REPORT OF THE 

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 

TASK FORCE 

ON 

Year 2000 

April 1998 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR ACQUISITION and TECHNOLOGY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140 
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB 

is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent 

advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the 

official position of the Department of Defense. 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED. 
DEFENSE SCIENCE 

BOARD 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

31 40 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140 

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

on Year 2000 

Attached is the final report of the DSB Task Force on the Year 

2000. This Task Force was asked to determine if the priorities 

assigned, resources allocated, and funding strategy used to 

implement the Department's Year 2000 program are sufficient. 

The Summary Findings of the Task Force are: 

-- The Y2K problem is a very serious one; it is a big 

system and system management problem. DoD is experienced and capable 

in analyzing, structuring and managing such programs. 

- - Further, Y2K is a CEO problem, not just a CIO problem; 

it needs direction and guidance from the top; its solution must 

involve all users of IT which certainly includes the Chairman and 

the CINCs as well as the more traditional users. 

The Task Force makes three major Recommendations: 

1. USD(A&T) should appoint a full time executive with the 

requisite authority and staff to provide the needed leadership and 

the overall plan for addressing the Y2K problem. Specific tasks to 

insure that each area is following a disciplined approach, is 

getting reliable support and has reasonable consistency with the 

rest of the Department are delineated. 

2. OSD should establish a Y2K "escape valve" fund under the 

direct control of the Y2K executive to be made available for certain 

special needs. Funds should be established now and also put into 

the FY99 budget. 

3 . OSD should work with the components to establish strong 

incentives for program managers and the other key people to provide 

the necessary attention and emphasis to the Y2K issue. 

The Task Force believes the Department needs to take these 

steps to get on top of the Y2K problem and to reduce substantially 

the risks associated with these problems. 
The Task Force, its advisors and its support staff consisted of 

an exceptionally competent group of dedicated individuals. It was a 

pleasure to work with them. 

w 

Charles A. 

Task Force 

Fowler 

Chair 

David R. Heebner 

Task Force Vice Chair 

Attachment 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................. I 

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................................... II 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... III 

1 . INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1 

A . CURRENT PROGRAM ......... .................................................................................................................. 1 

I . The Problem ................. .................................................................................................................. 1 

2 . DOD Approach ............ ................................................................ ........................................... 1 

3 . Status: Good News .......................................................................... ........................................... 3 

B . TASK FORCE APPROACH ................................ ................................................................... 4 

II. SPECIFIC AREAS REVIEWED ................................................................................................................. 5 

A . THE DOD PROCESS AND RESOURCES ........... .............................................................. 5 

1 . Monitoring ................................................... ............................................................................. 5 

2 . Prioritization/ Mission Critical .............................................................................................. Systems 6 

3 . Resource Utilization ............................................................................................................................ 7 

B . MANAGEMENT ISSUES ............................................................................................................................... 7 

1 . Incentives/ Disincentives .................................................................................................................... 8 

2 . Replacement of Legacy Systems ................................................... ..................................... IO 

3 . Promulgation of Fixes ....................................................................................................................... 12 

2 . Emergency Response Teams ......................................................................................................... 18 

4 . Summary ............................................................................................. ........... .............. 20 

2 . Transportation ................................................................................... 

.. 

c . TESTING, EMERGENCY RESPONSE, AND CONTINGENCY PLANS ............................................................. 15 

I . Testing ............. 

3 . Contingency Plans ............................................................................. 

............................................................................................................................. 15 

................................... 19 

D . BUSINESS-LIKE SYSTEMS ...... ............................................................... 21 

1 . Logistics ............................ ..................................................................................... 22 

3 . Financial Operations .................................... .......................... ....................................... 22 

....................................................... 22 

1 . Weapon Systems ............................................................................................................................. 23 

2 . Command, Control and Communications (C3) ............................................................................. 24 

3 . Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) ........................................................................................................ 26 

F . INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION WARFARE ...................... ........................................ 29 

1 . Information Warfare (I W) related to Y2K ..................... ..... ................................................. 29 

2 . Information Warfare Threat .............................................................................................................. 30 

3 . Phase by Phase Threat Analysis ..................................................................................................... 31 

4 . Counter measures ................................................................................ 

5 . Intelligence Summary ........................................................................... 

E . OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS ...... 

G . MEDICAL SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................... 

H . SUMMARY FINDING ............................................ .............................................................. 39 

III . RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 41 

A . USD(A&T) SHOULD APPOINT A FULL TIME EXECUTIVE..................................................................... 

1. Identify the REALLY Mission Critical Systems.................... 

............................................................... 41 

3 . Testing ............................................................................................................................................... 41 

2 . Management ............................................................. 

I 
4. Information Warfare [IW] Vulnerabilities ..........................................................................42 

5 . Other Responsibilities .................................................................................................42 .. 

B . OSD SHOULD ESTABLISHA Y2K “ESCAPE VALVE” FUND UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE Y2K 

EXECUTIVE ................................................................................................................................................... 43 

1 . The “escape fund" is to be made available for the following: ..................................... 43 

2 . Sources for this fund: ........................................................................................................................ 43 

THE OTHER KEY PEOPLE .................................................................................................................................44 

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................... 45 

C. OSD SHOULD WORK WITH THE COMPONENTS TO ESTABLISH INCENTIVES FOR PROGRAM MANAGERS AND 

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE .................................................................................................. 47 

APPENDIX B: MEMBERS AND ADVISORS ........................................................................49

APPENDIX C: DATES AND AGENDA ...................................................................................................... 51 

APPENDIX D: SUB-PANELS LEADERS AND MEMBERS ............................................................... 57 

APPENDIX E: LIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................................................................... 59 

TABLE 1 --- Y2KSTATISTICS ............................................................................................................................. 3 

TABLE 2 ---THREAT CONDITON/ RESPONSE ................................................................................ 33 
Most, but not all, of the problems associated with computer systems’ calendar date 

format and the coming year 2000 are due to the use of a two digit year designation in which 

the year 2000 will become 00 and be interpreted as 1900. This could cause computers to 

quit functioning or produce incorrect data outputs, which could result in problems such as 

incorrect calculations of pay and retirement, mis-pointing of directional antennae, erasure of 

data fields, and rejection and return of “old” items. 

Within DOD, the ASD (C3I), as Chief Information Officer (CIO), has been responsible 

for the development of the DOD Y2K Action Plan [January 1997] and the DOD 

Management Plan [April 1997]. These include a five-phase process covering Awareness, 

Assessment, Renovation, Validation, and Implementation. An initial effort to identify 

Mission Critical [MC] systems on which to focus resulted in over 3,000 computers being 

labeled MC. This is because MC systems were defined as being those whose degradation 

would cause a loss of a core capability. Brief probing by the DSB Task Force suggests that 

by applying the "so what" test, the number of "priority MC system" could be reduced by a 

factor of 10 or greater. 

In the current DOD management of the Y2K problem, policy and oversight are 

centralized in OSD, while execution is decentralized to the component Services, CINCs, 

Agencies, etc. Each component is funding Y2K fixes out of existing budgets - a so called 

“take-it-out-of-hide” approach. Information on each MC system is listed in the Defense 

Information Support Tools (DIST), and DOD has a goal of fielding and testing all MC 

systems by November 1998 to allow a full year to work out the bugs. 

The Task Force feels the current management approach has problems in that status 

reporting is too general, lacks measurable references to any program plan, and lacks 

enforcement of “exit/ entrance” criteria. Despite the fact that industry and commercial 

concerns view the Y2K problem with alarm, DOD components report no difficulty in meeting 

compliance by 2000, and have focused little attention on promulgation of “ fixes,” risk 

management, or development of contingency plans. Program managers and other key 

people have no specific incentives to give the Y2K problem priority over other issues, 

especially system performance improvements. 

The Task Force believes that the Y2K probiem is a major system management 

problem, capable of being solved with DOD experience in analysis, structure and 

management of programs. The key is that DOD recognize that Y2K is a CEO problem, not 

just a CIO problem, and that DOD needs direction and guidance from the top. Any solution 

should involve all users of IT, and should certainly include the Chairman and ClNCs as well 

as more traditional users. 

The Task Force makes three major recommendations, the first of which is the 

appointment of a full time executive with requisite authority and staff to provide the needed 
leadership and overall plan for addressing the Y2K problem. The Task Force has 

delineated specific tasks to insure that each area is following a disciplined approach, is 

getting reliable support, and has reasonable consistency with the rest of DOD. These tasks 

include identification of really Mission Critical systems, management, testing, Information 

Warfare [IW] vulnerabilities, and a host of other responsibilities. 

Secondly, the Task Force recommends the establishment by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) of a Y2K “escape valve” fund under the direct control of the 

Y2K executive to be made available for certain special needs. These funds should be 

established now and put into the FY99 budget. 

Thirdly, the Task Force recommends that OSD work with the components to 

establish strong incentives for program managers and other key people to provide the 

necessary attention and emphasis to the Y2K issue. 

It is not possible to foretell precisely the total impact of Y2K problems on DOD 

operations. However, the U.S. has sized and equipped its forces predicated on 

overwhelming information superiority and this is widely known. The risk of being unable to 

operate effectively and efficiently during any crisis that might occur during the transition 

period is sufficiently serious that prudence demands that DOD take those steps needed to 

reduce that risk substantially. The Task Force believes that the measures it has 

recommended are necessary and appropriate for such risk reduction. 

IV
The Year 2000 (Y2K) Task Force was formed at the request of the USD(A&T) to 

review the issues the DOD faced in dealing with the technological problems associated with 

the arrival of the Year 2000, frequently referred to (erroneously) as the beginning of the next 

Millennium. 

The Terms of Reference (TOR) are shown in Appendix A. The members of the 

Task Force, Government Advisors, and supporting staff are listed in Appendix B. 

A. Current Program 

1. The Problem 

Since the beginning of the information age [circa 1950] no standardized calendar 

date format has been used - more than twenty formats have evolved, most of which do 

not accommodate the century change. 

The DOD uses computers; including embedded computers and control devices, to 

perform or support: business functions [financial and personnel management, health care, 

contract management, and logistics management], strategic/ tactical operations 

[mobilization, deploying, and maneuvering forces and weapons systems used by the 

forces], and intelligence, surveillance and security efforts. 

Most, but not all, of the problems are due to the long-standing use of a two digit year 

designation. Thus year 2000 will become 00 and be interpreted as 1900, which can cause 

computers and control devices with date microchips to quit functioning or produce incorrect 

data outputs. Some of the many possible impacts follow: some systems won’t work at all; 

incorrect calculations of pay; incorrect retirement dates and interest; assumption of 1900 

satellite ephemeredes and associated mis-pointing of directional antennas; erasure of entire 

data fields; and rejection and return of “old” items. 

I This may be looked at as an excellent example of self-inflicted 

information warfa re! 

2. DOD Approach 

The White House Office of Management and Budget [OMB] is in overall charge of 

the Federal government Y2K efforts and the DOD reports progress to OMB on a regular 

basis. 
ASD (C3I), the DOD Chief Information Officer [CIO], has been responsible for 

developing and publishing the DOD Y2K Action Plan [January 1997] and the DOD Y2K 

Management Plan [April 1997]. 

The process for addressing the issue consists of five phases: Awareness, 

Assessment, Renovation, Validation and Implementation. An early step in the process is to 

identify Mission Critical [MC] systems. The effort thereafter focuses on MC systems. The 

current definition of an MC system is one whose degradation would cause a loss of a core 

capability. This definition led to a large number [several thousand] of systems being listed 

as MC. A tighter definition is being devised now which will make some reduction [probably 

20-30 percent] in the number systems listed as MC. The DOD goal is to have all MC 

systems totally fielded and operationally tested by December 1998, thereby giving a full 

year to wring out all the bugs. 

The DOD management approach consists of the following: 

Centralized Policy and Oversight by OSD 

Decentralized Execution by the Components [Services, JCS/CINCs, Agencies] 

Resources: No identified DOD funding; each component will fund Y2K work out 

of existing budgets; a "take it take-it-out-of-hide" approach 

Information on each system being worked [except, as noted later, the intelligence 

systems] is listed in the Defense Information Support Tools (DIST). 

There are frequent meetings and status reports. Much of this reporting is 

required for the quarterly report to OMB. Some additional reporting is required to 

OSD. 

. 

2 
The 3rd quarter, 1997 report showed: 

Total systems Identified 25,054 

Mission Critical 3,143 

Compliant 

Being replaced 

Planned Terminations 

To repair 

In Assessment 

In Renovation 

In Validation 

In Implementation 

Completed repair 

Total 

*672 

203 

128 

2,140 

148 

1,045 

605 

305 

37 

2,140 

*But Not Proven 

Table 1 - Y2K Statistics 

The focus of DSB and OMB attention has been on the 3000 

plus so called “Mission Critical” systems 

3. Status: Good News 

There is now top level interest and concern with the Y2K problem in DOD with 

the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Chairman, the Department Secretaries 

and Agency Heads receiving regular reports. 

Much good work has been and is being done in many places. . 

Many old legacy systems are being replaced. 

Most weapon systems do not have serious “date” problems BUT many of the 

systems they interface with do. Also, the hardware used by some systems may 

have embedded “date” problems that are not apparent from examining the 

software alone. 

The efforts in the DOD medical community are impressive and probably ahead of 

the civilian community. There are, however, some issues that need addressing 

as noted later. 

3 
B. Task Force Approach 

The task Force held a series of meetings, the dates and agendas of which are 

presented in Appendix C. Panels were formed to gather more detailed information -the 

members and leaders of the panels are found in Appendix D. Briefings and visits made by 

the panels are shown in Appendix E. Section II, that follows, consists of the reports from 

the panels 

The Task Force as a whole developed a number of Observations, Concerns, and 

Findings, based on the meetings and reports and presented in Section Ill. These forrned 

the basis of the Recommendations listed in Section IV. 

4 
A. The DOD Process and Resources 

The following paragraphs deal with the monitoring of ongoing Y2K activities, the 

prioritization of mission critical systems, and resource utilization, all of which are essential in 

assuring that the process is managed efficiently, thoroughly, and cost-effectively, while also 

assuring that critical milestones are met. 

I 1. Monitoring 

The only OSD level guidance dealing with the Y2K problem is the “Year 2000 

Management Plan,” version 1, dated April 1997, published by the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence (C3I), Information Technology Directorate. This Management Plan calls 

for a “central policy and decentralized implementation” with responsibilities 

distributed across the various services, programs and agencies within DOD. 

While the Plan defines generic steps to be taken by DOD organizations to 

identify systems needing remediation, checklists to assure compliance, and includes 

formal reporting mechanisms, it lacks a unified, overall schedule, milestones, risk 

mitigation strategy, and designated anticipated resources required to execute the 

activity. There also does not appear to be any SECDEF level guidance directing 

subordinate agencies’ compliance with Y2K performance standards, including 

monitoring of activity and resource utilization. 

Although a progress reporting template has been established, and a 

significant record keeping effort is under way, it does not appear to have a solid 

metrics program in place to accomplish the following: 

. Identify quantitative and qualitative goals at a milestone or elemental level 

Provide meaningful measures to track progress against these goals 

. Define threshold indicators to trigger management actions 

Provide a tracking/ closure methodology to assure compliance and 

success 

To remedy these shortcomings, an effort should be made to create a policy 

and directive to establish common objectives for the program and with other 

Departments of the Federal Government. Also, a mechanism needs to be put in 

5 
place to collect plans and schedules and to track execution and expenditures of 

resources against the plan in order to define, organize and track the progress of the 

disparate Y2K activities across the DOD. 

The Task Force recommends the establishment of a full time executive with 

the requisite staff to provide the needed leadership and the overall plan for 

addressing the Y2K problem. The executive would reside in an Office of Primary 

Responsibility (OPR) appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The OPR should be 

responsible for the development of a comprehensive Year 2000 Remediation Plan to 

provide templates, schedules, milestones, tools, and performance and fiscal 

reporting mechanisms for effective oversight and implementation of the remediation 

process. The OPR needs to be given the authority to determine which systems are 

“mission critical” in order to assign remediation priorities. Functional user input 

should be sought in determining mission critical systems, and reviewed by the 

JCS/CINCs. The OPR should provide a standardized reporting mechanism, and be 

held responsible for tracking and assuring performance and compliance with the 

Remediation Plan. 

Comprehensive test plans must be put into place linked to specific program 

plans and milestones. Provision for compliance audits need to be established to 

verify the readiness of mission critical systems, and that schedules are being met. 

Community of interest Project Managers should be established and held 

accountable for systems interface. Mechanisms for monitoring compliance of 

commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and government-off- the-shelf (GOTS) should be 

established, and JITC should be considered as the prime DOD organization 

responsible. JITC should work with GSA and other Governmental organizations in 

disseminating this information community wide. 

2. Prioritization/ Mission Critical Systems 

Over 3,000 systems have been identified as being “mission critical” - but 

there are indications that the current prioritization approach does not adequately 

identify the systems most in need of special attention. Some of the systems 

identified, while important (i.e., video conferencing), are not in the same class as 

other truly critical systems (i.e., logistics system). In some systems the manner of 

Y2K failure, while an inconvenience, may not preclude the system from normal basic 

functions. 

It is possible that the number of systems identified as “mission critical” could 

be reduced by a factor of 10 through the application of the “so what?” test. This 

would allow DOD to focus on the systems that need most attention. While focusing 

on the really “mission critical” systems will minimize the risk to DOD’s warfighting 

capability, it is important to note that it will not fully solve the Y2K problem. There are 

thousands other systems of that are important, though not “mission critical” that 

ultimately need to be addressed to restore full warfighting capability. 

6 
3. Resource Utilization 

Currently expenditures to assure Y2K compliance will be contained within 

normal operating budgets. This “take-it-out-of-hide” approach seems to work well in 

those places where there is an ongoing program, including planned IT system 

replacements and upgrades. However, where no such designated funding is 

provided, performance accountability may suffer. With programs reporting “no bad 

news” or with no funding visibility, the ability to sweep the effort “under the rug” must 

be avoided. Systems with no defined program office or budget may not have 

needed funding. 

The “take-it-out-of-hide” approach also provides no resources for fixing 

“homeless” systems (e.g., those without a program office or budget) or for the 

replacement of legacy systems in financially strapped areas. To date, there is no 

evidence of solid “Bases of Estimate” for the operational or functional units’ 

remediation efforts. Some system developed in the “field” may not have strong 

configuration management, development processes, or qualified resources to 

remediate these systems. Perhaps most important, no funding mechanisms exist for 

system interface and “system-of-systems” testing. 

It is not possible to estimate the total cost of addressing the Y2K problem, 

because remediations have not been fully estimated, the costs of ongoing activities 

have not been clearly identified or segregated, and testing phase cost estimates do 

not exist yet. Finally, funding must be provided or allocated for the period and efforts 

AFTER the year 2000. There will be substantial costs to address temporary fixes, to 

fix non-”mission critical” systems, and to implement new capabilities that were 

postponed either to allow work on the Y2K problem or because of the fear of 

introducing new problems at this critical time. 

B. Management Issues 

The DSB Year 2000 Task Force has had presentations from various consulting 

groups, to include: MITRE; Keane Inc.; Science Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC); Paul Strassman, Inc; Bellcore; and International Business Machines (IBM). In 

addition, the panel had overviews from various operating functions from within the 

Department of Defense. 

If DOD wants and expects critical systems to work on January 1 , 2000, with a high 

degree of probability, or if DOD needs assurance that sufficient progress is being made, 

then in our judgement, the DOD Y2K program lacks adequate control. 

Our unease is driven by the following: 

7 
The size and impact of the Y2K problem on operations are unclear. 

The resources committed to solve the Y2K problem are partially visible, but also 

partially buried in programs and operation. 

Whether a small or large fraction of technical resources is currently involved in 

Y2K is unknown, so surge capability is unknown. 

Commercial organizations, in finance, logistics, and transportation, are spending 

hundreds of millions of dollars for testing and remediation, which is much larger 

than visible DOD investment. 

The portfolio of Y2K efforts includes individual efforts that are very well done, and 

others that are unmanaged. Therefore the portfolio quality is questionable. 

Most software programs do not meet schedule originally envisioned 

The downside, or disruption, if mission critical systems are jeopardized is 

substantial 

Three primary management issues have evolved for the Task Force and are 

discussed in the following sections: 

Incentives -what incentives could be used to help facilitate timely and through 

resolution of Y2K problems 

Replacement of Legacy Systems -what approaches could be used to 

encourage replacement of legacy systems increasing long term benefits to DOD. 

Promulgation of fixes -what approaches could be used to effectively share tips, 

processes, and software to correct Y2K problems. 

1. Incentives/ Disincentives 

After review and presentation by weapons system programs, functional 

managers and Service executives, we believe that the Y2K problem is not 

adequately defined, the magnitude of the solution is unclear. The consequences of 

failure have been defined too broadly. Operational commanders understand too 

little the implications of Y2K to operations. All of which raises concerns about the 

outcome of the project. Such conditions on a weapons system project would raise 

alarms, and we believe should with respect to Y2K. These conditions result in 

inadequate motivation down the line leading to less than desired urgency, greater 

uncertainty, inappropriate tradeoffs, and schedule slippage. Furthermore the current 

implementation of the Defense Reform Initiative may lead to further elimination, 

8 
reduction and or retirement of key personnel with the associated possible loss of 

Y2K knowledge and experience. 

Our impressions are more true for support functions than for weapon 

systems, on average. We believe that: 

Objectives are too general, incomplete and only measurable at the 

extremes of catastrophic failure or complete success. 

Priority is a staff priority, delegated to lower levels, with regular but too 

infrequent reviews of progress, slippage, or risk. 

Grades of failure from catastrophic to minor need to be defined by 

individual system, failure modes identified, and urgency clarified. 

Organizational responsibility, instead of dispersed as broadly as it is, 

needs to be strongly coordinated, measured and evaluated by a powerful 

project group at the center. 

Resources taken ‘out of hide’ favor those organizations most likely to be 

advanced in their understanding of the problem, and disadvantage those 

organizations most likely to be laggard. 

Technical people will be in greater demand as testing peaks in 1998, both 

inside and outside of DOD. Little has been done to ensure that technical 

people are available as needs peak and as rapidly escalating 

compensation externally exerts pressure on people to retire or resign. 

This is particularly a worry if test results show substantial shortcomings. 

Motivating a dispersed organization, with many competing priorities, is not 

easy. Currently, many of the lessons learned on weapon system development 

about project team motivation are not being rigorously applied to this equally 

complex project. They should be. 

The Motivation sub-team has the following observations to consider. Y2K 

should be managed like the large, complex and potentially disruptive project that it is. 

DOD has great experience in managing complex projects. The lessons, skills and 

structure from those projects need to be applied to Y2K. The vast difference in 

motivation between a well organized project and a poorly organized project is 

understood and well known. The management techniques that create successful 

weapons system teams need to be applied to this project at the earliest possible 

time, in doing what DOD already knows what to do: 

Clarify Objectives: Although financial objectives are clear, there is a need 

to be clear about operational readiness, maximum tolerable disruption, 

extent of legacy system switching, and other non-financial objectives. 

9 
Establish priorities: Establish Y2K as a major CINC/line priority, instead of 

a staff, or even more inappropriately, a CIO concern. 

. Identify the consequences of failure. 

. Identify more clearly the consequences of failing to correct critical, 

important, or support/ indirect systems, system by system. An appropriate 

sense of urgency can then be created for each weapons system, each 

operational unit, and the portfolio of systems as a whole. 

Create a project organization: Create an organization appropriate to the 

problem, with the power to move quickly, intervene in line organization 

programs where necessary, and marshal the SECDEF, USD and 

Chairman, JCS attention where needed. Install normal time, cost, and 

technical performance measures. 

Resource adequately: Insure that more than enough resources (time, 

money, programmers) are available for critical systems, and at least 

sufficient resources for important systems. Particularly review ‘homeless’ 

systems for adequate resources for few managers will be motivated to 

spend time and resources on testing and fixing these. 

. Improve individual motivation: Within the technical community 

responsible for testing and fixing systems, take extraordinary steps to 

motivate key people through 2001, including carryover of bonuses as are 

being offered elsewhere to retain programmers, and acquisition of test 

tools without long procurement and administrative delays, and the like. 

2. Replacement of Legacy Systems 

Based upon information presented to date and conversations with task force 

members, the team has the following observations with regard to replacement of 

legacy systems where required within the various DOD agencies. These 

observations are followed by a background section on relevant issues. 

a. Observations 

The DOD should set aside enhanced funding, approximately $100M, 

to be made available for replacement of legacy systems where this is critical 

and other program funds are not available. Each agency, in the process of 

performing a Y2K assessment/ inventory of their systems, should determine 

whether system replacement outweighs current system fixes for the 

maximum in long term benefits and the minimum in risk. The various 

agencies should present these business cases for system replacement to the 

Y2K Steering Committee who would select those proposals demonstrating 

10 
the most merit. Final funding approval for implementation should be obtained 

by the Comptroller. 

DOD should take advantage of COTS/GOTS as replacement 

solutions whenever practical. 

b. Sources for this enhanced funding could be from the following: 

1) funds earmarked for routine Operational Test and Evaluation 

(OT&E) for all systems; 

2) funds from prior year USG contracts; 

3) 85 person years of DOD IG and Service audit agencies efforts to 

examine status diverted to fixing Y2K problems; and 

4) OSD imposed tax across some or all of the DOD budget to 

augment above resources. 

DOD needs the ability to grant requests to carry over end-of-year 

funds for Y2K projects. This should include Operations and Maintenance 

(O&M) funds and the transfer of other funds (Research and Development 

[R&D] and Procurement) into 0&M type activities for the purpose of fixing 

Y2K problems. DOD must work closely with the Comptroller and Congress to 

get the exemptions and permission to allow this to happen. 

c. Background Findings and Issues 

The goals and objectives of the DOD Y2K Management Plan 

encourage agencies to recognize the Y2K problem as an opportunity to retire 

legacy systems early. However, at issue is the fact that the services have 

been directed to utilize existing funds for system replacement should this be 

their elected Y2K solution. This "take-it-out-of-hide" approach seems to work 

well in those areas where there is an ongoing program including planned IT 

system replacements and upgrades. On the other hand, this directive has 

encouraged some agencies to understate Y2K issues or take the least-cost 

approach toward Y2K compliance which, in some cases, may not be the best 

long-term solution from an IT standpoint. Legacy system replacement could 

allow for long-term cost savings but not necessarily within the Y2K horizon. 

The "out-of-hide" approach provides no resources for: fixing 

"homeless" systems (those without a program office, budget, etc.); replacing 

legacy systems in financially strapped areas; and, funding interface and 

"system-of-systems" testing. 
The organizations with the worst "legacy system" problems are those 

with less knowledge, technical skill and resources. They are least able to 

manage and fund replacements. Likewise, they are most in need of 

resources and direction, from OSD. They are most likely to have problems 

due to old, complex hardware or software. 

d. Legacy System Summary 

Early Y2K testing is important to accelerate identification of those 

legacy systems that fail Y2K. Timing for replacement of these systems is 

important. Otherwise implementing last minute and costly patches may end 

up being the only solutions. Additionally, Y2K fixes will likely add new system 

"bugs" to established systems, complicating attempts to remedy Y2K 

problems quickly. Furthermore, as mentioned subsequently, replacement 

funds may be needed for financially strapped areas. 

3. Promulgation of Fixes 

Based upon information presented to date and conversations with task force 

members, the team has made the following observations with regard to promulgation 

of "fixes" across the various DOD agencies. These observations are followed by a 

background section on relevant issues. 

. 

a. The Problem 

There seem to be many areas in need of management attention and 

there are several crucial areas where top level direction, guidance and 

program review are needed: 

1) It is not possible to determine accurately the current status of Y2K 

fixing because the level of reporting is too general and lacks 

measurable references to any program plan benchmarks, and 

because few systems have entered the crucial testing phase. 

2) Good program management processes do not appear to be in 

place to report against and, thus, realistic determination of status of 

the ongoing efforts is not possible. 

3) Enforcement of "exit/ entrance" criteria for the several phases is 

lacking. 

4) Almost all presentations report everything is going well and no 

difficulty is expected in meeting compliance by 2000. 

5) In contrast industry and commercial concerns view their problems 

12 
with alarm. 

We seem to have the worst of both worlds with lots of reporting 

required of the components but little value to the reports. Although 

some, perhaps most, of the reporting is needed to meet OMB 

requirements, much could be done to make the reports more 

meaningful and to reduce the number of reports. Efforts are 

needed to automate the required reporting from the DlST and 

other information collection tools currently in use. 

There has been inadequate attention to promulgation of "fixes," 

risk management and development of contingency plans. 

There are no specific incentives for program managers to give the 

Y2K problem priority over other issues especially system 

performance improvements. 

The DOD no longer has much clout in getting attention to their special 

problems since they represent a very small part of the business base of U.S. 

computer and software industries. Further, many of these companies seem 

to feel they have no responsibility for Y2K compliance of previously delivered 

products. High level attention would help the programs in dealing with this 

issue. 

b. Background Findings and Issues 

Y2K Project Tracking -the level of reporting on Y2K status has been 

too general and lacks measurable references to any program plan. A review 

that goes down to lower levels of the organization reflects the true status of a 

project is not on schedule as the briefs may indicate. At the service level, it 

appears there is no real analysis being done on how or why the plans on 

various systems are changing over time. It cannot be determined what 

specific systems are slipping schedule and why, which leads to the 

conclusion that better methods of project management need to be applied. 

Effective Communications - there has been inadequate attention to 

the promulgation of "fixes." While working groups may function well in 

uncovering Y2K issues and disseminating this information within the Y2K 

community, it does not appear to filter down to the lower program 

management levels where implementation of the "fixes" to these issues is 

critical. Working groups tend to function as purely a reporting mechanism. A 

central OPR could facilitate this communication. 

13 
Testing -promulgation of fixes efficiently will become more urgent as 

more organizations enter the testing phase. There is a likelihood that a "bow 

wave" of problems identified in test will exist - perhaps beyond available 

resources. Efficient promulgation will be critical to solving problems in a 

timely manner. Likewise promulgation of failures without fear of litigation 

reaction by vendors must take place. 

c. The Solution 

Assure effective Y2K communication is taking place across all working 

levels. While Working Groups may serve well as status reporting 

mechanisms, the DOD Y2K executive needs to ensure that the appropriate 

outcome of these Working Group efforts is communicated down through the 

proper levels, which could mean as far down as the Program Management 

tier. 

The main promulgation vehicle that should be considered is a central 

web site that has all relevant information pertaining to the overall DOD Year 

2000 Program Plan. Not only could this web site contain the unified, overall 

DOD schedule, milestones and risk mitigation strategy, but should serve as 

the primary sharing media for information on Y2K problems, best practices, 

lessons learned, COTS/GOTS Y2K compliance, Y2K tools, and for 

leveraging Y2K experiences across the different agencies. 

The GSA comprehensive web site could serve this purpose. 

However, should this web site be made publicly available, there would be 

some vulnerabilities in regard to disclosure of DOD trouble areas, issues, or 

other topics considered sensitive in nature. Considering this, the web site 

could be structured such that only Y2K functional areas or broad categories 

of Y2K work efforts would be identified along with corresponding points of 

contact for more detailed information. This would support information access 

on a need-to-know basis only. 

The Working Groups should be a primary source of input to the central 

web site. Relevant input should also be provided by the Y2K Project Office, 

and the Services Project Offices. Also, as the DOD Y2K executive office 

completes various projects throughout the DOD, they will become a vast 

repository of information, much of which will need to be shared via the web 

site. This should assist in avoiding duplicative efforts across agencies in their 

Y2K projects. 

The DOD Y2K executive should develop a checklist for projects in 

each priority tier. 

74 
One successful means of maintaining a Y2K remediation schedule is 

to surface the unknown issues as early as possible. To accomplish this, the 

DOD executive, as part of its Y2K mission, should ensure in-depth analysis of 

schedule movement. A sample of mission critical programs/ systems should 

be reviewed and tested to ensure that the status being briefed actually 

represents the realities and issues down at the detailed program level. Not 

only will this ensure issues are addressed on a timely basis, but will foster 

more effective and accurate communication of solutions across the different 

agencies. 

C. Testing, Emergency Response, and Contingency Plans 

There is no way to assure perfect operation of all mission critical systems throughout 

the Year 2000 transition. The risk of system malfunctions and their damaging effects can 

be minimized if careful attention is paid to system and system-of-system (systems 

integration) testing, emergency response teams and operational contingency planning. 

1. Testing 

Inadequate attention is being paid to testing.Traditionally, half the cost and 

time of software development and repair are consumed in testing. Testing is critical 

not only for individual systems but for interface and “system-of-systems” operational 

assurance. For example, an end-to-end test of those systems needed to support a 

conventional cruise missile strike would incorporate related intelligence collection, 

analysis and processing systems, C3 systems at many command levels, mission 

planning systems and several weapons platform systems. 

Thorough system, and system-of-systems testing is essential to validate Year 

2000 system renovation. System testing for Y2K compliance verification is the most 

difficult part of the renovation, validation and implementation process (and is often 

under resourced) for many reasons: 

. Although the DOD, “Year 2000 Management Plan,” Version 2.0, (still in 

draft at the time of this report) contains a comprehensive listing of Year 

2000 critical dates, there are no standard test routines approved for 

widespread use. The USSOCOM Year 2000 Draft Test Plan, 

however, does contain checklists for known critical Year 2000 

conditions . 

. The great diversity of system functions (logistics, finance and 

accounting , com mu n icat ions, weapons systems cont ro I, intelligence) , 

the variety of system configurations in widely deployed networks, and 

the large number of Year 2000-related fault possibilities, mean that no

single test for Y2K compliance is feasible. Year 2000 problems may 

exist in software, firmware, hardware system functions, or on date 

15 
microchips embedded in control devices. 

. Year 2000 system fixes can induce other faults in systems that can 

affect functions unrelated to the intended fix. A comprehensive Year 

2000 test plan must exercise all system features to assure that the 

system operates as intended. Y2K faults may cause the system to 

crash or may give subtly incorrect answers; tests must detect both 

types of faults. 

Because of the promulgation of fixes, regression testing, both within 

and between, systems will become a major Y2K test effort, and must 

simulate many dates before and after January 1, 2000. 

Most critical systems interact with other systems. Even though each 

system checks out individually, system-to-system interfaces may not 

work. Several approaches exist to fixing Y2K system problems; 

systems renovated in different ways may not inter-operate. Although 

memoranda of understanding defining interface specifications between 

the owners and operators of interacting systems reduce the likelihood 

of system-to-system incompatibilities, the fact that system renovations 

are performed by a variety of contractor and vendor personnel leaves 

room for misinterpretations. Without full system and system-ofsystems environment tests, there is no assurance of overall Y2K 

corn plian ce . 

. The system test plan and environment for Y2K compliance can be as 

complex as the system or combination of systems being tested. Test 

environments must be developed as systems are being renovated in 

order that tests are not delayed or rendered ineffective by poorly 

conceived test conditions. 

System tests must include operation with legacy databases to assure 

both proper system operation and the preservation of database 

integrity . 

Vendor Y2K compliance claims are frequently in error or incomplete. 

DOD must verify Y2K compliance for itself. 

Lessons learned from systems test experience on large, complex, 

interactive systems such as the Defense Messaging System (DMS) 

show that each time changes are made to individual system elements, 

the entire system or system-of-systems must be revalidated to assure 

overall system functionality. 

. There is no central authority for certifying system Y2K compliance. At 

16 
present, when testing is performed by an independent agency, test 

results are forwarded to program managers or system operators who 

individually certify Y2K compliance. The agency itself cannot make 

that determination. 

. The “take-it-out-of- hide” funding approach to achieving Y2K 

compliance virtually assures that testing is insufficiently planned and 

executed in many systems. 

Ideally, mission- critical system and system- of systems validation testing 

would be carried out by independent agencies such as the Joint lnteroperability Test 

Center (JITC), Defense Communications Test Facility (DCTF), DISA-Westhem or 

their Service equivalents. These organizations have expanded their capabilities to 

perform Year 2000 testing, however the large amount of complex testing that must 

be carried out on mission critical systems, the short time remaining, and the testing 

resources available, dictate that most Year 2000 testing be delegated to system 

owners with independent agency oversight. Authority for Year 2000 compliance 

certification, or certification review, should be vested in duly constituted certifying 

authorities such as JITC, DCTF, Westhem or their Service counterparts. 

Since independent test agencies do not have their own funds to perform Y2K 

testing or testing technical assistance, system owners must pay for agency support 

out of current operating budgets. This is a significant disincentive to using the most 

competent system testing centers in DOD which are outside the control of the 

component. Independent testing centers (such as JITC, DCTF and Westhem) must 

and results of most critical systems and other mission critical systems that do not 

have owners. 

System (and system- of-systems) testers must be prepared to provide 

information on which to base claims for Y2K compliance. System characteristics 

and testing details and documentation should be carefully reviewed before a 

certification decision can be made. 

Year 2000 test verification of a system or system- of-systems Year 2000 

certification can be ranked according to risk of system problems in four levels (in 

order of least risky to riskiest): 

Level 1 : 

Westhem or Service equivalents) 

Certification by an independent Agency (JITC, DCTF, 

Level 2: 

Manager, System Owner or Operator 

Certification by in- house authority such as the Program 

Level 3: Vend or certification 

17 

be funded to conduct/assist with Y2K compliance testing or audit certification plans
Level 4: No certification 

Currently there are few Level 1 systems 

In view of the critical importance of testing in assuring proper operation of 

reach Level 1 or 2 status by the end of 1998. Those deemed most critical by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (nuclear weapons command and control, conventional global 

command and control, and mission planning systems, for instance) should receive 

Level 1 certification. 

A standard set of planned tests such as those described in the USSOCOM 

Year 2000 Test Plan1, as applicable to the subject system, should be mandatory for 

all certification testing. 

2. Emergency Response Teams 

Even in the most optimistic estimates of Year 2000 system operations, 

unanticipated problems will occur on many dates2 before and after the January 1 , 

2000. Many of these problems will be minor but some major system failures can be 

expected. DOD's response to these problems should be in place before the end of 

1998 to assure rapid restoration of proper operation. 

System operators must be alert to the possibility of Y2K problems. When 

encountered, response to these problems should be graduated: 

. System operators should be the first line of defense. Simple problems 

should be dealt with immediately by those in control of system 

operations in real time. These are the people most able to respond to 

unexpected problems quickly and should be trained to look for Y2K 

problems. 

System owners or program managers should establish a second 

echelon of emergency response to Y2K problems consisting of the 

technical staffs responsible for maintaining the system. These staffs 

are the subject matter experts in the operation of the specific system 

or system-of-systems that should be able to quickly comprehend 

where the problem has occurred. 

The Service System commands should provide backup capability for 

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Year 2000 Test Plan Draft of 12/17/97 

See the Year 2000 Management Plan, Version 2.0, draft, January 1998 

mission-critical systems and system-of-systems, all mission-critical systems should
system owners. The System commands have unique expertise in the 

operation of system-of-systems. 

. The independent testing agencies (JITC, DCTF, Westhem and their 

Service counterparts) are tasked with emergency response to system 

problems as part of their mission and have emergency response 

capabilities. These experts should be DOD’s resource for contending 

with the most serious Year 2000 system problems. These agencies 

should have emergency response teams available to step in quickly to 

resolve the most difficult system problems when they occur. 

Emergency response plans are not yet in place at any of these four levels. 

Since the earliest anticipated problem dates occur late in 1998, DOD should now 

insist that plans for emergency response capabilities at the system operations and 

owner levels be developed for each system deemed mission critical. Additionally, 

the independent testing agencies need to develop rapid response capabilities for 

dealing with the most serious Year 2000 problems. 

Triage procedures for managing responses to Year 2000 problems should be 

developed at the level to assure best use of emergency response capabilities. 

Information on how to call in appropriate response teams to deal with system 

problems should be readily available to managers and operators of mission critical 

systems. 

3. Contingency Plans 

Mission critical systems must have contingency plans mitigating the risks of 

system malfunction due to Y2K problems. Such plans might include fast systems 

fixes (e.g., 28 year clock decrement) find out more about this and correct 

accordingly, operational work-arounds, engineering support, and manual backup or 

older system alternatives in case of system failure. The DSB Y2K Task Force notes 

that some system owners have already developed and put in place sensible plans to 

mitigate the effects of system failure; others, however, have yet to devise such action 

plans. Of particular concern are those system managers who plan to replace 

existing non-compliant systems with new hardware and software before January 1 

2000. Many of these managers have no plan for what to do if the planned 

replacement systems do not materialize in time. 

Risk assessment and contingency plans must address such possibilities as: 

System crashes due to date failure 

Incorrect results due to errors in date data transmission and computation 

19 
. Impact on systems coupled with the contingent system 

. Program crashes due to sending or receiving incorrect data or data fields 

. Corruption of data due to incorrect data introduced into archives or 

destruction of data bases due to erroneous data cleansing 

Contingency plans should address response times and provide a basis for 

prioritizing responses to problems. 

The single manager of Y2K issues should require contingency plans of all 

mission critical system owners covering how system functions can be maintained in 

the event of system failure due to Y2K problems or failure of replacement systems to 

come on line in time to avoid Year 2000 effects. These plans should be accepted 

and understood by the operational community. The Unified Command should have 

a major role in judging the sufficiency of the contingency plans. 

4. Summary 

a. There has been inadequate attention given to the testing area. 

This is very serious given that traditionallv half the cost and time for 

software proqrams are consumed in the testing phase. Testing is critical not 

only for individual systems but for interface and "system-of-systems." For 

example: an end-to-end test of those systems needed to support a 

conventional cruise missile strike would test: relevant intelligence collection; 

analysis and processing systems; C3 systems at many command levels; 

mission planning systems; and several weapon platform systems. 

b. Other key observations relating to testing are: 

. With the great range of DOD system characteristics and the multiplicity of 

potential Y2K problems, no single test will suffice to assure Y2K 

com pIiance . 

. Testing is not an "after the fact" event. Test conditions and the test 

environment must be developed at the same time that system fixes are 

being made so that the test capability is ready when the system is 

remediated. This requires test personnel involvement throughout the five 

stages of Y2K system correction. 

. Y2K certification through testing can be considered in four categories (in 

order of system assurance, highest first): 

1) Certification by testing by an independent agency 

20 
2) Certification by system owner in-house testing 

3) Certification by vendor 

4) No certification 

Ideally, DOD mission critical systems should all fall in Category 1. At the 

least, they should have category 2 assurance. 

Independent testing agencies within DOD (e.g., JITC) are alarmed at the 

lack of requests for Y2K testing assistance by system owners and 

operators. Since their support is funded by customer funds, it is likely that 

the "take-it-out-of-hide" policy has resulted in delayed test activity which 

will likely snowball as Y2K critical dates approach. 

. DOD has no central certification authority. Although the Y2K 

management program describes test conditions, there is no assurance 

that the conditions are being uniformly applied. Those independent 

agencies within DOD that perform, oversee or assist with Y2K testing are 

prevented by policy from "certifying" Y2K compliance. Instead the results 

of their tests are forwarded to the system owner who makes the 

compliance determination. 

. Contingency planning for unanticipated problems is not being uniformly 

pursued. 

No one is taking steps to plan for and implement Emergency Response 

Teams [ERTs]. Several organizations in DOD have provision of emergency 

response teams as part of their missions. These organizations have not yet begun 

to plan for the emergency response requirements presented by Y2K problems. 

D. Systems Business-like 

Discussions were held with the Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 

Logistics, members of his staff, and various major weapon systems to gain insight on 

business-like systems - Logistics, Transportation, and Financial Operations. All of these 

business-like systems are heavily date-dependent and are extensively impacted by Y2K. 

This could pose a serious threat to the ability of DOD to carry out its mission. There are 

enterprise-wide systems (i.e., Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] and Defense Financial and 

Accounting Service [DFAS]), and each branch of the DOD has its own systems. These 

systems have been significantly automated and in many cases can not fall back on manual 

processes. It is critical that these systems be corrected well before the Year 2000, and that 

a coordinated test plan be implemented. 

21 
1. Logistics 

In the field of logistics, most systems are very complex. They are also highly 

customized and integrated. Weapon system operations are critically dependent on 

timely provisioning of supplies and equipment. In order for provisions to arrive in a 

timely fashion, scheduling and long lead-times are often required. Because of the 

nature of logistics, information systems supporting logistics are heavily date 

dependent. For these reasons, immediate corrections are required, and manual 

work-arounds are not possible. Due to the highly customized nature of logistics 

information systems, few, if any, COTS replacement systems are available. A 

further complication is the fact that many of the critical systems and operations 

supporting logistics are handled by suppliers that are not organic to the unit being 

supplied. This, in turn, increases the difficulty in carrying out interoperability testing. 

These technical and organizational Y2K problems are further exacerbated by the 

fact that the DOD has been traditionally slow in providing direction to suppliers. 

2. Transportation 

Transportation is integral to an efficient logistics system, and is key to the 

basic operation, maintenance, and support of weapon systems. It is also internal to 

overall logistics support processes and systems. While many transportation systems 

are date dependent, in contrast to logistics systems, they are also quite similar to 

commercially available systems. For this reason, use of COTS systems or 

commercially available services may help alleviate some of the problems associated 

with Y2K. 

3. Financial Operations 

Financial operations by their nature are heavily date dependent, and are 

highly integrated into networks of systems with other financial institutions. Financial 

systems are also more vulnerable to a system shutdown. Supplier data feeds are 

impacted at EDI interfaces. Problems stemming from financial operations systems 

failure would also have a major impact on managing suppliers. Many DOD suppliers 

could not tolerate long-term cash flow problems caused by system failure, because 

of the supplier's small size and relative dependence on DOD contracts. However, 

some systems could operate manually for a short period. Many COTS systems and 

consulting services are available that could quickly be implemented in case of an 

emergency. 

E. Operational Systems 

The Operational Systems group examined three categories of systems for Y2K 

problems: weapon systems, command, control, and communications (C3), and 

Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) concerns. 

22 
1. Weapon Systems 

Briefings were provided to the task force by four major weapon systems 

organizations including AEGIS, F-15, MLRS and PATRIOT. Additional briefings 

were provided which related in part to interfaces to weapon systems (e.g., E-6B, 

AWACS, JCS/J6 Nuclear Weapon Interfaces, etc.). 

The four major weapon systems had some important characteristics in 

common relative to Y2K: 

. All had program management organizations in place with the clear ability 

to identify and respond to issues as they were identified. 

. All had adequate resources to deal with any problems which might arise. 

. All had programs on-going to identify and solve possible problems. 

. Although time oriented, none of the weapons systems were calendar 

oriented so there was little concern as to whether they would work when 

needed. 

. There was relatively little concern about the ability of the systems to meet 

mission requirements except with regard to interfaces to supporting 

systems such as mission planning, C3I,training and logistics. For 

example, in the case of the F-15, there is a clear dependency on the 

Mission Planning System functionality if the F-15 is to carry out its strike 

mission. The F-1 5 SPO is very aware of this situation and is actively 

involved with the correction of Mission Planning System deficiencies. 

Also, the significance of operational interfaces for systems beyond the 

control of PATRIOT systems organization was noted as an uncertainty. 

This type of uncertainty was also noted for some of the other weapon 

systems. 

It is evident that the major weapon systems managers are fully aware of the 

Y2K issue and are actively looking for problems and solutions. There is not much 

concern that they will experience ugly surprises, mature programs with veteran 

program management organizations have incorporated Y2K into the normal 

development and upgrade process. However, there is room for the major weapon 

systems managers to look harder at the supporting systems (e.g. training, logistics, 

C3I,etc.) upon which their systems rely. 

In addition, there is little evidence of any management, planning or resources 

in place for large scale joint interoperability demonstration testing as would be 

required to resolve the uncertainties in the significance of operational interfaces 

beyond the control of the weapon systems managers. 

23 
Contingency planning is not in place for testing or for the solution of late 

breaking surprise problems. This lack of contingency planning is somewhat 

surprising since major weapon systems managers are known for not leaving much to 

chance. 

However, of all of the areas the Y2K panel has examined, we believe that the 

major weapon systems per se are in the best shape, both to avoid Y2K problems, 

and to address them should they arise. 

2. Command, Control and Communications (C3)

The task force received briefings and/or participated in Y2K discussions with 

C3 personnel from Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS/ J6), OPNAV (N6), Head Quarters Marine Corp (HQMC) (C4I),Air Force 

Program Executive Office (AFPEOI C3),Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS), Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD C3I), Joint Tactical Information 

Distribution System (JTIDS) and the E6-B program. 

Important characteristics regarding Y2K, and common to at least two or three 

of these organizations dealing with C3 issues include: 

a. All have strong program management organizations in place with senior 

executive visibility and the clear ability to identify and respond to issues as 

they are identified. 

b. All have programs on-going to identify and solve possible Y2K problems. 

c. All believe they were basically on schedule for systems under their 

authority and responsibility. For example, AWACS and JTIDS expressed 

that their systems are well in hand. However, almost all expressed 

concern regarding interfaces and interoperability particularly for systems 

not under their control but critical to their missions. These concerns 

included known and unanticipated Y2K problems. Several organizations 

noted the difficulty in obtaining status information on Y2K activities for 

many of these systems. The DlST was inadequate in this regard not only 

for systems in DlST but also because intelligence systems (e.g. NSA, 

etc.) are not in DlST and not reported on elsewhere. The DlST was also 

regarded as user unfriendly. 

d. The management of Y2K varies significantly across organizations. 

Mature programs in veteran program management organizations have 

adopted management processes and metrics expected from such 

organizations (e.g., AWACS, JTIDS, E6-B, etc.). Management of newer 

programs lacked the strong processes and metrics to provide confidence 

24 
in assessing progress on Y2K issues. For example, this was evident 

even with such mission critical systems as GCCS and GCSS. 

e. Several organizations noted significant dependence on COTS hardware 

and software products and expressed the need for a Y2K compliant 

infrastructure or a central COTS product test agency to provide the DOD 

with a single central source of valid Y2K compliance information on COTS 

hardware and software products. 

Almost all expressed the beneficial aspect of the Y2K problem as an 

opportunity to terminate ineffective legacy systems and replace them with 

more effective Y2K compliant systems including new systems if the 

budget resources and funding flexibility happened to be available. 

Several expressed concern regarding OMB statements regarding the 

possibility of directing Federal departments to delay IT modernization 

efforts in order to fix Y2K problems if this meant that key modernization 

efforts underway which not only provided improved and needed 

functionality but also fixed Y2K problems became possible targets for 

delays. 

g. Several expressed significant concern regarding recruiting and retaining 

the skilled IT civilian and military personnel needed in the DOD to address 

the Y2K problems during the next several years, the most critical time 

period. It was clear to all that there is an IT employment environment with 

significant commercial demand, a national shortage of skilled personnel 

and escalating compensation packages. This exists in the face of the 

recently announced Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). The continued 

efforts to downsize the DOD, with the elimination of existing careers in 

military and civilian personnel IT and the DOD initiatives to outsource 

various IT functions exasperate the problem. 

h. All understood the criticality of achieving Y2K compliance for mission 

critical C3 systems and how broadly these systems can affect DOD 

operations. In fact, C3 systems represent about half of the warfighters top 

20 Y2K concerns for the CINCs. 

i. Several organizations recognized and were working significant Y2K 

issues concerning non-compliant telephone switches. Of the 663 DOD 

switches worldwide, about 33 percent are not compliant and most of these 

are NORTEL products. Some concern existed regarding the availability of 

replacement switches given the commercial demand in “fixing” Y2K switch 

problems. Several organizations also recognized and were working 

significant Y2K issues concerning non-compliant Personal Computers 

(PCs) needing replacement, MUX-IDNX non-compliance and U.S. 

Message Text Format (MTF) problems. 

25 
j. Many expressed concerns regarding the “take-it-out-of-hide” approach to 

fund all Y2K fixes. They admitted the fact that although well-funded 

development programs had funds to fix Y2K problems, other programs 

were at the stage of not having funds identified, and were “hoping” funds 

would be made available to fix their Y2K problems. It was clear that 

funding flexibility (e.g., ability to transfer funds) was an issue inhibiting 

timely action by some organizations to fix Y2K problems. Finally, highly 

structured processes such as those required for MAISRC programs have 

inhibited timely action on Y2K issues. Attention to having such processes 

modified to allow critical Y2K issues to be addressed in a more timely 

manner is important. 

Beyond those items mentioned above, clearly more attention should be given 

to large scale joint interoperability testing. “Test early and test often” is a 

recommended theme. Field testing of C3I systems in controlled environments is 

particularly important to address interfaces and interoperability. C3I interfaces 

remain a critical potential Y2K vulnerability particularly with decentralized system 

responsibilities. Also, problems observed in early tests should not be condemned as 

was unfortunately the case by the press with the JWlD ‘97 GCCS tests. Such 

actions discourage organizations from testing early to understand their Y2K 

problems in order to have sufficient time to fix problems observed. 

Additional attention also is important for development of contingency plans 

and for the formation and exercise of Emergency Response Teams (ERTs). All Y2K 

problems will not be solved and tested. There will be surprises and many unknowns. 

Appropriate planning for such contingencies is critical. 

The human resource problem appears to need high level attention. As time 

passes, Y2K issues will increase in their importance and skilled DOD staff is critical. 

Y2K consideration should become factors in the DRI, downsizing and outsourcing 

decisions. Special incentive programs are important to consider. Strong teaming 

with industry is recommended to reduce the vulnerability to staffing issues. 

Finally, it is important to have special Y2K funds available for programs not 

currently well funded, for interoperability and interface testing and for surprises. In 

addition, increased funding flexibility and the reduction of process and procedural 

barriers are important to consider to allow critical Y2K issues to be addressed in a 

timely manner as they arise. 

3. Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) 

The task force received briefings from and participated in discussions with 

Y2K organizations from two CINCs, USSTRATCOM and USACOM. In addition, 

briefings by JCS (J6) and E-6B personnel provided a broader perspective regarding 

ClNC activities on Y2K including possible implications for nuclear systems. 

26 
The ClNC organizations had some important characteristics in common 

relative to Y2K: 

a. Both have strong program management organizations in place with the 

clear ability to identify and respond to issues as they were identified. 

b. Both have programs on-going to identify and solve possible problems. 

c. Both noted the strong dependence on the Services and external agencies 

for achieving Y2K compliance for the weapon systems, the intelligence 

systems, the facilities, the C3 systems and other systems critical to ClNC 

missions. They also noted the difficulty in obtaining status information on 

Y2K activities for many of these systems. The DlST was inadequate in 

this regard not only for systems in DlST but also because intelligence 

systems (e.g., NSA, etc.) are not in DlST and not reported on elsewhere. 

d. Both expressed concerns regarding interfaces and interoperability 

particularly for systems not under their control but critical to their missions. 

These concerns included known and unanticipated Y2K problems. 

e. Both are dependent on significant COTS hardware and software products 

and noted the need for a Y2K compliant infrastructure or a central COTS 

product test agency to provide the ClNCs and the rest of the DOD with a 

single central source of valid Y2K compliance information on COTS 

products. 

f. Both participate in the ClNC Y2K sessions which produced the consensus 

Top 20 list of mission critical systems for the warfighters which is currently 

being staffed for approval. Greatest concern was expressed regarding C3

systems such as the DII COE, GCCS, GCSS, DSN, Red Switch Network, 

DMS, and DISN. 

g. Both believe they are on schedule for systems under their responsibility. 

USSTRATCOM activities focus on 1 13 mission critical systems including 88 

for strategic war planning, 11 for command and control, and 14 for command 

management. Systems are in the renovation/validationphase or are planned for 

decommissioning. Y2K activities are facilitated by the major on-going modernization 

efforts. USACOM indicated that all of their mission critical systems are the 

responsibility of other organizations. 

Nuclear system interfaces, war planning, and C3 were discussed with 

USSTRATCOM, JCS (J6), and E6-B personnel. These systems are receiving 

appropriate and strong attention in the U.S. and significant progress is evident. 

However, several areas were noted for increased attention. One was Y2K interface 

and interoperability testing. Although C2 testing and communications testing are 

27 
progressing separately, it is important to have more comprehensive C3I testing in an 

integrated fashion. Another area was NATO and other allies. Clearly, other 

countries are behind the U.S. in addressing Y2K issues. 

There was no evidence that DOD was taking strong, positive steps to 

increase awareness of Y2K issues with our defense partners to assure appropriate 

actions toward Y2K compliance, particularly for NATO nuclear systems. Finally, 

concern was expressed regarding other countries with nuclear weapons such as 

Russia and China and their actions or, more importantly, perceived inaction 

regarding Y2K issues. Clearly, it is in our national interest to have positive command 

and control as well as safety and physical security for weapons of mass destruction 

in Russia and China, particularly nuclear weapons. DOD has not been pro-active in 

Y2K education and awareness effort for these countries. 

Y2K issues for the base infrastructure were discussed with the above 

organizations as well as others. Y2K issues include basic utilities (e.g., electrical 

power, telecommunications, water treatment, sewage, etc.) as well as embedded 

software in microprocessors in equipment such as elevators, heating and air 

conditioning systems, security systems, and other systems critical to normal base 

operations. Although it was noted that the base infrastructure is the responsibility of 

the Services, it also was noted that most Y2K efforts in this area appear to have 

started later than the basic computer hardware and software efforts on Y2K. This is 

also true in the commercial environment. Increased attention in this area by the 

DOD is warranted. 

Foreign bases were of particular concern, again because most other 

countries are behind the U.S. in addressing Y2K issues. Yet, these bases are 

dependent to a large degree on focal utilities such as electrical power and 

telecommunications. Increased attention to foreign bases by the DOD is warranted 

including contingency planning for Y2K problems in the host country. Also, DOD 

needs to assist our military and coalition partners in addressing their Y2K problems, 

to ensure continued capabilities before and after January 1,2000. 

ClNC IT budgets are small. Increased funding flexibility and a source for 

additional resources are needed to address Y2K issues, particularly to achieve 

adequate interface and interoperability testing. Such testing is critical for CY98. In 

one case, testing is being postponed to wait until systems not under a CINC’s 

responsibility are deemed Y2K compliant. “Systems of systems” tests are 

recommended such as a conventional cruise missile strike scenario. Such a Y2K 

test scenario would test intelligence collection, analysis and processing systems, C3

systems at many command levels, mission planning systems, and weapon 

platforms. Systems tested in such a scenario span many organizational 

responsibilities but all support the warfig hter. 

28 
Clearly the ClNCs are aware of Y2K issues and are addressing them 

vigorously for systems under their responsibility. However, they are in the position of 

being heavily dependent on the Y2K activities by the Services and agencies in order 

to meet their mission requirements. 

F. Intelligence and Information Warfare 

1. Information Warfare (IW) related to Y2K 

The DSB Year 2000 Task Force had briefings from Booze, Allen, and 

Hamilton on Information Warfare (IW), and had briefings and discussions with the 

National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency 

(NIMA), and the Community Management Staff (CMS) of the Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI), and their support contractors. 

In addition, we have had overviews from various operating functions from 

within the DOD which raised IW concerns and issues. Based upon the information 

presented to date and conversations with task force members, the team has 

identified the following action items with regard to information warfare concerns. 

There are a number of areas of concern relating to the impact of Y2K on 

intelligence and information warfare. In attempting to fix the problem, Y2K “fixes” will 

result in patches on patches, that is, a fix on one system may require a fix on another 

to enable the systems to interface, etc. Also, all fixes have a fixed date cliff in that 

they have to be fully implemented and tested by December 31 , 1999. The 

significant time compression of work required to have everything done on time is 

bound to result in unexpected errors. As a result, testing will be also be 

shortchanged, as insufficient time will remain to carry out needed testing of system 

fixes. In an effort to meet the time constraints imposed by the date cliff, out of 

country coding expertise may be used which could increase vulnerabilities from 

remediation efforts. This could result in some increased threat from global hackers, 

as foreign coders could not be held to the level of security checks of U.S. coders. In 

general, the Y2K remediation community is not thinking in terms of IW threat. 

A number of actions need to be taken to mitigate the impact of Y2K of the 

intelligence and information warfare threat. Organizations should establish 

contingency plans to implement work arounds of Y2K issues. The United States has 

“bet the farm” in the sense that we are sizing our force structure predicated on 

information superiority, and this is known to our adversaries. They may well intend 

to attack our command and control systems (our information dominance) to give 

them an asymmetrical response to our “technical superiority.” They should begin by 

determining the most critical of DOD systems that could be affected. To ensure 

objectivity, renovation work on absolutely critical systems needs to be independently 

verified. The verification process should include very selective negative testing as 

29 
well as positive testing to see that new functionality has not been inserted with the 

remediated code 

Because System Administrators (SAs) are the first line of defense during the 

period spanning the Y2K transition, DOD should take steps to improve their 

effectiveness. DOD should elevate the role of System Administrators: and provide 

adequate training, security clearances and back ups. System Administrators should 

also be brought into the remediation planning process. In addition, DOD should 

solicit SA views about techniques to detect Y2K problems in real time, and courses 

of action that could be taken on how to respond. As noted previously, independent 

validation of implemented changes needs to be conducted as does strict 

configuration control. To mitigate IW threats, changes made to critical software 

should not be advertised, and Y2K fixes and problems should keep a low profile on 

the Web pages. Unclassified DOD systems should be examined to determine if they 

have the capability to provide bad data to classified systems. System Administrators 

also need to take active measures to raise protective barriers. Such measures 

should include the installation of effective firewalls, the use of dynamic passwords, 

and sophisticated filters and encryption where possible. These recommendations 

are based on the following observations and issues. 

2. Infomation Warfare Threat 

It is highly likely that DOD information systems will be probed or penetrated 

by hackers coincident with the Year 2000. An abundance of information relating to 

Y2K problems and the "fixes" to those problems is increasingly available on the web 

and other public sources. Hackers from many parts of the United States and the rest 

of the world undoubtedly will share information about Y2K weaknesses in computer 

systems. In some cases "communities of hackers" may act in concert to 

demonstrate their ability to cause mischief. While the likely focus of such efforts will 

be information systems in the private sector, the DOD also is clearly an attractive 

target. We should expect that hackers will expose and widely disseminate 

vulnerabilities to Y2K solutions. 

Increased vigilance by system administrators will be very important during the 

period spanning the Y2K transition. The Y2K transition will not be a discrete event 

centered on December 31, 1999; rather, the transition will span a number of months 

after or perhaps years as a wide variety of systems are remediated to accommodate 

four digit year data. Thus, the period of increased DOD vulnerability is surely to be 

lengthy as systems not initially identified as "mission critical" are remediated after 1 

January 2000. The likelihood of successful penetrations during these periods 

dictates that each MC system have a contingency plan for successful mission 

accomplishment to "work around" Y2K issues. 

While perhaps less likely, there is a substantially greater area of concern. 

That relates to thoroughly planned, intentional activities by a foreign power, 

30 
transnational group or terrorist group to use DOD's remediation planning and 

execution period to install malicious code in systems critical to the effective 

functioning of the DOD! Consider that thousands of computer programmers and 

engineers have been brought relatively quickly into remediation efforts for thousands 

of DOD essential systems. Corrupting very, very few of these systems could have 

dramatic impact. Furthermore, COTS by the thousands of applications reside in 

DOD systems and while most COTS operating systems software is developed in the 

U.S.; much other software (such as device drivers and applications) is developed on 

foreign shores. Programmers in India, Russia, China, Israel and Ireland are all 

involved in off shore code development. Many of the telephone switches in the U.S. 

come from foreign sources, and, as we know, 95 percent of all DOD 

communications ride on our public switched networks! 

However, not all of our most likely adversaries will be foreign. Given all of the 

downsizing and centralization activities in the U.S. and the DOD, it is quite possible 

that disaffected citizens with strong technical skills and a dislike for their former 

organization could work to cause damage and disruption in computer systems, or 

sell their skills to terrorists, drug or crime cartels. 

3. Phase by Phase Threat Analysis 

How might our adversaries plan to conduct an IW or Information Operations 

attack against our Y2K Conversion Model? 

During the Assessment Phase: an adversary might try to influence the 

Assessment by falsifying Y2K vulnerability analyses, by identifying critical systems 

upon which to focus malevolent actions (targeting), by influencing contingency plans 

in the least effective direction, and by trying to have resources misappropriated or 

misdirected. 

During the Renovation Phase: insert malicious code; convert, replace or 

eliminate databases; insert triggers, Trojan horses or logic bombs; or work to alter 

the focus of software upgrades and remediation in the least effective direction. 

Install holes in key systems to allow "data mining" or intelligence gathering over an 

extended period of time. (Consider JCS Exercise Eligible Receiver 97 in PACOM.) 

During the Validation Phase: refine attack plans and implants; falsify 

validation data; provide or sell bad test equipment, tools or procedures. 

During the Implementation Phase an adversary would attempt to prepare for 

or execute an attack, possibly stimulated by world or political events outside the U.S. 

Department of Defense. 

31 
4. Counter measures 

Possible counter measures, which may thwart or at least mitigate these kinds 

of efforts, include the following: 

reviewing contingency plans. 

. Independently verify renovation work for those systems that are absolutely 

critical. This might include very selective "negative testing" as well as 

"positive testing." That is, testing to insure that new functionality has not 

been inserted with the remediated code. Positive testing, verifies only that 

the year digit issue is fixed. 

. For absolutely critical systems, internally verify portions of the validation 

process. Use the two person rule. 

.

. Conduct strict configuration control which will make it easier for us to 

understand our security posture coincident with remediation. 

. Do not advertise changes made to critical software. Keep a low profile on 

the Web pages. 

. Look at unclassified DOD systems to determine if they have the capability 

execution. Candidate systems include logistics, weather, finance, medical 

and so forth. 

32 

Determine the real criticality of DOD systems and developing and

Independently validate and verify (IV & V) implementation changes

to provide bad data to classified systems thereby inhibiting mission
It is important that the Defense Department create capabilities to function in 

reduced mode operations. Therefore, it is desirable that a systems of alerts and 

responses be adopted which will help the JCS, the ClNCs and other key elements of 

the DOD respond adaptively to degradation’s in its systems. 

Below is a table (originally proposed in the 1996 DSB Study on Information 

Warfare - Defense) summarizing threat conditions and possible responses based on 

a perimeter defense. This concept is for systems, analogous to the DEFCON 

Conditions used for so many years in the DOD regarding military readiness. 

CONDITION SITUATION REQUIRED RESPONSE 

I. Normal 

II. Perturbation 

III. Heightened 

Defense Posture 

IV. Serious 

V. Brink of War 

~~ 

8 Normal threat-crime/ incompetents 

8 Normal activities in all sectors 

8 10 percent increase in incident 

reports, regional or functionally 

based 

8 15 percent increase in all incidents 

8 20 percent increase in all incident 

reports 

8 Condition II with special contexts 

0 Major regional of functional events 

that seriously undermine U.S. 

Interests 

8 Condition II/ Ill with special contexts 

8 Widespread incidents that 

undermine U.S. ability to function 

8 Condition III/ IV with special contexts 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

Normal actions and requirements 

Increase incident monitoring 

Look for patterns across wide range of 

variables 

Alert all agencies to increase awareness 

activities 

Begin selective monitoring of critical 

element 

Disconnect all unnecessary connections 

Turn on real-time audit for critical 

systems 

Begin mandatory reporting to central 

control 

Implement alternate routing 

Limit connectivity to minimal states 

Begin “aggressive” forensic 

investigations 

Disconnect critical elements from public 

infrastructure 

ImplementWARM protocols 

8 Declare state of emergency - -,, 

Table 2 - Threat Condition/ Response 

Beyond the turn of the century there are real concerns. It is certain that all 

remediation will not have been accomplished by the year 2000. Furthermore, there 

probably is a greater chance of software penetration later due to exposure during the 

Y2K correction processes. 

5. Intelligence Summary 

What we regularly refer to as the Intelligence Community, is actually a 

confederation of activities and agencies who singly and collectively have 

responsibilities for intelligence activities on behalf of the United States. Thus, the 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) does not have line authority over each of the 

elements of the “Intelligence Community’’ in the same sense that the Secretary of 

33 
Defense has authority over elements and agencies of the Department of Defense. 

From the perspective of Y2K, this means that the Intelligence Community 

Management Staff (CMS), under the DCI is chairing a collaborative effort within the 

community regarding remediation efforts in support of Y2K. For example, while the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the 

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) are responsive to the CMS direction 

regarding the reporting and evaluation of remediation activities, each Y2K of these 

organizations is an independent Defense Agency under the SECDEF. 

The IC wrestles with the same issues as does ASD(C3I) regarding Y2K: no 

additional funding, take-it-out-of-hide; “Centralized” direction with decentralized 

execution and remediation; a large number of systems designated as mission 

critical; stressful deadlines for testing and integration; January 1, 2000 applies to all 

systems; large numbers of legacy systems, a number undoubtedly with poor 

documentation; ongoing programs are better able to allocate resources (funds) to 

remediation than are programs whose systems no longer are in development. 

There simultaneously are additional stresses on the Intelligence Community: 

0 Very large archived data bases. 

0 Some difficulty in understanding “all of the interfaces” driven by 

intelligence data. That is Intelligence Agencies “broadcast” information to 

hundreds, in some cases thousands, of consumers and may not be 

aware of the uses to which recipients put the intelligence information. 

Intelligence data rarely are “hard wired” as interfaces to operational 

systems. Thus, testing of these “interfaces” is often difficult or in some 

cases practically impossible. 

0 Information of potential adversary geographic locations provided by 

Intelligence Sensors often drive threat warning algorithms in operations 

systems, and only the sponsors of the operational system will know the 

extent to which this occurs. 

Testing of Intelligence Systems offer some unique challenges, such as 

testing of interfaces of existing space based sensors which potentially will 

be effected by remediation efforts. If you “lock up a satellite” during such 

a test, how do you recover? With regard to the planning of testing, the 

Intelligence Community has the same approach as DOD, in that each 

activity is responsible for scheduling and conducting (or causing to be 

conducted) its own testing. Thus, we note that NIMA is creating a Testing 

Master Plan, much in the same vein as USSOCOM. DIA is considering a 

special Y2K test facility, and also plans to use the Joint Integration Test 

Facility (JITF) at Rome, New York. Both NSA and the NRO consider 

testing to be the responsibility of the applicable program manager. It is 

34 
clear that the Intelligence Community could benefit from some of the 

suggestions and structured approaches proposed for above. 

Members of this DSB Task Force met with and discussed Y2K issues on 

several occasions with members of the CMS and Intelligence Community. The good 

news is that Seniors, that is Agency Directors, in the Intelligence Community are 

alert to and placing significant emphasis on Y2K remediation. In each of these 

agencies, either the CIO, or a Y2K Task Force, or both, are charged with responding 

to Y2K problems. As in the case of the DOD, the intelligence community has 

chosen to respond, or remediate, through program managers or Program Element 

Officers of existing programs. 

Reporting of Intelligence Community Y2K planning and remediation activities 

are, because of classification, not included in the DIST; thus most of OSD does not 

know the status of planning for and execution of Y2K remediation. Therefore, there 

is some uneasiness about whether Intelligence will be available when and where 

needed. Although a system of accounting and reporting is in place within the 

Intelligence Community analogous to the DIST used by DOD, there needs to be a 

more direct and clear linkage between DOD and the Intelligence Community Y2K 

planning and execution efforts. 

There are other similarities to the DOD. A major similarity is the apparent 

difficulty in identifying REALLY “mission critical systems”. In response to the original 

guidance from OSD soliciting identification of mission critical systems, the 

Intelligence Community initially identified over 2,200 “mission critical systems”. As 

OSD began to narrow the criteria for “mission critical” the numbers of IC mission 

critical systems began to decline. For example, NSA, which identified the largest 

numbers of such systems started out with over 2,000 reported systems, reduced that 

to 744 in December, then to 456 as of January 31 st. 

Each of these reductions was the result of refining the definition of what 

constituted REALLY critical systems. In this vein, the Command and Control 

community of DOD has identified 20 key systems in the intelligence community that 

are considered necessary for DOD minimum essential capabilities. It is not 

surprising that the Intelligence Community would consider a larger number of its 

systems to be mission critical, than the number of intelligence community systems 

the SECDEF would consider critical to DOD missions. This is so because the 

intelligence Community supports all of our government, not just the DOD. Thus 

support to the other cabinet departments and agencies, as well as the National 

Security Council and the White House, are properly considered by the Intelligence 

Community as equally critical Y2K systems issues. 

Since many intelligence community systems support several of these 

agencies and DOD at the same time, it would be a most difficult task to identify 

systems totally unique to DOD requirements. It might be misleading to attempt to do 

35 
so. As a side note, it is interesting that the DOD considers its financial systems to be 

mission critical, but that after OSD narrowed its definitions, NSA removed its financial 

system from its list of mission critical systems. 

So how is the Intelligence Community doing? In the case of known problems, 

progress appears to be pretty good-at least from the reporting perspective. 

0 Very large archival data bases are known (there probably are not huge 

data bases that no one knows about) and have well established data 

dictionaries, thus remediation should be straightforward. The very size of 

these data bases, however, offer significant challenges to insure that “all” 

necessary changes have been made, AND TESTED! 

0 In at least one case, NIMA, an additional problem exists. A very large 

(read huge) archived imagery data base was designed with a “first-in, firstout” protocol. That is, imagery requires so many gigabytes of storage, the 

system was designed to “self purge” so that automatically several years of 

imagery would be archived to permit comparison of new imagery with 

former images of the same facility to detect change. Therefore, if a date 

were to be misread as being significantly wrong (at the 00 date boundary 

for example), the system might automatically purge all information prior to, 

or after, that date wiping out years of crucial data. This problem is 

important, it is known, and NIMA has its support contractor focusing on 

this issue. 

0 There is concern in parts of the intelligence community that THE 

Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) to DMS conversion offers risk as 

we approach the millennium. For example, the DMS components 

required to process classified information have not yet been let for 

contract to the developer. Both the DOD and the Intelligence Community 

must have either AUTODIN or DMS classified message processing. 

AUTODIN cannot be taken down without this capability resident in DMS. 

It is being “assumed” that this key development will proceed as 

scheduled. In this regard, the Intelligence Community finds itself in the 

same position as DOD in that failure of planned improvements, 

developments or remediation efforts can have a significant adverse 

impact for which good contingency plans are essential. 

0 NSAs addressing of crypto issues seems to be on everyone’s’ critical 

path. Areas of potential concern have included the Electronic Key 

Management System (EKMS), and the STU-Ill. NSA believes that both of 

these activities are on track. Development of EKMS is proceeding as 

scheduled. 

With respect to the compliance status of the STU-Ill and its supporting 

36 
infrastructure, the full results of actual formal testing are not expected to be available 

until May 1998, which unfortunately reflects a slip from the original March date. At 

this time however, based on work done in NSAs STU-Ill program offices, and at 

their contractors facilities, NSA is confident that not only are the STU-Ill terminals, 

per se, not appearing to have any issues-the infrastructure supporting STUs looks 

like it is also in good shape based on extensive preliminary testing. The NSA 

Director of Information Security (DDI) is confident that the formal full-scale testing will 

be completed by early May. Additionally, the DDI reports that he is committed to 

having a completely tested and validated compliant system in place by December 

31, 1998. 

Although a number of the programs have conducted risk assessments and 

identified contingency plans-in some cases new systems are being accelerated to 

replace legacy systems-none of the intelligence agencies has created a "priority 

system" for determining what contingency plans are required. Close liaison with 

DOD is required to identify where the critical paths lie so that remediation and testing 

may be scheduled in such a way as to dovetail with DOD needs. Nowhere is this 

more true that regarding the issue of systems, and "system-of-systems-testing." 

There are a couple of issues within the Intelligence Community which may 

well have parallels with the DOD community and its allies. Firstly, NSA has 

cooperative arrangements with over fifty nations. Although NSA has advised each 

of these nations that NSA has adopted a two digit windowing approach to the year 

field problem; each of the nations is responsible for its own remediation. Thus, it 

certainly is possible, if not likely, that one or more of these interfaces will experience 

problems between NSA and the 2nd or 3rd party nation with whom data is to be 

received or exchanged. "Testing" these interfaces in some cases may not occur 

until the problem shows up in operations. 

Secondly, a number of NSA field and service cryptologic stations have over 

the years had "cottage industry" software systems and upgrades developed and 

installed for specific applications pertinent to the mission of that station. The extent 

of this "cottage industry" software is not well known by NSA and in some cases 

probably not even well understood by the station itself. Problems with this software 

may cause local problems for the field stations as the year 2000 rolls over. (The 

CINC's probably have similar problems resulting from decades of software and 

applications support local to each of the CINCs. These software packages are often 

poorly documented and may not necessarily be identified in the ongoing DOD 

reporting and remediation activities.) 

In summary, the Intelligence Community faces many of the issues that 

confront DOD in general. There is a cogent need to identify truly mission critical 

systems. This must, at least in part, be accomplished in concert with ASD(C3I). 

From this should be created a prioritization of resources and contingency plans 

around those systems. Specific test plans should be created to insure that 

37 
interfaces to DOD mission critical systems will function. And, crisis action teams or 

emergency response teams must be created to support the Intelligence Community 

and interface with their defense counterparts. Finally, the Intelligence Community 

needs to share with ASD(C31) and key DOD elements all data on Y2K plans and 

remediation. 

G. Medical Systems 

Discussions were held with the OASD(HA) Defense Medical Information 

Management (DMIM) organization. Clearly there is senior executive awareness of the Y2K 

issue in the DOD medical community and that strong efforts are underway to identify and 

solve Y2K problems. These Y2K efforts have been set in motion by the OASD(HA) in 

coordination with the Service Surgeon Generals representing strong direction from top 

leadership. 

An Integrated Product Team (IPT) was formed during 1996 to address Y2K issues in 

the Military Health System (MHS). IPT membership represents each of seven business 

areas (clinical, executive information and decision support, logistics, resources, 

infrastructure, theater and other) as well as each military department. The IPT has 

identified 1 12 systems for which Y2K activities are being tracked. A November 1997 report 

indicates assessment is100 percent complete, renovation 42 percent complete and 

validation 25 percent complete. The goal is to complete all phases, including 

implementation, by December 1998. Contingency planning is to be part of the MHSS Y2K 

Management Plan to be completed December 1997. A joint interoperability exercise is 

planned for January 1999. 

Resources are believed adequate to address Y2K issues. Of the 112 systems being 

tracked, 43 have been assessed as compliant, 25 are designated to be replaced as part of 

normal modernization, 8 are to be retired and the Y2K specific funding is believed adequate 

to address the remaining 36 systems. 

Biomedical devices are being addressed by a tri-service group with data maintained 

at Ft. Deterick. The Services have compiled inventories of biomedical devices in use, a 

very important step in assessing the situation. Information on biomedical devices is being 

shared with a similar group at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Industry responsiveness 

is evident and supported by FDA actions as well as the Medical Safe Practice Act. 

Y2K readiness of facilities and utilities is the responsibility of the individual Services 

who manage each of the facilities. The OASD(HA) is requiring the Services to report Y2K 

status for facilities and utilities. The Services also are responsible for the locally procured 

PCs and other COTS hardware, software and utilities such as electrical power and 

telecommunications. Particular attention is important regarding the medical hospital and 

clinical facilities and supporting utilities in foreign countries because most foreign countries 

lag the U.S. in their attention to Y2K. 

38 
One of the more complex areas being addressed by the IPT is interfaces with 

systems in other functional areas such as personnel, finance and logistics. Although risk 

analyses on interfaces are being conducted, Memorandums of Understanding are in place 

and some testing is being done, more and broader testing at earlier times than currently 

planned is important, particularly during CY 1998. This includes “system-of-systems” 

testing. The Joint Warfare Interoperability Demonstrations (JWIDs) could be a logical time 

to further test Y2K, particularly cross-functional interfaces. For example, test scenarios of 

systems to support casualty evacuation or the provision of blood supplies would test 

personnel systems, medical systems, logistic systems, transportation systems, as well as C3

systems at many command levels. 

Overall, it is clear that Y2K issues in the medical area are receiving strong attention 

by OASD(HA) and the Services and appear to be further along than similar activities in the 

commercial community. The DOD should continue to support fully the OASD(HA) Y2K 

plans, facilitate cross-functional interface testing, and protect Y2K funding. 

H. Summary Finding 

The Y2K problem is a very serious one. It is a big system and system management 

problem. DOD is experienced and capable in analyzing, structuring and managing such 

programs. 

Further, Y2K is a CEO problem, not just a CIO problem. It needs direction and 

guidance from the top. Its solution must involve all users of IT which certainly includes the 

Chairman, JCS, and the ClNCs as well as the more traditional users. 

39 

The Task Force makes three major recommendations: 

A. should USD(A&T) appoint a full time executive 

The USD(A&T) should appoint a full time executive with the requisite authority and 

staff to provide the needed leadership and the overall plan for addressing the Y2K 

problems. The breadth of the Y2K problem, spanning as it does all aspects of military 

systems and operations, requires that OSD oversight of Y2K activities go well beyond the IT 

focus. Continued active involvement of the C3I community is, of course, not to be lessened 

in any way as the result of this recommendation. Specific tasks to insure that each area is 

following a disciplined approach, is getting reliable support, and has reasonable consistency 

with the rest of the Departmentfollow: 

1. Identify the REALLY Mission Critical Systems 

a. Work with components to determine and understand the consequences of 

failure to “fix” each “mission critical” system. 

b. Work with the users to apply the “so what” test to determine those 

absolutely critical ones and establish a prioritized list. 

2. Management 

a. Require a milestone program plan for fixing these systems including 

identification of needed resources. 

b. Reduce the number of meetings/ reports but insist on meaningful reports 

against a milestone program plan. Negotiate reasonable reporting 

requirements with OMB. 

c. Develop special, streamlined procedures including funding flexibility to 

allow Program Managers the needed quick response capability warranted 

by Y2K problems. 

3. Testing 

NOTE: This area is, without question, most in need of direction. 

a. Provide an outline of a testing approach and define results deemed 

adequate by OSD. 

b. Provide for central certification authorities that can assure a uniform 

41 
C. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g. 

h. 

approach to Y2K compliance by doing the testing themselves, by 

overseeing testing, by assisting with test design or by auditing test 

procedures. 

Require for each program, system and "system-of-systems" a test plan 

which includes the specific tests planned, schedule, test location, planned/ 

Require development of contingency plans including replacements for 

legacy systems that may arrive late or with incomplete or inadequate 

"fixes." 

Assume responsibility for emergency response capabilities to deal with 

Y2K problems beyond the competence of system owners and operators 

as they arise. 

Require end-to-end analysis and testing of major scenarios to help define 

Y 2K "s ystem-of-systems'' tests. 

Require generation of test plans which include interfaces and relevant 

"homeless" systems. 

Assure introduction of Y2K testing in every scheduled major test and 

exercise wherever possible. 

4. Information Warfare [IW] Vulnerabilities 

a. Alert all groups working on the Y2K problem to the potential for increasing 

system vulnerabilities to IW. 

b. Bring the IW community into the Y2K arena. This should include active 

involvement of the IW Emergency Response Teams [ERTs]. 

c. Work with the IW community to see if there are ways of reducing current 

vulnerabilities with proper Y2K fixes. 

5. Other Responsibilities 

a. Assume responsibility for distribution of reliable information on COTS 

hardware and software including tools. 

b. Assume responsibility for promulgation of "fixes" and Y2K tools, including 

tool limitations and problems. 

c. Be the focal point for dealing with commercial hardware/ SW firms on the 

42 

needed facilities, and certification procedures.
Y2K issue. Arrange for QSD [preferably the DepSecDef] to call in the 

CEOs of the relevant HW/SW companies and ask for their cooperation 

and help with this issue. 

d. Assure that Y2K infrastructure considerations include consideration of the 

reliability of basic services at foreign bases. 

e. Raise the awareness across DOD - consider implementation of a standdown Y2K awareness/ testing day. 

f. Assure appropriate interactions and coupling with other government 

agencies, such as FEMA, FAA, FCC, NIMA, State and Treasury. 

g. Work with other government Departments to initiate some sort of Y2K 

education and awareness program for all countries with nuclear weapons, 

including, especially, China and Russia. 

B. OSD should establish a Y2K "escape valve” fund under the direct control of the Y2K 

executive 

1. The “escape is fund” to be made available for the following: 

a. Critical “System of Systems” testing not planned for as part of “normal” 

testing. 

b. Fixing critical “homeless” systems. 

c. Replacement of legacy systems where this is critical and other program 

funds are not available. 

d. Funding of special ClNC needs 

The fund should be established now and also included in the FY99 budget. It 

is not possible to estimate the funds required until the really critical systems have 

been identified, a meaningful reporting system has been established, and the 

relevant testing programs described. The total is, however, thought to be greater 

than $100 M. 

2. Sources for this fund: 

a. Because testing of Y2K systems must be given special priorityl a portion 

of funds earmarked for OT and E for all systems [not just those having 

Y2K problems] should be used as a source for Y2K testing. 

This testing is far more important than much of the routine OT&E testing 

carried out on programs. 

43 
b. If necessary, OSD should impose a tax across some or all of the DoD 

budget to augment the above resources. 

The Task Force believes the Department needs to take these 

steps to get on top of the Y2K probiem and to reduce 

substantially the associated risks. 

_I 

Note: The DoD IG and Service audit agencies have a planned ‘98 effort of 85 

man years to examine the status of the Department’s Y2K work. Most of this effort 

should be attached to the senior management responsible for correction of the Y2K 

problems. 

C. OSD should work with the components to establish incentives for Program 

Managers and the other key people 

Incentives would provide the necessary attention and emphasis to the Y2K issue. 

Suggested actions are: 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

Extend tours for Program Managers and other key people to cover the 

period into year 2000 to assure continuity of management, technical, and 

resource attention through the testing and “solution” phases. 

Provide extra payment in the form of bonuses for special situations where 

the accomplishments are of unusually great quality or where the required 

efforts cause undue hardships. 

In anticipation of unusual time demands on key personnel during the next 

two plus years, modify the “use or lose” leave policy to allow ready 

exceptions for those personnel. 

In cases where the Program Manager and/or other key personnel are 

reassigned beforethe Y2K critical dates occur, defer the comments on 

that portion of the fitness report until the degree of Y2K compliance has 

become evident. 

44 
Appendix A: Terms of Reference 

Appendix B: Members and Advisors 

Appendix C: Dates and Agenda 

Appendix D: Sub-panels - Leaders and Members 

Appendix E: Briefings, Additional Material 

Appendix F: Glossary 

45 
46 
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010 

J U L 9 1997 

AQUISITION AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for the Defense Science Board Task 

Force on Year 2000 

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task 

Force on the Year 2000 (Y2K) to determine if the priorities 

assigned, resources allocated and funding strategy used to 

implement the Department's Y2K five phase process are sufficient 

to ensure all mission critical systems will function properly on, 

before and after January 1, 2000. You should specifically 

address the feasibility of Component strategies that propose the 

work can be done within current budgets through various options 

(e.g., by changing software maintenance priorities, by delaying 

software research and development efforts, etc.). 

The Y2K Task Force will provide advice, recommendations, and 

supporting rationale that addresses the items below for OSD, the 

Military Departments, the Joint Staff, Unified and Specified 

Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities. 

Degree and quality of top-level and middle-level ownership and 

sponsorship for addressing the Y2K problem; 

. Adequacy of resources: 

zj Assigned to central project teams; 

a Allocated to implement the five phases (Awareness, 

Assessment, Renovation, Validation, and Implementation); 

and 

3 Allocated to building and maintaining a DoD Y2K systems 

inventory. 

Adequacy of risk management strategies and controls to include 

sufficient early warnings to enable tirnely detection and 

correct ion;

Adequacy of contingency planning ; 
Adequacy of configuration management control procedures; 

. Adequacy of renovation, testing/validation and deployment 

procedures; 

Adequacy of scheduling procedures and testing/validation 

facilities ; 

Adequacy of information distribution about the Y2K status of 

application software packages, systems software and utilities; 

0 Adequacy of information distribution about automated Y2K 

tools; and 

Adequacy of quarterly reporting requirements to determine 

progress. 

The Task Force should: (a) submit its final report by 

December 30, 1997; (b) include an assessment of the risks to 

mission critical systems; and (c) provide specific advice for 

implementation of the Task Force's recommendations. 

The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence) and I will co-sponsor this Task 

Force. Mr. Bert Fowler will serve as the Task Force Chairman. 

Mr. Walter Benesch will serve as the Executive Secretary and CDR 

David Norris, USN, will serve as the Defense Science Board 

Secretariat representative. 

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the 

provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," 

and DoD Directive 5104.5, "DoD Federal Advisory Committee 

Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force 

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning 

of Section 208 of Title 18, United States Code, nor will it cause 

any member to be placed in the position of acting as a 

procurement official. 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition and Techno1 ogy)
Charles A. Fowler 

C. A. Fowler Associates 

Task Force Chair 

David R. Heebner 

Private Consultant 

Task Force Vice-Chair 

Walter P. Benesch 

ASD(C3I)/ Information Technology 

Directorate 

Task Force Executive Secretary 

Herbert W. Anderson 

Northrop Grumman 

Corporate Vice President of Data 

Systems and Services Division 

Thomas K. Backman 

MITRE Corp., 

Associate Director of Information 

Technologies Directorate 

Dr. David L. Briggs 

MIT/ Lincoln Laboratory, 

Asst. Director for Air and Ballistic 

Missile Defense 

Dr. George H. Heilmeier 

Private Consultant 

Dr. William G. Howard Jr. 

Private Consultant 

Brian T. Keane 

Keane Inc. 

Senior Vice President, Mid-Atlantic &

Southern U. S. Branch Operations 

W. Lily O’Byrne 

Lockheed Martin, 

VP of Applications, Enterprise 

Information Systems 

Dr. Alan B. Salisbury 

Learning Tree International President 

John M. Stewart 

McKinsey and Co. 

Director 

VADM Jerry 0. Tuttle, USN (Ret.) 

MANTECH Systems International Corp. 

President 

Dr. John H. Warner Jr. . 

SAlC 

Executive Vice President and Director 

Jack H. Winters 

IBM 

Vice President, IBM Global Services 

Dr. Lawrence T. Wright 

Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 

Partner and Vice President 

49 
Advisors 

Allan A. Astley Robin Frost 

Defense Technical Information 

Center 

Joint Staff, J-6 MCCTA 

USD(A&T)/Dir, Test Systems Eng. 

Lt Col Ramona Barnes, USAF CAPT Karl Hartenstine, USMC 

Margaret B. Bennardo 

DoD Inspector General 

Col Ray Brylski, USAF 

AFClCl 

Steve Selwyn 

ASD(C3I)/ ISS 

Dr. James Soos 

AS D (C3I) 

CDR Gary Evans, USN 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Navy (C4I) 

support 

George M. McVeigh Jr. 

SAIC 

CDR Dave Norris, USN 

Defense Science Board 
The Task Force met on the following dates: 

September 15-1 6, 1997 

October 16-1 7, 1997 

November 6-7, 1997 

December 1-2, 1997 

January 12-1 3, 1998 

Following are the agendas for those meetings: 

Meeting - September 15, 16, 1997 

September 15,1997 

8:30 Coffee/ Tea 

9:00 

9:20 DSB Vice Chairman’s Remarks Dr. Jacques Gansler 

9:40 Standards of Conduct Briefing General Counsel 

10:00 C3I Overview: Y2K Problem ASD (C3I) Dr. Jim Soos 

11:OO Break 

11 :30 MITRE View Mr. Tom Backman 

12:00 Keane Inc, View Mr. Brian Keane 

12:30 Lunch 

1:00 SAlC Dr. John H. Warner, Jr. 

1 :30 

2:OO DSB Chairman’s Remarks 

2:15 “Bellcore Year 2000 Integration Solution” Mr. Paul Minkin 

3:15 IBM Mr. Roger Andrews 

4: 15 Discussion 

5:00 Adjourn 

Chairman’s opening remarks and introductions 

“Managerial and Political Implications of the Year 2000 

Fix,” 

Paul A. Strassmann, Strassmann, lnc. 

September 16,1997 

8:OO Coffee/ Tea 

8:30 Discussion 

9:30 Service CIO Navy 

10:30 Break 

11 :00 Service CIO - Marines 

12:00 Lunch 

12:30 Service CIO -Army 

1 :30 

2:30 

Service CIO - Air Force 

Joint Staff CIO - J6 

CDR Gary Evans 

Maj Ken Beutel, Deputy Director, 

MCCTA 

Mr. Bill Dates, Army Y2K Program 

Manager 

Col Ray Brylski, Air Force Y2K POC 

Lt Col Ramona Barnes, J-6V, JCS 

51 
3:00 Discussion 

4:00 Planning Session 

5:00 Adjourn 

Meeting - October 16,17,1997 

October 16,1997 

8:30 Coffee/ Tea 

9:oo 

9:15 

9:45 

10:15 

10:45 

11:45 

12:15 

12:45 

1 :45 

2:45 

3:15 

4:15 

Chairman’s remarks 

Overview of last meeting 

ASD (C3I) Update 

Break 

Aegis 

Lunch 

Patriot 

ASD (C3I)

F-15 E 

Break 

“GCCS Year 2000 Task Force” 

Task Force Discussion 

Mr. George McVeigh, SAlC 

Mr. Sam Worthington, Director 

Information Technology 

Mr. Bill Hyre with Mr. Jim Reagan 

Mr. Tony Valletta, Acting ASD (C3I)

Mr. Dean Mullis 

Col Richard Bowman, F-15 Program 

Office(ASC/FBA), Wright Patterson 

AFB OH and AFPEO/FB (Fighters and 

Bombers) wifh Maj Richard Ruggiero 

Maj. Eleazer, DlSA 

5:00 Adjourn 

October 17,1997 

8:OO Coffee/ Tea 

8:30 Task Force Discussions 

9:30 Intelligence Community Outlook Ms. Letifia A. Long, Associated Execufive 

Director, lnfelligence Community Affairs 

10:30 Break 

11 :00 DLA/Logistics 

12:00 Lunch 

12:00 DFAS/Finance 

Ms. Sandra King, DLA Y2K P.M., wifh 

Ms. Sarah Reed 

Mr. Bob Burke, Depufy Direcfor for 

Information Management 

1 :30 Task Force Discussion 

2:15 Break 

2:45 Task Force Discussion 

4:00 Adjourn 

Planning Future agenda 

52 
Meeting - November 6-7,1997 

November 6,1997 

8:30 Coffee/ Tea 

9:oo 

9:30 

10:00

10:30 

10:45 

12:00 

12:30 

1:00

2:00 

3:OO 

3:15 

3:30 

4:30 

C3IUpdate 

Group I - Process, monitoring, Resources 

Group I I- Incentives, Replacement, Fixes 

Break 

CINCSTRATCOM, 

Group Ill - Testing, Contingencies, Emergency 

Response, Discussion 

Lunch 

Y2K Issues with GAO 

AWACS and JTIDS Brief 

Informal Discussion of IG Status Report 

Break 

“Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Year 2000 

Weapon Interface” 

Group V - Impact Y2K: Financial Operations, Logistics, 

Transportation 

Mr. Tony Valletta, Acting ASD (C3I)

Mr. Tom Backman 

Mr. Jack Winters 

Col Rounce and Maj Healy, USAF, 

USSTRATCOM 

Mr. Brian Keane 

Mr. Jack Brock, Mr. John Stephenson, 

Mr. A Summers 

Jim Lender, A WACS Program Office 

(MITRE), Linda Scannell, A WACS 

Program Office (MITRE), Ma] David A. 

Huss, AFPEO/WS (Warning and 

Surveillance) Carmen A. Paludi, Jr., 

ESC/DIG, Maj. James Forney, 

ESC/DIG 

Mary Lu Ugone, DOD IG 

Mr. Neal Patterson, MLRS Project 

Office. 

Mr. Herb Anderson 

5:30 Adjourn 

November 7,1997 

8:OO Coffee/ Tea 

8:30 Discussion Members and Advisors 

9:oo 

9:30 

1o:oo 

10:15 

11:00 

12:00 

12:30 

1 :30 

2:15 

2:45 

4:00

Group IV - Information Warfare Vulnerabilities 

Group VI - Impact Y2K: C3,Weapons Systems, ClNCs 

BREAK 

Group VII - Impact Y2K: Intelligence Systems 

MIT Presentation Dr. Howard Shrobe 

Lunch 

JTlCs Role in Y2K 

DOD/ USG Telecom Infrastructure 

Break 

Task Force Discussion 

Adjourn 

Dr. Larry Wright 

Mr. John Warner 

Dr. Larry Wright 

Dr. Carl Palmer 

Members and Advisors 

53 
Meeting - December 1,2,1997 

December 1, 1 997 

8:30 

9:oo 

9:30 

10:00 

1 l:oo 

12:15 

12:45 

2:45 

3:15 

Coffee/ Tea 

Chairman’s time Mr Bert Fowler 

Task Force Discussions 

“Tools for Resolving Year 2000 

“Software Test Verification: Key to Y2000 Readiness 

Assurance” Assurance Corporation 

Lunch 

Task Force Discussions 

Break 

Task Force Discussions 

Howard Shrobe, MIT 

Paul Strassmann, Software testing 

5:00 Adjourn 

December 2,1997 

8:00 Coffee/ Tea 

8:30 Chairman’s time 

9:00 Task Force Discussions 

IO: 15 C3I Update Tony Vallelta, Actg. ASD (C3I)

1 1 :00 J-6V 

11:45 Lunch 

12:15 Navy E-6 

1 :00 Task Force Discussions 

3:00 Break 

3:15 Task Force Discussions 

4:00 Adjourn 

54 
Meeting - January 12-1 3, 1998 

January 12,1998 

8:30 Coffee/ Tea 

9:00 ASD (C3I) Update Tony Valletta, Actg. ASD (C3I)

10:00 Task Force Discussions 

10:15 Break 

10:30 Task Force Discussions 

1 1 :I 5 National Security Agency Ms. Bambi Nelms 

12:15 Lunch 

12:45 JITC: Subject Testing Mr. Leo Hansen 

2:45 Break 

3: 15 Task Force Discussions 

500 Adjourn 

January 13,1998 

8:00 Coffee/ Tea 

8:30 Chairman's time 

9:00 Task Force Discussions 

10:15 Break 

10:45 Task Force Discussions 

55 
56 
Sub-Panels 

Process Monitoring, Resources 

W. Lily O’Byrne* 

Thomas K. Backman 

Incentives, Replacement, Fixes 

Jack H. Winters* 

John M. Stewart 

Testing, Contingencies, Emergency Response 

Dr. William G. Howard Jr.* 

Brian T. Keane 

Dr. David L. Briggs 

Information Warfare Vulnerabilities 

Dr. Lawrence T. Wright* 

Charles A. Fowler 

Impact Y2K: Financial, Logistics, Transportation 

Herbert W. Anderson* 

Dr. Allen B. Salisbury 

Impact: C3,Weapon Systems, ClNCs 

Dr. John H. Warner Jr.* 

VADM Jerry 0. Tuttle, USN (Ret) 

David R. Heebrier 

Impact Y2K: Intelligence Systems 

Lawrence T. Wright* 

Charles A. Fowler 

Senior Advisor 

Dr. George Heilmeier 

* Sub-Panel Leader 

57 
58 
AFClC 

AFPEO 

AFPEO/FB 

AF P EO/WS 

ASC 

ASD 

AUTODIN 

AWACS 

C3

C3I

C4I

CEO 

ClNCs 

CIO 

CMS 

COTS 

DCI 

DCTF 

DDI 

DFAS 

DIA 

DlSA 

DISA/GCCS 

DISN 

DlST 

DLA 

DMlM 

DMS 

DOD 

DRI 

DSB 

EKMS 

ERTs 

GAO 

GCCS 

GCSS 

GOTS 

A 

Air Force Communications and Information Center 

Air Force Program Executive Office 

Air Force Program Executive Office (Fighters and Bombers) 

Air Force Program Executive Office (Warning and Surveillance) 

Aeronautical Systems Center 

Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Automatic Digital Network 

Airborne Warnings and Control System 

C 

Command, Control, Communication 

Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence 

Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence 

Chief Executive Officer 

Commander-in-C hiefs 

Chief Information Officer 

Community Management Staff 

Commercial Off The Shelf 

D 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Defense Communications Test Facility 

Deputy Director Information 

Defense Financial and Accounting Agency 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Defense Information Systems Agency 

Defense Information Systems Agency, Global Command and Control System 

Defense Information Systems Network 

Defense Information Support Tools 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Defense Medical Information Management 

Defense Messaging System 

Department of Defense 

Defense Reform Initiative 

Defense Science Board 

E 

Electronic Key Management System 

Emergency Response Teams 

G 

General Accounting Office 

Global Command and Control System 

Global Combat Support System 

Government Off The Shelf 

59 
HQMC 

I BM 

I PT 

IT 

IW 

IV&V 

JCS 

JCS(J6) 

JITF 

JTlC 

JTIDS 

JWlD 

MHS 

MIT/LL 

MLRS 

MTF 

NATO 

NlMA 

NRO 

NSA 

O&M 

OASD (HA) 

OPNAV 

OPR 

OSD 

OT&E 

PACOM 

PCs 

R&D 

SAlC 

SAs 

SECDEF 

H 

Head Quarters Marine Corp. 

I 

International Business; Machines 

Integrated Product Team 

Information Technology 

Information Warfare 

Independent Validation and Verification 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Chiefs of Staff/ J-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers) 

Joint Integration Test Facility 

Joint Interoperability Test Center 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 

Joint Warrior lnteroperability Demonstrations 

J 

M 

Military Health System 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology/ Lincoln Laboratory 

Multiple Launch Rocket System 

Message Text Format 

N 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

National Imagery and Mapping Agency 

National Reconnaissance Office 

National Security Agency 

0 

Operations and Maintenance 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs 

Operations Staff Navy 

Office of Primary Responsibility 

Secretary of Defense 

Operational Test and Evaluation 

Pacific Command 

Personal Computers 

P 

R 

Research and Development 

S 

Science Applications International Corporation 

System Administrators 

secretary of Defense 

60 
STU-Ill 

TOR 

U.S. 

USACOM 

USAF 

US D(A&T) 

USN 

USSOCOM 

U SSTRATCOM 

WARM 

WPAFB-OH 

Y2K 

Secure Telephone Unit-Ill 

Terms of Reference 

T 

U 

United States 

United States Atlantic Command 

United States Air Force 

Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition and Technology 

United States Navy 

United States Special Operations Command 

United States Strategic Command 

W 

War Reserve Mode 

Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 

Y 

Year 2000 

61 

DEFENSE SCIENCE 

BOARD 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

31 40 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140 

2 APR 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION & 

TECHNOLOGY 

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force 

on Year 2000 

In response to tasking from the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition & Technology), the DSB Task Force on Year 2000 has 

examined the Department's efforts and prepared the attached 

report. 

The Task Force concluded that the Year 2000 problem is a 

very serious one, but more than just a CIO problem. It is a CEO 

problem and it needs direction and guidance from the top. Its 

solution must include all users of IT, including the Secretary, 

Chairman, and the warfighting CINCs. 

The Task Force made three major recommendations: 

USD(A&T) appoint a full-time executive 

OSD establish a Year 2000 "escape valve" fund for the FY99 

OSD should work with the components to establish incentives 

budget 

for Program Managers. 

These steps must be taken to get on top of the problem and reduce 

the management risk. 

Attachment