If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re STENNETT, Minors. November 22, 2022

Nos. 360081; 360084

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2001-404727-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and SERVITTO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother, M. Stennett, and respondent-father, B. 

Stennett, appeal as of right the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the minor 

children, CS and LS, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondents both argue 

that the trial court erred when it found that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s 

best interests. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Respondents, who have been together for more than 20 years and married for the last 13 

years, have three children: CS and LS, the two children at issue in this appeal, and a now-adult 

daughter, RH.1 Child Protective Services (CPS) in both Michigan and West Virginia investigated 

the family for abuse and neglect and in 2014, after LS tested positive for THC at birth, CS and LS 

were made in-home court wards for six months. During that time, respondents were ordered to 

participate in and benefit from a treatment plan. When their progress was deemed sufficient, the 

court terminated its jurisdiction in July 2014.

 

1 Respondents first came to the attention of Child Protective Services shortly after RH’s birth in 

2001. Respondent-father voluntarily relinquished his rights to RH and, following a hearing the 

court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to RH. The trial court found that statutory 

grounds to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights were established because of continued 

substance abuse, abandonment, and failure to benefit from services.
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In 2016, the family again came to the attention of CPS after the police were called to the 

home in response to a domestic violence complaint. When respondents refused to cooperate with 

CPS, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition in April 2017, seeking 

termination of respondents’ parental rights. In August 2017, after a hearing on the petition, the 

trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights, but found

that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Consequently, the court dismissed the 

permanent-custody petition, made the children temporary wards of the court, and ordered 

respondents to participate in and benefit from a treatment plan designed to improve their parenting 

skills and address mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues. During the four 

years that followed, respondents were referred and re-referred for a multitude of services and the 

court, once again, denied another permanent-custody petition and permitted respondents additional 

time to work toward reunification.

In October 2019, after the children had been in care for more than two years, DHHS filed 

yet another petition seeking termination of respondents’ parental rights. A hearing on this petition 

was delayed approximately two years because of COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and 

respondents’ insistence on an in-person hearing. Ultimately, in October 2021, respondents entered 

pleas of admissions and stipulated that statutory grounds existed to terminate their parental rights. 

The court then conducted a best-interest hearing, following which it found that, after four years of 

being court wards, termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE

On appeal, respondents do not directly contest that statutory grounds existed to terminate 

their parental rights. Instead, both respondents argue that the trial court erred when it found that 

termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Additionally, in the context 

of her best-interest argument, respondent-mother asserts that DHHS failed to make reasonable 

efforts toward reunification. At the outset, both respondents have waived any argument related to 

the adequacy of the services offered and the existence of statutory grounds to terminate their 

parental rights. Challenges to the adequacy and reasonableness of services relate to the sufficiency 

of the evidence in support of a statutory ground for termination. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 

NW2d 587 (2009). Both respondents entered pleas of admission and stipulated that statutory 

grounds existed to support termination of their parental rights. They elected to proceed to a 

contested hearing regarding the children’s best interests. Neither respondent claims any 

irregularity with the plea process, nor have they ever sought, even on appeal, to withdraw their 

pleas. Accordingly, through their unchallenged pleas, respondents have waived any claim of error 

related to the reasonableness of petitioner’s efforts toward reunification or the existence of 

statutory grounds for termination of their parental rights. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 

264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011); In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).2 

 

2

In any event, respondent-mother’s claim that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward 

reunification is not supported by the record. Respondents were offered services in 2004, before 

their parental rights to RH were terminated. They were again offered services in 2014 when CS 

and LS were in-home wards. After these two children were removed from respondents’ care in 
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Accordingly, on appeal, both respondents are limited to challenging the trial court’s findings 

regarding the children’s best interests. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court 

did not err in this regard.

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The court may consider several factors when deciding if termination 

of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, including the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s 

parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a 

foster home over the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 

(2012). The court may also consider psychological evaluations, the child’s age, continued 

involvement in domestic violence, and a parent’s history. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 131; 

777 NW2d 728 (2009). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the 

children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In 

considering the child’s best interests, the trial court’s focus must be on the child and not the parent. 

In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). Whether termination of parental rights 

is in a child’s best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 90. This 

Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s 

best interests. In re Jones, 286 Mich App at 129.

When considering the children’s best interests, the trial court weighed several factors. It 

concluded that because respondents had not meaningfully participated in and benefited from the 

treatment plan, the children would be at risk of harm in respondents’ care. Although the DHHS 

“has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there 

exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that 

are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Further, “[n]ot only 

must respondent cooperate and participate in the services, she must benefit from them.” In re TK, 

306 Mich App 698, 711; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). In this case, the trial court’s findings are 

consistent with the oft-quoted legal principles that “[a] parent’s failure to participate in and benefit 

from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and 

custody,” In re White, 303 Mich App at 710, and “a parent’s failure to comply with the terms and 

conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the 

parent’s home.” Id. at 711.

 

2017, respondents were again offered services designed to remove the barriers to reunification. 

Moreover, the court transferred the matter to its active-efforts docket, where respondents were 

offered more intensive assistance and court supervision. Finally, when it appeared that 

respondents were on the precipice of having their parental rights terminated, the court twice found 

that there existed statutory grounds to terminate their parental rights, but it declined to do so. As 

a consequence, respondents were granted an extraordinary amount of time to participate in and 

benefit from services. There is no support in the record for respondent-mother’s claim that 

reasonable efforts toward reunification were not made.
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Overwhelming evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the children would be at risk 

of harm in respondents’ care. CS and LS were in-home court wards for six months in 2014. During 

this time, respondents were provided with services to improve their parenting skills and address 

domestic violence, mental health, and substance abuse issues. When the children were removed 

from respondents’ home in 2017, respondents were again provided a multitude of services 

designed to remove these same barriers to reunification. Services included, among other things, 

parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, individual counseling, domestic violence counseling, 

family therapy, supervised and unsupervised parenting time, and drug screens. Respondents were 

offered more hands-on assistance through a parent partner and a court appointed special advocate. 

More intensive court reviews were available and all parties were held more accountable when the 

case was transferred to the court’s active-efforts docket. Further, respondents were granted an 

extraordinary amount of time to work toward reunification. Despite respondents’ frequent early 

termination from services, DHHS continued to make re-referrals in an effort to encourage 

respondents to engage in their treatment plan. Notwithstanding these efforts, after four years of 

services and court oversight, respondents were in no better position to parent their children than 

when they were removed from respondents’ care in April 2017.

Respondents simply could not maintain any forward momentum. At the time of 

termination, both respondents had entered pleas in which they admitted that, except for attending 

parenting time, they were not in compliance with any other component of their treatment plan. At 

the time of termination, respondents lacked suitable housing and there was no evidence that 

respondents had meaningfully addressed their poor parenting skills and their mental health and 

substance abuse issues. Indeed, at the December 2021 best-interest hearing, a caseworker testified 

that respondents had not been in compliance with their treatment plan since the court had denied 

an earlier permanent-custody petition in December 2019. Respondent-mother had not submitted 

a drug screen in the previous two years and, since January 2019, the caseworker had referred and 

re-referred respondents to counseling 11 times. At the time of termination, respondents were not 

consistently attending therapy. Indeed, they had not been in counseling in the preceding three 

months. Moreover, there was no evidence that respondents would make meaningful progress 

anytime soon.

The Clinic for Child Study clinician who evaluated respondents before the best-interest 

hearing noted that the respondents still lacked insight into the reasons why the children came into 

care and why, after four years, they continued to be under the court’s jurisdiction. Respondents 

were simply unwilling or unable to put their children’s needs ahead of their own. Accordingly, 

there is overwhelming evidence to support the trial court’s finding that respondents would neglect 

the children if they were returned to respondents’ care.

As noted by the trial court, the children were thriving in their separate foster homes and 

both sets of foster parents had expressed a willingness to adopt the child in their care. Further, the 

foster families had facilitated sibling visits between CS and LS and indicated that they would 

continue to do so if parental rights were terminated. When balancing the best-interest factors, a 

court may consider the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home and the possibility of 

adoption. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. CS and LS were placed in stable homes

where they are progressing and this progress would likely continue because the foster parents were 

willing to provide permanency for the child in their care.
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Respondents nevertheless both assert that because they loved their children and a parentchild bond existed, the trial court erred when it found that termination of their parental rights was 

in the children’s best interests. While the court found that a bond existed, the evidence established 

that the quality of the bond was poor. The caseworker explained that the bond between respondentmother and CS was not a mother-daughter bond, but rather a friend-to-friend relationship. Further, 

CS, 15 years old at the time of the termination hearing, revealed that she did not look forward to 

visits with respondents and she wished that the frequency were reduced. Indeed, CS expected that 

respondents would cancel visits, so when they did, it was not upsetting to her. The caseworker 

further opined that no bond existed between LS and respondent-mother. LS had reported that he 

did not like the foul language that respondents used and he was scared to bring up difficult topics 

with them. More recently, LS reported that he was scared to be around respondents because he 

was remembering the reasons that brought him into care. Regarding the bond between respondentfather and the children, the caseworker found that the bond was not a constructive one. While the 

children enjoyed seeing respondent-father, they did not ask to visit or speak with him outside of 

parenting time. Considering the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that any 

bond that existed did not outweigh the children’s need for a safe and stable home where their needs 

were being met.

The court considered the children’s need for permanency, finality, and stability, 

recognizing that the children had been removed from respondents’ care for more than four years. 

The proceedings that culminated in the termination of respondents’ parental rights in December 

2021 were the second time that the children had been wards of the court. Respondents’ inability 

to improve their parenting skills and address mental health and substance abuse issues was taking 

its toll on the children. CS was old enough to express clearly her desire for the matter to be 

concluded. LS was confused, scared, angry, and frustrated. He described having two sets of 

parents: his visiting parents and the parents he lived with. The trial court did not clearly err when 

it found that the children had been made to wait entirely too long for stability, permanency, and 

finality and that neither respondent was in a position to provide the children with stability and 

permanence.

Based on the extensive record, the trial court did not clearly err during the best-interest 

phase of the proceedings. Termination was the only avenue by which to ensure that the children’s 

needs would be met and that that they would achieve stability, permanency, and finality. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that a preponderance of the evidence 

demonstrated that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Christopher P. Yates