[Cite as Elliott v. Rhodes, 2011-Ohio-339.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 PICKAWAY COUNTY 

KELLY ELLIOTT, nka 

ELLIOTT-RODGERS, : 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 10CA26 

vs. : 

JOHN RHODES, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 

 

Defendant-Appellant. : 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 APPEARANCES: 

APPELLANT PRO SE: John Rhodes, 439 John Street, Circleville, Ohio 

43113 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Michael D. Hess, 214 South Court Street, Suite 200, 

P.O. Box 682, Circleville, Ohio 43113 

_________________________________________________________________ 

CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT 

DATE JOURNALIZED: 1-20-11 

ABELE, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile 

Division, judgment that ordered John Rhodes, defendant below and appellant herein, to 

pay monthly child support. 

{¶ 2} Appellant raises the following assignments of error1 for review: 

 1

 Appellant’s brief does not contain a dedicated section that delineates specific 

assignments of error. We have reviewed his “statement of issues” and “arguments 

and authorities cited” and have extracted what we interpret to be the assignments of 

error from the “arguments and authorities cited” section.
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 2

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“‘COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PICKAWAY COUNTY, 

JUVENILE DIVISION ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY IMPUTING THE 

DEFENDANT’S-APPELLANT’S INCOME TO WAGES THAT 

THE DEFENDANT IS NO LONGER EARNING DUE TO 

COLLECTING UNEMPLOYMENT. DEFENDANT’S 

UNEMPLOYMENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY.’ DECISION 

IS CONTRARY TO LAW. ALSO ‘COURT OF COMMON 

PLEAS, PICKAWAY COUNTY, JUVENILE DIVISION 

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING 

THE DEFENDANTS [SIC] DOCTOR’S NOTE INDICATING 

THAT HE COULD NOT LIFT MORE THAN 10 POUNDS 

AND THEREFORE RENDERING HIM UNABLE TO 

PERFORM THE TYPE OF WORK THE DEFENDANT DID 

PRIOR TO BEING UNEMPLOYED.’” 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“DUE TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE 

‘COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PICKAWAY COUNTY, 

JUVENILE DIVISION ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY RELYING UPON TESTIMONY[,] 

EVIDENCE, AND IMPROPER DOCUMENTATION TO 

VERIFY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S INCOME TO 

DETERMINE THE PLAINTIFF’S GROSS INCOME.”2

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“CONTRARY TO LAW ‘COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

ERRED AND ABUSED IT’S [SIC] DISCRETION BY NOT 

INCLUDING WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER 

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR PARENTING TIME AND 

VISITATION.’” 

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“‘COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PICKAWAY COUNTY, 

JUVENILE DIVISION SPECIFICALLY MAGISTRATE 

 2

 Appellant places a quotation mark beginning with “Court” above, but does not 

indicate where the quotation ends.
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 3

HARSHA, AND THE CLERK OF COURTS ERRED AND 

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION HEARING ANY AND ALL 

MOTIONS, AND LEGAL MATTERS RELATED TO THE 

PLAINTIFF.’” 

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“‘COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PICKAWAY COUNTY, 

JUVENILE DIVISION ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY NEGLECTING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE 

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A SHARED PARENTING 

DECREE SUPPORTED BY A PARENTING PLAN.’” 

{¶ 3} Appellee and appellant are the biological parents of three children. On 

December 6, 2006, Pickaway County Job and Family Services filed a complaint to 

establish an order of support on behalf of plaintiff below and appellee herein, Kelly 

Elliott, and her three minor children.3

{¶ 4} On December 8, 2006, appellee filed a “custody complaint” and a motion 

for temporary custody.4

 Appellee alleged that the children presently reside with her, 

but no order has allocated parental rights and responsibilities. Appellee requested the 

court to designate her the legal custodian of the children and to enter a child support 

award. 

{¶ 5} On December 21, 2006, appellant filed a pro se complaint for visitation.5

 

Appellant requested reasonable companionship rights with the children. He also 

 3

 This case was captioned as “State of Ohio ex rel. Pickaway County Job & 

Family Services v. John Rhodes” and assigned case number 20640274.

4 These two documents do not bear case numbers and the caption is “Kelly L. 

Elliott vs. John R. Rhodes.” Nonetheless, the clerk filed these documents in the child 

support matter.

5 Appellant designated the caption as brought “In the Matter of [the three 

children].” The clerk designated his complaint with the same case number as the child 

support complaint and appellee’s custody complaint.
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 4

sought temporary custody of the children during the pendency of the case. 

{¶ 6} On December 22, 2006, the magistrate entered a child support order that 

directed appellant to pay $231.21 per child in monthly child support. The magistrate 

subsequently entered temporary orders that designated appellee the residential parent 

and granted appellant companionship time. The magistrate further modified 

appellant’s total monthly child support obligation to $216.08. 

{¶ 7} On April 2, 2007, appellant filed a motion and requested the court to 

designate him the residential parent and legal custodian. The magistrate issued an 

interim order that designated appellant the children’s “temporary custodian for school 

placement” and suspending his child support obligation. 

{¶ 8} On April 11, 2008, the trial court adopted the parties’ agreed shared 

parenting plan, under which the children reside primarily with appellant and appellee 

pays child support. 

{¶ 9} On July 1, 2009, appellee filed a motion to modify the allocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities and requested the court designate her the residential 

parent and legal custodian. 

{¶ 10} On November 12, 2009, the magistrate designated appellee the 

residential parent and legal custodian of the parties’ minor children. The order further 

stated that appellee “waives all child support payments until February 15, 2010.” The 

magistrate also terminated appellee’s child support obligation. 

{¶ 11} On February 19, 2010, appellant filed a “motion for modification or 

termination of child support.” 
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 5

{¶ 12} On April 25, 2010, the magistrate directed appellant to pay child support in 

the amount of $592.10 per month plus $134.33 per month for cash medical support 

when private health insurance is not provided. When, however, health insurance is 

provided, the magistrate ordered that appellant pay $727.25 in monthly child support. 

In reaching her decision, the magistrate found that: (1) appellee earns $19,863 per 

year; (2) appellant is unemployed and receives $16,952 in annual unemployment; (3) 

appellant lost his job due to tardiness; (4) when appellant was employed, he earned 

$32,240 annually; and (5) appellant’s doctor stated that appellant is not to lift more than 

ten pounds due to his medical condition. The magistrate thereupon determined that: 

(1) the doctor’s note did not establish that appellant is disabled and unable to work; and 

(2) appellant lost his employment “due to his conduct, not due to any outside or 

uncontrollable forces.” Thus, the magistrate imputed $15,288 in income to appellant. 

{¶ 13} On May 6, 2010, appellant filed pro se objections to the magistrate’s 

decision. He stated: 

“I would like to know why doctors [sic] note was’nt [sic] reconized 

[sic] by court. I never said I was disabled. According to paperwork 

received states that a hearing was heard on 4-22-10 and I was there, I 

didnt even know there was a hearing. I have an appointment with Adena 

Bone and Joint on 5-20-10, to be scheduled for another MRI. I would like 

a chance for courts to take my herniated/bulging disc into consideration. 

Court paper say I was terminated due to my conduct. Unemployment 

determined * * * I was discharged without just cause.” 

{¶ 14} On May 14, 2010, appellant filed a motion and requested the magistrate 

and the trial court judge to recuse themselves. Appellant additionally requested that 

future hearings and motions be heard before Judge Knece and that the filing of all 

documents be transferred to the Clerk for Judge Knece. On May 19, 2010, appellant 
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 6

then filed a motion for shared parenting. 

{¶ 15} On June 29, 2010, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision6 and 

ordered appellant to pay $737.25 in monthly child support as long as private health 

insurance is maintained for the children. When, however, no health insurance is 

provided, appellant shall pay $592.10 per month for child support and $134.33 for cash 

medical support. The court imputed $15,228 in income to appellant in order “to bring 

his income to the level it was prior to his termination [from employment.]” The court 

further determined that appellant was not disabled or unable to work. The court stated 

that its entry is a final appealable order and also stated: “All until further order of this 

Court.” 

{¶ 16} On July 2, 2010, appellant filed a document in which he objected to the 

trial court’s June 29, 2010 decision because he “was under the impression we were 

going back before Judge Knece with regards to this matter when I had the transcripts 

from the April 6, and April 22, 2010 court dates.” On July 2, 2010, appellant filed 

another motion and requested the court to recuse itself. On July 28, 2010, 

appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s June 29, 2010 order. 

{¶ 17} Before we consider the merits of appellant’s appeal, we must determine 

whether the trial court’s June 29, 2010 order constitutes a final appealable order. An 

appellate court’s jurisdiction over trial court judgments extends only to final orders. 

Ohio Const. Art. IV, Section 3(B)(2). Section 2505.02(B)(2) defines “a final order that 

 6

 We observe that the trial court did not enter an order to specifically address 
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 7

may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed” as one that “affects a substantial 

right made in a special proceeding * * *.” “An order affects a substantial right if, in the 

absence of an immediate appeal, one of the parties would be foreclosed from 

appropriate relief in the future.” Koroshazi v. Koroshazi (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 637, 

640, 674 N.E.2d 1266, citing Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 

616 N.E.2d 181. To constitute a final order, the order must dispose of the whole case 

or some separate and distinct branch. See, e.g., Noble v. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio 

St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381. In general, when an order does not contemplate 

further action and no other related issues remain pending, the order normally 

constitutes a final order. See In re H.T.-W., Lucas App. No. L-10-1027, 

2010-Ohio-1714, at ¶7; see, also, Christian v. Johnson, Summit App. No. 24327, 

2009-Ohio-3863. 

{¶ 18} The case sub judice began as a complaint to establish child support. It 

then morphed into a back-and-forth child custody and support dispute. The trial court 

apparently resolved the most recent round involving child support, but it appears that it 

did not resolve the most recent pending custody issue. See Kouns v. Pemberton

(1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 499, 501, 617 N.E.2d 701 (trial court granted custody 

modification, but deferred child support issue for further determination did not constitute 

a final appealable order). Accordingly, because this case includes multiple claims and 

the trial court’s decision did not resolve all pending issues, we do not believe that the 

 

appellant’s objections.
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 8

court’s decision constitutes a final appealable order.7 Moreover, the trial court’s 

decision states “until further order,” thus arguably contemplating further action. We 

recognize that the court’s ruling on appellant’s pending custody modification may 

impact its child support ruling, in which case this appeal would be moot. Therefore, it 

would be a waste of judicial resources to address appellant’s present arguments 

concerning child support. 

{¶ 19} Accordingly, we hereby dismiss this appeal. 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

 7

 The trial court did not enter a specific order to address appellant’s objections. 

The Ninth District has adopted the position that “‘[w]hen a trial court enters judgment on 

a magistrate’s decision, but fails to explicitly rule on a party’s objections, that judgment 

does not constitute a final, appealable order because it does not fully determine the 

action.’” In re Strickler, Lorain App. No. 09CA9692, 2010-Ohio-2277, at 5, quoting In 

re Strickler, Lorain App. Nos. 08CA009375 and 08CA009393, 2008-Ohio-5813, at ¶7-8. 

 The Ninth District requires a trial court to specifically and explicitly resolve each 

objection in order for a court’s judgment that adopted a magistrate’s decision to 

constitute a final, appealable order. Other courts have declined to adopt this position. 

See In re Estate of Knowlton, Hamilton App. No. C-050728, 2006-Ohio-4905; Chan v. 

TASR, Total Abatement Specialist & Remodelers, Hamilton App. No. C-070275, 

2008-Ohio-1439. Although we need not adopt either position, we do believe that “the 

better practice is to clearly set forth an explicit ruling on the objections.” In re Adoption 

of S.R.A., Franklin App. No. 09AP-1096, 2010-Ohio-4435, at 20.
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 9

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that appellee recover of appellant 

costs herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway 

County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Kline, J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion 

For the Court 

BY: 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge 

 

 
PICKAWAY, 10CA26 10

 NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry 

and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.