IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 22–0684 

Submitted November 16, 2023—Filed January 5, 2024 

LORRI HAGEN,

Appellee, 

vs. 

SERTA/NATIONAL BEDDING CO., LLC, AND SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CO.,

Appellants. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Christopher Foy, 

Judge. 

An employer and insurance carrier seek further review of the district 

court’s ruling on a claimant’s petition for judicial review that reversed the workers’ compensation commissioner’s exclusion of the claimant’s untimely evidence. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined. 

Lindsey E. Mills of Smith Mills Schrock Blades, P.C., West Des Moines, for 

appellant. 

John M. Loughlin of Loughlin Law Firm, Cherokee, for appellee. 
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CHRISTENSEN, Justice. 

A workers’ compensation claimant failed to timely certify her expert witnesses in accordance with the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner’s 

scheduling order and Iowa Administrative Code rule 876—4.19(3). The claimant 

also failed to produce these experts’ reports at least thirty days before the arbitration hearing, serving them instead around two weeks before the hearing commenced. Upon objection from the employer and its insurance carrier, the deputy 

determined the receipt of the reports would be unfairly prejudicial and excluded 

the reports under Iowa Administrative Code rule 876—4.19(3)(e). The commissioner affirmed this decision, but the district court reversed on judicial review. 

The court of appeals, over a dissent, affirmed the district court’s reversal, 

and we granted further review. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the 

court of appeals decision, reverse the district court judgment, and remand to the 

district court for entry of an order affirming the commissioner’s decision. The 

commissioner’s decision to exclude untimely evidence is entitled to deference 

because Iowa law tasks the commissioner with adopting and enforcing the rules 

and procedures necessary to implement Iowa’s workers’ compensation laws. This 

includes the rules governing evidentiary deadlines in workers’ compensation proceedings. Given this deference, we cannot say the commissioner abused his discretion by excluding the untimely evidence here. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Lorri Hagen was injured in the course of her employment with Serta/National Bedding Co., LLC, on February 21, 2017, when a cart weighing upwards 

of 350 pounds rolled over her right foot. At Serta’s request, Hagen underwent an 

independent medical examination (IME) on July 22, 2019, with Dr. Gorsche, who 

opined that Hagen had reached maximum medical improvement for the work 
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injury. On August 5, Hagen filed an arbitration petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits from Serta and its insurer, Safety National Casualty Co. (collectively, “Serta”). On November 5, Hagen requested agreement from Serta to 

provide an IME under Iowa Code section 85.39 (2019), which Serta agreed to on 

November 7. 

The workers’ compensation commissioner filed an order on December 31 

that set Hagen’s arbitration hearing for September 25, 2020, where one of the 

disputed issues would be whether Hagen was permanently and totally disabled. 

The order also established deadlines for discovery and the exchange and filing of 

witness and exhibit lists and proposed exhibits. These deadlines largely followed 

the time limits under Iowa Administrative Code rule 876—4.19(3), which governs 

“prehearing procedure, completion of discovery and case management in contested cases.” 

Under rule 876—4.19(3)(b), Hagen was required to “certify to all other parties the expert’s name, subject matter of expertise, qualifications, and a summary of the expert’s opinions” if she intended to introduce evidence from an expert. Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—4.19(3)(b). The rule also gave Hagen 120 days to 

certify before the hearing and Serta 90 days before the hearing and required that 

Hagen certify any rebuttal experts 60 days before the hearing. See id. Rule 

876—4.19(3)(c) further provides that “[a]ll discovery responses, depositions, and 

reports from independent medical examinations shall be completed and served 

on opposing counsel and pro se litigants at least 30 days before hearing.” Id.

r. 876—4.19(3)(c). 

The scheduling order set a 30-day deadline for the parties to serve a witness and exhibit list in accordance with rule 876—4.19(3)(d), ordering all parties 

to “serve a witness and exhibit list and exchange all intended exhibits that were 

not previously required to be served.” See id. r. 876—4.19(3)(d). Finally, the order 
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mandated the parties file proposed exhibits “[a]t least 14 days prior to hearing” 

and any written objections or motions to exclude evidence at least 7 days before 

the hearing. See id. 

In accordance with rule 876—4.19(3)(e), the order notified the parties of 

the following consequence for violating these deadlines: 

If evidence is offered at hearing that was not disclosed in the time 

and manner required by this order, other rulings made by a deputy 

workers’ compensation commissioner or agency rules, the evidence 

may be excluded if the objecting party shows that receipt of the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial. 

(Emphasis added); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—4.19(3)(e). 

The IME that Hagen requested was scheduled to occur with Dr. Kuhnlein 

on May 19, 2020, but Dr. Kuhnlein’s office had to reschedule the IME for June 23 

due to illness. On August 19, Hagen provided Serta with updated discovery responses and listed Tom Karrow as a vocational expert. Serta provided Hagen 

with its vocational report on August 27. On the same day, which was less than 

thirty days prior to the arbitration hearing, Hagen’s counsel informed Serta “that 

he ha[d] inquired into the status of the two reports [from Dr. Kuhnlein and Karrow] and that they can be expected soon.” Both Karrow and Dr. Kuhnlein completed their reports on September 10. Hagen provided Serta with Dr. Kuhnlein’s 

report on September 10 and Karrow’s report on September 11. 

Hagen filed her proposed hearing exhibits on September 11, listing 

Dr. Kuhnlein’s IME report as “exhibit 10” and Karrow’s vocational report as “exhibit 11.” Neither Dr. Kuhnlein nor Karrow were timely certified as experts, and 

their reports were not timely provided to Serta at least thirty days before the 

hearing. Serta filed a written objection to these two exhibits a week before the 

arbitration hearing, arguing, 
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The production of Dr. Kuh[n]lein’s report after the 30-day deadline 

is prejudicial to Defendants as they were not aware of Dr. Kuhnlein’s 

opinions regarding the extent of impairment and permanent work 

restrictions until 15 days prior to the Arbitration Hearing. In addition, Mr. Karrow’s report concluding that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled was produced to Defendants 14 days 

prior to the Arbitration Hearing. Given the late production of the 

reports, Defendants are unable to respond or rebut Dr. Kuhnlein or 

Mr. Karrow. 

Serta renewed this objection at the arbitration hearing on September 25, 

to which Hagen proposed leaving the record open for Serta to obtain rebuttal 

reports. Serta objected, arguing this would not alleviate the prejudice because it 

would have “to go expend additional expenses and costs and time,” which would 

cause further delay. The deputy commissioner agreed with Serta and excluded 

the reports, concluding this was “an unfairly prejudicial instance.” 

Hagen moved to reconsider the exclusion of these exhibits after the hearing, which the deputy denied, reasoning, 

Failing to adhere to the well-established timelines discussed above 

causes an inherent prejudice to litigants. The defendants were prejudiced by late production of reports. . . . I agree with the defendants 

that leaving the record open to obtain rebuttal reports would only 

serve to delay the final disposition of this matter, which is why I 

declined, and continue to decline to do so. 

The deputy concluded Hagen suffered an industrial disability of sixty percent 

and reached maximum medical improvement on July 23, 2019, but she failed to 

prove she is permanently and totally disabled. The deputy also ordered Serta to 

pay Hagen penalty benefits due to its late payment of benefits to Hagen on five 

occasions. 

On appeal, the commissioner issued a decision concluding the deputy did 

not abuse his discretion in excluding the exhibits. The commissioner noted that 

“keeping the record open and offering the objecting party the opportunity to seek 
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responsive reports is often the preferred remedy employed by deputy commissioners in similar circumstances.” However, he explained, 

The IME report and vocational assessment report were not authored by treating physicians and were exchanged for the first time 

roughly two weeks before hearing in violation of Iowa Administrative 

Code rule 4.19(3). Furthermore, Mr. Karrow was not designated as 

an expert until roughly one month before hearing, which was also 

in violation of the rule, and Mr. Karrow’s report concluded claimant 

was permanently and totally disabled, which was an opinion not 

shared by any other experts in this case. Thus, I find defendants 

proved unfair surprise and prejudice by the untimely exchange of 

these reports. As a result, with this additional analysis, I affirm the 

deputy commissioner’s exclusion of Exhibits 10 and 11. 

The commissioner also increased the amount of penalty benefits that Serta must 

pay Hagen for its late payments and ordered Serta to reimburse Hagen for the 

cost of the IME that Dr. Kuhnlein performed. He affirmed the deputy commissioner’s ruling on all other aspects. 

Hagen petitioned for judicial review in the district court, challenging the 

exclusion of the reports and other issues that are not relevant to this appeal. The 

district court reversed the commissioner’s decision excluding the reports. It concluded the deputy and commissioner merely assumed the late disclosure and 

production of the reports was inherently prejudicial to Serta instead of making 

the necessary finding that admitting these reports would be unfairly prejudicial 

to Serta. According to the district court, “this assumption constitutes an abuse 

of discretion and a failure to apply and interpret the law correctly.” The district 

court also observed, “Given that [the Commissioner] found Respondents to have 

unreasonably denied or delayed paying Hagen temporary disability benefits for 

over seven months earlier in these proceedings, the Court questions whether 

Respondents have any genuine concerns about disposing of this case promptly.” 

Alternatively, it found no evidence in the record to support a finding of unfair 

prejudice. 
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The district court reversed the agency’s decision and remanded with directions to admit the reports and other exhibits and “leave the record open for a 

whatever length of time [the commissioner] deems sufficient to permit [Serta] an 

opportunity to file responsive reports, and then revisit and rule on the issues.” 

Serta appealed, and we transferred it to the court of appeals. The court of appeals 

affirmed the district court’s ruling, with one judge dissenting. 

The dissenting judge wrote, 

Given the deferential standard of our review, particularly toward an agency decision, I would not find it was unreasonable for 

the commissioner to uphold the deadlines and would reverse the 

district court’s decision. While the penalty of excluding evidence is 

harsh, “[i]t is of no concern to a court reviewing an administrative 

sanction whether a different sanction would be more appropriate or 

whether a less extensive sanction would have sufficed; such matters 

are the province of the agency.” Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 

779, 782 (Iowa 2005). 

More broadly, it strikes me that some might use this majority 

opinion as a map to ignore deadlines and navigate around the rules. 

I think an agency should have discretion to apply the standards so 

that does not become the pattern. 

(Alteration in original.) We granted Serta’s application for further review. 

II. Standard of Review. 

Iowa Code section 17A.19 (2021) controls our judicial review of agency 

decisions to determine whether we reach the same conclusion as the district 

court. Chavez v. MS Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa 2022). Here, the relevant sections guiding our decision are Iowa Code section 17A.19(10), subsections (m) and (n), which authorize the district court to grant relief on judicial 

review when the agency’s action is “[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly 

unjustifiable application of law to fact” or “[o]therwise unreasonable, arbitrary, 

capricious, or an abuse of discretion” that results in prejudice to the “substantial 

rights of the person seeking judicial relief.” 
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III. Analysis. 

The only issue before us is whether the commissioner abused his discretion by excluding the reports from Dr. Kuhnlein and Karrow after Hagen failed 

to meet the deadlines in accordance with Iowa Administrative Code rule 

876—4.19(3). “Abuse of discretion is synonymous with unreasonableness, and 

involves lack of rationality, focusing on whether the agency has made a decision 

clearly against reason and evidence.” Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 522 N.W.2d 

828, 831 (Iowa 1994). This is a lenient standard that requires us to “ ‘broadly 

and liberally’ apply the agency findings in order to uphold, rather than defeat, 

the agency’s decision.” Id. (quoting Ward v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 

236, 237 (Iowa 1981)). 

That deference is appropriate here because the commissioner is statutorily 

required to “[a]dopt and enforce rules necessary to implement” Iowa’s workers’ 

compensation laws, Iowa Code § 86.8(1)(a), and the commissioner relied on those 

procedural rules to exclude the reports at issue. See also id. § 17A.3(1)(b)–(c) 

(“[E]ach agency shall . . . [a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and 

requirements of all formal and informal procedures available to the public . . . 

[and rules] embodying appropriate standards, principles, and procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the law it administers.”); Marovec, 693 

N.W.2d at 782 (“[W]e think we must give appropriate deference to the commissioner’s decision [to dismiss the claimant’s appeal for failure to file the required 

appeal brief] because by law the commissioner is required to adopt and enforce 

rules and procedures necessary to implement Iowa Code chapter 86.”). Specifically, the commissioner excluded the reports under rule 876—4.19(3)(e), which 

authorizes the commissioner to exclude untimely evidence “if the objecting party 

shows that receipt of the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial.” Iowa Admin. 

Code r. 876—4.19(3)(e); see also Schoenfeld v. FDL Foods, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 595, 
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598 (Iowa 1997) (“Exclusion of evidence is the most severe sanction available 

under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 125(c), the rule concerning discovery of experts, and is justified only when prejudice would result.”).1 

The district court determined this was an abuse of discretion because the 

deputy and the commissioner “assumed that the prejudice to [Serta] inherent in 

the late disclosure and production of the reports by Hagen was sufficient, in 

itself, to warrant their exclusion from the record.” See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 

604 N.W.2d 621, 631 (Iowa 2000) (“[The commissioner] failed to exercise that 

discretion but, instead, merely applied an erroneous rule of evidence to exclude 

the testimony. A failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion.”). But 

that overlooks the commissioner’s analysis in the written decision affirming the 

deputy’s exclusion of the reports. See Iowa Code § 86.24(5) (“The decision of the 

workers’ compensation commissioner is final agency action.”). 

The commissioner examined Serta’s claim that it was prejudiced by the 

untimely reports and decided “there was some element of surprise, as the reports 

were not timely exchanged, nor was Mr. Karrow timely designated as an expert 

under the administrative rules.” He also acknowledged that deputy commissioners in similar circumstances often remedy untimely evidence by leaving the record open and giving the objecting party an opportunity to seek responsive reports. Nevertheless, the commissioner noted this case was different because the 

reports from Dr. Kuhnlein and Karrow “were not authored by treating physicians 

1The issue here is the agency’s application of its own procedural rules. The standard of 

review is abuse of discretion. Boehme v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Iowa 2009). 

We are not dealing with the commissioner’s interpretation of statutory language, where we have 

frequently not deferred to the commissioner’s views despite the commissioner’s rulemaking authority under Iowa Code section 86.8(1). See Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 261 

(Iowa 2012). 
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and were exchanged for the first time roughly two weeks before hearing.” Additionally, he observed, “Mr. Karrow’s report concluded [Hagen] was permanently 

and totally disabled, which was an opinion not shared by any other experts in 

this case.” Consequently, the commissioner decided Serta “proved unfair surprise and prejudice by the untimely exchange of these reports” and affirmed the 

deputy’s exclusion. 

This analysis goes beyond simply assuming inherent prejudice. More importantly, we cannot say that the commissioner’s decision to exclude the reports 

was “clearly against reason and evidence.” Stephenson, 522 N.W.2d at 831. Hagen disregarded multiple deadlines and did not submit the challenged reports 

until about two weeks before the scheduled hearing. Moreover, as the commissioner explained, the reports were not from Hagen’s treating physicians and Karrow’s report reached an opinion that no other expert in the case shared. 

This explanation appropriately differentiates this case from Schoenfeld v. 

FDL Foods, Inc., where we held the commissioner abused his discretion in excluding an untimely report from the employee’s treating physician because there 

was no “unfair surprise to the other party.” 560 N.W.2d at 598. Schoenfeld

turned on the circumstances of that case, which were that the treating physician’s “evaluation report [was] limited to an assessment of the right knee he 

treated,” the physician had already “provided the employer with detailed medical 

information from the date [the employee] was first examined in November 1992 

to his last treatment in April 1993,” and “[t]he employer had also received the 

hospital operative records and had offered them as exhibits at the hearing.” Id. 

The commissioner’s explanation also correctly distinguishes this case from 

Trade Pros., Inc. v. Shriver, 661 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 2003), where we affirmed the 

commissioner’s admission of an untimely medical evaluation report from a doctor who was not the authorized treating physician. Id. at 122–23. There, the 
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company representing the employer’s insurance had authorized the doctor to 

treat the employee, paid her for the employee’s first three visits to her office, and 

sent the doctor a request for the employee’s medical records. Id. at 122. Thus, 

the employer and its insurance company knew the doctor had been treating the 

employee before the employee sought to admit the doctor’s report. Id. In any 

event, we clarified, “Schoenfeld should not be read so broadly as to require [the] 

admission of evidence received after the cutoff date on the basis the employer 

merely knew of the existence of the reporting doctor.” Id. Although we commended the commissioner for reaching a solution that balanced the parties’ interests by admitting the report and giving the employer an additional thirty days 

to respond, we reiterated that the commissioner’s “rulings are discretionary.” Id.

at 123. 

Moreover, we have previously held that the prejudice resulting from the 

untimely designation of an expert need not be great to justify the commissioner’s 

exclusion of that expert’s testimony. See Stephenson, 522 N.W.2d at 831. For 

example, in Stephenson v. Furnas Electric Company, we affirmed the deputy commissioner’s exclusion of an expert’s testimony because the party did not identify 

the anticipated expert witness “as soon as practicable” under the controlling rule 

of civil procedure at the time. Id. Although the prejudice from this delayed identification to the opposing party was “not great,” we could not say “that cutting by 

half (about sixty days to thirty days) the time available for inquiry into the matter 

and perhaps deposing the newly named expert is totally without prejudice.” Id. 

Just as the deputy commissioner in that case “might well have exercised 

the discretion by imposing a lesser sanction,” id. at 832, the commissioner here 

could have imposed a less extensive sanction by following Hagen’s suggestion of 

leaving the record open and giving Serta the opportunity to obtain rebuttal reports. But that has no bearing on our decision because the commissioner has 
12 

the ultimate “responsibility for deciding cases in an expeditious and timely manner,” and we should not infringe upon a decision that is well within his prerogative. Marovec, 693 N.W.2d at 787; see also Stephenson, 522 N.W.2d at 832 (“Although the deputy might well have exercised the discretion by imposing a lesser 

sanction, we agree with the district court in finding there was no abuse.”). Nor 

does it matter that Serta was penalized for its own late payment of benefits, 

which the district court noted in questioning Serta’s claim of unfair prejudice, 

because those late payments and this litigation delay are two different matters. 

One can make required workers’ compensation payments late without causing a 

litigation delay, and vice versa. 

Among other tasks, competent hearing preparation typically 

requires identification of an adverse party’s expert in sufficient time 

before [the hearing] to allow for investigation of the qualifications of 

the proposed expert, his opinions, conclusions and the basis therefor, his experience with the same or similar incidents, his relationship with the parties or their attorneys, the nature and extent of his 

prior experience as an expert witness, and the cases in which he 

previously testified regarding the identical subject, among other 

matters. 

Ellis v. Union Elec. Co., 729 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Hagen’s failure 

to timely certify Dr. Kuhnlein and Karrow as experts or submit their reports left 

Serta in the dark about the experts they were supposed to be preparing for and 

little time to evaluate and respond to these experts’ reports. Historically, “[w]e 

have been reluctant to reverse the Commissioner’s imposition of the sanction of 

exclusion for noncompliance with the scheduling order or the rule that requires 

information thirty days prior to hearing.” Schoenfeld, 560 N.W.2d at 598. That 

remains the case today, and nothing in the commissioner’s decision leads us to 

believe he abused his discretion by concluding Serta demonstrated unfair prejudice that warranted excluding Hagen’s untimely evidence. 
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IV. Conclusion. 

For these reasons, we vacate the court of appeals decision and reverse the 

district court decision remanding this matter back to the commissioner with instructions to admit the challenged evidence, reopen the record, and revisit the 

issues. We remand this case to the district court to enter a judgment affirming 

the commissioner’s decision. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.