United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

June 1995 NAVY TORPEDO

PROGRAMS

MK-48 ADCAP

Upgrades Not

Adequately Justified

GAO/NSIAD-95-104

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260154 

June 12, 1995

The Honorable William J. Perry

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As part of our ongoing work on Navy torpedo programs, we reviewed the

Navy’s plans to upgrade both the propulsion and the guidance and control

systems of the MK-48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) torpedo. Because the

program manager is requesting approval to begin low-rate initial

production, we are reporting on (1) the need for the propulsion system

upgrade and (2) the appropriateness of approving low-rate initial

production of the guidance and control system.

Results in Brief The proposed $249 million upgrade to the ADCAP propulsion system is not

needed. The Navy justifies this upgrade as improving the ADCAP’s

performance against diesel submarines operating in littoral or shallow

water by reducing the range at which an adversary is alerted to an attack

and the time available for that adversary to counterfire, thereby reducing

the launching submarine’s vulnerability. However, because of the short

ranges at which diesel submarines are likely to be detected in littoral or

shallow water, the technological improvement to be contributed by the

propulsion upgrade—that is, torpedo quieting—will neither improve the

performance of the ADCAP nor reduce the vulnerability of the launching

submarine to enemy attack. Moreover, the Commander, Operational Test

and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR), already considers the current ADCAP

operationally suitable and effective in shallow water, and the Navy did not

establish a requirement to improve the ADCAP’s propulsion system for use

in open ocean, deep water in its operational requirements document for

the upgrade.

Approval for low-rate initial production for the guidance and control

upgrade would be ill-advised at this time. The Navy’s proposed acquisition

schedule was developed to “piggyback” on the installation of the

propulsion upgrade. Installing the new guidance and control unit will do

nothing more to counter the existing threat than the current units until the

new software is developed and installed. Since the software necessary to

take advantage of the upgraded guidance and control hardware will not be

ready until mid-1998, upgrade acquisition would be better scheduled to

coincide with the software development schedule. As currently planned,

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

the Navy could buy as many as 529 units at a cost of $177 million before

the new software will be available.

Background In 1975, the MK-48 Advanced Development Torpedo program was

established to develop, procure, and deliver to the fleet an advanced

heavyweight torpedo system to counter faster, deeper diving, quieter

submarines that could threaten U.S. ships. The ADCAP reached full

production in fiscal year 1989 and is expected to serve as the Navy’s

primary submarine-launched antisubmarine warfare weapon through the

year 2026. The Navy had planned to buy ADCAP torpedoes beyond the year

2000. However, in 1992, in response to the end of the Cold War and to

budgetary pressures, the Secretary of the Navy canceled further ADCAP

production. All production contracts for the ADCAP are scheduled to be

completed by 1996.

In fiscal year 1989, the Navy began an effort to increase the processing

capabilities of the ADCAP’s guidance and control unit. The new unit was

designed to process more data at a faster rate by using a new processor

and converting its current software to the ADA computer language. The

Navy had planned to use the new guidance and control system on

torpedoes purchased in fiscal year 1995 and beyond. But since ADCAP

production will end in 1996 and because the Navy believes the new

guidance and control system and the use of ADA will enhance ADCAP

operation, the Navy has decided to upgrade ADCAPs in its inventory with

the new guidance and control units. Beginning in January 1997 and until

ADA software is completed, currently scheduled for mid-1998, these units

are expected to use a version of the current software modified for ADA.

In 1992, the Navy initiated the ADCAP torpedo propulsion upgrade program

to reduce noise emissions, making the torpedo harder to detect. A July 7,

1992, operational requirements document described the initial

improvement expected from the propulsion unit. In November 1993, the

document was rewritten to provide operational requirements for the

upgrade in littoral waters, including shallow water.

In January 1993, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,

Development, and Acquisition approved a plan to combine the guidance

and control and the propulsion upgrades into a single modification

program. That decision and the decision to begin engineering and

manufacturing development were based, in part, on a cost and operational

effectiveness analysis (COEA) completed in 1992. The purpose of a COEA is

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternatives to the proposed changes,

including maintaining the status quo.

The Navy program manager is currently requesting approval for low-rate

initial production for the upgrade program. If approved, the Navy would

upgrade its entire inventory of ADCAP torpedoes over the next 7 years at a

total cost of about $821 million—$249 million for the propulsion upgrade,

$462 million for the guidance and control upgrade, and $110 million for the

torpedo’s new software.

Propulsion Upgrade

Does Not Improve

Littoral- or

Shallow-Water

Operations

The most pressing threat to Navy submarines, according to Navy

documents, is the diesel electric submarine. The Navy’s Forward . . . From

The Sea strategy places emphasis on defeating this type of threat. The

Operational Requirements Document for the propulsion upgrade justifies

the upgrade on the basis of improving the ADCAP’s ability to defeat this type

of threat in littoral- and shallow-water operations where diesel submarines

are expected to be detected at very short ranges. The littoral- and

shallow-water environments present difficult acoustic and geographic

constraints that limit distances at which targets can be detected. The

Navy’s justification indicates that by quieting the torpedo, the propulsion

upgrade would reduce the range at which an adversary could determine

that it is under attack. This would put U.S. submarines in a better position

to evade counterfire, yet maintain the same probability of destroying the

target.

However, we found evidence that the upgrade would not improve the

performance of the ADCAP by reducing the range and time a target is

alerted or the vulnerability of the launching ship to counterfire by a diesel

submarine operating in shallow or littoral water. For example, a June 1994

report by the Commander, OPTEVFOR, concluded that a diesel submarine

operating in shallow water would have a very short period of time to react

to an ADCAP launch at high speeds and would not be able to take effective

evasive or counterfire actions. In addition, the report and other Navy

documents show that the littoral- and shallow-water diesel submarine

threat will likely be detected by Navy forces at ranges that are too close

for quieting to yield any operational benefit. Although a diesel submarine

alerted by the noise of a high-speed ADCAP launch could in some cases take

evasive action, the report considered the increased probability of the

diesel submarine taking effective action as insignificant. The Commander,

OPTEVFOR, certified that the ADCAP torpedo without the propulsion upgrade

was both operationally suitable and effective for shallow-water operations.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)

said that the tests that showed that the propulsion upgrade would not

improve shallow- and littoral-water operations were limited to a single

threat in a single environment. DOD stated that testing in dissimilar

environments might lead to different results. We agree that testing in an

open-ocean, deep-water environment against a different threat could

produce different results, but that was not the purpose of the upgrade. The

Navy justified the upgrade on the basis of improving the ADCAP’s

performance against diesel submarines operating in littoral or shallow

water and the threat used for the testing we cite was a simulated diesel

submarine and the environment was shallow water.

The Proposed

Propulsion Upgrade

Does Not Address

Open-Ocean,

Deep-Water

Requirements

As we have previously reported,1 the proposed propulsion upgrade does

not meet quieting goals that, until 1992 were considered necessary to

counter a nuclear submarine threat operating in an open-ocean,

deep-water environment.

In fiscal year 1986, the Navy initiated the Closed-Cycle ADCAP Propulsion

System (CCAPS) program to replace the existing system and reduce its

detection or delay its classification as a weapon by a threat submarine.

But, as a result of technical problems, schedule delays, and high estimated

costs, the Navy canceled the CCAPS requirement in July 1992 and decided to

proceed instead with this propulsion upgrade program, which did not meet

the CCAPS requirements.

In establishing the operational requirements for the upgrade in 1992, the

Navy used open-ocean, deep-water based performance measures.

However, in the 1993 revision, it eliminated open-ocean, deep-water

operational performance requirements for the proposed upgrade. Thus,

the upgrade is not in response to a specific open-ocean, deep-water

performance requirement.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Operational

Requirement Document specifies that the ADCAP shall be operationally

effective in all expected ocean environments. We agree that the

Operational Requirements Document specifies that the ADCAP shall be

effective in all ocean environments. However, OPTEVFOR has already

approved the fleet introduction and certified the operational effectiveness

1

Navy Torpedo Program: MK-48 ADCAP Propulsion System Upgrade Not Needed (GAO/NSIAD-92-191,

Sept. 10, 1992).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

and suitability of the ADCAP without the upgrade for use in all ocean

environments.

COEA for Propulsion

Upgrade Did Not

Adequately Address

Significant Issues

No new COEA has been prepared to support the proposal to proceed to

low-rate initial production because, according to Navy program officials,

an updated COEA is not required for a low-rate initial production decision.

The 1992 COEA did not address significant items that bear on the decision

to approve production. Specifically, it did not evaluate:

• The proposed upgrade’s effectiveness in shallow water. At the time of the

COEA, a shallow-water model had yet to be validated against shallow-water

results. This model is currently underdevelopment.

• Alternate ways to reduce the noise of the torpedo. The only comparisons

made were of the proposed propulsion upgrade and the existing ADCAP.

Further, the effectiveness of the proposed upgrade and the existing ADCAP

were compared in the COEA using different speeds. DOD maintains that this

allowed a comparison of systems, each operating at its optimum

efficiency. The comparisons of the two systems used a modified ADCAP

running 63 percent slower than the existing ADCAP. However, slower

torpedoes generate less noise and are therefore less detectable by an

adversary. The COEA did not identify how much of the difference between

projected propulsion upgrade performance and existing ADCAP

performance was due to the difference in speed and how much may have

been due to system improvements.

In addition, the December 1992 COEA assumed that the propulsion upgrade

would achieve its noise goals. But in 1993, the allowable noise levels were

increased by about as much as 30 percent over the COEA noise goals to

accommodate differences in the torpedo’s technical performance.

Therefore, the projected quieting benefits of the upgrade may have been

overstated.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that alternative ways to

reduce torpedo noise were addressed in a Special Initiatives Assessment

(SIA) in 1991, which identified the propulsion upgrade as the most

cost-effective alternative for torpedo quieting. However, the proposed

upgrade did not exist at the time of the SIA.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

A Navy briefing on the SIA and discussions with the Technical Program

Manager at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center indicate that the purpose

of the SIA was to evaluate alternative technologies to attain the CCAPS noise

quieting levels considered necessary to counter the Soviet nuclear

submarine operating in the open ocean. As noted above, CCAPS

experienced technical development problems that generated the Navy’s

seeking alternatives to this development effort. Alternatives considered

included electrical and stored chemical energy and major internal and

external modifications to the current ADCAP. The study suggested that the

only way to quiet the current ADCAP was to modify the existing open-cycle

engine.

According to a Navy official, contractors were asked to come up with

ways to make the current engine quieter. While some of the concepts from

the SIA were considered, such as sound damping or adding a muffler, the

proposed propulsion upgrade design bears very little resemblance to the

designs considered during the SIA.

Acquisition of the

Guidance and Control

Upgrade Is Premature

The Navy has not established an independent need for low-rate initial

production of the guidance and control upgrade. Navy officials told us that

the Navy decided instead to acquire the upgraded guidance and control

system beginning in 1995 because they anticipated cost savings from

installing the propulsion and guidance and control upgrades at the same

time. These projected savings shown in the 1992 COEA were based on

buying enough of each upgrade per year to complete the program in 

5 years. However, due to budget pressures, the quantities of the upgrades

to be bought each year have been reduced and the program has been

extended. According to program officials, this program extension would

probably reduce the potential cost savings shown in the 1992 COEA, but at

the time of our review a new cost analysis had not been conducted to

determine the extent of the reduction in the projected savings.

Subsequently, DOD provided updated cost data. However, the new data

prepared to support the low-rate initial production decision does not show

the impact on potential cost savings if the propulsion upgrade portion of

the modification program was canceled.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that (1) the upgraded

guidance and control hardware will provide the increase in processing

power needed to allow the torpedo to discern the target in the complex,

noisy, shallow-water environment and (2) this hardware is required to

support software development and testing scheduled for fiscal year 1997.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

Our analysis shows that the new guidance and control unit will do nothing

more to counter the existing threat than the existing unit does until new

software is installed. ADA software that makes the new guidance and

control system more effective in shallow water is not scheduled to be

available until mid-1998, by which time the Navy, under the current plans,

may have bought as many as 529 units at a cost of about $177 million (in

then-year dollars) through fiscal year 1998.

In November 1994, we reported2

 that the practice of prematurely

approving low-rate initial production for weapon systems had resulted in

large inventories of unsatisfactory weapons that have subsequently

required costly modifications. We also noted that once low-rate initial

production starts, options available to DOD and the Congress when the

system is deficient are greatly limited.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Navy to

• terminate the proposed propulsion system upgrade program and reduce

program funding accordingly and

• delay any production decision for the guidance and control system until an

acquisition schedule that coincides with the software development

schedule and avoids premature commitment to production can be

developed.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD’s written comments on a draft of this report are presented in

appendix I. DOD disagreed with our two recommendations and stated that

reductions in torpedo radiated noise are essential to enhancing the

survivability of the launching vessel and that the upgraded guidance and

control hardware is required to support fiscal year 1997 testing.

As indicated throughout the report, DOD’s comments provide no new

information or further rationale for the proposed upgrade. Therefore, we

continue to believe that the propulsion upgrade should be terminated

because it does not improve the performance of the ADCAP or increase the

survivability of the launching submarine in littoral or shallow waters. We

also continue to believe that the guidance and control upgrade should be

scheduled to support the current software development schedule.

2

Weapons System Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapons Systems Prematurely

(GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

Although some upgraded guidance and control units may be needed for

testing, the Navy cannot reasonably justify the production of over 

500 units, which is its current acquisition schedule, before the software

that makes the units more effective is scheduled to be available.

Scope and

Methodology

We analyzed and discussed data and test plans at the Naval Undersea

Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island. We reviewed data and discussed

emerging issues with the Commander, OPTEVFOR, Norfolk, Virginia. In

addition, we visited the National Maritime Intelligence Center, Suitland,

Maryland, and the Commander, Submarine Development Squadron 12,

Groton, Connecticut, to clarify threat capabilities and operational issues.

We reviewed the cost, schedule, and technical performance issues and the

results of our analysis with program officials in Washington, D.C., and with

technical experts from the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport,

Rhode Island.

We conducted our review between September 1994 and April 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit

a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the

Senate Committee Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of

the report. A written statement must also be submitted to the Senate and

House Committees on Appropriations with an agency’s first request for

appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Navy; the

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and

Acquisition; and appropriate congressional committees. Upon request, we

will make copies available to other interested parties.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
B-260154 

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Brad Hathaway

Associate Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 3.

See comment 6.

See comment 6.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-4.

See comment 1.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-5.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6.

See comment 5.

See comment 4.

See comment 6.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-7.

See comment 6.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 7.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 7.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

GAO Comments The following are GAO’s comments on the unclassified Department of

Defense (DOD) letter.

1. Page 5 of the June 1994 report states that the probability of effective

counter fire, based on best known projected capabilities and tactics of the

threat submarine, was low and the adverse effect on survivability of the

launching platform was not significant. The June 1994 report also shows

that in the vast majority of cases the threat submarine when alerted by the

noise of the Mk-48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) torpedo did not have time

to effectively evade the ADCAP or to effectively fire on the launching

platform. The report shows that the ADCAP performance was well above the

threshold stated in the 1993 Operational Requirements Document.

The tactical memorandum on which the tactics used in the test were based

clearly states that short detection and firing ranges are a result of the

harsh acoustical environments found in littoral and shallow waters.

Further, Navy tactics as regards most encounters during regional conflicts

will require quick reactions because of the short-detection ranges. Rules of

engagement will likely preclude the attacking U.S. submarine from

increasing the range to better protect itself. Moving to a safer covert firing

range could cause the nuclear attack submarine to lose contact with the

adversary and put U.S. surface forces at risk.

2. DOD provided us a bar graph as documentation that fleet sonar systems

could engage diesel submarines at greater ranges than were used in the

cited test. Navy personnel with whom we discussed the graph were not

able to explain when and how the numbers used in the graph were

derived. We asked for further documentation but were not provided

anything. As a result, we are not able to accept the graph as a rebuttal to

our position.

3. We agree that the Operational Requirements Document specifies that

the ADCAP torpedo, with or without the propulsion upgrade, will be

effective in all ocean environments. In fact, the Commander, Operational

Test and Evaluation Force, has approved the ADCAP for fleet introduction

and certified the operational effectiveness and suitability of the torpedo

for use in all ocean environments without the propulsion upgrade. The

three deep-water environments cited in the Operational Requirements

Document are littoral, not open ocean.

4. The propulsion upgrade was not evaluated in or during the Special

Initiatives Assessment (SIA). The purpose of the SIA was to evaluate

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

alternative propulsion system technologies to attain the Closed-Cycle

ADCAP Propulsion System (CCAPS) noise quieting goals considered

necessary to counter Soviet nuclear submarines operating in the open

ocean. The study concluded that the noise goals were not attainable within

the immediate future and suggested that the only way to quiet the ADCAP

was to modify the existing open-cycle engine. Contractors were asked to

come up with ways for quieting the engine. While some of the concepts

from the SIA were considered, the proposed propulsion upgrade design

bears little resemblance to the designs considered during the SIA.

5. According to the Technical Director of the cost and operational

effectiveness analysis (COEA), the study cannot be used in any way to

conclude that the propulsion upgrade will or will not be effective in

shallow water.

6. DOD provided a one page update to the cost evaluation when we met to

discuss their comments on the draft report. The updated data does not

identify the cost of independently proceeding with either proposed

upgrade.

7. The COEA noise level compared against the ADCAP base line was based on

the 1992 Operational Requirements Document. Our report states that the

1993 Operational Requirements Document increased the radiated noise

levels by as much as 30 percent.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Thomas J. Denomme

Penny D. Stephenson

Boston Regional

Office

Richard E. Silveira

Joseph Rizzo, Jr.

John M. Ficociello

(707083) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-104 Navy Torpedo Programs
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a

single address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (301) 258-4097 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Mail

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100