06/16/2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 16, 2017 Session

RONALD STRINGER v. ALECIA STRINGER

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 15D-1423 Philip E. Smith, Judge

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No. M2016-01314-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Mother, the primary residential 

parent, sought to relocate to Texas, citing an employment offer. Father objected to the 

relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose and that Mother’s real 

purpose for relocating is to be closer to her boyfriend. The trial court denied mother’s 

request to relocate based on mother’s perjury in the trial court’s presence and on the 

finding that the real purpose of mother’s proposed move is to be closer to her boyfriend. 

We reverse the trial court’s decision because we determine that father failed to carry his 

burden of proof.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.

GOLDIN, and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Thomas F. Bloom, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Alecia Stringer.

Thomas F. Mink, Charles M. Duke, and William M. Leech, Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellee, Ronald Stringer.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff/Appellee Ronald Stringer (“Father”) and Defendant/Appellant Alecia 

Stringer (“Mother”) married in 1998. During the marriage, the parties moved often

because of Father’s job as a preacher, living in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Texas. 

A daughter (“the child”) was born in November 2006. In the summer of 2013, the parties 
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separated, and Mother moved to Middle Tennessee. Father at some point after moved to 

Lawrence County, Tennessee, to be closer to the child. On April 29, 2014, the parties 

were divorced in Texas, and on July 28, 2015, the decree of divorce nunc pro tunc was 

domesticated in Tennessee. Mother was designated the primary residential parent, and 

Father was named the alternate residential parent. 

Mother returned to Texas in March 2015 and June 2015 to visit with an old high 

school friend (“boyfriend”). In a letter dated August 3, 2015, Mother notified Father by 

certified mail that she intended to relocate to Houston, Texas, in order to accept an 

employment opportunity; Father received this letter on August 6, 2015. On September 4, 

2015, Father filed a petition in opposition to the relocation in the Davidson County 

Circuit Court, alleging that the proposed relocation was vindictive and not in the child’s 

best interest. Father further alleged that Mother was dating someone who was living in 

Texas and that Mother and the child would live with him if Mother were allowed to 

relocate. Mother’s answer on September 10, 2015, alleged that the job opportunity in 

Texas offered her the opportunity to work full-time as a piano, voice, and kindermusik 

teacher,1allowing her to utilize her degree in music education as well as provide 

increased income. Mother further asserted that she had been unable to secure similar 

employment in Tennessee. Although Mother denied most of the allegations in Father’s 

petition, Mother “admit[ted] that she has a boyfriend who lives in Texas.”

A trial was held on May 18, 2016. Mother was called first as an adverse witness 

as part of Father’s case-in-chief. Shortly into Mother’s testimony, the trial judge began 

questioning Mother about the nature of her relationship with the boyfriend. Mother 

asserted that the individual was just a friend and that they were “not dating.” When the 

trial judge questioned whether Mother had a romantic relationship and had sex with the 

boyfriend in Texas, Mother responded in the negative.2 After the trial judge allowed 

Mother to confer with counsel, Mother admitted that she “did have sex [with the 

boyfriend in June 2015] for one time and had a relationship then.”

3

 Mother explained 

that she was confused about which time period the trial judge was referring to, because, 

according to Mother, “I don’t have sex with him now[.]” The trial judge found Mother in 

criminal contempt and stated that “it’s going to be tough for me to believe anything else 

[you] say after that admission.” Although Mother initially stated that she went to Texas 

to look for a job, Mother eventually admitted that she was more serious about the job 

search in June 2015. 

 

1 According to Mother, kindermusik is “[e]arly childhood education for ages seven and under.”

2 The parties agree that Mother admitted to the relationship in her deposition although the 

deposition has not been made part of the record on appeal. According to Mother’s brief, “it was not a 

disputed fact” but “[f]or whatever reason, . . . Mother offered the excuse of confusion, she denied to [the 

trial judge] that she had had sex with the [paramour].”

3 When counsel for Father continued with his questioning of Mother later, Mother admitted that 

she had sex with the boyfriend both in March 2015 and June 2015.
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Otherwise, Mother generally testified that she moved to Middle Tennessee from 

her home state of Texas because she needed her parents’ and sister’s financial support 

after her separation from Father. Mother testified that she was employed as a substitute 

teacher on occasion but never landed a permanent position in Tennessee. Mother 

eventually developed an online business managing web sites and blogs; however, none of 

her various efforts ever netted more than $10,000.00 per year. Although Mother has an 

Arkansas teaching license, Mother does not have one in Tennessee. Mother testified that 

she could apply for a Tennessee teaching license “[i]f there was a need to.” According to 

Mother, rent in Tennessee and Texas would be the same, approximately $1,300 per 

month. Mother asserts that the job offer that she received in Texas would eventually 

allow her to teach in her chosen profession.

Father generally testified about his parenting schedule and his efforts in finding a 

job as a preacher in Tennessee to be near the child. Father testified that his current 

girlfriend lives in Knoxville, Tennessee. Father admitted that Mother never made any 

substantial income from her music career or online marketing because her career was 

secondary to his during the marriage. 

Mother’s prospective employer in Texas, Skiles Kelly, testified that he owns three 

music studios. Mr. Kelly testified that, although the teaching job that he initially offered 

to Mother was no longer available to her because all of the children have since been 

placed with another teacher, he offered Mother a job as a part-time administrative 

assistant at $15.00 per hour for 25 hours per week. However, Mr. Kelly testified that if 

the school were to take on new piano or voice students, Mother would receive those 

students. According to Mr. Kelly, teachers in his studios make between $1,000.00 to 

$3,000.00 per month. 

On May 27, 2016, the trial court entered an order finding Mother in willful direct 

criminal contempt and fined her $50.00. On July 29, 2016, the trial court entered a final 

order, giving no weight to Mother’s testimony because “if you violate that oath, then 

there are consequences that the [c]ourt believed nothing [Mother] said.” According to the 

trial court, no proof was presented showing that the proposed relocation would be 

harmful to the child or that the move is for vindictive purposes. With respect to the 

ground that the move lacks a reasonable purpose,4the trial court found that Mother was 

seeking to move to Texas to be close to the boyfriend, not because of her career in music, 

that she “is using employment in Houston, Texas, as a basis for the move when she has 

made no effort to seek employment in the Middle Tennessee area.” The trial court further 

found that most of Mother’s support system is located in Tennessee or Northern 

Alabama. As such, the trial court concluded that Father carried his burden of establishing 

 

4 Although the reasonable purpose ground was not alleged in Father’s petition, there appears to be 

no dispute that this ground was tried by consent. 
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that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. In addition, the trial court noted 

that Mother waived further hearing as to the best interest of the child. Mother appeals.

ISSUE

Mother raises the following issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in rejecting Mother’s testimony in its entirety and in failing to find that the 

proposed relocation was reasonable?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court heard this case sitting without a jury. Accordingly, we review the 

trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the 

evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). No presumption of 

correctness, however, attaches to the trial court’s conclusions of law, and our review is de 

novo. Blair v. Brownson, 197 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Bowden v. Ward, 27 

S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)). Additionally, the trial court’s findings on credibility are 

entitled to great deference on appeal. See Taylor v. McKinnie, No. W2007-01468-COAR3-JV, 2008 WL 2971767, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008). Where the trial court’s 

factual determinations are based on its assessment of witness credibility, this Court will 

not reevaluate that assessment absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 

Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Crabtree, 337 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) 

(citing Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002)).

DISCUSSION

The parties first disagree as to whether the trial court’s determination that Mother 

was not credible and whether the rejection of her entire testimony should stand. Even 

without disturbing the trial court’s credibility determination, however, we hold that 

Father failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing that Mother’s proposed 

relocation lacked a reasonable purpose. We begin our analysis with the statutory 

requirements contained in Tennessee’s Parental Relocation Statute.

Tennessee’s Parental Relocation Statute is found in Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 36-6-108. The statute sets out different standards for relocation, depending on 

whether the parents spend substantially equal intervals of time with the child. When 

parents spend substantially equal amounts of time with the child, “[n]o presumption in 

favor of or against the request to relocate with the child shall arise,” and the trial court 

must determine whether the relocation is in the child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-6-108(c).
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Where, as in this case, the parents do not spend substantially equal intervals of 

time with the child,5Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(d)(1) provides for a 

much different standard:

If the parents are not actually spending substantially equal intervals of time 

with the child and the parent spending the greater amount of time with the 

child proposes to relocate with the child, the other parent may, within thirty 

(30) days of receipt of the notice, file a petition in opposition to removal of 

the child. The other parent may not attempt to relocate with the child unless 

expressly authorized to do so by the court pursuant to a change of custody 

or primary custodial responsibility. The parent spending the greater amount 

of time with the child shall be permitted to relocate with the child unless the 

court finds:

(A) The relocation does not have a reasonable purpose;

(B) The relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the 

child that outweighs the threat of harm to the child of a change of custody; 

or

(C) The parent’s motive for relocating with the child is vindictive in that it 

is intended to defeat or deter visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or 

the parent spending less time with the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1) (emphasis added). “[W]here the parents are not 

spending substantially equal time with their child, section 36-6-108 includes a 

legislatively mandated presumption in favor of permitting the parent spending the most 

residential parenting time with the child to relocate with the child.” Aragon v. Aragon, 

513 S.W.3d 447, 462 (Tenn. 2017); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d) (providing 

that the custodial parent “shall be permitted to relocate with the child” unless the trial 

court finds one of the three enumerated grounds). “The petitioner—the parent opposing 

relocation—bears the burden of proving grounds for denying permission to relocate.”

Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 462. If the petitioner cannot prove one of the grounds by a 

preponderance of the evidence, the relocating parent will be allowed to move with the 

child. See id. at 456 n.8.

Our consideration in this case is guided by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Aragon v. Aragon, 513 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn. 2017).6Prior to the Aragon

 

5 The parties agree that Mother spends substantially more time with the child. 

6 As an initial matter, we note that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Aragon v. Aragon, 

513 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn. 2017) was filed after briefing was already completed in this case. Father filed a 

motion for supplemental briefing in light of the Aragon decision but the motion was denied. The parties 

did not dispute at oral argument that the Aragon standard is applicable to this case and made their 

arguments in light of the Aragon holding. As a result, we will assume that the Aragon standard is 

applicable to this case.
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decision, the term “reasonable purpose” in section 36-6-108(d)(1)(A) was defined in an 

unpublished court of appeals decision—Webster v. Webster—to mean “a significant 

purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the loss of the non-custodial 

parent’s ability ‘to participate fully in their children’s lives in a more meaningful way.’”

Webster v. Webster, No. W2005-01288-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3008019, at *14 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006), overruled by Aragon v. Aragon, 513 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn. 2017). 

The supreme court’s decision in Aragon, however, expressly overruled this definition 

and held that “[t]he term ‘reasonable purpose’ should be given its ordinary meaning.”

Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 467.

In Aragon, the father, who spent the majority of the residential parenting time 

with the parties’ child, notified the mother of his intent to relocate to Arizona because he 

received a nursing job offer. Id. at 450. Father subsequently filed a petition asking the 

trial court to modify the parenting plan and permit father to relocate. Id. The petition 

asserted that the relocation to Arizona was for a reasonable purpose because his new job 

would provide “the opportunity for greater income over his current options in the state of 

Tennessee”; father “has an extensive family support system in the Tucson, Arizona area 

including his parents and several aunts, uncles and cousins”; and the relocation could 

“provide many opportunities for the minor child to interact with the [f]ather’s family that 

are otherwise unavailable in Tennessee.” Id. Mother opposed the relocation, asserting 

that the relocation would cause hardship for her in exercising parenting time with the 

child and that father’s proposed relocation would serve “no purpose,” was not in the 

child’s best interest, and would “separate the child from her extended family.” Id. 

After trial, the trial court found that there was “no proof” that father had better 

career opportunities in Arizona than in Tennessee because Father had not even pursued 

any nursing jobs in Tennessee. Id. at 453. The trial court credited mother’s testimony 

that she gave up her equal residential parenting time to work abroad with the 

understanding that father would look for nursing employment in Tennessee after he 

finished his nursing education. Id. The trial court found that father reneged on his 

promise and decided to move with the child. Id. Although the trial court acknowledged 

that father “posits a rational basis for his move,” the trial court concluded that the 

proposed relocation was “not reasonable under all the circumstances.” Id. 

The father appealed,7arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that his 

requested relocation had no reasonable purpose and that it was in the child’s best interest 

to designate mother as the primary residential parent. The court of appeals in a split 

opinion affirmed the trial court’s judgment under the Webster standard. Aragon v. 

 

7 Two appeals resulted. In the first appeal, the court of appeals vacated and remanded the case to

the trial court because the trial court failed to make specific factual findings regarding the child’s best 

interest. See Aragon v. Aragon, No. M2013-01962-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1607350, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Apr. 21, 2014). 
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Aragon, No. M2014-02292-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 7752440, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Nov. 30, 2015), appeal granted (Mar. 23, 2016). 

Because reasonable purpose is not statutorily defined, the supreme court, after 

considering the legislative history of the Parental Relocation Statute, came to the 

following conclusion:

Specifically, [the legislative history] does not support the Webster court’s 

interpretation of “reasonable” as “significant” or “substantial,” nor does it 

support an approach in which the trial court weighs the purpose of the 

proposed relocation “against the gravity of the loss of the non-custodial 

parent’s ability ‘to participate fully in their children’s lives in a more 

meaningful way.’” Webster, 2006 WL 3008019, at *14 (quoting Aaby [v. 

Strange], 924 S.W.2d [623,] 631 [(Tenn. 1996)] (White, J., dissenting)). 

Rather, the statutory structure and legislative history both indicate an 

intent to make relocation cases relatively clear-cut, to permit the 

parent who has been spending the majority of the residential parenting 

time with the child to relocate with the child without court 

intervention, except in unusual cases in which the other parent proves 

that the move is vindictive, risks serious harm to the child, or has no 

reasonable purpose at all.

* * *

We note that the Webster court’s view of the term “reasonable 

purpose” encourages trial courts to consider evidence that has little to do 

with the proposed purpose of the move and more to do with the perceived 

overall fairness of the primary residential parent’s decision to relocate or 

whether the move is in the child’s best interest. For example, in the case at 

bar, the trial court factored into its decision Mother’s assertion that, because 

neither parent could secure employment, she accepted work abroad with the 

understanding that Father intended to remain in middle Tennessee after he 

received his nursing education, but after obtaining the benefit of their 

bargain, Father decided not to seek a nursing job in Tennessee. These facts 

would be pertinent if the trial court were charged with deciding whether 

Father’s proposed relocation was fair to Mother; it was not, however, 

tasked with making that determination. The testimony relied upon by the 

trial court in fact ranges far afield from an evaluation of the limited 

question of whether Father’s stated purpose for moving to Arizona was 

reasonable. The rigid structure of section 36-6-108—in which best interest 

is reached only if and when the parent opposing the move proves one of the 

grounds—suggests that the “reasonable purpose” ground is not intended 

to be a guise under which the trial court may determine whether the 

parent’s decision to relocate is wise or fair or in the child’s best 

interest.
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Accordingly, we overrule Webster v. Webster insofar as it 

interpreted the term “reasonable purpose” in section 36-6-108 to mean “a 

significant purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the 

loss of the non-custodial parent’s ability to participate fully in their 

children’s lives in a more meaningful way.” Webster, 2006 WL 3008019, at 

*14. The term “reasonable purpose” should be given its ordinary meaning.

Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 466–67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Although the 

burden has always been on the parent opposing relocation, because of the clarification 

offered by the Aragon decision, it is now clear that the proof required to meet this burden 

is both demanding and limited. 

Accordingly, we turn to consider whether Father met his burden to show that 

Mother’s move served no reasonable purpose, as required by our supreme court’s recent 

holding. In this case, in support of its conclusion that the proposed move had no 

reasonable purpose, the trial court made the following findings:

The [c]ourt will find it believes the real purpose of the move is not to 

advance [Mother’s] career in music—it is to be close to [boyfriend]. The 

[c]ourt does not believe [Mother] has set forth any effort toward obtaining 

employment in the Middle Tennessee area. The [c]ourt did not believe 

what [Mother] said. She has failed to prove she set forth any effort to seek 

gainful employment in the Middle Tennessee area. 

So, in light of the fact [Mother] has failed to do that or failed to 

establish that she has, the [c]ourt looks at the move from a stand point of its 

reasonableness. [Mother] is using employment in Houston, Texas, as a 

basis for the move when she has made no effort to seek employment in the 

Middle Tennessee area. The [c]ourt finds it is absolutely not reasonable. 

She has made no effort. Her parents live here, her family lives here, the 

father of the minor child lives here, and the paternal grandparents and other 

extended family live in North Alabama. So considering the stated purpose 

of the move, what the [c]ourt believes is the real purpose of the move and 

the fact that [Mother] has taken no steps to seek gainful employment in 

Middle Tennessee, the [c]ourt finds that [Father] has carried his burden of 

proof in establishing the move does not have a reasonable purpose.

As an initial matter, we note that much like the trial court in Aragon, it appears 

that the trial court in this case likewise improperly placed the burden of proof on Mother 

to show a reasonable purpose for the move rather than placing the burden on Father of 

proving that “[t]he relocation does not have a reasonable purpose.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-6-108(d)(1)(A). The supreme court in Aragon, however, explicitly rejected as 

irrelevant evidence of the custodial parent’s lack of reasonable efforts in pursuing a job 

closer to the noncustodial parent because the custodial parent did not have the burden of 
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proof. Rather, the Aragon court held that the trial court’s focus on the lack of evidence of 

the custodial parent’s efforts to secure employment in Tennessee improperly shifted the 

burden from the parent opposing relocation. See Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 463 (noting that 

the trial court improperly allocated the burden of proof on the father to show a reasonable 

purpose for the move based on the trial court’s comments that there was “no proof . . . 

that [father] has better job opportunities, greater salary opportunities or career 

advancement opportunities in [Arizona]” and “no proof whatsoever with regard to 

[father’s] comparable job opportunities in the Middle Tennessee or Southern Kentucky 

area because he has not . . . pursued such opportunities.”); see also Redmon v. Redmon, 

No. W2013-01017-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1694708, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 

2014) (stating that father had not carried his burden of proving lack of a reasonable 

purpose for mother’s proposed move by showing that mother did not look “hard enough”

for a job in Tennessee). As such, Mother is not required to present any evidence to 

“establish” that she diligently pursued job opportunities in Tennessee in order to be 

allowed to relocate; rather, the burden remains at all times on the parent opposing 

relocation to show that the move lacks a reasonable purpose. Cf. Redmon, 2014 WL 

1694708, at *7 (noting that while “comparison of . . . job opportunities” in the current 

location and the proposed location may be relevant, “the party with the burden of 

proving lack of reasonable purpose” bears “the onus . . . to produce evidence from which 

such a comparison could be made”). But see Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 467 (holding that 

“the ‘reasonable purpose’ ground is not intended to be a guise under which the trial court 

may determine whether the parent’s decision to relocate is wise”). Despite the trial 

court’s improper allocation of the burden of proof, however, we will endeavor to 

determine, based on the record, whether Father nevertheless met his burden of proving 

that Mother’s proposed relocation does not have a reasonable purpose.

Here, Father does not dispute that Mother received a job offer in Texas; rather, 

Father argues that he met his burden of proof by showing that Mother’s proposed move

lacks a reasonable purpose. We respectfully disagree.

First, we find it significant that Father’s case-in-chief consisted only of Mother’s 

testimony regarding her motivations for moving and Father’s testimony. The trial court in 

its order found that Mother’s “testimony is not worthy of belief[,]” “believ[ing] nothing 

[Mother] said” and “giving no weight to [Mother’s] testimony.” If we were to take the 

trial court’s order literally, the trial court appeared to have rejected all of Mother’s 

testimony, even the testimony Father relied on in his case-in-chief. As a result, Father is 

left with only his testimony regarding his current job and relationship status, which 

spanned a mere seven pages in the trial transcript. Father’s sparse testimony, standing 

alone, is not sufficient to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Mother’s proposed relocation lacked a reasonable purpose. 

Even if we were to interpret the trial court’s order to mean that the trial court 

rejected all of Mother’s testimony that was favorable to her, such as the fact that she is 
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moving to Texas for a job offer, we are confronted with the trial court’s additional 

finding that it “believe[d] the testimony of Mr. Kelley,” who testified that he was 

interested in Mother’s ability to teach kindermusik and offered Mother an administrative 

assistant job until she became completely booked with students at his music studio in 

Texas. We note that, even if Mother worked as an administrative assistant until she could 

eventually teach, her salary as an administrative assistant would net approximately 

$1,500.00 per month, which is more than what she is currently making in Tennessee.8 

Father has presented no proof, other than Mother’s lack of reasonable efforts to find a job 

in the Middle Tennessee area, to show that Mother “has no reasonable purpose at all” to 

move. Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 466.

Father argues, however, that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial 

court’s finding that Mother’s main purpose for relocating is to be closer to her boyfriend. 

From our review of the Aragon decision, our inquiry is far more limited than ascertaining 

the reasonableness of any and all of the custodial parent’s purposes in relocating. Rather, 

the Aragon Court directed that courts consider only “the limited question of whether [the 

relocating parent’s] stated purpose for moving . . . was reasonable.” Aragon, 513 S.W.3d 

at 467 (emphasis added). As we perceive it, the Aragon decision appears to have 

contemplated the situation where a relocating parent may have multiple reasons for 

moving, but, as long as there is at least one validly stated purpose for moving, the 

relocating parent must be allowed to move with the child. See Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 

466 (“[T]he parent who has been spending the majority of the residential parenting time 

with the child [should be permitted] to relocate with the child without court intervention, 

except in unusual cases in which the other parent proves that the move is vindictive, risks 

serious harm to the child, or has no reasonable purpose at all.”) (emphasis added). Here, 

Mother’s motivation for moving may very well be that she wants to be closer to her 

boyfriend. Mother’s stated purpose, however, is to accept a job offer that allows her 

increased income, as well as the opportunity to work in her chosen field. The evidence 

shows that, giving credence to Mr. Kelley’s testimony, Mother has been offered a job in 

Texas that could lead to a full-time teaching job in Mother’s chosen profession, and 

Father has simply not shown that Mother’s decision to move to pursue better employment 

is unreasonable. Father’s reliance on Mother’s purported ulterior motive and lack of 

reasonable efforts is not enough to meet his burden of proving that there is no reasonable 

purpose at all for Mother’s proposed relocation. Rather, we conclude that, even 

considering the trial court’s credibility finding against Mother, Father has failed to 

present evidence that Mother’s move lacked a reasonable purpose, i.e., that Mother’s 

“stated purpose for moving . . . was [not] reasonable.” Aragon, 513 S.W.3d at 467. As a 

 

8 Although Mother testified that her annual salary never exceeded $10,000.00 per year, which 

would make her current salary $833.33 per month, Father, in the body of his brief, calculated Mother’s 

actual monthly salary to be $1,200.00 based on the specifics of Mother’s testimony regarding each of her

clients. Father does not dispute that Mother’s monthly salary in Texas would be more than her current 

salary in Tennessee; rather, he maintains that it is “not a significant increase.”
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result of Father’s failure to establish a ground for denying Mother permission to relocate, 

Mother, pursuant to statute, must be permitted to move. 

We are mindful that the current standard under Tennessee law places a much more 

substantial burden on the parent opposing the relocation than before because it is 

difficult, if not impossible, to prove a negative. See Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 

854 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Jones v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Ky. 

1991)) (“[I]t is virtually impossible to prove a negative[.]”); Kirby v. State, No. 03C01-

9303-CR-00074, 1994 WL 525086, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 1994) (“[C]ourts 

are reminded that it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative.”). Regardless of our 

concerns about this standard, however, we are not free to depart from the Tennessee 

Supreme Court’s unequivocal holding. “The Court of Appeals has no authority to 

overrule or modify Supreme Court’s opinions.” Bloodworth v. Stuart, 428 S.W.2d 786, 

789 (Tenn. 1968) (citing City of Memphis v. Overton, 392 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1964)); 

Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976). As such, “[o]nce the Tennessee 

Supreme Court has addressed an issue, its decision regarding that issue is binding on the 

lower courts.” Morris v. Grusin, No. W2009-00033-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4931324, at 

*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (quoting Davis v. Davis, No. M2003-02312-COA-R3-

CV, 2004 WL 2296507, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004)); see also Thompson v. 

State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (“[I]t is a controlling principle that 

inferior courts must abide the orders, decrees and precedents of higher courts. The 

slightest deviation from this rigid rule would disrupt and destroy the sanctity of the 

judicial process.”) (quoting State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995)); Levitan v. 

Banniza, 236 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (“This court is bound by the 

decisions of the Supreme Court.”).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s denial of permission for 

Mother to relocate to Texas with the child, and this cause is remanded to the trial court 

for the entry of an order allowing Mother to relocate with the child, as well as all further 

proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this 

appeal are taxed to the Appellee, Ronald Stringer, for which execution may issue if 

necessary.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE