NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1911-15T3

KATHLEEN LEGGETTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

INSURANCE COMPANY ("GEICO"),

Defendant-Respondent,

and 

DERICK HARRIS,

Defendant.

_______________________________

Argued March 23, 2017 – Decided May 30, 2017

Before Judges Lihotz, O'Connor and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L1585-14.

Mitchell J. Makowicz, Jr., argued the cause 

for appellant (Blume, Forte, Fried, Zerres & 

Molinari, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Makowicz, on 

the brief).

Elizabeth C. Chierici argued the cause for 

respondent (Chierici, Chierici & Smith, 

P.C., attorneys; Ms. Chierici, on the 

brief).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

May 30, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-1911-15T3

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.

Plaintiff Kathleen Leggette, a Virginia resident, was 

struck by a New Jersey licensed driver as she walked across a 

street in Princeton. Plaintiff appeals from the December 4, 

2015 summary judgment dismissal of her declaratory judgment 

complaint against her insurer, defendant Government Employees 

Insurance Company (GEICO). In her complaint, plaintiff sought 

personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, pursuant to N.J.S.A.

17:28-1.4, commonly known as the "Deemer Statute," which 

generally requires an insurer, authorized to do business in New 

Jersey, must provide PIP coverage for policies sold outside New 

Jersey, whenever the insured automobile is "used or operated" in 

this state.1 Plaintiff maintained her Virginia policy was deemed 

to provide standard PIP coverage while her vehicle was in this 

state. The trial judge concluded the Deemer Statute was 

inapplicable to the circumstances presented. We affirm.

For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the parties 

did not dispute any material facts. Plaintiff drove her 

 

1 "N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 apparently acquired its name as the 

Deemer Statute because it 'deems' New Jersey insurance coverage 

and tort limitations to apply to out-of-state policies." 

Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 510 n.2 (2009); see also

Lusby v. Hitchner, 273 N.J. Super. 578, 583-84 (App. Div. 1994) 

("[T]he statute eponymously 'deems' that the policy includes the 

required coverage.").
3 A-1911-15T3

Virginia registered 2005 Toyota Sequoia, insured by GEICO, to 

Princeton University to visit her daughter, a student. 

Plaintiff parked her vehicle in a Princeton University parking 

lot and began walking toward her daughter’s dormitory. While in 

a crosswalk on Edwards Place, plaintiff was struck by an 

automobile. Consequently, plaintiff suffered injuries and 

incurred approximately $113,825.47 in medical bills. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint and thereafter settled her 

claims against the driver of the automobile. She initiated this 

declaratory judgment action against defendant GEICO for PIP 

coverage to satisfy resultant medical expenses. Plaintiff 

alleged defendant, which is authorized to conduct business in 

New Jersey, was legally obligated, by the Deemer Statute, to 

provide minimum standard automobile insurance policy PIP 

benefits, covering injuries suffered when her out-of-stateinsured vehicle was used in New Jersey. Defendant refuted this 

interpretation, maintaining plaintiff, as a pedestrian, was not 

using or operating her vehicle at the time of the accident, so 

coverage required by the Deemer Statute was not triggered.

The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. 

The trial judge accepted plaintiff's position, concluding the 

comprehensive insurance scheme provided PIP coverage to 

plaintiff, despite being a pedestrian. The judge denied 
4 A-1911-15T3

defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiff's 

motion in an October 23, 2015 order. 

Defendant moved to vacate this order and sought dismissal 

of the complaint. Following oral argument, the Law Division 

judge reviewed the legislative history accompanying the adoption 

of the Deemer Statute and reconsidered his prior order. The 

judge vacated the October 23, 2015 order and concluded a party 

must be using or operating his or her vehicle at the time of the 

accident to trigger Deemer coverage. Plaintiff's appeal from 

the December 4, 2015 order followed.

The narrow legal issue on appeal requires consideration of 

the Legislative intent in enacting N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4. These 

principles guide our review.

A matter of statutory interpretation is a legal issue 

requiring our de novo review. See, e.g., Manalapan Realty, L.P. 

v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); In re 

Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed by Various Muns., 446 N.J. 

Super. 259, 281 (App. Div. 2016), aff’d as modified on other 

grounds, 227 N.J. 508 (2017). Accordingly, "we accord no 

deference to the trial judge's interpretive conclusions." Brick 

Twp. PBA Local 230 v. Twp. of Brick, 446 N.J. Super. 61, 65 

(App. Div. 2016).
5 A-1911-15T3

Our paramount goal in interpreting a statute is to 

ascertain the Legislature's intent, requiring we start with the 

statutory language. See, e.g., Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 

575 (2014) ("The goal of all statutory interpretation 'is to 

give effect to the intent of the Legislature.'" (quoting 

Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 597 (2011))); DiProspero v. 

Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) ("[G]enerally, the best indicator 

of that intent is the statutory language."). When interpreting 

a statute, we give words "their ordinary meaning and 

significance." Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) 

(quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492). Further, "we must 

construe the statute sensibly and consistent[ly] with the 

objectives that the Legislature sought to achieve." Nicholas v. 

Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 480 (2013). "We will not adopt an 

interpretation of the statutory language that leads to an absurd 

result or one that is distinctly at odds with the public-policy 

objectives of a statutory scheme." State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 

295, 308 (2016) (citing Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 

N.J. 581, 592 (2012)).

Enacted in 1985, the Deemer Statute "is part of this 

State's no fault automobile insurance plan." Gov't Emps. Ins. 

Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 

2003). "The legislation was in response to a growing number of 
6 A-1911-15T3

cases where New Jersey residents were injured in accidents 

caused by out-of-state drivers whose insurance coverage was less 

than New Jersey's statutory requirements" and the law was 

intended "to reduce the demands on the Unsatisfied Claim and 

Judgment Fund." Ibid. (quoting Craig and Pomeroy, N.J. Auto 

Ins. Law, cmt. § 1:2-6 (2003)). The Deemer Statute provides, in 

pertinent part:

Any insurer authorized to transact or 

transacting automobile or motor vehicle 

insurance business in this State . . . shall 

include in each policy coverage to satisfy 

at least the liability insurance 

requirements of . . . personal injury 

protection benefits coverage pursuant to . . 

. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4] . . . whenever the 

automobile or motor vehicle insured under 

the policy is used or operated in this 

State. . . . 

[N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4.]

"In short, the Deemer Statute furnishes the covered out-of-state 

driver with New Jersey's statutory no-fault PIP and other 

benefits and, in exchange, deems that driver to have selected 

the limitation-on-lawsuit option of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)." 

Zabilowicz, supra, 200 N.J. at 514. 

Plaintiff focuses on the statutory phrase "whenever the 

automobile or motor vehicle insured under the policy is used or 

operated in this State," maintaining defendant was required to 

provide PIP coverage because her vehicle entered New Jersey. 
7 A-1911-15T3

She contends "[p]recluding [her] from receiving PIP benefits 

because she is an out-of-state resident would be contrary to the 

plain language of the Deemer Statute and would be inconsistent 

with well-established case law." Plaintiff argues the statute's 

provisions extend to any vehicles "that enter into and travel 

around New Jersey, irrespective of th[e] automobile's direct 

involvement in the accident." Citing Indem. Ins. Co. v. Metro. 

Cas. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 507 (1960), plaintiff urges "[o]ne who 

operates a car uses it, but one can use a car without operating 

it." Id. at 513 (citation omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff 

maintains the fact she was not in her vehicle at the time she 

was injured is irrelevant.

Plaintiff also argues this interpretation aligns with 

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4's requirements, which mandate every standard 

automobile insurance policy shall contain PIP benefits to the 

named insured "who sustain[s] bodily injury as a result of an 

accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using 

an automobile," as well "as a pedestrian, caused by an 

automobile . . . ." 

Defendant confronts plaintiff's argument as an attempt to 

circumvent the legislative purpose in adopting the Deemer 

Statute, which defendant urges aimed to protect New Jersey 

residents injured in automobile accidents from out-of-state 
8 A-1911-15T3

operators with insufficient coverage. Citing the same statutory 

phrase relied upon by plaintiff, defendant insists a nexus 

between the out-of-state automobile and the accident is 

necessary. Thus, "the automobile . . . insured under the outof-state policy must be operated or used at the time of the New 

Jersey accident before the Deemer Statute is triggered." 

Defendant asserts N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4's PIP requirements apply only 

if the Deemer Statute is triggered. 

Various cases have examined challenges to the applicability 

of the Deemer Statute when an out-of-state driver is involved in 

an automobile accident in New Jersey. See, e.g., Whitaker v. 

DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341, 349-55 (1997) (reviewing constitutional 

and other challenges to the Deemer Statute); Cooper Hosp. v. 

Prudential Ins. Co., 378 N.J. Super. 510, 515 (App. Div. 2005) 

("Generally speaking, the [D]eemer [S]tatute effectively 

mandates that out-of-state policies within its ambit are 

automatically construed as New Jersey policies when the covered 

vehicle is involved in a New Jersey accident."); Gov't Emps. 

Ins. Co., supra, 358 N.J. Super. at 561 (enacting the Deemer 

Statute, the Legislature "sought to ensure that New Jerseyauthorized insurance companies provide to their out-of-state 

insureds travelling in New Jersey the same protections required 

of in-state insured vehicles") (citing Martin v. Home Ins. Co., 
9 A-1911-15T3

141 N.J. 279, 282 (1995))). These authorities state the Deemer 

Statute "guarantees that out-of-state insureds driving in New 

Jersey and insured by companies authorized to transact insurance 

business in New Jersey have available up to $250,000 in personal 

injury protection (PIP) benefits, see N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, 

irrespective of the comparable benefits mandated by the 

insured's home state." Whitaker, supra, 147 N.J. at 348 

(emphasis added). However, we have located no case mirroring 

the facts at hand. 

We frame the issue of first impression as whether an outof-state automobile policy is deemed by N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 to 

provide PIP benefits when the named insured is injured by a New 

Jersey driver while a pedestrian. We conclude the answer is no. 

The parties' divergent views in construing the plain 

meaning of the Deemer Statute expose an ambiguity. "[I]f a 

statute's plain language is ambiguous or subject to multiple 

interpretations, this [c]ourt 'may consider extrinsic evidence 

including legislative history and committee reports.'" Parsons 

ex rel. Parsons v. Mullica Bd. of Educ., 226 N.J. 297, 308 

(2016) (quoting State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 500 (2010)); see 

also Brick Twp. PBA Local 230, supra, 446 N.J. Super. at 65 

("[W]hen the statutory language is ambiguous and yields more 

than one plausible interpretation . . . we turn to extrinsic 
10 A-1911-15T3

sources, such as legislative history." (citing DiProspero, 

supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93)). "In the absence of specific 

guidance, our task is to discern the intent of the Legislature 

not only from the terms of the Act, but also from its structure, 

history and purpose." Martin, supra, 141 N.J. at 285 (quoting 

Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, 140 N.J. 452, 471 (1995)). "The 

inquiry [into statutory meaning] in the ultimate analysis is [to 

determine] the true intention of the law; and, to this end, the 

particular words are to be made responsive to the essential 

principle of the law." Id. at 290 (quoting Roig v. Kelsey, 135 

N.J. 500, 516 (1994)).

We are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that her 

injuries, suffered while a pedestrian, are covered by the Deemer 

Statute's specific reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, which provides 

PIP benefits to pedestrians injured caused by a motor vehicle. 

This provision only applies if the Deemer Statute is triggered, 

which turns on the meaning of "whenever the automobile or motor 

vehicle insured under the policy is used or operated in this 

State." 

Focusing on this language, we note courts have examined 

"the statutory words 'occupying . . . or using' an automobile in 

the context of eligibility for PIP benefits[,]" per N.J.S.A.
11 A-1911-15T3

39:6A-4. Negron v. Colonial Penn Ins., 358 N.J. Super. 59, 62 

(App. Div. 2003) (alteration in original). This court stated: 

The broad principle developed by case law 

has been summarized with disarming 

simplicity in Craig & Pomeroy, New Jersey 

Auto Insurance Law, § 6:2-3, pg. 119 (Gann 

2003):

[I]t is not necessary that the 

injury be directly or proximately 

caused by the automobile or by its 

motion or operation, so long as 

there is a substantial nexus 

between the occupancy or use of 

the vehicle and the injury.

Cases considering the issue of substantial 

nexus in PIP matters were surveyed in 

Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 242, 

247-53 (1994). More recent cases, like Ohio 

Cas[.] Gr[p.] v. Gray, 323 N.J. Super. 338 

(App. Div. 1999); Svenson v. Nat['l] 

Consumer Ins. Co., 322 N.J. Super. 410, 413-

17 (App. Div. 1999); and Stevenson v. State 

Farm Indem[.] Co., 311 N.J. Super. 363, 372-

73 (App. Div. 1998), have addressed the 

issue with similar surveys.

[Ibid.]

In Negron, a passenger exited a vehicle to ask a bar patron 

"who was pounding the hood" and blocking the car's path, to 

move. Id. at 61. The passenger "was immediately assaulted and 

knocked down by several people." Ibid. The driver then exited 

the vehicle to aid the passenger; he too was seriously injured. 

Ibid. The passenger-plaintiff argued "his actions were directly 

linked to the use of the automobile in which he was traveling 
12 A-1911-15T3

because he was acting to aid the driver of his car, to clear a 

path of travel and to stop third parties from damaging the 

vehicle." Id. at 62. We were not persuaded and affirmed the 

trial judge's conclusion the passenger's actions to aid the 

driver, although commendable, had a "purpose . . . not 

sufficiently 'entwined with normal use' of a vehicle to bring 

this case within the ambit of PIP coverage." Id. at 61.

In Vasil v. Zullo, 238 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1990), we 

affirmed the denial of benefits to a passenger who exited the 

vehicle blocked by another motorist during a "road rage" 

incident. The other driver stabbed the passenger who, after 

being injured, returned to the vehicle and died. Id. at 575. 

We concluded the plaintiff could not "reasonably be said to have 

been 'using' the [defendant's] vehicle simply because the 

altercation with the occupants of the [other car] arose out of 

the operation of the [defendant's] car or because the [other 

car] was blocking the [defendant's] vehicle's path." Id. at 

577. 

Cases have held "[a] non-occupant of a vehicle may be found 

to have been 'using' the vehicle in which he was riding or 

driving while examining the damage sustained in an accident or 

while pushing the vehicle from the roadway to the shoulder." 

Ibid. (citing Clyburn v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 214 N.J. Super.
13 A-1911-15T3

644, 648-49 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 652 (1987)); 

see also Gray, supra, 323 N.J. Super. at 341 (finding continuing 

use of vehicle by driver injured when leaving vehicle to remove 

shopping carts blocking vehicle). However, when the break is 

more than temporary, the vehicle becomes unrelated to events of 

the accident. 

Here, plaintiff parked her car, locked the doors, walked 

away, exited the parking lot, and was crossing a street when she 

was struck by a vehicle. At the time she sustained her 

injuries, her use of her vehicle had ended. We are satisfied 

plaintiff's interpretation of the phrase "whenever the 

automobile . . . insured under the policy is used . . . in this 

State" to include merely driving a vehicle into New Jersey is 

overbroad. N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4. We cannot reconcile the 

Legislature's intent in enacting the Deemer Statute to cover a 

pedestrian accident, which is not a consequence of plaintiff's 

use of her automobile. Rather, we conclude coverage under the 

Deemer Statute demands "substantial nexus" between the out-ofstate vehicle and the accident for which benefits are sought. 

Negron, supra, 358 N.J. Super. at 62 (quoting Craig & Pomeroy, 

New Jersey Auto Insurance Law, § 6:2-3, pg. 119 (Gann 2003)). 

Here, the negligent act that caused plaintiff's injury was not 

related to the use of her vehicle in New Jersey. The Deemer 
14 A-1911-15T3

Statute is not applicable to extend PIP benefits to satisfy her 

medical costs.

Affirmed.