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S. HRG. 107–338

RULINGS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AS THEY

AFFECT THE POWERS AND AUTHORITIES OF

THE INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

CONCERNS OF RECENT DECISIONS OF THE U.S SUPREME COURT AND

THE FUTURE OF INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS IN AMERICA

FEBRUARY 27, 2002

WASHINGTON, DC

(
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado, Vice Chairman

FRANK MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona,

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota

HARRY REID, Nevada

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

PAUL WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington

PATRICIA M. ZELL, Majority Staff Director/Chief Counsel

PAUL MOOREHEAD, Minority Staff Director/Chief Counsel

(II)
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Statements:

Allen, W. Ron, chairman, Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe, Sequim, WA .......... 30

Anderson, Robert, University of Washington, School of Law, Seattle, WA . 10

Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from Colorado, vice chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs .............................................................. 2

Canby, Jr., William C., senior judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, Phonix, AZ ....................................................................................... 19

Getches, David, professor, University of Colorado at Boulder, School,

CO .................................................................................................................. 4

Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, chairman, Committee

on Indian Affairs ........................................................................................... 1

St. Clair, John, chief justice, Supreme Court, Wind River Reservation,

Ft. Washakie, WY ......................................................................................... 28

Yazzie, Robert, chief justice, Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Window

Rock, AZ ......................................................................................................... 26

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

Allen, W. Ron .................................................................................................... 51

Anderson, Robert .............................................................................................. 40

Canby, Jr., William C. ...................................................................................... 44

Cantwell, Hon. Maria, U.S. Senator from Washington ................................. 39

Getches, David (with attachments) ................................................................. 55

St. Clair, John ................................................................................................... 43

Yazzie, Robert ................................................................................................... 86

(1)

RULINGS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AS

THEY AFFECT THE POWERS AND AUTHORITIES OF INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., Hon. Daniel

K. Inouye (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Campbell, Cantwell, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM

HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. Well before this country was founded, Indian nations exercised dominion and control over approximately 550 million acres of land. Their governments pre-existed the formation of

the U.S. Government, and, indeed, were so sophisticated that the

framers of the U.S. Constitution modeled what was to become

America’s governmental structure after the Government of the Iroquois Confederacy.

The recognition of the Indian tribes as sovereign governments

has its origins in the Constitution of the United States, which in

Article III, Section 8, Clause 3, provides that, ‘‘The Congress shall

have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and

among the several States and with the Indian tribes.’’ From that time forward, this status of Indian tribal governments

as separate sovereigns has informed the laws enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the President for over 200 years, and

until relatively recently, has served as the foundation for the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court.

In the early 1830’s the U.S. Supreme Court’s Chief Justice John

Marshall articulated the fundamental principles upon which the

body of Federal Indian law would be constructed in a series of

cases that are now referred to as the Cherokee cases. Yesterday

this committee received testimony from Professor Reid Chambers,

who observed that at the time of Chief Justice Marshall’s rulings,

the Cherokee Nation had a written constitution, an elected bicameral legislature, a tribal judicial system, schools, an established

military, a written language, and a much higher adult literacy rate

than any State of the Union at that time.

Today tribal governments have not only discarded the mantle of

‘‘ward’’ to the United States ‘‘guardian’’ of Chief Justice Marshall’s
2

day, but have assumed a wide range of government responsibilities

that were formally the exclusive province of the National Government.

Although Federal policies have vacillated and congressional acts

have reflected those changes in policy, beginning in 1934 with the

enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, and reinforced in 1970

with the establishment of the Federal Policy of Native Self-Determination and Tribal Self-Governance, two of the three branches of

the U.S. Government have consistently acted in concert to reaffirm

the legal status of Indian tribal governments as sovereign governments.

We are here today because there is a third branch of the U.S.

Government, the Judicial Branch, that appears to be headed in a

decidedly different direction than the other two branches of the National Government. If there were a few aberrations from the Supreme Court precedent and Federal statutory law, one might not

have cause for concern, but those that study the law and the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court instruct us that the Court is on a

steady march to divest native governments of their governmental

powers and authorities.

Principles long and well-established, such as the fact that tribal

governments retain all of their inherent sovereign powers and authorities not relinquished by them in treaties or abrogated by an

express act of the Congress, appear to have been cast aside. The

fundamental principle that tribal governments have authority to

exercise jurisdiction over their territory, just as other governments

do, is being steadily eroded by the Court’s rulings.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the U.S. Constitution proscribing discrimination on the basis of race, the Court seems to be consistently imposing limitations on the exercise of tribal government

jurisdiction based upon the race and ethnicity of those over whom

jurisdiction is exercised.

The historical foundations of the relationship between sovereign

governments, the Federal, State, and tribal governments, appear to

no longer have any legal import in the Court’s rulings.

Last, but certainly not least, from the perspective of the branch

of the government that the U.S. Constitution charges with conducting relations with foreign governments, the several states, and Indian tribes, the Congress—one is hard-pressed to find reference in

the Court’s opinions to the context in which the rest of America is

operating; namely, Federal laws and the policies they reflect.

So today the committee has called upon a few of the many experts who have, through their writings and scholarly discourse, instructed us that there is cause for alarm, and have urged the Congress to act. With that, I am pleased to call upon the vice chairman

for his remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO, VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

INDIAN AFFAIRS

Senator CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that very fine

statement. I think it is important that statements like yours remind people that Native Americans’ ability to govern themselves

didn’t start with the Movie ‘‘Dances with Wolves.’’ Indeed, I live
3

about maybe 40 miles east of what’s commonly called the ‘‘cliff

dwellings’’ of Mesa Verde. People lived there about the time that

Christ walked the Earth, and they had a form of government. They

were there 400 years before Columbus landed on the shores of the

Caribbean Islands. They had a form of government then, 400 years

before Columbus got here.

And they weren’t the only ones. If you look at two other of the

really ancient cultures that thrived about that time, Cahokia,

which is in Missouri south of St. Louis, and Tenochtitlan, which

the city of Mexico City was built on the ruin of Tenochtitlan, they

were thriving communities as large as any community in Europe

at the time. They had forms of government.

The tenets of all those ancient forms of government with Native

Americans were really based on just three or four: The belief in the

family, the relationship with their natural surroundings, and their

belief in creative force. I guess I am just continually amazed that

so much transpires in America that deals with Federal-tribal relationships when all those years and those centuries, eons and eons

of time, are just discarded, like they weren’t important in the

scheme of things when we deal with tribal self-governance. So I

thank you for that statement.

At yesterday’s hearing on Indian trust management reform, we

heard from distinguished legal scholars about the legal and political foundation of the Federal-tribal relationship. We heard about

Chief Justice John Marshall, who we credit with firmly establishing the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Federal system and

the role he played in Indian jurisprudence, as you have mentioned.

The pendulum of Federal Indian policy has been swinging back

and forth right from the beginning of our Republic: Treaties, relocation, reservations, allotment, assimilation, termination, and to the

current policy of self-determination. But Indian self-determination

is more than a slogan to be carelessly thrown around. Chief Justice

Marshall’s decisions are grounded in it, and President Nixon knew

what it meant in 1970, when he issued his famous Special Message

to Congress on Indian Affairs.

Local decisionmaking is important. It is an important part of

Federal Indian policy, but it’s an important fact to many of us here

in Congress, too, and that’s why we believe in states’ rights and

local jurisdiction and the ability of people to make their own decisions at the local level. It is really the core of the principles of

American freedoms to me and many of us that are here.

It is also a key concept because it works. Local governments

know best what works for their citizens, and Indian tribes are no

different in this respect than any other local government. As important as the legal tenets of Federal Indian law and policy are, I’m

just as concerned with the practical results that the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court will have on that policy and on

the future of Indian tribal governments in America.

An Indian tribal government that can’t legally defend its territory isn’t a sovereign government at all. An Indian tribal government that is unable to levy a tax on a hotel or things of that nature

that enjoy the benefits and the amenities of the tribe with the

things that the tribe provides certainly cannot survive very long.
4

In short, I feel, if left unchecked, the philosophy and reasoning

of the Supreme Court cases will mean that in fairly short order Indian tribes will be left with very little, if any, powers at all. If this

trend continues, the current vigor of Indian tribal governments will

be a distant memory, and the tribes themselves will become little

more than social clubs or mechanisms for funding Federal dollars

to Indian people.

The advances of rehabilitating tribal economies will be reversed

if tribes lack fundamental authority over people and events that

are located on their lands. Massive refederalization on Indian

issues will take place, which is not healthy for the tribes, for tribal

members, or local citizens, or the taxpayer. This result is not, in

my view, what the U.S. Constitution sets out envisioned, and does

not represent the views of, I believe, the majority on this committee

or in Congress generally.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I’d ask unanimous consent that my

formal statement be included in the record, and I look forward to

the hearing with our witnesses today.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Today we are honored to have the greatest legal minds of this

land on matters involved in Indian affairs. For the first panel I call

upon Professor David Getches, of the University of Colorado at

Boulder, School of Law, and Professor Robert Anderson, of the University of Washington School of Law, Seattle.

STATEMENT OF DAVID GETCHES, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY

OF COLORADO AT BOULDER, SCHOOL OF LAW, BOULDER, CO

Mr. GETCHES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator

Campbell. It is a pleasure to be here, and I am pleased to have an

opportunity to talk about an issue of extreme importance to those

of us who have been involved in Indian law for many years, and

certainly to all people of Indian country.

The current U.S. Supreme Court has made an astounding shift

in its Indian law jurisprudence. It has disregarded 170 years of Supreme Court precedent. It has undermined the congressional policy

of political and economic self-determination for Indians, and these

decisions affect the lives of every reservation Indian, making reservation life less secure and reservation futures less promising.

Now the travesty of mismanaged Indian trust funds is wellknown, but the Supreme Court’s assault on the foundations of Indian law and on congressionally-mandated Indian policy is virtually unknown outside Indian country, but the effects of the Supreme Court’s actions promise to be deeper and longer lasting.

Now I’ve been a student and a teacher and a practitioner of Indian law for over 30 years now. In the nineties we have witnessed

a sea change in Indian law. We have found that Indian law in the

Supreme Court is heading in a radical new direction.

I began researching why this was several years ago. I did this

reading painstakingly all the opinions of the Court and then spending a summer here at the Library of Congress going through the

files that had been made available by the late Justice Brennan and

Justice Thurgood Marshall. The first revelation I had in looking at

these records was that the internal memos showed that for some

Justices on the Supreme Court Indian law was seen as a field with
5

no anchors, with no guiding principles, or moorings. The memos,

internal, private memos, showed an unabashed concern with setting things right in Indian country, with taking to task the decisions of the past, and applying the present values of these Justices,

as if the opinions of the past had been grounded in no principles

at all.

As your statement, Mr. Chairman, and the statements of Senator

Campbell indicated, those earlier opinions were, indeed, grounded

in long tradition of Supreme Court precedent, going back to the

early 1800s and the decisions in three major cases by Chief Justice

John Marshall.

Now it became clear to me as I proceeded in this research that

majorities of the Court were deciding cases in order to reach outcomes that satisfied them without basing their decisions on the

precedents and principles that had guided their predecessors for

170 years. But other than the fact that the whole exercise was subjective, as I indicated in a 1996 article, I couldn’t find any new philosophy or set of principles that gave coherence to the Court’s decisions.

Eventually, I turned my attention to the work of constitutional

scholars and looked beyond my own expertise in Indian law and

found in the full array of cases, the cases going well beyond Indian

law, that there were three themes or trends that explained nearly

every decision of the Court since the mid-1980’s, not just in Indian

law. They describe a set of values that the majorities favor, and

these values are not specific to Indian law. The three value-based

trends are, first, a commitment to the rights of states; second, a belief that the law must be colorblind, and, third, a desire to support

mainstream values.

Now each of these trends sweeps with them nearly every Indian

case. As I am sure is obvious to the members of the committee,

States are adverse to Indians in nearly every Indian case in the

Supreme Court. Colorblind justice may stand for principles that are

important to members of the Court in affirmative action settings,

but Indian laws are not about affirmative action. That’s about a

government-to-government relationship.

Mainstream values, Indians may have lifestyles and religions

that are different, but it’s not the same as the perception of being

‘‘out of step’’ that the Court might see in other contexts. These

trends are robust, accounting for the Court’s outcomes in virtually

every case. I would like to offer today this article that does the

analysis. I expect that, in the interest of time, we ought not to go

over all 80 pages of this very interesting article, but I will offer it

for the committee and your record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be part of the record.

Mr. GETCHES. Now when you look at the work of the Court since

the mid-1980’s, the most striking reality is that Indians lose. On

the chart that I have put up here, you can see the blue lines stand

for cases, or rather percentages of cases, in each term of the Court

since 1958 to the term 2000–2001. The red lines stand for percentages of losses. As you can see, the red lines are much more prevalent at the more recent end of the chart. The black is a trend line

showing the trend of decisions, a trend against Indians.
6

Now if, for purposes of comparison, it is helpful to look at other

courts, what I have done is compared the Rehnquist Court, which

really began in 1986, with its predecessor, the Burger Court. This

pie charts show that in the Burger Court, Indians were winning 58

percent of the cases. In the Rehnquist Court, almost equal number

of terms of Court, Indian tribes are winning on 23 percent of the

cases that come before the Court.

Now the differences here are striking. In trying to understand

what is going on here, I ask myself, is this extraordinary or are

there other groups of litigants, other types of interests, or other

subject matters of cases, where litigants have done as badly as Indians. I looked at possibilities ranging from immigration to criminal cases, and the worst record I found for any litigants other than

Indians was convicted criminals seeking reversals of their convictions. I found that convicted criminals won 34 percent of the time

while Indian tribes have won only 23 percent of the time. Nobody

does worse in this Supreme Court than Indian tribes.

These decisions are not only bad on a win/loss ratio. These decisions are major departures from Indian law as it was developed

and articulated by the Court from the very foundings of this Nation

until the 1980’s. The basic rules were straightforward. You mentioned the foundational principles and cases in your statement, Mr.

Chairman. The foundation principles are summarized here. Tribes

are sovereigns. Tribes became subject to the legislative power of

the United States and lost their external sovereignty by being incorporated into the United States, but retained tribal powers can

only be qualified by congressional legislation or treaties. This is

laid out in the Marshall trilogy, those three leading cases from the

early 1800’s.

Now not all of these principles have always pleased Indian

tribes. The Indian law scholars, Indian tribal leaders and their attorneys have not liked the idea that, just by virtue of planting an

American flag on the shore of North America, the right to squelch

and diminish tribal powers was gained by the Europeans. But, be

that as it may, this doctrine of plenary congressional power has

been reiterated by the courts, and tribes have learned to live with

it.

They have learned that it can be a barrier against the intrusion

of State governments into their territories. Tribes have also suffered under this plenary power doctrine. Congress has not always

been generous with Indian tribes.

For instance, tribes suffered enormous losses when Congress embraced the allotment policy in the 1800’s, the late 1800’s, and the

purpose there was to break up reservation lands, tribal lands, and

distribute small parcels to every individual Indian, so that the remaining land could be distributed to homesteaders. This policy

proved to be an abject disaster. Congress recognized that, but not

for almost 50 years. Eventually, Congress reversed the policy with

the Indian Reorganization Act policies that you mentioned, Mr.

Chairman.

Now the ensuing period was more benign, but then again in the

1950’s Congress went astray, if I may say, and abruptly changed

the course of Indian policy. Termination became the policy of that

era. The idea was to end the Federal relationship with the tribes
7

of the United States and divide up the property of the tribes, again

assimilation.

Now this took an enormous toll on 100 Indian tribes, but the

courts didn’t alter it. The courts didn’t alter the allotment policy.

The courts deferred to Congress. It was Congress that reversed

again the termination policy after 15 years of failure. It took 20

years to make things right and restore tribes to their original status; that Congress did, but without any encouragement from the

courts.

Now since then tribal governments have rebuilt. Some are

strong, healthy governments. Others are struggling to overcome a

myriad of disadvantages. Congress has decided to support tribes in

their successes and allow them their occasional missteps. Tribes

have begun to find their footing, and their cultures, bruised by illconsidered policies of the past, are gaining new strength.

During the last 30 years of its self-determination polity, Congress

has passed dozens of bills to support the ideal of self-determination, and those bills are enumerated, or many of them, in the footnotes to my written testimony that I submitted earlier. Bills, great

pieces of legislation, like the Indian Self-Determination Act, the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Native American Graves Protection

and Repatriation Act, the list is very long, and it’s a tribute to the

work of this committee and to the unflagging policy of Congress

during this period.

Meanwhile, the Rehnquist Court has decided case after case

against the very principles and policies that the Congress has

sought to advance. Instead of recognizing the will of Congress, the

Court has strained to give effect today to the policies of yesterday.

The allotment policy, for instance, has been a dominant force in the

decisions of the current Court.

The Court has prevented tribes from trying non-Indians who

commit crimes on the reservation. It’s prevented tribes from regulating non-members hunting and fishing on the reservation. It’s

prevented tribes from zoning non-members’ lands in parts of some

reservations. It’s prevented tribes from taxing guests in hotels on

the reservation, and it’s prevented tribal courts from hearing personal injury lawsuits by non-Indians who want to use the tribal

courts, and from hearing suits by Indians who have tried to sue

non–Indians in tribal court for torts committed against them in

their homes on reservation lands owned by the tribe.

Now just compare how the Rehnquist Court looks at these issues

of tribal sovereignty and powers. I have put up here some quotes

from the earlier Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court. On tribal

powers, the modern era Burger Court said:

Until Congress acts, the tribe retains existing powers of sovereignty. That’s the

law as it has always been.

A 1997 case, Strate v. A–1 Contractors, our case law establishes

that, absent express authorization by Federal statute or treaty,

tribal jurisdiction exists only in limited circumstances, an exact

shift in position.

Tribal sovereignty, what did the Court say up until the mideighties? Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of

non-members. Non-members’ presence and conduct on Indian lands

is conditioned by the limitations tribes choose to impose. That was
8

the law until the mid-eighties. The 2001 case of Atkinson Trading

Company said that Indian tribes can no longer be described as

sovereigns in this sense.

Look at the shift with respect to tribal courts. In 1987, Iowa Mutual, civil jurisdiction over non-member activities presumptively

lies in tribal courts. 2001, Justice Souter concurring in the Hicks

case says:

A presumption against tribal court civil jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant:

The earlier criminal jurisdiction case.

What does the present Court say about congressional intent compared to its predecessors? How do they look on the policies of this

Congress? In the modern era, the period up until the mid-1980’s,

the Court said things like this in Bryan v. Itasca County:

Courts are not obligated in ambiguous circumstances to strain to implement an

assimilationist policy Congress has now rejected.

Look at what the Court now says. In the Brendale case, it said

that:

When an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of

tribal government, we can find no tribal jurisdiction.

You see, the Court in the 1970’s not ready to look back at repudiated policies of Congress, and you see the Court in 1989 looking

farther backward to the allotment policy as its touchstone for its

decisions.

Now let’s look at a couple of these recent cases and what their

impacts are. The Brendale case, which I just quoted, involved two

non-Indian landowners on the reservations. Both of them wanted

to build multi-unit housing developments on the Yakima Reservation. Now the tribe, the Yakima Nation, has for many years had

its own zoning laws. Later on the county adopted its zoning laws.

The county, under its zoning laws, would make possible these

multi-unit developments on the Yakima Reservation. The Yakima

zoning regulations would not.

Now the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the applicable zoning

for one of the two parcels was tribal because in this case the land

of the non-Indian was located in a pristine wilderness-type area

that the Court said ‘‘retained its Indian character.’’ In the case of

the other parcel, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the county

could zone the non-Indians’ land because in this area there had

been several non-Indians move into a small town on the reservation, and that area had lost its Indian character, having businesses

in it and a small airport.

In another case, the 1997 Strate case, which we quoted earlier,

a non-Indian contractor was doing work on the Ft. Berthold Indian

Reservation. The non-Indian contractor was driving down the road,

and Jazella Fredericks came out of her driveway at her home. The

truck hit her at a high rate of speed and did serious harm to her.

She was in the hospital for many weeks, having been gravely injured.

She and her several children, all members of the tribe, sued.

Now Mrs. Fredericks was not a member of the tribe. She had lived

on the reservation most of her life, having been a war bride of her

husband, Mr. Fredericks, a tribal member. They met in Germany,
9

and she came directly from her native Germany to the reservation,

lived there, raised her children.

When she found that she needed the help of the justice system,

she went to the Ft. Berthold justice system, and she was turned

back by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held that the tribe had

no jurisdiction because the accident had taken place on non-Indian

land. What was the non-Indian land? It was a road on tribal property over which a right-of-way had been granted to the State to

construct the road, non-Indian land.

Now the result would have been different, the Court said, if it

was a Federal road or a tribal road, or if Mrs. Fredericks had been

a tribal member. Now consider for 1 minute the plight of being a

police officer or a zoning official or some other officer of the government for either the tribe or the county or the State in either of

these situations. How do you apply the law handed down by this

U.S. Supreme Court? It is absolutely impractical and unworkable,

depending as it does on tribal membership, race of the parties, and

the ownership of land.

Now consider also how all of this must look to a person thinking

of putting a business on an Indian reservation or investing in a

tribal business. The one thing that a business person wants in my

experience is certainty. There is no certainty here, where the law

depends on a complex mix of factors that the Court is continuing

to articulate, such as race, tribal membership, landownership, and

some unarticulated balancing of those factors.

As tribal governments look forward to trying to enhance their

economies and fulfill the congressional policy of Indian self-determination and economic growth, these cases are going to be, are

today, a major barrier. They are going to drive away businesses.

Congress’ policy of self-determination for tribes and bolstering tribal governments is being seriously eroded by this course of decisionmaking.

In the modern era, this period since 1958 until 1986, about when

the Rehnquist Court began, the Supreme Court gave modern

meaning to those old precedents from the Marshall trilogy, and it

sustained tribal powers over tribal territory. During this same period, tribes enacted codes and laws. They strengthened tribal governments and built up agencies and entities to administer their

laws over everything from water and the environment to business

regulation.

With the help of congressional policy and congressional funding,

they strengthened their tribal courts and governments. With new

business activity coming in, and it wasn’t just bingo parlors and casinos that are known best to the public, the cycle of poverty started

to lose its grip on many reservations.

Tribally-controlled schools got new quality and accessibility to

education. Now progress, admittedly, has been slow, but it has

been steady, and it’s been progress, to be sure, thanks to wise and

determined tribal leaders, and thanks to the congressional policy of

self-determination that’s remained unchanged for 30 years. But all

of this is now threatened by the devastating impact of these U.S.

Supreme Court decisions that deny and reverse congressional policy.
10

The decisions are filling every gap that Congress has left. If Congress has not addressed an issue, has not spoken, the Court will

enter and curb tribal powers. The activism of the Court is resulting

in a new and more confused Indian policy with no agenda and no

vision beyond its distaste for difference and what it considers to be

race-based institutions and a commitment to protecting the powers,

prerogatives, and immunities of states. The Court is ruling against

tribes in case after case.

The trend in Indian law, indicated by our first chart, is explained

by these broader trends that I have identified in the article, but the

Court, whether purposefully or not, is advancing a kind of termination. But termination, even wrapped in a black robe, is still termination.

What surely remains of Indian law is Congress’ power to legislate in Indian affairs. Just as Congress has stepped in to correct

the error in Duro v. Reina, the case denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-members, Congress can reaffirm and clarify tribal

jurisdiction and set Indian law and Indian policy back on track.

Indian rights and Indian sovereignty are essentials in a government-to-government relationship that goes all the way back to the

founding of the Nation. If the Court understood this and appreciated this grounding in original intent, Indian law could be put

back on track by the Court itself, but this seems unlikely. The

Court’s primary mission has little to do with Indian law. It will be

up to Congress to reverse the trend. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Getches appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor.

May I now call upon Professor Anderson.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT ANDERSON, UNIVERSITY OF

WASHINGTON, SCHOOL OF LAW, SEATTLE, WA

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. It is an honor to be here today.

I want to state for the record that I agree with everything that

Professor Getches has so eloquently laid out. He’s done such a good

job that he doesn’t leave much for his colleagues to discuss here.

But I have spent about 1 dozen years working for the American

Native Rights Fund, 5 years with Secretary Babbitt at the Interior

Department, and I’m now at the University of Washington, where

I teach Indian law and run the Native American Law Center,

which does a lot of day-to-day work with Indian tribes in the

Northwest, Alaska, and around the country. I am also a member

of the Bois Forte Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe.

I want to talk to you a little bit about some of the particular instances where the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of late has

caused real harm to Indian tribes on the ground and also created

the significant potential for mischief within the executive branch.

First and foremost is the fact that for years the executive branch,

States, and tribes have understood that they operate in a legal

world in which Congress has the final say. The foundational principles of Indian law, that tribes have all powers except those expressly taken away, provided a baseline against which tribal leaders, their lawyers, States, and non-Indians could operate. If adjustments needed to be made or experiments were to be undertaken in
11

the Indian law arena, that sort of an experiment or approach could

be authorized by Congress, hopefully after dialog with the affected

tribal leaders and others.

The Indian Reorganization Act is a great example. Adopted in

1934 to reverse the trends of the allotment assimilation era, the

terrible loss of land, the IRA stands as a bulwark against termination of tribes. Even though a termination era was undertaken in

the 1950’s, the IRA stood as a backstop. Many tribes are organized

under the IRA.

But, more importantly than the particular provisions of the IRA,

I think, is the philosophy that it sets out, and that philosophy is

that in the United States there are three sovereigns, the United

States, the States, and Indian tribes, and that Congress firmly supports the continued recognition of Indian tribes and the broad exercise of tribal powers through tribal courts and tribal institutions as

tribes see fit.

Now when Public Law 280 was based by the termination era

Congress in the 1950’s, it provided states with jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Congress, mistakenly in my view, did not require tribal consent to such state jurisdiction. Congress was dealing

with what was perceived as a state of some lawlessness within Indian reservations and acted in Public Law 280 to give States authority.

It was only 14 years later, in 1968, when the Indian Civil Rights

Act was passed, in which Congress amended Public Law 280 to require that States who would assert jurisdiction over Indian reservations receive the consent of the tribe, receive the consent of the

body with governmental authority over a particular reservation.

Since 1968, no State has assumed jurisdiction over an Indian reservation.

In fact, in the State where I live, Washington State, the Tulalip

Tribes recently worked with the State legislator, with the Governor

of Washington State, to have the State of Washington surrender its

jurisdiction over the Tulalip Reservation in favor of tribal jurisdiction. The tribe worked with Secretary Babbitt, with the county police officials, with Congress, in order to obtain funding to ensure

that the tribal government could administer police protection and

provide a forum for judicial dispute resolution on the reservation.

The Tulalip Tribes have a tribal court with a couple of judges,

a public defender’s office, a prosecutor’s office, a jurisdictional arrangement with the counties and with the State that works well

for all parties.

Now the Supreme Court decisions in the Hicks case and the Atkinson case severely undermine the certainty that we have, or had,

that the tribe could provide justice to all parties on the reservation,

at least in the civil context. The Court has indicated that tribal

courts may not have authority to hear cases that involve only nonIndian parties, of which there are a significant number on the

Tulalip Reservation, who may wish to use the tribal court for dispute resolution.

Now also part of the Indian Civil Rights Act were provisions of

the U.S. Constitution which were placed on Indian tribes. As Professor Getches pointed out, the tribes are recognized in the Constitution as one of three sovereigns. The provisions of the Bill of
12

Rights are applicable to the Federal Government and to the States

through the 14th Amendment. The Congress, in 1968, chose, over

the objection of many tribes, I might add, to make many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to Indian tribes. That was

Congress’ prerogative to do so.

The Supreme Court, in 1978, when it heard a case involving the

application of the Indian Civil Rights Act, a Federal law, correctly,

in my view, determined that Congress had not intended to allow

Federal courts to intrude on the operation of Indian tribes. Instead,

the Court said, well, Congress has put in place the provisions of

the Bill of Rights to some extent and made them applicable to

tribes. However, Congress did not clearly authorize Federal court

to hear these cases, and therefore, we’re going to make these rights

enforceable only in tribal court.

If Congress wishes to allow Federal courts to hear these actions,

it can state so explicitly. That is as it should be. Unless Congress

speaks clearly to an issue, the Court should rule that the tribal autonomy is not interfered with. We’ve seen a dramatic departure in

just the opposite presumption taking place with the current Court,

as Professor Getches has pointed out.

Third, Congress has acted in several areas to delegate Federal

authority to Indian tribes. Most notably, in the Clean Air Act, Congress explicitly provides tribes with the ability to obtain treatment

as a state and to set air quality standards within reservations,

after going through a bureaucratic exercise with the EPA. Similarly, the Indian liquor laws are administered in tandem by the Department of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior, and Indian tribes

with tribes acting to exercise delegated Federal authority under the

Indian liquor laws.

The Clean Water Act provides an interesting example. It seems

to me to provide for the exercise of delegated Federal authority. It

has also been interpreted by the EPA to allow tribes to exercise

their inherent authority over reservation lands, and EPA has taken

its cue from Congress and interpreted the Clean Water Act quite

liberally. It has provided tribes with treatment as a state in a number of cases, recognizing tribal inherent authority over their reservations.

The Hicks and the Atkinson cases make it appear that the EPA

may have to cabin its authority and recognition of tribal inherent

authority. I think that would be a tragedy if it were to do so, but

many state that that may be the case.

Again, uncertainty caused by the radical shift in the Supreme

Court’s approach to these cases is causing many to reconsider what

the baseline is anymore. I submit that this body is the appropriate

one to act to correct that baseline, to reconfirm tribal authority

over all land within the reservations and all people present within

reservation boundaries. do, that this body has adopted a great deal

of laws in the 1980’s and 1990’s that support and enhance tribal

governmental jurisdiction: the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Indian

Child Protection and Family Violence Act, the Indian Tribal Justice

Act. The Department of Justice COPS Program is a tremendous

success. The funding that’s been provided by Congress has put police officers, tribal police officers, on the beat on reservations. It is
13

another example of tribes receiving that which is their due treatment under the U.S. Constitution.

The executive branch has taken notice. Now the executive

branch, as I can well attest, sometimes drags its feet at implementing Federal policy. President Clinton issued executive orders on

consultation with tribes as governments. President Nixon announced the self-determination policy in 1970. Memoranda on government-to-government relations and other secretarial orders that

confirm and recognize the status of tribes as government sometimes seem to me as sort of a paper chase. These are exercises that

are not really worthwhile.

But having been in the administration, I can tell you that the

fact that the President of the United States cites the Self-Determination Act and other acts of Congress and directs career employees to consult with Indian tribes because they are governments has

an important effect on the way the Government does business.

Now the Supreme Court in these cases has undermined that policy by limiting the authority of tribes over their reservations. I fear

that it is possible that the executive branch will get cold feet unless

this Congress steps in and reaffirms the authority of tribes in a

strong baseline against which tribes, states, and Federal bureaucrats may operate.

I can’t say enough about Congress’ work with the Indian Self-Determination Act and the Self-Governance Act. I was looking at

some statistics the other day. In Alaska, 97 percent of BIA programs are carried out by tribes; 75 percent of Indian Health Services programs are carried out by tribes. That’s the case in many regions of the country.

Notwithstanding the terrible loss that Alaska Natives suffered in

the Vinatie case, they remain governments with members and important jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court, never known for

its friendly disposition to Indian tribes, recently recognized the authority of tribes in Alaska to adjudicate domestic relations matters

among members and non-members who consent to tribal jurisdiction, this notwithstanding the loss in the U.S. Supreme Court in

the Vinatie case.

I tell you, it is a strange day when we look to State Supreme

Courts for protection, and they look better than the U.S. Supreme

Court. Yet, that is the case that we find ourselves in as a result

of the Rehnquist Court’s recent decisionmaking.

Similarly, when the Rehnquist Court handed down the Seminole

Indian Gaming Case, which, in essence, made part, important

parts, of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act unenforceable, the Secretary of the Interior was able to step in with gap-filling regulations. The cases in litigation, the administration was able to respond to the Court’s ruling in the best way that it could, but,

again, I fear with these recent blows that have been dealt with

Hicks and Atkinson, it is only Congress that can make the situation

right. I urge Congress to do so. Thank you very much.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Anderson appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor.

If I may proceed now with questions, Professor Getches, you have

suggested the Rehnquist Court is not pursuing its own Indian policy, but advancing its agenda of states’ rights, colorblind justice,
14

and mainstream values. Now if this is accurate, how can you explain why the Court applies considerations of race and ethnicity in

determining the scope of tribal jurisdiction?

Mr. GETCHES. Yes; there certainly is a paradox there, Mr. Chairman, in announcing a policy of colorblind justice and then bringing

race into consideration as a major factor in its Indian decisionmaking, but I would see this as part of an overall effort to limit

the scope of what the Court views as special rights for one minority

for Indian tribes and to make sure that that realm of special rights,

as they see it, doesn’t include or affect any non-Indians, non-members of that tribe.

As they do that, it runs the risk of becoming, as Senator Campbell warned in his statement, tantamount to the treatment of a social club. The Elks Club or a college fraternity has the same level

of ‘‘sovereignty’’ over its place and its members as an Indian tribe

would under that kind of formulation. So, in a sense, they’re making it colorblind by factoring out any residual governance that a

tribe might have over people or territory that is not owned by it

and members who are not participants in that tribal government.

The CHAIRMAN. Sovereignty, as related to Indian country, has

been defined in many different ways. How does the Supreme Court,

the Rehnquist Court, define sovereignty?

Mr. GETCHES. It seems to define it as what a tribe has, the powers that a tribe has specifically over its members. It has taken

away the territorial version of that sovereignty. In quotes that we

looked at earlier, the earlier courts have recognized the territorial

reach of tribal powers. In fact, Justice Rehnquist himself said in

the Mazzare case years ago, before he became Chief Justice in this

earlier period I’ve characterized as the modern era, a term I borrowed from my colleague Charles Wilkinson, he said that a tribe

has power over its members and territory, and that is language

that incorporates the notions going back all the way to Chief Justice Marshall’s time.

But there’s been a turn of events since then. The current Court

has said that kind of sovereignty, territorial sovereignty, no longer

exists. That’s the shift. It’s just sovereignty over members and

owned land, again the social club model.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of you have suggested that the Congress

should do something about the present trend of the Rehnquist

Court. What type of statute are you talking about, case-by-case or

a statute of general application?

Mr. GETCHES. Mr. Chairman, I think that the legislation will

have to address cases, or at least the outcomes in cases, that now

have become generalized to all tribes. Of course, a case comes up

on one reservation concerning a couple of people, and then the law

becomes generalized. Congress has a great advantage in being able

to step back and look at the big picture and decide what the impact

on Indian country as a whole and society as a whole will be, to

have hearings and participation.

I think that looking case-by-case at what’s been done and seeing

whether Congress is happy with those results at a generalized level

is the first step. Then legislation to undue the effects of unacceptable results is necessary. This means, would man under the approach that I would recommend taking, a restoration of tribal pow-
15

ers in many of these instances where they have stripped away by

the Court decisions.

Second, a clarification of the jurisdictional situation on reservations. Third, a reaffirmation in a more general way of the

foundational principles that were the formulation of the Supreme

Court itself in the past. Give them back their own rules of decision

and let them know that gap-filling will be done by the Congress

and not by the Court.

The CHAIRMAN. And you believe that will suffice?

Mr. GETCHES. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. That will suffice? That would overcome these decisions?

Mr. GETCHES. Well, I think you need to start by being very specific about the principles in those decisions that need to be reversed. If, for instance, civil jurisdiction over non-members in tribal

courts is to be restored, that will have to be explicit.

The CHAIRMAN. So then the law should specifically address, say,

the Hicks case or the Atkinson case?

Mr. GETCHES. Well, I think the approach of Congress should address those cases. The statement of the principle should be more

than a reversal of the case by citation, which in a few rare cases

Congress has done. I think this is like the approach to Duro v.

Reina, where the case wasn’t specifically overruled, but the principle was embodied in legislation after Congress determined that it

was unacceptable. So, yes, it is case-by-case, but probably without

citation to or limitation to a court decision.

I know Congress did that once in the case of United States v.

Midwest Oil in the public lands area, just said the case is overruled. I think more amplified and thorough treatment is needed for

these cases.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may now ask Professor Anderson, do you

have any personal theory as to why the Supreme Court in recent

rulings seemed to ignore the stated Federal policy of self-determination and tribal self-governance?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think that there are a few reasons, a couple of

which were stated by Professor Getches here. No. 1, I think that

this whole notion that tribes have jurisdiction over non-members is

something—and non-members who can’t vote in tribal elections or

run for tribal office in some cases, although a tribe can do what it

wishes in terms of determining its officers might be, I think there’s

a fundamental problem.

Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion to the Hicks case, outlined that reason as one of the particular problems that he personally sees in analyzing whether or not to affirm tribal jurisdiction

over non-members.

Second, my personal thought is that we don’t have anybody on

the Court who takes a great personal interest in these cases anymore. When Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall and Justice

Blackmun were on the Court, they took it upon themselves to become scholars in this area. They cared about Indian law. They

cared about Indian people and understood what was happening on

the ground. I just don’t think that we have anybody on the Court

right now that takes that sort of an interest.
16

When I look at the opinions, I see them as quite superficial in

their analysis. I see them letting themselves off the hook by saying,

well, if we make any mistakes, Congress can just remedy them. It

used to be, under the Burger Court and prior Courts, that the law

would run in favor of tribes. Ambiguities, as we all know, would

be interpreted in favor of Indian tribal governments, and if a Court

erred in terms of recognizing too much tribal governmental powers,

the Court said, well, Congress can remedy that, as it did with the

Indian Civil Rights Act. So we’ve seen a complete reversal in the

modern era.

I think it really comes down to a lack of interest and this notion

that, oh, we’re not going to recognize any special rights for groups,

and because of the lack of interest, the Court fails to understand

the governmental status, the political status of Indian tribes and

treats them as a racial minority instead of as governments that

they are that pre-existed the establishment of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of you have suggested that we should act

on this trend. Can we impose upon both of you and call upon you

for assistance in drafting appropriate legislation? We are not in the

practice of overturning the Supreme Court. We have done that in

some cases, like the Duro v. Reina case, but it is not common practice here. May we call upon both of you?

Mr. GETCHES. Well, in my case, certainly. I would be eager and

honored, and I wouldn’t consider it reversing the Supreme Court,

but merely providing guidance. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think as a Member of Congress I should

say that. [Laughter.]

Mr. Vice Chairman.

Senator CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dave, it is nice to see you again. I remember two decades ago

when we worked on issues of mutual interest in Colorado, and I

had great admiration for you then and still do. You have really a

good heart when it comes to dealing with Indian people and Indian

issues. I am glad to see you’ve done so well. I guess the jury’s still

out whether I’ve done well because it seems like all I do when I

show up at these hearings is get mad. [Laughter.]

But, I’ll tell you, when I hear comments like yours and Mr. Anderson’s, I do get mad, not at you, but at the process, the way we

have treated Indians in the history of this country.

It seems to me that they should have two sets of rights: that of

being Native Americans as given in the treaties and that they inherit being an American, like any other American. Yet, we see a

constant erosion of their rights on both sides of that equation.

Some of those, it seems to me, ought to be protected in the Constitution like anybody else. And, yet, if they were protected in the

Constitution, they probably would have had the right to vote at

least as early as women did in this Nation. If they were protected,

truly protected, by the Constitution, I mean the basic human rights

that they ought to have like anybody else, we wouldn’t have the remains of 16,000 Indians warehoused in the basement of the Smithsonian, although many of them are not there now because of the

work of Senator Inouye and me. As you know, under the Museum

of the American Indian Act 12 years, we required the Museum to
17

start giving those remains back to the tribes and the families of the

people they had collected.

But I point that out because I think it’s clearly different than

any other, if I can use the word, minority is treated in this country.

Indians have made some small gains sometimes in the state courts,

as Mr. Anderson suggested, and years ago a few of them in the Supreme Court. They’ve made a few gains here, but it seems like

every time they make a gain, they lose one.

You spoke at length about termination. Both of you did. I’ll tell

you, of all the misguided, dumb things that Congress could have

done, I guess that was the classic worst. I often think that the Termination Act, the equivalent would have been for the Federal Government to tell African Americans that we passed a law saying

you’re no longer black. I mean, how stupid can you get? That was

a stupid act.

But we rectified that. We changed that, as you know. It’s a good

thing we did. It should have been done sooner. It did a lot of damage to Indian people.

But now we seem to have, for lack of a better phrase, termination by Court decree, rather than what we have done here.

Maybe we’re getting a little more enlightened, but we have a long

way to go. I know you’re aware of that, too.

But let me ask you just a couple of questions. That’s our role,

Congress’ role. Maybe either one can answer, but let me just address it to maybe you, Dave, first of all.

How much is our fault? How much are we to blame for allowing

the Court to encroach in the field of Indian affairs, a field where

the Constitution, and you pointed out a number of former decisions

made by the Court that I think supported the fact that the Constitution delegates affairs with Indians to Congress. Have we made

big mistakes by not taking this on sooner?

Senator Inouye mentioned that we don’t often get involved in

this, and I agree we don’t. Maybe we should have a long time ago.

Mr. GETCHES. Well, Senator Campbell, I would say, no, it hasn’t

been something that you look back at with regret or guilt for not

wading in sooner, because who could have seen this coming? The

jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has always been that, unless

Congress speaks, we’re going to read tribal powers as

undiminished.

Now implicit in that is there might be situations where it is intolerable for tribal powers or tribal rights to exist, and that Congress will take care of that.

Senator CAMPBELL. Now it seems that if we don’t speak, they do

diminish them.

Mr. GETCHES. It’s just the opposite now. I think that while you

can’t say that Congress has dropped the ball in the past, it would

be a serious mistake not to wade in at this point. We’re all on notice. This thing has gone on for at least 15 years, and it doesn’t appear to be getting any better. In fact, every decision that comes

down, as those trends indicate, show that things are getting much,

much worse, and it’s time for Congress to act.

Senator CAMPBELL. Well, we’re doing things little by little. I’m

just not sure that the courts are getting the message. During the

106th I sponsored a bill that repealed parts of the Dawes Act. That
18

message was really to thoroughly repudiate the allotment policy.

Will things like that have an effect on future decisions, do you

think?

Mr. GETCHES. Yes; they certainly should, but then one would

think that the legislation that is the legacy of this committee over

the past many years, and of its members and their work, and of

Congress itself, one would think that that would send a clear

enough message to the Court. I think that you need to stay the

course on dealing with these vital issues, but be much more directive in terms of the rules of decision. There isn’t another area in

constitutional law that I think of where Congress’ power is more

clear-cut and more sweeping than in Indian affairs, and it’s time

to act on that.

Senator CAMPBELL. In 2000 also enacted a bill I introduced

called, ‘‘The Indian Tribal Legal Systems Enhancement Act,’’ which

would help, strengthen the tribal courts. Yesterday Justice Breyer

spoke at the National Congress of American Indians and noted the

need for solid Indian courts. Do you think that if we continue the

strengthening of tribal courts, that the Supreme Court would recognize the tribes have the ability to deal with their own problems?

Mr. GETCHES. I think it’s absolutely essential that those efforts

move forward. Without them, there is going to be backsliding,

maybe even in a more understanding Court, one which, as Professor Anderson indicated, has a member or two who really is engaged

on Indian law. Even in those Courts, if you don’t have a strong

tribal court system itself, the support from the Federal judiciary is

not likely to be sustainable. However, it is still not enough. It is

not going to be enough when you have members of this present

Court talking about tribal courts as strange institutions, as institutions that have come a long way, but are still alien to many people

and have their own customs and their own rules of decision that

are not all written down.

Senator CAMPBELL. Has that been language that’s been included

in the Supreme Court’s decisions?

Mr. GETCHES. Yes; it is. I could read you worse language. I’ve

collected it all, and it’s frightening. It borders on racism.

Senator CAMPBELL. When we speak of sovereignty, do you believe

the Federal Government has the trust obligation to protect tribal

sovereignty?

Mr. GETCHES. Does the Court have it?

Senator CAMPBELL. Do we have it?

Mr. GETCHES. Oh, definitely, the Congress is the lead trustee, if

you will. I like to look at this like a bank. Congress is the bank——

Senator CAMPBELL. I believe so, too, but I think the problem we

face now is the tribes in some cases feel they have no place to go.

Is there anything the tribes can do if we fail in our obligation to

uphold that obligation?

Mr. GETCHES. The buck stops here.

Senator CAMPBELL. It seems like I’ve heard that somewhere before. [Laughter.]

Professor Anderson, how can Congress—this is kind of rhetorical;

you might not even answer that—but how do we get the Supreme

Court to return to their former approach, assuming that tribal authority exists until it is clearly extinguished by an act of Congress?
19

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, I just think that you’ve got to act. You

know, we can wait around 30 or 40 years and hope for a better

Court and try to get them to discard this approach as wrong-headed. That’s always possible. But unless this body acts, I just think

that we’re going to continue this downward spiral. I mean, it

reached a crescendo last year with Hicks and Atkinson. It’s been

getting worse every year for the last 15, and it’s time to stem the

tide here.

Senator CAMPBELL. Thank you. I appreciate the appearance of

both of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I just have one more, but I would like to submit

several other questions, if I may.

It appears, as you have pointed out, both of you, that more and

more the Court seems to be applying a principle that tribal exercise

of criminal, civil, judicial, or regulatory jurisdiction over non-members would be inconsistent with the domestic status of tribal governments. Statutorily, do you believe we can prevent the Court

from applying this principle?

Mr. GETCHES. The powers of Congress to legislate in this area

may be limited if there is a constitutionally-based decision of the

Supreme Court. One such decision apparently was the Court’s decision in Smith, which the Congress tried to rectify—that’s the Peyote case—with an act that re-established the strict scrutiny test

for establishment of religion cases. That was struck down by the

Court itself. You tried to remedy the situation. The Court said, no,

this is a constitutional matter.

But I think strictly within the realm of Indian affairs, the power

is much greater. That dealt with the First Amendment and defining the constitutional powers under the Bill of Rights. But commerce clause powers belong to Congress. Even if the Court finds

that constitutionally tribes never had a power, you can do it. You

can restore those powers. Certainly even if a power didn’t exist before, you could delegate it to an Indian tribe.

The CHAIRMAN. May I thank both of you on behalf of the committee, and we will be calling upon you for assistance, if we may.

Mr. GETCHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

And now we are most privileged to have as a witness the Senior

Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

William C. Canby, Jr.

Judge it is a great pleasure and honor to have you here, sir.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., SENIOR JUDGE, U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PHOENIX, AZ

Mr. CANBY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I used to

teach Indian law, and in the last 20-some years I have been on the

Court occasionally deciding cases of Indian law, but I have to begin

my remarks by saying that I speak as a former teacher and a

present student of Indian law, and I hope a scholar of Indian law,

but I can’t speak for my Court or the Federal Judiciary in general.

I have been asked to elaborate on some trends in the Court, and

I’ll try not to go over ground that has already been covered so well
20

by Professors Getches and Anderson. But there are two or three

doctrines that the Supreme Court has evolved, and even within

those doctrines, has changed over time. The present trend in use

of all of those doctrines is to the detriment of tribal power.

We’ve already seen in the analysis of Professor Getches that

there’s been a reversal of the original presumption. I date it from

what was a friendly decision of McClanahan back in the 1970’s,

where since the days of John Marshall, it had always been assumed that the States had no power in Indian country unless it

had been affirmatively granted by Congress or by a treaty or something like that.

The presumption has been switched, as some of the language

shown by Professor Getches indicates. So now they say, well, the

state power extends into Indian country unless there’s some positive law excluding it. That is a function of the last 20 or so years.

Once you switch the presumption, then when you get to any particular case, the tribe tends to suffer.

I would like to emphasize most, though, the business of the Supreme Court in deciding that various powers are inconsistent with

the status of the tribes as domestic dependent nations. The Court

is going against the historical background that I think has already

been set out for you. When John Marshall decided that the tribes

were separate nations governing their own territories, territories in

which the laws of Georgia could have no force, Chief Justice Marshall was acting perfectly in accord with the dominating congressional legislation of the time, the Trade and Intercourse Acts. The

first one was passed by the very first Congress.

Those acts, for instance, provided that tribes could not alienate

their land to others without the consent of the United States. They

could only alienate to the United States. So the Judiciary and Congress were pretty much in synchronization at that time.

Then we went through the period of assimilation, and that was

ended in 1934. The time of allotment ended in 1934. The time of

termination came in the fifties, and that was ended, and we’ve already had reference to that. So by 1968, with the effective repeal

of Public Law 280 by the Indian Civil Rights Act, and in 1970 by

the Executive pronouncement of President Nixon, we had Congress

and the Executive once again back on a historical track of protecting Indian self-determination. It’s been buttressed by things like

the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.

At that time the Supreme Court was on board, too. The dominating case of that time in 1959 was Williams v. Lee, which held that,

if a non-Indian wanted to sue an Indian over a transaction that occurred on the reservation, that non-Indian would have to go to tribal court. The reason that non-Indian would have to go to tribal

court was that to sue an individual Indian in State court would

interfere with the self-government of the tribe.

Now we have to think of what kind of an interference that is

when we look at what the Court is doing today. Justice Black in

Williams v. Lee said, if you take an individual Indian and sue over

a private transaction, and sue that Indian in State court, that’s an

interference with self-government of the tribes, and it can’t be

done. The State court has no jurisdiction.
21

So the Court and the Executive and Congress were really quite

in agreement as of, say, 1970, and then it began to deteriorate with

Oliphant in 1978, when it was held that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction. Why? Well, Oliphant went through some Federal statutes and made an argument that was perhaps at least arguable

that they seem to assume that the tribes wouldn’t be exercising jurisdiction over non-Indians.

But the Court didn’t really base its decision on those statutes at

all. It says, well, exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians

would be inconsistent with the status of the tribes as domestic dependent nations.

Now Chief Justice Marshall had announced two disabilities of dependent status. The tribes could not alienate their lands to others

than the Federal Government or with the consent of the Federal

Government, and this was in line with the congressional policy of

protecting the Indian land base from erosion by aggressive States

and State citizens.

And the other, which seemed to be almost necessary once the

tribes were engulfed within the United States, was that the tribe

lost control of external relations. And what did they mean by that?

They meant the tribe, an Indian tribe, could not make a treaty

with Germany or France. They lost their power over external relations in the international foreign relations sense.

Justice Marshall said, well, if a foreign power tried to make a

treaty with an Indian tribe, we might well consider that an act of

war as a nation. Well, we still hear the phrase from the Supreme

Court today that the tribes lost power over external relations, but

what they now mean is that the tribe can only deal with its own

members on its own land. It means that they can’t deal with a

non–Indian who’s in Indian territory doing things there and is

brought into tribal court. That is not an external relation within

John Marshall’s view of domestic dependent status.

Well, once this line was broken and Oliphant invented a new

limitation on tribal status because of domestic dependent status,

it’s an unbounded category. Any time the Court is suspicious of a

tribal power and decides to strike it down, it can simply say it’s inconsistent with domestic dependent status.

The list is long. Rice v. Rehner, the tribes lack status to adopt

a preemptive liquor licensing law, of all things. Strate, they lost the

power to adjudicate accidents that occur on a public right-of-way

within the reservation that’s on tribal land when non-Indians were

the parties.

Then we have Atkinson, the taxation of non-Indians on fee land,

and Hicks v. Nevada just last term, where State officers enforcing

a search warrant were held not to be subject to regulation by the

tribe, even when they’re executing a warrant against an Indian on

Indian land, on Indian-owned land.

Well, the key case that the Supreme Court is using when they

invoke these doctrines now is Montana against United States,

which was decided in 1981. The Court now considers that the fountainhead of its jurisprudence.

When Montana came down, most of us didn’t get too excited. It

seemed to create a small exception to what we all assumed was the

power of the tribe to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over its whole
22

reservation, fee and non-fee, Indian and non-indian. The exception?

Well, when a rancher owned his own ranch, he could go out and

hunt birds or deer on that ranch, and the tribe wouldn’t be able

to regulate it.

Well, that seemed like a small exception, and even that exception

had exceptions. If it affected the welfare of the tribe, they talked

about the internal relations, the self-government, but also the

health or welfare of the tribe. If the non-Indian conduct, even on

fee land, affected the welfare of the tribe, then the tribe would be

able to regulate. That’s the way Montana was read by most of us.

It also had language, however, which talked about the tribal

power really is over Indians and isn’t really aimed at non-Indians.

But the holding was rather narrow. But as has happened in almost

every case since Montana, the most pernicious language in the

opinion becomes the deciding point in the next case. Montana was

an exception. We all saw it as an exception.

Well, what happens is Montana becomes not the exception, but

the rule. The rule is that tribes are presumed not to have regulatory power over non-Indians.

Well, that wasn’t the holding, but it has become the rule that

people talk about. So when we get to Strate, we have Justice Ginsburg saying, well, we’ve got to interpret very narrowly the exceptions to Montana because, if you interpret the effect on welfare

broadly, it would swallow the rule. Well, this ignores the fact that

Montana was supposed to be an exception to a rule.

What happened now, by interpreting the Montana exceptions,

the exceptions to Montana narrowly, Montana has become the exception that is swallowing the rule, the rule being that tribes have

power over their own territories and the people within it.

Well, Strate, for instance, admitted that those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through the reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal

members. But if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the

exception would severely shrink the rule, and so on. Well, of

course, there is an effect on the tribe when people race down the

highway right through the reservation on tribal land.

The last two cases, Atkinson and Nevada, make me wonder, as

I do in my written testimony, whether the Court fully understands

the impact of its decisions in Indian country. In Atkinson the Navajo tribe, which provides services to the trading post on fee land

that is surrounded by an within the reservation can’t impose a

hotel tax. Well, there are small tribes, for instance, whose primary

income, or a very substantial part of it, comes from taxing railroad

property that goes through a right-of-way over Indian land. Has it

lost its primary tax base? Remember, Strate now says right-of-way

is just like fee land, and Atkinson says, well, you can’t tax non-Indian things on fee land.

Well, this is a very, very disruptive decision. It is a judicial construct. It comes from nothing Congress has said. It isn’t consonant

with Congress’ view that tribes are self-governing bodies with control over their territories.

The same with Nevada against Hicks, I wondered if the Supreme

Court, when it decided Nevada against Hicks, wondered why when

State officers went to a State court in Nevada and asked for a
23

search warrant to be executed against an Indian on Indian land

within a reservation, the State judge said, well, I can give you a

search warrant, but it’s no good there; you will have to go to tribal

court. That State judge did what, to my knowledge, every State

judge that I know in the West would have done, was to say, sure,

I can give you a writ if you want, but it doesn’t run on the reservation against an Indian.

So the State officers did what is not at all unknown. They went

to the tribal court and they got a search warrant, which isn’t hard

to do and it wasn’t hard to do in Hicks. They then went to execute

it. Unfortunately, they allegedly exceeded the scope of it and

caused some damage to property, and so on.

But all of this, if you take the rationale of the Supreme Court

in deciding Hicks, that State judge was just engaged in a nicety.

There was no necessity for that. The tribal officers could have

walked right onto tribal land. They didn’t have to notify anybody.

They could exercise their search warrant just banging on the door,

as they would off reservation, without saying ‘‘boo’’ to anybody.

That’s the rationale of Hicks. That’s the law of Hicks.

Well, they even drop a footnote dealing with, in either Atkinson

or Hicks, I believe it was actually Atkinson, where they drop a footnote saying that, well, we wouldn’t want the reservation to become

a haven for criminals, and they refer to an old 1970’s case from the

Ninth Circuit which deal with extradition from the Navajo Reservation, and it didn’t permit extradition because the Navajos did

not have an extradition treaty with Oklahoma, as they did with Arizona, an extradition agreement.

Well, several of the tribes, many of the tribes have extradition

agreements, either informal or formal, in my part of the country.

Those were worked out over a long period of time. Under Hicks, it’s

so much waste paper and waste effort. If the State of Arizona

wants an Indian who has committed a crime off reservation, under

Hicks it can just go in and arrest him, get an arrest warrant from

a State court. They don’t have to ask a tribal court. They don’t

have to ask a tribal government. They don’t have to ask anybody.

They can just go in and make the arrest, if you follow Hicks.

Well, this has upset settled expectations in Indian country in a

way that I suspect even the members of the Supreme Court may

not fully understand; I don’t know. But if you look at Hicks and

Atkinson, Atkinson particularly, which says that certainly the

Cameron Trading Post has an impact on the tribe—I mean, it costs

some fire and police protection, and so on—but it doesn’t threaten

the very viability of the tribe. So it doesn’t interfere with tribal

self-governance.

In Hicks, Justice Scalia has said, well, this doesn’t fall within the

second Montana exception because, with the exception that says

that if it affects the health and welfare of the tribe, then the tribe

can regulate it, it doesn’t fall within that exception because the

state’s interest in enforcing the law is very strong. Well, they’re

supposed to discuss the tribal interests when you decide whether

something affects the health and welfare of the tribe, not just the

state interest, but the Supreme Court did not do that.

Indeed, if you look back at Williams v. Lee, suing an individual

Indian on a private contract in State court was considered an im-
24

permissible interference with self-government. Now we’ve moved to

where you can have an impact on the fire services, the police services, you can endanger the tribal members on the highways, and

none of that has an effect on the tribe because it doesn’t threaten

the very existence of the tribal government. That’s just much too

strong a test, and it’s an evolution of a test that the Supreme Court

has used. It is certainly not in—it does not come from anything

Congress or the Executive has ever done.

I know that we are getting pressed for time, and I will only refer

briefly to the rest of my testimony. That had to do with when this

committee and Congress corrected the result of Duro v. Reina and

referred to the inherent authority of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.

The effect of that came to an en banc decision of my court to consider just how that worked out. All 11 members of the court said

that, well, this was really an adjustment of the Supreme Court’s

view of history or it was not necessary to adjust it. Either way, the

tribe was exercising its sovereign power after this act, and so there

was no double jeopardy problem.

The important point for the purposes of today, however, is that

all 11 judges—there was no dispute—all 11 judges had no difficulty

with the idea that this body has the ultimate power to decide what

jurisdiction the tribes have, and the fact that there’s been a Supreme Court decision which was overruled by this body is simply

business as usual, because in non-constitutional matters the Supreme Court is simply operating until Congress speaks, and Congress had spoken. There’s no question now that the tribal courts

have that power, and the Supreme Court denied review of that 11-

judge decision.

So I believe that my view is much in accord with that of the first

two witnesses. The trend of Indian decisions in the last 15, possibly

to 20, years has been seriously out of synchronization with that of

the Congress and the executive branch.

I thank the committee for permitting me to address them.

[Prepared statement of Judge Canby appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much for your learned and

scholarly explanation.

If I may, I would like to ask the same question I asked of Professor Getches. You spoke of the principle that the Court, the

Rehnquist Court, has been applying, that tribal governments have

lost governmental powers because the exercise of these powers

would be ‘‘inconsistent with their status as domestic dependent

sovereigns.’’ Can Congress statutorily prevent the Court from applying this

principle in future cases?

Mr. CANBY. Yes; I think it could. It is hard, I suppose, to have

legislation which simply says that there’s some sort of a principle

that cannot be applied, but you can have legislation that’s clearly

inconsistent with the principle and the Court would be forced to

follow it.

For instance, there could be legislation stating specifically in

some of the same areas that the Court has been making decisions

in, that the inherent power of the tribes include, and then name

things that the Court has said were inconsistent. Congress can an-
25

nounce that they are, indeed, consistent. That is much in the manner of what Congress did after Duro v. Reina.

I don’t see this, incidentally, as a battle between Congress and

the Court at all. The Court has never purported in any of these decisions except the Smith religious decision to be announcing constitutional policy. There are several points in these decisions where

they say, in the absence of acts of Congress, and what they mean

is a specific act of Congress on this very point. In the absence of

an act of Congress, then we decide this. In the absence of an act

of Congress, the tribes cannot exercise jurisdiction, criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Well, then there was an act of

Congress, and the Court has yielded to it.

I think that if this body chooses to overrule decisions of the

Court, it’s not something that the Court would view as an interference with its business because it recognizes the plenary power

of Congress in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Constitution of the United States explicitly grant or vest the Supreme Court with authority to change

the legal status of Indian tribes?

Mr. CANBY. Well, no, it certainly doesn’t explicitly vest that authority in the Supreme Court. There has been a long tradition,

however, from Marshall of the Court’s deciding what the status of

the tribe is when a decision requires it. In other words, when there

is a dispute before the Court that turns on the capacity of the tribe,

then the Court might have to decide its view of the status or the

capacity of the tribe, but it would certainly be subject to any directions Congress gave.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, I thank you very much.

Mr. Vice Chairman.

Senator CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Judge Canby, do you think your colleagues on the Federal Bench

would be opposed to legislation that expanded tribal court jurisdiction over non–Indians if it allowed some form or review or appeal

in the Federal courts?

Mr. CANBY. No; I don’t think they would be opposed. They might

well go take the position that it’s really up to Congress to decide

and we will exercise jurisdiction and we will recognize tribal jurisdiction whenever the Congress pleases.

Senator CAMPBELL. Second, it is my understanding that Federal

law requires Federal courts to implement arbitration decisions

even if the Federal courts disagree with the result reached by the

arbiters and even if they think the arbiter applied the law incorrectly. Could Congress require the Federal courts to implement

tribal court rulings in a similar manner?

Mr. CANBY. I don’t see why they couldn’t. I haven’t thought about

that, but we certainly would have, I would think in reviewing a

tribal court decision, as we now do in habeas corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act, we give the same kind of deference, I believe,

to a tribal court decision that we would have to give to a State

court decision, if we were exercising habeas jurisdiction, which is

a very deferential standard of review. Findings of fact by that

Court, for instance, normally don’t get re-examined.

Senator CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No further questions.
26

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Mr. CANBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of

the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Now may I call the chief justice of the Navajo

Nation Supreme Court, Robert Yazzie; the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Wind River Reservation of Wyoming, John St.

Clair, and the chairman of the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe of

Washington, W. Ron Allen.

Now it’s my great honor to call upon the chief justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT YAZZIE, CHIEF JUSTICE, NAVAJO

NATION SUPREME COURT, WINDOW ROCK, AZ

Mr. Yazzie. Chairman Inouye and Vice Chairman Campbell, and

the working staff of this committee, I appreciate the opportunity to

speak to this committee on the effect of recent U.S. Supreme Court

rulings on the Navajo Nation and its legal system. A copy of my

entire comments has already been submitted for the record. So I

will quickly give a summary of the Navajo Nation’s concern.

The rulings have caused many problems. Neither Indians or nonIndians have a clear understanding of what happens when someone commits an act or causes harm in Indian country, and victims

of crime are helpless because of the failure of Federal prosecutors

to prosecute. One of the problems from the rulings is that the docket of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court is crowded with jurisdictional challenges.

Another, businesses with right-of-ways or leases of Navajo Nation land, such as utilities and pipeline, are now claiming that the

Navajo Nation has no authority to regulate or sue them. Navajos

are being denied the right to access to our courts when they are

involved in motor vehicle accidents or incidents on highway rightsof-way across Navajo Nation land.

Even though Congress dealt with the issue of criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, Russell Means continues to challenge this congressional action and our authority to deal with family violence by non-Navajos.

A non-Navajo sued the State of New Mexico and the Navajo Nation over a civil traffic ticket for speeding and resisting arrest by

a Navajo Nation police officer cross-deputized as a State law enforcement officer. Now even the BIA’s putting forward cross-Commission agreements with state law enforcement agencies without

our input.

Last November a member of the Hopi Nation was arrested for

possession of unlawful weapons and the possession and distribution

of liquor, but we have no jurisdiction because the arrest was done

on a highway right-of-way within the Navajo Nation. The defendant is currently challenging Navajo jurisdiction.

State police officers are entering the Navajo Nation and engaging

in misconduct or violations of the Treaty of 1868. One situation involved a high-speed chase that resulted in a death. County deputies are entering the Navajo Nation to siege license plates without

a hearing, and they are attempting to arrest Navajos for crimes

committed outside the Navajo Nation without following Navajo extradition laws.
27

Navajo trial courts are being sidetracked from the nuts-and-bolts

of deciding cases because of the large number of jurisdictional challenges. Creditors are now saying, ‘‘We do not need to follow Navajo

Nation consumer protection laws.’’

In sum, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have made it impossible to maintain a functioning civil government in the Navajo

Nation to safeguard the public.

We are all concerned of the way things have changed after September 11, 2001, but you may not be aware of the consequence for

Indian country. The U.S. Department of Justice has released reports on the fact that crimes in Indian country are far higher than

other parts of the United States, and domestic violence in Indian

country is out of control.

Given decisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the

U.S. Department of Justice to make the war on terrorism and

homeland defense priorities, I am concerned about our power to

punish and our power to prevent crime. The ability of Indian nations to effectively exercise jurisdiction and to address crime and

social problems must be maintained.

There are also fears expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court about

whether tribal courts can and will protect individual civil rights.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, I give you my assurance that

the courts of the Navajo Nation can and do provide individuals

these protections.

One controversial issue is that tribal courts do not appoint counsel for indigents. This is not true. We have a law for appointing

counsel that fully complies with the Federal constitutional standard that an indigent must have counsel if there is a likelihood of

a jail sentence.

Non-Indians challenge the fairness of Indian customary law.

Non-Indians assume that traditional Indian law is some kind of

mystery, something to be feared. In our legal system decisions are

written in English, in plain words, the commonsense nature of

Navajo commonlaw. The Navajo Nation Bar Association has 400

members. They are required to learn Navajo common law. Many

nonIndian lawyers appear before the Navajo Nation courts and administrative hearing officers, making arguments in Navajo, using

Navajo commonlaw.

The lack of jurisdiction to regulate activities and to hear a case

because one or both of the parties are non-Navajo or the activity

or event took place on lands that may or may not be Indian country

is a nightmare. The Navajo Nation legal system is open, visible,

and easy to understand. Under the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights

that predates the Indian Civil Rights Act, all protections of the

U.S. Constitution are available.

Recent rulings of the Supreme Court are not grounded in the

Constitution. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has openly invited

Congress to clarify these jurisdiction complexities. It is time for

Congress to act.

The Navajo Nation asks this committee today to commit itself

and the Congress to work with Indian nations to resolve these jurisdictional problems by legislatively recognizing and affirming the

inherent authority of Indian nations to regulate the activities of all
28

individuals within their territorial jurisdiction. The Navajo Nation

is committed to do just that. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Justice Yazzie appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Mr. Chief Justice. I can

assure you that the chairman and the vice chairman of this committee will do everything possible to address the problems that you

have cited. However, I cannot speak for the Congress of the United

States, but we will do our best to convince them.

Now it is my privilege to call upon the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Wind River Reservation, Chief Justice John St.

Clair.

STATEMENT OF JOHN ST. CLAIR, CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME

COURT OF THE WIND RIVER RESERVATION, FORT

WASHAKIE, WY

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Good afternoon, Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman

Campbell, and distinguished members of the Senate Committee on

Indian Affairs.

Thank you for the invitation to come before you today to talk

about a topic that has a major impact upon Indian tribal governments. My name is John St. Clair. I’m the chief judge and chief

justice of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court located in west

central Wyoming. I’m an enrolled member of the Eastern Shoshone

Tribe. I’m also a licensed attorney. I have been in that position

since 1983. I’m also on the board of directors for the National

American Indian Court Judges Association.

The Wind River Indian Reservation is approximately 3,500

square miles in area, and it’s inhabited by approximately 12,000

members of both tribes, plus other Indians living within the exterior boundaries. In addition, there are about 25,000 non-Indians.

The Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court, through a comprehensive law and order code, extends jurisdiction over all persons who

have significant contacts with the reservation and over all Indians

who commit offenses that are prohibited in the law and order code.

It consists of a chief Judge who must be a professional attorney

and three Associate Judges. There is an appeals court that consists

of remaining judges who did not sit as trial judge.

Jurisdiction is limited by applicable Federal law. Total caseload

for 2001 was approximately 3,500 cases.

The recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have become a major

concern for the tribes due to their intensified passion to limit the

sovereignty of tribal governments. As stated before by the other

witnesses, tribes have lost, between 1990 and 2000, 23 out of 28

cases argued by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe in 1978, the tribes

held by implication for the first time, the Court held that tribes are

without inherent jurisdiction to try non-Indians for crimes. From

this case, a new doctrine has emerged that tribes lack certain powers that are inconsistent with their dependent status, even when

Congress has not acted to terminate those powers.

This new doctrine has been extended to the civil area, the regulatory area in Montana v. United States and the adjudicatory area

in Strate v. A–1 Contractors; recently, in Atkinson Trading Post v.

Shirley to a hotel occupancy tax imposed by the Navajo Nation.
29

The most recent extension was mentioned before, United States v.

Hicks, where was held that tribes lacked jurisdiction over civil

suits against State officials for violating the rights of Indians on Indian land within a reservation.

The impact of Oliphant and its progeny on the powers and authorities of Indian tribal governments is that it severely restricts

the ability to exercise basic regulatory and adjudicatory functions

when dealing with everyday activities on reservations. When both

Indians and non-Indians are involved in domestic violence, alcohol

and/or drug-related disturbances, or other criminal activity, the

tribes can only adjudicate the Indians while non-Indians, even

when detained and turned over to State officials, go unpunished.

This double standard of justice creates resentment and projects the

image that non-Indians are above the law in the area where they

choose to live or choose to enter into.

The effect on tribes of not being able to regulate taxing, hunting

and fishing, the environment, zoning, and even traffic places limitations on economic development and self-sufficiency. Without the

ability to generate revenues to fund basic governmental functions,

tribes become more and more dependent upon Federal grants, contracts, and compacts as a sole source of funding. This results in increased economic burden that ultimately falls on the Federal Government.

Now tribal courts constitute one of the front-line institutions that

are involved in issues involving sovereignty. While charged with

providing reliable and equitable adjudication of increased numbers

of criminal cases by both Indians and non-Indians and complex

civil litigation, tribes are increasingly underfunded.

Tribes and their courts also agonize over the same issues that

Federal and State courts do, such as violence against women, sexual abuse of children, alcohol and substance abuse, gang violence,

child neglect, pollution of the air, the water, and the earth. These

are just some of the common, yet complicated, problems that arise

on Indian reservations.

These vast panorama of cases handled by the 500-plus courts, Indian courts, would significantly increase the caseloads of Federal

district courts and also state courts, if they chose to exercise this

jurisdiction. This would not only increase the caseloads, but increase the cost to Federal and state courts and result in major

budget shortfalls.

This recent trend of the U.S. Supreme Court toward judicial termination poses the greatest threat to tribes since the allotment era

of the 19th century and congressional termination of the mid-20th

century, and it runs counter to the proclaimed Federal policy of

self-determination that has repudiated the allotment and the termination policies.

The third sovereign, America’s third sovereign, the Indian tribes

occupying Indian country, have come before you today to ask that

you utilize the plenary power of Congress found in the Indian commerce clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution

and request that you restore and reaffirm the inherent and regulatory adjudicatory authority of tribes over all persons and all land

within Indian country as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 1151. This

approach would place the exercise of jurisdiction in the hands of
30

the tribes and the extent of it within their organic and case law,

making it a question of tribal law.

I want to also add that recent Supreme Court Justices have invited Congress to rectify these decisions that diminish tribal sovereignty through legislation. Just the other day, Justice Breyer in

a speech invited Congress to act.

A recent Supreme Court case that was requested to go to the Supreme Court was denied certiorari, United States v. Enas. This

case affirmed the Duro fix legislation and let stand that legislation.

So today we ask that Congress go forward with this legislation and

take the same or similar approach that was done in the Duro, the

so-called Duro fix.

Again, I want to thank you for this opportunity that you provided

to my tribes and to all Indian tribes today together. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Mr. St. Clair appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Mr. Chief Justice.

May I now call upon Chairman Allen. It is always good to have

you here, sir.

STATEMENT OF W. RON ALLEN, CHAIRMAN, JAMESTOWN

S’KLALLAM TRIBE, SEQUIM, WA

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s always an honor to

be before this committee. It’s disappointing that we have to be here

with regard to a matter that makes our hearts heavy.

For the record, I am Ron Allen, chairman for the Jamestown

S’Klallam Tribe, a signatory to the No-Point Treaty in Washington

State. I’m here as a former president and first vice president of the

National Congress of American Indians. In that capacity, I am

cochairing, along with the president of the Navajo Nation, a National Tribal Task Force to propose some options and approaches

to deal with what we believe are clear attacks of the Federal court

and Supreme Court system on tribal sovereignty and tribal jurisdiction.

Because of the Hicks and Atkinson case, the tribes definitely

came together to start deliberating on what is it we can do. As a

former NCA officer, I joined in this effort to crisscross Indian country, because of the profound concerns of the tribal leaders, our lawyers, our counsels, and our people regarding the future of our governments, our reservations, and the welfare of our communities.

The speakers before me have provided you a great deal of details

and examples of Indian law, the background of the tendencies of

the Supreme Court and Federal court system with regard to Indian

law. Suffice it to say that I and my colleagues clearly believe that,

as a basic principle, the treaties, the Constitution, Federal Indian

law has made it quite clear: Indian governments are supposed to

be provided the authority, based on our sovereignty, to govern ourselves, to provide for the needs of our people, and to protect our

cultures, our unique ways of life that are very unique to our society.

There’s over 560 American Indian and Alaska Native nations

across the United States, and our ways of life are very unique. We

believe that the fundamental rule of Indian law is that we retain

our inherent sovereignty and that we have that authority.
31

So as we’re moving forward and engaging in discussions with

this committee and the Congress, the question becomes: Where are

we going and what are the problems that we have to face? As a

tribal politician, I’m not a lawyer nor am I a justice. That’s not our

duty. Our duty is to provide leadership for our community. Our

duty is to establish the laws for our communities, so that we can

have order over how our communities are going to advance. Our

duties are to be able to advance the goals of our communities and

to utilize the opportunities that the Congress is making to help the

tribes become more self-sufficient and self-reliant, based on our

own laws and our own rules and our own value systems.

There are a lot of laws that have been passed over the last number of years, and many of them have been constructive, but many

of them have been counterproductive with regard to advancing

those goals. When Public Law 280 was passed, many people would

argue that it had pluses and minuses with respect to the various

Indian communities.

But there’s been a basic concept with regard to these laws and

the principles of the Congress, and that is that they respected tribal sovereignty, that they respected the responsibilities of the tribal

governments, and that the tribes have jurisdiction over our lands,

unless Congress is attempting to revise that authjority or modify

that in any way.

The string of court cases that has emerged from the Supreme

Court, from back in the Oliphant case to the Montana case, Atkinson case, and so on, certainly is providing us some great concerns.

The Atkinson case with regard to, can we tax? And it’s saying absolutely not, you cannot tax non-Indian businesses on Indian lands.

Where historically you looked at what Congress has established

through treaties with Indian nations, provided a preservation of

certain lands that the tribes have reserved, and then the Congress

created some complications, the Dawes Act. Subsequently, the

Dawes Act created all kinds of new problems with the checkerboard

reservations, and so forth, and the slow erosion of those reservations, but we believe that it didn’t change our authority over the

activities within those reservations or the right that we preserved

in our treaties.

But these cases now are redefining that matter, and it is also redefining the current objective of the Congress to preserve the selfdetermination and self-sufficiency goals of the tribes. If the Congress says, you need to become self-sufficient but we can’t tax,

where does Congress think that we’re going to start getting revenues? If the Congress doesn’t believe that—or if the Court starts

saying that we can’t provide order within our reservation borders,

how are we going to invite investors to come into our reservations

and invest, if they feel that they have no due recourse or they have

no confidence over the order that is supposed to be maintained

within the reservation borders?

Based on the way the Supreme Court decisions are heading, we

are supposed to govern our reservations, but we can’t prevent nonIndians from committing crimes; we can’t regulate matters that affect our communities, including zones. We can’t tax Indian businesses, and yet we’re still providing road maintenance and water

services, law enforcement, that provide some sort of order and
32

other fundamental domestic services that are made available to all

members, Indian and non–Indian alike. Yet we have no revenues

for those fundamental services that we are providing.

Now some attorneys might say that, well, these cases aren’t as

bad as you think, that we still are preserving our governmental authority. We believe that these cases are creating a great deal of uncertainty. We believe that it is clearly eroding the tribe’s authority,

and that it is absolutely contrary to the treaty commitments and

the current modern laws and commitments of Indian nations to

empower our tribes to take care of our communities and move our

agenda forward.

We believe it is not taking into consideration the problems that

we have that this Congress and past administrations have recognized that we have many problems. So if we have domestic problems, as provided by the Supreme Justices, we have a domestic violence problem with a non-Indian beating up an Indian woman,

which we know is a common problem that we have throughout our

communities, but we can’t do anything about it. So what are we to

do? The courts come to us, our courts come to us as politicians and

say, ‘‘What are we going to do about this?’’ So we have some serious problems.

Are the county governments or State governments going to help

out? No, they’re not. They have other priorities. They have no interest in spending their resources to deal with the problems on Indian reservations, and the attitude has not been very encouraging

over the years, even though in some areas you will see some constructive success that is going on.

The Hicks case makes it even worse. You know, obviously, that

creates even a greater concern to us over what the Hicks case does.

In our opinion, it creates a lot of chaos and a lot of disorder in our

communities.

We can give you example after example of where there are State

and county enforcement officers who would just love to come on

and just not even respect the tribal courts and enforcement systems with regard to matters that they believe that they have to enforce their laws on tribal lands.

So our concern is, what are we going to do? How are we going

to fix this? Now, you know, based on our simple little knowledge

of civics, understanding how this Government works, our understanding is that Congress makes the laws, the administration enforces, carries out the laws, and the courts interpret whether or not

anybody is complying with those laws and those commitments, including the treaties, which we understand is the supreme law of

the land in this country with regard to Indian affairs.

So if the Court is now interpreting these laws and they’re now

interpreting in a way that is eroding the fundamental historical,

legal, and moral commitment to Indian nations, then where do we

go? We believe that it is the responsibility and duty of the Congress

as the ultimate trustee to assist the tribes in reaffirming our sovereign authority. The lands that we preserved is for our people and

our cultures, and the laws that we have been establishing, the ordinances for order in our communities are for the purposes of the

welfare of our future children. We need to have order. We need to

have respect for those laws.
33

So we’re asking this Congress to move forward. Our tribal leaders are gathering to organize methodically and deliberately, crisscrossing the Indian country, for a solution that we would like to

offer to this committee and to this Congress to help correct this

problem. We look forward to your help. We have appreciated your

support, and we hope that we can come back to propose a piece of

legislation that will correct the errors and misunderstandings of

the Supreme Court. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Allen appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chief Justice Yazzie, you have testified that, as a result of the

Supreme Court’s decision in the Strate case, utility companies are

now challenging the Navajo Nation’s jurisdiction over the rights-ofway. Am I correct to assume that these rights-of-way were granted

to these utility companies by the Navajo Nation?

Mr. YAZZIE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That you could have turned them down?

Mr. YAZZIE. Well, at the time the Navajo Nation did not foresee

any problem as a result of granting these rights-of-ways as they do

today.

The CHAIRMAN. But if an application is made today by a utility

company, you can deny that application, can’t you?

Mr. Yazzie. If that’s the position the Navajo Nation wishes to

take, that is correct. There’s a big concern about jurisdictional challenges granting States rights-of-way, affects the economic stability

of the Navajo Nation. The challenge jeopardizes the Nation’s ability

to tax, and taxing is very crucial to providing essential governmental services.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you have indicated that the Navajo Nation

provides services to these utility companies, such as fire protection,

police protection, et cetera?

Mr. Yazzie. Yes; the Navajo Nation does provide emergency services in case of accidents, services such as medical, fire protection,

and police services to both Indians and non-Indians.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are refusing to pay for those services

through taxation?

Mr. Yazzie. To our knowledge, that’s the case today.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you have also stated that county police officers are now entering the Navajo Nation and confiscating State license plates from vehicles owned by Navajos. Do county police officers provide Navajo Nation with any notice before they enter Navajo Nation or do they just drive in?

Mr. YAZZIE. To my knowledge, if there is a notice to confiscate

a license plate, the notice would go to the individual. As far as I

know, if the license plate is taken away, Navjos may not have the

ability to challenge or even appear in attempting to get their license plates back. Today we have unemployment rate of 60 percent. Most Navajos have no steady income. It takes money to hire

an advocate to handle these kinds of matters. An individual would

have to go before the State, and it takes money to do that. Most

people do not have the job and most people cannot afford legal

services to do just that.

The CHAIRMAN. So no notice is provided to you?
34

Mr. YAZZIE. To my knowledge, I have not seen any cases, but if

there’s ever to be one, that challenge will probably go to the courts.

More then likely, State courts.

The CHAIRMAN. Navajo Nation law enforcement officers, police officers, are they subject to civil suits if they detain a non-Indian or

non-member in a domestic violence case or alcohol or drug-related

disturbance?

Mr. YAZZIE. In the Navajo Nation, if officers cause an injury,

while acting under Navajo law, they would be subject to the Navajo

Nation jurisdiction; therefore, subject to suit. But if the Navajo Nation police officer were acting under State law, then the State

would have to determine whether the Navajo police officers acted

under the color of State law.

There was such a case in 1998. A non-Indian was arrested for

civil traffic violation, and the non-Indian told the Navajo police officer, ‘‘You don’t have jurisdiction over me,’’ and he resisted arrest.

He was arrested and taken to State facilities. The non-Indian challenged the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, and the New Mexico

court of appeals dismissed the action, saying that there was no

State action pursued by the Navajo police officer, and also the Navajo Nation is also immune from suit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. If I may ask Chief Justice

St. Clair, we speak of tribal sovereignty at every hearing, every

meeting. Does the tribal judiciary or the system of courts play an

important role in sovereignty?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I believe it’s one of the most important roles of

tribal government because it deals with the day-to-day activities

that occur within the reservation. The tribal court interprets the

tribal law and the tribal custom of the tribes. The judiciary provides a forum for establishment of membership. Paternities are

brought into our court system, so that the process of enrollment is

enhanced or carried forward.

Should the court not exist, I believe it would be a case where

there would not be equal protection of the laws because, if an incident occurred between an Indian and a non-Indian, an accident or

whatever, the Indian would have to sue in state court. The State

courts in Wyoming today, just the past month or so, they’re still

trying to get more Indians for their juries, and there’s an issue of

whether they have enough Indians on the juries even for the cases

that occur off the reservation. So they’re struggling with trying to

provide equal protection in their courts, and it would be even worse

if they had to hear the cases from the reservation or if they had

to go into the Federal courts.

But I believe the tribal courts are a front-line institution that

deals with these conflicts that occur between individuals and between individuals and society, that arise on a day-to-day basis, especially domestic violence, drug- and alcohol-related incidents,

which are on the rise. The recent statistics indicate that Indian

reservations are the one area where crime has arisen within the

past few years as compared to the state and Federal areas.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are stating that if your governmental powers were taken away from you, self-determination

and self-governance would be just a sham and worthless and meaningless?
35

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Correct. Government without a judiciary really

wouldn’t be a government at all. If you can’t adjudicate matters

that occur within the area you live, you can’t regulate those, commercial dealings would be—there wouldn’t be any place for contracts that are made by the tribe and with businesses that come

on the reservation to be heard. They would have to be taken into

State court. Many times the tribes in the State courts, they’re reluctant to take their cases in there. For the court to interpret

these, I believe that the tribe and the business, if the court was

fully funded and a stable institution, it would provide a forum and

a stable forum for those business contracts or incidents that occur

as a result of business activity to be heard right there on the reservation.

The CHAIRMAN. You have indicated in your testimony that nonIndians on your reservation consider themselves to be above the

law. Are you suggesting that, as a result of these Supreme Court

decisions, the level of criminal activities among non-Indians has

gone up?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes; I think just crime in general, whether it’s Indians or non-Indians, has arisen on reservations. When an incident

does occur, even if there is an extradition procedure or agreement

or a law enforcement assistance agreement between the tribes and

the county or the State government, that just deals with how to

handle the incident on the scene. It doesn’t deal with adjudication.

Most of the time, once that is completed, the non-Indian is not

prosecuted. So the result is that only the Indian people are prosecuted.

In the civil area, without having jurisdiction over or being limited to the Montana test, to exert jurisdiction as it now is, the nonIndian is at an advantage because he could take the Indian into

either the tribal court or the State court, whereas the Indian can

only take the non-Indian into the State court, but not into the tribal court. So there’s two choices for him or her.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Chief Justice.

Chairman Allen, you have been long involved in the matter of Indian affairs. You have served as president of the National Congress

of American Indians and have been involved in not just governing

your Nation, but in representing this Nation’s tribes, 566 of them.

Would you suggest or consider that the Supreme Court decisions

are at times violating treaties or amending treaties that were entered into by Indian nations and our Nation?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; I believe they are. I believe that

the Supreme Court is taking great liberty in their discretion on the

judicial review, and in that process, through these decisions, are reinterpreting the commitment that this Nation made to the Indian

nations through those treaty agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. All three of you have testified that, as a result

of the Nevada v. Hicks case, more and more State and local police

departments are coming into reservations. Are you documenting

these instances, so we can use it as evidence in our reports?

Yes, Chief Justice?

Mr. YAZZIE. Mr. Chairman, it would be nice to document, give

you numbers, but we do not have the ability to do that. We just

don’t have the resources to maintain, to get statistics. It takes
36

money to buy computers and to develop the data necessary to tell

us something.

The CHAIRMAN. But would you say that these incidents are commonplace?

Mr. YAZZIE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been on this committee now for over 25

years. Somehow I get the feeling, and this is a very ugly feeling,

that, right or wrong, these decisions of the Supreme Court have

been rendered because Indians are considered inferior people. Is

that a fair statement, that this is racism?

Mr. YAZZIE. We had two U.S. Supreme Court Justices visit the

Navajo Nation in July 2001. The visit was very beneficial. This is

the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court was exposed to how

tribal courts work. They were very clear as to the attitude of nonIndians, toward tribal justice that no matter how well we’re educated in the law, how experienced we are in the law, how well we

run the system, it’s still not good enough. There’s constant challenges about our ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.

We are forever telling the American public, our court system is

very competent—I can show you the flowchart there.

Justice Breyer looked at it and said, ‘‘This is a very complex and

sophisticated system,’’ and Justice O’Connor said, ‘‘This is a demonstration to show that the Navajo Nation has a competent system.’’ You can tell that to the non-Indian they still will not believe

it.

Non-Indians do not understand how our legal systems work.

Today we are making the effort to let the world know. The Navajo

Nation courts, we go to law schools; we hold our oral argument, to

let the American public know, the lawyers, the legal community, to

say this is how we work; this is our law, and it’s a fair system.

I think there is an effort now to develop polls among the American public. I think if the American public were educated to know

something about tribal courts, they would know that the Indian

courts are very human, that they care about getting to the bottom

of the problem, and that’s exactly what we do as a Navajo legal

system.

We don’t believe in win/lose-type adjudication. It doesn’t work. It

takes a lot of money to win a lawsuit. Better yet, get the people

who are involved in the lawsuit, get them to solve the problem, and

that’s exactly what we’re doing with peacemaking. We let the people, the people who are related, solve their own problem, and it

means more to them when they do that. They are more satisfied

with the outcome than they are with the outcome of court orders.

We have to prove to the American public that our court system

is just as good as State and Federal courts, and we have shown

that, and we have gone beyond that. We have shown that the Navajo Nation has traditional justice methods that work, and we have

been traveling to other countries, Norway, Australia, Canada, they

know about our system. We go over there; they come to us.

Now the State courts are looking at us and ask: How do you Navajos work your justice system? We tell them this is how we work

it. Our system is very simple. Rather than treating somebody impersonal, you treat the parties with respect. You treat the parties
37

like human beings. I’ll tell you, we have done a lot in solving disputes using the Navajo mind as to how disputes are solved.

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Allen, what do you think?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, my answer is yes. I think that one

of the root problems that we have with this society and its political

and judicial system is it still cannot cope with the sophistication

and the ability to administer quality justice in tribal systems. I

think Chief Justice Yazzie is talking about the educational campaign that we have to engage in. There’s no question that we have

to do that here in Congress as well as in the general public, but,

yes, that is clearly a huge hurdle that we have to overcome.

The CHAIRMAN. After two centuries, Americans are not convinced

you’re equal?

Mr. ALLEN. That’s correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Justice St. Clair?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Chairman Inouye, I do believe there’s a feeling

that Indians are inferior within these Supreme Court decisions.

Like Justice Yazzie says, they’ve shown time and time again that

their system is probably the most sophisticated of all the Indian

tribes; yet, it still doesn’t seem to be sufficient.

I believe there is a fear of Indian people in general in the Supreme Court, so that they want to do away with Indian tribes. This

judicial termination that’s coming about is just another attempt to

get rid of Indian people, which has been attempted in various ways

and various methods, beginning with extermination originally and

change in vacillating between extermination, self-determination,

and allotment, assimilation, and the policies have gone back and

forth, and we’re just in an era here that happens to be within the

Supreme Court another era of termination.

However, I believe that the American public itself, and especially

when I see non-Indians come into our court system to use the system, are very satisfied with the speed of the cases that are processed, the fairness exhibited by the judges, the efficiency of the

clerks, and all this being done on a very, very limited budget.

One of the questions I think that was posed to me was, what

would be the average cost of one of the cases, of our cases that we

have? It looks like the cost is somewhere around $1,200 a year.

That’s ideally, if we were funded fully. We’re doing that on about

a third of what we asked for in our budget. So we have to cut costs

here and there. We don’t have a prosecutor, although we apply

for—I mean a defender, sorry. We apply for a defender every year.

The only defense counsel that we have available is Legal Services,

which the party must be indigent to qualify. So that leaves a vast

area of people who are not represented in tribal court. It’s sort of

an imbalance.

So we have some deficiencies, but I believe that overall this sense

of feeling that tribal governments and tribal people are inferior is

still there within the Supreme Court of the United States, but the

American public itself I don’t believe feels that way. I think if there

was more education and more contact and tribal courts were funded better, we could demonstrate that we have a fair system; we

have judges that care; we have people in our system who are willing to put forth extra effort, work long hours, to deal with our increased caseloads, even though our taxing ability and regulatory
38

ability is being diminished. We have less ways to obtain resources.

Funding is tight, and we’re still trying to face these increased caseloads that we have.

The CHAIRMAN. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank

all of the witnesses for sharing their wisdom and their expertise

with the committee.

I must apologize to all of you that the attendance has been poor,

but hope you will understand that at this moment there are about

12 committees meeting, and this is just one of them. So in every

committee you will have situations such as this. But I can assure

you that the staff people who are sitting here represent the members of this committee, and they will advise their Senators as to

what transpired. I will also recommend that they read the transcript.

This has been a good day, and I can assure you that this committee will act on this matter.

With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
(39)

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to learn from the testimony of legal

scholars regarding recent Supreme Court rulings that have worked to curtail tribal

sovereignty. I would also like to thank Professor Robert Anderson and the Honorable Ron Allen for making the trip from Washington State to be with us today.

The testimony from these experts, and others here today, is critical to our ability

to help clarify the authority of tribal governments.

United States policy toward Native Americans has certainly been marked with inconsistencies, dramatic shifts, and reversals. In the 19th century, Native Americans

were pushed onto reservations, and then saw the reservations broken up to force

assimilation. The 20th century saw a repeat of this cycle, with the Government recreating reservations and then later trying to terminate the Federal relationship

with tribes.

But in 1970, President Nixon announced a commitment to a new Federal policy

of tribal self-governance and self-determination. Since then, Presidential administrations and Congress have affirmed self-governance and self-determination in their

policymaking.

At the same time, Supreme Court decisions have been moving in the opposite direction, finding that tribal sovereignty, particularly over non-Indians in tribal communities, is inconsistent with tribes’ ‘‘dependent status.’’ These recent rulings are

inconsistent not only with the legislative and executive trends toward self-governance, but also with Supreme Court precedent itself Indeed, the fundamental principle of Indian law, which was set by Worcester v. Georgia in 1832, is that Indian

tribes maintain their sovereign rights except when explicitly limited by treaty or

Federal law.

I am concerned that these Court rulings undermining tribal sovereignty are making for, once again, an inconsistent Federal relationship with tribes.

Tribal governments are responsible for providing the same services to their communities as local, county, and State governments. It is imperative that tribal governments be empowered with the authority and resources to serve the people in

their jurisdiction. Tribal governments need the power to tax and to enforce laws,

and Supreme Court rulings have negatively affected their power to do both.

Reservation boundaries often include a mix of tribal and non-tribal members and

a mix of trust and fee simple land. If the courts rule that tribal jurisdiction depends

on qualities like status of the land within the reservation boundary, tribal membership, or race, then we must seriously consider the implications of these limits on

jurisdictional authority. This is obviously a very complex issue, but we must ensure

that tribal governments can provide critical services to the people in their jurisdictions, such as law enforcement.

Again, I am pleased that the committee is hearing from the scholars and experts

appearing today, and thank you all for sharing your insights with us.
40

1For criticism of the foundations of Indian law in the United States, see Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s

Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wisc. L. Rev. 219. 2Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT T. ANDERSON, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, DI- RECTOR, NATIVE AMERICAN LAW CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF

LAW, SEATTLE, WA

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the

opportunity to present my views on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Indian law decisions. I teach Indian law at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle

and I also am the director of the Law School’s Native American Law Center. Prior

to joining the faculty, I was counselor to Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt

and held the position of Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs within the Interior Department. I also worked as a senior staff attorney for 12 years with the Native

American Rights Fund.

I was asked to address the effect of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on the

exercise of tribal authority over their territory. Professor Getches’ testimony illustrated the dramatic break the Supreme Court has made from tradition in recent

cases such as Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) and Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley, 121 S.Ct. 1825 (2001). In contrast to prevailing rules, Hicks and Atkinson

permit State authority and limit tribal authority in an unprecedented fashion.

It is difficult to overstate the change in the law that has occurred regarding tribal

jurisdiction over non-Indians during the past 25 years. The Court’s ruling in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) stripped tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and signaled the rise of the Court as the lawmaking body

with regard to tribal authority over non-Indians. The Court’s recent presumption

against tribal authority over non-Indians on fee lands stands in stark opposition to

foundational principles of Indian law, and the actions of Congress and the executive

branch in the modern era. I begin with some general observations on the development of Indian law and then contrast recent trends in the Supreme Court with the

actions of Congress and the executive branch.

I. The Court’s Traditional Respect for Tribal Self-Government and the Role of Congress.

Many have questioned the moral basis for the very notion that ‘‘discovering’’ European nations were entitled to usurp the rights of Indian tribes to deal with their

own property or engage in foreign relations.1 The law recognized by the Marshall

Court, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), nevertheless provided a sound basis for legal insulation of Indian tribes from the authority of the States. The Court soundly rejected

Georgia’s attempt to assert jurisdiction over Indian country and recognized tribes

as domestic dependent Nations. In tandem with the Indian Commerce Clause of the

U.S. Constitution, the basic principle set out in these cases is that Indian tribes are

free to govern themselves and others who enter their territory to the exclusion of

State power.

The independence of tribes was even recognized to some degree in relation to the

Federal Government. In Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) the Court followed

the basic principles of the Marshall Court and ruled that the murder of one Indian

by another within Indian country was not a criminal offense punishable by the

United States. This was not because the United States lacked power over Indian

country, but because Congress had not expressly legislated in the area. In short, Indian tribes and their territory were free of regulations by other sovereigns absent

explicit direction from Congress.

Cases that followed, such as United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the power of Congress to adopt the Major Crimes Act) and the infamous

case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), cemented the central role of

Congress in Indian affairs as provided in the Indian Commerce Clause. In Delaware

Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) and United States v. Sioux

Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) the Court made clear that there were some limits to

Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs. Congressional action had to be tied rationally to fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians2 and congressional acts allegedly taking Indian property would be thoroughly reviewed for

consistency with the United States’ role as trustee.

The development of the Court’s general doctrine up to the Oliphant decision in

1978 reveals considerable deference to congressional action and continuation of rules

that insulated Indian tribes from state authority. In the case Williams v. Lee, 358

U.S. 217 (1959) the Court ruled that disputes over debts incurred on an Indian res-
41

ervation must be heard in tribal court because allowing State court jurisdiction infringed on the right of tribal self-government. Similarly, in Fisher v. District Court,

424 U.S. 382 (1976) state court jurisdiction was denied over an adoption proceeding

involving tribal members. The Court reasoned that denying State court access

furthered the congressional policy of tribal self-government. Important to the Supreme Court in all of these cases was the bedrock presumption that Indian country

is beyond the reach of State courts and state jurisdiction, unless and until Congress

provides otherwise.

The Court’s approach, however, took note of the fact that Congress regularly legislated in the area of Indian affairs and made adjustments to the doctrine rooted in

the decisions of the Marshall Court. For example, in response to the ruling in Ex

Parte Crow Dog, Congress adopted the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §1153, and thus

provided for Federal jurisdiction over certain criminal acts. Likewise, in Public Law

280, Congress provided for State court jurisdiction to hear civil causes of action and

enforce State criminal law within Indian country. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426

U.S. 373 (1976). The Court thus adhered to the general rule that State regulatory

or judicial jurisdiction within tribal authority is prohibited unless Congress sees fit

to alter the status quo.

The same rule applied to Federal court incursions on tribal authority and thus

buttressed the notion of tribal independence. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

U.S. 49 (1978) the Court refused to allow Federal courts to hear alleged violations

of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The Court rested on the bedrock principles

that tribes are autonomous, absent governing acts of Congress. The Court also took

notice of the fact that Congress had expressly provided for Federal court review in

habeas corpus actions. It was accordingly appropriate for the Court to leave it to,

Congress to determine whether to further intrude on tribal self-government by providing for Federal court review of alleged violations of ICRA.

While the Court’s decision in Santa Clara Pueblo remains controversial, Congress

has not chosen to alter the law. There have, however, been several oversight hearings dealing with the issue of enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act over the

past several years. As an Administration witness in two of those hearings, I can attest to the value of direct dialog between Congress, Indian leaders and the executive

branch on the important policy issues. Through such a process adjustments that are

found to be necessary may be made Congress, not the courts and only after a dialog

with the tribes.

It is thus evident that the course followed by the Supreme Court from the Marshall Court up to the Oliphant decision was marked by judicial restraint with respect to tribal powers. Through the varying policy eras employed by Congress and

through the beginning of the self-determination era, on thing remained clear—it

was Congress not the Supreme Court that decided policy in the Indian law area.

Congress thus legislated against a static judicial backdrop that recognized tribal autonomy unless clearly altered by Congress. The current Supreme Court has turned

this principle on its head, thus prompting the need for congressional action. As detailed below, the Court’s current approach is completely at odds with modern congressional and executive branch policies.

II. Modern Congressional Acts Support the Role of Tribes as Governments with

Comprehensive Authori1y Over Their Territory.

The vacillation in congressional policy with respect to the role of Indian tribes in

the United States is well-known. The formative years of Indian policy saw the development of the guardian-ward relationship as evidenced in the Trade and Intercourse

Acts beginning in 1790. This protective assertion of a monopoly over land transactions with Indian tribes soon gave way to the removal statutes and the forced relocation of Indian tribes from the East to the Oklahoma Territory and other parts

of the West. Soon thereafter, in the treaty era, the President’s agents negotiated

treaties with western tribes to obtain peace and cessions of vast areas of land. In

exchange, the United States promised permanent homelands, obtained peace and

often guaranteed certain off-reservation rights. See Washington v. Passenger Fishing

Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979). The treaty era was supplanted by the allotment

policy and the attempt to assimilate Indians into mainstream American society in

the fashion of yeoman farmers.

The failure of that policy demonstrated the need for major change. The Indian

land base had been reduced by nearly two-thirds and it was clear that assimilation

of Indian people was not going to occur. All of this prompted passage of the Indian

Reorganization Act of 1934 [IRA], which provided substantial support for tribal governments and was geared toward protecting the remaining Indian land base.

Not long after passage of the IRA, Congress again shifted its approach and called

for the termination of a number of tribes in the United States. This ‘‘termination’’

of the Federal-tribal relationship for some Indian tribes was accompanied by the
42

3See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 4 Compare Backcountry Against Dumps v. Environmental Protection Agency, 100 F.3d 147

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (setting aside EPA’s treatment of tribe as a State under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, et seq. as not authorized by statute). 5The Honorable Judge Canby’s testimony eloquently reveals the Supreme Court’s doctrinal

evolution.

adoption of Public Law 280, which authorized (and in some instances required)

States to extend their jurisdictional reach into Indian country. This termination period galvanized Indian tribes to fight for their political existence and prompted the

congressional termination experiment to fizzle out by the early 1960’s. See Stephen

Cornell, The Return of the Native 123–124 (1988).

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 marked another turning point for congressional policy. While the act’s application of certain provisions of the Bill of Rights

to Indian tribes can be seen as a further diminishment of tribal autonomy, it is

equally plain that the act contemplated the continued existence of Indian tribes as

vibrant governments exercising governmental power over their territory and the

people present therein. President Nixon’s message to Congress in 1970 announced

the policy of ‘‘self-determination without termination.’’ H.R. Doc. No. 91–363, 91st

Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970). That marked the course that Congress and the Executive have followed to this day and stands in stark contrast to decisions such as

Strate, Atkinson and Hicks.

There is likely no statute that surpasses the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450, et seq., in importance and effectiveness. The act allows tribes to operate dozens, if not hundreds, of programs previously carried out by Federal agencies like the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the

Indian Health Service. Congress has amended the statute on a number of occasions

to spur the executive branch to contract more and more programs out for tribal administration and with increased flexibility for the tribes. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa,

et seq. The Self-Determination Act and Self-Governance Act have assisted in building tribal governmental infrastructure, while maintaining the Federal-tribal trust

relationship. Other statutes provide directly for the exercise of tribal or delegated

Federal authority of tribal territory and all those within it. Examples include the

Indian liquor laws, 18 U.S.C. § 1152,3 and a number of environmental statutes. The

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 directs the Administrator of the EPA to treat

Indian tribes as States under the act. Tribes exercise delegated Federal authority

over members and non-members within Indian country. Similarly, the Clean Water

Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1377, provides that tribes may be treated as States and exercise either inherent, or delegated authority over members and non-members within

Indian country. See city of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 4l5 (10th Cir. 1996);

and Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). See also, Safe Drinking Water

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–f; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and

Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9657; Surface Mining Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.

§§ 1201–1328; and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§

136–136y (all providing for some measure of tribal authority over land for both

members and non-members).4

Even a cursory review of the United States Code reveals the broad scope and support of Congress for the welfare of tribes and their members, as well as their ability

to govern their reservations. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 4301, et seq. (Native American

Business Development Act of 2000); 25 U.S.C. § 4101, et seq. (Native American

Housing Assistance Act of 1996); 25 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (Indian Tribal Justice

Act of 1993); 25 U.S.C. § 3201, et seq. (Indian Child Protection and Family Violence

Act of 1990); 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988); and

25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq., (Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978). The point here is that

Congress has unequivocally acted to support Indian tribes and has even delegated

Federal authority to tribes in many circumstances.

By way of contrast, since the passage of the Self-Determination Act, the Supreme

Court has gone out of its way to implement long-abandoned policies that increase

state authority and reduce the power of tribes. For example, in County of Yakima

v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), the Court stretched to implement

policies embodied in an obscure proviso the repealed allotment act in order to uphold county real estate taxes on tribal property. The Court appears oblivious to the

past 35 years of congressional policy even as it abandons the previous 140 years of

Supreme Court doctrine.5 It bears emphasizing that even as Congress implemented

failed policies such as allotment, assimilation and termination, the Supreme Court

during that time adhered to the basic policy enunciated by the Marshall Court.

Thus, in 1883 which was the heart of the assimilation era, the Court secured tribal

Indians from Federal prosecutions in recognition of their status as separate
43

sovereigns. Likewise, during the termination era of the 1950’s the Court upheld the

right of ‘‘Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’’ The Court thus

adhered to the Marshall Court’s rule that Indian tribal powers and immunities continue until Congress acts clearly to diminish those powers, or authorizes state incursions into Indian country.

The Court’s recent course has not just been a reversal of the fundamental rules

of Indian law, it has also usurped the role of Congress as the policymaking body

in the area of Indians affairs. What is truly remarkable is that the Court has taken

this course in the midst of an era of unprecedented support for Indian tribes and

their authority.

III. Executive Branch Policies Similarly Support Indian Tribe Jurisdiction.

Although Congress has paramount authority in the field of Indian affairs, the actions of the executive branch are also worthy of consideration. Beginning with President Nixon’s announcement of the self-determination policy, every Administration

has supported the role of tribes as sovereign governments within the United States.

Most recently, President Clinton issued an Executive order calling on all Federal

agencies to engage in ‘‘Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Government.’’ E.O. No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000); see also, Memoranda of

the President, 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (April 29, 1994), Government to Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments. Similarly, the Secretaries of the

Interior and Commerce have issued orders calling on their subordinate agencies to

consult with Indian tribes in the implementation of the Endangered Species Act.

Secretarial Order Nos. 3206 and 3225 (Orders applicable to Indian tribes in the

lower 48 States and Alaska respectively).

The executive branch, through the Justice Department, has supported Indian

tribes in the recent cases before the Court (Strate, Atkinson and Hicks) and has actively supported Indian treaty rights in cases such as United States v. Washington

and United States v. Michigan. The Justice Department also supported the tribes

in the Indian gaming case—Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Indians. When the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State by upholding Florida’s sovereign immunity,

the Department of the Interior exercised its authority to fill the gap caused by the

ruling and promulgated a rule in support of Indian gaming. Administrative agencies, however, are limited in terms of their authority and only Congress can right

the wrongs committed by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

Congress has always led the way in setting Federal Indian policy as provided in

the Constitution. I respectfully suggest that Congress should act to correct the Supreme Court’s mistaken notions of what is best for governance in Indian country.

This should be done with deliberation and full consultation with Indian tribes. I

commend the Chairman and members of the committee for holding this hearing.

Thank you very much. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN ST. CLAIR, CHIEF JUDGE, SHOSHONE AND ARAPAHOE

TRIBAL COURT, WIND RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION, WYOMING

Good afternoon Chairman Inouye and distinguished members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Thank you for the invitation to come before you today to

testify about a topic that has had a major impact upon the powers and authorities

of Indian tribal governments.

My name is John St. Clair. I am an enrolled member of the Eastern Shoshone

Tribe of the Wind River Indian Reservation located in west central Wyoming. I am

an attorney licensed in Wyoming and have been sitting as chief Judge of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court since 1983. I am president of Wyoming Legal

Services, president of Montana-Wyoming Tribal Judges Association and a member

of the board of directors of the National American Indian Court Judges Association

[NAICJA].

The Wind River Indian Reservation is jointly owned by the Eastern Shoshone and

Northern Arapahoe Tribes [the tribes]. It is approximately 3,500 square miles in

area inhabited by about 12,000 members of both tribes and other tribes, along with

about 25,000 non-Indians.

The Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court through a comprehensive Law and

Order Code extends jurisdiction over all Indians who commit offenses prohibited in

the Code and over all persons who have significant contacts with the reservation.

The Court consists of a chief judge who must be a professional attorney and three

associate judges. There is a Court of Appeals comprised of the remaining three

judges who did not hear the case. Jurisdiction is limited by applicable Federal law.

Total case load for 2001 was approximately 3,500.
44

IMPACT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have become a major concern to the tribes

due to their intensified passion to limit the sovereignty of Indian tribes. In particular, within the past 10 years tribes have lost 23 of 28 cases argued before the Court.

Since the case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), where the

Court held by implication that tribes are without inherent jurisdiction to try nonIndians for crimes, a new doctrine has emerged that tribes lack certain powers that

are inconsistent with their dependent status even, when Congress has not acted to

curtail those powers. This new doctrine has been extended to the civil regulatory

area by Montana v. United States 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the adjudicatory area by

States v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) and in 2001, in Atkinson Trading

Post v. Shirley, 531 U.S. 1009 (2001) to a hotel occupancy tax imposed by the Navajo

Nation. The most recent extension of the doctrine is Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct.

2304 (2001) where it was held that tribes lack jurisdiction over civil suits against

State officials for violating the rights of Indians on Indian land within a reservation.

The impact of Oliphant and its progeny on the powers and authorities of Indian

tribal governments is that it severely restricts the ability to exercise basic regulatory and adjudicatory functions when dealing with everyday activities on reservations. When both Indians and non-Indians are involved in domestic violence, alcohol

and/or drug related disturbances or a other criminal activity, tribes can adjudicate

only Indians while non-Indians, even when detained and turned over to State authorities, go unpunished. This double standard of justice creates resentment and

projects an image that non-Indians are above the law in the area where they choose

to reside or enter into.

The affect on tribes of not being able to regulate taxing, hunting and fishing, the

environment, zoning, traffic, et cetera placed limitations on economic development

and self-sufficiency. Without the ability to generate revenues to fund basic governmental functions, tribes become more and more dependent on Federal grants, contracts and compacts, as a sole source of funding, This results in an increased economic burden that ultimately falls on the Federal Government.

Tribal courts constitute one of the frontline institutions confronted with the issues

involving sovereignty, while charged with providing reliable and equitable adjudication of increased numbers of criminal matters and complex civil litigation. Tribes

and their court agonize over the same issues State and Federal courts confront.

Child sexual abuse, alcohol and substance abuse, gang Violence, violence against

women, child neglect, pollution of the air, water, and earth, are just some of these

common yet complicated problems that arise on Indian reservations. The vast panorama of cases handled by the 500 plus tribes in their courts would significantly increase the caseloads of Federal District Courts and also local State courts, if tribal

courts no longer existed. The increased cost to Federal and State courts would also

result in major budget short falls.

CONCLUSION

The recent trend of the U.S. Supreme Court toward judicial termination poses the

greatest threat to tribes since the allotment era of the 19th Century and Congressional termination of the mid–20th Century. This trend runs counter to the proclaimed Federal policy of self-determination that has repudiated the allotment and

termination policies.

America’s Third Sovereign, the Indian tribes, occupying Indian country come before this distinguished body to ask that you utilize the plenary power of Congress

in Indian affairs conferred upon you by the Indian Commence Clause, article 1, section 8, clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution. We request that you restore and reaffirm

the inherent regulatory and adjudicatory authority of tribes over all persons and all

land within Indian country as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1151. This approach would

place the exercise of jurisdiction in the hands of the tribes and the extent of it within their organic documents and case law making it a question of tribal law.

Again I want to thank you for this unique opportunity that you have provided on

behalf of my tribes and all the Indian tribes.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR. JUDGE, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members, of the committee. I appear here as

a former professor of Indian Law who has worked on technical assistance programs

with tribal courts over the years. For the past 21 years I have been a judge of the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and am chair of the Ninth Circuit

Council Committee on Tribal Courts. I preface all of my remarks with the dis-
45

claimer that the views I express are my own; I cannot and do not speak for my court

or the Federal judiciary in general.

I have been asked to elaborate on recent trends in the Indian Law decisions of

the Supreme Court during the past several years particularly with reference to a

divergence between the trend of those decisions and the Indian Law policies of Congress and the executive branch.

Others will describe for the committee the general historical overview of Indian

Law, in terms of judicial decisions, legislation, and actions of the executive branch.

I wish to focus on a few recurring themes in the line of Supreme Court decisions

in the past 30 years, to emphasize the development of certain doctrines that have,

in my view, led to decisional law that has significantly changed the legal status of

Indian tribes in ways that differ from earlier decisional law and from the patterns

set by Congress and the executive branch. The doctrines of the Supreme Court that

I will discuss involve: (1) preemption analysis when State interests conflict with

tribal interests; (2) the discovery of new limitations on tribal power because of the

tribes’ status as domestic dependent nations; and (3) the diminishing role of

territoriality in the concept of tribal power. I will then discuss one example of congressional overruling of a Supreme Court decision and some of the questions that

arose in its aftermath.

The basic judicial concepts of Indian Law were, of course, established by Chief

Justice John Marshall in the Cherokee cases. He recognized tribes as self-governing

bodies that he termed ‘‘domestic dependent nations’’ in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,

30 U.S. 1 (1831), and then held that the Cherokee Nation governed a distinct territory ‘‘in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.’’ Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.

515 (1832). In holding that the tribes enjoyed a special relationship with the United

States, and that the States did not exercise power over the tribes or their territories,

Marshall was acting entirely consistently with the series of Trade and Intercourse

Acts that had been passed by Congress, beginning with the first Congress in 1790.

1 Stat. 137 (1790).

Over the ensuing years there were major movements in Indian law initiated by

Congress or the executive branch, including the removal of tribes to the west and,

in the 1880’s, a policy of allotment designed to break up the tribal landholdings into

small individual farms. Many years later, Congress acknowledged that the allotment policy had been a disaster and enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,

which was based on the proposition that the tribes were here to stay as self-governing bodies with power over their territories. There was an interruption in this view

during the 1950’s, when congressional acts were passed to terminate the special relationship between specified tribes and the Federal Government. At the same time,

Public Law 280 extended the civil and criminal jurisdiction of certain named States

into Indian country, and permitted other States to elect to do the same without tribal consent. This period of ‘‘termination’’ came to an end with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the President’s statement on Indian affairs in

1970. Since that time, such measures as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 and the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of

1982, have clearly signaled a congressional policy of encouraging tribal self-government.

Tribal self-government was also supported by the Supreme Court in the 1959 case

of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217. In holding that a non-Indian was required to go

to tribal court to sue an Indian over a debt incurred in a transaction on the reservation, the Supreme Court stated that its ruling was necessary to preserve ‘‘the right

of reservation Indians to make, their own laws and be ruled by them.’’ Id. at 220.

Notably, this right of self-government was protected by requiring a non-Indian to

come to tribal court. Williams v. Lee was an important modern foundation of

decisional Indian law, and under its regime all three branches of the Federal Government by 1970 were united in a strong view of tribal self-government over tribal

territories.

The 1970’s marked the beginning of a shift in the Supreme Court away from a

view of the tribes as entities with full governmental power over their territories.

The first doctrinal step occurred in a case generally regarded as a victory for the

tribes—McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). That case

held that Arizona could not tax the income of an Indian earned on a reservation,

but the analysis contained the seeds of a diminution of tribal power. McClanahan

considered tribal sovereignty to be a mere ‘‘backdrop’’ for the determination of

whether States could exercise their power over subjects in Indian country. If Federal

laws and treaties, read against the backdrop of sovereignty, preempted State power,

then the State was excluded. This analysis reversed a previous presumption: that

States had no power in Indian country unless some positive reason (or legislation)

existed to extend it there. Under the McClanahan approach, State power extended
46

into Indian country unless a positive Federal law or policy excluded it. Thus preemption doctrine, as it has been formulated since McClanahan favors the extension

of State power into Indian country. An example is Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New

Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), which permitted a State to impose a severance tax on

non-Indian oil and gas lessees on a reservation, even though the tribe also imposed

a tax.

A far greater doctrinal limitation on Indian tribal power was employed in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 1911 (1978), which held that tribes had

no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who committed crimes on their reservations. The Court held that exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would

be inconsistent with the status of the tribes as domestic dependent nations. Chief

Justice Marshall, who had characterized tribes as domestic delineated only two limitations dependent nations in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, delineated only two limitations on full sovereignty that attended the tribes’ status as domestic dependent nations: (1) they could not alienate their land other than to, or with the consent of, the

Federal Government, and (2) they could not enter treaties or other agreements with

foreign nations. For 150 years these limitations we’re generally assumed to be the

only two that flowed from the tribes’ status. Oliphant came up with a new limitation,

and since that time, other Supreme Court decisions have proliferated the limitations

that are deemed to arise from the tribes’ domestic dependent status. Thus, in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), a tribe’s regulation of non-Indian hunting on non-Indian land within the reservation was held to be inconsistent with the

tribe’s domestic dependent status. One case went so far as to state that a tribe’s domestic dependent status prevented it from adopting preemptive regulation of liquor sales on its reservation. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983). Tribes were

held to lack criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians because of their domestic

dependent status. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). And, under the refinement

introduced by Montana v. United States, which I will discuss in a moment, tribes

have been held to lack inherent authority to adjudicate civil disputes between nonmembers arising out of activities on a highway right-of-way within the reservation.

Strate v. A–I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Most recently, tribes have been held

to be precluded by their domestic dependent status from collecting a hotel room

rental tax from a non-Indian hotel on non-Indian fee land within a reservation. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), and from regulating the activities of State law enforcement officers executing a search warrant of an Indian dwelling on Indian land within the reservation, when the investigation concerns a crime

allegedly committed off-reservation. Hicks v. Nevada 121 S.Ct. 2304 (2001).

These recently announced additional limitations on the powers of tribes because

of the tribes’ domestic dependent status create numbers of questions for lower

courts. It is easy for historical reasons to understand why tribes could not alienate

their land except to, or with the consent of the Federal Government, and it is easy

for reasons of international law to understand why tribes are not allowed to enter

treaties with foreign nations. Both of these limitations are explainable as inherent

in the status of the tribes as internal nations owed a duty of protection by the Federal Government. But the new limitations On tribal sovereignty do not seem to have

such compelling necessity behind them. Tribes could exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over persons within their territory without torturing their status as domestic dependent nations. So it is difficult to predict when a challenged exercise of

tribal power is to be upheld on the ground that the power is inconsistent with the

tribe’s domestic dependent status. One way of drawing a bright line, and that indeed seems the direction in which things are going, is to say that a tribe has no

power over non-members at all. Such a rule provides certainty, but leaves the tribe

with almost no governmental power at all, greatly reducing tribal authority below

the level it enjoyed under Williams v. Lee and below the level that is contemplated

by existing legislation Congress and policies of the executive branch. Short of that

drastic formulation, it is difficult under the current trend of Supreme Court decisions to draw a predictable line defining what tribes may do or not do as domestic

dependent nations.

Perhaps the watershed case of recent times, although did not appear to foreshadow such immense changes when it was announced, is Montana v. United

States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). That decision held that a tribe, as a domestic dependent

nation, had no power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian

fee land within a reservation. At the time this ruling did not appear to be a large

exception to the general proposition that tribes could regulate non-Indian activity

within their reservation; Montana freely acknowledged that tribes could regulate or

prohibit hunting or fishing on Indian lands within the reservation. Moreover, there

were two acknowledged exceptions that permitted tribes to regulate non-Indian activity even on non-Indian fee land: (1) the tribe could regulate activities of non-
47

members who entered consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, such

as leases or licenses; and (2) the tribe could regulate activities of non-members on

fee land that, ‘‘threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.’’ Id. at 566. This latter exception, with its language reflecting the traditional view of a State’s police power, suggested that a tribe could regulate non-Indians whenever its reasonable interests

supported such regulation.

Montana contained some expansive language, however, describing tribal sovereignty in terms of power over members, implying the absence of power over others. In later years, the Supreme Court has emphasized this aspect of the Montana

opinion. The fact that Montana was an exception to the general rule that tribes

could regulate non-member activity, within their borders seems to have disappeared

from sight. In later cases, the Montana exception has become the Montana ‘‘rule’’ that tribes have no power over nonmembers. In Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U.S.

438 (1997), for example, the Supreme Court held that a tribe had no regulatory authority over nonmember activities on a State highway right-of-way through the reservation; even though the highway was on tribal land, not fee land, the tribe had

given up the right to exclude and therefore the Court treated it as if it were fee

land. The Court also concluded that a tribe’s adjudicatory jurisdiction (by civil suit

in tribal court) could not exceed its regulatory jurisdiction. It is difficult to see

where this limitation came from. Most courts, of course, are not so restricted; an

Arizona court can entertain a case arising from an automobile accident in New York

even though Arizona would have no authority to regulate the conduct of the parties

in New York.

Most egregiously, Strate held that a highway accident within the reservation did

not affect the welfare of the tribe, so as to fall within the second exception prescribed by Montana. Strate stated: ‘‘Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through

the reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the exception

would severely shrink the rule.’’ 520 U.S. at 457–58. But this formulation ignores the fact that the Montana rule

was itself an exception. If, as a general proposition, it is improper to permit exceptions to swallow rules, then Montana itself should be narrowly construed, so that

it does not erode the general rule that tribes have regulatory jurisdiction over activities on their reservations. Accordingly, Montana’s exceptions, being exceptions to an

exception, must be construed broadly.

The Montana rule continued to be broadened, and its exceptions narrowed, to the

detriment of tribal power in two decisions of last term, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley 532 U.S. 645 (2001), and Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (2001).

Atkinson held that the Navajo Nation could not tax room rentals in a trading post

hotel on fee land within the reservation, even though the trading post benefited

from various tribal services. The Supreme Court applied Montana and, again, read

the exceptions narrowly. License as a trading post was not closely enough related

to operation of a hotel to fall within the ‘‘consensual’’ exception, and the second exception to Montana did not apply because ‘‘[w]hatever effect petitioner’s operation

of the Cameron Trading Post might have upon surrounding Navajo land, it does not

endanger the Navajo Nation’s political integrity.’’ 532 U.S. at 659. Perhaps most interesting of all, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) entered a

concurring opinion stating that ‘‘[i]f we are to see coherence in the various manifestations of the general law of tribal Jurisdiction over non-Indians, the source of

doctrine must be Montana v. United States.’’ And, he continued, Montana’s principle

that tribal authority does not extend to non-members should apply ‘‘whether the

land at issue is fee land, or land owned by or held in trust for an Indian tribe.’’

Id. at 659–60. Under this apparently developing view, tribes lose the power to regulate non-members on trust land, a power that was accepted as a given in Montana.

Hicks took the last step, in holding that tribes had no power to regulate the activities of State law enforcement officers executing a search warrant against an Indian

on tribal land within a reservation. The Supreme Court’s opinion states that the

Montana ‘‘rule’’ that tribes have no inherent power to regulate nonmember activity

applies on tribal as well as fee lands! Once that proposition is established, then

under Strate a tribal court could not entertain civil suit against the officers for exceeding the scope of the warrant because a tribe’s adjudicatory jurisdiction cannot

exceed its regulatory jurisdiction.

The expansive rationale of Hicks represents an astonishing diminution in the control that tribes may exercise over their own reservations. Montana assumed that

tribes could control non-Indians, but carved out an exception for non-Indian hunting

and fishing on Indian land if it was not consensual with the tribe and did not affect
48

the welfare of the tribe. In Hicks, Montana is invoked as support for the proposition

that the tribe cannot regulate non-members even on tribal land, unless the activity

falls within two exceptions that are being ever-more-narrowly construed. It is clear

that, between the dates of Montana and Hicks, a major shift has occurred in the

Supreme Court’s view of tribal authority.

One characteristic of the considerable shift in the Supreme Court’s recent Indian

Law cases is the movement away from a territorial view of tribal power. To John

Marshall in the Cherokee cases, tribal power was clearly territorial; the 12 tribes

exercised power over their reservations and the laws of Georgia could not, intrude.

Later in the 19th century, State law was permitted to govern the activities of nonIndians on reservations, so long as the activity did not involve Indians or have an

effect on Indians. There was no reason to doubt, however, that enough of John Marshall’s original concept remained so that tribes could govern their territories largely

in the way that any other sovereign did. If the tribes’ power over non-Indians was

rarely exercised, it had not been negated. And as tribal governments were buttressed by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, it was natural to assume and expect an increasing exercise of tribal powers over the reservation.

The Oliphant decision put a stop to this trend by holding that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. At about the same time, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), which for the first time made

the jurisdictional distinction not between Indians and non-Indians, but between

tribal members and non-members. Thus began a shift in emphasis from tribal power

as governmental power over a territory to tribal power as a function of membership.

Without a territorial concept, any analysis of challenged governmental power is likely to be very restrictive. It is very difficult to conceive of a government that wields

power other than over a territory; we do not regard governments-in-exile, for example, as real governments—they are potential governments that presume to become

governments over a territory. When tribal power is viewed only through a membership lens, then tribal power is automatically restricted to power over members, leaving tribes with no more governmental power than a club or a union or a church may

exercise over its members.

Until recently, the courts in deciding jurisdictional questions in Indian law looked

to Congress’s definition of Indian country for criminal-law purposes, which included

all land within the exterior boundaries of a reservation whether owned in fee by

non-Indians or not. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Montana, however, introduced a new distinction between tribally owned land and fee land within a reservation. Later another wholly new, but less frequently used, distinction was introduced between

‘‘open’’ and ‘‘closed’’ portions of a reservation for purposes of tribal zoning. Brendale

v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408

(1989). The tribe was permitted to exercise zoning authority over all lands in the

closed portion.

Almost every move away from a purely geographical delineation of tribal power

has resulted in a diminution of that power. In 1982, when a more expansive view

of tribal power still obtained in some fields, the Supreme Court upheld a tribal tax

on non-Indian mineral lessees of tribal property and in doing so the Court was careful to assert that the power to tax did not depend only on the tribe’s power to exclude persons from its reservation: ‘‘it derives from the tribe’s general authority, as

sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction.’’ Merrion v. Jicarilla

Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). By the time of Atkinson last year, however, Montana controlled and a tribe could not tax non-Indian activity on fee land (with three

justices asserting that it made no difference whether fee land or tribal land was involved).

Another facet of a non-geographical approach to tribal power is illustrated by

Strate v. A–1 Contractors, which held that tribes could not regulate non-Indian activity on a highway located on Indian land within a reservation because the rightof-way deprived the tribe of the power to exclude. Under Merrion’s more expansive

view of tribal power, jurisdiction to regulate would not have depended on a right

to exclude.

The trend, therefore, away from a territorial-geographical view of tribal governmental power is one more facet of the general shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence

toward a highly restrictive view of tribal authority.

All of these doctrinal trends of the Supreme Court cases, which have led to a far

more restrictive view of tribal power than existed in the 1960’s, were judicial constructs. The Supreme Court did not take its lead in these matters from congressional or executive policies. Indeed, as I observed earlier, Congress in 1934, and

again consistently since 1968, has placed its emphasis on the strengthening of tribal

self-government. The executive branch has done the same since 1970. It is hard to
49

see where the new direction in restricting power comes from, other than from the

Supreme Court.

In fairness, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that its actions dealing with

tribal authority were taken in the absence of controlling statutes, and have recognized the appropriateness of Congress delineating the extent of tribal authority. See,

e.g. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. It is also possible that at least some of the Justices

have not understood what an enormous change their recent jurisprudence represents in Indian country. In Hicks for example, the State judge had done what virtually any State judge in the West would have done in the last 50 years; he told

the State officers that his writ was of no effect against an Indian on the reservation

and that any search warrant he issued would have to be approved by the tribal

court before it could be executed on the reservation. Under the rationale of the Supreme Court in Hicks, however, the State judge was just engaging in an unnecessary nicety; the tribe had no authority at all over the State officers on the reservation. Similarly, the extradition arrangements that many tribes have worked out

with the States over the past decades are just so much waste paper; no extradition

is necessary under the rationale of Hicks. Hicks thus upsets settled expectations in

Indian country to a degree that may not have been apparent to all of the Justices

(or many others). Just how disruptive Hicks will be may depend on the local relationship between particular tribes and the State and local governments; some may

continue to function cooperatively as before. As a matter of doctrine, however, Hicks

does not encourage such cooperation, and removes its necessity.

There was an instance about a decade ago when Congress promptly overruled a

decision of the Supreme Court dealing with tribal power. In Duro, v. Reina, 495 U.S.

676 (1990), the Supreme Court ruled that it was inconsistent with the domestic dependent status of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians

who commit crimes in Indian country. Congress, first temporarily and then permanently, overruled this decision by enacting the following provision:

(1) ‘‘Indian tribe’’ means any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government.

(2) ‘‘Powers of self-government’’ means and includes all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial,..; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.

25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (emphasis added to new language).

The effect of this provision was recently the subject of an en banc decision of my

court (I was not a member of the en banc panel) in United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d

662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 925 (2002). The question was

whether, after the above amendment was enacted, a non-member Indian could be

tried both by a tribal court and a Federal court for the same offense without violating the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. In the ordinary case, there is no

problem with such double prosecutions because each sovereign, the tribe and the

Federal Government, acts on its own authority. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.

313 (1978). The question posed by Enas was whether the tribal authority recognized

by the statutory amendment of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) was a form of inherent tribal

authority or was a grant of delegated Federal authority. If it was delegated, then

the tribe in prosecuting was exercising a form of Federal authority and the Federal

Government could not then conduct a second prosecution. The en banc court in Enas

unanimously held that the tribe was exercising its own sovereign authority in prosecution Enas, so the double jeopardy clause was not violated by a later Federal prosecution. Six judges I ruled that Congress was correcting the history discussed by

the Supreme Court when it decided Duro.

Because this history was a matter of Federal commonlaw, not constitutional law,

Congress had the power to revise it. With the history corrected, it was clear to the

six-judge majority that the tribal power was historical and inherent.

A five-judge concurring opinion took a more direct view stating that when Congress authorized a tribe to prosecute, it was simply enabling the tribe to exercise

an independent sovereign power which did not necessarily depend on history.

Under both views expressed in Enas, there is no question of Congress’ power to

modify the boundaries of tribal power as? delineated by the Supreme Court. Under

the six-judge majority view, the recognition by Congress of a new, non-historical

tribal power would be a Federal delegation of power, the exercise of which by the

tribe would be subject to the double jeopardy clause and many additional constitutional restraints. By the five-judge concurring view, any congressional recognition

of governmental power by tribes would result in the tribes’ exercising their own sovereign power, subject of course to the restraints of the Indian Civil Rights Act but

not the Federal Constitution. I must say that I am a partisan of the five-judge con-
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curring view. The most important point, however, is that the entire en banc panel

saw no difficulty in recognizing the effectiveness of the congressional overruling of

Duro; the only discussion was over the collateral effects of such overruling.

In summary, the recent decades have seen a significant change in the Supreme

Court’s view of the inherent power of Indian tribes. Many decisions, culminating in

last term’s Atkinson and Hicks, have substantially changed what has long been assumed to be the boundaries of tribal and State power in Indian country. The new

restrictions on tribal power represent a judicial trend only; they have not been paralleled by any changes in congressional or executive policies concerning Indian affairs. None of the changes in the boundaries of tribal and State power effected by

Supreme Court decisions are based on the Constitution; they accordingly are subject

to modification at the will of Congress in the exercise of its power over Indian affairs.

That concludes my testimony. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I

thank you for giving me this opportunity to express my views to you.
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