2014 UT App 221

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

DAVID WAYNE GLASSCOCK,

Defendant and Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20120615-CA

Filed September 18, 2014

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Robin W. Reese

No. 111903576

Peter A. Daines and John B. Plimpton, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE

JOHN A. PEARCE and SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD

concurred.

1

ROTH, Judge:

¶1 After a bench trial, David Wayne Glasscock was convicted 

of aggravated robbery and possession of a firearm by a restricted 

person. The conviction hinged on an eyewitness identification 

and incriminating statements Glasscock made during an 

 

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by 

special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code 

Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 2 2014 UT App 221

interview with police. On appeal, Glasscock argues that the 

confession should have been suppressed because he was heavily 

intoxicated and police took advantage of his impaired condition 

by employing coercive interrogation tactics. He also argues that 

the eyewitness identification was unconstitutionally unreliable. 

Finally, Glasscock asserts that his trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance when he failed to challenge the admission 

of a prior felony conviction into evidence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 In May 2011, a young man (Victim) was standing outside 

of a community center in Salt Lake County when three men in a 

gray Dodge Stratus pulled over and parked nearby. One of the 

men got out of the back seat of the car, ran toward Victim, and 

put a gun to Victim’s head. The man asked Victim if he had any 

drugs. When Victim did not respond, one of the men in the 

Stratus told the assailant to hurry up. The assailant took Victim’s

backpack and got back in the Stratus, which then sped away. 

¶3 A woman who saw the Stratus drive off called 911. When 

police arrived, Victim described his assailant as ‚a white male in 

his early 40s‛ who was ‚wearing an eye patch.‛ Police located a 

gray Stratus and followed it to a gas station on North Temple 

and Redwood Road, not far from where the robbery took place. 

There were three men in the vehicle—Patrick Woods, a black 

male in his mid-twenties; Randall Cropper, a white male in his 

late twenties or early thirties with long hair; and Glasscock, a

white male in his fifties with long hair. Woods was driving, 

Cropper was in the passenger seat, and Glasscock was in the 

 

2. ‚On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the trial court’s findings,‛ and ‚we present 

conflicting evidence‛ only ‚to the extent necessary to clarify the 

issues raised on appeal.‛ State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, ¶ 2 

n.1, 76 P.3d 1173 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 3 2014 UT App 221

back seat. Police ordered the men out of the car and handcuffed 

them.

¶4 In the meantime, another officer drove Victim to the gas 

station and parked across the street. Using binoculars, Victim got 

a ‚clear view‛ of each man and identified Glasscock as his 

assailant. Police searched the vehicle, finding a loaded pistol 

under the driver’s seat and a short rifle and an empty vodka 

bottle in the trunk. Police then took Glasscock into custody for 

further investigation. 

¶5 During a half-hour interrogation, Glasscock initially 

claimed that he could not remember what happened because he 

had been in a ‚stupor‛—he was ‚toasted‛ from ‚eating Lortabs‛ 

for his broken hand and foot, and he had been drinking vodka. 

When pressed, Glasscock admitted that Woods handed him a 

gun and pressured him to approach Victim. Glasscock denied 

pointing the gun at Victim and also claimed he could not 

remember taking a backpack. But when police told him that the 

backpack had Victim’s homework in it, Glasscock admitted that 

Cropper had thrown the backpack out of the car before police 

arrived. 

¶6 Glasscock was charged with aggravated robbery and 

possession of a firearm by a restricted person, based on a prior 

felony conviction. He waived his right to a jury trial and moved 

to suppress the statements he made to police and Victim’s 

identification. 

¶7 At trial, Victim testified and identified Glasscock as his 

assailant. The State played a video of Glasscock’s confession, and 

the officers that arrested Glasscock and searched the Stratus also 

testified. In his defense, Glasscock raised the possibility that 

Victim mistook Cropper for him, arguing that Cropper had 

access to Glasscock’s eye patch and could have used it. 

Glasscock testified that he did not remember what happened the 

day of the robbery because, at the time, he had not been taking 

his medication for a mental illness, he was using heroin, and he

had drunk ‚about three-quarters of a gallon‛ of vodka. He 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 4 2014 UT App 221

claimed not to remember ‚robbing anybody‛ or ‚threatening 

anybody with a firearm.‛ And he explained that he had tried to 

tell the detectives what really happened during his interrogation, 

but they ‚basically forced [him] to say what they wanted [him]

to say.‛ According to Glasscock, he went along with the 

detectives only because he ‚was scared to death‛ after a ‚bad 

run-in with the Salt Lake Police Department back in 1987‛ and 

because he was ‚still intoxicated‛ but ‚was trying to maintain‛

so that he did not look intoxicated.

¶8 One of the detectives that interrogated Glasscock 

countered that Glasscock ‚seemed pretty good actually, all 

things considered.‛ And he testified that ‚compare[d] . . . to 

other intoxicated individuals‛ the detective had questioned, 

Glasscock appeared to be ‚in pretty good condition.‛ The State 

also introduced evidence of Glasscock’s prior felony conviction 

for attempted sexual abuse of a child in support of the charge 

that he was a restricted person in possession of a firearm. 

¶9 The district court denied Glasscock’s motions to suppress 

the confession and Victim’s identification and found Glasscock 

guilty of both charges.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 Glasscock raises four claims on appeal. First, he argues 

that the district court should have granted his motion to 

suppress the statements he made during the police interrogation 

because ‚the interrogating officers exploited his intoxicated, 

medicated, and injured state,‛ rendering his confession 

involuntary. We review a district court’s ‚ultimate 

determination of [the] voluntariness [of a confession] . . . for 

correctness.‛ State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 10, 984 P.2d 

1009. But we defer to the court’s underlying factual findings 

unless ‚they are clearly erroneous.‛ Id.

¶11 Second, Glasscock argues that Victim’s identification 

should have been suppressed because the showup procedure 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 5 2014 UT App 221

was ‚unconstitutionally suggestive.‛ The reliability of an 

eyewitness identification is a question of law, and we review the 

district court’s decision for correctness. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 

35, ¶ 28, 44 P.3d 794. 

¶12 Third, Glasscock asserts that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the 

admission of his prior felony conviction because ‚it was not 

admissible under the applicable rules of evidence and was 

prejudicial to Glasscock’s case.‛ ‚An ineffective assistance claim 

raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.‛ 

State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.

¶13 Finally, Glasscock argues that the cumulative effect of 

these errors deprived him of a fair trial. ‚Under the cumulative 

error doctrine, we apply the standard of review applicable to 

each underlying claim of error‛ and ‚will reverse only if the 

cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 

confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.‛ State v. McNeil, 2013 UT 

App 134, ¶ 16, 302 P.3d 844 (omission in original) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted), cert. granted, 317 P.3d 432 

(Utah 2013).

ANALYSIS

I. Glasscock’s Confession

¶14 Glasscock argues that his confession was involuntary 

because the detectives employed ‚coercive police interrogation 

tactics‛ to take advantage of his unstable mental condition, and 

he argues that ‚*s+everal of the [court’s] findings of fact‛ 

supporting the court’s denial of his motion to suppress ‚were 

clearly erroneous.‛ Specifically, Glasscock maintains that he was 

‚significantly impaired from alcohol, heroin, pain pills‛ and that 

‚he suffered from multiple disorders, including ‘bipolar Type I,’ 

‘post-traumatic stress,’ and ‘borderline personality.’‛ And even 

though the detectives ‚knew that Glasscock had consumed a 

number of impairing substances‛ that had ‚significantly 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 6 2014 UT App 221

impacted *Glasscock’s+ memory,‛ Glasscock contends that they 

employed a ‚false friend technique‛ and other coercive 

strategies that ‚basically forced [him] to say what they wanted 

[him] to say.‛ After carefully reviewing the evidence in the 

record, including the video of Glasscock’s police interrogation, 

we agree with the district court that Glasscock’s confession was 

not coerced.

¶15 ‚The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution protect individuals from 

being compelled to incriminate themselves.‛ State v. ArriagaLuna, 2013 UT 56, ¶ 9, 311 P.3d 1028. A confession is not 

compelled, however, ‚‘*s+imply because *a defendant+ was 

under the influence of drugs *or alcohol+’‛ at the time police 

questioned him. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 39, 272 P.3d 

769 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Howard, 532 

F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 2008)). And even if police are aware ‚of a 

suspect’s mental illness or deficiencies at the time‛ he confesses, 

that fact alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the confession 

is the product of compulsion; the defendant must still 

demonstrate that police ‚effectively exploit*ed+ those 

weaknesses‛ to obtain it. State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 18, 

984 P.2d 1009 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164–65 

(1986)). ‚In other words, the evidence must show that‛ police 

employed ‚coercive tactics . . . *and+ overcame the defendant’s 

free will.‛ State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998), superseded

by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Bowers, 2012 UT 

App 353, ¶ 15, 292 P.3d 711. 

¶16 To determine whether a confession was voluntary, we 

look to ‚*t+he totality of the circumstances,‛ including ‚both the 

characteristics of the accused and the details of the 

interrogation.‛ Arriaga-Luna, 2013 UT 56, ¶ 10 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Characteristics of the accused 

that may indicate a particular susceptibility to coercive police 

tactics include ‚the defendant’s mental health, mental deficiency, 

emotional instability, education, age, and familiarity with the 

judicial system.‛ Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). And details of the interrogation that may be relevant 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 7 2014 UT App 221

are ‚the duration of the interrogation, the persistence of the 

officers, police trickery, absence of family and counsel, and 

threats and promises made to the defendant by the officers.‛ Id. 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶17 For example, in State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 

1009, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a defendant’s 

confession was coerced where police made thirty-six false 

statements ‚about testimonial and physical evidence of [the 

defendant’s+ guilt‛ even though ‚they had no physical evidence 

linking *the defendant+ to the crime.‛ Id. ¶¶ 21, 45. The court 

noted that police used a ‚‘false friend technique’‛ to convince 

the defendant ‚that they were his friends and that they were 

acting in his best interest.‛ Id. ¶ 24. Additionally, police made 

‚significant references to *the+ defendant being charged with 

capital murder,‛ and they ‚strongly suggested that *the 

defendant] would not face the death penalty as long as he 

confessed to the crime.‛ Id. ¶ 29 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The court observed that the defendant was 

interrogated over a two-day period and kept in solitary 

confinement for twenty-two hours, id. ¶ 33, and that when he 

finally confessed, he offered ‚little information that was not first 

provided or suggested by the interrogating officers,‛ id. ¶ 40. 

And the court also noted that the defendant was vulnerable: he 

had ‚below-average cognitive abilities‛ and other mental 

conditions that made him particularly susceptible to the coercive 

tactics police employed. Id. ¶ 26.

¶18 Here, the district court found that Glasscock ‚was lucid 

and properly oriented‛ during his interview with the detectives. 

Although Glasscock’s answers evinced some ‚hesitation at first,‛ 

the court determined that he ‚voluntarily cooperated‛ 

throughout the interview. The court also determined that there 

‚was insufficient evidence of intoxication, mental defect, or 

coercion to justify excluding the interview,‛ so the ‚confession 

was fully knowing and voluntary.‛ At Glasscock’s urging, we 

have reviewed the video recording of Glasscock’s interrogation 

and find that the district court’s findings and conclusions are 

unassailable. 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 8 2014 UT App 221

¶19 Unlike the interrogation in Rettenberger, which involved 

multiple two-hour sessions and a twenty-two-hour period of 

solitary confinement, Glasscock’s interview lasted roughly thirty

minutes. The detectives engaged in several minutes of small talk, 

asking Glasscock where his accent was from, inquiring about 

why he relocated to Utah from Louisiana, and comparing the 

catfish in the two states. They also asked him for his birthdate 

and contact information, which he provided without hesitation. 

The detectives then advised Glasscock of his rights, and he 

affirmed that he was willing to continue the interview. 

¶20 For the next fifteen minutes, Glasscock offered vague 

details of his role in the robbery and blamed his spotty memory 

on alcohol, pain medication, and other drugs. However, his

recounting of how he came to be with his two companions, their 

travels over the hours before the robbery, and other aspects of 

their interactions was detailed and lucid. He admitted that he 

handled a gun that day, but claimed he did so only because 

Woods had handed him the weapon. When asked why he was in 

Salt Lake City, Glasscock told the detectives that Woods gave 

him a ride to run some errands before Glasscock could catch a 

bus back to Layton. But he claimed he had been in a ‚stupor‛ 

after taking pain medication and drinking heavily when ‚all of a 

sudden‛ he found himself lying in the backseat of a car 

‚surrounded by cops.‛ Without any prodding from the 

detectives, he also mentioned that he ‚ran into a Mexican dude 

today‛ that he initially thought ‚was one of the Romero brothers 

from the joint who had tried to stab‛ him. When he saw him, 

Glasscock said, he asked Woods to pull over, then ‚jumped out‛ 

and ‚was fixing to knock the dude on his ass.‛ But he 

apologized and got back in the car when he realized he was 

mistaken. When the detectives asked Glasscock if the man had a 

backpack, he claimed he could not remember because he was 

‚toasted‛ from ‚eating Lortabs‛ and drinking vodka. 

¶21 At that point, one detective leaned forward on the table 

toward Glasscock and began questioning him more aggressively: 

‚Listen. You robbed that guy of his backpack with a gun. Okay? 

That’s what happened. There’s no argument there. There’s no
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 9 2014 UT App 221

discussion there. That’s what happened. I want to know what 

was going through your mind at the time.‛ Glasscock continued 

to assert that he could not remember because he was ‚so drunk,‛ 

and he claimed that ‚one of the only things‛ he could remember 

was that Woods and Cropper ‚were pressuring‛ him to find 

drug dealers to rob. One of the detectives then suggested that 

Glasscock had mistaken ‚an 18-year-old kid who is trying to get 

his GED‛ for a drug dealer and stole his backpack, and ‚now 

[the kid] has to make up all that work because he can’t find his 

backpack.‛ 

¶22 When Glasscock continued to plead ignorance, one of the 

detectives informed him that the other two men in the car ‚seem 

like angels to us‛ because ‚they’re talking to us. You’re the only 

one who is playing this other card.‛ He continued, ‚Do you 

want . . . the courts to look at you as a cold blooded straight-up 

liar . . . or do you want to look like a guy who told the truth?‛ At 

that point, Glasscock admitted that Woods had handed him a 

gun and that he had approached Victim and asked Victim if he 

was ‚a dope dealer.‛ He denied taking the backpack, but 

minutes later admitted that he had taken it and Cropper had 

thrown the backpack out the window while police were 

following them to the gas station. Near the end of the interview, 

one of the detectives asked Glasscock if he was sorry for robbing 

Victim, and he said yes. 

¶23 Throughout the interrogation, there is no indication, other 

than his own statements, that Glasscock was significantly 

impaired or suffering from a mental illness, and Glasscock 

offered neither expert testimony nor medical records at trial to 

support his own assertion that several mental illnesses—and 

having gone without medication—made him particularly 

susceptible to coercive questioning. To the contrary, on the video 

recording of the interview, he appears alert, he has no difficulty 

understanding the detectives’ questions, and his answers are 

responsive and lucid. As a consequence, Glasscock has failed to 

show that the detectives had reason to believe that his drug use 

was as extensive as he had claimed or that there was any 

indication that Glasscock was so impaired that he was 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 10 2014 UT App 221

‚incapable of making a voluntary statement.‛ See State v. 

Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶¶ 39–41, 47, 272 P.3d 769 (concluding 

a confession was voluntary where, even though the defendant 

was intoxicated and on pain medication, the defendant did not 

exhibit any ‚truly bizarre behavior‛ that would have alerted 

police that the defendant was impaired). And even if Glasscock 

was suffering from the mental disorders he identified in his trial 

testimony, police are ‚not routinely required to inquire into a 

defendant’s medical condition prior to questioning him‛ absent 

behavior that provides ‚notice that *the d+efendant’s mental 

state warrant*s+ special concern.‛ Id. ¶ 40. Glasscock’s demeanor 

throughout the interview simply did not provide the detectives 

with any reason to question his mental stability.

¶24 Further, even if Glasscock were mentally impaired during 

the interview, Glasscock has not identified any evidence that 

calls into question the district court’s finding that there was 

insufficient evidence of coercive tactics that would have 

overcome his free will. Unlike the officers in Rettenberger who 

employed a variety of threats, made false promises, placed the 

defendant in solitary confinement for twenty-two hours, and 

refused his request to speak with his parents, 1999 UT 80, ¶¶ 21–

36, 984 P.2d 1009, the detectives’ questioning in this case was 

straightforward, built on Glasscock’s own statements and 

inconsistencies, and lasted only half an hour. The detectives did 

not misrepresent the strength of the evidence against Glasscock, 

make any threats, or falsely promise significantly more lenient 

treatment if he confessed. Glasscock has therefore failed to show 

that the district court was incorrect when it found that ‚*t+here 

was insufficient evidence of intoxication, mental defect, or 

coercion to justify excluding the interview.‛ As a consequence, 

we also agree with the court’s ultimate legal conclusion that 

Glasscock’s confession ‚was fully knowing and voluntary.‛ 

II. The Lineup Procedure

¶25 Glasscock also argues that his ‚due process rights were 

violated when the prosecution was allowed to introduce 

*Victim’s+ identification of him as the robber because the 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 11 2014 UT App 221

circumstances surrounding the identification were 

unconstitutionally suggestive.‛ In particular, he maintains that 

Victim offered a ‚fairly generic description‛ of his assailant that 

‚fits Cropper about as much as it fits Glasscock‛ and provided 

more specific details only after he saw Glasscock during a 

‚highly suggestive show up procedure.‛ 

¶26 The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution bars the 

admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications into evidence. 

State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶ 26, 44 P.3d 794. To evaluate the 

admissibility of an eyewitness identification, we examine the 

‚totality of the circumstances‛ to determine whether ‚the 

eyewitness testimony . . . is sufficiently reliable [so] as not to 

offend a defendant’s right to due process.‛ State v. Guzman, 2006 

UT 12, ¶ 21, 133 P.3d 363. The Utah Supreme Court has set forth 

five factors that guide this inquiry: 

(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 

actor during the event; (2) the witness’s degree of 

attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) 

the witness’s capacity to observe the event, 

including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 

whether the witness’s identification was made 

spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, 

or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 

(5) the nature of the event being observed and the 

likelihood that the witness would perceive, 

remember and relate it correctly.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (alteration in 

original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), holding 

modified by State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). After 

carefully examining the evidence in the record, we conclude that 

the district court did not err in concluding that the eyewitness 

identification in Glasscock’s case was sufficiently reliable.

¶27 The circumstances surrounding Victim’s identification of 

Glasscock are far less troubling than those in State v. Ramirez, 817 

P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), holding modified by State v. Thurman, 846 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 12 2014 UT App 221

P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), where our supreme court concluded no 

constitutional violation occurred. In Ramirez, an eyewitness saw 

a man with a gun ‚crouched near the end of *a+ building, 

wearing a mask over the lower part of his face.‛ Id. at 782. The 

witness viewed the gunman for less than a minute while another 

man with a pipe was ‚threatening and swinging the pipe‛ at the 

witness. Id. at 782–83. At one point, the man with the pipe ‚hit 

[the witness] in the stomach‛ while a ‚masked robber . . . 

point*ed+ a pistol at him.‛ Id. at 783. The witness identified the 

defendant as the gunman ‚thirty minutes to an hour after the 

crime‛ when he saw the defendant ‚on the street in the middle 

of the night,‛ alone, ‚with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence 

behind his back,‛ and the ‚headlights of several police cars . . . 

trained on him.‛ Id. at 783–84. The court noted that despite the 

‚blatant suggestiveness of the showup‛ procedure and the fact 

that the witness never ‚saw the full face of the gunman,‛ it was 

‚an extremely close case.‛ Id. at 784. Ultimately, the court 

concluded that admitting the eyewitness testimony did not 

violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. Id.

¶28 Here, the fact that Victim had a gun pointed at his head 

during the robbery likely affected his capacity to observe his 

assailant. But unlike the witness in Ramirez, who never saw the 

defendant without a mask and identified him during a 

‚blatant*ly+ suggestive*+‛ showup procedure at night, see id. at 

782, 784, Victim was assaulted around 2:30 p.m., was face-to-face 

with his assailant, and identified Glasscock as the robber less 

than one hour later in broad daylight. And unlike the highly 

suggestive showup procedure in Ramirez where the witness 

viewed the defendant all alone, handcuffed to a fence, and 

spotlighted, see id. at 784, Victim was able to see all three of the 

men the police apprehended in the Stratus—including Cropper, 

the man Glasscock claims may have committed the robbery. We 

therefore agree with the district court that Victim’s eyewitness 

identification was not unreliable and its admission into evidence 

did not violate Glasscock’s constitutional rights.
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 13 2014 UT App 221

III. Ineffective Assistance

¶29 Glasscock next claims that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the 

admission into evidence of his prior conviction for attempted 

sexual abuse of a child. He argues that the conviction ‚was not 

admissible under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence‛ and 

that the nature of the charge ‚allowed the trial court to look past 

the many troubling aspects of the State’s case.‛ To prevail on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Glasscock must show 

both that his trial counsel’s performance ‚was deficient‛ and 

‚that the deficient performance prejudiced‛ his defense. See 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We conclude 

that failing to object to the admission of Glasscock’s felony 

conviction into evidence was not deficient performance because 

the conviction was admissible, and Glasscock was not 

prejudiced by the timing of its admission because he was tried 

before a judge, not a jury. 

¶30 Glasscock is correct that rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 

Evidence bars the admission of bad acts evidence to prove a

propensity for criminal behavior. The rule is designed ‚to ensure 

that a defendant is only convicted because he committed the 

charged offense and not because the jury is convinced of his 

cumulative bad behavior.‛ State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, ¶ 24, 

62 P.3d 444. And it is certainly true that evidence of ‚a prior 

sexual offense against a child is particularly likely to suggest a 

verdict on an improper, emotional basis.‛ State v. Fowers, 2011 

UT App 383, ¶ 22, 265 P.3d 832 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶31 Here, however, Glasscock was charged with a second 

degree felony for possession of a firearm by a restricted person, 

which requires evidence that the defendant has a prior 

conviction for a ‚violent felony.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) 
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 14 2014 UT App 221

(LexisNexis 2012).3 Attempted sexual abuse of a child is a violent 

felony. Id. § 76-3-203.5(1)(c)(i)(W). When evidence of a 

‚defendant’s prior convictions *is+ relevant to establish an 

essential element of the crime charged, it is admissible at the 

appropriate time of trial . . . unless ‘its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’‛ 

State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1989) (quoting Utah R. 

Evid. 403). Here, Glasscock’s conviction was directly relevant to 

establishing an element of the unlawful firearm possession 

charge and was therefore admissible. And because the evidence 

was admissible, the only real issue for his counsel was the timing 

of its admission, something that Glasscock does not address on 

appeal.

¶32 However, even if Glasscock had addressed the issue, it is 

unlikely that he could have shown prejudice in this case. 

Glasscock’s central concern is that a factfinder would be unable 

to objectively examine the evidence pertinent to the aggravated 

robbery charge after being advised that he had a prior felony 

conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a child. We are 

certainly mindful that evidence that a defendant attempted to 

sexually abuse a child ‚may have an emotional impact on a jury 

that could suggest a decision on an improper basis.‛ State v. 

Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶ 40, 256 P.3d 1102. But this was a 

bench trial, not a jury trial, and the district court’s knowledge of 

a prior conviction does not raise the specter of prejudice to the 

same degree that a jury’s awareness would.4Indeed, ‚we have 

 

3. Because these statutory provisions have not been 

substantively amended, we cite to the current version of the 

Utah Code.

4. Glasscock has not argued that his trial counsel should have 

asked the court to bifurcate the trial, nor has he asserted that trial 

counsel should have stipulated that Glasscock committed a 

felony for purposes of the firearms charge to avoid revealing the 

(continued...)
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 15 2014 UT App 221

traditionally assumed that judges are capable of properly sorting 

and evaluating evidence presented to them and are much less 

subject to improper influence than a lay jury.‛ State v. Hallet, 796 

P.2d 701, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 

1993); see also Adams, 2011 UT App 163, ¶ 12 (noting that ‚judges 

in bench trials are presumed to be less likely than juries to be 

prejudiced by prior bad acts evidence‛). Glasscock has not 

demonstrated that the evidence of his prior conviction affected 

the district court’s decision in any material way. 

¶33 We therefore conclude that the failure of Glasscock’s 

counsel to challenge the admission of his felony conviction did 

not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidence of the 

felony conviction was admissible on the firearms charge, and 

because Glasscock was tried before a judge, admitting the felony 

conviction in the same proceeding as the aggravated robbery 

charge does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. See 

State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 86, 152 P.3d 321 (noting that to 

demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show ‚a reasonable 

probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had 

a reasonable doubt respecting guilt,‛ or in other words, the 

errors ‚undermine confidence in the *verdict+‛ (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

IV. Cumulative Error

¶34 Finally, Glasscock argues that the cumulative effect of the 

three errors he identifies should undermine our confidence that 

he had a fair trial. ‚Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will 

reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors 

undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.‛ State v. 

Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 25, 999 P.2d 7 (omission in original) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Having found no error, 

Glasscock’s cumulative error claim fails.

 

nature of his offense. We therefore do not discuss the availability

or propriety of either option.
State v. Glasscock

20120615-CA 16 2014 UT App 221

CONCLUSION

¶35 We affirm the district court’s decision denying 

Glasscock’s motions to suppress his confession and the 

eyewitness identification. We also conclude that Glasscock did 

not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, 

Glasscock’s convictions are affirmed.

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