IV

107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 468

Affirming the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

supporting continued United States participation in NATO, ensuring

that the enlargement of NATO proceeds in a manner consistent with

United States interests, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 27, 2002

Mr. GALLEGLY (for himself, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. COX) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on

International Relations

RESOLUTION

Affirming the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), supporting continued United States

participation in NATO, ensuring that the enlargement

of NATO proceeds in a manner consistent with United

States interests, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved,

2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

3 This resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Transatlantic

4 Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2002’’.

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

6 The House of Representatives makes the following

7 findings:
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1 (1) Since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Orga2 nization (NATO) has played an essential role in

3 guaranteeing the security, freedom, and prosperity

4 of the United States and its partners in the Alliance.

5 (2) NATO, founded on the principles of democ6 racy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, has

7 proved to be an indispensable instrument for forging

8 a trans-Atlantic community of nations working to9 gether to safeguard the freedom and common herit10 age of its peoples and promoting stability in the

11 North Atlantic area.

12 (3) NATO is the only institution that promotes

13 a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to

14 issues concerning the security of North America and

15 Europe and remains the only multilateral security

16 organization demonstrably capable of conducting ef17 fective military operations and preserving security

18 and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

19 (4) The security, freedom, and prosperity of the

20 United States remain linked to the security of the

21 countries of Europe.

22 (5) NATO remains the most visible and signifi23 cant embodiment of United States engagement in

24 Europe and therefore membership in NATO remains
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1 a vital national security interest of the United

2 States.

3 (6) NATO enhances the security of the United

4 States by providing an integrated military structure

5 and a framework for consultations on political and

6 security concerns of members which could impact

7 the Alliance.

8 (7) The security of NATO member countries is

9 inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe,

10 and the consolidation and strengthening of demo11 cratic and free societies on the entire continent is of

12 direct and material importance to the NATO Alli13 ance and its partners.

14 (8) The sustained commitment of the member

15 countries of NATO to a mutual defense has been a

16 major contributing factor in the democratic trans17 formation of Central and Eastern Europe.

18 (9) Members of the Alliance can and should

19 play a critical role in addressing the security chal20 lenges of the post-Cold War era and in creating the

21 stable environment needed for Central and Eastern

22 Europe to successfully complete political and eco23 nomic transformation.

24 (10) NATO should remain the core security or25 ganization of the evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture
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1 in which all countries enjoy the same freedom, co2 operation, and security.

3 (11) NATO’s military force structure, defense

4 planning, command structures, and force goals must

5 be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its

6 members, and should be capable of projecting power

7 when the security of a NATO member is threatened,

8 and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing

9 partners among NATO members to defend common

10 values and interests.

11 (12) NATO must act to address new post-Cold

12 War risks emerging from outside the treaty area in

13 the interests of preserving peace and security in the

14 Euro-Atlantic area, including—

15 (A) risks from rogue states and non-state

16 actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chem17 ical weapons and their means of delivery;

18 (B) transnational terrorism and disruption

19 of the flow of vital resources; and

20 (C) conflicts outside the treaty area stem21 ming from unresolved historical disputes and

22 the actions of undemocratic governments and

23 sub-state actors who reject the peaceful settle24 ment of disputes.
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1 (13) All NATO members should commit to im2 proving their respective defense capabilities so that

3 NATO can project power decisively and sustain op4 erations over distance and time.

5 (14) The requirements to provide collective de6 fense, to project power, and to sustain operations

7 dictate that European NATO members possess mili8 tary capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long

9 distances, sustain operations for extended periods of

10 time, and operate jointly with the United States in

11 high-intensity conflicts.

12 (15) NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,

13 which is intended to improve the defense capabilities

14 of the European Allies, particularly the deployability,

15 mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of Alli16 ance forces, must continue to be pursued by all

17 members of the Alliance in order to develop balanced

18 capabilities.

19 (16) With a few exceptions, European members

20 of NATO have been deficient in maintaining re21 quired military capabilities and providing defense

22 spending at levels adequate to meet these capability

23 shortfalls. Failure of the European NATO members

24 to achieve the goals established through the Defense
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1 Capabilities Initiative could weaken support for the

2 Alliance in the United States over the long term.

3 (17) Members of the Alliance must also recog4 nize that the campaign against new and emerging

5 threats to the security of the Alliance requires other

6 non-military capabilities and efforts to be effective.

7 Thus, the need to enhance intelligence-sharing and

8 cooperation, both bilaterally between Alliance mem9 bers and partners and within the Alliance collec10 tively, the facilitation of enhanced coordination

11 among Alliance member’s law enforcement agencies,

12 and improved police and judicial cooperation and in13 formation exchanges are critical to the overall effort.

14 (18) NATO has embarked upon an historic mis15 sion to share its benefits and patterns of consulta16 tion and cooperation with other nations in the Euro17 Atlantic area through both enlargement and active

18 partnership.

19 (19) NATO has enlarged its membership on

20 four different occasions since 1949.

21 (20) The NATO summit meeting to be held in

22 the fall of 2002 in Prague will provide an historic

23 opportunity to chart a course for NATO in the new

24 millennium by reaffirming the importance of NATO

25 to the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region,
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1 by addressing new threats, developing new capabili2 ties, and by extending invitations to additional coun3 tries of Europe to become members of the Alliance.

4 (21) The governments of NATO member coun5 tries have stated that enlargement of the Alliance is

6 a further step toward the Alliance’s basic goal of en7 hancing security and extending stability throughout

8 the Euro-Atlantic region.

9 (22) The enlargement process of NATO helps

10 to avert conflict, because the very prospect of mem11 bership serves as an incentive for aspiring members

12 to resolve disputes with their neighbors and to push

13 ahead with reform and democratization.

14 (23) The Partnership for Peace, created in

15 1994 under United States leadership, has fostered

16 cooperation between NATO and the countries of

17 Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a path to

18 future membership in the Alliance.

19 (24) At the Washington Summit of the NATO

20 Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state

21 and government issued a communique declaring

22 ‘‘[we] pledge that NATO will continue to welcome

23 new members in a position to further the principles

24 of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to

25 peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area’’.
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1 (25) In 1999 NATO launched a Membership

2 Action Plan designed to help interested Partnership

3 for Peace countries prepare for membership by offer4 ing advice and assistance on programs and member5 ship-related issues.

6 (26) The Membership Action Plan establishes

7 certain political, economic, social, and military-re8 lated goals that aspiring candidate nations are ex9 pected to meet, including the peaceful resolution of

10 territorial disputes, respect for democratic proce11 dures and the rule of law, human rights, democratic

12 control of the military and other military reforms,

13 and a commitment to stability and well-being

14 through economic liberty and social justice.

15 (27) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, nine

16 nations of Europe issued a statement (later joined

17 by a tenth) declaring that their countries will co18 operate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the

19 next round of NATO enlargement and since then

20 have taken concrete steps to demonstrate this com21 mitment, including their participation in Partnership

22 for Peace activities and their commitment to the

23 concept of the Membership Action Plan.

24 (28) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw,

25 Poland, President George W. Bush stated ‘‘[all] of
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1 Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the

2 Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the

3 same chance for security and freedom—and the

4 same chance to join the institutions of Europe’’.

5 (29) The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to

6 include as full and equal members additional democ7 racies in Europe will serve to reinforce stability and

8 security in Europe by fostering their integration into

9 the structures which have created and sustained

10 peace in Europe since 1945.

11 (30) As new members of NATO assume the re12 sponsibilities of Alliance membership, the costs of

13 maintaining stability in Europe will be shared more

14 widely. The concurrent assumption of greater re15 sponsibility and development of greater capabilities

16 by new members of NATO will further reinforce

17 burdensharing.

18 (31) The membership of the Czech Republic,

19 Hungary, and Poland has strengthened NATO’s

20 ability to perform the full range of NATO missions

21 by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for

22 NATO forces during Operation Allied Force in the

23 Balkans, by their contributions of military forces to

24 NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and by their

25 support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
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1 (32) The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Po2 land, due to their similar recent history, have bol3 stered NATO’s capability to integrate former com4 munist nations into a community of democracies and

5 have served as mentors to other countries that as6 pire to join NATO.

7 (33) In supporting NATO enlargement all can8 didate countries must be fully aware of the costs and

9 responsibilities of NATO membership, including the

10 obligation set forth in Article X of the North Atlan11 tic Treaty that new members be able to contribute

12 to the security of the North Atlantic area, and fur13 ther to ensure that all countries admitted to NATO

14 are capable of assuming those costs and responsibil15 ities.

16 (34) For those candidate countries that receive

17 an invitation to join NATO at the Prague Summit,

18 the process of joining NATO does not end with the

19 invitation but rather with meeting the full respon20 sibilities of a NATO member, including the comple21 tion of issues identified by the Membership Action

22 Plan, which will continue beyond Prague.

23 (35) In considering the enlargement of NATO

24 at Prague and in issuing invitations to the candidate

25 countries who have made significant progress toward
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1 achieving their objectives in the Membership Action

2 Plan established by NATO, there is a recognition

3 that each country invited to join NATO should ac4 cede on a common date but before the date on which

5 the next announced NATO summit is to take place.

6 (36) The countries that will be invited to begin

7 accession negotiations with NATO at the NATO

8 summit in Prague should not be the last such coun9 tries invited to join NATO and there should be a

10 continuing process and progress toward the admis11 sion of additional democracies in Europe beyond

12 2002 depending on the degree to which those coun13 tries meet the criteria set forth in NATO’s Member14 ship Action Plan.

15 (37) The process of NATO enlargement entails

16 the consensus agreement of the governments of all

17 19 NATO member countries and ratification in ac18 cordance with their constitutional procedures.

19 SEC. 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN

20 FEDERATION.

21 The House of Representatives makes the following

22 findings:

23 (1) The admission into the North Atlantic

24 Treaty Organization (NATO) of new members from

25 countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as
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1 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, will not

2 threaten any other country.

3 (2) Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has

4 attached particular importance to the development

5 of constructive and cooperative relations with the

6 Russian Federation in order to overcome remaining

7 vestiges of confrontation and competition in order to

8 strengthen mutual trust and cooperation between

9 NATO and the Russian Federation.

10 (3) In 1994, building on previous efforts at co11 operation, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace

12 Program, further enhancing the emerging NATO13 Russian Federation dialogue.

14 (4) On May 27, 1997, in an expression of

15 strong commitment to work together to build a last16 ing and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area,

17 the heads of state and government of NATO and the

18 Russian Federation signed the ground-breaking

19 ‘‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation

20 and Security Between NATO and the Russian Fed21 eration’’.

22 (5) On March 18, 1998, the Russian Federa23 tion formally established its mission to NATO and

24 appointed a senior military representative to facili-
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1 tate military and defense-related cooperation be2 tween NATO and the Russian Federation.

3 (6) Since 1998, NATO and the Russian Fed4 eration have worked cooperatively with each other in

5 the Balkans and elsewhere setting the stage for the

6 ability of an enlarged NATO to continue the cooper7 ative spirit embodied in the Founding Act.

8 (7) On May 28, 2002, in an historic step to9 ward the Alliance’s long-standing goal of building a

10 secure, cooperative, and democratic Euro-Atlantic

11 area, NATO took the decisive and substantial step

12 of deepening the NATO-Russian Federation rela13 tionship by establishing the new NATO-Russia

14 Council.

15 SEC. 4. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

16 The House of Representatives declares the following

17 to be the policy of the United States:

18 (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

19 (NATO) should remain the primary institution

20 through which European and North American allies

21 address security issues of transatlantic concern.

22 (2) The member states of NATO should reaf23 firm, at the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002, the

24 continued importance of NATO, renew their commit25 ment to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, re-
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1 inforce unity within NATO, maintain a vigorous ca2 pability to carry out collective defense, and har3 monize security policies and strategies for trans4 atlantic affairs.

5 (3) At the Prague Summit, the Alliance, while

6 maintaining collective defense as its core function,

7 should as a fundamental Alliance task, continue to

8 strengthen national and collective capacities to re9 spond to new threats wherever such threats occur,

10 including from abroad.

11 (4) The Alliance, in addition to the strategic

12 concept adopted by the Allies at the summit meeting

13 held in Washington in 1999, must recognize the

14 need to develop new capabilities, and agree to con15 sider acting upon the threats posed by the prolifera16 tion of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism

17 by intensifying consultations among political and

18 military leaders, and by developing comprehensive

19 capabilities to counter these threats to the inter20 national community.

21 (5) The Alliance should make clear commit22 ments to remedy shortfalls in areas such as logistics,

23 strategic airlift, command and control, modern

24 strike capabilities, adequate shared intelligence, and

25 the other requirements identified by NATO’s De-
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1 fense Capabilities Initiative necessary to provide the

2 ability to carry out the full range of NATO’s mis3 sions.

4 (6) The Alliance must ensure a more equitable

5 sharing of contributions to the NATO common

6 budgets and to overall national defense expenditures

7 and capability-building.

8 (7) The President, the Secretary of State, and

9 the Secretary of Defense should fully use their of10 fices to encourage the NATO allies to commit the

11 resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to

12 rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain op13 erations for extended periods of time, and operate

14 jointly with the United States in high intensity con15 flicts, thus making such NATO allies more effective

16 partners.

17 (8) The member states of NATO should com18 mit to enhanced intelligence-sharing, law enforce19 ment, police, and judicial cooperation, and expanded

20 information exchanges within and among Alliance

21 members in order to meet the challenges of new and

22 emerging threats.

23 SEC. 5. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERA24 TION.

25 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—
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1 (1) while maintaining its essential and inherent

2 right to make its own decisions, the North Atlantic

3 Treaty Organization (NATO) should seek to

4 strengthen its relations with the Russian Federation

5 as an essential partner in building long-term peace

6 in Europe, and to that end, the new NATO-Russia

7 Council, in which member states and the Russian

8 Federation will work as equal partners on mutually9 agreed matters, should be welcomed and supported;

10 (2) while retaining its primary commitment to

11 collective defense, NATO enlargement should be car12 ried out in such a manner as to underscore to the

13 Russian Federation that NATO enlargement will en14 hance the security of all countries in Europe, includ15 ing the Russian Federation; and

16 (3) in seeking to demonstrate NATO’s defen17 sive and security-enhancing intentions to the Rus18 sian Federation, it is essential that neither funda19 mental United States security interests in Europe

20 nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a

21 defensive alliance be jeopardized.

22 SEC. 6. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

23 AND DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE

24 FOR NATO.

25 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—
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1 (1) at the Summit to be held in Prague in the

2 fall of 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

3 (NATO) should extend invitations for accession ne4 gotiations to any appropriate candidate country that

5 meets the objectives and targets for NATO member6 ship as outlined in the Membership Action Plan

7 process established by NATO in 1999, including—

8 (A) a commitment to the basic principles

9 and values set out in the Washington Treaty;

10 (B) the capability to contribute to collec11 tive defense and the Alliance’s full range of mis12 sions; and

13 (C) a firm commitment to contribute to

14 stability and security, especially in regions of

15 crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to

16 assume the responsibilities of NATO member17 ship;

18 (2) the candidate countries of Albania, Bul19 garia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the

20 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania,

21 Slovakia, and Slovenia should be commended on the

22 significant progress such countries have made thus

23 far in political and economic liberty and military re24 form necessary for meeting the objectives for pro-
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1 spective members of NATO as set out in their own

2 Membership Action Plans;

3 (3) each candidate country, despite recognized

4 Membership Action Plan deficiencies requiring fur5 ther refinement, could in its own way contribute to

6 stability, freedom, and peace in Europe as a whole,

7 as many of such countries have done thus far in the

8 Balkans and in Afghanistan, and would make a

9 positive contribution toward furthering the goals of

10 NATO should it become a NATO member country;

11 (4) having made significant progress in reform12 ing their societies and their military forces, and hav13 ing developed reasonable, affordable, and sustainable

14 plans to be able to work within the Alliance struc15 ture and to contribute positively to the collective de16 fense of the Alliance and other NATO missions, the

17 most qualified candidate countries, as recommended

18 by the Committee on International Relations of the

19 House of Representatives, should be invited to begin

20 the accession process to join the Alliance at the

21 Prague summit;

22 (5) with respect to candidate countries invited

23 to join NATO, such countries should accede on a

24 common date before the next announced NATO

25 summit is to take place;
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1 (6) after the Prague summit those candidate

2 countries invited to join the Alliance should continue

3 to participate in the Membership Action Plan until

4 accession, and the accession process should take into

5 account work conducted under the Membership Ac6 tion Plan; and

7 (7) the process of NATO enlargement should

8 continue beyond the inclusion of such candidate

9 countries invited to join NATO at Prague, to include

10 those candidate countries not so invited at Prague

11 as well as other democratic European countries

12 which may express interest in joining the Alliance,

13 and which agree to utilize the Membership Action

14 Plan to facilitate such NATO enlargement.

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