisis action planning

process. Using one of these processes, we formulate a general plan that

covers the organization, procedures, and policies of logistic support

groups and the specific directives or instructions detailing the execution of support for a particular operation. Naval logistic information

support allows us to keep the plan current, accurate, and adequate by

providing data on the status of logistic resources, operational force

needs, and the ability to meet those needs. Logistic planning and

information support are thus complementary. Information enables a

commander to apply his experience and judgment to deviate from

existing plans. Similarly, formal planning can organize and prioritize

a commanders information needs, allowing him to select the best

courses of action and adapt what he knows to the situation.

Logistic Planning

Logistics is the responsibility of the operational commander,

who must ensure that his operations and logistic experts integrate

their operation and logistic plans. Overall feasibility of these plans

will be determined by their ability to generate and move forces and

materiel into the theater, then forward to our operating forces.

The complexity of planning would be extremely daunting, but

for the fact that both logistic and operations planning are organized

processes. Logistic planning is performed in parallel with naval operations planning. Logistic planners identify and resolve support problems early by working concurrently with, and in support of operations planners. All planners must consider the overall support requirements and capabilities. This is accomplished by working back

from established objectives, and addressing such issues as adequacy

and availability of resources. The result of this process is a logistic

concept of operations that parallels the commanders concept of
35 NDP 4

operations, permitting subsequent detailed, tactical-level, support planning. Detailed logistic planning should:

l Earmark significant time-phased support requirements

l Identify transportation requirements to support the

movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies

l Outline the capabilities and limitations of ports, including the Logistics-Over-The-Shore11 capability to respond

to normal and expanded requirements

l Recognize support methods and procedures required to meet

the needs of the sea, air, and land lines of communications

l Coordinate and control movement into the contingency area

l Develop reasonable logistical assumptions

l Define the extent of needed host nation resources

l Identify the engineering and construction requirements

for sustainability

l Identify the source of funding for logistic support

l Consider the meteorologic and oceanographic limitations.

Sources of Logistic Planning Guidance

“Logistic considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of

military planning during the process of preparation for war and for

specific wartime operations, but may well become the controlling element with relation to timing and successful operation.”

 — Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, USN

Address to the Naval War College, 1954

11 Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) operations. The loading and unloading of ships without

the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or non-defended territory, and, in time of

war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition from the

enemy. Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) operations are conducted by forces of two

or more service components.
NDP 4 36

The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy,

Unified Command Plan, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan all

form the basis of the theater campaign plan, and, in turn, the logistic

support plans. These broad documentsin particular, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which conveys the Chairmans guidancecontain

the basic planning assumptions for developing regional plans. Navy

and Marine Corps Capabilities and Mobilization Plans, and the Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan contain detailed policies

and force capabilities and allocation for each logistic functional area.

Logistic planning guidance establishes planning assumption

boundaries, to make the intended logistic support both reasonable

and tenable. This guidance applies to all categories of planning.

Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning. Logistic planning

covers the full range of operations. Some likely contingencies will

allow the relative luxury of time to employ deliberate planning; others will require crisis action planning to meet demands for quick

response. Deliberate planning can take years; some crises may allow

only hours. Although military flexibility requires a capability to conduct short-notice crisis planning when necessary, our nations military strength is enhanced by deliberate peacetime analysis, planning,

and exercises. Deliberate planning and crisis action planning often

occur concurrently.

Both types of planning use a similar process, to move the right

blend of combat and support forces, equipment and supplies into a

theater of operations, on time.

The Logistic Planning Process.

“A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis

of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take

risks with those factors, and battles are won by taking risks.”

— Napoleon, ca. 1805
37 NDP 4

Command carries the responsibility to move, support, protect,

and coordinate assigned forces to accomplish the mission. The planning

process that assists in carrying out these duties includes the commanders

estimate of the situation, the commanders plan, the commanders directive, and the execution (including supervision) of the plan. Figure 3-1

illustrates the parallel nature of logistic planning in concert with operational planning. No single precise planning formula will work in every

case, but the basic building blocks in this standard planning process

allow the commander to issue his directives in a clear, familiar format

while preparing to carry out the mission.12

Commanders Estimate/Logistic Estimate. Given a mission

(which may include mission constraints), the commanders planning

staff analyzes the situation, developing and proposing several feasible

courses of action. The commander then selects from proposed possible courses of action the one he judges most likely to succeed. Using

this course of action, the commander then develops a brief concept

12 The naval planning process is discussed in depth in both Naval Doctrine Publication 5

Naval Planning and Naval Warfare Publication 11 Naval Operational Planning.
NDP 4 38

of operations which states, in broad terms: what is to be done; the size

of the force needed; and the time frame. This concept of operations

identifies the problems planners must address in positioning, sustaining, and defending the force. Accordingly, logistic planners must:

l Understand the mission and the commanders intent

l Identify the means necessary to accomplish the mission

(resource requirements in terms of forces, capabilities,

sustainment, and lift)

l Know the time available for both planning and executing the mission

l Identify the order in which forces and materiel are

needed

l Identify and adjust for shortfalls

l Assess risks, based on the difference between desired and

attainable amounts of support.

The logistic estimate and concept of operations are prepared

concurrently with the commanders estimate and concept of operations. In many cases, logistic limitations and plans will become a

deciding factor (even the focus of effort) in the commanders plan.

The logistic estimate tells the commander which operational course of

action is most supportable from a logistic standpoint, and lists the

measures needed to overcome logistic problems or factors limiting

support for each course of action. Together with estimates prepared

by other staff divisions, the logistic estimate provides key conclusions

and recommendations to assist the commander.

Using data from the logistic estimate and information pertaining to the commanders selected course of action, the planners

develop the logistic concept of operations concurrently with the

commanders concept of operations. Just as the commanders concept of operations outlines a broad course of action to accomplish

the mission, the logistic concept of operations outlines a broad plan

of support. The commanders intent, concept of operations, and

other command priorities drive the logistic concept of operations,
39 NDP 4

which also includes the division of effort among the operational

components. The logistic concept also establishes the Joint Force

Commanders responsibilities, as well as those of the Service components.

Commanders Plan/Logistic Plan. During the planning

phase of this process, the commander develops a detailed plan for

accomplishing the selected course of action. The logistic plan is developed concurrently with, and as a part of, the operation plan to describe in detail associated logistic tasks. The Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System encompasses both deliberate and crisis action

planning and is used to monitor, plan and execute mobilization,

deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with

joint operations. With this system, planners can assess quickly the

feasibility of their plans in terms of resources and transportation

considerations.

In deliberate planning, theater commanders and their staffs

transform planning requirements into a family of operation plans to

meet requirements in the theater. The plan-development phase includes both the operational and logistic plans and directives. From a

logistic planning perspective, the most difficult task occurs during the

plan-development phase of deliberate planning, when support requirements are determined and time-phased deployment schedules are

developed. Logistic planners must determine the quantities of

sustainment (supplies, equipment, and personnel) needed to support

particular courses of action. The gross quantities are then converted

into number of personnel, weight, square footage and volume, and

then lift requirements are calculated and phased into the deployment

plan. The actual support calculations are based on consumption rates

developed by the Services. These consumption rates vary with the class

and subclass of supply, theater or area of operations, expected combat

intensity levels, and projected duration of the operation.

The starting point for crisis action planning, on the other

hand, may be an existing operation or concept plan. An operation

plan may require updating, while a concept plan will require full

development beyond the approved concept of operations. In many

cases, however, the uniqueness of the crisis may require the timely
NDP 4 40

creation of a concept of operations, development ofalternative courses

of action, and development of force deployment schedules for each

alternative. We may be forced to develop and evaluate logistic support

plans concurrently with alternative courses of action using an iterative approach. Once a particular course of action is selected, we can

finalize force, lift, and sustainment requirements. Here too, development of crisis action plans inherent in the Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System relies heavily on its automated data processing

capabilities.

Using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System,

planners can build an effective combat and support force package and

calculate the logistic support and sustainment requirements. Normally,

specific ships are not identified to support plans developed during the

deliberate planning process, but typical or notional force packages are

identified and unit characteristics are listed in the Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System data base. During the crisis action

planning process, specific ships and shore logistic support sites are identified for the particular operation and their capabilities are compared

to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data.

Operational Directives/Logistic Annex. During the directive phase, the commander communicates his planned organization

and tasks to his subordinates through operation plans (in deliberate

planning) or operation orders (in crisis action planning). Within

these plans or orders the commander expresses the end state he desires

by way of the commanders intent. Generally, the logistic plan is

placed in an annex to operational directives with amplifying appendices for each logistic functional area. In the logistic plan, tasks are

assigned to particular elements of the force. These taskings include

establishing and maintaining the logistic pipelinefrom identifying

lines of communications and setting up advance bases and facilities,

to managing in-theater distribution of supplies, setting priorities for

intratheater transportation, medical evacuation, the use of host nation and contractor support, the disposition of captured materiel, the

purchase of regional resources, and container management in the

objective area.
41 NDP 4

Supervision of the Plan. During the execution phase, the

commander monitors the operation to see if it is accomplishing the

mission, and whether he needs to revise his directives. Such evaluation

is essential to our logistic systems ability to anticipate and respond to

changes. Commanders at each level of the chain of command must

be ready to modify existing support plans whenever necessary. With

every change, we refine the logistic plan.

Strategic-level logistic refinement is conducted primarily by

the Service logistic sourcing agencies, the Defense Logistics Agency,

and the Service components of the unified commands. The purpose

of refinement is to confirm the sourcing of logistic support and to

assess the adequacy of the resources to support the planned operation.

It allows us to resolve resource shortfalls (forces, materiel, or lift) as

well as problems regarding non-unit personnel and cargo movement,

materiel retrograde, medical evacuation, and materiel resupply. Refinement conducted at this level eventually affects all levels.

Logistic Planning Considerations. Throughout the planning process several important considerations influence the feasibility

of our logistic options and the strategies from which we may choose.

Issues such as the availability of strategic lift assets; joint, interagency,

international, and host nation support; and environmental concerns

impact our courses of action and our ability to execute them.

Transportation Planning. This is perhaps our most important planning consideration. Phasing personnel, equipment and supplies into the theater ensures that terminals and ports of entry are not

gluttedbut more important, phasing ensures that the right combinations of combat-ready units arrive on time with proper logistic

support. The enormous amount of cargo and people that must be

moved to any theater of war, the time constraints, and the many ways

of moving logistic support require that logistic planners organize and

prioritize the employment of strategic lift assets. There never is

enough strategic lift to move everything simultaneously.
NDP 4 42

Initial decisions regarding power projectionespecially the

type and number of forcesare decisive in determining the character

of an operation. If we initially deploy an abundance of combat power

with inadequate logistical support, this may not only hinder the longterm logistical support of the operation, but also the success of the

operation itself. At the other extreme, if we decide to inject an early

logistical buildup, we may place materiels at risk and find ourselves

struggling to build up our combat power with the remaining lift.

These decisions normally are among the first to be made. Because

there is limited strategic lift, the essential tradeoff is between projecting combat forces rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat

power and logistical resources to accomplish the mission. The selection of the earliest arriving unitswhether they are combat or combat service supportwill have broad implications.

If the right units deploy earlyproperly balanced between combat and combat service supportthey will allow the force to respond to

unforeseen events. In areas with substantial infrastructure, the commander may weight his force more heavily with combat units. When

we enter an austere theater, combat service support units will be needed

early in the flow to facilitate the reception and onward movement of

forces. This will reduce the number of combat units and potential

combat power arriving early in theater. These decisions are most difficult when combat has not yet begun, and the enemy can provide

effective low-grade opposition or attack suddenly. The commander must

seek a balance that provides effective initial combat power and critical

logistic support to respond to a variety of situations.

In formulating the transportation aspects of the plan, lift

requirements are defined as forces and cargo that must be moved,

their origins and destinations, and their required delivery dates. The

goal of this planning segment is to provide the theater commander

the support he needs using the fewest possible support personnel and

the minimum support infrastructure. Running computer simulations

that compare requirements and capabilities produces time-phased

force and deployment data that assist planners in the task of managing deployment resources. If these simulations show transportation
43 NDP 4

shortfalls, planners can devise ways to eliminate bottlenecks or redesign

the plan to fit the constraints. Transportation sequences that function

properly in simulation are designated as transportation feasible, and

considered effective for planning. The time-phased force and deployment data also helps to provide flexibility to planning, allowing transportation packages to be rapidly developed or modified in crisis situations.

Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Host Nation Support.

The reality of a changing and politically complex world affects our operational planning and the availability of joint-service, interagency, multinational and host nation support must be included in our logistic support

considerations. Much of our operational and logistic planning involves full

integration and participation in joint and multinational operations. Similarly,

our planning must consider Department of Defense interservice agreements. For example, the Navy provides outfitting and logistic support to

Coast Guard ships, aircraft, and facilities to ensure that the Coast Guard

is prepared to carry out assigned naval warfare tasks while operating with

the Navy.13 Special aspects involving joint and multinational participation

include:

13 Additional details are contained in OPNAV Instruction 4000.79_, Policy for U.S. Navy

Support of the U.S. Coast Guard.

PHOTO 3-11
NDP 4 44

l The capability to support or receive support from joint or

multinational forces

l Assignment of logistic responsibilities and servicing arrangements by the Joint Force Commander

l The tactical and physical limitations of participating

units from other Services and nations to receive and

provide logistic support using naval systems

l Early contracting for foreign logistic support (including

contractual and finance personnel) and other host

nation support, to ensure access to the required host

nation capabilities.

The emphasis on joint integration demands coordination

among diverse functions and organizations. Procurement, transportation, supply, personnel, maintenance, health-services systems and

information must be compatible to find, acquire, store, move, and

track resources from one Service or location to another. For example,

such organizations as the Defense Logistics Agency and General Services Administration support all Services and coordinate their activities with the transportation component commands of the U.S. Transportation Commandthe Military Sealift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Air Mobility Commandin addition to host nation communication and transportation functions.

The magnitude and complexity of major force deployment and resupply stretches each distribution element to its limit. Without interagency coordination, forces and logistic support will not arrive at

their destination in adequate quantities or on schedule.

Environmental Planning Considerations. Environmental

issues may be addressed during the development of a logistic support

concept and plan. The law and the public require our continued

adherence to the regulations protecting the world we live in. But our

acceptance of this responsibility is not driven solely by legal concerns. Environmental issues affect the health, safety, and readiness

of our forces. We readily address these issues in our peacetime dayto-day operations, but in contingencies these matters loom largest

after the expeditionary operation is concluded and the retrograde
45 NDP 4

phase commences. Foresight and guidance in planning the operation can preclude unnecessary actions from being taken during the

operation that impact the environment adversely, afloat or ashore.

Separate from how we impact the environment is the way the

environment affects logistic planning. Meteorologic and oceanographic conditions affect logistic operations by influencing routes

and arrival times of the supply tail, controlling movement of Logistics-Over-The-Shore operations, and even dictating the quantity of

materiel required to complete the mission. Timely and accurate meteorologic and oceanographic information is essential and must be

considered throughout the logistic planning process.

The bridge between planning and execution requires a system

for direction and control. Logistic support information both

undergirds our planning and becomes the bridge to execution of the

logistic plan.

Logistic Information Support

“Gentlemen, the officer who doesn’t know his communications and

supply as well as his tactics is totally useless.”

— General George S. Patton, USA

Providing logistic support is a process of resource

prioritization, allocation, distribution, and management. Locating

and moving logistic support in a way that gets the right materiel,

personnel, and services to the right users on time requires reliable

logistic information support. Such support provides vital data before,

during, and after the planning process. It allows the commander to

disseminate his logistic plan and enables him to coordinate and direct

the distribution of logistic support during the plans execution.

Interface with the Planning Process. Logistic support information systems are essential tools that assist the planner in:
NDP 4 46

l Translating plans and command decisions into the

physical distribution of support resources

l Monitoring to ensure that the logistic system is responding to end-user requirements

l Informing the end user about the status of delivery.

Whatever the nature of the conflict or forces involved, logistic

information will be a major factor. Logistic information support

provides important planning data for such basic questions as: What

do I have? What do I need? When will I get it? What will I do with

it? The questions may appear simple, but the answers are spread among

many dispersed areas of the logistic pipeline. This requires that planners have access to an integrated information network which will

enable commanders and their staffs to plan, control and coordinate

logistic support operations.

Logistic Command, Control, and Communications. Logistic information support assists the commander in aligning his logistic

support systems with the structure and employment of his combat

forces. This unity of effort is best obtained through a single command

authority, exercising command and control over his combat forces

and the support system that sustains them. Effective logistic command and control is characterized by:

l Timely and accurate receipt of requirements, expenditure information, and shipping status

l Accurate inventory visibility, including materiel in

transitTotal Asset Visibility14

l Effective information management

14 Total Asset Visibility: A system that provides information for both operational commanders and logistic managers on the location, quantity, condition, movement, and

status of assets throughout the Department of Defense logistic system. In-transit Visibility, a subsystem of Total Asset Visibility, has the ability to track the identity, status, and

location of Department of Defense unit and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum,

oils, and lubricants) and passengers, medical patients, and personal property from origin

to destination.
47 NDP 4

l Flexible support that allows the reroute of cargo based

on operational need

l Accessibility to the support system data base

l Proper positioning with respect to transportation

hubs and theater(s) of operation.

These characteristics require redundant and reliable communications that link users, providers, and commanders. Despite the

apparent abundance of such modern communications technology as

satellites, computers, and fiber-optic transmission, communications

capacity is a limited resource. There always will be competition for

communications, whether afloat or ashore. Therefore, communications for logistic support must be viewed as an operational requirement, not an administrative one. Logistic support connectivity is

neither optional nor insignificant, in terms of its requirements for

dedicated connectivity to update logistic requirements and resource

availabilities.

Information Vulnerability and Security. New and evolving

strategies and technology advances are improving our decision-making processes. These advances keep us prepared to perform wartime

missions, as well as those that occur across the full range of power

projection and forward presence missions. Such technologies as electronic mail and electronic data interchange, using readily available

commercial communication links and global computer networks, are

becoming a routine part of our logistic planning environment. The

collective volume of unclassified, discrete pieces of logistic data can

reveal the classified intent and objectives of the force. Logistic planners and operational forces must recognize the importanceas well as

the vulnerabilityof our logistic information and take the necessary

steps to protect and back up these systems.

The aim of any military organization is to produce the most

effective combat power with the resources available. Detailed naval

logistic planning and accurate logistic information support form the

bedrock of our naval combat power and force readiness.

— § — § — § —
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49 NDP 4

CHAPTER FOUR

Naval Logistics Operations

“Integrated support resources in the form of fleet-based sustainment

assets and strategic assets provide naval expeditionary forces and joint

and multinational forces the ability to operate in peacetime and in war

wherever and whenever our national interests demand. Our ability to

move and sustain forces at great distances from our shores is critical to

the forward presence component of our military strategy.”

— Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare

Readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility

are the qualities that permit naval forces to be

expeditionaryable to establish and maintain a forward presence around the world. Effective logistics is essential for our

naval forces to function in this expeditionary role conducting operations at sea and from the sea in support of the National Military

Strategy.
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The continuous flow of logistic support can be viewed in terms

of pipelines that channel supply, engineering, transportation, maintenance, health, and other services from sources to end users. They

also have the important capability of responsible disposal or return

of excess materiel and inoperable items that are beyond the capacity

of in-place repair facilities. At the entry, exit, and forwarding or intermediate staging nodes of the pipelines, are points where we obtain

and feed back information while factoring in the considerations of

the planning process. The concept of logistic pipelines oversimplifies

a complex process, but it is useful in describing the flow of logistic

support. Figure 4-1 illustrates this flow.

The flow of logistic support begins by obtaining services and

commodities from reliable, high-quality sources. This support enters

the pipelinethe combination of facilities, installations, ships, aircraft, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain,

issue and move the necessary support with and to naval forces around

the world. To direct and manage the specific distribution of logistic

support to the end user, we use a concept of intermediate points,

which may be thought of as support nodes. We complete the pipeline

by including a means of flowing logistic support back out of the

FIGURE 4-1
51 NDP 4

theater, during and after the operation. This entire pipeline is linked

by the skill and dedication of thousands of professionalsline and

staff corps officers and enlisted personnel from both the active and

reserve components as well as civiliansinvolved in logistic planning

and execution. Depending on the operation, portions of the pipelineadvanced support bases, host nation support and othersmay

not exist and will need to be constructed, developed or contracted.

Sources of Logistic Support

Logistic support of naval operations depends heavily upon the

intricate and substantial infrastructure and industrial bases in the

continental United States. In time of national emergency, the mobilization process provides additional sources and a significant increase

in the volume of this support. In addition, we obtain significant

logistic resources and services from other Services, agencies and supporting nations.

Continental United States. The majority of our logistic support materiel and services are either produced, provided, or managed

from the continental United States. We depend upon many foreign

subcontractors and component manufacturers; the relative extent of

this dependence is taken into account in assessing our national security. Many of our logistic support personnel obtain their training and

experience at U.S. bases, shipyards and medical facilities. Our nations

commercial infrastructure is the foundation of our logistic support

system at the strategic level. It relies on the industrial base for technology, raw materials, and manufacturing to provide our nation sufficient materiel to support existing systems and produce and support

new ones. The nations agricultural and energy sectors are key components of the industrial base. This infrastructure produces our principal end items (ships, aircraft, weapon systems), and secondary items

(components needed to support our end items and personnel), and

maintains the constant flow of these items that we either consume or

stockpile. The capability to produce these materielsboth those readily

available and others requiring long lead timesmust be adequate to

meet (in a timely manner) the demand generated by the operational

tempo of our forces.
NDP 4 52

Mobilization. The flow rate of the logistic pipeline is linked

directly to the mission requirements of our operating forces. Increases

in our operating force activity must be met by a concurrent mobilization of the logistic resources and services required to support accelerated

operations. Mobilization entails assembling and organizing national

resourcese.g. personnel, transportation, industry, energy in time of

war or other emergency. Mobilization is designed to augment the size

of the armed forces through the call-up of reserve individuals and units.

It includes the following categories: Selectivelimited call up to meet

domestic and other emergencies; Partialexpansion of the armed forces

to meet the requirements of war or national emergency from an external threat to national security; Fullcall-up of all reserve components

in the existing approved force structure; Totalorganization and generation of additional units and personnel beyond the existing force

structure. The authorities used in mobilizing reserves, e.g., either a

presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency, also

make available additional authorities for mobilizing the industrial base.

We must discuss mobilization when addressing sources of logistic support; even though our logistic process remains essentially unchanged,

mobilization produces a significant increase in the volume of resources

flowing into the logistic pipeline.

 Fleet support at the shore maintenance facilities, intelligence

centers, supply centers and headquarters staff units, among other activities, uses a wide range of reserve capabilities. Similarly, support areas

such as health services, legal and religious programs depend in large

part on the professional skills of reservists. The experience and skills of

reserve forces are essential and can be used as deployable assets or as

supplements following crisis deployment of their parent elements.

Because we cannot predict when our logistic system must increase or accelerate its output of logistic resources and services, it is

important to monitor and evaluate the systems capability to surge in

time of national emergency, well in advance. Our nations ability to

supply the logistic pipeline and the capability of that pipeline to

deliver needed logistic support to our operational forces continues to

be analyzed routinely in wargames, simulations, and operational exercises. A full analysis of our logistic pipeline potential in time of war

starts with an assessment of our nations industrial preparedness.
53 NDP 4

Industrial preparedness planning is conducted by each Service. This planning analyzes the capability of the nations industrial

bases to support increased output of naval systems, equipment, and

logistic resources and services in the event of mobilization. Industrial

preparedness is closely related to peacetime acquisition and procurement activities. Industrial preparedness planning reviews surge and

production capability, research and development, the availability of

raw materials, the status of strategic stockpiles, industrial infrastructure, and the skilled labor pool. To ensure that U.S. industrial capability will be able to support the demands of mobilization, our nation

uses a combination of strategies that includes new production, restart

production, sustained low-rate production, and high-rate production

with storage. Appropriate use of these strategies should occur during

peacetime to ensure the availability of critical materiel during crises.

Joint and Multinational Support. Logistic support in joint

and multinational operations traditionally has been the responsibility of each participating Service. The concept of collective logistics,

however, allows us to use limited resources more efficiently. At the

operational level, the theater commander may direct cross-servicing

(where the cost of support is reimbursed), common servicing (where

expenses are not reimbursed), or joint servicing (where expenses are

shared). In the joint Services case, the theater commander may direct

Service components to support the joint force with particular logistic

functions, based on that Services being the dominant user or the

most capable provider. For example, non-naval support may be provided by organizations such as the Armys Corps Support Commands

for common or cross-service support, the Defense Logistics Agency for

joint Service support, the Air Force for common-user airlift, and foreign countries for host nation support.

A joint force commander must be able to integrate the logistic

functions of participating Services and collaborating nations alike. Joint

logistic integrated operations include such operational support as Joint

Logistics-Over-The-Shore Operations, cross-service agreements, and

executive-agency assignment in particular functional areas. Servicing

arrangements not only provide financial savings by reducing redundancy; they also can enhance our force mobility while simplifying the
NDP 4 54

overall organization by minimizing the support infrastructure we must

establish in-theater. To realize these benefits, our planning must be versatile enough to take full advantage of joint and multinational logistic

capabilities. Policies that are consistent with each Services and each

nations specialized needs, standardized procedures, uniform standards,

common terminology, and the free exchange of information at all levels

of command will enhance the logistic support we receive and can provide in joint operations.

Host Nation Support. Host nations can be a source of logistic

support, drawing upon their local infrastructure and resources. During

contingencies, they can reduce the demands on our strategic lift resources. Resources from host nations encompass locally produced or

stored goods and access to facilities and in-theater services such as

maintenance, transportation, health services, personnel support, and

other activities required for immediate support and sustainment. Prearranged host nation support can supplement significantly the ability to

meet logistic support demands coming directly from continental U.S.

sources. Such arrangements include the operation, maintenance, and

security of ports or the construction and management of roads, railways,

and inland waterways. In addition, provisions for health service and

subsistence support, pipelines and bulk storage, and operation of existing communications networks may be negotiated, as well as transportation, civilian labor, communications services, and local security and police

forces. When host nation support has not been prearranged, it may be
55 NDP 4

necessary to negotiate such support on deployment. In these circumstances, deployed forces may require the presence of trained contractual

and financial personnel to arrange for certain aircraft repair and master

ship maintenance contracts, to secure transshipment points for logistic

supplies, and to provide ready and rapid access to port facilities.

Support Nodes

Support nodes such as advanced support bases and sites correlate force needs and logistic status information and assist in matching the flow rate of services and materiel from sources to users, so that

transfer and delivery is controlled and efficient. Additionally, they

contain prepositioned stocks and are focal points where the flow of

logistic support is received for further redirection or staging. Although

most of our support nodes are located overseas, interfacing between

continental U.S. bases and forward-deployed naval expeditionary

forces, support nodes also can be U.S. bases supporting naval force

operations directly. Support nodes ensure that logistic support is available and gets to the end user.

Continental U.S. Bases. Naval depots, inventory control

points, distribution centers, logistic bases, arsenals, medical facilities,

personnel support activities, homeports, and operating bases located

in the United States provide the majority of logistic support to U.S.

naval operations. While in continental U.S. bases, our forces receive

fuel, housing, engineering, contracting, and personnel support servicesand, at some locations, intermediate maintenance support.

Naval forces maintain their inventories of food, fuel, repair parts,

consumables and ammunition by drawing upon these bases to support their day-to-day needs. Across the full range of operations in

peace and war, these bases are the principal interface for our forces

operating in local regions and are the first extension of the logistic

pipeline to our advanced support bases.

Advanced Support Bases. Advanced support bases are essential support nodes. Advanced bases are overseas areas or localities in

or near the theater of operations from which we organize logistic

facilities to conduct and support naval operations. Advanced support
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bases may be joint and may be configured to support multinational

operations. Advanced support bases may be permanentlong term,

well-developed installationsor situational facilities established to support specific operations. Permanent bases are generally integrated into

the logistic support capabilities of the host nation, and have, or have

access to, well-established airlift, sealift, storage, and transshipment facilities. These bases are designed to support both our day-to-day forward presence and our crisis-response operations. When logistic support from existing permanent bases is either inaccessible or inadequate

for a particular contingency, we may use available host nation facilities

or construct temporary advanced support bases for the situation, using

civilian contractors or the Naval Construction Force. The use of situational (temporary) bases allows us to position logistic support nodes in

the best proximity to the operation. Primarily established ashore, temporary support bases consist of naval forward logistic sites, which are

positioned as close as possible to our operating forces, and naval advanced logistic support sites, which are located in the theater of operations but remote from the immediate battle area.

Collectively, our sources of logistic support are capable of providing all the materiel and services we need to continue operations. The

capacity to supply such needs, however, can exceed the receiving capability of any individual unit or task force. Early in the deployment phase

of Operation Desert Shield, very little materiel was moved into theater,

mostly because of lift constraints. Later, when theater stock objectives

were raised from 30 to 60 days of supply, and sealift was not a constraining factor, containerized subsistence items were pushed into theater

without in-transit visibility of the contents, resulting in significant delays

at the receiving docks. This problem was compounded by a lack of

logistic discipline. Delays would cause commanders to reorder and raise

the shipping priority of all their needs to the highest level regardless of

the item. The problem was diminished by implementing an apportioned

lift philosophy, under which each component commander had his own

daily tonnage of lift and could set his own priorities. Logistic discipline

and properly functioning support nodes that monitor and regulate logistic

flow are essential to providing the logistic support at the time it is needed.
57 NDP 4

Naval advanced logistic support sites are designated to receive

(from airlift and sealift), store, consolidate, and transfer logistic support materiel, services, and personnel. In many situations this logistic

support may go directly to our forward-deployed units. Naval forward

logistic sites assist naval advanced logistic support sites by staging and

facilitating locally the throughput of battle-damage repair and equipment-maintenance services as well as high-priority cargo. They may

expand to include capabilities nearly equivalent to that of a naval

advanced logistic support site. Temporary bases are dynamic. As the

operation moves, additional naval forward logistic sites may be established or disestablished as required.

Temporary support bases may draw upon war reserve materiel,

facilities, and host nation provided services. They are staffed by naval

component theater support personnel and augmented by specialized

packages of personnel, facilities, equipment, or materiel. These groupings are known as Advanced Base Functional Components.15 Each is

15 Two reserve organizations have been created to enhance operational requirements

through coordination of shore-based logistic support. The Logistics Task Force (LTF) was

created to assist the Fleet Commanders-in-Chief in planning and execution of logistic

functions, and to obtain appropriate mix of reserve forces at shore-based logistic support

nodes. The Expeditionary Logistics Support Force (ELSF) was established to organize,

equip, and train the supply, transportation and fuel-related Advanced Base Functional

Components.
NDP 4 58

designed to fulfill a specific capability. By combining a number of these

packages, the theater commander can supplement or expand organic

capabilities of assigned forces to meet operational requirements. Capabilities of Advanced Base Functional Components include administration, harbor control/defense, communications, supply/fuel/transportation,

maintenance, cargo handling, health services, ordnance, camp and welfare, construction and engineering, and special groups.

The ultimate goal of advanced basing is a logistic structure that

is flexible, supports the concept of operations, and meets the needs of

the warfighters. Advanced support bases are an essential link in providing responsive and continuous logistic support when naval forces are

functioning independently or together with joint and multinational forces.

Staging/Prepositioning. Closely linked to the advanced support bases concept are the concepts of forward positioning stocks and

staging war reserve materiel. Forward positioned stocks are intended

to bridge the gap between a conflicts initial logistic needs and the

time that continental U.S.-based stocks begin to flow into the theater

to sustain prolonged combat operations. Separate from forward-positioned stocks, placing war reserve materiel at advanced support bases,

in theaters of potential conflict, reduces intertheater lift requirements

and frees strategic lift assets for other use.

Although not all war reserve materiel is prepositioned, staging

critical materiel at forward deployed or U.S. based locations in advance of requirements enhances considerably the mobility of our

operating forces, by allowing them to proceed directly to a troubled

region where this materiel can be made available immediately. Measured in days of supply, war reserve materiel includes mission essential

major end items, secondary items in all classes of supply, and munitions organized into two major categories: starter stocks and swing

stocks.16 Our overall war reserve materiel requirements are based on

16 Additional details are contained in DoD Directive 3110.6_, War Reserve Material

Policy.
59 NDP 4

supporting operational and other stockage objectives consistent with

Secretary of Defense planning guidance. Starter stocks are allocated to

the forces assigned in a unified command. They are located in or near a

theater of operations and intended to provide the initial sustainment of

our combat forces in a crisis until resupply at wartime rates is established. Landing Forces Operational Reserve Material, prepositioned on

board selected amphibious ships, is an example of a starter stock.

Swing stocks complement starter stocks as a follow-on source

of supply in a contingency and can be stored afloat or ashore. These

stocks are sized and organized to support more than one contingency

in more than one theater of operations. Collectively, swing stocks are

held by the Services or by Department of Defense materiel managers

until assigned to a particular combatant command. These stocks also

may be relocated to support contingency needs. The materiels associated with the Advanced Base Functional Components are considered

mostly swing stocks because this materiel is directed into a theater of

operations when the component is mobilized. Specific stocks

prepositioned afloat are a special subset of war reserve materiel.

In the late 1970s, the United States began a program of storing Marine Corps combat equipment and consumables in commercial ships with civilian crews, when suitably located sites for logistic

shore depots were unavailable in Southwest Asia. The concept called

for the U.S.-based Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to be airlifted

to a port where they could marry up with the equipment and

supplies to perform their assigned mission. Today, the Afloat

Prepositioning Force has evolved into two programs: the Marine

Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Prepositioning Ships,

which support all Services.

The Maritime Prepositioning Force is considered a naval

power projection asset because of its significance in supporting the

employment of naval expeditionary forces. The Maritime

Prepositioning Force consists of three squadrons of civilian-owned

and operated roll-on/roll-off ships under long-term lease to the

Military Sealift Command. Each squadron is loaded with all the
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equipment needed to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

of up to 16,500 personnel and associated Navy support elements, and

30 days of supplies. Special mobile cargo-handling and port-operations

units are trained and equipped to deploy and offload these ships rapidly

once they reach port. In time of war or national emergency, a unified

commander-in-chief can commit these stocks to regional conflicts.

Maritime Prepositioning Force stocks are counted as part of the overall

war reserve materiel assets.

The Prepositioning Ships consist of a combination of government-owned and leased ships managed by the Military Sealift Command. These ships, strategically located around the world, contain

stocks of subsistence items, construction supplies, medical supplies,

ammunition, packaged and bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants supporting all Services. Although most afloat prepositioned stocks are stored in

general bulk quantities, some of the ships supporting the Army are loaded

with unit sets of equipment and have a limited in-stream offload capability.
61 NDP 4

The receiving, staging, and management functions of support

nodes such as advanced support bases, continental U.S. bases, and

prepositioning sites allow them to collect and feed back critical data

to the logistic information system on the needs and logistic status of the

operational commander. Their primary purpose, however, is to get logistic support and services to the end usersnaval forces operating at sea

and ashorepromptly and efficiently.

End Users

Logistic support users are the operating forces, afloat and ashore,

located around the world. The variety of fleet customers in terms of

needs, priorities, location, and receiving capabilities requires a flexible

and responsive support system. Determining what support is needed

and when that support should be inserted into the distribution pipeline

is a significant challenge confronting logisticians at all levels. Continuous logistic support depends on predicting future consumption accurately, determining what the end user will need, and getting it there. In

war, particularly with short-notice hostilities, consumption rates are

unpredictable, communications between the theater and the support

infrastructure may be limited (or unavailable), and delivery times uncertain. Weighing these impediments to availability, the logistic commander considers the advantages and disadvantages of two primary

concepts of providing support. Materiel and support forces can be

provided from staging points without request, based on anticipated

needs (push), or as determined by user demand (pull).

Pushing Supplies into TheaterProviding certain support automatically can reduce the administrative burden on the

operational commander. The push concept requires an accurate

estimate of the expected tempo of operations and the consumption rate of various kinds of materiel and other support. Underestimating consumption may result in a shortage; overestimating

creates in-theater receipt and storage problems. For these reasons,

the push system is seldom used at the strategic level to resupply

a theater. However, its use at the operational and tactical levels,

within a theater, is far more common.
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PUSHING SUPPLIES IN THEATER

During the latter stages of Operation Desert Shield, Marine forces

prepared to conduct a two-division breach of the Iraqi defenses in western

Kuwait. The Commander of the Direct Support Command task-organized

the combat service support element to help implement the commanders

intent. He selected a system of support in which materiel was automatically

provided, based on anticipated needs. This push system required the

combat service support area be established in close proximity to the

breaching operation. The staging area selected was named Al Khanjar, the

Dagger. In just 14 days the 11,280 acres of Al Khanjar encompassed a 780-

acre ammunition supply point, a tank farm holding 5,000,000 gallons of

fuel and 1,000,000 gallons of water, and the third-largest Naval hospital in

the world. Al Khanjar was key to providing combat service support to the

1st and 2d Marine Divisions. During their attack to Kuwait City, specific

quantities of rations, fuel, and ammunition were pushed from Al Khanjar

to the attacking units (tactical level). Predetermined quantities of supplies

also were pushed from other ports to maintain the desired dump levels at

Al Khanjar (operational level). This combination of operational and tactical

level use of the push system provided uninterrupted support and

flexibility as the Marines fought through the Iraqi defenses during the

liberation of Kuwait.

Pulling Supplies into TheaterIn the pull concept of

supply, an operating unit directly controls the reorder of materiel to

replace consumed stock as well as the calls for engineering, maintenance and other support forces. This concept has been a logical outgrowth of improved communications between strategic, operational and

tactical logistic levels and a more responsive distribution pipeline. Initially, combat forces may enhance their mobility by carrying only a basic

level of support. As our forces advance, however, replacement of their

consumed stocks becomes increasingly dependent on establishing and

protecting intermediate resupply points.
63 NDP 4

In support operations at seaas well as from the seawe

employ a combination of both methods. At the strategic and operational levels, Navy Combat Logistics Force ships, tenders, maintenancerelated ships, hospital ships, and organizational and intermediate maintenance activities all push most of the projected logistic support into the

theater, based on the anticipated level of operations. At the tactical level,

combat forces requisition (pull) their specific needs, according to their

consumption rates and employment, from in-theater Combat Logistics

Force ships and advanced bases. Combat Logistics Force ships replenish their stocks by requisitioning (pull) replacement materiel from rear

area bases. Pull is frequently considered when we desire to minimize the

battle forces footprint, are significantly limited by a shortage of transportation assets, or when time is insufficient to allow for push operations.

In a large operation requiring significant logistic support afloat as well as

ashore, the logistic commander weighs the benefits and risks of both

methods and may choose push, pull or a combinationbased on the

mission, amount of logistic support needed, and the environment in which

this support is provided.

Support At SeaNaval Forces Afloat. The ability to replenish our naval forces at sea enables the United States to maintain its

forward presence, and conduct operations of unlimited and uninterrupted duration close to areas of interest. At-sea replenishment encompasses the coordinated movement of passengers, mail, cargo, and

bulk liquids for deployed forces as large as a battle group to individual

ships and submarines conducting independent operations.

The task of supporting naval forces afloat requires that coordinators carefully balance time, sources of support, the priority needs of

our deployed forces, and current force operations. For example, timely

handling, delivery, and dispatch of mailcrucial to morale and administrative continuitymay be integrated with an emergent requirement

to transfer essential repair materiel or support personnel. Balancing

and coordinating logistic support for naval forces afloat is accomplished

with a cadre of highly trained personnel, dedicated to keeping the

logistic pipeline flowing. They get logistic support materiel and services

made available by the Combat Logistics Force to and from end users
NDP 4 64

by using the specialized underway replenishment capability of our ships.

These coordinators manage the commanders support resources, maintenance capabilities and organic distribution assets.

Versatile and reliable systems allow us to take advantage of

scheduled and unscheduled opportunities to resupply our forces at

sea. Although circumstances may dictate in-port replenishment, the

uniqueness and flexibility of naval logistics is best exemplified by

replenishment at sea. Using both connected and vertical replenishment operations, we routinely resupply our ships underway. Connected replenishment employs rigs to transfer fuel, stores, and ammunition while one or more ships steam alongside a delivery ship. Vertical replenishment delivers stores, ammunition and other supplies by

helicopter. This fast and efficient means of replenishment is conducted daily, around the world, in the same manner in peacetime as

in wartime.

Employing underway replenishment, battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and individual ships receive supplies at sea from

Combat Logistics Force ships.17 The Combat Logistics Force is highly

mobile and carries a broad range of stores, including fuel, food, repair

parts, ammunition, and other essential materiel to keep the naval

forces operating at sea for extended periods. It consists of station

ships, shuttle ships, and a variety of other support ships.

 Station ships bring logistic support to and accompany naval

forces. Navy-crewed or crewed by Military Sealift Command personnel and military detachments, they support a typical battle group

with fuel for 20-30 days, consumables other than fuel and ordnance

(e.g., food, paint, rags, and lubricants) for 75 days, spare parts for 90

days, and ordnance. Station ships such as oilers, ammunition ships,

and stores ships, typically carry multiple products and have seakeeping

characteristics that allow them to operate with the battle group.

17 The Combat Logistics Force includes both active Navy ships and those operated by the

Military Sealift Command within the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force.
65 NDP 4

Shuttle ships include oilers, ammunition ships, and stores ships

crewed by Military Sealift Command personnel and military detachments. Shuttle ships resupply both the station ships and combatants and

are themselves resupplied at advanced support bases or continental

U.S. bases. When distance or consumption rates outstrip the capacity of

the shuttle force, the Merchant Ship Naval Augmentation Program ships

augment the Combat Logistics Force. They are part of the Ready Reserve Force and are maintained in an inactive or reduced operating

status, available to get underway in 5-20 days.

Other support ships include Navy-crewed tenders and salvage

ships. Tenders are specially configured to provide intermediate-level

maintenance support to deployed and non-deployed forces.18 They

have full intermediate-level repair capability in the hull, mechanical,

and electrical repair areas and have extensive battle-damage repair

capabilities. Although initially designed to serve one type of customer,

they are becoming increasingly able to support both surface ships and

submarines. These ships typically provide their support services from

relatively secure ports or anchorages, with the tended forces coming

to their location. Salvage ships are configured for off-ship firefighting,

diving, towing and salvage missions. These ships normally operate

independently of naval force formations and can provide rapidresponse, first-line battle damage repair. The Combat Logistics Force

makes it possible to implement the philosophy of maintaining high

logistic support levels and the concept of centrally coordinating

maintenance and battle damage repair capabilities, as well as sharing

needed parts and limited support personnel.

In conflict as well as day-to-day operations, commanders recognize the need to replenish their ships on a regular and sometimes

spontaneous basis in accordance with the established logistic support

plan. As the naval expeditionary force commander positions the force

at sea, sustainment requirements may change quickly. Opportunities

to conduct replenishment operations may be unpredictable and

18 Aircraft carriers and aviation amphibious ships (i.e., LHA, LPH, and LHD) also possess

an organic hull, mechanical, and electrical repair capability and all have an Aviation

Intermediate Maintenance Department.
NDP 4 66

should be exploited rapidly when available. Ships on the front line are

rotated regularly with fresh ships to conduct needed replenishment in

protected rearward areas. In exercise scenarios, we build in replenishment periods as an integral part of underway operations. Such considerations as the nature of the operations, regional tensions, availability of

logistic resources, and minimum and desired logistic support levels established by the theater commander drive the frequency of these needed

replenishment periods. Factoring in all these concerns and the need to

anticipate contingencies, commanders aggressively seek opportunities to

top off their logistic support levels whenever possible. Having the requisite supplies and materiel on board, however, fulfills only part of the

requirements that enable our forces to remain on station. Using that

materiel, we keep mission-essential and safety-related equipment in

repair, using on board repair capability and the battle force intermediate

maintenance activity concept.

The process of coordinating the organic capabilities, resources

and personnel of the ships in a naval force to sustain battle readiness

underway and on station is accomplished with the battle force intermediate maintenance activity management concept of operations.

Battle force intermediate maintenance activity coordinators screen,

broker and conduct underway repairs using the ship best able to

accommodate the work. Having comprehensive information on such

inherent naval force capabilities as structural, mechanical, electrical,

electronics, communications, and avionics repair, these coordinators

also can arrange outside assistance when the situation is beyond the

capability of the naval force. The logistic information that helps the

battle force intermediate maintenance activity coordinator manage

repair efforts efficiently also permits the efficient distribution of critical support personnel and materiel.

The material control officer concept is another naval force

logistic concept of operations that enables ships within a group or

theater to obtain spare parts urgently required on one ship that may

be available for redistribution from another ship. In addition, medical, chaplain and other logistic support is shared as available and

needed among ships of the naval force. The battle force intermediate
67 NDP 4

maintenance activity and material control officer concepts promote the

efficient and economical self-sufficiency of our deployed ships.

The movement of passengers, mail, and cargo is essential in

sustaining our forces at sea. Using the Combat Logistics Force, our

specialized replenishment capabilities, and logistic concepts of operations, we enhance force readiness and end-user self-sufficiency while

deployed.

Support From the Sea—Naval Forces Projecting Power Ashore.

“No matter who carries the load in any fight—soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines—they need to be supported and supplied from the

sea.”

— Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN

Supporting naval operations from the sea involves the same

naval logistic system that supports operations at sea: the Combat

Logistics Force, advanced support bases, and the continental U.S.

infrastructure. As naval expeditionary forces conduct power projection ashore and battlespace dominance from the sea, logistic support

must be able to sustain our forces at sea while extending an equally

flexible and responsive system ashore to support the landing force.

The commanders intent and the operational concept will determine

whether the logistic system and combat service support will be seabased or evolve to shore-based logistic support.
NDP 4 68

Amphibious forces represent the naval expeditionary forces

forcible-entry capability. These forces deploy with sufficient supplies

for initial sustained combat operations. A landing force is an example

of a Marine air-ground task force, a task-organized, combined-arms

component of naval expeditionary forces. The Marine air-ground task

force contains four elements: the command element, the ground combat

element, the aviation combat element, and the combat service support

element. As is the case for units of battalion/squadron size or larger, each

element has limited organic combat service support capabilities and it is

the commanders responsibility to use these assets fully. The combat

service support element has the mission of supplementing the organic

support of each element of the Marine air-ground task force in all logistic

functions.19

Getting the landing forces ashore requires amphibious assault

shipping and tactical airlift. Sufficient assault shipping is not available

to transport the entire landing force. The landing force is therefore

usually divided into the assault echelon (transported in amphibious

assault shipping, and landed by assault craft and helicopters), and the

assault follow-on echelon (transported by commercial roll-on/roll-off

or containerships, and airlift). In addition, an expeditionary airfield

system enables Marine aircraft to rapidly transfer ashore and operate

from undeveloped bases and hastily constructed runways.

The buildup of both combat power and logistic support ashore

is facilitated by numerous temporary task organizations such as the

Tactical Logistics Group, the Landing Force Support Party, and the

Naval Beach Group. These organizations are composed of landing

force and Navy units and become responsible for the landing and

movement of waterborne troops, equipment, and supplies, plus the

evacuation of casualties and prisoners of war. In joint operations, the

Armys Terminal Service Units, long-haul truck, supply, and ordnance

units also may support amphibious operations.

19 Further discussions of Combat Service Support and logistic support for the Aviation

Combat Element are contained in Fleet Marine Force Manuals 4 and 5-1, respectively.
69 NDP 4

Three basic approaches to supporting amphibious operations and

power projection ashore are used: seabasing, sea echelon, and building up

logistics ashore through beach support areas and combat service support

areas. In seabasing, the majority of combat service support assets remain

afloat, sent ashore only when needed. Seabasing increases helicopter

support requirements. It provides flexibility and mobility in dispersing tactical forces in amphibious operations. Sea echelon reduces the concentration of amphibious ships in the immediate objective area where ships are

called forward only as needed. It requires detailed planning to ensure the

troops, supplies and equipment are embarked correctly to correspond

with phased entry. The third approach, buildup of logistics ashore, employs a beach support area developed by the landing support element,

which permits an initial buildup of sustainment ashore and establishment of

a combat service support area that provides sustained support to the

landing force.

The logistics ashore approach is situationally dependent, influenced by the expected scope and duration of the operation. In largescale scenarios in which there is no opposition by the enemy, LogisticsOver-The-Shore operations may be used. These operations are used to

sustain forces ashore after the assault and involve the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities during phases

of theater development. Logistics-Over-The-Shore can be used over

unimproved shorelines, in shallow-draft ports, in damaged ports, or in

ports with inadequate cargo offloading facilities to sustain forces ashore

after the initial assault. Some Logistics-Over-The-Shore operations may

become Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore operations, involving units and

equipment from the Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps. These operations

employ specially configured ships to facilitate offloading from other than

amphibious ships.
NDP 4 70

Supporting our forces ashore also depends upon special-purpose ships that can be activated on short notice to provide additional

intermediate-level health support and aircraft maintenance services.

Such shipping includes hospital ships and aviation logistic support

ships. Hospital ships are maintained by the Military Sealift Command in a reduced operating status, but are ready to provide full medical

care when activated. The medical spaces are fully equipped with stateof-the-art medical equipment and staffed by pre-identified medical personnel coming from shore-based naval hospitals. Aviation logistic support ships are dedicated sealift for moving or operating an aviation intermediate maintenance activity to support a deployed Marine air-ground

task force aviation combat element. Aviation personnel may deploy with

the ship or be flown in to rendezvous with the ship once it arrives in

theater. Intermediate maintenance and supply support may be performed

on board the ship, underway or at anchor, or the ship may be offloaded

as needed to an expeditionary site ashore. They are designed to embark

a task-organized Marine aviation logistic squadron, tailored to support

a particular mix and number of type, model, and series aircraft.

Naval logistic support at sea and from the sea relies on its complete integration with operational objectives. The logistic effort must be

adaptable to changing missions and priorities, continuous, and reliable

never becoming hostage to a single source or mode of support. Together, advanced support bases, prepositioned assets, and the Combat

Logistics Force provide flexible sustainment support of naval operations.

Retrograde and Disposal. Navy and Marine Corps forces are

most likely to be first on the scene when a crisis threatens U.S. interests.

They are also likely to be among the last to leave, after the situation

stabilizes. The redeployment of enormous numbers of personnel and

disposition of amounts of combat materiel is a significant responsibility

that requires detailed planning. The need to return personnel home

promptly and recover some equipments immediately is driven by many

factorsincluding security, morale, and political concerns.
71 NDP 4

Because of its unequaled capacity, sealift will deliver the vast

majority of war stocks in theater. Similarly, as forces redeploy, most of

the recoverable materiel will return by sealift, either via support nodes or

directly to its ultimate destination. During conflict, assets in need of repair

or refurbishment also may require movement out of theater. The naval

logistic system has the capability to ensure that this materiel is safely

returned to its ultimate destination (often the continental United States)

or responsibly disposed of without degrading the environment.

Another aspect of retrograde is the evacuation of sick and injured

personnel. Health Services provides five echelons of care. We achieve

continuity in care and treatment by moving the patient through a progressive, phased system, from the forward area of the combat zone extending

rearward, as required by the patients condition. Lower echelons of care

are highly mobile, with a very limited capability to provide extensive medical care. Higher echelons of care have greater capability to provide medical care but are less mobile. Health Services emphasize returning to duty

as many of the sick and injured as possible, while treating, stabilizing, and

preparing the remaining patients for evacuation to an appropriate rearward

echelon of care.

Planning for operations from the sea focuses on the buildup of

combat power ashore. Support for sustained operations ashore entails

marshalling and delivering considerable stocks of non-unit supplies,

equipment, and personnel. In most cases, significant quantities of these

supplies and equipment will not have been expended during the operation and will require movement out of the area for redistribution. Upon

completion of naval operations or during continuous routine operations,

personnel, equipment and cargo require movement from the theater of

operations back to the United States or to another theater. Such movements of personnel and items away from the theater are known as

retrograde or redeployment operations. Retrograde usually occurs at the

end of an operation, but battle-damaged equipment may require return

for repair during the operation. Perhaps the most impressive example of

this was the extraordinary three-day shipyard repair of the severely

damaged USS Yorktown (CV-5) in 1942. This heroic effort supported
NDP 4 72

RETROGRADE

Operation Desert Sortie

Promptly after the victory over Iraq, the Defense Department

began the sizable task of withdrawing U.S. forces and materiel from the

Arabian Peninsula. Between August 1990 and March 1991, the Navys

Military Sealift Command had delivered 459 shiploads of cargo to the

Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Additionally, the Air Forces Air Mobility

Command had also deposited sizeable cargoes in Saudi Arabia. By March

1991, approximately 6 million measurement tons of supplies and material,

including 945,000 pieces of unit equipment, remained in the theater. R-Day

was 10 March 1991, the official date when U.S. forces began withdrawing

from the region. Central Command planners divided the redeployment

into two, chronologically overlapping stages. Stage I involved the

redeployment of combat units and their equipment. Central Command

component commanders and those of other unified and specified commands

had worked up a time-phased force deployment list to determine the

sequence in which units would depart the theater.

To ensure rapid reconstitution of combat forces in the United

States, Europe, and the Pacific, personnel and their equipment withdrew in

unit formations. In general, U.S. Navy ships carried their own crews home,

while the Air Mobility Command transported Naval reservists. Ships carried

more than 95% of all material returned from the theater. Unlike similar

operations after the Korean and Vietnam wars, in Desert Sortie the United

States mounted an unprecedented effort to clean up the theater of

operations before closing it down. Before leaving the Arabian Peninsula,

U.S. forces dismantled buildings and other structures and put their bases

in trim. On the average, units left behind 20% of their personnel for

cleanup purposes and the disposition of material. U.S. personnel accounted

for, segregated, dismantled, cleaned, packed up, and loaded thousands of

armored fighting vehicles, trucks, and aircraft as well as enormous amounts

of equipment, ammunition, and supplies on board ships of the Navys

Military Sealift Command.

As Central Commands combat units departed, joint teams of

Military Sealift Command ship schedulers, Army stevedores, Navy cargo

handlers, Marine load specialists, and merchant ship crews coordinated the

redeployment of material. During the first 120 days of Desert Sortie, U.S.

forces shipped more than 117,000 wheeled and 12,000 tracked vehicles,

2,000 helicopters, and 41,000 containers of supplies. The joint teams often

loaded out more than 20 ships a week. By mid-July, the services had stowed

903,000 short tons of equipment in 236 ships. Delivery of the last

sustainment material the following December, 21 months after the end of

the war, brought to a close one of the most successful retrograde operations

in U.S. military history.
73 NDP 4

her return to service for the Battle of Midway, a major turning point of

World War II. Shipping used for transporting supplies to the theater is

usually available for retrograding this equipment although airlift may be

needed for urgent repairs or return.

In some cases, materiel may be designated for disposal instead

of retrograde. The handling, storage, and disposition of enormous

amounts of wartime materiel is a significant concern for a joint force

commander. Adherence to international, national, regional, state,

and local environmental protection laws is a personal responsibility

of naval commanders, ashore and afloat. Complying with these regulations requires conscientious action by everyone in the chain of

command. Noise, air, and water pollution, waste disposal, and hazardous materiel storage are only a few of many areas of concern. The

requirement to minimize environmental damage to training areas

also influences the conduct of training exercises. Many of these issues

impact on operations, and efforts to prevent or correct environmental damage also have significant logistic implications. Thus, while not

a specifically defined logistic function, environmental protection and

compliance impacts on many logistic support functions, especially

materiel, transportation, medical, and engineering.

 The concept of a logistic pipeline represents the enormously

complex execution of the naval logistic process. It illustrates a system

that observes the principles of logistics, channeling the elements of

the logistic process in each functional area. Functioning across the

wide range of operations in peace and war, it accomplishes the naval

logistic support goalgetting the right support to the right place at

the right time.

— § — § — § —
NDP 4 74

CONCLUSION

“Victory is won or lost in battle, but all military history shows that

adequate logistic support is essential to the winning of battles.”

— Dan A. Kimball

Secretary of the Navy, 1952

 Our nations military might is dependent upon our ability to

project power decisively. But power projection is more than striking

from a distance. It must include an ability to sustain the forces that

will conduct and exploit those strikes. Naval power projectionthe

application of offensive force against an enemy at a chosen time and

placeincludes and is made possible by a dynamic logistic support

system that extends from the leading edge of engagement all the way

back to our national industrial bases and worldwide sources of raw

material. We see the influence of our logistic system in every operation. When a weapon system is brought to bear, we count on its

reliability because it has been maintained by skilled technicians and

supported by an extensive supply and engineering network. When

Marines land across the beach, they know that complete stocks positioned for the operation will contain all the materiel they may need

until long-term sustainment is established, and the health-services

system that attended to their routine needs is ready for casualty response. Naval logistics is an integrated system that supports day-one

readiness, and provides substantial initial and continuous sustainment

through a responsive logistic pipeline that taps into the industrial

might of the United States.
75 NDP 4

Success or failure in military operations derives from the relative

combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy

and the leadership, skill, and tenacity with which it is applied. The

naval logistic system exists to meet the operational needs of our forces

and is linked directly to our combat power and ability to apply that

power. It is a tool of the commander, a component of his warfighting

effectiveness that assists him in seizing and maintaining the initiative.

Because of its critical role, it can also be a prized target of the enemy

if left unprotected.
NDP 4 76

GLOSSARY

Combat Service Support: The essential capabilities, functions,

activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating

forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater

logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered

by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and

ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their

missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating

forces on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Force Sustainment: Capabilities, equipment, and operations

that ensure continuity, freedom of action, logistic support, and command and control. (NWP 1-02)

Forward Presence: Forward deployed forces or forces overseas to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade

potential adversaries, and enhance the ability to respond quickly to

contingencies. (NWP 1-02)

Industrial Preparedness: The state of preparedness of industry to produce essential materiel to support the national military

objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Infrastructure: A term generally applicable to all fixed and

permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities for the support

and control of military forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)
77 NDP 4

Integrated Logistic Support: A composite of all the support

considerations necessary to assure the effective and economical support of a system for its life cycle. It is an integral part of all other

aspects of system acquisition and operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Interagency Coordination: Coordination within the context

of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs

between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary

organizations, and international organizations for the purpose of

accomplishing our objective. (Joint Pub 3-08)

Joint: Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in

which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

Lines of Communications: All the routes, land, water, and

air which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (Joint Pub

1-02)

Littoral: Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or

coastal region, within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking

power of naval expeditionary forces. (NWP 1-02)

Logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the

movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive

sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design

and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition

or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Maritime Prepositioning Force: Civilian-crewed, Military

Sealift Command-chartered ships which are organized into three

squadrons and are usually forward-deployed. These ships are loaded

with prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support

three Marine expeditionary brigades. (Joint Pub 1-02)
NDP 4 78

Starter Stocks: War reserve materiel stocks prepositioned in

or near a theater of operations and intended to last until resupply at

wartime rates is established. (DoD Directive 3110.6)

Swing Stocks: War reserve materiel stocks positioned ashore

or afloat for meeting war reserve requirements of more than one

contingency in more than one theater of operations. (DoD Directive

3110.6)

War Reserve Materiel: Mission essential secondary items,

major end items, and munitions required to attain operational objectives in the scenarios authorized for sustainability planning in the

Secretary of Defense planning guidance. (DoD Directive 3110.6)
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READING

OKeefe, Sean, Frank B. Kelso, II, and Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

 ... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992).

Dalton, John H., J.M. Boorda, and Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

Forward . . . From the Sea: Continuing the Preparation of the

Naval Services for the 21st Century. (Washington, D.C.: Department

of the Navy, 1994).

Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint

Operations (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff).

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, 28 March 1994.

Fleet Marine Force Manual 4, Combat Service Support (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Navy, 10 August 1993).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1, Organization and Function

of Marine Aviation (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Navy, 16

October 1991).

Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993).

Field Manual 100-10, Combat Service Support (Washington,

D. C.: Department of the Army, 18 February 1988).

Air Force Manual 1-10, Combat Support Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1 April 1987).

Ballantine, Duncan S., U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second

World War (Princeton University Press, 1947).
Carter, Worrall R., Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (Washington,

D.C., 1951)

Carter, Worrall R. and Duvall, Elmer E., Ships, Salvage, and

Sinews of War (Washington, D.C., 1954)

Clausewitz, Karl von, On War. Ed. and trans. Michael Howard

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Corbett, Sir Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

(Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

Dyer, George C., Naval Logistics (United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1962).

Eccles, Henry E., Logistics in the National Defense (The

Stackpole Company Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, May 1959).

Eccles, Henry E., Operational Naval Logistics (Bureau of Naval Personnel, NAVPERS 10869, April 1950).

Hooper, Edwin B., Mobility, Support, Endurance (Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1972)

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Mahan On Naval Strategy. Ed. J.B.

Hattendorf (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

Shrader, Charles R., U.S. Military Logistics, 1607-1991, A Research Guide, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct., 1992).

Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Ed. and trans. Samuel. B. Griffith

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War, Logistics from

Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Wylie, Joseph. C. Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), Military Strategy:

A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute

Press, 1989).
Naval Doctrine Command was established by the Department of the Navy in 1993. Its primary missions are to develop naval

concepts and integrated naval doctrine; provide a coordinated NavyMarine Corps voice in joint and multinational doctrine development; and address naval and joint doctrine with respect to training,

education, operations, exercises, simulations, and war games. To ensure doctrine remains relevant we encourage your feedback on this

publication and other doctrinal issues. Address your comments to:

Commander, Naval Doctrine Command

1540 Gilbert Street

Norfolk, VA 23511-2785

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