United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

October 1994 NAVAL AVIATION

F-14 Upgrades Are Not

Adequately Justified

GAO/NSIAD-95-12

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-257718 

October 19, 1994

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable David R. Obey

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

We evaluated the implications of the Navy’s decision to spend about

$2.5 billion between fiscal years 1994 and 2003 for a limited ground attack

upgrade and other modifications to about 200 F-14 Tomcat fighters.

Subsequent to our review, the Navy removed the ground attack upgrade

from its Program Objectives Memorandum. However, the Navy is currently

awaiting the results of an ongoing cost and operational effectiveness

analysis (COEA) of potential F-14 improvements to determine the

magnitude of future modifications to the F-14, including this upgrade.

Since this upgrade or a similar one continues to be a possibility, we are

providing this report to assist you in ongoing deliberations of Department

of Defense aviation modernization issues at a time of declining Defense

budgets and forces.

Background Prior to recent congressional deliberations on the Navy’s fiscal year 1995

budget, the Navy planned to spend over $2.5 billion to add limited ground

attack capability and other improvements to 210 F-14 Tomcat fighter

aircraft (53 F-14Ds, 81 F-14Bs, and 76 F-14As). According to the Navy, the

ground attack capabilities were required to partially compensate for the

loss in combat capabilities during the period starting in 1997, when all of

its A-6E Intruder attack aircraft are scheduled to be retired, to the turn of

the century when the F/A-18E/F, the next generation strike fighter, is

scheduled to arrive. The F-14 was to undergo two upgrades. An initial

upgrade, commonly called the A/B upgrade, included structural

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B-257718 

modifications to extend the F-14’s fatigue life to 7,500 hours, improved

defensive capabilities and cockpit displays, and incorporation of digital

architecture and mission computers to speed data processing time and add

software capacity. The A/B upgrade had to be incorporated into 157 F-14

aircraft before the second upgrade, called the Block I, could be added.

Block I was to add a Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod with a built-in

laser to designate targets and allow F-14s to independently drop laser

guided bombs (LGBs), a modified cockpit for night attack operations (night

vision devices and compatible lighting), and enhanced defensive

countermeasures.

Concerned about the Navy’s capability to maintain carrier-based power

projection without A-6Es and with only limited F-14 upgrades, the Joint

Conference Committee on the fiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Act

directed the Navy to add an F-15E equivalent capability to its F-14D

aircraft, including the capability to use modern air-to-ground stand-off

weapons. The act restricted the obligation of fiscal year 1994 F-14

procurement funds until 30 days after the Navy submitted a report

outlining its plans to add more robust ground attack capability. The report,

submitted on May 20, 1994, reiterated the Navy’s intent to add only the A/B

and Block I upgrades.

During recent fiscal year 1995 deliberations, the defense authorization act

conferees eliminated funding for F-14 Block I ground attack upgrades,

authorizing funds for only the A/B structural and survivability

modifications. In a subsequent similar action, defense appropriation act

conferees did not appropriate funds for the Block I upgrades. The Navy

eliminated the Block I ground attack upgrade from its Program Objectives

Memorandum. However, Navy officials continue to believe a ground attack

upgrade is necessary. A final decision on the extent of the upgrade

depends upon the results of a COEA and an acquisition milestone decision

scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 1995.

In a related response to congressional direction to add more robust

capability to the F-14, beyond that mentioned above, the Navy estimated it

would cost $1.8 billion to add F-15E-equivalent capability to 53 F-14Ds and

another $9 billion to upgrade 198 F-14A/Bs. According to the Navy, an

upgrade of that magnitude was not affordable.

Results in Brief Although the Navy justified F-14 attack upgrades as necessary to replace

some capability that will be lost when it retires all A-6E attack aircraft by

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B-257718 

fiscal year 1998, planned upgrades will not include an air-to-ground radar

for precision ground mapping that would permit crews to locate, identify,

and attack targets in adverse weather and poor visibility. In addition, no

F-14s will be able to launch current or planned precision munitions or

stand-off weapons, except for LGBs.

Upgraded F-14s generally have greater range than the F/A-18C and could

possibly reach targets beyond the Hornet’s range. However, this capability

may not be needed with the Navy’s shift to a littoral warfare strategy. In

the Navy’s revised strategy, “From The Sea,” dated September 1992, it

announced a need to concentrate on capabilities required to operate near

the world’s coastlines. The Navy recognized that this direction represented

a fundamental shift away from open-ocean war fighting and toward joint

service operations conducted from the sea. In defining this change of

emphasis, the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy’s potential

targets are within 200 miles of the coast. This is within the F/A-18C’s

range. If greater range is needed, the Navy’s Tomahawk cruise missile can

attack targets up to a range of about 700 miles, and Air Force bombers

have even greater range. Both supplement and complement carrier

aviation in striking deep within enemy territory.

Delivery of upgraded F-14s is not scheduled to begin until after the A-6Es

are retired, even though the Navy stated they were needed to fill a gap

between A-6E retirement and the introduction of the F/A-18E/F aircraft. By

default, carriers will deploy for several years without either A-6Es or

upgraded F-14s. For example, the USS Constellation will deploy later this

year using its F/A-18Cs for all attack missions, demonstrating the Navy’s

willingness to rely fully on the F/A-18C for its strike capability.

The Navy has not made a compelling case to proceed with its $2.5 billion

plan because upgraded F-14s will not (1) have any capability not available

or planned for the F/A-18C, (2) replace a significant portion of the attack

capability lost with the A-6E retirement, or (3) be available to fill any gap

between the A-6E retirement and introduction of the F/A-18E/F.

Most Upgraded F-14s

Will Be Less Capable

Than F/A-18Cs

Most F-14s, even after receiving the Block I upgrade, will lack some

important capabilities that the F/A-18C currently has or will gain in the

near future. The absence of these capabilities could limit the combat

effectiveness and utilization of the F-14 under some adverse conditions.

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B-257718 

Most F-14s Will Lack

Ground Attack Radars

The Block I upgrade will permit F-14s to drop LGBs, which are more

accurate than unguided gravity bombs. But the usefulness of laser

targeting is limited when targets are obscured by clouds, smoke, haze, and

moisture that prevent laser beams from illuminating and marking the

targets and from providing a clear path for the bomb guidance system to

follow. Thus, to assist crews in locating and identifying targets, attack

aircraft need synthetic aperture radar with ground mapping capability.

The F-14A/B models’ AWG-9 radar is one of the most powerful U.S.

military aircraft radars for detecting multiple air targets approaching at

long range, but it is not ideally suited to pinpointing ground targets under

some conditions. For example, it does not provide a ground mapping

capability that permits crews to locate and attack targets in adverse

weather and poor visibility or to precisely update the aircraft’s location

relative to targets during the approach, a capability that improves bombing

accuracy. Only the 53 F-14Ds, with their improved APG-71 synthetic

aperture ground mapping radar, will have this capability. The 157 F-14A/Bs

in the Block I program, lacking the APG-71 radar, will not be as effective in

locating, identifying, and attacking targets, except in daylight and clear

visibility conditions. F/A-18Cs, which have synthetic aperture ground

mapping radar with a doppler beam sharpening mode to generate ground

maps, have greater capability, and they will get even more precise and

clear radar displays when they receive the APG-73 radar upgrade later this

decade. New production F/A-18Cs are scheduled to receive APG-73 radars

later in 1994.

Limited Variety of Weapons The Navy, in a COEA summary dated May 1992 comparing the F/A-18 to

various alternatives, wrote that “a strike fighter should be capable of

effectively employing all Navy strike and fighter weapons in the inventory

and under development.” However, the Block I upgrade will not add any

weapon capability new to the F-14, except the ability to independently

drop LGBs. No Block I F-14s will be able to launch precision stand-off

attack weapons such as the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM),

Harpoon antiship missile, Maverick anti-armor missile, Walleye guided

bomb, and Stand-off Land Attack Missile (SLAM). F/A-18Cs and A-6Es can.

Block I aircraft will not be able to employ future precision stand-off

weapons, including the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the Joint

Stand Off Weapon (JSOW). F/A-18Cs will. The Navy does plan to add the

capability to launch the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile

(AMRAAM) to F-14Ds when their computer software is updated. (AMRAAM is

the Defense Department’s newest air-to-air missile.) The Navy has stated

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that it cannot afford to add stand-off weapon capability to other F-14s.

Currently, F/A-18Cs have AMRAAM capability. Table 1 shows the weapons

carried by F-14s and F/A-18Cs.

Table 1: Variety of Weapons to Be

Carried by F/A-18Cs and Block I F-14s Air-to-ground F/A-18C F-14A/B F-14D

MK-82 (500 lbs.) X X X

MK-83 (1,000 lbs.) X X X

MK-84 (2,000 lbs.) X X X

MK-20 cluster bomb X X X

MK-82 LGB X X X

MK-83 LGB X X X

MK-84 LGB X X X

HARM X

Harpoon X

Maverick X

SLAM X

Walleye X

JDAM X

JSOW X

Air-to-air

AIM-9 Sidewinder X X X

AIM-7 Sparrow X X X

AIM-54 Phoenix X X

AIM-120 AMRAAM X X

aNo new weapons added. Block I adds the capability for F-14 crews to independently launch

LGBs without needing an external source to mark targets with a laser designator.

F-14s Have Greater Range

Than F/A-18Cs, but

Existing Weapon Systems

Offer Alternatives

In defending the F-14 upgrade, Navy officials said F-14s have a combat

range and/or endurance approaching that of the A-6E, which is

considerably longer than the F/A-18. While range (distance) and endurance

(loiter time in the target area) are important capabilities, they are not as

critical in littoral warfare, when carriers may operate close to shore.

Operating close to the shore decreases the distance to targets and

increases the amount of loiter time the aircraft has at or near the target.

The Secretary of the Navy, in the 1994 Posture Statement, stated that

85 percent of the Navy’s potential targets are within 200 miles of the

world’s shorelines.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-12 Naval Aviation
B-257718 

Although the F-14 generally has greater range and endurance than the

F/A-18C, the majority of littoral targets should be within the F/A-18C’s

range, even with an aircraft carrier operating 100 miles or more offshore.

The Navy’s Atlantic Fleet officials told us that F/A-18Cs carrying four

1,000-pound bombs and external fuel tanks have an unrefueled mission

radius of about 340 miles. Future F/A-18Es are projected to carry the same

weapon load up to 520 miles without refueling. While the longer range

F-14s could potentially reach the 15 percent of the targets beyond 200

miles of shorelines, alternatives are available. The Navy’s Tomahawk

cruise missile can strike fixed targets up to a range of about 700 miles. Air

Force bombers, with mid-air refueling, have even a greater range. If aerial

refueling is available, as should be the case with U.S. forces operating

jointly, an aircraft’s range, including the F/A-18’s, can be extended

significantly.

Upgraded F-14s Will

Be Less Capable Than

Some Attack Aircraft

The Block I F-14 aircraft will not have all of the capability of the Air

Force’s F-15E Strike Eagle (a long range, all-weather, multimission strike

fighter with precision weapons capability), the Navy’s own F/A-18C

Hornet, or its A-6E Intruder (see table 2). F-14A/Bs can drop most

unguided bombs, including 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound gravity bombs, as

well as cluster munitions. They can also drop LGBs if another aircraft

marks the target with a laser beam. Block I will add the capability to

independently drop LGBs without external assistance. F-14A/B aircraft will

not have a radar ground mapping capability to assist crews in locating,

identifying, and attacking targets when visibility is poor. No F-14s,

including the D model, will be able to launch precision stand-off weapons,

and none will have all-weather terrain following capability.

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B-257718 

Table 2: Selected A-6E, F/A-18C, F-15E,

and F-14 Block I Capabilities Block I

Capability F-14A/B F-14D A-6E F/A-18C F-15E

Radar detection

All-aspect X X X

Overland look-down X X X

Passive infrared detection X

Elements contributing to all-weather

Ground mapping radar X X X X

Targeting FLIR X X X X X

Navigation FLIR X X

Terrain avoidance radar X X X

Targeting laser X X X X X

Moving map display X

Radar reconnaissance Xa

Photo reconnaissance X X

Weapons

Air-to-ground

LGBs X X X X X

HARM X X

Harpoon X X

Maverick X X X

SLAM X X

Walleye X X

JDAM X X

JSOW X X

Air-to-air missiles

AIM-7 Sparrow (medium

range)

X X X X

AIM-9 Sidewinder (short

range)

X X X X

AIM-54 Phoenix (long range) X X

AIM-120 AMRAAM 

(medium range)

X X X

aWhen APG-73 (Phase II) is installed.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-12 Naval Aviation
B-257718 

Upgraded F-14s Will

Not Reach the Fleet

Before A-6Es Are

Retired

Although the Navy justified the F-14 upgrade as necessary to fill the gap

between A-6E retirements and delivery of F/A-18E/Fs, no F-14s, under the

original Block I plan, were scheduled to begin receiving upgrades until

fiscal year 1998, a year after the last A-6s were retired. The Navy plans to

procure F/A-18 E/F aircraft starting in fiscal year 1997 and expects the

aircraft to enter service in the year 2000. In the interim, two carrier air

wings have retired their A-6Es, and these air wings will operate for 5 years,

at a minimum, before the first upgraded F-14s are delivered in 1999. The

USS Constellation is scheduled to deploy late in 1994, without A-6Es. Its

F-14Ds cannot drop bombs because they lack the necessary computer

software.

The first carrier air wing equipped with Block I F-14s will not deploy until

fiscal year 1999 or 2000. The last F-14s will not complete the upgrade until

fiscal year 2003. By that time, if not earlier, the Navy should start receiving

squadrons of F/A-18E/Fs to replace F-14s and older F/A-18s.

As the Navy eliminates A-6Es from carrier air wings, it plans to add a third

squadron of F/A-18s to each wing, increasing the number of F/A-18s in

each air wing from 20 to 36. The Navy also plans to eliminate one F-14

squadron from each air wing, reducing the number from 20 to 14 planes.

Two air wings, including the USS Constellation’s, will receive this

modified air wing mix in fiscal year 1994. Two more air wings are

expected to change their aircraft mix in fiscal year 1995, with three more

wings changing in fiscal years 1996 and 1997, respectively, until the

configuration of all 10 active air wings is changed.

Navy Study

Concluded a

Modernized F-14 Was

Less Capable Than the

F/A-18C

As noted earlier, most F-14s, even after under going the Block I upgrade,

will lack some important capabilities that the F/A-18C has or will gain in

the near future. The absence of these capabilities could limit the F-14’s

combat effectiveness and utilization under some adverse conditions. This

view is supported by an April 1992 Navy COEA summary, which compared

the F/A-18 to various alternatives, including an upgraded F-14D called

Quick Strike. This version was to have more capability than is planned for

Block I. The analysis concluded that the F-14 Quick Strike was a less

capable strike aircraft than the F/A-18C.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Because the Navy faces an uncertain budget environment and system

affordability concerns, and, since planned F-14 upgrades offer little or no

improvement over current capabilities and may not be fielded before

F/A-18E/Fs are delivered, the upgrades do not appear to be cost-effective.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-12 Naval Aviation
B-257718 

Current Navy plans will not provide F-14s with F-15E-equivalent

capabilities. If the Congress wishes to add these capabilities, Navy

estimates show that it will cost much more.

Therefore, the Congress may wish to defer authorizing or appropriating

additional monies for the F-14 until the Navy can demonstrate that

planned upgrades are essential when considering (1) the current F/A-18C

capabilities; (2) the net weapon capability gain over current F-14A/B

levels; (3) the absence of a ground attack radar in 157 of the 210 aircraft;

(4) the lack of precision stand-off weapons capability in all 210 F-14

aircraft that limits the versatility and use of these aircraft in combat;

(5) the nearly simultaneous delivery of upgraded F-14s and F/A –18E/Fs;

and (6) the Navy’s willingness to deploy carriers without A-6Es or

upgraded F-14s, as evidenced by the upcoming deployment of the USS

Constellation.

Agency Comments Navy officials, commenting on a draft of this report, defended the F-14

upgrade as necessary, even though they were aware that the Block I

ground attack upgrade capability had been eliminated from the Navy’s

budget by the House and Senate defense authorization conferees and from

the Navy’s 1996 Program Objectives Memorandum. Navy officials said the

upgrade was only eliminated from the Program Objectives Memorandum

for the present. They defended the need for this upgrade, which is one of

several possible upgrades being considered in an ongoing COEA. The Navy

could resubmit the ground attack upgrade in a future budget. However, if

this upgrade is delayed, it is likely that new F/A-18E/Fs will be deployed

before upgraded F-14s enter the fleet, making a need based on capability

more questionable.

Navy officials said the key issue discussed in our report is not whether

planned F-14 upgrades duplicate strike capabilities available in the Navy

as well as in the other services, as suggested by us, but rather the

contribution these aircraft would make to the capability of each carrier air

wing. Commenting on the Navy’s willingness to immediately deploy

carriers without A-6Es, relying completely on F/A-18s for its strike

capability, Navy officials said this decision is a reflection of affordability

constraints, not a willingness to forgo the capability. We agree that

affordability is part of the issue. Affordability provided the impetus for the

Navy to set priorities. In setting its priorities, the Navy eliminated the F-14

upgrade from its Program Objectives Memorandum, which was a clear

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-12 Naval Aviation
B-257718 

admission that the Navy weighed its needs and found it had more

important priorities.

Scope and

Methodology

Our data gathering and analysis focused on the Navy’s decision to upgrade

210 F-14 aircraft. We interviewed officials and reviewed documents from

the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Director for Air Warfare); the

Naval Air Systems Command; and Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, in

Washington, D.C. We also interviewed personnel at the U.S. Naval Air

Forces, Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet; Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Air

Combat Command; the Naval Strike Warfare Center, Naval Air Station,

Fallon, Nevada; Carrier Air Wings Two and Fifteen at Naval Air Station,

North Island, California; and Naval Air Station, Miramar, California; and

Hughes Aircraft Company, Los Angeles, California.

We conducted our review between June 1993 and May 1994 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Navy, and the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;

and the Chairman, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces.

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are William

C. Meredith, Kenneth W. Newell, and Frances W. Scott.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

(701008) Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-12 Naval Aviation
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