Docket No. 108089.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant v.

ANTHONY OLIVER, Appellee. 

Opinion filed March 18, 2010.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The issue in this appeal is whether a police officer’s request to

search the trunk of a driver’s vehicle, following the consensual search

of its interior after a valid traffic stop, violates defendant’s

constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). The

circuit court of Henry County denied defendant’s motion to suppress

the evidence recovered from his vehicle’s trunk. Ultimately,

defendant was convicted of two controlled-substance offenses. A

majority of the appellate court reversed, concluding that defendant

was subjected to an unlawful seizure when the officer requested to

search the trunk. 387 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1052. For the reasons that

follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the
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circuit court’s judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

Following a traffic stop in the early morning hours of November

14, 2002, Deputy Sheriff Glenn Hampton recovered cocaine from the

trunk of defendant’s vehicle. After being arrested and taken to the

police station, defendant signed a statement admitting the cocaine was

his, but he denied any intent to sell it. Defendant was charged with

possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver. Defendant’s passenger, Orlando

James, was also charged with the same offenses.

Defendant filed a pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress his

confession, arguing, in relevant part, he was subjected to an illegal

seizure. Codefendant James also filed a motion to suppress. With the

parties’ agreement, the trial court conducted a consolidated

suppression hearing on those motions. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Hampton testified he stopped

defendant’s car for following another vehicle too closely in a

construction zone. When Officer Hampton asked defendant for his

driver’s license, defendant produced an Illinois identification card.

Officer Hampton did not observe anything suspicious inside

defendant’s vehicle, but he did notice a strong-smelling fragrance he

suspected of masking the smell of contraband. While radioing

defendant’s information from the Illinois identification card to police

dispatch, Officer Hampton placed defendant in the passenger seat of

his squad car. Officer Hampton learned that defendant was not the

registered owner of the vehicle and did not have a valid Illinois

driver’s license. Defendant’s passenger, James, however, had a valid

Illinois driver’s license. 

After receiving this information, Officer Hampton, still inside the

squad car with defendant, returned defendant’s identification card,

explained he was not going to arrest defendant for operating a vehicle

without a license, and told defendant he was free to leave if James

drove the car. Officer Hampton also asked defendant if he had any

weapons or contraband inside the vehicle. Defendant replied that he

did not. Officer Hampton then asked defendant if he was sure, and

defendant responded, “If you want to search it, go ahead.” Officer
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Hampton estimated that the time between when he stopped the

vehicle and when defendant gave consent to search the car was less

than 10 minutes. 

Officer Hampton returned to defendant’s vehicle and explained

to James that defendant had consented to a search of the vehicle.

Officer Hampton asked James if he could search the vehicle, and

James replied affirmatively. Officer Hampton estimated he searched

the interior of the car for between 10 and 15 minutes. During the

search, Officer Hampton had defendant stand at the front of the

vehicle and James at the rear of the vehicle. Officer Hampton found

no contraband inside the vehicle. 

Upon completion of the interior search, Officer Hampton asked

defendant and James if there was any contraband in the vehicle’s

trunk. Both replied negatively, explaining the trunk contained only

clothing. Officer Hampton next asked to search the trunk, and

defendant and James both consented. During his search of the trunk,

Officer Hampton recovered a plastic bag of cocaine. Officer Hampton

then arrested defendant and James. According to Officer Hampton,

defendant and James never withdrew their consent for the interior and

trunk searches. Defendant and James were not handcuffed during the

stop, and neither asked if they were under arrest or free to leave.

Officer Hampton was the only police officer present during the traffic

stop and subsequent searches. 

In response, defendant testified that after Officer Hampton

received the information from the radio dispatch, he told defendant

he was free to go. Defendant denied, however, that he gave Officer

Hampton permission to search the car. Instead, defendant stated that

Officer Hampton simply told defendant he would search the car and,

if he did not find any contraband, he would let them leave if James

drove. Officer Hampton did not ask defendant for his consent to

search. During this conversation, defendant was locked inside the

police car alone with Officer Hampton. Although defendant felt free

to leave when Officer Hampton told him he could go, he no longer

believed he was free to leave when Officer Hampton told defendant

he was going to search the vehicle. 

Officer Hampton made defendant stand at the front of the vehicle

during the search. According to defendant, Officer Hampton opened

the trunk from inside the vehicle during the interior search. Officer
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Hampton then searched the trunk of the vehicle. Defendant testified

Officer Hampton did not ask for permission to search the interior or

the trunk. Defendant did not hear Officer Hampton ask James for

permission to search the interior and trunk. 

James also testified, and he denied that Officer Hampton asked

him for permission to search the vehicle’s interior and trunk. James

could not hear the conversation between defendant and Officer

Hampton when they were inside the police car. After the interior

search, James saw Officer Hampton remove the key from its ignition

and use the key to open the trunk. 

Upon hearing the disputed evidence, the trial court entered a

detailed written order, including factual findings, and denied

defendant’s motion to suppress. The court found that the traffic stop

was justified and did not constitute an illegal detention. After

observing the credibility of the witnesses, including their demeanor

during testimony, and making reasonable inferences from the

evidence, the court further found that defendant and James felt free

to leave when Officer Hampton asked for consent to search, and

defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle’s interior

and trunk.

The appellate court reversed, holding that defendant’s motion to

suppress should have been granted. People v. Oliver, No. 3–04–0427

(2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We denied

the State’s petition for leave to appeal, but, exercising our supervisory

authority, directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and

reconsider in light of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d

842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), and People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282

(2006).

On remand, the appellate court again reversed the trial court’s

judgment. People v. Oliver, No. 3–04–0427 (2007) (unpublished

order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We denied the State’s petition

for leave to appeal, but, again exercising our supervisory authority,

directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider in

light of People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262 (2008). 

On remand for the second time, a majority of the appellate court

reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court concluded the police

officer’s request to search the vehicle’s trunk after conducting a
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consensual search of the interior constituted an unconstitutional

seizure and invalidated defendant’s consent, requiring suppression of

the evidence recovered from the trunk. The dissenting justice argued

that this court’s decision in Cosby was based on facts “nearly

identical” to those of this case and upheld a search under similar

circumstances. 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1053 (Carter, J., dissenting). 

We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R.

315. 

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State challenges the appellate court’s reversal of

the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress the

evidence recovered from his trunk. When reviewing a trial court’s

suppression ruling, this court applies a two-part standard of review.

People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2006), citing Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct.

1657, 1663 (1996); Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271. The trial court’s factual

findings are entitled to great deference, and we will reverse them only

if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cosby, 231 Ill.

2d at 271, quoting Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. The trial court’s

ultimate legal ruling on whether suppression is warranted, however,

is reviewed de novo. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271, quoting Luedemann,

222 Ill. 2d at 542.

Citing Cosby, the State argues defendant’s seizure during the

traffic stop terminated when the officer told defendant he was free to

leave and the officer’s request to search the trunk after searching its

interior did not constitute a subsequent unconstitutional seizure. The

State further argues that none of the factors recognized by the United

States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980), or any other relevant

factors supporting a finding of a subsequent seizure, are applicable in

this case. The State therefore maintains the trial court properly denied

defendant’s motion to suppress because he was not seized when

Officer Hampton sought consent to search the trunk. 

Defendant responds that, although he voluntarily consented to an

interior search, his subsequent consent to search the trunk was

involuntary because he was unconstitutionally seized by the time
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Officer Hampton sought his consent to search the trunk. Citing

Mendenhall, defendant argues that a person cannot voluntarily

consent to a search if he is illegally seized when he gives consent.

Thus, defendant argues the appellate court properly reversed the trial

court’s suppression ruling because his consent to search the trunk was

invalid when given during an unconstitutional seizure, requiring

suppression of the evidence recovered from the trunk. 

As a preliminary matter, we note it is undisputed that Officer

Hampton’s traffic stop itself was a constitutionally permissible

seizure. The parties also agree that the initial traffic-stop seizure

ended before Officer Hampton sought consent to search. The parties

disagree, however, on whether defendant was illegally seized when

Officer Hampton sought consent to search the vehicle’s trunk after

completing the consensual interior search.Accordingly, the sole issue

we consider in this appeal is whether defendant was seized within the

meaning of the fourth amendment when Officer Hampton asked to

search the trunk after the valid traffic stop and consensual interior

search. See Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 276 (when an officer asks for

consent after a traffic stop has ended, the relevant question is whether

the officer’s actions constituted an unconstitutional seizure).

The fourth amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The

Illinois Constitution of 1970 similarly protects an individual’s right

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Ill. Const. 1970,

art. I, §6; see also People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 314-16 (2006)

(Illinois’ constitutional search and seizure provision interpreted

consistently with federal provision). 

It is settled that “[t]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to

eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but ‘to

prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials

with the privacy and personal security of individuals.’ ” Mendenhall,

446 U.S. at 553-54, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877, quoting

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 49 L. Ed. 2d

1116, 1126, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3081 (1976). Thus, individuals may

challenge the government’s actions under the fourth amendment if

their freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force

or a show of authority. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 168
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L. Ed. 2d 132, 138, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007); Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d

at 273-74, citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509,

100 S. Ct. at 1877.

In Cosby, this court used the Mendenhall standard to determine

whether the driver of a vehicle was seized when, after a traffic stop

ended, the police officer sought consent to search the vehicle. Cosby,

231 Ill. 2d at 276. Under the Mendenhall standard, a person has been

seized when, considering the totality of the circumstances, a

reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.

The Mendenhall Court recognized four factors indicating a seizure

without the person attempting to leave: (1) the threatening presence

of several officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer; (3) some

physical touching of the person; or (4) using language or tone of voice

compelling the individual to comply with the officer’s requests.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877;

see also People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 390 (1990) (adopting

Mendenhall standard); Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 553 (same). 

The Mendenhall factors are not designed to be exhaustive,

however, and coercive behavior similar to those factors may also

constitute a seizure. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 557. Nonetheless, we

have recognized that the absence of anyMendenhall factors “is highly

instructive” on the issue of whether a seizure has occurred.

Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 554. Accordingly, in Cosby, this court

concluded that the two defendant drivers in consolidated appeals had

not been seized by officers who asked for consent to search their

vehicles after traffic stops when none of the four Mendenhall factors

were present. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 288. 

Here, as defendant concedes, three of the four Mendenhall factors

are indisputably absent. Officer Hampton was the sole police officer

involved, he did not display his weapon, and he did not make physical

contact with defendant. On the fourth factor, the officer’s use of

compelling language or tone of voice, defendant contends that we

should infer that Officer Hampton used compelling language to

secure defendant’s compliance simply because defendant ultimately

complied with Officer Hampton’s request. As defendant

acknowledges, however, the record contains no testimony or other

evidence of Officer Hampton using a compelling tone or language.
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Absent any evidentiary support, we necessarily reject defendant’s

position. Thus, as in Cosby, none of the Mendenhall factors are

present in this case. Nevertheless, defendant contends an additional

factor exists showing he was seized, making this case distinguishable

from Cosby. According to defendant, unlike Cosby when the officer

sought consent immediately following the traffic stop, here the officer

sought consent to search the trunk only after 10 to 15 minutes had

elapsed for the consensual interior search. Defendant maintains he

was not free to leave during this time and Officer Hampton chose

defendant’s waiting location. Based on these circumstances,

defendant contends he was illegally seized when he was asked to

consent to the search of his trunk. 

We cannot accept defendant’s argument, however, because it

would transform every consensual vehicle search into an

unconstitutional seizure. Obviously, defendant had to wait

somewhere while OfficerHampton conducted the consensual interior

search of his vehicle. By its very language, “[t]he touchstone of the

fourth amendment is reasonableness.” Leudemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 566,

citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497,

505, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001). In our view, it was entirely

reasonable for Officer Hampton to direct defendant and his passenger

to stand at opposite ends of the vehicle parked safely along the

roadside after receiving consent to search. Simply put, in the

complete absence of any of theMendenhall factors, defendant’s 10 to

15 minute wait while Officer Hampton conducted the consensual

interior search cannot be construed as constituting an unconstitutional

seizure. An individual’s agreement to wait during a consensual search

is inherent in the consent he gives for that search and the individual

cannot later complain the search time constituted an improper seizure.

This conclusion is consistent with the trial court’s findings that

defendant felt free to leave after the traffic stop ended and voluntarily

consented to the subsequent searches.Although defendant testified he

did not feel free to leave when Officer Hampton sought consent to

search and denied giving consent to search, the trial court is

responsible for weighing the credibility of the witnesses at

suppression hearings. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).

Here, the trial court resolved the conflicting testimony in favor of

Officer Hampton. Reviewing the court’s factual findings with the
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appropriate level of deference, we do not find them to be against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271, quoting

Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. 

Thus, in accordance with Mendenhall and Cosby, we conclude

defendant was not seized within the meaning of the fourth

amendment when Officer Hampton asked for consent to search his

trunk. Because defendant was not unconstitutionally seized when he

gave consent to search the trunk, his consent and the subsequent

search were valid, and the appellate court erred when it reached the

opposite conclusion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court. The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

 circuit court judgment affirmed.