United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

February 1995 HONDURAS

Continuing U.S.

Military Presence at

Soto Cano Base Is Not

Critical

GAO/NSIAD-95-39

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259044 

February 8, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommitte on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Member, Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Since 1983, the United States has maintained a semipermanent military

presence at Honduras’ Soto Cano Air Force Base.1

 The U.S. presence was

established there to support U.S. military and political interests in Central

America, which were threatened by communist expansion in the region.

With the end of the Cold War and political changes that have occurred in

the region, we examined the continuing need for a semipermanent U.S.

military presence in Honduras. Specifically, we assessed whether this U.S.

military presence is critical to current U.S. activities and objectives in the

region. The cost to maintain the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano is

projected to be about $38 million in fiscal year 1994. In light of budget

constraints and current efforts to increase the cost-effectiveness of the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) worldwide operations, we believe this

report will be of interest to the Subcommittee.

Results in Brief The U.S. military presence at Soto Cano provides useful and convenient

support to some U.S. government activities but is not critical to these

activities or current U.S. policy objectives in the region—which are now

oriented toward economic growth and democratic reform. U.S. military

and embassy officials in the region agree that the military’s contribution to

the new objectives is incidental and not reason enough to maintain the

presence. Moreover, the United States has underway a range of official

programs to achieve economic and democracy objectives in Latin

America, which are being carried out by several civilian agencies.

With the end of the Cold War and political changes that have occurred in

the region, the major missions of U.S. personnel at Soto Cano are to

1

A combination of conditions have contributed to describing the U.S. military presence in Honduras as

semipermanent. These include the early congressional concerns that facilities not be permanent-type

construction, the short-term assignments at Soto Cano, and the use of semipermanent facilities for

more than 10 years.

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B-259044 

support military training exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance

exercises, and U.S. counterdrug activities. However, the U.S. military

presence at Soto Cano is not essential to training exercises. Similar

training is routinely conducted in other Central American countries

without this type of semipermanent arrangement. The U.S. Army has

recently acknowledged that training can be conducted in the region

without a semipermanent logistics support base.

Soto Cano is located in the center of the drug transit area, and U.S.

military personnel there assist the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Navy,

and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in counterdrug

operations. However, this support is minimal. Officials from the three

agencies characterized the support they received as convenient, but not

critical, and said they could continue their operations in the region

without support from the U.S. military at Soto Cano.

The pending withdrawal of U. S. forces from Howard Air Force Base in

Panama was also ascribed as a reason for the continuing U.S. presence at

Soto Cano. Some U.S. government officials believe that the U.S. presence

at Soto Cano provides the U.S. military with needed flexibility as it draws

down assets in Panama and in the event of a future crisis in the region.

However, the current arrangement with the Honduran government does

not guarantee that the United States could have full access for future U.S.

missions. A significant expansion of U.S. assets at Soto Cano and access

for future military missions would likely be encumbered by a number of

factors, including the absence of a base rights agreement, limited capacity,

and political issues. DOD and State Department officials acknowledged it

was unlikely the United States would become involved in a major military

conflict in Latin America.

The original reasons for the establishment of U.S. presence at Soto Cano

no longer exist. The elimination of this arrangement would have minimal

impact on current U.S. missions and objectives in the region and would

potentially result in budgetary savings. However, we did not attempt to

establish firm estimates of cost savings that would result from

discontinuing the U.S. presence because there were too many unknowns,

including how current activities at Soto Cano would be dispersed to other

DOD installations or whether they would be eliminated.

Background In August 1983, DOD established a joint task force called Joint Task

Force-Bravo (JTF-B) of about 1,100 Army and Air Force personnel at Soto

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Cano (formerly, Palmerola Air Base), the Honduran military installation

that houses the Honduran Air Force Academy. The presence was

established to support various U.S. political and military objectives that

demonstrated U.S. commitment to its allies against the increasing

communist threat in the region. JTF-B and the other U.S. military units at

Soto Cano were assigned missions to coordinate and support U.S.

counterinsurgency and intelligence operations, and military training

exercises in the region. When directed, JTF-B provides support for disaster

relief, search and rescue, and contingency-type missions in Central

America. JTF-B was established as a subordinate unit of the U.S. Southern

Command (USSOUTHCOM), headquartered in Panama.

The United States funded construction projects and infrastructure

upgrades at Soto Cano, such as a F-16 capable runway, semipermanent

barracks, offices and recreational facilities, 22 miles of roads, and

upgrades of the water, sewer, and electrical systems. The annual cost for

the United States to maintain the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano has

grown steadily from about $24 million annually in the mid-1980s to a

projected $38 million for 1994. (See table 1 for a breakdown of the costs.)

Since 1991, the average annual cost of new construction and upgrades has

been about $2.5 million. U.S. operations at Soto Cano are funded from the

Army’s and the Air Force’s Operations and Maintenance accounts.

In addition to JTF-B, other U.S. military units are stationed at Soto Cano to

support JTF-B’s missions, such as an aviation battalion and a military police

platoon. About two-thirds of the U.S. military personnel assigned to Soto

Cano are on temporary duty, usually from 4 to 6 months. The remainder

serve a 1-year tour.

In April 1994, authorized U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano was reduced

to 780 (see app. I). At the time of our fieldwork, DOD officials told us that

the level of personnel was scheduled to increase to about 900 in

October 1994 due to the relocation of helicopter personnel and three

helicopters stationed in Panama. DOD officials informed us that this move

was being made to keep aircraft assets in the theater due to the drawdown

of U.S. forces in Panama. However, during discussions on a draft of this

report, DOD officials told us that the level is now scheduled to decrease to

about 500 personnel in October 1995 due to the deactivation of a

helicopter battalion, which will reduce the number of helicopters from 31

to 11. In addition, all U.S. aviation operations and support at Soto Cano

will be consolidated with JTF-B facilities, and the current main air facility,

Camp Pickett, will be closed.

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According to DOD documents, the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano

contributes about $14 million annually to the Honduran economy in the

form of contracts and services to support the U.S. military presence. This

includes the U.S. military personnel estimated spending on the Honduran

local economy.

Military Presence at

Soto Cano Not

Essential to New

Strategic Interests

With the resolution of military conflicts and greater political stability in

Central America, the focus of U.S. interest in the region has shifted from

political/military objectives to economic growth and democracy building.

The U.S. government officials we met with said that the continuing U.S.

military presence contributed to U.S. democracy objectives, but that the

contribution was incidental to their presence to perform other missions.

Since 1990, Central America has experienced new political stability as the

conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua have been resolved, and the overall

threat of communist expansion has diminished. As a result, U.S.-directed

counterinsurgency and intelligence activities have ended. The changed

political condition from the time that JTF-B was established is reflected in

the April 1994 congressional testimony of the Assistant Secretary of State

for Inter-American Affairs. The Assistant Secretary stated “the United

States is no longer compelled to base foreign policy strategy on defending

the United States and its neighbors from external aggression. Instead,

foreign policy can now be focused on encouraging democracy and

promoting economic growth.”

When questioned about the continuing need for a military presence in light

of new U.S. goals and the relative stability in the region, military officials

at Soto Cano and the Southern Command said that the military presence at

Soto Cano contributes to U.S. efforts to promote democracy. According to

these officials, the military personnel at Soto Cano serve as an example of

a military force that is subordinate to civilian control, a main tenet of

democracy. However, the officials stated that the influence exerted by the

U.S. military at Soto Cano was incidental and difficult to quantify.

According to State Department officials, the principal U.S. programs to

promote democratic initiatives and military professionalism are

administered by other U.S. agencies such as the State Department, the

Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and the

Defense Security Assistance Agency. Further, the continuing U.S. military

presence at Soto Cano appears inconsistent with the current goal of the

U.S. Embassy in Honduras—which is to reduce the overall size and scope

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B-259044 

of U.S. activities in Honduras in recognition of declining U.S. funding and

increased political stability in the region. Moreover, the United States is

also encouraging the government of Honduras to implement military

reforms, which include reducing its armed forces.

U.S. Military Presence

Is Not Needed to

Support Military

Training Activities

Since the end of the Cold War, the primary missions of JTF-B are to support

joint, combined and interagency operations, and provide logistical support

for military training exercises, and to maintain and operate an all-weather,

C-5 capable airfield. While the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano is useful

and convenient, it is not essential to support military training activities in

the region. U.S. military personnel are routinely deployed throughout Latin

America for training missions without a dedicated, semipermanent U.S.

logistics and support base like Soto Cano. According to DOD records, in

1993 over 60,000 U.S. active and reserve military personnel were deployed

from the United States and other locations to conduct a variety of training

and civic assistance activities throughout Latin America. About 5,500 of

the 60,000 participated in training activities conducted in Honduras. In

discussions on a draft of this report, DOD officials provided us with figures

for fiscal year 1994 training. These figures show that JTF-B provided

support to 10,665 personnel, which is 89 percent of the total deployed in

Central America. However, the types and levels of support provided by

JTF-B to the various training exercises were not available. According to DOD

officials, the number of personnel trained in Central America is

approximately 17 percent of all personnel deployed from the United States

and other locations to Latin America.

Training activities conducted in Latin America included engineering

exercises to drill wells, build roads, schools, and medical clinics; medical

exercises to provide basic medical, dental, and veterinary care; and

combined exercises with host nation forces, such as computer-simulated

war exercises and counterterrorist training.

JTF-B and the other U.S. military units stationed at Soto Cano provide

support to these types of training exercises conducted in Honduras. For

example, in support of an engineering exercise conducted in Honduras in

1993, U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano

• performed liaison functions with Honduran military and local government

officials,

• assisted U.S. reserve units in awarding contracts to procure services and

supplies on the local economy, and

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B-259044 

• transported and accompanied advance teams to identify suitable locations

for base camps and inspected training sites during the exercise.

The U.S. military at Soto Cano also often provides limited support (such as

supplies and communication support) to training exercises in Belize,

Guatemala, and El Salvador. For example, military personnel at Soto Cano

provided and transported tents to a National Guard training site in

Guatemala when the Guard’s shipment of tents was delayed.

Currently, assets from Soto Cano are being used to support demining

training under the operational control of the U.S. Military Group (USMILGP)

in Honduras for Brazilian, Costa Rican, and Honduran troops. JTF-B also

recently provided assistance to the USMILGP in El Salvador in the

coordination of air operations for the Fuertes Caminos exercise.

Officials from the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard said that the

support they receive from U.S. military forces at Soto Cano makes training

more convenient but that the training can be accomplished without a U.S.

military presence. Since 1992, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve

have increased their training deployments to other Central American

countries, especially El Salvador and Guatemala. In these countries,

intergovernmental coordination for logistical support is provided by U.S.

military personnel attached to the Embassy; personnel deployed in

advance of the training; post-exercise evaluation teams; and in some cases,

the host nation military, according to U.S. Army Reserve and National

Guard officials.

In a March 1994 memorandum on the review of the requirement for JTF-B,

to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), the Army staff concluded that

training activities in the region could continue without support from U.S.

military personnel at Soto Cano. According to the memorandum training

exercises in the region can be supported from bases located in the United

States without the support of an “expensive, semi-permanent, logistics

base.” The memorandum states that the costs to support training exercises

in Honduras exceed the benefits and the resources could be better used

elsewhere to meet other Army operational requirements. Further, the

Army Chief of Staff indicated to the Commander in Chief (CINC),

USSOUTHCOM, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a message,

that reducing or eliminating the Army’s support requirement for JTF-B

would represent an important savings to the Army. Furthermore, we

reported in November 1993 and testified in April 1994 that some DOD

humanitarian and civic action projects were not designed to contribute to

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foreign policy objectives, did not appear to enhance U.S. military training,

and either lacked the support of the country or were not used.2

According to DOD officials, the CINC, USSOUTHCOM, considered the CSA’s

concerns about the need for JTF-B. The CINC’s position is that JTF-B could be

reduced, but that access to Soto Cano, with its C-5 capable airfield and a

U.S. presence, is needed to accomplish USSOUTHCOM’s mission, which

includes conducting various military and humanitarian operations,

training, and providing support for exercises in the Central American

region.

U.S. Military Support

at Soto Cano to

Counterdrug

Activities Is Minimal

U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano provide support to the U.S. Customs

Service, the U.S. Navy, and the DEA counterdrug programs in the region.

However, the level of support is minimal and involves only a small portion

of the U.S. military personnel and equipment at Soto Cano. U.S. Customs,

U.S. Navy, and DEA officials characterized the support they receive from

the U.S. military at Soto Cano as useful and convenient, but not critical to

their counterdrug programs.

Minimal Support to

Customs Counterdrug

Activities

Honduras is an ideal location for U.S. Customs to intercept and track

suspect drug-trafficking aircraft. The U.S. Customs Service has two

airplanes and eight personnel stationed at Soto Cano to intercept and

track planes suspected of carrying drugs in the Central American region

and over the eastern Pacific Ocean. Customs provides housing for its

personnel at the base and its mechanics maintain their counterdrug

planes, but receives utilities and other support services through the U.S.

military and can use U.S. military facilities, such as the dining hall.

In addition, Customs purchases airplane fuel from U.S. military supplies

and receives ground and air operations support, such as air traffic control

and weather reports from U.S. military at Soto Cano. The U.S. military

presence at the base provides Customs with a secure environment and

operational capability 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. According to the U.S.

Air Force commander at the base, about 130 personnel are involved in

airfield operations. However, Customs counterdrug flights accounted for

only a small percentage of the total flights handled by these personnel. For

example, Customs’ aircraft accounted for about 8 percent of total U.S.

fixed-wing flights from Soto Cano between July 1993 and May 1994—an

2

Department of Defense: Changes Needed to the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

(GAO/NSIAD-94-57, Nov. 2, 1993) and Department of Defense: Weaknesses in Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-158, Apr. 19, 1994).

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B-259044 

average of 16 times per month. During the 9-month period, April to

December 1993, Interagency Counterdrug Assessment data shows that

Customs’ aircraft based at Soto Cano participated in intercepting/tracking

32 trafficking aircraft, which resulted in 13 cocaine seizures.

Customs officials said their counterdrug operations could continue at Soto

Cano without assistance from the U.S. military if support were obtained

from the Honduran military and/or contractors. Additionally, Customs

officials told us that if they did not have access to Soto Cano, they could

use aircraft based in Panama, Mexico, or other locations to monitor areas

now covered by the aircraft at Soto Cano. However, the officials also said

that this option would decrease the effectiveness of operations because

Customs’ aircraft would always be in a “catch-up” mode rather than an

intercept mode. We note that Customs carries out similar activities in

Mexico and other locations without a U.S. military presence.

Notwithstanding the current Customs’ arrangement with USSOUTHCOM3

 for

use of the Soto Cano Base facilities, arrangements to provide for Customs

use of civilian airport facilities for antidrug activities—without a U.S.

military presence—may be possible as has been done in Mexico according

to Customs officials. This would require the governments of the United

States and Honduras to negotiate and establish appropriate arrangements.

Navy Uses Soto Cano

Infrequently

The Navy uses Soto Cano in its counterdrug operations, which involve

detecting and monitoring suspected drug planes. U.S. military flight

records at Soto Cano showed that Navy counterdrug planes landed at Soto

Cano on average 11 times a month from July 1993 through May 1994. Two

Navy P-3 counterdrug planes based in Panama sometimes use Soto Cano

for refueling or as a temporary base for their operations. The aircraft

refuel at Soto Cano and receive ground and air operations support similar

to the support provided to Customs. Navy personnel are sometimes

housed at Soto Cano during 2- to 3-day stopovers.

Navy officials said that due to intercept geometry limitations, in order for

the Navy P-3 aircraft to provide a constant air intercept capability, they

must be staged at a Central American site. The optimum location for

staging is north of Costa Rica but south of Mexico. Currently, Soto Cano is

the only air base with U.S. aviation support that fits that description. These

officials further added that due to excessive transit distance from other

3

The arrangement is based upon a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Customs Service

and USSOUTHCOM, dated September 14, 1990. The purpose of this memorandum is to facilitate and

implement cooperation and coordination for the detection and monitoring of maritime and aerial

transit of illegal drugs through the USSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility into the United States.

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B-259044 

P-3 bases, a Central American base is required to conduct maritime patrols

in the southwestern Caribbean and eastern Pacific. When Howard Air

Force Base closes, Soto Cano will be the only base in Central America that

has U.S. aviation support. According to DOD officials, if the U.S. presence

at Soto Cano is discontinued, P-3s could potentially continue to stage out

of there or other bases in the region if the appropriate operating

agreement can be made with the host nation. However, in considering

options associated with the possible elimination of the U.S. presence at

Soto Cano, the effectiveness of the Navy’s P-3 interdiction efforts should

be considered. Our prior work has raised serious questions about the

cost-effectiveness of DOD’s surveillance efforts in the drug war.4

DEA Receives Limited

Support From U.S. Military

at Soto Cano

A part of DEA’s mission is to assist local law enforcement agencies with

counterdrug investigations, intelligence, and other activities. The 4th

Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, at Soto Cano occasionally provides

helicopter transport to DEA agents and Honduran law enforcement officers

for counterdrug operations.5

 These missions have involved transporting

agents to investigate drug seizures (post-seizure investigation),

reconnaissance, drug eradication, and training for Honduran law

enforcement officers.

At the time of our fieldwork, the helicopter battalion had 33 helicopters: 

15 Blackhawk, 10 Huey, and 8 Chinook helicopters. From October 1992

through March 1994, the battalion provided transportation support to DEA

about once a month, typically transporting two DEA and three Honduran

agents. This accounts for only a small portion of the helicopter battalion’s

total flying hours. For example, during fiscal year 1993, DEA air transport

totaled 91.3 flying hours, or only 1.2 percent of the helicopter battalion’s

total flying hours. The remaining 98.8 percent of the helicopter flying

hours went for a variety of missions such as pilot proficiency training,

humanitarian and civic action exercises, and general support for U.S.

military groups and embassies in the region.

DEA officials characterized the helicopter battalion’s flight support as

convenient. They said that DEA operations in Honduras could be conducted

with one Chinook and two Blackhawk helicopters. However, DEA officials

noted they have other options to meet their needs for air transportation.

4

Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off (GAO/NSIAD-93-220, 

Sept. 1, 1993).

5

DEA is authorized to request DOD assistance for its counterdrug operations by section 1004 of the

fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended (P.L. 101-510).

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These include chartering planes, which they have done in the past, or

using U.S. helicopters based in Guatemala.

Soto Cano Not a

Viable Option to

Howard Air Base

U.S. military and diplomatic officials told us that another reason to

maintain a U.S. presence at Soto Cano is the pending U.S. withdrawal from

Panama by the end of 1999, that will result in the loss of Howard Air Force

Base. These officials stated that it is important to retain access to an

airfield in the region that is operated by U.S. military personnel. Without a

U.S. military presence at Soto Cano or Panama, officials said the United

States would no longer control or have immediate access to an airfield in

Latin America for contingency purposes. They stated, however, that this is

not reason enough to justify continuing the U.S. presence. They also

acknowledged that it was unlikely that the United States would become

involved in a major military conflict in Latin America.

Maintaining a U.S. military presence at Soto Cano does not guarantee

continued access to the base because the United States has no base rights

or status of forces agreements with the government of Honduras.

According to some Honduran officials we met with, the Honduran

constitution prohibits the permanent basing of foreign troops in Honduras,

which would limit U.S. options with respect to future missions at Soto

Cano. The 1954 Military Assistance Treaty between the United States and

Honduras was the basis for military cooperation and assistance during the

Cold War. Subsequent annexes and protocols to the 1954 agreement

provided for the establishment of U.S. military presence at Soto Cano. U.S.

and Honduran officials characterize the agreement allowing a U.S. military

presence at Soto Cano as a “handshake” agreement, which either side

could decide to break at any time.

In fact, the current U.S. presence has become a source of political

controversy. Some Honduran government officials question the need for

the U.S. military at Soto Cano and the adequacy of the arrangement for

this presence. The Honduran President, the Chief of the Armed Forces,

and leaders of the Honduran Congress have called for an examination of

the terms and conditions of the U.S. presence because the reasons for its

establishment no longer exist.

Finally, continuation of the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano will

require recurring renovation and upgrade construction of some facilities

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and environmental issues will need to be addressed.6 For example, the

waste water treatment system is not adequate for the current U.S.

presence.

Cost to Maintain U.S.

Presence at Soto Cano

Base

We did not attempt to establish firm estimates of cost savings that would

result from discontinuing the U.S. presence at Soto Cano because there

were too many unknowns. For example, we did not know how current

activities at Soto Cano would be dispersed to other DOD installations and

whether they would continue at the same level. Similarly, we did not have

a firm basis for estimating the costs that Customs would incur with a

different support arrangement for its mission. However, since about

83 percent of training exercises in the region take place without assistance

from U.S. forces at Soto Cano, there are other DOD units and bases that

provide similar support and they could take on the support role currently

performed by JTF-B. Thus, we infer that DOD resources (i.e., human,

financial, supplies and equipment, and contracts and fees) associated with

base operations and maintenance could be eliminated and costs would

either decline and/or shift to other agencies. Table 1 shows the direct costs

associated with maintaining the U.S. military presence for fiscal year 1994.

6

JTF-B envisions providing proactive environmental leadership and began using environmental

compliance assessment system inspections in April 1993 to establish a baseline program. They have

begun to identify and prioritize requirements and funding sources. Additional full-time staffing is

required for this program.

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Table 1: Costs to Operate and Maintain

U.S. Military Presence at Soto Cano

Base (Projected for Fiscal Year 1994) 

Dollars in thousands

Cost elements FY 1994

Contracts and feesa $9,510.9

Army Flying Hours Programb 7,900.0

Supplies and equipmentc 6,075.6

Per diem and transportd 6,000.0

Travel and transportatione 1,012.2

Civilian salariesf 1,003.2

U.S. Air Force costsg 6,790.0

Total $38,291.9

aBase operations contract, telephone and electrical service costs, and design fees for U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers projects.

bFuel, repair and replacement parts, and travel expenses for the 4th Battalion, 228th Aviation

Regiment.

cOffice, medical and maintenance supplies, repair parts, and data processing purchases.

dTransportation costs for initial deployment and return to home base for U.S. military personnel at

Soto Cano, and per diem and separation allowance costs while stationed at the base.

eCosts to transport equipment to the base, and for U.S. military personnel stationed at Soto Cano

to travel from the base to other locations on official duty.

f

Salaries for 39 Honduran clerks at Soto Cano and for 45 staff-years of personnel in Panama

providing administrative support to U.S. military at Soto Cano.

gAir Force shares the cost of all cost elements except Army Flying Hours Program. However, Air

Force costs are shown in total because Air Force personnel were unable to separate its costs by

the individual cost elements.

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by U.S. Army and Air Force.

Recommendation The reason that the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano was established no

longer exists and this presence is not critical to current missions. In light

of budget constraints and current efforts to increase the cost-effectiveness

of DOD’s worldwide operations, we question whether the U.S. military

presence at Soto Cano is justified. Therefore, we recommend that

• the Secretary of Defense reduce U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano to

the level necessary to support counterdrug activities, pending the

development of other arrangements to support those counterdrug

activities;

• the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, the Administrator of DEA,

the Secretaries of State and Defense, in conjunction with the Director of

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B-259044 

the Office of National Drug Control Policy, develop a plan to conduct their

operations without U.S. military units at Soto Cano; and

• the Secretary of Defense withdraw the remaining U.S. military personnel

at Soto Cano once the interagency plan is developed and implemented.

Agency Comments In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that they have already

begun reducing U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano to the levels

necessary for USSOUTHCOM to carry out JTF-B’s restructured mission, which

was formally approved on November 18, 1994, after the completion of our

audit work. DOD plans to reduce the number of helicopters from 33 to 11

and personnel from the April 1994 level of 780 to 499 by October 1995. DOD

said that if JTF-B were eliminated, it would cost units deploying to the

region about $8.2 million per year to provide the command and control

and logistics support for most exercises in the Central American countries

at the fiscal year 1993-94 level. No details were provided as to how the

$8.2-million estimate was established or its relevance to the total cost of

the U.S. presence at Soto Cano. DOD stated that continued U.S. military

operations at Soto Cano are important to ensure effective forward

presence and to execute peacetime operations in the Central American

region. They responded that any further restructuring of DOD activities at

Soto Cano should await decisions that are pending on the relocation of

USSOUTHCOM headquarters. DOD’s response and comments are in 

appendix II.

The Department of State generally agreed with the information in the draft

report but expressed concern about its timing and the political signal that

might be perceived by the Latin American region if JTF-B were to be

terminated. The U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and the Office of National

Drug Control Policy generally agreed with the information contained in

the draft report. Informal comments received from the agencies during

discussions on a draft of this report have been included where

appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

We interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the U.S. Customs

Service, DEA, and the Army National Guard Readiness Bureau, all in the

Washington, D.C., area. We also met with the Army Reserve Command

Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, and the U.S. Atlantic Command in

Norfolk, Virginia. We obtained additional information related to the costs

of maintaining the presence at the base from Air Force Air Combat

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
B-259044 

Command Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and the Army Forces

Command Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

In Panama, we met with officials from the USSOUTHCOM, including U.S.

Army South, and the U.S. Customs Service and DEA. In Honduras, we

visited the U.S. military installation at Soto Cano and interviewed the

Commander, JTF-B; the Commander, 4th Battalion, 228th Aviation

Regiment; and other military personnel assigned to the base. We also met

with the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras and other embassy officials,

including the Commander of the USMILGP, the Defense Attache, and the DEA

Country Attache. Additionally, we interviewed former and present

Honduran government and military officials regarding the U.S. military

presence in Honduras. We did not assess the effectiveness of the programs

that are supported by JTF-B and the other U.S. military units at the base.

We conducted our review between October 1993 and June 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, State,

and Treasury; the Attorney General; the Commissioner of U.S. Customs;

the Administrator of DEA; the Directors of the Office of National Drug

Control Policy and the Office of Management and Budget; and interested

congressional committees. Copies will also be made available to others

upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III.

Joseph E. Kelley

Director-in-Charge

International Affairs Issues

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Authorized Level of

U.S. Military

Personnel at Soto

Cano Base (as of

April 1, 1994)

18

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

19

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

23

Table Table 1: Costs to Operate and Maintain U.S. Military Presence at

Soto Cano Base

12

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief

CSA Chief of Staff of the Army

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

JTF-B Joint Task Force-Bravo

USMILGP U.S. Military Group

USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Appendix I 

Authorized Level of U.S. Military Personnel

at Soto Cano Base (as of April 1, 1994)

Military unit Authorized level

Joint Task Force Bravo

Command group and joint staff 153

Air Force forces 136

Medical element 79

Joint security force 51

Army forces 38

Subtotal 457

Other military units

4th Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment 263

Military police platoon 48

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service 3

Criminal investigation unit 1

Other small support unitsa 8

Subtotal 323

Total 780

aIncludes five personnel in the power plant and three personnel in an equipment diagnostic and

measurement unit.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 12.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Benjamin F. Nelson, Associate Director

Andres C. Ramirez, Assistant Director

Atlanta Regional

Office

Mario L. Artesiano, Regional Assignment Manager

Nancy T. Toolan, Evaluator-in-Charge

Daniel E. Ranta, Evaluator

Sara L. Bingham, Reports Analyst

(711056) Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-39 Honduras
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