IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph J. Holloway, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania State Horse Racing :

Commission, : No. 817 C.D. 2023

Respondent : Argued: December 4, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: January 9, 2024

Joseph J. Holloway (Holloway) filed a petition for review (Petition) of 

the July 27, 2023 Adjudication and Order (Order) of the Pennsylvania State Horse 

Racing Commission (Commission).1 The Commission affirmed the decision of the 

Meadows Board of Judges (Meadows Judges) suspending Holloway’s horse training

license after a horse under his care tested above the violation threshold for 

testosterone.2 Upon review, we affirm the Commission’s Order. 

1 The Commission’s Order was dated July 25, 2023, signed July 26, 2023, and mailed July 

27, 2023. 

2 Holloway previously filed a motion for stay of the suspension pending the outcome of 

the Petition, along with expedited review, both of which this Court granted.
2

I. Background

Holloway holds a horse trainer’s license from the Commission. 

Reproduced Record (RR) at 543a.

3

 On June 26, 2021, Perfect Sting, a standardbred 

horse trained by Holloway, placed second in a race at Meadows Racing in 

Washington, Pennsylvania; through later disqualification of the winner, Perfect 

Sting ultimately placed first. Id. After the race, the Commission collected blood 

and urine samples from Perfect Sting and tested them for various substances. Id. 

The Commission’s testing lab found testosterone in a sample of Perfect Sting’s blood 

at a concentration of 3,765 picograms per milliliter (pg/ml) +/- 141.6 pg/ml, and a 

follow-up test by an independent lab found testosterone at 3,635 pg/ml +/- 14 pg/ml. 

Id. at 544a. Testosterone occurs naturally in horses, but the concentrations found 

exceeded the violation threshold testosterone level set by Commission policy for 

horses participating in races.4 Id. 

In a December 29, 2021 ruling (Ruling), the Meadows Judges 

concluded that Holloway violated the Commission’s regulations due to the 

testosterone levels found in Perfect Sting. RR at 544a-45a. The Ruling imposed a 

$500 fine, disqualified Perfect Sting as winner, ordered the $74,166 winner’s purse 

redistributed, and imposed a 15-day suspension of Holloway’s trainer’s license. 

Pet., Ex. A at C-12. 

3 The pages in the Reproduced Record are improperly numbered using a capital “A” (1A, 

2A, etc.). Citations herein to the Reproduced Record use a small “a” as mandated by Rule 2173

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 2173.

4 The Commission apparently set the testosterone violation threshold via a policy statement 

effective October 1, 2008. See Pet., Ex. H at C-23.
3

Holloway timely appealed the Meadows Judges’ Ruling to the 

Commission on January 3, 2022.5 RR at 545a. Holloway argued that the Ruling 

was arbitrary and capricious, asserting that testosterone is natural in horses and the 

violation threshold set by the Commission is without a scientific basis. Pet., Ex. A 

at C-14. The Commission held a hearing over two days, at which the Commission 

and Holloway, respectively, presented the testimony of two expert witnesses, Mary 

Robinson, VMD/Ph.D (Dr. Robinson) and Stephen Barker, DVM (Dr. Barker). 

The Commission’s expert, Dr. Robinson, described the process through 

which the Commission used statistics to determine a violation threshold for 

testosterone. See generally RR at 44a-60a. The Commission has set a violation 

threshold for testosterone of 2,000 pg/ml for intact male horses in standardbred 

racing, which the Commission based on multiple scientific studies. Id. at 549a. 

These studies and the violation threshold took into account the effects of seasonal 

variations and racing on testosterone levels. Id. at 550a-51a. Follow-up studies 

conducted after implementation of the violation threshold measured an “upper limit” 

of 1,546 pg/ml of testosterone in racing intact males. Id. at 552a. Tests from a 

laboratory in Pennsylvania of 17,780 samples, taken since 2010 from Pennsylvania 

racetracks, found only three samples, including that from Perfect Sting, that 

exceeded the violation threshold of 2,000 pg/ml. Id. at 554a. Dr. Robinson also 

testified that Perfect Sting had previously tested at 567 pg/ml and 443 pg/ml for 

testosterone in the summer months, when natural testosterone levels are expected to 

be elevated; notably, the 443 pg/ml level was revealed in a test performed just 41 

days before the tests that revealed the 3,765 pg/ml level. Id. at 553a-54a. The 

5 The Commission granted a stay pending appeal for the duration of the proceedings before 

it. See Pet., Ex. A at C-15. 
4

laboratory conducting the test of Perfect Sting did not specifically test to determine

whether the testosterone detected was exogenous or endogenous, as the applicable 

regulation does not make such a distinction. Id. at 555a. However, Dr. Robinson 

opined, and the Commission found as a fact, that Perfect Sting’s testosterone level 

was so high that it could not have occurred naturally. Id. 

Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Barker, testified critically concerning the 

Commission’s testosterone violation threshold, pointing out purported shortcomings 

in the scientific research supporting the violation threshold. See RR at 344a-69a & 

556a. He stated that some horses have natural testosterone levels at 4,000 or 5,000 

pg/ml, and opined that testosterone should not be regulated at all in intact male 

horses. Id. at 556a-57a.

Holloway also presented the testimony of Karl Nagle, DVM (Dr. 

Nagle), the veterinarian who treated Perfect Sting. Dr. Nagle testified that Perfect 

Sting was consistently very aggressive, high-strung, and frequently biting and 

kicking. RR at 556a. 

Holloway himself testified concerning his protection and supervision 

of Perfect Sting. Notably, he stated that he had installed security cameras and hired 

a security guard for those times when he was not physically present. RR at 81a. 

However, as the Commission observes, Holloway produced neither footage from a

security camera from the relevant time period nor the testimony of the security 

guard. Id.

Following the hearing and post-hearing briefing by the parties, the 

Commission affirmed the Meadows Judges’ Ruling. See RR at 569a. The 

Commission concluded the Commonwealth proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Holloway violated the Commission’s regulations, based on the 
5

elevated testosterone levels found. Id. at 510a; see also id. at 508a & 509a. The 

Commission found Dr. Robinson’s testimony “persuasive, credible, and trustworthy.” 

Id. at 563a. The Commission stated its view of the trainer responsibility regulations 

as “essentially making trainers strictly liable for things that happen under their 

watch,” such that no direct evidence of any wrongdoing by Holloway was necessary 

to find a violation. Id. at 564a. The Commission posited that “it is unrealistic to 

require direct evidence of wrongdoing” in horse drugging cases. Id. The 

Commission also responded to Holloway’s invocation of the evidentiary standard 

for expert testimony first announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.

1923),

6 by pointing out that it is an evidentiary standard, not a standard for evaluating 

regulations. Id. at 566a-67a.

The Commission rejected Holloway’s argument that the testosterone 

violation threshold is arbitrary and capricious, explaining that the violation threshold

was set based on a regulation and therefore “is not the province for adjudicatory 

revisit.” RR at 567a. The Commission relied predominantly on case law from other 

jurisdictions, but also cited Commonwealth v. Webb, 274 A.2d 261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1971), in which, notably, this Court rejected a substantial evidence challenge to a 

violation, explaining:

The foregoing study of the facts is not to say that the 

Commission reached its decision . . . by this exact 

interpretation of the facts or that this Court has interpreted 

the facts one way or the other. How we would have 

decided the matter is beside the point because our only 

function is to examine the facts to determine whether 

6 Under this evidentiary standard, which has been incorporated into the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Evidence, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . . (c) the expert’s methodology 

is generally accepted in the relevant field.” Pa. R.E. 702(c). 
6

sufficient evidence exists on which the Commission could 

have based its decision.

Id. (quoting Webb, 274 A.2d at 272) (additional quotation marks omitted).

Counsel for the Commission informed Holloway that his suspension 

would begin August 2, 2023, and that his request to the Commission for a stay 

pending adjudication of the Petition had been denied. Pet., Ex. Q. Holloway timely 

filed the Petition with this Court, along with an Application for Stay and Motion for 

Expedited Decision, which this Court granted in a previous order. 

In our opinion in support of the stay order, this Court observed that 

Holloway had not raised before the Commission his due process argument 

concerning improper notice via the charging instruments. That observation was 

supported by the Commission’s quotation of a stipulation below that the only issues

to be decided were whether the Meadows Judges’ ruling “was proper under the 

Commission’s medication/drug regulations and whether the violation threshold for 

testosterone established by the Commission is based on sound science.” RR at 561a 

(quoting from the parties’ stipulation). Therefore, we concluded that Holloway 

waived the due process issue by failing to raise it below. See MEC Pa. Racing, Inc.

v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 827 A.2d 580, 592 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), as 

amended (July 15, 2003).

However, we also determined that Holloway raised novel legal 

questions regarding the Commission’s testosterone violation threshold. We are not 

aware of prior decisions by any court considering whether the Commission’s 

testosterone violation threshold policy or the trainer responsibility regulations at 

issue are arbitrary and/or capricious. The regulations at issue here became effective 

October 19, 2019, see 49 PA.B. 6221 (2019), and have not yet been the subject of 

any judicial decisions concerning the proper standard of proof, or the standard of 
7

review, when the Commission proceeds under these regulations. Thus, we 

concluded that the Petition presents novel and substantial questions of law as to the 

sufficiency of the evidence before the Commission and the validity of the 

Commission’s regulations and testosterone violation threshold policy sufficient to 

justify a stay of Holloway’s suspension pending the disposition of the Petition.

II. Issues7

Holloway presents two legal theories for this Court’s review. First, he

posits that the Commission’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence of 

either the presence of exogenous testosterone or the scientific viability of the chosen 

regulatory violation threshold testosterone level.8 With respect to the presence of 

exogenous testosterone in Perfect Sting, Holloway maintains that the record contains 

no evidence of anyone having administered synthetic testosterone to Perfect Sting;

nor does the record of the test results contain any evidence of the presence of any 

exogenous testosterone in Perfect Sting. 

Second, with respect to the propriety of the violation threshold 

generally, Holloway contends that the scientific community has not set a widely 

7

“This Court’s scope of review of an adjudication of the Commission is limited to a 

determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, whether findings of fact are supported 

by substantial evidence of record, or whether an error of law has been committed.” Vaders v. Pa. 

State Horse Racing Comm’n, 964 A.2d 56, 58 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (quoting Monaci v. State 

Horse Racing Comm’n, 717 A.2d 612, 616 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (additional quotation marks 

omitted)). We review de novo any legal questions raised. SugarHouse HSP Gaming, LP v. Pa.

Gaming Control Bd., 136 A.3d 457, 476 (Pa. 2016).

8

“Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Cashdollar v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 600 A.2d 646, 650 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1991) (citing McKenna v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 476 A.2d 505 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1984)).
8

accepted level of testosterone that is considered normal in horses. Holloway further 

suggests the regulatory threshold is improper because it inexplicably regulates 

standardbred horses, such as Perfect Sting, but not thoroughbreds. Thus, Holloway 

asserts that the violation threshold has not been set using generally accepted 

scientific principles sufficient to constitute competent expert evidence, without 

which Holloway insists the record is insufficient to support the legal validity of the 

violation threshold. 

In a related argument, Holloway asserts that the Commission’s decision

is arbitrary and capricious because it rests upon standards and theories that are 

rejected by the scientific community and most other jurisdictions, defy logic and 

common sense, and are inconsistent with the regulations the Commission itself 

applies to thoroughbred horses. Holloway also challenges the propriety of deeming 

a set violation threshold as automatically constituting substantial evidence that a 

horse has been administered or exposed to exogenous testosterone, where 

endogenous testosterone levels vary daily and there is no evidence of the presence 

of anything but endogenous testosterone. Thus, Holloway argues that the 

Commission’s decision misapplied the law as well as being arbitrary and capricious 

and, accordingly, was manifestly unreasonable and constituted an abuse of 

discretion.

III. Discussion

Holloway’s violations as found by the Commission related to trainer 

responsibilities, a prohibition on drugs, and conduct detrimental to the sport. 

Section 203.22 of the regulations addresses trainer liability and 

provides: 
9

(a) The trainer is responsible for the condition of the horse 

entered in an official workout or race and is charged with 

the responsibility to guard and protect the horse at all times 

regardless of the trainer’s location. The trainer shall be 

responsible for the presence of any prohibited drug, 

medication, agent or other substance, including permitted 

medications in excess of the maximum allowable level, 

in the horses. A positive test for a prohibited drug, 

medication or substance, including permitted medication 

in excess of the maximum allowable level, as reported by 

the Commission’s testing laboratory, is prima facie

evidence of a violation of this rule. In the absence of 

substantial evidence to the contrary, the trainer shall be 

responsible.

(b) A trainer shall prevent the administration, attempted 

administration or passive contamination by others, 

including the trainers’ [sic] employees and assistants who 

have care, custody and control of the horse from any drug, 

medication or other prohibited substance that may cause a 

violation of these rules.

(c) A trainer shall immediately report to the Judges and 

the Commission Veterinarian if the trainer knows, or has 

cause to believe, that a horse in the trainer’s care, custody 

or control has received any prohibited drugs or medications.

7 Pa. Code § 203.22. 

Section 401.2(a) of the regulations, regarding prohibited substances, 

states in pertinent part:

(1) A horse participating in a race may not carry in its 

body a prohibited drug, medication, chemical, substance 

or any other substance foreign to the untreated horse, 

except as otherwise provided.

. . . . 

(3) In addition to the Commission approved Prohibited 

Substances List and the provisions of Chapter 403 

(relating to equine veterinary practices—temporary 

regulations), the term prohibited substance shall include:

. . . . 
10

 (iii) Substances present in the horse in excess of 

concentrations at which the substances could occur 

naturally[.]

7 Pa. Code § 401.2(a).

Sections 401.41, 205.33, and 205.501(14) of the regulations address 

procedure and sanctions for violations. Section 401.41 directs the Commission to 

investigate the results of a positive test for a prohibited substance and authorizes 

boards of judges (in this case, the Meadows Judges) to conduct a hearing on whether 

a violation of the regulations has occurred, make findings, consider mitigating and 

aggravating factors, and impose penalties on a trainer for violations found. 7 Pa. 

Code § 401.41. Subsection (g) specifically authorizes redistribution of a winner’s 

purse in the case of a positive test of a race-winning horse. Id. § 401.41(g). Section 

205.33 further authorizes boards of judges “to charge any licensee for a violation of 

these [regulations],” and, if a violation or attempted violation is found, specifically 

authorizes, inter alia, fines and license suspension. 7 Pa. Code § 205.33(a), (b). 

Section 205.501 sets forth several specific grounds for which any licensee may be 

suspended and fined, including for “[a]ny other act or conduct detrimental to the 

sport or reflects negatively on the sport.” 7 Pa. Code § 205.501(14).

A. Substantial Evidence that Holloway Failed to Protect Perfect Sting

Holloway first suggests that the Commission improperly imposed strict 

liability rather than requiring substantial evidence of exogenous testosterone in 

Perfect Sting and of his responsibility for the presence of that substance. We 

disagree. 

The pertinent regulation does not impose strict liability; rather, it 

allocates the burdens of proof. As quoted above, it provides that “[a] positive test 
11

for a prohibited drug, medication or substance . . . is prima facie evidence of a 

violation . . . ” and that, “[i]n the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, 

the trainer shall be responsible.” 7 Pa. Code § 203.22(a); see also Brown v. Pa. State 

Horse Racing Comm’n, 499 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).

In Webb, this Court considered whether the Commission had imposed 

strict liability in applying the violation threshold. We observed:

The [] Commission, discreetly speaking, concluded that 

[the trainer] failed “to protect and guard” his horse and 

then cited [former analogous rules] to state the more 

embarrassing particulars that a violation involving 

medicines or drugs had been committed. The Commission 

did not substitute for evidence of guilt a mere fiat (that the 

administering of a drug to a horse entered in a race is 

chargeable to the owner or trainer without regard to his 

knowledge of the fact or ability to prevent it), but instead 

conducted a formal proceeding upon notice with adversary 

parties, with issues on which evidence was adduced by 

both parties, and with ample opportunity for each party to 

be heard.

274 A.2d at 272. 

Likewise, here, although the Commission used language suggesting 

strict liability, it actually considered the evidence presented and made findings and 

conclusions applying that evidence, as discussed above. It is true that the record 

contains no direct evidence proving that Holloway or one of his employees or agents

injected Perfect Sting with testosterone. However, the Commission made findings 

of fact demonstrating test results of testosterone levels exceeding the regulatory 

threshold for a violation. Those findings established a prima facie case under 7 Pa. 

Code § 203.22(a), thus giving rise to a presumption of Holloway’s liability under 

Brown. The burden then shifted to Holloway to rebut that presumption by evidence 

sufficient to demonstrate that he had satisfied his duty to protect Perfect Sting. When 
12

asked whether there were eyes on Perfect Sting “24/7,” Holloway responded, “As 

close as possible.” RR at 81a. As set forth above, Holloway testified that he had

security cameras and a security guard at his barn. Id. Notably, however, he did not 

present either camera footage or the security guard’s testimony in evidence. Id. He 

did not even suggest that anyone checked the security camera video, either regarding 

the day in question or in general. See id.

In Brown, this Court rejected a trainer’s challenge to the Commission’s 

finding of a violation based on failure to protect his horse from administration of a 

prohibited drug. 499 A.2d at 1134. There, the trainer’s testimony that he hired a 

night watchman for the horse was insufficient to rebut the regulatory presumption 

of liability, as the horse was not supervised 24 hours a day. See id.

Here, the Commission was not required to credit Holloway’s testimony 

as sufficient proof of 24-hour-a-day supervision of Perfect Sting, particularly in light 

of his failure to produce either security video or the testimony of the security guard. 

Under this Court’s reasoning in Brown, the Commission was within its discretion in 

finding that Holloway failed to sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that he had provided adequate protection of Perfect Sting. See RR at 

568a.

B. Sufficiency of the Process Setting the Violation Threshold

Holloway insists that the Commission’s determination of the maximum 

testosterone level recognized as naturally occurring in standardbred horses was 

faulty and is out of date. However, both expert witnesses testified at length on this 

subject at the hearing before the Commission, and there were a number of supporting 

exhibits. See generally RR at 27a-325a & 333a-491a. The Commission’s expert, 
13

Dr. Robinson, testified regarding the extensive scientific studies that were performed 

before setting the violation threshold. RR at 44a-60a. The studies were specific to 

Pennsylvania and considered a number of variables, including the time of year, type 

of horse, breeding status of the horse, and geographic location. See id. at 276a-94a. 

There was also evidence that standardbred horses generally have lower testosterone 

levels than thoroughbreds and that of 17,780 standardbreds tested since 2010, only 

3, including Perfect Sting, have had testosterone levels exceeding the threshold. Id.

at 554a. 

Holloway strenuously disputes the validity of the studies and Dr. 

Robinson’s related expert opinion. However, the Commission is the finder of fact 

and the arbiter of witness credibility; “[t]his Court’s limited scope of review on 

issues such as this . . . includes neither making findings of fact nor resolving 

credibility issues.” McKenna v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 476 A.2d 505, 

507 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). The evidence supporting the regulatory threshold was not 

only substantial, but extensive, as discussed above. The Commission obviously

found that evidence credible. See, e.g., RR at 510a (concluding that “[t]he 

preponderance of the evidence supports that the threshold in this matter is supported

by credible, accepted scientific methods”). Notwithstanding the vehemence of 

Holloway’s arguments, the Commission’s findings concerning the competing expert 

evidence constituted determinations of fact and credibility, which this Court may not 

reexamine on review. See McKenna, 476 A.2d at 507.

We also reject Holloway’s Frye challenge. Frye relates to a rule 

concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. However, it is not applicable here. 

As this Court has explained, “[t]he Frye test is employed by courts to ensure that 

novel scientific evidence has obtained acceptance in the scientific community . . . . 
14

However, ‘a Frye analysis is not triggered every time science enters the courtroom; 

it only applies when an expert seeks to introduce novel scientific evidence.’” Worley 

v. Cnty. of Del., 178 A.3d 213, 236 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Dengler, 843 A.2d 1241, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Here, there is no suggestion 

that Dr. Robinson sought to introduce novel scientific evidence. That Holloway and 

his expert dispute Dr. Robinson’s conclusions provides no basis to apply a Frye

analysis. See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 276 (Pa. 2008) (explaining 

that “Frye does not operate to bar disputed conclusions of an expert, so long as the 

methodology employed is not novel”).

Further, Holloway concedes that, under Frye, although an expert’s 

methodologies must be generally accepted in the scientific community, the 

conclusions reached from the application of those methodologies need not also be 

generally accepted. See Walsh v. BASF Corp., 234 A.3d 446, 456 (Pa. 2020) (citing 

Trach v. Fellin, 817 A.2d 1102, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc)).

Moreover, Holloway did not object to the methodology of the 

Commission’s expert, Dr. Robinson, under the Frye standard at the hearing.9 Cf. RR 

at 53a (objecting to Dr. Robinson’s testimony concerning certain documents solely 

because Holloway’s expert had not seen them previously), 59a (objecting to the form 

of certain testimony as lacking foundation) & 60a (objecting to the form of questions 

as unclear). Therefore, any such objection is waived. See Cashdollar v. State Horse 

9 Notably, Holloway’s counsel expressly had no objection at the hearing to Dr. Robinson’s 

admission “as an expert and qualified to render an opinion in the field of drug testing, detection, 

screening and quantification of the presence of chemicals in race horses, veterinary medical 

science and the pharmacological effects of drugs in race horses, including pharmacokinetics.” RR 

at 44a.
15

Racing Comm’n, 600 A.2d 646, 649-50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (citing Man O’War 

Racing Ass’n v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 250 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1969)).

Finally, we reject Holloway’s suggestion that the absence of a parallel 

Commission regulation limiting testosterone levels in thoroughbreds somehow 

invalidates the existence of a limit regarding standardbreds. As the Commission 

observes, the Commission has separate bureaus regulating thoroughbreds and 

standardbreds, each with separate regulations. Compare 7 Pa. Code Subpart D, 

Chapters 201- 205 (governing Standardbred Racing), with 7 Pa. Code Subpart E, 

Chapters 301- 307 (governing Thoroughbred Racing). Indeed, the record contains 

evidence that there are statistically significant differences between average 

testosterone levels in the two breeds. RR at 53a. We agree with the Commission 

that one bureau’s regulations are not arbitrary and capricious merely because they 

are not identical to those of the other bureau.

For all of these reasons, we reject Holloway’s argument that the 

Commission’s regulation limiting testosterone levels in standardbred horses is 

arbitrary and capricious.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, the Commission’s Order is 

affirmed.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph J. Holloway, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania State Horse Racing :

Commission, : No. 817 C.D. 2023

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of January, 2024, the July 27, 2023 Order of 

the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge