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[House Report 107-530]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-530

======================================================================

 
                 NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM ACT

                                _______
                                

 June 25, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

  Mr. Boehlert, from the Committee on Science, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 4687]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on Science, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 
4687) to provide for the establishment of investigative teams 
to assess building performance and emergency response and 
evacuation procedures in the wake of any building failure that 
has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed 
significant potential of substantial loss of life, having 
considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment 
and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
   I. Amendment.......................................................1
  II. Purpose of the Bill.............................................5
 III. Background and Need for the Legislation.........................6
  IV. Summary of Hearings.............................................9
   V. Committee Actions..............................................14
  VI. Summary of Major Provisions of the Bill........................14
 VII. Section-by-Section Analysis (By Title and Section).............15
VIII. Committee Views................................................18
  IX. Cost Estimate..................................................22
   X. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate......................23
  XI. Compliance With Public Law 104-4 (Unfunded Mandates)...........25
 XII. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations...............25
XIII. Statement on General Performance Goals and Objectives..........25
 XIV. Constitutional Authority Statement.............................25
  XV. Federal Advisory Committee Statement...........................26
 XVI. Congressional Accountability Act...............................26
XVII. Statement on Preemption of State, Local, or Tribal Law.........26
XVIII.Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported..........26

 XIX. Committee Recommendations......................................26
  XX. Administration Letter on H.R. 4687.............................27

                              I. Amendment

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``National Construction Safety Team 
Act''.

SEC. 2. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAMS.

  (a) Establishment.--The Director of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (in this Act referred to as the ``Director'') 
is authorized to establish National Construction Safety Teams for 
deployment after events causing the failure of a building or buildings 
that has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed significant 
potential for substantial loss of life. To the maximum extent 
practicable, the Director shall establish and deploy a Team within 48 
hours after such an event. The Director shall promptly publish in the 
Federal Register notice of the establishment of each National 
Construction Safety Team.
  (b) Procedures.--
          (1) Development.--Not later than 3 months after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director, in consultation with 
        the United States Fire Administration and other appropriate 
        Federal agencies, shall develop procedures for the 
        establishment and deployment of National Construction Safety 
        Teams. The Director shall update such procedures as 
        appropriate. Such procedures shall include provisions--
                  (A) regarding conflicts of interest related to 
                service on the Team;
                  (B) defining the circumstances under which the 
                Director will establish and deploy a National 
                Construction Safety Team;
                  (C) prescribing the appropriate size of National 
                Construction Safety Teams;
                  (D) guiding the disclosure of information under 
                section 8;
                  (E) guiding the conduct of investigations under this 
                Act;
                  (F) identifying and prescribing appropriate 
                conditions for the provision by the Director of 
                additional resources and services National Construction 
                Safety Teams may need;
                  (G) to ensure that investigations under this Act do 
                not impede and are coordinated with any search and 
                rescue efforts being undertaken at the site of the 
                building failure;
                  (H) for regular briefings of the public on the status 
                of the investigative proceedings and findings;
                  (I) guiding the National Construction Safety Teams in 
                moving and preserving evidence as described in section 
                5(a)(4), (b)(2), and (d)(4);
                  (J) providing for coordination with Federal, State, 
                and local entities that may sponsor research or 
                investigations of building failures, including research 
                conducted under the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 
                1977; and
                  (K) regarding such other issues as the Director 
                considers appropriate.
          (2) Publication.--The Director shall publish promptly in the 
        Federal Register final procedures, and subsequent updates 
        thereof, developed under paragraph (1).

SEC. 3. COMPOSITION OF TEAMS.

  National Construction Safety Teams shall be led by an individual 
named by the Director. National Construction Safety Team members shall 
include at least 1 employee of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology and shall include other experts who are not employees of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, who may include private 
sector experts, university experts, representatives of professional 
organizations with appropriate expertise, and appropriate Federal, 
State, or local officials.

SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS OF TEAMS.

  National Construction Safety Teams shall--
          (1) conduct investigations to establish the likely technical 
        cause or causes of the building failure;
          (2) evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and 
        emergency response procedures;
          (3) recommend specific improvements to building standards, 
        codes, and practices based on the findings made pursuant to 
        paragraphs (1) and (2); and
          (4) recommend research and other appropriate actions needed 
        to improve the structural safety of buildings, and improve 
        evacuation and emergency response procedures, based on the 
        findings of the investigation.

SEC. 5. AUTHORITIES.

  (a) Entry and Inspection.--In investigating a building failure under 
this Act, members of a National Construction Safety Team, and any other 
person authorized by the Director to support a National Construction 
Safety Team, on display of appropriate credentials provided by the 
Director, may--
          (1) enter property where a building failure being 
        investigated has occurred, or where building components, 
        materials, and artifacts with respect to the building failure 
        are located, and do anything necessary to conduct the 
        investigation;
          (2) inspect any record (including any design, construction, 
        or maintenance record), process, or facility related to the 
        investigation;
          (3) inspect and test any building components, materials, and 
        artifacts related to the building failure; and
          (4) move such records, components, materials, and artifacts 
        as provided by the procedures developed under section 2(b)(1).
  (b) Avoiding Unnecessary Interference and Preserving Evidence.--An 
inspection, test, or other action taken by a National Construction 
Safety Team under this section shall be conducted in a way that--
          (1) does not interfere unnecessarily with services provided 
        by the owner or operator of the building components, materials, 
        or artifacts, property, records, process, or facility; and
          (2) to the maximum extent feasible, preserves evidence 
        related to the building failure, consistent with the ongoing 
        needs of the investigation.
  (c) Coordination.--
          (1) With search and rescue efforts.--A National Construction 
        Safety Team shall not impede, and shall coordinate its 
        investigation with, any search and rescue efforts being 
        undertaken at the site of the building failure.
          (2) With other research.--A National Construction Safety Team 
        shall coordinate its investigation, to the extent practicable, 
        with qualified researchers who are conducting engineering or 
        scientific (including social science) research relating to the 
        building failure.
          (3) Memoranda of understanding.--The National Institute of 
        Standards and Technology shall enter into a memorandum of 
        understanding with each Federal agency that may conduct or 
        sponsor a related investigation, providing for coordination of 
        investigations.
  (d) Interagency Priorities.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), 
        a National Construction Safety Team investigation shall have 
        priority over any other investigation of any other Federal 
        agency.
          (2) National transportation safety board.--If the National 
        Transportation Safety Board is conducting an investigation 
        related to an investigation of a National Construction Safety 
        Team, the National Transportation Safety Board investigation 
        shall have priority over the National Construction Safety Team 
        investigation. Such priority shall not otherwise affect the 
        authority of the Team to continue its investigation under this 
        Act.
          (3) Criminal acts.--If the Attorney General, in consultation 
        with the Director, determines, and notifies the Director, that 
        circumstances reasonably indicate that the building failure 
        being investigated by a National Construction Safety Team may 
        have been caused by a criminal act with intent to cause the 
        building failure, the National Construction Safety Team shall 
        relinquish investigative priority to the appropriate Federal 
        law enforcement agency. The relinquishment of investigative 
        priority by the National Construction Safety Team shall not 
        otherwise affect the authority of the Team to continue its 
        investigation under this Act.
          (4) Preservation of evidence.--If a Federal law enforcement 
        agency suspects and notifies the Director that a building 
        failure being investigated by a National Construction Safety 
        Team under this Act may have been caused by a criminal act with 
        intent to cause the building failure, the National Construction 
        Safety Team, in consultation with the Federal law enforcement 
        agency, shall take necessary actions to ensure that evidence of 
        the criminal act is preserved.

SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS, HEARINGS, WITNESSES, AND SUBPOENAS.

  (a) General Authority.--The Director, on behalf of a National 
Construction Safety Team, may conduct hearings, administer oaths, and 
require, by subpoena and otherwise, necessary witnesses and evidence as 
necessary to carry out this Act.
  (b) Briefings.--National Construction Safety Teams shall hold regular 
public briefings on the status of investigative proceedings and 
findings.
  (c) Public Hearings.--During the course of an investigation by a 
National Construction Safety Team, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology may, if the Director considers it to be in the public 
interest, hold a public hearing for the purposes of--
          (1) gathering testimony from witnesses; and
          (2) informing the public on the progress of the 
        investigation.
  (d) Production of Witnesses.--A witness or evidence in an 
investigation under this Act may be summoned or required to be produced 
from any place in the United States. A witness summoned under this 
subsection is entitled to the same fee and mileage the witness would 
have been paid in a court of the United States.
  (e) Issuance of Subpoenas.--A subpoena shall be issued under the 
signature of the Director but may be served by any person designated by 
the Director.
  (f) Failure To Obey Subpoena.--If a person disobeys a subpoena issued 
by the Director or a National Construction Safety Team under this Act, 
the Director may bring a civil action in a district court of the United 
States to enforce the subpoena. An action under this subsection may be 
brought in the judicial district in which the person against whom the 
action is brought resides, is found, or does business. The court may 
punish a failure to obey an order of the court to comply with the 
subpoena as a contempt of court.

SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL POWERS.

  In order to support National Construction Safety Teams in carrying 
out this Act, the Director may--
          (1) procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts 
        or consultants under section 3109 of title 5, United States 
        Code;
          (2) request the use, when appropriate, of available services, 
        equipment, personnel, and facilities of a department, agency, 
        or instrumentality of the United States Government on a 
        reimbursable or other basis;
          (3) confer with employees and request the use of services, 
        records, and facilities of State and local governmental 
        authorities;
          (4) accept voluntary and uncompensated services;
          (5) accept and use gifts of money and other property;
          (6) make contracts with nonprofit entities to carry out 
        studies related to purpose, functions, and authorities of the 
        National Construction Safety Teams; and
          (7) provide nongovernmental members of the National 
        Construction Safety Team reasonable compensation for time spent 
        carrying out activities under this Act.

SEC. 8. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.

  (a) General Rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, a 
copy of a record, information, or investigation submitted or received 
by a National Construction Safety Team shall be made available to the 
public on request and at reasonable cost.
  (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not require the release of 
information described by section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code, 
or protected from disclosure by any other law of the United States.
  (c) Protection of Voluntary Submission of Information.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a National Construction 
Safety Team, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and 
any agency receiving information from a National Construction Safety 
Team or the National Institute of Standards and Technology, shall not 
disclose voluntarily provided safety-related information if that 
information is not directly related to the building failure being 
investigated and the Director finds that the disclosure of the 
information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of 
information.
  (d) Public Safety Information.--A National Construction Safety Team 
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall not 
publicly release any information it receives in the course of an 
investigation under this Act if the Director finds that the disclosure 
of that information might jeopardize public safety.

SEC. 9. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY TEAM REPORT.

  Not later than 90 days after completing an investigation, a National 
Construction Safety Team shall issue a public report which includes--
          (1) an analysis of the likely technical cause or causes of 
        the building failure investigated;
          (2) technical recommendations for changes to or the 
        establishment of evacuation and emergency response procedures;
          (3) recommended specific improvements to building standards, 
        codes, and practices; and
          (4) recommendations for research and other appropriate 
        actions needed to help prevent future building failures.

SEC. 10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY ACTIONS.

  After the issuance of a public report under section 9, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology shall comprehensively review the 
report and, working with the United States Fire Administration and 
other appropriate Federal and non-Federal agencies and organizations--
          (1) conduct, or enable or encourage the conducting of, 
        appropriate research recommended by the National Construction 
        Safety Team; and
          (2) promote the appropriate adoption by the Federal 
        Government, and encourage the appropriate adoption by other 
        agencies and organizations, of the recommendations of the 
        National Construction Safety Team with respect to--
                  (A) technical aspects of evacuation and emergency 
                response procedures;
                  (B) specific improvements to building standards, 
                codes, and practices; and
                  (C) other actions needed to help prevent future 
                building failures.

SEC. 11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY ANNUAL REPORT.

  Not later than February 15 of each year, the Director shall transmit 
to the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and to the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a 
report that includes--
          (1) a summary of the investigations conducted by National 
        Construction Safety Teams during the prior fiscal year;
          (2) a summary of recommendations made by the National 
        Construction Safety Teams in reports issued under section 9 
        during the prior fiscal year; and
          (3) a description of the actions taken by the National 
        Institute of Standards and Technology during the prior fiscal 
        year in response to reports issued under section 9.

SEC. 12. ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

  (a) Establishment and Functions.--The Director, in consultation with 
the United States Fire Administration and other appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall establish an advisory committee to advise the Director 
on carrying out this Act and to review the procedures developed under 
section 2(b)(1) and the reports issued under section 9.
  (b) Annual Report.--On January 1 of each year, the advisory committee 
shall transmit to the Committee on Science of the House of 
Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate a report that includes--
          (1) an evaluation of National Construction Safety Team 
        activities, along with recommendations to improve the operation 
        and effectiveness of National Construction Safety Teams; and
          (2) an assessment of the implementation of the 
        recommendations of National Construction Safety Teams and of 
        the advisory committee.
  (c) Duration of Advisory Committee.--Section 14 of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act shall not apply to the advisory committee 
established under this section.

SEC. 13. ADDITIONAL APPLICABILITY.

  The authorities and restrictions applicable under this Act to the 
Director and to National Construction Safety Teams shall apply to the 
activities of the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 
response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

SEC. 14. AMENDMENT.

  Section 7 of the National Bureau of Standards Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1986 (15 U.S.C. 281a) is amended by inserting ``, or from 
an investigation under the National Construction Safety Team Act,'' 
after ``from such investigation''.

SEC. 15. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There are authorized to be appropriated to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology for carrying out this Act $25,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2003 through 2005, to remain available until 
expended.

                        II. Purpose of the Bill

    The purpose of H.R. 4687 is to improve the structural 
integrity of buildings and evacuation and emergency response 
procedures by investigating building failures and recommending 
specific improvements to building standards, codes, and 
practices, as well as to evacuation and emergency response 
procedures.

              III. Background and Need for the Legislation

    The aftermath of the collapse of the World Trade Center 
(WTC) revealed serious flaws in how the Federal government 
carries out investigations of major building failures. The 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) all were involved in 
investigating this disaster in some way. However, none of these 
agencies was prepared to conduct a comprehensive and thorough 
investigation immediately following the collapse of the WTC 
buildings. In addition, the Federal efforts that were 
undertaken to study the building failures were hindered by many 
impediments: no Federal agency was clearly charged with 
investigating building failures; nothing ensured that an 
investigation would begin quickly enough to preserve evidence; 
no Federal agency had the investigative authority to ensure 
access to all needed information; nothing ensured that the 
public was kept informed of the progress of the investigation; 
and inadequate funding limited the efforts that were 
undertaken. Families of the victims, outside experts, and NIST 
itself have called for future investigations to be given 
additional investigative authorities like those used by the 
National Transportation Safety Board.
    Chairman Boehlert and Mr. Weiner on May 9, 2002 introduced 
H.R. 4687, which is modeled on the legislation that created the 
National Transportation Safety Board. The legislation also 
builds on the procedures followed by FEMA to investigate 
building failures and on the existing authority Congress vested 
in NIST. The Act is designed to address each of the impediments 
that hindered the WTC investigation. First, the Act establishes 
NIST as the lead agency to investigate building failures that 
have caused a substantial loss of life or that posed 
significant potential for substantial loss of life. Second, the 
legislation requires NIST, to the maximum extent practicable, 
to deploy a Team within 48 hours of a disaster so that the 
investigation is not hindered by delay. Third, the legislation 
gives Teams and NIST authority to enter the site of building 
failure, inspect and move records and materials, issues 
subpoenas, and impound evidence. Fourth, the legislation 
requires Teams to hold regular public briefings on the status 
of the investigation in order to ensure the public is informed. 
Fifth, to prevent funding limitations from inhibiting future 
investigations, the legislation authorizes appropriations of 
$25,000,000.

                      RESPONSE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

    FEMA responded to the WTC disaster by sending search and 
rescue teams to the site, and by establishing a disaster field 
office within hours of the first strike to assist in New York 
City's rescue effort. FEMA also employed its standard protocol 
for studyingbuilding failures, which was to deploy a Building 
Performance Assessment Team (BPAT).
    This team, composed of Federal and non-Federal building and 
fire experts, was tasked with analyzing information about the 
sequence of events and failures that resulted in the 
progressive collapse of the WTC towers and severe damage to 
surrounding buildings. Its goal was to analyze how the 
structures performed and determine if any recommendations could 
be made for changing building codes and design practices. 
However, this Team faced many impediments, which were uncovered 
during a March 6 hearing before the House Science Committee. 
(The impediments are outlined in more detail below.)
    Eventually FEMA recognized that it did not have the 
resources or the authority to conduct a comprehensive and 
thorough investigation of the disaster. In January, FEMA asked 
NIST to take over the investigation once the BPAT released its 
findings and recommendations. Both FEMA and NIST expected that 
the report would provide initial findings and recommendations 
that would help guide a more comprehensive investigation and 
research effort that NIST intends to perform.
    The BPAT report was released at a House Science Committee 
hearing on May 1, 2002. As expected, the final report reached 
some initial conclusions about the structural performance of 
the buildings, but it was not a comprehensive and thorough 
investigation of every important aspect of the disaster. For 
example, the report reviewed the performance of each building 
affected by the attacks and subsequent collapses, but it 
generally did not examine issues related to building evacuation 
mechanisms and emergency response procedures.
    Shortly after the attack, NIST appointed an employee of its 
Building and Fire Research Laboratory to serve on the 23-member 
BPAT team. While this partnership lent some of NIST's resources 
and expertise to the BPAT study, NIST did not immediately 
launch a formal investigation into the technical causes that 
led to the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings.
    Nearly nine months after the September 11 attacks, NIST 
proposed a three-phase plan to complete the work that the BPAT 
report started. First, NIST will conduct a 24-month 
investigation of the building construction, materials and 
technical conditions that combined to cause the collapse of the 
WTC buildings. NIST has requested supplemental funding of $16 
million to carry out this part of the plan. Second, the Agency 
will undertake a multi-year research and development program to 
provide the technical basis to support any potential 
improvements to building and fire codes, standards, and 
practices. The results of this program will support the 
voluntary consensus process used in the United States to 
develop codes and standards. Third, NIST will work with 
industry to disseminate technical guidance and tools to better 
prepare facility owners, contractors, designers, and emergency 
personnel to respond to future disasters. NIST has redirected 
$2 million in Fiscal Year 2002 funds and has requested an 
additional $2 million in its Fiscal Year 2003 request to carry 
out second and third parts of the plan.
    NIST's Building and Fire Research laboratory will carry out 
most of the investigative and research activities under the 
three-part plan. This lab is uniquely qualified to conduct 
comprehensive building failure investigations; it carries out 
research in fire science, fire safety engineering, and 
structural, mechanical, and environmental engineering. It is 
the only Federal laboratory dedicated to research on building 
design and fire safety. In the past, the lab has investigated 
several structural failures using authority Congress made 
explicit in 1985 (15 U.S.C. 282a). Some of the most prominent 
of these were the 1981 collapse of a walkway in the Kansas City 
Hyatt Regency Hotel, the 1986 Dupont Plaza Hotel fire in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, the 1994 Northridge earthquake collapses, 
and the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake building collapses. The 
goals of these investigations were to determine the probable 
technical causes of the failures, to examine what lessons could 
be learned, and to work with code-setting bodies to develop 
improved building codes, standards, and practices. The 
investigations also identified areas of research that needed 
further study.
    The National Science Foundation was also involved in 
responding to the attacks of September 11. The agency awarded 
nearly $300,000 to experienced earthquake researchers, 
including engineers and social scientists, within 72 hours of 
the attacks. In an effort to quickly deploy researchers to the 
site, NSF made these awards through the Small Grants for 
Exploratory Research Program, a supplemental award program that 
enables NSF's program managers to award additional support to 
currently funded investigators through an abbreviated internal 
review process. The same obstacles that hindered other Federal 
efforts also impeded the NSF-funded researchers. In addition, 
there was little, if any coordination between FEMA's and NSF's 
efforts.

               SUMMARY OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FEDERAL RESPONSE

    The Science Committee's March 6 oversight hearing reviewed 
how the Federal government investigated the collapse of WTC 
buildings and what impediments those efforts faced. The 
Committee found that:
     There was not clear statutory authority directing 
any federal agency to lead an investigation after major 
building failures, such as the collapse of the WTC buildings. 
Immediately after the attacks, private groups (such as the 
American Society of Civil Engineers and the Structural 
Engineers Association of New York) and NSF responded by sending 
engineers to the site. However, these individuals, having no 
formal authority to conduct an investigation, had trouble 
gaining access to the disaster site. The Federal agencies that 
did have limited authority allowing them to conduct 
investigations (FEMA and NIST) were slow to respond. FEMA did 
not formally create its investigative team, the BPAT, until 
October 1. NIST began planning an investigation only after FEMA 
realized that it could not carry out a comprehensive and 
thorough investigation. Nine months after the attacks, NIST is 
only beginning to carry out its proposed investigation. This 
overall response stands in stark contrast to investigations 
conducted bythe National Transportation Safety Board, which 
usually has an investigative team at a disaster site immediately 
following an event.
     The BPAT's lack of investigative powers led to 
problems gaining access to information it needed to complete 
its work. BPAT members had no authority to impound steel 
evidence after it was removed from the WTC site. This problem, 
coupled with the difficulty the team faced in gaining access to 
the site, led to the destruction of important pieces of steel 
evidence. In addition, because FEMA did not immediately 
intervene on behalf of the BPAT, building owners, designers, 
and insurers delayed the BPAT's access to pertinent building 
documents. For example, the BPAT did not receive the full set 
of blueprints until January 2002. The BPAT was also denied 
access to other information such as the tapes of 911 calls to 
the New York City Police Department and unaired high-quality 
video footage of the attack taken by the major television 
networks.
     There was no statutory or regulatory requirement 
to ensure that the public was kept informed of the BPAT's 
progress and findings. Lack of communication with the public 
led to public criticism of the Team's efforts, as families of 
victims could not get a clear picture of exactly what the Team 
was investigating and what the Team's ultimate goals were. This 
ongoing controversy needlessly undermined the efforts of the 
Team.
     Funding limitations severely constrained the 
BPAT's ability to conduct a comprehensive investigation. 
Funding limitations also deterred NIST from investigating the 
building failures immediately after the collapse. The BPAT 
received $600,000 in FEMA funding in addition to approximately 
$500,000 in in-kind contributions from the American Society of 
Civil Engineers. However, this amount was not enough to fund a 
comprehensive and thorough investigation of the WTC disaster. 
The BPAT ultimately relied on volunteers to help with the 
investigation. Once FEMA asked NIST to take over the 
investigation, NIST requested $16 million in supplemental 
funding in order to carry out its proposal.

                        IV. Summary of Hearings

 MARCH 6, 2002: LEARNING FROM 9/11--UNDERSTANDING THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
                           WORLD TRADE CENTER

    On Wednesday, March 6, the House Committee on Science held 
a hearing on the investigation into the collapse of the World 
Trade Center (WTC). Witnesses from industry, academia, and 
government testified on the catastrophic collapse of the WTC 
complex and subsequent efforts by Federal agencies and 
independent researchers to understand how and why the 
structures failed. Witness described why it was importantto 
scrutinize the steel and other debris, blueprints and other documents, 
and recorded images of the disaster, so that engineers, designers, and 
construction professionals could learn valuable lessons that could 
ultimately improve the safety of buildings. Witnesses also described 
the many impediments that they encountered, such as: no Federal agency 
believed it was clearly charged with investigating building failures; 
nothing ensured that an investigation would begin quickly enough to 
preserve evidence; no Federal agency had the investigative authority, 
akin to that of the National Transportation Safety Board, to ensure 
access to all needed information; and no one kept the public informed 
of the progress of the investigations.
    The Committee heard from: (1) Mr. Robert Shea, Acting 
Administrator, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), accompanied by Mr. 
Craig Wingo, Director of Division of Engineering Science and 
Technology, Federal Emergency Management Agency; (2) Dr. W. 
Gene Corley, P.E., S.E., American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) and Chair of the Building Performance Assessment Team 
(BPAT) reviewing the WTC disaster; (3) Professor Glenn Corbett, 
Assistant Professor of Fire Science at John Jay College, City 
University of New York; (4) Dr. Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl, 
Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 
University of California, Berkeley; and (5) Dr. Arden Bement, 
Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).

Leading investigations of building failures

    Witnesses testified as to the confusion that characterized 
the Federal government's efforts to investigate the collapse of 
the WTC buildings. It became clear that while the Federal 
agencies represented at the hearing tried to respond to the 
disaster in some fashion, no agency believed it had the 
authority to lead an investigation of a major building failure.
    During the hearing when the witnesses were asked to 
indicate who was in charge of the investigation of the WTC 
collapse, several witnesses raised their hands. FEMA clearly 
believed it was initially in charge because it deployed the 
BPAT. However, Mr. Shea testified that FEMA did not have the 
authority to investigate the building disaster, but only to 
study it. Dr. Bement also appeared unclear as to where 
authority lay to conduct an investigation of the collapses. 
While he testified that he was acting as though NIST was in 
charge, it is clear that NIST initially took no action to 
conduct an investigation in response to the collapse of the 
WTC.
    Ultimately, Mr. Shea concurred with the Chairman that for 
several months after the attacks it was uncertain who was in 
charge of investigating this disaster. In addition, Mr. Shea 
testified that FEMA turned to NIST to lead an investigation 
because FEMA does not have the technical capability or 
resources to conduct investigations of major building failures. 
Mr. Shea said that based on his experience, an overall Federal 
government strategy for responding to building failures is 
needed and NIST should be vested with this authority.

Preserving evidence and gaining access to critical information

    Witnesses testified that confusion regarding who was in 
charge of the investigation and the BPAT's lack of 
investigative authorities led to delays in deploying the BPAT 
team, problems in gaining access to the WTC site, an inability 
to preserve valuable steel evidence from the site, and problems 
gaining access to information the BPAT requested.
    During the hearing Members voiced concern about why the 
BPAT had not been deployed immediately after the attacks and 
whether the delay had hindered the team's ability to preserve 
important evidence. Dr. Corley testified that immediately 
following the attacks, ASCE began assembling a team of experts 
of study the disaster. Although this team later became part of 
the official BPAT that FEMA created, that official designation 
did not occur until late September. Furthermore, it was only at 
that time that the team was able to gain access to the disaster 
site. Dr. Corley believed that that one possible reason for 
this delay was the uncertain relationship between the BPAT and 
ongoing search and rescue efforts, as well as the criminal 
investigation. During the time the team was not present on 
site, the City of New York decided to haul away and recycle the 
steel, which could have been useful as evidence for the 
investigation.
    Even after the BPAT was on site and had actively assumed 
its duties, there was still confusion abut whether the BPAT had 
the authority to preserve evidence. Mr. Shea said that the BPAT 
was in charge of gathering the necessary evidence for an 
investigation. However, Dr. Corley, who led the BPAT team, said 
that he did not know whether anyone had the authority even to 
ask the City of New York to stop recycling the steel. When Dr. 
Bement was asked if NIST could presently sequester evidence for 
its investigation, he said that NIST could request that 
evidence be preserved, but that it had no power to enforce the 
request.
    Dr. Astaneh-Asl, who was funded by the National Science 
Foundation to study the collapse, testified that he experienced 
the same problems that Dr. Corley's team faced in terms of 
trying to access the site, and studying and preserving the 
steel evidence. He testified that he had, without any 
assistance from any federal agency, directly negotiated with 
the plants recycling the steel, and it was only because of 
their cooperation that he was given access to the steel.
    Professor Corbett described the consequences of losing 
pieces of steel evidence. He said with steel from critical 
areas of the building (such as where the planes hit the 
building) would help the BPAT make more definitive statements 
as to the specific cause and chronology of the collapse.
    Several witness commented on the problems the BPAT faced in 
gaining access to information it required as part of its 
investigation. The BPAT requested access to the WTC building 
blueprints, design drawings, and maintenance records. It 
planned to use these to validate physical and photographic 
evidence and to develop computer models to explain why and how 
the buildings failed and how similar failures might be avoided 
in the future. The BPAT did not get immediate access to the 
full set of these documents and eventually, FEMA had to 
intercede on behalf of the BPAT. However, there was a 
significant delay in FEMA making this request. Mr. Wingo 
testified that FEMA did not ask the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey for blueprints and designspecifications for the 
buildings until December 21, nearly four months after the disaster, and 
Dr. Corley testified that the BPAT did not receive full copies of the 
blueprints and design drawings until January 8.
    In addition to the structural records, the BPAT team 
requested video footage from the television networks and tapes 
of 911 calls from the New York City Police Department. Dr. 
Corley testified that the BPAT team was only able to obtain 
from TV networks video footage of the collapse that had been 
played on air; the networks would not release unaired footage. 
The BPAT ultimately gave up on attempting to obtain the 911 
tapes. During the May 1 follow up hearing held by the Science 
Committee (described below), Dr. Jonathan Barnett, Professor, 
Center for Fire Safety Studies, Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts, who was also a BPAT 
member, said that after being denied access to the 911 tapes 
for several months, he withdrew the request for the tapes 
because the computer modeling that would have used the 911 
tapes would not be completed in time for the BPAT report.
    Dr. Bement explained that NIST's planned investigation 
could run into the same impediments as the BPAT in terms of 
gaining access to this information. Dr. Bement explained that, 
while NIST could request information, it lacked the power to 
issue subpoenas for information it deemed critical to its 
investigation, and that he therefore could not ensure that NIST 
would have total access to this information.

Informing the public

    Members expressed great concern about lack of regular 
public briefings by FEMA about the status of the BPAT 
investigation and its factual findings. Witness generally 
agreed that briefing the public was an important component of 
any investigation, but the hearing revealed that there were 
problems with how FEMA handled communications with the public 
during the BPAT study. While Mr. Shea testified that he 
believed FEMA did try to respond to inquiries from the public, 
he also said that BPAT participants were asked to sign 
confidentiality agreements that prohibited them from publicly 
disclosing the conversations and opinions discussed during the 
course of the team's deliberations. He said this was standard 
practice with BPATs in order to protect the scientific 
integrity of the process. However, Several Members point out 
that much of the public criticism and leaks to the press 
regarding the BPAT initial findings could have been prevented 
by regular public briefings.

Funding investigations

    Witnesses and Members expressed concern about the resources 
Federal agencies were able to commit to investigate the WTC 
building collapses. Dr. Corley testified that the total amount 
of money (both public and private) supporting the BPAT study 
was about $1 million, and that, in his opinion, $40 million 
would be required to conduct a comprehensive study of the WTC 
disaster. Dr. Bement concurred with this figure by stating that 
$40 million ``wasn't too far out of the ballpark'' of what NIST 
would need to complete its proposed investigation. Professor 
Corbett summarized the general funding problems of this effort 
by saying that, ``a disaster of such epic proportions demands 
that we fully resource a comprehensive, detailed investigation. 
He further emphasized that``instead, we are staffing the BPAT 
with part-time engineers and scientists on a shoestring budget.''

  MAY 1, 2002: THE INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE: 
                FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the key findings 
and recommendations of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency's (FEMA) investigation into the collapse of the World 
Trade Center (WTC). The hearing also reviewed the plans of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to 
conduct a more extensive follow-up investigation and to 
establish a comprehensive research and development plan to help 
improve standards, practices, and codes for buildings. In 
addition, the witnesses were asked to comment on a draft 
version of H.R. 4687.
    The Committee heard from: (1) Mr. Robert Shea, Acting 
Administrator, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency; (2) Dr. W. Gene Corley, 
P.E., S.E., American Society of Civil Engineers, Chair of the 
Building Performance Assessment Team reviewing the World Trade 
Center disaster, accompanied by Dr. Jonathan Barnett, 
Professor, Center for Fire Safety Studies, Worcester 
Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts; (3) Dr. Arden 
Bement, Director, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology; and (4) Professor Glenn Corbett, Assistant 
Professor of Fire Science at John Jay College, City University 
of New York.
    Dr. Corley discussed the findings and recommendations that 
the BPAT made in its final report (World Trade Center Building 
Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, 
and Recommendations, FEMA publication #403, May 2002). The 
report reached general conclusions about how each of the 
buildings in the World Trade Center complex performed after the 
attacks, and made several recommendations for improving 
buildings that may be the target of terrorist attacks. The 
report also concluded that some of the recommendations could be 
considered for all buildings, but that additional studies were 
needed before any general recommendations could be made. 
Finally, the report recommended several areas that require 
further study, such as the interaction of structural elements 
and fire, how better to integrate structural and fire 
professionals in building design, and evacuating buildings 
after a disaster, among other things.
    Dr. Bement testified about NIST's plans for conducting an 
investigation and follow-on research. NIST's response plan will 
consist of three elements: First, NIST will conduct a 24-month 
building and fire safety investigation into the collapse of the 
Twin Towers (WTC 1 and 2) and WTC 7. Second, NIST will 
undertake a multi-year research and development (R&D) program 
to provide the technical basis to support any potential 
improvements to building and fire codes, standards, and 
practices. Third, NIST will operate an industry-led 
dissemination and technical assistance program (DTAP) that will 
provide practical guidance and tools to better prepare facility 
owners, contractors, designers, and emergency personnel to 
respond to future disasters.
    Professor Corbett testified that he was supportive of the 
proposed NIST initiative. However, he said that NIST should 
rapidly assemble a Federal Advisory Committee to oversee the 
investigation. He also stressed the need for subpoena power for 
the proposed NIST investigation. Specifically, Professor 
Corbett said, ``The Science Committee hearing on March 6 
clearly highlighted some of the impediments the BPAT faced in 
obtaining key information. My fear is that the NIST 
investigation will be hindered by these same problems. 
Information may be found in a variety of locations and may be 
held by many different individuals and organizations that will 
not provide this information voluntarily. Even though the WTC 
investigation is an investigation of a fact-finding nature, a 
legal means for obtaining information that would otherwise be 
unavailable must be provided for investigators.''

Comments on the draft version of H.R. 4687

    During the hearing the witnesses were offered an 
opportunity to comment on the proposed legislation. Each 
witness supported the efforts that the Committee had undertaken 
in reviewing the WTC disaster and drafting the legislation. Dr. 
Corley and Professor Corbett both endorsed the legislation. 
Specifically, Dr. Corley said that this legislation would have 
helped overcome not only the impediments the BPAT faced during 
the World Trade Center investigation, but also obstacles that 
have hindered previous investigations he has led on behalf of 
the Federal government. Professor Corbett said that based on 
his 20 years of experience in the fire service, it is critical 
that the Federal government have the ability to investigate 
building failures in order to learn from them. He argued that 
because lessons learned from an individual disaster can be 
applied to many similar types of buildings across the United 
States, it is clearly the responsibility of the Federal 
government to investigate major building disasters and to 
derive these lessons.

                          V. Committee Actions

    The House Science Committee met on May 22, 2002 to consider 
H.R. 4687. Chairman Boehlert offered several technical 
amendments to the bill, which were considered en bloc and 
adopted by voice vote. The Committee favorably reported the 
bill as amended, by voice vote.

              VI. Summary of Major Provisions of the Bill

    The Act gives responsibility to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to dispatch teams of experts 
within 48 hours after major building disasters.
    The Act gives the teams a clear mandate to:
          Establish the likely technical cause of building 
        failures;
          Evaluate procedures used for evacuation and emergency 
        response;
          Recommend specific changes to building codes, 
        standards and practices; in addition, recommend changes 
        in emergency response and evacuation procedures; and
          Make final recommendations within 90 days of 
        completing an investigation.
    The Act gives NIST and the teams comprehensive 
investigative authorities, similar to those of the National 
Transportation Safety Board, to:
          Access the site of a building disaster;
          Subpoena evidence;
          Access key pieces of evidence such as records and 
        documents; and,
          Move and preserve evidence.
    The Act ensures that the team's investigations will not 
impede search and rescue efforts.
    The Act establishes clear lines of communication to ensure 
that the public will be informed throughout the investigation 
by:
          Requiring teams to hold regular briefings on the 
        status of the investigative proceedings and findings; 
        and,
          Allowing the Director of NIST to convince a public 
        hearing to take testimony relevant to a team's 
        investigation.
    The Act creates a standing advisory committee to oversee 
the implementation of the Act and evaluate team's duties.
    The Act also gives NIST comprehensive authority to complete 
the investigation of the WTC disaster.
    The Act authorizes for each of fiscal years 2003 through 
2005 $25 million to remain available until expended to carry 
out investigation under this Act.

                    VII. Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short title

    This Act is named the ``National Construction Safety Team 
Act.''

Section 2. National Construction Safety Teams

    The Director of the National Institutes of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) may constitute and deploy a National 
Construction Safety Team (hereafter referred to as the 
``Team'') after a building failure that has caused substantial 
loss of life or had the potential to cause substantial loss of 
life. To the maximum extent possible, the Director shall 
establish and deploy a team within 48 hours after such an 
event. The Director shall promptly publish in the Federal 
Register a notice any time a Team is established.
    The Director has three months after date of enactment to 
develop and publish the procedures that will govern the 
operation and deployment of the Teams. When developing the 
procedures, the Director must consult with the United States 
Fire Administration (USFA) and other appropriate Federal 
agencies. The Director has the authority to update these 
procedures as necessary.
    The final procedures, and any updates thereof, shall be 
published in the Federal Register.

Section 3. Composition of the Teams

    Teams created under this Act, shall be led by an individual 
named by the Director, and shall include at least one NIST 
employee. Teams shall also include other experts who are not 
employees of NIST and who may include private sector experts, 
university experts, representatives of professional 
organizations with appropriated expertise, and appropriate 
Federal, State, or local officials.

Section 4. Functions of the Teams

    The Act directs the Teams to:
          (1) Determine the likely technical cause of causes of 
        the building failure;
          (2) Evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and 
        emergency response procedures;
          (3) Recommend specific improvements to building 
        codes, standards, and practices; and
          (4) Recommend research and other appropriate actions 
        needed to improve the structural safety of buildings, 
        or improve evacuation and emergency response 
        procedures.

Section 5. Authorities

    In investigating a building failure under this Act and upon 
the display of appropriate credentials, which shall be issued 
by the Director of NIST, members of Teams may:
          (1) Enter a property where a building failure being 
        investigated under this Act has occurred, or where 
        building components, materials, and artifacts with 
        respect to the building failure are located, and do 
        anything necessary to conduct the investigation;
          (2) Inspect any record (including any design, 
        construction, or maintenance record), process, or 
        facility related to the investigation;
          (3) Inspect and test any building components, 
        materials, and artifacts related to the building 
        failure; and
          (4) Move such records, components, materials, and 
        artifacts.
    When conducting an investigation, Teams must ensure their 
actions do not unnecessarily interfere with the services 
provided by the owner of the building components, materials, 
artifacts, property, records, process, or facility.
    When conducting an investigation, Teams must ensure that 
their actions are coordinated with, and do not impede search 
and rescue efforts. Teams shall also coordinate investigations, 
to the extent practicable, with qualified researchers who are 
conducting engineering or scientific research related to the 
building failure. In addition, NIST shall enter into a 
memorandum of understanding with each Federal agency that may 
conduct or sponsor related investigations, providing for coordination 
of investigations.
    Investigations conducted by Teams under this Act shall have 
priority over any other investigation of any other Federal 
agency except in cases where:
          (1) The National Transportation Safety Board is 
        conducting an investigation related to a Team's 
        investigation; or
          (2) The Attorney General, in consultation with the 
        Director, determines that circumstances reasonably 
        indicate that the building failure may have been caused 
        by a criminal act with intent to cause the building 
        failure.
    In either of these cases, Teams retain the authority to 
conduct an investigation.
    In cases where a Federal law enforcement agency suspects 
and notifies Teams that a building failure may have been caused 
by a criminal act with the intent to cause the building failure 
(but has not yet initiated a criminal investigation) Teams must 
take proper steps to preserve evidence of such act.

Section 6. Briefings, hearings, witnesses, and subpoenas

    The Act authorizes the Director, on behalf of the Team, to 
conduct hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena necessary 
witnesses and evidence in order to carry out this Act. It 
requires the Team to hold regular public briefings on the 
status of the investigation. The Director may hold a public 
hearing in order to gather testimony for the investigation and 
keep the public informed about the investigation if the 
Director deems it in the public interest.
    The Act authorizes a witness or evidence to be summoned or 
be produced from any place in the United States. The Act 
entitles a witness to the same fee and mileage that the witness 
would receive in a court of the United States. The Act also 
requires a subpoena to be signed by the Director, but may be 
served by a designee chosen by the Director. Finally the Act 
authorizes the Director to bring a civil action against anyone 
failing to obey a subpoena. Such action may be brought against 
the person where the person resides, is found, or does 
business. Failure to obey an order may be punished as contempt 
of court.

Section 7. Additional powers

    In order to support the Team, the Director may carry out 
the following activities in support of this Act:
          (1) Procure the services of experts and temporary 
        consultants on a temporary basis;
          (2) When appropriate, request the use of services, 
        equipment, personnel, and facilities of another entity 
        of the U.S. Government on a reimbursable basis;
          (3) Confer with employees of, and request the use of 
        services, records, and facilities of State and local 
        authorities;
          (4) Accept voluntary services;
          (5) Accept and use gifts of money and other property;
          (6) Contract with nonprofits to conduct studies 
        related to the purpose and activities of the Teams; and
          (7) Compensate on a reasonable basis the 
        nongovernmental members of the Team.

Section 8. Disclosure of information

    A copy of a record, information, or investigative report 
submitted or received by the Team shall be made available to 
the public on request for a reasonable cost except where the 
information requested is protected by 5 U.S.C. 552(b) 
(originally enacted as part of the Freedom of Information Act) 
or where the Director determines that the disclosure of 
voluntarily provided information not directly related to the 
building failure may inhibit the voluntary provision of such 
information. In addition, the Director shall not disclose 
information if the Directory finds that the release of such 
information will jeopardize public safety.

Section 9. National Construction Safety Team report

    After completing an investigation initiated under this Act, 
Teams have 90 days to submit a report on their findings. The 
report shall include:
          (1) Analysis of the likely technical cause or causes 
        of the building failure;
          (2) Technical recommendations for changes to or the 
        establishment of evacuation and emergency response 
        procedures;
          (3) Recommendations for specific improvements to 
        building standards, codes, and practices; and
          (4) Recommendations for research and other 
        appropriate actions needed to prevent future building 
        failures.

Section 10. National Institute of Standards and Technology actions

    After a Team issues the report required under section 9 
regarding the findings of an investigation, NIST shall review 
the report and working with the USFA:
          (1) Conduct, or encourage other Federal agencies to 
        conduct, appropriate research recommended by the 
        National Construction Safety Team; and
          (2) Promote and encourage the adoption of the Team's 
        recommendations.

Section 11. National Institute of Standards and Technology annual 
        report

    Not later than February 15 of each year, NIST shall 
transmit to Congress a report that includes a:
          (1) Summary of the investigations conducted by Teams 
        during the prior fiscal year;
          (2) Summary of recommendations made by the Teams in 
        reports required under section 9; and
          (3) Description of action taken by NIST during the 
        prior fiscal year in response to reports issued under 
        section 9.

Section 12. Advisory committee

    The Director shall establish, in consultation with the USFA 
and other appropriate Federal agencies, an advisory committee 
to advise the Director on carrying out this Act, review the 
procedures developed by the Director under this Act, and review 
the post-investigation reports issued by Teams.
    The advisory committee shall prepare and transmit to 
Congress a report that includes an evaluation of Team 
activities, recommendations to improve the operation and 
effectiveness of Teams, and an assessment of the implementation 
of the Teams' recommendations.
    The Act exempts the advisory committee from the sunset 
provision of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Section 13. Additional applicability

    The Act applies all of the authorities and restrictions 
given to the Director or to Teams under this Act, to actions 
that NIST is undertaking in response to the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.

Section 14. Amendment

    The Act amends 15 U.S.C. 281(a) to include investigations 
conducted under this Act.

Section 15. Authorization of appropriations

    The Act authorizes $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 and 
2005, to remain available until expended.

                         VIII. Committee Views

Responding to building failures

    The Committee believes the Federal government lacks a clear 
protocol for conducting comprehensive and thorough 
investigations of building failures and for learning the 
lessons that these failures can teach us. Building failures can 
stem from a number of causes, such as natural disasters, 
terrorist actions, flaws in building design and construction 
practices, and other unforeseen events. It is the Committee's 
view that building failures caused by any of these events 
should be investigated with the authority in this Act in cases 
where there is substantial loss of life or the significant 
potential for substantial loss of life. Clearly not every 
building failure will be investigated under thisAct, but the 
Director should investigate building failures that were unexpected or 
that are likely to yield significant lessons that could be broadly 
applied.
    The Act requires that investigations review the technical 
causes of building failures and recommend how to improve 
building codes, standards, and practices, and emergency 
response and evacuation procedures. The Committees believes 
that by learning and applying the lessons that building 
failures have to teach us, the Federal government can 
ultimately reduce financial losses and save lives.
    While it is the Committee's intent that this legislation 
supplement the National Institute of Standards and Technology's 
(NIST) existing authority to respond to building failures, this 
Act should not be construed as giving NIST any new regulatory 
powers over building design, practices, and standards, or over 
evacuation and emergency response procedures.
    It is the Committee's view that the Director of NIST should 
not limit investigations only to buildings that have collapsed. 
NIST may find instances in which a building failure has not led 
to a collapse, but has resulted in significant loss of life. 
Such instances may hold important lessons about the design of 
the building or evacuation and emergency response procedures.
    It is the Committee's view that Teams created under this 
Act should not be permanent, standing entities requiring 
ongoing funding. Rather, Teams should be formed only in 
response to a specific building failure. It is also the 
Committee's view that the Director should immediately notify 
the public through appropriate means, including the Internet, 
of the decision to establish a Team. That notification would be 
in addition to the requirement in the Act that the Director 
notice the establishment of Teams in the Federal Register.

Section 2. National Construction Safety Teams

    The Committee believes that the procedures required by this 
section are critical to ensuring the successfull implementation 
of this Act. Past efforts to investigate structural failures by 
other Federal agencies have been uncoordinated, incomplete, and 
without a clear mandate to review the technical causes or to 
recommend how to improve building codes, standards, and 
practices, or emergency response and evacuation procedures. As 
such, it is the Committee's view that the Director should 
ensure that these procedures are clear, comprehensive, and 
developed, where appropriate, in consultation with the United 
States Fire Administration and other Federal entities.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has 
extensive experience with many of the procedures that NIST must 
develop pursuant to this Act. It is the Committee's view that 
the Director should, to the maximum extent possible, draw on 
this experience by consulting with the NTSB when developing 
these procedures.
    The legislation requires the Director to develop procedures 
within three months after enactment of this legislation. The 
Committee expects NIST to begin working promptly on these 
procedures to meet this deadline.
    It is the Committee's view that while the Director has the 
discretion to determine the appropriate size of Teams created 
under this Act, Teams should generally consist of ten members 
or more to ensure adequate representation of various 
disciplines, which are described in the next section. In 
addition, it is the Committee's view that when developing 
procedures for coordination with Federal, State, and local 
entities, the Director should also consult with agencies 
engaged in earthquake related research authorized under the 
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, such as the National 
Science Foundation. The Director should clearly define how 
earthquake researchers and Teams will carry out their 
responsibilities in a coordinated fashion in cases where 
building failures have been caused by an earthquake.

Section 3. Composition of Teams

    The Committee believes that the Director of NIST should 
ensure that the membership of any Team created under this Act 
has a wide variety of expertise. For any given investigation, 
the Director has the discretion to determine the appropriate 
composition of the Team. It is the Committee's view that, when 
exercising this discretion, the Director should consider 
representation from the following disciplines: structural 
engineering, forensic engineering, fire protection engineering, 
geotechnical and geoenvironmental engineering, the engineering 
of deep foundations, earthquakes and soil dynamics, wind 
engineering, and other engineering disciplines as the Director 
may deem necessary. In addition, it is the Committee's view 
that lessons learned regarding emergency response and 
evacuation procedures are as important as structural lessons. 
Where appropriate, the Director should ensure that experts in 
both emergency response and evacuation procedures are part of 
any Team.

Section 4. Function of the Teams

    The ultimate goal of investigations conducted under this 
Act should be to develop a detailed set of recommendations for 
any necessary improvements to building codes, standards, and 
practices, as well as emergency response and evacuation 
procedures, based on the findings of the investigation. Many of 
these procedures are based on an understanding of how people 
respond to a disaster. It is the Committee's view that, when 
examining emergency response and evacuation procedures, Teams 
should evaluate not only the effect that a building's design 
has on emergency response and evacuation procedures, but also 
on human behavior.
    While Teams are tasked to make specific recommendations 
regarding changes that may be warranted in building codes, 
standards, and practices, the authority to make those changes 
lies with other State, local and private authorities (and with 
Federal agencies in the case of Federal buildings). Applying 
the lessons learned through building investigations conducted 
under this Act therefore is ultimately left to the different 
public and private entities that are now responsible for 
building standards and codes. The Act does not give any 
regulatory authority to Teams or NIST over building codes, 
standards, practices, but the Committee hopes that 
recommendations made by the Team will be taken under 
consideration quickly by the appropriate authorities.

Section 5. Authorities

    When a Team arrives at a disaster site, members should have 
written notification of the Director's establishment of the 
Team, as well as official credentials from NIST stating that 
they are members of the Team and that they have authority 
vested under this Act to conduct an investigation. It is the 
Committee's view that, because the credentials issued by the 
Director will allow the Team to exercise its authority provided 
by this Act, the Director should establish a rapid 
credentialing process for Team members.
    The Act gives Teams the authority to move records, 
components, materials, and artifacts in order to inspect, 
preserve, or test these materials. It is the Committee's view 
that this authority allows Teams to move these materials from 
the site where the building failure occurred or where they are 
stored.
    The Committee recognizes that saving lives must be the top 
priority in the wake of a building failure. The Act makes clear 
that Team members should not do anything to impede search and 
rescue efforts. Teams should work closely with search and 
rescue teams to ensure that any evidence important to the 
Team's investigation is preserved. For example, while Team 
members must not prevent the necessary removal of debris, they 
may attempt to take photographic evidence of the debris before 
it is moved and should be allowed to determine where any 
evidence critical to the investigation should be moved.
    The Committee notes that several Federal agencies will 
likely respond to building failures. While other Federal 
agencies may have reason to carry out work at the site of a 
failure, the Act makes clear that NIST is responsible for 
leading investigations of building failures.
    The Committee also recognizes that in the wake of natural 
disasters, researchers with expertise in a number of fields are 
deployed to a disaster site to conduct research. In such cases, 
these researchers may serve as a valuable source of information 
for investigations conducted under this Act. The Act requires 
that Teams should coordinate their investigation, to the 
maximum practicable, with qualified researchers at a site to 
minimize duplication of effort and ensure that investigations 
are complete and thorough.
    In cases where a building failure may have been caused by 
criminal actions, the Committee has included provisions to 
ensure that Teams relinquish investigative priority to the 
appropriate Federal law enforcement agency. In some cases, 
there may be a question as to whether a Federal law enforcement 
agency will conduct a criminal investigation. It is the 
Committee's view that in these instances, after the Federal law 
enforcement agency notifies the Director of a potential 
criminal investigation, a Team should preserve evidence in a 
way that would not hamper the criminal investigation should it 
take place. Teams should not themselves conduct any criminal 
investigations. The Committee notes that the NTSB has 
experience preserving evidence for a potential criminal 
investigation, and it is the Committee's view that the Director 
should consult with the NTSB when developing procedures under 
this section.
    The Committee notes that in cases in which Teams must 
relinquish investigative priority under this Act either to NTSB 
or a Federal law enforcement agency, Teams still have the 
authority to continue an investigation of the building failure.

Section 6. Briefings, hearings, witnesses, and subpoenas

    The Committee notes that nothing ensured that the public 
was kept informed during FEMA's investigation of the World 
Trade Center disaster. This led to public criticism of the 
Team's efforts, as families of victims did not know the status 
of the investigation or what the BPAT's ultimate goals were. 
Many families of the victims called for regular public 
briefings about the effort's status and factual findings, much 
like the National Transportation Safety Board holds during an 
investigation of an accident. To prevent this problem from 
reoccurring, the Act requires that Teams conducting 
investigations brief the public on regular basis about the 
investigation's status and findings.

Section 8. Disclosure of information

    It is the Committee's intent that as a general practice the 
Director should make every effort to publicly release as much 
information obtained by Teams under this Act as possible. It is 
the Committee's view that the exceptions to the release of 
information contained in this section should be used 
infrequently and only after careful deliberation by the 
Director.

Section 13. Additional applicability

    NIST is planning to conduct a $16 million comprehensive and 
thorough two-year investigation and a technical analysis to 
determine how World Trade Center buildings 1, 2 and 7 
collapsed. The Administration has formally requested Fiscal 
Year 2002 supplemental funding for this investigation.
    While this legislation is generally focused on 
investigating future building failures, this section gives NIST 
all of authorities and restrictions conferred by this Act for 
its investigation of the World Trade Center disaster. The 
Committee does not believe that NIST must create a National 
Construction Safety Team for this investigation. Rather, NIST 
should move forward with the current proposed structure of its 
investigation, while utilizing the authorities, such as the 
power to subpoena evidence, that are granted under this Act.

                           IX. Cost Estimate

    A cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been timely submitted to 
the Committee on Science prior to the filing of this report and 
is included in Section X of this report pursuant to House Rule 
XIII, clause 3(c)(3).
    H.R. 4687 does not contain new budget authority, credit 
authority, or changes in tax expenditures. Assuming that the 
sums authorized under the bill are appropriated, H.R. 4687 does 
authorize additional discretionary spending, as described in 
the Congressional Budget Office report on the bill, which is 
contained in Section X of this report.
    H.R. 4687 could affect both direct spending and receipts. 
However, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that any 
such effect would be less than $500,000 a year.

              X. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, June 7, 2002.
Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert,
Chairman, Committee on Science,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4687, the National 
Construction Safety Team Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Ken Johnson 
(for federal costs), Elyse Goldman (for the state and local 
impact), and Cecil McPherson (for the private-sector impact).
            Sincerely,
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 4687--National Construction Safety Team Act

    Summary: H.R. 4687 would authorize the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of 
Commerce to establish National Construction Safety Teams to 
investigate the structural causes of building failures that 
cause substantial loss of life. The bill would authorize the 
appropriation of $75 million over three years for this purpose. 
NIST also would be allowed to accept and spend monetary gifts 
to support the teams.
    CBO estimates that maintaining a Construction Safety Team 
program prepared to respond to building failures would cost 
about $2 million a year during the 2003-2007 period. The amount 
of the added costs for investigations would depend upon the 
number and size of the building failures that occur during a 
given year. Although the agency is incurring significant costs 
to investigate the terrorists attacks on the World Trade 
Center, historically, the frequency and cost of investigating 
such building failures has been small. These amounts would be 
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    The provisions of H.R. 4687 related to the acceptance of 
monetary gifts could affect both revenues and direct spending; 
therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. We expect that 
any such effects would be less than $500,000 a year.
    H.R. 4687 contains an intergovernmental mandate defined in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO estimates that the 
total costs associated with the mandate would be small, and 
therefore, would not exceed the threshold established in UMRA 
($58 million for intergovernmental mandates in 2002, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    H.R. 4687 also contains a private-sector mandate as defined 
in UMRA. CBO expects that the direct costs of the mandate would 
be well below the annual threshold established by UMRA ($115 
million for private-sector mandates in 2002, adjusted annually 
for inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: H.R. 4687 would 
authorize the appropriation of $25 million a year over three 
years for NIST to send teams to investigate the structural 
causes of major building collapses. CBO expects that the agency 
would need to maintain the personnel and equipment necessary to 
respond to any collapses that occur, as well as to write an 
annual report required under the bill. Based on information 
from NIST, CBO estimates that these costs would amount to about 
$2 million a year, assuming the appropriation of the necessary 
amounts. Excluding the World Trade Center investigation, the 
historical costs of federal investigations into collapsed 
building incidents have been only a few million dollars (or 
less) each year.
    The amount of the additional cost NIST would incur to 
investigate specific incidents would depend greatly on the 
number and size of the collapses that occur during a specific 
year. For example, similar investigations conducted by NIST and 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have cost 
less than $500,000 a year. However, the total cost to the two 
agencies of investigating the collapse of the World Trade 
Center could cost as mush as $57 million over the next several 
years. Over the next three years, any additional costs for new 
investigations would be subject to the availability of 
appropriated funds from the $75 million that would be 
authorized to be appropriated by this bill.
    H.R. 4687 would allow NIST to accept and spend monetary 
gifts for the National Construction Safety Team program. 
Although NIST is not allowed under current law to receive any 
such gifts, the Department of Commerce does possess this 
authority. Any additional gifts accepted or spent under this 
bill would be classified in the federal budget as revenues and 
direct spending. However, CBO expects that these effects would 
be less than $500,000 in each year.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures 
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. Although 
H.R. 4687 could affect both direct spending and receipts, CBO 
estimates that any such effects would be less than $500,000 a 
year.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures 
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. Although 
H.R. 4687 could affect both direct spending and receipts, CBO 
estimates that any such effects would be less than $500,000 a 
year.
    Estimated impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: 
H.R. 4687 would authorize the Director of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology to establish National 
Construction Safety Teams and to issue subpoenas on their 
behalf. Such power would constitute an intergovernmental 
mandate as defined in UMRA. CBO expects that the probability of 
an event resulting in substantial loss of life is low, and that 
state and local governments would likely comply voluntarily 
with federal investigators. Therefore, CBO estimates that the 
costs of complying with the mandate would be low and would not 
exceed the threshold established in UMRA ($58 million in 2002, 
adjusted annually for inflation). The remaining provisions of 
the bill contain no intergovernmental mandates and would impose 
no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: H.R. 4687 contains 
a private-sector mandate as defined by the UMRA. Section 6 
would require private-sector entities, if subpoenaed, to 
provide testimony and evidence related to matters the National 
Construction Safety Team would be empowered to investigate. 
Such a requirement would be a private-sector mandate as defined 
by UMRA. CBO expects that the probability of an event that 
would trigger such as an investigation is very low. 
Consequently, although the precise number of individuals likely 
to be subpoenaed under this provision is uncertain, CBO expects 
that the direct cost of the mandate to private-sector entities 
would be well below the annual threshold established by UMRA 
($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs, Ken Johnson; Impact on 
State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman; Impact on 
the Private Sector: Cecil McPherson.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                  XI. Compliance With Public Law 104-4

    H.R. 4687 contains provisions that allow the director of 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology to issue 
subpoenas on behalf of a National Construction Safety Team to 
governmental and private-sector entities. The Congressional 
Budget Office finds that this is an intergovernmental and 
private-sector mandate, but estimates that the costs of 
complying with this provision are well below the threshold 
established by Public Law 104-4.

         XII. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    The Committee on Science's oversight findings and 
recommendations are reflected in the body of this report.

      XIII. Statement on General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Pursuant to clause (3)(c)(4) of House Rule XIII, the goals 
and objectives of H.R. 4687 are to investigate building 
failures in order to make recommendations that will result in 
changes in building codes, standards, and practices, as well as 
evacuation and emergency response procedures. These 
recommendations should include a description of how the safety 
of buildings will be improved if adopted. H.R. 4687 also 
requires two annual reports to Congress. The National Institute 
of Standards and Technology must submit a report detailing 
investigations conducted under this Act, recommendations made 
by National Construction Safety Teams and a description of how 
NIST responded to these recommendations. The advisory committee 
established under this Act must also submit a report evaluating 
investigations conducted under this Act and an assessment of 
the implementation of the recommendations made by Teams.

                XIV. Constitutional Authority Statement

    Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United 
States grants Congress the authority to enact H.R. 4687.

                XV. Federal Advisory Committee Statement

    The functions of the advisory committee established by H.R. 
4687 are not currently being nor could they be performed by one 
or more agencies or by enlarging the mandate of another 
existing advisory committee.

                 XVI. Congressional Accountability Act

    The Committee finds that H.R. 4687 does not relate to the 
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services 
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of 
the Congressional Accountability Act (Public Law 104-1).

      XVII. Statement on Preemption of State, Local, or Tribal Law

    This bill is not intended to preempt any state, local, or 
tribal law.

      XVIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italics and, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

  SECTION 7 OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                           FISCAL YEAR 1986

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                          STRUCTURAL FAILURES

  Sec. 7. The National Bureau of Standards, on its own 
initiative but only after consultation with local authorities, 
may initiate and conduct investigations to determine the causes 
of structural failures in structures which are used or occupied 
by the general public. No part of any report resulting from 
such investigation, or from an investigation under the National 
Construction Safety Team Act, shall be admitted as evidence or 
used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any 
matter mentioned in such report.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                     XIX. Committee Recommendations

    On May 22, a quorum being present, the Committee on Science 
favorably reported the National Construction Safety Team Act, 
by a voice vote and recommended its enactment.

                 XX. Administration Letter on H.R. 4687

                             General Counsel of the
                      United States Department of Commerce,
                                      Washington, DC, May 21, 2002.
Hon. Sherwood Boehlert,
Chairman, Committee on Science,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: This is to present the views of the 
Administration on H.R. 4687, the National Construction Safety 
Team Act. The bill would authorize the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to establish investigative 
teams to respond to major building failure events. The teams 
would investigate the performance of buildings in and following 
such events and the probable technical cause of the building 
failures. Based on its technical findings, NIST would recommend 
improvements to standards, codes and practices. NIST would also 
recommend future research to improve building safety as well as 
evacuation and emergency response procedures. To support these 
investigations, the bill would provide NIST with investigatory 
powers, including subpoena power. The bill would also extend 
those powers to NIST for its proposed investigations into the 
collapse of buildings at the World Trade Center.
    Among Federal laboratories, NIST is uniquely qualified to 
conduct comprehensive building failure investigations. NIST's 
Building and Fire Research Laboratory is the foremost in its 
field, and through the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Program, NIST is the principal agency involved in R&D to 
improve building codes and standards for structures and 
lifelines. NIST has extensive disaster investigation experience 
and expertise--including investigations following structural or 
construction failures, fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, and 
tornadoes. Some of the most prominent of these were the 1981 
collapse of a walkway in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, 
the 1986 Dupont Plaza Hotel fire in San Juan, Puerto Rico, the 
1994 Northridge earthquake collapses, and the 1995 Kobe, Japan 
earthquake building collapses.
    NIST is currently proposing to undertake a building and 
fire safety investigation into the collapse of several of the 
buildings at the World Trade Center. That investigation is part 
of an overall response plan with three main elements. One is 
the 24-month investigation of the building construction, 
materials and technical conditions that combined to cause these 
disasters following the initial impact of the aircraft. The 
second element is a multi-year research and development program 
to provide the technical basis to support improved building and 
fire codes, standards, and practices. The results of this 
program will support the voluntary consensus process that is 
used in the United States to develop codes and standards. 
Third, the response plan calls for an industry-led 
dissemination and technical assistance program to provide 
practical guidance and tools to better prepare facility owners, 
contractors, designers, and emergency personnel to respond to 
future disasters.
    The Administration supports the NIST response plan and has 
requested $16 million as part of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency's FY 2002 supplemental budget request to 
support the NIST investigation. The President's FY 2003 budget 
request to Congress also requests an increase of $2 million in 
base funding to support other elements of the NIST response 
plan. NIST's Building and Fire Research Laboratory has already 
redirected about $2 million of its existing base funds to 
support the response plan.
    The Administration supports the intent of H.R. 4687. To 
this end, the Administration supports vesting NIST with 
subpoena power to complete full and thorough investigations of 
major structural failures, provided however that enforcement 
power rests, as is typical, with the Department of Justice. At 
the same time, the Administration is concerned that the 
historic role of NIST as a technological and standard-setting 
body not be materially altered by this legislation. NIST has 
operated effectively in the past to investigate building and 
structural failures, and we wish to work closely with the 
Congress to ensure that NIST not be tasked in this bill with 
inappropriate regulatory responsibilities. The Administration 
will seek improvements in the bill to address liability and 
other issues that might otherwise discourage private sector 
participation on investigatory teams, and to ensure that NIST 
is not transformed into a regulatory or quasi-regulatory 
agency. In addition, the Administration requests that the 
authorization levels conform to the President's FY 2003 budget.
    Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. The 
Office of Management and Budget has advised us that, from the 
standpoint of the Administration's program, there is not 
objection to submission of this letter.
            Sincerely,
                                             Theodore W. Kassinger.

                                  
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