United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1995 PEACE OPERATIONS

Heavy Use of Key

Capabilities May Affect

Response to Regional

Conflicts

GAO/NSIAD-95-51

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259367 

March 8, 1995

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable James V. Hansen

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

House of Representatives

This report discusses the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, force

structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security

requirements while engaged in peace operations, and options for increasing force flexibility and

response capability. We prepared the report at the request of the former Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on

Armed Services. The information in this report should be useful to your Committee in its

deliberations on the impact of peace operations on the military. The report contains a

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the staffing of high-priority support

units.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congresional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine

Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available

to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has become increasingly

involved in a number of peace operations,1

 such as the ones in Somalia

and Haiti. The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on

Armed Services, asked GAO to review the suitability of the current U.S.

force structure for peace operations. They wanted to know whether the

U.S. military had the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a

peace operations environment, while maintaining the capability to respond

to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). GAO did not

assess whether the United States should participate in peace operations.

GAO examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military

forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability

to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace

operations, and (3) options for increasing force flexibility and response

capability.

Background Recent changes in the international security environment, led by the

collapse of the Soviet Union, are redefining the role of the U.S. military. In

addition to emphasizing the capability to respond to two nearly

simultaneous MRCs, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) bottom-up review

notes that U.S. military forces should also be prepared for operations short

of declared or intense war, including peace operations. According to the

bottom-up review, U.S. forces are more likely to be involved in these

other-than-war operations.

As the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased in the

past several years, the nature and extent of U.S. military participation has

changed markedly. While U.S. military forces have participated in peace

operations for many years, notably as part of the Multinational Force and

Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, the size of the U.S. military contingent

has traditionally been limited. Recently, however, the United States has

used more military forces, of an increasingly varied nature, in peace

operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Northern and Southern Iraq.

These operations often take place for an extended duration, usually

occurring in austere environments with little or no infrastructure from

which to base and sustain an operation.

1

For the purpose of this report, “peace operations” includes everything from low-intensity

peacekeeping operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement

operations. In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to participate in humanitarian and disaster

relief operations, as it has done for many years.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

Results in Brief Peace operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including

certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation

units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other

forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air

Force combat aircraft outside Europe. Repeated use of these forces, of

which there are relatively few in the active force, has resulted in some

units and personnel deploying more than once to an operation or to

consecutive operations, increased the tempo of operations, and reduced

the time available to prepare for combat missions. Because of their

forward-deployed mode of operations, the Navy and the Marine Corps

have not faced the same force structure constraints. However, the

increased naval commitment to peace operations, combined with the

decrease in forward-deployed forces, has escalated the tempo of

operations and reduced the preparation time between deployments for

certain naval forces.

Extended participation in multiple and/or large scale peace operations

could impede the services’ timely response to MRCs because certain active

component support units and specialized Air Force aircraft used for these

operations would also be needed initially in a MRC. Contrary to the

bottom-up review’s assumption, it could be difficult to disengage these

support units and specialized Air Force assets quickly from a peace

operation and redeploy them to a MRC. First, some of the forces needed in

the early days of a MRC would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment

from the peace operation. Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted

to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation. Finally,

some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before

deploying to another major operation.

There are a number of options available that could allow DOD to meet the

demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to respond

to MRCs. These options include changing the mix of active and reserve

forces and making greater use of the reserves and contractors. DOD is

currently examining these and other options GAO mentions in this report. If

the United States wants to continue participating in sizable peace

operations for extended periods and still maintain the capability to

respond rapidly to two nearly simultaneous MRCs, it must make choices

involving the use of resources and the degree of military risk it is prepared

to take.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Peace Operations Have

Stressed Key Military

Capabilities

Peace operations have heavily stressed certain key military capabilities, of

which there are few in the active component, particularly certain Army

support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and Air

Force specialized aircraft, while having less impact on other capabilities

such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force

combat aircraft. Because each peace operation is different, the

experiences provided and the impact on the forces differ.

Sustaining large-scale peace operations for an extended period of time

uses a large number of some kinds of active Army support forces to

establish infrastructure in what is often an austere environment. Support

forces provide basic necessities—food, water, toilets, and showers—to

U.S. military forces and, in many cases, to coalition forces and the local

population. If nation building is part of the military mission, support

requirements increase even further as the military builds schools,

hospitals, and local housing and establishes police and other civil

administration services.

The Army’s combat support forces (such as military police) and combat

service support forces (such as port handlers and quartermaster

personnel) provide these important support capabilities. However, many

of these forces are in the reserve component and, for the most part, have

not been activated for peace operations. As a result, the responsibility for

these operations has fallen on the smaller number of forces in the active

component. In some cases, nearly all the active units for particular support

capabilities have had to deploy to specific operations. For example,

100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams and 75 percent of

the petroleum supply companies in the active component deployed to

Somalia. In many cases, certain personnel have had to deploy multiple

times to the same operation or to consecutive operations.

The stress of peace operations on the Army has been exacerbated by the

practice of cross-leveling. This practice involves maintaining support units

at about 10 to 20 percent below their authorized personnel levels during

peacetime and increasing their personnel levels during deployment by

borrowing personnel from units that are not deploying. Given the decrease

in the size of the Army, GAO believes that this practice needs to be

reassessed.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

The Army’s experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that could lie

ahead if the United States chooses to deploy sizable forces to Bosnia or to

other large-scale peace operations throughout the world. While the Army

provided approximately a brigade-size force to Somalia, it likely would

provide a division-size force to Bosnia—roughly three times the Army’s

force in Somalia. Army officials have stated that if the United States sends

approximately 22,000 Army forces to Bosnia, access to the reserve

component likely would be required for the second 6-month rotation

because the large support requirement would exceed the number of active

forces available in certain support capabilities.

The Air Force has contributed to recent peace operations by providing

airlift, delivering humanitarian relief, and participating in various no fly

zone air operations. Air Force officials stated that these operations have

provided valuable experience in joint and coalition operations. However,

they have placed considerable stress on (1) specialized capabilities that

only exist in small numbers, such as command and control, surveillance,

reconnaissance, and radar jamming aircraft and (2) forward-deployed

units in the European theater, where most recent operations have

occurred. Many of these units have experienced increased operational and

personnel tempo because of sustained deployments and have had fewer

opportunities for training in the broad spectrum of warfare requirements,

such as night intercept operations and advanced aircraft handling

characteristics. For example, 48 percent of EF-111 aircrews and 42 percent

of active component F-4G aircrews received waivers for training

requirements they were not able to complete during the January-June 1994

training cycle. These waivers were needed because of the crews’ extensive

participation in peace operations.

In addition, deploying part but not all of a unit to peace operations has

created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force, because

squadrons are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather

than in smaller packages as they are doing for peace operations.

Consequently, essential unit personnel and equipment have to be shared

by the forces at the home base and those in the deployed location.

The traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with a

command’s own resources as much as possible combined with the

drawdown of forces in Europe have increased the strain on the remaining

Air Force assets in Europe. For example, since their inception in July and

November 1993, the U.S. Air Force Europe’s two new F-15E squadrons,

designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night in a high-threat

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

environment, have been participating continuously in two peace

operations—Provide Comfort and Deny Flight. Because of their

participation in these operations, the squadrons have had to forego major

training exercises that would have provided them with the most realistic

combat training available. This training is particularly important for these

squadrons because they have not had the opportunity to participate in a

major tactical air combat exercise since they were established in 1993. Air

Force volunteer reservists have been used in peace operations to reduce

the burden on certain active component units, such as C-130, A-10, and

F-16 units, but full-time jobs and family obligations prevent reservists from

devoting extensive amounts of time to the operations. Many of these

problems are now being addressed by heavier reliance on U.S.-based

active, reserve, and Guard units that have deployed to Operations Provide

Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of this burden.

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the Marine

Corps because they are normally forward deployed throughout the world.

Certain Navy and Marine Corps units, however, have experienced

increased operating tempo and decreased time between deployments due

to their increased participation in these sustained operations and to the

reduced force structure available to respond to them and other forward

deployment requirements. For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that

returned on June 23, 1994, from a 6-month deployment, including 3 months

off the coast of Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to

support U.S. operations off the coast of Haiti. Navy officials told GAO that

increased operational tempo has resulted in reduced U.S. naval

participation in certain training and exercises, less time for intermediate

maintenance and repair, and reduced U.S. naval presence in certain

geographic areas.

Participation in Peace

Operations May Delay

Services’ Response to

Major Regional Conflicts

According to the bottom-up review, military forces needed for peace

operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use in the

event of one or more MRCs. Certain key Army support units and specialized

Air Force aircraft used in recent peace operations have been identified as

being needed in the early stages of a MRC. However, it may be difficult to

disengage these forces from the peace operation and redeploy them

quickly to the MRC. This is significant because in the event of a

short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy rapidly to the theater

and enter the battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

During the Somalia operation, the Army used a large percentage of certain

support forces needed in the early stages of a MRC, such as forces for

opening ports and airfields. In certain cases, nearly 100 percent of the

contingency support forces for particular capabilities had deployed to

Somalia and hence were unavailable for deployment elsewhere. For

example, during the course of the operation, the Army used all its

contingency support forces attached to general supply, air terminal

movement control, medium truck (petroleum), cargo transfer, and water

purification units. Some of these support capabilities, of which there are

few in the active component, would also be needed to facilitate a

redeployment from the peace operation theater and hence would not be

immediately available for the MRC. The Army has recognized this as a

challenge and is currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army

Analysis 2003, a biennial process to determine nondivisional support

requirements. The Army expects to complete this analysis by mid-1995.

The Air Force is in a similar situation. Many of its special capability units

have been participating in peace operations on a fairly continuous basis,

yet DOD plans to use some of these units in both MRCs. While the aircraft

and aircrews could easily move to another location, the supplies,

equipment, and personnel associated with the support of the aircraft

would have to wait for available airlift.

On the other hand, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones and

other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S. forces can

also enhance the ability of the U.S. military to respond quickly to regional

contingencies. This was the case in Operation Vigilant Warrior in

October 1994, where having U.S. aircraft already operating from Saudi

Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition response to Iraq’s threatened

aggression against Kuwait.

A Number of Options Are

Available for Easing the

Strain of Peace Operations

There are options available for reducing the strain of continued military

participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations while

maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. DOD has a number of

ongoing analyses that are examining such options. These options have

their own advantages and disadvantages and will require choices on the

use of the nation’s resources. While there are costs associated with some

of these options, GAO has not examined their magnitude and how DOD

might fund them.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

One option involves increasing the number of support forces on active

duty and decreasing the number of combat forces. The Army maintains

limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty and

substantial active combat capability. While changing the mix of active

combat and support forces would make more support forces available for

peace operations, it would decrease available active combat forces for

regional conflicts. Alternatively, GAO has recently reported that DOD may be

able to increase the number of combat and combat service support forces

without decreasing the number of combat forces by making more use of

civilian employees.

Another option involves greater use of the reserves. This would ease the

strain on Army support forces and on Air Force airlift and combat forces.

The disadvantage of this option would be the disruption to reservists’

lives, which ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to join

the reserves. The President called up approximately 1,900 reservists to

support the September 1994 military intervention in Haiti. Prior to that

call-up, the President’s Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority had been

invoked only once since its 1976 enactment—for the Gulf War. Reserves

were not called up for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989,

and Somalia in 1992. DOD is examining the issue of making greater use of

the reserves for peace operations.

Other options include making greater use of contractors to augment

support forces, using worldwide Air Force assets rather than regional

assets to support peace operations, and changing forward presence and

deployment goals to relieve the strain on naval forces. Although no one

option addresses all the problems GAO has identified, a combination of

these options could substantially ease the problems.

Recommendations Congress, concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget,

has directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the

President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense

Program. The review is to consider peace operations and directs among

other things that the report describe in detail the force structure required

to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously in light of other ongoing

or potential operations. Consequently, GAO is not making

recommendations regarding reassessing the impact of participation in

peace operations in this report.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

On another matter, however, GAO believes that because of the Army’s

significantly reduced size, the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20 percent

below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. Consequently, GAO is

recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to reexamine whether high

priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should still be

manned at less than 100 percent of their authorized strength.

Agency Comments DOD’s comments on a draft of this report appear in appendix I. DOD

generally agrees that peace operations have stressed certain military

capabilities but disagrees with GAO’s conclusion that participation in peace

operations could delay the timely response of U.S. forces to MRCs.

Regarding GAO’s recommendation, DOD states that a review of Army

support requirements is underway as part of Total Army Analysis 2003.

DOD agrees that there are only a small number of certain active support

units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace operations and

MRCs. However, it believes that GAO’s resultant conclusions reflect a lack of

understanding of how U.S. forces would respond to a MRC. GAO’s

conclusions in this regard focus on certain critical capabilities that exist in

limited numbers, specifically certain Army support units and certain Air

Force aircraft. GAO reached its conclusions through analysis of how these

capabilities have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and its

planned use in future conflicts. GAO agrees that most combat forces would

be readily available to respond to a MRC.

DOD specifically disagrees with GAO’s discussion of specialized aircraft.

DOD’s comments on specialized aircraft and GAO’s evaluation are discussed

in chapters 2 and 3.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Demand Has Increased for U.S. Military Response to Peace

Operations

12

Peace Operations Require Extended Force Commitments 13

Force Drawdown Has Increased Challenge of Responding to

Peace Operations

14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 14

Chapter 2 

Recent Peace

Operations Have

Stressed Key Military

Capabilities

17

Certain Army Support Forces in the Active Component Bear

Heavy Burden

17

Peace Operations Stress Certain Air Force Units 25

Naval Forces Have Not Been as Taxed by Peace Operations as

Other Services, but Operational Stress Is Increasing

35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Chapter 3 

Participation in Peace

Operations May Delay

Services’ Response to

Major Regional

Conflicts

41

Bottom-Up Review Envisions Peace Operations as Secondary

Mission

41

Key Force Capabilities Relied on for Both Peace Operations and

MRCs

42

Disengagement From Peace Operations and Redeployment to

MRCs Would Be Difficult

46

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 48

Chapter 4 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

50

Options for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations 51

Recommendation 55

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 55

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 58

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 80

Tables Table 1.1: U.S. Participation in Selected Peace Operations 13

Table 2.1: Selected Army Support Units That Experienced Heavy

Deployments to Somalia

21

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Contents

Table 2.2: Percentage of Selected Support Forces in the Reserve

Component

23

Table 2.3: Percentage of Selected Specialized Aircraft Used in

Peace Operations

26

Table 2.4: Number of Training Waivers Granted to USAFE

Personnel Participating in Peace Operations

33

Table 2.5: Comparison of Calendar Year 1989 and 1993 Sixth

Fleet Aircraft Carrier Operations and Exercise Days

36

Table 3.1: Selected Active Support Units Within CFP 1-3 That

Deployed to Somalia

44

Figure Figure 2.1: Area of Responsibility for U.S. and Coalition Forces in

Somalia

19

Abbreviations

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CFP Contingency Force Pool

DOD Department of Defense

MRC major regional conflict

PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up

ROWPU Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit

USAFE U.S. Air Forces in Europe

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the number, scope, and size of operations

other than war have increased dramatically, and the United States has

become an active participant in some of these operations. Senior

administration officials have testified that multilateral peace operations

are an important part of this administration’s national security strategy,1

albeit not the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. These officials have stated

that the United States must be willing to act to preserve peace and stability

in order to advance and protect U.S. interests in the world. This in turn

demands that the United States encourage the successful conduct of

multilateral peace operations and, when it is in the United States’ interests,

participate in these operations.

Demand Has

Increased for U.S.

Military Response to

Peace Operations

U.S. military forces have been participating in peace operations for almost

50 years, with limited numbers of personnel. However, as the number, size,

and scope of peace operations have increased dramatically in the past

several years, the nature and extent of U.S. participation have changed

markedly. Recently, the United States has used much larger numbers of

combat and support forces to respond to events in a number of locations,

including Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq. (See 

table 1.1) For example, while the United States has approximately 1,100

military personnel committed to the Multinational Force and Observers for

the 12-year operation on the Sinai Peninsula,2

 starting in December 1992 it

deployed approximately 26,000 to Somalia and approximately 20,000 to

Haiti beginning in September 1994.

While U.S. participation in peace operations has increased, the size of the

armed forces has declined over the past 8 years. From a post-Vietnam War

peak of 2.2 million in fiscal year 1987, the active armed forces have been

reduced to an authorized level of 1.5 million in fiscal year 1995.

1

For the purpose of this report, “peace operations” includes everything from low-intensity

peacekeeping operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement

operations. In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to participate in humanitarian and disaster

relief operations, as it has done for many years.

2

The Multinational Force and Observers is a buffer force of 11 nations, deployed to supervise a

demilitarized zone in the Sinai. The force’s mission is to ensure that Israel and Egypt abide by the

provisions of the Peace Treaty pertaining to the Sinai.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: U.S. Participation in

Selected Peace Operations

Operation Time period

Country or

region Mission

Approximate

maximum

number of

forces

Multinational

Force and

Observers

1982 - present Sinai Sinai buffer

force between

Egypt and Israel

1,100

Provide Comfort 1991 - present Northern Iraq Provide safe

havens for

population of

northern Iraq

1,500

Provide Relief/

Restore Hope/

Continue Hope

1992 - 1994 Somalia Provide security

and support for

relief efforts

26,000

Provide Promise 1992 - present Bosnia Provide

humanitarian

assistance

1,000

Deny Flight 1992 - present Bosnia Support U.N. no

fly zone over

BosniaHerzegovina

2,000

Southern Watch 1992- present Southern Iraq Monitor

repression of

southern Iraq

population

14,000

Sharp Guard 1993 - present Adriatic Sea Prevent arms

from entering

the former

Yugoslavia

11,700

Uphold

Democracy

1994 - present Haiti Secure

conditions for

the return of

democracy

20,000

Peace Operations

Require Extended

Force Commitments

Peace operations tend to be sustained rather than short-term operations

and sometimes have required extended force commitments from the U.S.

military services. U.S. military forces continue to maintain a 12-year

commitment to the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai

Peninsula, a 3-year commitment to Operation Provide Comfort in northern

Iraq, and were committed to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia for

almost 2 years. Numerous units provide forces during these operations

and are rotated to ensure a ready presence. During Operation Restore

Hope, the Army rotated forces to and from Somalia approximately every 

4 months. The Air Force tends to rotate its aircrew more frequently. In

peace operations such as Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight,

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

and Southern Watch, it rotated forces every 3 months. In addition to the

forces deployed, additional forces are preparing to deploy or have recently

redeployed.

Force Drawdown Has

Increased Challenge

of Responding to

Peace Operations

The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S.

military in responding to extended peace operations. All four services have

experienced reductions in personnel and equipment that have forced

military planners to reevaluate how the services will respond to peace

operations and major regional conflicts (MRC). For example, with the

reduction in the number of overseas bases and forward-deployed forces in

Europe, the Army and the Air Force have returned part of their Cold

War-era European force structure to the United States and

decommissioned some units. The forces that remained in the force

structure, which once could have responded to peace operations from

forward locations, now may have to be augmented by forces from the

United States.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee

on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services,

asked us to review the suitability of the current U.S. force structure for

peace operations. They wanted to know whether the U.S. military had the

capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a peace operations

environment, while maintaining the capability to respond to two nearly

simultaneous MRCs. We did not assess whether the United States should

participate in peace operations. We examined (1) the impact that peace

operations have on U.S. military forces, (2) force structure limitations that

may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security

requirements while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for

increasing force flexibility and response capability.

To determine the impact of peace operations on U.S. military forces, we

held discussions with personnel who participated in recent peace

operations. We also reviewed after-action reports and situation reports

and conferred with service, unified command, and Office of the Secretary

of Defense officials to identify the units involved, their level of

participation, the types of capabilities provided, and the problems

encountered in providing these capabilities. In addition, we reviewed the

before- and after-deployment personnel and equipment readiness reports

of some participating units and interviewed (1) officials responsible for

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

the readiness of these forces and (2) some of the forces that participated

in these operations.

To determine the effect on the Army of participating in peace operations,

we reviewed the experiences of combat and support forces who

participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and in a number of

other smaller operations such as the Multinational Force and Observers in

the Sinai. However, we focused our efforts primarily on Operation Restore

Hope, the largest Army peace operation deployment to date. We also

reviewed the plans for employment of Army forces in Bosnia should a

peace plan be implemented. The operations in Rwanda and Haiti took

place after we completed the bulk of our work, so we were not able to

fully address them.

As a means of determining the effects of peace operations on the Air

Force, we selected four of the specialized U.S.-based platforms identified

by the Air Force as most affected by participation in peace operations,

reviewed data concerning their participation, and interviewed aircrew and

maintenance personnel involved in the missions. Similarly, we analyzed

data and met with military personnel concerning heavily tasked Air Force

units based in Europe. We concentrated our efforts on peace operations

involving relatively large numbers of Air Force units, such as Operations

Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Southern Watch in Southern Iraq, and

Provide Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia.

For the Navy, we compared pre-Desert Storm Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier

deployments in the Mediterranean area with current Sixth Fleet

deployments where the U.S. Navy is supporting Operations Deny Flight

and Sharp Guard. We also briefly reviewed Navy participation in Haiti and

Cuban operations in the Caribbean. We focused on the Marine Corps’

participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia since it was the largest

Marine Corps participation to date in a peace operation.

To determine whether there are force structure limitations that may affect

the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements

while engaged in peace operations, we held discussions with the Office of

the Secretary of Defense and unified command and service officials,

including officials associated with MRC planning. Using the national

security requirements in the bottom-up review as our criteria, we obtained

data describing the capabilities necessary to respond to a MRC within the

initial days of conflict. We then compared this with the capabilities that

had recently been used in peace operations and the total number of the

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

same capabilities available in the active force. We also discussed the

actions that would be necessary to disengage from a peace operation in

order to deploy to a MRC with officials from each of the military services.

To identify options for increasing force flexibility and response capability

for peace operations, we reviewed pertinent documents and interviewed

senior service, unified command, and other Department of Defense (DOD)

officials to obtain information concerning proposed initiatives and

options.

During the course of this review, we did not examine the adequacy of the

funding for DOD’s participation in peace operations or the impact of

participation on DOD’s planned spending. We are examining these issues as

part of a separate request of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness,

House Committee on National Security, and will report the results

separately.

Our review was conducted primarily at Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine

locations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and component and

unified command headquarters within the United States and Europe. We

contacted by telephone any relevant organizations we did not visit, such as

the 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis, Virginia; the Military Police

Center and School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the 57th Wing at Nellis Air

Force Base, Nevada; the 27th Operations Group at Cannon Air Force Base,

New Mexico; the 552nd Operations Group at Tinker Air Force Base,

Oklahoma; and the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron at Keesler Air

Force Base, Mississippi.

Our review was performed from August 1993 to July 1994 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. We obtained DOD

comments on a draft of this report.

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Peace operations have affected each of the military services differently.

These operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including

certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation

units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other

forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air

Force combat aircraft outside Europe.

In the Army, a large percentage of certain support capabilities in the active

component have been used for peace operations. Most of these support

capabilities are in the reserves and, for the most part, the reserves have

not been activated for use in peace operations. The adverse impact on

these support forces has been further exacerbated because the Army

frequently borrows people from one unit to supplement another that lacks

sufficient personnel to deploy and assigns some personnel to the same

operation more than once, or to consecutive operations, because of the

high demand for their capability.

In the Air Force, peace operations have placed considerable stress on the

relatively limited number of forces providing specialized capabilities and

on forward-deployed units in the European theater. The increased flying

hours necessary to support these operations have resulted in extended

temporary duty in excess of established goals, increased aircraft

maintenance, cannibalization of home station aircraft, and missed training.

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the Marine

Corps. However, forward-deployed naval forces have experienced

increased operating tempo and, in some cases, reduced time to prepare for

deployments, both of which have limited the forces’ availability for

training. Naval officials point out, however, that in many cases, peace

operations have exposed the naval services to unique experiences in joint

and coalition operations.

Certain Army Support

Forces in the Active

Component Bear

Heavy Burden

Certain kinds of Army combat support and combat service support

capabilities, including quartermaster and transportation companies, are

critical in peace operations. The need to establish and provide continued

infrastructure support for U.S. military forces, coalition forces, and the

local population is the key reason support forces are needed in peace

operations. The type and amount of support differs with each operation,

depending on the mission and the nature of the operating environment.

Peace operations often occur in austere locations where there is limited

electric power, roads, water, port facilities, and air fields. As such, support

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forces have played an important role in establishing and sustaining a

working infrastructure, not only for U.S. forces but also for coalition

forces and the local population. In Somalia, for example, the Army

encountered an environment completely devoid of any useful

infrastructure and had to refurbish or build even the most basic of

facilities. If nation building is part of the military mission, support forces

are additionally burdened with tasks such as building schools, hospitals,

and local housing and establishing police and other civil administration

services.

Operational and environmental challenges further tax support forces. In

Somalia, for example, the area of responsibility for U.S. and coalition

forces consisted of approximately 21,000 square miles in the southern half

of the country, with U.S. military and coalition forces dispersed over

considerable distances throughout the country. As shown in figure 2.1,

Mogadishu is more than 200 miles from Kismayo (a key Army location)

and about 200 miles from the Marine base in Bardera, which in turn is

about 200 miles from Kismayo. Support forces had to frequently move

between these locations to deliver food, water, fuel, and other supplies. To

the extent possible, decentralized support operations were established at

various locations throughout the country to reduce the time spent moving

between locations. In some cases, however, this posed even greater stress

on support forces because they had to divide already limited support

assets. For example, the 10th Mountain Division’s 710th Main Support

Battalion divided some of its water teams so that they could provide water

purification capabilities at additional locations.

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Figure 2.1: Area of Responsibility for U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia

International Boundary

Regional Capital

National Capital

Road Networks

Somalia

Ethiopia Belet Uen

Gialalassi

Oddur

Baidoa

Baledogle

Mogadishu

Marka

Kismayo

Bardera

Afgooye

Buur Hakaba

Qoryooley

Luuq

Jilib

Bandar Salaam

Buur Koy

Kenya

Indian Ocean

US Army Forces


Moroccan Forces

US Joint Task Force


US Army Forces


US Marine Forces

US Army Forces


Belgian Forces

US Marine Forces

French Forces

Australian Forces

Canadian Forces

Italian Forces

207 Miles

202 Miles

143 Miles

126 Miles

76 Miles

US Army 


Forces

Source: 10th Mountain Division After Action Report: U.S. Army Forces, Somalia.

Combat forces also have played a significant role in peace operations.

However, because more of these forces are in the active component, a

larger number of them have been available for peace operations. Armored

combat divisions have had limited involvement.

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Army Uses a Large

Percentage of Some

Support Capabilities to

Meet Peace Operations

Requirements

The Army’s capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceeds that

of any other military service or nation. Yet, most of these support

capabilities are in the reserves and, except for volunteers, the Army has

been authorized to draw on reserves for peace operations only once—in

September 1994 for the operation in Haiti. Without a presidential decision

to call up reserve forces, the Army has had to draw upon the smaller

number of active forces and reserve volunteers to meet support

requirements. In some cases, nearly all the active units for a particular

support capability deployed to a peace operation. For example, 75 percent

of the petroleum supply companies in the active force structure deployed

to Somalia. Similarly, 67 percent of the medium petroleum truck

companies and 100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams

deployed to Somalia. Table 2.1 provides a list of selected Army capabilities

within quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and miscellaneous

support units that experienced heavy deployments to Somalia.

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Table 2.1: Selected Army Support

Units That Experienced Heavy

Deployments to Somalia

Type of unit

Number of

active units

Number

deployed to

Somalia

Percentage of active

units deployed to

Somalia

General supply companya 4 5b 100

Air terminal movement control

detachmentc 1 1 100

Petroleum supply company 4 3 75

Medium truck company

(petroleum)d 3 2 67

Cargo transfer company 3 2 67

Light-medium truck company 10 6 60

Fire-fighting truck detachment 7 4 57

Water purification ROWPUe

detachment 4 2 50

Perishable Subsistence Teamf 2 1 50

aA company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

bThe additional unit comprised volunteer reserves.

cDetachments are not limited to a certain number; according to Army officials, they range from 2

to 60 personnel.

dWhile there are other medium truck companies for transporting petroleum, these units have

particular tactical capabilities.

eROWPU—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. This particular detachment is capable of

producing drinkable water from any water source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can

only produce drinkable water from fresh water sources.

f

This team deployed about 65 people.

Source: Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army.

Army’s Cross-Leveling and

Multiple Rotation Practices

Tax the Already

Overextended Support

Forces

To prioritize scarce resources, many of the Army’s active support units are

assigned fewer people in peacetime than are required to perform their

wartime missions. If the Army’s early-deploying support units were needed

for war, the Army would supplement the units with people and equipment

from other active and reserve units. After the Army restructured its forces

in the mid-1980s, we reported that its goal was to authorize combat units,

which are the chief means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of

their wartime requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of

90 percent of their wartime requirements.1

 In discussions with XVIIIth

Airborne Corps officials, the most ready and resourced of all the Army

1

Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf

War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec. 15, 1992).

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corps, we were advised that units deploying to Somalia needed

100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment in order to

meet operational requirements. Most units did not have the people, and

many did not have the equipment to satisfy this requirement. For example,

almost half of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’ First Corps Support Command

units were authorized 90 percent or less of their authorized people, and

several support units were authorized 80 percent or less of their

authorized people. Other corps support commands, such as the Third

Corps’, which provided initial corps support for operations in Somalia, are

resourced at an even lower level than the XVIIIth Airborne Corps.

The Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units deploying to

Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force

structure. This practice is known as “cross-leveling.” Cross-leveling has

occurred at both the division and corps level. For instance, the 210th

Forward Support Battalion, an element of the 10th Mountain Division,

took people and equipment from the Division’s 46th Forward Support

Battalion and the 710th Main Support Battalion before deploying to

Somalia. The 710th Main Support Battalion also supported the 

46th Forward Support Battalion’s deployment, thereby creating a domino

effect within the 10th Mountain Division. According to the 710th

commander, the battalion deployed with fewer than all its people and

equipment. Thus, the remaining people were burdened to make do with

less.

People from some units rotated more than once to the same peace

operation or deployed to consecutive peace operations and/or participated

in domestic relief operations because of the high demand for their

particular capability. For example, almost all of the people from the

XVIIIth Airborne Corps’ 364th Direct Support Supply Company that

deployed to Hurricane Andrew also deployed to Somalia within the next

year. Other units within the XVIIIth Airborne Corps had similar

experiences. According to Army officials, support personnel from other

Army units rotated more than once to Somalia. The 10th Mountain

Division, which responded to the Hurricane Andrew relief operation and

to Operation Provide Hope in Somalia, also deployed to Operation Uphold

Democracy in Haiti in September 1994 to provide the predominant Army

force in support of this peace operation. According to Army officials,

approximately 40 percent of the participants in the Haiti operation also

participated in the Somalia operation less than 1 year ago.

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Cross-leveling and frequent deployments in turn affect the ability of a

unit’s non-deployed elements to meet their operational responsibilities. A

combat support group headquarters has considerable responsibility,

particularly as part of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. When the approximately

150 of 180 military personnel from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’s 507th

Combat Support Group Headquarters deployed to Somalia for several

months, they left approximately 30 headquarters personnel at Fort Bragg,

along with the group’s three battalions, without any additional

augmentation. The headquarters was still responsible for (1) supporting

the group’s three battalions, (2) supporting the Multinational Force and

Observers rotation, (3) conducting logistics operations missions on the

installation, and (4) preparing quarterly training briefs to XVIIIth Airborne

Corps. In addition, several of the remaining personnel had to participate in

two emergency deployment and redeployment exercises and conduct

testing and a major briefing for the Army Chief of Staff. In order to cope

with the absence of so many headquarter personnel, many operational

requirements were decentralized to the battalion level. In some cases,

remaining headquarter personnel (1) took on responsibilities typically

assigned to more senior personnel, and (2) doubled and tripled workloads

throughout the deployment period.

Reserve Forces Contain

Key Support Capabilities,

but They Have Not Often

Been Activated for Peace

Operations

Until recently, the President has elected not to activate reserve personnel

for use in peace operations. Therefore, only reserve volunteers have

participated in most peace operations. This policy has posed particular

difficulties because, as shown in table 2.2, many of the support capabilities

most heavily relied upon in recent operations reside predominantly in the

reserves.

Table 2.2: Percentage of Selected

Support Forces in the Reserve

Component (as of April 1994) 

Support capability

Percentage of units

in reserve

component

Quartermaster 76

Engineer 69

Transportation 63

Psychological operations 75

Civil affairs 97

The Army relied on many reserve volunteers in the Somalia operation.

While Army volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are not

always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and training

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required for the peace operation. Furthermore, individual volunteers do

not meet the Army’s requirement for units, in which a group of individuals

are trained and organized to perform a mission as a cohesive entity. For

example, when Army planners needed a postal unit for operations in

Somalia, they created a unit from available volunteers. This process

proved to be time-consuming, taking 1 month to create a 49-person postal

unit.

The recent initiative for using reserve volunteers for the peacekeeping

operations in the Sinai has been time-consuming due to planning and

procedural processes associated with activating approximately 420

reserve personnel. The reserve volunteers will be ready to deploy to the

Sinai by January 1995 after completing 3 to 6 months of training. More

senior personnel will train longer. While there has been no shortage of

volunteers for the current deployment, Army officials are concerned that

they will not be able to recruit enough volunteers to continue this on an

annual basis. Therefore, the Army is considering the use of volunteers for

every third rotation.

Future Operations Could

Further Burden Support

Capabilities in the Active

Component

The Army’s experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that could lie

ahead if the United States chooses to deploy forces to Bosnia or to other

peace operations throughout the world. The Army will likely send at least

a division-size force to Bosnia if a peace plan is signed. This could have

almost three times the impact on the Army as the Somalia operation,

which generally required one-third the number of forces designated for

Bosnia.

Military police units, in particular, have been kept extremely busy as a

result of peace operations. In September 1994, 40 percent of the military

police combat support companies stationed in the United States were

deployed to Guantanamo Bay supporting the Cuban and Haitian refugee

operation. Three other companies were deployed to Suriname, Honduras,

and Panama, leaving just 13 companies to patrol nine installations in the

United States. According to an Army official, this is a problem because

many installations require more than one military police combat support

company for patrol duties. Because the increase in military police

deployments, mostly due to the refugee crisis, has exceeded the number

available in the Army’s force structure, Army infantry units have been used

to help meet military police deployment requirements. For example, upon

completion of their rotation to Guantanamo Bay, military police

companies will return home while rifle companies rotate to Cuba.

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According to an Army official, while rifle companies will undergo 2 weeks

of training to perform the military police function, the training will not

provide them with the full breadth of skills that military police possess.

The Army will continue to face challenges in responding to sizable peace

operations if reserve forces are not activated. The need for reserve

activation depends on a variety of factors, such as the size of a peace

operation and the number of such operations ongoing at one time. For

example, Army officials stated that if the United States participates in

enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an Army deployment of

approximately 22,000 soldiers, access to the reserve component could be

required for the second 6-month rotation because the large support

requirement exceeds the number of active forces available in certain

support capabilities.2

 According to Army officials, reserve forces would

also likely be required if a number of smaller size peace operations were

ongoing at one time.

On September 15, 1994, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense

and the Secretary of Transportation to call to active duty about 1,900

Selected Reserve military personnel in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine

Corps, and Coast Guard to support operational missions in Haiti. The

call-up included reservists in specialties such as tactical airlift, aerial port

operations, military police, medical support, and civil affairs. These

specialties are those that maintain most of their capabilities in the reserve

component. In regard to this activation, the Secretary of Defense stated

that DOD “. . . cannot conduct operations involving significant numbers of

personnel and amounts of equipment being moved without using the

Reserves.”

Peace Operations

Stress Certain Air

Force Units

Since Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force has responded to numerous,

and often simultaneous, peace operations throughout the world on a

sustained basis. While these operations have provided valuable experience

in joint and coalition operations, they also have taxed the Air Force’s

specialized capabilities and the units that are forward deployed in the

European theater, where most recent operations involving the Air Force

have occurred. The Air Force’s participation in these operations has

resulted in extended tours of duty, missed training, increased maintenance

on aircraft, and cannibalization of aircraft. There are some reports that the

stresses on personnel are affecting morale and families. The Air Force has

2

Civilian contractors could provide support in specific capabilities, such as petroleum and medium

truck companies. Their introduction, however, requires a stabilized operating environment, and this

may not be the case in Bosnia. Furthermore, using civilian contractors to provide this support is costly.

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used reserve force volunteers to relieve part of the operational burden on

these forces.

Increasing Number of

Peace Operations Stress

Specialized Forces in the

Active Component

The Air Force’s specialized support aircraft provide reconnaissance,

surveillance, command and control, and other capabilities that are often

not available from other services or nations. This report focuses on four of

these specialized aircraft, all of which (except two E-3B/C aircraft) are

based in the United States—the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command

and Control Center (ABCCC), for command, control, and communications,

and on-scene tactical battle management; the EF-111 Raven, for

suppression of enemy air defenses; the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS), for surveillance and command and control; and the F-4G

Wild Weasel, for suppression and/or destruction of enemy radars.

The Air Force has relatively few of these specialty aircraft in the active

component,3

 and they are being used in an increasing number of peace

operations, most of which require a sustained presence. For example, as

shown in table 2.3, in June 1994 more than 40 percent of available E-3

AWACS, EC-130E ABCCC, and active component F-4G aircraft were being

used in peace operations.

Table 2.3: Percentage of Selected

Specialized Aircraft Used in Peace

Operations (June 1994) Aircraft Number availablea

Number deployed to

peace operations

Percent deployed to

peace operations

EC-130E

(ABCCC) 7 3 43

EF-111 25 7 28

E-3

(AWACS) 17b 7 41

F-4G 19 14 74

aThis column indicates the average number of aircraft available for mission-ready training or

deployment to a contingency in June 1994. Excluded are test aircraft and aircraft undergoing

depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance.

bFour additional aircraft were not available for peace operations during this period because they

were assigned to the initial qualification training squadron.

3

The EC-130E ABCCC, EF-111, and E-3 AWACS are found only in the active component. Only the F-4G

aircraft are in both the active and reserve components.

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Increase in Flying Hours Has

Stressed Aircraft and Home

Stations

Participation in multiple peace operations by a limited number of

specialized U.S.-based assets has resulted in increased flying hours for

those aircraft involved. This has led to additional wear on the aircraft and

more frequent intermediate and phase maintenance. For example, aircraft

in the only F-4G squadron in the active component, the 561st fighter

squadron, are undergoing major phase maintenance every 4 to 6 months

versus every 7 to 8 months 1 year ago. Similarly, EF-111 maintenance

officials noted that maintenance teams now must work longer to achieve

desired results over a shorter time span than normally required.

In order to support increased peace operation flying hour requirements

and maintain the operational effectiveness of forward-deployed forces, the

home station has had to share key operational and support personnel with

the deployed portion of the squadron. At times, the home station has gone

without certain equipment and supplies to ensure that deployed forces can

operate effectively. For example, the 7th Air Command and Control

Squadron, the only EC-130E ABCCC squadron in the force structure, had to

cannibalize home station aircraft and use their parts to support the

squadron’s forward-deployed aircraft when parts were not available from

other sources.

Aircraft Personnel Are

Exceeding Recommended Time

on Duty

Due to the extended nature of these operations, participating forces

periodically rotate their aircrews, maintenance personnel, and aircraft in

order to maintain a continuous ready presence in theater and reduce

stress on aircraft and personnel. The Air Combat Command has

established 120 days as the recommended maximum number of temporary

duty days that Air Combat Command personnel should accrue in a year.

However, because of the increasing number of peace operations,

personnel associated with specialty aircraft have spent an increased

number of days on temporary duty, away from their home bases. In 1994,

personnel for the EF-111 and the F-4G approached the Air Combat

Command’s recommended maximum number of temporary duty days in a

year—120. According to one of their senior commanders, the F-4G’s

deployment schedule for 1994 indicates that many individuals will be on

temporary duty for about 180 days. According to squadron officials, the

increased number of temporary duty days has affected the morale of Air

Force personnel participating in peace operations and their families. Some

Air Force personnel believe that this increase in temporary duty days is

contributing to increased instances of divorce and decisions to leave the

Air Force, although no direct link has yet been formally documented.

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Aircraft Personnel Miss

Training Necessary to Prepare

for High-Threat Combat

Environment

Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not get

the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary for

maintaining combat efficiency. For example, while deployed in support of

Operation Provide Comfort, F-4G aircrews conducted lethal suppression

of enemy defenses but were unable to remain proficient in formation

take-off and landing events, night intercept operations, and advanced

aircraft handling characteristics. In addition, according to squadron

officials, aircrews maintained weapons qualifications at minimum

proficiency while participating in peace operations. Without this training,

aircrews do not meet the technical requirements needed to qualify for

participation in a high-threat, combat environment.

On a selected basis, wing commanders can waive certain training

requirements for aircrew participating in operations that prevent them

from completing all required training. According to senior Air Force

officials, the number of waivers granted recently has far exceeded those

granted prior to Air Force involvement in these sustained operations.

During the January through June 1994 training cycle, 30 of the 71 aircrew

personnel of the only F-4G squadron in the active component required a

waiver for at least one Graduated Combat Capability event.4

 Similarly, 

29 of the 61 aircrew in the only EF-111 squadron required one or more

waivers for events to which they could not train. Squadron officials

attribute most, if not all, of these waivers to extensive participation in

peace operations. The Operations Group Commander, to whom the EF-111

squadron reports, considers the events waived to be critical mission areas.

According to the commander, if a large number of aircrew personnel are

not flying the required number of sorties required by the Air Combat

Command, overall squadron and wing combat capability will suffer.

While there were no waivers received by E-3 AWACS aircrews for the

training cycle ending June 30, 1994, squadron officials said that they still

have training concerns. The AWACS Operations Group Commander noted

that the quality of the training conducted from home station and/or at

exercises is significantly greater than that logged on deployed sorties.

However, in general, approximately 50 percent of the aircrews’ training

requirements were accomplished on deployed sorties. While the training

was completed, the commander believes that the aircrews did not receive

the quality training they needed. As a means of ensuring quality training in

4

General Graduated Combat Capability events are training events necessary to prepare mission-ready

pilots for combat and all possible missions in their respective aircraft. This training is broken into

three increments known as Graduated Combat Capability levels A, B, and C. The levels are defined by

the number of sorties, specific weapons qualifications, and other sorties and events as determined by

the major command.

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the future, an Air Combat Command task force is reviewing Graduated

Combat Capability training regulations. In addition, according to Air Force

officials, the number of deployed E-3 AWACS aircraft will be reduced so that

there will be more available at the home station for training. The reduction

will be felt in the drug interdiction program.

European-Based Air Force

Assets Carry Heavy Burden

in Supporting Peace

Operations

Since 1991, the end of Operation Desert Storm, three peace operations

requiring substantial and sustained Air Force participation have occurred

in the European theater of operations—Operations Provide Comfort,

Provide Promise, and Deny Flight. These operations, combined with

reductions in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s (USAFE) force

structure—from 8.8 to 2.3 fighter wing equivalents5

—and corresponding

squadron relocations, have resulted in many of the same conditions

experienced by specialized U.S.-based assets participating in these

operations, such as increased flying hours, high temporary duty rates, and

missed training opportunities.

In addition, because recent peace operations have occurred in parts of the

European theater where the Air Force has not maintained a permanent

presence, a significant number of USAFE personnel have been required to

build and maintain infrastructure from which to base forces. Weapons

training deployment facilities in Aviano, Italy, and Incirlik, Turkey, had to

be expanded greatly in order to accommodate the large numbers of

military personnel supporting Operation Deny Flight and Operation

Provide Comfort. The Air Force constructed tent cities in these two

locations to provide additional housing and other services for deployed

personnel.

With the reduction of forward-deployed squadrons in the European

theater, considerable portions of some USAFE capabilities have been

dedicated to peace operations. For example, USAFE has two F-15E

squadrons designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night in a

high-threat environment. For more than a year, about 14 aircraft from both

squadrons, which have a combined total of about 48 aircraft, have been

participating in Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight. The F-15E’s

night navigational and targeting system and high resolution radar have

been valuable in identifying ground targets during these operations.

Similarly, USAFE has one A-10 squadron, which provides close air support

and forward air control. Twelve of its 21 aircraft have been participating in

Operation Deny Flight for more than a year. According to Air Force

5

A fighter wing equivalent generally comprises 72 combat aircraft.

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officials, although all the squadrons’ aircraft were not involved in the

operation at any one time, peace operations affect entire squadrons

because they are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit

rather than in smaller packages.

Recent peace operations in the European theater have also placed a heavy

demand on USAFE’s C-130 Hercules, which provides intra-theater airlift

capabilities. The Air Force has only one active C-130 squadron in the

European force structure, and almost the entire squadron—17 of 19

aircraft—has been participating in peace operations in the European

theater. Operation Provide Promise’s missions into Bosnia have required

the heaviest use of C-130 assets. The squadron’s capabilities were

supplemented by reserve aircraft from the United States; nevertheless, the

squadron had to curtail training in certain skill areas in order to fly

scheduled airlift missions between bases to deliver supplies and

participate in Operation Provide Promise.

USAFE, which had primary responsibility for responding to these operations

since they have occurred within its area of responsibility, met operational

requirements with its own forces as much as possible. This is traditional

Air Force practice. Where USAFE did not have the necessary assets (such as

the E-3 AWACS) or had shortfalls (such as in C-130s), it sought

augmentation from outside Europe. To the extent other USAFE assets could

have been augmented with active-duty units from the United States, such

as in the case of the F-15E aircraft, some of the adverse impact of

participation in these peace operations might have been mitigated. In

commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force has

recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying more on

active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States,

which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to

relieve some of the operational burden.

Split Operations Create

Logistics and Personnel

Challenges for Squadrons

Supporting Peace Operations

Deploying to peace operations from bases in Europe or the United States

has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force because

essential unit equipment and personnel have to be shared by the forces at

the home base and in the deployed location. These split operations have

had a significant impact on home bases, which sometimes have had to

make due with a reduced number of maintenance and operational

personnel and essential unit equipment to ensure that the deployed forces

maintain a high state of readiness. Even if a squadron deploys less than

half of its aircraft, the effect on the home base is still significant because

key operations and maintenance personnel and equipment must deploy to

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support the aircraft. According to Air Force officials, split operations

challenges exist because Air Force squadrons are still structured to fight in

place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are

doing for peace operations. According to squadron personnel, split

operations impede squadron-wide communication processes and

long-term squadron planning, and tax senior squadron leaders who often

have to perform the jobs of their absent colleagues in addition to their

own. According to one squadron commander, it is difficult to plan the

future vision for the squadron because the squadron’s senior leaders are

geographically separated.

Split operations create other personnel challenges as well. Operations and

maintenance personnel rotate between the home station and the peace

operation. For example, according to USAFE officials, aircrews from USAFE’s

A-10 squadron deploy to Operation Deny Flight for an average of 6 to 9

weeks and remain at the home station for varying periods of 2, 5, or 7

weeks. Maintenance personnel remain deployed for 90 days. While at

home station, personnel must train and attend to squadron administrative

responsibilities. According to the squadron commander, this allows

personnel minimal time for leave and attending to family responsibilities

before rotating again to the peace operation.

Aircraft Squadrons Often Have

to Forego Necessary Training

Because of Peace Operation

Demands

Many USAFE squadrons participating in peace operations on a sustained

basis have found it difficult to attend major training exercises at the same

time they are participating in a peace operation. According to squadron

and wing officials we talked with, the squadrons do not have enough

people or equipment to support the peace operation, home station

requirements, and the training exercise concurrently. Because of their

participation in peace operations, both of USAFE’s F-15E squadrons have

had to reduce their level of involvement or cancel their participation

altogether in training exercises. For example, the squadrons were not able

to participate in major tactical air combat exercises, such as Maple Flag, a

Canadian exercise similar to Red Flag, which would have provided them

with realistic combat training. This type of training is particularly

important for these F-15E squadrons since they were established in 1993

and have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air

combat exercise.

While USAFE squadrons have not deployed all their forces to peace

operations, the forces remaining at the home station often find it difficult

to maintain enough aircraft to conduct home station training. For

example, beginning with its initial deployment in July 1993, USAFE’s only

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A-10 squadron provided 12 of its 21 aircraft on hand to support Operation

Deny Flight. Of the remaining nine, two were undergoing phase

maintenance inspections at the home station; one was undergoing depot

repair; and one was used for spare parts in support of forward-deployed

aircraft. Thus, only five of the remaining aircraft were available for pilot

training sorties at the home station. Because of the limited number of

available aircraft, the remaining aircrews were only able to fly the

minimum number of hours needed to maintain mission-ready status. On

the occasions when an additional aircraft had to be dedicated to Operation

Deny Flight, the squadron did not have enough aircraft available to meet

training needs. According to squadron officials, this was also true for USAFE

F-15E, F-15C, F-16, and C-130 aircrews.

The Commander of USAFE’s A-10 squadron identified four training events

that could not be accomplished at Operation Deny Flight because of

various restrictions in the operating theater. These events also were

difficult to accomplish at home station because of environmental and

other restrictions on low-level flight (below 500 feet), target marking, full

scale-weapons delivery, and certain types of approaches. Had the

squadron not been participating continuously in Operation Deny Flight, it

would have had the opportunity to deploy elsewhere for this training.

As is the case with certain U.S.-based squadrons, aircrews from

Europe-based squadrons participating in peace operations have also had

to obtain waivers for training requirements they were not able to satisfy

during the last training cycle. According to the squadron and wing officials

we interviewed at home stations and deployed locations, pilot proficiency

in a low-threat environment is at an all-time high due to the nature of the

missions over Bosnia and Northern Iraq. However, proficiency in

high-threat, low-altitude mission profiles has suffered and will continue to

suffer as long as training opportunities and peace operation mission

taskings remain at their present levels. As shown in table 2.4, for example,

all of the aircrews in USAFE’s two F-15E squadrons obtained waivers for

one or more training events they were not able to accomplish during the

6-month training cycle ending June 30, 1994. Aircrews received waivers in

areas such as Night Weapons Delivery, Air Combat Maneuvers, Air Combat

Tactics, and Basic Fighter Maneuvers.

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Table 2.4: Number of Training Waivers

Granted to USAFE Personnel

Participating in Peace Operations (as

of June 1994) USAFE platform

Number of 51-series

regulation waivers

granteda

Percentage of air

crew receiving

waivers

F-15E 737 100

A-10 55 55

F-15C 38 66

C-130 0 0

aThese 51-series regulations are Multi-Command Regulations for major training and include

training unique to each airframe. Events within these regulations are waived at the major

command level, such as the Air Combat Command.

As mentioned earlier, USAFE’s only C-130 squadron had to curtail training in

order to meet its peace operation and normal operational requirements.

However, after March 1994, its operational requirements for Operation

Provide Promise declined significantly. As a result, C-130 aircrew did not

require training waivers for the training cycle ending June 30, 1994. At the

height of Operation Provide Promise, squadron aircrew required training

waivers for two consecutive periods ending June 30 and December 31,

1993. For these training cycles, 42 and 52 percent of squadron cockpit

crew required 102 and 127 training waivers, respectively. Squadron

aircrew received training waivers in critical areas such as night vision

profiles and assault approaches.

In September 1994, the newly appointed USAFE Commander acknowledged

that USAFE units were having difficulty accomplishing their training tasks

because they are supporting peace operations. He noted that operations

such as Deny Flight and Provide Comfort are competing for combat

training time and causing combat skills to atrophy. According to the

Commander, fighter pilots need to practice intercepts, bomb dropping,

and air-to-air combat, yet they do not typically get this experience during

the course of a peace operation. He stressed that USAFE can no longer

continue to accept degraded levels of training. As noted earlier in this

chapter, the Air Force is now relying more on active, reserve, and Guard

units based in the continental United States to relieve some of the

operational burden.

Reserves Provide

Operational Relief to

Certain Forces in the

Active Component

Air Force reserve volunteer participation in peace operations has more

than doubled since fiscal year 1991. Reserve forces have participated in

such major operations as Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, Provide Hope,

and Southern Watch, as well as other smaller international peace

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operations and domestic disaster relief operations. In some cases, reserves

have been needed to meet mission requirements that active forces were

unable to fulfill. For example, since there is only one F-4G squadron in the

active component and it is participating in Operation Provide Comfort and

Southern Watch, reserve F-4Gs have had to provide augmentation to

Operation Southern Watch. In particular, the 190th Air National Guard

Fighter Squadron deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation

Southern Watch in December 1993, within a year of returning from

another Southern Watch deployment. According to squadron officials, the

190th Fighter Squadron was deployed 12 out of 18 months during this time

period.

In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief to

active forces. For example, from November 15, 1993, to January 15, 1994,

and again during the summer of 1994, reserve A-10 personnel and aircraft

from the United States relieved USAFE’s A-10 squadron so that its personnel

could attend scheduled training at Nellis Air Force Base. Operational relief

for other USAFE aircraft was provided by F-16, KC-135, C-141, and C-5

reserve aircraft from the United States. In addition to providing this

operational relief, reserve forces still have had to meet most of their

individual and unit training; attend exercises; and satisfy other operational

responsibilities for local, state, and federal agencies, such as providing

assistance in weather reconnaissance, disaster relief, aeromedical

evacuations, and counternarcotics.

The majority of C-130s are in the reserves. Given Operation Provide

Promise’s extensive C-130 requirements and USAFE’s relatively small

number of C-130s, reserve aircraft and personnel were looked to for

meeting mission requirements. Initially, reserve aircraft and personnel

augmented USAFE’s only C-130 squadron. However, in January 1994,

because an increasing number of U.S.-based aircraft and personnel were

needed, the Air Force formed another squadron, known as the Delta

squadron. This squadron consisted of reserve and active C-130 aircraft and

personnel that operated out of Germany. Aircrew and maintenance

personnel rotated every 2 to 3 weeks. The reserve deployments allowed

the active component C-130 squadron in Europe to reduce its flying hours

and subsequently increase its mission capable rates. As of May 1994,

volunteer Air Force reservists flew approximately 62 percent of the airlift

sorties in support of Operation Provide Promise. However, while

reservists generally are willing to participate in these operations, Air Force

Reserve and National Guard officials noted that this level of reserve

participation in peace operations is affecting the willingness of reserves to

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volunteer for exercises. As of May 1994, however, the need for reservists

to support Provide Promise dropped as operational demands diminished.

Naval Forces Have

Not Been as Taxed by

Peace Operations as

Other Services, but

Operational Stress Is

Increasing

Certain Navy and Marine Corps units have experienced increased

operating tempo and reduced time to prepare for deployments due to their

participation in peace operations. The ability to obtain necessary training

while participating in these operations is also becoming an increasing

concern. However, peace operations have provided the naval services with

unique experiences in joint and coalition operations that in many cases

may be more valuable than training exercises.

Naval Services Experience

High Operating Tempo in

Providing Forces for Peace

Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps in peacetime are inherently crisis- and

contingency-oriented forces and have conducted peace operations in

littoral areas since their creation. Navy and Marine Corps force structure is

designed so that the naval services can maintain a forward presence and

rapidly respond to crises, as well as the war-fighting requirements of MRCs.

The peacetime role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and

amphibious task forces covers the spectrum of military

involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction and

blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of

U.S. nationals, to major amphibious operations.

According to naval officials, in attempting to meet both the requirements

of peace operations and normal peacetime presence commitments, naval

forces have exceeded established operating tempo standards for

forward-deployed forces in the Central Command, European Command,

and Pacific Command areas of operation. The officials indicated that this

was due in part to participation in peace operations involving Bosnia, Iraq,

and Somalia and in part to the reduction in force structure and

forward-deployed forces available to respond to the same or greater

number of operational commitments. While the Navy and Marine Corps

have tried not to extend deployments beyond 6 months, the operating

tempo has increased during deployments. This is reflected, for example,

by an increased number of steaming days incurred by Navy aircraft

carriers operating in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas in 1993 versus

1989 (the year before Operation Desert Shield).

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Participation in Peace

Operations Affects

Training of Naval Forces

Sustained commitments to particular peace operations, such as

Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe and Operation

Southern Watch in Southwest Asia, require a sustained presence of surface

ships and an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea and Arabian Gulf. This

often reduces U.S. naval participation in certain exercises and training.

For example, in written responses to our questions the Navy stated that

several exercises have been canceled in the European and Central

Commands’ areas of operation, severely limiting training in anti-submarine

warfare, amphibious operations, and command and control. These

capabilities would be needed in a major regional conflict. Table 2.5

compares Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier deployments in 1989 and 1993 and

shows a decrease in the number of days devoted to training exercises and

an increase in the number of days devoted to all other operations.6

Table 2.5: Comparison of Calendar

Year 1989 and 1993 Sixth Fleet Aircraft

Carrier Operations and Exercise Days

Steaming daysa

Year

Days in

theater

for

operations

for

exercises

Days in

port

1989 490 218 124 148

1993 368 299 5 64

aDays steaming comprises days in operations and days in exercises.

Postponed or canceled training has not always had a negative effect on

naval forces, however. Naval officials stress that peace operations provide

unique opportunities for realistic joint and coalition experience and in

many cases may be better than exercises. For example, naval forces may

receive better training by participating in a multilateral peace operation

involving maritime and air interdiction, such as Operations Sharp Guard

and Deny Flight in Europe, than by participating in a scheduled exercise

with one or two other nations. Similarly, Marine support forces in Somalia

obtained valuable experience building infrastructure and providing other

logistical support to U.S. and coalition forces.

If naval forces are pulled out of training required before a major

deployment, they have to compress their training period and then work

longer hours to catch up when they return to port. Some of the ships that

have participated in the Haiti operation were taken out of single-ship basic

training, such as damage control drills. The Navy considers interrupting

this training less damaging to overall mission effectiveness than taking

ships out of intermediate or advanced training that requires operating with

6

The U.S. Sixth Fleet’s area of operation includes the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black seas.

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more than one unit. Much of the basic training can be done at sea, even

while a ship is participating in an operation. As more ships were dedicated

to support Cuban migrant interdiction, however, training opportunities

decreased because more of a ship’s crew was involved in migrant sighting,

recovery, screening, care, and feeding. When the ships return to port,

therefore, they have to perform in-port maintenance, training, and many

administrative and operational inspections simultaneously to remain on

schedule for their next major 6-month deployment. This has resulted in

crewmen working longer hours and has left less time for them to spend

with their families prior to a major deployment.

Naval officials also told us that peace operations are resulting in reduced

intermediate training, such as that at instrumented ranges for missile and

gun shoots. U.S. European Command officials noted that naval aviators

participating in these operations are experiencing many of the same

challenges as the Air Force in terms of training and operational tempo.

Participation in sustained peace operations and a reduction in

forward-deployed forces has also contributed to reduced U.S. naval

presence in certain geographic areas where U.S. forces had been able to

visit on past deployments. Among the results has been a reduced level of

participation in bilateral exercises and training with countries that may

not be participating in peace operations and fewer port visits and

military-to-military exchanges. Quantifying the effects of this reduction in

presence is difficult since the political and diplomatic factors at issue are

somewhat intangible. Naval officials have noted, however, that some

nations dedicate considerable resources preparing for the opportunity to

participate in an exercise with the U.S. Navy. When exercises are

canceled, countries do not get the experience operating with

technologically superior U.S. systems and therefore may not be capable of

doing so in the future should the need arise.

Table 2.5 also shows the decrease in the number of days aircraft carriers

spent in port during Sixth Fleet Mediterranean deployments in 1989 and

1993. The reduced number of days in port has affected the Navy’s ability to

conduct intermediate maintenance on its ships and equipment. According

to U.S. Navy officials in Europe, there has been a 20-percent reduction in

the Navy’s ability to conduct intermediate maintenance in this theater,

which requires time in port. They are concerned that continued delays in

conducting intermediate maintenance may degrade equipment readiness

and service life, particularly since peace operations tend to expose

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equipment to more wear and tear than would be expected during normal

peacetime operations.

According to the Navy, its participation in peace operations has not, thus

far, had a harmful impact on its ability to perform other more traditional

missions. Thus, naval units have been able to meet a variety of demands by

moving within or across command boundaries—such as between the

European and Central Commands—in response to emerging crises. The

Navy has generally been able to maintain its policy mandating that

deployments not exceed 6 months and that the period between

deployments be twice as long as the last deployment. The Navy had to

break this policy in some cases, however, so that ships could be made

available to support Somalia operations. While in 1993 there were 5 of

these cases, through September 1994 the Navy had 15 cases in which it had

to break this policy. According to the Navy, the 1994 cases were due

chiefly to operational requirements regarding Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and

counter-drug missions. The Marine Corps faces similar challenges. For

example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23, 1994, from

a 6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of Somalia, was

sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S. operations off the

coast of Haiti.

According to service officials, the Navy and Marine Corps have not found

it necessary to rely upon volunteer reserve forces in peace operations to

the same degree as the Army and Air Force. Naval forces are structured

for daily peacetime forward presence operations that require a complete

range of combat forces and capabilities be readily available for immediate

response. As a result, the majority of these forces and capabilities are in

the active component. The function of the Navy and Marine Corps reserve

is to augment the active component forces. Nevertheless, there are certain

capabilities that reside exclusively, or nearly so, in the Naval Reserve and

are essential to many peace operations. These capabilities include units

and individuals involved in cargo handling, Navy air logistics, medical fleet

hospitals, and mobil construction battalions. Recent Navy support to

peace operations has included the Naval Reserve in search and rescue and

maritime patrol support for Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, as

well as construction support for operations in Somalia. According to naval

officials, reliance on these limited, yet important, combat support and

combat service support capabilities may increase as the Navy’s

commitment to future peace operations continues to expand.

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Short Duration of Marine

Corps Participation in

Somalia Operation Had

Limited Impact

Marine Corps forces, chiefly from the First Marine Expeditionary Force,

supported operations in Somalia from December 1992 through early May

1993. Later, other Marine forces provided offshore support. While Marine

Corps forces have participated in a variety of peace operations, their

participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia represented their

largest peace operation commitment. Early in the operation, the Marine

Corps provided the predominant number of forces, including initial entry

and sustainment forces. At its peak in January 1993, there were over

11,000 U.S. Marine forces in Somalia. However, by February 1993, the U.S.

Army gradually assumed the majority of the support responsibilities for

U.S. and coalition forces, and the Marine Corps began to redeploy.

The deployment of Marine forces to Somalia resulted in certain support

units’ devoting a significant percentage of their capability to the operation,

leaving minimal support available at the home base for use in other

operations. For example, approximately 95 percent of the 1st Marine

Division’s Combat Engineer Battalion and half of the Division’s

Headquarters Battalion deployed to Somalia. The absence of the

Headquarters Battalion required a secondary planning staff, the 11th

Marines, to handle division operations until the main battalion returned.

While the 11th Marines, which functions normally as an artillery unit,

could have handled a contingency similar in size and scope to the riots in

Los Angeles or the Northridge Earthquake, it did not have the capacity to

orchestrate a response to a MRC, according to Marine officials. Had another

conflict occurred while these forces were in Somalia, the Marines would

have to have looked to one of the other two Marine Expeditionary Forces

to respond. However, since the Marine Corps’ major ground participation

was limited to several months and other forces were available for crisis

response elsewhere, the operation had a limited impact.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD generally agrees that recent peace operations have stressed key

military capabilities and states that it is already examining various means

to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations and

operations other than war. DOD further states that high temporary duty

rates and heavy use of specialized aircraft are force management issues

that have been addressed by better use of worldwide assets, heavier

involvement of the reserves, and the purchase of additional and

replacement aircraft. We describe DOD efforts to address the stress peace

operations have placed on key military capabilities at several points in the

report and modified the report based on DOD’s comments and further

discussion with DOD officials.

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DOD disagrees with our characterization of the demand peace operations

have placed on specialized Air Force aircraft. It believes that we have

painted an inaccurate and misleading picture about the degree to which

such Air Force capabilities are devoted to peace operations. Our report

clearly states that the aircraft we cite (see table 2.3) were the average

number of aircraft available for mission ready training or deployment to a

contingency in June 1994 and that the number excluded test aircraft

and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase

maintenance. We recognize that the Air Force has more aircraft in its

inventory than those available at any one time. However, we believe that

in evaluating how peace operations affect military capabilities the

appropriate focus is the number of aircraft available for use at any one

time.

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As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD concluded that military forces

needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of forces

identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs. Some of the Army and

Air Force forces used in recent peace operations, including certain Army

support units such as port and terminal services units and petroleum

handling units that exist in small numbers in the active Army and

specialized Air Force aircraft, such as the E-3 AWACS, are also needed in the

early stages of a MRC. Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and

redeploying them to the MRC quickly may be difficult. Also difficult would

be obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy the forces, retraining forces to

restore their war-fighting skills, and reconstituting equipment. These

difficulties are significant because in the event of a short-warning attack,

forces are needed to deploy and enter battle as quickly as possible to halt

the invasion and minimize U.S. casualties.

Bottom-Up Review

Envisions Peace

Operations as

Secondary Mission

In 1993, the Secretary of Defense conducted the bottom-up review, a

reassessment of U.S. defense requirements. This review, completed in

October 1993, examined the nation’s defense strategy, force structure,

modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the

post-Cold War era. The Secretary’s report on the bottom-up review

outlined the new dangers facing the U.S. interests, chief among them being

regional aggression. To deal with regional aggression and other regional

dangers, DOD’s strategy is to (1) defeat aggressors in MRCs; (2) maintain

overseas presence to deter conflicts and provide regional stability; and

(3) conduct smaller scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping,

humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. To deal with the threat of

regional aggression, DOD concluded that it is prudent for the United States

to maintain sufficient military power to fight and win two MRCs that occur

nearly simultaneously. According to the report on the bottom-up review,

while deterring and defeating major regional aggression will be the most

demanding requirement of the new defense strategy, U.S. military forces

are more likely to be involved in operations short of declared or intense

warfare. The forces responding to these other operations will be provided

largely by the same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs

and overseas presence.

DOD’s report on the bottom-up review states that if a MRC occurs, DOD will

deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the United States and

draw on forces assigned to overseas presence missions. Unless needed for

the conflict, other forces that are engaged in smaller scale operations like

peacekeeping will remain so engaged. If a second conflict breaks out, the

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bottom-up review envisioned that DOD would need to deploy another block

of forces, requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any

forces still engaged in smaller scale operations, and most of the remaining

U.S.-based forces. In determining force requirements for the two-conflict

strategy, DOD assumed that forces already engaged in peace operations

could rapidly redeploy to a regional conflict.

Congress Directs Review

of Bottom-Up Review

In the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress expressed

concern about the bottom-up review and the defense budget. Regarding

peace operations, Congress found that U.S. forces are involved in a

number of peace operations, there was a possibility of even larger future

involvement, and many of the forces participating in peace operations

would be required early on in the event of one or more MRCs.

Consequently, Congress directed that DOD review the assumptions and

conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the

Future Years Defense Program. The review is to consider the various

other-than-war or nontraditional operations in which U.S. forces are or

may be participating and directs among other things that the report

describe in detail the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs

nearly simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations.

Congress also stated that the President should be willing to increase

defense spending if needed to meet new or existing threats.

Key Force

Capabilities Relied on

for Both Peace

Operations and MRCs

We found that certain Army support forces as well as specialized Air Force

aircraft and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and stocks that would

be needed early in a first MRC have been engaged in peace operations.

Army Support Forces

Designated for Early Use

in a MRC Are Used in

Peace Operations

The Army identified 5-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support

forces that are needed in the early stages of a MRC. An additional 3-1/3

active combat divisions and associated support forces—follow-on

forces—would either be deployed later in a MRC or could provide part of

the response for a second MRC.

The support units that accompany active combat forces are organized into

seven packages. The first three packages, called Contingency Force Pool

(CFP) 1-3, support the first 5-1/3 divisions. While the fourth package, CFP 4,

does not support the first 5-1/3 divisions directly, it rounds out the theater

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support that would be required for these early deploying forces. The

follow-on 3-1/3 divisions are supported principally by CFP 5-7.

Army planners try to avoid using forces designated for early deployment to

a MRC for contingencies such as peace operations. Although planners have

been able to minimize the use of these forces in peace operations, they

have had to use a large portion of some of the Army’s CFP 1-3 support

forces in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations because there is a

limited number of such forces in the active component.

In the Somalia operation, 50 percent of the active support forces used

were from CFP 1-3 units. Specifically, 92 percent of quartermaster forces,

69 percent of engineering support forces, 64 percent of miscellaneous

support forces, and 65 percent of transportation forces deployed to

Somalia were CFP 1-3 units. As shown in table 3.1, certain support

capabilities within those areas had an even higher percentage of CFP 1-3

units.

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Table 3.1: Selected Active Support

Units Within CFP 1-3 That Deployed to

Somalia

Type of unit

Active CFP

1-3 units

Active CFP 1-3

units deployed to

Somalia

Percentage of

active CFP 1-3

capability

deployed to

Somalia

General supply companya 3 3 100

Air terminal movement control

detachmentb 1 1 100

Medium truck company

(petroleum)c 2 2 100

Cargo transfer company 1 1 100

Water purification ROWPUd

detachment 1 1 100

Perishable subsistence teame 1 1 100

Petroleum supply company 4 3 75

Light-medium truck company 3 2 67

Fire fighting truck detachment 4 2 50

aA company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

bA detachment is not limited to a certain number; according to Army officials, it ranges from 2 to

60 personnel.

cWhile there are other medium truck companies for transporting petroleum, these units have

particular tactical capabilities.

dROWPU—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. This particular detachment is capable of

producing drinkable water from any water source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can

only produce drinkable water from fresh water sources.

eThis team deployed about 65 people.

Source: Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army.

Similarly, should a peace plan be signed and U.S. military forces deploy to

Bosnia to support the implementation of this plan, the Army likely would

need to draw on support forces, including CFP units, to meet support

requirements. For example, approximately 64 percent of the total number

of forces planned to deploy are support forces, and approximately

14 percent of those forces will likely come from CFP 1-3 units.

Air Force Will Need

Specialized Aircraft for

MRCs That Are Also Used

in Peace Operations

The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized and unique

capability aircraft, such as the EF-111, F-4Gs, E-3 AWACS, EC-130 ABCCC,

and F-15E in the early days of a MRC. The Air Force’s experience in

Operation Desert Storm documents the early demand for these aircraft.

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For example, approximately 63 percent of the F-4G aircraft were deployed

in support of Operation Desert Storm at the beginning of the hostilities.

According to the bottom-up review, some of these aircraft are so

important to a MRC’s success and are of such limited number in the active

force structure that they are tasked to both MRCs, even in the case of nearly

simultaneous MRCs. Recent peace operations have required varying

numbers of the Air Force’s specialized and unique capability aircraft on a

fairly continuous basis. For June 1994, we calculated that approximately

46 percent of these aircraft were involved in Operations Provide Comfort,

Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch.

According to DOD officials, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones

and other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S. forces

can also enhance the ability of the U.S. military to respond quickly to

regional contingencies. These officials said that this was the case in

Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, where having U.S. aircraft

already operating from Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition

response to Iraq’s threatened aggression against Kuwait.

Naval Services Use

Forward-Deployed Forces

for Peace Operations and

MRCs

U.S. naval forces are structured to respond to regional contingencies with

their forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious-ready

groups, which rotate on a regular basis between home ports and regional

theaters. The Navy and the Marine Corps respond to many types of

operations, from MRCs to peace operations, with the same

forward-deployed forces. Generally, this has not been a problem because

of the flexibility and rotational nature of naval forces. However, to

respond to recent peace operations in the Caribbean Sea, the Navy has had

to use its non-deployed forces, which were training and conducting

maintenance in preparation for their upcoming scheduled 6-month

deployments.

Army and Marine Corps

Use Prepositioned

Equipment and Stocks for

Peace Operations

The Marine Corps and the Army have prepositioned equipment and stocks

afloat for use in the event of a MRC. The Marine Corps has relied on

prepositioned equipment and supplies stored on their Maritime

Prepositioned Ships for a quick contingency response capability.

Equipment and supplies that the Marines used in Somalia came from 4 of

the 13 Maritime Prepositioned Ships that are organized into three

squadrons positioned throughout the world. Each squadron is designed to

provide enough ground combat and combat support equipment and

supplies to sustain about 17,300 Marines for 30 days. The equipment and

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Conflicts

supplies aboard these ships are also needed to support other conflicts in

which U.S. Marine forces are involved. To the extent these ships have been

off-loaded to support a peace operation, their equipment and supplies are

unavailable to respond to a MRC.

Similarly, the Army has prepositioned equipment afloat to facilitate the

rapid deployment of a heavy Army brigade. Ships from the Army’s

Prepositioning Afloat Program, which contains 12 ships with combat and

support equipment and supplies, were recently positioned for use in

supporting the Rwanda humanitarian operation. Five of these ships,

containing support equipment and supplies, were positioned off the coast

of Africa to support this operation if necessary. The need to unload these

ships’ equipment and supplies never arose. In early October 1994, all 12 of

these ships were sent to Southwest Asia to support U.S. forces responding

to Iraqi troop movements. Had the five ships positioned off the African

Coast been unloaded to support the Rwanda operation, their supplies and

equipment likely would not have been available for use in Southwest Asia.

Disengagement From

Peace Operations and

Redeployment to

MRCs Would Be

Difficult

U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they needed

to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace operations to a

MRC. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements

stated in June 1994 that the United States would “liquidate” its

commitments to peace operations in the event of two simultaneous

regional conflicts. Discussions with service officials and review of data

concerning the types and number of forces committed to peace operations

indicate that disengagement from one or more sizable peace operations

and redeployment of forces to a MRC on short notice could be difficult.

Obtaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges

encountered in redeploying forces from one or more peace operations to a

MRC. In order to redeploy ground personnel and equipment from the peace

operations, the already limited number of airlift assets flying from the

United States to the MRC would have to divert to the peace operation, in

some cases pick up personnel and equipment, and take them to the MRC.

The Air Force has not yet fully studied the implication of such a

redeployment and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay on the

Air Force’s ability to meet MRC deployment requirements. Air Force

officials did say that it would make a difficult situation even worse.

According to Air Force officials, the Air Force’s tactical forces would also

encounter an airlift problem in moving from a peace operation to a MRC.

While aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation to another,

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Conflicts

the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft

flying—supplies, equipment, and personnel—would have to wait for

available airlift.

Another challenge that would be encountered is that certain Army

contingency support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea movement

control personnel, and petroleum handlers) needed in the early days of a

MRC, would still be needed within the peace operation theater to facilitate

the disengagement and redeployment. As a result of our analysis

comparing the support capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC

with the contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia, we found

that in some cases 100 percent of some of these active component support

forces were used in the Somalia peace operation. Had a MRC arisen during

this time, immediate access to reserve component forces would have been

necessary. According to DOD officials, the Army has recognized this as a

challenge and is currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army

Analysis 2003, which it expects to complete in mid-1995.1

According to Navy officials, the response of Navy ships to a MRC would

depend more on their overall distance to the crisis location than on the

operations they were currently conducting. With some peace operations,

however, Navy ships may not be directed to disengage quickly and move

to a MRC. A senior Navy official noted, for example, that it took

approximately 7 months to resolve a crisis in Liberia in 1990-91 and until

that time the amphibious ready group was not directed to participate in

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Each service faces challenges with reconstituting its forces in terms of

training, equipment, and supplies in order to deploy directly to a MRC.

Army officials have expressed some concern that participating in peace

operations may degrade combat unit readiness for combat operations

because of the inability to practice certain individual and collective

wartime skills. In Somalia, for example, while the combat forces received

extensive experience in military operations conducted in an urban

environment, they were not able to practice collective training skills.

According to 10th Mountain Division officials, in some cases it took

approximately 3 to 6 months to bring these skills back to a level

acceptable for combat operations once they returned from Somalia. Army

officials also noted that while peace operations offered the opportunity to

practice and enhance logistic skills, logistics training provided in Somalia

1

This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the simulation of combat to generate

nondivisional support requirements, based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.

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did not substitute completely for the training that would result from a

prepared training exercise, such as those at the National Training Center.

In the latter, the support forces would work with combat forces as they

would in high-intensity combat operations. Marine Corps ground forces

had similar experiences in Somalia.

According to Air Force officials, peace operations tend to degrade the

overall combat readiness of Air Force flight crews that participate in these

operations on a sustained basis because they often restrict night and

low-level flight operations and do not provide experience in other combat

skills such as night intercept maneuvers. Similarly, naval aviators find that

they lose proficiency in some combat skills, such as air combat

maneuvering, through prolonged participation in peace operations. As

with the Air Force, naval aviators who participate in these operations on a

sustained basis are not as able to get to combat ranges where they can

practice their full breadth of combat capabilities.

The reconstitution of equipment used in peace operations may also hinder

a timely disengagement and redeployment to a MRC. The extensive use of

certain equipment, combined with the harsh environmental effects

encountered in certain peace operations, has required extensive

maintenance before the equipment can be used again. For example, upon

their return from Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division’s AH-60 helicopters

had to enter depot level maintenance as a result of the harsh desert

environment and the extensive use of these helicopters in Somalia.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD disagrees with our conclusion that participation in peace operations

could impede the timely response of U.S. forces to MRCs. It agrees that

there are only a small number of certain active support units that are likely

to be needed to conduct both peace operations and MRCs. However, it

believes that our resultant conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of

how U.S. forces would respond to a MRC. Our conclusions in this regard

focus on certain critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers,

specifically certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft. We

reached our conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities have

been used in peace operations and past conflicts and their planned use in

future conflicts. We agree that most combat forces would be readily

available to respond to a MRC.

In its comments DOD states that, on the basis of the recent response of U.S.

forces to the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S.

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forces were engaged in Haiti, it does not see any evidence that significant

support unit shortfalls exist. It further states that the participation of

certain Air Force aircraft in peace operations in that part of the world

facilitated the response to Iraqi movements. Since these events occurred

after we had completed our audit work, we were not in a position to

analyze them.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
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Conclusions and Recommendations

Participation in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations could impede

the ability of U.S. forces to rapidly respond to MRCs because of several

factors. First, certain critical support forces needed in the early days of a

major regional conflict would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment

from the peace operation. Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted

to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation. Finally,

some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before

deploying to another major operation.

Forces with capabilities that exist in limited numbers in the active Army

and would be needed in the early stages of a MRC have been used

repeatedly in peace operations. Similar-type units that are not engaged in

peace operations may not be able to respond quickly or effectively to MRCs

because they are assigned fewer people than authorized and they may

have loaned some people to the units engaged in the peace operations,

which exacerbates an already difficult situation.

Specialized aircraft that exist in limited numbers in the active force

structure and their crews are also being used more frequently in peace

operations. The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized

aircraft in the early days of a MRC.

Some forces in each service are missing training and exercises that affect

their overall combat readiness and their ability to redeploy directly to a

MRC. Numerous waivers have been issued for aircrews that have not been

able to complete required training due to the demands of peace

operations. Naval forces involved in peace operations are spending almost

all their time at sea conducting operations and so have been unable to

participate in some exercises and training.

Peace operations are also likely to have a long-term impact on the people

who participate in them although it is difficult to quantify that impact. In

1994 personnel for specialized aircraft have approached the Air Force’s

recommended maximum number of temporary duty days away from home

station in a year—120. In the case of the F-4Gs, squadron personnel are

likely to exceed the recommended maximum by 50 percent. There are

reports that increased temporary duty days for Air Force personnel are

affecting their morale and their families and that it is contributing to

increased instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force. Naval

personnel, unable to perform as much maintenance, training, and

operational inspections while at sea, are working longer hours in port and

have less time for their families prior to a major deployment.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

A June 1994 Defense Science Board Report on Readiness notes that the

amount of time individuals are away from home has been affected by,

among other things, the rapid force drawdown and a higher level of

contingency operations. This has increased deployment frequency and

placed new strains on personnel. The report further notes that family

separation has always been a major, if not the number one, retention

variable.

Options for Easing the

Strain of Peace

Operations

There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of

participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations on

military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs.

These options have their own advantages and disadvantages and will

require choices on the use of the nation’s resources. Although no one

option addresses all the problems we have identified, a combination of

these options could substantially ease the problems. While there are costs

associated with some of these options, we have not examined their

magnitude and how DOD might fund them. DOD is currently examining a

range of such options.

Change the Mix of Army

Combat and Support

Forces

One option involves increasing the availability of support forces for peace

operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces on

active duty. At present, the Army has placed many support functions in the

reserve component. For example, many units that open and operate ports

overseas are in the reserve component. This capability was placed in the

reserve component during the Cold War, and DOD expected that when

forces were needed in wartime it would be able to quickly access and

deploy these reserve forces. However, many of these forces that are in the

active component have been required in peace operations because the

Army has not been authorized to involuntarily access reserve units in most

peace operations. While the Army maintains limited numbers of certain

types of support capability on active duty, it maintains substantial combat

capability in the active component. More support forces could be made

available for peace operations if the Army maintained fewer combat forces

and redirected those resources to maintaining more support forces.

According to Army officials, this is one of the issues that is being

examined as part of the Total Army Analysis, which should be completed

by mid-1995.

Alternatively, DOD may be able to increase the number of combat and

combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat

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Conclusions and Recommendations

forces by making more use of civilian employees. We recently reported

that the services use thousands of military personnel in support functions,

such as personnel management and data processing, that are typically

performed by civilian personnel and do not require skills gained from

military experience.1

 We further reported that replacing these military

personnel with civilian employees would reduce peacetime personnel

costs and could release military members for use in more combat-specific

duties.

Make Greater Use of the

Reserves

Making greater use of the reserves would ease the burden on Army active

support forces and Air Force airlift and combat forces. Authority to call up

the reserves rests with the President. There are three provisions of Title 10

of the U.S. Code that provide access to large numbers of reservists, one of

which is section 673b—Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). This

section provides access to 200,000 members in the Selected Reserve for up

to 270 days and would only require the President to notify Congress that

he was making the call-up.

DOD policy guidance regarding the use of reserves for peace operations

requires that maximum consideration be given to the use of volunteers

before involuntary activation is ordered. The President called up

approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military

intervention in Haiti. Prior to that call-up, PSRC had been invoked only once

(for the Gulf War) since its 1976 enactment. The reserves were not

activated for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, or

Somalia in 1992. According to senior Army officials, a request went from

the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for involuntary access to reserves for

Somalia. The request ultimately was never presented to the President. An

April 1994 DOD report on accessibility of reserve forces notes that using

PSRC authority would raise sensitive domestic and foreign policy concerns

that require time to resolve before the President could be expected to

decide on when large numbers of reservists should be ordered to active

duty.

Prior to the Haiti intervention, DOD had stated in its April 1994 report on

accessibility of reserve forces that the decision to not invoke PSRC in

Grenada, Panama, and Somalia supported the perception that PSRC has

evolved into a de facto mobilization authority.

1

DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant

Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
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Conclusions and Recommendations

As DOD’s report on the reserves notes, gaining involuntary access to

reserve personnel for any mission is a sensitive matter. A reserve call-up

has the potential to disrupt the lives of reservists, their families, and their

employers or customers. According to DOD, the assumption of many

reservists is that reservists would be called up for service only when vital

interests of the United States are threatened. This is based on Cold War

experiences and certain post-Cold War contingencies such as Desert

Storm. U.S. Army Reserve Command officials advised us of their concern

that involuntary use of the reserves for peace operations would be

disruptive to reservists’ lives and ultimately could affect the willingness of

Americans to join the reserves.

The Office of Reserve Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, is examining the limits and impediments to volunteerism and

how to expand their use. That office has identified several impediments,

including statutory requirements involving the lack of some benefits for

reservists on duty for less than 31 days, the lack of employer support, and

the lack of funds to pay the costs of reservists on active duty, which

currently is not included in the annual defense budget, that must be

eliminated if DOD is to rely on expanded use of volunteers. DOD reports that

it is addressing a wide range of proposals for mitigating these and other

impediments.

Make Greater Use of

Contractors

DOD could also use contractors to augment support forces. The Army is

already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the

support services typically provided by its combat service support

personnel. In Somalia, for example, the Army used the logistics civil

augmentation program, which uses a civilian contractor to provide

construction services and general logistic support. This reduced the Army

support requirement. The Army has also tasked this contractor with

developing a worldwide logistics civil augmentation plan and a specific

plan for a potential future deployment to Bosnia. The Bosnia plan

describes the military support the contractor personnel can provide and

the types of military units it can replace.

Use of the contractor entails additional costs that, in Somalia, were paid

first from the Marine Corps’ and then the Army’s operations and

maintenance budget. In addition, Army officials said that in Somalia, the

contractor needed to use Army equipment to perform its tasks, which

required taking equipment from Army units.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Use Worldwide Military

Assets

The use of worldwide military assets could ease the strain on military

forces. Peace operations had a number of negative impacts on USAFE

because USAFE followed its traditional practice of meeting operational

requirements with its own forces as much as possible. While USAFE’s two

F-15E squadrons and one A-10 squadron were heavily engaged in

supporting peace operations, there were several active-duty F-15E and

active-duty A-10 squadrons based in the United States that might have

been able to ease the strain if they could have taken turns rotating aircraft

and personnel to those operations. In commenting on a draft of this report,

DOD noted that the Air Force has recognized these challenges and is

addressing them by relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based

in the continental United States, which have deployed to Operations

Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational

burden.

Change Forward Presence

Goals

At present, one of the Navy’s principal missions is to maintain forward

presence around the world. Forward presence is also a key component of

national military strategy as described in the report on the bottom-up

review. However, the extent of forward presence necessary is a matter of

judgement for the Navy and the Joint Staff.

DOD could change the required level of forward presence to relieve the

strain on naval forces. This would require a significant military and

diplomatic policy decision. It could also result in reduced crisis response

capability and less opportunity to participate in multilateral exercises.

Accept the Status Quo The alternative to using defense resources differently is to accept the

status quo and so continue to treat peace operations as a secondary

mission. The risk of accepting the status quo is that it would continue the

strain on the military as a result of its participation in peace operations

and could adversely affect the military’s ability to respond to a MRC if one

should occur while military forces were engaged in a sizable peace

operation or several smaller ones.

Whether the risk is acceptable in part depends on the frequency with

which the United States engages in sizable peace operations and the

duration of these operations. Each operation is different in terms of size,

operating environment, and duration. For example, the operation in

Somalia required large numbers of ground forces in an austere

environment for over a year, while the Rwanda operation required smaller

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
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Conclusions and Recommendations

numbers of ground and airlift forces for several months. Estimates for a

potential Bosnia deployment call for even larger numbers of ground forces

in an austere environment for about 2 years. Other operations, such as

enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq and Bosnia, have required

aviation assets for an extended period but few ground forces.

Whether the risk is acceptable also depends on the extent to which the

services can mitigate the risks. For example, the services might be able to

use civilian contractor logistics support, or use some of the other options

we have identified. Ultimately, however, if policymakers believe that the

likelihood of U.S. involvement in large scale, extended duration operations

is low, the risk may be much more acceptable than if they believe that the

likelihood is high.

Recommendation Concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget, Congress

directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s

budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. DOD

is to review peace operations and report in detail on the force structure

required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously while responding

to other ongoing or potential operations. Consequently, we are not making

recommendations regarding reassessing the impact of participation in

peace operations in this report.

We recently reported on the bottom-up review’s assumptions concerning

the broader force structure issues, including the redeployment of forces

from other operations to MRCs, the availability of strategic mobility, and

the deployability of reserve combat forces.2

On another matter, however, we believe that because of the Army’s

significantly reduced size the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20 percent

below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. Consequently, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army,

as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to reexamine whether high

priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should still be

staffed at less than 100 percent of their authorized strength.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD states that it is addressing the matter we raise in our recommendation

as part of Total Army Analysis 2003. If the Army fully assesses the issue of

2

Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
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Conclusions and Recommendations

staffing high priority support units as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003,

we believe that the intent of our recommendation would be met.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2 and 12-14.

See comment 2.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 17-21.

See comment 3.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 21-23.

See comment 4.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 23-24.

See comment 5.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-5 and

24-25.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 25-29.

See comment 6.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6 and

29-35.

Now on pp. 6 and 35-39.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-7 and

41-46.

See comment 7.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 11.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-7 and

46-48.

See comments 7

through 11.

See comment 12.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7-8 and

51-54.

See comment 13.

Now on pp. 54-55.

See comment 14.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8-9 and 55.

See comment 15.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s specific comments on the Department of Defense’s

(DOD) letter dated February 7, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. We make one recommendation in our report, regarding the need to

reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early in a

crisis should be manned at less than 100 percent of their authorized

strength. DOD’s response to that recommendation appears on the last page

of its written comments.

2. We agree that in recent years there has been a proliferation of terms

used to describe military operations other than war. We also agree that the

United States has participated in disaster relief and humanitarian relief

operations for many years and have revised our report to reflect this fact.

Regarding our revised definition of peace operations, we are using the

same definition used in the DOD Inspector General’s September 1994 report

entitled Specialized Military Training for Peace Operations. The peace

operations identified in table 1.1 of our report are included in the

Secretary of Defense’s January 1994 Annual Report to the President and

Congress except for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, which was

authorized after the date of the Secretary’s report.

3. DOD disagrees with our conclusions regarding the extent that peace

operations may have stressed military capabilities. DOD specifically focuses

its comments on our discussion of how peace operations have stressed

specialized aircraft, noting that there were other aircraft in addition to the

aircraft we enumerate as available. Our report states that the aircraft cited

in table 2.3 were the average number of aircraft available for mission ready

training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994 and that the number

excluded test aircraft and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or

intermediate phase maintenance. The aircraft we list were the ones

available for immediate use. We have revised our report to state that

forward deployment of U.S. forces, including aircraft, can enhance the

ability to respond to regional conflicts.

4. Our discussion focuses on support forces that participated in peace and

domestic relief operations, not installation support. We have revised our

report to clarify the impact of cross-leveling and frequent deployments on

the ability of a unit’s non-deployed elements to meet their operational

responsibilities.

5. We have clarified our discussion of the Army’s use of reserve volunteers.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

6. As discussed in comment 2, the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report

characterizes the operations identified by DOD in this comment as U.S.

forces acting in support of U.N. peace operations. We have revised our

report to exclude the E-3 AWACS aircraft used in the drug interdiction

program from our count of such aircraft used in peace operations. While

we agree that participating in peace operations provides aircrews valuable

practical experience, as we discuss in chapter 2, aircrews flying extended

hours in these operations sometimes do not get the opportunity to train to

the broad range of skills necessary for maintaining combat efficiency.

7. DOD does not believe that the use of significant percentages of types of

support units in Somalia represents the existence of a shortfall in

capabilities. DOD states that substitute units or capabilities are available in

almost all cases and that recent contingency operations, specifically the

initial deployment of U.S. forces to deter potential Iraqi aggression against

Kuwait while U.S. forces were involved in Haiti, verify the correctness of

U.S. force posture. Our report discusses the use of a large proportion of

certain types of support forces in Somalia that are designated for early

deployment to a MRC because there is a limited number of such forces in

the active component. As DOD points out, there are options available for

some support missions, such as the use of contractors. However, these

options may not be immediately available. We discuss several alternatives

that would allow DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while

maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. Until DOD takes steps

to ease the strain on active duty forces it will have to initially rely on active

duty units to rapidly respond to a MRC.

8. Our discussion focuses on the early availability of certain Army support

forces, Air Force specialized aircraft, and Army and Marine Corps afloat

prepositioned equipment. We agree that infantry units engaged in peace

operations are likely to have adequate time to redeploy to a MRC.

9. The changes in end strength have decreased the Army’s flexibility to

provide more support units in areas of need. The 13,000 person decrement

represents a net decrease in end strength for the active component and the

U.S. Army Reserve—those components that provide most of the Army’s

support units—and an increase in the Army National Guard’s end strength.

Within its increased end strength, the National Guard is retaining more

combat positions than it retained under the base force. Because of the

decreases in end strength in the active and U.S. Army reserve components

and the fact that the increased National Guard end strength is being used

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Comments From the Department of Defense

to retain combat positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing more

support units within its end strength.

10. We state that aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation

to another and have revised the report to state that forward deployment of

U.S. forces, including aircraft, can enhance the ability to respond to

regional conflicts. Regarding redeploying maintenance and logistics units

from a peace operation to a MRC, we state that the Air Force has not yet

fully studied the airlift implications of redeploying forces from a peace

operation to a MRC and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay

on the Air Force’s ability to meet MRC deployment requirements. We agree

that redeploying forces from one operation to another may not necessarily

increase lift requirements. However, until DOD examines the lift

requirements for such redeployments, we believe that the specific impact

is unknown.

11. We have revised the report to reflect this information.

12. As discussed in chapter 3, our analysis comparing the support

capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency

support capabilities deployed to Somalia indicated that in some cases

100 percent of some of these active component support forces were used

in Somalia.

13. We agree that feasibility, cost, and, impact of each option must be

considered. Chapter 4 discusses some of the difficulties that could be

associated with these options and recognizes that there are costs

associated with them.

14. We are not making a blanket statement about the adequacy of current

force structure to respond to a MRC while U.S. military forces are engaged

in a sizable peace operation or several smaller ones. Our report identifies

certain limited capabilities that could affect a timely response to a MRC and

states that peace operations have had less impact on other forces, such as

Army armored combat divisions and general purpose combat aircraft

outside Europe. As DOD notes, U.S. forces quickly responded to the

possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S. forces were

engaged in Haiti. Since these events occurred after we had completed our

audit work, we were not in a position to analyze them.

15. DOD partially agrees with our recommendation, but it states that it is

addressing the matter we raise as part of Total Army Analysis 2003. We

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

believe that if this action is completed, it would meet the intent of our

recommendation and we have revised our recommendation to reflect this.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

Steven H. Sternlieb, Assistant Director

M. Elizabeth Guran, Evaluator-in-Charge

Brenton E. Kidd, Evaluator

Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Evaluator

Lisa M. Quinn, Evaluator

European Office,

Frankfurt, Germany

Inez M. Azcona, Senior Evaluator

David G. Artadi, Evaluator

(701017) Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-95-51 Peace Operations
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