United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1995 SECURITY

CLEARANCES

Consideration of

Sexual Orientation in

the Clearance Process

GAO/NSIAD-95-21

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-258273 

March 24, 1995

The Honorable George E. Brown, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

In response to your request and that of the former Chairman, House

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the

Judiciary, we reviewed issues relating to how sexual orientation is treated

in the security clearance process for federal civilian and contractor

employees. Specific areas we reviewed included (1) whether clearances

are currently being denied or revoked based on individuals’ sexual

orientation, (2) whether sexual orientation is being used as a criterion in

granting or revoking security clearances, and (3) how concealment of

sexual orientation affects the granting or revoking of security clearances.

We performed our review at eight agencies that, except for the Central

Intelligence Agency, accounted for over 95 percent of the security

clearances granted to civilian and contractor employees during fiscal year

1993. As agreed, we did not review security clearances at the Central

Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, or National Security

Agency. Also, the scope of this work did not include military personnel;

however, our prior work has addressed policies in that area.1

Background The federal government is charged with determining who can be entrusted

with the nation’s secrets. Currently, 52 federal agencies have granted

personnel security clearances to over 206,000 civilian and contractor

employees. The requirement for federal employees who handle classified

information to be loyal and trustworthy was an outgrowth of a 1947

federal loyalty program, established by President Truman during a time of

heightened feelings of national security over growing concerns about the

1

Defense Force Management: DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality (GAO/NSIAD-92-98, June 12, 1992);

Defense Force Management: Statistics Related to DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality

(GAO/NSIAD-92-98S, June 12, 1992); and Homosexuals in the Military: Policies and Practices of

Foreign Countries (GAO/NSIAD-93-215, June 25, 1993).

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communist threat.2 Executive Order 10450 modified the loyalty program in

1953, requiring that any individual’s employment be “clearly consistent

with the interests of the national security,” and for the first time included

sexual perversion as a basis for removal from the federal service.

Executive Order 10450, which provides the basic security standards for

agencies to follow, has been amended several times through the years,

most recently in 1974, but the security standards have remained basically

the same. Appendix I contains the security standards in Executive Order

10450.

Federal agencies used the sexual perversion criteria in the early 1950s to

categorize homosexuals as security risks and separate them from

government service. Agencies could deny homosexual men and women

employment because of their sexual orientation until 1975, when the Civil

Service Commission issued guidelines prohibiting the government from

denying employment on the basis of sexual orientation.3

 The guidelines,

which further define the provisions of Executive Order 10450, resulted

from court decisions requiring that persons not be disqualified from

federal employment solely on the basis of homosexual conduct. Although

the public policy change resulted in the restrictions against employment of

homosexuals being lifted, the guidance for granting security clearances to

homosexuals remained generally vague or restrictive until the early 1990s.

Appendix II contains a synopsis of key court decisions pertaining to sexual

orientation and the security clearance process.

Results in Brief Until about 1991, when agencies began to change their security policies

and practices regarding sexual orientation, there were a number of

documented cases where defense civilian or contractor employees’

security clearances were denied or revoked because of their sexual

orientation. However, our review of various records at eight agencies and

outreach to members of the homosexual community have not identified

such cases since 1991. Since no overall database of such information

exists, our work was based on judgmentally selected reviews of agencies’

records and information solicited from parties involved in the process. We

also recognize there is the possibility that some individuals who have

2

Executive Order 9835, “Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees Loyalty

Program in the Executive Branch of the Government” (Mar. 21, 1947).

3

The Civil Service Commission is now the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). As a result of legal

actions, the Commission initially issued suitability guidelines for federal government employment in

Federal Personnel Manual letter 731-3 (July 3, 1975). In May 1980, OPM issued a memorandum to

heads of departments and independent establishments clarifying that personnel actions based on

non-job-related conduct such as sexual orientation may be considered prohibited personnel practices

under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b). The policy was reaffirmed in February 1994.

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experienced problems would be unwilling to come forward and discuss

their cases. Notwithstanding these limitations, our work disclosed no

evidence that sexual orientation has been used as a criterion in the

security clearance process for federal civilian and contractor employees

since 1991. However, some individuals we spoke with believed they were

asked inappropriate questions during the clearance process.

Information we received from homosexuals, gay and lesbian groups, and

attorneys who have experience with the security clearance process

confirms that clearances have not been recently denied because of sexual

orientation and that the number of problems experienced by homosexuals

has diminished in recent years. In addition, our detailed review of selected

security clearance denials, revocations, and suspensions during fiscal year

1993 showed that none were attributable to sexual orientation.

All eight agencies we reviewed told us that homosexuality is not a

criterion in granting security clearances.4

 Six of the eight agencies have

written policies and procedures that prohibit direct questions about an

applicant’s sexual orientation and the denial of a security clearance on the

basis of sexual orientation alone. Although the other two agencies—DOD

and the U.S. Secret Service—told us sexual orientation is not a criterion,

they have not revised their written policies and procedures to reflect this

position. Under their existing policies and procedures, investigators are

authorized to pursue information regarding an applicant’s homosexuality.

Secret Service procedures require investigators to be alert to and

thoroughly investigate allegations of homosexual conduct. DOD

investigators can ask questions about sexual orientation once it has been

established that an applicant is homosexual.

All of the agencies in our review indicated that concealment of any

personal behavior that could result in exploitation, blackmail, or coercion

is a security concern. However, the treatment of concealment as it relates

to sexual orientation varies. Although most of the agencies have

eliminated specific references to sexual orientation, DOD and FBI guidelines

treat concealment as a security concern. At DOD, coworkers and family

members must be informed of the applicant’s sexual orientation, or the

applicant is considered potentially vulnerable to blackmail or coercion and

could be denied a clearance. DOD plans to eliminate this language in

revised guidelines to be issued in early 1995.

4

The agencies we reviewed were the Department of Defense (DOD), the Departments of Energy and

State, OPM, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S.

Secret Service, and the U.S. Customs Service.

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The FBI’s investigative guidelines on sexual orientation require

investigators to record admissions of sexual orientation for use in

determining an applicant’s vulnerability to compromise. The FBI explained

that this requirement is intended to provide investigators precise guidance

on how to handle sexual orientation, and that the guidelines also state that

no inference of susceptibility to coercion is to be drawn based on sexual

orientation. We believe the inclusion of the requirement in the

investigative guidelines could be misinterpreted to suggest that a person is

vulnerable to compromise only because of the individual’s sexual

orientation. In addition, none of the other agencies in our review have a

similar requirement.

Problems Related to

Sexual Orientation

Appear to Be

Declining

No central source of data exists that captures incidents where individuals

believe their security clearance was denied or revoked because of their

sexual orientation. Therefore, we reached out to individuals who believed

their sexual orientation influenced the security clearance process.

Specifically, we asked over 30 gay and lesbian publications throughout the

United States to publish an article soliciting input from individuals who

believe federal agencies denied or revoked their security clearances based

on their sexual orientation between 1991 and 1994. We also contacted nine

attorneys and one paralegal who represented individuals on gay rights

issues. In addition, we talked with representatives from five gay rights

organizations that represent federal employees and other professionals

who might have sought a security clearance.

We recognize that some individuals who have experienced problems with

the security clearance process might not be willing to contact us, but the

information we received, and the individuals with whom we talked,

generally indicated that in recent years (between 1991 and 1994) sexual

orientation has not been used as a criterion for denying security

clearances. The attorneys told us that they have had no sexual orientation

cases associated with security clearances since 1992. The paralegal also

had no cases, but said there is not parity between questions asked of

homosexuals versus heterosexuals (e.g., homosexuals are often asked

detailed questions about their sexual habits). The National Organization of

Gay and Lesbian Scientists and Technical Professionals, Pasadena,

California, believes that improvements have been made and the problems

are not nearly as severe as in the past, but they are concerned that the

process for obtaining clearances appears to take longer for homosexual

than heterosexual employees. Appendix III identifies some of the major

organizations we contacted.

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Based on information from the above sources, we identified 25 cases

where civilian or contractor employees believed their sexual orientation

had an impact on their security clearance investigations. Nine of the 

25 cases occurred after 1990: 3 in 1991, 5 in 1992, and 1 in 1993. None of

these cases involved a denial, revocation, or suspension of a security

clearance. However, the individuals believed that the investigation took

longer than it should have or that the investigators asked unnecessary

questions about the individuals’ sexual behavior. No incidents were

reported to us for January through November 1994.

Of the 16 cases that occurred before 1991, 8 clearances were revoked. Five

of the eight individuals were defense contractor employees who either

omitted disclosing homosexual activities to defense investigators, did not

disclose their homosexuality to family members and coworkers (a defense

personnel security requirement), or fraternized with foreign nationals.5

The other three included one defense and two foreign service employees

at the Department of State and USIA. Their clearances were revoked for

medical health reasons, and fraternizing with foreign nationals and/or

criminal behavior. The five defense contractor personnel appealed the

revocation, and three of the clearances were reinstated.6

 Clearances were

not revoked or denied for the other eight cases that occurred before 1991;

however, the individuals believed they were asked inappropriate questions

during the clearance process. In summary, for the eight cases we reviewed

where a clearance was revoked, it appears that the individuals’ clearances

were not revoked because of sexual orientation, per se, but rather for the

concealment of it.

Selected Fiscal Year

1993 Case Review

Shows Sexual

Orientation Was Not a

Factor in Denials,

Revocations, or

Suspensions

In addition to our outreach effort to homosexual individuals, we

judgmentally selected and reviewed 129 cases where clearances were

denied, revoked, or suspended. Our objective was to see if we could find

any evidence that sexual orientation was a factor in these decisions. Our

detailed review showed that no clearances were denied, revoked, or

suspended because of sexual orientation. Also, a limited review of

interviewee follow-up information showed similar results.

During fiscal year 1993, the eight agencies included in our study denied,

revoked, or suspended security clearances for 2,526 individuals. We

collected data from each agency on the reason for the adverse action and

5

Fraternization is a relationship with a foreign national that involves close, romantic, or sexual ties.

6

One of the three clearances was revoked by one agency but reinstated by another agency when the

individual transferred.

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reviewed 129 cases in detail to determine whether sexual orientation was

a criterion in the clearance determination. Our detailed review showed

that no clearances were denied, revoked, or suspended because of sexual

orientation. In nine cases, sexual conduct—not sexual

orientation—appeared to be a key factor in the adverse action. There was

no indication that the individuals were homosexual or that sexual

orientation was an issue. The other 120 clearances were denied, revoked,

or suspended for a number of reasons, including alcohol and drug abuse,

mental or medical health issues, and security violations.

Table 1 shows the number of denials, revocations, and suspensions by

agency, and table 2 shows the reason for the adverse action as reported to

us by each agency for the 129 cases we reviewed in detail.

Table 1: Number of Security

Clearances Denied, Revoked, or

Suspended for Fiscal Year 1993

Agency Number

DOD 1,945a

Energy 509

FBI 11

OPM 13

State 21

Secret Service 2

USIA 9

Customs 16

Total 2,526

aDOD records show that the Army, Navy, and Air Force accounted for 954 of the denials,

revocations, and suspensions; Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for 52; Defense Logistics

Agency for 20; and 7 other defense organizations for 18. Civilians working for defense contractors

accounted for the remaining 901.

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Table 2: Security Factors Cited by Agencies for the Cases Reviewed by GAO (Fiscal Year 1993) 

Number of denials, revocations, and suspensions

Security factors Customs DMA Energy FBI OPM

Secret

Service State USIA Total

Alcohol/drug abuse 15 4 19

Counterintelligence/

national

interest/falsification of

information

3 1 1 5

Criminal/notorious conduct 4 8 7 19

Failure to update security

forms

2 2

Falsification of information 2 3 5

Fraud/falsification/

financial matters

1 3 1 5

Falsification/mental or

medical health/

alcohol/drugs

2 1 1 4

Falsification/security

violation

1 1

Integrity investigations 7 7

Mental/medical health 1 4 4 2 11

National interest/security

violations

1 1

Refusal to submit to

polygraph

1 1

Security violations 1 2 4 1 8

Termination/transfer/no

clearance needed

13 13

Unusual conduct/sexual

activity

6 6

Sexual misconduct 2 1 3

Sexual misconduct/drugs/

falsification

1 1

Financial matters 14 1 15

Unauthorized absence 3 3

Total 16 52 6 11 13 2 21 8 129

Note: We reviewed files at DMA because initially, more people from DMA contacted us than from

the military services.

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Investigative Quality

Assurance Follow-Up

Results

In an effort to ensure that investigators are asking appropriate questions

and behaving in a professional manner, four of the eight agencies in our

review (DOD, State, OPM, and USIA) send follow-up letters to randomly

selected security clearance applicants and third parties who were

interviewed during background investigations. As another means to

determine if agencies use sexual orientation as a security factor, we

examined a small, nonstatistical sample of 41 investigator follow-up letters

from the 2,100 DOD, State, and USIA sent in 1993 and 1994. We also reviewed

the summary results of an OPM project that included feedback from over

800 interviewees.7

 There was no indication on the follow-up responses we

examined, or in OPM’s project results, of any discrimination or

inappropriate behavior—for example, failure to ask clear and direct

questions on topics the interviewee would consider important to a security

investigation—by the investigators.

Procedures at Two

Agencies Do Not

Reflect Stated Policies

on Sexual Orientation

Excluding the Central Intelligence Agency, the eight agencies we reviewed

accounted for over 95 percent of the security clearances granted to civilian

and contractor employees during fiscal year 1993. All of the agencies told

us that sexual orientation is not a criterion in granting security clearances.

As shown in table 3, six of the eight agencies have written policies and

procedures that prohibit direct questions about an applicant’s sexual

orientation and the denial of a security clearance on the basis of sexual

orientation alone. Secret Service and DOD, however, have not yet revised

their written policies and procedures to reflect this position. Under these

two agencies’ policies and procedures, investigators are authorized to

pursue information regarding an applicant’s homosexuality. Secret Service

procedures require investigators to be alert to and thoroughly investigate

allegations of homosexual conduct. DOD investigators can ask questions

about sexual orientation once it has been established that an applicant is

homosexual.

Secret Service officials told us they were not aware of the provision in

their regulations and that they plan to revise their policies and procedures

in the near future. DOD officials also told us they plan to revise their

security manual. In commenting on our draft report, DOD noted that it has

drafted revised adjudication guidelines and recently issued revised

investigative procedures. However, we note that the guidelines and

procedures may be inconsistent since the adjudication guidelines focus on

sexual misconduct and the investigative procedures focus on orientation.

7

“Summary of Quality Control Reinterview Project” (Dec. 11, 1992).

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Table 3: Synopsis of Agency Investigative and Adjudicative Policies and Procedures on Sexual Orientation

Agency Sexual orientation policy Investigative and adjudicative procedures

DOD December 1993 Memorandum on Changes to

Defense Investigative Manual—Sexual Conduct

1993 Defense Investigative Service Manual for

Personnel Security Investigations

No investigations or inquiries will be conducted

solely to determine a subject’s sexual

orientation. Investigators are not to ask direct

questions about sexual orientation unless

credible, relevant information has been

developed from other sources. Investigators

should not ask questions unless the individual

introduces the matter or it is developed through

other sources.

These procedures are applicable to

investigations of civilian and contractor

personnel. Under certain circumstances (e.g.,

when sexual acts, conduct, or behavior include

acts performed with a minor, involving coercion,

force, or violence, or acts committed for

money), investigators can expand an

investigation, but investigations or inquiries will

not be conducted solely to determine an

individual’s sexual orientation.

DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program,

January 1987

Family members and coworkers must be

informed of an individual’s sexual orientation.

Concealment of sexual preference from an

employer, coworkers, or family members could

disqualify an individual from obtaining a security

clearance.

Allegations of an individual’s sexual conduct

should be designed to elicit information that

adjudicative authorities consider in accordance

with clearance denial criteria. DOD’s current

definition of “moral behavior” includes sexual

conduct, which may or may not be technically

illegal in any given jurisdiction. (Officials told us

investigators no longer use this definition.)

Note: This process appears to be inconsistent

with DOD policy to not use sexual orientation as

a security criterion, and to not ask questions

about sexual orientation.

DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program,

January 1987

These procedures are applicable to civilian

personnel. Disqualifying factors: conduct or

actions that increase the individual’s

vulnerability to coercion or blackmail, including

concealment of sexual preference from

immediate family members, close associates,

supervisors, or coworkers.

Draft Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining

Eligibility for Access to Classified Information

Note: These procedures will be applicable to

civilian and contractor personnel and are

scheduled to replace 5200.2-R. Sexual behavior

is a security concern if it involves a criminal

offense, indicates a personality or emotional

disorder, subjects the individual to undue

influence or coercion, or reflects lack of

judgment or discretion. Conditions that signal

security concern include sexual behavior that

causes an individual to be vulnerable to undue

influence or coercion. Defense officials told us

that homosexual behavior could cause an

individual to be vulnerable to undue influence or

coercion.

(continued)

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Agency Sexual orientation policy Investigative and adjudicative procedures

DOD (cont.) 1992 Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial

Personnel Security Clearance Review Program

This directive implements Executive Order

10865, Safeguarding Classified Information

Within Industry, which describes appeal

procedures for contractor employees and

contains security standards from DOD

regulation 5200.2-R, which are applicable to

contractor and civilian employees.

Department of Energy 1993 Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining

Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and/or

Special Nuclear Material

1993 Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining

Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and/or

Special Nuclear Material; and Title 10 Code of

Federal Regulations, Part 710

Engaging in homosexual activity is not cause for

security concern unless there is a clear

indication that such activity involved a criminal

act or a lack of judgment or discretion.

Individuals will not be subject to further security

review merely due to the fact that they engage

in homosexual activity.

Note: OPM conducts investigations for the

Department of Energy. Therefore, Energy has

no investigative guidelines.

Consensual sexual acts between adults,

conducted in privacy, are not subject to security

concern unless the adjudicator believes

extenuating circumstances are involved.

Derogatory information includes those cases in

which the individual has engaged in unusual

conduct or is subject to circumstances that tend

to show the individual is not honest, reliable,

and trustworthy, and there is no adequate

evidence of rehabilitation or reformation or that

furnish reason to believe the individual may be

subject to coercion, influence, or pressure that

may cause the individual to act contrary to the

best interests of the national security.

FBI Background Investigations Policy/Guidelines

Regarding Sexual Orientation (Mar. 2, 1994)

Background Investigations Policy/Guidelines

Regarding Sexual Orientation (Mar. 2, 1994)

No person, as a condition of submitting an

application for employment or as a condition of

federal employment, may be asked to declare

his or her sexual orientation or preference.

Homosexuality does not create an inference of

unsuitability for security clearance or access to

sensitive information. (See also Department of

Justice policy.

Note: Where an applicant/candidate volunteers

information concerning his/her sexual

orientation or preference during the course of a

background investigation, it should be recorded

for use in determining the person’s vulnerability

to compromise.

Concealed matters in a person’s life may be the

basis for attempted pressure or influence and

the concealment of the activity or conduct may

be more important in determining

trustworthiness than the conduct or activity itself.

(continued)

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Agency Sexual orientation policy Investigative and adjudicative procedures

OPM OPM adopted the Department of Justice’s 1993

policy to not discriminate on the basis of sexual

orientation.

Draft OPM Manual 732-1, Subchapter 5,

Security Adjudication, and 736-1, Personnel

Investigations

Department of Justice Statement of Policy With

Respect to Nondiscrimination in Employment

(Dec. 2, 1993)

In the context of determining eligibility for

security clearances or access to sensitive

information, the Department may investigate

and consider any matter that would reasonably

subject the applicant or employee to coercion,

but no inference concerning susceptibility to

coercion may be raised solely on the basis of

the race, color, religion, sex, national origin,

disability, or sexual orientation of the applicant

or employee.

Federal personnel investigators are not

authorized to interview applicants or appointees

concerning their sexual behavior or attitudes

concerning sexual conduct in the absence of

allegations or information indicating sexual

behavior that would have a bearing on efficient

service in the position in question, or would

interfere with or prevent effective performance

by the employing agency of its duties and

responsibilities.

Note: In commenting on a draft of this report,

OPM indicated that subchapter 5 of Draft OPM

Manual 732-1 has been abolished and chapter

736-1 will be retained until December 1994.

April 1992 OPM Investigator’s Handbook

The handbook has no specific language

regarding sexual orientation. Regarding

personal conduct, investigators are instructed to

ask: “Is there anything in your background or

personal conduct that could result in

exploitation, blackmail, or coercion?” If, during

the course of the interview, the subject brings

up any aspect of personal conduct that appears

questionable, the investigator may ask direct

questions and develop the basic facts and the

extent to which they are known to others.

Note: In commenting on a draft of this report,

OPM indicated that the Investigator’s Handbook

is being revised and that the investigative

procedures noted above are no longer

accurate. OPM noted that its investigators are

not authorized to question applicants or

appointees concerning their sexual behavior or

attitudes concerning sexual conduct, but are

authorized to report information received that

may be of value to an agency adjudicator as

bearing on the individual’s efficient service in a

position or an agency’s ability to perform its

duties and responsibilities effectively.

(continued)

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Agency Sexual orientation policy Investigative and adjudicative procedures

Department of State Diplomatic Security Memorandum on Sexual

Conduct Policy (Dec. 10, 1992)

Investigators will not pursue issues of sexual

conduct. 

One’s sexual orientation, per se, does not

constitute a basis for denial of security

clearance.

1993 Policy Memorandum, 12 Foreign Affairs

Manual 230, on Personnel Security, and

Adjudicative Guidelines

Note: Allegations of potentially exploitable

conduct will be referred to headquarters

security personnel for review. Sexual conduct is

a security concern if it involves a criminal

offense, indicates a personality disorder,

subjects the individual to undue influence or

coercion, or reflects lack of judgment or

discretion.

Secret Service Secret Service has no written policy, but

according to Secret Service officials,

investigators should not ask questions about

sexual orientation. Officials told us they plan to

publish written policies and procedures upon

publication of Treasury Department guidelines.

1983 Secret Service Investigative Manual

Note: Investigators must be alert to information

concerning an applicant’s homosexual conduct

or sexual perversion(s). Allegations of

homosexual conduct or sexual perversion must

be completely investigated. The purpose of the

investigation is to ascertain whether the

individual’s possible homosexual conduct or

sexual perversions may be indicative of a

personality disorder or make the individual

subject to blackmail or coercion. This process

appears to be inconsistent with Secret Service

policy to not ask questions about sexual

orientation.

USIA 1993 USIA manuals on Conduct of the

Background Investigation and Guidelines for

Making Security Determinations

1993 USIA manuals on Conduct of the

Background Investigation, and Guidelines for

Making Security Determinations

Investigators are prohibited from inquiring into a

subject’s sexual orientation. Sexual conduct is

of concern only to the extent that there is reason

to believe the individual may be vulnerable to

coercion or has violated laws or security and

other federal regulations.

Note: If a third party, during the course of the

investigation, volunteers information about the

individual being investigated, investigators are

not to pursue the issue other than through

routine questioning regarding the individual’s

character, reputation, and conduct.

U.S. Customs Service Follows OPM guidance to not ask direct

questions on sexual orientation.

1985: Customs Policies and Procedures Manual

Note: The manual contains no specific language

on sexual orientation with regard to granting or

revoking security clearances. The Customs

manual provides specific guidance with regard

to suitability issues, but not security clearance

issues, per se.

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Agencies’ Policies and

Procedures Differ on

Concealment of Sexual

Orientation

All the agencies in our review indicated that concealment of any personal

behavior that could result in exploitation, blackmail, or coercion is a

security concern. However, the treatment of concealment, as it relates to

sexual orientation, varies.

Most of the agencies have eliminated references to concealment of sexual

orientation, per se, as a security factor. However, under DOD adjudicative

procedures, individuals can be denied a clearance if they conceal their

homosexuality from their employer, family members, or coworkers.8

Officials told us that individuals who fail to disclose their homosexuality

could be subject to coercion or blackmail. This creates a dilemma for

homosexual employees who do not wish to share their orientation with

others. On the one hand, individuals need not volunteer information about

their sexual orientation. On the other hand, if individuals do not volunteer

the information, they could be denied a clearance for concealing their

sexual orientation. DOD has drafted new adjudicative guidance that

eliminates specific reference to concealment, and it intends to review its

procedures by April 1995 to ensure that sexual orientation is not an issue

in the investigation or adjudication of security clearances.

DOD officials told us that there were no recent examples where the

concealment provision was used to deny or revoke a security clearance,

but one of the attorneys we contacted referred us to three cases that

occurred in the mid-1980s. In these cases, the security clearances were

revoked but later reinstated through the appeals process. Secret Service

investigative procedures are similar to DOD’s in that investigators can

pursue information related to concealment to ascertain whether an

individual may be susceptible to blackmail or coercion.

The FBI’s guidelines regarding the issue of sexual orientation in

background investigations were established in March 1994. According to

FBI officials, the guidelines are intended to prevent discrimination based

on sexual orientation and were developed to implement the Attorney

General’s policy statement regarding nondiscrimination and to comply

with a December 1993 court-approved settlement agreement on

discrimination.9

 Although the guidelines are generally consistent with

Justice and FBI policies regarding sexual orientation, the guidelines contain

some language that could be misinterpreted.

8

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that its revised adjudication guidelines, developed

in conjunction with the Intelligence Community, have deleted this provision.

9

Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298 (1993).

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Specifically, the FBI guidelines on sexual orientation require investigators

to inform applicants that the concealment of an activity or conduct may be

more important in determining suitability and trustworthiness than the

conduct or activity itself, that candor and forthrightness are significant

considerations of FBI employment, and a lack of candor may disqualify the

candidate from employment even when the underlying activity or conduct

might not. The guidelines further require investigators to document the

fact that the information about concealment and candor was provided to

the applicant, and that it, together with the applicant’s response, be

appropriately recorded in the applicant’s file.

The FBI guidelines on sexual orientation also require that investigators

record admissions of sexual orientation for use in determining an

applicant’s vulnerability to compromise. FBI officials explained that this

requirement is intended to provide investigators precise guidance on how

to handle sexual orientation, and noted that the guidelines also state that

no inference of susceptibility to coercion is to be drawn based on sexual

orientation. We found no recent examples where the FBI has drawn such

an inference. However, including this requirement in the investigative

guidelines could be misinterpreted to suggest that a person is vulnerable

to compromise only because of the individual’s sexual orientation. In

addition, none of the other agencies in our review have a similar

requirement.

Specifically, with the exception of DOD, the agencies in our review have

eliminated references to concealment of sexual orientation as a security

concern, and DOD stated it intends to do so. For example, OPM’s

adjudicative procedures and investigator’s handbook contain no specific

references to concealment of sexual orientation. Similarly, the State

Department’s adjudicative guidelines focus on concealment of sexual

conduct without regard to orientation. In commenting on our draft report,

State indicated that security concerns raised by allegations relating to an

individual’s sexual conduct are directed toward other appropriate criteria,

such as criminal conduct, mental/emotional health, vulnerability to foreign

influence or coercion, or lack of judgment or discretion.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
B-258273 

No Clear Linkage

Exists Between

Sexual Orientation

and Espionage

No one knows how many federal workers are homosexual or how many

homosexuals hold security clearances, but sexual orientation seems to

have little bearing on the motives behind acts of espionage. A 1991 study

by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center10 concluded there is

little evidence to suggest that homosexuals are security risks.11 Six of the

center’s 117 recorded espionage cases between 1945 and 1991 involved

homosexuals. In these six cases, the study found that fear of having one’s

homosexuality disclosed was not the motive for disclosing the nation’s

secrets. Instead, the motives appeared to be the same as in most espionage

cases: primarily money and secondarily resentment. All volunteered to

provide national security information except one, who was recruited as an

accomplice by a heterosexual friend.

According to another defense organization, the DOD Security Institute,12

sexual orientation was an issue in one 1992 espionage case that involved a

homosexual employee who sold national secrets to East German foreign

intelligence agents. According to the Institute, homosexuality was just one

of many emotional issues the East Germans used to manipulate the

employee. The individual was also depressed, lonely, and had difficulty

with interpersonal relations and other problems.

Recommendations We recommend that the

• Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,

Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to modify DOD investigative

and adjudicative procedures to be consistent with stated agency policies

and to ensure that adjudication guidelines and investigative procedures

are consistent by focusing only on conduct-related issues, rather than on

sexual orientation;

• Secretary of the Treasury direct the Secret Service’s Assistant Director for

Investigations to modify the Service’s investigative and adjudicative

procedures to be consistent with stated agency policies; and

10The Defense Personnel Security Research Center, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), is a research organization that

studies aspects of personnel security, including espionage. Its findings rest on the statistical analysis of

quantitative data on a large number of variables or indicators.

11Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center, “Homosexuality and Personnel

Security,” Theodore R. Sarbin (Sept. 1991, PERS-TR-91-008), p.28.

12The DOD Security Institute was established in 1986 by the Secretary of Defense to serve as the focal

point for promoting activities supporting DOD security programs, particularly in the area of education

and training. The institute provides security education and training to DOD military and civilian

personnel as well as personnel from about 20 other federal agencies.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
B-258273 

• Attorney General direct the Director, FBI, to revise that Bureau’s

investigative guidelines regarding sexual orientation to eliminate the

requirement that admissions of sexual orientation be recorded for use in

determining an applicant’s vulnerability to compromise.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Departments of State and Energy, DOD, the Secret Service, OPM, USIA,

and the Customs Service agreed with the information presented in a draft

of this report. DOD and the Secret Service concurred with our

recommendations. DOD has drafted adjudication guidelines that eliminate

the requirement for an individual’s family members to be informed about

the individual’s homosexuality and focus on conduct-related factors as a

basis for security clearance actions. The Secret Service will determine

procedures based on forthcoming Treasury Department guidelines.

Several of the agencies provided technical corrections that have been

incorporated in the report.

However, the Justice Department disagreed with our interpretation of the

FBI’s sexual orientation guidelines and with our recommendation that the

FBI eliminate specific language in its guidelines regarding sexual

orientation. According to Justice, FBI guidelines are consistent with Justice

policy and the dictates of Executive Order 10450. Justice maintained that

FBI guidelines limit consideration of sexual orientation to circumstances in

which sexual orientation could reasonably be thought to raise an issue of

susceptibility to coercion. Justice provided no examples of what these

circumstances might be.

Justice stated that the FBI had agreed to issue a letter to its field staff

reaffirming and clarifying the investigations policy regarding sexual

orientation. The FBI’s December 1994 letter deals primarily with guidelines

for follow-up interviews with applicants when a third party provides

information about a potential vulnerability. The letter states that

applicants should (1) not be asked to declare a sexual orientation and

should be reassured that the only potential issue is susceptibility to

coercion, (2) be told that another person provided information about a

potential susceptibility, and (3) be asked whether, in fact, there is a

vulnerability that was not previously disclosed.

We eliminated references in our draft report contrasting FBI guidelines and

Justice policy. In addition, we have clarified language in our draft report

regarding the FBI requirement that investigators record admissions of

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
B-258273 

sexual orientation for use in determining applicants’ vulnerability to

compromise.

Our detailed comments supplementing those in the report text appear at

the end of appendixes V through XI.

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed current investigative and

adjudicative policies, procedures, and practices at eight agencies.

Collectively, these agencies accounted for over 95 percent of the security

clearances granted to civilian and contractor employees during fiscal year

1993. In addition, we obtained data on the number of security clearances

that were denied, revoked, or suspended during fiscal year 1993 and

reviewed a sample in detail to determine the reason for the adverse action.

We also solicited input from homosexuals, attorneys, and representatives

of gay and lesbian groups who had experience with the federal security

clearance process. We conducted our review between August 1993 and

November 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards. Our scope and methodology is described in detail in

appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House Committees

on National Security, Appropriations, and Government Reform and

Oversight and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and

Government Affairs; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, State, and the

Treasury; the U.S. Attorney General; the Directors of the FBI, OPM, USIA,

Secret Service, and Office of Management and Budget; and the

Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service. We will also make copies available

to others upon request. Please call me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your

staff have any questions. Other major contributors are listed in 

appendix XII.

Donna M. Heivilin

Director, Defense Management

 and NASA Issues

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Executive Order

10450 (as amended,

1974) Security

Requirements for

Government

Employment

22

Appendix II 

Synopsis of Legal

Decisions Affecting

the Employment and

Security Rights of

Homosexual

Employees

28

Appendix III 

Scope and

Methodology

30

Appendix IV 

Civilian and

Contractor Employee

Concerns Regarding

Sexual Orientation

Discrimination

(1976-94)

32

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Contents

Appendix V 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

38

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

Department of State

43

Appendix VII 

Comments From the

U.S. Secret Service

46

Appendix VIII 

Comments From the

Office of Personnel

Management

47

Appendix IX 

Comments From the

U.S. Customs Service

50

Appendix X 

Comments From the

U.S. Information

Agency

53

Appendix XI 

Comments From the

Department of Justice

56

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Contents

Appendix XII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

60

Tables Table 1: Number of Security Clearances Denied, Revoked, or

Suspended for Fiscal Year 1993

6

Table 2: Security Factors Cited by Agencies for the Cases

Reviewed by GAO

7

Table 3: Synopsis of Agency Investigative and Adjudicative

Policies and Procedures on Sexual Orientation

9

Table IV.1: Individuals’ Concerns About the Impact of Sexual

Orientation in the Security Clearance Process

32

Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DISCR Defense Industrial Security Clearance Agency

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DOD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

OPM Office of Personnel Management

USIA United States Information Agency

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix I 

Executive Order 10450 (as amended,

1974) Security Requirements for

Government Employment

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix I 

Executive Order 10450 (as amended,

1974) Security Requirements for

Government Employment

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix I 

Executive Order 10450 (as amended,

1974) Security Requirements for

Government Employment

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix I 

Executive Order 10450 (as amended,

1974) Security Requirements for

Government Employment

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix I 

Executive Order 10450 (as amended,

1974) Security Requirements for

Government Employment

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix I 

Executive Order 10450 (as amended,

1974) Security Requirements for

Government Employment

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix II 

Synopsis of Legal Decisions Affecting the

Employment and Security Rights of

Homosexual Employees

Litigation has, in large part, exemplified the struggle to erase the link

between homosexuality and trustworthiness. It has also driven the

development of current public policy on sexual orientation in the security

clearance process. Some landmark cases are summarized below.

Norton v. Macy (417 F. 2d

1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969))

The plaintiff engaged in homosexual conduct and was fired on grounds of

“immorality.” The court ruled that alleged or proven immoral conduct is

not grounds for separation from public employment unless it can be

shown that such behavior has demonstrable effects on job performance.

The court found that the notion that the federal government could enforce

the majority’s conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of its

employees was inconsistent with the elementary concepts of liberty,

privacy, and diversity.

Society for Individual

Rights, Inc., v. Hampton, 

63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal.

1973)

An organization of homosexual individuals and a discharged Civil Service

Commission employee brought action to challenge the Commission’s

policy of excluding individuals who have engaged in homosexual conduct

from government employment. The court found that the Commission

could discharge a person for immoral behavior only if the behavior

impaired the efficiency of the service, and that the Commission had not

met this standard. The court ordered reinstatement of the employee. The

Civil Service Commission amended its regulations in 1976 and 1977 so that

no person could be denied federal employment on the basis of sexual

orientation.

High Tech Gays v. DISCO,

668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.

1987), Cert. Denied, 895 F.

2d 563, 570-74 (1990)

The case was filed in 1984 on behalf of an organization of Silicon Valley,

California, employees known as High Tech Gays. Three members of the

group had been denied security clearances because of Department of

Defense procedures that, at that time, allowed security investigations to be

expanded when prospective employees were identified as homosexual.

The court found the policy to be prejudicial based on the unwarranted

claim that homosexual men and women were emotionally unstable and,

therefore, potential targets for blackmail.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The court

argued that heightened or strict scrutiny could be applied only to

government actions that discriminated against persons based on such

things as race, gender, alienage, or national origin. Further, the opinion

indicated that to be perceived as a suspect or quasi-suspect class,

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix II 

Synopsis of Legal Decisions Affecting the

Employment and Security Rights of

Homosexual Employees

homosexuals must meet three criteria: (1) have suffered a history of

discrimination, (2) exhibit obvious or immutable characteristics that

define them as a discrete class, and (3) show that they are a minority or

politically powerless. The court held that the first criterion was met, but

the second and third were not.

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.

592 (1988)

In 1982, John Doe, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

voluntarily told an agency security officer that he was a homosexual. The

CIA conducted an investigation that included a polygraph examination

designed to uncover whether Doe had disclosed classified information.

Doe passed the test but was dismissed from the agency as a national

security risk. The decision enabled Doe to appeal to federal courts, but

was silent regarding the treatment of homosexuals as a suspect class.

Buttino v. FBI, No.

C-90-1639 SBA N.D. Cal.

(1992)

The plaintiff was employed as a special agent with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI). In August 1988, the FBI received an undated,

handwritten letter stating that the plaintiff engaged in homosexual activity.

The FBI then initiated an administrative inquiry regarding the plaintiff that

resulted in the FBI’s revoking the plaintiff’s security clearance. The plaintiff

brought action against the FBI and its director alleging deprivation of

constitutional rights.

In 1994, under the terms of a settlement agreement, the FBI established

guidelines for conducting background investigations, employment

determinations, and security clearance adjudications intended to prevent

discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix III 

Scope and Methodology

To determine if sexual orientation is considered as a security factor in the

security clearance process, we obtained policy memorandums and

investigative and adjudicative policies and procedures from 31

departments and agencies. However, we focused our review on the

policies and procedures of eight departments and agencies that have

investigative authority or grant large numbers of security clearances.

Except for the CIA, this represents over 95 percent of the security

clearances granted to civilian and contractor employees during fiscal year

1993.

Our review did not include security clearances for military personnel;

clearances at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, or National Security

Agency; or cases involving access to sensitive compartmented

information.

We excluded cases related to suitability for employment. The investigative

procedures for determining suitability are similar to those for granting

access to classified information. However, suitability designations are

based on the potential for damage to the efficiency of government service,

while security designations are based on the potential for risk to the

national security.

To obtain information on security investigative processes, we conducted

our review at agencies that have investigative authority. To obtain data on

security clearance denials and revocations, we contacted and reviewed

records at agencies that grant large numbers (over 300) of security

clearances. We were unable to statistically sample records from all

agencies because there is no central security database and most agencies

do not categorize their records by the reason for a security revocation or

denial. Our initial attempt to sample security records at DOD did not

provide useful information since about 80 percent of the clearances are for

military personnel and civilian and military personnel records are merged.

We also reached out to members of the homosexual community to identify

individual cases between 1991 and 1994 where individuals believed their

sexual orientation had affected the security clearance process.

To determine if sexual orientation was reported as a cause for security

clearance denials, revocations, and suspensions, we examined 129 security

files and/or case summaries at 8 departments and agencies. We reviewed

files for all fiscal year 1993 denials, revocations, and suspensions at the

Defense Mapping Agency, Office of Personnel Management (OPM),

Department of State, and U.S. Information Agency (USIA). This included 

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix III 

Scope and Methodology

52 files at the Defense Mapping Agency, 13 files at OPM, 21 files at the

Department of State, and 9 files at USIA. Of the Department of Energy’s 

509 revocations, denials, and suspensions, we reviewed 6 security files

that were in a category we believed most likely to include instances of

sexual misconduct. The FBI provided us with a case-by-case summary

describing the rationale for their revocations, denials, and suspensions.

We examined copies of 14 suspension letters provided to us by the U.S.

Customs Service.

To identify recent instances where homosexual civilian and contractor

employees believed they were denied or revoked security clearances

because of their sexual orientation, we contacted local and national gay

and lesbian organizations and publications throughout the United States,

including the National Organization of Gay and Lesbian Scientists and

Technical Professionals, Inc., Pasadena, California; The Federal Globe,

Washington, D.C.; American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities,

Washington, D.C.; The Village Voice, New York, New York; Texas Triangle,

Austin, Texas; Bay Area Reporter, San Francisco, California; Metroline,

Hartford, Connecticut; the State Department’s American Foreign Service

Association, Washington, D.C.; Gay and Lesbians in Foreign Affairs

Agencies, Department of State, Washington, D.C.; The Washington Blade,

Washington, D.C.; Baltimore Alternative, Baltimore, Maryland; Southern

Voice, Atlanta, Georgia; The Weekly News, Miami, Florida; Alabama

Forum, Birmingham, Alabama; Dallas Voice, Dallas, Texas; Out Front,

Denver, Colorado; Orange County Blade, Laguna Beach, California; and

the Baltimore Gay Paper, Baltimore, Maryland.

We spoke with and obtained information from 10 experts and attorneys

who specialize in gay rights security issues; examined 41 1992 and 1993

investigator follow-up quality assurance letters; and examined pertinent

laws and regulations. We also interviewed and obtained information from

officials at headquarters offices of the Departments of Defense (DOD),

Energy, Justice, and State; Office of Personnel Management; U.S. Customs

Service; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Marshals Service; USIA; the FBI; the

Defense Investigative Service; the Department of Defense’s Directorate for

Industrial Security Review; and the Defense Manpower Data Center,

Monterey, California.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IV 

Civilian and Contractor Employee Concerns

Regarding Sexual Orientation

Discrimination (1976-94)

Table IV.1 summarizes individuals’ concerns regarding the impact of

sexual orientation in the security clearance process. Individuals contacted

us as a result of our publications asking for information from those who

believed federal agencies had denied or revoked clearances based on

sexual orientation. Some individuals referred us to specific or other

individuals’ cases that we followed up on. We also reviewed security files

with individuals’ permission and discussed some specific cases and

general concerns with agency officials. The far right column shows how

the agencies defined or currently use the appropriate security standard

relating to the cases.

Table IV.1: Individuals’ Concerns About the Impact of Sexual Orientation in the Security Clearance Process

Agency

Date

problem

occurred Description of concern Agency’s comments

Air Force 1992 The employee’s clearance was being updated.

The employee believed the investigator used

the employee’s sexual orientation to make the

employee feel uncomfortable during the

interview process and fearful of being

dismissed from the agency. A clearance was

granted.

According to the Defense Investigative

Service, an investigation can be expanded to

determine if the employee is vulnerable to

coercion and/or blackmail. If investigators

have developed credible information, they may

ask questions about the employee’s sexual

orientation.

Army 1988-91 

1987

The employee believes that sexual orientation

was responsible for a polygraph during a

security upgrade. A clearance was granted.

The employee believes the investigator

focused on the employee’s homosexuality by

asking detailed questions about the frequency

and nature of the employee’s sexual habits.

The investigator then asked the employee to

dinner. The employee’s security clearance was

administratively terminated.

If the employee denies allegations,

investigators can ask the employee to be

polygraphed. A polygraph is voluntary and not

used in isolation. Before 1993, however, sexual

orientation, that is, homosexuality, could

trigger the use of a polygraph.

An investigation can also be expanded if

investigators determine that sexual conduct,

which has occurred within the past 10 years,

offers the potential for influence, duress, or

exploitation; when the conduct is a crime; or

when the employee is cohabitating with

another unmarried person.

Defense Mapping

Agency

1982 The employee believes sexual orientation was

responsible for inappropriate, personal

questions being asked when a clearance was

obtained in 1982. A clearance was granted.

If an investigation is expanded, the investigator

may ask questions about the individual’s

sexual orientation.

(continued)

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IV 

Civilian and Contractor Employee Concerns

Regarding Sexual Orientation

Discrimination (1976-94)

Agency

Date

problem

occurred Description of concern Agency’s comments

Navy 1991 The employee, a defense contractor, believes

the investigator asked unnecessary detailed

questions about sexual partners during the

investigation because the employee informed

the investigator of membership in a local

gay/lesbian organization. The employee felt

intimidated by the small, locked room where

the investigation was conducted. A security

clearance was granted.

If an investigation is expanded, the investigator

may ask questions about the individual’s

sexual orientation.

1992 The defense contractor employee believed the

investigator asked improper questions during

a security clearance update.

National Security

Agency

1987 The employee was an overseas defense

contractor. The employee believes sexual

orientation discrimination occurred because

coworkers informed security officials that the

employee was fraternizing with foreign

nationals. According to the employee,

investigators asked graphic questions about

the employee’s sexual habits. The clearance

was revoked.

If an investigation is expanded, the investigator

may ask questions about the individual’s

sexual orientation.

Directorate for

Industrial Security

Clearance Review

(DISCR)

1992 

1987 

1989

The employee, a defense contractor, believes

investigators asked improper, detailed

questions regarding sexual habits during a

security clearance update. The clearance was

administratively suspended, but the clearance

was reinstated based on recommendations by

DISCR.

The contractor employee did not inform

investigators about homosexual activities. After

appealing the case, a clearance was granted.

The contractor employee was advised of an

unfavorable security action because of

homosexual and other activities. The employer,

coworkers, and others—except the employee’s

spouse—were not aware of the activities.

DISCR believed the employee’s failure to

disclose this information reflected poor

judgment, unreliability, and information

reflected poor judgment, unreliability, and

untrustworthiness. A clearance was not

granted.

Note: These defense contractor cases were

identified to us by individuals familiar with the

cases, not the subject of the investigations.

DISCR is now known as the Defense Office of

Hearings and Appeals.

The Defense Investigative Service performs

background investigations for the Department

of Defense (DOD) civilian and contractor

employees. Defense agencies adjudicate and

make security clearance decisions for civilian

and contractor employees. DISCR reviews

contractor employee appeals, but civilian

employees appeal through the defense

agency or service.

Until 1993, DOD considered homosexuality as

sexual misconduct or deviant sexual behavior

indicative of a personality disorder. In 1993,

Defense Investigative Service regulations and

DISCR regulations were modified.

(continued)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IV 

Civilian and Contractor Employee Concerns

Regarding Sexual Orientation

Discrimination (1976-94)

Agency

Date

problem

occurred Description of concern Agency’s comments

DISCR (cont.) 1987 Investigators considered the contractor

employee subject to coercion and influence

based on the employee’s homosexual

activities. Supervisors and work associates

were not aware of the employee’s homosexual

activities. The employee’s security clearance

was granted on appeal.

Commerce 1981 The employee, assigned overseas, claimed

that the investigation was delayed. The

employee’s assignment to Saudi Arabia was

canceled when agency officials determined

the employee was homosexual. The employee

retained employment through litigation. The

clearance was retained.

At one time, Commerce maintained a list of

countries where homosexuality was

acceptable, not acceptable, or not

encouraged. It no longer does so. Commerce

is more concerned about the impact an

individual’s behavior might have on that

person’s ability to be trustworthy.

Energy 1992 The employee believes the investigator

focused on the employee’s homosexuality, but

did not address other issues such as the

employee’s being the victim of child abuse or

the employee’s alcoholism. The employee

believes that sexual orientation was used as a

reason for being audiotaped during an

interview in January 1993. A clearance was

granted.

OPM conducts security investigations for the

Department of Energy. In adjudicating

clearances, Energy requires mandatory,

audiotaped interviews of all employees,

regardless of their sexual orientation.

Justice 1992 

1991

The employee was required to sign a

statement confirming the employee’s

homosexuality. The employee believes the

investigator focused on the employee’s

homosexuality. Investigators also interviewed

the employee’s mother. A clearance was

granted.

The employee listed membership in a

gay/lesgian organization on the security

questionnaire. After the initial interview was

completed, the investigator called the

employee to set a time to ask questions about

the employee’s alternative lifestyle. The

employee believed the additional interview

was inappropriate. A clearance was granted.

Department of Justice investigations are

conducted by FBI investigators. According to

FBI officials, sexual orientation, per se, has

never been a disqualifying factor in

adjudicating trustworthiness for a security

clearance. Prior to March 1994, allegations

concerning sexual orientation could cause an

investigation to determine whether the conduct

would cause vulnerability to coercion or

influence.

The FBI requires a signed, sworn statement

whenever an employee is interviewed to

resolve issues or allegations that may affect

their trustworthiness. Such issues can include

unreported arrests, sexual misconduct or

notoriety (whether heterosexual or

homosexual), or drug abuse.

(continued)

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IV 

Civilian and Contractor Employee Concerns

Regarding Sexual Orientation

Discrimination (1976-94)

Agency

Date

problem

occurred Description of concern Agency’s comments

Justice (cont.) Family members are interviewed when the

investigation does not resolve whether the

individual’s sexual orientation is concealed,

which may be the basis for attempted pressure

or influence, and the subject of the security

adjudication indicates that family members are

aware of the sexual orientation. FBI

investigators are not, however, to ask

specifically about the employee’s sexual

orientation or conduct. Rather, the interview

should focus on the individual’s knowledge of

susceptibility to compromise.

FBI investigators can expand an investigation

and may need to reinterview the subject when

there are unresolved questions of

trustworthiness or suitability. However, as of

March 1994, investigators may not ask

individuals to declare their sexual orientation or

preference or ask persons being interviewed

to discuss intimate sexual acts. Prior to March

1994, FBI investigators had no written

instructions, although FBI officials told us the

unwritten investigative guidelines were the

same.

OPM 1990 The individual accepted a job at the agency.

The individual believed the investigator asked

intimidating questions.

OPM’s Investigator’s Handbook is being

revised. Investigators are not authorized to

question applicants or appointees concerning

their sexual behavior or attitudes concerning

sexual conduct.

Health and Human

Services

1991 The employee believes the investigator asked

detailed, embarrassing questions about the

employee’s sex life. A clearance was granted.

OPM performs investigations for Health and

Human Services employees.

State 1985 The employee claims State revoked a security

clearance because of the employee’s sexual

orientation, and the fact that the employee had

sex with a minor almost 10 years ago should

be forgiven.

State Department officials believe sexual

orientation was not a key issue in any of these

cases. According to State, other issues

surfaced, including unreported travel,

falsification of information, sexual relations with

subordinates, and fraternization with foreign

nationals. Heterosexual or homosexual

behavior with foreign nationals will prompt a

security investigation; however, State will

permit cohabitation with foreign nationals as

long as security officials are aware.

(continued)

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IV 

Civilian and Contractor Employee Concerns

Regarding Sexual Orientation

Discrimination (1976-94)

Agency

Date

problem

occurred Description of concern Agency’s comments

State (cont.) 1992 Security officials threatened to revoke the

employee’s (a foreign service officer) security

clearance upon receipt of a letter alleging the

employee had a homosexual affair. Security

officials called the employee to appear as a

source for a fraud investigation. Upon arriving

at the meeting, however, security officials

announced the investigation was about the

employee’s lifestyle. Investigators told the

employee that any allegation of homosexuality

will prompt an investigation. A clearance was

granted.

Until 1992, State security personnel asked

individuals to appear as witnesses or sources

for information to ensure the individuals would

attend the meeting. State officials told us they

used this procedure to protect individuals’

privacy if they were at post. According to State

officials, this practice has been discontinued.

In 1992, State curtailed the practice allowing

investigators (with the employee’s permission)

to contact a family member selected by the

employee to verify that the family member was

aware of the employee’s sexual orientation.

1989 

1993

Security officials asked the foreign service

employee to appear as a source for a fraud

investigation. Upon arriving at the meeting,

however, security officials announced the

investigation was about the employee’s

lifestyle. Security officials told the employee

that family members must be informed of the

employee’s homosexuality to prevent the

employee from being subject to coercion or

blackmail. The employee informed family

members and retained a security clearance.

The foreign service employee issued a visa to

a foreign national companion; this prompted a

security investigation that the employee

believes was unfair because a heterosexual

issued a visa to a foreign national family

member with no repercussions. A clearance

was retained.

State’s current (December 1992) policy is not

to ask questions regarding sexual conduct

during the preappointment or periodic update

investigation process. If an individual

volunteers information, the investigator may

ask if family, friends, and associates are aware

of the individual’s lifestyle, but the individual is

not required to inform family members.

State requires its investigators to follow up on

substantive allegations that the employee is

involved in illegal or exploitable sexual

conduct. Sexual misconduct is a security

concern if it involves a criminal offense,

indicates a personality disorder, or subjects

the individual to blackmail or coercion.

USIA 1976 The employee believes sexual orientation was

responsible for difficulty in obtaining a security

clearance in 1976, but the employee

eventually got the clearance.

Investigative procedures have changed much

since 1976. USIA policy is not to ask about

sexual orientation unless it involves foreign

service in a country that forbids homosexual

behavior.

1984 The employee’s clearance was revoked

because of unauthorized travel to and possible

fraternization with foreign nationals in an

eastern bloc country. The employee left the

agency and was rehired by another agency.

Concealment, regardless of sexual orientation,

is the only issue that concerns USIA security

personnel as it pertains to applicable laws and

policies in foreign countries.

USIA’s current 1993 adjudicative policies and

procedures provide that investigators should

not ask about sexual orientation.

(continued)

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IV 

Civilian and Contractor Employee Concerns

Regarding Sexual Orientation

Discrimination (1976-94)

Agency

Date

problem

occurred Description of concern Agency’s comments

USIA (cont.) 1986 The employee transferred from another

agency. The employee believes investigators

asked detailed, invasive questions about the

employee’s sexual behavior. A clearance was

granted.

However, if the subject volunteers this

information, investigators are expected to

follow up with questions regarding the

individual’s vulnerability to coercion because

of sexual activity.

1989 A coworker denounced the employee, a

foreign service officer, as a security risk

because of the employee’s homosexuality. At

the same time, the employee was undergoing

a security review. The employee believes

investigators asked detailed, invasive

questions about the employee’s sexual

lifestyle. The security clearance was retained.

Note: We did not include cases involving employment issues or sensitive compartmented

information clearances since these issues were beyond the scope of our review.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 15.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 15.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 16.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comment on DOD’s letter dated November 1, 1994.

GAO Comment 1. DOD has taken steps to ensure that sexual orientation is not considered

a determining factor in the security clearance process. It has drafted

revised adjudication guidelines and recently issued revised investigative

procedures. DOD believes the recent changes to its investigative

procedures should be sufficient to preclude inappropriate inquiry into

one’s sexual orientation. However, we are concerned that DOD’s

investigative procedures could be inconsistent with its adjudication

guidelines. The investigative procedures currently require investigators to

follow up on credible allegations of homosexuality, while its adjudication

guidelines focus on sexual misconduct, not sexual orientation. Thus, to be

consistent, it would seem appropriate that in the area of sexual

orientation, DOD’s investigative procedures should mirror its adjudication

guidelines. DOD indicated that by April 1995, it will conduct a review of its

investigative procedures to ensure sexual orientation is not an issue in the

clearance process.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of State

Now App.IV 

on pp. 35-36.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 36.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 38.

See comment 1.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comment on the Department of State’s letter dated

October 17, 1994.

GAO Comment 1. The technical corrections suggested by State were incorporated in our

final report.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VII 

Comments From the U.S. Secret Service

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Office of Personnel

Management

Now on p.2.

See comment 1.

Now on p.11.

See comment 1.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Office of Personnel

Management

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Office of Personnel

Management

The following are GAO’s comment on OPM’s letter dated November 9, 1994.

GAO Comment 1. The technical corrections suggested by OPM were incorporated in our

final report.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IX 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Now on p. 13.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 2.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IX 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix IX 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Customs Service’s letter

dated October 17, 1994.

GAO Comments 1. We believe that the Customs Service’s statement on concealment is

inconsistent with its policy that no individual may be asked to declare his

or her sexual orientation or preference and that no inference concerning

susceptibility to coercion may be raised solely on the basis of sexual

orientation. This issue, as it pertains to the Justice Department and the FBI,

is discussed in-depth on pp. 13-15 of our report.

2. With regard to the Customs Service’s concern about vulnerability to

espionage, we note that, historically, the chief motivating factor in

espionage cases is pure monetary greed.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix X 

Comments From the U.S. Information

Agency

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Now App. IV 

on pp. 36-37.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 7.

See comment 1.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix X 

Comments From the U.S. Information

Agency

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix X 

Comments From the U.S. Information

Agency

The following are GAO’s comment on USIA’s letter dated October 20, 1994.

GAO Comment 1. The technical corrections suggested by USIA were incorporated in our

final report.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix XI 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Now on p. 11.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix XI 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Now on p. 3.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix XI 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Now on p. 13.

Now on p. 16.

See comment 5.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix XI 

Comments From the Department of Justice

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter

dated December 2, 1994.

GAO Comments 1. We eliminated references in the report contrasting FBI guidelines on

sexual orientation with Justice policy and clarified our report to

specifically identify sections of the guidelines that raise questions. (See

comments 2 and 3.)

2. The FBI’s guidelines provide no examples where sexual orientation could

reasonably be thought to raise an issue of susceptibility to coercion.

Rather, the guidelines address instances where sexual conduct (e.g., a

sexual relationship with a subordinate employee, date rape, or public lewd

behavior) is relevant to suitability or trustworthiness.

Moreover, the requirement that volunteered information on an individual’s

orientation be recorded for use in determining the individual’s

vulnerability to compromise constitutes different treatment than that of

heterosexual applicants. The FBI guidelines on sexual orientation require

the assessment of a homosexual applicant’s vulnerability to compromise

solely on the basis of sexual orientation without any indication that there

has been behavior or conduct that would warrant further assessment. A

similar assessment is not required of heterosexual employees without an

indication that there has been behavior or conduct that could make an

applicant vulnerable to blackmail or coercion. Further, with the exception

of DOD, which has said it intends to, the other agencies in our review have

eliminated references to concealment of sexual orientation as a security

concern.

3. Applicants have no obligation to reveal their orientation because,

according to Justice policy, individuals may not be asked to declare their

orientation.

4. The FBI’s December 1994 letter to its field staff deals primarily with

guidelines for follow-up interviews with applicants when a third party

provides information about a potential vulnerability.

5. See comments 2 and 3.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
Appendix XII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David R. Warren

Thomas J. Howard

Elizabeth G. Mead

Leo G. Clarke, III

Jacqueline E. Snead

Office of the General

Counsel

Ernie E. Jackson

(709036) Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-95-21 Security Clearances
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