[Cite as State v. Cisse, 2013-Ohio-3895.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 12 CAA 10 0074 

 : 

JAGA N. CISSE : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court 

of Common Pleas, case no. 12 CR I 06 

0210 B 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 6, 2013 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

CAROL HAMILTON O’BRIEN DAVID H. BIRCH 

DELAWARE CO. PROSECUTOR 286 South Liberty St. 

BRIAN J. WALTER Powell, OH 40365 

140 North Sandusky St. 

Delaware, OH 43015 

 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 2 

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Jaga N. Cisse hereby appeals from the September 20, 2012 

Judgment Entry of conviction and sentence of the Delaware County Court of Common 

Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio. This case is related to State of Ohio v. Dame 

Cisse, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 12 CAA 09 0070. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} Appellants Dame and Jaga Cisse are brothers from Senegal who are 

naturalized U.S. citizens. Jaga’s first name was originally “Ndiaga,” but when he 

became a citizen, he changed it to “Jaga” because the latter is easier for Americans to 

pronounce. For the time period relevant to this case, Dame and Jaga lived together at 

1776 Bairsford Drive, Columbus, Ohio. Both brothers were employed, sometimes 

working multiple jobs, and enrolled in college courses. According to Dame, they rarely 

saw each other despite living in the same house. Mail for both brothers came to the 

house. 

The JPMC Hiring Process

{¶3} J.P. Morgan Chase (JPMC) operates a major enterprise in central Ohio 

with offices throughout the region and thousands of employees engaged in myriad 

activities involving banking, loans, and mortgages. 

{¶4} JPMC has an online application process by which applicants submit an 

initial application online for a recruiter to review. If the applicant meets the initial criteria 

for a position, the recruiter schedules an interview between the applicant and a JPMC 

manager. The interview takes place at the office location where the manager is based. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 3 

{¶5} If the applicant’s interview is successful, the recruiter contacts the 

applicant again to schedule a background check which includes fingerprinting, 

photographing, and a drug test. This background check occurs at yet a different 

location. At the time of these events, all fingerprinting and photographing for 

background checks for employment with JPMC in the Columbus area was performed at 

1111 Polaris Parkway, Columbus, Ohio. This location is in Delaware County. 

{¶6} Finally, if the background check is successful, an offer of employment may 

be extended. If something undesirable shows up in the background check, no offer of 

employment is made and any offers already discussed are rescinded. 

{¶7} At trial, a JPMC investigator acknowledged the inherent flaw in this hiring 

process: the interviewer is not present at the background check location, nor is the 

recruiter present at the interview. The possibility exists, therefore, that the person 

interviewed is not the person who shows up to be fingerprinted, photographed, and 

subsequently background-checked. 

Dame Cisse is Rejected for a Position at JPMC and “Ndiaga” is Hired 

{¶8} On or around November 9, 2009, Dame Cisse submitted an online 

application to JPMC for the position of Executive Resolution Analyst. This application 

was rejected. 

{¶9} On January 12, 2010, “Ndiaga Cisse” submitted an online application to 

JPMC which was duly reviewed by a recruiter. “Ndiaga’s” application was forwarded to 

Robert Hall, the manager of a group called the Customer Request Management Team. 

{¶10} Hall met with “Ndiaga Cisse” in person for an interview at the JPMC facility 

at 3415 Vision Drive, Columbus, known as the “Easton” facility and located in Franklin 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 4 

County. “Ndiaga” told Hall to call him “Jack.” “Jack” was working on a bachelor’s 

degree in accounting and hoped that the temporary position might lead to a permanent 

position with JPMC. “Jack” was very friendly and outgoing and Hall recommended him 

to be hired. After the interview, Hall told the recruiter to contact “Jack” regarding the 

background check process. 

{¶11} The background check seemingly went smoothly because a few weeks 

later, in late January or early February, 2010, “Jack” became one of Hall’s new team 

members. On his first day at JPMC, Hall met “Jack” and five or six other new hires in 

the lobby at the Easton facility, escorted him to his new desk, and helped him start in his 

new position. 

{¶12} About a week later, “Jack’s” JPMC ID badge arrived and Hall delivered it 

to him. The badge is used to enter and exit the JPMC offices but employees usually do 

not wear the badges throughout the workday. The badges display a photo of the 

employee and their name. 

{¶13} “Jack” worked on Hall’s team through May 2010; Hall described him as a 

productive employee with an average work product, but very personable, friendly, and 

always smiling. At the close of the busy season, Hall encouraged his team, including 

“Jack,” to apply elsewhere for permanent positions with JPMC. 

{¶14} Carly Richardson worked as an “Investor Reporting Mortgage” for JPMC; 

the team she supervised reported Freddie Mac loans for mortgages. Richardson also 

worked at the Easton location. Someone on her team referred his friend “Jaga” to her 

as a potential new team member and Richardson interviewed him. “Jaga” had 

accounting and mortgage experience on his resume and would not require another 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 5 

background check because he was already employed by JPMC. Richardson brought 

him onto her team as a temporary employee with the title “Investor Reporter, Operations 

Analyst.” 

Supervisor Discovers Discrepancy on “Jaga’s” ID Badge 

{¶15} Richardson always referred to “Jaga” as “Jaga” but she heard other 

employees call him “Jack.” She testified she was not impressed with his performance 

as an employee and his slowness affected the competitiveness of her unit; 

consequently, she visited “Jaga’s” cubicle frequently to make sure he stayed on task. 

One day Richardson came into his cubicle and noticed “Jaga’s” JPMC ID badge lying in 

plain sight; she was surprised to notice the photo was not of the man she knew as 

“Jaga.” She said, “That’s not you,” and “Jaga” replied, “Yes it is; I lost weight.” “Jaga” 

tried to snatch the badge from Richardson. 

{¶16} Richardson left “Jaga’s” cubicle and reported the matter to her immediate 

supervisor, who had access to the JPMC employee Passport system containing 

employee photos. Together they pulled up the photo of “Jaga,” and it was not the man 

working for Richardson as “Jaga Cisse.” Richardson looked on Facebook and 

discovered that the man she knew as “Jaga” was in fact appellant Dame Cisse, and that 

appellant Jaga (Ndiaga) Cisse was Dame’s brother. At trial, Richardson identified 

Dame as the man who worked for her under the name “Jaga,” and Jaga as the man 

pictured in the JPMC employee ID badge used by Dame. 

The JPMC Investigation 

{¶17} Richardson reported the matter to corporate security and Kelly O’Reilly 

launched an investigation. O’Reilly was aware of Richardson’s Facebook research and 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 6 

discovered through a LexisNexis search that Dame and Jaga lived at the same address. 

Additional research tied the brothers together more closely. He found a blog written by 

“Ndiaga Cisse” containing a photo that matched the photo on the JPMC employee ID 

badge. He reviewed forensic imaging of “Jaga’s” JPMC computer that revealed emails 

from the address papadame2000@gmail.com. One email contained an attachment of a 

letter written by Dame Cisse to FINRA, a financial industries regulatory agency that 

oversees brokers. 

{¶18} O’Reilly also discovered JPMC paychecks payable to “Ndiaga Cisse,” 

endorsed by Ndiaga Cisse over to Dame Cisse. 

{¶19} O’Reilly’s next step was to interview Dame and Jaga Cisse. He met with 

the JPMC employee known as “Jaga” on September 7, 2010 at the Easton facility. 

“Jaga” stated his date of birth was March 4, 1977 and the last four digits of his Social 

Security Number were 8575, consistent with the “real” Jaga Cisse. O’Reilly asked him 

to explain the discrepancy in the photo on his employee ID badge. “Jaga” said there 

was a delay in receiving his badge, and when he finally got it the photo was wrong, but 

he never got around to asking for a new one. When his supervisor had confronted him 

about the photo, “he was just joking” when he told her it was him but he lost weight. 

“Jaga” said he didn’t have the badge on him during the interview, and also stated he 

didn’t have any form of government ID on him, either; “Jaga” said he would get these 

items and bring them back to the HR department that day. “Jaga” also stated he would 

be willing to come back at a later date to be fingerprinted. 

{¶20} O’Reilly confronted “Jaga” with a picture of Dame Cisse printed out from 

Facebook, and “Jaga” denied it was him, claiming Papa Dame Cisse is his cousin from 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 7 

Florida. “Jaga” declined to make a written statement and was suspended pending the 

investigation. 

{¶21} That evening, after O’Reilly was gone for the day, someone came into the 

HR office and provided a driver’s license for Jaga Cisse, date of birth March 4, 1977. 

The photo on the license matches the photo on the JPMC employee ID badge, but does 

not match the individual working at JPMC as “Jaga Cisse.” The person also brought in 

the JPMC employee ID badge and the photo on the badge had been noticeably 

scratched. 

{¶22} O’Reilly discovered an earlier JPMC application by Dame Cisse in the 

company’s files dated November 9, 2009. A photograph of Dame Cisse had been taken 

as part of the background check into that application: the person currently working for 

JPMC as “Jaga Cisse” was in fact Dame Cisse. 

{¶23} Finally, O’Reilly discovered a temporary employee by the name “Jaga 

Cisse” had been hired with JPMC in May or June, 2011, and this “Jaga Cisse” was a 

different individual than the “Jaga Cisse” interviewed by O’Reilly. This individual was 

still in training and had been hired through a temporary agency. He was able to work 

for a while for JPMC before being “red flagged” by corporate security. 

{¶24} O’Reilly concluded Jaga and Dame worked together to evade the 

background check for Dame because Jaga had obviously reported to the 1111 Polaris 

Parkway location and undergone the background check, established by his photograph 

on the employee ID badge and his fingerprints on file. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 8 

{¶25} O’Reilly got in touch with the supervisor who was training the “real Jaga” 

and asked him to make Jaga available for an interview. Jaga left the training room to 

take a phone call and never returned. Consequently O’Reilly never met Jaga in person. 

The Columbus Police Department Investigation 

{¶26} O’Reilly turned the results of his investigation over to the Columbus Police 

Department. Detective Todd Schiff spoke to Jaga Cisse by telephone. Jaga confirmed 

Dame was his brother but stated he had no means of reaching him. Schiff eventually 

reached Dame Cisse by telephone; Dame denied working at JPMC during the dates in 

question and said he last worked there as a temp in 2003. 

{¶27} Schiff prepared a photo lineup which was shown to Carly Richardson; she 

selected Dame as the person who worked for her as “Jaga” and Jaga as the person 

pictured on the JPMC employee ID badge. 

{¶28} Schiff obtained records of a Huntington Bank account held by Dame; 

Dame had listed his current employer as JPMC. 

First Indictment and Jury Trial: Mistrial 

{¶29} Dame Cisse and Jaga Cisse were originally indicted together on August 

26, 2011; Dame was charged with two counts of identity fraud pursuant to R.C. 

2913.49(E), both felonies of the fifth degree, and Jaga was charged with one count of 

identity fraud pursuant to R.C. 2913.49(D), a felony of the fifth degree. 

{¶30} The case proceeded to joint jury trial. During appellee’s case in chief, 

Schiff, testifying in narrative fashion and not in response to a specific question, 

commented several times that appellants refused to speak to him without counsel 

present. During cross-examination, Dame’s trial counsel, in the context of the general 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 9 

willingness of witnesses and suspects to speak with law enforcement, asked, “And in 

your experience, is an illegal alien open and eager to talk with you?” Appellee objected 

and the trial court recessed for the day. 

{¶31} Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court found pursuant to State v. 

Leach, appellee allowed Schiff to raise an inference of guilt prejudicial to appellants by 

referencing their pre-arrest silence. 102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2d 

335. Appellee objected to the trial court’s characterization of the prosecutor’s 

questions, but the trial court prompted appellants’ trial counsel for motions, and 

appellants both moved for mistrial. The motions were granted and the trial court 

observed, “Certainly there was no intention here on the part of [appellee] to create a 

mistrial * * *. It’s obvious that there is substantial evidence that’s been presented here. 

And this was after two days of trial something that was maybe brought out and certainly 

not intended for that inference by [appellee] and probably not even by the detective, he 

wasn’t really conscious of what he was saying regarding that issue.” 

Re-Indictment and Trial 

{¶32} On June 1, 2012, appellants were charged again by indictment. The 

following information is taken from the joint indictment of Dame and Jaga, and 

appellee’s bill of particulars. Each offense charged is a felony of the fifth degree. 

Ct. DEFT. OFFENSE DATE(S) CONDUCT ALLEGED VERDICT

I. Dame R.C. 

2913.49(E) 

Identity Fraud 

12/23/09-

1/12/10 

Pretended to be Jaga 

while applying for job 

with JPMC 

Not 

Guilty 

II. Jaga R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Identity Fraud 

12/23/09-

1/12/10 

Allowed Dame to use 

his ID info in applying 

for position w/JPMC 

Not 

Guilty 

III. Dame R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Identity Fraud 

1/13/10- 

1/20/10 

Pretended to be Jaga 

during interview with 

Robert Hall 

Not 

Guilty 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 10 

IV. Jaga R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Identity Fraud 

1/13/10- 

1/20/10 

Allowed Dame to use 

his ID info during 

interview w/Hall 

Not 

Guilty 

V. Jaga R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Identity Fraud 

1/21/10 Permitted Dame to use 

his ID info during 

background check 

(No 

Verdict) 

VI. Dame R.C. 

2913.49(E) 

Identity Fraud 

1/21/10 Held himself out as Jaga 

for purposes of background 

check 

(No 

Verdict) 

VII. Dame R.C. 

2923.03(A)(2)/ 

R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Aid & Abet 

Identity 

Fraud 

1/21/10 Encouraged Jaga to allow 

him to use his ID info for 

purposes of background 

check 

(No 

Verdict) 

VIII. Dame R.C. 

2913.49(E) 

Identity Fraud 

2/1/10- 

9/6/10 

Posed as Jaga while 

working for JPMC 

Guilty 

IX. Jaga R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Identity Fraud 

2/1/10- 

9/6/10 

Allowed Dame to pose as 

Jaga while working for 

JPMC 

Guilty 

X. Dame R.C. 

2913.49(E) 

Identity Fraud 

9/7/10 Pretended to be Jaga during 

interview with JPMC 

corporate security (O’Reilly) 

Guilty 

XI. Jaga R.C. 

2913.49(D) 

Identity Fraud 

9/7/10 Permitted Dame to use his ID 

info during interview with JPMC 

corporate security (O’Reilly) 

Guilty 

Testimony of Dame and Jaga: Dame Makes Admissions but Both Claim Jaga 

Didn’t Know About Identity Theft 

{¶33} Dame and Jaga testified at the second trial. Dame admitted to using 

Jaga’s identity to gain employment with JPMC. Dame testified that he was offered a job 

at JPMC which was later withdrawn; he applied again under the name “Ndiaga Cisse,” 

using his brother’s information. He did not tell Jaga he was doing this or ask his 

permission. Dame was unaware Jaga had changed his name when he became a 

citizen, from Ndiaga, hence the discrepancy. Dame submitted the online application 

using Jaga’s name, date of birth, Social Security number, and pertinent information. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 11 

When JPMC called to schedule an interview, Dame attended the interview with Robert 

Hall. He knew the next part of the process would be the background check. Dame 

testified he told Jaga someone from JPMC called and said he should come in for a 

background check; Dame encouraged him to go because maybe it would turn into a job. 

He still did not tell Jaga he had applied for a job in his name. 

{¶34} Dame received a call from JPMC confirming his start date and began 

working. He worked for Robert Hall for three months and then applied for another 

position within JPMC. During his employment, he never told Jaga he was working 

under his name. When Carly Richardson confronted him about the ID badge photo that 

was not him, Dame admitted he claimed he lost weight, and said he told Kelly O’Reilly 

that he knew it was a mistake but never bothered to correct it. When he was 

suspended after the interview, he took Jaga’s driver’s license and some identifying 

information while Jaga was in the shower and brought it into the HR department and 

dropped it off. He did not have Jaga’s permission to use the documents. 

{¶35} Dame insisted Jaga knew nothing about the identity fraud scheme. Dame 

claimed that he signed the paychecks over to himself trying to make two signatures look 

different. 

{¶36} Jaga in turn testified that he never knew Dame used his information to 

apply for a job at and work for JPMC. When he got a call to come in for a background 

check, he thought it was “weird,” but his resume information was on the Ohio State 

University career services’ website and he thought perhaps JPMC contacted him in 

connection with that. He thought he had nothing to lose by going in for the background 

check even though at that point he had never applied for any position with JPMC. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 12 

{¶37} The same day he was photographed and fingerprinted, he received an 

offer letter in the mail from JPMC offering him a job. Jaga testified he thought about 

taking it, but he was already going to school and working a different job, and it would be 

too many hours. He claimed he called “a woman” at JPMC and turned the job down. 

Jaga speculated at trial his brother set up a series of phone calls to make the possible 

job scenario more believable so it was more likely Jaga would go in for the background 

check. Jaga testified he never saw any paychecks in his name from JPMC, and he 

never gave Dame permission to use his driver’s license or any other information. He 

also testified the evidence regarding the JPMC hiring process is not accurate because 

he was hired there in June 2011 without interviewing with any JPMC manager. 

{¶38} Appellant moved for judgments of acquittal at the close of appellee’s 

evidence and at the close of all the evidence, and the motions were overruled. 

Appellants were found not guilty of some counts, guilty of others, and the jury was 

unable to reach a verdict on others, as shown on the chart, supra. After the jury was 

unable to reach a verdict as to Counts V., VI., and VII., appellee dismissed those 

counts. 

{¶39} Appellants were each sentenced to a term of community control, three 

years for Dame and two years for Jaga. Appellants now appeal from the judgment 

entries of their convictions and sentences. 

{¶40} Appellant Jaga Cisse raises four assignments of error: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶41} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THAT JEOPARDY 

ATTACHED TO THE APPELLANT WHEN A MISTRIAL WAS GRANTED.” 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 13 

{¶42} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THE APPELLEE’S 

EXHIBITS HEARSAY AND PRECLUDING THEM.” 

{¶43} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL MADE AT THE CLOSE OF ALL EVIDENCE.” 

{¶44} “IV. THE CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE.” 

ANALYSIS 

I.

{¶45} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in not 

finding jeopardy attached after granting a mistrial. We disagree. This argument is 

similar to that raised by appellant’s co-defendant and we adopt the same rationale. 

{¶46} In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 

(1982), the Supreme Court held: “ ‘ * * * [T]he circumstances under which such a 

defendant may invoke the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited 

to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial 

was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Prosecutorial 

misconduct will bar a second trial only when such behavior was ‘intentionally’ calculated 

to cause or invite mistrial. State v. Doherty, 20 Ohio App.3d 275, 276, 485 N.E.2d 783 

(1st Dist.1984). Accordingly, not all retrials after jeopardy attaches are precluded. See 

State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19, 517 N.E.2d 900 (1988). Rather, if a mistrial was 

properly granted, then retrial is constitutionally permissible. Id., 19-20. 

{¶47} The reviewing court examines the trial court's decision to grant a mistrial 

with deference. Glover, supra, 35 Ohio St.3d at 19. A balancing test is employed 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 14 

whereby appellant's right to be tried by the original tribunal is weighed against the 

public's interest in the efficient implementation of justice. Id. At times, the public's 

interest in a fair trial dominates over appellant's right to have his fate determined by a 

certain tribunal. Id. Thus, “[w]here the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the 

accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. 

In evaluating the propriety of a mistrial order, the reviewing court should apply flexible 

standards “due to the infinite variety of circumstances in which a mistrial may arise.” Id. 

at 19, citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 

(1971). 

{¶48} In this case, it was prejudicial comments of appellee’s witness, 

unprompted by appellee, which resulted in the trial court properly sustaining the 

defendants’ joint motion for mistrial. It is apparent from the record that neither appellee 

nor the trial court “goaded” trial counsel into asking for a mistrial. We find the judge's 

action in declaring a mistrial was not instigated by prosecutorial misconduct designed to 

provoke a mistrial, nor was the declaration of a mistrial an abuse of discretion. 

{¶49} Accordingly, appellant’s protection against double jeopardy has not been 

violated and his first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶50} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should 

have excluded the copies of Facebook pages taken from the web offered as exhibits by 

appellee. We disagree. 

{¶51} The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Absent an abuse of discretion resulting in material prejudice 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 15 

to the defendant, a reviewing court should be reluctant to interfere with a trial court’s 

decision in this regard. State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128, 224 N.E.2d 126 (1967). 

{¶52} First we note the exhibits at issue here are distinguishable from those in 

the case cited by appellant, State v. Tooley, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2004-P-0064, 2005-

Ohio-6709, reversed on other grounds, 114 Ohio St.3d 366, 2007-Ohio-3698, 872 

N.E.2d 894, cert. denied by Tooley v. Ohio, 552 U.S. 1115, 128 S.Ct. 912, 169 L.Ed.2d 

757 (2008). Tooley was a child pornography case in which a law enforcement witness 

testified about the ages and countries of origin of victims in computer images. The 

“layers of hearsay” in that case referred to the many layers of investigation which had 

involved the Department of Homeland Security and international law enforcement in 

identifying victims in images generated by a worldwide web of child exploiters. 

{¶53} In this case, as the trial court determined, the jury was free to look at the 

photos from the Facebook pages and determine their weight. The Facebook photos 

were only relevant to the investigation and how first Richardson and then investigators 

determined who “Jaga Cisse” really was. In light of Dame’s subsequent admissions, the 

admission of this evidence was harmless. 

{¶54} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

III., IV. 

{¶55} Appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error challenge the manifest 

weight and sufficiency of the evidence and will be considered together. Appellant 

argues appellee presented insufficient evidence of venue and the jury lost its way in 

finding appellant knew of and participated in Dame’s plan of identity theft. We disagree. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 16 

{¶56} Appellant was found guilty of two counts of identity theft pursuant to R.C. 

2913.49(D), which states, “No person, with intent to defraud, shall permit another 

person to use the person's own personal identifying information.” 

{¶57} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the 

evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard 

of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 

61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which 

the Ohio Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence 

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the 

average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” 

{¶58} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing 

the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, 

the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 

Ohio St.3d at 387. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 17 

evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in 

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.

{¶59} Appellant challenges the sufficiency of appellee’s evidence with respect to 

the element of venue. It is axiomatic that “[v]enue, although not a material element of 

the offense, must be proven by the state unless it is waived by the defendant.” State v. 

Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 453 N.E.2d 716 (1983); State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 

418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981). The issue of venue was raised several times through the 

course of two trials; all parties have acknowledged the sole event which occurred in 

Delaware County is the background check, to wit, Jaga Cisse reported to the JPMC 

location at 1111 Polaris Parkway to be fingerprinted and photographed. The drug test 

occurred elsewhere. The interview and work performed by Dame Cisse occurred at the 

Easton location in Franklin County. Nevertheless, venue for all of the offenses is proper 

in Delaware County, as it would have been in any county where any element of the 

offense of identity theft occurred. 

{¶60} R.C. 2901.12(A) governs venue in criminal cases and states that the trial 

should be “held in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, and in the territory of 

which the offense or any element thereof was committed.” Therefore, venue can exist in 

any jurisdiction where any element of the crime was committed. State v. Plants, 5th 

Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2009 AP 10 0054, 2010-Ohio-2930, ¶ 39, citing State v. 

Chakirelis, 11th Dist. Lake No. 95-L-041, 1996 WL 200605 (March 29, 1996). The 

standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, although venue need not be proved in 

express terms so long as it is established by all the facts and circumstances in the case. 

State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 18 

{¶61} All eleven counts of the indictment assert the offenses occurred in 

Delaware County; appellee’s bill of particulars states each offense occurred as part of a 

continuing course of conduct. R.C. 2901.12(H) states: 

When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits 

offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of 

those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or 

any element of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation 

on the evidence that may be used to establish the course of 

criminal conduct, any of the following is prima-facie evidence of a 

course of criminal conduct: 

(1) The offenses involved the same victim, or victims of the same 

type or from the same group. 

(2) The offenses were committed by the offender in the offender's 

same employment, or capacity, or relationship to another. 

(3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or 

chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective. 

(4) The offenses were committed in furtherance of the same 

conspiracy. 

(5) The offenses involved the same or a similar modus operandi. 

(6) The offenses were committed along the offender's line of travel 

in this state, regardless of the offender's point of origin or 

destination. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 19 

{¶62} In this case, the offenses were committed as part of the same transaction 

or chain of events, in furtherance of the same purpose: Dame Cisse obtaining 

employment with JPMC. We find all of the offenses were properly venued in Delaware 

County as part of a course of criminal conduct. See, State v. Jewell, 5th Dist. Delaware 

No. 01CAA03006, 2002-Ohio-226. 

{¶63} Appellant further argues there is no evidence Jaga knew of Dame’s 

scheme of identity fraud, but we disagree. Jaga admittedly went to Polaris Parkway for 

the background check; he claimed it was “weird” because he never applied for a job 

with JPMC, but he went nevertheless. The jury was free to believe him or not. The 

weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are determined by the trier of 

fact. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 231, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216. 

The jury also had the evidence of the paychecks payable to “Ndiaga” signed over to 

Dame and the fact that the brothers lived together for months while this scheme went on 

despite Jaga’s claims of ignorance. Dame was also able to access Jaga’s driver’s 

license and other identifying paperwork, although both claimed Jaga did not give him 

permission to do so. 

{¶64} In short, we are unable to find, upon reviewing the entire record, the jury 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be overturned and a new trial ordered. 

{¶65} Appellant’s two convictions for identity theft are supported by sufficient 

evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s third and 

fourth assignments of error are overruled. 
Delaware County, Case No.12 CAA 10 0074 20 

CONCLUSION 

{¶66} For the foregoing reasons, each of appellant’s four assignments of error is 

overruled and the judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By: Delaney, J. and 

Gwin, P.J. 

Baldwin, J., concur. 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN