COUNTERINSURGENCY:

Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

Steven Metz

February 28, 1995
LL

******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

******

The author would like to thank David Tucker, Larry Cable,

William Mendel, Robert Adolph, William Flavin, John Hunt, Stephen

Sloan, James Wirtz, Donald Vought, Thomas-Durell Young, and James

Kievit for (sometimes painfully) insightful comments on an

earlier draft of this study. It is much better for their

efforts. This study is dedicated to my mentors in

counterinsurgency, Larry Caber, Steve Butler, Roland Dutton, John

Cole, Larry Gavin, Dave Decker, and Terry Griswold, and to the

war they should have won.

******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)

245-3822 or DSN 242-3822, FAX (717) 245-3820, DSN 242-3820.
LLL

FOREWORD

Counterinsurgency is seemingly not of great concern to the

U.S. Army today. This may represent a period of remission rather

than the apparent abandonment of the mission. It is possible

that the U.S. military may again become engaged in

counterinsurgency support in the future.

In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the

Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when

counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American

national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they

react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If

analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the

military is better prepared for the reconstitution of

capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency

and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would

be more difficult.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

study as part of its ongoing analysis of the strategic dimensions

of military operations other than war.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
LY

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College. Dr. Metz has taught at the Air War College, the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities.

 He holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies from the

University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science

from the Johns Hopkins University.
Y

SUMMARY

Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S.

engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests that if the

United States remains involved in the Global South, one may

emerge. American counterinsurgency strategy has unfolded in a

distinct pattern over the past 50 years. At times, policymakers

saw a strategic rationale for engagement in counterinsurgency. 

When they did, the military and Department of Defense formed or

reconstituted counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts, and

organizations. When the strategic rationale faded, these

capabilities atrophied. This pattern may be repeated in the

future.

During the last decade of the Cold War, the U.S. military

developed an effective approach to insurgency and implemented it

in El Salvador, but this focused on one particular type of

insurgency: Maoist "people's war." The El Salvador model may not

apply to post-Cold War forms of insurgency. Moreover, many of

the basic assumptions of American counterinsurgency strategy

appear obsolete. Trends such as ungovernability, the

routinization of violence, and the mutation of insurgency change

the costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era

strategy and doctrine.

During the current period of remission in insurgency, the

Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing

mutations in insurgency and to open a debate on the nature of a

cogent post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy

should expand its conceptual framework and stress three

principles: selectivity, multilateralism, and concentration on

secondary support functions including indirect or second-tier

engagement. Such efforts will pave the way for the

reconstitution of American counterinsurgency should it be

required.


COUNTERINSURGENCY

Introduction.

The insurgents of the world are sleeping. Few new old-style

insurgencies have emerged since the end of the Cold War and many

old ones, from the Philippines to Peru, from Mozambique to El

Salvador, from Northern Ireland to the West Bank and Gaza are

lurching or inching toward settlement. But sleep is not death--

it is a time for rejuvenation. Since the means and the motives

for protracted political violence persist, it will prove as

attractive to the discontented of the world in the post-Cold War

global security environment as it did before. Eventually

insurgency will awaken. When it does, the United States will be

required to respond.

Since the late 1940s, the importance American policymakers

attached to supporting friendly states facing guerrilla threats

has ebbed and flowed. Often counterinsurgency was not considered

strategically significant and the defense community paid it

little attention. When the president did decide that insurgency

posed a threat, the military and the defense community had to

craft or update an appropriate conceptual framework, organization

and doctrine. Like a phoenix, American counterinsurgency

capability periodically died, only to be reborn from the ashes. 

And always, how the period of remission was spent shaped the

process of rebirth. When the military and defense community

maintained a cadre of counterinsurgency experts to ponder past

efforts and analyze the changing nature of insurgency, the

reconstitution of understanding and capability was relatively

easy.

Today there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S.

engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests one may

emerge if the United States remains involved in the Global South.

 This is the time, then, for introspection, assessment, and

reflection--for keeping the intellectual flame burning, even if

at a very low level. Just as conventional combat units train

after an operation in order to prepare for future ones (while

hoping they never occur), the U.S. military and other elements of

the defense community must mentally train for future

counterinsurgency. This entails both looking backward at

previous attempts to reconstitute counterinsurgency capabilities


and looking forward to speculate on future forms of insurgency

and the strategic environment in which counterinsurgency might

occur. To do this now will shorten the period of learning and

adaptation should counterinsurgency support again become an

important part of American national security strategy.

Threat and Response, Mark I.

From the end of World War II, revolutionary insurgency was

epidemic in the developing world, driven by an unfortunate

conflux of trends and factors. For instance, most Third World

governments exercised only limited or ineffective control over

parts of their nations. Because of rugged terrain, poor

infrastructure, government inefficiency, and tradition, the

common pattern was for the influence of the regime to decline

according to distance from the capital. The national government

was something of an abstraction. As Jeffrey Race noted in his

classic study War Comes to Long An, "for the majority of the

Vietnamese population, 'government' has always meant simply the

village council--the peasant had little experience of any

other."1

 The fragile legitimacy of many Third World regimes also

helped set the stage for insurgency. Since many Third World

states were artificial creations of colonialism, no national

government, however good, would be accepted by all segments of

the population. The stress on local or primal identities during

the colonial period--part of a deliberate "divide and conquer"

approach by the imperial metropoles--exacerbated this problem. 

In Asian and African states where decolonization was peaceful,

regimes often found it difficult to build legitimacy because of

the taint of association with the colonial masters. Even in

regions long independent or autonomous such as Latin America and

parts of the Islamic world, repression and corruption by

autocratic or traditional regimes eroded governmental legitimacy.

The electronic and transportation revolutions of the 20th

century also paved the way for revolutionary insurgency by

allowing people in remote regions to develop an accurate sense of

their predicament. Before modern communication, the hinterland

poor assumed that all the world lived as they did. With the

advent of modern communication, they recognized their

disadvantages and, more importantly, came to blame the

government. The result was what social scientists call the

"revolution of rising expectations" which simply meant that


demands on Third World states tended to grow faster than the

government's ability to meet them, thus generating frustration. 

Empirical studies have closely linked the resulting "perceived

relative deprivation" with political violence2. Improvements in

communication and transportation also gave revolutionaries

methods to organize support and allowed them to study and emulate

revolutionary success in other parts of the world.

At the same time, changes in global values helped legitimize

revolutionary violence. Although Americans often forgot it

during the Cold War, armed resistance to repression has been an

intrinsic part of the Western political tradition, enshrined in

the Declaration of Independence. Reflecting this, the political

left in the United States and Western Europe remained sympathetic

to Third World revolutionaries fighting repressive regimes. 

Ironically, the ascendence to superpower status of the United

States, with its strong liberal tradition, helped spark global

consciousness concerning human rights which, in turn, further

legitimized armed resistance to repression. It is not

coincidence that Ho Chi Minh cited the American Declaration of

Independence during his announcement of the independent Republic

of Vietnam in 19453. The French-speaking parts of the Third

World also found justification for revolution in their

intellectual heritage. The liberating effect of political

violence was a recurring theme among French thinkers Rousseau

through Georges Sorel.4 Frantz Fanon, who argued that only

violence could psychologically liberate the victims of

colonialism, was very influential among Third World radicals.5

And throughout the 1950s and 1960s the United Nations General

Assembly, increasingly dominated by Third World nations recently

liberated from colonialism, implicitly and, sometimes, explicitly

approved armed struggles which it considered "just."

Finally, the existence of an international support network

manipulated by the Soviet Union encouraged the spread and

persistence of insurgency. Armed opponents otherwise easy for

even weak regimes to defeat became serious threats with training,

advice, equipment, and sanctuary from the Soviet Union, China, or

one of their surrogates. Mao's triumph in 1949, in addition to

providing a blueprint for successful revolution, offered

potential insurgents proof that even apparently strong, Westernbacked regimes could be defeated.


Insurgency took a number of forms, some specific to certain

regions or countries, others global, but all were attempts to

alter the social, political, and economic status quo through

violence. In contrast to insurrections or coups d'état,

insurgencies were characterized by protractedness and broad

participation. In essence, insurgent strategists had two tasks:

first, strip legitimacy from the regime, and, second, seize it

themselves. The precise strategy of an insurgency varied

according to its leaders' backgrounds, personalities, and answers

to questions concerning the nature and extent of the insurgent

coalition, its ideological framework, geographic focus, and the

priority accorded the military and political dimensions of the

conflict.

Of the insurgent strategies that appeared during the Cold

War, Maoist "people's war" was undoubtedly the most successful. 

With the exception of Cuba, nearly all victorious insurgents--

Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Guinea Bisseau,

Namibia, Algeria--followed some variant of Maoist "people's war."

 This had several defining characteristics: the primacy of

political organization over military operation, the development

of extensive political undergrounds and common fronts of

"progressive" organizations and movements, protractedness, and

emphasis on rural areas. All of these are simple ideas. Why,

exactly, was "people's war" so successful? In part, because it

correctly identified and targeted the key vulnerabilities of most

Third World regimes: limited legitimacy, weak public support, and

shaky control of the hinterlands. Maoist "people's war" was also

able to organize the very real, local grievances of Third World

peasants into a strategically significant movement. This

distinguished "people's war" from the innumerable serf, slave,

and peasant rebellions of the past, most of which never

transcended their local roots. Maoist "people's war" was

successful less because it was truly new or innovative than

because it was holistic, integrated, and synchronized while the

efforts of the counterinsurgents were sometimes astrategic or, at

best, torn by contradictory and counterproductive practices.

And, finally, Maoist "people's war" succeeded because it was new.

Still, many of the key counterinsurgent powers had dealt

with small wars before. The French and British fought insurgentstyle opponents during their colonial expansion in Asia and

Africa, and the United States had faced guerrillas during the


Indian wars and in the Philippines, Mexico, and Nicaragua.6 Yet

this did not immediately translate into proficiency at opposing

communist "people's war." After some initial problems, though,

the United States came to grips with the Huk Rebellion in the

Philippines and the British eventually defeated a Chineseinspired insurgency in Malaya.7

 The French developed the most

elaborate concept of counterinsurgency but had the least success

implementing it. Based on their experience in Indochina, the

French concluded that counterinsurgency must mirror "people's

war." It thus required a careful blend of military, political,

and psychological efforts including pro-government propaganda,

mobilization of the state's political resources, attacks on the

subversive infrastructure, reconquest of liberated zones,

isolation and destruction of insurgent military forces, and

diplomatic efforts.8 Similarly, the British stressed strict

unity of effort between the military, economic, political, and

police forces during counterinsurgency, effective political and

psychological operations, and the limited use of firepower in

military operations.9 Initially, neither of these concepts found

eager converts in the U.S. military. Rather than use the 1950s

to hone their understanding of insurgency, policymakers and

senior military leaders ignored the hard-earned wisdom of

America's allies and forgot what the United States itself had

learned and captured in documents like the Marines' astute Small

Wars Manual of 1940.10

During President Dwight D. Eisenhower's tenure, American

national security strategy had been based on "massive

retaliation."11 American superiority in strategic nuclear

weapons, he believed, would deter Soviet aggression better and

more cheaply than conventional forces. In the 1950s strategic

thinkers linked nuclear stalemate and "indirect aggression," but

thought this would come as limited conventional war.12 As a

result, Americans trained their Third World allies to confront

Korea-style external invasion rather than internal threats. In

addition, U.S. conventional forces had declined precipitously

after the Korean War, leaving the United States with little to

counter guerrilla warfare. Even Army Special Forces, which were

created at this time, focused on partisan warfare and

unconventional operations in Europe rather than insurgency. To

the extent that Third World conflict was a problem, Eisenhower

and his national security team felt that the European colonial

powers--Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and


Belgium--would deal with it.

Under Kennedy, this changed. Inspired by Khrushchev's

January 1961 speech endorsing "wars of national liberation," the

eroding security situation in Laos and South Vietnam, the

consolidation of Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba, the French defeat

in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist insurgencies in

Colombia and Venezuela, Kennedy was convinced that indirect

aggression through guerrilla insurgency had become a paramount

security threat. The strategic rationale for U.S. engagement in

counterinsurgency thus grew from ideas like the "domino theory"

and the notion of "death by a thousand small cuts" advanced by

French theorists of guerre révolutionnaire. Revolutionary war,

this group believed, was the dominant form of conflict in the

late 20th century. A defeat for pro-Western forces even in

places that appeared strategically insignificant became important

when seen as one more small contribution to global Soviet

victory. Metaphorically, at least, the Cold War consisted of

interminable skirmishes rather than decisive pitched battles. 

The strategic significance of insurgency, in other words, was

symbolic and perceptual rather than tangible and empirical.

Kennedy immediately instigated a wide-ranging program to

improve U.S. capabilities.13 He first formed a Cabinet-level

Special Group--the Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas

Internal Defense Policy--to lay the groundwork for a unified

counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate the disparate elements

of the government.14 The Pentagon established the Office on

Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities headed by Major General

Victor H. Krulak (USMC) and gave him direct access to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.15 The services

integrated counterinsurgency into their professional educational

systems, and established training centers. Army Special Forces

were expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.

 Even the State Department and Agency for International

Development began to take counterinsurgency seriously (albeit

with less enthusiasm than the military).16

Within a year, the Interdepartmental Committee released a

basic statement of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. It stated:

The employment of indirect aggression through the use

of subversion and insurgency against Free World


institutions is related directly to the fact the world

is dominated by two over-whelmingly strong centers of

power. These power centers tend to become involved

directly or indirectly in most of the critical

situations that occur throughout the world. They tend

at the same time to muffle any violent confrontation so

as to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. On the

part of the communists, this has resulted in an

increased effort to seek their objectives by subversive

insurgency rather than overt aggression.17

Reflecting the theoretical work of Kennedy advisor Walt

Rostow, the policy assumed economic "take off" was inherently

destabilizing and stressful.18 Communists, under the leadership

of the Soviet Union, exploited this for their own geostrategic

ends. The solution was to ameliorate the root causes of the

insurgency, to "deal with and eliminate the causes of dissidence

and violence."19 "The U.S. must always keep in mind," wrote the

Interdepartmental Committee, "that the ultimate and decisive

target is the people. Society itself is at war and the

resources, motives and targets of the struggle are found almost

wholly within the local population."20 But the policy stressed

that outsiders cannot solve insurgency, and thus the role of the

United States should be strictly limited. The United States

sought to augment "indigenous capabilities" and seek "the

assistance of third countries and international organizations."21

The new policy intentionally glossed over what would later

became a raging debate between those who focused on the

endogenous political and economic causes of the insurgency and

those who stressed outside intervention and the military

dimensions of the problem. The debate between "root causes" and

"military threat" approaches to counterinsurgency grew from the

deliberate decision of insurgent strategists to make their

struggle neither war nor peace. Western democracies knew how to

deal with war and knew how to deal with peace. They were

confused, however, by conflicts overlapping and blending the two,

by what American policymakers and strategists would later

recognize as deliberate ambiguity.

When the U.S. military became heavily involved in Vietnam,

senior leaders largely ignored the American experience with small

wars as well as that of the British and French. From first

involvement until the mid 1960s, American advisors sought to


augment the conventional military capabilities of the South

Vietnamese Army (ARVN) in anticipation of a Korea-style war.22

Even when the true nature of the conflict became clearer, the

U.S. Army, in Andrew Krepinevich's words, "was neither trained

nor organized to fight effectively in an insurgency conflict

environment."23 With the exception of the Marines and Army

Special Forces, the U.S. military was uninterested in the more

mundane aspects of counterinsurgency such as training the ARVN,

village pacification, local self-defense, or rooting out

insurgent political cadres, at least at the higher level.24

Perhaps more importantly, the United States never forced the

South Vietnamese regime to undergo fundamental reform. Army

Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler reflected the thinking of

Johnson and top advisors when said, "The essence of the problem

in Vietnam is military."25

Still, inappropriate military techniques in themselves did

not lose Vietnam. With a clear, coherent counterinsurgency

strategy and a president who understood Marxist "people's war,"

the U.S. military could have been forced to change. But basic

U.S. counterinsurgency strategy contained major flaws. Having

never faced major engagement in a serious Maoist "people's war,"

American policymakers grossly underestimated the extent and

length of commitment that this entailed, and thus became involved

in an area with absolutely no U.S. interests beyond the symbolic.

 The Kennedy policy gave inadequate attention to preparing the

American public for engagement in counterinsurgency. In part

this was because the Kennedy approach to counterinsurgency

eschewed major involvement by the armed forces and stressed

advice and assistance. It also grew from Kennedy's confidence in

his ability to mobilize public support when necessary. Whatever

the cause, the effects were debilitating.


Some writers have suggested that Kennedy recognized the

mounting problems of U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia and

intended to withdraw after the 1964 elections.26 But Johnson did

not and, as popular approval of American involvement lagged, the

Vietnamese communists skillfully used a program they called dich

van ("action among the enemy") to further weaken public support.27

 The administration offered no effective response. Lyndon

Johnson thus inherited a flawed strategy and made it worse by

allowing advocates of a military solution--both those in uniform

and key civilians like National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow

and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara--to win bureaucratic

battles over the conduct of the conflict while simultaneously

refusing the military the resources it considered necessary for

victory.28 By the time the United States formed an organization

to synchronize the military, political, and psychological

dimensions of the struggle in 1967--the Civilian Operations and

Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS program--it was too

late.29 The Viet Cong political infrastructure was too

entrenched, the South Vietnamese regime too corrupt and

illegitimate, and the American public too alienated to win the

conflict. And even CORDS could not substitute for coherent

counterinsurgency strategy. As Phillip B. Davidson noted, the

communists won because they had a superior grand strategy.30

Threat and Response, Mark II.


After Vietnam there was no presidential pressure to focus

the Pentagon's attention on counterinsurgency. Without a

strategic rationale, the Army relegated counterinsurgency to its

periphery, the flame barely kept burning by a handful of

concerned experts, most with Vietnam experience.31 The 1981

version of basic Army doctrine for low-intensity conflict did not

even use the word "counterinsurgency."32 Admittedly, there were

good reasons for this: conventional warfighting capabilities had

declined precipitously, and Europe and Southwest Asia posed more

pressing threats than Third World insurgency. The Carter policy

in the Third World placed greater emphasis on human rights than

containment. The leaders of ongoing insurgencies in places such

as Nicaragua and Zimbabwe appeared less solidly pro-Soviet than

their predecessors. Together, these considerations led President

Jimmy Carter to conclude that the cost and risks of American

engagement in counterinsurgency such as the strengthening of

corrupt, illegitimate, and repressive regimes outweighed the

risks of insurgent victory.

Luckily, when perceptions of the strategic situation began

to change, there was residual expertise within the military and

Department of Defense. The flame had been kept alive. The

motive for the reconstitution of counterinsurgency capability was

the growth of pro-Soviet regimes throughout the Third World,

especially the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, gains by

communist insurgents in Guatemala, and the near-victory of the

Cuban-backed Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN)

in El Salvador. "Death by a thousand small cuts" again found

articulate and influential spokesmen such as Secretary of State

Alexander Haig and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane

Kirkpatrick. In a critique of the Carter administration's

tolerance of leftist political movements in the Third World, Dr.

Kirkpatrick wrote, "violent insurgency headed by Marxist

revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian

tyranny."33 In rhetoric reminiscent of Kennedy and his top

advisors, Secretary Haig argued that Americans should be

concerned "about illegal Soviet interventionism in El Salvador,

in Africa, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and wherever

international law is violated and the rule of force is applied

against people who are seeking self-determination and social

change."34 "We cannot," he stated, "ignore Soviet activity in the

developing nations because our passivity alters the calculations

of other countries. It makes further Soviet expansion or Soviet-


backed destabilization appear to be inevitable. It gives the

appearance--and it is no more than an appearance--that Marxism in

the Soviet mode is the wave of the future."35 Such statements

offered an indication of the administration's intent and a

renewed strategic rationale for counterinsurgency.

As during the Kennedy administration, high-level attention

and the existence of a strategic rationale energized the

military. For instance, by the late 1970s counterinsurgency had

become a "non-subject" in the military educational system.36 In

the 1980s, it was reintroduced with systematic attempts to

integrate the lessons of Vietnam. The Army's Special Warfare

Center, the School of the Americas, and the Air Force's Special

Operations School expanded their offerings on counterinsurgency.

 Eventually the Navy added a program on low-intensity conflict at

its Postgraduate School sponsored by the United States Special

Operations Command (USSOCOM). The services created "proponency

offices" to coordinate thinking and education on low-intensity

conflict.37 The Army and Air Force established a Center for LowIntensity Conflict (AAFCLIC) at Langley AFB. Army Special

Operations Forces and the foreign area officer program, both

major contributors to counterinsurgency support operations, grew.

 The Senate Armed Services Committee, a particularly strong

advocate of organizational change, forced the Department of

Defense to name an Assistant Secretary of Defense for LowIntensity Conflict and Special Operations (ASDSOLIC) and create

USSOCOM. Recognizing the need for coherent strategy and policy,

the Senate panel urged the National Security Council to form a

low-intensity conflict board.38 The Central Intelligence Agency

also augmented its covert action capability which includes

support to counterinsurgency.39

The explosion of thinking and debate about low-intensity

conflict was even more important than institutional reform. A

number of serving and former government officials, retired

officers, and analysts at government-related think-tanks began to

write on low-intensity conflict.40 Articles on counterinsurgency

returned in force to military publications such as Military

Review, Parameters, and Marine Corps Gazette after a decade-long

hiatus. The Department of Defense and the military services

sponsored major studies and workshops.41 Congress held hearings.42

 As a result, a working consensus on appropriate post-Vietnam

counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine eventually emerged.43


Conceptually, the Reagan policy echoed Kennedy's by

stressing the relationship of Third World conflict to the

superpower struggle. Secretary of State George Shultz could have

been reading from Kennedy administration policy statements when

he noted that low-intensity conflict "proliferated, in part,

because of our success in deterring nuclear and conventional

war...Low-intensity warfare is [our enemies'] answer to our

conventional and nuclear strength--a flanking maneuver in

military terms."44 As in the Kennedy administration, Reagan

advisors were divided between hard-liners that stressed the wider

geostrategic dimension of low-intensity conflict and the role of

outside agitators, especially the Soviet Union and Cuba, and

moderates who focused on internal causes of insurgency. The

compromise which ensued was exactly the same as during the 1960s.

 Reagan's 1987 National Security Strategy, for instance, noted

that the major causes of low-intensity conflict were "instability

and lack of political and economic development in the Third

World" which provided "fertile ground..for groups and nations

wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes."45

The Reagan counterinsurgency strategy blended "carrots" and

"sticks," simultaneously promoting democracy, development,

dialogue, and defense.46 However, it was less globally ambitious

than the Kennedy policy, with a clear focus on Central America

and the Caribbean and, like its pre-Vietnam predecessor,

attempted to resist escalation. The 1987 National Security

Strategy, for instance, stated that indirect applications of

American military power, particularly security assistance, were

appropriate for low-intensity conflict.47 The limits on American

involvement in counterinsurgency made even more explicit when the

1988 National Security Strategy emphasized that U.S. engagement

in low-intensity conflict "must be realistic, often discreet, and

founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome

and important U.S. national security interests."48

For the Army and Air Force, the counterinsurgency experience

of the Reagan administration was eventually codified with the

1990 release of FM 100-20/AFM 3-20, Military Operations in LowIntensity Conflict. Success in low-intensity conflict, according

to this doctrine, is based on five "imperatives": political

dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and

perseverance.49 The pivotal concept is legitimacy defined in a


quintessential Western, rationalistic style. This assumes the

people of a country facing insurgency will decide whether the

government or the rebels can give them the "best deal" in terms

of goods and services, and then support that side. Following

this, U.S. activity in counterinsurgency is based on the internal

defense and development (IDAD) strategy under which the host

government "identifies the genuine grievances of its people and

takes political, economic, and social actions to redress them."50

 But while FM 100-20, like the national security strategy, noted

that the U.S. military role in counterinsurgency would "normally

center on security assistance program administration," it did not

rule out direct tactical involvement of U.S. forces even though

admitting this "will be rare." Similarly, tactical-level

doctrine stated,

The introduction of US combat forces into an insurgency

to conduct counterguerrilla operations is something

that is done when all other US and host country

responses have been inadequate. US combat forces are

never the first units into a country. They are

normally the last.51

The gate to escalation, then, was narrower than in 1965, but not

closed entirely.

Just as Southeast Asia offered a laboratory for Kennedy's

version of counterinsurgency, Central America, especially El

Salvador, provided a testbed for the development of post-Vietnam

counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. If there was ever a

nation "ripe for revolution," it was El Salvador in the late

1970s. Like much of Central America, El Salvador had a weak

economy dependent on commodity exports, badly maldistributed land

and wealth, a history of authoritarian government and military

intervention in politics, widespread corruption, and violent

suppression of political opposition. The nation had occasionally

attempted to develop an open political system, but without

success. Democracy, according to Salvadoran political leader

Guillermo M. Ungo, was "a cruel and painful deceit to

Salvadorans."52 Furthermore, El Salvador's extreme population

density made things even worse than in neighboring states like

Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. All of the pathologies of

Central America were thus distilled in one small country.


Aided by substantial shipments of American military

equipment left in Vietnam a decade earlier and shipped to El

Salvador by way of Nicaragua, the FMLN guerrillas quickly became

"one of the most combat-effective insurgent organizations in

Central America, if not all Latin America."53 By late 1980 they

controlled large areas of three northern provinces, and in

January 1981 launched a "final offensive" designed to topple the

Salvadoran government in the same fashion that Somoza had been

overthrown 3 years earlier. To support the attacks, the rebels

had stockpiled 600 tons of weapons, most from Soviet-bloc

sources.54 With large-scale assistance from the Carter

administration--earlier cut off for the rape and murder of four

U.S. churchwomen by members of the National Guard-- the

government thwarted the "final offensive" but could not defeat

the rebels or even gain the tactical initiative. Until early

1984, the FMLN operated in large, conventional-style units and

continued to exercise partial control over regions of El

Salvador.55

Despite the inauspicious combination of a brutally

repressive government, incompetent and corrupt military, and an

insurgent movement growing in political and military skill, the

Reagan administration decided to "draw the line." El Salvador was

to be the indicator of the new administration's more active

containment of Third World communism.56 A State Department

special report called the insurgency in El Salvador "a textbook

case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers."57

Secretary of State Haig said, "our problem with El Salvador is

external intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign

nation in this hemisphere--nothing more, nothing less . . . the

rebel activity, its command, control, and direction, now is

essentially in the hands of external forces--Cuban, Nicaraguan,

and, of course, indirectly, Soviet."58

Focusing on Latin America was not a new twist in American

strategy. President Kennedy's efforts were directed more at

Latin America than Southeast Asia, and included the Alliance for

Progress and the inter-American military system.59 This policy

fell into disrepair when many Latin American insurgencies petered

out by the early 1970s. President Carter further cut security

assistance and training programs in the belief that Latin armies

were tools of repression. For President Reagan, the communist

threat to Latin America changed the strategic calculus.60 When


the administration decided to "draw the line" in El Salvador,

some elements in the U.S. military welcomed the chance to try

counterinsurgency again, this time tempered by the "lessons" of

Vietnam. According to an important report prepared by four Army

lieutenant colonels, "For the United States . . . El Salvador

represents an experiment, an attempt to reverse the record of

American failure in waging small wars, an effort to defeat an

insurgency by providing training and material support without

committing American troops to combat."61 A healthy degree of

realism and sense of constraint flavored the new approach to

counterinsurgency. But U.S. strategy and doctrine still

reflected the basic assumption that paved the way for escalation

in Vietnam: Americans knew how to defeat Maoist "people's war,"

but Third World regimes did not. Henry Kissinger's Bipartisan

Commission on Central America, for instance, distinguished

American-style "enlightened counter-insurgency" which stressed

the building of democracy and the encouragement of economic and

social development from the iron-fist approach favored by Third

World governments.62 The essence of counterinsurgency support was

thus bringing "enlightenment" to American allies.

American military advisors were determined that El Salvador

would not become "another Vietnam." Armed with "lessons" from

Southeast Asia, Americans urged the El Salvador Armed Forces

(ESAF) to stress pacification, civil defense, and population

security--what was called the "other war" in Vietnam--rather than

the destruction of guerrilla units. The military, American

experts believed, should operate in small units with strict

constraints on the use of firepower. Since the support of the

population was the crux of counterinsurgency, military activities

should be subordinate to economic, political, and psychological

ones designed to augment the legitimacy of the government. 

Equally important, the post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy

and doctrine stressed that the United States must not assume

control of the conflict.

The U.S.' post-Vietnam approach to counterinsurgency still

required making fundamental changes in the host nation's basic

social, economic, political, and military structures and beliefs,

but doing so with a limited American presence. The absolute crux

of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, then, was finding ways to

encourage or force an allied government and elite to do things

they vehemently opposed. Improving the capability of the ESAF


was not enough. Salvadoran society had to be reformed, a just

legal system developed, right-wing political violence stopped,

the military submitted to civilian control, and the peasants

given a better life. U.S. policy then, sought to simultaneously

strengthen the military and promote democracy. The primary tools

were advice and assistance. The aid was only a small portion of

U.S. foreign assistance, but staggering considering El Salvador's

size. Military aid peaked at $196.6 million in 1984, economic

assistance at $462.9 million in 1987.63 Michael J. Hennelly has

calculated that from 1981 to 1992, American assistance to El

Salvador was about $1 million per day--this for a country of 5.2

million people.64

American officials, both civilian and military, were

constantly frustrated at the difficulty they faced convincing the

Salvadorans to take the steps called for in the American approach

to counterinsurgency. It took a 1983 National Campaign Plan--

written with substantial assistance from American General Fred F.

Woerner--to focus the counterinsurgency effort on winning popular

support rather than killing guerrillas.65 To that point, the

Salvadoran military had largely used "iron fist" techniques which

indiscriminately eradicated suspected insurgent supporters. The

result was gruesome massacres such as the 1981 destruction of the

village of El Mozote.66 In fact, human rights abuses by the

military and "death squads" of off-duty military and police posed

the greatest obstacle to the winning of popular approval by the

government.67 It also threatened American support on a number of

occasions and was the primary tool used by the FMLN in building

an extensive international patronage network outside the Soviet

bloc.68 Serious improvement in the human rights situation only

came after a direct warning in 1983 from Vice President Bush that

continued death squad violence would lead to an aid cutoff.69

Despite the persistence of human rights abuses and the

political skill of the FMLN, steady progress was made by the

counterinsurgents throughout the 1980s. By 1985, the ESAF was

competent enough that the FMLN reverted to small unit, protracted

warfare. Awash in American aid, the ESAF grew from 10,000

soldiers at the beginning of the insurgency to 56,000 in 1987.70

Elite special units were formed and proved particularly

effective. But the most important changes were political. With

intense American pressure, the 1984 presidential elections won by

José Napoleón Duarte were the cleanest in El Salvador's history.


 By the end of the 1980s, El Salvador was a democracy--albeit a

fragile one, the ESAF a reasonably proficient military force, and

the FMLN stood little chance of outright victory. Still, most

analysts doubted that anything better than stalemate would ensue.

Today, however, El Salvador is at least a qualified success.

 January 1992 peace accords reintegrated the FMLN into El

Salvador's political life, and a number of former rebel political

and military leaders hold elected office or head political

parties. Joaquín Villalobos, one of the preeminent FMLN

comandantes, has rejected socialism and now leads a reformist,

left-of-center political movement.71 El Salvador is rapidly

rebuilding war damage and the economy is fragile, but growing. 

The third set of open presidential elections took place in 1994.

 "In terms of US regional objectives," writes Victor Rosello, "El

Salvador presently appears to be an unqualified success."72 But

was it? If anything, the American experience in El Salvador

suggests that U.S. doctrine works against a particular type of

opponents, but only in conjunction with the appropriate strategic

framework. For future counterinsurgency strategy, El Salvador

had two important implications.

First, El Salvador showed the magnitude of the task when

applying the American concept of counterinsurgency. It can work,

but the political and economic costs are immense. El Salvador is

a small country close to the United States, but the United States

spent nearly $6 billion in assistance plus a tremendous amount of

political capital, time, and attention.73 Put simply, the extent

of change necessary to prepare a government for effective

counterinsurgency is immense. It requires not only changing

institutions and procedures, but attitudes and values. The final

costs of consolidating counterinsurgency--of making it permanent-

-are still not clear. The United States has lost interest in El

Salvador and is cutting assistance, but that nation's program of

reconstruction and reconciliation is not finished.74

Second, El Salvador showed the serious constraints on

American leverage. The major tool was "conditionality"--the

continuation of aid was made contingent on reforms, especially

the building of democracy and an end to death squad violence and

other human rights abuses. Phrased differently, U.S.

policymakers and diplomats had to convince the Salvadoran elite,

particularly the ESAF, that American aid was necessary for


success, but the aid would only continue if appropriate reforms

were made. The Reagan administration was able to pull this off

largely by a strategic version of the "good cop/bad cop" method

of influence. The administration expressed sympathy with the

predicament and difficulties of the elite and the ESAF

leadership, but reminded them that Congress--the "bad cop"--would

cut off aid without reform. Ironically, the end of the Cold War

increased American leverage because threats to cut off aid were

suddenly more credible. But, as Benjamin Schwarz points out, if

U.S. counterinsurgency strategy "proves most effective when vital

interests are not at stake, it will work best in situations that

matter least."75

Threat and Response, Mark III?

After Vietnam, specialists considered the essence of U.S.

counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine sound, but concluded that

it had not been applied properly in Southeast Asia. El Salvador

thus did not require a radical revision of either strategy or

doctrine, but simply better application. This was an accurate

assessment. Despite some stark differences, Vietnam and El

Salvador both occurred within the same strategic environment. In

terms of the broad nature of the threat and the wider

geostrategic concerns which shaped American decisionmaking,

Vietnam and El Salvador shared more features than not. Today,

U.S. counterinsurgency strategy continues to assume that the

wisdom gained in Southeast Asia and Central America holds. El

Salvador is thought to have proven the correctness of American

strategy and doctrine. "The El Salvador experience," Victor

Rosello writes, "generally validated the US Army's Foreign

Internal Defense doctrine in countering insurgency."76

Future counterinsurgency may not emulate the past--the

similarities between Vietnam and El Salvador will be much greater

than those between El Salvador and what comes after it. Since

the strategic environment determines the form and salience of

insurgency, the United States must now revise its

counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Some trends in the

post-Cold War strategic environment may inhibit insurgency,

others will simply force it to mutate. Many of them, though,

will alter the strategic calculus for the United States leading

policymakers to reconsider where, when, why, and how they engage

in counterinsurgency support.


In his seminal book, Political Order in Changing Societies,

Samuel Huntington argued that political development entails the

creation and maintenance of institutions capable of dealing with

demands on the state.77 The contemporary Global South is

undergoing mitosis, splitting into those able to craft adaptive

and viable institutions and those unable. Success at

institution-building often leads toward democracy.78 Since

functioning democracies are less susceptible to insurgency even

if not altogether exempt, this is good news. Failed institutionbuilding results, at best, in the division of states into

subnational units with security the purview of warlords and

militias. At worst, the outcome is anarchy and a Hobbesian war

of all against all. Robert Kaplan, among others, contends that

the trend toward anarchy will eventually win out and much of the

Global South will see "the withering away of central governments,

the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of

disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war."79 Afghanistan,

where "there is no civil law, no government, no economy--only

guns and drugs and anger," may portend the Third World's future.80

 While political results are mixed, macroeconomic trends favor

fragmentation over sustainable democracy. Despite the economic

take-off of a few states, most of the Global South seems unable

to sustain a level of economic growth able to keep pace with

population. Democracy can be born in a stagnant economy, but

cannot grow to maturity.

A second related trend is the routinization of violence. At

best, this results in the omnipresence of crime. While crime is

growing in nearly all countries, this trend is most threatening

in developing countries where un- and underemployment are

epidemic and police forces overwhelmed, ineffective, or corrupt.

 In much of the Global South, walls topped by concertina wire and

backed by elaborate alarm systems are standard on even middleclass homes. In poorer neighborhoods, dirt-floored, single-room

houses have thick bars on the windows. More and more businesses

have their own heavily armed guards. In Panama, for instance,

one sees frozen yogurt shops protected by men with M-16s. At its

worst, the global routinization of violence has spawned entire

generations for whom protracted conflict is normal. Whether

Lebanon, Gaza, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Liberia, or the

inner cities of the United States, youth see violence not as an

aberration, but part an intrinsic aspect of life. It takes


little to spark insurgency in such a context.

On the positive side, the end of the Cold War and the

evolution of global norms have diminished external sponsorship of

insurgency or its use as an element of national security policy.

 For the present, at least, only pariah states dabble in the

export of insurgency and terrorism. The Cold War notion of the

moral legitimacy of support to armed struggle has thus abated. 

The end of the Cold War also allowed a surge in the ability of

the United Nations to cobble together coalitions for peacekeeping

and broker negotiated solutions to conflict. For the United

States, the end of the Cold War did not end global engagement,

but changed national interests. American leaders have long had

little tolerance for military casualties in conflicts where they

saw few serious national interests or chances of clear success--

witness Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut. With the demise of the

superpower competition, issues worth spilling American blood have

become even rarer even while the U.S. military remains engaged

around the world.

As the strategic environment changes, insurgency itself is

mutating. Distilled to its essence, a revolutionary strategy

includes goals and methods. The goals of Maoist "people's war"

were the seizure of political power and the revolutionary

transformation of the political and economic systems. Its

methods were political and guerrilla warfare followed, if

necessary, by conventional military action. Post-Cold War

insurgents may seek political, social, and economic

transformation that is revolutionary in its extent, but not

necessarily revolutionary in the Marxist sense of building a

"new" system. For instance, reactionary insurgency, in which a

religious-based group attempts to seize power from a secular,

modernizing government as the Iranians did in 1979, will be

common. In some ways this will also emulate Cold War

revolutionary insurgency in that legitimacy will be the focus,

control of the state the goal, and external support important,

but tactically future reactionary insurgents will largely be

urban with an emphasis on terrorism rather than rural guerrilla

war. This type of insurgency will be most dangerous if it again

becomes a technique of inter-state conflict with external

sponsors using insurgency to weaken an opponent.

Other post-Cold War insurgent movements will not seek to


seize the state in order to change the political, social, and

economic system. Many regions of the Global South will suffer

from what Larry Cable calls "defensive" insurgency where some

subgroup within a state, whether ethnic, tribal, racial, or

religious, seeks autonomy or outright independence.81 Given the

extent of primal conflict in post-Cold War world, such

secessionist/separatist insurgencies may be the dominant form

during the next decade. It is also the closest to traditional

"people's war" since the insurgents will place great stock on the

creation of "liberated zones." But where Maoists based

mobilization and support on political ideology, secessionist

insurgents will use primal ties. This will alter the essence of

counterinsurgency. When the opponent was Maoist, the government

could build legitimacy by offering the people a "better deal"

than the insurgents. When the roots of the conflict are primal

with the government controlled by a different group than the

insurgents, legitimacy will be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps

impossible, for the regime to win. As bitter struggles in Peru

and Guatemala have shown, the tendency will be for the government

to consider all members of the group supporting the insurgency as

enemies. And from a regional perspective,

secessionist/separatist insurgencies will be particularly

dangerous since they can easily spill over state borders.

What can be called commercial insurgency will also pose

security threats without seeking the outright seizure of state

power.82 Commercial insurgency will be a form of what is becoming

known as "gray area phenomena"--powerful criminal organizations

with a political veneer and the ability to threaten national

security rather than just law and order.83 In fact, many

commercial insurgencies will see an alliance of those for whom

political objectives are preeminent and the criminal dimension

simply a necessary evil, and those for whom the accumulation of

wealth through crime is the primary objective and politics simply

a rhetorical veneer to garner some support that they might not

otherwise gain. It is this political component that

distinguishes commercial insurgents from traditional organized

crime. Most often, though, commercial insurgencies will not

attempt to rule the state but seek a compliant regime that allows

them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded. If that is

impossible, they will use persistent violence to weaken and

distract the state. In many ways, commercial insurgency has the

longest historic lineage--quasi-political bandits and pirates,


from Robin Hood to Carlos Lehder, have posed pervasive security

threats throughout history.

Another emerging form of insurgency will be aimed at

multinational political organizations and military forces

attempting to stabilize failed states. These will emulate

anticolonial conflicts in Algeria, Angola, and the first phase of

Vietnam as the insurgents play on nationalism and, to an extent,

racial divisions. Since public support in the nations providing

the multinational force will often be precarious or weak, the

insurgents will need only to create instability and cause

casualties among the multinational force. Somalia is a prototype

for this new type of insurgency.

Within this array of goals, the methods used by insurgents

will vary according to the nature of the regime they oppose and

the extent of their support network. If the legitimacy of the

regime is weak, insurgents may follow something like Maoist

techniques. If the regime is a democracy with at least

moderately strong legitimacy, insurgents may pursue what U.S.

Army doctrine calls "subversive insurgency." This will combine a

legitimate, above-ground element participating in the political

process and an underground using political or criminal violence

to weaken or delegitimize the government and thus can also be

called camouflaged insurgency. The insurgents will camouflage

the connection between the above-ground and underground elements

in order to avoid alienating potential allies opposed to the

regime but not in favor of violence, and to complicate attempts

by the government to obtain outside assistance. It is much

easier for a regime to acquire international support to fight a

avowed revolutionary insurgency than a camouflaged insurgency

that gives all the appearance of general disorder or widespread

crime. When the underground element does destabilize the state

and the above-ground element seizes power, the immediate problem

for the new government will be reining in its violent wing. It

will first attempt cooptation. Failing that, the government will

have all of the intelligence needed to violently crush the

underground, thus cementing its legitimacy by bringing order and

stability. For the United States, subversive insurgencies may

pose intractable strategic problems because they will strike at

fragile democracies, and because their covert nature will make

early intervention difficult. Like many forms of insurgency,

camouflaged insurgency will be difficult to recognize until it is


so far developed that cures are painful.

In combination, changes in the strategic environment and

mutations in insurgency undercut the basic assumptions of U.S.

counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. For example, during the

Cold War American policymakers often assumed the costs of not

acting when a friendly government faced a Marxist insurgency

outweighed the potential risks and costs of engagement. In the

post-Cold War strategic environment, this may not hold except

when insurgents intend to destabilize their neighbors. Marxism

was a proselytizing ideology. From Leon Trotsky to Daniel

Ortega, its adherents linked their own political survival to

spreading the revolution. Future insurgents may not

automatically come to the same conclusion, particularly if they

see that destabilizing neighbors and spreading the insurgency are

likely to provoke serious international involvement and make them

less secure rather than more so.

This holds important implications for the United States. 

Victory by non-proselyting insurgents, even those ideologically

hostile to the United States, is unlikely to threaten serious

national interests. Existing policy and strategy suggests two

reasons for U.S. concern for insurgency. One is an updated

"domino theory." But if most post-Cold War insurgents do not

seek to spread violence, this argument weakens. It is also true

that it is easier to contain a radical state run by former

insurgents than to prevent insurgent victory. The other reason

for American concern is access to raw materials and markets. 

But, as Benjamin S. Schwarz writes, "America's essential

interests very rarely depend upon which group controls resources

or power within underdeveloped countries...basic American

economic interests seem relatively secure whatever happens

politically in the Third World."84 This does not mean that the

United States has no economic interests in the Global South, but

simply that who holds power there will have only a minimal

impact. Since victorious insurgents must undertake post-conflict

national reconstruction, they are unlikely to stop exporting raw

materials. They may be more likely to close their markets, but

these are often insignificant anyway. And, even if victorious

insurgents did deny the United States access to a resource or

market, the costs would ultimately be less than the burden of

protracted counterinsurgency support.


In the post-Cold War security environment, the costs and

risks of counterinsurgency are increasingly altering the basic

strategic calculus. Counterinsurgency always risks damaging the

American credibility, either by association with a repressive or

corrupt regime, or by staking its prestige on the outcome of a

conflict and forcing policymakers to choose between the economic

costs of engagement or the political costs of disengagement. Put

simply, a government in serious danger of defeat by an insurgency

is often a bad ally. Hypothetically, the United States could

only engage in counterinsurgencies where the beleaguered

government is not so bad. But this is extraordinarily difficult,

mostly because of the way the United States usually becomes

involved in counterinsurgency. Rather than making a rational

costs-benefits assessment and then committing assistance until

the end of the conflict, Americans stumble in and persist as the

political costs of disengagement mount. During the Cold War, the

United States often rushed in to bail out governments facing

imminent defeat and then found that, rather than a bucolic summer

romance, it had entered a fatal attraction. In the post-Cold War

period, American involvement in counterinsurgency may grow out of

peace operations, but will still be inadvertent more often than

not. The Clinton administration's national security strategy

does not specifically mention counterinsurgency other than

"nation assistance" in Latin America, but its emphasis on global

engagement, expanding democracy, and supporting peace operations

opens the way for stumbling into long-term commitments.85

Decisions such as the willingness to provide arms to the

Cambodian government to fight Khmer Rouge guerrillas could be the

first step.86

American engagement in counterinsurgency also risks damaging

the social, political, and economic system of the friendly state.

 For South Vietnam, the cure may not have been worse than the

disease, but it was close. In El Salvador the United States was

able to avoid damaging the state and society to the extent of

Vietnam, but a regime may eschew badly needed reform and

negotiation with insurgents if it thinks American assistance will

allow outright victory. It is possible that the Salvadoran

military recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union spelled

the end of massive U.S. support, and thus finally allowed a

negotiated settlement that could have been reached several years

earlier. American involvement in counterinsurgency, then, is

often like lending money to a chronic gambler--it postpones real


resolution of the problem rather than speeding it.

Counterinsurgency can also damage American institutions and

morale. The erosion of national purpose and respect for

authority engendered by Vietnam has taken years to ameliorate and

will never be fully cured. Future American engagement in

counterinsurgency might also provoke domestic terrorism. With

easy global transportation, the existence of a variety of emigre

communities in the United States, and a perception of the

American public's unwillingness to accept casualties from

peripheral conflicts, insurgents may open an "American front" and

target public health, financial networks, communications systems,

and the ecology.

During the Cold War, American policymakers often assumed

that only the United States could provide effective

counterinsurgency support. This was always questionable. Often

the British and French better understood revolutionary insurgency

than Americans. In the post-Cold War security environment, the

most effective counterinsurgency support may come from military

institutions with extensive experience either fighting

insurgents--the South Africans, Nicaraguans, Turks, Israelis,

Peruvians, Filipinos, Colombians, and Salvadorans, for instance--

or those such as the Zimbabweans with insurgent backgrounds. 

Thus there may be others both willing and able to provide

counterinsurgency support in the post-Cold War security

environment. U.S. effort might be better spent augmenting the

planning, intelligence, sustainment, and mobility capabilities of

these regional counterinsurgency powers than directly aiding a

threatened regime.

Finally, Cold War-era counterinsurgency strategy and

doctrine assumed Americans understood insurgency better than the

threatened regime. Whether this was true or not, there is little

evidence that U.S. policymakers and strategists fully grasp the

motives, fears, and hopes driving emerging forms of insurgency. 

Americans are particularly likely to fail against insurgents

driven by intangible motives like justice, dignity and the

attainment of personal meaning and identity. If, in Martin van

Creveld's words, "future war will be waged for the souls of men,"

the United States will face profound problems.87 As U.S.

experience with "holy terrorists" in the Middle East shows,

Americans are ill-equipped to deal with the "root causes" of


religion-driven violence.88

In the post-Cold War strategic environment, then,

counterinsurgency is increasingly becoming a high risk/low

benefit activity. The U.S. military and defense community must

make policymakers aware of this while simultaneously watching for

changes in the strategic calculus.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

American counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine must be

revised to reflect the post-Cold War strategic environment. 

Because counterinsurgency is not a central element of current

U.S. national security strategy, such revision must deal with

broad concepts rather than specifics, thus paving the way for a

reconstitution of capability should the strategic calculus change

and a new rationale for counterinsurgency emerge.

Conceptual expansion should be the first step. The

definition of insurgency itself must be expanded to reflect the

complexity of the new security environment. The first post-Cold

War revision of FM 100-20--now called Operations Other Than War--

recognizes the variegation of insurgency that accompanied the

collapse of the Soviet Union. While continuing to emphasize

Maoist "people's war," it pays greater attention to urban and

subversive insurgency than its predecessors. It also stresses

that U.S. neutrality in insurgencies "will be the norm." The new

doctrine argues that "Success in counterinsurgency goes to the

party that achieves the greater popular support."89 There are two

problems with this. First, it does not offer practical advice on

the spiritual and psychic dimensions of legitimacy. Americans

often assume that legitimacy arises solely from the provision of

tangible goods and services and thus overlooks the importance of

spiritual and psychic fulfillment. Second, the current American

approach to counterinsurgency as evinced in existing doctrine is

accurate for forms of insurgency that seek to seize power by

mobilizing greater support than the regime, but offers little

guidance for confronting gray area phenomena, "irrational"

enemies for whom violence is not a means to political ends, or

what Ralph Peters calls "the new warrior class"--"erratic

primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with


no stake in civil order."90 In a study that brilliantly captures

changes in the global security environment, Hans Magnus

Enzensberger writes,

Nothing remains of the guerrilla's heroic halo. Once

ideologically armed to the teeth and exploited by their

shadowy backers, today's guerrillas and anti-guerrillas

have become self-employed. What remains is the armed

mob. All the self-proclaiming armies of liberation,

people's movements and fronts degenerate into marauding

bands, indistinguishable from their opponents...What

gives today's civil wars a new and terrifying slant is

the fact that they are waged without stakes on either

side, that they are wars about nothing at all.91

For American counterinsurgents, this is a sea change. As

John Keegan points out, cultures with a Clausewitzean belief in

the connection of war and politics often have difficulty

comprehending--much less defeating--opponents with other

motives.92 The job of experts in the military and defense

community is to help overcome this. Some movement in this

direction has taken place. New joint doctrine, for instance,

states that foreign internal defense "has traditionally been

focused on defeating an organized movement attempting to

overthrow the government," but in the future "may address other

threats" such as civil disorder, narcotrafficking and terrorism

which "may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional

power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries

surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking

continue."93 To transcend the conceptual limits of the Cold War,

insurgency should be considered simply protracted, organized

violence which threatens security and requires a government

response, whether revolutionary or nonrevolutionary, political or

nonpolitical, and open or clandestine.

Building consensus on basic principles should be the second

step. In the post-Cold War security environment, four seem

appropriate. One is rigid selectivity. The key factor when the

United States considers engaging in counterinsurgency support is

whether the threatened state and regime warrants the effort.94

During the Cold War, the simple fact that a non-communist regime

faced a communist challenge led American policymakers to support

counterinsurgency. In the post-Cold War world, the United States


can and must be much more discerning. The international system

is not domestic society where every citizen, no matter how

reprehensible, deserves assistance.

The second principle of post-Cold War American

counterinsurgency strategy should be multilateralism. When

engaging in counterinsurgency, the United States should engineer

an international support coalition both to enlarge the assistance

available to the threatened state and to avoid staking U.S.

credibility on the outcome of the conflict. Even though American

counterinsurgency strategy has long called for multinational

efforts, policymakers seldom attempted to be "one among equals"

but instead formed hierarchical coalitions where the United

States clearly bore the brunt of the effort. Horizontal

coalitions should be the way of the future. In the Western

Hemisphere, the United States might lead such coalitions but

elsewhere rely on others.

 The third principle should be concentration on secondary

support. The United States might lead efforts to deter, isolate,

and punish external sponsors of insurgency. In general the

United States should be an indirect or second-tier supporter

providing assistance to regional states with greater experience

in counterinsurgency and a more direct stake in a conflict. They

are more likely to truly understand the conflict and, since they

have a greater interest in regional stability, to persist if the

struggle becomes prolonged. One thing that made the Soviet Union

an effective supporter of insurgency was reliance on surrogates

like Cuba and North Vietnam. The United States should adopt this

practice. If the United States does join a multinational

counterinsurgency support coalition, it should focus on special

skills such as intelligence, mobility, planning support, and

psychological operation.

The fourth principle of post-Cold War American

counterinsurgency strategy should be organizational coherence. 

The United States may need a new organization to confront new

forms of insurgency. With the exception of

secessionist/separatist insurgency, all post-Cold War forms will

be far removed from the Army's traditional areas of expertise and

will be more police functions than military ones. The Army

should thus encourage the formation of a permanent civil-military

cadre of experts with a strong emphasis on law enforcement and


intelligence collection and analysis. Rod Paschall's argument

that Western military forces are not proficient at

counterinsurgency and should be replaced by "an international

corporation composed of former Western officers and soldiers

skilled in acceptable counterinsurgency techniques" rings even

truer today than when written in 1990.95

What can the Army do to preserve residual counterinsurgency

capability? Working closely with the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the

Army should use its intellectual resources to "keep the flame

burning," at least at a low level. Sponsored research, symposia,

workshops, conferences, discussion papers, working groups,

publications, and debate in the Army educational system can

contribute to this. The wargames, planning exercises, and case

studies used in the Army's professional educational system should

deal with commercial, subversive, or spiritual insurgency rather

than Maoist "people's war." The Army should also make sure it

retains a cadre of counterinsurgency experts within its ranks

during downsizing. With luck, no strategic rationale for

extensive U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency will emerge and

this cadre will never be activated. But it is the fate of the

military to prepare for the worst even as it hopes for the best.

 With clear thinking now, the U.S. military can be ready to offer

effective advice should the strategic calculus change and the

United States once again see a rationale for major involvement in

counterinsurgency support.

ENDNOTES

1. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in

a Vietnamese Province, Berkeley: University of California Press,

1972, p. 9.

2. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1971.

3. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: Penguin, 1984,

p. 135.

4. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, New York: Collier,

1961.


5. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove,

1963.

6. See the essays on France, Great Britain, and the United

States in Ian F.W. Beckett, ed., The Roots of Counter-Insurgency:

Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, London: Blandford, 1988.

7. On American involvement in the Huk rebellion, see Robert B.

Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, New York:

William Morrow, 1994, pp. 527-542; Douglas S. Blaufarb, The

Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the

Present, New York: Free Press, 1977, pp. 22-40; Wray R. Johnson

and Paul J. Dimech, "Foreign Internal Defense and the Hukbalahap:

A Model Counter-Insurgency," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 4,

No. 1, Spring/Summer 1993, pp. 29-52; and, D. Michael Shafer,

Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy,

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. On the British

activity in Malaya, see Asprey, War in the Shadows, pp. 563-574;

Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960,

Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966; and, Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long,

Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, New York:

Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

8. Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to

Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine, New

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, pp. 20-79.

9. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons

of Malaya and Vietnam, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

10. Small Wars Manual, Washington, DC: Headquarters, United

States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, 1940.

11. See Steven Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use

of Military Power in War and Peace, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993.

12. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 305-357; Robert Endicott

Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 4-8; and Henry A.

Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper

and Brothers, 1957, pp. 132-173.


13. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 52-53.

14. Charles Maechling, Jr., "Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal

by Fire," in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Low

Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and

Antiterrorism in the Eighties, New York: Pantheon, 1988, pp. 26-

27.

15. Asprey, War in the Shadows, p. 736.

16. See U. Alexis Johnson, "Internal Defense and the Foreign

Service," Foreign Service Journal, July 1962, pp. 21-22; and,

Henry C. Ramsey, "The Modernization Process and Insurgency,"

Foreign Service Journal, June 1962, pp. 21-23.

17. U.S. Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal

Defense Policy, U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, July 24,

1962, pp. 2-3.

18. U.S. Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal

Defense Policy, U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, July, 24

1962, pp. 2-3.

19. Ibid., p. 5.

20. Ibid., p. 8.

21. Ibid., p. 19.

22. Ronald H. Spector, The United States Army in Vietnam--Advice

and Support: The Early Years 1941-1960, Washington, DC: United

States Army Center of Military History, 1985.

23. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 4.

24. Larry Cable, Unholy Grail: The US and the Wars in Vietnam,

1965-8, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 133.

25. Quoted in Asprey, War in the Shadows, p. 724.

26. John M. Newman, JFK And Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and


the Struggle for Power, New York: Warner Books, 1992, p. 456;

William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, New York: Charles Scribner's

Sons, 1985, p. 181; and, Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The

Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F.

Kennedy, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967, p. 536.

27. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, Novato, CA:

Presidio, 1986, pp. 240-252.

28. See William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, Garden City,

NY: Doubleday, 1976, pp. 350-362 and passim.

29. On CORDS see Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S.

Performance in the Vietnam Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986,

pp. 118-121. Ambassador Komer was director of the CORDS program.

30. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History: 1946-1975,

Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988, p. 795.

31. On the Army's inattention to counterinsurgency and foreign

internal defense during this period, see Donald B. Vought,

"Preparing for the Wrong War?" Military Review, Vol. 57, No. 5,

May 1977, pp. 16-34.

32. FM 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, Washington, DC:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 1981.

33. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards:

Rationalism and Reason in Politics, New York: Simon and Schuster,

1982, p. 51.

34. Secretary Haig, "Interview on the 'MacNeil/Lehrer Report',"

March 13, 1981, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, May

1981, p. 1.

35. Secretary Haig, "Peaceful Progress in Developing Nations,"

commencement address at Fairfield University, May 21, 1981,

reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, July 1981, p. 8.

36. John D. Waghelstein, "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency

Doctrine," Military Review, Vol. 65, No. 5, May 1985, p. 42.

37. The Army Low-Intensity Proponency Office was headed by a


colonel and housed at the Command and General Staff College at

Fort Leavenworth. See the description of this organization in

Military Review, Vol. 71, No. 6, June 1991, pp. 24-25.

38. Christopher M. Lehman, "Protracted Insurgent Warfare: The

Development of an Appropriate U.S. Doctrine," in Richard H.

Shultz, Jr., et. al., eds., Guerrilla Warfare and

Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World,

Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989, p. 129. The Executive

agencies involved resisted many of the programs of the Armed

Services Committee. The Department of Defense only appointed an

Assistant Secretary to head SOLIC with great reluctance, and the

Low Intensity Conflict Board of the National Security Council was

never activated.

39. See the papers by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and B. Hugh Tovar

in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s:

Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action,

Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 165-236.

40. For example, Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who

Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War, New York:

Crane Russak, 1989; Max G. Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars:

Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict, Boulder, CO:

Westview, 1991; Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations and

Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century, Washington:

Brassey's, 1990; Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism:

Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Washington: Brassey's, 1990;

and John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the

Future, Washington: Brassey's, 1991. The Arroyo Center of the

RAND Corporation was especially active. For a survey, see Steven

Metz, The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict: A Selected

Bibliography and Suggestions for Future Research, Langley AFB,

VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 1988.

41. See, for example, Supporting U.S. Strategy For Third World

Conflict, Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group of the

Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, DC: The

Pentagon, June 1988; Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final

Report, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,

1986; and Robert H. Kupperman Associates, Low Intensity Conflict,

Report Prepared for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,

Volume I: Main Report, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and


Doctrine Command, July 30, 1983.

42. Soviet Posture in the Western Hemisphere, hearing before the

House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, February 28,

1985, 99th cong., 1st sess.; U.S. Policy Toward Anti-Communist

Insurgencies, hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign

Operations Appropriations, May 8, 1985, 99th cong., 1st sess.; To

Combat Terrorism and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare,

hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force

Projection, August 5, 1986, 99th cong., 2d sess.; and the

testimony of General Paul F. Gorman in National Security

Strategy, hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

January 28, 1987, 100th cong., 1st sess., pp. 749-801.

43. This did have its critics, particularly on the political

left. See, for example, Klare and Kornbluh, eds., Low Intensity

Warfare.

44. George Shultz, "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of

Ambiguity," address before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference

at the National Defense University, January 15, 1986, reprinted

in Department of State Bulletin, March 1986, p. 15. Note the

similarities to Johnson, "Internal Defense and the Foreign

Service."

45. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United

States, Washington, DC: The White House, January 1987, p. 32.

46. Lehman, "Protracted Insurgent Warfare," pp. 126-128. Two

primary innovations of the Reagan strategy for low-intensity

conflict were the addition of support for insurgency or

proinsurgency to the array of available tools, and focusing

counterterrorism on international supporters of terrorism like

Libya, Syria, and Iran.

47. Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States,

1987, p. 33.

48. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United

States, Washington, DC: The White House, January 1988, p. 34. 

Emphasis added.

49. Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military


Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, DC:

Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December

5, 1990, p. 1-5. See also Stephen T. Hosmer, The Army's Role in

Counterinsurgency and Insurgency, Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corporation, 1990. Confirming the beliefs of the French

counterinsurgent theorists, the "imperatives" from FM 100-20

mirrored Mao's principles of revolutionary war.

50. FM 100-20, 1990, p. 2-18.

51. FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, Washington, DC:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1986, p. 1-6.

52. Quoted in Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El

Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979

Insurrection to the Present, Washington, DC: National Defense

University Press, 1988, p. 7.

53. Victor M. Rosello, "Vietnam's Support to El Salvador's FMLN:

Successful Tactics in Central America," Military Review, Vol. 70,

No. 1, January 1990, p. 71. On Hanoi's involvement, see also The

Challenge to Democracy in Central America, Washington, DC:

Department of State and Department of Defense, June 1986, pp. 48-

49; and John D. Waghelstein, "We Traced Weapons Back to Vietnam,"

in Manwaring and Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War, p. 92. 

Waghelstein commanded the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador from

1982 to 1983.

54. General Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez, "They Had Introduced 600 Tons

of Weapons into the Country," in Manwaring and Prisk, eds., El

Salvador at War, p. 91.

55. See the comments of Colonel James J. Steele, commander of

the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador, 1984-86, in Manwaring

and Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War, p. 145; and Colonel Joseph

S. Stringham III, "The Military Situation from the Fall of 1983

to the Turning Point," in Manwaring and Prisk, eds., El Salvador

at War, pp. 148-151. Stringham commanded the El Salvador

Military Group from 1983 to 1984.

56. William M. LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the

Line in El Salvador," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1,

Summer 1981, p. 27.


57. "Communist Interference in El Salvador," a State Department

special report, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, March

1981, p. 7. This report was highly controversial.

58. "Secretary Haig Discusses Foreign Assistance," remarks to

reporters, February 27, 1981, reprinted in Department of State

Bulletin, April 1981, p. 21; and Secretary Haig, "Interview on

'Meet the Press'," March 29, 1981, reprinted in Department of

State Bulletin, May 1981, p. 5.

59. Jack Child, "US Policies Toward Insurgencies in Latin

America," in Georges Fauriol, ed., Latin American Insurgencies,

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and

International Studies, 1985, p. 133. For history and background

on U.S.-Latin American defense cooperation, see Dennis F.

Caffrey, "The Inter-American Military System: Rhetoric versus

Reality," in Georges Fauriol, ed., Security in the Americas,

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989.

60. See Thomas O. Enders, "El Salvador: The Search for Peace,"

address before the World Affairs Council, Washington, DC, July

19, 1981, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, September

1981, pp. 70-74.

61. A.J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White, and

Thomas F. Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case

of El Salvador, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, p. 1.

62. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central

America, Washington, DC: National Bipartisan Commission on

Central America, January 1984, p. 96.

63. Americas Watch, El Salvador's Decade of Terror: Human Rights

Since the Assassination of Archbishop Romero, New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1991, p. 141.

64. Michael J. Hennelly, "US Policy in El Salvador: Creating

Beauty or the Beast?," Parameters, Vol. 23, No. 1, Spring 1993,

p. 59.

65. Bacevich, et. al., American Military Policy in Small Wars,

p. 6. See also General Fred F. Woerner, "Fundamental Objective:


Develop a Military Strategy," in Manwaring and Prisk, eds., El

Salvador at War, pp. 114-116.

66. For a brilliant (and chilling) description, see Mark Danner,

"The Truth of El Mozote," The New Yorker, December 6, 1993, pp.

50-133.

67. See Americas Watch, El Salvador's Decade of Terror; and

Amnesty International, El Salvador "Death Squads"--A Government

Strategy, London: Amnesty International, 1988.

68. Mexico, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, for instance, provided

publication outlets for the FMLN (Comments of Colonel Orlando

Zepeda in Manwaring and Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War, p. 93).

 In the United States, political and financial support for the

FMLN were engineered by an organization called the Committee on

Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). See J.

Michael Waller, The Third Current of Revolution: Inside the

"North American Front" of El Salvador's Guerrilla War, Lanham,

MD: University Press of America, 1991.

69. See the comments of General Adolfo Blandón, Colonel Joseph

S. Stringham III, and Ambassador Thomas Pickering in Manwaring

and Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War, pp. 212-215.

70. Bacevich, et. al., American Military Policy in Small Wars,

p. 5.

71. Jorge Guerrero Luna, "Where Does Villalobos Want to Go?"

News Gazette (San Salvador), November 4-10, 1994, pp. 1, 14

72. Victor M. Rosello, "Lessons From El Salvador," Parameters,

Vol. 23, No. 4, Winter 1993-94, p. 101.

73. Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and

El Salvador: The Frustration of Reform and the Illusions of

Nation Building, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991, p. 2.

74. Barbara Crossette, "Peace Program Is in Danger, Salvadorans

Tell the U.N.'s Chief," New York Times, January 5, 1995, p. A7.

75. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El

Salvador, p. 83. Emphasis added.


76. Rosello, "Lessons From El Salvador," p. 102.

77. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies,

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.

78. See Larry Diamond, ed., The Democratic Revolution: Struggles

for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World, New York:

Freedom House, 1991; and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner,

eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1993.

79. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly,

February 1994, p. 48.

80. Tim Weiner, "Blowback From the Afghan Battlefield," New York

Times Magazine, March 13, 1994, p. 53.

81. Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency,

Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," Small Wars

and Insurgencies, Vol. 4, No. 2, Autumn 1993, p. 229.

82. This is explored in Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 1993, pp. 13-15.

83. See Max G. Manwaring, ed., Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting

the New World Disorder, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993. The phrase

first appeared in Peter Lupsha, "Gray Area Phenomenon: New

Threats and Policy Dilemmas," a paper presented at the High

Intensity Crime/Low Intensity Conflict Conference, Chicago,

September 1992.

84. Benjamin C. Schwarz, "A Dubious Strategy in Pursuit of a

Dubious Enemy: A Critique of U.S. Post-Cold War Security Policy

in the Third World," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 16,

No. 1, 1993, pp. 269, 270.

85. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: The White House, July

1994.

86. Philip Shenon, "U.S. Considers Providing Arms To Cambodia to


Fight Guerrillas," New York Times, January 30, 1995, p. A2.

87. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York:

Free Press, 1991, p. 215.

88. See Bruce Hoffman, 'Holy Terror': The Implications of

Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative, Santa Monica, CA:

RAND Corporation, 1993.

89. FM 100-20, Operations Other Than War, Initial Draft,

Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September

30, 1994, p. 4-20. This draft is for review purposes and does

not represent approved Department of the Army doctrine.

90. Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," Parameters, Vol 24,

No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 16.

91. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia,

New York: New Press, 1994, pp. 17, 30. Emphasis in original.

92. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1993.

93. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other

Than War, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1994, p. III-6.

94. Collins, America's Small Wars, p. 79.

95. Paschall, LIC 2010, p. 125.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Steven Metz

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler