[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-14951

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A094-794-172

MUNTA ZAMPALIGIDI-JEBREEL, 

 

Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 

Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(October 8, 2013)

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Before DUBINA, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Petitioner Munta Zampaligidi-Jebreel, a native and citizen of Ghana, 

proceeding pro se, seeks review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for 

asylum and withholding of removal. The following facts are relevant to his appeal. 

Prior to his merits hearing, Zampaligidi-Jebreel requested a second change 

of venue from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City, New York because he had 

relocated there. DHS subsequently opposed the venue change for multiple reasons, 

including a prior venue change and a failure to provide a detailed explanation of 

the reasons for a transfer, with which the IJ agreed.

Moreover, Zampaligidi-Jebreel’s case was continued several times in order 

to afford him an opportunity to find representation. The IJ repeatedly advised him 

of his right to seek counsel and the applicable time constraints to do so if he 

wished, which he acknowledged that he understood. After the IJ granted 

Zampaligidi-Jebreel’s request to discharge his counsel on November 5, 2010, the IJ 

warned Zampaligidi-Jebreel that he was unlikely to grant a further continuance of 

his scheduled November 16, 2010, merits hearing for the purpose of allowing him 

to seek replacement counsel again. Zampaligidi-Jebreel also did not request 

another continuance before or during his subsequent merits hearing. 

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At his merits hearing, Zampaligidi-Jebreel stated that he suffered past 

persecution when Mamprusi tribe members burned down his family home in 2001, 

and severely beat him on three occasions in 2001, 2007, and 2008, because he 

belonged to the Kusasi tribe. He further asserted that he had a well-founded fear of 

future persecution because he believed that if he returned to Ghana, the Mamprusi 

would kill him because he was a Kusasi. He also admitted that since 2001, he had 

been fighting and killing the Mamprusi, and burning their houses, in order to 

defend his Kusasi tribe. 

At the conclusion of Zampaligidi-Jebreel’s testimony before the IJ, the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) moved to have his asylum application 

pretermitted based on preclusion, in accordance with the persecutor bar under 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(B), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i).1

 The IJ deferred his position as to 

whether Zampaligidi-Jebreel, as a matter of law, was ineligible for asylum based 

on the persecutor bar, and instead proceeded to address his application on the 

merits. 

The IJ ultimately decided that because Zampaligidi-Jebreel did not establish 

past persecution, or demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, he was 

not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal. Zampaligidi-Jebreel 

 

1 This provision states that an alien is ineligible for both asylum and withholding of 

removal if “the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any 

person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i). 

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subsequently appealed to the BIA, arguing that substantial evidence supported his 

claims, in addition to asserting certain due process violations. The BIA affirmed 

the IJ’s decision, concluding that Zampaligidi-Jebreel failed to show that he was 

entitled to asylum relief based on a well-founded fear of future persecution. The 

BIA further determined that Zampaligidi-Jebreel’s due process arguments were 

without merit.

On appeal, Zampaligidi-Jebreel first argues that the IJ erred in finding that 

he was not credible based on past criminal activity because he qualified his 

involvement as one of an unwilling participant. Moreover, numerous occurrences 

led him to fear that he would be persecuted if he continued to live in Ghana, 

including his prior severe beatings and the destruction of his family home. 

Zampaligidi-Jebreel next asserts that the IJ violated his due process rights by 

compelling him to proceed pro se, refusing a second change of venue, and entering 

into the record a research report, submitted by the government, in violation of court 

rules.

We will address each point in turn.

I.

We review the BIA’s decision as the final judgment. Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 

F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007). However, when the BIA explicitly agrees with the 

findings of the IJ, we will review the decision of both the BIA and the IJ as to 

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those issues. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Because the BIA issued its own opinion in this case, we review the BIA’s opinion. 

Ruiz, 479 F.3d at 765. 

We review an agency’s findings of fact, including credibility determinations,

under the substantial evidence standard. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 

1283‒84 (11th Cir. 2001). When the IJ makes an adverse credibility determination 

and the BIA nonetheless assumes an applicant is credible, we will do the same. Shi 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2013). These findings are 

considered conclusive “unless a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to 

conclude to the contrary.” Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 352 F.3d 1338, 1340 (11th 

Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Under this highly deferential standard, we 

may not overturn the agency’s factual determination unless we find that the record 

supports the contrary conclusion and compels reversal. Fahim v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

278 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002).

An alien bears the burden of proof to establish his eligibility for asylum and 

withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B), 1231(b)(3)(C). The alien 

must show that he is a refugee, a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his 

native country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 

persecution based on his “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). If the alien 

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demonstrates that he was subject to past persecution, a rebuttable presumption 

arises that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(1). To independently establish a well-founded fear of persecution, an 

alien must show that such fear is both “subjectively genuine and objectively 

reasonable.” Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289). Additionally, an application for asylum 

made in removal proceedings is also considered a request for withholding of 

removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b). An alien who fails to satisfy the lower burden of 

proof required for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the higher clear probability 

standard required for withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); Rivera v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 815, 820‒21 (11th Cir. 2007).

II.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that ZampaligidiJebreel was not entitled to asylum and withholding of removal. As ZampaligidiJebreel testified, and as the 2008 and 2009 State Reports demonstrate, the harm he 

experienced and fears upon return to his native country derives from a conflict in 

Bawku that has been ongoing for a long period of time. During this conflict, 

members of both the Mamprusi and Kusasi tribes have been injured, and 

Zampaligidi-Jebreel has not shown how the harm he suffered as part of this 

conflict is different from the harm faced by the general population. The harm that 

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Ghana’s internal tribal conflict poses is not specific to Zampaligidi-Jebreel, but 

rather, is widespread. See Matter of Sanchez and Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276, 

288 (BIA 1985) (petitioners did not show that “any special individualize 

circumstances indicating that they had been or will be singled out for persecution 

beyond the general threat of harm affecting the entire population”); cf. Mazariegos 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he INA does not 

extend eligibility for asylum to anyone who fears the general danger that inevitably 

accompanies political ferment and factional strife.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Zampaligidi-Jebreel also does not show that the harm he fears would be 

committed by either the government or by forces that the government is either 

unable or unwilling to control. Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 

(11th Cir. 2007) (petitioner must show that he is “unable to avail [himself] of the 

protection of [his] home country”). He testified that the police or security forces 

had never harmed or threatened him personally. Additionally, ZampaligidiJebreel’s own testimony supports the BIA’s conclusion that he might be arrested in 

Ghana for his involvement in unlawful and criminal activity, not because of his 

membership in the Kusasi tribe. Thus, we conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the BIA’s determination that Zampaligidi-Jebreel is not entitled to asylum 

and withholding of removal. Accordingly, we decline to reverse the BIA’s order.

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III.

“We review constitutional challenges de novo.” Lonyem, 352 F.3d at 1341. 

“To establish due process violations in removal proceedings, aliens must show that 

they were deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the asserted 

errors caused them substantial prejudice.” Id. at 1341‒42; see also Patel v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 334 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). In order to demonstrate 

substantial prejudice, an applicant must show that the outcome of his proceedings 

would have been different. See Ibrahim v. U.S. INS, 821 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

Pursuant to the INA, “[i]n any removal proceedings before an immigration 

judge . . ., the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no 

expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such 

proceedings, as he shall choose.” 8 U.S.C. § 1362. However, a waiver of the right 

to counsel need not always be express, and may be inferred from the language and 

acts of the defendant. Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S. Ct. 

1755, 1757 (1979); Cobourne v. INS, 779 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986).

With respect to venue, the IJ may change venue upon the request by a party, 

“after the charging document has been filed with the Immigration Court.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.20(b). “The [IJ] may grant a change of venue only after the other party has 

been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion to change venue.” 

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Id.; see Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 1277, 1282 n.9 (11th Cir. 2007). Good 

cause is determined by balancing certain relevant factors, including administrative 

convenience, expeditious treatment of the case, location of witnesses, and the cost 

of transporting witnesses or evidence to a new location. Matter of Rahman, 20 I. 

& N. Dec. 480, 482‒83 (BIA 1992) (citations omitted).

Zampaligidi-Jebreel has failed to show that any of the IJ’s purported 

procedural errors deprived him of the right to a fair and impartial hearing. First, 

his case was continued several times in order to afford him an opportunity to find 

representation, and the IJ warned him on November 5, 2010, that another 

continuance would likely not be granted. After discharging his counsel, 

Zampaligidi-Jebreel also did not request another continuance before or during his 

subsequent merits hearing on November 16, 2010, and instead, proceeded with the 

hearing. See Cobourne, 779 F.2d at 1566. Second, he failed to show that the IJ 

erred in denying his motion for a second change of venue. The IJ acted within his 

discretion not to grant a second change of venue, after determining there was 

insufficient good cause to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b); Matter of Rahman, 20 I. 

& N. at 482‒83. However, even if the IJ had abused its discretion in failing to 

grant the request, we conclude from the record that Zampaligidi-Jebreel failed to 

establish that he was substantially prejudiced by the denial of the motion because 

he received a full and fair hearing in Atlanta, Georgia. Ibrahim, 821 F.2d at 1550; 

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see Frech, 491 F.3d at 1282 n.9.2

 Accordingly, we also deny his petition as to his 

claim of a denial of due process.

PETITION DENIED.

 

2 Zampaligidi-Jebreel also asserts that the IJ abused its discretion by entering a DHSsubmitted reported into the record in violation of court rules. However, he offers no argument on 

this issue. Thus, we deem the issue abandoned on appeal. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 

F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).

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