United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 2024 Decided July 26, 2024

No. 22-5170

ANDRES F. CABEZAS,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cv-00145)

Brian D. Horwitz argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Johnny H. Walker III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Brian P. Hudak 

and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Kenneth A. 

Adebonojo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 
2

Before: PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge: Andres Cabezas appeals 

the grant of summary judgment to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation on his motion pursuant to the Freedom of 

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for records relating 

to his conviction of receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(a)(2). While his direct appeal of his conviction was 

pending, Cabezas submitted FOIA requests for records under 

his name or any identifier assigned to his name. When the FBI 

failed after six months to produce responsive records in its 

possession, he sued. The district court granted summary 

judgment to the FBI, finding that it had conducted a reasonable 

search, properly withheld documents pursuant to the FOIA and 

the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and disclosed all segregable 

information, and summarily denied Cabezas’s motions for 

limited discovery and in camera review. Cabezas appeals,

principally challenging the adequacy of the search. He raises

multiple challenges, some without regard to statutory and 

procedural preconditions. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

I.

In 2017, Cabezas was arrested in an FBI sting operation. 

Following his indictment for online enticement of a minor to 

engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), 

he pled guilty on October 18, 2017, to receipt of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). He 

appealed his conviction and 151-month sentence to the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. While his direct 

appeal was pending, Cabezas submitted FOIA requests in May 
3

2018 to the U.S. Attorney General, the United States Marshals 

Service, and the FBI (Orlando Resident Agency) for records 

under his name or any identifier assigned to his name. His 

request extended to arrest reports, investigatory records, video 

tapes, telephonic recordings, and photographs. On June 25, 

2018, the FBI acknowledged receipt of his request and notified 

him of related administrative matters, including copying fees. 

After six months had passed and the FBI had not turned over 

responsive records in its possession, Cabezas filed suit on 

January 22, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia. He requested the court to declare that the FBI 

violated the FOIA and the Privacy Act, enjoin it from

continued withholding of responsive records and order the

release without delay, expedite the proceedings, and grant

other appropriate relief. Compl. at 3. 

On November 22, 2019, the FBI filed a motion for 

summary judgment on the grounds that the responsive records 

were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 7(A), which 

permits withholding of records that could interfere with 

enforcement proceedings, and that Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(C), 

and 7(E) also applied. Cabezas filed an opposition on April 27, 

2020, and a supplemental opposition on June 23, 2020. Six 

days later he moved to compel preservation of private email 

records that he alleged were generated from non-governmental 

email accounts in violation of FBI policy. By sworn 

declaration of July 22, 2020, the FBI replied that it had

“followed the records management policies and procedures.” 

Seidel Decl. ¶ 9 (July 22, 2020).

After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Cabezas’s guilty plea 

and sentence on December 5, 2019, United States v. Cabezas, 

797 F. App’x 415, 417–19 (11th Cir. 2019), the FBI 

acknowledged that Exemption 7(A) was inapplicable and that 

its “main argument for withholding records [was] moot.” 
4

Status Report ¶ 3 (July 14, 2020). In total, the FBI released to 

Cabezas 176 pages in full, 41 pages and two videos in part, and 

withheld 74 pages in full (of which eleven were duplicative)

under the FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions. The FBI also 

provided a Vaughn index describing each document withheld 

and the applicable FOIA exemption. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 

F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

On April 1, 2021, the FBI renewed its motion for summary 

judgment. Cabezas, in turn, filed a motion for summary 

judgment on November 15, 2021, and evidentiary motions for 

limited discovery and in camera review. The FBI did not 

oppose the evidentiary motions and instead conducted another 

search. In January and March 2022, the FBI made a 

supplemental release of audio recordings and photographs. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the FBI. 

Cabezas v. FBI, No. 19-cv-145, 2022 WL 898789 (D.D.C. 

Mar. 28, 2022). It found that the FBI had conducted a 

reasonable search and properly withheld information pursuant 

to FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(E), and the Privacy Act, 

and that the FBI had disclosed all segregable information. The 

court summarily denied the motion for limited discovery and

the motion for in camera review. Order (Mar. 28, 2022). 

Thereafter, the court denied Cabezas’s motion to alter or 

amend the judgment. 

Cabezas appeals the grant of summary judgment, 

challenging the district court’s conclusions that the FBI’s 

search was adequate and its withholdings justified by FOIA 

exemptions, as well as the denial of his motions for limited 

discovery and in camera review. This court “review[s] de novo

a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an 

agency which claims to have complied with FOIA.” Nation 

Mag., Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 889 
5

(D.C. Cir. 1995). By contrast the court reviews the denial of

the motions for discovery and in camera review for abuse of 

discretion. Montgomery v. IRS, 40 F.4th 702, 713 (D.C. Cir. 

2022); Cruz v. McAleenan, 931 F.3d 1186, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 

2019).

II. 

Cabezas challenges the district court’s findings under the

FOIA, not the Privacy Act. Of his multiple challenges, some 

are properly preserved for review. Others, however, are

forfeited by failure to be raised in his opening brief. Al-Tamimi 

v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Still others 

improperly attempt to incorporate by reference arguments 

presented in the district court, id., and this court will consider 

only those addressed in the FBI’s responsive appellate brief, 

see id. at 6–7. Our analysis addresses his challenges by subject.

The FOIA “was enacted to facilitate public access to 

Government documents” and “was designed ‘to pierce the veil 

of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light 

of public scrutiny.’” U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 

173 (1991) (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 

352, 361 (1976)). But “[w]hile transparency and government 

accountability are at the heart of FOIA’s mandate, Congress 

exempted certain . . . records from disclosure to protect 

important governmental and private interests in 

confidentiality.” Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 898 F.3d 51, 61 

(D.C. Cir. 2018). The FOIA requires agencies to disclose 

records upon request unless the records fall within one of nine 

exemptions, which are to be “narrowly construed,” Milner v. 

Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011) (quoting FBI v. 

Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982)), yet “intended to have 
6

meaningful reach and application,” John Doe Agency v. John 

Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989).

A.

To prevail on summary judgment against a challenge to 

the adequacy of an agency’s search, “the agency must show 

that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the 

requested records, using methods which can be reasonably 

expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. 

U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The 

agency must also provide a “reasonably detailed affidavit, 

setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, 

and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials 

(if such records exist) were searched.” Id. “Agency affidavits 

are accorded a presumption of good faith[.]” SafeCard Servs., 

Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). On the 

other hand, if the plaintiff provides “‘countervailing evidence’ 

as to the adequacy of the agency’s search,” Iturralde v. 

Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (internal citation omitted), or “the record leaves 

substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary 

judgment for the agency is not proper,” Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal citation 

omitted). 

The FBI submitted three sworn declarations from Michael 

G. Seidel, Section Chief of the Record/Information 

Dissemination Section, dated July 22, 2020, March 2, 2021, 

and March 11, 2022, and one sworn declaration from David M. 

Hardy, the former Section Chief, dated November 20, 2019. 

These affidavits were designed to demonstrate that the FBI had

made a good faith effort to conduct a reasonable search for the 

records Cabezas requested. The FBI initially searched the 

Central Records System index, which is “an extensive system 
7

of records” consisting of files compiled and maintained by the 

“FBI in the course of fulfilling its integrated missions and 

functions as a law enforcement, counterterrorism, and 

intelligence agency.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 12 (Mar. 2, 2021). The 

FBI used Cabezas’s names and identifiers: Andres Fernando 

Cabezas, Andres F. Cabezas, and Andres Cabezas, which 

resulted in locating material responsive to Cabezas’s FOIA 

request. 

In response to Cabezas’s argument in moving for 

summary judgment that it failed to disclose all relevant records, 

the FBI conducted an additional search of the Central Records 

System. It also conducted a targeted search of the Tampa Field 

Office, contacting the special agent who maintained Cabezas’s 

criminal file. These supplemental searches resulted in the 

release of additional records to Cabezas. Even though the 

FBI’s declaration about the Tampa Field Office search was thin 

regarding the identity of the custodian of the records, see Oral 

Arg. Rec. at 44:40–47:20 (Feb. 14, 2024), the affidavits 

described the FBI’s methodology for its searches, which 

databases it searched, and how the search method was 

calculated to locate responsive records. See Oglesby, 920 F.2d 

at 68. 

1.

Incomplete records. To the extent Cabezas contends that 

the FBI did not maintain “complete records” in the Central 

Records System, he overlooks records released in response to 

the supplemental targeted search in the Tampa Field Office and

refers to likely emails on a commercial server and records on 

his iPhone. See Appellant’s Br. 13. 

Cabezas incorporates by reference his argument in the 

district court that emails on a commercial Google email 
8

account used by FBI agents in his case should have been 

released, relying on an affidavit from a digital evidence 

forensic expert. His FOIA request was limited to “records 

under [his] name and/or any identifier assigned to [his] name.” 

FOIA Request at 1 (May 9, 2018). These email messages were 

“serialized,” (i.e., “assigned a document number in the order in 

which the document is added to the file,” Seidel Decl. ¶ 13 

(Mar. 2, 2021)), and released to Cabezas. 

With regard to messages exchanged with the undercover 

agents and contained on his iPhone that Cabezas argued in the 

district court should have been released, the FBI explained that 

these too were serialized into Cabezas’s case file. Seidel Decl. 

¶¶ 14–15 (Mar. 11, 2022). The FBI uncovered no other records 

during its reasonable search relating to Cabezas’s iPhone. Id.

¶ 15. In the district court, Cabezas had relied on the affidavit 

of his brother, Luis, who stated in a sworn affidavit after 

inspecting Cabezas’s iPhone, which the FBI had seized, that he 

was able to access the messaging screen but could not locate 

“any of the text message conversations involved in [Cabezas’s] 

case, nor the information [Cabezas] was asking for.” Luis F. 

Cabezas Aff. ¶ 23. The affidavit did not offer information on 

the substantive content. On appeal Cabezas does not develop 

the argument why there should be additional records before this 

court. “Mentioning an argument ‘in the most skeletal way, 

leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for 

the argument, and put flesh on its bones’ is tantamount to 

failing to raise it.” Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 6 (quoting 

Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 

2005)). 

2. 

Records not uploaded to files. Cabezas renews his 

argument that the FBI failed to upload all the responsive 
9

records to the Central Records System, stating that he “used the 

fruits of his discovery in his criminal case to show that the 

FBI’s records and record keeping policies were deficient.” 

Appellant’s Br. 20. The district court explained that Cabezas 

was conflating records in his criminal discovery and those in 

the FBI’s possession when it received his FOIA request. On 

appeal Cabezas neither explains why the district court erred nor 

describes what other locations might contain responsive 

records that have not been searched using reasonable means. 

B.

The exemptions. Cabezas contends that responsive 

records were improperly withheld under FOIA Exemptions. 

The FBI relied on Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C) & (E). Cabezas’s

challenge proves to be unpersuasive as to every exemption. 

Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or 

intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be 

available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation 

with the agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), and incorporates “the 

deliberative process privilege, attorney-client privilege, and 

attorney work-product privilege.” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. 

v. Sierra Club, Inc., 592 U.S. 261, 267 (2021). The FBI 

withheld two passages of a non-public “detailed operational 

plan containing information related to [Cabezas’s] arrest” 

under Exemption 5: Bates No. 122, for which the FBI invoked 

the deliberative process privilege and attorney-client privilege, 

and Bates No. 125, for which the FBI invoked the deliberative 

process privilege. Seidel Decl. ¶ 20(b) (Mar. 11, 2022).

The deliberative process privilege “covers ‘documents 

reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and 

deliberations comprising part of a process by which 

governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’” Dep’t 
10

of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 

U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 

U.S. 132, 150 (1975)). To fall within its protections, the 

document must be predecisional and deliberative. Sierra Club, 

Inc., 592 U.S. at 268. A document is predecisional if it was 

“generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter,” 

and deliberative if it was “prepared to help the agency 

formulate its position.” Id. The agency must also demonstrate

that disclosing the records would not foreseeably harm an 

interest protected under the relevant exemption by “concretely 

explain[ing] how disclosure ‘would’ — not ‘could’ —

adversely impair internal deliberations.” Reps. Comm. for 

Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 3 F.4th 350, 369–70 (D.C. Cir. 

2021) (quoting Machado Amadis v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 971 

F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). 

The FBI properly relied on the deliberative process 

privilege to withhold portions of an “FBI operational plan,” 

including material containing “suggestions regarding FBI 

operational strategies” and “memorializ[ing] communications 

with an Assistant United States Attorney . . . who . . . provided 

advice regarding investigative strategy related to [Cabezas’s] 

case.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 37 (Mar. 2, 2021). This material is 

predecisional. It was prepared prior to the specific operation, 

and it does not “reflect final agency decisions.” Id. The 

material is also deliberative. The FBI explained that the 

Assistant United States Attorney’s “recommendations and 

legal analysis were contingent on predicted scenarios that were 

only speculated to potentially occur.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 18 (Mar. 

11, 2022). The FBI further explained how release of this 

information could harm future FBI investigations by creating a 

chilling effect on the FBI’s employees’ willingness to share 

ideas and would damage the integrity of the FBI’s investigative 

plans and strategies. Seidel Decl. ¶ 37 (Mar. 2, 2021). 
11

Cabezas insists that the FBI improperly invoked the 

deliberative process privilege to protect “a fact-based arrest 

operations plan,” which has no relation to “agency [policy 

oriented] judgment.” Appellant’s Br. 14–16 (internal citation 

omitted). He relies on Shapiro v. CIA, 247 F. Supp. 3d 53 

(D.D.C. 2017). There the district court suggested that a draft 

Operations Plan on preparations for an American delegation to 

attend the funeral of South Africa President Nelson Mandela 

might not be deliberative. Id. at 63–64. Upon in camera

review the court concluded that the Plan was both 

predecisional and deliberative. Shapiro v. CIA, 272 F. Supp. 

3d 115, 118 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated as moot, No. 22-5144, 

2024 WL 1061322 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 2024). Given the nature

of the sting investigation of Cabezas and others, Cabezas 

provides no basis for this court to conclude that the FBI has 

mischaracterized the content of the material withheld under 

Exemption 5. The FBI’s sworn declarations state how the 

withheld records fall within the deliberative process privilege 

of Exemption 5. Cabezas points to nothing in the record to the 

contrary. See Watkins L. & Advoc., PLLC v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Just., 78 F.4th 436, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2023). 

The FBI also invoked two other FOIA Exemptions to 

justify redaction of personal identifying information for 

government employees and various third parties. Exemption 6 

protects from disclosure “personnel and medical files and 

similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(6). Because the text of “Exemption 7(C)’s privacy 

[provision] is broader than . . . [that] in Exemption 6,” U.S. 

Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 

U.S. 749, 756 (1989), the court need not “consider Exemption 

6 separately,” Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
12

Exemption 7(C) protects “records or information 

compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that 

the production of such law enforcement records or information 

. . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). It

requires the court to “balance the . . . privacy interest against 

the public interest in disclosure.” Nat’l Archives & Recs. 

Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004). The requestor 

must show that there is a significant public interest in the 

requested information and that the information is “likely to 

advance that interest.” Id. at 172. 

Cabezas does not challenge that the records at issue were 

“compiled for law enforcement purposes,” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7). Instead he asserts that the public interest in his 

case outweighs the privacy interests of persons whose 

information was redacted. Appellant’s Br. 13. In his view, the 

multiple instances of alleged misconduct by FBI agents during 

his investigation that he has identified would establish a

significant public interest in learning the withheld identities. 

Cabezas alleges that (1) FBI case agents “potentially destroyed 

iPhone records and evidence” and failed to upload these 

records to the Central Records System, Cabezas’s Mem. for 

Summ. J. at 18 (citing his brother’s affidavit); (2) in 2013 an 

FBI special agent used his home computer in violation of FBI 

policy; (3) another agent created a Craigslist posting on an 

unauthorized T-Mobile cellphone; and (4) the FBI’s attempt to 

return his cellphone while he was in prison constitutes 

misconduct because the iPhone was forfeited and in evidence. 

The FBI invoked Exemption 7(C) to withhold identifying 

information of FBI special agents and professional staff, an 

Assistant United States Attorney and other local law 

enforcement personnel, third parties mentioned in investigative 

records, a third party of investigative interest to the FBI, and 
13

an individual who provided information to the FBI in the 

course of the investigation of Cabezas. Each of these 

individuals has a cognizable privacy interest. E.g., Schrecker 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 

Nation Mag., Wash. Bureau, 71 F.3d at 894. Still, “where there 

is a privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) and the 

public interest . . . asserted is to show that responsible officials 

acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance 

of their duties,” information may be released if the requester 

“produce[s] evidence that would warrant a belief by a 

reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety 

might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174; see SafeCard 

Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1206. 

Cabezas maintains that the instances of alleged FBI 

misconduct were sufficient to overcome the privacy interests 

of an unspecified number of these individuals. Appellant’s Br. 

13, 18. He did not develop these claims on appeal, opting

instead to incorporate by reference his arguments in the district 

court. See Appellee’s Br. 32. Reliance on incorporation by 

reference to make arguments on appeal may not forfeit all of 

Cabezas’s claims to the extent the FBI has responded to some

in its appellate brief. See Appellees’ Br. 32–34; Al-Tamimi, 

916 F.3d at 6–7. But vague allegations and essentially “bare 

suspicion[s]” are not “evidence that would warrant a belief by 

a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety 

might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174; see Kowal v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 22-5231, 2024 WL 3418844, at *5 

(D.C. Cir. July 16, 2024); SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 

1206. Cabezas has not proffered such evidence.

Additionally, the FBI invoked Exemption 7(E) to withhold 

undercover communications used in the investigation of

Cabezas, the operational plan to which Exemption 5 applies in 

part, and the details of investigative databases and their search 
14

results. Exemption 7(E) provides for the withholding of law 

enforcement records that “would disclose techniques and 

procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, 

or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 

investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could 

reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The exemption “only requires that the 

[agency] demonstrate logically how the release of the 

requested information might create a risk of circumvention of 

the law.” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1194 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). 

Cabezas stated during oral argument in this court that he 

had challenged the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 7(E) in the 

district court and was now replying to the FBI’s brief. Oral 

Arg. Rec. at 6:43–7:40 (Feb. 14, 2024). He did not include an 

objection in his opening brief, however, see Al-Tamimi, 916 

F.3d at 6, and offers no persuasive explanation for his failure. 

On this record, Exemption 7(E) suffices to support the FBI’s 

withholding of details about an undercover operation, the

operational plan, and database information and search results.

Cabezas’s other preserved objections to the district court’s 

FOIA findings lack merit. For instance, as an example of the 

FBI’s inappropriate invocation of Exemptions 6 and 7(C), 

Cabezas speculates that the FBI withheld his given alias in 

documents concerning the indictment of an unidentified person 

in the Eleventh Circuit. Appellant’s Br. 21. The FBI explained 

that the redacted name is not that of Cabezas, but of a “third 

party of investigative interest.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 19(e) (Mar. 11, 

2022); see also Oral Arg. Rec. at 47:40–48:12 (Feb. 14, 2024).
15

C.

Change of agency position. Cabezas’s suggestion in his 

reply brief that the FBI has changed its position in this court 

regarding allegations of misconduct is not well taken. Judicial 

estoppel “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one 

phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a 

contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” New 

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting 

Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000)). The FBI

agreed with the district court that Cabezas “alluded to 

government misconduct but he fails to identify any specific 

misconduct.” Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Alter or Amend J. at 3

(May 6, 2022) (internal citation omitted). 

Cabezas’s view that the FBI “acknowledges that [he]

specified the alleged misconduct,” Reply Br. 8, shows only the 

FBI now describes his allegations as unsupported. The FBI has

not conceded that Cabezas’s allegations were of specific

misconduct. The FBI states instead that Cabezas alleged

“purported misconduct” was never developed in this court. 

Appellee’s Br. 32. This shows no inconsistency in the FBI’s 

position that would warrant application of judicial estoppel.

D.

Remand for findings. Finally, Cabezas seeks a remand for 

development of an adequate record on the ground that the 

district court abused its discretion by failing to provide any 

reasoning for denying his motions for limited discovery and for 

in camera review. He relies on Summers v. Department of 

Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Appellant’s Br. 

10. Unlike there, no such abuse of discretion occurred here. 

The reason for summary denial of his discovery and in camera

motions is self-evident in view of the district court’s reasons 
16

for granting summary judgment to the FBI. See 

Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 612 (D.C. Cir. 

2010). Given the evidence of an adequate search, see DiBacco 

v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and 

Cabezas’s failure to “provide ‘countervailing evidence,’”

Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 314 (internal citation omitted), in the 

district court or to proffer such evidence on appeal, a remand 

would serve no purpose.

Accordingly, the court affirms the judgment of the district 

court granting summary judgment to the FBI and the order

denying Cabezas’s motions for limited discovery and for in 

camera review.