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76–801 PDF 2002

S. Hrg. 107–207

RESPONDING TO HOMELAND THREATS: IS OUR

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED FOR THE CHALLENGE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

HOLLY A. IDELSON, Counsel

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

ROBERT J. SHEA, Minority Counsel

JANA C. SINCLAIR, Associate Counsel to the Minority

JAYSON P. ROEHL, Minority Professional Staff Member

JOHN T. DAGGETT, Minority Professional Staff Member

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1

Senator Thompson ............................................................................................ 4

Senator Cleland ................................................................................................ 6

Prepared statements:

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 37

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 38

WITNESSES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2001

Hon. Warren B. Rudman, Co-Chair, U.S. Commission on National Security/

21st Century ......................................................................................................... 6

Hon. Gary Hart, Co-Chair, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century ........................................................................................................................ 10

Hon. James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia

and Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic

Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction ..................... 12

Hon. L. Paul Bremer, III, Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism, U.S. Department of State and Member, Advisory Panel to Assess

the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons

of Mass Destruction ............................................................................................. 15

Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office . 17

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bremer, Hon. L. Paul, III:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15

Gilmore, Hon. James S., III:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Hart, Hon. Gary:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

Rudman, Hon. Warren B.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6

Walker, Hon. David M.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 17

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 53

APPENDIX

New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Major Themes

and Implications, The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security

Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century, by the United

States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999 65

Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert For Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, The Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security Strategy

for the 21st Century, by the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15, 2000 ........................................................................ 76

Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report

of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, by the United

States Commission on National Security/21st Century, January 31, 2001 .... 90

(1)

RESPONDING TO HOMELAND THREATS: IS

OUR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED FOR THE

CHALLENGE?

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Cleland, and Thompson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. I apologize to witnesses and to everyone in the room that we had to delay

the hearing because there were two votes on the floor of the Senate. If this does not sound, to two of our witnesses, Senators Rudman and Hart, like deja vu all over again, I would be surprised,

but I welcome all of you here this morning.

This morning, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee will

be considering a question of whether the Federal Government, and

specifically the Executive Branch, is adequately organized to meet

threats to the security of the American people in the 50 American

States. Today’s hearing complements the series of hearings that

the Committee has been conducting on protection of the Nation’s

critical infrastructure. It is, also, of course, a response to the terrible attacks on America that occurred on September 11.

My personal response to those attacks has probably been like the

response of most other Americans, most other members of Congress. I have gone from shock to anger to remorse to determination

that we must, together, do everything we can to make as certain

as possible that nothing like what happened on September 11 ever

happens again. The nature, scale, and motivation of the attacks

were unprecedented and so must be our response.

This Governmental Affairs Committee is primarily an oversight

and investigative Committee. What we must now attempt to understand is how this violation of our Nation was possible. In particular, we must ask the difficult question of whether our government did enough to protect its citizens. With the horrifying images

of devastation at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and in

Pennsylvania still fresh in our minds, the answer to that question

must, sadly, be no.

2

The purpose of these hearings, in one sense, is to make sure that

we never have to give that answer to that kind of question again.

After the attacks, the people who are our government did all that

was humanly possible to respond. We owe a tremendous debt of

gratitude to the firefighters and police whose courageous efforts

saved countless lives at the cost of so many of their own, to the

EMT personnel, and doctors, and nurses who administered aid to

the injured and dying, to the public servants who manned the crisis support machinery at all levels of government, managing priorities, handling logistics and making key services of relief and rescue available, to members of the military who were deployed to

guard against further loss of life, to elected leaders who brought a

sense of hope, unity, and purpose to a Nation stunned by this tragedy, including, most recently, the magnificent statement of American principles and purpose that President Bush delivered to the

Congress, to the Nation, and indeed to the world last night.

Our primary purpose here this morning is not to assign blame,

it is to prevent future attacks. Even before last week’s tragic attacks, we had important warnings that our government was not as

well-prepared to meet these new threats to our security to the

American homeland as it should have been. For that, we can thank

the dedicated efforts of at least two important commissions that recently looked at this issue: The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission; and the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction referred to as the Gilmore Commission, which have identified serious

deficiencies in our Nation’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and

prevent terrorist acts.

And, I am proud to say, we can also thank our own General Accounting Office, whose oversight committee this is and whose

Comptroller, David Walker, will testify this morning. GAO has

given us repeated warnings that are relevant to our agenda this

morning.

The chief members of the two panels that I referred to are with

us today: Senator Hart, Senator Rudman, Governor Gilmore, and

Ambassador Bremer. I should note that Ambassador Bremer was

also chair of another commission, the National Commission on Terrorism that, in some respects, laid the foundation for the work that

has followed.

Though they differ in their approach and recommendations, I do

see agreement between the Hart-Rudman and Gilmore Commissions on three key points: First, they concluded that there was a

growing threat of homeland attack and how painfully accurate they

have now been proven to be; second, that the Nation lacked a clear

strategy to prevent and protect against these threats; and, third,

that responsibility for homeland security was spread among too

many agencies without sufficient coordination.

In fact, current responsibility for addressing terrorism and other

homeland threats is diffused throughout all levels of government—

local, State, and Federal. At the Federal level, coordination, operational planning, and implementation are divided and subdivided

among at least 40 agencies, bureaus, and offices which spend over

3

$11 billion a year. Both commissions criticize this state of organization and offered recommendations to improve homeland security.

The Hart-Rudman Commission proposed the establishment of a

National Homeland Security Agency, an independent agency whose

director would be a member of the President’s Cabinet. The Agency

would be responsible for coordinating an array of Federal activities

related to homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management

Agency, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol,

and other entities that are relevant here would be transferred to

the new organization, which would be functionally organized

around prevention, protection of critical infrastructure, and emergency preparedness and response.

The Gilmore Commission went in a different direction, recommending the creation of a National Office for Combatting Terrorism. This new White House office would report directly to the

President and would be responsible for formulating antiterrorism

strategy. It would also coordinate terrorism policy and have some

influence over national budget allocations for antiterrorism activities.

I must say that I come to this hearing favoring the Hart-Rudman

approach, but I want to hear from all sides in this important discussion. I favor the Hart-Rudman approach because it seems to me

that creating a Homeland Security Agency has special merit. If you

want to get a job done, there is no substitute for having an organization with a budget and line, as opposed to advisory authority. Because in such a context, real people are responsible and accountable for making decisions and taking the necessary and appropriate

action. Within an executive agency, all of the policy, budget, and

programmatic activities can be integrated and focused toward very

specific programs and goals.

Now, as we all know, last night a funny and good thing happened on the way to this hearing about a National Homeland Security Agency. President Bush, in fact, endorsed such an idea. In fact,

he went beyond that and, by Executive Order, created a National

Homeland Security Agency with Governor Ridge of Pennsylvania

as its designated head with cabinet status.

This morning it is not clear what the contours, makeup and powers of that agency will be. I certainly look forward to having this

Committee meet with Governor Ridge and others in the administration to discuss this proposal, but I feel very strongly, though I

greet President Bush’s action last night as a welcome and significant first step toward greater homeland protection, that Congress

needs to pass a law, after deliberate consideration, to make this

Homeland Security Agency permanent because it is clear that we

crossed a bridge on September 11, and in a way that has not been

true for most of our history for the future as far as we can see. We

are going to have to be prepared to protect the American people as

they live and work in the 50 United States.

In the history of America’s Government, major organizational

changes have occurred during times of crisis. General Marshall

transformed what was a small peacetime Army in 1939 into the

planet’s most powerful military force by 1945, helping to bring victory in World War II.

4

President Truman’s realignment of our national security infrastructure in 1947 helped us successfully prosecute the Cold War.

More recently, the sweeping defense reorganization mandated by

the Goldwater-Nickles Act of 1986 was an essential factor in helping us win the Gulf War just 5 years later. Similarly bold organizational change is demanded of us now, given the events of September 11. This Committee can lead the Congress to that change,

and I hope and believe that we will.

I am very pleased to be working shoulder-to-shoulder on these

critical questions of national security with my friend from Tennessee, the Committee’s Ranking Republican, Senator Fred Thompson. I am proud to call on him now.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I cannot think of

a more timely hearing than this one or a more important one.

Speaking of coordination or lack thereof, as you know, both parties have conferences going on right now which will probably keep

some of our people away or some may be coming in a little bit

later. We very well may be discussing some of the issues we are

discussing here. You and I have discussed what Congress should

do, in terms of its organization or reorganization.

I would certainly appreciate our alums here commenting on

whether or not we need a select committee or a different committee

or what we should do about current jurisdiction. As you know, we

have jurisdiction over Capitol Hill, as well as the Executive

Branch. So I am going to leave briefly, and hopefully come back,

if that is satisfactory.

I want to start out by thanking the gentlemen at this table. I

think the whole Nation owes you a debt of gratitude. You have all

been telling us what we needed to hear for a long time. Our country, and I suppose maybe all democracies which are not interested

in matters of war or aggression or anything other than enjoying

peace and freedom, was a little slow out of the blocks. We have

been very slow out of the blocks here with regard to something that

you have told us should be the Nation’s number one priority. You

also told us that it is not a matter of if we get hit, it is a matter

of when we get hit. This is pretty serious business. You have been

steadfast. You have been voices in the wilderness for the most part.

We get these reports up here. They do not filter up to the Executive Branch, they do not filter down to the average person. They

show up; we have a hearing; three or four of us are around; or

maybe not. Maybe you get to page 16, in a report, but nothing really happens, even though we know it is a different world we live in.

We are dealing with different kinds of people than we ever have

before, and we have vulnerabilities that we have not had before.

We have let our guard down, as other countries have on other

occasions. Other democracies have done so after other wars. Ours

having been the Cold War victory. While we have enjoyed discussing and consuming our peace dividend, things have happened

around us that we have not responded to. I am very pleased, especially that the people we work with so closely on a daily basis, and

we inundate them with all of our little pet ideas sometimes, that

GAO has kept a wonderful focus on all of this.

5

I read their strategic plan, several months ago, and told them I

thought it was the best document that I had seen. Every member

of Congress ought to be required to read it, and this was in there.

It had to do with a handful of issues that are important, as most

of the things that we deal with up here are not. Of course, this is

No. 1.

I hope that, in terms of Senator Rudman, Senator Hart, and Mr.

Bremer, that we will be able to keep your services somehow, some

way, as we go forward, and continue to enjoy the contribution that

you have made to this because more expertise reside in you gentleman probably than anywhere else.

I was noticing, with regard to the counterterrorism organization

or lack thereof, staff pulled together some points here that I think

bring it home. who is in charge of these activities depends on a

number of factors, such as the nature of the incident and the perpetrator. For example, FEMA is the lead Federal agency in charge

of consequence management. The Federal Bureau of Investigations

is the lead agency for crisis management and for domestic terrorism events. The State Department is designated as the lead

agency for counterterrorism overseas. The Federal Aviation Administration is the lead for hijackings, but only after the plane doors

have been closed.

We have had presidential directives which have placed substantial responsibility within the NSC. With regard to the announcement last night that the President made, I share your enthusiasm

not only for the move, but for the gentleman who will be taking

this position. Obviously, we need to know more about what the

President has in mind there. I would agree with you, without having talked to him about it or thought it through, that we are going

to need some legislation. I am not sure at all that the new person,

Governor Ridge, will have the authority he needs in terms of the

reorganization problem that we have got or the ability to

reprioritize budget matters and things of that nature. So I think

we have got to move forward on it.

One approach would be to put the right tools in the hands of the

President and let him decide what to do and when to do it. I think

it is important that we not tie the President’s hands and decide up

here unilaterally, precisely in great detail, exactly what should and

should not be done. I think we need to work together with the

President and take the lessons put forth by the commissions, the

GAO, the Department of Justice, and FEMA, and apply them.

One way to do this would be to reauthorize the Reorganization

Act, which sunsetted in 1987. That act allowed expedited consideration for any presidential proposals to reorganize Federal agencies

and would be a foundation upon which a new and effective strategy

for defeating terrorists could be built. It is just another idea to go

along with the very good ones that you have set forth, Mr. Chairman. So I think that we are now on the right track, and I think

there is going to be a lot of good come out of this, and I think that

what we are doing here today is a part of that.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Thompson.

Senator Cleland.

6

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank

our panelists, especially our dear former colleagues here.

A W.C. Fields’ quote comes to mind that we have got to take the

bull by the tail and face the situation. [Laughter.]

I think we have to face the situation that the whole

counterterrorism, the homeland defense issue was very much on

the back burner, uncoordinated, buried deep in the bowels of the

Pentagon and the Justice Department until Tuesday. Now what do

we do? Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our panelists as to how we

move forward.

I do know that we need to coordinate these more than 40 different offices that deal with homeland defense better. I just wonder

how our panelists feel about the President’s decision last night, if

they embrace that or not. So I am looking forward to our panelists,

Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Cleland.

Let us go now to Senator Rudman and Senator Hart. I would

say, very briefly, that the two of you proved that there are ample

opportunities for public service after one leaves the Senate, and the

two of you have just done admirably in that regard.

I think I am just going to go without listing your credentials. You

are both very respected spokespeople on matters of foreign affairs,

defense, and intelligence and have been leaders for a long time.

Senator Rudman, we are pleased to hear from you now.

TESTIMONY OF HON. WARREN B. RUDMAN, CO-CHAIR, U.S.

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

Senator RUDMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cleland. It is an honor to appear before this Committee which

I served on for my entire service in the Senate, sitting in this room.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Welcome home.

Senator RUDMAN. There are many questions that you have, and

I am going to try to brief and direct in my answers to summarize

on behalf of our commission what we did, and Senator Hart, of

course, will do that as well.

A little background. This commission came about after a conversation between former Speaker Newt Gingrich and President

William Clinton, in which they commiserated about the fact that

there had been no ongoing study of America’s national security

since 1947, which resulted in massive reorganizations of our entire

government. Thus, our commission was established. There has

been some misunderstanding, our commission, as opposed to the

other commissions, did not start out to study terrorism per se.

This report, which you have seen, covers the entire panoply of

the Federal Government security apparatus: State, Treasury,

trade, education, intelligence, and law enforcement. The curious

thing is that the 14 people—seven Democrats and seven Republicans—who worked for over 3 years on this, at the conclusion,

unanimously came to the consensus that the single most important

issue facing America was how to deal with domestic terrorism. So

that is why we are here today. It became Chapter 1 of our report

which deals with security, in general.

7

Our deliberations resulted in something rare in Washington: A

consensus amongst 14 people of divergent political views and

ideologies who came together on the 50 recommendations that are

contained in the report, seven of which deal with what we are talking about here this morning.

We reached a consensus that an attack on the domestic homeland was not a question of if, but a question of when, and we

reached the consensus that the Nation was, and is, largely unprepared to respond here at home to such an attack. More important,

I believe, is that the commission also reached a consensus on the

core elements of a road map to allow the Nation to move forward,

and we were unanimous on that score as well.

We proposed and still believe that any solution to this problem

must address issues of strategy. It must address issues of Federal,

State, and local organization and cooperation, and it must address

issues of capacity and cooperation. In general, we said that the

United States must replace a fractured ad hoc approach to homeland security with a sustained focused approach, emphasize integration of existing agencies and departments, rather than wholesale invention, and recapitalize our existing assets and capabilities

rather than try to create redundancy.

Is this plan ambitious? It is, without question. Is it going to take

the patience of the American people? Certainly. Is it going to require a whole new way of thinking about our national security? Absolutely. We believe that given the evidence that we heard—all

over the world we heard this evidence—the history of our government and the resources available, the best way we could help

would be to come up not with a philosophical approach, but with

a series of specific recommendations for the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. After all, the charter of this commission, founded by the Congress in 1998, was to give the incoming

administration in 2001 and the incoming Congress in 2001 a road

map to America’s national security. That is what we have tried to

do.

The first step, and I will go through a number of steps, is for the

President of the United States to declare unequivocally that homeland security is the primary responsibility of our national strategy,

not a peripheral responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, I think that happened last night, and I want to

just depart from the previous prepared remarks, just to give you

a few thoughts on that, which I know you have mentioned, and

Senator Cleland has mentioned you would be interested in.

The President has moved quickly to establish an office of homeland security. We do not know yet the details of the office, but

would appear to be what is generally called the czar approach. We

have had drug czars and others. Why we have ever picked that

particular name, I am not sure, but that is the one we tend to use.

It is a very good method to bring attention to a recognized problem.

Moreover, it is a very good way in time of crisis to encourage improved coordination between disparate agencies which, in normal

times, tend to pursue their own bureaucratic purposes.

We applaud the President’s initiative and heartily endorse Governor Ridge, who is known to all of us. It is a great choice. For an

enduring solution to what we feel certain will be a long-term probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:41 May 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 76801.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
8

lem, we believe the President must move beyond this White House

office and establish a major department with homeland security,

with a seat at the cabinet table, as its singular mission.

We believe that without budget authority, command authority,

accountability, and responsibility to the Congress and to the President, nothing in this government ever works very well, but we

applaud this step, and we believe that the Congress and the President can build on it.

The President should propose, and the Congress should agree to

create a new National Homeland Security Agency. The nucleus of

this agency would be the current Federal Emergency Management

Agency, the nucleus. While retaining its 10 regional offices, the

new agency would have the responsibility for the nationwide planning and coordination and integration of the various government

activities that now involve homeland security. I believe there are

about 51 of those activities in various places, and we believe the

Director should be a member of the cabinet and a statutory adviser

to the National Security Council.

Third, the President should propose, and the Congress should

agree, to transfer the Customs Service to the Border Patrol and the

Coast Guard to this new agency. This transfer would be for common purpose coordination, not bureaucratic consolidation. Each of

these entities would retain their own distinct identities, structures,

and internal operating procedures. They would just be located in

another cabinet department. If you look at the details of the report,

you will see the logic of why those three agencies, in particular,

with FEMA are to be in one place.

I want to stress that under our plan, each of these three entities

would receive long overdue increases in resources. Let me just

summarize that shortly. We were shocked to hear that the Customs

Service currently has the capacity to inspect only 1 or 2 percent of

all shipments received from overseas and our country. This has to

change. We were shocked to learn that the cutter fleet of America’s

Coast Guard is older than 39 of the 41 world major naval fleets.

That has to change.

We were somewhat disappointed to hear the continuing challenges, the horror stories facing the U.S. Border Patrol. Consider

this: Each day 1.3 million people cross our borders; 340,000 vehicles cross our borders; and 58,000 containers arrive at America’s

seaports. These figures are expected to double by 2005.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a case of wanting to create a political

carrot to entice people to sign on to a reform proposal. It is a matter of creating the political will to do what we should have done

a very long time ago.

Fourth, the President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council include an analysis of homeland security and asymmetric threats, particularly those involving infrastructure and information technology. That portfolio should be assigned full time to

a national intelligence officer and the national intelligence estimate, the so-called NIE, should be produced on these threats.

Fifth, the President should propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security

within the Office of Security of Defense and reporting directly to

the Secretary. Along similar lines, we propose that the existing

9

Joint Forces Command and Joint Task Force for Civil Support be

broadened and strengthened. For those who may not be familiar

with those two organizations, these commands are DOD’s current

mechanisms for planning and dealing with homeland attacks.

Sixth, it is time to emphasize the ‘‘national’’ in National Guard.

Specifically, the Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction,

should make homeland security a primary mission of the National

Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly trained and

fully equipped to undertake the mission. However, these requirements, we make clear, should be in addition to, not substitutes for,

the current state of readiness for sustained combat overseas. Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, to use the vernacular of the military,

the National Guard is forward deployed in the homeland. It is

where we would need it, in time of crisis.

Finally, we recommend, Mr. Chairman, and I say this with some

hesitancy, but directness, that the Congress reevaluates its organizational approach to issues of homeland security, counterterrorism

and protection of information security. Currently, the Congress has

roughly two dozen committees addressing these issues in a very

scattershot way. We think there ought to be two select committees,

one in the House and one in the Senate, and we believe that the

members of those committees ought to be carefully selected for

their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations.

Mr. Chairman, as I said, I wanted to keep these remarks brief.

Let me just say that many of the commentators in recent days

have tended to portray the types of changes that we talk about

here this morning as a zero sum game. They argue that doing more

here at home means that we will have to do less overseas, that

homeland is a code for a retreat to unilateralism or that doing

more on defense means less for weapons and missiles.

The commission did not and does not subscribe to that point of

view. We firmly believe that an engaged, enlightened, and unilateral foreign policy, and defense policy is still America’s first line of

defense. America not only has interests in the rest of the world, it

has obligations. As we said in the report, to shield America from

the world out of fear of terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists’ work for them, but to continue business as usual is irresponsible.

We think that, ultimately, our challenge is to balance the openness and generosity of the American spirit with the security and

well-being of the American people. Essentially, we address the

issues that are the hallmarks of homeland security. They are to

prevent, to protect, and to respond.

As someone who has had the privilege to serve this country on

both the field of battle and in the halls of this Capitol, I implore

you to take action on the recommendations of these panels that sit

before you today. You have an obligation and a duty to the American people to do no less.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Rudman, for that excellent statement. I appreciate it very much.

Senator Hart.

10

1The prepared statement of Senator Hart appears in the Appendix on page 39.

TESTIMONY OF HON. GARY HART,1 CO-CHAIR, U.S.

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, thank you and Members of the

Committee for holding these hearings and for the opportunity for

us to appear here.

‘‘Americans will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack

on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large

numbers.’’ This was our first conclusion of our commission after almost a year of investigation of what we called the ‘‘New World

Coming,’’ which we described in our first public report. That conclusion was delivered September 15, 1999, almost exactly 2 years

to the day before our prediction came true.

‘‘The United States is today very poorly organized to design and

implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland,’’

our commission also concluded in its final public report on January

31, 2001. Eight months later, regrettably, that same assessment is

true. In light of the dark, satanic events of last week, further delay

in creating an effective national homeland defense capacity would

be nothing less than a massive breach of the public trust and an

act of national folly.

As Senator Rudman has pointed out, our commission was appointed to conduct the most comprehensive review of U.S. national

security since 1947. The commissions of that era, post-World War

II, pre-Cold War, ended in creating a statutory base for the conduct

of the Cold War and created, among other things, the Department

of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Air Force, and

a massive overhaul of this Nation’s defense structures.

Those of us on this commission represent almost 300-personyears of public service, almost all of that in the field of national security and foreign policy. As Senator Rudman has pointed out, although we debated issues such as the structure of a homeland defense agency at great length, in the final analysis we were all

unanimous.

Senator Rudman has more than adequately summarized the

seven conclusions that relate specifically to the creation of what

President Bush fortuitously last night called a new Homeland Security Office. What we are really here now to discuss, that decision

by the executive having been made, is what the nature of that office or agency should be.

As Senator Rudman has pointed out, we particularly called attention to the role of Congress in this effort and would do so again

today. The events of the last 10 days—and the President’s speech

last night—have presented to the Congress both an opportunity

and an obligation to help the President put form, structure, and

content on what was essentially a two-line commitment.

We believe this should be a statutory agency. We believe this

agency should have budget authority. We believe it should consolidate, under one authority, one civilian authority who has the accountability to the President and the American people for homeland security.

11

Our commission strongly believes that any lesser or more tenuous solution will merely perpetuate bureaucratic confusion and

diffusion of responsibility. No homeland czar can possibly hope to

coordinate the almost hopeless dispersal of authority that currently

characterizes the 40 or 50 agencies or elements of agencies with

some piece of responsibility for protecting our homeland.

May I recall to you when we had an energy crisis in the 1970’s,

a czar for energy was created. It happened to be a former governor

of my State of Colorado. It turned out to be obvious within a matter of months that a czar approach to the issues of energy security

in this country was not going to work. And whether you agree with

the result or not, we ended up with the Department of Energy.

We have heard, particularly before a week ago Tuesday, that

Washington bureaucracy will not permit our solution to be adopted.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear a cabinet officer or bureau head

in this government make that argument today. I would like to hear

the Attorney General or the Secretary of Transportation or the Secretary of the Treasury explain to the President, and the American

people, and the Congress why it is more important to keep that

piece of bureaucratic turf in that department than to protect the

people of the United States. Bureaucracy matters nothing right

now. The lives and safety of the American people are at stake.

Of those who have taken the trouble to read our recommendations and the reasons for them, some have said that we have gone

too far in creating what some have called an ‘‘Interior Ministry,’’ a rather ominous phrase. Others say that we have not gone far

enough to incorporate intelligence, counterintelligence, and military

components. There are thoroughly debated reasons of constitutional

principle and practical effectiveness that caused us to strike the

balance we did.

The Homeland Security Agency should not have police or military authority, it should not be an intelligence collection agency or

have responsibility for counterterrorism. It should not be a military

agency. It should be the central coordinating mechanism for anticipating, preventing, and responding to attacks on our homeland.

The executive director of our commission, General Charles Boyd,

who is here with us today, has, I think, made a very apt analogy

to the situation. We are now, where homeland security is concerned, as if we were in the situation before we had a Department

of Defense and a Secretary of Defense. Those who argue against an

approach similar to ours would essentially be saying the Army

should be in one department, the Navy should be in another department, the Air Force in another department, and by the way,

we will have a coordinator of those services somewhere in the

White House.

We think the logic of our circumstances require a statutory agency under the accountability of one individual. This is a daunting

task, but, Mr. Chairman, we owe it to our children to begin. It

would be a mistake of historic proportions to believe that protection

must await retribution, that prevention of the next attack must

await punishment for the last. We can, and must, do both simultaneously. We do not know when we will be held accountable for the

next attack on this country. I believe, personally, it will be sooner

rather than later, and we are still not prepared.

12

1The prepared statement of Govenor Gilmore appears in the Appendix on page 41.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Hart, very much for

very strong testimony.

Governor Gilmore, good morning and welcome. I know you had

some difficulty with flight arrangements getting here, but we are

very grateful for your persistence.

For the record, Governor Jim Gilmore is, of course, Virginia’s

chief executive and also vice chair of the National Governor’s Association, an Army veteran. He is here in his current capacity as the

Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Welcome, Governor.

TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES S. GILMORE, III,1 GOVERNOR OF

THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AND CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS THE CAPABILITIES FOR DOMESTIC

RESPONSE TO TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

Governor GILMORE. Thank you, Senator Lieberman, and also,

Senator Cleland, of course who is here, and other Members, for the

record. Thank you for inviting me to discuss recommendations of

the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction and local response, a national panel that was established by the Congress in

1999. We have a statutory duty to report to the Congress and to

the President.

I have served as chairman of this advisory panel, Senator

Lieberman, and it has been my privilege to work with experts in

a broad range of fields, many from outside of the Washington Beltway, including current and former Federal, State and local officials,

specialists in terrorism, such as L. Paul Bremer who is here to

speak in just a few moments who has chaired his own commission

and has been a faithful member of our commission, people from the

intelligence community, the military, law enforcement, emergency

management, fire services, health and medicine, and public health.

And this is the unique quality of the congressional panel that was

assembled. It includes the local and State responders as a primary

force and input into our panel which I think makes us unique and

different.

I might take a moment to say that one of our panel members,

Ray Downey, the deputy fire chief for the City of New York, is listed as missing, as he was trying to help people in the City of New

York at the World Trade Center, when he was lost, together with

about 300 other firefighters in the City of New York, and we will

miss him on our panel.

Our panel has had time. We have been working for almost 3

years. We have been able to deliberate quietly and without any

type of pressure of crisis. For many generations to come, Senators,

September 11, 2001, is a day that is going to stand out in the history of the United States, and indeed I think the entire world, as

the day that the tyranny of terrorism attacked American freedom.

The criminals who committed these acts on the people of the

United States in New York and in Virginia sought a decisive strike

13

that was designed to remake the world and the post-Cold War period. Sooner or later those who inflicted these injuries will feel the

full weight of justice and the free world’s combined efforts to hold

them responsible, and I believe no one can exceed the President’s

eloquence in this matter, as we heard last night.

This brings me quickly, Senator, to the work of the Advisory

Panel and the work that lies ahead for the Congress, the Executive

Branch, and for our States and for our communities. To date, our

panel has issued over 50 specific recommendations in two reports.

The first report was issued in December 1999 and the second was

issued in December of the year 2000.

In quick summary, the first report was devoted to the assessment of the threat, concern over the issue of who was to be in

charge of any particular response effort, and an increased concern,

particularly to recognize that weapons of mass destruction, while

less probable, could not be dismissed, but that in the meanwhile,

that a conventional attack was nearly inevitable. This was our conclusion in December 1999.

The next report, in December 2000, recognized that there was

not a national strategy, that there was an absolute essential to

have a national strategy, including State and local people, and to

make sure that there was, in fact, a separate approach on response

itself, particularly emphasizing State and local people in combination with FEMA and other Federal agencies, and of course recommendations for enhancing and improving our intelligence capabilities.

I want to focus your attention today, Senator, on two central recommendations concerning the role of government organization and

inner-agency coordination in this war against terrorism.

In our December 2000 report, we proposed at that time the statutory creation of a new national office for combatting terrorism, to

coordinate national terrorism policy and preparedness in the Executive Branch located in the White House. The President has done

this last night.

Our recommendation was that the director of this office should

be a high-ranking official appointed by the President; that, foremost, that the office should have the responsibility to develop a

comprehensive national strategy to be approved by the President.

The issue is the need for the central direction on this issue among

the different complex, solid, different issues, including budgetary

concerns, a need for the development of the national strategy, as

the President said last night, but including Federal, as the President said, State and local response. Otherwise every agency up and

down the line, vertically and horizontally, will assert its own authority in, of course, an uncoordinated way.

Senator this is an important distinction here with our panel and

others. Our proposal is an office located in the White House reporting directly to the President of the United States, not a separate

homeland agency that competes against other agencies or even

other cabinet secretaries. Instead, this office will invoke the direct

authority of the President to coordinate various agencies, receive

sensitive intelligence and military information, and deal directly

with Congress and State and local governments on both domestic

14

and international counterterrorism programs. This defines the difference between our panel and that of Hart-Rudman.

The central point is this: America needs a White House-level office for a White House-level crisis, and that is the plan that the

President adopted last night.

Senator the Annual Report to Congress on Combatting Terrorism

of July 2001 points out that we spend about $10.3 billion per year

now. Approximately 8 percent of that goes to preparedness and response. About $300 million, only, is designated for State and local

government concerns.

Our third report, which is due December 2001, will now be accelerated in an executive summary, although completed on time in

December 2001. We propose to accelerate our meetings and to accelerate our report for the benefit of the Congress to which we report and the President. We will, at that time, define five areas of

further study in our third year: Health and medical, use of the

military, cyber security, local and State response, and border security, as well as filling out some of the additional points on intelligence and other matters.

The second point that I wish to address to you this morning, and

that is the area of border security as a prime example of the need

for White House coordination. As you know, on September 11 hijackers entered the United States. The question is how did they get

in. Senator, as was previously read, we have 100,000 miles of national coastline; 2,000 miles of land bordered with Mexico; 4,000

miles with Canada; 500 million people cross our borders annually;

127 million automobiles cross annually; 11.5 million truck crossings

annually; 2.1 million rail cars; 200,000 ships annually dock; and

5.8 million containers enter annually, less than 3 percent are adequately inspected.

The answer calls for interagency coordination. If America is to be

secure, we must coordinate immigration enforcement and border

securities at all levels of entry in the United States, air, sea, and

land. It will require unprecedented coordination between the appropriate agencies.

Our report on this one single issue of the five we will address in

our new report will propose that border and immigration agencies

all be included in intelligence collection analysis and dissemination

process, that there be an intergovernmental border advisory group

within the Office of Combatting Terrorism, a coordinated plan for

research and development, particularly with sensors and warning

systems, trusted shipper’s programs to begin to address the issue

of containers, and full coordination with Mexico and Canada, and

we will have identical and more comprehensive detail in the other

four areas as well, as we conclude our report back to the Congress

and to the President.

Senator we must start preparing the Nation to defend freedom

within our borders today. There is certainly not a moment to spare.

The President and the Congress face solemn decisions about how

to proceed, and there is certainly little time for deliberation. This

is not a partisan political issue. It transcends partisanship. It is

about the preservation of freedom and the American way of life.

The American people deserve to be prepared, and they deserve to

15

be prepared now. We must take bold action to defend our freedom

at home and abroad.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Governor. We appreciate your

service and your testimony. I look forward to a question and answer period.

Our next witness is Ambassador Paul Bremer, formerly Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism in the Reagan and first Bush

administrations. He is clearly one of our Nation’s leading experts

on terrorism and, in fact, as I mentioned earlier, chaired the National Commission on Terrorism. He was also a member of the Gilmore Commission.

Ambassador Bremer, thanks for being here, and I look forward

to your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER, III, FORMER AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND MEMBER, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS

THE CAPABILITIES FOR DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Mr. BREMER. Senator, I will be brief because the governor has

summarized our report. I am just going to make two or three

points.

I think there is a lot of value in both of these panels. These are

not mutually exclusive. There are some things that can be borrowed from one or the other. There is a fundamental difference on

the structure. And I think one of the reasons there is a difference

on the structure has to do with one of the most important trends

in terrorism, which we saw dramatically last week, and that is the

fading distinction between domestic and international terrorism.

As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, since

1985, our government, has been divided between the State Department being responsible for international terrorism and the Justice

Department being responsible for what we call domestic terrorism.

This is a nice distinction. It just does not happen to be one that

terrorists follow, as we saw last week. And one of the places where

this is the most dramatic the governor has just referred to, and

that is in the question of immigration and border controls.

The State Department is responsible for issuing visas to people

overseas, but it is the INS which is responsible for deciding whether somebody gets into the country and then monitoring, to the extent the INS can, whether that person remains in their visa status

in the United States. The intelligence involved in this problem of

immigration control is not seamless; that is to say, there are lots

of databases around, they are not all interactive.

For example, the consular officer who issues a visa, until today,

does not have access to important FBI databases dealing with people who are suspected criminals. There is legislation in the bill

which was sent up yesterday, by the Attorney General, does try to

deal with this issue, but it is just an example of the fact that you

cannot make a distinction any longer between international and

domestic terrorism.

Indeed, I think that is one of the problems with trying to set up

an agency, one of the substantive problems of trying to set up an

16

agency whose role is essentially just to look at domestic terrorism.

You cannot do it. You cannot cut it that way any more. And as our

report pointed out, it is very important to get a seamless connection between intelligence collected by various agencies overseas and

intelligence collected in the United States.

A second point I would make is we look very hard at the necessary attributes for the office, whatever the office is, whether it

is the one that the distinguished gentleman on Rudman-Hart proposed or one we did or what the President came up with.

First of all, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I think it should

be established by statute. I think it is important for two reasons.

It is important for the political reason that the Congress should

embrace whatever the new reorganization is going to be. Second,

it is important because of the overriding importance that both of

our panels stressed on budget.

We looked at the attributes of what a new office should have,

and in my view came up with four. The new office should have political accountability; that is to say, the person in charge should be

appointed and given the advice and consent of the Senate. He

should be responsible to the American people through the Senate.

We said that should also be at the cabinet level, which is the second attribute. The person in charge of this office should have access and visibility.

Third, that office must have budgetary authority, as both of our

panels have stressed. In our view, it is important for this office to

have an ability to design a national strategy and then to certify

whether various departments of the U.S. Government programs are

consistent with the President’s strategy, and when they are not, to

decertify those budget requests as, indeed, has been the case with

the Office of National Drug Control for the last decade.

Finally, it is important, we thought, for that office to have a certain degree of autonomy and neutrality, not to be seen as an active

member of the bureaucratic fights which are so familiar to all of

us here inside the Beltway. These fights are almost a necessary

part of life in Washington, but in this particular case we thought

you need to rise above it.

The final point I would make, Senator, is a political point, even

though I am not a politician. I have followed this subject now, on

and off, for almost 30 years. It is the case that over those 30 years

attention to terrorism has been very episodic. In the wake of a terrorist attack, as we are now, there is a lot of attention. There are

congressional hearings. There is a lot of stuff on television. There

are interviews and articles. After a couple of months in the past,

that attention span has gone away. The spotlight moves on to some

other subject.

One of the problems this country has had in coming up with a

coherent counter-terrorist policy is precisely that we do not get sustained attention in a balanced way to this problem. I would urge

this Committee and your colleagues in both Houses of Congress to

work now with the administration and all of us in trying to keep

a sustained attention. It does not mean we need hysteria. We do

not need hysteria. As the President said last night, we need to get

back to work. We need to show again the great, wonderful resilience of this society, but we need a sustained and balanced attenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:41 May 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 76801.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
17

1The prepared statement of Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on page 53.

tion to this problem that is going to outlive the immediate emotions

of this week.

Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Ambassador Bremer. That was

very helpful testimony.

I think the last point you made is a critically important one

about the attention to terrorism having been episodic over recent

decades. When we talk now about a war on terrorism and talk as

the President so eloquently did last night about this being a long,

sustained struggle, that is what we are talking about.

Part of the problem is the elusive nature of the enemy here. It

is not as if we can say at any point, well, we have won one battle,

but the enemy is still occupying Country A, and the war is not over

until it ends. They blend into the darkness, the shadows. But if we

are not persistent and do not break the episodic response, we will

lower our guard again and once again be victims of attack. So I

think your last point is a very important one, and it is part of why

a permanent agency, however we decide to shape it, is critically important.

Mr. BREMER. People ask how do you define victory? What is our

goal? It seems to me our goal is to delegitimize terrorism. We will

not, as you point out, ever capture all of the terrorists, but we can

delegitimize the practice, and that is our goal.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much.

Our final witness today is David Walker, Comptroller General of

the United States, head of the General Accounting Office. He and

his extraordinary staff are a constant source of good counsel for

this Committee and Congress, generally, in making the government more efficient.

Welcome, again, Mr. Walker. Thanks for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER,1 COMPTROLLER

GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss a framework for possibly addressing the need to enhance homeland security.

As Senator Thompson said, GAO’s past and present strategic

plan includesa number of key themes, one of which has been the

changing nature of the security threats that this Nation faces in a

post-Cold War environment.

We have issued over 65 reports dealing with homeland securityrelated issues during the past 6 years, and we have issued three

in the last 3 days, including this report, which is entitled combatting terrorism, selected challenges, and related recommendations. I

might also add, for the record, that of the reports that we recently

issued, we let the administration know about them at least 6 weeks

ago and had an opportunity to be able to relook at them to consider

classification and other factors before we released them this week,

and we will continue to do that.

According to a variety of U.S. intelligence assessments, the

United States now confronts a range of increasingly diffuse threats

that puts greater destructive power in the hands of small States,

18

groups, and individuals, and threatens our values and way of life.

GAO’s work indicates that we face a range of challenges in this

area that will have to involve many Federal agencies, as well as

State and local governments, the private sector, and even private

citizens. The Federal Government must address three fundamental

needs.

First, the government needs clearly defined and effective leadership with clear vision to develop and implement a homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant partners, both foreign and domestic, and the ability to marshal the necessary resources to get the job done;

Second, a national homeland security strategy should be developed based upon a comprehensive assessment of national threats

and risks; and,

Third, a large number of organizations will need to be involved

in addressing homeland security. They need to have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms in

order to get the job done.

Crafting a strategy for homeland security involves reducing the

risk, where possible; assessing the Nation’s vulnerabilities; and

identifying the critical infrastructure most in need of protection. To

be comprehensive, the strategy should include steps to use intelligence assets and other means to identify attackers and prevent

attacks before they occur, harden potential targets to minimize the

damage from an attack, and effectively manage the consequences

of the incident.

In addition, the strategy should focus resources on the areas of

greatest need and measure performance against specified goals and

objectives. Because the plan will need to be executed nationally,

the Federal Government can assign roles to Federal agencies once

the strategy is developed, but also will need to develop coordinated

partnerships with State and local governments, as well as with private and not-for-profit entities.

Effective homeland security will require forming international

partnerships to identify attackers, prevent attacks and retaliate if

there are attacks. It will also require efforts by both the Executive

and Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.

As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, just yesterday we issued this report which discusses challenges confronting policy makers on the

war on terrorism and offers a series of recommendations. One of

these recommendations is that the government needs a more clearly defined and effective leadership to develop a strategy for combatting terrorism and assuring the security of our homeland, to oversee development of a new national threat and risk assessment, and

to coordinate implementation among Federal agencies.

Similar leadership is also needed for the broader issue of homeland security. President Bush, as has been noted, announced the

creation of a new cabinet-level office of homeland security and the

nomination of Governor Tom Ridge to head that office. Important

details have not been provided. It is important to understand what

the nature and extent of this office will be, what control it will

have over resources, what responsibilities it will have with regard

to the determination and the implementation of the strategy,

whether or not this will be a statutory position, whether or not this

19

1 Chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 64.

will be a term appointment, and there are a variety of questions

that we believe are important that the Congress needs to ask in

order to make sure that, in substance, this can be an effective approach.

I think the fact of the matter is that whether we end up having

a particular vertical silo or a department agency deal with this or

whether you take a horizontal approach because we believe this is

a horizontal issue, you will never be able to combine all of the different entities that are going to have to address this issue. In fact,

as has been mentioned, there has not been a recommendation to

combine the military elements, the law-enforcement elements, the

intelligence elements, and certain other elements.

Therefore you need to consider whether or not there should be

some combination, but in any event, there is going to have to be

coordination across a number of boundaries, across a number of

silos, both foreign and domestic, not just at the Federal Government level, but also State and local, the not-for-profit and the private sector because, after all, the private sector owns a lot of the

critical infrastructure that is exposed.

The United States does not currently have a national threat and

risk-assessment mechanism to guide Federal programs for homeland security. Given the tragic events of Tuesday, September 11, a

comprehensive national threat and risk assessment that addresses

all threats has become an urgent need.

In addition, as this report notes, neither the Executive Branch

nor the Congress is well-organized to address this issue.

In my statement, Mr. Chairman, I summarize a number of areas

where GAO has done work relating to these issues, combatting terrorism, aviation security, cyber security, international crime control, public health, a variety of areas.

Finally, let me note that we believe that there are four key questions that need to be addressed in connection with this issue, as

noted on this chart:1 (1) What are our vision and our national objectives to make the homeland more secure? (2) What essential elements should comprise the government’s strategy for

homelansecurity? (3) How should the executive branch and the

Congress be organized to address homeland security issues? and (4)

How should we assess the effectiveness of any homeland security

strategy implementation to address the spectrum of threats?

As you might imagine, Mr. Chairman, homeland security issues

are now at the top of the national agenda as a result of last week’s

tragic events. Obviously, our work has not been able to be updated

to reflect all of the actions that the administration has taken in the

last 2 weeks. We expect that at some point in time we will be

asked to do so. We stand ready to continue to assist this Committee and the Congress in addressing homeland security and a

range of other issues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Walker. Thank you all for

your very direct and relevant testimony.

Again, I want to express my regrets that the other Members of

the Committee are not here, and I know it is because both parties

20

have chosen to hold caucuses this morning, so hopefully as they

end, they will be here. But for better or worse, I have a lot of questions that I want to ask all of you, and I am sure my colleagues

will review the record.

Let me begin, before we get to the discussion about which is the

appropriate response structure for the Congress to choose, to ask

you to talk just a bit more about what we mean by ‘‘homeland defense.’’ And I am just going to throw something out and ask you

all to put some more leaves on the tree here.

I take it that what we mean is taking efforts to prevent or secure

potential targets of terrorist or other enemy attack on the homeland, and then if they, God forbid, occur, to be certain that we are

prepared to react quickly and comprehensively in a way that diminishes human suffering. But I wonder if you could just go

through this a little bit in terms of what you saw, what you learned

and the considerable work you did, to help build a record, but also

help inform the public as to what we are actually talking about

here when we say ‘‘homeland defense.’’ Senator Rudman, you want to begin?

Senator RUDMAN. I will be pleased to. I think probably all of us

would agree on this at this panel. We have all determined that

there are major threats out there. We define the threats as weapons of mass destruction, and we specifically referred to weapons of

mass disruption, which is what we saw on September 11.

We must look at the three things with which the government has

to organize itself in order to deal with that. One is to prevent, if

possible. The second is to protect. And the third is to respond. And

that is a Federal, State, local responsibility, particularly the response. Obviously, the most important one, in terms if you could

make it work, would be the prevention.

But I can tell you, having served, as you know, for many years

on the Senate Intelligence Committee, having chaired the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for a long time, I have

to tell you, Senator Lieberman, and I wish more people would be

saying it, we should not let the American people think that intelligence, no matter how good, is ever going to be good enough to prevent all of these things from happening.

Historically, intelligence agencies throughout the world, going

back to the late 1800’s, are very good at assessing capabilities and

threats. They have been very poor at figuring out people’s intentions. If they were good at figuring out intentions, even though

they knew what the threat was, we would not have had Pearl Harbor, we would not have had the Battle of the Bulge, and Saddam

Hussein would not have got into Kuwait, because we had the basic

intelligence. We did not know what the intentions were.

So we talk about prevention, we talk about intelligence, and Ambassador Bremer is quite right, we leave most of those activities

where they are now. They should not be transferred. When we talk

about prevention, a lot of that is intelligence, but a lot of it has to

do with the kind of physical security that we have seen here in

Washington over the last few years, and which unfortunately, we

will probably be seeing more of around the country. That will be

an inconvenience, but I do not think a loss of freedom. It will be

an inconvenience.

21

When we talk about response, we are talking about what I think

Governor Gilmore has very eloquently laid out, this response depends heavily on local and State organizations, but you do not get

these things to work right unless you do a lot of war gaming, if you

will, long before these things happen.

And one final thing. We have all admired Mayor Giuliani and

Governor Pataki and the extraordinary job that they have done,

and they have done it in an incredible city that has incredible resources of fire and police and emergency workers, and they have

done war gaming in New York. I am aware of it. Their hospitals

have gone through a number of exercises to deal with things. But

the fact is that most places in our country do not have that capacity or that experience or have not exercised these things. And that

is why the response side of it is so very important, and I think to

some extent the Gilmore Commission properly, because of its

charge, has dealt more directly with the response side of this than

certainly we have. We have talked about it generally, but not with

that kind of specificity.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So one of the responsibilities of the agency or the office would be to aggressively see to it that local, State,

and Federal agencies are better prepared than they are today to respond to such attacks.

Senator RUDMAN. The major responsibility. In fact, it is being

done now. It has been done by a number of cities with the aid of

the military in some cases. One of the Marine divisions has done

exercises in the Southwest in local communities to try to help

them. But the fact is, it is sporadic. The resources have not been

there, and we have got to get the resources out there.

Let me just say one other thing, because I know we are going to

get to it, and I would rather say it now and then let the other

panel talk about it. This is an honest disagreement about organization between people of good will who respect what each other have

done, and I admire what they have done, and it is a major contribution. But, I come at it differently based on my experience in

government, and let me just lay it out in a way that I think everybody can understand. We have an intelligence czar in this country.

He is called the Director of Central Intelligence, and everybody

really believes that he runs intelligence in this government, but

anybody on the Intelligence Committee can tell you that—and I

cannot talk in detail because it is classified—but with a relatively

small percentage of the intelligence budget being in the CIA. He is

also dual-hatted. He is the Director of the CIA and he is Director

of Central Intelligence, and some people do not understand the distinction. He has no control over the budget authority, the activities

of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has little control over the

National Security Agency and many other defense agencies. And

everyone who has studied it has said that it does not work as well

as it should because he does not have the budget authority for the

command or the control.

We have come at this by saying that at least when it comes to

our borders, Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, and FEMA, because of what it does, which the Gilmore Commission has written

about, we believe that that consolidation is important because it

belongs more properly there than where it currently resides. We

22

certainly are not talking about taking all of those other activities

and moving them into this new agency, certainly not.

But I want to answer your question more broadly than you asked

it. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The kind of straight talk we have come to

respect from you, Senator Rudman. Thank you.

Senator Hart, before you answer, let me add an addendum to the

question as you are prepared to answer in this way. But one of the

things, I think, we are all feeling now after September 11, as we

saw the insanely inhumane acts of these terrorists, that one of the

things we are not doing is thinking like they are. So as we talk

about preparation, we have to really begin to think beyond what

would be normally unthinkable for us, and one of the things that

I think we have to think about, and I know that your commission

looked at, is the possibility of a chemical or biological attack on the

United States.

So I wonder, as you give the answer to my initial question,

whether you would give us some help in examples of what a homeland security agency would do to, in some sense prevent, but also

protect and respond to such an attack if it ever occurred?

Senator HART. Well, obviously, such an agency would not itself

combine either the military or the police functions of our country

which are, as Governor Gilmore said, distributed on at least three

levels of government. The direct response, counterterrorism, if you

will, will come from the military and come from police agencies

broadly defined. Senator Rudman accurately stated the way our

commission broke down the threat. Try to find out who has evil intent against this country, who they are, how they are organized,

how they are financed, and to the degree possible, what their intentions are. Now, their intentions are to do harm to the United

States. What you try to find out is when and how, and that is the

hardest part.

Then if you get a sense, any sense that this threat is imminent,

you try to stop it at the borders using all the assets that we have

presently uncoordinated.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is a very important point. Excuse me.

And that is why you focused on the coordination of the agencies

that control access of people or goods into the United States.

Senator HART. And the reason why I stress, frankly, this problem

with bureaucracy is that those agencies had a different mission. I

mean they are where they are for a different purpose. Border Patrol is in Justice because it is a law enforcement agency. It is trying to prevent people from illegally entering the country. Customs

is the Treasury because its purpose originally was to collect revenues. Coast Guard regulates incoming and outgoing seaborne traffic, makes rescues and so on, but that historic function was a

Transportation function. Now these are front-line defense organizations. It frankly makes little sense for them to be where they are

given their new responsibility. If we are in fact in war, and I believe we are, in a prolonged war, the nature and function of these

agencies has changed. So the reason why they are where they are,

frankly, makes very little sense any more, and to protect that bureaucratic turf, as I have indicated, under these circumstances is

folly.

23

If the bad guys get inside our country, then the prevent is to try

to get them before they act, any way you can, and again, this is

FBI, local law enforcement, every asset you have.

And finally, if they act, to limit the damage, bringing together

FEMA, State and local agencies, and so forth, under one command.

I think what is important, on September 11 the nature of warfare changed. You have to get your mind around that concept, the

nature of warfare changed. Now, it has been changing since the colonial area. The rise of guerilla warfare, that gave way to terrorism. In the Cold War we helped support some people that are

now—these people that are now trying to kill us on the theory that

the enemy of our enemy is our friend. But the nature of warfare

has changed, and the distinction between war and crime has

changed.

Had there been a couple of fewer zeroes, had 50 or 60 people

been killed, it would have been a crime—6,000 to 7,000 is war.

Now, how many people have to die when it quits being crime and

becomes war is a matter that theoreticians can debate. So what we

are seeing now, what we have to think about differently is to bring

assets of the military and policy together, and frankly, I think it

will lead to the creation of an entirely new kind of paramilitary capability, something combining Delta Force, Rangers, Seals, some

Special Forces of the Marines, and maybe they will not wear uniforms. But that is another whole subject.

I think Senator Rudman, for the commission, has very accurately

answered your original question.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you want to take me up on the question of how, just to give an example, a homeland security agency

would prevent or protect and respond regarding chemical or biological attack?

Senator HART. Try to find a way to inspect more than 2 or 3 percent of the containers coming into the country. We had one scenario we discussed of a small tactical warhead, nuclear warhead,

begin in one of the inspected sealed containers, shipped from

Shanghai or from Singapore to Newark by way of the Chicago Rail

Yards, off loaded in the Long Beach Port, put on a train. The train

is reorganized in the Chicago yards, and you use global positioning

triggering to blow up the nuclear warhead. Got to stop them at the

borders I think.

Now, you get the chemical, everybody knows chemical is hard to

do. All the experts will tell you how hard it is to disperse the

chemicals. Biological agents is a little bit different, and here, Ambassador Bremer is much more an authority than I and many

members of the commission were, but I am told you can disperse

smallpox virus from an aerosol can. now, how we are going to find

every aerosol can coming into this country is going to be very, very

tough.

The only answer I can give you is do our very, very best to stop

whatever the agent is at the border.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Governor Gilmore.

Governor GILMORE. Senator Lieberman, there is so much to say,

let me see if I can organize this in a way that is efficient. Our

panel evaluated chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological.

These are the classic weapons of mass destruction. We evaluated

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them. We were absolutely unwilling to dismiss the possibility of

those kinds of attacks, although we examined very closely the difficulty of delivery of those kinds of attacks. Yes, you can certainly

deliver them in an aerosol can and so on like that, so we have focused our attention, for example, on the organization of health and

medical, which will be discussed in our next report, so that physicians and the communities will begin to trigger those kinds of responses with the Center for Disease Control in a rapid way so that

we can address those kinds of issues.

Biological is an extremely serious matter, nuclear as well, although we considered them relatively unlikely, although catastrophic, and that is why we must address them. On the other

hand, a conventional attack, such as the one we have just experienced we thought was highly likely, and that is why we call for a

national strategy not a Federal strategy, a national strategy that

absolutely incorporates in the locals and the States. They are the

cops on the beat. They are the State troopers. They are the local

physicians in the local clinics. They are the people in the hospitals

that are going to be the responders who are going to see these

issues first, and then allow a circumvention of the problem at the

earliest possible moment.

I know you are going to go to the issue of the national office and

coordination types of issues. That has been the central point of our

commission, and we are anxious to talk about that, but we have

not discussed moving agencies because, as has been so widely discussed by everybody on this panel, it is fairly fruitless to move

agencies. They are doing other things, too, besides terrorism. But

aside from that, there are so many, that it requires not movement

or restructure, but coordination, and we will be happy to return to

that topic, but we will put it aside for just a moment so that I can

be responsive to your question.

The terrorist has the absolute advantage. He picks the time and

the place and the manner of the attack. And the freer the society,

the stronger the terrorist is. That is why America becomes the target of opportunity because we are the freest society in the world.

So we have tried to analyze this into two pieces. Let me just take

them up quickly.

One is the issue of response. The Pentagon is a perfect example,

and I am the Governor of the State in which the Pentagon is located. The minute that I saw the second plane go into the World

Trade Center, we triggered the Emergency Operation Response

System in Virginia immediately. What that does is automatically

hooks into FEMA. This is a program that has been in place for

years and years. And I have some good news for you, Senator—this

is something that actually works, and it works very well. You do

not get competition between FEMA and the local State authorities

and localities. All of these professionals work well in coordination

together, and they did in the Pentagon situation, as a matter of

fact. I will not dwell on some of the other issues that I took specifically in Virginia, but I want to say that our panel has concluded

that there is a system in place on the response already that works

well, although there is, of course, much to do to prepare for that

response. That is the office of the local and national coordinator

dealing with all of these other types of issues.

25

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me just interrupt and punctuate that.

I think it is an important point, because though all of the work

that has been done here has shown inadequacies either in preparedness or in organization, perhaps it is saying the obvious, but

it bears saying at a time when the American people’s confidence

has been shaken, there is a lot out there now in all these three categories—prevent, protect and respond—not as much as any of you

or we would like, and not as well organized or coordinated as we

would like, but I appreciate your example.

Governor GILMORE. And it is working in New York also very,

very well. Now, when you get over into the issue of chemical, biological, nuclear, and you go into a factor of 10 or 100 times what

we have already seen this week, then it requires a coordinator to

do a national strategy to be prepared.

But the final point that I would make is the one that you, I

think, were approaching before you move onto your governmental

structure issue, and that is the one of prevention. We have thoroughly addressed that issue as a matter of fact. We focused a great

deal of attention on the intelligence community. I was in the intelligence community in the early 1970’s as a low-level agent in the

U.S. Army. I was trained on human intelligence. But it was very

clear very quickly that the intelligence community was getting out

of human intelligence in the early 1970’s. We were moving more

technologically into satellites, into your electronic intercept, which

are doing extremely well. But we have been out of the human intelligence for a long time in its most complete and comprehensive

fashion. We believe you must go back in. How can you determine

intent of conspirators unless you make an effort to get into the conspiracy and find out the information from the inside. And there are

many ways you can confirm the reliability of that kind of information. One of our points is we believe that the rule against the recruitment of terrorists and criminals overseas should be dropped.

It is not fun to do business with bad guys, but bad guys are the

ones that we have to try to stop. And as a result of that, you have

to find—as I have said in local media and national media, the terrorists worldwide must wake up every morning wondering who in

their organization is informing on them to the Central Intelligence

Agency.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well said.

Governor GILMORE. That is what we must do.

And then third, we believe that there must be dissemination of

intelligence up and down the line vertically, Federal, State and

local. Unheard of in the intelligence business, but we believe, as a

panel, that you can qualify people, that you can clear them, you

can give them need-to-know, and you can have the same security

that you would have inside any given agency, and we believe that

begins to disseminate the information as necessary.

In addition, of course, we focused a great deal of attention also

in health and medical and on border. I emphasized border in my

opening statement, because we believe that you can in fact apply

all of these approaches in order to secure your border types of

issues, and you must use the locals. When the terrorist picks the

random target because of his advantage of secrecy and because of

26

surprise, you have got to want to have the local policemen see it

and be alert to looking for it before it occurs.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Ambassador Bremer.

Mr. BREMER. I will just make two brief points. First, Senator

Rudman is absolutely right about the problems of intelligence. I

have been in the foreign affairs community for about 35 years now,

and I know of no area where intelligence is more vital than in

counterterrorism. If you do not have good intelligence, you do not

have a policy. It does not matter what you have got on the borders

or anywhere else, and that is really the answer to your question

about how we stop the hypothetical example that Senator Hart

talked about. The only way to stop that is to have good intelligence

and the only way to get good intelligence, as the Governor points

out, is to have human resources.

So it will not stop it all. As Senator Rudman said, the American

people have to be aware that there will be further attacks, but

without intelligence, there is no point in talking about the rest of

this stuff. You have to do that right.

Second point, and here I may have a disagreement with my

Chairman, in which case he can disavow me. I think in fact one

of the bridging ideas between these two panels involves immigration and border control. I could imagine, myself, putting together

an agency, where you could take Coast Guard, Customs, Border

Patrol, and I would throw in INS, and make an agency that is

called the Immigration and Border Control Agency or some other

such thing, where you pull together these things that have indeed

been sort of bureaucratically encrusted over the decades, in some

cases, centuries, to take a really serious look at the problem of

what kind of regulations there are for letting people and things

into this country. And that would be consistent with our having a

homeland agency, whatever it is going to be called that Governor

Ridge is going to head. No contradiction there. So it is one of those

ideas that maybe between the two panels one could find——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Walker, from GAO’s work, comment

about what a homeland agency would actually do?

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, I think, one has to focus on what is

homeland security, and then you have to look at how do you go

about trying to achieve it. I think on the ‘‘what’’, in our view, it is

a lot broader than many people have assumed. I mean you obviously have the traditional national defense issues that we have always dealt with, but you also have the nontraditional threats that

both of these commissions have dealt with. The scope is very broad.

It deals with transportation issues, as we saw last week very dramatically, financial issues, cyber issues, public health issues, immigration and border issues, drugs, a whole variety of areas.

I think our objectives really need to be threefold. First, avoid

events; second, to maximize preparedness; and third, to manage

the consequences.

I would make an observation. I think last week dramatically illustrated how Federal, State and local entities, and how public and

private sector entities, can rise above silos and narrow institutional

interests and borders that are real or perceived, and manage consequences with outstanding results.

27

We need to figure out how we can best (1) avoid events, (2) maximize preparation, and (3) manage a crisis if an event occur.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Have your folks done any work on—I

keep coming back to them—chemical and biological? In other

words, I think what has been said is the difficulty of preventing

here, apart from intelligence, very high, very difficult. So perhaps

part of this is response and the state of our preparedness now to

respond. Has your office done any work on that?

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, we have done some work on bio-terrorism and on the chem-bio area. We have got some work ongoing

right now with regard to that. Some additional reports are be coming out soon. I would be happy to provide information on that if

you so desire.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Rudman.

Senator RUDMAN. I just want to add one thing that I think none

of us have addressed, but I am sure we all agree with. I think it

was Vince Lombardi who said the best defense is a good offense.

I mean since the intelligence community is very good at assessing

the threat and the capability and knowing many of these organizations and the foreign governments that support them, the best way

to start to cut down the threat is to eliminate the threat. And I

thought the President was very eloquent last night when he said

to these people out there, ‘‘Either you are with us, or you are with

the terrorists.’’

Now, that has not been U.S. policy for a long time irrespective

of which party held the White House. That has not been U.S. policy. If that is U.S. policy and we are serious about it and the American people recognize that there will be loss of life amongst the

military to protect our freedoms, then the best thing we can do is

to start eliminating the threat. You will never get all of it, but you

can sure get a lot of it if you work at it, and I think that is precisely how I read what the President had to say last night.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. A very important point. Apart from the

eloquence, the fact that the President dealt with the public’s fear

and anger very constructively, what was stated last night and is

reflected in both parties in Congress, this is a totally new policy to

finally catch up with and meet the new threats whose reality became painfully clear to us last Tuesday, but we have turned a corner both in terms of the search and pursuit of terrorists internationally and in our willingness and commitment to defend ourselves here at home from their attacks.

Senator RUDMAN. And unfortunately, but not unsurprisingly, in

a democracy such as ours, it took what happened on September 11

to galvanize everyone to that point of view.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Let me ask the members of the two

commissions now to engage directly on the question of the organizational response. I think you see the problem in very similar

terms, and each commission said homeland attacks are likely,

there are agencies out there working on it, but they need to be coordinated. And let me ask you each why you chose the course you

did and why you did not choose the other recommendation?

Senator RUDMAN. Well, we chose our plan for really two reasons.

First, it was the collective wisdom of that panel—and if you look

at that panel they are people with extraordinary experience in FedVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:41 May 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 76801.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
28

eral Government, not local and State, which is very important for

what the Gilmore Commission—but they are all people who have

held major positions in the Federal Government. If you want to

take the Border Patrol and leave it where it is, and leave Customs

where it is, and leave Coast Guard where it is, and have someone

in the White House, no matter how friendly the President or how

good, and assume that person will strongly influence those agencies, it is not going to happen. Now, we believe that. Others may

not, but we believe that.

Now, certainly we set up a liaison agency here if you will. If you

look at, have your staffs later look at page 17 of our report, and

again, on the emergency side on page 21, you will see the organization. Why it is written that way and why it is done that way is we

said let us try to protect the borders, and I think Senator Hart has

said that as well as it can be said, and I think Ambassador Bremer

has indicated that he thinks maybe in some other form that might

work. That has to be done in our view.

Beyond that, you have to have this agency, whether it is an office

in the White House or a cabinet department, we think a cabinet

department. Once you get that reorganization done, there will be

time to do all of the things that these two commissions say need

to be done, Federal, State and local.

But I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect

for the Governor and his commission, but I have seen others come

into the White House with supposedly high-visibility positions, and

a few months went by, and they were not reporting to the President, they were talking to some staff aide—I hate to be that blunt,

but I am just going to lay it out the way it is—and the Secretary

of Defense is not in the White House. He is sitting over in Virginia.

But he is important, and when he wants to see the President, he

sees the President, and we believe that you could have a cabinet

secretary with the same kind of responsibilities without being necessarily located at the White House. But we think the reorganization is very important from a functional point of view.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Hart.

Senator HART. I think it gets down to one word, and that is accountability. If a White House office has authority to coordinate,

the agencies that it has authority to coordinate are not necessarily

accountable to that office. They are accountable to their department head, cabinet secretary or whatever. They will accept the coordination recommendations. There will be a lot of task forces and

working groups and so forth, but no one is accountable. No one is

accountable today. The President of the United States, but I think

the President has, in his wisdom, understood that he cannot run

this operation. Somebody else has to. The question is: What is most

effective? What is effective? Is there a single person accountable to

the President and the American people? And I do not think, whether it was energy in the 1970’s, drugs in the 1990’s, as much power

as you give the czar or whatever you want to call that person, they

are ultimately accountable.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Governor, you have served as a Governor,

you know the importance of authority and accountability, why not

go with an agency such as the Senators have described?

29

Governor GILMORE. Senator, obviously, we are very respectful of

the other panel’s conclusions and its suggestions, and it is on the

table for debate just like every other issue, and that is what we are

engaged in right now. Our sense as a panel was that a national security coordinator type of model perhaps works better. This is a

single person who is in fact accountable. And as the President said

last night, that Governor Ridge would be reporting directly to him.

We think that is setting off in the right direction. We have to remember, Senator, that an attack by the terrorists and the entire

community of terrorists can be on the fabric of a complete free society, and it can be anywhere at any time at anywhere. So how do

you ever conglomerate every aspect of the society into one homeland agency? Instead the emphasis needs to be on coordination of

all agencies as needed, as planned, as part of an overall strategy

for the national strategy.

I think it was said a little while ago that the big dogs are still

going to be there to run, and we understand that, because the

major people in national security, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, they all have duties to do, and they

are going to want to do them in the most effective possible way

that they can. If they are competing just with simply another agency on the same level in the same way, then there is going to be

the danger and hazard. There is going to be turf battles and back

and forth, but if the President is basically operating this business

through his national coordinator, his national office, that it is the

President’s authority that then begins to coordinate and manage

from the top, and then at that point I think you begin to be able

to put something together in a coordinated way.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. How about the argument that the Senators make that unless there is direct line and budget authority,

that the office in the White House is not going to be as effective

as it should be?

Governor GILMORE. We agree. As a matter of fact, we have proposed in our reports that in fact that the national coordinator have

in fact budget authority within the area of terrorism, so that a national strategy goes into place each and every department and

agency fits within it, including its plan for its expenditures so it

can be spent in the most effective possible way, and that there be

a certification process where this individual looks not just at his

agency, but at all agencies in order to determine whether or not

the spending and the budgetary considerations are coordinating

with the national strategy.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Ambassador Bremer.

Mr. BREMER. Both of these suggestions involve pretty dramatic

changes in the Executive Branch, so either way we are up to some

pretty dramatic changes. I am very sensitive to the point that the

Rudman-Hart panel made about the difficulties of coordination. It

actually can work without direct budgetary—without command and

control authority, and the example I would give is exactly how the

government has coordinated its international counterterrorist policy over the last 15 years, and I was intimately involved in setting

up that process back in the second Reagan Administration. And effectively, it is a person on the NSC who does that coordination.

Now, he had no authority over me as Ambassador-at-Large for

30

Counterterrorism, nor over the CIA, nor over the other concerned

agencies, but was able by virtue in fact of being located in the

NSC, to coordinate. You could say, well, why do we not just do the

same thing? Well, the answer is, he is not politically accountable.

No President, and for very good reasons in my view, having been

in the Executive Branch, is going to have NSC people be accountable to Congress.

And therefore, when we got looking at this question, we came

back to this question about budget authority and political accountability, and concluded you need to have it be cabinet level. It needs

to be somebody with the advice and consent of the Senate appointed, and he needs to have the budgetary authority that we put

in our report.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Walker, let me ask you first, and

then the others if they want to respond. Are these two proposals

mutually exclusive?

Mr. WALKER. You read my mind, Mr. Chairman. I do not think

they are mutually exclusive.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Spending too much time with you, David.

Mr. WALKER. We spend a lot of time together, and I enjoy it, personally.

I do not think they are fundamentally at odds. The fact of the

matter is that you have 40 to 50 plus Federal entities that are

going to be involved in this fight. There is no question about it.

And theoretically you could say that there are certain entities that

you might be able to consolidate. As Senator Hart said before,

there are some entities that are merely placed where they are

today based upon what they were originally focused on decades

ago, and those reasons may no longer be the most important reasons or even valid in some circumstances. And, by the way, there

are a lot of other government departments and agencies outside of

homeland security that are in the same situation.

You could theoretically consolidate a number of those that should

be focused primarily on what we could all define as being homeland

security. But even if you do that, a vast majority of the resources

and a vast majority of the people that are going to be necessary in

order to accomplish the three objectives that I talked about before,

are not going to be in that entity in all likelihood. And therefore,

you still have to have some means to have somebody, as Senator

Hart said, who has overall responsibility and accountability, who

has the ability, as Governor Gilmore has said, to be able to have

control not only over the planning, but the execution, who has some

direct involvement in control over people, process and technology,

even if they are not in that entity that you have consolidated.

And so I think there are several dimensions of this challenge

that have to be addressed.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Rudman, I presume you could not

have an office in the White House and an agency dealing exclusively with homeland security, or does that seem like an unnecessary overlap? The fact is that you cannot include everything in the

Homeland Security Agency related to terrorism or weapons of mass

destruction.

Senator RUDMAN. Let me answer the question that you just have

posed to us, because I think there are some great similarities here.

31

Let us understand what our commission recommended in terms of

government reorganization. The only area that we considered in

the area of government reorganization was ‘‘protect the border,’’ because that is so fundamental. I mean, we would all agree, if you

cannot protect the border better than we are doing now, then no

matter how good your intelligence, how good your response, you got

big-time trouble coming at you.

So we said—and I think Gary Hart put it better than I can—here

is what these people used to do, here is why they were created. Let

us protect the border and take Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and

Customs. Now, that goes into a cabinet-level agency which has all

of the kinds of responsibilities that Governor Gilmore and Ambassador Bremer have talked about, and the comptroller general, in

terms of coordinating, I believe it is 51, take away three after you

took those three agents, but it is 48 disparate government responsibilities in the area of responding, protecting, and preventing terrorism. And I think the only difference is, that we are saying that

Governor Ridge would be confirmed by the Senate. He would sit at

the cabinet table. He would not be competing with other people’s

resource in that area. Those three entities would have their budget

about to where they are now or increased by the Congress, but the

only agents to be moved in would be that which protected the border. All of the others, and we all know the obvious, the Defense Department, CIA, FBI, but there is HHS and the Governor probably

knows even more than that, having dealt with them as a Governor,

they would still be where they are, but they would be subject to

strong coordinative authority issued by the Congress in statutory

language and the President by Executive Order to get it done. So

I do not think there is a huge difference about what we are talking

about here.

But we are very firm about the fact that these three agencies

ought to be where they are, and FEMA, of course, which we think

is a major building block.

Senator Hart said to our group, about 2 years ago, when we were

debating some of these things, ‘‘Let us not recommend to the Congress and to the President that which we think is politically doable.

Let us submit, in our report, what we think ought to be done.’’ And

this was one of the big hot buttons, and we knew it at the time.

That is no reason it should not be done.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The big hot button was bringing those

agencies——

Senator RUDMAN. Was bringing these three, taking them away

from where they are.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you the question while we are

on it, because I was going to ask it in a while, which is: What

about the other functions of those agencies, particularly Coast

Guard, but also Customs and Border Patrol, but particularly Coast

Guard, that are not directly related to homeland defense, such as

navigational security that the Coast Guard does?

Senator RUDMAN. They would keep their absolute identities, just

as the Coast Guard did when it went into the Department of

Transportation. Its mission did not change. Its mission was the

same.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

32

Senator RUDMAN. All we are saying is that a very heavy part of

their responsibility, those three agencies, is border security from

goods and from people, and we think they ought to be together.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Governor Gilmore, are these two proposals mutually exclusive? I mean, could you envision yourself

being supportive of a kind of agency that would combine FEMA,

Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, that Senator Rudman has

talked about?

Governor GILMORE. Senator Lieberman, the essence of legislative

life is a combination of different proposals.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Spoken like a Governor. [Laughter.]

Governor GILMORE. No, spoken like a legislator, I believe.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I accept your amendment, spoken like a

former legislator.

Governor GILMORE. Naturally, we are all very deeply respectful

of every proposal that is here, and I am confident that they could

be harmonized, and that they could be accommodated to each other

if that is what it takes in order to pass a piece of legislation and

to get the votes.

From an executive point of view, sometimes you must choose that

which is best, and weigh and balance the different options as meritorious as each of them may be, and ultimately choose. Our belief

has been that the answer here was not any bureaucracy, but a vehicle for management, and a vehicle for management. I believe the

President has established a vehicle for management with Governor

Ridge last night. I suppose that one could put these pieces together, and you could have an agency. It would then go into the

cabinet I suppose, a border cabinet position or something, or an

agency, something of that nature. And then it would fight for turf,

budget issues, and accommodations and influence with other perhaps bigger dogs. That is all right. But ultimately, we believe the

ultimate answer is the coordination, budget authority, planning of

a national strategy from a national terrorism office that I believe

that the President has now established.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Anyone else want to comment on that last

question? If not, let me go to another part of this. I noticed my staff

gave me two articles from the Defense Trade Press today in which

there were statements made, attributed to people in the Pentagon,

that we are talking about defense here. So why should this not go

under someone in the Defense Department? Why should there not

be a new unified command for homeland defense? Presumably, although the article is not totally clear on this, that would include

the border control agencies and even the preparedness that we are

talking about. Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Two and a half reasons. One is the Constitution

of the United States. The second is the Posse Comitatus Law. The

third is this practical necessity.

The constitutional argument dates to the constitutional debate.

What we did then, 225 years ago, was create two armies. The Federalists wanted a standing army and navy to protect American

commercial interests broad, Alexander Hamilton. The anti-Federalists were afraid, dating to classic Republican theory from the Greek

city-states, that a standing army in peacetime in a republic was a

danger. So they insisted that the defense of the homeland be in the

33

hands of the militia, and the militia would be under the control of

the States, and that was the compromise. Now, the militia, in the

late 19th Century, became the National Guard. In the 20th Century the National Guard became an auxiliary expeditionary force,

and that’s the way they think of themselves. But the fact of the

matter is, their primary duty under the Constitution is to defend

the homeland of the United States. Now, as Senator Rudman has

appropriately said, we have not said that is their exclusive duty.

They have not heard what we said, but we have not said that is

their exclusive duty. They can still keep their, and need to keep

their ability as a follow-on expeditionary force, that a primary, if

not the primary, mission of the National Guard is to defend the

homeland. That is the constitutional argument.

The statutory argument, as you know, prohibits the use of American troops, regular army forces, on our soil, absent declaration by

Congress. And that goes back to, oddly enough, a very closely-contested national election in 1874. So you have got a statutory prohibition against the Defense Department running this thing in effect.

And practically, as Senator Rudman said, National Guard units

are forward deployed in 2,100 different units around the country.

Now, you are going to get the argument that the Guard is ‘‘weekend warriors,’’ and incompetent. Wrong. If the National Guard can

fight world wars, and it has, it can defend the homeland. It has to

be properly trained and equipped. It is to today? Largely not, but

if it is made a national priority and the Commander in Chief orders

it done, it will be done. These are citizen soldiers. These are people

in the communities and if you need—if the terrorists take over a

downtown office building in Denver, it is going to be a while before

the 82nd Airborne Division gets there and the damage may be

done. But the Governor knows you can mobilize the Guard awfully

fast and special units particularly, and if you have had any prior

warning, they can be ready to go. They are in the streets of New

York. They were within hours, not too many hours.

So I focused my attention here on the Guard because it is the

solution to the question that you have asked. It is a constitutional

military power under the control of the States, locally deployed,

and trainable and equipable for this mission.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I admire your answer, appreciate it. You

must have had some very interesting sessions of this commission.

Senator HART. You do not know the half of it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I do not want to hear half of it.

[Laughter.]

Senator RUDMAN. Well, let me tell you, interesting enough, Newt

Gingrich, who was the father of this idea, on the theory that no

good deed goes unpunished, when he left the House, was put on

this commission. And he is a historian who brought a lot of insight.

Let me just add one thing to answer your question. The military

made it very clear they do not want this primary responsibility.

That is not theirs. They have enough to do protecting the Nation

overseas, and they do not think that they should have it.

However, everyone agrees, that if we had had a chemical, a nuclear or a biological incident in this country, it is only the active

force military with the National Guard that would have the reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:41 May 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 76801.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
34

sources to deal with the horrendous situation that would face the

country under those circumstance. That is a response issue.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you just a quick question here

about the role of the National Guard as you contemplate it in

homeland defense. If you take your tripartheid approach of the responsibilities of the Homeland Security Agency, prevent, protect

and respond, is it primarily in the respond part that you see the

Guard being active?

Senator RUDMAN. Yes, it is. Some protection, but mainly response, and I think Governor Gilmore would be in a better position

to tell you when they have had disasters in Virginia, hurricanes

and whatnot, I mean there is nothing like the Guard, even though

many are not trained to do that. We say they need specific training

to deal with these kind of contingencies.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What were you thinking about, Senator

Hart, when you said there might be a role in protection as well?

Senator HART. Well, let us hypothesize, which I hate to do because in an interview a few days ago I said this could happen in

Nashville, Denver and Seattle, and my phone has been ringing off

the hook from people in those three cities. Take a city, Hartford.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. [Laughter.]

Senator HART. Sorry.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What was your phone number? [Laughter.]

Senator HART. Let us say intelligence picks up a threat. Let us

say the intelligence is precise enough to say probably a capital city

in New England. I can see the Guard, units of the Guard, not the

whole Connecticut National Guard, but units specially trained,

paramilitary units of the Guard, in a protective role, working with

the State patrol, the local Hartford police, to find them and prevent

them from acting.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good example. Governor, how about the

role of the military generally, why the commission decided to not

ask the Pentagon to take this over, and then specifically, uniquely

as Governor, how you see the role of the National Guard here?

Governor GILMORE. Senator Lieberman, this is a very important

question, and I want to be as forthright as I can. We also will be

addressing an entire provision of our third report to the issue of

the use of the military. We have had thorough discussion about it

over a long period of time. We absolutely reject the Department of

Defense playing a leading role even in the event of a weapon of

mass destruction catastrophic attack should the President conclude

that only regular military can step in to help, even then we recommend that that be subordinate to a Federal civilian agency, logically FEMA. If the military has to be engaged, they should be engaged only at the request and in support of FEMA and the combined operation of State and local people as well.

We reject the use of the military in any first type of response.

It is exactly what the enemy wants, is to have United States military people patrolling the streets of our Nation and imbuing our

citizens with the idea that they are to be controlled by uniform

military people. It is absolutely against the American tradition.

35

And furthermore, Senator, I have made some statements, and I

believe that I reflect the panel’s feelings, that we should never ask

any American to give up any civil right in return for security. The

civil rights and human rights of the people of the United States

under the Constitution are absolutely paramount, and we should

not give the enemy the win to say that we should in any way compromise any of that. As a former elected prosecutor, I know that

you can take actions consistent with the Constitution and security—the Fourth, the Fifth, and the Sixth Amendments. You can do

these things. But we should not cross that line, and we are concerned that the use of the military, unless it is in a subordinate

capacity, would be in fact moving down that direction. And all our

representatives in the Department of Defense on our panel have

concurred that they should not be first responders.

And the second point I would make is to remember, when you

start thinking about sticking something like this in the DOD, remember the key provision that we have put forward, the locals and

the States absolutely must be built in to the local response. I cannot imagine a day that the local and State officials across the 50

United States will become subordinate to a military authority in

the case of a crisis. And in fact, if you went the DOD route, even

there are some Federal agencies that would be a little uncomfortable with that, the CIA perhaps.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you for the answer. I was thinking,

as you were talking, that I have spoken to a number of people in

New York, and people do not want the Guard patrolling streets in

normal times, but the rapid appearance of the National Guard on

the streets of New York after the attacks was immensely reassuring to the public there.

Governor GILMORE. Senator Lieberman, two things. First of all,

the Guard is a little different, as Senator Hart said. They are the

historical militia of the United States. They are under control of

the Governor of each individual State, that civilian authority, unless federalized, and I do not believe there has been a federalization in any of these disasters. So that is a little bit different, but

in addition to that, even then, they should come in subordinate to

the first responders, police, fire, rescue, health, medical, and then

come in to provide additional hands, and then finally, as the situation or the attack escalates or becomes a weapon of mass destruction, then perhaps the regular services, but only in response to and

at the request of a civilian authority.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Ambassador Bremer, correct me if I am

wrong. It is my impression, not that you disagree with what has

been said, but that you have a more expansive view of the potential

role of the military in these matters. Is that true?

Mr. BREMER. The National Commission on Terrorism, which I

chaired, which was a bipartisan commission appointed by Congress, reached a slightly different conclusion which was based on

the following analysis. It is possible, particularly if one considers

biological and chemical terrorism, to imagine a circumstance, as we

said in our report, where not thousands but tens of thousands of

casualties are inflicted. In such a circumstance it is possible to

imagine that one event or several events like this would quickly

overwhelm available local, State and Federal capabilities, including

36

FEMA. In such circumstances, we said, the President of the United

States ought to have the possibility on a one-time ad hoc temporary

basis of asking the Department of Defense to be the lead agency

in responding to such an attack or series of attacks.

There are no plans for that to happen for a lot of the reasons

that the Governor has mentioned and others. Our view is that

under those circumstances, again, hypothesizing a much worse attack than we saw last week, the President in fact is likely to do

that. He is likely to move the military into the lead agency because

they do have all of the capabilities. Our commission’s view, and I

speak now for the National Commission, not for the Gilmore Commission, our commission’s view was the best way to protect civil

liberties in that circumstance is to plan for it ahead of time and

exercise it. The worst way to protect civil liberties is never to even

allow the possibility.

And the example I have given, Senator, in testimony on my National Commission, is what happened after Pearl Harbor, the last

major domestic attack, when the two great American liberals,

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Earl Warren, responded by locking

up Japanese Americans. Although the Supreme Court upheld that

decision—most Americans today believe that was a violation of

their civil liberties. So I take the opposite view precisely because

of the respect I have for civil liberties, and that was the unanimous

consensus of my bipartisan commission, which is, as you point out,

different from where some others have come out.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very interesting and worth thinking

about. It is true also that in the recent crisis the President did deploy military assets in response in a very controlled way. For instance, the fighter planes that were sent out over American cities,

the AWACs, and in a very different way, the medical ships, for instance, that came in to New York and maybe other areas as well.

Mr. Walker, a final question just to give a perspective. I believe

the GAO has done some comparative work here on the way other

countries in the world deal with homeland security, and the role

of the military in homeland security, and I wonder if you could just

speak for a moment about that.

Mr. WALKER. Senator, we have done some work with regard to

how certain other countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom,

France, and Israel, end up approaching this issue. We have already

issued a report on that. It is publicly available, and it would provide some useful information for you and the Congress to consider.

One of the things that we find at GAO is that we are very much

in a borderless world. In many cases the United States is the lead

with regard to many types of activities. In some cases we are not.

And in this area we are not. And there are other countries that

have been dealing with this issue for longer than we have for various reasons, and I think there are some lessons learned there that

we ought to draw from.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will look to that. You have been immensely helpful. Any of you want to make a statement? Yes, Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, in our efforts since our commission

to convey what our report does and does not do at both the congressional staff and administrative and media level, a lot of misunderVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:41 May 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 76801.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
37

standing has occurred. And I know you get, and your staff gets,

dozens of these. We obviously believe this is an extraordinary effort, a historic effort.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We agree.

Senator HART. May I just say if any on your staff or any of your

colleagues need to understand what we do and do not do, the first

report is 8 pages, the second report is 16 pages. Eleven pages of

this one will show you what we propose and what we do not propose, and I would really hope anyone making a decision as to what

the congressional response should be, or the administrative response, should at least read those 35 pages. It is not too much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I absolutely agree. We will make sure

that, with your cooperation, that every Member of the Committee,

if they have not already, gets copies of the reports. I have been

over them, and they are superb pieces of work, as is your commission’s work, Governor Gilmore.

I thank each and every one of you. You have been very constructive. You were ahead of your time, ahead of the rest of the Nation’s

time unfortunately, but it is not too late now to put into effect the

recommendations that you have made to deal with the new realities that we face.

This Committee will continue its consideration of protection of

critical infrastructure next week with two hearings, one on airline

security and then the other on what we are doing now to protect

other elements of critical infrastructure, including other transportation systems, public utilities, and the computer infrastructures

on which so much of our country today, including the financial systems, are based. And then I certainly hope that we can engage

Governor Ridge and the administration as quickly as possible.

And I would like to set the goal for the Committee, and I believe

Senator Thompson shares this—we have talked about it—to see if

we can work with everyone involved here and report a bill out

soon. These are not ordinary times and we should not be following

an ordinary legislative schedule. The President, by his action last

night, if you will, closed the gap, and now I think we have to act

with the administration to create a permanent structure here to

forever after protect the American people when they are at home.

We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for a week.

Senators Akaka and Voinovich have submitted statements, which

I would like to add for the record.

[The prepared statements of Senators Akaka and Voinovich follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Good morning. I commend the Chairman for calling this hearing and

thank all the witnesses for being here. It is a pleasure to have such expertise on

this subject here today. I especially want to welcome my friends and former colleagues, Senator Hart and Senator Rudman.

In the face of tragedy, our leadership must be steady and our voice calm but firm.

The President is right to say this will be a long conflict.

I was a young man when Pearl Harbor was attacked. I watched as Japanese Zeros

bombed Hawaii and my country. Then we knew our enemy, but today’s faceless terrorist is more difficult to identify.

Dreadful as the attacks were on September 11, we can imagine some which could

be even more lethal. In July the International Security Subcommittee, which I

chair, held a hearing on FEMA’s Role in Managing a Bio-terrorist Attack. One truth

38

became clear: We lack a national security strategy and institutional organization to

address terrorist attacks.

This threat is amorphous . . . amoral . . . without race . . . or . . . ethnicity and

may operate from several countries. It is asymmetric in the sense that it exploits

our strengths—in technology and organization—and turns them into weaknesses.

This Nation’s commercial airline system, piloting knowledge, and the way our institutions are designed and our people trained to react to such threats, were turned

into a weapon against us. Our airline system is clearly not our only vulnerability.

This was not Pearl Harbor—this was an asymmetric attack altogether different

than anything we have experienced.

The response last week reflected a strategy and coordination that was inadequate.

Today’s hearing properly focuses on how our Nation’s institutions must be reorganized in a way that maximizes their ability to react effectively.

Today the enemy of democracy is less definable in a world that was forever altered on September 11. I look forward to the testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing this morning

on the Federal Government’s role in responding to terrorist threats against the

United States. I would also like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for being

here today.

Mr. Chairman, last Tuesday, the United States of America suffered a horrible national tragedy, the images of which will forever etch the date, September 11, 2001,

on the collective minds of the American people. The events of that day and the days

following the terrorist attack have highlighted just how important a role our Federal

agencies—and the individuals who work for them—play in the defense of our Nation.

While this Committee has broad jurisdiction to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of these agencies, there is perhaps no greater function that we can undertake than ensuring that those entities of our Federal Government are properly

arrayed and structured to deal with any attack on our homeland. Both the HartRudman and Gilmore Commissions have released reports in recent months on this

issue. Little did we know that their observations would be so prescient. In the wake

of last week’s tragic events, I believe we should consider more carefully than ever

the recommendations of these two commissions and ensure that our government is

prepared to act expeditiously in responding to any future attacks.

Mr. Chairman, we have an excellent panel of witnesses with us today, and I am

especially pleased to welcome Senator Gary Hart and Senator Warren Rudman. As

you know, Mr. Chairman, earlier this year, the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee held a hearing on the national security implications of the

human capital crisis. I was pleased to have former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and retired Admiral Harry Train, two of the commissioners who worked with

Senators Hart and Rudman, as witnesses at that hearing. They offered excellent

testimony on preparing our Federal workforce for the challenges of national defense

in the 21st Century, and I will be interested in hearing the recommendations of our

witnesses today on the homeland security section of their report.

Mr. Chairman, like all Members of this Committee, I wish we did not have to conduct this hearing under these circumstances. However, I think it is important, in

light of last Tuesday’s tragedy, to get this dialogue going so that we may ultimately

eliminate the threat of terrorism once and for all.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But you have each done extraordinary

public service here, and I thank you for it. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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