F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 28, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MARCIE FUERSCHBACH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.; CITY

OF ALBUQUERQUE; DUANE

HOPPE; ELDON MARTINEZ;

MICHAEL SANTIAGO; and TINA

MARIE TAPIA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-2117

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Mexico

(D.C. No. CIV-03-540 RHS/LFG)

Thomas P. Gulley, Jontz Dawe Gulley & Crown, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico

for the Plaintiff–Appellant.

Jeffrey L. Baker (L. Helen Bennett, The Baker Law Firm, Albuquerque, New

Mexico; and Duane C. Gilkey and George C. Kraehe, Gilkey & Stephenson, P.A.

with him on the briefs), The Baker Law Firm, Albuquerque, New Mexico for the

Defendant–Appellees.

Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
- 2 -

Several supervisors at Southwest Airlines convinced two Albuquerque

police officers to stage an arrest of Marcie Fuerschbach, a Southwest Airlines

employee, as part of an elaborate prank that included actual handcuffing and

apparent arrest. This was a “joke gone bad,” and turned out to be anything but

funny, as Fuerschbach allegedly suffered serious psychological injuries as a result

of the prank. She sued the officers and the City of Albuquerque under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Fuerschbach also asserted claims for various state torts against the officers, the

city, her supervisors, and Southwest Airlines. The district court found that the

officers were shielded from the constitutional claims by qualified immunity, and

granted summary judgment to all defendants on all other claims. We conclude

that Fuerschbach’s allegations are sufficient to survive the assertion of qualified

immunity. Whether the characterization of the incident as a prank permits the

officers to escape liability is a question for the jury to resolve. As such, we

REVERSE the grant of qualified immunity to the officers. We also REVERSE

the grant of summary judgment to the officers and the city on several state claims. 

In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment of the court below.

I

Marcie Fuerschbach worked as a customer service representative for

Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”), serving travelers at Southwest’s main ticket
1

 In reciting the facts of this case, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, as is appropriate when reviewing a grant of

summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

2

 Apparently the officers took some time to arrive and the supervisors grew

impatient. Noticing a group of Boy Scouts standing in line, they discussed

(continued...)

- 3 -

counter in Albuquerque’s Sunport airport.1 Southwest prides itself on being a

“fun-loving, spirited company.” This lighthearted image extends from marketing

and customer relations into the company’s corporate culture. As part of this funloving atmosphere, newly hired employees who have successfully completed an

initial probationary period often find themselves subject to a prank

commemorating the occasion. In one instance, an employee was led onto an

airplane, the doors were sealed, and the employee was flown to Dallas. Another

employee was dressed in a hula skirt and made to perform a hula dance for

customers. Aware of this tradition, Fuerschbach knew it was possible that her

colleagues would play a prank on her at the end of her probationary period. 

 Fuerschbach’s supervisor, Tina Marie Tapia, and other customer service

supervisors had discussed various pranks to commemorate Fuerschbach’s

successful completion of probation. Because Tapia had once been subjected to a

similar prank, and had thought the experience amusing, she suggested a mock

arrest. The others agreed. On the day of the incident, one of the supervisors

called the Albuquerque police department and requested that officers come to the

Southwest counter.2

 When Officers Duane Hoppe and Eldon Martinez arrived at
2

(...continued)

dispensing with the arrest prank and instead merely having the Boy Scouts

serenade Fuerschbach. Tapia testified in her deposition that she refused to put the

kibosh on the arrest plan, stating: “I felt at the time that I wanted something way

more special than just having Boy Scouts sing to her.” 

- 4 -

the ticket counter, the supervisors told them of the plan to arrest Fuerschbach as a

celebratory prank. The officers, who were employed by the City of

Albuquerque’s City Aviation Department and detailed to the Sunport, asked if

Fuerschbach “would be okay with it,” and Tapia assured them that she would. 

With the assistance of the supervisors, the officers developed and executed the

plan for staging the arrest. 

Fuerschbach was working at a ticket counter crowded with customers when

the two uniformed and armed police officers approached her. One of the officers

ordered Fuerschbach to go with him to answer some questions, and proceeded to

escort her to the end of the ticket counter. Once there, the other officer informed

Fuerschbach that during the course of performing her background check, the City

Aviation Department discovered an outstanding warrant for her arrest. The

officers asked Fuerschbach if she had ever been arrested before, and she replied

that she had not. When she began to explain that there must have been some

mistake, and that there were no outstanding warrants, the officers interrupted her

and demanded that she take off her badges and turn them in. Fuerschbach

complied and handed her badges to Tapia, who was standing close by. Hoppe and

Martinez then asked if Fuerschbach had anyone to “bail her out,” and she
- 5 -

responded tearfully that she hoped Tapia would. After asking for a tissue to dry

her tears, Fuerschbach asked if the arrest were a joke. Both officers refused to

respond. Instead, Hoppe asked if Fuerschbach had any unpaid traffic citations. 

The officers then placed Fuerschbach’s hands behind her back and

handcuffed her tightly. A crowd of employees and customers formed to watch the

unfolding arrest. One of the officers said to Fuerschbach, “[w]e don’t want to

embarrass you anymore so we’ll take you to the elevator so we don’t have to walk

in front of all those people.” Fuerschbach continued to cry. The officers led

Fuerschbach in handcuffs fifteen feet to the elevator, at which point someone

jumped out and yelled, “congratulations for being off probation.” The officers

removed the handcuffs and people began to clap. Fuerschbach, however,

continued to cry. Later that day, she was found in the break room weeping and

was sent home. As a result of her distress, Fuerschbach began seeing a

psychologist for treatment. The psychologist diagnosed Fuerschbach as suffering

from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). 

Claiming a violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights,

Fuerschbach sued Hoppe, Martinez, and the City of Albuquerque under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. In the same action she sued Southwest, Tapia, and Michael Santiago, a

Southwest manager, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims of

conspiracy, false imprisonment, false arrest, assault and battery, and defamation
3

 The parties filed a stipulated motion to dismiss the defamation claim,

which the district court granted. 

- 6 -

were asserted against all defendants, along with a claim for punitive damages.3

Following discovery and extensive briefing, the district court first granted

summary judgment to the officers and the City of Albuquerque. Although finding

that Fuerschbach’s constitutional rights were violated, the district court found that

her rights were not clearly established. On that basis, the court afforded Hoppe

and Martinez qualified immunity and dismissed the § 1983 claims asserted against

them. Because Fuerschbach “has offered nothing that would indicate that any of

the challenged actions were authorized or ratified by the City of Albuquerque,”

the court granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims asserted against the

city. Concluding that all the state law claims lacked merit, the court granted

summary judgment to the officers and the city and dismissed all claims with

prejudice. In a separate order, the court granted Southwest, Santiago, and Tapia’s

motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the New Mexico

Workers Compensation Act barred all claims against Southwest and dismissed the

claims asserted against the airline. After reviewing each of the state law claims

asserted against Santiago and Tapia, the court determined that the defendants

were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fuerschbach appeals.
- 7 -

II

We review de novo a district court’s ruling on qualified immunity. Farmer

v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2002). To determine whether qualified

immunity shields a public official from the burdens of litigation, we conduct a

two-part inquiry. We first ascertain whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true,

amount to a constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). 

If so, the defendant “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages

if [his] actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 739 (citation omitted).

A

Fuerschbach alleges that Officers Hoppe and Martinez violated her Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment provides: 

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S.

Const. amend. iv. To determine whether an officer violated the Fourth

Amendment, courts must ascertain whether an alleged incident constitutes a

seizure and, if so, whether such seizure was unreasonable.

Fuerschbach’s allegations, if true, establish that she was seized. A seizure

occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when “a reasonable person would have

believed that he was not free to leave.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
- 8 -

573 (1988). The factors identified in United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143 (10th

Cir. 1999), guide our determination of whether a person was, in fact, seized. 

These factors include:

1) the threatening presence of several officers; 2) the

brandishing of a weapon by an officer; 3) some physical

touching by an officer; 4) use of aggressive language or tone

of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s request is

compulsory; 5) prolonged retention of a person’s personal

effects . . . ; 6) a request to accompany the officer to the

station; 7) interaction in a nonpublic place or a small, enclosed

place; 8) and absence of other members of the public.

Hill, 199 F.3d at 1147-48 . None of these factors are dispositive, nor should they

be treated as exclusive, and “it may be that the strong presence of two or three

factors demonstrates that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not

free to terminate an encounter with government officials.” Jones v. Hunt, 410

F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005). Fuerschbach alleges that she was confronted

by two uniformed and armed police officers, told of an outstanding arrest warrant,

ordered to accompany the officers, and finally handcuffed and led forcibly toward

an exit. Using the Hill factors to guide our determination, we have little trouble

concluding that a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the

encounter with the law enforcement officers under these circumstances.

Unique to this case is that the seizure arose in the context of a workplace

prank. Given this factual context, a jury could be presented with evidence at trial

leading it to conclude that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. 
- 9 -

When reviewing an assertion of qualified immunity, however, we are bound to

take the plaintiff’s allegations as true. Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 736. Fuerschbach’s

allegations establish that she thought the arrest was “real,” that she did not

consent to the seizure, that the officers designed the arrest to look “real,” that the

arrest appeared “real,” and that the officers refused to respond when asked if it

were a joke. These allegations, if true, amount to a seizure for qualified

immunity purposes. Nevertheless, there remains a disputed issue of material fact

for the jury to resolve as to whether, given that the arrest occurred in the context

of a workplace prank, a reasonable person in Fuerschbach’s position would have

felt free to leave. Therefore, our determination that Fuerschbach has satisfied the

first prong of the qualified immunity analysis does not preclude a jury finding for

the officers on the § 1983 claim. 

B

Limited by our duty to take all of Fuerschbach’s allegations as true, we

conclude that the officers’ alleged seizure of Fuerschbach was unreasonable. A

search or seizure generally requires either a warrant or probable cause. Jones,

410 F.3d at 1227. In limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has carved out

narrow exceptions to this general rule. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-

41 (1985) (“Ordinarily, a search . . . must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to

believe that a violation of the law has occurred. [However,] we have in a number

of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that,
- 10 -

although ‘reasonable,’ do not rise to the level of probable cause.”). Examples of

such exceptions to the warrant or probable cause requirement include Terry stops,

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), incidents presenting exigent circumstances,

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004), and situations where school officials

detain and question a child for the purpose of maintaining or restoring order in a

school. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 

In the present case, Officers Hoppe and Martinez not only lacked a warrant

or probable cause for seizing Fuerschbach, they lacked any legal basis for doing

so. Indeed the conduct alleged in this case would violate the most minimal

Fourth Amendment standard, namely that a search or seizure be “justified at its

inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified

the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. A seizure lacking any

legal justification is not justified at its inception. As we held in Jones, “[w]here

no legitimate basis exists for detaining [an individual], a seizure is plainly

unreasonable.” Jones, 410 F.3d at 1228. Even the officers acknowledge that “it

might have been manifestly unreasonable and unrelated to any legitimate law

enforcement purpose for the Officers to place a random citizen under arrest for no

reason whatsoever.” Appellees City of Albuquerque, Eldon Martinez, and Duane

Hoppe’s Opening Br. at 18. As no legitimate basis existed for seizing

Fuerschbach, her alleged seizure was unreasonable. 
- 11 -

The officers, however, ask us to create an exception to the warrant or

probable cause requirement for pranks. Whenever the Court has relaxed the

warrant or probable cause requirement, it has done so in furtherance of unique

public safety concerns, and only after a careful balancing of the individual

interests at stake. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“the

permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of

legitimate governmental interests.”). A false arrest intended as a prank furthers

no unique public safety interests, such as those that have justified exceptions to

the warrant or probable cause requirement in the past. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20;

Groh, 540 U.S. at 559; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. No court has ruled that an

otherwise unreasonable seizure becomes reasonable when the officers intend it as

a prank. We will not do so here. When law enforcement officers acting under

color of state law seize non-consenting private citizens, they must act in

furtherance of legitimate law enforcement interests and on the basis of sufficient

facts.

Analogous tort law supports this view. See Memphis Community School

Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986) (“We have repeatedly noted that 42

U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability.”); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 483 (1994) (“[W]e look first to the common law of torts.”) Carey v. Piphus,
- 12 -

435 U.S. 247, 257-258 (1978). In discussing intentional torts, the Restatement

provides: 

[T]he fact that the defendant who intentionally inflicts bodily harm

upon another does so as a practical joke, does not render him immune

from liability so long as the other has not consented. This is true

although the actor erroneously believes that the other will regard it as

a joke, or that the other has, in fact, consented to it. One who plays

dangerous practical jokes on others takes the risk that his victims

may not appreciate the humor of his conduct and may not take it in

good part.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13, cmt. c; see also W. Prosser & W. Keeton,

The Law of Torts § 8, at 36-37 (5th ed. 1984) (“The defendant may be liable

although intending nothing more than a good-natured practical joke, or honestly

believing that the act would not injure the plaintiff, or even though seeking the

plaintiff’s own good.”). Numerous state court decisions apply this principle. See,

e.g., Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1987); Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.

2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W. 2d 898

(Wis. 1979). Thus, the common law of torts instructs that an intentional

tortfeasor is held to the applicable standard of care, notwithstanding the

characterization of the tort as a prank, or even a good faith but incorrect belief

that the tort victim will enjoy the joke. Similarly, a law enforcement officer

undertaking to seize a non-consenting private citizen will be held to the governing

Fourth Amendment standard; an intent to commit a practical joke will not render

the officer immune from liability.
- 13 -

 It remains for the jury to decide whether Fuerschbach was in fact

unreasonably seized. Moreover, even if a jury were to find that the officers

violated Fuerschbach’s Fourth Amendment rights, any damages award could

account for the joking nature of the encounter. Nevertheless, Fuerschbach’s

allegations, if true, establish that Hoppe and Martinez seized her without any

legitimate justification. Therefore, Fuerschbach’s Fourth Amendment claim

survives the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

C

Because Fuerschbach’s allegations demonstrate that the officers violated

clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known, her claims clear the second hurdle of the qualified immunity analysis as

well. The pivotal inquiry is whether “it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). We conclude that it would have been clear to a

reasonable officer in Hoppe and Martinez’s shoes that seizing a private citizen

without any legitimate basis was unlawful. Nor would an officer’s perception of

the seizure as a prank have made the legal standard less clear.

The rule that arrests must be supported by a warrant or probable cause is

well established. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979). 

Even if we were to interpret this incident as a seizure not requiring a warrant or

probable cause, the officers actions nevertheless violated Fuerschbach’s clearly
- 14 -

established constitutional rights. In Jones we determined that the defendant

violated clearly established constitutional rights because the defendant “was on

notice that the Fourth Amendment’s requirements applied to him, that a seizure

would occur within the meaning of that Amendment if at any point the person

believed that she was not free to terminate an encounter with him, that the ‘free to

leave’ determination would be informed by the Hill factors, and that any seizure

[must at least] be justified at its inception.” Jones, 410 F.3d at 1230 (social

worker who seized a child at a public school with no lawful basis for doing so

violated clearly established rights). Under that standard, Hoppe and Martinez’s

actions, if true, violated Fuerschbach’s clearly established rights. As city police

officers, Hoppe and Martinez were on notice that the Fourth Amendment’s

requirements applied to them. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994). 

The “free to leave” standard was clearly established. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486

U.S. 567, 573 (1988). So were the standards announced in Hill, 199 F.3d at 1147-

48 (decided in 1999), and in Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (decided in 1968). The

plaintiff’s allegations, if true, demonstrate that the defendants violated a clearly

established constitutional right because the “conduct as alleged constituted a

seizure under Hill and was unreasonable under Terry.” Jones, 410 F.3d at 1230.

In Jones we held that “[t]he tests enunciated in Hill and Terry are . . .

specific,” and therefore our rejection of qualified immunity in that case was

“based on clearly and narrowly articulated Fourth Amendment principles.” Jones,
4

 The officers argue that they had no notice that a prank, which they

thought the victim would enjoy, implicated constitutional concerns. It is true that

no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case has applied the Fourth Amendment where

law enforcement officers inform a private citizen that outstanding warrants exist

for the person’s arrest, and then seize and handcuff the individual, all for the sake

of amusement. Nevertheless, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity

simply because no previous court has rejected a prank exception to the Fourth

Amendment. See, e.g., Jones, 410 F.3d at 1230 (“officials committing

outrageous, yet sui generis, constitutional violations ought not to shield their

behavior behind qualified immunity simply because another official has not

previously had the audacity to commit a similar transgression”). A defendant

does not gain qualified immunity by asserting a novel exception to a longstanding

constitutional rule and then arguing that no case has declined to apply the

exception. This is particularly true where, as here, analogous tort law, extant at

the time of the incident, has refused to adopt the asserted exception. See Murrell

v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999) (government officials

must make “reasonable applications of the prevailing law to their own

circumstances.”).

- 15 -

410 F.3d at 1230. In other words, Terry’s holding that any seizure must at the

very least be “justified at its inception,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, placed all law

enforcement officers on notice that seizures without any legal justification would

violate the Fourth Amendment. Fuerschbach’s right to be free from seizures

lacking any legal basis was well known to Officers Hoppe and Martinez at the

time of the incident. We therefore conclude that “it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.4

Fuerschbach’s allegations, if true, establish that Officers Hoppe and

Martinez violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from
5

 The officers claim that any injury Fuerschbach suffered was de minimis. 

They have pointed to no authority, however, establishing that injuries arising

from Fourth Amendment violations must be more than de minimis to permit

recovery under § 1983. Nor have the officers persuaded us that suffering PTSD is

a de minimis injury. Referring to Fuerschbach’s reaction as “histrionic,”

“overwrought,” and “hysterical” does not aid the officers in that regard, but does

constitute a lack of decorum by counsel. Because Fuerschbach has presented

uncontroverted evidence that she has been diagnosed with PTSD, she has

demonstrated for summary judgment purposes that her injuries are more than de

minimis. We therefore need not decide whether de minimis injuries resulting

from unreasonable seizures are compensable under § 1983.

6

 Fuerschbach’s complaint seeks relief for violations of her Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted qualified immunity to

the officers on both claims. To the extent that Fuerschbach alleges Fourteenth

Amendment injury simply because the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, her claimed Fourteenth Amendment

injury survives the assertion of qualified immunity and the district court is

reversed. However, because Fuerschbach presents no case on appeal showing that

Officers Hoppe and Martinez violated clearly established Fourteenth Amendment

rights, she has waived any appeal of the dismissal of independent Fourteenth

Amendment claims.

- 16 -

unreasonable seizures.5 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order

dismissing Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claims against the officers on the basis of

qualified immunity.6

III

In addition to her claim for relief under § 1983, Fuerschbach asserts several

state tort claims against Officers Hoppe and Martinez. Specifically, Fuerschbach

alleges that the officers committed false imprisonment, false arrest, assault and

battery, and civil conspiracy. Finding that the officers were entitled to judgment
7

 Fuerschbach also appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claim for

punitive damages. In § 1983 matters, punitive damages will be awarded only

when “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent,

or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected

rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Punitive damages in

state tort suits are available “when the defendant acts with reckless disregard for

the rights of the plaintiff – i.e., when the defendant knows of potential harm to

the interests of the plaintiff but nonetheless utterly fails to exercise care to avoid

(continued...)

- 17 -

as a matter of law on all counts, the district court granted the officers’ motion for

summary judgment.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using

the same standards applied by the district court.” Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210,

1216 (10th Cir. 2005). Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will

affirm a grant of summary judgment only where “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to Fuerschbach’s false

imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery claims, we reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on these counts. However, because

Fuerschbach has failed to provide any argument to support her appeal of the

dismissal of her civil conspiracy claim, the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on that count must be affirmed.7
7

(...continued)

the harm.” Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 880 P.2d 300, 308 (N.M.

1994) (quotations omitted). Upon review of the record, we agree with the district

court that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fuerschbach, a

reasonable jury could not return an award of punitive damages against any of the

defendants.

- 18 -

A

“Under New Mexico law, ‘false imprisonment consists of intentionally

confining or restraining another person without his consent and with knowledge

that he has no lawful authority to do so.’” Romero v. Sanchez, 895 P.2d 212, 215

(N.M. 1995) (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-4-3). False arrest or unlawful

detention occurs when the “facts available to [a] detaining officer would [not]

warrant [a] person of reasonable caution to believe detention appropriate.” 

Sanchez, 895 P.2d at 215 (“Unlawful detention has similar requirements” to false

imprisonment). A defendant possessed of a good faith and reasonable belief in

the lawfulness of the action is not liable for false imprisonment or false arrest. 

See State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 1148, 1154 (N.M. 1996); Perea v. Stout, 613 P.2d

1034, 1039 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). The district court found that the officers had a

good faith and reasonable belief that their actions were lawful because they only

“briefly restrain[ed] Plaintiff as part of a prank at the request of SWA.” 

Neither the brevity of the seizure nor its characterization as a prank enable

the officers to prevail on summary judgment. False imprisonment may arise out

of a brief encounter. See, e.g., State v. Corneau, 781 P.2d 1159, 1164 (N.M. Ct.
- 19 -

App. 1989) (“The restraint need be for only a brief time.”). Moreover, a good

faith belief in the lawfulness of the action ordinarily requires probable cause to

arrest. See Johnson, 930 P.2d at 1154 (“a common-law defense to a civil

wrongful arrest or a false imprisonment suit also requires only that the officer

prove that he or she acted in good faith and with probable cause and therefore

lawfully under the circumstances”) (emphasis added) (citing with approval Carroll

v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (cited for proposition that “in cases

where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts

unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause”)). The

defendant officers lacked probable cause, and indeed did not even suspect

Fuerschbach of wrongdoing. Although they seized Fuerschbach at the invitation

of her employer, and did so in the context of a prank, they nonetheless had no

lawful authority to inform her that she was under arrest, restrain her in handcuffs,

and direct her movement. See Diaz v. Lockheed Elecs., 618 P.2d 372, 374 (N.M.

Ct. App. 1980) (“False imprisonment involves the unlawful interference with the

personal liberty or freedom of locomotion of another. There is no need that the

plaintiffs have been held in jail or custody.”). Given the well established

jurisprudence that a good faith defense to false imprisonment and false arrest

ordinarily requires a showing of probable cause, it was error to award the officers
8

 There remains a triable issue of whether Fuerschbach knew the encounter

was part of a prank and consented to participate in it. See Romero, 895 P.2d at

215 (false imprisonment requires absence of consent); Restatement (Second) of

Torts, § 41 (“The custody is complete if the person against whom and in whose

presence the authority is asserted believes it to be valid, or is in doubt as to its

validity, and submits to it.”). However, summary judgment was clearly

inappropriate.

9

 New Mexico has applied different standards in criminal false

imprisonment cases and civil false imprisonment cases. Compare Stout, 613 P.2d

at 1039 (applying in civil case the standard “that good faith and reasonable belief

in the lawfulness of the action taken are defenses to a false arrest claim”) with

State v. Barrera, 54 P.3d 548, 550 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring as an element

in criminal case that defendant have “knowledge that he has no lawful authority

to” intentionally confine or restrain the victim) (emphasis added). Yet, both the

New Mexico courts and this court have applied the criminal standard in civil

cases. See, e.g., Romero, 895 P.2d at 215-16 (relying on the criminal statute and

holdings in both civil and criminal cases in adjudicating qualified immunity

defense); Diaz, 618 P.2d at 376 (Sutin, J., concurring) (“The Penal Code

definition governs in civil as well as criminal actions. Under this statute,

defendants are liable if two events occur: (1) defendants intentionally confined or

restrained plaintiffs without their consent and (2) defendants knew that they had

no lawful authority to do so.”) (quotation omitted); Scull v. New Mexico, 236

F.3d 588, 599 (10th Cir. 2000) (when evaluating civil false imprisonment claim

under New Mexico law, applying criminal standard that defendants “knew that

they had no lawful authority to” intentionally confine or restrain the victim). 

Fuerschbach’s false imprisonment claim survives summary judgment under either

standard.

- 20 -

summary judgment under the facts of this case.8 We therefore reverse the district

court’s decision.9

B

Fuerschbach’s claim of assault and battery by Hoppe and Martinez survives

summary judgment as well. For there to be an assault, there must have been an

“act, threat or menacing conduct which causes another person to reasonably
- 21 -

believe that he is in danger of receiving an immediate battery.” N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 30-3-1(B). Battery occurs when an individual “acts intending to cause a

harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an

imminent apprehension of such a contact, and . . . an offensive contact with the

person of the other directly or indirectly results.” State v. Ortega, 827 P.2d 152,

155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 18). The district

court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the

officers did not intend to cause an offensive contact, but rather that “the officers

were courteous and professional,” and that in any event, placing an individual in

handcuffs is not an offensive contact.

Any bodily contact is offensive “if it offends a reasonable sense of personal

dignity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Fuerschbach, a jury could conclude that the officers’ actions

offended a reasonable sense of personal dignity. See Ortega, 827 P.2d at 155

(citing with approval Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629

(Tex. 1967) (intentionally grabbing a plaintiff’s plate constitutes battery because

“[t]he intentional snatching of an object from one’s hand is clearly an offensive

invasion of his person”) and Morgan v. Loyacomo, 1 So.2d 510, 511 (1941)

(intentionally seizing a package from under a plaintiff’s arm constitutes battery)). 

A jury could find that placing a person’s hands in position to be handcuffed,

handcuffing the individual, and then leading the individual to walk fifteen feet
10 Because New Mexico has not adopted a specific civil jury instruction for

assault and battery, the officers urge us to apply the elements of criminal battery,

which include touching “when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner.” N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 30-3-4. It would be incorrect to do so. In disposing of an appeal in a

criminal battery case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied upon the elements

of civil battery discussed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Ortega, 827 P.2d

155. Because the court explicitly applied the elements of civil battery in a

criminal case, we have little trouble applying those same elements in a civil case.

- 22 -

offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. See, e.g., Love v. Port Clinton,

524 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Ohio 1988) (“The acts of ‘subduing’ and ‘handcuffing’ are

undoubtedly offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”).

Moreover, the officers’ demeanor is not probative of their intent to cause an

offensive contact.10 Nor is the officers’ intent merely to pull a prank on

Fuerschbach an excuse. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 20, cmt. a, illus. 1

(“A, intending merely to frighten B, throws a bucketful of water at him. The

water unexpectedly splashes in B’s face. A is subject to liability to B.”). The

record reveals that the officers intended to touch Fuerschbach’s arms, to place her

arms in position to be handcuffed, and to then handcuff her tightly, thus intending

to cause an offensive contact. See Love, 524 N.E.2d at 167 (“The contact

involved is plainly intentional; one cannot accidentally handcuff or subdue

another.”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fuerschbach, the

officers intended to cause an offensive contact with Fuerschbach’s person and did

cause an offensive contact. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the officers on Fuerschbach’s assault and battery claim.
- 23 -

C

Fuerschbach’s appeal of her civil conspiracy claim is limited to two

sentences, which make no argument, cite to no authority, and direct us to no

evidence supporting an appeal of this issue. We therefore determine that she has

waived the issue. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th

Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived”);

Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (deciding that where

appellant “fail[ed] to frame and develop an issue,” there was insufficient basis for

appellate review); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)

(applying “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”).

D

 The district court granted the City of Albuquerque’s motion for summary

judgment on all state tort claims because the court found that Officers Hoppe and

Martinez committed no tort against Fuerschbach. The city’s only argument on

appeal is that because its employees committed no tort, it is not liable for any

harm to Fuerschbach. Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the

officers on Fuerschbach’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery

claims, and remand for further proceedings, the city is potentially liable under the

doctrine of respondeat superior. Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (N.M. 1987). 
- 24 -

We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to the City of Albuquerque

on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery claims. 

We affirm, however, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

city on Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claims. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable

under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a municipality can be sued directly under

§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where “the action that is

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.” Id. at 690. Additionally, a city faces liability under § 1983 if a

deprivation of constitutional rights is caused by a municipal “custom.” See Bd. of

County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Marshall v. Columbia Lea

Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (“‘custom’ has come to mean

an act that, although not formally approved by an appropriate decision maker, has

such widespread practice as to have the force of law.”). It is not clear whether

Fuerschbach intends to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

the city on her § 1983 claims. Assuming that she does appeal the ruling, we agree

with the district court that the allegedly unconstitutional seizure in this case

neither implemented nor executed an official policy, ordinance, regulation, or

decision by the city. Moreover, the record reveals that the officers were not
11 Appeal of Fuerschbach’s civil conspiracy claim is deemed waived for the

reasons discussed in § III.C supra. 

- 25 -

acting pursuant to any municipal custom. The City of Albuquerque is therefore

entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.

IV

Fuerschbach seeks damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy against

her supervisors Tina Marie Tapia and Michael Santiago, and against her

employer, Southwest Airlines. The district court granted summary judgment to

the defendants on all claims, finding that Fuerschbach’s sole recourse for

compensation is the New Mexico Workers Compensation Act (“WCA”). Because

we agree that the WCA precludes Fuerschbach’s tort claims, we affirm the grant

of summary judgment in favor of Tapia, Santiago, and Southwest.11

The WCA provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries where, at

the time of the incident, (1) the employer has complied with the relevant

insurance provisions; (2) the employee is performing service arising out of and in

the course of his employment, and (3) the injury is proximately caused by an

accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 52-1-9. The parties’ dispute is limited to the third prong and involves whether

the mock arrest arose out of employment and whether Fuerschbach’s injury was

proximately caused by an accident. If the WCA covers Fuerschbach’s injuries, it
- 26 -

precludes her from suing both Southwest and her supervisors in tort. See N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 52-1-8 (“Any employer who has complied with the provisions of the

Worker’s Compensation Act relating to insurance or any of the employees of the

employer . . . shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death

of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the Worker’s

Compensation Act”); Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, 93 N.M. 511, 517

(N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (“Under [the WCA], an employee of an employer who has

complied with the requirements of the Act is not subject to liability under the

common law for the injury or death of a coemployee.”). Consequently, whether

the WCA applies to the plaintiff’s injuries presents a threshold legal question.

A

Ordinarily, to show that an injury “arises out of employment,” a party must

show that the claimed injury “resulted from a risk incident to [the] work itself or

increased by the circumstances of the employment.” Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps

Dodge, 850 P.2d 1038, 1040 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (quotation omitted). Although

enduring a mock arrest, being waylaid on an airplane and shipped to Dallas, or

being conscripted to perform a hula dance for weary travelers may not appear to

be a risk incident to employment as an airline ticket agent, courts have

acknowledged that acts of “horseplay” may very well arise out of one’s

employment. 
- 27 -

In the earliest workmen’s compensation cases, injuries stemming from

pranks or horseplay were deemed incompensable. 1A Arthur Larson, Workmen’s

Compensation Law § 23.10, at 5-181 (1990) (“[j]ust as malicious assaults by

co-employees were ruled out as intentional and personal, so sportive assaults were

treated as something foreign to the inherent risks of the employment”). In 1920,

then-Judge Cardozo led the New York Court of Appeals in a different direction. 

Determining whether a particular injury caused by horseplay in a factory was one

“arising out of and in the course of employment,” the court reasoned that “[t]he

risks of injury incurred in the crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of

fellow workmen are not measured by the tendency of such acts to serve the

master’s business. Many things that have no such tendency are done by workmen

every day.” Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 712 (1920). 

Cardozo famously commented:

Whatever men and boys will do, when gathered together in such

surroundings, at all events if it is something reasonably to be

expected, was one of the perils of his service. . . . [I]t was ‘but

natural to expect them to deport themselves as young men and boys,

replete with the activities of life and health. For workmen of that

age or even of maturer years to indulge in a moment’s diversion from

work to joke with or play a prank upon a fellow workman, is a matter

of common knowledge to every one who employs labor.’ The

claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but

because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and

conditions inseparable from factory life. The risks of such

associations and conditions were risks of the employment.
- 28 -

Id. at 711 (quoting Hulley v. Moosbruger, 93 A. 79, 79 (N.J. 1915)). “[T]his

view eventually won the ascendancy in non-participating victim cases.” Larson

§ 23.10, at 5-182. 

New Mexico has followed New York’s lead, in part because “[t]he sheer

number of workers’ compensation cases that involve horseplay, and the variety of

factual circumstances surrounding the injuries, indicate that horseplay occurs on a

daily basis throughout the workplace.” Woods v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836

P.2d 81, 84-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). In New Mexico, an incident constitutes

compensable horseplay either “if horseplay was a regular incident of

employment” or if “horseplay was not a substantial deviation from employment,

which the judge would find after considering the extent of the deviation, the

completeness of the deviation, the extent to which horseplay was an accepted part

of the employment, and the extent to which the nature of the employment may

include some horseplay.” Cox, 850 P.2d at 1041. The record clearly

demonstrates that horseplay, in the form of pranks, was a regular incident of

employment at Southwest. Beginning with its training program, Southwest

emphasizes to new employees that it is a “different kind of company, fun-loving,

that puts a lot of emphasis on fun and spirit.” In keeping with that culture,

employees completing their probationary period, or having received a promotion,

routinely are subject to a prank. These pranks are often elaborate and may

involve some degree of embarrassment. In short, enduring a prank as a Southwest
- 29 -

employee “is something reasonably to be expected . . . .” Leonbruno, 128 N.E. at

711.

Fuerschbach, however, argues that the incident giving rise to this case was

so egregious that it cannot be considered horseplay. Although we agree that

Tapia and Santiago’s request of Officers Hoppe and Martinez was ill-considered,

the horseplay jurisprudence is broad enough to encompass it. See Woods, 836

P.2d at 85 (“The breadth of the New Mexico view . . . would certainly

accommodate an award of compensation under many horseplay circumstances”). 

Analogous cases from other jurisdictions show that diverse and even more

repugnant workplace incidents have properly been considered compensable. See,

e.g., Nelson v. Winnebago Indus., 619 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2000) (suit claiming

false imprisonment and battery, where plaintiff was duct taped from head to toe

“like a mummy” in a prank to commemorate his transfer); Diaz v. Newark

Industrial Spraying, Inc., 174 A.2d 478 (N.J. 1961) (co-employee threw bucket of

lacquer thinner on plaintiff; thinner was immediately ignited by nearby flame

causing serious injuries); Tilly v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 324 P.2d 432 (Wash.

1958) (employee died of cerebral hemorrhage after being chased and held by coemployees); Johnson v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 161 So.

667, 668 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (night watchman died of heart attack after

pranksters disarmed him and carried him across a bridge, telling him that they

were liberating prisoners held at the parish jail. Court ruled that it makes no
- 30 -

difference “that the whole matter was a joke. It was real to deceased. The

scheme was concocted with the idea of severely frightening him.”). Without

approving of Tapia and Santiago’s judgment in recruiting Officers Hoppe and

Martinez to engage in a mock arrest, we are persuaded that their actions amount

to horseplay for purposes of this analysis. Therefore, we agree with the district

court that Fuerschbach’s injuries arose out of employment.

B

The WCA applies only to injuries “proximately caused by an accident.” 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-9. Fuerschbach argues that the incident giving rise to this

litigation was not an accident, and therefore her employer and co-employees are

exposed to tort liability. 

“[W]hen an employer willfully or intentionally injures a worker, that

employer, like a worker who commits the same misconduct, loses the rights

afforded by the [Workers Compensation] Act.” Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino,

Inc., 34 P.3d 1148, 1150 (N.M. 2001). Actual intent to injure is not required;

willfulness suffices and occurs when “(1) the worker or employer engages in an

intentional act or omission, without just cause or excuse, that is reasonably

expected to result in the injury suffered by the worker; (2) the worker or employer

expects the injury to occur, or has utterly disregarded the consequences of the

intentional act or omission; and (3) the intentional act or omission proximately

causes the worker’s injury.” Id. Dispute between the parties centers on the
- 31 -

second prong, which turns on “an examination of the subjective state of mind of”

the supervisors. Id. at 1156. “If the worker or employer decided to engage in the

act or omission without ever considering its consequences, this prong is satisfied. 

If, on the other hand, the worker or employer did consider the consequences of

the act or omission, this prong will be satisfied only when the worker or employer

expected the injury to occur.” Id. 

Although they grossly miscalculated Fuerschbach’s reaction to the mock

arrest, Tapia and Santiago did consider the consequences of their actions.

Therefore, Fuerschbach can prevail only by showing that her supervisors expected

the alleged injury – in this case, psychological injury – to occur. Even viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to Fuerschbach, there is no question that

Tapia and Santiago expected all involved, including Fuerschbach, to be amused

by the prank. The record demonstrates that Tapia and Santiago considered the

consequences of the mock arrest and in no way expected Fuerschbach to suffer

psychological injury. 

C

In a final attempt at avoiding the WCA’s bar to her state tort claims,

Fuerschbach argues that because “there is no provision in the WCA that allows a

claimant to recover for the intentional torts of assault, battery, false

imprisonment, false arrest or intentional infliction of emotional distress,” the

WCA cannot apply to her claims. Appellant’s Br. at 46. Fuerschbach cites to no
- 32 -

authority for the proposition that the WCA covers only injuries arising from

specifically named torts, and we have found no authority that agrees with her. It

is true that “the WCA will preclude other claims only if the injury falls within the

scope of the WCA.” Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1004 (N.M.

1999). For instance, injuries caused by sexual harassment, id., sex

discrimination, Sabella v. Manor Care, 915 P.2d 901 (N.M. 1996), intentional

spoliation of evidence, Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995),

and retaliatory discharge, Michaels v. Anglo-American Auto Auctions, Inc., 869

P.2d 279 (N.M. 1994), do not fall within the WCA’s purview, and the New

Mexico Supreme Court has held that suits for those torts are not barred by the

WCA. 

New Mexico courts have not ruled the WCA inapplicable to injuries arising

from assault or battery. New Mexico jurisprudence does, however, apply the

WCA to injuries stemming from horseplay, and “[i]t is hard to imagine a form of

horseplay that causes injury that is not either an assault or a battery.” Park Oil

Co. v. Parham, 336 S.E. 2d 531, 534 (Va. Ct. App. 1985). Nor have New Mexico

courts ruled that injuries arising from false imprisonment, false arrest, or

intentional infliction of emotional distress fall outside the WCA’s scope, and

Fuerschbach has provided us with no reason to so conclude. Rather, New

Mexico’s approach to WCA applicability demonstrates that the injuries alleged in

this case fall squarely within the WCA’s coverage.
- 33 -

In Manor Care, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the WCA applies

to physical and psychological injuries stemming from a supervisor’s sexual

assault on an employee. The WCA does not apply, however, to claims of sex

discrimination and retaliation. What distinguishes injuries arising from sexual

assault from claims arising from sex discrimination, is that the “the essence of the

[former] is personal injury,” which is the peculiar type of injury covered by the

WCA. Manor Care, 915 P.2d at 905-06. In the present case, Fuerschbach seeks

recovery for psychological injury stemming from assault, battery, false

imprisonment, false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is

similar to the psychological injury resulting from sexual assault in Manor Care,

and distinguishable from non-personal injuries such as sex discrimination,

retaliation, and intentional spoliation of evidence. See, e.g., Nelson, 619 N.W. 2d

at 389 (“mere labeling of a claim for injuries as false imprisonment or battery

because in some circumstances those torts may be compensable without a physical

injury cannot avoid the exclusivity of workers’ compensation if the gist of the

claim is for [personal] injury”); Larson § 68.34(a), at 13-180 (“if the essence of

the action is recovery for physical injury or death, including in ‘physical’ the

kinds of mental or nervous injury that cause disability, the action should be

barred even if it can be cast in the form of a normally non-physical tort.”).

Fuerschbach’s alleged injuries fall within the scope of the WCA. Because

her injuries stem from an act of horseplay, we conclude that they arose from her
- 34 -

employment with Southwest. Additionally, her supervisors neither intentionally

nor willfully injured her. Therefore, the WCA’s exclusivity provision bars all

Fuerschbach’s tort claims against Southwest, Tapia, and Santiago.

V

We REVERSE the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Officers

Hoppe and Martinez on Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourth

Amendment rights. We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment to the

officers on Fuerschbach’s state tort claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, and

assault and battery and REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the City of Albuquerque on these claims as well. We AFFIRM the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants on Fuerschbach’s civil

conspiracy claim and her claim for punitive damages and AFFIRM the grant of

summary judgment to Southwest Airlines, Tapia, and Santiago on Fuerschbach’s

assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress claims. We REMAND this case to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.