United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1994 PEACE CORPS

New Programs in

Former Eastern Bloc

Countries Should Be

Strengthened

GAO/NSIAD-95-6

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-258632 

December 19, 1994

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Chairman, Legislation and National

 Security Subcommittee

Committee on Government Operations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton

Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe

 and the Middle East

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

As you requested, we reviewed the Peace Corps’ processes and

procedures for starting programs in Central and Eastern Europe and the

states of the former Soviet Union. Specifically, our objectives were to

determine whether (1) the Peace Corps’ new country entry planning and

staffing procedures were adequate; (2) the Peace Corps provided

volunteers adequate assignments, training, and other support; and (3) the

expansion into the former Eastern bloc came at the expense of programs

in other regions. To make this assessment, we visited Poland, Bulgaria,

Russia, and Uzbekistan.

Results in Brief The Peace Corps has comprehensive, sound written procedures for

planning, introducing, and implementing new programs and preparing

volunteers for entry into countries around the world. However, in its

eagerness to meet the mission set out by the President and the Congress to

help the former Eastern bloc countries, the Peace Corps truncated or

overrode its normal procedures and launched programs prematurely. As a

result, the Peace Corps faced serious difficulties that limited the programs’

effectiveness in those countries. The four programs we examined had very

difficult beginnings. The programs were poorly designed, and volunteers

did not receive the guidance, support, or well-conceived assignments they

were led to expect. The Peace Corps suffered a high rate of staff turnover

and early returns of volunteers. As a result, the programs’ developmental

impact in these countries was impaired.

Peace Corps officials acknowledged the problems and have taken actions

designed to overcome them; however, it is too soon to determine how

effective these actions will be.

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The Peace Corps programs in the former Eastern bloc were not

undertaken at the expense of programs in other regions. Funding and

staffing in other countries did not appear to be affected by the new

programs.

Background The Peace Corps was created in 1961 to help countries meet their needs

for trained manpower.1

 In addition, it was meant to provide a new

expression of U.S. character and foreign policy—an idealistic sense of

purpose and a means of countering the expansion of communism

throughout the world. It was anticipated that through contact at the

grassroots level, Peace Corps volunteers would help promote a better

understanding of the American people, who in turn would better

understand cultures of other peoples.

The end of the Cold War presented the Peace Corps with an historic

opportunity: For the first time, the countries of the former Eastern bloc

became open to Western economic and technical assistance. In July 1989,

the President announced that Peace Corps volunteers would teach English

in Hungary. Shortly thereafter, new programs were started in Poland and

Czechoslovakia, then successively throughout Central and Eastern

Europe. In December 1991, the Secretary of State announced that he

would like to see at least 250 volunteers placed in the states of the former

Soviet Union by the end of 1992. From 1989 through 1993 the Peace Corps

established 18 new country programs throughout Central and Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet Union.

During this period of expansion into Europe and Central Asia, the Peace

Corps also opened or reopened 20 new programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin

America.2

 Together, these new programs raised the total number of

countries served by Peace Corps to 93—an increase of 43 percent since

1989. These new country programs represent the largest increase of new

programs since the first years of the agency’s existence.

Peace Corps programs in the former Eastern bloc countries were selected

in consultation with the host governments and in concert with the

Department of State, which is responsible for coordinating U.S. assistance

1

The Peace Corps was initially established under Executive Order 10924, March 1, 1961. The Peace

Corps enabling legislation (22 U.S.C. 2501, et. seq.) was signed into law on September 22, 1961.

2

In the Peace Corps’ history, it has closed numerous programs because of civil strife or political

developments, as recently occurred in Rwanda, Burundi, Yemen, and Sierra Leone. Once a country’s

political situation stabilizes, the Peace Corps often reenters the country.

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B-258632 

to the region. The Peace Corps concentrated its development assistance in

the region in three program areas: the Teaching English as a Foreign

Language (TEFL) program; a small business development program, which

provided technical assistance in such areas as privatization, marketing,

management, and business education; and a program in the environmental

sector to promote environmental awareness and education.

During fiscal year 1993, an average of 665 volunteers served in former

Eastern bloc countries. The volunteers serving in this region are, on

average, older and more experienced than the average Peace Corps

volunteer. The average age of all Peace Corps volunteers is 32. The

average age of volunteers serving in the region is 37, with small business

development volunteers averaging 40 years of age. In addition, many of the

business volunteers hold advanced degrees and have significant work

experience.

The Peace Corps Has

Adequate Guidelines

for Starting New

Country Programs

The Peace Corps policy and procedures manuals describe numerous, often

interdependent steps for opening new overseas posts. These manuals are

generally comprehensive and sound and, if followed, should result in

effective programs. The Peace Corps’ Policy Manual, for example,

identifies the following as necessary steps:

• consulting with host country officials, assessing a country’s needs, and

determining which Peace Corps programs can best address those needs;

• negotiating agreements with host country officials regarding the Peace

Corps and host country services and support to be provided;

• recruiting and selecting country staff;

• establishing administrative support services, including obtaining office

space and medical and banking services;

• identifying and developing volunteer work sites;

• identifying and recruiting volunteers in the necessary numbers and with

the requisite skills to implement country program plans; and

• designing and conducting in-country technical, language, health and

safety, and cross-cultural training programs to prepare volunteers for their

assignments.

The Peace Corps’ newly developed Programming and Training System

(PATS) manual provides additional guidance for starting new volunteer

projects. This manual defines project criteria, field staffs’ efforts with host

country and other foreign assistance agencies to identify and define the

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B-258632 

scope of work for individual projects, and volunteers’ training, placement,

and support.

Peace Corps guidance also provides information on the sequencing of

various steps in the program development process. For example,

consultations with host country officials on a country’s needs should

precede an assessment of those needs; country agreements should be

completed and signed before the country office is established and opened

and staff arrive; and project identification and development and volunteer

training programs should be in place before the volunteers’ arrival.

Peace Corps

Experienced

Problems Because It

Did Not Follow

Procedures

In its attempt to quickly begin programs in Central and Eastern Europe

and the former Soviet Union, the Peace Corps often did not follow its

established guidance when starting its programs. Many of the steps

necessary to introduce effective programs were rushed, done superficially,

or not done at all. Consequently, many of the new programs we examined

were poorly designed and faced a host of other problems, including the

lack of qualified staff, the assignment of volunteers to inappropriate or

underdeveloped projects, insufficient volunteer training, and volunteer

support systems that did not work. These problems frustrated many

volunteers who had joined the Peace Corps to contribute to the region’s

development and contributed to a relatively high resignation rate among

the volunteers.

Program Designs Were

Poorly Done

The Peace Corps relied on consultants or staff who lacked adequate

cultural or language knowledge to develop sector plans. These personnel

were often under pressure to work quickly and did not have time to learn

about local conditions or cultivate a common understanding with host

country officials. For example, the Peace Corps assigned a staff person on

temporary duty from the Philippines to design its environment program in

Poland, even though the person did not know the language and had no

previous experience in the region. As a result, the program’s design did not

address Poland’s environmental goals or have much impact. In another

case, a consultant for the Peace Corps designed Russia’s Far East small

business program without traveling to the region to assess its business

situation.

Once drafted, sector plans were not systematically reviewed by senior

Peace Corps management officials on a timely basis. Peace Corps

personnel who normally provide technical support to country programs

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B-258632 

told us that they were usually left out of the review process. When reviews

did take place they were often cursory or were done after volunteers were

already in the country. For example, Russia’s small business project plans

were not reviewed by the Peace Corps’ technical support officials until

several months after volunteers were at their sites. These critiques

identified a number of gaps in the planning process, such as the failure to

identify assignments before volunteers were placed at sites. This later

turned out to be a critical problem. Finally, the Peace Corps’ senior

management did not formally approve country program plans prior to

their implementation.

We were told that the Peace Corps’ regional directors are ultimately

responsible for ensuring the adequacy of country program plans in their

regions and are given significant authority and autonomy to ensure that

their programs are effectively managed. However, they often did not carry

out this responsibility, and management oversight of the country programs

we visited appeared to be minimal. For example, the Peace Corps sent

small business development volunteers to Uzbekistan despite the fact it

had not developed a business program. In Poland, the small business

program designed and implemented in 1991 was not approved until 1994.

Peace Corps management officials told us that some newer programs

required greater management support from Washington than others, and

in February 1993, Washington staff began playing a direct role in managing

certain problem programs in the former Soviet Union. They said actions

taken included delaying the entry of volunteers into some programs to give

staff more time to prepare; making staff changes; and instituting initiatives

to strengthen training, programming, and staff support.

Insufficient and

Unprepared Staff

Peace Corps policy manuals require that programs be sufficiently staffed

in order to properly plan volunteer assignments and support volunteers at

their sites. However, the Peace Corps did not always provide adequate

numbers of staff to open new posts and did not assign sufficient staff to

countries once the programs were underway. Compounding the problems

caused by inadequate staffing was the short lead time the Peace Corps had

to prepare for the arrival of the large number of volunteers assigned to the

region.

The Peace Corps’ recruitment of staff for these new country entries was

reactive. The Peace Corps’ recruiting efforts largely consisted of sending

announcements of vacancies to a few publications and foreign affairs

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B-258632 

associations. The Peace Corps also relied on former volunteers and staff

from other countries to fill its staff positions.

The quality of the staff was uneven in Central and Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union countries. The Peace Corps often assigned staff that

had prior Peace Corps experience but did not have necessary language

skills. Also, some staff and consultants lacked the necessary cultural

knowledge and technical skills.

The Peace Corps’ staff training was also inadequate. Many of the staff we

interviewed said they did not receive any training until after they started

their assignments. In addition, staff we spoke with said that what training

they received after they started their assignments was too general in

nature and failed to prepare them for the particular challenges of their

posts. Many of the staff we met told us they had little knowledge of the

local language and culture before they arrived, which they said

significantly hindered their effectiveness.

Peace Corps staffing data indicates a pattern of shortages and turnover

throughout the region, as illustrated in the following examples:

• Country directors resigned or were terminated within the first year in 3 of

4 countries we visited and in 9 of 18 country programs in the region. The

Bulgaria program had four country directors and one acting director in a

20-month span.

• Three of the four countries we visited did not have an Associate Peace

Corps Director (APCD) for their small business programs until after the

volunteers arrived in country. In Poland, the small business APCD arrived

18 months after the first business volunteers arrived. In Bulgaria and

Uzbekistan, there was no small business APCD for 6 months or more while

volunteers were in the field.

• In Poland, the first APCD for the TEFL program was responsible for

developing assignments for 60 volunteers, when the normal staff ratio is

one APCD for approximately 30 volunteers.

• At the time of our fieldwork, many country programs in the region had

other staff vacancies, including positions in Russia and Uzbekistan that

had been vacant for over a year.

The Peace Corps gave several reasons for having insufficient staff. First,

the Peace Corps had already reached its overall staff ceiling established by

the Office of Management and Budget. Second, in some instances the State

Department restricted the number of U.S. personnel allowed into a

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B-258632 

country. For example, the Peace Corps was restricted to managing its

three Baltic programs—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—from a central

office in Latvia. Third, the Peace Corps had difficulty attracting qualified

candidates to fill a number of its staff positions.

Peace Corps officials attributed the high staff turnover to two factors.

First, the Peace Corps did not have enough lead time to recruit, prepare,

and place staff in the field before the volunteers arrived. Once staff

arrived, they had to accomplish too many tasks in a short amount of time,

which led to frustration and burnout. Second, some staff were not a good

match for their assignments and lacked the necessary skills and

temperaments for the job.

Problems in Providing

Volunteers With Support

and Well-Developed

Assignments

The Peace Corps did not provide adequate assignment programming and

other support for volunteers in the countries we visited. In many cases,

volunteer sites were not visited, assignments were ill-defined, and

host-country sponsors were not identified. Host country officials were

often uncertain what the Peace Corps’ goals and philosophy were, what

volunteers had to offer, and what the Peace Corps expected of host

country officials. In addition, sponsors did not provide what they

committed to provide, such as housing, office space, and counterparts,

because they lacked a clear understanding of their roles and had no

written agreements. These problems eventually led many volunteers to

change their assignments or leave the Peace Corps early.

Designing adequate assignments for its volunteers has been a

long-standing Peace Corps problem. In 1990, we reported that, worldwide,

many volunteers had no positions or were underemployed, were forced to

develop their own assignments, or did not receive host government

support—problems we first reported in 1979.3

 We recommended in 1990

that the Peace Corps establish procedures to improve the planning and

development of volunteer assignments and projects. In response to our

recommendation, the Peace Corps developed the PATS manual to improve

its programming efforts. The manual states that all sites are to be visited

and surveyed and that the roles and expectations of the local people

should be clarified 3 to 6 months before volunteers arrive for training. The

scope of this review did not include a worldwide evaluation to determine

whether the Peace Corps’ actions corrected the assignment problems in

3

Peace Corps: Challenges of the 1990s (GAO/NSIAD-90-122, May 18, 1990) and Changes Needed for a

Better Peace Corps (GAO/ID-78-26, Feb. 1979).

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other areas; however, site identification and development problems

persisted in each of the four countries we visited.

In Poland, over one-half of the first small business volunteers were moved

to new assignments because of insufficient staff work on site placements

and project design. These assignment problems have persisted, as some

small business volunteers of subsequent groups have had difficulties

finding meaningful positions. Volunteers assigned to work in the

environmental sector were largely unemployed because the Peace Corps

had not developed project plans that were accepted by Polish officials.

Volunteers assigned to teach English in secondary schools told us that

their schools had large numbers of skilled English teachers and that it was

hard to justify their continued presence in the schools.

In Bulgaria, half of the first class of small business volunteers left early

due to frustrations over their assignments. The centerpiece of the Peace

Corps’ small business program was to be the creation of regional resource

centers where volunteers would provide information and advice to local

businesses. However, the centers lacked local sponsorship and an

independent funding source. This left the volunteers unsupported and

forced them into fund-raising activities. According to the volunteers, office

equipment and supplies needed to set up the centers did not arrive until

some volunteers were already halfway into their 2-year assignment. Over

25 percent of the first TEFL volunteers had to be reassigned because

sponsors had failed to provide them adequate housing or teaching

positions. Although generally positive about their experience, many of the

TEFL volunteers we spoke with questioned their placements, since their

schools had large numbers of capable English language teachers.

The Peace Corps also experienced some of the same difficulties in Russia

that we saw in other countries. The main problem in Russia was a lack of

local government officials’ understanding of and commitment to the

program and the Peace Corps’ inability to provide volunteers with

business equipment and other support. These factors, coupled with

frustrations over undefined assignments and lack of housing, contributed

to the departure of 30 percent of the volunteers within the first year. Local

officials expected the Peace Corps to staff and equip sophisticated

business centers, speak Russian proficiently, and attract joint ventures.

When these expectations did not materialize, their support for the

volunteers declined. Nonetheless, according to the Peace Corps, local

officials continue to request more volunteers.

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Of the four countries’ programs we reviewed, Uzbekistan’s program

experienced the most difficulties. Half of the volunteers left the program

within their first year of service, and of the volunteers that remained, over

half had their sites changed due to harassment by the local population, the

lack of viable assignments, or the failure of sponsors to follow through

with commitments to provide housing. Many volunteers were sent to sites

that were not visited by Peace Corps staff. The Peace Corps failed to

design a business program, and the business volunteers were thus forced

to develop their own assignments. The TEFL volunteers were sent to their

sites in March—near the end of the school year—and had to wait until

September to start their teaching assignments. The TEFL volunteers’

situation was made worse when the preservice training instructor quit and

was not replaced. Some of the volunteers told us they were struggling

because they lacked the necessary technical training and experience to be

in a classroom. Many of the volunteers told us they had made little impact

because much of their time was spent finding a meaningful assignment or

adequate housing.

The size of a program also affected assignment programming. The Peace

Corps’ rule of thumb for programs is that each APCD should manage about

30 volunteers. The Poland and Hungary programs started with a ratio of

one APCD to 60 volunteers. Overall, the programs in Central Europe and the

former Soviet Union averaged over 35 volunteers in their first year.

Problems in Volunteer

Training

The Peace Corps’ procedures call for the training of volunteers so that

they can effectively carry out their assignments. The Peace Corps is

expected to provide information to volunteers before their departure and

intensive preservice training after they arrive in the country. This training

is supposed to help volunteers serve and work effectively and has four

components: language, technical, cross-cultural, and personal health and

safety. Language training is to provide volunteers with reasonable

proficiency to function effectively in their assignments. The technical

training strategy is to teach job skills within a cultural context in

conjunction with language and social customs.

Many volunteers said that their language training did not prepare them for

their assignments. The languages of the region are difficult to learn, so the

Peace Corps officials said they focused on improving language training in

the region. Nonetheless, most business and environment volunteers we

interviewed said that their language skills were not sufficient to perform

their jobs and the language training lacked job-related terminology. As a

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B-258632 

result, to perform their work, many of them were relying on interpreters.

Some of the volunteers we spoke with in Uzbekistan were trained to speak

Russian and Uzbek but were assigned to cities where the Tajik language is

predominant. TEFL volunteers fared better because they were expected to

speak English and did not have to rely on their language skills to function

in their assignments.

A common theme struck by the small business volunteers we spoke with

throughout the region was that their technical training had little relevance

to their assignments. The Peace Corps trainers taught basic U.S. business

practices, which were of little use to many volunteers who already had

degrees in business, accounting, and law and years of practical business

experience. These volunteers said they needed to know how to adapt their

expertise to local situations, but their trainers had no knowledge or

appreciation of local conditions. Some of the TEFL volunteers we spoke

with told us that their technical training did not prepare them for their

teaching assignments.

The volunteers we spoke with told us the cross-cultural training they

received generally prepared them for living and working in a new culture.

However, the volunteers in rural and small urban areas in Uzbekistan told

us that they were totally unprepared for the physical and verbal

harassment westerners, especially women, received. Many women

volunteers in rural and small urban areas in Uzbekistan were targets of

physical and verbal assaults, including beatings, fondling, and rock

throwing. As a result several volunteers left early. The remaining women

volunteers were relocated to larger, safer cities.

The Peace Corps had trouble providing support to volunteers once they

were at their sites. The main causes for the lack of support to volunteers

were the shortage and turnover of staff and the lack of adequate

resources. The unsettled staffing situation pressed Peace Corps missions

to operate in a crisis-response mode. This crisis mode did not permit

adequate time for dealing with volunteer issues in the field. Volunteers we

spoke with told us it was generally up to them to solve any problems

related to their assignments or living situations.

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Despite Problems,

Volunteers Generally

Believe They Are

Having Some Positive

Impact

Despite the programming problems and the lack of preparation and

support, many volunteers told us that they were often able to find

meaningful work on their own initiative and generally believed they were

making some positive impact. Also, according to several U.S. assistance

and private voluntary organization officials, volunteers are a low-cost

means to provide assistance to the region, and host country officials

appreciate Peace Corps support. Various officials said the region needs the

long-term technical assistance the Peace Corps provides.

Officials of other assistance agencies told us that Peace Corps volunteers

generally worked well with them. Since the Peace Corps has volunteers at

the grassroots level, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the

U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, and

U.S.-funded private voluntary organizations, among others, often relied on

volunteers to provide advice and identify suitable development projects,

exchange students, and business ventures.

Peace Corps’ Efforts

to Address Problems

in the Region

Top Peace Corps officials acknowledged that the agency had difficulties

introducing programs in Central and Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union and told us they are taking steps to address them. They said

they are taking precautionary measures to ensure better planning and

preparation for future programs and actions to address problems in

existing programs.

According to Peace Corps officials, the schedule for introducing programs

into the region was overly ambitious, both in terms of time to adequately

develop the programs and the funding and staff resources to support them.

They said that future programs would be more thoroughly planned before

their introduction and better supported when introduced. They also said

additional emphasis would be placed on developing individual volunteer

assignments and volunteer support programs.

In conjunction with this increased emphasis, the Peace Corps’ office of

Europe, Central Asia, and Mediterranean (ECAM) operations, which is

responsible for managing country programs in the former Eastern bloc,

recently clarified its planning, review, and approval processes and made

them policy. ECAM also plans to request input from technical advisors when

designing new volunteer projects and will develop program plans prior to

sending volunteers to a country.

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The Department of State provided the Peace Corps fiscal year 1994

supplemental funding, which was being used to stabilize new country

programs in the region. The funds were used to contract for additional

consultants to help strengthen ongoing programs, among other things. The

funds will also be used to place more staff in programs in the region. In

addition, a recently completed Peace Corps evaluation recommended

improvements in staff hiring and support practices, and a special

recruitment effort was underway at the time of our review to increase the

pool of small business staff candidates.

The Peace Corps was also revising and testing its overseas staff

development training curriculum and expanding staff training in the field.

Officials said the revised curriculum would be fully developed and

operational by April 1995. In addition, ECAM has hired additional staff to

increase the time volunteers devote to language training, is developing

additional language materials, and is making technical training more

specific to the country.

Peace Corps’

Expansion Into the

Former Eastern Bloc

Was Not at the

Expense of Other

Regions

The Peace Corps’ entry into the former Eastern bloc did not appear to

adversely affect staffing and financial resources for programs in the

African, Asian and Pacific, and Inter-American regions. During fiscal 

years 1990-94, the Peace Corps received incremental budget increases to

facilitate the start-up of new programs. In addition, in fiscal year 1994, the

Department of State transferred $12.5 million to the Peace Corps to

develop and stabilize its new programs in the former Soviet Union. For

fiscal year 1995, the Peace Corps has requested $11.6 million from the

State Department for these programs. Table 1 shows the Peace Corps

funding for fiscal years 1989-95.

Table 1: Peace Corps Funding

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Annual

appropriation

Transferred from

State Total

1989 $153.5 0 $153.5

1990 165.6 0 165.6

1991 186.0 0 186.0

1992 197.0 0 197.0

1993 218.1 0 218.1

1994 219.7 $12.5 232.2

1995 219.7 11.6a 231.3

aThis is the amount requested by the Peace Corps.

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According to the Conference Report on the fiscal year 1995 appropriations

act, the Congress expects that the State Department will transfer funds to

the Peace Corps to cover the full cost of its fiscal year 1995 operations in

the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

During expansion into the 18 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and

the former Soviet Union, the Peace Corps also started 20 additional

programs in the rest of the world and closed or suspended 10 programs,

for a net increase of 28 country programs.

From fiscal year 1989 through 1993, Peace Corps direct-hire staff

increased by 10 percent, from 1,071 to 1,183. Our review of staffing

allocations indicates that the African and Inter-American regions received

staffing increases of 4 and 9 percent, respectively, during this period, and

staffing in the Asian and Pacific region decreased by 10 percent. According

to the Peace Corps, if the new Europe, Central Asia, and Mediterranean

region and its new posts were excluded, the number of fully active posts

would have increased from 52 to 66, a 27-percent increase, and the direct

hire staff equivalent would have increased by 18, a 3.4-percent increase.

The Peace Corps’ Washington staff levels remained relatively constant

during this period.

As the number of Peace Corps programs increased during the period, the

average number of volunteers serving in countries worldwide decreased.

From 1989 through 1993 the total number of volunteers increased from

5,185 to 5,351 (approximately 3 percent). Thus, with the net addition of 

28 new programs, the Peace Corps added 166 volunteers. During this

period, the average ratio of volunteers to country programs decreased

from 80 to 57. (Twelve of the new programs did not begin until fiscal year

1993. Because the Peace Corps’ policy is generally to phase in the

agreed-upon contingent of volunteers over a 2-year period, 11 of the 12

programs had only half their volunteer contingents in place in 1993.4

 (See

table 2.)

4

The 11 countries were Madagascar, Zambia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan,

Ukraine, Russia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and El Salvador. In the 12th country, China, the full

complement of 18 TEFL volunteers entered in 1993.)

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Table 2: Average Number of

Volunteers in a Country Program in

Each Region Fiscal Year Africa

Asia and

Pacific

InterAmerican ECAM Worldwide

1989 76 67 100 0 80

1993 61 44 78 39 57

Change –15 –23 –22 +39 –23

Peace Corps officials attributed the reduction in the average number of

volunteers per country to factors other than the initiation of programs in

the former Eastern bloc. For example, programmatic assessments made

prior to 1990 had already suggested reductions of over 250 volunteers in

Central America and the Caribbean (Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala,

Honduras, Jamaica, and Haiti). Also, 600 positions became available with

the closure of three large programs (Liberia, the Philippines, and Zaire)

and the temporary suspension of 11 other programs for safety and security

reasons.

Recommendations Notwithstanding the Peace Corps’ earlier development of the PATS manual

and its current initiatives, we recommend that the Director of the Peace

Corps ensure that the written procedures are followed so that (1) program

plans are well-developed, (2) volunteers have received adequate

preservice training, and (3) viable assignments are in place before

volunteers arrive.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this project, the Peace Corps stated that its

programs in Central and Eastern Europe and the states of the former

Soviet Union have been a difficult challenge. The agency indicated that

some problems were attributable to unique circumstances in this region,

but acknowledged that it had brought some problems on itself. The

agency’s comments, which are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I,

discuss the steps the Peace Corps has taken recently in an effort to

improve programming, training, and staffing in the region.

Scope and

Methodology

We conducted our review at the Peace Corps’ headquarters in Washington,

D.C., and in Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, and Uzbekistan. To assess the Peace

Corps’ new country entry processes, coordination, and volunteer

assignment and support issues, we reviewed current and historical records

and interviewed numerous Peace Corps officials, including former officials

who were primarily responsible for opening new programs in the region.

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We reviewed Peace Corps manuals and policy documents and analyzed

budget, staffing, and volunteer data. We also met with officials from

various U.S. agencies responsible for coordinating assistance to the

region, including the Department of State, the Agency for International

Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Office of Management

and Budget.

We selected the Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, and Uzbekistan programs on the

bases of their differing sizes, dates of introduction, and geographical and

cultural diversity, and because of the countries’ differing stages of

development. Poland was one of the first programs in the region, and the

largest. Bulgaria was a smaller program, introduced after Poland. Russia

was the largest program in the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan was a

later entry, and representative of entries into central Asia. The four

countries were selected in consultation with the Peace Corps.

In each of the four countries we visited, we obtained pertinent documents

and interviewed Peace Corps staff, U.S. embassy officials, and

representatives of private voluntary organizations that worked with

volunteers. In each country, we interviewed a large number of Peace

Corps volunteers at their sites. We also visited several volunteers’ project

sites and interviewed the host-country people with whom the volunteers

lived and worked.

To determine whether the Peace Corps’ expansion into the former Eastern

bloc came at the expense of other regions’ programs, we examined budget

and staffing data and spoke with senior Peace Corps officials responsible

for managing those programs. However, we did not conduct work in the

other regions.

We conducted our review between September 1993 and July 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue

date, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we

will send copies to the Director of the Peace Corps, the Secretary of State,

the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the

Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be

made available to other interested parties upon request.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-6 Peace Corps
B-258632 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please call me

on (202) 512-4128. Major contributors to this report were David R. Martin,

Patrick A. Dickriede, Edward D. Kennedy, and Peter J. Bylsma.

Harold J. Johnson, Director

International Affairs Issues

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-6 Peace Corps
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-6 Peace Corps
Appendix I 

Comments From the Peace Corps

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-6 Peace Corps
Appendix I 

Comments From the Peace Corps

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-6 Peace Corps
Appendix I 

Comments From the Peace Corps

(711036) Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-6 Peace Corps
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