Opinion filed October 18, 2019

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

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No. 11-19-00154-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF N.A.L. AND N.A.R., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 318th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. FM 55,842

and

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No. 11-19-00155-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF I.M.S., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 318th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. FM 55,843
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M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

These companion appeals stem from orders in which the trial court terminated

the parental rights of the mother of N.A.L., N.A.R., and I.M.S. The mother timely 

filed notices of appeal. In her sole issue in each appeal, she challenges the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the children’s best interest. We

affirm.

Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2018). To terminate 

parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent 

has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id.

In both cases, the trial court found that the mother had committed five of the 

acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D), (E), (L), (N), 

and (O). Specifically, the trial court found that the mother had knowingly placed or 

knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that 

endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, that the mother had 

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in 

conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, that the 

mother had been convicted or placed on community supervision for being criminally 

responsible for the death or serious injury of a child, that the mother had 

constructively abandoned the children, and that the mother had failed to comply with 

the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for 

her to obtain the return of the children. The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 

161.001(b)(2), that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in the best 

interest of each child.
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On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect 

to the best interest findings; she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support the findings under subsections (D), (E), (L), (N), and (O). To determine 

if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a 

rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient in a parental termination case, we give due deference 

to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against 

the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trier of 

fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses at trial and that we are not at 

liberty to disturb the determinations of the trier of fact as long as those 

determinations are not unreasonable. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 
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may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.

Background Facts

The record from the joint trial in these causes reflects that Appellant had a 

history with the Department of Family and Protective Services based upon 

allegations of neglectful supervision and physical abuse of her children. The 

Department ultimately removed the children from Appellant’s care based upon an 

incident that occurred while Appellant and N.A.R. were at the Department’s facility 

for a counseling session. Appellant picked three-year-old N.A.R. “up off the ground

by her hair and her head, and [swung] her over to the right direction of the 

bathroom.” Several Department employees observed this incident. Appellant also 

cursed at N.A.R. and later “became very resistant,” “cussing at everyone in the 

room.”

The record reflects that Appellant had issues controlling her anger and that 

she had other untreated mental health issues, including depression and anxiety. 

These issues put her children at risk and were a concern with respect to her ability 

to parent the children. Just two weeks prior to removal, Appellant “took a bunch of 

pills” and stated that she could not “cope with life” and did not “want to live 

anymore.”

Appellant’s children were scared of her and feared that she “would beat them 

to death.” Appellant had pleaded guilty and was convicted of two offenses relating 

to her children: (1) abandoning a child with the intent to return and (2) injury to a 

child. While the termination proceedings were pending in the trial court, Appellant

tested positive for marihuana, and she admitted to her use of marihuana. Appellant 

also tested positive for methamphetamine while the case was pending below; she 

was positive for methamphetamine about two months before the final hearing, about 

three weeks before the final hearing, and again just a few days before the final 
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hearing. Despite these results, Appellant denied that she had ever used 

methamphetamine. Appellant did not complete the services required by her family 

service plan, and she failed to maintain steady employment and a stable residence 

while this case was pending. Appellant admitted that, at the time of trial, she was 

unable to provide for the children. However, she hoped to be able to do so in the 

future, and she did not want her parental rights to be terminated.

At the time of removal, I.M.S. was eight years old. He was eventually placed 

with his paternal grandmother and has expressed a desire to live with that 

grandmother. The conservatorship caseworker testified that, although I.M.S. 

struggled with behavioral issues, his paternal grandmother was dedicated to him and 

to helping him with his behavioral issues.

At the time of removal, N.A.L. was five years old, and N.A.R. was three years 

old. N.A.L. and N.A.R. were eventually placed with their father and stepmother. 

The caseworker indicated that N.A.L.’s and N.A.R.’s father and the father’s wife 

were “very dedicated to ensuring [N.A.L.’s and N.A.R.’s] success and thriving.”

According to the caseworker, all three children were in good, stable 

placements, and the children were happy and thriving in those placements. 

Furthermore, the caseworker testified that the children would be in “severe danger” 

if Appellant were permitted to have any type of access to them. The Department’s

goal for the children was to terminate Appellant’s parental rights and to give 

managing conservatorship of N.A.L. and N.A.R. to their father and managing 

conservatorship of I.M.S. to his paternal grandmother. The children’s attorney 

ad litem believed that it would be in the children’s best interest for the trial court to 

terminate Appellant’s parental rights.

Analysis

We have considered the record as it relates to the desires of the children, the 

emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, the emotional 
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and physical danger to the children now and in the future, the parental abilities of 

Appellant and of the persons with whom the children were placed, the Department’s

plans for the children, Appellant’s inability to provide a safe home for the children,

Appellant’s drug use, and Appellant’s physical abuse of the children. The trial court

could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, based on the clear and 

convincing evidence presented at trial and the Holley factors, that termination of 

Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of each of the children at 

issue in these appeals. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Therefore, we hold that 

the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the findings that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in N.A.L.’s, N.A.R.’s, and I.M.S.’s best 

interest. See id.

Appellant seems to contend that, because the parental rights of the father of 

N.A.L. and N.A.R. and the father of I.M.S. were not terminated and because I.M.S. 

was placed with his paternal grandmother, Appellant’s parental rights should not 

have been terminated. We disagree. The trial court’s decisions regarding managing 

conservatorship—to appoint I.M.S.’s paternal grandmother to be the sole managing 

conservator of I.M.S. and to appoint N.A.L.’s and N.A.R.’s father to be their sole 

managing conservator—are not dispositive with respect to the question of whether 

it was in the children’s best interest to terminate Appellant’s parental rights. The 

trial court’s failure to terminate the parental rights of I.M.S.’s father is also not 

dispositive of the issue before us. We note that Appellant was the offending parent 

in that it was her actions that necessitated the removal of the children. Clear and 

convincing evidence supported the findings that termination of Appellant’s parental 

rights was in the best interest of the children. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue in 

both appeals.
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This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s orders of termination.

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

October 18, 2019

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

Willson, J., not participating.

 

1

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.