An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

NO. COA13-1196

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 20 May 2014

RANDI LEIGH ROBERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Vance County

No. 12 CVD 809

RUSSELL DAVID ROBERSON,

Defendant.

_________________________

MARLINA LYNETTE ROBERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Vance County

No. 12 CVD 1019

RUSSELL DAVID ROBERSON,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from orders entered 5 April 2013 by 

Judge John W. Davis in Vance County District Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 17 February 2014.

Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Dietrich D. McMillan, 

Jason Langberg, Aaron J. Rogers, Celia Pistolis, and Gina 

Reyman, for plaintiff–appellee Randi Leigh Roberson.

Melissa C. Lemmond, for plaintiff–appellee Marlina Lynette 

Roberson.

Stainback, Satterwhite & Zollicoffer, PLLC, by Paul J. 
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Stainback, for defendant–appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant Russell David Roberson appeals from domestic 

violence orders of protection, forbidding acts or threats of 

domestic violence to, and contact with, his daughter, plaintiff 

Randi Leigh Roberson (“Randi”), and his wife, plaintiff Marlina 

Lynette Roberson (“Mrs. Roberson”). We affirm.

The evidence presented at the hearing tended to show that 

defendant and Mrs. Roberson were twice married to each other,

and that three children were born to their first marriage; two 

daughters and a son. Randi is their eldest child; seventeen on 

the date of the events giving rise to this action. On the 

morning of 10 August 2012, just before 9:00 a.m., defendant, 

Randi, and the other children were in the family residence in 

Henderson, North Carolina, while Mrs. Roberson was at work about 

an hour away. When Randi descended the stairs, defendant asked 

her for the keys to the van that Randi drove to and from work, 

which vehicle was registered in Mrs. Roberson’s name, so that 

defendant could move the van into the yard. In response to his 

request, Randi gave defendant her key ring, which included the 

key to the van. Defendant walked out of the house, moved the 

vehicle, came back into the house, and returned the key ring to 
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Randi, who put it in her pocket. Then, moments later, defendant 

demanded that Randi take the key for the van off of the key ring 

and give it back to him. According to Randi’s testimony, when 

she refused, defendant said, “We can do this the easy way or we 

can do this the hard way. I will slam you down right here and 

take that key.” Randi then said that defendant “proceeded to 

grab [her around her neck] in a choke hold [from behind],”

during which time she “couldn’t breathe,” “felt restrained,” and 

“was scared that he was gonna hurt [her].” In an attempt to try 

to “get free any way [she] could,” Randi said she tried to bite 

defendant’s arm, but was only able to bite her own lip. When 

she was finally able to “get free” from defendant’s hold around 

her neck, Randi ran past her twelve-year-old brother, who had 

been standing in the kitchen throughout the altercation, and ran 

down the hallway into the garage. Randi testified, without 

objection, that, after she ran from the kitchen, her brother 

“was yelling out behind [her] to——asking [her] dad to stop.”

Defendant gave chase and “caught [Randi’s] shirt” as she 

entered the garage. Defendant then “got [her] in a choke hold 

again up against [their] air hockey table.” After “struggl[ing] 

there for a while,” defendant “slammed [her face] down against 

the freezer” and grabbed the key ring out of her pocket, at 

which point Randi ran outside, jumped the fence into her 
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neighbor’s yard, and called both 9-1-1 and her mother. Randi

testified that her eye was bruised as a result of defendant 

“slam[ing]” her face against the freezer.

Mrs. Roberson testified that, upon receiving a “frantic, 

upset” phone call from her twelve-year-old son, she immediately 

jumped into her car and left work to drive home. Mrs. Roberson

then testified, without objection, that she called Randi and 

asked her where she was, to which Randi replied that she was 

outside in the yard at the neighbor’s house. When Mrs. Roberson

asked if Randi was okay, Randi started crying and recounted to 

Mrs. Roberson that defendant “had choked her and that——had 

slammed her down on the ground in the——down on the floor in the 

garage and had hit her face on the refrigerator, and that, she 

finally got away from him and she called 9-1-1, and the police 

was [sic] on the way.” When Mrs. Roberson arrived at the family

residence, she saw that Randi “had a really red, splotchy eye”

that “had started to bruise,” and “she was complaining of a 

swollen neck, and it was swollen, no marks on the neck, but it 

was swollen.”

Mrs. Roberson also testified, without objection, that, 

several years prior to this incident, defendant had “harmed 

[Mrs. Roberson] before,” where “[h]e bit [her] and threw [her]

to the ground, bruising [her] from head to toe.” Mrs. Roberson
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further testified that her relationship with defendant was

an emotional, mental struggle all the time, 

and he has to be right, he has to——he has to 

have everything his way and such control, 

he’s got to make sure [the family] do[es]

what he says, move where he says, go where 

he says, and not go where he says . . . . 

[H]e escalates emotionally, and he becomes 

verbally abusive and now, physically.

Mrs. Roberson also said that after the first year of their 

second marriage to each other, “it started again, and that’s why 

[she’s] worried, and that’s why [she’s] afraid, and that’s why 

[she’s] scared because it’s going down the same path . . . the 

same path, the same controlling behavior, the same emotional and 

mental control.” She said that, during their second marriage, 

defendant “started controlling where [she] could go. . . . 

[They] were never to go to anybody else’s holiday, you know, 

parties or anything. It just——it was a control thing. It was 

an emotional thing.” “If [defendant] couldn’t [make her] do 

something then it was just like hounding [her] constantly making 

[her] feel worthless, laughing at [her] just, you know, making 

[her] feel like——belittled, in which [sic] he’s done this entire 

time.” Mrs. Roberson also said, without objection, that her 

children “tell [her] that they were afraid of [defendant],” 

which was corroborated by Randi’s own testimony that she is 

afraid of defendant because she “never know[s] what the 

punishment will be” and because she is “afraid that if 
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[defendant] comes back” to the family residence, a punishment 

like the one she suffered during the incident at issue, “where 

he——he slammed [her] and choked [her] and all this,” “will 

happen again and he will try to take out revenge on [her].” 

Additionally, when asked whether defendant ever threatened Mrs. 

Roberson with a firearm, Mrs. Roberson testified that, “[l]ong 

ago,” when she tried to leave with Randi when she was very 

small, defendant “put his finger up to [her] head and said, ‘I 

will do that if you ever try to take her.’”

Defendant testified on his own behalf that, on the morning 

of 10 August 2012, after repeatedly asking Randi for her key 

ring and being met only with her refusals to comply with his 

request, defendant “reached for the keys to grab the keys out of 

her pocket.” Defendant said that, as he reached for the keys, 

Randi “leaned over and started plowing toward [him]” and 

“knocked [him] backwards.” Defendant said that it was at this 

point, as he was “trying to catch [him]self,” that his “hand 

went around back of her and just grabbed her trying to stand 

up.” Defendant said then that Randi “took off down——down the 

hallway,” and that he followed behind her as she ran away from 

him. According to defendant, as Randi was running away from him 

and he was following closely behind her, Randi tripped over a 

pile of dirty clothes and started falling, but, “to keep her 
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from falling, . . . [he] hit her in the back and she must’ve 

bruised her eye on the way down in her fall.” He then testified

that, as she was falling, he “grabbed her to brace her, and she 

immediately started biting [his] arm” and bit him for 

“approximately a couple of minutes there.” Defendant then said 

that he “immediately pulled [his] arm back out” when Randi

started coughing, then reached around and “grabbed the key out 

of her pocket,” which is when Randi “hollered 9-1-1” and ran to 

the neighbor’s house. Defendant said he then walked down to the 

boat dock at the back of the family residence, waited about 

fifteen minutes, and then walked back to the residence, where he 

was met by law enforcement officers and was placed under arrest.

Randi and Mrs. Roberson each filed a complaint and motion 

for a domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”) against 

defendant, alleging that defendant “has attempted to cause or 

has intentionally caused me bodily injury [or has caused bodily 

injury to the children living with me],” or “has placed me or a 

member of my family or household in fear of imminent serious 

bodily injury or in fear of continued harassment that rises to 

such a level as to inflict substantial emotional distress.” 

Both complaints requested, in part, that the court order the 

eviction of defendant from the family residence. The court 

entered ex parte domestic violence orders of protection against 
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defendant as to both complaints. Defendant filed answers with 

respect to both complaints requesting that the matters be 

dismissed. After numerous continuances, the matters were 

consolidated for hearing and heard on 2 April 2013. Defendant 

moved to dismiss both cases at the close of the complainants’ 

evidence, which motions were denied. On 5 April 2013, the trial 

court entered domestic violence orders of protection against 

defendant in which it concluded, in part, that defendant 

committed acts of domestic violence against Randi and against 

the minor child residing with Mrs. Roberson, and ordered that 

defendant stay away from the parties’ residence. Defendant 

appeals from both orders.

_________________________

“[W]hen the trial court sits without a jury, the standard 

of review on appeal [for a DVPO] is whether there was competent 

evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and 

whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such 

facts.” Burress v. Burress, 195 N.C. App. 447, 449, 672 S.E.2d 

732, 734 (2009) (first alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because “the trial judge is present 

for the full sensual effect of the spoken word, with the nuances 

of meaning revealed in pitch, mimicry and gestures, appearances 

and postures, shrillness and stridency, calmness and composure, 
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all of which add to or detract from the force of spoken words,” 

Brandon v. Brandon, 132 N.C. App. 646, 651, 513 S.E.2d 589, 593

(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]here the trial 

court sits as the finder of fact, and where different reasonable 

inferences can be drawn from the evidence, the determination of 

which reasonable inferences shall be drawn is for the trial 

[court].” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Where there is competent evidence to 

support the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are 

binding on appeal.” Burress, 195 N.C. App. at 449–50,

672 S.E.2d at 734.

N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a) provides that, if a trial court “finds 

that an act of domestic violence has occurred, the court shall 

grant a protective order restraining the defendant from further 

acts of domestic violence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) (2013). 

Domestic violence is defined as

the commission of one or more of the 

following acts upon an aggrieved party or 

upon a minor child residing with or in the 

custody of the aggrieved party by a person 

with whom the aggrieved party has or has had 

a personal relationship, but does not 

include acts of self-defense:

(1) Attempting to cause bodily injury, 

or intentionally causing bodily 

injury; or

(2) Placing the aggrieved party or a 

member of the aggrieved party’s 
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family or household in fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury or 

continued harassment, as defined 

in G.S. 14-277.3A, that rises to 

such a level as to inflict 

substantial emotional distress; or

(3) Committing any act defined in 

G.S. 14-27.2 through G.S. 14-

27.7[, which are criminal offenses 

in the “Rape and Other Sex 

Offenses” Article of the General 

Statutes].

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) (2013). Additionally, the term 

“personal relationship” referenced in this subsection includes a 

relationship wherein the parties involved are either “current or 

former spouses” or “related as parents and children.” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 50B-1(b).

Defendant first asserts that the trial court’s findings of 

fact are not supported by competent evidence. However, a 

careful examination of the evidence in the record before us and 

of defendant’s arguments in his brief reveals that there is 

competent evidence to support the court’s findings, and that 

defendant is merely urging this Court to reweigh the evidence 

presented to the trial court, and to give greater consideration 

to his own testimony which is favorable to him. Because it is 

for the trial court to determine, when sitting as the finder of 

fact, which reasonable inferences are to be drawn from the 

evidence when such inferences can be so drawn, see Brandon, 
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132 N.C. App. at 651, 513 S.E.2d at 593, and because findings of 

fact are binding on appeal where there is competent evidence to 

support them, see Burress, 195 N.C. App. at 449–50, 672 S.E.2d 

at 734, and since there is ample competent evidence in the 

record to support the trial court’s binding findings of fact, we 

must decline defendant’s entreaty to disturb them.

Defendant next suggests that the acts he committed against 

Randi were not acts of domestic violence but, instead, acts of 

parental discipline, and asserts that the court’s determination 

that his acts were “well in excess of ordinary and 

constitutionally protected discipline, and, in fact, his actions 

constituted an assault that cause physical injury to Randi” is, 

in his words, “just wrong.” However, it is defendant’s burden 

“to present the arguments and authorities upon which [he]

rel[ies]” in support of his position, see N.C.R. App. P. 28(a),

and “[t]he scope of review on appeal is limited to issues so 

presented . . . .” Id. In his brief, defendant presented no 

substantive legal argument to support his assertion that choking 

his daughter twice, chasing her throughout the family residence, 

and slamming her face against a freezer with such force that it 

left a bruise, all for the self-professed purpose of “trying to 

prove a point with and discipline his child,” are acts that are 

“not what was comprehended or envisioned by the enactment of the 
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Domestic Violence Act as set forth in Chapter 50B.” Since 

issues “in support of which no reason or argument is stated[]

will be taken as abandoned,” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also

Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 

360, 361 (per curiam) (“It is not the role of the appellate 

courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant.”), reh’g 

denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005), we decline to 

consider defendant’s unsupported argument further.

Our disposition renders it unnecessary to consider 

defendant’s remaining substantive issue on appeal, as it was not 

preserved by proper objection at trial. We also decline to 

address those remaining assertions in support of which defendant 

has provided no legal argument.

Affirmed.

Judges ELMORE and HUNTER, JR. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).