[Cite as Edwards v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2017-Ohio-2675.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Stephen and Constance Edwards, : 

 

 Appellants-Appellants, : 

 No. 16AP-607 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 15CV-1639) 

 

Ohio Department of Job : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Family Services, 

 : 

 Appellee-Appellee. 

 : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 4, 2017 

 

On brief: Roger Warner, for appellants. Argued: Roger 

Warner. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Cheryl R. 

Hawkinson, for appellee. Argued: Cheryl R. Hawkinson. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} Stephen and Constance Edwards, appellants, have filed an appeal from the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in which the court affirmed the 

decision of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS"), appellee. 

{¶ 2} Appellants live in Greene County, Ohio, and have been certified foster 

parents since 1971. One of the hundreds of foster care children they have cared for is 

Daniel, whom they eventually adopted. Daniel was 19 years old at the relevant time here 

and living in appellants' home. 
No. 16AP-607 2

{¶ 3} On May 10, 2013, Greene County Children Services ("GCCS") conducted a 

recertification home study and home inspection of appellants' home. The inspector asked 

appellants orally whether any household members had been arrested, charged with, or 

convicted of any offenses, and appellants answered "no." They also answered "no" to the 

same question on a report the same day. However, on March 20, 2013, Daniel had been 

arrested for impersonating an officer and inducing panic, and on May 2, 2013, Daniel had 

pled guilty to a fourth-degree misdemeanor charge of impersonating an officer. 

{¶ 4} On May 28, 2013, appellants received a notice informing them that they had 

been recertified as a foster home. The notice indicated, among other things, that 

appellants needed to report any child 12 through 18 years of age residing in the home who 

has been convicted of or pled guilty to a criminal offense or was adjudicated delinquent 

for an act that would have been a crime if committed by an adult. On June 5, 2013, 

Constance called GCCS to see if she was required to report Daniel's conviction. An 

investigation subsequently commenced, and GCCS determined appellants had violated 

Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-7-14(H), which requires notice within 24 hours of any conviction 

of an adult resident of the home. 

{¶ 5} On February 28, 2014, an ODJFS hearing examiner held a hearing. On 

December 12, 2014, the hearing examiner issued a report and recommendation 

recommending appellants' certification be revoked. Appellants filed objections with the 

ODJFS director, but the director concluded they were untimely. On February 9, 2015, the 

director issued an adjudication order adopting the hearing examiner's report and 

recommendation and revoking appellants' foster care certification. 

{¶ 6} Appellants appealed the director's adjudication order to the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas. On July 27, 2016, the court affirmed the adjudication 

order of the ODJFS director revoking appellants' foster care certification. Appellants 

appeal the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following two assignments of error: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 

THE DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF OHIO 

DEPARTMENT OF JOBS [sic] AND FAMILY SERVICES 

(ODJFS) IN REVOKING THE FOSTER CARE LICENSE OF 

APPELLANTS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
No. 16AP-607 3 

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 

APPELLANTS' MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF THE 

DIRECTOR WHERE THE AGENCY REINTERPRETED THE 

LICENSE REQUIREMENTS AND REINSTATED 

APPELLANTS' LICENSE SUBSEQUENT TO ITS ADJUDICATION ORDER. 

{¶ 7} Appellants argue in their first assignment of error that the trial court erred 

when it found the adjudication order of the director revoking appellants' foster care 

certification was in accordance with law. When reviewing an order of an administrative 

agency, pursuant to R.C. 119.12, a common pleas court must affirm the order if, upon 

consideration of the entire record, the order is in accordance with law and is supported by 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control 

Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 570, 571 (1992). In reviewing the decision of the trial court, an 

appellate court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Bryant Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 13AP263, 2014-Ohio-92, ¶ 23. However, an appellate court has plenary review of purely legal 

questions. Id. Furthermore, a reviewing court should accord considerable "deference to 

an administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules and regulations where the 

interpretation is consistent with the statutory law and the plain language of the rules." 

Alternative Residences, Two, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 

04AP-306, 2004-Ohio-6444, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Natl. Lime & Stone 

Co., 68 Ohio St.3d 377, 382 (1994). 

{¶ 8} Appellants argue that at each level of appeal, ODJFS indicated it had no 

discretion once appellants acknowledged that they failed to report Daniel's charges within 

24 hours pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-7-14(H). However, appellants contend there 

was an alternative remedy available in the foster care manual issued by GCCS with the 

approval of ODJFS. Appellants assert there is a corrective action plan that allows GCCS to 

work with a home that is out of compliance with regulations. Appellants argue that 

neither the hearing examiner nor the director addressed GCCS's ability to arrive at an 

alternative treatment under the corrective action plan. Instead, ODJFS believed that any 

charge must be reported within 24 hours, and the trial court believed it had to give due 

deference to ODJFS's interpretation. 
No. 16AP-607 4 

{¶ 9} Former Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-7-14(H) provided: 

A foster caregiver shall notify the recommending agency 

within twenty-four hours of any charge of any criminal offense 

brought against the caregiver or any adult resident of his 

home. If the charges result in a conviction, the foster caregiver 

shall notify the recommending agency within twenty-four 

hours of the conviction. Failure to notify the agency in either 

of these circumstances shall result in the agency 

recommending the Ohio department of job and family 

services (ODJFS) seek an order to revoke or deny the 

caregiver's certification to operate a foster home. 

{¶ 10} Initially, the mandate for the reporting of any criminal offense within 24 

hours and the repercussions for failing to notify are set forth in explicit terms in former 

Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-7-14(H). Thus, despite what the foster care manual issued by 

GCCS indicates, the Ohio Administrative Code clearly addresses the current factual 

circumstances, and appellants fail to cite any authority that the GCCS foster care manual 

should control over the Ohio Administrative Code. Nevertheless, Elizabeth Jackson, a 

foster care specialist for GCCS, testified that a corrective action plan, as set forth in the 

foster care manual, could not be implemented here because appellants' actions were a 

clear violation of a rule that clearly states to proceed with revocation if violated. She gave 

examples of when a corrective action plan would be implemented due to lack of 

compliance, such as when the foster parents fail to submit a monthly form or medical 

documentation for the child for appointments or prescriptions. She testified that a 

corrective action plan would not have been proper here because appellants had already 

been trained on the reporting rule, and appellants had already reported a similar pending 

fourth-degree misdemeanor charge, demonstrating that they understood the rule. Thus, 

even if the GCCS foster care manual gave GCCS some discretion as to what action to take 

after appellants reported their violation, Jackson provided supporting evidence that 

appellants' circumstances did not fall within GCCS's parameters for issuing a corrective 

action plan. 

{¶ 11} Appellants also point out that GCCS contacted the liaison at ODJFS, and the 

liaison informed GCCS that it was required by former Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-7-14(H) to 

make the recommendation to revoke appellants' certification. Appellants contend that it is 
No. 16AP-607 5

a violation of due process for ODJFS to, in essence, make a recommendation to itself to 

revoke. We disagree. "Due process requires that an individual in an administrative 

proceeding is entitled to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal." Serednesky v. Ohio 

State Bd. of Psychology, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-633, 2006-Ohio-3146, ¶ 21, citing In re 

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The key factor in deciding whether a hearing 

satisfies procedural due process is whether the claimant had the opportunity to present 

the facts that demonstrate he was entitled to benefits. Howard v. Electronic Classroom of 

Tomorrow, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-159, 2011-Ohio-6059, ¶ 15, citing Atkins v. Dir., Ohio 

Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-182, 2008-Ohio-4109, ¶ 17. "It is wellsettled that a reviewing court must presume that the decision of an administrative agency 

is valid and was reached in a sound manner." West Virginia v. Ohio Hazardous Waste 

Facility Approval Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 83, 86 (1986). "This presumption imposes upon an 

appellant the burden of proving his or her contention that a hearing examiner in a cause 

was biased, partial or prejudiced to such a degree that the hearing examiner's presence 

adversely affected the board's decision." Althof v. Ohio State Bd. of Psychology, 10th Dist. 

No. 05AP-1169, 2007-Ohio-1010, ¶ 35. 

{¶ 12} Here, in essence, what appellants contend is that ODJFS was biased in its 

subsequent decisions because it had previously decided the matter when it advised GCCS. 

We disagree. Initially, appellants present no evidence to support any argument that the 

hearing examiner and the director failed to review the merits of the matter. Furthermore, 

ODJFS's advisement to GCCS was only with regard to what actions GCCS should take. 

ODJFS did not make any premature decision as to what its determination would be if the 

matter came before it later. Insofar as due process is concerned, the record is clear that 

appellants were able to fully and fairly litigate the matter and had the opportunity to 

present the facts. The record is devoid of any indication that ODJFS's advisement to 

GCCS had any impact of ODJFS's later review of the merits. Therefore, we find this 

argument without merit. 

{¶ 13} Appellants also make the argument under this assignment of error that 

ODJFS erred when it found the objections to the director from the report and 

recommendation of the hearing examiner were untimely. Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-50-

09(B)(1) provides that service of the hearing examiner's report and recommendation must 
No. 16AP-607 6

be made to both the appellant and the appellant's attorney. However, Ohio Adm.Code 

5101:6-50-09(B)(2) provides that any objections to the hearing examiner's report "must 

be received no later than ten days after the appellant receives the report." Here, appellants 

were served via certified mail on December 13, 2014, while counsel was not served until 

December 15, 2014. Pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-50-09(B)(2), appellants had ten 

days from the date of service to themselves to file objections; thus, they were required to 

file objections by December 23, 2014. They did not file objections until December 26, 

2014. 

{¶ 14} Appellants contend that where service is required on a party as well as on 

counsel, as Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-50-09(B)(1) requires, logic demands that service on 

appellants is not complete until service on counsel is made. Appellants assert that any 

other interpretation could lead to absurd results. We disagree. The issue of service here is 

not one of interpretation, as appellants suggest. Instead, the Ohio Administrative Code 

clearly and explicitly indicates that the deadline to file objections begins to run on service 

to the appellants. Although appellants present an equitable argument as to why this is 

unfair, they support it with no case law or other authority. Given the clear mandates of 

Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-50-09(B)(2), we cannot say the ODJFS director erred in finding 

that appellants' objections to the hearing examiner's report and recommendation were 

untimely. 

{¶ 15} Appellants also argue that even if their objections were untimely, the 

director still had a duty to review the hearing examiner's report and recommendation. In 

this regard, appellants argue that a de minimus violation should not give rise to the 

forfeiture of a valued certification, given the following facts: they had a 40-year financial 

and emotional investment in service to children; Daniel's violation was only a fourthdegree misdemeanor; appellants self-reported; and Daniel's conviction was not a 

disqualifying factor if it had been reported. The director indicated in the adjudication 

order that she had reviewed the record in the matter and approved and adopted the 

hearing examiner's report and recommendation. The director found that the findings in 

the report and recommendation constituted a legal basis for revocation of appellants' 

foster care certification. There is no dispute that appellants violated Ohio Adm.Code 

5101:2-7-14(H), and we are without authority to modify ODJFS's penalty of revocation. 
No. 16AP-607 7

Neither the court of common pleas nor this court may modify the penalty imposed if the 

penalty was authorized by law, once it is determined that ODJFS's order was supported by 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. See Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor 

Control, 170 Ohio St. 233 (1959), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. Given our 

above findings, we conclude the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion, and its 

decision was in accord with the law on all legal issues. Therefore, appellants' first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 16} Appellants argue in their second assignment of error that the trial court 

erred when it overruled their motion to vacate the order of the director when the agency 

reinterpreted the requirements and reinstated appellants' certification subsequent to its 

adjudication order. Appellants contend that ODJFS eventually recertified appellants as a 

foster care provider on May 29, 2015, following the usual procedure for recertification. 

Appellants point out they are still not in compliance with the rule that caused the 

revocation in the present case, yet the agency has now apparently waived the violation and 

reissued a certification. 

{¶ 17} However, we find ODJFS's subsequent recertification is a separate matter 

and irrelevant to the determination in the present case. The only issue before this court is 

whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found ODJFS's current order was 

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. 

Furthermore, as ODJFS points out, evidence of a subsequent recertification is not "newly 

discovered" evidence, as permitted by R.C. 119.12(K), but newly created evidence that was 

created after ODJFS's adjudication. For these reasons, appellants' arguments are without 

merit, and their second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 18} Accordingly, appellants' two assignments of error are overruled, and the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

TYACK, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur. 

 

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