Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DN-1085 | November 7, 2018 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stephen R. Lewis

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jack M. Freedman

Fishers, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jennifer Rose,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

William D. Bozeman, Sr.,

Appellee-Petitioner.

November 7, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-DN-1085

Appeal from the Hamilton 

Superior Court

The Honorable J. Richard 

Campbell, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D04-1708-DN-7220

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DN-1085 | November 7, 2018 Page 2 of 9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, Jennifer L. Rose (Rose), appeals the trial court’s Order 

on Appellee-Plaintiff’s, William D. Bozeman, Sr. (Bozeman), motion to correct 

error with respect to the division of marital property in the parties’ decree of 

dissolution of marriage. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Rose presents us with two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Bozeman’s 

motion to correct error without specifying its reasons; and

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting the division of 

the marital estate. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Bozeman and Rose married on July 7, 2017. They closed on the purchase of 

the marital residence located in Fishers in the amount of $499,900 on July 19, 

2017, and moved into the marital residence on July 28, 2017. Although Rose 

did not contribute any money towards the purchase of the residence, the house 

was titled in both parties’ names. The parties separated on July 31, 2017, and 

Bozeman petitioned for a decree of dissolution on August 1, 2017, after twentyfour days of marriage. When the parties separated, Bozeman gave Rose 

$30,000. Rose continued to live in the marital residence rent-free while the case 
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was pending; Bozeman paid the taxes on the residence and the cost of painting 

necessary to sell the residence. 

[5] Including the money used to purchase the marital residence, Bozeman brought 

more than three million dollars of assets into the marriage. Other than the 

marital residence and the increase in value of assets during the marriage, 

Bozeman was awarded all the assets he brought into the marriage upon its 

dissolution.

[6] On February 28, 2018, the trial court conducted a final hearing. On March 15, 

2018, the trial court issued its decree of dissolution of marriage, concluding in 

pertinent part that

21. Within seven (7) days after this Decree has been file marked 

by the Clerk of Hamilton County, Indiana, [Bozeman] shall pay 

twenty thousand, four hundred four dollars ($20,404) to [Rose] 

as her share of the increase in value of the marital assets that took 

place prior to the date of final separation.

22. With regard to the marital residence, although [Bozeman] 

brought the purchase money into the marriage, Indiana law is 

clear that once he put [Rose’s] name on the deed it is just as 

much hers as his. Even though the marriage was short, once 

[Rose’s] name was put on the real estate, it is half hers. 

Therefore, [Bozeman] and [Rose] shall each receive fifty percent 

(50%) of the “net proceeds” from the sale of the house. “Net 

proceeds” shall mean the amount that is paid to the parties by the 

closing agent after all contractual amounts, taxes, closing costs 

and expenses, and broker’s fees have been paid. [Bozeman] shall 

pay the costs of any repairs or improvements to the home that 

were made in preparation for sale.
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23. [Rose] shall vacate the marital residence as required by the 

closing on the sale.

24. [Bozeman] shall continue to pay the utility costs and other 

expenses of the marital residence until ownership is transferred.

25. [Rose] shall have sole ownership of all personal property 

remaining in the marital residence that is not contractually 

required to go to the buyers.

26. Each party shall have sole ownership of all other personal 

property in his or her possession.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 40-41). 

[7] On April 12, 2018, Bozeman filed his motion to correct error, requesting the 

trial court to correct the equal division of the net proceeds from the sale of the 

marital residence because Bozeman had “put up all the money for the purchase 

just two (2) weeks before the divorce case was filed.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, 

p. 54). On April 23, 2018, the trial court granted Bozeman’s motion, holding:

Paragraph 22 of the Decree is deleted and replaced with the 

following language:

[Rose] shall receive $35,000 and [Bozeman] shall receive the 

balance of the “net proceeds” from the sale of the marital 

residence[.] “Net proceeds” means the amount that is paid to the 

parties by the closing agent after all contractual amounts, taxes, 

closing costs, expenses, and broker’s fees have been paid. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11).
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[8] Rose now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Articulation of General Reasons

[9] Rose appeals from the grant of Bozeman’s motion to correct error. We review 

a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. 

Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 173 (Ind. 2013). In so doing, we afford

the trial court’s decision “a strong presumption of correctness.” Id. 

[10] Rose contends that because Bozeman filed his motion to correct error pursuant 

to Indiana Trial Rule 59(J) and corrective relief was granted, the trial court was 

required to “specify the general reasons therefor.” See Ind. Trial Rule 59(J). 

Because these general reasons are absent in the trial court’s order, Rose requests 

this court to reverse the trial court’s grant of Bozeman’s motion. In support of 

her argument, Rose relies on Riggen v. Riggen, 71 N.E.3d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2017) in which we concluded that the trial court’s failure to provide an 

explanation for its decision to grant Wife’s motion to correct error in 

accordance with T.R. 59(J) could not be considered harmless error. In Riggen, 

appellee failed to submit an appellee’s brief, and we cautioned that “[w]ere this 

case before us with an appellee’s brief, we might conclude that the error was 

harmless.” Id. 

[11] We reached the opposite result in Pickett v. Pickett, 470 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1984), where the trial court similarly failed to specify the general 

reasons for its decision to grant Wife’s motion to correct error. Based on “other 
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evidence in the record,” we were able to infer the trial court’s general reason for 

correcting its original decree and noted that Husband failed to demonstrate “on 

appeal how the trial court’s failure ha[d] prevented him from formulating his 

appeal.” Id. Concluding that “[w]ithout a showing of prejudice, the trial 

court’s error was harmless,” we noted that “[t]o remand to the trial court for the 

sole purpose of stating such reasons in this case we believe would violate the 

principle of judicial economy, the mere honoring of form over substance.” Id. 

[12] Bozeman initially petitioned for an unequal division of the marital estate based 

on the short duration of the marriage, and the assets of the respective parties 

prior to the marriage. During the dissolution hearing, he requested the court to 

award him the marital residence and allocate to him the loss on the sale of the 

residence. In its dissolution decree, the trial court awarded Rose half of the net 

proceeds of the sale of the residence. Bozeman filed a motion to correct error, 

requesting in his memorandum to award him the net proceeds of the sale of the 

marital residence based on the duration of the marriage, the respective assets 

the parties brought into the marriage, and the windfall Rose reaped by being 

awarded half of the net proceeds of the sale. Rose responded to this 

memorandum. Even though the trial court omitted to specify its reasons for 

granting Bozeman’s motion, Rose fails to show how she was prejudiced by the 

lack of general reasons as there is sufficient evidence in the record from which

to infer the basis of the trial court’s grant. Therefore, as in Pickett, we conclude 

that this error was harmless. See id. 

II. Adjustment of Division of Marital Estate
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[13] Turning to the merits of the case, Rose contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by adjusting the division of the net proceeds of the sale of the marital 

residence. She maintains that under “the facts and circumstances of this case, 

specifically those surrounding the trial court’s granting of [Bozeman’s] [m]otion 

to [c]orrect [e]rror, this [c]ourt cannot reasonably infer that the trial court 

considered all the factors set out in Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

15). 

[14] In dividing marital property, the trial court shall presume that an equal division 

of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. I.C. § 31-15-

7-5. This presumption may be rebutted however, by evidence that an equal 

division would not be just and reasonable. Id. This rebuttal may include 

evidence of the following factors:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the 

property, regardless of whether the contribution was income 

producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 

spouse:

(A)Before the marriage; or

(B)Through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the 

disposition of the property is to become effective, including 

the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to 

dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court 

considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to 

the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
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(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the 

parties.

I.C. § 31-15-7-5. In dividing marital property, the trial court must consider all 

of these factors, but it is not required to explicitly address all of the factors in 

every case. Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

[15] Rose argues that the trial court, in considering Bozeman’s motion to correct 

error, only emphasized the first two statutory factors, without considering any 

of the others. However, “[w]hen a party challenges the trial court’s division of 

marital property, [she] must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court 

considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is 

one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” 

Hatten v. Hatten, 825 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[16] The extremely short duration of the marriage, the substantial property and 

financial contribution by Bozeman to the marriage versus the very limited assets 

of Rose only speak to the first two statutory factors of I.C. § 31-15-7-5. The 

twenty-four-day term of married life is simply too short to even evaluate the 

other factors as the economic circumstances and earning abilities of the parties 

would not yet have been impacted. Rose, however, contends that the trial 

court’s grant of the motion to correct error must be based on a decision to 

allocate fault for the failed marriage as Bozeman alluded to in his motion that 

the marriage had never been consummated. In light of the presumption that the 

trial court considered all statutory factors and in the absence of any evidence 

supporting Rose’s allegation, we must conclude that the trial court applied the 
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law and Rose’s claim amounts to nothing more than speculation. Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s grant of Bozeman’s motion to correct error.

CONCLUSION

[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in granting Bozeman’s motion to correct error.

[18] Affirmed.

[19] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur