SUMMARY

October 29, 2020

2020COA152

No. 19CA2326, People in the Interest of G.C.M.M. — Family Law 

— Paternity — Uniform Parentage Act — Uniform Child-custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

In this paternity proceeding, a division of the court of appeals 

considers the interplay between the jurisdictional provisions of the 

Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and the Uniform Child-custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The child at issue 

was conceived in Colorado but born in another state, and the 

juvenile court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to make a 

child-custody determination. 

Agreeing with the juvenile court, the division concludes that, 

while a paternity proceeding under the UPA may be initiated before 

a child’s birth, a court must also have jurisdiction under the 

UCCJEA before it may make a child-custody determination as part 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
of the proceeding. The juvenile court here did not have jurisdiction 

under the UCCJEA because that statute does not provide a basis 

for jurisdiction over an unborn child. Nor does the UPA expressly 

authorize a court to make a child-custody determination before the 

child is born. Therefore, the division affirms the judgment.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA152

Court of Appeals No. 19CA2326

El Paso County District Court No. 18JV906

Honorable Linda Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of G.C.M.M., a Child,

and Concerning S.M.M.,

Appellant,

and

L.M.D.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO

Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

Announced October 29, 2020

Modern Family Law, Chelsea Hillman, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Law Office of Greg Quimby PC, Greg Quimby, Erica Vasconcellos, M. Addison 

Freebairn, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
1

¶ 1 In this paternity proceeding, we must consider the interplay 

between the jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act 

(UPA), §§ 19-4-101 to -130, C.R.S. 2019, and the Uniform Childcustody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), §§ 14-13-101 

to -403, C.R.S. 2019. S.M.M. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s 

judgment vacating an earlier custody order for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Father’s child, G.C.M.M., was conceived in 

Colorado, and father filed this paternity proceeding before the 

child’s birth. The child was born in New Hampshire, however, and 

has never lived in Colorado. Still, father asserts that the juvenile 

court could make a custody determination because its jurisdiction 

over this proceeding was established before the child’s birth.

¶ 2 We reach the opposite conclusion. While a paternity 

proceeding under the UPA may be initiated before a child’s birth, 

the court must also have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA before it 

may make a child-custody determination as part of the proceeding. 

The juvenile court here did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA

because that statute does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over 

an unborn child. Nor does the UPA expressly authorize a court to 
2

make a child-custody determination before the child is born. As a 

result, we affirm the judgment.

I. Procedural History

¶ 3 In August 2018, father initiated a paternity proceeding under 

the UPA concerning the yet to be born child. He sought a 

determination that he was the child’s father and an allocation of 

parental responsibilities — decision-making authority and 

parenting time — for the child. When father initiated the 

proceeding, he and L.M.D. (mother) lived in Colorado.

¶ 4 Before the child’s birth, however, two significant events 

occurred for purposes of this case. First, mother moved to New 

Hampshire. Second, based on the parents’ agreement, a magistrate 

issued a paternity judgment declaring father the child’s parent.

¶ 5 The child was born in New Hampshire in mid-September 

2018. Not long after, the parents stipulated to a parenting plan 

that contemplated father’s exercising parenting time with the child 

in New Hampshire. The magistrate adopted the stipulation and set 

a permanent orders hearing for July 2019.

¶ 6 Before the hearing, mother moved to dismiss the action based 

on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the child had lived 
3

in New Hampshire his entire life. Mother also initiated a 

child-custody proceeding in New Hampshire. After communicating 

with the Colorado magistrate, the New Hampshire court stayed its 

proceeding pending the resolution of the jurisdictional dispute.

¶ 7 The magistrate decided that a Colorado court could make a 

custody determination because its jurisdiction to determine 

paternity was properly invoked before the child’s birth and such 

jurisdiction included an allocation of parental responsibilities. The 

magistrate further reasoned that the court had not lost jurisdiction 

when mother moved out of the state before the child’s birth.

¶ 8 Mother sought review of the magistrate’s order by a juvenile 

court judge. The juvenile court concluded that the magistrate had 

jurisdiction to determine paternity, but that the magistrate erred by

holding that Colorado had jurisdiction to make a child-custody 

determination. The court also concluded that the UPA provides no 

authority to restrain a pregnant mother from leaving the state. 

Accordingly, the court (1) affirmed the paternity judgment; 

(2) denied mother’s request to dismiss the case; and (3) vacated the 

temporary custody order and directed the magistrate to confer with 

the New Hampshire court in accordance with the UCCJEA.
4

II. Jurisdiction

¶ 9 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by concluding 

that the UCCJEA’s provisions limit its jurisdiction to make a 

custody determination in a paternity case. He argues that the UPA 

confers broader jurisdiction to make custody determinations than 

the UCCJEA because the UPA permits a juvenile court to acquire 

jurisdiction when a paternity action is initiated before a child’s 

birth. We disagree. 

A. Standard of Review and Statutory Interpretation

¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction over a 

child-custody proceeding is a question of law that we review de 

novo. Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 18. We also review questions 

of statutory interpretation de novo. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 

CO 34, ¶ 13.

¶ 11 In construing a statute, we look at the entire statutory scheme 

“in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of 

its parts, and we apply words and phrases in accordance with their 

plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting UMB Bank, N.A. v. 

Landmark Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22). When construing 

statutes related to the same subject matter, we aim to avoid an
5

interpretation that would render certain words or provisions 

superfluous or ineffective. Id. Instead, we adopt an interpretation 

that achieves consistency across a comprehensive statutory 

scheme. Id.

B. Stipulation to Initial Parenting Plan

¶ 12 To start, we recognize that mother and father initially 

stipulated to a parenting plan and asked the magistrate to adopt it. 

But the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court. 

See In re Marriage of Tonnessen, 937 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. App. 

1996). Furthermore, a question of subject matter jurisdiction may 

not be waived and may be raised at any time. In re Marriage of

Finer, 893 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Colo. App. 1995). 

C. Statutory Frameworks

1. The UPA

¶ 13 Paternity proceedings are generally subject to the UPA. N.A.H. 

v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 360 (Colo. 2000); see also In re Support of E.K., 

2013 COA 99, ¶ 9.1 Except as otherwise provided by law, the 

 

1 A proceeding to determine paternity may also be brought under 

the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). §§ 14-5-201, 

14-5-402, C.R.S. 2019. UIFSA enumerates additional bases for 
6

juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the parentage 

of a child who was conceived in the state and to make an order of 

support in connection therewith. § 19-1-104(1)(f), C.R.S. 2019; 

§ 19-4-109(1), (2), C.R.S. 2019. A paternity proceeding may be 

initiated before a child’s birth. § 19-4-105.5(3), C.R.S. 2019.

¶ 14 Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court may 

determine the custody of a child who otherwise comes within its 

jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c). Once a paternity proceeding is 

initiated, a temporary injunction goes into effect restraining each 

parent from removing from the state a child who is the subject of 

the proceeding. § 19-4-105.5(5)(c)(I)(B). The court may also issue 

orders concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities, 

including determinations of decision-making authority and 

 

jurisdiction over nonresidents in proceedings to establish support 

orders or to determine parentage. In re Parental Responsibilities of 

H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848, 854 (Colo. App. 2003). It provides an 

alternative statutory method outside of the UPA for determining 

support and parentage issues. DeWitt v. Lechuga, 393 S.W.3d 113, 

117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also In Interest of R.L.H., 942 P.2d 

1386, 1389 (Colo. App. 1997) (holding that UIFSA remedies are 

cumulative to remedies available under other law). No party 

invoked UIFSA’s provisions in this case.
7

parenting time, as part of the proceeding. §§ 19-4-111(4), 

19-4-116(3)(a), 19-4-130(1), C.R.S. 2019.

2. The UCCJEA

¶ 15 In addition to the UPA, the UCCJEA governs whether a court 

has jurisdiction to address custody matters, including an allocation 

of parental responsibilities. See Madrone v. Madrone, 2012 CO 70, 

¶ 10. Indeed, the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” in 

section 19-1-104(1) indicates that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is 

limited by other legislative enactments. Nistico v. Dist. Court, 791 

P.2d 1128, 1129 (Colo. 1990).

¶ 16 The UCCJEA is designed to avoid jurisdictional competition 

between states over child-custody matters in an increasingly mobile 

society. Brandt, ¶ 19. To accomplish this purpose, the UCCJEA 

establishes a comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must 

follow to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a 

child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of another 

state. In Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA 94, ¶ 17. Absent emergency 

jurisdiction, a court of this state may make an initial child-custody 

determination only if it has jurisdiction to do so based on the 

grounds identified in section 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2019. Madrone, 
8

¶ 10; see also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.C.B., 

2015 COA 42, ¶ 10.

¶ 17 Section 14-13-201 contains four independent grounds for 

jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination. People 

in Interest of S.A.G., 2020 COA 45, ¶ 20 (cert. granted Sept. 14, 

2020). First, a court may have jurisdiction if Colorado is the home 

state of the child on the date of the commencement of the 

proceeding or was the home state within 182 days of the 

commencement of the proceeding. § 14-13-201(1)(a). A child’s 

home state is the state in which the child has lived with a parent for 

at least 182 consecutive days immediately before the 

commencement of the proceeding or, for a child less than six 

months of age, the state in which the child has lived from birth. 

§ 14-13-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2019. The UCCJEA prioritizes home state 

jurisdiction for initial child-custody determinations. Madrone, ¶ 11. 

¶ 18 The other three bases for establishing jurisdiction apply when 

Colorado is not the child’s home state. S.A.G., ¶ 20. They include 

“significant connection” jurisdiction, “more appropriate forum” 

jurisdiction, and “last resort” jurisdiction (no court in any other 

state would have jurisdiction). Madrone, ¶¶ 15-17; see also
9

§ 14-13-201(1)(b)(I), (c), (d). No party asserts that any of these other 

bases applies here.

D. Jurisdiction to Determine Paternity

¶ 19 We first conclude that the juvenile court properly determined 

that it had jurisdiction to determine the child’s paternity.

¶ 20 The UCCJEA covers a wide variety of child-custody matters, 

defined as child-custody determinations and child-custody 

proceedings. M.M.V., ¶ 17. The UCCJEA defines a child-custody 

determination as “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court 

providing for the legal custody or physical custody of a child or 

allocating parental responsibilities with respect to a child or 

providing for visitation, parenting time, or grandparent or 

great-grandparent visitation with respect to a child.” 

§ 14-13-102(3). A child-custody proceeding is “a proceeding in 

which legal custody or physical custody with respect to a child or 

the allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to a child or 

visitation, parenting time, or grandparent or great-grandparent 

visitation with respect to a child is an issue.” § 14-13-102(4). 

¶ 21 A paternity determination, standing alone, does not fall within 

the definition of a child-custody determination. A paternity 
10

determination decides who will be a child’s legal parent. See 

N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 359. But it does not address issues concerning 

custody of the child, an allocation of parental responsibilities, 

visitation, or parenting time. And the UCCJEA expressly provides 

that a child-custody determination does not include an order 

related to child support or other monetary obligation of an 

individual. § 14-13-102(3).

¶ 22 True, a paternity case is one type of child-custody proceeding 

under the UCCJEA. § 14-13-102(4). The official comment to 

section 14-13-102, however, clarifies that only the custody and 

visitation aspects of paternity cases are child-custody proceedings 

subject to the UCCJEA. § 14-13-102 cmt. In contrast, the UPA or, 

in certain circumstances, the Uniform Interstate Family Support 

Act governs the determinations of paternity and child support. See

id.; see also DeWitt v. Lechuga, 393 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 

2013).

¶ 23 As a result, the UCCJEA does not limit a court’s jurisdiction to 

determine paternity or order child support. See In re Marriage of 

Richardson, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 391, 393 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding 

that the UCCJEA does not limit jurisdiction over child support 
11

orders); DeWitt, 393 S.W.3d at 118-20 (holding that the court could 

make a paternity determination when the child was conceived in 

the state even though it lacked jurisdiction to make a child-custody 

determination under the UCCJEA); Harshberger v. Harshberger, 

724 N.W.2d 148, 156 (N.D. 2006) (recognizing that courts have 

construed the UCCJEA as applying to paternity cases only when 

custody or visitation is an issue).

E. Jurisdiction to Determine Custody

¶ 24 We must next decide whether the juvenile court properly 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction to make an initial 

child-custody determination.

¶ 25 The UCCJEA defines a child as “an individual who has not 

attained eighteen years of age.” § 14-13-102(2). And recall that,

when a child is less than six months of age, the child’s home state 

is the state in which the child has lived “from birth.” 

§ 14-13-102(7)(a).

¶ 26 When interpreting these provisions, we look to guidance 

provided by other states because, if a statute has been adopted 

from a uniform law, it should be construed to bring uniformity to 

the law in the various states that adopt it. See In Interest of R.L.H., 
12

942 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Colo. App. 1997). Indeed, in the UCCJEA, 

our legislature has explicitly directed courts to consider “the need to 

promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter 

among states that enact it.” § 14-13-401, C.R.S. 2019. Moreover, 

the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the UCCJEA for the key 

purpose of creating consistency in interstate child-custody 

jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings. M.M.V., ¶ 16.

¶ 27 Other state courts interpreting these same provisions have 

concluded that the UCCJEA does not provide a jurisdictional basis 

to make a child-custody determination concerning an unborn child 

or a child who has never resided in the state. See Gray v. Gray, 139 

So. 3d 802, 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 

Cox, 82 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ark. 2002); Fleckles v. Diamond, 35 

N.E.3d 176, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Sara Ashton McK. v. Samuel 

Bode M., 974 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (App. Div. 2013); Mireles v. Veronie, 

___ N.E.3d ___, ___, 2020 WL 2652274 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); 

Waltenburg v. Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308, 316 (Tex. App. 2008); In 

re Custody of Kalbes, 733 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). 

¶ 28 For instance, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals explained 

that an unborn child cannot have a home state as the child has not 
13

“lived from birth” in any state. Gray, 139 So. 3d at 806. The 

Wisconsin Court of Appeals similarly reasoned that, although a 

child was conceived in Idaho and the father filed for divorce from 

the mother in Idaho before the child’s birth, Wisconsin was the 

child’s home state under the UCCJEA because the child had been 

born in that state and had lived there from birth. Kalbes, 733 

N.W.2d at 650. Likewise, in interpreting the UCCJEA’s 

predecessor, the Arizona Court of Appeals observed that the statute 

did not contemplate the in utero period of time in determining a 

child’s home state. In re Marriage of Tonnessen, 941 P.2d 237, 239 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).

¶ 29 We recognize that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has reached 

a different conclusion. In interpreting UCCJEA’s predecessor, the 

court held that, when a marriage dissolution petition was filed in 

Kentucky before a child’s birth, the child did not have a home state 

as the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Yet, the court 

concluded that, although the child was later born in Ohio, 

Kentucky remained the proper forum to litigate child-custody issues 

under other jurisdictional provisions of the statute. Gullett v. 

Gullett, 992 S.W.2d 866, 869-71 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). We do not 
14

believe this holding comports with the UCCJEA’s preference for 

home state jurisdiction based on where a newborn child has lived 

since birth. See also Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d. at 317 (disagreeing 

with Gullett). Therefore, we agree with the majority of state courts 

that have concluded that the UCCJEA does not provide a 

jurisdictional basis to make a child-custody determination 

concerning an unborn child.

¶ 30 In fact, father agrees that the UCCJEA relies on a “home state 

analysis after the child is born” and there “cannot be a home state 

for an unborn child.” Even so, father asserts that the UPA itself 

provides jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination in this 

case because the UPA expressly allows a court to establish its 

jurisdiction before a child is born. We reject this argument for two 

reasons. 

¶ 31 First, the provisions governing initial child-custody 

determinations under the UCCJEA provide the “exclusive 

jurisdictional basis for making a child-custody determination by a 

court of this state.” § 14-13-201(2). Thus, before a juvenile court 

may make a custody determination (including an allocation of 

parental responsibilities) in a paternity case, it must also obtain 
15

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See Nistico, 791 P.2d at 1129 

(recognizing that a custodial dispute arising in a UPA action was 

governed by the predecessor to the UCCJEA); see also People in 

Interest of M.S., 2017 COA 60, ¶¶ 22-23 (holding that, in a 

dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court had to follow 

the procedures set forth in the UCCJEA to acquire jurisdiction 

before it could issue a custody order); In re Marriage of Pritchett, 80 

P.3d 918, 920 (Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that a court had 

jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination in a 

dissolution of marriage proceeding when Colorado was the 

children’s home state under the UCCJEA). Stated differently, the 

jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA apply to child-custody 

determinations regardless of the statute under which the 

proceeding was commenced. See Mireles, ___ N.E.3d at ___, 2020 

WL 2652274.

¶ 32 Second, while section 19-4-105.5(3) provides that a paternity 

case may be commenced “prior to a child’s birth,” the UPA contains 

no provision authorizing a court to make a custody determination 

or an allocation of parental responsibilities concerning an unborn 

child. Indeed, the temporary restraining order provision provides 
16

that each party is restrained from removing a “minor child.” § 19-4-

105.5(5)(c)(I)(B). Similarly, section 19-4-116(3)(a) authorizes the 

court to enter a judgment with a provision allocating parental 

responsibilities “with respect to the child” and parenting time 

privileges “with the child.” And section 19-4-130(1) states that, as 

soon as practicable, the court shall enter a temporary or permanent 

order that allocates the decision-making responsibility and 

parenting time “of the child.”

¶ 33 Similar to the UCCJEA, the Children’s Code defines a child as 

a “person under eighteen years of age.” § 19-1-103(18), C.R.S. 

2019. This definition of a child applies only to a child after birth. 

See People in Interest of H., 74 P.3d 494, 495 (Colo. App. 2003) 

(holding that, after amending the applicable definition to remove 

any reference to an unborn child, the General Assembly intended to 

have the definition apply only to a child after birth); cf. People v. 

Estergard, 169 Colo. 445, 448-50, 457 P.2d 698, 699-700 (1969) 

(concluding that the prior definition of a child as a person under 

eighteen “unless the context otherwise requires” included an 

unborn child for purposes of determining paternity and support). 
17

¶ 34 Nor are we persuaded by father’s arguments that the juvenile 

court erred by relying on Nistico and Tonnessen. In Nistico, our 

supreme court recognized that the determination of a child’s home 

state is based on where the child has lived since birth. 791 P.2d at 

1131. And in Tonnessen, a division of this court likewise concluded 

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine custody of a 

child who had never resided in Colorado and had another home 

state. 937 P.2d at 865.

¶ 35 Father asserts that Nistico and Tonnessen are not instructive 

where, as here, the paternity case was initiated before the child’s 

birth. We disagree. While a paternity case may be initiated before a 

child’s birth, the home-state determination must be deferred until 

the child’s birth and the child’s birth state becomes the home state. 

Fleckles, 35 N.E.3d at 187-88. In other words, a court does not 

acquire jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination simply 

because a proceeding is initiated before the child’s birth and the 

court has jurisdiction over the parents. See Mireles, ___ N.E.3d at 

___, 2020 WL 2652274 (rejecting the father’s claim that jurisdiction 

over an unborn child was automatically established with the filing 

of the complaint for divorce because the trial court had jurisdiction 
18

over the mother); see also Arnold v. Price, 365 S.W.3d 455, 460-61 

(Tex. App. 2011) (rejecting the father’s contention that the trial 

court had subject matter jurisdiction over child-custody issues 

concerning an unborn child because the UCCJEA does not apply to 

unborn children and jurisdiction was proper as to the mother).

¶ 36 As a result, the principles articulated in Nistico and Tonnessen 

— a child’s home state is based on where the child has lived since 

birth and a court generally lacks jurisdiction to determine custody 

of a child who has another home state and has never lived in 

Colorado — hold true regardless of whether a paternity proceeding 

is initiated before or after a child’s birth.

¶ 37 Father also claims that “the law specifically does not provide 

for the scenario presented in th[is] case” because mother “was 

enjoined from leaving the state with the minor child” and Colorado 

surely would have jurisdiction if mother had obeyed the injunction. 

But, as the juvenile court recognized, section 19-4-105.5(5)(c)(I)(B) 

restrains a parent from removing a child from the state — it does 

not apply to an unborn child. Indeed, the Children’s Code contains 

no provision “designed to restrict the conduct of a pregnant 

woman.” H., 74 P.3d at 496.
19

¶ 38 In his reply brief, father expounds on his position. He claims 

that a court has jurisdiction to issue the injunction when the 

paternity case is filed, but the injunction does not come into force 

until the child is born. According to father, the injunction does not 

restrain a pregnant mother from leaving the state, but the mother 

would be in violation of the injunction once the child was born in 

another state. An injunction restraining a party from removing a 

child from Colorado, however, would not apply to a child who was 

born in another state and has never been in Colorado.

¶ 39 Father further asserts that the UPA must allow for expanded 

jurisdiction beyond the UCCJEA because otherwise it would be 

impossible for any court to acquire jurisdiction in a paternity action 

before a child was born, even where the action did not address 

parenting time or decision-making responsibility. As discussed, 

however, the UCCJEA does not limit a court’s jurisdiction to make a 

paternity determination or order child support. Rather, the 

UCCJEA applies to child-custody or visitation aspects of paternity 

cases. § 14-13-102 cmt.; see also M.M.V., ¶ 17.
20

¶ 40 For these reasons, we hold that the juvenile court properly 

concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody 

determination.

F. Mandatory Injunction

¶ 41 Finally, father contends that the juvenile court erred by

addressing whether mother had violated the temporary injunction 

because that issue was not part of the magistrate’s ruling and was 

unnecessary to address the jurisdictional determination. But the 

magistrate explicitly noted that, after the injunction had been 

issued, mother moved to New Hampshire without permission. In 

context, this was effectively a determination that the injunction 

applied to an unborn child and mother had violated it. 

¶ 42 Mother presented this issue to the juvenile court in her motion 

for review under section 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. 2019. Accordingly, 

the court properly reviewed that aspect of the magistrate’s ruling.

III. Attorney Fees

¶ 43 Mother requests attorney fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 

2019. Section 14-10-119, however, does not govern the award of 

attorney fees in a paternity proceeding brought under the Children’s 

Code. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning N.J.C., 2019 
21

COA 153M, ¶¶ 43-44, 50 (applying section 19-4-117, C.R.S. 2019, 

to an attorney fee request in a paternity proceeding and comparing 

its differences to an award under section 14-10-119).

Consequently, we deny mother’s request.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.