United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

July 1995 B-1B BOMBER

Evaluation of Air Force

Report on B-1B

Operational Readiness

Assessment

GAO/NSIAD-95-151

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-261347 

July 18, 1995

The Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence, Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security 

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young, Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Section 132 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994

(Public Law 103-160) required the Air Force to test the operational

readiness rate of one B-1B bomber wing, if the wing was provided the

planned complement of spare parts, maintenance equipment and

manpower, and logistics support equipment. The test—referred to as the

B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA)—was conducted from

June 1, 1994, through November 30, 1994. The Air Force issued its report,

“B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment Final Report,” to the

congressional defense committees on February 28, 1995.

As required by the conference report accompanying the legislation (H.R.

103-357), we are providing our views on the ORA design and

implementation and the resulting report.

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Background The B-1B fleet has never achieved its objective of having a 75-percent

mission capable rate.1

 During the 2-year period preceding the test, the

B-1B mission capable rate averaged about 57 percent. According to the Air

Force, a primary reason for the low mission capable rate was the level of

funding provided to support the B-1B logistics support system. Concerned

about the low mission capable rate, a history of B-1B problems, and the

Air Force’s plans to spend $2.4 billion modifying the B-1B to become a

conventional bomber, the Congress directed the Air Force to conduct an

ORA.

The purpose of the ORA was to determine whether one B-1B wing was

capable of achieving and maintaining its planned 75-percent operational

readiness rate for a period of 6 months, if provided the full complement of

spare parts, maintenance equipment and manpower, and logistic support

equipment. If the 75-percent planned operational readiness rate could not

be achieved, the ORA was to provide the basis for

• an estimate of the operational readiness rate that could be achieved with

the planned level of spares, manpower, and logistics support;

• an estimate of the additional amounts of spares, maintenance manpower,

and logistics support and the added costs to achieve the planned

operational readiness rate; and

• an enumeration of the specific factors limiting the achievable operational

readiness rate, which would be cost-effective to mitigate, and the increase

in operational readiness that would result therefrom.

The Air Combat Command, with the assistance of the Air Force

Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), developed the test plan.

AFOTEC formed a test team that was the Air Force focal point for

monitoring and reporting test activities. The unit selected for the ORA was

the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. As required

by the legislation, a 2-week segment of the ORA consisted of a remote

deployment. The Air Force selected Roswell, New Mexico, as the remote

deployment site.

Results in Brief The ORA test plan was complete and comprehensive. Further, the ORA was

conducted in accordance with the test plan.

1

Mission capable means that the bomber can perform at least one of its assigned missions. A more

detailed discussion of the Air Force definition of mission capable is included in appendix I.

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The ORA demonstrated that, given a full complement of spare parts,

equipment, and manpower, the Air Force could achieve and sustain a

75-percent mission capable rate for the B-1B. But, the ORA was not

exclusively used to project the cost of sustaining the entire B-1B fleet at

that rate. We asked the Air Force to provide an estimate of that cost, but

the Air Force declined our request.

At the completion of the ORA, the mission capable rate for the B-1B fleet

was about 65 percent. The Air Force believes that the completion of

ongoing initiatives in progress and the continued funding for spare parts

and repairs will increase the fleet mission capable rate to 72 percent. The

Air Force estimates that for an additional $11.19 million for management

actions and reliability and maintainability improvements, the B-1B fleet

has the potential to achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission capable rate

by 2000. We believe that the $11.19 million estimate, which was based on

various modeling techniques, is optimistic. Neither we nor the Air Force

can predict how successful the ongoing or planned initiatives will be.

Therefore, the potential cost to achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission

capable rate for the B-1B is still not known.

The ORA Was a

Credible Exercise

The AFOTEC test plan and the associated detailed test procedures were

comprehensive and designed to ensure the credibility of data collected

during the ORA. Additionally, AFOTEC personnel adhered to the detailed test

procedures that specified their monitoring duties and requirements.

AFOTEC reported that the test unit achieved an 84.3-percent mission

capable rate during the test period. The AFOTEC report was a fair

presentation of the actual results attained during the test. Further, the

report was careful to put the test results in the proper perspective by

pointing out that the mission capable rate achieved during the test was a

measure of the capability of the B-1B support structure to keep the

bomber in a mission capable status, not a measure of the effectiveness of

the aircraft to execute assigned missions.

During the 6-month ORA, we visited the 28th Bomb Wing five times,

including an on-site presence during the 2-week remote deployment phase.

During our visits, we witnessed and documented the wing’s activities on

the flight line and at the repair and supply facilities. We also accompanied

the AFOTEC test team members as they compared their observations with

the Air Force maintenance databases used to determine mission capable

rates. Their comparisons included reconciling disparities noted between

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
B-261347 

AFOTEC direct observations and data entered into the Air Force database,

which, if left unreconciled, would have resulted in erroneous mission

capable rates. Based on our monitoring efforts, we believe that the mission

capable rate data accumulated during the ORA, and reflected in the AFOTEC

report, are credible.

An unexpected occurrence during the ORA was that the mission capable

rates for the nontest units did not decline as the Air Force had anticipated.

In that regard, a major assumption of the test plan was that the B-1B fleet

would not have all the spare parts needed to achieve the mission capable

goal of 75 percent. As a result, the test plan indicated that the mission

capable rates of the nontest units would decrease as they sent spare parts

to the test unit. This did not happen for a variety of reasons, including a

changed force structure, improved repair and distribution of spare parts,

improved maintenance practices, and the acquisition of missing defensive

avionics systems. These reasons are discussed in appendix II.

Projected Additional

Cost to Sustain Fleet

at 75 Percent Mission

Capable Rate Is

Optimistic

As previously stated, one of the test objectives was to provide an estimate

of the additional amounts of spare parts, maintenance manpower, and

logistics support and the added cost to enable the entire B-1B fleet to

sustain a 75-percent mission capable rate. The AFOTEC report concluded

that the B-1B fleet has the potential to achieve a 75-percent mission

capable rate with an additional $11.19 million above what is currently

requested in the fiscal year 1996 and future budgets.2

 Our review indicated

that the $11.19 million estimate, which was based on various modeling

techniques rather than on ORA data, was optimistic. It is a best case

estimate that assumes total success of the planned reliability,

maintainability, and management improvements. The ORA was used to

verify the need to improve the reliability and maintainability of various

B-1B components, rather than provide the basis to project actual costs to

the fleet.

According to the Air Force’s report, ORA data were not representative of

the B-1B fleet. For example, the congressional mandate to conduct the test

allowed the test unit to have 100 percent of manpower, spare parts, and

support equipment. This level of manning and support provided a robust

repair capability that is not historically characteristic of the B-1B fleet or

virtually any other Air Force aircraft, according to AFOTEC.

2

This cost estimate was prepared by an Air Force cost analysis team and independently verified by

AFOTEC.

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The $11.19 million estimate is, therefore, the Air Force’s estimate of the

most cost-effective way to bring the B-1B fleet to a 75-percent mission

capable rate. Table 1 summarizes the factors and related costs that the Air

Force projects will yield a 75-percent mission capable rate by 2000.

Table 1: Mission Capable Rate

Summary

Factor

Cumulative

percentage Cost

Historical rate 57 None.

Improvements implemented before

ORA (+8%) (See app. II.)

65 Already funded.

No additional cost.

Initiatives in progress (+<4%)

(See ORA report; pp.A-10,11.)

68 Already funded.

No additional cost.

Future expenditures for spare

parts and repairs (+4%)

72 Continued funding

for spares and

repairs.

Management actions and unfunded

reliability and maintainability

improvements (+3%)

(See ORA report; p. A-13.)

75 $11.19 million.

If these initiatives, both funded and unfunded, are not successful, the cost

to achieve and sustain the B-1B fleet at a 75-percent mission capable rate

will exceed the additional $11.19 million reported by AFOTEC. Additional

spare parts will have to be purchased or repaired more frequently.

In addition, it should be noted that the $11.19 million estimate represents

only the costs associated with management actions and reliability and

maintainability improvements that are projected to increase the B-1B

mission capable rate from 72 percent to 75 percent. It does not include the

cost associated with increasing the B-1B mission capable rate from about

65 percent at the start of the ORA to 72 percent through (1) initiatives that

are in progress and funded and (2) future expenditures for spare parts and

repairs in support of the flying hour program.

Cost data were not available for the initiatives in progress. Regarding

spare parts and repairs, table 2 shows that the Air Force requested

$374.8 million for these items for fiscal years 1996 and 1997.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
B-261347 

Table 2: Fiscal Year 1996 Budget

Request

Fiscal Year

Dollars in millions

1996 1997 Total

Spares/Air Force repair $124.9a $116.2 $241.1a

Contractor repair 56.3 77.4 133.7

Total $181.2 $193.6 $374.8

aDoes not include $165 million for Mobility Readiness Spares Package dedicated for wartime

deployment and, as such, does not impact mission capable growth rate.

Funding data for future years spare parts and Air Force repair of parts

were not available. According to the President’s fiscal year 1996 budget,

funding for contractor repair of B-1B parts will continue through fiscal

year 2001 at a total cost of about $122.8 million for fiscal years 1998

through 2001.

In our view, the Air Force’s report on the ORA would have been more

useful if it had included the estimated cost to sustain the B-1B fleet based

on actual ORA test data. The resulting cost estimate would represent the

upper limit of the cost of achieving and sustaining a 75-percent mission

capable rate for the B-1B fleet based on actual ORA test results.

We met with the Director of Air Force Test and Evaluation on February 9,

1995, before the ORA final report was issued, to discuss our concerns

regarding the cost estimate. Based on that discussion, the Director, on

February 16, 1995, requested the Air Combat Command to prepare an

estimate based on our concerns. By letter dated April 17, 1995, the

Director advised us that the $11.19 million “cost effective” estimate

included in the Air Force’s ORA report was the appropriate response to the

congressional legislation directing the ORA.

The Air Force is projecting that the B-1B fleet will reach a 75-percent

mission capable rate by 2000 by virtue of numerous on-going and future

reliability, maintainability, and management initiatives. In the meantime,

the Congress is being requested to fund the B-1B Conventional Mission

Upgrade Program3

—a program estimated to cost $2.4 billion and to

continue through 2007. By 2000, the Air Force plans to have spent almost

$1.4 billion on the program. Without a range of estimates, including an

estimate based on actual ORA experience as described above, the Congress

3

This program is intended to enhance the B-1B conventional capability by adding precision guided

munitions, upgrading the electronic countermeasures system, and adding an antijam radio. The Air

Force is requesting $196.6 million for the program in fiscal year 1996.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
B-261347 

will not have the best information to make more informed decisions

regarding future funding for upgrading the B-1B.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Before making its funding decisions on the Conventional Mission Upgrade

Program, the Congress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to

project the actual costs of the ORA to the B-1B fleet. This projection would

provide the Congress with more comprehensive data on the potential cost

to bring the B-1B fleet to the planned 75-percent mission capable rate.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense

concurred with our findings. It did not concur, however, with our

suggestion that the Congress require the Air Force to project the actual

costs of the ORA to the B-1B fleet.

In its comments, the Department stated that, because the ORA actually

achieved a mission capable rate of 84.3 percent, projecting the actual costs

of the ORA as the way to improve the B-1B fleet mission capable rate to

75 percent would likely overstate the requirement. As we pointed out in

our report and the Department recognized in its comments, the

$11.19 million estimate the Air Force provided to the Congress assumed

that (1) management emphasis on mission capable rates would continue,

(2) planned improvements for increasing the mission capable rates would

be maintained, (3) funding levels for spares would be sustained at

projected levels, and (4) identified reliability and maintainability and

process improvements would be incorporated.

In our view, the ORA provided the Air Force a unique opportunity to project

the cost to increase the B-1B mission capable rate based on actual data,

rather than on success oriented assumptions. Therefore, we continue to

believe that providing a range of cost estimates based more directly on ORA

results would be useful to the Congress.

The Department’s comments are included in their entirety in appendix III.

Scope and

Methodology

We performed our work at headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.;

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the 28th Bomb

Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; the 7th Wing, Dyess Air

Force Base, Texas; the 384 Bomb Group, McConnell Air Force Base,

Kansas; Roswell Air Industrial Center, New Mexico; and the B-1B System

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
B-261347 

Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. At these locations,

we interviewed responsible agency personnel and reviewed applicable

policies, procedures, and documents. We conducted our review between

February 1994 and April 1995 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; and the

Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to

other interested parties upon request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me on

(202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix IV.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Mission Capable Rate

12

Appendix II 

Improvements That

Increased B-1B

Mission Capable

Rates Prior to ORA

14

Changed Force Structure 15

Spare Parts Repair and Distribution Improvements 16

Improved Maintenance Practices 18

Acquisition of Defensive Avionics Systems 19

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

20

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

22

Tables Table 1: Mission Capable Rate Summary 5

Table 2: Fiscal Year 1996 Budget Request 6

Table I.1: Status of Nonoperational Systems and Subsystems on

the MESL

13

Figures Figure II.1: B-1B Fleet MC Rates 15

Figure II.2: B-1B Total NMC Rate for Supply 17

Figure II.3: B-1B Total NMC Rate for Maintenance 19

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Contents

Abbreviations

AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center

FMC fully mission capable

MC mission capable

MESL Mission-Essential Subsystem List

NMC not mission capable

ORA Operational Readiness Assessment

PMC partially mission capable

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix I 

Mission Capable Rate

Mission capable is defined by Air Force Instructions 10-602 and 21-103 as

an aircraft’s capability to perform at least one of its assigned peacetime or

wartime missions. As such, the mission capable rate is the measure of the

ability of the B-1B support structure to keep the bomber in a mission

capable status. Instruction 10-602 defines fully mission capable (FMC),

partially mission capable (PMC), and not mission capable (NMC), as follows:

• A FMC aircraft is one that can perform all assigned peacetime and wartime

missions.

• A PMC aircraft is one that can perform at least one, but not all, of its

missions.

• A NMC aircraft is one that cannot perform any of its assigned missions.

A mission capable rate is further defined as the sum of the FMC and PMC

rates.

An important factor in determining the rate is the Mission-Essential

Subsystem List (MESL). Each subsystem on the MESL serves as a required

element of either a FMC or PMC aircraft. The B-1B MESL contains

54 subsystems that must be operational for the bomber to be FMC.

The B-1B can do conventional bombing missions when in a PMC status. At

present, and during the B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA), all

of the B-1B bombers fly missions in only a PMC status. The reason for this

is that several of the 54 systems and subsystems listed in the MESL either

do not work as planned or, as in the case of the band 6 transmitter

discussed in the following table, are not permitted to be turned on for

safety reasons. The nonoperational systems precluding the B-1B from

being FMC, together with the current status of those systems, are listed in

table I.1.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix I 

Mission Capable Rate

Table I.1: Status of Nonoperational Systems and Subsystems on the MESL

Nonoperational system Problem Planned corrective action

Ice and Rain Protection (engine inlet area) System melts ice that can refreeze, break

off, and damage the engine. Also, the

system does not provide ice protection for

entire engine inlet area.

This system will be deleted from the MESL

because aircrews do not fly in icing

conditions or they leave icing areas as

soon as possible.a

Window/Windshield Anti-Ice Defog Maintenance personnel have accidentally

turned on the system while on the ground,

which can cause the windshield to

overheat and crack.

This system will be deleted from the MESL

because bleeding air from the engine is an

alternate method that can be used to keep

the windshield clear.a

Electronic Warfare ECM Band 4 Band 4 aft sector transmitter interferes with

the Tail Warning Function system.

Band 4 will be deleted from the MESL

because there are no lethal threat radars in

this band.a

Electronic Warfare ECM Band 6 Using the electronic countermeasures in

Band 6 has the potential to heat the radar

absorbing material around the antenna,

presenting a fire hazard.

A corrective modification was tested in late

April 1995, and the results are being

analyzed.

aThe B-1B MESL is being updated to reflect these changes.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix II 

Improvements That Increased B-1B Mission

Capable Rates Prior to ORA

The mission capable (MC) rate for the B-1B fleet increased about 8 percent

from its historical average of about 57 percent to about 65 percent by the

end of the ORA (see fig.II.1). The Air Force emphasized the conventional

role of the B-1B in the 1992 Bomber Roadmap after the stand-down of

nuclear alert aircraft in 1991. As the B-1B transitioned from a role of

nuclear deterrence to conventional missions, MC rates became an

important indicator of the B-1B’s ability to conduct repetitive conventional

sorties. As a result, the Air Force took several initiatives to improve the

B-1B’s support posture and MC rate. The 8-percent improvement is

attributable primarily to a changed force structure, improved repair and

distribution of spare parts, improved maintenance practices, and the

acquisition of missing defensive avionics systems.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix II 

Improvements That Increased B-1B Mission

Capable Rates Prior to ORA

Figure II.1: B-1B Fleet MC Rates

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

88 89 90 91 92 93 O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F

Fiscal Year FY-94 FY-95

ORA

Goal 75%

Monthly NMC rate

NMC trend

Historical MC rate

Changed Force

Structure

Prior to 1994, the B-1B fleet operated out of four bases: Dyess Air Force

Base, Texas; Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; McConnell Air

Force Base, Kansas; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. In

1994, the Air Force realigned the B-1B fleet by closing the Grand Forks Air

Force Base and transferring the aircraft at McConnell Air Force Base to

the Air National Guard.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix II 

Improvements That Increased B-1B Mission

Capable Rates Prior to ORA

With the transfer, the B-1B support structure, including spare parts, was

distributed to the two remaining main operating bases. The concentration

of aircraft and repair facilities at Dyess and Ellsworth Air Force Bases

resulted in improved support capabilities, which improved MC rates.

Spare Parts Repair

and Distribution

Improvements

Spare parts availability improved because of increased repair capability,

reduced reliance on contractor repair, reduced repair cycle times,

increased spare parts management oversight, and implementation of a new

computer system to oversee supply distribution and repair of parts. These

initiatives reduced the total NMC for supply rate, as shown in figure II.2.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix II 

Improvements That Increased B-1B Mission

Capable Rates Prior to ORA

Figure II.2: B-1B Total NMC Rate for Supply

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

J J A SO N D J FM AM J J A SO N D J F

1993 1994

ORA

1995

Monthly NMC rate

NMC trend

The logistics concept for the B-1B is to have contractors do repairs until

the repair capability can be taken over by the Air Force. Due to funding

shortfalls in 1987 and 1988, the Air Force deferred buying some B-1B

logistics support equipment, which increased reliance on contractor

repair. As of September 1993, the B-1B fleet had a contractor repair

backlog of about 3,800 assets with an estimated repair cost of about

$31 million. The deferred logistics support items, however, are now

funded, and the Air Force’s repair capability for the B-1B is increasing. As

of March 1995, its repair capability was 86 percent of repairable items,

with a 100-percent capability projected by the end of fiscal year 1997.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix II 

Improvements That Increased B-1B Mission

Capable Rates Prior to ORA

Because of increased Air Force repair capability and repair funding, the

repair backlog was eliminated by May 1994.

In addition, the repairs are done faster because of process improvements

and increased reliability and availability of repair equipment. For example,

the average repair time has been reduced from 21 to 12 days. Specific

initiatives included:

• The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center B-1B avionics shop increased its

workforce from 15 to 36 people.

• Use of express package carriers, such as Federal Express reduced the time

aircraft await parts.

• The Air Combat Command established the B-1B Customer Support Cell in

July 1993 with nine staff members to monitor critical B-1B parts levels,

distribute spare parts between bases, and direct item managers to provide

support where it is most needed.

• In January 1994, the Air Force adopted a new system at bases and depots

to prioritize repairs and distribute B-1B spare parts, based on impact on MC

rates. Previously, the oldest requisitions were satisfied first, regardless of

their impact on MC rates.

Improved

Maintenance

Practices

As B-1B units gained experience in performing periodic inspections and

maintenance (known as phase maintenance), the Air Force determined

that the interval between phase maintenance could be increased from

200 flying hours to 300 flying hours. This change reduced the number of

aircraft NMC for maintenance, as shown in figure II.3.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix II 

Improvements That Increased B-1B Mission

Capable Rates Prior to ORA

Figure II.3: B-1B Total NMC Rate for Maintenance

ORA

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

J J A SON D J FM AM J J A SO ND J F

1993 1994 1995

Monthly NMC rate

NMC trend

Acquisition of

Defensive Avionics

Systems

As a result of problems encountered during the development and

production of the defensive avionics system, a number of B-1B bombers

did not have a defensive avionics system. Because this is a mission critical

system, these bombers could not be counted as mission capable. The

missing systems have been acquired, and the last system was installed in

April 1994. Installation of the defensive avionics system enabled these

aircraft to achieve a PMC status, thereby having a positive effect on the

fleet’s MC rates.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven F. Kuhta

Cincinnati Regional

Office

Daniel J. Hauser

Gerald W. Wood

Kansas City Regional

Office

Virgil N. Schroeder

Bradley L. Terry

(707059) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-151 B-1B Bomber
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