[Cite as State v. Codeluppi, 2012-Ohio-5812.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

CORRINE CODELUPPI 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 11CA010133 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

ELYRIA MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 2011TRD05695 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 10, 2012 

 

MOORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Corrine Codeluppi, appeals from the November 14, 2011 

order of the Elyria Municipal Court denying her motion to suppress. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} In August of 2011, Officer Ryan M. Young of the North Ridgeville Police 

Department stopped Ms. Codeluppi on Lorain Road for driving 53 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone. 

When Officer Young walked to the driver’s window of Ms. Codeluppi’s car, he smelled a strong 

odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the car. He confronted Ms. Codeluppi about the 

odor, and she admitted to being at two bars and having two drinks. At that time, Officer Young 

requested that Ms. Codeluppi exit the car to perform Field Sobriety Tests. 
2 

 

{¶3} Officer Young attempted to administer three Field Sobriety Tests on Ms. 

Codeluppi: (1) the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”), (2) the Walk and Turn, and (3) the 

One Leg Stand. 

{¶4} During the instruction phase of the HGN test, Officer Young reported that Ms. 

Codeluppi swayed toward and away from him. He observed that her eyes were red and glassy. 

He also observed lack of smooth pursuit, distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation, and the 

onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in both eyes. 

{¶5} Prior to the Walk and Turn test, Officer Young gave Ms. Codeluppi the option of 

taking off her high heeled shoes and performing the test in her bare feet. Ms. Codeluppi refused 

and testing commenced. During the instruction phase of the Walk and Turn test, Ms. Codeluppi 

could not stand in the start position, thus causing her to reposition her feet throughout the test. 

She also used her arms to maintain balance and repeatedly interrupted the officer while he 

explained the test. Further, Officer Young reported that she started the test three times prior to 

being instructed to do so. Finally, when Ms. Codeluppi was instructed to begin, she began the 

test on the wrong foot and did not touch “heel to toe on steps 3, 6, 8, and 9.” Officer Young reexplained the test and during her second attempt, Ms. Codeluppi used her arms for balance, 

walked casually, completely failing to touch heel to toe. 

{¶6} Again, prior to the One Leg Stand test, Ms. Codeluppi declined the offer to 

remove her high heeled shoes. During the instruction phase of the One Leg Stand test, she 

prematurely started the test twice. Then, after three attempts where she either lost her balance or 

failed to count, Officer Young terminated the test for Ms. Codeluppi’s own safety. 

{¶7} At that time, Officer Young arrested Ms. Codeluppi for operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated (“OVI”). Ms. Codeluppi was charged with OVI, in violation of R.C. 
3 

 

4511.19(A)(1)(a), and speeding, in violation of R.C. 4511.21. Ms. Codeluppi pleaded not guilty 

to all charges and filed a motion to suppress wherein she challenged the constitutionality of her 

arrest. 

{¶8} In her motion to suppress, Ms. Codeluppi asserted that: (1) the officer lacked 

sufficient reasonable grounds to effectuate a traffic stop and/or probable cause to arrest her, (2) 

the Field Sobriety Tests were not conducted in substantial compliance with National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) Guidelines, and (3) statements she made during the 

traffic stop were obtained in violation of her Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Ms. Codeluppi also requested a hearing. 

{¶9} One day prior to the hearing scheduled on November 15, 2011, the State filed its 

response to Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress. In its response, the State argued that Ms. 

Codeluppi’s motion should be denied because, pursuant to Crim.R. 47, it failed to state with 

particularity the respects in which Officer Young failed to conduct the Field Sobriety Tests in 

substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines. As such, the State contended that Ms. 

Codeluppi did not put it on notice by setting forth any factual basis for her challenge to the 

constitutionality of the traffic stop and arrest. 

{¶10} On November 14, 2011, after reviewing both parties’ arguments, the trial court 

denied Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress without conducting the scheduled hearing, and, 

instead, set the matter for a pre-trial. In its order, the trial court stated: 

[Ms. Codeluppi’s] Motion to Suppress is denied, at the [S]tate’s request, due to 

the fact it fails to state legal and factual bases with sufficient particularity to * * * 

place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues to be decided. * * * Case 

remains set for pretrial on 11/15/11 at 1:30 P.M. 

{¶11} On November 15, 2011, Ms. Codeluppi filed a motion for leave to file a 

supplemental brief in support of her motion to suppress, along with an affidavit from her 
4 

 

attorney, Joseph T. Burke. In addition, she simultaneously filed a supplemental brief and a 

motion for reconsideration. That same day, Ms. Codeluppi pleaded no contest to OVI and 

speeding. Based upon her plea, the trial court found Ms. Codeluppi guilty of OVI, and the State 

dismissed the speeding violation. 

{¶12} Ms. Codeluppi timely appealed, and raised five assignments of error for our 

consideration. For purposes of facilitating our discussion, we will address Ms. Codeluppi’s 

related assignments of error together. 

{¶13} Prior to addressing Ms. Codeluppi’s assignments of error, we will briefly address 

the State’s contention that there is no final appealable order in this case because the trial court 

never ruled upon Ms. Codeluppi’s motions for leave to file a supplemental brief in support of her 

motion to suppress and for reconsideration. “Typically, if a trial court fails to rule on a pending 

motion prior to entering judgment, it will be presumed on appeal that the motion in question was 

implicitly denied.” George Ford Constr., Inc. v. Hissong, 9th Dist. No. 22756, 2006-Ohio-919, ¶ 

12, citing Lorence v. Goeller, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008556, 2005-Ohio-2678, ¶ 47. In the present 

matter, Ms. Codeluppi filed the above-stated motions on November 15, 2011, and then, 

subsequent to filing the motions, entered a plea of no contest as to OVI and speeding. The 

record indicates that the trial court accepted Ms. Codeluppi’s plea and journalized a sentencing 

order wherein she was found guilty of OVI and the charge for speeding was dismissed. The 

record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the trial court was unaware of the motions filed 

prior to Ms. Codeluppi’s plea, or that the trial court intentionally left certain motions pending. 

Therefore, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court failed to consider Ms. Codeluppi’s 

motions. Rather, we conclude that the trial court implicitly overruled the motions and a final 

appealable order exists. See Lorence at ¶ 48. 
5 

 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

ISSUED AN ORDER DENYING [MS.] CODELUPPI’S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WITHOUT ALLOWING [MS.] CODELUPPI AN 

OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY IN VIOLATION OF RULE[S] 47 AND 12(F) OF 

THE OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 

{¶14} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Codeluppi argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by denying her motion to suppress without allowing her time to file a reply to the 

State’s response in violation of Crim.R. 47 and 12(F). An abuse of discretion “implies that the 

[trial] court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). We disagree with Ms. Codeluppi’s contention. 

{¶15} Motions in criminal proceedings are governed by Crim.R. 47, which states: 

An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion, other than 

one made during trial or hearing, shall be in writing unless the court permits it to 

be made orally. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made 

and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It shall be supported by a 

memorandum containing citations of authority, and may also be supported by an 

affidavit. 

To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the 

submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written 

statements of reasons in support and opposition. 

(Emphasis added.) However, this is a traffic case, and Traf.R. 11(E) sets forth the procedure for 

ruling on motions. Therefore, Ms. Codeluppi’s reliance upon Crim.R. 12(F) is misplaced. 

Traf.R.11(E) does not provide for the filing of a reply to the response to a motion, but states, in 

relevant part, that “[a] motion made before trial, other than a motion for change of venue, shall 

be timely determined before trial.” 

{¶16} In the present matter, Ms. Codeluppi filed her motion to suppress and the State 

filed its response. Upon reviewing the arguments made by both parties, the trial court 
6 

 

adjudicated the matter in favor of the State. Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that 

the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress without 

allowing Ms. Codeluppi time to file a reply to the State’s responsive memorandum. First, Ms. 

Codeluppi had the opportunity to make all arguments in her original motion to suppress. 

Second, Ms. Codeluppi does not cite any authority where a trial court abused its discretion by 

ruling on a motion to suppress, prior to allowing time for the filing of a reply, where both parties 

submitted their arguments to the trial court via written memoranda. Finally, the record does not 

demonstrate that Ms. Codeluppi requested to file a reply brief when she pleaded to the OVI 

charge. 

{¶17} Ms. Codeluppi relies upon our decision in State v. Dalchuk, 9th Dist. No. 21422, 

2003-Ohio-4268, to support her argument. However, Dalchuk is clearly distinguishable from the 

present matter. In Dalchuk at ¶ 5, we held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting 

the appellee’s petition to vacate his administrative license suspension (“ALS”), the same date it 

was filed, without giving the State notice or time to respond. We stated that “‘[u]ntil the other 

party has a reasonable opportunity to file a written response, there is no reasonable consideration 

by the court of the issues involved.’” Id., quoting State v. Diehl, 3d Dist. No. 14-89-30, 1991 

WL 44166, *3 (Mar. 25, 1991). 

{¶18} Here, unlike Dalchuk, both parties filed written memoranda setting forth their 

positions regarding the issue of whether evidence derived from the traffic stop should be 

suppressed. The trial court agreed with the State’s position and denied Ms. Codeluppi’s motion. 

Because both parties had an opportunity to make their respective arguments, we cannot say that 

the trial court’s denial of Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress, without allowing time for her to 

file a reply, was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. 
7 

 

{¶19} Accordingly, Ms. Codeluppi’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

DENIED [MS.] CODELUPPI’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WITHOUT 

CONDUCTING THE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED ORAL HEARING IN 

VIOLATION OF RULE [11(B)(3)(b)] OF THE LOCAL RULES OF ELYRIA 

MUNICIPAL COURT; [AND] RULE[S] 47 AND 12(F) OF THE OHIO RULES 

OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

DENIED [MS.] CODELUPPI’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY THE GROUNDS UPON 

WHICH THE MOTION WAS MADE IN VIOLATION OF RULE[S] 47 AND 

12(F) OF THE OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 

{¶20} In her second and third assignments of error, Ms. Codeluppi argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion by denying her motion to suppress (1) without conducting a hearing, 

in violation of Loc.R. 11(B)(3)(b) 1 of the Elyria Municipal Court and Crim.R. 47 and 12(F), and, 

(2) for failure to state with sufficient particularity the grounds upon which the motion was made 

in violation of Crim.R. 47 and 12(F). 

{¶21} Loc.R. 11(B)(3)(b) of the Elyria Municipal Court states, in relevant part that, 

aside from continuances, “[a]ll other motions shall be in conformance with applicable Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. Motions shall be set for oral hearing, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court.” 

{¶22} In the present matter, the trial court set the suppression hearing on November 15, 

2011. However, after reviewing the parties’ submitted motions and memoranda, the trial court 

 1

 We note that Ms. Codeluppi misstates the local rule in her brief as “11(A)(3)” and 

“11(B)(3).” 
8 

 

denied Ms. Codeluppi’s motion and converted the suppression hearing into a pretrial. Pursuant 

to Loc.R. 11(B)(3)(b), “[m]otions shall be set for oral hearing, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court.” (Emphasis added.) Although the trial court originally set a suppression hearing, in 

compliance with the local rule, it later denied Ms. Codeluppi’s motion prior to the hearing 

because it determined that the motion failed “to state legal and factual bases with sufficient 

particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues to be decided.” As such, 

the trial court did not violate Loc.R. 11(B)(3)(b) by setting a suppression hearing and later 

converting it to a pretrial through an order of the court. 

{¶23} Traf.R. 11(E) does not mandate a hearing on every suppression motion. Thus, the 

trial court is required to hold a hearing only when the claims are supported by factual allegations 

which would justify relief. (See State v. Jefferson, 9th Dist. No. 20156, 2001 WL 276343, *3 

(Mar. 21, 2001), quoting State v. Hartley, 51 Ohio App.3d 47, 48 (9th Dist.1988), for a similar 

proposition of law set forth in Crim.R. 12(F)). As such, “we review a trial court’s decision not to 

hold an evidentiary hearing under an abuse of discretion standard.” Westerville v. Sagraves, 10th 

Dist. No. 04AP-1126, 2005-Ohio-5078, ¶ 10. Further, as stated above, Crim.R. 47 provides that 

a motion “shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the 

relief or order sought.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶24} Here, the trial court’s order stated that Ms. Codeluppi’s motion failed to state any 

legal and factual bases to place the prosecutor and trial court on notice regarding the issues to be 

decided. Upon review of the motion, we agree that it generally sets forth numerous legal issues 

regarding probable cause, substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines in field sobriety 

testing, and possible constitutional violations. However, the motion fails to state with

particularity any factual allegations as to (1) how Officer Young allegedly lacked probable cause 
9 

 

to further detain Ms. Codeluppi after initiating the traffic stop, and (2) the respects in which 

Officer Young allegedly violated provisions of the NHTSA guidelines in administering the Field 

Sobriety Tests. 

{¶25} In State v. Zink, 9th Dist. No. 17484, 1996 WL 502317, *1 (Sept. 4, 1996), we 

examined the issue of whether Ms. Zink’s motion to suppress complied with the particularity 

requirement set forth in Crim.R. 47, thus mandating an evidentiary hearing on suppressing the 

results of her breath alcohol test. Ms. Zink argued that, pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 

decision State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54 (1994), her motion to suppress complied with 

Crim.R. 47 by providing “adequate information to identify the issues to be decided through a 

combination of general factual allegations and citations to relevant legal authority.” Id. In 

affirming the trial court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing, we stated: 

The State cannot be expected to anticipate and prepare to address every possible 

violation of Ohio Revised Code 4511.19(D), 4511.19(A) through (D) and Ohio 

Department of Health Regulations under O.A.C. 3701-53-01 et seq., without any 

clue as to which violation was alleged to have occurred. In addition, there must 

be some factual basis in the motion to indicate that there is some substance to the 

motion and not just a shotgun approach achieved by merely “wrapping the 

administrative code in a folder and filing it.” State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio App.3d 

822, 829 (3d Dist.1992). 

(Emphasis sic.) Shindler at *2. Further, we distinguished Zink from Shindler by noting that, 

although Ms. Shindler’s motion was “quite broad,” it “set forth seven separate paragraphs, each 

specifically stating exactly which particular statute, regulation, subsection and constitutional 

right she alleged was violated.” Id. Additionally, we mentioned that Ms. Shindler’s motion 

“also included many specific factual allegations pertaining to each purported infraction * * * .” 

Id. 

{¶26} Here, based upon the record before us, we conclude Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to 

suppress is more akin to Ms. Zink’s, rather than Ms. Shindler’s, motion. We acknowledge that 
10 

 

Ms. Codeluppi sets forth many legal issues and supporting authorities, however, when discussing 

the actual traffic stop, she merely states that “the testing law enforcement officer failed to 

instruct, conduct, evaluate, administer, and/or record the standardized field sobriety tests used in 

the within matter in substantial compliance with the NHTSA Guidelines.” This statement is very 

broad and it does not adequately put the State or trial court on notice of the issues to be decided. 

Therefore, pursuant to Crim.R. 47, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. 

Codeluppi’s motion to suppress without a hearing for lack of particularity. 

{¶27} Accordingly, Ms. Codeluppi’s second and third assignments of error are 

overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

DENIED [MS.] CODELUPPI’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THEREBY 

ALLOWING EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM AN ILLEGALLY EXTENDED 

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION TO BE USED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 

CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND CONVICTION OF [MS.] CODELUPPI, ALL 

IN VIOLATION OF [MS.] CODELUPPI’S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM AN 

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION, RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY, 

AND RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH, 

FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 

STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

DENIED [MS.] CODELUPPI’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THEREBY 

ALLOWING EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 

ADMINISTERED IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE NHTSA GUIDELINES TO 

BE USED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND 

CONVICTION OF [MS.] CODELUPPI, ALL IN VIOLATION OF [MS.] 

CODELUPPI’S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH 

AND SEIZURE, RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, RIGHT TO BE 

REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY, AND RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 

LAW PURUSANT TO THE FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
11 

 

AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 

ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶28} In her fourth and fifth assignments of error, Ms. Codeluppi argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying her motion to suppress because (1) Officer Young illegally 

extended her detention after the initial traffic stop, and (2) the Field Sobriety Tests were 

administered in contravention to NHTSA guidelines. Thus, she argues that Officer Young lacked 

probable cause to arrest her for OVI. 

{¶29} In its resolution of Ms. Codeluppi’s third assignment of error, this Court 

concluded that the trial court did not err in denying her motion to suppress. Therefore, Ms. 

Codeluppi’s fourth and fifth assignments of error are moot, and we decline to address the issue 

of probable cause. 

III. 

{¶30} In overruling Ms. Codeluppi’s first, second, and third assignments of error, and 

deeming her fourth and fifth assignments of error moot, we affirm the judgment of the Elyria 

Municipal Court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Elyria Municipal 

Court, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 
12 

 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CARLA MOORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

BELFANCE, J. 

DISSENTING.

{¶35} I respectfully dissent because I believe that the trial court was required to give 

Ms. Codeluppi the opportunity to actually respond to the State’s responsive filing rather than rule 

merely six hours after its filing. Furthermore, I believe that Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress 

was sufficient to put the prosecution on notice of the grounds upon which it was made, and, 

therefore, the trial court erred when it denied her motion without a hearing. 

Opportunity to Respond 

{¶36} The record indicates that Ms. Codeluppi filed her suppression motion on October 

4, 2011. That same day, the trial court issued a notice setting the suppression hearing for 

November 15, 2011, as well as a third pretrial. Notwithstanding the trial court’s issuance of the 

notice of hearing, the State did not protest that it did not have sufficient notice of the grounds for 

the suppression motion or the nature of the alleged constitutional violations to enable it to 

proceed with the hearing. In anticipation of the hearing, a subpoena was issued for an officer’s 
13 

 

attendance. For over one month, the State did not oppose the suppression motion. Then, one 

day prior to the scheduled suppression hearing, the State filed a “Response to Defendant’s 

Motion to Suppress” in which it “move[d] the Court to deny the Defendant’s Motion to 

Suppress[,]” and also was “seeking * * * sufficient particularity on the issue of alleged improper 

administration of field sobriety tests[.]” Notably, the infirmity identified by the State related to 

only one of the grounds set forth in the suppression motion, and the State did not address the 

remaining alternative grounds. In substance, the State’s “Response” was actually a motion to 

dismiss Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress, acting for all practical purposes as a collateral 

attack on the motion. Thus, Ms. Codeluppi was entitled to an opportunity to respond to the 

State’s procedural argument just as the State had been entitled to respond to her substantive 

arguments. See State v. Dalchuck, 9th Dist. No. 21422, 2003-Ohio-4268, ¶ 5 (“Until the other 

party has a reasonable opportunity to file a written response, there is no reasonable consideration 

by the court of the issues involved.”) (Internal quotations and citation omitted.). However, the 

trial court acted upon the State’s filing just hours after it was filed. Given the circumstances, I 

disagree with the majority’s assertion that this was a situation where “both parties had an 

opportunity to make their respective arguments[.]” 

{¶37} Ironically, although the State claimed that Ms. Codeluppi’s motion was not 

specific enough, the State’s responsive filing could be said to suffer from the same deficiency 

given its broad and nonspecific assertion that the suppression motion was deficient. In its 

response, the State did not truly explain why it could not discern Ms. Codeluppi’s grounds for 

the motion. The State merely asserted that her “Motion to Suppress states only that the field 

sobriety tests were not administered in strict compliance NHTSA guidelines[]” and that “specific 

alleged violations were not noted giving no factual basis for the overly broad allegation.” The 
14 

 

remainder of the State’s response contains a lengthy discussion of legal precedent regarding 

“‘shotgun’ motion[s.]”2

 The vague nature of the State’s filing makes the trial court’s immediate 

ruling even more problematic given that Ms. Codeluppi should have, at the very least, been 

afforded the opportunity to point out the need for clarification of the State’s reasoning, not to 

mention challenge the fact that the State never addressed or recognized the multiple grounds in 

her motion. 

{¶38} Our system of justice is founded upon the principle of due process, which 

includes notice, an opportunity to be heard, and fair play among litigants. See, e.g., Cleveland 

Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due process is 

that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 

appropriate to the nature of the case.”) (Internal quotations and citations omitted.). Ms. 

Codeluppi’s motion sat unopposed for over thirty days and was not met with opposition until the 

day before the scheduled suppression hearing. When the State responded, the trial court acted 

upon the State’s filing within hours, thus depriving Ms. Codeluppi of any reasonable opportunity 

to provide a response to the issues raised by the State. Under the circumstances of this case, Ms. 

Codeluppi should have been afforded the opportunity to respond to the State’s filing, and, 

therefore, I would sustain her first assignment of error. 

Sufficiency of Motion to Suppress 

{¶39} However, even assuming the trial court did not commit reversible error by 

depriving Ms. Codeluppi of the opportunity to respond to the State’s filing, I believe its 

determination that her motion was not stated with sufficient particularity is also erroneous. 

 2

 In fact, it could be said that the State’s motion closely resembles a boilerplate response 

as it contains no facts concerning the case and does not even address three of the four grounds 

upon which Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress was based. 
15 

 

Standard of Review 

{¶40} Before addressing whether Ms. Codeluppi provided the prosecution with 

sufficient notice of the grounds upon which she sought to suppress in accordance with Crim.R. 

47 and the principles enunciated in State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54 (1994), I question the 

majority’s employment of an abuse of discretion standard of review with respect to the initial 

determination of the sufficiency of the motion under Crim.R. 47. Notably, the Shindler Court 

did not review the sufficiency of the motion under an abuse of discretion standard, rather, the 

court appeared to review the sufficiency of the motion de novo.3

 

{¶41} The majority relies in part upon Westerville v. Sagraves, 10th Dist. No. 04AP1126, 2005-Ohio-5078, which reasoned that, because Crim. R. 12 does not require a hearing on 

every motion to suppress, the court’s decision not to hold a hearing is reviewed under an abuse 

of discretion standard. However, many of the cases relied upon in Sagraves only apply the 

abuse of discretion standard where the motion does not contain any factual allegations at all. 

See Sagraves at ¶ 10. See, e.g., State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio App.3d 822, 830 (3d Dist.1992) 

(“Where the motion does not contain factual allegations justifying relief, the trial court has 

discretion to deny the motion without hearing.”) (Empahsis added.); Solon v. Mallion, 10 Ohio 

App.3d 130, 132 (8th Dist.1983) (“The defense motion here did not contain any such factual 

allegation, so the court had discretion to deny the motion without any further hearing.”).4

 In 

 3 Shindler expressly recognizes that, if a motion to suppress is sufficient under Crim.R. 

47, the trial court is required to hold a hearing. See id. at syllabus. Thus, any discretion 

regarding the decision to hold a hearing arises only after a court makes the threshold legal 

determination that the motion is not sufficiently particular under Crim.R. 47. 

4 Sagraves also relies upon State v. Gozdan, 7th Dist. No. 03 CA 792, 2004–Ohio–3209, 

and State v. Miller, 1st Dist. Nos. C-930290, C-930291, 1994 WL 79590 (Mar. 16, 1994). 

However, Gozdan, like Sagraves, misstates Mallion. Gozdan at ¶ 6. Miller similarly misapplies 

State v. Kuzma, 11th Dist. No. 93-P-0019, 1993 WL 545129 (Dec. 3, 1993 because Kuzma
16 

 

contrast to those cases, in this case, the motion did contain factual allegations. However, 

irrespective of which standard of review is applied, I would find that the trial court committed 

reversible error because Ms. Codeluppi’s motion was sufficient under Crim.R. 47. 

Sufficiency of Motion 

{¶42} In Shindler, the motion to suppress “challenged the admission of [the defendant’s] 

breathalyzer test results on the basis of specific regulations and constitutional amendments she 

believed were violated.” Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d at 57. Nothing in Shindler indicates that the 

defendant provided any additional factual support for her allegations regarding violations of the 

administrative code.5

 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of 

appeals that the defendant’s motion to suppress satisfied the particularity requirement of Crim.R. 

47. Id. at 58. 

{¶43} In this case, Ms. Codeluppi filed a 10-page motion and memorandum in support 

of her motion setting forth the specific grounds she sought to suppress evidence. In her motion 

to suppress, she alleged, in pertinent part for purposes of this appeal, as follows: 

The law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant and 

thus any evidence obtained as a result thereof is the fruit of an unconstitutional 

search and seizure in violation of the rights guaranteed the Defendant by the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 

I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. 

[]The standardized Field Sobriety Tests were not conducted in substantial 

compliance with NHTSA guidelines. 

 

provides that “[a] trial court has discretion to deny a suppression motion without hearing where 

the motion fails to comply with the dictates of Crim.R. 47.” (Emphasis added.) Kuzma at *3.

5

 The discussion of factual support in Shindler is limited to the memorandum giving 

support to the defendant’s allegation that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the 

traffic stop. Id. at 57. Of course, an allegation that an officer “was not licensed to operate the 

instrument analyzing the Defendant’s alcohol level nor was he supervised by a senior operator in 

accordance with O.A.C. 3701–53–07” is itself both a factual and legal assertion. Id. at 55, 57. 
17 

 

In her memorandum in support of her motion to suppress, Ms. Codeluppi asserted that Officer 

Ryan Young requested that she perform the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn 

test, and the one-legged-stand test. Ms. Codeluppi argued that the officer lacked probable cause 

to arrest her because he failed to perform the field sobriety test in compliance with NHTSA as 

required by R.C. 4511.19(D)(b)(4) and asserted that her arrest was “[b]ased on her 

performance[]” in the field sobriety tests. Thus, Ms. Codeluppi’s motion contained both factual 

assertions and legal authority in support of her motion. 

{¶44} This case is clearly distinguishable from State v. Zink, 9th Dist. No. 17484, 1996 

WL 502317 (Sept. 4, 1996), upon which the majority relies.6

 In that case, this Court stated, “The 

State cannot be expected to anticipate and prepare to address every possible violation of Ohio 

Revised Code 4511.19(D), 4511.191(A) through (D) and Ohio Department of Health 

Regulations under O.A.C. 3701-53-01 et seq., without any clue as to which violation was alleged 

to have occurred.” (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis sic.) Id. at *2. Far from the motion to 

suppress in Zink, which broadly alleged violations of R.C. 4511.19(D), R.C. 4511.191(A)-(D), 

and OAC 3701-53-01 et seq, Ms. Codeluppi narrowly alleged that the officer had not conducted 

the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, or the one-legged-stand test in 

substantial compliance with NHTSA as required by R.C. 4511.19(D)(b)(4). In other words, as in 

Shindler, she specifically asserted the code section (R.C. 4511.19(D)(b)(4)), the standards that 

had not been met (NHTSA), and even the specific tests she was challenging. The State could 

 6

 Notably, the trial court in Zink conducted a hearing on the portion of the defendant’s 

suppression motion challenging the grounds for the traffic stop and probable cause. Id. at *1. It 

denied a hearing only on the portion of the motion concerning lack of compliance with the 

entirety of various provisions of the Ohio Revised Code and the administrative code. Id. 
18 

 

have had no doubt what the basis for Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress was.7 However, even 

assuming that the portions of Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress referenced above did not 

satisfy the particularity requirement of Crim.R. 47, she also specifically argued that the tests 

were invalid because 

1) The tests were administered under duress resulting in the Defendant’s 

emotional and/or physical condition (independent of alcohol) affecting the 

Defendant’s ability to perform the field sobriety tests; 

2) The tests were administered under difficult environmental conditions; 

3) The officer’s analysis of the Defendant’s performance on these tests was 

biased[,] resulting in inaccurate recording at the police station. 

In other words, Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress at the very least specifically alleged that 

Officer Young failed to properly conduct the field sobriety tests because they were administered 

under improper conditions, both environmental and due to her own mental and physical 

condition. 

{¶45} It is important to remember that 

[a] defendant has a short window of time in which to file the motion or face a 

waiver. Until discovery is complete, counsel will likely not have sufficient 

information to fully explore potential grounds. Even after it is concluded, the 

defense may still lack some information necessary to explore and pursue all 

potential grounds. As [an] example, in the case of field sobriety tests, few 

defendants will be conversant enough to inform counsel of the exact details in 

which the tests were administered so as to expose any defects. Unless a video has 

been made, and preserved, of the test administration, the attorney will likely not 

be in a position to learn the deficiencies in the administration of the test until there 

is an opportunity to question the officer on the stand. 

Weiler and Weiler, Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law, Section 9:13 (2012-2013 Ed.). In 

light of the constraints for the filing of a motion to suppress, to require a defendant to file an 

 7

 Upon stating the grounds upon which suppression is sought, the State is then in a 

position to investigate the matter prior to hearing. Unlike defense counsel, it has easy access to 

law enforcement and can quickly obtain information concerning the circumstances of the traffic 

stop as well as the administration of field sobriety tests. 
19 

 

even more detailed motion to suppress than Ms. Codeluppi’s places an improper burden upon 

defendants who are essentially at the start of the case and may have very little information. See

Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d at 58 (recognizing time constraints attendant to suppression motions as 

well as potential waiver of constitutional issues). Crim.R. 47 sets forth a basic requirement that 

all motions, including suppression motions, generally contain the basis for which they are being 

pursued—a concept that is consistent with the notice pleading requirements inherent in our 

justice system. See State v. Slates, 9th Dist. No. 25019, 2011-Ohio-295, ¶ 74 (Belfance, P.J., 

dissenting) (“The holding in Shindler is consistent with the generalized pleading requirements 

that are basic to our jurisprudence.”). In my view, it is evident that Shindler stands for the 

proposition that the Crim.R. 47 sufficiency requirement is met where the basic factual and legal 

contours of the challenge are set out. Accordingly, I would find that Ms. Codeluppi’s motion 

satisfied the requirements of Crim.R. 47 and sustain her third assignment of error. 

APPEARANCES:

JOSEPH T. BURKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

TONI L. MORGAN, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.