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77–439 PDF 2002

S. Hrg. 107–263

HAS AIRPORT SECURITY IMPROVED?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

AND THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

RESTRUCTURING, AND THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 14, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

SUSAN E. PROPPER, Counsel

HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

ELLEN B. BROWN, Minority Senior Counsel

ROBERT J. SHEA, Minority Counsel

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING AND

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

MARIANNE CLIFFORD UPTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

ANDREW RICHARDSON, Minority Staff Director

MASON C. ALINGER, Minority Professional Staff Member

JULIE L. VINCENT, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1

Senator Thompson ............................................................................................ 3

Senator Durbin ................................................................................................. 5

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 8

Senator Cleland ................................................................................................ 28

Senator Carnahan ............................................................................................ 30

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 34

Prepared statements:

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 59

Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 59

WITNESSES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001

Hon. Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S.

Department of Transportation ............................................................................ 10

Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 13

Bruce E. Carter, A.A.E., Director of Aviation, Quad City International Airport ........................................................................................................................ 37

Marianne McInerney, Executive Director, National Business Travel Association (NBTA) .......................................................................................................... 39

Jacqueline Mathes, Flight Attendant, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL–

CIO ........................................................................................................................ 41

Captain Duane E. Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International ................................................................................................................. 44

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Carter, Bruce E., A.A.E.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 37

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87

Garvey, Hon. Jane F.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61

Mathes, Jacqueline:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93

Mead, Hon. Kenneth M.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 67

McInerney, Marianne:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 39

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 90

Woerth, Captain Duane E.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 44

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 101

(1)

HAS AIRPORT SECURITY IMPROVED?

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, AND THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Durbin, Levin, Cleland, Carnahan,

Thompson, and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and welcome to this hearing. Today, the full Committee on Governmental Affairs and the

Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee, asks the question that I would

guess millions of Americans are asking. Has aviation security improved since September 11?

The fear and loss of life caused by the attacks that day have

focused an intense and very personal spotlight on the question of

aviation security. Since September 11, the number of airline passengers has fallen off dramatically.

The crash just this past Monday of American Airlines Flight 587

in New York, of course, has renewed concerns in the minds of

many Americans about the safety of air travel. Our hearts go out

to the families of those who died in that crash even as we continue

to work to find ways to allay concerns about the security of air

travel. If the cause was mechanical, we need to find out what went

wrong and take steps to prevent future accidents. If it was a terrorist act, of course, we must urgently redouble our efforts to make

our airports and airplanes more secure.

As one airline executive told the Washington Post, ‘‘While it is

tragic under any circumstance, the impact to the psyche of the

traveling public would be greater if it were a security-related

cause.’’ Because its investigation is just beginning, I do not intend to ask

the FAA or other witnesses today questions directly related to the

Monday crash. This hearing was scheduled well before that incident and is more broadly focused on the measures that the FAA,

the airports, and the airlines have taken in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

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We in Congress began our most recent round of investigations on

airline security immediately after September 11. This Committee

held a hearing just about 2 weeks later, on September 25. The Senate finished work a month later, October 11, on an aviation security bill that makes sweeping changes in the way that airline and

airport security is handled, including expanding the air marshal

program and federalizing passenger and baggage screening services.

I am very proud that amendments to this bill sponsored by Senator Durbin and me on the one hand and Senator Thompson on the

other, which emerged from our earlier hearing, were adopted by

the full Senate and are part of the bill and make it stronger.

The House later passed a very different bill, and as we all know,

the conferees are now at work. I want to plead with the conferees,

our colleagues in both parties from both Houses, to really stretch

to quickly reach an agreement because it will be truly outrageous

if Congress leaves for Thanksgiving without passing aviation security legislation and sending it to the President to be signed. It is,

after all, now more than 2 months since our aviation system was

used by terrorists to attack us. We have acted very rapidly on a

host of other measures in response to those attacks, including $15

billion of aid to the airlines. It is long past the time when we

should find common ground and pass this aviation security legislation.

Remember, as Congress also struggles to find similar common

ground on an economic stimulus package for our receding economy,

that aviation security also means economic security and economic

growth. So passage of the aviation security legislation, I think, both

in direct terms and in its psychological effect, is one of the best

things we can do to help our economy grow again.

But even if enacted today, the changes in the aviation security

legislation would not have an immediate effect. The focus of this

hearing is, therefore, on what has been done, what is being done,

and what should be done to improve aviation security.

Since September 11, the FAA has issued a series of new security

directives to airports and airlines. Some of them are familiar to

those of us who fly frequently, like the restrictions against anyone

but ticketed passengers in sterile areas and the conspicuous presence of uniformed National Guard personnel at screening checkpoints. Other less visible measures are also being undertaken, such

as the use of computer programs to pre-screen passengers and stepping up security in the ramp areas.

And consistent with Transportation Secretary Mineta’s zero-tolerance policy, FAA is more willing today to take stronger actions

in response to perceived security breaches, such as bringing taxiing planes back to the gate, evacuating a concourse, or holding a

flight, as has been done on numerous occasions since September

11, and those are all welcome developments.

Nonetheless, there continue to be embarrassing and potentially

dangerous lapses in security, the most egregious of which occurred

a week and a half ago with the passenger at O’Hare National Airport.

Today, we want to explore how such incidents still occur in spite

of the heightened vigilance. We need to ask how unusual are these

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incidents. Are there more such incidents today than there were last

year or are we just more aware because of heightened public and

media scrutiny? And bottom line, are airline passengers safer today

than they were on September 11?

We need to question if the new FAA requirements are stringent

enough to deter violence in our skies and if they are being properly

carried out by security personnel on the ground. How consistently

are the orders being implemented across the Nation? Why, for instance, as we hear, does it seem that random carry-on baggage

checks are standard in some airports but not in others?

We also want to find out how aggressively airlines are examining

checked baggage. For example, in spite of the fact that the government has ordered that greater use be made of explosives detection

systems, passengers have reported to us seeing these machines sitting idle in some airports. In fact, we will hear from the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General today that a spot check

conducted at nine airports during the past weekend showed that

fewer than 30 percent of the machines are in continuous use. And

it turns out that the American Airlines terminal at Kennedy International Airport, where Monday’s ill-fated flight originated, apparently has no bomb detection equipment at all. How can that be so?

President Bush’s announcement that he will increase the National Guard presence at airports by 25 percent over the holidays,

as well as expand their duties, is, of course, welcome, but the Committee and I think a lot of the American people would like to know

more about the National Guard’s role and its effectiveness.

Americans who want to fly ought to be able to look forward in

this season of celebration to celebrating and not to feeling rampant

insecurity. Those are the lines of inquiry that I hope we are going

to pursue today as part of an ongoing oversight role for this Committee in pursuit of greater aviation security.

Let me now turn to Senator Thompson, the Ranking Member of

the full Committee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

for your leadership in this area, especially in crafting the bill on

the Senate side. I think we will have a bill because we should, and

we oftentimes do what we should do and I think this is going to

be one of those times.

But I want to focus in on one particular aspect of the discussion.

We are hung up right now, apparently on the question of federalization or non-federalization, and the point I would like to

make is that it is not going to make any difference as to where we

come out on that unless we have actual people on the ground,

screeners and others, doing their job. So what can we set up to

more likely produce a good situation on the ground?

I think we did something good in the Senate bill. It is not in the

House bill. And I would hope, above all, even above the Federal/

non-Federal discussion, that we wind up with provisions in there

that will clearly set performance goals and measures and then hold

those responsible strictly accountable for meeting them. I think

that is what has been lacking. And whichever direction we go,

surely we can have a provision like that.

4

Performance subject to accountability is not yet institutionalized

within the industry as it is in many industries, but it must be.

Where are the incentives for the top safety executives to ensure

that their workforce is up to this enormous challenge? What drives

the head of security at each airport to guarantee that his or her

employees are trained, rested, and alert? How motivated is each individual screener to perform his job, knowing that good performance will be rewarded and poor performance might mean the end

of that job?

Across all levels of this enterprise, accountability has largely

been missing except when the TV cameras are watching. Instead

of merely reacting to each unfortunate discovery of dangerous

items that make it through the screening process onto an airplane,

we must be proactive, making sure that the right tools are in place

from the start. Until each employee has a clear understanding of

what his job is and has a reason to do it the right way, we will

keep playing catch up.

Therefore, we must begin with a comprehensive performance

plan which gives the entire airline security sector a clear strategic

direction. We then must establish performance goals for all levels

of management, not just the screeners, that flow from the plan, and

leave no doubt about what is expected throughout the organization.

Finally, we ought to include bonuses for superior performance as

well as provisions that allow employees who fail to meet these

goals to be suspended or terminated.

The Senate airline security bill included an amendment that I

drafted to put such a management system in place and I urge my

colleagues to consider the amendment and make that a part of the

law.

We have had a lot of discussion about the upsides and downsides

of federalizing this system, more or less. One of the main objections

to federalizing it, for lack of a better term, has been that it is so

difficult to discipline those who are found to be not up to the job

in the Federal system. The Federal employee does have a number

of appeal rights. In addition to whatever internal appeal rights

might be available to the employee at his or her agencies, they may

also appeal through the Merit Systems Protection Board and the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

I found very interesting a recent review of this appeal process by

the Inspector General of the Railroad Retirement Board. He said

this. Under the current system, Federal Government management

is often reluctant to take necessary disciplinary action to contest

dubious claims filed by employees. The result is a bureaucracy that

accommodates employees who cannot or will not perform their jobs,

because at times, management is unable to meaningfully and efficiently deal with the problem and the ensuing burdens of litigation.

Now, that employee may be removed from the specific job while the

appeal process is going on, but this does not do much to instill accountability.

Now, the Senate bill, I think, addressed this and allowed, really

removed screeners from any of the protections afforded under Title

V. What we did was add on to that. In the first place, our amendment does not, as you know, does not just apply to screeners. It applies to every employee hired under the Act. It requires the DepartVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
5

ment to prepare a performance plan setting out goals and objectives necessary to ensure aviation security and that every employee

who is hired must enter into a performance agreement where they

commit to being evaluated based on their performance and achieving goals related to the aviation industry. The head of aviation security can take performance into account when deciding to fire

screeners.

So I think it is a responsible approach. You do not want to just

fire people willy-nilly based on somebody’s whim. We have a system here. We have got performance goals. We have got a system

set up to see whether or not people are meeting those goals and

then we have got the opportunity for people to act on that.

Now, there are certainly other reasons to believe that federalizing the system is not going to solve all of our problems, and I do

not even want to get into that debate. The point is, whether you

have a Federal system or whether you have a system where you

contract with Federal supervision, this provision that I just discussed can be placed within either one of those systems so that we

can have some accountability and some motivation and reward and

punishment for the people actually on the ground doing the job,

and that is what we are going to have to wind up having in order

to get this job done.

So I urge that we keep that in mind as we go along. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Thompson. I

fully support your amendment and I am proud that it emerged, at

least in part, from a hearing we held on September 25, as did the

amendment that the Senate also adopted that Senator Durbin and

I worked on that would expand background checks of airport personnel, employ more effective passenger and baggage screening

procedures and equipment, and fund some accelerated research and

development of promising new technologies.

Senator Durbin is the Chairman of the Subcommittee who is cochairing this hearing and has been a passionate and persistent advocate for aviation security. Senator Durbin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Senator

Thompson, for this important hearing. It is an opportunity for us

to get an update on what has occurred since September 11 by way

of airport and aviation security.

I am glad that Bruce Carter, who is Director of Aviation at the

Quad City International Airport in Moline, is going to be a witness

later on. He will bring a perspective to this discussion which is important. And Jacqueline Mathes of Woodstock, Illinois, representing the flight attendants, will also be here to share with us

some of their feelings on the front line of the war against terrorism

on our airplanes and in our airports.

Let me say that it is a curious situation that we now across

America are confiscating nail clippers at a time when we learned

that a man got on a plane yesterday with two meat cleavers in

Miami and made it to Chicago through the screening process. It is

odd to me that we are confiscating cuticle scissors at a time when

a man ten days ago was able to get through the screening check

6

at O’Hare with seven knives, a stun gun, and a can of mace in his

baggage. It is a suggestion to me that the current system, despite

the disaster of September 11 and all of the negative publicity, has

been unresponsive.

And the largest private contractor, Argenbright, announced last

Friday that they got the message. Now they understand there is

a problem. Excuse me. This is a death bed conversion. This company has known since September 11 that this is a national crisis,

and the fact that they have not responded in a way to create peace

of mind across America is an indication to me that this system is

fatally flawed as it currently exists.

I want to commend Senator Thompson for bringing out some of

the specifics of the Senate legislation, which passed on a bipartisan

roll call vote of 100–0. The critics of this legislation have not considered the specifics, which provide for, first, no right to strike, and

second, the performance contracts which he referred to which make

it clear that if people are hired under the Senate provision, they

can be dismissed for failure to perform in a professional manner.

That, to me, is an assurance to all the critics of our bill that we

are not creating a bureaucratic nightmare that will protect people

in positions when they are incompetent, and we have seen clear indication and evidence of incompetence in the current system.

Allow me to add one other point. Let me concede the obvious. No

matter who wins this debate, whether we federalize the screeners

or keep them in the private sector, there are bound to be lapses in

security in the future. That is going to happen. But it is our responsibility in Congress to take the most prudent course and the

safest course to try to make airports and airline travel more predictable and safer for people across America.

There used to be an old saying, would you buy a used car from

this man? I think when we look at the current system, American

families are saying, would I trust the safety of my family to the

current system, to Argenbright and all of the other screeners at the

airports? And the answer to that question, unfortunately, is demonstrated by the fact that people are reluctant to get back on airplanes.

So here we are, weeks after having passed a bill 100–0. It is now

sitting in a conference committee. I hope it is resolved this week.

The people who are against the bill have made it clear where they

are coming from. Mr. DeLay has said he does not want Federal employees. Mr. Armey has said we cannot have people joining unions,

and that seems to be the motivating force in opposition to what the

Senate has proposed.

Just for the record, let us put in a reminder that those firefighters, those police officers, those postal employees, those people

who have given their lives on the front line of the war against terrorism were public employees and members of unions and we have

been very proud of them as Americans. We have called them our

heroes.

Today, we are going to hear from the front line what is going on

across America. I hope that this hearing will be a motivation for

the members of the conference committee to waste no time. Pass

this bill this week. Get it in place, moving forward. Restore conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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fidence so that people can return to the airlines and airports.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Chairman Lieberman, I am pleased to co-chair this important hearing with you

this morning. I commend you for bringing the Committee together to assess the

progress made in securing our national aviation system since the September 11 attacks.

First, let me express my sympathy to the families of the passengers and crew of

American Airlines Flight 587 and to those who were affected in Queens, New York.

I would like to take this time to thank our witnesses. In particular, I want to recognize Bruce Carter, Director of Aviation at Quad City International Airport in Moline, Illinois. Bruce has a wealth of aviation and airport management knowledge

and has managed a number of Illinois airports. Quad City International Airport is

the third largest commercial airport in Illinois, enplaning about 400,000 annual passengers. I look forward to his testimony.

Jacqueline Mathes of Woodstock, Illinois is here representing the flight attendants. By the way, Jackie is someone I met on an airplane. She has been a familiar

face on United Airlines flights from the Washington, DC to Chicago, O’Hare market.

She will testify as someone who is on the front lines, both in airports and on board

commercial airplanes.

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing is a follow up to the joint Subcommittee-Full Committee hearing on September 25. We want to explore the changes that have been

made since September 11 at our nation’s airports, on board airplanes, and within

the Federal Government.

This hearing is not designed to point fingers or assign blame. What has been

done? What still needs to be addressed? How effective is the Federal Government

working with state and local governments and private industry?

Before we move to the witnesses, I’d like to share a few observations. First, it has

been just over 2 months since the September 11 attacks and we still do not have

an aviation security bill. This is inexcusable. The American traveling public should

not have to begin the busy holiday travel season with anything less than the peaceof-mind that Congress and the Administration have done everything possible to improve aviation security. This is not the time for partisan politics. But it’s also clear

that simple internal reforms at private security firms, like Argenbright, won’t do the

trick. If these firms didn’t get the message on September 11, they never will.

In fact, just last night, a 76-year-old chef was being held in Chicago after he flew

from Miami to O’Hare with two meat cleavers in his carry-on bag. These cleavers

were only found when he went to board another flight. And recently in Boston, a

security guard left her post unattended for several minutes, causing hundreds of

passengers to be cleared from the terminal. While it may be hard to make the case

that this man was a terrorist or that the Boston incident posed an immediate threat

to our national airspace, it is disturbing that these security breaches continue to

happen. Inspector General Mead has noted in his written testimony that since October 30, approximately 90 incidents ranging from concourse evacuations to passenger

deplaning and rescreening have occurred. In my opinion, that’s 90 too many.

Second, while law enforcement officials and National Guard troops have been deployed at our nation’s airports, we need to do more to clearly define their roles and

ensure that effective communication and coordination exists.

For example, 2 weeks ago at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, a 27-year-old

man with an expired student visa was able to sneak seven knives, a stun gun, and

a can of pepper spray past a security screening checkpoint and enter the boarding

area of a United Airlines flight to Omaha. He was able to accomplish this despite

the fact that screeners took two knives from him as he initially passed through the

screening checkpoint. His bag was not search and he was not otherwise detained.

When a United employee subjected him to a random search in the boarding area

and these additional weapons were discovered, he was simply charged with a misdemeanor and sent home. It wasn’t until the next day that the FBI moved to arrest

and hold him on more serious charges. And this was done only after he returned

to the airport to claim his bag. Furthermore, two of his knives were stolen, allegedly

by security screeners who were later fired.

You know something is truly wrong when toe nail clippers are being confiscated

by the thousands yet someone makes it to the gate with an arsenal of weapons.

The O’Hare incident raises some important questions. What’s the role of local law

enforcement at our airports? The role of Federal agents? The National Guard’s function? If it’s window dressing, reassurance, peace-of-mind for jittery travelers, that’s

8

great. But, let’s ensure that in addition to a show of force there’s also real coordination and an effective common security strategy.

Let me again put a plug in for seamless security from curbside to cockpit. I’m anxious to hear of the changes not only on board commercial airplanes but in our airports—both large and small—since September 11. While there are certainly specific

challenges at O’Hare or Washington Dulles or at Quad City International Airport,

the basic procedures and effectiveness of overall security should not be any different

in Washington, DC or Moline, Illinois. Afterall, all these airports are also gateways

to the national-international aviation system and U.S. airspace.

Finally, I want to talk about perimeter security and employee access to secure

areas. Do we know who our airport/airline employees are and have they been subjected to comprehensive background checks? Are airport employees required to undergo the same scrutiny as passengers? I know how it should work, I’ve read the

press releases and seen the hidden camera investigations, but my question to our

witnesses today—Is it working?

With that Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our witnesses, including FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and Inspector General Mead. I thank you again for co-hosting

this hearing with me.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Durbin.

Senator Voinovich is the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like

to thank you and Senator Durbin for calling today’s hearing on

aviation security. I think that when you decided to have this hearing, none of us would have anticipated the recent tragedy of American Airlines Flight 587 that we had in New York City. The only

consolation there is that preliminarily, at least, it has not been attributed to terrorism, but that really does not make me feel any

better, particularly if it is through defective equipment, lack of

maintenance, or pilot error that was the cause of that tragedy.

I think we ought to understand that there is a great deal of fear

and anxiety out there today among the American people, anxiety

and fear that I have never seen before in my almost 35 years in

government. People are comforted, Mr. Chairman, by the fact that

they believe the President is doing a good job and is making his

decisions based on what he feels is in the best interest of the American people, and also because of the fact, and this came through

loud and clear when I visited the Toledo Post Office 2 weeks ago,

that it appears to them that Republicans and Democrats in Congress are working together and putting aside partisan politics for

the betterment of the people of this country.

I also would like to let you know that I was encouraged that

when I met with the postal workers I learned that what we heard

from the Postmaster General and the union leaders that cooperation has filtered down to the rank and file front line workers in our

domestic war against terrorism. I made it very clear to them that

we are going to do everything that we can to help them, to make

sure that they are secure in their jobs, because we knew that if

they are secure in their jobs and the mail is secure, that the American people would feel secure about their postal delivery and that

would help lessen this tension that we have today out there in our

country.

I have seen a large increase in the security at airports that I

travel to, and I think members of Congress know more about this

maybe than anyone else because we travel so often. I wish that

Congress had worked and moved quickly to pass legislation to inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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crease airport security. The fact of the matter is that the President

is right. We need to get that legislation passed before we go home

for Thanksgiving, period.

I want to say to Ms. Garvey that I have seen an improvement

in it, and I know there are the stories of the meat cleavers and the

rest of it. I am most concerned about the inconsistency in enforcement.

For example, I was flying out of Boston. I have a little screwdriver that I use to tighten the frames of my glasses so that the

glass does not come out. It was confiscated. Now, that was the first

time. I have had that in there time and time again.

The other thing that bothers me is the inconsistency when they

check the luggage and how they go about doing it. There doesn’t

seem to be any kind of standards that are involved.

One thing that you and I have talked about is that when I travel

within 24 hours of purchasing a ticket, I have my bags checked. I

do not know whether you have experienced that or not, but I have

almost every time now that I have traveled, because my ticket is

usually purchased within 24 hours. I get stopped as a result of

that. Last week in Boston, twice I spent 15 minutes having my

bags checked.

Senator THOMPSON. You are suspicious looking.

Senator VOINOVICH. I am suspicious. A member of the U.S. Congress, they knew it and so on and so forth, but spent all of that

time with me, and you wonder to yourself, again, is this a mindless

type of operation? I do not mind the time. That is fine. But it seems

to me that it is ridiculous that you take all this time with members

of Congress when there are greater risks.

So there is a real problem there, and whatever kind of legislation

that passes, I agree with Senator Thompson that you have to do

a really good job in improving the standards so that there is consistency across the country, so when I travel from Columbus or

Cleveland or wherever I am traveling from, that I can see that it

is uniform across the board.

It seems to me that we ought to be able to pass some type of hybrid legislation. If you do not want to federalize it, then maybe

there is another solution. I would be interested in hearing your

opinion today. If government set the standards, could we allow

some private companies to do the job and then maybe federalize

those that are not getting the job done? But there has got to be a

way of getting this thing done now and not have it drag on.

I agree with Senator Durbin that to argue that we ought not to

federalize this function because these people are going to join the

union is ridiculous. I think one of the reasons why people want,

perhaps, to federalize this is because they trust their police department, they trust their sheriffs, they trust their fire departments. I

have high regard for those employees. They have done a good job,

and I think that if we federalize this, they would do an outstanding

job. Now, if we cannot get an agreement on doing that, let us get

on with something.

But we certainly should not demean the people who are doing an

outstanding job, we have seen it, have we not, what they have been

able to do in New York and in Arlington and right across the country. I am very proud of them.

10

1The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey appears in the Appendix on page 61.

So I am anxious to hear what you have to say. What are your

observations? Has security improved? Do you see the traveling public coming back?

One other thing that you need to understand is that not only is

this important for our personal safety, but this has had a devastating impact on the economy of the United States of America.

A couple of weeks ago, I had breakfast with Alan Greenspan and

I said, what is the first thing that you would do to get the economy

off the ground? He said, get the planes in the air, No. 1. It is having a terrible impact right across this country today.

So this is important not only to the security of the traveling public and the national security, but, by golly, this is important to the

economy of this country and it really needs a boost today because

it is tumbling. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. I was thinking as you were talking, I have had my baggage opened and

searched three or four times in the last couple of months and one

constructive result of that I have found is that it brings great

pleasure to my fellow airline passengers who watch this happening

to me, so that is a good result. [Laughter.]

We will go now to our two witnesses, and I welcome them with

thanks for their time and the leadership they have given in a very

difficult period of time.

We will begin with the Hon. Jane Garvey, Administrator of the

Federal Aviation Administration.

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE F. GARVEY,1 ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION

Ms. GARVEY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thompson,

Members of the Committee. I appreciate very much the opportunity

to be with you this morning to discuss the steps taken in the aftermath of September 11.

Before I begin my remarks, I would like to offer a few words on

the recent crash of American Airlines Flight 587. Certainly, Mr.

Chairman, I join with you in saying that our thoughts and prayers

are with the families of the victims of this tragedy and also with

the people of New York, who have suffered a great deal since September 11.

The National Transportation Safety Board is leading the investigation, and while it may be too early to theorize on the causes

of the crash, as Members of the Committee have indicated, certainly the early signs lead us to believe that this was a tragic accident. The FAA will support the NTSB and lend whatever expertise

is necessary, and I am confident that, in the end, a cause to this

accident will be determined.

What I would like to do this morning is to address two critical

issues. First, the security measures that we have put in place since

September 11, and second, the areas where we will focus on in the

coming days and weeks ahead.

The approach that we have taken has had one guiding principle

and that is to put in place layers of security, a series of redunVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
11

dancies to significantly increase the security throughout the Nation’s aviation system. There is a recognition that there is no one

single solution, no one single approach that will provide the complete answer. Rather, it is a layered approach using various procedures and various technologies.

I know a number of you have mentioned some of the measures

that are in place, but I will just highlight a few. One calls for the

airlines to reinforce the cockpit doors, and I am very pleased to report that the major airlines have completed that work—that is

good news—with a lot of support, by the way, from Congress in

terms of financial support in that area.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So that all the cockpit doors—— Ms. GARVEY. For all the commercial aircraft, that is about 4,000,

that is 100 percent complete.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. All done?

Ms. GARVEY. All done.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Great.

Ms. GARVEY. The regional airlines are making progress, as well.

They are not fully complete yet, but making good progress. So that

is good news.

We have significantly increased the number of Federal air marshals, again, with enormous support from Congress. We could not

have done that without Congress’s help.

We are calling for more random searches throughout the airports. We are requiring positive identification for all passengers before they board. We are reducing the number of access points to secure areas and we are increasing the use of explosives detection.

I want to make a comment about the use of explosives detection

systems, because the IG and I have talked a great deal about that.

We are not where we want to be. We are calling for continuous use.

We know we need to keep on the airlines to make sure that those

are being used continuously. We have seen an increase of about 30

percent, but we are not there yet and we know that is a focus for

us.

We are also requiring that all airports and airline employees

with access to the secured areas have their IDs reissued, undergo

background checks, and are compared to ‘‘watch lists.’’

We have also increased the number of uniformed security at our

Nation’s airports. One of the most visible aspects, as you have mentioned, is the deployment of the National Guard. Last week, the

President announced a 25 percent increase in the numbers of National Guard troops deployed at the airports. I want to just mention that the increase really came about as a result of requests

from governors, and from members of Congress who said that we

need more of them but we need to use them in different places, not

just at the checkpoint areas. So we have expanded their mission.

They will be patrolling the perimeters of the airports. They will be

used on the ramps. They will be used in other locations in addition

to the checkpoint areas.

In addition, as you have mentioned, we are taking swift and immediate enforcement of all the security directives at the Nation’s

airports. That was a real concern for Secretary Mineta. When there

are lapses or other deficiencies, rescreening of passengers and baggage is ordered. In many instances, this has resulted in closing

12

gate concourses and emptying planes so that passengers or baggage

can be rescreened.

In order to prepare for the holiday travel season ahead, we are

hiring an additional 225 people to augment our special agent workforce. I want to mention that many of these individuals have security backgrounds. They are, as a matter of fact, a number of them

laid-off airline employees and we are going to use them to augment

the work that our special forces are doing.

Each of these steps, I believe, represent the right measures, but

they are not the only measure. In the days and weeks ahead, there

are several areas that we will continue to be very focused on. One

is to make sure that the security directives are implemented and

that they are implemented consistently. You have raised that as an

issue and I would be happy to talk about that more in questions

and answers.

Second, we have got to be ready when we transition to a new

agency. We know we are going to restructure screening. We know

it is probably going to be a new agency. How that transition takes

place is taking a great deal of our time. We have listened carefully

to the debate in Congress. We have got screening performance

measures that are ready, and that will be put in place, and training packages that are ready no matter what the structure is. So we

want to be able to transfer that and be able to turn that over to

a new agency.

Focusing on technology. We are ordering more EDS equipment

and getting that out to the airports. I will tell you, if it is manufactured and ready to go, we are going to be ready to get it out there.

We have received, as you can well imagine, hundreds of proposals

on technology and we have assembled a very expert team of outside

folks who are helping us evaluate those proposals. We expect the

first report by the end of this month and I am looking forward to

that.

We are continuing to ramp up on the Federal air marshal program. We are bringing back former Federal air marshals, and retired Secret Service agents who can help us in the training that is

needed. It is a very aggressive program and we are working very

hard on that.

We are developing and see a real need for a shared database

among all Federal agencies, including the intelligence agencies,

and I am particularly encouraged by the leadership of Governor

Ridge and the Homeland Security Office in this area.

And finally, I just want to mention that we have received some

wonderful recommendations from the flight crews. We spent some

time on Sunday with some of the flight attendants. We will be

spending some time this afternoon with the pilots. There are some

recommendations that they have that we have already put in place,

but others that we have not yet acted on. I think we need to consider those and move forward on those very quickly.

Our goal must be an integrated and seamless security web, one

that leads to 100 percent screening of all passengers, baggage, and

airport and airline employees. I certainly look forward to working

with Congress to achieve that goal and I would be happy to answer

any questions that may arise in the discussion today. Thank you

very much.

13

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mead appears in the Appendix on page 67.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Ms. Garvey.

Now we are very happy to have back with us, and thank him for

his continuing good work, the Hon. Kenneth Mead, who is the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation. Mr. Mead.

TESTIMONY OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD,1 INSPECTOR

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. MEAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here

with Administrator Garvey again. I would like to commend the

Committee for its persistent and comprehensive oversight of this

subject.

It is difficult to believe that roughly 80 days ago, the main debate in the aviation community was the need to lay more runways,

put out more concrete, and deal with congestion and capacity. How

times have changed.

What I would like to do today is focus on improvements that

have been made since September 11, and, of course, improvements

that still need to be made.

The observations of our auditors and investigators across the

country are that security is noticeably tighter, as I think most of

you would acknowledge. That is not just a statement to help restore confidence. That is a fact. We are not nearly where we ought

to be, but it is our judgment that the Department has been moving

very forcefully in the right direction, and fairly quickly, if you stop

and think about the changes that have occurred in the past 60

days.

I would add to what you say about the aviation security legislation. This is not just any piece of legislation dealing with a passing

issue or dealing around the edges. This legislation deals with very

fundamental changes. The measures we are speaking of today are

a temporary patchwork quilt, and I think the legislation will put

the fundamental changes in place and give a more systemic approach to it, particularly with the points that Senators Lieberman,

Thompson, and Durbin made about the amendments that were offered. I think the performance measures that Senator Thompson

mentioned represent an area that is ripe for that type of application.

Everybody has mentioned so far today a number of the different

security improvements. I would just like to list ten that our auditors and investigators think are making a difference.

Watch lists and intelligence sharing. Perhaps we do not see 100

percent improvement compared to pre-September 11, but it is pretty close.

Intensified passenger and carry-on baggage screening, including

secondary screening at the gate. Despite the imperfections, it has

been beefed up.

Limiting access beyond the screening checkpoints to passengers

with tickets.

Greater use of explosives detection machines for checked baggage.

Revalidating airport IDs.

Increasing the law enforcement presence.

14

Expanding the Federal Air Marshal program.

Deploying Guard troops.

Reinforcing cockpit doors.

Banning cargo from unknown shippers, a fairly substantial list.

Despite those measures, Mr. Chairman, there are still alarming

lapses of security and some systemic vulnerabilities that we think

need to be addressed. You may know that the President, the Secretary, and the Attorney General called on the Inspector General

to assist in the oversight of airport and aircraft security, most recently Friday in his news conference. He has instructed us to conduct undercover audits at airports nationwide, and I want you to

know that our teams will be in place before the Thanksgiving

weekend and we will be conducting a variety of unannounced tests

nationwide.

I would like to say a word about Secretary Mineta’s zero-tolerance policy, which he announced on October 30. If security lapses

are found, the Secretary authorizes concourses to be evacuated,

passengers rescreened, and flights halted, if necessary. This is really in the best interests of aviation security. It shows that there will

be consequences when there is a compromise of security and noncompliance with the rules. It also demonstrates to air carriers and

screening companies that it is more cost effective and efficient to

do it right the first time.

In implementing the zero-tolerance policy, our office and FAA

have found instances where the air carriers were not continuously

using the explosives detection systems to check baggage. Staff at

screening points were frequently not identifying dangerous items in

carry-on baggage. And air carriers were not randomly screening

passengers before boarding aircraft. These are not the general rule,

but they are instances that we noted and we need to do away with

those instances.

Actions taken by FAA included the de-planing of the aircraft,

evacuating a concourse, halting flights, and rescreening passengers.

There have been about 90 incidents across the country that have

necessitated that type of action.

I would like to turn now to five action areas that I would recommend we pay attention to in the near term, and this will be the

case when that legislation passes, as well.

First on my list is ensuring that the air carriers maximize the

use of bulk explosives detection machines for screening of checked

baggage. During our observations this past week, most carriers

were not selecting enough passengers to supply the machines with

a constant stream of bags. These machines are still underutilized,

yet we found one carrier who was trying to make sure that every

bag went through the explosives detection machines. So it is that

inconsistency that you were referring to earlier, Senator Voinovich.

We also observed instances where the explosives detection machines were not adequately staffed or the staff had been working

extremely long hours on the machine—in one instance, 15 to 20

hours. In our opinion, that screener was no longer alert. In that instance, due to the lack of available staff, the machine was shut

down.

FAA needs to issue a rule or order on screening checked baggage

and set a minimum usage level on the number of bags screened.

15

The current guidance of ‘‘continual use of the machine’’ is too

vague. I think we ought to be, on average, requiring the screening

of 125 to 150 bags per hour. These machines are certified to do 225,

and I think that is about the only way to ensure continuous use.

If there were 125 bags available, we ought to be requiring that

many, on average, per hour.

They need to work towards 100 percent screening of checked baggage and cargo, but I would like the Committee to know that the

present approach of putting these machines in lobbies of airports

is not the way that you will ever get there. The machines will have

to be integrated into the baggage systems of the carriers, which is

going to require some construction in the basements of the terminal buildings and so forth. But just putting the machines around

the lobbies will result in an inefficient process. I do not care how

many machines we come up with, it is like running the bags

through a baggage system twice, once through the security machine, then once through the regular baggage system.

The second area is issue the final rule on certification of screening companies to improve the screening of passengers, baggage,

and cargo. The rules for this should have been out in March 1999.

FAA was prepared to issue them on September 10. I think they are

still on hold, pending recommendations of the Secretary’s rapid response teams. Once issued, though, those rules will serve as a

baseline for performance, which is exactly what Senator Thompson

is referring to. Whether screeners are Federal employees, contract

employees, or some mix of the two, you are going to need performance standards no matter what. And if the screeners, be they Federal or contract people, will not perform and meet those standards,

they ought to be terminated.

The third area is strengthening controls to prevent access to secure areas of the airport by unauthorized individuals. We will be

doing testing in this area over the next several weeks. Testing in

the past, before September 11, showed weaknesses. Since September 11, FAA has closed a lot of the access points to the secured

areas (by secured area, I am referring to access to the runway area

or to aircraft).

The fourth area is criminal history checks for everybody, meaning all employees of all airports, not just new employees at the top

20 Category X airports. I think there is a rule about to come out

from FAA on that particular subject.

And finally, cargo security. We recently completed a follow-up

audit of FAA’s cargo security program and briefed FAA on our results. FAA took action to strengthen that program since September

11. I cannot go into all the details here, but basically, they no

longer allow people that are known as ‘‘unknown shippers’’ to ship

cargo.

We think additional action is needed for a group of people called

‘‘indirect air carriers.’’ Essentially, an indirect air carrier is a

freight forwarder that is known to FAA and gets freight and packages from other people, consolidates the shipment, and then puts

it into stream of commerce into the cargo bays of aircraft. So that

is one area where I think additional attention is needed.

I would just like to close by saying that it is very noteworthy

that the Senate bill has a reference in it to the Government PerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
16

formance and Results Act, which had its origins, I believe, in this

Committee——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is right.

Mr. MEAD [continuing]. And its companion committee on the

House side. This is an opportunity for the real world application of

that statute. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Mead.

We will begin the questioning now and we will give a few extra

moments to our colleagues who did not make opening statements

so they can do that during their time for questioning.

Mr. Mead, I particularly appreciate your focus on the bomb scanning machinery. Because of the unevenness here and your previous

statement on the House side that I have read earlier in October,

it struck me, particularly the part that the FAA’s goal, which is to

screen 100 percent of the checked baggage, seems like, obviously,

a worthy goal, but at that time, it was not going to be fully phased

in until 2009. Mr. Mead, you testified in the House that the goal

assumes the replacement of all machines deployed through 2006

with a faster, cheaper technology.

So my question is, does this mean that the goal of 100 percent

screening cannot be achieved with current technology, and obviously more urgently, my question both to Mr. Mead and Ms. Garvey is, how can we speed up that process now so that well before

8 years from now, we have 100 percent screening of checked baggage?

Mr. MEAD. Well, I would counsel moving out on two fronts. First,

you are not going to get there overnight, although it would be nice

to get there overnight. In our opinion, going to 100 percent screening of checked baggage, it would be appropriate to set a statutory

target of 2004.

In the meantime, we have all these machines we have already

purchased. We still have them in line and they are still being produced, so we want to put them in the lobbies and get them used

while we are transitioning to 100 percent checked baggage. I alluded to what, in our opinion, was required to accomplish that: The

FAA needs to come up with a rule, and it needs to enforce how

many bags will go through screening.

As to going to the 100 percent, there are different approaches in

terms of what machines to get, but in all scenarios, you will have

to put the machine in line with the regular baggage system. That

will require a lot of work at the nearly 400 commercial airports

around the country.

There is one construct where you use two machines and you put

them in the baggage line. The first machine does sort of a prescreen and has a rapid flow-through.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do these machines screen just for explosives or do they also screen for weapons of other kinds?

Mr. MEAD. The machines automatically detect explosives, but

they also detect metal objects such as guns and knives.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me get Ms. Garvey in here and ask,

just for information, is there any screening of checked baggage for

other dangerous material, weapons, for instance, that might be in

the baggage?

17

Ms. GARVEY. Explosives really are the focus for the EDS machines. Just to pick up a little bit on what Mr. Mead said, I think

there are three issues in terms of meeting a more aggressive schedule. One is funding, and a steady stream of funding. The second

is site preparation, because these are very heavy machines. You

have to often reinforce the floors, etc. Mr. Mead spoke about retrofitting that may need to be done. And the third is what the manufacturers actually can produce.

Congress has answered the first question extraordinarily well. I

mean, the funding seems to be there, and from all indications of

what we have heard, it is going to be there.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true. In our amendment, we did

include authorization to use monies from the Airport Improvement

Program—— Ms. GARVEY. That is right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. For the acquisition and conversion of locations for these bomb scanning devices.

Ms. GARVEY. Yes. And in terms of site preparation, we have laid

out where we think they need to go, where the next most critical

machines will be needed. There is some site preparation and work

that needs to be done, but I think airports are poised and ready

with us to move very quickly in that area.

The third is probably the most challenging of all, and that is

what can the manufacturers produce. There are currently two manufacturers that are certified. One has machines that are very well

accepted by the airline community and they are certainly being

used and out there. But how many those two companies can actually get into production is a challenge. They have said they will

ramp up. They have said they can meet a schedule that would be

much closer to 2004. I know yesterday, Secretary Mineta met with

one of the manufacturing companies and was really challenging

them to see if there were other ways that we could—— Chairman LIEBERMAN. A way to do it sooner. So right now, the

earliest we are going to get 100 percent screening will be 2004?

Ms. GARVEY. If we look at what the manufacturers are currently

saying. But again, we will deploy them as quickly as they come out.

We are ordering them even in anticipation of the money.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What percentage do you think we are at

now? In other words, what percentage of baggage or flights are now

covered by bomb detection equipment?

Ms. GARVEY. That is a question that it probably would be best

to get back to.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine.

Ms. GARVEY. I know it is certainly significantly higher since September 11 because we have required air carriers to apply CAPPS

to all passengers, so that means the number is higher.

Mr. MEAD. You are not close to a double-digit number. You are

not close.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We are in single digits as to what percentage of baggage checked on the planes is screened for bomb detection?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is really stunning. I did not realize

it was that low. Let me ask, then, what the current requirement—

18

for instance, I was quite surprised to see in the news coverage of

the accident on Monday that American Airlines terminal at JFK

has no bomb scanning equipment. Are they not required to have

any?

Ms. GARVEY. There are EDS machines at most of, and again, I

am reluctant to give a lot of the numbers, but most of the larger

Category X airports. There are machines in those airports. The

challenge in a place like JFK is, was it at the exact American

checkpoint location. So that is one of the challenges.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is there any requirement on the airlines

now?

Ms. GARVEY. We have a rule that was ready to go right before

September 11, but frankly, it was geared towards a much later

date for having EDS machines screen 100 percent of checked baggage. We obviously are revisiting that, and the question of whether

it is 2004 or can be even sooner is critical. But it is definitely a

requirement that I think the airlines and the public is anticipating.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up, but how long have we had

any requirement for the bomb detection equipment?

Ms. GARVEY. We have had it in place—— Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because it is a long time, obviously, since

planes were exploding, going back to the 1970’s for fear of bombs

on the planes.

Ms. GARVEY. Lockerbie and then the concern over TWA really, I

think, generated the—— Chairman LIEBERMAN. Lockerbie, I guess, was 1988, I think.

Ms. GARVEY. I cannot remember the time, Lockerbie.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Late 1988, I believe that is right. Is that

when the requirement began?

Ms. GARVEY. I think TWA generated the most interest in really

getting the equipment out there. A lot of the equipment has been

around about 10 years.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I mean, this is another classic example of how we all sort of pull back after the initial period following

what we suspected and in one case certainly knew was a terrorist

attack on a plane. We pulled back from pushing to require the airlines to put this equipment on board, and obviously we cannot let

that happen anymore.

Mr. MEAD. No. That is another reason why this legislation is so

urgent, because under the current construct, it is discretionary

with the airline whether it accepts a machine or not.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MEAD. The corollary to that is one reason why there has also

been resistance to a mandatory figure on how many bags ought to

be put through the machine.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. My last word here, but bottom line,

that is another indication that security for the airlines for too long

has been just another cost of doing business. In other words, it has

not been isolated as a priority. I say that respectfully. So if you are

pressing to produce a good quarterly report for your shareholders,

unfortunately, that is going to be one item that is going to fall

down on your priority list unless you are required by law or regulation to do it, and that is why I think the Senate bill moves in this

and other ways in the right direction.

19

I am sorry I took a little extra time. Senator Thompson.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it

seems to me that what is happening in the airline industry and

what is happening with the Department of Transportation is indicative of what is happening throughout the entire government, two

things. One, we are improving our planning, and two, we are getting worse in our performance.

If you look at the Department of Transportation, I think you

would have agreed—we on this Committee who look at all these

things—that the Department of Transportation has some of the

best outcome-oriented goals in terms of the goals that they set

forth as required by the Results Act, GPRA, that you mentioned,

Mr. Mead, really good goals as to what we need to accomplish. But

yet we see in terms of the screeners, for example, the results have

been getting worse for a decade, have they not?

Mr. MEAD. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. And with all due respect to the compromise

I understand that is being attempted, the results for the smaller

airports are worse than the results for the bigger airports, are they

not? I think I recall that. Somebody is shaking their head affirmatively back there. We will take their word for it. [Laughter.]

But I think the record indicates—I mean, I was struck by that

when I looked. It has been a little while since I looked at that, but

I think you will find that that is the case.

And the Department of Transportation is quite candid in its report of the year 2000 results. It says DOT did not meet this year’s

performance targets. Then you look to see what they are doing.

Well, they purchased new machines, awarded new contracts for

baggage checks, awarded grants, and conducted regional assessments. Somebody has got to follow through in order to get the job

done. You can have good plans, good goals, and so forth, but when

you are not meeting those goals, you do not just come back next

year and say, we did not meet them again, which is what we do

up here. We watch this all the time in every department.

There are no consequences to bad performance anywhere. Usually, you get some kind of a budget increase. We do not do it, but

they go before the Appropriations Committee and there is no tiein between performance and budgeting.

So, clearly, now we have got an absolute disaster on our hands,

so maybe this is, Mr. Mead, as you say, a way to get the foot in

the door and maybe it will not take disasters in every department

in government to make some progress here. But how do we move

from having good goals and good intentions and good ideas, and between the two of you, you have laid out an additional 30 or 40,

probably, things we need to do, but what happens when we do not

do it? All of these terrible things that have happened in the last

few days in terms of the meat cleavers and the mace cans and all

violated some rules. We had the rules in the charge of companies

that have been cited time and time again, fined in some cases time

and time again.

I guess I am touting my own pet horse here again, but clearly,

is it not clear that we have got to have some consequences for bad

performance? Somebody has got to take responsibility. Somebody

has got to hold the right people accountable. Some people need to

20

be promoted and rewarded and some people need to be fired and

some people need to be fined.

Mr. Mead, getting to that point, we see where some of these security firms have been fined, some airlines have been fined and so

forth, but I am wondering in terms of aviation security and passenger security, we all want to get along and say nice things about

each other here, but accountability has got to go all the way to the

top. How is the FAA doing? I know they are doing better. We are

all doing better since September. But over a period of time, in

terms of their relationship to the airlines and so forth, in terms of

watching the planning go up and the performance go down, what

is your assessment of the FAA as they try to get a handle on this?

They point out in the report some of these things do not look as

good after the fact, but this report in March 2001 FAA puts out

said we have got to take into account the speed of processing passengers and baggage through screening checkpoints and other security measures must improve to accommodate the rapid growth in

passenger traffic. So before September 11, one of the things we

were concerned about, passenger traffic is picking up. We have got

to speed up. And these challenges must be met while protecting

civil liberties. Well, we are all concerned about that. But those

were the kinds of things that were on our mind before September

11, and rightfully so.

But in terms of priorities and in terms of accountability, what

has the FAA been doing with regard to all of this? We hear that

sometimes the airline industry has too much influence. We know

they are all in trouble financially. Nobody wants to unduly burden

anyone. We also hear that sometimes they get caught in negligent

conduct and it takes forever to process a claim and they continue

on with the same practices while they get their lobbyists to come

up here and talk to us and the FAA and everyone else.

Straighten us out a little bit about that. What is your candid observation over the years as to what has been going on there?

Mr. MEAD. I think the Senate and House bills both have it right

on the security function per se. It is a tall order for FAA, whose

principal mission is the safety of aircraft, safety of air crews, and

running the air traffic system. FAA is not fundamentally a security

agency. I think there are a lot of competing missions there, and

that is why I think it is a good idea that you have an entity that

is dedicated to, focused on security, where they do not have to balance and juggle and all these other competing values.

Second, last year, our office with the Justice Department did pursue the case against one of the security firms, the one that got a

$1 million fine plea, criminal plea agreement. At the time that case

came out, it got very little attention here in the Congress, frankly,

in the Department, or even in the news media. Certainly in Philadelphia, it got pretty extensive coverage. Now, I would wager that

90 percent of the Congress is aware of that case, maybe 100 percent.

So, with all respect, I think it is important that Congress take

issues like this Government Performance and Results Act and have

hearings on it, on the important things. It keeps the pressure on,

keeps the focus on the important issues.

21

And finally, the airlines have been subjected to fines for security

violations, but I think they have been the cost of doing business.

When we go to this new system, I believe we are going to have to

be very firm. When people do not perform, there have to be consequences, as you say, and sometimes it takes a wake-up call like

September 11 for people to realize we have to really be firm here.

Senator THOMPSON. My time is up, but is what you are saying,

the FAA is not established or set up or equipped to crack the whip

in terms of security? Ms. Garvey may want to, of course, comment

on that, too.

Mr. MEAD. I will defer to Administrator Garvey.

Ms. GARVEY. Well, I think, Senator, the role that we have played

in terms of the screening companies is essentially through the airlines. The airlines hire the screening company, and frankly, from

my perspective, one of the most frustrating elements since September 11, in particular, is to see those violations and know that

legally, the only immediate things that we can do are to close a

concourse, or close down the operation. You hate to do that for passengers. People are traveling. You want to serve customers and

serve the public. But we can close the concourse, take an immediate action, and we have the ability to fine. We have fined in ever

single case. But, as Mr. Mead has suggested, to some degree, that

is the cost of doing business.

So the direct Federal control and management to be able to do

just exactly what you are saying, set the standards and then take

the right action, set the pay level, and put training programs in

place. We, meaning DOT, the FAA or, more appropriately, another

agency can do all of that. I think it does make sense, as Mr. Mead

has suggested, to have an agency who has a single combination of

security and law enforcement ability.

But I think we have taken the law as far as we can. We have

put the civil penalties in place. If it is a safety action, by the way,

and a civil penalty has to be levied, even with due process, you can

keep something shut down until that due process continues. If it

is not a safety action and we feel it has been corrected, then it does

have to go through the due process, but it can be a very frustrating

and long process, as you have suggested.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thompson. Senator Durbin.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank Ms. Garvey and Mr. Mead for being here.

You have done a great job since September 11 in your capacity at

FAA and as Inspector General in helping us to understand the

problem and to address it.

Ms. Garvey, when I met with pilots and flight attendants in Chicago, Illinois, shortly after September 11, one of the things they

brought to my attention was the lack of dialogue between the FAA

and the pilots and flight attendants who were on the planes and

clearly on the front line when we talk about safety in the air. Has

that changed?

Ms. GARVEY. I think it has changed very definitely. As a matter

of fact, as a result of our conversation, we have had a couple of

meetings that have occurred since that time. In addition, as I menVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
22

tioned, we have received some very specific suggestions from the

flight crews. Some, we have implemented. Some, I think we really

need to have even more discussions and move out on.

The unions have also suggested, which I think is an excellent

suggestion, naming representatives from their organizations that

we can work with on a regular basis as we move forward with

some of these initiatives. I mentioned earlier we have a meeting

this afternoon with one of the pilots’ unions that we have not had

a chance to meet with and I am looking forward to that and know

there will be lots of other discussions, as well.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you.

Mr. Mead, when you talked about the people who were operating

the detection devices for explosives and baggage and working 15 to

20 hours, like the screeners, are these also airline or contract employees of airlines?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, contract employees.

Senator DURBIN. Let me raise an observation based on an experience of a television station in Chicago. This television station, the

FOX station, sent one of their reporters to the Argenbright training

course. Several things occurred during the course of her training

which really raised some serious questions.

First, they did a background check, but they did not complete the

background check until she had gone through training. I do not

think you have to go to the FBI Academy to understand that is

backwards. You would not want to put someone through training

who is a security risk so that they understand how to defeat the

system. That is exactly how Argenbright was doing it.

Second, if I am not mistaken, the FAA rules require 12 hours of

training for these screening employees at the current time. That is

being debated as to changes. Several hours of the 12 hours of training were spent on appearance and dress, as well as trying to interest these prospective employees in buying insurance policies and

bail bond cards. That does not strike me as really directed to the

question of airline and airport security.

This young woman came back from the experience and said that

she felt that they were woefully unprepared to take on the responsibilities at the screening station. All of these things occurred long

after September 11. At the time, Argenbright had been paying

$6.75 an hour. I think they are up to $10 an hour at O’Hare, but

still, we find all of these lapses.

If you have the power to put the rules in place to make this

training meaningful—Mr. Mead has raised the question in his testimony—why has the FAA not done that?

Ms. GARVEY. That is a very fair question and one we have looked

at and asked ourselves since September 11. First of all, the rule

was ready last March, and as I think I have had a chance to say

to some of you, we had actually scheduled something with the Secretary on September 21 because it was a rule that was very important to him.

But one of the considerations for us right now is really seeing

what is going to come out of the legislation. For example, we may

not need a rule. We may be able to do these things without putting

a rule in place, but just do them as the Federal Government. For

23

example, we would not need a rule to establish the right kind of

training. We could just do it.

So we have got it ready. We are ready to go. Again, I think it

speaks to the urgency and the importance of this legislation.

Senator DURBIN. Let me go to another aspect and that is background checks and let me ask you where we are today. Have we

done background checks and reissued identification to all employees that have access to ramp as well as to any aspect of the airplane?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, right after September 11, Senator, we did require that the airlines and airports revalidate all of their badges,

issue new badges if they needed to. We required that of both the

airlines and the airports. We also asked them to match their employees against the watch list, and they are doing that on a continual basis because the watch list has changed several times since

September 11, as you would expect.

But we are also, as the Inspector General indicated, getting

ready to issue a rule within the next day or so, really within the

next couple of days, to require criminal background checks of all

of those people who are within the secured area. Congress, in 2000,

passed legislation that allowed us to do that at Category X large

airports for new hires. We are sort of pushing that a little bit further and requiring it for all employees, not just the new hires, and

also we will be expanding that to the smaller airports. We understand from the smaller airports, they are eager to take this on.

Senator DURBIN. So currently, we do not have a background

check mandated on all employees who have access to the airplane,

on the ramp or otherwise?

Ms. GARVEY. For the large airports, the legislation called for year

2000, right, and 2003 for the smaller ones.

Senator DURBIN. So it is only at the smaller airports where the

criminal background checks are not taking place?

Ms. GARVEY. We are pushing for the new hires, that is correct.

It is only new hires, I want to be clear about that. What our rule

would contemplate is expanding that to not just the new hires, but

be all employees who have access to that secure area.

Senator DURBIN. Do you have any knowledge as to the cost of

these explosives detection devices that we have talked about?

Ms. GARVEY. Senator, they are about $1 million a machine. I will

say that we are testing and looking right now at a machine that

is smaller that would probably be more appropriate for some of the

smaller and mid-size airports, and while it is still just in development stage, that may be a machine that would cost less than $1

million.

Senator DURBIN. Any idea of its cost?

Ms. GARVEY. I think they are anticipating it would be about

$300,000 to $500,000.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Durbin.

Ms. Garvey, are people applying for work at the airports and

those who are there now being cross-checked with watch lists?

Ms. GARVEY. Absolutely, and that, again, is occurring almost

weekly because every time the list changed, the airports and the

24

airlines go back and run their employee list again for validation

and for matching.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it is not just criminal backgrounds, but

anybody who turns up on an FBI or—— Ms. GARVEY. Correct.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK.

Mr. MEAD. But there is an important clarification there. The

watch list is a list of names.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MEAD. The reason the rule needs to come out that Administrator Garvey is referring to is because with respect to existing employees, the revalidation of ID cards that she was referring to—— Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. MEAD [continuing]. We do not presently require a criminal

background check for existing employees at the Category X (highrisk) airports or at the smaller non-Category X airports. That is

why this rule is so important. Using the watch lists alone is not

enough, because these people do not always go by the name on the

watch list.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, absolutely. Of course, that is another

reason why some of the support for new technology is so important,

so we can move to a point where we are using biometrics or retinal

scanning or whatever it is to make sure the person is exactly who

they say they are and then to check whether they are on a watch

list.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. I would like to make an observation:

One thing that I have noticed that has not changed is the availability of personnel and machinery to do the screening.

Ms. GARVEY. A challenge.

Senator VOINOVICH. I know it is important. People have to be patient. But there are people right now in this country that are calculating the time it takes to get to the airport, wait in line, get on

a plane, get off and deplane and so on, and they are figuring the

hours out and many of them are deciding not to fly and go by automobile.

Ms. GARVEY. Right.

Senator VOINOVICH. I think that is something that you ought to

be concerned about and so should the industry.

Ms. GARVEY. Yes, very much so, Senator. As a matter of fact, last

Thursday, we met with all of the airlines and met with the top 20

airports in this country. They all came into Washington and two

assignments came out of it. One was to agree to a list of accepted

items that you can travel with to resolve the consistency issue that

you talked about, and we have got a brochure that is going to be

coming out with the airlines and with the pilots, by the way, who

did a lot of work on this with us. But it is an agreed-upon list of

what you can travel with, and what you cannot travel with.

And the second most important point from my perspective was

to ask the airlines whether they have the resources to deal with

open check points, and more ticket agents on duty. They are coming back to us with what resources they will have in order to meet

the demands for the travel. It is very challenging, I know, to get

some of the right personnel, and I know they have, as the Senator

25

mentioned, a lot of financial issues. But we think opening those

check points and increasing the number of ticket agents is critical

and that is why we were so anxious to hire the 225 additional people from our perspective.

Senator VOINOVICH. I have been concerned, and so have the

Members of this Committee, with the human capital crisis that we

have across the Federal Government, and Senator Thompson in his

amendment exempted the people that would be doing the screening

from Title V. Do you feel that exemption gives you the flexibility

that you are going to need in the event that we federalize those

screeners? Can you move forward and hire them and also manage

them once they are on board?

Ms. GARVEY. Certainly from our perspective, it gives us the flexibility that would be needed. I do not know if Mr. Mead has any

observations on that.

Mr. MEAD. The devil is sometimes in the details on these things,

and people do say FAA has personnel reform and they have procurement reform. In the personnel reform section of the law, for a

large group of existing FAA employees—basically, personnel reform

said, you will not be any worse off under personnel reform.

Some of the points that have been made in the hearing today

would suggest that it is important to be able to remove people fairly quickly if they do not perform. So rather than just incorporating

by reference the personnel reform authority for FAA, my advice

would be to directly say what we want.

Senator VOINOVICH. So you would go beyond that to give the government more authority—you need more authority, you think, to

get the job done?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK.

Mr. MEAD. And I am the Inspector General. I cannot speak for

the Secretary or the Administrator, but that would be my opinion

as Inspector General.

Ms. GARVEY. Senator, I will go back and look at that language.

I thought it actually was fairly explicit, but Mr. Mead raises a good

point and we will certainly look at that.

Senator VOINOVICH. That is real important.

My understanding is that the airlines right now are in charge of

the screening, is that correct?

Ms. GARVEY. That is correct.

Senator VOINOVICH. So they hire a company to do the screening.

Now, that company that they hire screws up. They do not do what

they are supposed to do and that is discovered. Do you then have

to bring that to the attention of the airlines and the airlines then

get involved and deal with the company that they have hired to do

the job? Is that correct?

Ms. GARVEY. I think that is fundamentally right. If there is an

issue on site, we can take immediate action, and we have done that

even before September 11. So you correct the action and take an

action at site. But in terms of a penalty, the penalty is levied

against the airline, so you are exactly right.

Senator VOINOVICH. So it is against the airlines and then the airlines have to do something about the company?

Ms. GARVEY. That is correct.

26

Senator VOINOVICH. To me, that is the primary reason why we

ought to eliminate that and go to federalized screeners, because if

they work for the Federal Government, you do not have to go to

the airlines. Then they do not have to go to the company that is

doing the work. If somebody does not do the job, they are working

directly for you and you can discipline them and hold them responsible and not go through the Maginot Line in order to get something done. Is that correct?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, that is correct, Senator, but I do not want to

get in trouble with my Secretary, who has been up here negotiating, I know, maybe slightly differently. But even if there is a

company, we could—as long as we are directly controlling and directly managing, and to me, that is the critical piece. I think that

the administration would suggest that——

Senator VOINOVICH. But the company is working for the airlines.

Ms. GARVEY. As it is today, yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. And right now, we know that some of

the airlines are in financial trouble. Some of them are going to go

out of business. So we are in a situation where they are in trouble

and we are saying, add more expenses on. It seems to me that we

ought to get out from under that whole business and guarantee to

the public that we are not going to have to go through the airlines

and the companies to hold people responsible. Would you agree

with that?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, I definitely would agree we need direct Federal control, direct Federal management. You are right. We have

to eliminate the middleman, if you will.

Senator VOINOVICH. The issue is this, that if you do not federalize the screeners and we go to a hybrid system, does the legislation that was passed give you adequate power to do what Senator

Thompson talked about and hold people responsible?

Ms. GARVEY. Senator, we are assuming that whichever construct

is finally voted on by the Senate, that we will and can and are already beginning to establish the performance standards, and the

training that is necessary. If it is a new agency that implements

that, we are going to be ready to turn that over so that that can

be implemented very quickly.

Mr. MEAD. Under both the House and Senate bills, the entity

that is created would have the authority to take summary action

with respect to people that do not perform. Now, unlike the Senate

bill, in the House bill, the President is given the discretion to contract, with private firms. Under that bill, though, those firms could

also be removed if they did not perform.

Senator VOINOVICH. Are they working for us or are they working

for the airlines?

Mr. MEAD. They are no longer working for the airlines—the airlines are out of it.

Ms. GARVEY. They are working for the government.

Mr. MEAD. The contractor would work for the government. In

other words, there would be a government contractor, not an airline contractor. And the provisions of the House bill do strongly

suggest that you would not be in long protracted disputes with the

contractors if you wanted to get rid of them if they did not perform.

27

Senator THOMPSON. The problem, I would interject here, everybody agrees, whatever government you are a part of or in private

industry, if you are not performing, you ought to be dismissed. The

question is, what is lack of performance? What are the standards?

Who is going to decide? That is what our bill does and the House

bill does not do. It takes it to its logical conclusion. It does not just

say, if you do not perform, you are gone. It sets out what the standards are and it requires the employees to sign on to that and to

agree to do certain things, and if they do not, you have an objective

standard there that is fair to the employee and can be determined

before the event happens what is going to happen when someone

is negligent.

So I think that is the difference. We both have the same goal,

but again, everybody agrees on that goal, always has, but we have

not been getting it. I think that is what the Senate bill carries out

that the House does not.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I must say, I agree with my

colleagues on this question of responsibility, but as we look back,

and again, all of us were painfully awakened by September 11, the

responsibility really has to go all the way up the line.

When I go back to what you said before, Mr. Mead, that 13 years

after a bomb blew up the plane over Lockerbie, that less than 10

percent of the baggage going on airplanes in this country is

screened for bombs is really just unacceptable. All of us are part

of that mea culpa, I am afraid, including, again, the airlines for

whom I am sure these machines were expensive, and so they are

a cost of doing business and, therefore, among the various items in

their priority list, the security of the traveling public went low.

Senator THOMPSON. And we have a lot of machines we are not

using, right? We are not utilizing them. Is that not correct?

Mr. MEAD. You are not utilizing them enough, that is right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, can I just make one point?

One of the things that we have to point out in this hearing is that,

overall, things are a lot better than they were before. I think that

is very important to note, because there are people watching us

right now and that should be mentioned.

I have always understood that if I check luggage and then I do

not board the plane, that they then try to identify whose luggage

it was and remove it from the plane, and that was one of the deterrents against bombs. Is that correct?

Ms. GARVEY. That happens for many airlines. It does not happen

for all.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not for all.

Senator VOINOVICH. It does not? Well, I always thought that was

one of the ways that you guarded against it. Now we have got a

new dimension, that people are willing to commit suicide in order

to achieve their goals.

Ms. GARVEY. Right.

Senator VOINOVICH. But that is not a universal practice?

Ms. GARVEY. And I think another point, too, as we move forward,

because as Mr. Mead says, EDS will not be in place at all airports

tomorrow, is stepped-up use of the dogs. It is stepped up use of

CAPPS. It is all of those things, more use of the trace detectors,

28

continuous, and making sure that the airlines are all using the

equipment that is out there. It has got to be a multiple, many faceted approach to this, and we have got to, I think, really hit it from

several angles. Most important of all, getting the right information

from the intelligence communities from the very beginning, can

prevent some of these folks from even getting access to the system.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let us now go to Senator Cleland and

then Senator Carnahan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Ms.

Garvey, I have a lot of respect for you and Mr. Mead.

I will say to my colleagues and to the public here that I have sat

through hours since September 11 in dealing with this question of

aviation security. I am on the Commerce Committee and the Subcommittee on Aviation and it was out of that subcommittee and out

of that committee that came the Senate version of how to dramatically improve the checkpoints, over 700 checkpoints at some 400

airports throughout America by federalizing, professionalizing, upgrading, paying for increased security on checked baggage. I will

say, sitting through this hearing now almost 2 hours of length, I

am more frustrated than ever.

I think we are just missing the point. I have this powerful sense

we are all sitting here fiddling while Rome is burning and while

the American airline industry is crashing and burning.

Over the last 2 months, five domestic airliners crashed and

burned, killing all people on board. I think the American people,

before they start flying again, are going to want to know that the

U.S. Government is somehow guaranteeing their security. I do not

think it is going to look to the airlines. I do not think it is going

to look to a private contractor. I do not think they are going to look

to some foreign-owned company. They are going to look to us and

it is our responsibility to get it done and that is not happening.

Now, I have heard the phrase Argenbright. I know Frank

Argenbright. But he sold his company to a foreign entity. It is no

longer owned by an American company. And that company continues to provide baggage claim security for 17 of the 20 largest

airports in America. That is unacceptable. That is a scandal, because, clearly, they provided baggage screening for Dulles and

Newark, where two of the four hijacked planes originated. They

also provide security, if you can call it that, for O’Hare, where we

had that incredible incident happen in Chicago. This, despite a

DOT investigation into Argenbright and fines and criminal complaints filed against them. I mean, they have had everything done

to them but shot and they are still out there doing it.

I look at Atlanta, the largest, busiest airport in the world. What

do we have there? A Cleveland-based company called ITS, International Total Services, cited by Federal authorities 19 times in the

past 11 years, including two major violations since September 11,

and they are still there. I am still flying in and out of there on Fridays and Mondays, God help us. They have filed for bankruptcy.

How do you think that makes me feel? How do you think that

makes all those people going through Atlanta and Hartsfield, feel?

29

And what is the pay? The average is $7 an hour. They can get

$7.25 if they go work flipping burgers, which requires substantially

less training than what even they go through.

I think continuing to allow the American people to rely on these

contract baggage claim people is like letting the Boston strangler

massage your neck. I think it is ridiculous. [Laughter.]

They have a staggering—in Atlanta, that company has a 375 percent turnover annually. You cannot even run a burger place with

that kind of turnover.

Now, let us face it. This is a scandal. It needs correcting and we

need to get it done, and I think all the things you have said today

about performance and accountability are correct. We have it in the

Senate bill passed 100–0, and I think the Nation ought to know

that it is not the U.S. Senate holding this up. It is the House of

Representatives that came back with this God-awful contract situation one more time.

I think it is a travesty. I think it is a national scandal, and I

think that unless we get this good bill passed before Thanksgiving,

where we normally have record travel on airlines in America, I

think there is not going to be much travel on Thanksgiving Day,

I am sorry to say.

So I agree with Alan Greenspan. The best thing for our economy

is to get people back in those seats, and I intend to be in one of

them. Pray for me, because we continue to allow these baggage

claim people out there to work on a contractual basis where nobody

is accountable, where the FAA can do nothing about them. Nobody

fires anybody. They just continue right on.

I think unless we make a dramatic departure here and federalize

this system, professionalize it, instead of sending them to charm

school in Chicago, we ought to be sending all these baggage claim

people to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia

where all the Secret Service people and the Customs people go anyway. That is where they get their training. That is why they are

professional and that is what we need.

We need a domestic version of the Customs Service, and not run

out of the Department of Transportation. We need it run out of the

Justice Department, like the Senate bill says. It is a law enforcement function that the U.S. Government ought to be responsible

for and we ought to live up to that responsibility right now, because the American people are depending on us. They are not depending on the airlines anymore and they are not depending on

some foreign corporation to contract out at minimum wage. I just

feel that way.

Now, I want to put you on record, Ms. Garvey. Do you or do you

not support the Senate bill?

Ms. GARVEY. Oh, Senator——

Senator CLELAND. Well, I mean, a thousand people have lost

their lives. They have crashed and burned in five airline incidents

over the last 2 months. Now do you not or do you support the Senate bill which we passed 100–0?

Ms. GARVEY. I know you did, Senator, and what I do support is

strong Federal management, strong Federal control, and I certainly

support passing it as quickly as we possibly can.

30

Senator CLELAND. Mr. Mead, do you or do you not support the

Senate bill, passed 100–0 by this Senate?

Mr. MEAD. I would recommend some revisions to it. I do not

want to take a position on this federalization of screeners. That is

above my pay grade. I would just say that, categorically, whatever

you do, you need to have, in my judgment, a law enforcement presence at every screening station at every airport in the United

States. That law enforcement presence, that person, ought to be a

Federal employee.

I do not think you need to have every screener be a policeman.

If you want to make them all Federal employees or contractor people, I just think you need to have very powerful standards which

I have tried to make in my testimony today. I am not going to go

out and substitute my judgment for yours on that.

I think in the Senate bill, there is a big issue. In the House bill,

there is a big issue in the placement of this function.

Senator THOMPSON. On what?

Mr. MEAD. On the placement of this function. The Senate bill

places some functions in the Department of Transportation and

other functions in the Department of Justice. The House bill places

the functions in the Department of Transportation. The Senate bill

creates something called a Deputy Secretary for Security, yet the

function is placed in the Justice Department.

I think a good case could be made for the placement of this entire

function in the Department of Transportation, because this is a

multiple issue. It is not just an aviation issue. That would be one

area I would recommend you consider changing in the Senate bill,

Senator Cleland. But I am not going to get into the issue on substituting my judgment for yours, sir.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much. Thank you very much,

Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cleland. Senator Carnahan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am extremely

pleased that we are holding these hearings today because I believe

it is important that we continue to shine the spotlight on airport

security until we see that some significant improvements are made.

I am very proud of the work that the Commerce Committee has

done, under the leadership of Chairman Hollings and Senator

McCain, to draft airline security legislation. The committee reported a bill that I believe will greatly enhance aviation security

in this Nation. The bill ultimately passed the Senate, as you know,

unanimously.

Congress has for years been hearing about the problems that

exist in our aviation security system, and a multitude of people, including the Inspector General of DOT, the GAO, and others, have

warned about the dangers associated with poorly trained and underpaid baggage screeners. The Senate legislation that we have

been talking about here today addresses the shortfalls made by

making the Federal Government directly responsible for the screening of airline passengers and their baggage.

31

No Senator offered an amendment to allow private screeners to

continue operating at our Nation’s major airports. The bill passed

100–0. I believe that it is precisely this shift in responsibility for

passenger screening that will have the most profound impact on

improving the safety and security of our aviation system.

The events of September 11 demonstrate quite convincingly that

aviation security will forever be linked with national security. Passenger safety can no longer be left to private screening companies

who are not accountable to the American people. The Federal Government does not contract out the work of Customs agents, of Border Patrol, of Secret Service, or of Capitol Police, nor should we

contract out the work of protecting the safety of the American flying public.

I hope that the conference committee will conclude its work expeditiously so that we can meet our responsibility to provide a safe

and secure aviation system.

Administrator Garvey, I would like to return to a question that

we were talking about a little earlier, the screening of bags. It dismays me that we are checking only 10 percent of those, and I know

you indicated that was because we do not have the machinery to

do that at this time. Between now and the time when we can get

that machinery, are there things we could do to augment the

screening of these checked bags? Would bomb sniffing dogs be a

possibility? Would you comment on that for me?

Ms. GARVEY. Absolutely, and as a matter of fact, we are using

part of the money that Congress has appropriated since September

11, the supplemental and so forth, for more of the bomb sniffing

dogs. So that is a very important element.

Using some of the trace detection equipment that is easier to use,

more quickly implemented, is another piece of it. Ramping up the

selectee program through CAPPS so that there is more screening,

is important, as well as looking at more random screening of passengers and bags.

So I think you have to look at a whole combination of issues between now and when all of the machines can be put in. And again,

as the Inspector General and we rightly agree, making sure that

all the machines that are out there are in use continuously.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Mead, as you know, there have been a number of lapses in

security since September 11. What efforts has your office undertaken in recent weeks to gauge the effectiveness of the new security measures that have been put in place?

Mr. MEAD. Well, we have sent roughly 100 of our staff to visit

58 airports around the Nation, and they made about 250 extended

observations of security. When we make these observations, people

do not know who we are. We record what we see and we report

that back to FAA. We do it in two different ways.

One is that we sometimes see a situation where the screener or

the security people are not familiar with the new procedures. For

example, when you are wanding somebody and it goes off when you

go down by the person’s shoe, it may be going off because it is picking up something under the floor or it may be going off because

there is a knife in the shoe. We try to make sure that the screener

understands right there on the spot what they are supposed to do,

32

in that event—take off the shoe or have them go somewhere else

where you can screen them without the interference from whatever

might be below the floor. So we are making a lot of on-the-spot corrections, and we are keeping track of those.

There have been about 50 other instances that we have referred

to FAA because, in our judgment, they are the types of things that

need systemic correction. In other instances, we go to the U.S. Attorney. We have done that most recently in a fairly well publicized

case. Right after September 11, we caught some people in Miami

who were distributing fake ID cards for the airport, and those people were arrested. Those are the types of actions we take. We are

keeping track of them, and if you would like me to come by your

office and share the specifics with you, I would be glad to, but I

would prefer not to do it in open session here.

Senator CARNAHAN. How uniformly would you say these have

been implemented?

Mr. MEAD. I would say, overall, there has been much improvement. But there are still alarming inconsistencies and you do not

want to be caught up in one of those inconsistencies. So I think we

need to aim for 100 percent.

The use of EDS machines is the exception to that remark. I think

they are woefully inadequate on the use of the explosives detection

machines. So I would not put that in the category of greatly improved. I think there is a long way to go there.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.

Before I recognize Senator Levin, can I follow up and ask you,

Mr. Mead, what is the percentage of utilization now of these machines? You made a point in your testimony that we could expect

as many as 250 or 225 bags an hour to go through the machines,

and you said currently, the percentage that are being checked for

explosives was in the single digits.

Mr. MEAD. Yes.

Senator DURBIN. How much could we increase the inspection just

by utilizing current machines to capacity?

Mr. MEAD. I think for the majority of machines you could probably quadruple it, and that is probably an understatement.

Senator DURBIN. Let me make sure that is clear on the record.

You think it could go up as many as four times——

Mr. MEAD. Yes, for the majority of machines.

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. By using current machines to their

capacity?

Mr. MEAD. Let me give you one example. My staff saw one situation where the screening company thought that they were continuously using the machine. They were doing maybe 14 bags an hour.

Senator DURBIN. And the capacity of the machine is?

Mr. MEAD. Two-hundred-twenty-five, but when you process 225

bags per hour, you are going to get a lot of false alarms. If you take

into account the time it takes to clear the false alarms, the operational real world experience, you are looking at around 125 or 150

bags an hour.

Senator DURBIN. Administrator Garvey, can you issue an order

today or tomorrow to utilize these machines to their capacity?

33

Ms. GARVEY. We have already done that, and I think the challenge is to make sure that directive is being carried out. We have

said that they must be used continuously. We have got 500 agents

in the field. They are looking at a lot of security measures. The 225

that we are hiring and in the process of hiring right now, their primary focus is going to be EDS, because we would agree with Mr.

Mead that is an area that needs much more focus and more attention. The great majority of them are people with a lot of background in security, and I think they are going to be very useful in

getting that number up.

Senator DURBIN. Would you agree with this conclusion that as

many as four times the number of—— Ms. GARVEY. I am not sure.

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Current bags being inspected

might be inspected?

Ms. GARVEY. I would like to go back to that. I am not sure I

would agree fully. I would like to look at that. I can tell you, I did

look at the numbers last week from November 1 through 7 just to

see what we are getting for numbers. We are seeing about a 30

percent increase overall. That is certainly better. It is not, and I

want to be very straight about this, it is not where we want it to

be. It is not where the Inspector General wants it to be. It is certainly not where the Secretary of Transportation wants it to be. We

are going to stay focused on that.

Senator DURBIN. Are you still limited by the airlines and the

number of people that they will make available for this?

Ms. GARVEY. Resources have been an issue. Mr. Mead spoke

about the alarm rate. If you respond to an alarm correctly, you

have got to stop the machine, take the bag off, look at it and resolve what is in it. That may mean more resources and that has

been an issue for them in some cases. But again, we think it is important enough that they just have to get the resources.

Mr. MEAD. Yes. Let me address the resource issue. Yes, there is

a resource issue, if the truth be told in this. When you are putting

these bags through the machine, and you get an alarm, you do not

want to just keep going. You want to clear that alarm, which may

mean that somebody has to open up that bag to see what is in it.

If you take the person that is supposed to be watching the screen

on the explosives detection machine and say, go rummage through

this bag to find out if there is something in there, that is what he

is doing while other bags are sitting on the conveyor belt.

Senator DURBIN. So it boils down to the same question again.

How much money will the airlines put into these devices so they

can be used more effectively, when we have a capacity to quadruple

the percentage of bags that are currently being inspected? This is

a classic, your money or your life, and as far as I am concerned,

we cannot explain this any longer to the American people. We have

to put the resources in to make it work.

Mr. MEAD. In the example I used in my testimony of the machine

where the employee had been working for almost 20 hours, that is

not the employee’s fault, but I do not think that employee could be

alert. They did not have a replacement, so the air carrier shut

down the machine.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Levin.

34

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. This is the area that I want to explore with you,

too, of the checked baggage and EDS machines. You say you have

entered an order now that says that all resources must be used to

their full capacity?

Ms. GARVEY. They have to be used continuously, so they must always be used. Before September 11, they were used only for

CAPPS selectees and that was a smaller number. We are saying,

even if you do not have selectees, if you have got a machine there,

you have got to be using it continuously.

Senator LEVIN. Could you get us a copy of that order?

Ms. GARVEY. Absolutely, I will.

Senator LEVIN. When was that issued?

Ms. GARVEY. Oh, it was probably 2 weeks after September 11,

but let me double check on the date and we will get a copy of that.

INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD BY ADMINISTRATOR

GARVEY’S OFFICE

On September 26, 2001, the FAA issued a Security Directive rather than

an Order. A Security Directive contains sensitive security information and

therefore cannot be publicly released. However, we can say that through

this Security Directive, we required continual use of all explosives detection

systems if available.

Senator LEVIN. What is the requirement on the airlines relative

to that checked luggage? What is the current rule that you have

issued?

Ms. GARVEY. Right now, there is not a requirement to have EDS.

We had a rule that was ready to go, but we had as a date something that is very far out into the future, and since September 11,

we have wanted to move that forward.

In the past, particularly since TWA, Congress has generously appropriated $100 million every year. We have spent that and we

have gotten a number of EDS machines out to the largest airports.

The requirement for when airlines, or when we had to have the

EDS’s all in place, again, is subject to how quickly the manufacturers can move that date forward. So the latest date that we have

been given—but again, I will mention that the Secretary has challenged the manufacturers to see if there is a way we can speed this

up even further—was 2004.

Senator LEVIN. And what is the date that was in the original

rule that has now been——

Ms. GARVEY. Two-thousand-and-thirteen, approximately. I think

there was one discussion, and I will tell you, it was still in discussion before September 11.

Senator LEVIN. And the current date? Is there a date in a rule

now?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, no, there is not a date in a rule.

Senator LEVIN. That is what you are looking at?

Ms. GARVEY. Right now, we are looking at 2004. Before September 11——

Senator LEVIN. But you have not yet issued it?

Ms. GARVEY. Right. We have not yet done that, no, and——

Senator LEVIN. And when are you going to make that decision?

35

Ms. GARVEY. Senator, I think, in part, it is going to depend on

what comes out in the legislation. Again, if it is a Federal responsibility, we may not need a rule. We may just make a determination

we want to get them out as quickly as we can. Depending on what

comes out in the legislation, we may or may not need the rule. We

do know we want to get them out there. We do know that we have

as a goal 100 percent screening for baggage and cargo.

Senator LEVIN. And will we get this in place faster if the legislation requires that this be a Federal screen, a government screen?

Ms. GARVEY. I am not sure we would get it in place faster. I

think getting the legislation in whatever form will get it moving

quicker.

The other point that the manufacturers have made, and I understand this, is the need to have a predictable stream of funding.

Congress has been very generous, both before September 11, but

particularly since September 11, in making sure that the funding

is there. That is critical, as well.

Senator LEVIN. And this is not a requirement on the airlines, this

is a requirement for public funding?

Ms. GARVEY. That is what it has been, Senator. We have paid for

the machines. The operating and maintenance of it was the responsibility of the airlines.

Senator LEVIN. And the personnel to run them?

Ms. GARVEY. And the personnel, that is correct, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. All right. And so we would look for alternative

sources of machines? We know there are only these limited

sources?

Ms. GARVEY. There are two manufacturers, one that is very well

accepted by the airlines, the other one that is certified by the FAA

but has had some operational difficulties. An Inspector General

team and the FAA team have been looking at that second manufacturer together and we have heard some promising news this week.

Senator LEVIN. A final question. Are we sure that all the checked

luggage that gets into an airplane belongs to someone on that

plane?

Ms. GARVEY. Whether or not it is actually matched?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Ms. GARVEY. Some airlines do this. Not all airlines do, and I

know that——

Senator LEVIN. Should we not require that be done by all airlines?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, that has certainly been one of the issues that

we have been looking at and I know it is being debated in Congress. There are two sides to it. Some have suggested, yes, that

would be a big help. Others have said, when you are dealing with

suicide bombers, that may no longer be an operable assumption.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have the power to do that by regulation?

Ms. GARVEY. We could do that through regulation and rule, yes,

sir.

Senator LEVIN. Pardon me?

Ms. GARVEY. Yes, we do have that power, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. And are you going to exercise that power?

36

Ms. GARVEY. We are looking at that, but again, I think, also looking at some of the discussion that is occurring on the Hill right

now.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Thompson.

Senator THOMPSON. Yes, just a comment in listening to the testimony. I want to reiterate that this is not just a Federal or non-Federal issue. In fact, that may not be even the most important issue.

I do not subscribe to the notion that if you go the contractor

route, it is all bad, and if you go Federal, it is all good. It is more

complex than that. As bad as the picture has been painted, it is

even worse because it is more complex and more difficult.

We need to understand, and I voted for the 100–0 bill, and I

think it contains a lot of good provisions. I think you can make a

very good case for everything Senator Cleland said, which I could

not put it more eloquently myself.

But we have been sitting here on this Committee over the years

looking at the performance of the Federal Government. I put out

a report in June 2001, when I still had access to the Xerox machine

of the Committee—— [Laughter.]

And it is called ‘‘Government at the Brink.’’ Just a summary here

of the 10 worst examples of mismanagement. The ‘‘Big Dig’’ in Boston, 525 percent increase from the original budget. Abusing the

trust of the American Indians, the Department of Interior does not

know what happened to more than $3 billion it holds in trust for

the American Indians. There is widespread agreement that the Department of Defense finances are a shamble, wasted billions of dollars a year. It cannot account for that expense.

NASA mismanagement causes mission failures, spectacular example after example. NASA has lost billions because of mismanagement. Because of the Mars lunar polar lander failure, for

example, one team used English measurements—feet, inches, and

pounds—to design the program, the vehicle, while another team

used metric measurements.

Medicare waste, fraud and abuse, billions of dollars every year.

Security violations of the Department of Energy. The Department

of Energy does not adequately safeguard America’s nuclear secrets.

In one case alone, an employee was dead for 11 months before Department officials noticed that he still had four secret documents

signed out.

IRS financial mismanagement takes up to 12 years sometimes to

record payments made by taxpayers. Veterans’ affairs, put patients’

health care at risk. The Department of Veterans IG found that a

hospital food service shares the loading dock with environmental

management services hazardous waste containers and dirty environmental management service and biohazard carts were located

next to the area where food is being transported to the kitchen.

Bilking taxpayers out of student financial aid, billions of dollars.

A Los Angeles man collected at least $230,000 in fraudulent unemployment payments, set up nonexistent claimants. It was years before that was discovered, and on and on and on. This is just a summary of this report. It is all in detail.

We have got to go past that. Whether we go Federal or non-Federal, we have got to do things remarkably different than we have

37

1The prepared statement of Mr. Carter appears in the Appendix on page 87.

ever done before. It is not just as simple as passing this bill. We

have got to have follow-up. We have got to have accountability. I

do not know that one person was disciplined or fired for any of this

stuff that I just mentioned. We have got to change that in order

to have more secure airline service.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Senator Thompson.

I want to thank Administrator Garvey as well as Inspector General Mead for your testimony. It has really helped us to understand

the current state of airport security and what progress has been

made. Thank you very much for joining us today.

Senator DURBIN. I would like to invite the second panel to come

to the table at this point, Bruce Carter, who is the Director of Aviation at the Quad City Airport, Moline, Illinois; Jackie Mathes, a

flight attendant with United Airlines; Marianne McInerney, Executive Director of the National Business Travel Association; and

Duane Woerth, a pilot with Northwest Airlines, Air Line Pilots Association. Thank you for joining us.

I would like to apologize in advance, but I am presiding over the

Senate at one o’clock and I will stay with the panel as long as I

can and Senator Lieberman will be returning very shortly.

Mr. Carter, if you would be kind enough to summarize your testimony, which will be entered into the record in its entirety.

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE E. CARTER, A.A.E.1 DIRECTOR OF

AVIATION, QUAD CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. CARTER. Good morning, Senator Durbin. Chairman Lieberman, Senators Thompson, Durbin, Voinovich, and distinguished

Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the concerns of aviation security at small

hub airports.

The Quad City International Airport serves the citizens of Western Illinois and Eastern Iowa and has a cachement area of 2.5 million people within 100 miles. We have access to seven different

hubs by five different carriers. Our aircraft mix varies from Boeing

717’s to Beech 1900’s. We have been one of the fastest-growing airports in the country, with a 48 percent growth.

One of the reasons for this is because of AirTran Airways to their

Atlanta hub. They have provided our passengers with competitive

air fares, and in turn, other carriers stay competitive with them.

In fact, all of our air carriers have experienced growth and we were

on track to enplane 400,000 passengers for 2001, until the tragic

events of September 11.

What have the passenger declines done to our operating budget,

which is about $7 million? We are experiencing about a 20 percent

decline in parking lot revenue, which annualized out to a $300,000

loss. We are experiencing a 40 percent decline in rental car activity. Rental car agencies, however, guarantee a monthly minimum,

which could adversely affect their existence. In fact, yesterday,

Alamo and National filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We are also

experiencing a 15 percent loss in landed weight.

We are trying to find creative ways to further cut expenses and

can see layoffs in the near future. We just opened up our new $18

38

million terminal concourse and are not hiring the needed building

maintenance and custodial personnel, and this puts added pressure

and stress on our existing staff.

What changes have we seen in airport security and what do we

expect those costs to be if the FAA requirements continue? Before

we were able to even open up our airport on September 13, we had

to tow 148 vehicles from our short-term and long-term lots and we

had to cut our ready car lot for our rental cars to abide by the 300-

foot rule implemented by the FAA. We then had to post two employees at the airport terminal curb to ensure that no cars were

left unattended. We hired a contract employee 24 hours a day, 7

days a week, at a cost of $300 a day. If that continues, that would

cost $109,000 per year.

In order to open our much-needed short-term parking lot, we

hired another contract employee for a 12-hour shift at $204 per

day. That would be annualized out to just about $65,000 per year.

Our public safety department and our airport staff have accumulated $11,000 in overtime just in a 6-week period, and if this continues, it would result in over $95,000 in overtime, and that is assuming that there will be no more security requirements which require additional manpower.

In late September, the National Guard was assigned to our airport and are only allowed to be present at the security checkpoint.

It greatly disturbs me that our request for greater flexibility was

denied. I cannot stress enough the need to allow our National

Guard presence at locations other than the screening checkpoint,

and many small hubs feel the same way.

As of today, we have not been able to expand the duties of the

National Guard at our airport. However, President Bush outlined

on Friday the need for more flexibility by the National Guard

troops and that is what airports have been waiting for and wanting

for the past 8 weeks. I hope that we see additional troops there

when I get back to work tomorrow.

I am concerned with the discussions that are taking place that

will continue to cost airports more money without additional revenue streams to offset these added expenses. As the cost per passenger increases at smaller airports, the airlines will consider their

yield potential and profit margin, and I am concerned that they

could eliminate service to many small communities.

There are 437 primary airports in the United States. Primary

airports are defined as an air carrier airport enplaning over 10,000

passengers. Of these, 50 percent of the airports enplaned less than

100,000 passengers. Smaller airports have much smaller staffs, and

one small requirement, such as inspecting vehicles, has a much

greater financial impact and burden than on larger airports.

Requiring all airports to have explosives detection equipment installed for checked luggage will have significant operational and financial impacts, especially at smaller to mid-sized airports. Who

will pay these initial and ongoing costs and who will be responsible? If the cost of the equipment is $1 million, it would not be unreasonable to expect the annual maintenance cost to be at 10 percent, or $100,000 per year. What happens if the equipment breaks

down and there is no backup? Congressional leaders need to have

39

1The prepared statement of Ms. McInerney appears in the Appendix on page 90.

answers for these questions, and we could talk for hours on other

important security issues that need to be considered.

I would like to briefly discuss the personnel that we have at our

screening checkpoints. I feel our small hub airport has the same

problems as large airports in hiring, replacing, and keeping personnel on the job. If the employees were paid a better wage and

benefits package, would this reduce turnover and give us a better

product? Does a $20 an hour employee do a better job than a minimum wage employee? We need to have these questions answered

before we decide on screening point jurisdiction. Constant turnover

causes problems in any type of business.

I feel that the FAA civil aviation security personnel need to do

a better job of communicating with the operators of our Nation’s

airports. It is not unreasonable to have an airport manager and

their staff invited to regional headquarters to discuss the concerns

of airport security. It is a way to get questions answered in a timely manner and helps to know what other airports are going

through to enhance security.

Communications is the key to success and it is our job to encourage people to get back into the Nation’s skies. The airlines are

doing their job in providing very reasonable fares and making the

needed safety improvements to their aircraft. The FAA and airports need to do whatever it takes to provide the safest environment for all citizens that choose to fly. I hope Members of this

Committee and other members of Congress will work to ensure

that airports throughout the country receive the reimbursement

they need to comply with the new security initiatives employed by

the FAA.

In closing, I would like to thank Senator Durbin for asking me

to testify today. Senator Durbin has been a great supporter of our

airports in Illinois and I have enjoyed my 10-year relationship with

him. And I would like to thank Pat Souders. Pat has been always

available to assist our airport with aviation concerns.

Thank you again for the opportunity to let me share my thoughts

with you today, and I would be pleased to try and answer any of

the questions you might have. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Carter. Marianne McInerney.

TESTIMONY OF MARIANNE McINERNEY,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUSINESS TRAVEL ASSOCIATION (NBTA)

Ms. MCINERNEY. Good afternoon. My name is Marianne McInerney and I am the Executive Director of the National Business

Travel Association. NBTA represents over 1,500 corporate travel

managers for the Nation’s Fortune 1,000 companies who are in

charge of over 70 percent of all the $190 billion spent annually on

business travel expenditures domestically, 46 percent which has

traditionally been spent on air travel.

Monday’s tragedy in Queens came at an already challenging time

in our Nation’s history. Now more than ever, the American public

needs to be given confidence in our Nation’s aviation system. As we

begin to pick up the pieces and march towards economic and psychological recovery, it is critical for Congress to take every necVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
40

essary measure to ensure the safety and security of our traveling

public and the stabilization of our aviation industry.

NBTA represents corporate travel managers and their companies

that operate throughout the world. They are responsible for sending over 44 million travelers throughout our Nation’s aviation system, who are, in turn, responsible, or at one point were, for 62 percent of all revenue to the Nation’s carriers.

By now, we all know that the terrorist attacks of September 11

have created a tremendous amount of unease among the traveling

public. Travelers have simply lost confidence in our Nation’s skies,

as well as our Nation’s airports. In response to this uncertainty,

immediately after the tragedy, many businesses dramatically curtailed and in many instances have permanently ceased employee

travel. Currently, many companies are reducing travel between 30

and 50 percent.

In an effort to represent our business travelers, we have worked

diligently to stay on top of their thoughts and their comments as

it relates to security within our Nation’s airports. Over and over,

we have gotten the same response: Please improve security before

we are to get on planes.

Improvement and standardization of security measures is the

single most important factor in getting people to resume travel and

restoring confidence in our aviation system. Seventy-one percent of

our travelers have noted that federalizing the security process is

extremely important for them to resume travel at previous levels.

We are now at the 2-month mark since the tragedy. Our members and our travelers are still very frustrated. There is no consistency among airports and airlines even today under new rules. Frequent travelers are noticing different protocol at different check-in

points and security procedures vary from airport to airport.

Two weeks ago, I myself noticed the difference. At Reagan National Airport, I was asked to ID myself at every place throughout

the check-in point. Last week at the very same airport, I was no

longer asked for ID. My computer was not checked. No one was

wanded. Two weeks ago, every third person on my flight was randomly checked. Last week, no one.

However, as I went through the security process and watched my

computer not being checked, a senior citizen right before me had

his toiletries kit opened, his eyeglass screwdrivers removed, and

his cuticle scissors taken away. There seems to be a big variation.

As one traveler recently put it, I think at this point, it is just the

luck of the draw. The same traveler reported a 20-minute checkin procedure at L.A., but a 2-hour experience at O’Hare. Another

traveler recently reported to us that the security check-in point at

Dulles was extremely stringent and well done, although time consuming, but on her return from Portland, she observed completely

relaxed security staff.

A business traveler from Home Depot recently traveling from

Reagan National was randomly wanded three times while sitting

at the gate waiting to board a flight. She noted to us that she observed the alertness and immediate attention to bags that were no

more than five feet away from their travelers, and at the same

time, she had noticed on her flight in no security checks.

41

1The prepared statement of Ms. Mathes appears in the Appendix on page 93.

At some airports, identification is not required for travelers as

they pass through checkpoints while personal items are confiscated

from others. Similarly, while other airlines are adopting the process of matching checked-in luggage to the names of passengers on

board, it is not a uniform practice, as we have heard today. Similar

inconsistent stories go on and on.

My point today is simple and concise. NBTA, our members, and

our frequent fliers are not seeing the necessary consistency in airport security. On TV and in the newspapers and even on the House

floor, the traveling public is constantly being reassured that tighter

security is in place. However, as we have been reminded by countless examples of inconsistency and failure to follow procedures,

such a vast nationwide task simply cannot be coordinated and is

still decentralized.

Central to this issue is returning traveler confidence and the individual’s perception of risk and behavior in light of those perceptions. By virtue of their frequently travelers’ experience, business

travelers get to witness this on a daily basis. Often, the traveler

is the one who visits multiple cities in a single day and walks away

with a completely different experience at every airport.

Going forward in the near term, consumer confidence and real

security improvements need to be the focus of the government.

NBTA and its members feel that the only way to accomplish this

is through the federalization of the airport screening process, implementation of new technologies, the screening and checking of all

luggage, and the institution of a voluntary travel card to provide

frequent travelers with the screening process that would apply to

6.2 million frequent travelers who account for 54 percent of all

travel.

We believe action such as this must be done swiftly. They must

be held to a high degree of accountability. And we believe that it

is only with the federalization of this system that travelers will return to the sky. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Jackie Mathes, flight attendant with

United Airlines.

TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE MATHES,1 FLIGHT ATTENDANT,

ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AFL–CIO

Ms. MATHES. Good morning, Senators Durbin, Thompson, and

Voinovich, and Committee Members. My name is Jacqueline

Mathes and I have been a flight attendant with United Airlines for

nearly 29 years. I am a proud member of the Association of Flight

Attendants, AFL–CIO, and I am here today representing AFA’s

50,000 members at 26 carriers. I want to thank you for giving me

the opportunity to testify at this important hearing on aviation security and I refer you to my written testimony for additional details.

I know firsthand from flying after September 11 and talking with

my flying partners what aviation security is like today. We have

all heard the horrific story of the security breach in my hometown

of Chicago earlier this month. A passenger nearly made it on board

42

with a number of knives, mace, and a stun gun. Luckily, a random

search was conducted on this passenger, but only after he had successfully cleared the metal detectors. His checked luggage, which

could have contained explosives, was not pulled off the aircraft. A

similar situation happened yesterday, as Senator Durbin spoke to

us about earlier.

Those who want to slip weapons through the current security

system will find a way unless we work quickly to change that system.

Soon after September 11, the FAA issued new security directives.

We believe these changes did not improve airport or airline security. They were merely window dressing. Flight attendants still believe there are far too many loopholes, large enough loopholes to

allow for another terrorist attack on our airlines.

Every day, we go to work to ensure the safety of our passengers.

In the air, we are the firefighters, the law enforcement agents, the

first aid responders, and the comforters to our passengers. On September 11, the 12 flight attendants on board United Flights 93 and

175 became the last line of defense in protecting the cockpit and

passengers.

Our lives and work have changed dramatically. Are we more confident in the safety of air travel since September 11? No. Do we believe that air travel can be safe? Yes, eventually, but much still

needs to be done.

Let me give you examples of how different life is today for flight

attendants. What is most unnerving to me is that flight attendants

now start each trip by discussing what we can use on the aircraft

for weapons. We actually talk about breaking wine bottles to protect ourselves in case of a terrorist attack. Without any additional

training from the airlines and working in a failed security system,

flight attendants believe they must prepare themselves for any situation.

On October 18, security screening at O’Hare found a small hotel

sewing kit in my bag. The kit contained thread, a few sewing needles, and a small pair of sewing scissors. I had forgotten this was

in my bag. It had been there for months. This was the first time

any screener had seen it, and while I did not fault the screener for

taking it from my bag, it is clear security screening is still inconsistent. Until this one screener spotted it, why was this overlooked

by every screener on every flight?

Other flight attendants report finding passengers with scissors,

various knives, screwdrivers, razor blades, box cutters, and even

knitting needles. Despite the fact that small nail clippers, and in

my case a tiny sewing scissor, are being taken from crew members,

passengers are managing to get on board with other potential

weapons.

In another example, one AFA member has been terminated and

another is facing severe discipline after their flight was canceled

following the discovery of a box cutter in the cockpit on the first

flight out in the morning. When the flight attendants reported to

the aircraft, there were already one FBI agent, five Boston police,

and one representative from the carrier on board. The flight attendants were asked to help conduct a security inspection of the

43

aircraft to make sure no other weapons were hidden on board, even

though they had no prior proper inspection training.

Given that the FBI seemed concerned, the crew was uncomfortable about taking the aircraft with the scheduled passengers and

suggested they move to another plane. The carrier refused. The

flight attendants were uncomfortable with the entire security procedure and expressed these concerns to their captain, who then

elected to cancel the flight. The carrier is now disciplining these

flight attendants simply because they were not confident in the security of the flight.

Flight crews have seemingly been targeted for extensive searches

by security personnel while passengers pass through security

checkpoints without a second glance. Female flight attendants have

been fondled and groped by male security guards. A female flight

attendant passing through security at San Francisco airport was

repeatedly rubbed over her body with a screening wand wielded by

a male security guard. While we strongly recognize the importance

of vigilant security screening to keep weapons from being brought

on board aircraft, this behavior is unacceptable.

AFA believes that Congress must move forward on the following

recommendations. We must federalize the security screeners

through the Department of Justice just as the Senate voted to do

on its bill last month. Flight attendant training and procedures

must be updated and include appropriate and effective responses to

terrorism as it exists today, including self-defense training.

Strict and defined limits for carry-on baggage must be enforced.

The FAA’s current guidelines are vague and not enforced uniformly

by all carriers. Congress must take immediate action to ensure the

safety and security of on-board supplies, carry-on baggage, and all

checked bags by screening everything that goes on an airplane. In

addition, the airlines must put 100 percent passenger baggage

match in place immediately.

While it is obvious we are screening passengers who have access

to the aircraft, all persons who have access to secure areas and aircraft must be screened.

Security personnel should be responsible for all cabin searches.

Some airlines have given the duty to perform these searches to

their fight attendants, who are not trained for these cabin inspections nor have adequate time.

As a flight attendant, I take pride in my role as an aviation safety professional and I am pleased to have the opportunity to tell you

what needs to be done to make our skies safe as we know now.

While we are pleased that the carriers have quickly fortified the

cockpit doors, little has been done to protect our passengers and

flight attendants, who remain the first and last line of defense on

the aircraft. I urge you to move swiftly on the adoption of these

crucial security procedures in order to build a truly secure and safe

aviation environment. Restoring faith in air travel is paramount.

Thank you for allowing me to testify before you and I welcome

any questions.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you for your testimony. Duane Woerth,

who is a pilot with Northwest Airlines is next.

44

1The prepared statement of Mr. Woerth appears in the Appendix on page 101.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH,1 PRESIDENT, AIR

LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

Mr. WOERTH. Thank you. Good morning. My name is Duane

Woerth. I am President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International, and ALPA represents 67,000 airline pilots who fly for 47

airlines in the United States and Canada and we sincerely thank

you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting ALPA to present its views at this

hearing.

I want to say as emphatically as I can, ALPA and its safety-conscious professional pilot members believe it is safe to fly. Our members prove this each and every day when they go to work, and they

have been proving it ever since just 2 days after the September terrorist attacks, when they were back in the air flying.

Unfortunately, too many passengers are still afraid to fly, despite

the aviation security advances made since that time. They need to

know what kind of improvements have been made and are being

made in order to bolster their confidence to return to air travel.

This hearing should help in that regard.

While there is still much work to be done, ALPA believes that

significant progress has been made to improve aviation security,

particularly in and around the aircraft, but it is the old cliche.

There is good news and there is bad news. I will start with the

good news.

One of the immediate safety improvements recommended by

ALPA and others was to harden and enhance cockpit doors. The

airlines have worked diligently to strengthen existing cockpit doors

and I am pleased to report that, as of last week, 100 percent of all

large-passenger aircraft have been fitted with some type of

strengthening devices to make the doors, and thus the cockpits,

more secure. We must now keep the pressure on to get the new

high-technology doors installed on new aircraft which will also

withstand gunshots or other types of forced entry.

Another short-term enhancement which the FAA has ordered to

be used for all passengers beginning September 28 is the use of

computer assisted passenger pre-screening, called CAPPS, which

the FAA ordered to be used for all passengers, as I said, after September 28. This program uses passenger information and airline

databases to determine whether an individual poses a security risk.

While the use of CAPPS is not visible to airline passengers, it is

providing each of them with a significant added measure of security.

The events of September 11 also created a very high level of security awareness of pilots, flight attendants, gate agents, and other

airline personnel, as well as passengers. That awareness translates

directly into a more secure operation. It means that pilots and

flight attendants are coordinating and communicating more than

ever before to ensure that each flight is secure.

The terrorists of September 11 were successful because of surprise, because of security complacency, and because of a passive response by crew and passengers. All three of these key elements of

the success of the terrorists are now gone.

45

However, one of the most troubling problems for our pilots is

that we have yet to see any evidence of our goal of one level of security. In fact, what we are seeing instead is a disturbing level of

non-uniformity and security screening from airport to airport and

even from terminal to terminal within the same airport. This is

both exasperating and frustrating to passengers and airline pilots,

who may be screened several different ways at several different

airports in a single day.

In addition, and I think this is important, security practices to

protect a Boeing 747 cargo aircraft are still far less stringent than

those for a passenger-carrying 747, even though both of those aircraft could be used as a terrorist guided missile.

The bottom line is this: Inconsistent, even illogical security

screening practices are doing very little for security and are, in

fact, eroding the confidence the traveling public has in the current

system, which in turn makes it much more difficult for the industry to rebound. Fortunately, this problem is one that can be addressed, at least in part, quickly and effectively.

What is needed is a single security checkpoint screening standard for all screeners to help achieve one level of security. Such a

standard already exists in the Checkpoint Operations Guide, or

COG, which is used by screeners to some extent, but it is not a regulatory document. We have recommended to the FAA that they

make the COG regulatory and train all screener personnel, both

current and future hires, to strictly follow it. This simple action

could be accomplished within a matter of a few weeks and would

begin to restore public confidence in the system.

ALPA continues to believe that identity verification is a critical

component of aviation security that must be given top priority. We

have been urging the government and the industry since 1987 to

create an electronic universal access system to positively identify

authorized employees. In the mid-1990’s, the FAA completed successful tests of the universal access system and standards were finalized for the system. However, there are still no airlines that

have implemented the universal access system because the FAA’s

policy has been to leave it to the sole discretion of the airlines.

Although magnetic strip technology was used as the basis of the

universal access test, there are now more advanced secure technologies that can be used to positively identify authorized personnel. One such technology is the new highly secure memory chip

card system being tested by the FAA to identify armed law enforcement officers. ALPA wholeheartedly endorses the development of

this memory chip card system and recommends that airlines use

the memory chip card as the basis for the universal access system.

One additional important area this would help in is identification

of cockpit jumpseat riders. As a result of the September 11 attacks,

the safety enhancement of a qualified extra trained jumpseat pilot

has been severely curtailed because of the lack of certainty in positively verifying the jumpseater’s request as to his identity and his

employment status.

I have much more lengthy comments I have submitted to you,

Mr. Chairman. I would like those to be included in the record and

I would like to answer any questions you may have.

46

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much. I have to leave briefly.

I will just ask a question or two.

Mr. Carter, you said you would like more flexibility in the use

of the National Guard at your airport. What would you do with the

National Guard if you had that flexibility?

Mr. CARTER. What would really help us tremendously would be

able to replace them on the curb of checking of the vehicles, and

the second item would be the area getting into our short-term

parking lot. Those are two expenses that have just been hurting us

terribly, and it would be great exposure, comfort level for the people coming into our lot, coming into our terminal space, and that

is where I would like to see them.

Right now, we have six National Guard people that are deployed

to the airport. Two work on a first shift, two work on a second

shift, and then we have two at the hotel. So we could use them out

there immediately, and it frustrates me that we cannot get this accomplished.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you.

I would like to ask Ms. Mathes and Mr. Woerth this question.

Since September 11, have you seen any substantial or dramatic

changes in the people who have access to an airplane, as to whether or not there are background checks, whether or not there is positive identification before they can get onto the ramp or near the

airplane?

Mr. WOERTH. I would say that the difference is the awareness

that I mentioned earlier. Everybody is a little more conscious. Everybody is looking at each other’s ID card. But what we are still

lacking is some form of positive electronic identification, which we

believe is the only thing that is going to work. A little badge with

a little picture on it the size of your thumb does not give anybody

any comfort, so we need to go to the electronic system I described.

Senator DURBIN. Ms. Mathes.

Ms. MATHES. I would agree with Mr. Woerth. We are checking

all the badges and we are observing everything we can, but basically, the security system in place does not allow us to do positive

ID.

Senator DURBIN. When I met with your flight attendants in Chicago, and I am not sure if you were at that meeting, but you could

have been, but others from AFA were in attendance, they talked

about this defense question for flight attendants. If we, as the system progresses and we move toward more air marshals, does that

increase the confidence and feeling of safety among the people in

your profession?

Ms. MATHES. Actually, I think that it does. When I flew in this

morning, one of my thoughts was that there probably was an air

marshal on board when I came from Chicago to Washington, DC.

Senator DURBIN. I might just add for the record that our colleague, Senator Stabenow, was on the flight from Pittsburgh the

other night that ran into a problem and there were two air marshals and an ATF agent to jump quickly to do the right thing, so

I think there are extra precautions at this airport and I hope we

will see that more in the future.

Thank you all for your testimony. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

47

Chairman LIEBERMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Durbin,

for co-chairing this hearing.

Senator Thompson.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you. Ms. McInerney, do you think,

from talking to the people that you represent, the frequent travelers, that they are interested in the issue of whether or not this

system ought to be federalized before them? Are they tuned in to

that issue one way or the other, do you think?

Ms. MCINERNEY. They are extremely tuned into it.

Senator THOMPSON. What are you getting, and how does that

rank in terms of feedback that you are getting, that issue?

Ms. MCINERNEY. Over 70 percent of the people that we are talking to tell us that federalization of the system, and by that, they

mean an end-to-end solution, where the government is not

outsourcing part of the screening process but is responsible for

every piece of security from the beginning to the end, is what they

need to see.

They have felt, I think, some degree of confidence when we have

looked at military personnel and other law enforcement personnel

in the airports. That, again, is varying from place to place, but that

is what they need to see in order to resume travel.

They very much see aviation security as national security. They

have put that equation together and are looking forward to, I

think, an answer this week.

Senator THOMPSON. I think we all feel better when we see those

uniforms in the airport, but I guess we also know that once this

system is geared up, those are not going to be the kind of people

who are actually going to be looking through those screeners and

making those determinations and coming to work every day.

Ms. Mathes, do you have the same feeling among the people you

represent, do you think?

Ms. MATHES. Yes, I feel the same way. I think that the Federal

Government is in charge of it from the beginning to the end, that

people will feel more confident about the security process.

Senator THOMPSON. One of the things that I think is a legitimate

point on the other side, people make the point that Europeans

seem to have done very well with a different kind of system, that

the Israelis seem to have done very well with a different kind of

system, and both of those places are more government-oriented in

terms of most of their policies than we are. Do you know anything

about that? Do any of you have any opinion as to why that might

work better? Mr. Woerth.

Mr. WOERTH. Senator, I believe the Israeli airline is owned by

the government. I think the Israeli example is one that really

shows that the government took charge of this. They have not had

a hijacking since 1968, since they take it deadly serious. It is a national security issue for Israel and that is why they have been successful.

Certainly, my members, and I have been on record that the Airline Pilots Association supports the Senate version. We think that

is the best bill and the sooner it gets passed, and we think not only

is it the best result, we also realize our passengers believe it is the

best result. It has a two-pronged effect. We will have better secuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jun 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 77439.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
48

rity and the passengers will come back quicker with the Senate

bill. I really believe that.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much for that.

On the issue of inconsistency, I do not know quite what to think

about that. That point has been made by a lot of people. Clearly,

if we go back to childhood and tell Daddy, Mama did not make us

do that, so why should we do it for you? It is not the merits of the

case, it is the fact that somebody else did something differently.

I am wondering what our real point is when we talk about the

inconsistency. Is it aggravation, or is it that some of the more liberal conduct is not protecting us enough? It would seem to me like

some inconsistency with regard to policies, like who gets checked

and what gets checked, might be good. I am not sure that everybody ought to know exactly what they are going to be faced with.

It looks to me like you could have some consistency as to what

might be confiscated, for example, the tweezers versus the meat

cleaver, but the process itself, perhaps that is not all bad.

We run into the same thing. I came back from New York and I

got both my bags gone through and my briefcase gone through

twice, I think, before I made it, so I fit the profile that Senator

Voinovich did, too, I guess.

But does that make sense? Could we make a distinction between

the kinds of things confiscated, perhaps, versus who gets checked?

Mr. WOERTH. Senator, I think this is one of the problems we

have. Because there was a sharp instrument, a razor blade or a box

cutter used in that instance, we got so focused on anything that

might be sharp. So the first security directive came out and our security screeners are doing what they were told. Now they are looking for every cuticle scissors, every fingernail file, every cigar cutter, and the mind can only comprehend and concentrate on so

much. So while they are so intent on that, it is not surprising that

a meat cutter gets through or a cleaver because they are exhausted

looking for tweezers.

We have got to get some common sense back into this system,

and I think the passengers know the difference between the weapons of mass destruction, which is not a cigar cutter and it is not

your eyeglass screwdriver. When they understand that and they

see us focusing, looking for serious weapons and not tweezers from

84-year-old grandmothers, we will have real security because we

will have time to do real security and we will not be just harassing

passengers and crew members. That is what we have got to get

back to.

Senator THOMPSON. Ms. Mathes, you represent people probably

that have the most at stake because you fly more than anybody,

and even more than the pilots now, I am sure, as you see these

doors being built that nobody can get through, so you are on your

own now.

Ms. MATHES. Exactly.

Senator THOMPSON. What would be the most—maybe you have

prioritized this and I did not pick up on it. Is there one thing that

stands out in your mind to the people that you represent that you

think would be the single most important thing that could be done

in order to make you feel more comfortable and, therefore, your

passengers?

49

Ms. MATHES. Well, I think as we mentioned earlier, I think an

air marshal on board makes everyone feel comfortable. Of course,

only the crew would actually know that they were on board.

Also, I think that flight attendants would like some line of selfdefense training so that we can protect ourselves and have some

knowledge and background training on how to deal with a situation. At this point, we have just basic minimal training for hijacking, and up until September 11, we always planned that airplane

would land.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Thompson.

Senator Voinovich, do you want to go next? Are you in a hurry?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, I do.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, go right ahead. I am here. Please.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would just like to say this. I do not know

about you, but I feel safer traveling today than I ever have in my

entire life. I think that if you look at where we were and where

we are today, substantial improvements has been made. Security

is not perfect and there are exceptions to the rule, including the inconsistency and so forth.

But I would like you to comment on it. What is your appraisal

of the situation today versus what it was before September 11 in

terms of the safety of flying?

Mr. WOERTH. Senator, I agree with you. Before, ignorance was

bliss. We did not think we were at risk, so therefore we were happy

with the complacent security. I, probably in the last 15 months,

have testified not on security, but at least nine times on air traffic

control delays. Between the Senate and the House, nine different

testimonies. We were worried about throughput. We were worried

about time. We were worried about efficiency. That was the focus

of the Nation. After Lockerbie, we thought if we were checking on

only international flights for bombs, everything else was fine.

The truth is, ignorance was bliss. But we are safer now. There

is more security now. Every single airline personnel, the government, everybody is doing more now. We are as safe as we have ever

been, and that is a fact.

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Mathes.

Ms. MATHES. I think as airline employees, we definitely are

safer. I think we have the same respect and confidence in our pilots, that they are very qualified and very trained. That was never

an issue for our security.

However, because of September 11, the security issue has come

to light. So as far as mechanics and our trained and qualified pilots

on the aircraft, as well as the flight attendants, that is a safety

issue that remains the same and I think very highly acceptable.

Again, with the security issue and some of the elements that get

by, security and the inconsistency is a question and a problem for

a lot of us.

Ms. MCINERNEY. If I might comment on that, Senator, I think

you are right. I think that the skies are safer and are getting safer

and that is something that the American public needs to hear. But

as we look back pre-September 11, I think that we had left our system open to a high degree of vulnerability. In many cases, I think

50

our high schools had better security systems than our Nation’s airports did. We were looking at a system that was over-capacity. We

were trying to move travelers through very quickly. There was a

different focus on what their needs were.

And I think that we, the travelers, probably assumed that behind

the scenes, the security issues were being addressed. What we have

found out is that they were not, and now, more than ever, I think

travelers are willing to give up some of the time that they have

been spending before that was precious to them. They are now willing to compromise that. They want to see a stronger system and

they are willing to pay the price for that.

Mr. CARTER. Senator, let us look when the passenger comes to

the terminal. You never had presence of law enforcement officers

or guards or National Guard out on the curb. When a vehicle is

coming to the terminal, that vehicle is getting checked if it is unloading something for a restaurant or a gift shop or for the airline.

Then if the passenger gets into the line to get into the ticket

counter area, you are showing your ID. You could be a selectee to

have that bag checked at that point.

As you go out to get to the screening checkpoint, you have only

ticketed passengers now beyond the screening checkpoint. Before,

those people at the screening checkpoint were getting stressed because you had passengers and you had the loved ones that wanted

to walk with the people to the gate. Those people had billfolds.

They had purses that had to go through that. It stressed those people out at the screening checkpoint because you had so many more

people going through.

Once you are out to get on the airplane, you are showing your

ID once again. If you are a selectee, you are getting your bag

checked. You are getting wanded. You are constantly being

wanded, both at the screening checkpoint as well as at the gate.

And yesterday, I was surprised. When I got on the airplane, they

actually checked the boarding pass. That had never happened to

me before, also.

So I think there has been an increased presence in a lot of the

things that have happened since September 11.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Voinovich.

Thanks to the witnesses on this panel. I have a few questions.

I apologize that I had to step out for a meeting. I did get to look

at your testimony and it was very helpful. There are times at hearings like this that I wish we could call the first panel back after

the second panel to respond to some of the things you have said,

and we will definitely share your testimony with the FAA and ask

for responses to some of the questions you have raised.

There was a fair amount of focus earlier on, and to some extent

in this panel, on the bomb detection equipment. I must say, I was

startled by the earlier testimony that less than 10 percent of the

baggage goes through the bomb detection equipment 13 years after

Lockerbie. I just had another thought that was your concern, Mr.

Carter, about small airports affording these machines, which is

whether, if we are moving toward public, that is, Federal Government, personnel doing the screening, whether, in fact, the government ought not to be the ones buying the equipment.

51

For instance, when I go through the screening device, the

magnometer or whatever it is, as I am heading up to get on a

plane? Who owns that?

Mr. CARTER. Well, we are a little different than some airports because I get very concerned about security, and usually, the airlines

own the equipment.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true?

Mr. CARTER. And you know, the airlines, are we going to go ahead and spend $35,000? No. So what I did at my airport last

year, I bought the most sophisticated piece of equipment for

$35,000 from RapiScan and then I charged the airlines back at 10

cents a passenger and I got my money back in 1 year, and I think

that made a lot of sense.

You look at an airport our size, you have that $1 million piece

of equipment. Where would you put that at so that you could have

all five of your carriers be able to funnel those bags in, but right

now, we have 400,000 passengers enplaning at our airports. Not

one of those checked bags go through a detection device. They go

through seven different hubs.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very interesting. So right now, the airlines own that equipment and the airport owns the bomb scanning

devices, generally?

Mr. CARTER. I would say not the airports. It would be the airlines, I would think.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not the airports. Again, it is the airlines.

Mr. CARTER. Right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So there is part of the problem. I do not

want to take on more for the Federal Government. It does seem to

me if we are going to start having Federal employees doing the

work, then we ought to have Federal money going into purchasing

the equipment. I know it is not an exact comparison, but it would

be a little like having the, I do not know, police cars in a town privately owned while the police were obviously paid by the public.

I was very interested in what you said, Ms. McInerney, in your

last statement, and it goes back to your earlier testimony, which

is that you are finding among your members a willingness to have

a little bit of delay, and maybe more than a little bit of delay, in

the interest of safety. Why don’t you talk about that a little bit

more.

Ms. MCINERNEY. I think prior to September 11, our system was

certainly at over-capacity and the biggest concern of a traveler was

how quickly I can get from point A to point B. Our system being

stressed, those delays were costing American corporations billions

of dollars and our company was the first to come forward and

measure those losses.

I think today, we are looking at a different type of risk and I

think that our frequent fliers, our business travelers, and even our

leisure travelers have taken a step back, and I think that travel

is not so much now about where you are going, it is also about who

you are leaving.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, well said.

Ms. MCINERNEY. I think as I am talking to business travelers,

they are feeling the stress of those family members and loved ones

that they leave behind. It is not unusual now for me to talk to

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someone and have their child say to them, ‘‘Mom, Dad, please do

not get on that plane.’’ Those are the kind of conversations that are

appearing and happening in American households and I think it is

the government’s responsibility to try and make all of those travelers and their families and loved ones feel a little bit safer.

We simply have to be willing to put our own investment in there,

and if the investment on the travelers’ part is time as well as giving up some of their own efficiencies, I think we are willing to pay

that price. We are not willing to see security go out to the lowest

bidder and we are not willing to have inconsistencies at airports.

But where it relates to time, we are now seeing American companies and American travelers being willing to take on those additional costs.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very important. It is clear that before September 11, the airlines certainly were operating on the assumption that the public was not going to take too much inconvenience in the interest of safety, so I hope they are listening now and

also that we are. And then as time goes by and the pain of September 11 and the jolt and the fear associated with September 11

recedes, as we hope it will because airline travel will be safe and

there will be no more terrorist accidents, then it is very important

to keep our guard up, in other words, to remember the feeling that

we have now so that we do not become vulnerable.

I wanted to ask Ms. Mathes and Mr. Woerth whether the treatment that I and some of the others here have been giving to the

airlines is fair. In other words, I am not trying to paint them as

evil, I am just saying in the normal course of a business life or

business career, if you are a CEO or chief financial officer and you

are in an industry that has ups and downs and you are under pressure quarterly to report to your stockholders, security becomes a

lower priority than it should be.

Ms. MATHES. Exactly. That is why we would like to see the Federal Government take over.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Do you agree, Mr. Woerth?

Mr. WOERTH. Yes. Besides being the president of this union, I actually served on a corporate board of Northwest Airlines for 51⁄2

years and had some pretty raucous fights on the financial committee and others, which is natural. This is a very brutally competitive business.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. WOERTH. What we need to ensure is that if we want one

level of safety, and we have insisted that we do not expect airline

passengers to shop from the safety record of airlines, if we want

to have one level of security, and especially, Senator, the last point

that was made, $1 million per machine, we do not need a few of

these, we do not need a few dozen, we need hundreds and hundreds of these machines.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. WOERTH. We are talking billions of dollars here. The airlines

are not going to be able to finance this. I mean, if they wanted to

and the CEO is pledged to it, he could not do it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. WOERTH. So to get the level of security with that new equipment, we are going to need some government help. But more than

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that, I think it is important that every passenger can pick any airline they want because it is going to be the same level of security

at every airline, not just those who can afford it and whose CEO

is committed to it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That reminds me of something I read in

your testimony, Captain, where you advocate the use of a single security checkpoint screening standard to achieve security, but also

to help restore consumer confidence, and I think you referred to a

document called the Checkpoint Operations Guide that could serve

as the standard for realizing that kind of purpose. Can you talk a

little bit about how that was developed and what difference it

would make for those of us who are passengers?

Mr. WOERTH. I think that is the biggest difference. It is already

work that is accomplished. The FAA, along with the airlines, along

with flight attendants, along with pilots, put that together some

time ago and it is so every security screener would know exactly

what is expected. He would not be taking away your pen flashlight

because he knows that is not a weapon.

Right now, we have very inconsistent training. We do not have

to invent a new guide. One is already there. We might even improve upon that, but we at least have something that is in print,

can just be made part of the regulatory package. We could be using

it. Now, it is just gathering dust.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And what would be different for those of

us who are buying a ticket and going on a plane?

Mr. WOERTH. Probably a lot of it may be more perception than

reality. But I know it is extremely discomforting, as all the witnesses here have testified and the passengers that I talk to and all

of our crew members have said. Part of the professional attitude

they expect to see that we see in our profession, certainly they

want every pilot to have the same checklist preformed the same

way. The same with flight attendants. Those standard operating

procedures and practices makes it safer and instills confidence.

Just the opposite occurs when you have a different experience at

every airport and at different terminals in the same airport. It instills a lack of confidence.

So I think it is probably more that than in reality, but when we

see the same standard everywhere, people will be confident again

that somebody professional is in charge of the operation.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Ms. Mathes, I remember for me a

particularly poignant part of your prepared testimony when I read

it, if I remember it correctly, which is that since September 11, not

much has really changed for flight attendants. That is, there has

not been any additional training or support. I do not know whether

you talked about that when you testified before, but would you talk

just a little bit about it now?

Ms. MATHES. Well, basically from what I have witnessed, nothing

really has changed besides the ID badging was changed a little bit

and updated. As far as on the airplane, the cockpit door is secured

at this point, and we witnessed the changeover of that. We now

brief so that we have a plan on board. But as far as for flight attendants, nothing has changed for our security. We come to work

the same way. I mean, we go through security, but that really has

not changed, either.

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Chairman LIEBERMAN. What would you like to see changed, the

top one, two, or three things?

Ms. MATHES. Well, I would like to see there be some form of a

self-defense program. That should be something standard that all

of us can comply by, where you would have intact rules and regulations for how you would handle a situation. I would like to see

more cooperation with management and possibly the government

in that area.

I have been on an aircraft where we make the rules up as far

as first class and main class using the lavatories as we go. I want

to see everything standardized, so that when we enter that aircraft,

we know what we are going to do and how we are going to handle

it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So if you have not received any other

training, how do flight attendants coordinate with the larger number of sky marshals that are on planes now? I gather there is a

meeting before the flight takes off, but are flight attendants given

instructions as to how to work with the marshals in the event of

a crisis?

Ms. MATHES. Actually, from the information I have read as far

as the sky marshal being on board, that you would be introduced,

but you are not to treat them as if they are different from any

other passenger or even acknowledge that they are a sky marshal.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So in the event that a passenger or group

of passengers suddenly begins to take hostile action, are flight attendants told what to do at that point?

Ms. MATHES. Get out of the way.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Get out of the way and let the marshals

deal with it?

Ms. MATHES. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. OK, just one more question—well,

two more. The first is, what do you all see happening in the socalled secure areas? I think one of the points of vulnerability that

has become more clear to us is that there are so many thousands

of people working at airports, not only screening us but behind the

scenes in areas where passengers do not go, who have regular access to baggage and the airplanes, people who service the planes,

who bring food on, clean, etc.

Since September 11, have we seen standards, procedures, protections change? Mr. Carter, do you want to start that?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I will start. The FAA did come down with the

directive to only allow vehicles through the gate into the side area,

the secure area, to be checked by a guard and have the vehicle

checked. That is the major change that we have seen.

We have put a request in to the FAA to at least allow the airport

operator, the airport director should have an opportunity to get on

his airfield without having to have his trunk checked. That is how

I feel, and we are trying to get that from the FAA. We put that

request in on Thursday and we still have not gotten a response

from it, but that is one of the major changes I have seen, is access

to the air operations area, the side area.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Does anyone want to add anything to

that?

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Mr. WOERTH. I would just say that is still one of the weaker

links.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is.

Mr. WOERTH. It is until we have, as in my testimony, those electronic ID cards, so once you enter a secure area, everybody is confident. You can go where you want to because everybody in that secure area is accounted for. Just having a plastic ID card with somebody’s picture on it does not do it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is not enough.

Mr. WOERTH. We have got to get that electronic identification.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Ms. Mathes, did you want to add anything to that, or Ms. McInerney?

Ms. MCINERNEY. I would like to add an experience I just witnessed on Friday.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead.

Ms. MCINERNEY. I was at Boston Logan last Friday, taking a

U.S. Airways shuttle. It was a five o’clock takeoff time, so it was

certainly a busy screening area, staffed by MPs who were doing a

very good job, might I add, and four gentlemen just came and

began to walk around the security and they noted that they were

there and they were contractors working on the airport. They had

no IDs. They had not been discussed to. They had a conversation.

They went around the screening.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Ms. MCINERNEY. They were then detained for about 10 minutes.

I sat as an interested observer and watched while they still could

not work these things out. They kept saying that they were there

to fix something. No one could determine who had hired these people, where they had come from. They had no work orders. And to

me, that is a little bit frightening to be occurring almost 80 days

later.

Mr. CARTER. And in the real world, they should be, those people

that she is talking about should be escorted by a person that does

have that ID badge that has verification.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. CARTER. That should happen immediately.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. At least they were stopped.

Ms. MCINERNEY. They were stopped, but only barely. An employee happened to notice them as he was changing shifts. Certainly, we all have to have a high degree of trust, but you cannot

stop but wonder.

And what is concerning to me is that there were over 100 passengers, many of whom just were talking among each other, because now we are almost like we were with HMOs. Back in the

day, we used to say, this is what happened to me when I went to

the doctor, this is what happened to me. Today’s cocktail talk is

about experiences at airports. We might as well be trading baseball

cards. A hundred passengers, many of whom were first-time fliers

since September 11, witnessed that, and I cannot imagine how

many people they have since discussed that with. It is a little

frightening.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Unfortunately, I agree. I would rather be

swapping baseball cards, but Senators are swapping stories like

that, too.

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Did you want to add anything, Ms. Mathes?

Ms. MATHES. I just wanted to say that, actually, we are a little

concerned by the food that is brought on the aircraft. Even though

the carts are taped with a blue tape and locks may be on the other

carts, we still have no way of knowing whether the food was actually tampered with before it came on the aircraft and we are not

even sure if the food service workers were screened before they

went to work that day. So it is a concern of ours.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you have any response to that, Mr.

Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I have been seeing the same thing that she has

been mentioning.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. That was my concern when I am watching this, because I know that if an employee is coming on that field, I know

that they are not going through a screening checkpoint. The food

service people, I have never seen a magnetometer over in the food

area.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a problem. That is a point of vulnerability. I am going to ask that question to the FAA. I appreciate

your mentioning it.

A final question. Ms. McInerney, has the Business Travel Association every tried to calculate the impact of business air travel on

the economy? In other words, as we look at the extraordinary decline in air travel now, and we know that some of it must be related to the weakening economy, some related to fears of terrorism,

but then it also has a causal effect, negative, on the weakening

economy.

Ms. MCINERNEY. Well, we look at it from two different perspectives. First, the travel industry net loss for 2002 is already projected to be about $2.4 billion. That is probably a conservative estimate.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Two-point-four billion dollars?

Ms. MCINERNEY. Correct.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And that is overall, airlines and tourism.

Ms. MCINERNEY. Correct.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I was in Florida over the weekend and

there is really a state of unemployment numbers that are rising

rapidly and the concerns about air travel have had a very drastic

effect on tourist areas like that.

Ms. MCINERNEY. Well, the overall loss to the GDP is projected

to be close to 10 times that much, as this has a causal effect.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Ten times the $2.4 billion——

Ms. MCINERNEY. Two-point-four billion dollars, correct. And in

line with that, as we are talking to corporations, they have sat out

the last few quarters traveling. There is a loss to them in productivity and sales and marketing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Ms. MCINERNEY. So I think that we have not seen the end of

what the economic impact of this crisis will be.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Unfortunately, I agree with you.

I thank the four of you. You have been an excellent panel of witnesses. To me, the hearing has shown, as I guess all of you said

before, that aviation security has been improved since September

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11 in this country, but it is obvious we have a ways to go yet before

we can have the confidence that we want air travelers to have.

I must say, when I go back to the previous panel, and you have

augmented it, we really did let ourselves become too relaxed about

these matters. I mean, it is human nature, unfortunately. We did

an earlier hearing here on September 25, post-September 11, and

I ended up concluding—I never would want to say that my conclusion was that if airline security was what it should have been on

September 11, we could have stopped all those terrorist attacks,

but we sure could have made them a lot harder to have pulled off,

and I think some of them probably would have been stopped if everything we are beginning to put in place and will if this aviation

security legislation ever gets agreed on and passed. It is going to

be—you never want to say impossible—but a lot harder for terrorists to do what they did on September 11.

This Committee is going to stay active in this area, and we know

how important it is to the American people, how important it is to

the people who work in the aviation system, and how important it

is to our economy, so I thank each of you for the contribution you

have made to our efforts.

At this point, the hearing will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:29 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(59)

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

I would like to thank the Chairman of our Committee and the Chairman of the

Subcommittee on the Oversight of Government Management for calling today’s follow up hearing on airline security. I also call on our colleagues who are debating

the airline security bills to complete their work as quickly as possible. The Senate

passed its bill a month ago, and it is wrong to delay its implementation any longer.

When the al-Qaida network turned four U.S. airplanes into guided missiles, the

vulnerabilities in our nation’s air transportation industry were revealed. In the

wake of September 11, Congress and the Administration have taken positive steps

to protect the flying public through increased security at airports and hardening

commercial planes. There is now increased information sharing among intelligence

and law enforcement agencies; mandatory criminal history background checks for all

airline and airport employees with access to secure areas; expanded use of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System and explosives detection equipment;

and funding for cockpit door security.

However, more must be done to restore the public’s confidence that all passengers

will reach their destinations safely. Like the railroads that opened the American

West in the 1800’s, air travel has helped define our nation. For me, it would be hard

to image Hawaii without the millions of tourists who annually enjoy the 50th state.

Hawaii, more than any other state, is economically dependent on a vibrant tourism and airline industry. Tourism accounts for a quarter of the state’s economy and

a third of its jobs. At the end of September, tourism in Hawaii was down 40 percent

and more than 11,000 people employed in the industry were out of jobs. The October

figures are expected to be substantially higher. A delayed recovery in the tourism

industry could lead to a loss of $1 billion and 24,000 jobs.

While there have been positive steps recently, the tragic crash in the Rockaway

neighborhood of Queens—which is considered to be unrelated to the events of September 11—has reopened wounds and reinstated fears about flying and traveling.

On behalf of the State of Hawaii and the nation’s airline and tourism industry,

we must do all that we can to ensure that air travel is safe and secure so that we

may travel our nation’s airspace without fear.

I welcome our distinguished witnesses.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our country has taken a serious blow over the past 2 months—not only are we

coping with the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the anthrax letters, but we

now face another airline crash which occurred on November 12.

My thoughts and prayers are with the victims of American Airlines flight 587 and

their families.

Today’s hearing focuses on the security of our airports and airplanes.

I think all of us would agree that changes need to be made to our aviation security as soon as possible.

Since September 11, we have heard news reports of passengers trying to enter

cockpits and passengers carrying knives and other weapons past the airport screeners.

We have also heard reports about some of the problems with the screening companies that handle airport security, including failing to do background checks and hiring illegal aliens.

Situations like this need to be stopped immediately and should not be tolerated.

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Congress is working on legislation to help make flying safer. Both the House and

the Senate have passed aviation security bills, and I hope we can work out the differences between the two versions soon.

We need to get a final version of this legislation to the President so he can sign

it into law, and we can start implementing some of these important reforms.

Let me add, however, that while we need to act as quickly as possible, we

shouldn’t act rashly. We need to make sure that our reforms will truly make our

skies safer.

Americans must feel safe as they pass through airport medal detectors and take

their seats on airplanes. If they do not feel safe, they will not fly.

I look forward to hearing from our guests today, and gaining their perspective on

this important issue.

Thank you.

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