★ 99–006

107TH CONGRESS REPORT " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 2d Session 107–530

NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM ACT

JUNE 25, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. BOEHLERT, from the Committee on Science, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H.R. 4687] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Science, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 

4687) to provide for the establishment of investigative teams to assess building performance and emergency response and evacuation 

procedures in the wake of any building failure that has resulted in 

substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss of life, having considered the same, report favorably 

thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as 

amended do pass.

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Amendment ................................................................................................. 1

II. Purpose of the Bill ...................................................................................... 5

III. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................ 6

IV. Summary of Hearings ................................................................................. 9

V. Committee Actions ...................................................................................... 14

VI. Summary of Major Provisions of the Bill .................................................. 14

VII. Section-by-Section Analysis (By Title and Section) .................................. 15

VIII. Committee Views ........................................................................................ 18

IX. Cost Estimate .............................................................................................. 22

X. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ............................................. 23

XI. Compliance With Public Law 104–4 (Unfunded Mandates) .................... 25

XII. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations ........................... 25

XIII. Statement on General Performance Goals and Objectives ...................... 25

XIV. Constitutional Authority Statement .......................................................... 25

XV. Federal Advisory Committee Statement ................................................... 26

XVI. Congressional Accountability Act .............................................................. 26

XVII. Statement on Preemption of State, Local, or Tribal Law ........................ 26

XVIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................ 26

XIX. Committee Recommendations .................................................................... 26

XX. Administration Letter on H.R. 4687 .......................................................... 27

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I. AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Construction Safety Team Act’’. 

SEC. 2. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAMS. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (in this Act referred to as the ‘‘Director’’) is authorized to establish National Construction Safety Teams for deployment after events causing the failure of 

a building or buildings that has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential for substantial loss of life. To the maximum extent practicable, the 

Director shall establish and deploy a Team within 48 hours after such an event. The 

Director shall promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of the establishment 

of each National Construction Safety Team. 

(b) PROCEDURES.— (1) DEVELOPMENT.—Not later than 3 months after the date of the enactment 

of this Act, the Director, in consultation with the United States Fire Administration and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop procedures for the 

establishment and deployment of National Construction Safety Teams. The Director shall update such procedures as appropriate. Such procedures shall include provisions—

(A) regarding conflicts of interest related to service on the Team; 

(B) defining the circumstances under which the Director will establish 

and deploy a National Construction Safety Team; 

(C) prescribing the appropriate size of National Construction Safety 

Teams; 

(D) guiding the disclosure of information under section 8; 

(E) guiding the conduct of investigations under this Act; 

(F) identifying and prescribing appropriate conditions for the provision by 

the Director of additional resources and services National Construction 

Safety Teams may need; 

(G) to ensure that investigations under this Act do not impede and are 

coordinated with any search and rescue efforts being undertaken at the site 

of the building failure; 

(H) for regular briefings of the public on the status of the investigative 

proceedings and findings; 

(I) guiding the National Construction Safety Teams in moving and preserving evidence as described in section 5(a)(4), (b)(2), and (d)(4); 

(J) providing for coordination with Federal, State, and local entities that 

may sponsor research or investigations of building failures, including research conducted under the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977; 

and 

(K) regarding such other issues as the Director considers appropriate. 

(2) PUBLICATION.—The Director shall publish promptly in the Federal Register final procedures, and subsequent updates thereof, developed under paragraph (1). 

SEC. 3. COMPOSITION OF TEAMS. 

National Construction Safety Teams shall be led by an individual named by the 

Director. National Construction Safety Team members shall include at least 1 employee of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and shall include other 

experts who are not employees of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, who may include private sector experts, university experts, representatives 

of professional organizations with appropriate expertise, and appropriate Federal, 

State, or local officials. 

SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS OF TEAMS. 

National Construction Safety Teams shall—

(1) conduct investigations to establish the likely technical cause or causes of 

the building failure; 

(2) evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and emergency response procedures; 

(3) recommend specific improvements to building standards, codes, and practices based on the findings made pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2); and 

(4) recommend research and other appropriate actions needed to improve the 

structural safety of buildings, and improve evacuation and emergency response 

procedures, based on the findings of the investigation. 

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SEC. 5. AUTHORITIES. 

(a) ENTRY AND INSPECTION.—In investigating a building failure under this Act, 

members of a National Construction Safety Team, and any other person authorized 

by the Director to support a National Construction Safety Team, on display of appropriate credentials provided by the Director, may—

(1) enter property where a building failure being investigated has occurred, 

or where building components, materials, and artifacts with respect to the 

building failure are located, and do anything necessary to conduct the investigation; 

(2) inspect any record (including any design, construction, or maintenance 

record), process, or facility related to the investigation; 

(3) inspect and test any building components, materials, and artifacts related 

to the building failure; and 

(4) move such records, components, materials, and artifacts as provided by 

the procedures developed under section 2(b)(1). 

(b) AVOIDING UNNECESSARY INTERFERENCE AND PRESERVING EVIDENCE.—An inspection, test, or other action taken by a National Construction Safety Team under 

this section shall be conducted in a way that—

(1) does not interfere unnecessarily with services provided by the owner or operator of the building components, materials, or artifacts, property, records, 

process, or facility; and 

(2) to the maximum extent feasible, preserves evidence related to the building 

failure, consistent with the ongoing needs of the investigation. 

(c) COORDINATION.—

(1) WITH SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS.—A National Construction Safety 

Team shall not impede, and shall coordinate its investigation with, any search 

and rescue efforts being undertaken at the site of the building failure. 

(2) WITH OTHER RESEARCH.—A National Construction Safety Team shall coordinate its investigation, to the extent practicable, with qualified researchers 

who are conducting engineering or scientific (including social science) research 

relating to the building failure. 

(3) MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING.—The National Institute of Standards 

and Technology shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with each 

Federal agency that may conduct or sponsor a related investigation, providing 

for coordination of investigations. 

(d) INTERAGENCY PRIORITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), a National Construction Safety Team investigation shall have priority over any other investigation of any other Federal agency. 

(2) NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD.—If the National Transportation Safety Board is conducting an investigation related to an investigation 

of a National Construction Safety Team, the National Transportation Safety 

Board investigation shall have priority over the National Construction Safety 

Team investigation. Such priority shall not otherwise affect the authority of the 

Team to continue its investigation under this Act. 

(3) CRIMINAL ACTS.—If the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director, determines, and notifies the Director, that circumstances reasonably indicate that the building failure being investigated by a National Construction 

Safety Team may have been caused by a criminal act with intent to cause the 

building failure, the National Construction Safety Team shall relinquish investigative priority to the appropriate Federal law enforcement agency. The relinquishment of investigative priority by the National Construction Safety Team 

shall not otherwise affect the authority of the Team to continue its investigation 

under this Act. 

(4) PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE.—If a Federal law enforcement agency suspects and notifies the Director that a building failure being investigated by a 

National Construction Safety Team under this Act may have been caused by a 

criminal act with intent to cause the building failure, the National Construction 

Safety Team, in consultation with the Federal law enforcement agency, shall 

take necessary actions to ensure that evidence of the criminal act is preserved. 

SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS, HEARINGS, WITNESSES, AND SUBPOENAS. 

(a) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—The Director, on behalf of a National Construction 

Safety Team, may conduct hearings, administer oaths, and require, by subpoena 

and otherwise, necessary witnesses and evidence as necessary to carry out this Act. 

(b) BRIEFINGS.—National Construction Safety Teams shall hold regular public 

briefings on the status of investigative proceedings and findings. 

(c) PUBLIC HEARINGS.—During the course of an investigation by a National Construction Safety Team, the National Institute of Standards and Technology may, if 

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the Director considers it to be in the public interest, hold a public hearing for the 

purposes of—

(1) gathering testimony from witnesses; and 

(2) informing the public on the progress of the investigation. 

(d) PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES.—A witness or evidence in an investigation under 

this Act may be summoned or required to be produced from any place in the United 

States. A witness summoned under this subsection is entitled to the same fee and 

mileage the witness would have been paid in a court of the United States. 

(e) ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS.—A subpoena shall be issued under the signature of 

the Director but may be served by any person designated by the Director. 

(f) FAILURE TO OBEY SUBPOENA.—If a person disobeys a subpoena issued by the 

Director or a National Construction Safety Team under this Act, the Director may 

bring a civil action in a district court of the United States to enforce the subpoena. 

An action under this subsection may be brought in the judicial district in which the 

person against whom the action is brought resides, is found, or does business. The 

court may punish a failure to obey an order of the court to comply with the subpoena as a contempt of court. 

SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL POWERS. 

In order to support National Construction Safety Teams in carrying out this Act, 

the Director may—

(1) procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants 

under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code; 

(2) request the use, when appropriate, of available services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United 

States Government on a reimbursable or other basis; 

(3) confer with employees and request the use of services, records, and facilities of State and local governmental authorities; 

(4) accept voluntary and uncompensated services; 

(5) accept and use gifts of money and other property; 

(6) make contracts with nonprofit entities to carry out studies related to purpose, functions, and authorities of the National Construction Safety Teams; and 

(7) provide nongovernmental members of the National Construction Safety 

Team reasonable compensation for time spent carrying out activities under this 

Act. 

SEC. 8. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. 

(a) GENERAL RULE.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, a copy of a 

record, information, or investigation submitted or received by a National Construction Safety Team shall be made available to the public on request and at reasonable 

cost. 

(b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) does not require the release of information described by section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code, or protected from disclosure 

by any other law of the United States. 

(c) PROTECTION OF VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION.—Notwithstanding 

any other provision of law, a National Construction Safety Team, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and any agency receiving information from a National Construction Safety Team or the National Institute of Standards and Technology, shall not disclose voluntarily provided safety-related information if that information is not directly related to the building failure being investigated and the 

Director finds that the disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of information. 

(d) PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION.—A National Construction Safety Team and the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology shall not publicly release any information it receives in the course of an investigation under this Act if the Director 

finds that the disclosure of that information might jeopardize public safety. 

SEC. 9. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM REPORT. 

Not later than 90 days after completing an investigation, a National Construction 

Safety Team shall issue a public report which includes—

(1) an analysis of the likely technical cause or causes of the building failure 

investigated; 

(2) technical recommendations for changes to or the establishment of evacuation and emergency response procedures; 

(3) recommended specific improvements to building standards, codes, and 

practices; and 

(4) recommendations for research and other appropriate actions needed to 

help prevent future building failures. 

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SEC. 10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY ACTIONS. 

After the issuance of a public report under section 9, the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology shall comprehensively review the report and, working 

with the United States Fire Administration and other appropriate Federal and nonFederal agencies and organizations—

(1) conduct, or enable or encourage the conducting of, appropriate research 

recommended by the National Construction Safety Team; and 

(2) promote the appropriate adoption by the Federal Government, and encourage the appropriate adoption by other agencies and organizations, of the recommendations of the National Construction Safety Team with respect to—

(A) technical aspects of evacuation and emergency response procedures; 

(B) specific improvements to building standards, codes, and practices; and 

(C) other actions needed to help prevent future building failures. 

SEC. 11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY ANNUAL REPORT. 

Not later than February 15 of each year, the Director shall transmit to the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that includes—

(1) a summary of the investigations conducted by National Construction Safety Teams during the prior fiscal year; 

(2) a summary of recommendations made by the National Construction Safety 

Teams in reports issued under section 9 during the prior fiscal year; and 

(3) a description of the actions taken by the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology during the prior fiscal year in response to reports issued under 

section 9. 

SEC. 12. ADVISORY COMMITTEE. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS.—The Director, in consultation with the 

United States Fire Administration and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall establish an advisory committee to advise the Director on carrying out this Act and 

to review the procedures developed under section 2(b)(1) and the reports issued 

under section 9. 

(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—On January 1 of each year, the advisory committee shall 

transmit to the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and to the 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that 

includes—

(1) an evaluation of National Construction Safety Team activities, along with 

recommendations to improve the operation and effectiveness of National Construction Safety Teams; and 

(2) an assessment of the implementation of the recommendations of National 

Construction Safety Teams and of the advisory committee. 

(c) DURATION OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—Section 14 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act shall not apply to the advisory committee established under this section. 

SEC. 13. ADDITIONAL APPLICABILITY. 

The authorities and restrictions applicable under this Act to the Director and to 

National Construction Safety Teams shall apply to the activities of the National Institute of Standards and Technology in response to the attacks of September 11, 

2001. 

SEC. 14. AMENDMENT. 

Section 7 of the National Bureau of Standards Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1986 (15 U.S.C. 281a) is amended by inserting ‘‘, or from an investigation under the 

National Construction Safety Team Act,’’ after ‘‘from such investigation’’. 

SEC. 15. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

There are authorized to be appropriated to the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology for carrying out this Act $25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 

2003 through 2005, to remain available until expended.

II. PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of H.R. 4687 is to improve the structural integrity 

of buildings and evacuation and emergency response procedures by 

investigating building failures and recommending specific improvements to building standards, codes, and practices, as well as to 

evacuation and emergency response procedures. 

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III. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

The aftermath of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) 

revealed serious flaws in how the Federal government carries out 

investigations of major building failures. The National Science 

Foundation (NSF), the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) all were involved in investigating this disaster in some way. 

However, none of these agencies was prepared to conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation immediately following the 

collapse of the WTC buildings. In addition, the Federal efforts that 

were undertaken to study the building failures were hindered by 

many impediments: no Federal agency was clearly charged with investigating building failures; nothing ensured that an investigation 

would begin quickly enough to preserve evidence; no Federal agency had the investigative authority to ensure access to all needed information; nothing ensured that the public was kept informed of 

the progress of the investigation; and inadequate funding limited 

the efforts that were undertaken. Families of the victims, outside 

experts, and NIST itself have called for future investigations to be 

given additional investigative authorities like those used by the 

National Transportation Safety Board. 

Chairman Boehlert and Mr. Weiner on May 9, 2002 introduced 

H.R. 4687, which is modeled on the legislation that created the National Transportation Safety Board. The legislation also builds on 

the procedures followed by FEMA to investigate building failures 

and on the existing authority Congress vested in NIST. The Act is 

designed to address each of the impediments that hindered the 

WTC investigation. First, the Act establishes NIST as the lead 

agency to investigate building failures that have caused a substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential for substantial 

loss of life. Second, the legislation requires NIST, to the maximum 

extent practicable, to deploy a Team within 48 hours of a disaster 

so that the investigation is not hindered by delay. Third, the legislation gives Teams and NIST authority to enter the site of building 

failure, inspect and move records and materials, issues subpoenas, 

and impound evidence. Fourth, the legislation requires Teams to 

hold regular public briefings on the status of the investigation in 

order to ensure the public is informed. Fifth, to prevent funding 

limitations from inhibiting future investigations, the legislation authorizes appropriations of $25,000,000. 

RESPONSE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

FEMA responded to the WTC disaster by sending search and rescue teams to the site, and by establishing a disaster field office 

within hours of the first strike to assist in New York City’s rescue 

effort. FEMA also employed its standard protocol for studying

building failures, which was to deploy a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT). 

This team, composed of Federal and non-Federal building and 

fire experts, was tasked with analyzing information about the sequence of events and failures that resulted in the progressive collapse of the WTC towers and severe damage to surrounding buildings. Its goal was to analyze how the structures performed and determine if any recommendations could be made for changing buildVerDate May 23 2002 18:21 Jul 08, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR530.XXX pfrm17 PsN: HR530
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ing codes and design practices. However, this Team faced many impediments, which were uncovered during a March 6 hearing before 

the House Science Committee. (The impediments are outlined in 

more detail below.) 

Eventually FEMA recognized that it did not have the resources 

or the authority to conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation of the disaster. In January, FEMA asked NIST to take 

over the investigation once the BPAT released its findings and recommendations. Both FEMA and NIST expected that the report 

would provide initial findings and recommendations that would 

help guide a more comprehensive investigation and research effort 

that NIST intends to perform. 

The BPAT report was released at a House Science Committee 

hearing on May 1, 2002. As expected, the final report reached some 

initial conclusions about the structural performance of the buildings, but it was not a comprehensive and thorough investigation of 

every important aspect of the disaster. For example, the report reviewed the performance of each building affected by the attacks 

and subsequent collapses, but it generally did not examine issues 

related to building evacuation mechanisms and emergency response procedures. 

Shortly after the attack, NIST appointed an employee of its 

Building and Fire Research Laboratory to serve on the 23-member 

BPAT team. While this partnership lent some of NIST’s resources 

and expertise to the BPAT study, NIST did not immediately launch 

a formal investigation into the technical causes that led to the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings. 

Nearly nine months after the September 11 attacks, NIST proposed a three-phase plan to complete the work that the BPAT report started. First, NIST will conduct a 24-month investigation of 

the building construction, materials and technical conditions that 

combined to cause the collapse of the WTC buildings. NIST has requested supplemental funding of $16 million to carry out this part 

of the plan. Second, the Agency will undertake a multi-year research and development program to provide the technical basis to 

support any potential improvements to building and fire codes, 

standards, and practices. The results of this program will support 

the voluntary consensus process used in the United States to develop codes and standards. Third, NIST will work with industry to 

disseminate technical guidance and tools to better prepare facility 

owners, contractors, designers, and emergency personnel to respond to future disasters. NIST has redirected $2 million in Fiscal 

Year 2002 funds and has requested an additional $2 million in its 

Fiscal Year 2003 request to carry out second and third parts of the 

plan.

NIST’s Building and Fire Research laboratory will carry out most 

of the investigative and research activities under the three-part 

plan. This lab is uniquely qualified to conduct comprehensive building failure investigations; it carries out research in fire science, fire 

safety engineering, and structural, mechanical, and environmental 

engineering. It is the only Federal laboratory dedicated to research 

on building design and fire safety. In the past, the lab has investigated several structural failures using authority Congress made 

explicit in 1985 (15 U.S.C. 282a). Some of the most prominent of 

these were the 1981 collapse of a walkway in the Kansas City 

8

Hyatt Regency Hotel, the 1986 Dupont Plaza Hotel fire in San 

Juan, Puerto Rico, the 1994 Northridge earthquake collapses, and 

the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake building collapses. The goals of 

these investigations were to determine the probable technical 

causes of the failures, to examine what lessons could be learned, 

and to work with code-setting bodies to develop improved building 

codes, standards, and practices. The investigations also identified 

areas of research that needed further study. 

The National Science Foundation was also involved in responding to the attacks of September 11. The agency awarded nearly 

$300,000 to experienced earthquake researchers, including engineers and social scientists, within 72 hours of the attacks. In an 

effort to quickly deploy researchers to the site, NSF made these 

awards through the Small Grants for Exploratory Research Program, a supplemental award program that enables NSF’s program 

managers to award additional support to currently funded investigators through an abbreviated internal review process. The same 

obstacles that hindered other Federal efforts also impeded the 

NSF-funded researchers. In addition, there was little, if any coordination between FEMA’s and NSF’s efforts. 

SUMMARY OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FEDERAL RESPONSE

The Science Committee’s March 6 oversight hearing reviewed 

how the Federal government investigated the collapse of WTC 

buildings and what impediments those efforts faced. The Committee found that: • There was not clear statutory authority directing any federal 

agency to lead an investigation after major building failures, such 

as the collapse of the WTC buildings. Immediately after the attacks, private groups (such as the American Society of Civil Engineers and the Structural Engineers Association of New York) and 

NSF responded by sending engineers to the site. However, these individuals, having no formal authority to conduct an investigation, 

had trouble gaining access to the disaster site. The Federal agencies that did have limited authority allowing them to conduct investigations (FEMA and NIST) were slow to respond. FEMA did 

not formally create its investigative team, the BPAT, until October 

1. NIST began planning an investigation only after FEMA realized 

that it could not carry out a comprehensive and thorough investigation. Nine months after the attacks, NIST is only beginning to 

carry out its proposed investigation. This overall response stands 

in stark contrast to investigations conducted by the National 

Transportation Safety Board, which usually has an investigative 

team at a disaster site immediately following an event. 

• The BPAT’s lack of investigative powers led to problems gaining access to information it needed to complete its work. BPAT 

members had no authority to impound steel evidence after it was 

removed from the WTC site. This problem, coupled with the difficulty the team faced in gaining access to the site, led to the destruction of important pieces of steel evidence. In addition, because 

FEMA did not immediately intervene on behalf of the BPAT, building owners, designers, and insurers delayed the BPAT’s access to 

pertinent building documents. For example, the BPAT did not receive the full set of blueprints until January 2002. The BPAT was 

also denied access to other information such as the tapes of 911 

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calls to the New York City Police Department and unaired highquality video footage of the attack taken by the major television 

networks. • There was no statutory or regulatory requirement to ensure 

that the public was kept informed of the BPAT’s progress and findings. Lack of communication with the public led to public criticism 

of the Team’s efforts, as families of victims could not get a clear 

picture of exactly what the Team was investigating and what the 

Team’s ultimate goals were. This ongoing controversy needlessly 

undermined the efforts of the Team. • Funding limitations severely constrained the BPAT’s ability to 

conduct a comprehensive investigation. Funding limitations also 

deterred NIST from investigating the building failures immediately 

after the collapse. The BPAT received $600,000 in FEMA funding 

in addition to approximately $500,000 in in-kind contributions from 

the American Society of Civil Engineers. However, this amount was 

not enough to fund a comprehensive and thorough investigation of 

the WTC disaster. The BPAT ultimately relied on volunteers to 

help with the investigation. Once FEMA asked NIST to take over 

the investigation, NIST requested $16 million in supplemental 

funding in order to carry out its proposal. 

IV. SUMMARY OF HEARINGS

MARCH 6, 2002: LEARNING FROM 9/11—UNDERSTANDING THE COLLAPSE

OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER

On Wednesday, March 6, the House Committee on Science held 

a hearing on the investigation into the collapse of the World Trade 

Center (WTC). Witnesses from industry, academia, and government 

testified on the catastrophic collapse of the WTC complex and subsequent efforts by Federal agencies and independent researchers to 

understand how and why the structures failed. Witness described 

why it was important to scrutinize the steel and other debris, blueprints and other documents, and recorded images of the disaster, 

so that engineers, designers, and construction professionals could 

learn valuable lessons that could ultimately improve the safety of 

buildings. Witnesses also described the many impediments that 

they encountered, such as: no Federal agency believed it was clearly charged with investigating building failures; nothing ensured 

that an investigation would begin quickly enough to preserve evidence; no Federal agency had the investigative authority, akin to 

that of the National Transportation Safety Board, to ensure access 

to all needed information; and no one kept the public informed of 

the progress of the investigations. 

The Committee heard from: (1) Mr. Robert Shea, Acting Administrator, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), accompanied by Mr. 

Craig Wingo, Director of Division of Engineering Science and Technology, Federal Emergency Management Agency; (2) Dr. W. Gene 

Corley, P.E., S.E., American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and 

Chair of the Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) reviewing the WTC disaster; (3) Professor Glenn Corbett, Assistant 

Professor of Fire Science at John Jay College, City University of 

New York; (4) Dr. Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl, Professor, Department 

of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, 

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Berkeley; and (5) Dr. Arden Bement, Director, National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST). 

Leading investigations of building failures 

Witnesses testified as to the confusion that characterized the 

Federal government’s efforts to investigate the collapse of the WTC 

buildings. It became clear that while the Federal agencies represented at the hearing tried to respond to the disaster in some 

fashion, no agency believed it had the authority to lead an investigation of a major building failure. 

During the hearing when the witnesses were asked to indicate 

who was in charge of the investigation of the WTC collapse, several 

witnesses raised their hands. FEMA clearly believed it was initially 

in charge because it deployed the BPAT. However, Mr. Shea testified that FEMA did not have the authority to investigate the building disaster, but only to study it. Dr. Bement also appeared unclear 

as to where authority lay to conduct an investigation of the collapses. While he testified that he was acting as though NIST was 

in charge, it is clear that NIST initially took no action to conduct 

an investigation in response to the collapse of the WTC. 

Ultimately, Mr. Shea concurred with the Chairman that for several months after the attacks it was uncertain who was in charge 

of investigating this disaster. In addition, Mr. Shea testified that 

FEMA turned to NIST to lead an investigation because FEMA does 

not have the technical capability or resources to conduct investigations of major building failures. Mr. Shea said that based on his 

experience, an overall Federal government strategy for responding 

to building failures is needed and NIST should be vested with this 

authority. 

Preserving evidence and gaining access to critical information

Witnesses testified that confusion regarding who was in charge 

of the investigation and the BPAT’s lack of investigative authorities led to delays in deploying the BPAT team, problems in gaining 

access to the WTC site, an inability to preserve valuable steel evidence from the site, and problems gaining access to information the 

BPAT requested. 

During the hearing Members voiced concern about why the 

BPAT had not been deployed immediately after the attacks and 

whether the delay had hindered the team’s ability to preserve important evidence. Dr. Corley testified that immediately following 

the attacks, ASCE began assembling a team of experts of study the 

disaster. Although this team later became part of the official BPAT 

that FEMA created, that official designation did not occur until 

late September. Furthermore, it was only at that time that the 

team was able to gain access to the disaster site. Dr. Corley believed that that one possible reason for this delay was the uncertain relationship between the BPAT and ongoing search and rescue 

efforts, as well as the criminal investigation. During the time the 

team was not present on site, the City of New York decided to haul 

away and recycle the steel, which could have been useful as evidence for the investigation. 

Even after the BPAT was on site and had actively assumed its 

duties, there was still confusion abut whether the BPAT had the 

authority to preserve evidence. Mr. Shea said that the BPAT was 

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in charge of gathering the necessary evidence for an investigation. 

However, Dr. Corley, who led the BPAT team, said that he did not 

know whether anyone had the authority even to ask the City of 

New York to stop recycling the steel. When Dr. Bement was asked 

if NIST could presently sequester evidence for its investigation, he 

said that NIST could request that evidence be preserved, but that 

it had no power to enforce the request. 

Dr. Astaneh-Asl, who was funded by the National Science Foundation to study the collapse, testified that he experienced the same 

problems that Dr. Corley’s team faced in terms of trying to access 

the site, and studying and preserving the steel evidence. He testified that he had, without any assistance from any federal agency, 

directly negotiated with the plants recycling the steel, and it was 

only because of their cooperation that he was given access to the 

steel. 

Professor Corbett described the consequences of losing pieces of 

steel evidence. He said with steel from critical areas of the building 

(such as where the planes hit the building) would help the BPAT 

make more definitive statements as to the specific cause and chronology of the collapse. 

Several witness commented on the problems the BPAT faced in 

gaining access to information it required as part of its investigation. The BPAT requested access to the WTC building blueprints, 

design drawings, and maintenance records. It planned to use these 

to validate physical and photographic evidence and to develop computer models to explain why and how the buildings failed and how 

similar failures might be avoided in the future. The BPAT did not 

get immediate access to the full set of these documents and eventually, FEMA had to intercede on behalf of the BPAT. However, there 

was a significant delay in FEMA making this request. Mr. Wingo 

testified that FEMA did not ask the Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey for blueprints and design specifications for the 

buildings until December 21, nearly four months after the disaster, 

and Dr. Corley testified that the BPAT did not receive full copies 

of the blueprints and design drawings until January 8. 

In addition to the structural records, the BPAT team requested 

video footage from the television networks and tapes of 911 calls 

from the New York City Police Department. Dr. Corley testified 

that the BPAT team was only able to obtain from TV networks 

video footage of the collapse that had been played on air; the networks would not release unaired footage. The BPAT ultimately 

gave up on attempting to obtain the 911 tapes. During the May 1 

follow up hearing held by the Science Committee (described below), 

Dr. Jonathan Barnett, Professor, Center for Fire Safety Studies, 

Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts, who 

was also a BPAT member, said that after being denied access to 

the 911 tapes for several months, he withdrew the request for the 

tapes because the computer modeling that would have used the 911 

tapes would not be completed in time for the BPAT report. 

Dr. Bement explained that NIST’s planned investigation could 

run into the same impediments as the BPAT in terms of gaining 

access to this information. Dr. Bement explained that, while NIST 

could request information, it lacked the power to issue subpoenas 

for information it deemed critical to its investigation, and that he 

12

therefore could not ensure that NIST would have total access to 

this information. 

Informing the public 

Members expressed great concern about lack of regular public 

briefings by FEMA about the status of the BPAT investigation and 

its factual findings. Witness generally agreed that briefing the public was an important component of any investigation, but the hearing revealed that there were problems with how FEMA handled 

communications with the public during the BPAT study. While Mr. 

Shea testified that he believed FEMA did try to respond to inquiries from the public, he also said that BPAT participants were asked 

to sign confidentiality agreements that prohibited them from publicly disclosing the conversations and opinions discussed during the 

course of the team’s deliberations. He said this was standard practice with BPATs in order to protect the scientific integrity of the 

process. However, Several Members point out that much of the 

public criticism and leaks to the press regarding the BPAT initial 

findings could have been prevented by regular public briefings. 

Funding investigations 

Witnesses and Members expressed concern about the resources 

Federal agencies were able to commit to investigate the WTC 

building collapses. Dr. Corley testified that the total amount of 

money (both public and private) supporting the BPAT study was 

about $1 million, and that, in his opinion, $40 million would be required to conduct a comprehensive study of the WTC disaster. Dr. 

Bement concurred with this figure by stating that $40 million 

‘‘wasn’t too far out of the ballpark’’ of what NIST would need to 

complete its proposed investigation. Professor Corbett summarized 

the general funding problems of this effort by saying that, ‘‘a disaster of such epic proportions demands that we fully resource a 

comprehensive, detailed investigation. He further emphasized that

‘‘instead, we are staffing the BPAT with part-time engineers and 

scientists on a shoestring budget.’’

MAY 1, 2002: THE INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER

COLLAPSE: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

The purpose of this hearing was to examine the key findings and 

recommendations of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) investigation into the collapse of the World Trade Center 

(WTC). The hearing also reviewed the plans of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct a more extensive follow-up investigation and to establish a comprehensive research and development plan to help improve standards, practices, 

and codes for buildings. In addition, the witnesses were asked to 

comment on a draft version of H.R. 4687. 

The Committee heard from: (1) Mr. Robert Shea, Acting Administrator, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency; (2) Dr. W. Gene Corley, P.E., 

S.E., American Society of Civil Engineers, Chair of the Building 

Performance Assessment Team reviewing the World Trade Center 

disaster, accompanied by Dr. Jonathan Barnett, Professor, Center 

for Fire Safety Studies, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, 

Massachusetts; (3) Dr. Arden Bement, Director, National Institute 

13

of Standards and Technology; and (4) Professor Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science at John Jay College, City University of New York. 

Dr. Corley discussed the findings and recommendations that the 

BPAT made in its final report (World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and 

Recommendations, FEMA publication #403, May 2002). The report 

reached general conclusions about how each of the buildings in the 

World Trade Center complex performed after the attacks, and 

made several recommendations for improving buildings that may 

be the target of terrorist attacks. The report also concluded that 

some of the recommendations could be considered for all buildings, 

but that additional studies were needed before any general recommendations could be made. Finally, the report recommended 

several areas that require further study, such as the interaction of 

structural elements and fire, how better to integrate structural and 

fire professionals in building design, and evacuating buildings after 

a disaster, among other things. 

Dr. Bement testified about NIST’s plans for conducting an investigation and follow-on research. NIST’s response plan will consist 

of three elements: First, NIST will conduct a 24-month building 

and fire safety investigation into the collapse of the Twin Towers 

(WTC 1 and 2) and WTC 7. Second, NIST will undertake a multiyear research and development (R&D) program to provide the technical basis to support any potential improvements to building and 

fire codes, standards, and practices. Third, NIST will operate an industry-led dissemination and technical assistance program (DTAP) 

that will provide practical guidance and tools to better prepare facility owners, contractors, designers, and emergency personnel to 

respond to future disasters.

Professor Corbett testified that he was supportive of the proposed 

NIST initiative. However, he said that NIST should rapidly assemble a Federal Advisory Committee to oversee the investigation. He 

also stressed the need for subpoena power for the proposed NIST 

investigation. Specifically, Professor Corbett said, ‘‘The Science 

Committee hearing on March 6 clearly highlighted some of the impediments the BPAT faced in obtaining key information. My fear 

is that the NIST investigation will be hindered by these same problems. Information may be found in a variety of locations and may 

be held by many different individuals and organizations that will 

not provide this information voluntarily. Even though the WTC investigation is an investigation of a fact-finding nature, a legal 

means for obtaining information that would otherwise be unavailable must be provided for investigators.’’

Comments on the draft version of H.R. 4687

During the hearing the witnesses were offered an opportunity to 

comment on the proposed legislation. Each witness supported the 

efforts that the Committee had undertaken in reviewing the WTC 

disaster and drafting the legislation. Dr. Corley and Professor 

Corbett both endorsed the legislation. Specifically, Dr. Corley said 

that this legislation would have helped overcome not only the impediments the BPAT faced during the World Trade Center investigation, but also obstacles that have hindered previous investigations he has led on behalf of the Federal government. Professor 

14

Corbett said that based on his 20 years of experience in the fire 

service, it is critical that the Federal government have the ability 

to investigate building failures in order to learn from them. He argued that because lessons learned from an individual disaster can 

be applied to many similar types of buildings across the United 

States, it is clearly the responsibility of the Federal government to 

investigate major building disasters and to derive these lessons. 

V. COMMITTEE ACTIONS

The House Science Committee met on May 22, 2002 to consider 

H.R. 4687. Chairman Boehlert offered several technical amendments to the bill, which were considered en bloc and adopted by 

voice vote. The Committee favorably reported the bill as amended, 

by voice vote. 

VI. SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE BILL

The Act gives responsibility to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to dispatch teams of experts within 48 

hours after major building disasters. 

The Act gives the teams a clear mandate to: 

Establish the likely technical cause of building failures; 

Evaluate procedures used for evacuation and emergency response; 

Recommend specific changes to building codes, standards 

and practices; in addition, recommend changes in emergency 

response and evacuation procedures; and 

Make final recommendations within 90 days of completing 

an investigation.

The Act gives NIST and the teams comprehensive investigative 

authorities, similar to those of the National Transportation Safety 

Board, to: 

Access the site of a building disaster; 

Subpoena evidence; 

Access key pieces of evidence such as records and documents; 

and, 

Move and preserve evidence. 

The Act ensures that the team’s investigations will not impede 

search and rescue efforts. 

The Act establishes clear lines of communication to ensure that 

the public will be informed throughout the investigation by: 

Requiring teams to hold regular briefings on the status of 

the investigative proceedings and findings; and, 

Allowing the Director of NIST to convince a public hearing 

to take testimony relevant to a team’s investigation. 

The Act creates a standing advisory committee to oversee the implementation of the Act and evaluate team’s duties. 

The Act also gives NIST comprehensive authority to complete the 

investigation of the WTC disaster. 

The Act authorizes for each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005 $25 

million to remain available until expended to carry out investigation under this Act. 

15

VII. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title 

This Act is named the ‘‘National Construction Safety Team Act.’’

Section 2. National Construction Safety Teams 

The Director of the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) may constitute and deploy a National Construction 

Safety Team (hereafter referred to as the ‘‘Team’’) after a building 

failure that has caused substantial loss of life or had the potential 

to cause substantial loss of life. To the maximum extent possible, 

the Director shall establish and deploy a team within 48 hours 

after such an event. The Director shall promptly publish in the 

Federal Register a notice any time a Team is established. 

The Director has three months after date of enactment to develop 

and publish the procedures that will govern the operation and deployment of the Teams. When developing the procedures, the Director must consult with the United States Fire Administration 

(USFA) and other appropriate Federal agencies. The Director has 

the authority to update these procedures as necessary.

The final procedures, and any updates thereof, shall be published 

in the Federal Register. 

Section 3. Composition of the Teams 

Teams created under this Act, shall be led by an individual 

named by the Director, and shall include at least one NIST employee. Teams shall also include other experts who are not employees of NIST and who may include private sector experts, university 

experts, representatives of professional organizations with appropriated expertise, and appropriate Federal, State, or local officials. 

Section 4. Functions of the Teams 

The Act directs the Teams to: 

(1) Determine the likely technical cause of causes of the 

building failure; 

(2) Evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and emergency response procedures; 

(3) Recommend specific improvements to building codes, 

standards, and practices; and 

(4) Recommend research and other appropriate actions needed to improve the structural safety of buildings, or improve 

evacuation and emergency response procedures. 

Section 5. Authorities 

In investigating a building failure under this Act and upon the 

display of appropriate credentials, which shall be issued by the Director of NIST, members of Teams may: 

(1) Enter a property where a building failure being investigated under this Act has occurred, or where building components, materials, and artifacts with respect to the building failure are located, and do anything necessary to conduct the investigation;

16

(2) Inspect any record (including any design, construction, or 

maintenance record), process, or facility related to the investigation; 

(3) Inspect and test any building components, materials, and 

artifacts related to the building failure; and 

(4) Move such records, components, materials, and artifacts. 

When conducting an investigation, Teams must ensure their actions do not unnecessarily interfere with the services provided by 

the owner of the building components, materials, artifacts, property, records, process, or facility. 

When conducting an investigation, Teams must ensure that their 

actions are coordinated with, and do not impede search and rescue 

efforts. Teams shall also coordinate investigations, to the extent 

practicable, with qualified researchers who are conducting engineering or scientific research related to the building failure. In addition, NIST shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with 

each Federal agency that may conduct or sponsor related investigations, providing for coordination of investigations. 

Investigations conducted by Teams under this Act shall have priority over any other investigation of any other Federal agency except in cases where: 

(1) The National Transportation Safety Board is conducting 

an investigation related to a Team’s investigation; or 

(2) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director, 

determines that circumstances reasonably indicate that the 

building failure may have been caused by a criminal act with 

intent to cause the building failure. 

In either of these cases, Teams retain the authority to conduct 

an investigation. 

In cases where a Federal law enforcement agency suspects and 

notifies Teams that a building failure may have been caused by a 

criminal act with the intent to cause the building failure (but has 

not yet initiated a criminal investigation) Teams must take proper 

steps to preserve evidence of such act. 

Section 6. Briefings, hearings, witnesses, and subpoenas 

The Act authorizes the Director, on behalf of the Team, to conduct hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena necessary witnesses 

and evidence in order to carry out this Act. It requires the Team 

to hold regular public briefings on the status of the investigation. 

The Director may hold a public hearing in order to gather testimony for the investigation and keep the public informed about the 

investigation if the Director deems it in the public interest. 

The Act authorizes a witness or evidence to be summoned or be 

produced from any place in the United States. The Act entitles a 

witness to the same fee and mileage that the witness would receive 

in a court of the United States. The Act also requires a subpoena 

to be signed by the Director, but may be served by a designee chosen by the Director. Finally the Act authorizes the Director to bring 

a civil action against anyone failing to obey a subpoena. Such action may be brought against the person where the person resides, 

is found, or does business. Failure to obey an order may be punished as contempt of court. 

17

Section 7. Additional powers 

In order to support the Team, the Director may carry out the following activities in support of this Act: 

(1) Procure the services of experts and temporary consultants 

on a temporary basis; 

(2) When appropriate, request the use of services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of another entity of the U.S. 

Government on a reimbursable basis; 

(3) Confer with employees of, and request the use of services, 

records, and facilities of State and local authorities;

(4) Accept voluntary services; 

(5) Accept and use gifts of money and other property; 

(6) Contract with nonprofits to conduct studies related to the 

purpose and activities of the Teams; and 

(7) Compensate on a reasonable basis the nongovernmental 

members of the Team. 

Section 8. Disclosure of information 

A copy of a record, information, or investigative report submitted 

or received by the Team shall be made available to the public on 

request for a reasonable cost except where the information requested is protected by 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (originally enacted as part 

of the Freedom of Information Act) or where the Director determines that the disclosure of voluntarily provided information not 

directly related to the building failure may inhibit the voluntary 

provision of such information. In addition, the Director shall not 

disclose information if the Directory finds that the release of such 

information will jeopardize public safety. 

Section 9. National Construction Safety Team report 

After completing an investigation initiated under this Act, Teams 

have 90 days to submit a report on their findings. The report shall 

include: 

(1) Analysis of the likely technical cause or causes of the 

building failure; 

(2) Technical recommendations for changes to or the establishment of evacuation and emergency response procedures; 

(3) Recommendations for specific improvements to building 

standards, codes, and practices; and 

(4) Recommendations for research and other appropriate actions needed to prevent future building failures. 

Section 10. National Institute of Standards and Technology actions 

After a Team issues the report required under section 9 regarding the findings of an investigation, NIST shall review the report 

and working with the USFA: 

(1) Conduct, or encourage other Federal agencies to conduct, 

appropriate research recommended by the National Construction Safety Team; and 

(2) Promote and encourage the adoption of the Team’s recommendations. 

18

Section 11. National Institute of Standards and Technology annual 

report 

Not later than February 15 of each year, NIST shall transmit to 

Congress a report that includes a: 

(1) Summary of the investigations conducted by Teams during the prior fiscal year;

(2) Summary of recommendations made by the Teams in reports required under section 9; and 

(3) Description of action taken by NIST during the prior fiscal year in response to reports issued under section 9. 

Section 12. Advisory committee 

The Director shall establish, in consultation with the USFA and 

other appropriate Federal agencies, an advisory committee to advise the Director on carrying out this Act, review the procedures 

developed by the Director under this Act, and review the post-investigation reports issued by Teams. 

The advisory committee shall prepare and transmit to Congress 

a report that includes an evaluation of Team activities, recommendations to improve the operation and effectiveness of Teams, 

and an assessment of the implementation of the Teams’ recommendations. 

The Act exempts the advisory committee from the sunset provision of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 

Section 13. Additional applicability 

The Act applies all of the authorities and restrictions given to the 

Director or to Teams under this Act, to actions that NIST is undertaking in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Section 14. Amendment 

The Act amends 15 U.S.C. 281(a) to include investigations conducted under this Act. 

Section 15. Authorization of appropriations 

The Act authorizes $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 and 2005, to 

remain available until expended. 

VIII. COMMITTEE VIEWS

Responding to building failures 

The Committee believes the Federal government lacks a clear 

protocol for conducting comprehensive and thorough investigations 

of building failures and for learning the lessons that these failures 

can teach us. Building failures can stem from a number of causes, 

such as natural disasters, terrorist actions, flaws in building design 

and construction practices, and other unforeseen events. It is the 

Committee’s view that building failures caused by any of these 

events should be investigated with the authority in this Act in 

cases where there is substantial loss of life or the significant potential for substantial loss of life. Clearly not every building failure 

will be investigated under this Act, but the Director should investigate building failures that were unexpected or that are likely to 

yield significant lessons that could be broadly applied. 

19

The Act requires that investigations review the technical causes 

of building failures and recommend how to improve building codes, 

standards, and practices, and emergency response and evacuation 

procedures. The Committees believes that by learning and applying 

the lessons that building failures have to teach us, the Federal government can ultimately reduce financial losses and save lives. 

While it is the Committee’s intent that this legislation supplement the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) 

existing authority to respond to building failures, this Act should 

not be construed as giving NIST any new regulatory powers over 

building design, practices, and standards, or over evacuation and 

emergency response procedures. 

It is the Committee’s view that the Director of NIST should not 

limit investigations only to buildings that have collapsed. NIST 

may find instances in which a building failure has not led to a collapse, but has resulted in significant loss of life. Such instances 

may hold important lessons about the design of the building or 

evacuation and emergency response procedures. 

It is the Committee’s view that Teams created under this Act 

should not be permanent, standing entities requiring ongoing funding. Rather, Teams should be formed only in response to a specific 

building failure. It is also the Committee’s view that the Director 

should immediately notify the public through appropriate means, 

including the Internet, of the decision to establish a Team. That 

notification would be in addition to the requirement in the Act that 

the Director notice the establishment of Teams in the Federal Register. 

Section 2. National Construction Safety Teams 

The Committee believes that the procedures required by this section are critical to ensuring the successfull implementation of this 

Act. Past efforts to investigate structural failures by other Federal 

agencies have been uncoordinated, incomplete, and without a clear 

mandate to review the technical causes or to recommend how to 

improve building codes, standards, and practices, or emergency response and evacuation procedures. As such, it is the Committee’s 

view that the Director should ensure that these procedures are 

clear, comprehensive, and developed, where appropriate, in consultation with the United States Fire Administration and other 

Federal entities. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has extensive 

experience with many of the procedures that NIST must develop 

pursuant to this Act. It is the Committee’s view that the Director 

should, to the maximum extent possible, draw on this experience 

by consulting with the NTSB when developing these procedures. 

The legislation requires the Director to develop procedures within three months after enactment of this legislation. The Committee 

expects NIST to begin working promptly on these procedures to 

meet this deadline.

It is the Committee’s view that while the Director has the discretion to determine the appropriate size of Teams created under this 

Act, Teams should generally consist of ten members or more to ensure adequate representation of various disciplines, which are described in the next section. In addition, it is the Committee’s view 

that when developing procedures for coordination with Federal, 

20

State, and local entities, the Director should also consult with 

agencies engaged in earthquake related research authorized under 

the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, such as the National Science Foundation. The Director should clearly define how 

earthquake researchers and Teams will carry out their responsibilities in a coordinated fashion in cases where building failures have 

been caused by an earthquake. 

Section 3. Composition of Teams 

The Committee believes that the Director of NIST should ensure 

that the membership of any Team created under this Act has a 

wide variety of expertise. For any given investigation, the Director 

has the discretion to determine the appropriate composition of the 

Team. It is the Committee’s view that, when exercising this discretion, the Director should consider representation from the following 

disciplines: structural engineering, forensic engineering, fire protection engineering, geotechnical and geoenvironmental engineering, 

the engineering of deep foundations, earthquakes and soil dynamics, wind engineering, and other engineering disciplines as the Director may deem necessary. In addition, it is the Committee’s view 

that lessons learned regarding emergency response and evacuation 

procedures are as important as structural lessons. Where appropriate, the Director should ensure that experts in both emergency 

response and evacuation procedures are part of any Team. 

Section 4. Function of the Teams 

The ultimate goal of investigations conducted under this Act 

should be to develop a detailed set of recommendations for any necessary improvements to building codes, standards, and practices, as 

well as emergency response and evacuation procedures, based on 

the findings of the investigation. Many of these procedures are 

based on an understanding of how people respond to a disaster. It 

is the Committee’s view that, when examining emergency response 

and evacuation procedures, Teams should evaluate not only the effect that a building’s design has on emergency response and evacuation procedures, but also on human behavior. 

While Teams are tasked to make specific recommendations regarding changes that may be warranted in building codes, standards, and practices, the authority to make those changes lies with 

other State, local and private authorities (and with Federal agencies in the case of Federal buildings). Applying the lessons learned 

through building investigations conducted under this Act therefore 

is ultimately left to the different public and private entities that 

are now responsible for building standards and codes. The Act does 

not give any regulatory authority to Teams or NIST over building 

codes, standards, practices, but the Committee hopes that recommendations made by the Team will be taken under consideration quickly by the appropriate authorities.

Section 5. Authorities 

When a Team arrives at a disaster site, members should have 

written notification of the Director’s establishment of the Team, as 

well as official credentials from NIST stating that they are members of the Team and that they have authority vested under this 

Act to conduct an investigation. It is the Committee’s view that, beVerDate May 23 2002 21:19 Jul 08, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR530.XXX pfrm17 PsN: HR530
21

cause the credentials issued by the Director will allow the Team to 

exercise its authority provided by this Act, the Director should establish a rapid credentialing process for Team members. 

The Act gives Teams the authority to move records, components, 

materials, and artifacts in order to inspect, preserve, or test these 

materials. It is the Committee’s view that this authority allows 

Teams to move these materials from the site where the building 

failure occurred or where they are stored. 

The Committee recognizes that saving lives must be the top priority in the wake of a building failure. The Act makes clear that 

Team members should not do anything to impede search and rescue efforts. Teams should work closely with search and rescue 

teams to ensure that any evidence important to the Team’s investigation is preserved. For example, while Team members must not 

prevent the necessary removal of debris, they may attempt to take 

photographic evidence of the debris before it is moved and should 

be allowed to determine where any evidence critical to the investigation should be moved. 

The Committee notes that several Federal agencies will likely respond to building failures. While other Federal agencies may have 

reason to carry out work at the site of a failure, the Act makes 

clear that NIST is responsible for leading investigations of building 

failures. 

The Committee also recognizes that in the wake of natural disasters, researchers with expertise in a number of fields are deployed 

to a disaster site to conduct research. In such cases, these researchers may serve as a valuable source of information for investigations 

conducted under this Act. The Act requires that Teams should coordinate their investigation, to the maximum practicable, with 

qualified researchers at a site to minimize duplication of effort and 

ensure that investigations are complete and thorough. 

In cases where a building failure may have been caused by criminal actions, the Committee has included provisions to ensure that 

Teams relinquish investigative priority to the appropriate Federal 

law enforcement agency. In some cases, there may be a question 

as to whether a Federal law enforcement agency will conduct a 

criminal investigation. It is the Committee’s view that in these instances, after the Federal law enforcement agency notifies the Director of a potential criminal investigation, a Team should preserve 

evidence in a way that would not hamper the criminal investigation should it take place. Teams should not themselves conduct any 

criminal investigations. The Committee notes that the NTSB has 

experience preserving evidence for a potential criminal investigation, and it is the Committee’s view that the Director should consult with the NTSB when developing procedures under this section.

The Committee notes that in cases in which Teams must relinquish investigative priority under this Act either to NTSB or a Federal law enforcement agency, Teams still have the authority to continue an investigation of the building failure. 

Section 6. Briefings, hearings, witnesses, and subpoenas 

The Committee notes that nothing ensured that the public was 

kept informed during FEMA’s investigation of the World Trade 

Center disaster. This led to public criticism of the Team’s efforts, 

as families of victims did not know the status of the investigation 

22

or what the BPAT’s ultimate goals were. Many families of the victims called for regular public briefings about the effort’s status and 

factual findings, much like the National Transportation Safety 

Board holds during an investigation of an accident. To prevent this 

problem from reoccurring, the Act requires that Teams conducting 

investigations brief the public on regular basis about the investigation’s status and findings. 

Section 8. Disclosure of information 

It is the Committee’s intent that as a general practice the Director should make every effort to publicly release as much information obtained by Teams under this Act as possible. It is the Committee’s view that the exceptions to the release of information contained in this section should be used infrequently and only after 

careful deliberation by the Director. 

Section 13. Additional applicability 

NIST is planning to conduct a $16 million comprehensive and 

thorough two-year investigation and a technical analysis to determine how World Trade Center buildings 1, 2 and 7 collapsed. The 

Administration has formally requested Fiscal Year 2002 supplemental funding for this investigation. 

While this legislation is generally focused on investigating future 

building failures, this section gives NIST all of authorities and restrictions conferred by this Act for its investigation of the World 

Trade Center disaster. The Committee does not believe that NIST 

must create a National Construction Safety Team for this investigation. Rather, NIST should move forward with the current proposed structure of its investigation, while utilizing the authorities, 

such as the power to subpoena evidence, that are granted under 

this Act. 

IX. COST ESTIMATE

A cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the 

Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974 has been timely submitted to the Committee on 

Science prior to the filing of this report and is included in Section 

X of this report pursuant to House Rule XIII, clause 3(c)(3). 

H.R. 4687 does not contain new budget authority, credit authority, or changes in tax expenditures. Assuming that the sums authorized under the bill are appropriated, H.R. 4687 does authorize 

additional discretionary spending, as described in the Congressional Budget Office report on the bill, which is contained in Section X of this report. 

H.R. 4687 could affect both direct spending and receipts. However, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that any such effect would be less than $500,000 a year. 

23

X. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, June 7, 2002. 

Hon. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, 

Chairman, Committee on Science, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4687, the National Construction Safety Team Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Ken Johnson (for federal costs), Elyse Goldman (for the state and local impact), and 

Cecil McPherson (for the private-sector impact). 

Sincerely, 

BARRY B. ANDERSON

(For Dan L. Crippen, Director). 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 4687—National Construction Safety Team Act 

Summary: H.R. 4687 would authorize the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce to establish National Construction Safety Teams to investigate the structural causes of building failures that cause substantial loss of life. The bill would authorize the appropriation of $75 

million over three years for this purpose. NIST also would be allowed to accept and spend monetary gifts to support the teams. 

CBO estimates that maintaining a Construction Safety Team 

program prepared to respond to building failures would cost about 

$2 million a year during the 2003–2007 period. The amount of the 

added costs for investigations would depend upon the number and 

size of the building failures that occur during a given year. Although the agency is incurring significant costs to investigate the 

terrorists attacks on the World Trade Center, historically, the frequency and cost of investigating such building failures has been 

small. These amounts would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

The provisions of H.R. 4687 related to the acceptance of monetary gifts could affect both revenues and direct spending; therefore, 

pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. We expect that any such effects would be less than $500,000 a year. 

H.R. 4687 contains an intergovernmental mandate defined in the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO estimates that the 

total costs associated with the mandate would be small, and therefore, would not exceed the threshold established in UMRA ($58 

million for intergovernmental mandates in 2002, adjusted annually 

for inflation). 

H.R. 4687 also contains a private-sector mandate as defined in 

UMRA. CBO expects that the direct costs of the mandate would be 

well below the annual threshold established by UMRA ($115 million for private-sector mandates in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation).

24

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: H.R. 4687 would authorize the appropriation of $25 million a year over three years for 

NIST to send teams to investigate the structural causes of major 

building collapses. CBO expects that the agency would need to 

maintain the personnel and equipment necessary to respond to any 

collapses that occur, as well as to write an annual report required 

under the bill. Based on information from NIST, CBO estimates 

that these costs would amount to about $2 million a year, assuming the appropriation of the necessary amounts. Excluding the 

World Trade Center investigation, the historical costs of federal investigations into collapsed building incidents have been only a few 

million dollars (or less) each year. 

The amount of the additional cost NIST would incur to investigate specific incidents would depend greatly on the number and 

size of the collapses that occur during a specific year. For example, 

similar investigations conducted by NIST and by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have cost less than $500,000 

a year. However, the total cost to the two agencies of investigating 

the collapse of the World Trade Center could cost as mush as $57 

million over the next several years. Over the next three years, any 

additional costs for new investigations would be subject to the 

availability of appropriated funds from the $75 million that would 

be authorized to be appropriated by this bill. 

H.R. 4687 would allow NIST to accept and spend monetary gifts 

for the National Construction Safety Team program. Although 

NIST is not allowed under current law to receive any such gifts, 

the Department of Commerce does possess this authority. Any additional gifts accepted or spent under this bill would be classified 

in the federal budget as revenues and direct spending. However, 

CBO expects that these effects would be less than $500,000 in each 

year. 

Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. Although H.R. 4687 

could affect both direct spending and receipts, CBO estimates that 

any such effects would be less than $500,000 a year. 

Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. Although H.R. 4687 

could affect both direct spending and receipts, CBO estimates that 

any such effects would be less than $500,000 a year. 

Estimated impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: H.R. 

4687 would authorize the Director of the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology to establish National Construction Safety Teams and to issue subpoenas on their behalf. Such power 

would constitute an intergovernmental mandate as defined in 

UMRA. CBO expects that the probability of an event resulting in 

substantial loss of life is low, and that state and local governments 

would likely comply voluntarily with federal investigators. Therefore, CBO estimates that the costs of complying with the mandate 

would be low and would not exceed the threshold established in 

UMRA ($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation). The 

remaining provisions of the bill contain no intergovernmental mandates and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

25

Estimated impact on the private sector: H.R. 4687 contains a private-sector mandate as defined by the UMRA. Section 6 would require private-sector entities, if subpoenaed, to provide testimony 

and evidence related to matters the National Construction Safety 

Team would be empowered to investigate. Such a requirement 

would be a private-sector mandate as defined by UMRA. CBO expects that the probability of an event that would trigger such as 

an investigation is very low. Consequently, although the precise 

number of individuals likely to be subpoenaed under this provision 

is uncertain, CBO expects that the direct cost of the mandate to 

private-sector entities would be well below the annual threshold established by UMRA ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation). 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs, Ken Johnson; Impact on 

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman; Impact on 

the Private Sector: Cecil McPherson. 

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

XI. COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC LAW 104–4

H.R. 4687 contains provisions that allow the director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to issue subpoenas on 

behalf of a National Construction Safety Team to governmental 

and private-sector entities. The Congressional Budget Office finds 

that this is an intergovernmental and private-sector mandate, but 

estimates that the costs of complying with this provision are well 

below the threshold established by Public Law 104–4. 

XII. COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee on Science’s oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the body of this report. 

XIII. STATEMENT ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND

OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause (3)(c)(4) of House Rule XIII, the goals and objectives of H.R. 4687 are to investigate building failures in order 

to make recommendations that will result in changes in building 

codes, standards, and practices, as well as evacuation and emergency response procedures. These recommendations should include 

a description of how the safety of buildings will be improved if 

adopted. H.R. 4687 also requires two annual reports to Congress. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology must submit 

a report detailing investigations conducted under this Act, recommendations made by National Construction Safety Teams and a 

description of how NIST responded to these recommendations. The 

advisory committee established under this Act must also submit a 

report evaluating investigations conducted under this Act and an 

assessment of the implementation of the recommendations made by 

Teams. 

XIV. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States 

grants Congress the authority to enact H.R. 4687. 

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XV. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

The functions of the advisory committee established by H.R. 4687 

are not currently being nor could they be performed by one or more 

agencies or by enlarging the mandate of another existing advisory 

committee. 

XVI. CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

The Committee finds that H.R. 4687 does not relate to the terms 

and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Public Law 104–1). 

XVII. STATEMENT ON PREEMPTION OF STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL

LAW

This bill is not intended to preempt any state, local, or tribal law. 

XVIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics 

and, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

SECTION 7 OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 

AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986

* * * * * * *

STRUCTURAL FAILURES

SEC. 7. The National Bureau of Standards, on its own initiative 

but only after consultation with local authorities, may initiate and 

conduct investigations to determine the causes of structural failures in structures which are used or occupied by the general public. 

No part of any report resulting from such investigation, or from an 

investigation under the National Construction Safety Team Act,

shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. 

* * * * * * *

XIX. COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

On May 22, a quorum being present, the Committee on Science 

favorably reported the National Construction Safety Team Act, by 

a voice vote and recommended its enactment. 

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XX. ADMINISTRATION LETTER ON H.R. 4687

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC, May 21, 2002. 

Hon. SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, 

Chairman, Committee on Science, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to present the views of the Administration on H.R. 4687, the National Construction Safety Team Act. 

The bill would authorize the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) to establish investigative teams to respond to 

major building failure events. The teams would investigate the performance of buildings in and following such events and the probable technical cause of the building failures. Based on its technical 

findings, NIST would recommend improvements to standards, 

codes and practices. NIST would also recommend future research 

to improve building safety as well as evacuation and emergency response procedures. To support these investigations, the bill would 

provide NIST with investigatory powers, including subpoena power. 

The bill would also extend those powers to NIST for its proposed 

investigations into the collapse of buildings at the World Trade 

Center. 

Among Federal laboratories, NIST is uniquely qualified to conduct comprehensive building failure investigations. NIST’s Building 

and Fire Research Laboratory is the foremost in its field, and 

through the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, 

NIST is the principal agency involved in R&D to improve building 

codes and standards for structures and lifelines. NIST has extensive disaster investigation experience and expertise—including investigations following structural or construction failures, fires, 

earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes. Some of the most prominent of these were the 1981 collapse of a walkway in the Kansas 

City Hyatt Regency Hotel, the 1986 Dupont Plaza Hotel fire in San 

Juan, Puerto Rico, the 1994 Northridge earthquake collapses, and 

the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake building collapses. 

NIST is currently proposing to undertake a building and fire 

safety investigation into the collapse of several of the buildings at 

the World Trade Center. That investigation is part of an overall response plan with three main elements. One is the 24-month investigation of the building construction, materials and technical conditions that combined to cause these disasters following the initial 

impact of the aircraft. The second element is a multi-year research 

and development program to provide the technical basis to support 

improved building and fire codes, standards, and practices. The results of this program will support the voluntary consensus process 

that is used in the United States to develop codes and standards. 

Third, the response plan calls for an industry-led dissemination 

and technical assistance program to provide practical guidance and 

tools to better prepare facility owners, contractors, designers, and 

emergency personnel to respond to future disasters. 

The Administration supports the NIST response plan and has requested $16 million as part of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s FY 2002 supplemental budget request to support the 

NIST investigation. The President’s FY 2003 budget request to 

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Congress also requests an increase of $2 million in base funding to 

support other elements of the NIST response plan. NIST’s Building and Fire Research Laboratory has already redirected about $2 million of its existing base funds to support the response plan. 

The Administration supports the intent of H.R. 4687. To this 

end, the Administration supports vesting NIST with subpoena 

power to complete full and thorough investigations of major structural failures, provided however that enforcement power rests, as 

is typical, with the Department of Justice. At the same time, the 

Administration is concerned that the historic role of NIST as a 

technological and standard-setting body not be materially altered 

by this legislation. NIST has operated effectively in the past to investigate building and structural failures, and we wish to work 

closely with the Congress to ensure that NIST not be tasked in this 

bill with inappropriate regulatory responsibilities. The Administration will seek improvements in the bill to address liability and 

other issues that might otherwise discourage private sector participation on investigatory teams, and to ensure that NIST is not 

transformed into a regulatory or quasi-regulatory agency. In addition, the Administration requests that the authorization levels conform to the President’s FY 2003 budget. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. The Office 

of Management and Budget has advised us that, from the standpoint of the Administration’s program, there is not objection to submission of this letter. 

Sincerely, 

THEODORE W. KASSINGER.

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