United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Readiness, Committee on Armed

Services, House of Representatives

November 1994 READY RESERVE

FORCE

Ship Readiness Has

Improved, but Other

Concerns Remain

GAO/NSIAD-95-24

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-256067 

November 8, 1994

The Honorable Earl Hutto

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As requested, we reviewed the Ready Reserve Force program. Our analysis included the ships’

overall readiness, the required readiness level for the highest priority ships, and the long-term

effect of the decline in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners to crew the Ready

Reserve Force ships. This report contains recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and

Transportation.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send

copies to interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions regarding this

report. Other major contributors are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose Ships move about 90 percent of all dry cargo needed to deploy, sustain,

and resupply U.S. forces. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF)—a

government-owned, inactive fleet of former commercial ships of various

configurations and capabilities—is the government’s largest source of

strategic sealift capability. During the Persian Gulf War, 75 percent of the

RRF ships could not be made ready within their specified time frames

principally because of the ships’ poor condition and problems crewing the

ships. In 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) recommended spending

almost $4 billion over the next 7 years to purchase more ships for the RRF

and improve their readiness. However, the pool of U.S. merchant mariners

available to crew RRF ships has been steadily declining for several decades.

The Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed

Services, asked GAO to evaluate whether RRF ships would be ready within

specified time frames in the event of a large-scale contingency.

Specifically, GAO determined whether (1) program changes implemented to

address problems encountered during the Persian Gulf War have improved

the ships’ overall readiness, (2) the readiness level of the highest priority

ships exceeds that of other strategic mobility components, and (3) a

further decline in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners would

have a long-term effect on crewing RRF ships.

Background RRF ships are maintained in a readiness status such that they can be

activated for service within 4, 5, 10, or 20 days after DOD requests them.

The Department of Transportation, through the Maritime Administration

(MarAd), manages and maintains the RRF ships, and DOD directs and controls

operations once the ships have been activated. DOD’s Transportation

Command is responsible for DOD’s RRF oversight and operational control.

In August 1990, the RRF consisted of 96 ships, 78 of which were activated

to support the Persian Gulf War. The problems encountered while

activating the ships for the war included numerous equipment deficiencies

caused by improper deactivations when the ships were acquired into the

RRF, inconsistent preservation techniques, weak ship manager controls,

and the lack of detailed records to track maintenance activities within the

fleet.

DOD’s 1992 Mobility Requirements Study recommended that by 1999 the

RRF consist of 142 ships, 63 of which would be kept in a high-priority

readiness status. Of these 63 ships, 36 would need to be able to activate in

4 days and 27 would have to be ready in 5 days.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Executive Summary

Results in Brief MarAd has made significant progress addressing problems it encountered

while activating RRF ships for the Persian Gulf War. It has identified and

corrected equipment deficiencies, instituted more uniform and

comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of RRF

ships, strengthened ship manager controls by expanding and clarifying the

manager’s contractual responsibilities, and developed and implemented

automated information systems for tracking maintenance repairs. MarAd

has also implemented new strategies for maintaining high-priority ships.

Recent testing has indicated that RRF ships can be made ready to sail

within specified time frames. However, the success of these activations

has resulted largely from maintenance and repairs performed during and

after the war.

MarAd’s ability to activate ships within 4 or 5 days exceeds the current

readiness level of other strategic mobility components. The Army’s ability

to get unit equipment (e.g., tanks and helicopters) from key Army

installations to seaports is still constrained by deteriorated facilities.

Although the Army plans to increase its capability to reach seaports more

quickly, most projects will not be completed by the 1999 time frame set in

DOD’s mobility study, when 63 RRF ships will be expected to be ready to

activate within 4 or 5 days. Further, the study’s recommendation to

maintain 63 ships in this high state of readiness is not justified by DOD’s

model.

The decline in the number of available mariners should not immediately

affect MarAd’s ability to crew RRF ships. However, if the decline continues,

MarAd’s future ability to adequately crew these ships is questionable.

Alternatives to resolve this situation, such as a civilian reserve program,

have been proposed, but none have been adopted.

Principal Findings

RRF Readiness Has

Improved

MarAd’s changes to the RRF program have addressed problems identified

during the Persian Gulf War. In 1993, DOD requested, without prior notice,

that MarAd activate six RRF ships to verify their readiness. The ships

performed excellently: all six were activated either on time or earlier and

experienced fewer equipment failures than during their activations for the

war. However, the activations were requested, on average, only 7 months

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Executive Summary

after the ships had been deactivated from their service in the war and after

almost $30 million had been spent on them.

MarAd has initiated several strategies to maintain the current readiness

levels of the RRF’s high-priority ships. For example, in 1993, MarAd began

assigning permanent, nucleus crews to the highest priority ships and

planned to activate them every year for testing. Also, MarAd began assigning

two-person crews to the other high-priority ships and planned to activate

them biennially for testing. The cost to sustain this high readiness status is

much greater than the amount spent before the war—$3 million per ship

annually compared with about $800,000 per ship annually. MarAd’s ability to

continue the RRF’s current high readiness status depends largely on future

maintenance and repair funding levels.

RRF Readiness Level

Exceeds Other

Deployment Components

Maintaining today’s RRF ships in a relatively high readiness status, as

recommended by DOD’s 1992 mobility study report, is not consistent with

the current readiness level of other strategic deployment components. For

example, the Army’s ability to move unit equipment from key installations

to seaports is currently hampered because of deteriorated rail facilities.

The Army has identified an estimated $550 million in military construction

and operations and maintenance funding through fiscal year 2001 for

various projects that are expected to increase its capability to transport

equipment to ports more quickly. However, at current funding levels, some

of these projects will take 15 to 20 years to complete and therefore do not

yet provide the rapid deployment capability assumed in DOD’s mobility

study.

The mobility study’s specific recommendation to maintain 63 RRF ships in a

4- or 5-day, high-readiness status was not supported by DOD’s detailed

analysis. For example, in the specific scenario used to justify the overall

study’s recommendations, the computer model assumed that only 14 RRF

ships would need to be ready to load cargo by the 5th day. DOD officials

could not explain the large discrepancy between the number of ships used

in its model and the number it recommended be kept in a high readiness

status in the study’s final report. However, they did state that the overall

requirement to maintain 63 RRF ships in a high-priority readiness status

was still valid. Transportation Command officials are currently reviewing

the RRF’s size, composition, and readiness status to meet surge sealift

requirements in the year 2001 as part of a new DOD mobility study, which is

expected to be released in January 1995.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Executive Summary

Long-Term Crewing

Initiatives Need to Be

Developed Further

The continuing declining pool of available, qualified U.S. mariners may

affect MarAd’s future ability to adequately crew RRF ships. DOD and MarAd

have conducted numerous studies on this issue and have proposed

alternative ways to improve the likelihood that RRF ships will be

adequately crewed. These alternatives include the creation of a civilian

merchant marine reserve and the expansion of the existing Naval

Merchant Marine Reserve. However, DOD, MarAd, and others involved in this

issue have thus far been unable to reach consensus on a crewing

alternative.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander in

Chief, Transportation Command, to annually review RRF ship readiness

requirements provided to MarAd and ensure that they are in line with

current military deployment capabilities.

GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the

Maritime Administrator to annually assess whether an adequate number of

experienced U.S. merchant mariners would be available to crew RRF ships

within DOD’s specified time frames. If these assessments indicate that the

number of qualified mariners may not be sufficient, the Secretary should

propose a specific merchant marine crewing alternative to the Congress.

Agencies Comments Both DOD and the Department of Transportation commented on GAO’s draft

report (see apps. I and II). DOD concurred with the recommendation to the

Secretary of Defense and stated that RRF readiness requirements are being

reviewed annually in cooperation with MarAd as part of the budget review.

DOD noted that readiness levels are also being examined as part of the

ongoing Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review.

Transportation partially concurred with the recommendation to annually

assess the number of qualified U.S. mariners available to crew RRF ships

and, if necessary, report crewing options. Transportation stated that it

maintains maritime workforce statistics on the size and the composition of

U.S. merchant mariners. It does not report this information to the

Congress in conjunction with defense requirements. GAO believes that

MarAd’s assessment would be an appropriate first step to define the effect

that the declining U.S. merchant marine pool has on national security.

Transportation said that the recommendation should focus on the need for

reemployment rights legislation for U.S. merchant mariners if called upon

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Executive Summary

to serve during a war or national emergency. It pointed out that

reemployment rights were discussed in GAO’s report.1 GAO disagrees with

Transportation. GAO has advised the Congress that the passage of

reemployment rights for mariners equivalent to the rights and benefits

provided any member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces is a

fair and equitable measure.2 GAO continues to believe that the primary

focus should be on the continuing decline in the pool of experienced U.S.

mariners and having an adequate number available to crew RRF ships.

Although reemployment rights could be a positive influence, this

incentive’s impact cannot yet be determined. GAO believes that an annual

assessment of the crewing issues could clearly identify specific actions

needed to meet defense objectives.

1

Strategic Sealift: Summary of Workshop on Crewing the Ready Reserve Force (NSIAD-94-177, June 6,

1994).

2

Management Reform: GAO’s Comments on the National Performance Review’s Recommendations

(GAO/OCG-94-1, Dec. 3, 1993).

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Organization and Management of the RRF 10

RRF Use During the Persian Gulf War 10

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 11

Chapter 2 

RRF Readiness Has

Improved Since the

Persian Gulf War

14

MarAd Has Addressed Wartime Problems 14

Recent Activations Show That RRF Readiness Has Improved 17

New Strategies to Sustain Readiness Depend on Funding

Availability

19

Conclusions 20

Chapter 3 

RRF Readiness

Exceeds Other

Deployment

Components and Is

Not Supportable

21

Deteriorated Infrastructure Constrains Army Operations 21

Ability to Unload Ships Is Limited in Underdeveloped Overseas

Ports

25

Surge Sealift Requirements Are Not Supportable 25

Conclusions 26

Recommendation 26

DOD Comments and Our Evaluation 26

Chapter 4 

Future Availability of

Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

27

RRF Crewing Requirements 27

U.S. Merchant Marine Pool Is Declining 28

Resolving Future Crewing Concerns 29

Conclusions 32

Recommendation 33

Transportation Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 36

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Transportation 48

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 59

Related GAO Products 63

Tables Table 2.1: Comparison of the Persian Gulf War and 1993

Activation Times for Selected Ships

18

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Contents

Table 2.2: Comparison of the Persian Gulf War and 1993

Activation Costs for Selected Ships

18

Table 2.3: Strategies for Maintaining Various RRF Readiness

Levels

19

Table 4.1: Estimates of RRF Crewing Requirements to Meet

DOD’s Mobility Study Recommendations

27

Figures Figure 3.1: Key Fort to Port Movements 22

Figure 4.1: Decline in U.S. Merchant Mariners and Seafaring

Employment for the Years 1960 Through 1990

29

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

MarAd Maritime Administration

ROS reduced operating status

RRF Ready Reserve Force

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a government-owned, inactive fleet of

former commercial ships of various configurations and capabilities that

should be ready to sail within 4, 5, 10, or 20 days in response to national

emergency sealift requirements. The RRF was organized in 1976 with 

30 ships drawn from the 360 ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet,

which was created in 1946 to be able to respond to national emergencies.1

During fiscal year 1994, the RRF consisted of 108 ships. The fleet is

expected to increase to 142 ships by 1999 in accordance with the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) Mobility Requirements Study and defense

plans.

Organization and

Management of the

RRF

The Department of Transportation, through the Maritime Administration

(MarAd), manages and maintains RRF ships, and DOD directs and controls

operations once the ships have been activated. The Military Sealift

Command, under the Transportation Command, carries out DOD’s

oversight and operational control responsibilities.

RRF ships are berthed at Reserve Fleet sites located in James River,

Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; Suisun Bay, California; and other locations in

the United States and overseas. MarAd contracts with ship managers, who

are responsible for activating, maintaining, crewing, operating, and

deactivating the ships as directed. The American Bureau of Shipping and

the U.S. Coast Guard conduct periodic limited inspections of the ships for

compliance with marine safety regulations.2

 The ship managers are

required to ensure that the ships are fully operational once MarAd notifies

them to activate the ships. The Military Sealift Command designates a ship

as being fully operational when, among other things, a complete crew has

been provided, all required regulatory certificates have been obtained, and

sea trials have been performed.

RRF Use During the

Persian Gulf War

Of the 96 ships that were in the RRF in August 1990, 78 were called upon to

support the Persian Gulf War. This was the first large-scale activation and

employment of the RRF since it was separated from the National Defense

Reserve Fleet. These ships transported nearly one-fifth of the dry cargo

1

The RRF was initially called the Ready Reserve Fleet and was renamed the Ready Reserve Force in

1982.

2

American Bureau of Shipping surveyors periodically inspect merchant vessels and certify that ships

are structurally sound and mechanically fit.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 1 

Introduction

deployed.3 However, ship activations were not as timely as planned—only

25 percent of the activated ships met their assigned readiness goals.

Although insufficient fiscal year 1990 maintenance funding has been cited

as a major reason for many late activations, a Department of

Transportation Inspector General report attributed ships’ mechanical and

crewing problems as the primary reasons the RRF ships were not able to

meet specified activation times.

Mechanical problems were attributed to (1) the poor condition of the ships

when they were purchased for the RRF, (2) the age of the ships’ equipment,

(3) improper steps taken to deactivate the ships, (4) the ships’ lack of use,

(5) shipyard repairs and upgrades not being tested upon completion, and

(6) uncorrected deficiencies identified during the periodic Coast Guard

inspections and during specified fleet maintenance procedures. The

Transportation Inspector General reported that 45 of the 79 ships activated

for the Persian Gulf War had not been operated since their acquisition and

acceptance into the RRF.

The Transportation Inspector General also reported that mariners must be

onboard the activating ships at specified times and should be

knowledgeable of the ships and their operating systems. They are

responsible for testing and operating all components and systems required

to make the ships operational. Crewing problems during the war were

caused by crew members that arrived late, lacked knowledge of the

specific ship and operating systems, or had to be replaced because of crew

turnover.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed

Services, asked us to evaluate whether RRF ships would be ready within

specified time frames in the event of a large-scale contingency.

Specifically, we determined whether (1) the changes implemented to

address problems encountered during war activations have improved the

ships’ overall readiness, (2) the readiness level of the highest priority ships

exceeds that of other strategic mobility components, and (3) a further

decline in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners would have a

long-term effect on crewing the force.

To determine whether the overall readiness of the RRF had improved since

the Persian Gulf War, we compared selected ships’ 1990 and 1993

3

The remainder of U.S. sealift was provided by DOD-controlled ships, including fast sealift ships,

preposition force ships, and commercial U.S.-flag ships.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 1 

Introduction

activation performance. The selected ships included those activated in

1993 for purposes other than testing post-war repairs. We reviewed MarAd,

Military Sealift Command, Coast Guard, and American Bureau of Shipping

records, as well as related external studies, to determine the length of

activation, significant machinery failures, and costs.

We identified and reviewed program modifications initiated since the war.

We visited ships on the East, Gulf, and West Coasts; interviewed officials

from the Military Sealift Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, the American

Bureau of Shipping, MarAd, the Merchant Marine Academy, and unions, as

well as RRF crew members and ship managers; and reviewed studies and

documents to assess the relative benefits of these program changes. We

examined the status and effect of post-war repair expenditures, changes in

MarAd’s policies for maintaining and preserving the ships, changes to MarAd’s

contractual agreement with ship manager companies, and new automated

maintenance management systems. We also assessed MarAd’s plans for

maintaining the readiness of the RRF and the consequences of reduced

funding.

To determine the appropriate readiness status for the RRF, we obtained

and analyzed data on several strategic mobility factors that may diminish

the need for RRF ships to be maintained in a high-priority status. We

analyzed the Mobility Requirements Study’s volume I and II reports, using

the Middle East scenario, to determine the times specific types of ships

first loaded, the ports that were assumed to be loading cargo within the

first 30 days, and the locations and readiness goals set in the study. We

discussed our analysis with Joint Chiefs of Staff officials.

We reviewed the Army’s Strategic Mobility Program’s Management Plan to

identify funding and plans for improvement to the continental United

States infrastructure that would increase the mobility of selected military

units to their seaports of embarkation. We discussed the status of these

improvements with Army headquarters, Forces Command, Transportation

Command, and Military Traffic Management Command officials.

To determine the current and future availability of crews, we reviewed

Persian Gulf War RRF activation data, RRF crewing requirements, and labor

availability estimates. We sponsored a workshop on April 5, 1994, to

discuss the impact of the declining merchant marine pool on U.S. sealift

capability, identify impediments in crewing RRF ships, and reach consensus

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 1 

Introduction

among the participants on how to address the issues discussed. We issued

a report,4

 that provided a summary of views expressed at the workshop.

We have issued several other products on issues related to the RRF. In our

testimony, 5

 we discussed several issues related to U.S. mobility

capabilities that need to be resolved, including the Army’s current ability

to get cargo to the ports. In our letter to the Maritime Administrator

(GAO/NSIAD-94-96R, Jan. 7, 1994), we provided information on the latest

selection of 12 roll-on/roll-off ships for the RRF.

6

 We stated that these ships

would provide 1.6 million square feet of additional deck space for surge

requirements, thereby increasing the fleet’s roll-on/roll-off cargo capacity

by 40 percent. Three of the ships have been upgraded to U.S.

specifications, and the other nine ships are expected to be completed by

November 1994. Two of these ships are serving as Army prepositioning

ships. A complete list of related GAO products appears on the last page of

this report.

We conducted our review between August 1993 and June 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

4

Strategic Sealift: Summary of Workshop on Crewing the Ready Reserve Force (GAO/NSIAD-94-177,

June 6, 1994).

5

Strategic Mobility: Serious Problems Remain in U.S. Deployment Capabilities (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-165,

Apr. 26, 1994).

6

Roll-on/roll-off ships are important to the RRF because they can quickly load and unload track and

wheeled vehicles such as tanks and trucks. The mobility study recommended that 19 more

roll-on/roll-off ships be added to the RRF.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 2 

RRF Readiness Has Improved Since the

Persian Gulf War

MarAd has made significant progress in implementing changes to address

problems encountered while activating RRF ships for the Persian Gulf War.

It identified and corrected equipment deficiencies, instituted more uniform

and comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of

RRF ships, strengthened ship manager controls by expanding and clarifying

the manager’s contractual responsibilities, and developed and

implemented automated information systems for tracking maintenance

repairs. MarAd also initiated programs, such as assigning permanent,

nucleus crews onboard high-priority ships to help maintain the RRF’s

material condition achieved after the war and alleviate crewing concerns.

Total RRF program expenditures between fiscal years 1990 and 1993 were

more than $1 billion when Persian Gulf War activation and deactivation

costs are included.1

Recent activations of the RRF have demonstrated the ships’ ability to meet

readiness requirements and operate with fewer mechanical failures. These

successful activations resulted largely from maintenance and repairs made

during and after the war. In fact, activations without prior notice occurred

an average of only 7 months after the ships had been deactivated from the

war. However, continuing the present high readiness status of the RRF

ships depends on MarAd’s future budgets and maintenance strategies.

MarAd Has Addressed

Wartime Problems

MarAd spent more than $1 billion to resolve mechanical, management, and

crewing problems encountered during Persian Gulf War activations.

Problems targeted were the poor condition of the ships upon entry to the

force; improper deactivation, as well as insufficient preservation and

maintenance techniques; insufficient monitoring of ship manager

companies; unknown, deferred, or unreported equipment deficiencies; and

inadequate crewing. MarAd has made significant progress toward solving

those problems.

Equipment Deficiencies

Were Identified and

Corrected

The war experience enabled MarAd to identify and repair equipment

deficiencies at an average cost of $5.5 million per ship. These repairs had

been deferred because many of the ships had been laid up since being

acquired for the RRF.

2

 Many ships had been added to the RRF with many

1

This figure includes $139 million to activate and $296 million to deactivate the RRF during the war. In

addition, MarAd was funded $615 million during fiscal years 1990 through 1993 for RRF maintenance

and operations.

2

Before the war, RRF ships were maintained in an inactive status (known as lay-up) with all systems

down, ship openings sealed, and interiors dehumidified. The ships received limited inspections and

maintenance due to the inactive status of the machinery.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 2 

RRF Readiness Has Improved Since the

Persian Gulf War

known and unknown machinery deficiencies, and MarAd lacked the funding

at that time to activate, fully inspect, and repair many of the ships. In fact,

prior to the war, only 34 ships had been activated since entering the RRF.

Preservation and

Maintenance Techniques

Were Improved

Improper deactivation and inconsistent preservation maintenance

techniques for RRF ships contributed to mechanical problems encountered

during war activations. Inadequate lay-up and maintenance techniques

contributed to boiler problems, clogged pipe systems, freeze damage, and

impurities in lubrication systems. After the war, MarAd instituted more

uniform and comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and

preservation of RRF ships. For example, to reduce corrosion in boiler

tubes—a problem for steam-powered ships laid up in colder

climates—some boiler panels are now left uncovered, and fans and

heaters are installed to improve the circulation of dehumidified air to

prevent freezing. These new techniques, however, have raised the cost of

standard maintenance procedures.

Ship Manager Controls

Were Strengthened

Some ship managers contributed to activation delays during the war

because of their lack of capability. For example, two ship managers were

unable to activate their ships due to their lack of knowledge. (These

managers’ contracts were subsequently canceled.) As a result of this and

other contract management difficulties during the war, MarAd expanded

and clarified ship managers’ contractual responsibilities at an estimated

annual cost increase of $18,000 per ship. The new contracts raise the

standards of technical competence, increase the number of technical

employees per ship, clarify penalties, and emphasize monitoring ship

manager performance.

Automated Maintenance

Information Systems Were

Developed

Before the war, RRF ship logs and machinery history records appear to

have been randomly kept by the chief and port engineers. For example,

according to MarAd officials during the war activation, one of five similar

ships had recently had an engine overhaul, but MarAd personnel and ship

managers were unsure which ship had been repaired. Up-to-date

inventories of vital components and spare parts were also not available for

the aging machinery on the RRF ships, which caused activation delays

while some parts had to be manufactured and shipped to the activation

sites.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 2 

RRF Readiness Has Improved Since the

Persian Gulf War

After the war, MarAd implemented automated systems for tracking

maintenance, repairs, and spare parts inventories. A Maintenance and

Repair Tracking System has been developed by MarAd officials and

contractors, and all repair funding requests must now be supported by

deficiencies recorded in this system. Contractors have also developed an

automated system for maintaining spare parts records and are completing

inventories of shipboard spares to update the system’s records. As of

April 1994, MarAd had invested $26 million in its new logistics program, and

annual spare parts costs are estimated to be $70,000 to $80,000 per ship.

Ship Outporting Was

Improved

The location of the RRF ships at the time of the war degraded the ships’

ability to be activated within planned time frames. Every ship required

some maintenance at a shipyard before reaching its designated loading

seaport. Although half the RRF ships were outported—berthed at locations

other than the three MarAd reserve fleet sites—they were not necessarily

located near a shipyard. During activation for the war, the number of ships

requiring simultaneous activation in a given location sometimes exceeded

the capacity of the local shipyards. As a result, queuing occurred, and

some ship activations were delayed.

When reassigning ships to a particular location, MarAd officials considered

factors such as towing time; likely congestion in shipyards; and, for

high-priority ships, transit times to likely seaports of embarkation. By

fiscal year 1994, MarAd had reassigned most RRF ships accordingly. For

example, 5- and 10-day ships have been better distributed according to

shipyard facilities for activation, and the high-priority 4-day ships have

been positioned closer to their ports of embarkation because they do not

require shipyard services to be activated.

Key Personnel Are Being

Assigned to Ships in

Reduced Operating Status

To address the problems of identifying crews and transporting them to the

ships in a timely manner, MarAd placed the highest priority ships in reduced

operating status (ROS) with permanent, nucleus crews onboard.3

 These

crews form the core of the required operating crew, which ensures that

key personnel needed for swift activation are onboard ships. According to

MarAd, about 50 percent of the senior engineers and 34 percent of the junior

engineers required by the RRF are already serving onboard ROS ships.

3

The highest priority ships are roll-on/roll-off ships that are required to be ready to load military cargo

at the seaport by day 4 of an activation.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 2 

RRF Readiness Has Improved Since the

Persian Gulf War

The current crew structure on a ROS ship consists of a Chief Engineer; 1st,

2nd, and 3rd assistant engineers; a qualified member of the Engineering

Department; an electrician; a chief mate; a bosun; a steward/cook; and a

steward/utility. The crew’s familiarity with the ship’s particular operating

systems and characteristics can avoid costly and time-consuming

activation delays. For example, during the war, one newly assigned crew

could not keep the steam propulsion system operating shortly after the

ship had been loaded and left the port. The ship had to be towed back to

port, where shipyard personnel that assisted in the ship’s activation

restored the system within 30 minutes. ROS crews could also help newly

arriving crew members make the transition to a level of full competence

on an unfamiliar ship.

Recent Activations

Show That RRF

Readiness Has

Improved

Comparisons of recent activations to those during the war demonstrate

that MarAd’s efforts to improve readiness have been successful. Sixteen of

the 20 ships we reviewed had been activated for the war and were an

average of 11.6 days late. In 1993, some of those 20 RRF ships were

activated earlier than Military Sealift Command or MarAd criteria; they were

activated more quickly with fewer, less significant equipment failures and

at less cost. Military Sealift Command, American Bureau of Shipping, and

MarAd officials agree that the improved readiness of RRF ships is largely due

to the extensive repairs made during and after the war.

Six of the 20 ships were activated without prior notice to test their

readiness and therefore the tests were the most realistic tests of the RRF’s

ability to meet defense requirements. All six ships were activated on time

or earlier than the time required, and the average cost to activate them was

about $1 million less than during the war. The ships had been inactive

between 6 and 9 months, or an average of 7 months, before their

unannounced activations. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compare the time and cost for

five of the ships activated without notice both in wartime and in 1993.4

4

The sixth ship was not activated during the war.

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Persian Gulf War

Table 2.1: Comparison of the Persian

Gulf War and 1993 Activation Times for

Selected Ships

Wartime 1993

Ship Status

Time to

activate Status

Time to

activate

Cape Breton 5 day 5 days 5 day 4 days

Cape Inscription 5 day 5 days 4 day 3 days

Cape Isabel 5 day 11 days 4 day 3 days

Comet 5 day 15 days 4 day 3 days

Meteor 5 day 15 days 4 day 4 days

Table 2.2: Comparison of the Persian Gulf War and 1993 Activation Costs for Selected Ships

Wartime 1993

Dollars in millions

Ship

Activation

cost

Deactivation

cost

Number of months

deactivated

Activation

cost

Deactivation

cost

Cape Breton $0.70 $3.40 6 $0.44 $0.92

Cape Inscription 0.90 3.70 9 0.52 0.10

Cape Isabel 1.53 5.58 6 0.35 0.10

Comet 2.47 5.57 7 0.26 0.46

Meteor 2.00 4.01 7 0.48 0.35

Total $7.60 $22.26 $2.05 $1.93

Average $1.52 $4.45 7 $0.41 $0.39

For both the wartime and 1993 activations without prior notice, DOD

reimbursed MarAd for activation and deactivation costs. Specific data that

compares two of the five ships’ recent tests and wartime activations

follow:

• The Cape Isabel, a steam-powered ship, was built in 1976, added to the RRF

in 1986, and laid up until its activation for the war in August 1990. During

its wartime activation, the ship had many equipment failures in its boiler

system, fuel system, evaporators, and service generator. After the war,

MarAd spent almost $5.6 million improving the ship’s habitability and

overhauling its steam engine and other major equipment. In 1993, the ship

was activated without prior notice and, according to the after-action

report, overall ship systems operated well during the activation and the

sea trial.

• The Comet, a steam-powered ship built in 1958, was added to the RRF in

1985, and laid up until its wartime activation in August 1990. During this

activation, the ship encountered numerous problems with its steam plant,

ballast tank pumps and indicators, salt water service systems, electrical

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RRF Readiness Has Improved Since the

Persian Gulf War

equipment, and service generator. During postwar deactivations, MarAd

spent almost $5.6 million overhauling the ship. When the ship was

activated without notice in 1993, no major deficiencies were reported

during the activation or the sea trial.

The remaining 14 ships we reviewed were activated on less demanding

schedules for either sea trials or operations. These activation costs were

on average about $0.6 million less than during wartime activations. Also,

there were fewer and generally less critical equipment failures and fewer

delays in making these repairs.

New Strategies to

Sustain Readiness

Depend on Funding

Availability

MarAd has initiated RRF maintenance strategies that will sustain fleet

readiness. These strategies combine various actions taken after the

Persian Gulf War to solve activation problems at an annual cost of

$3 million for a 4- or 5-day ship compared with $800,000 for an average

ship before the war. MarAd believes that these strategies should provide

reasonable assurance that MarAd can activate RRF ships within required time

frames. Table 2.3 identifies the major components of MarAd’s current

maintenance strategies.

Table 2.3: Strategies for Maintaining

Various RRF Readiness Levels Readiness time frames

Major components 4 days 5 days 10 days

Number of shipsa 36 27 39

Annual cost per ship (in

millions)

$3.12 $3.09 $2.15

Deactivation status ROS Fully laid-up Fully laid-up

Location Outported Outported Mostly at

Reserve Fleet site

Crew size 10 2 0

Activation frequency Annual sea trials Annual dock

and sea trials

Annual dock 

and sea trials

Performance of

preventative maintenance

Continuously by

the crew

Semiannually by

industrial

contractors

Semiannually by

fleet personnel

aThese numbers are based on DOD’s Mobility Requirements Study. MarAd also plans to maintain

40 ships in a 20-day readiness status.

The ROS concept and the annual test activations are significant changes to

the RRF maintenance program. MarAd cannot be certain that funding will be

available in the future to continue all of its preferred maintenance

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Persian Gulf War

strategies and has begun examining variations within its overall RRF

maintenance program. For example, MarAd assigned one 14-person crew

onboard two roll-on/roll-off ships berthed together, and it is considering

placing all 5-day ships in ROS with 9-person crews onboard.

MarAd’s fiscal year 1994 RRF budget request submitted to the Congress for

maintenance and operations was $136 million, or approximately

$221 million less than the $357 million identified in the Mobility

Requirements Study. To make up this difference, only 11 of the designated

22 4-day ships currently have permanent, nucleus crews. Also, the number

of planned maintenance test activations was reduced from 93 in

accordance with mobility study standards to 32. MarAd officials concluded

that reduced funding in fiscal year 1994 would not result in a great

degradation of readiness. Although budget constraints are expected to

continue, MarAd’s fiscal year 1995 budget request includes $246 million for

maintenance and operations.

Conclusions The readiness of the RRF has improved since the Persian Gulf War due to

the $1 billion invested in the program. Officials from the Military Sealift

Command, American Bureau of Shipping, and MarAd agree that the

satisfactory readiness of RRF ships is primarily due to the identification and

repair of machinery deficiencies during and after the war. Despite this

investment, however, these officials could not say how long the ships will

stay as ready. They agree that continuing the present readiness status of

RRF ships depends on MarAd’s future budgets and maintenance strategies.

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RRF Readiness Exceeds Other Deployment

Components and Is Not Supportable

On the basis of DOD’s 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, MarAd plans to

keep 63 RRF ships in a high state of readiness (i.e., ready to activate within

4 or 5 days) starting in fiscal year 1996. However, this high state of

readiness exceeds the Army’s ability to transport heavy equipment, such

as large vehicles, tanks, weapon systems, and helicopters, to seaports for

initially deploying units. Army deployment operations are hindered in the

continental United States by deteriorating transportation-related facilities

and overseas by its limited ability to unload ships in underdeveloped

seaports. Moreover, DOD’s mobility study’s recommendation to keep 

63 RRF ships in a high readiness status is not justified by the detailed study

analysis.

Deteriorated

Infrastructure

Constrains Army

Operations

In the event of a large-scale contingency, the Army must be able to deploy

heavy divisions rapidly from the continental United States.1

 These

divisions are located at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort

Campbell, Kentucky; and Fort Hood and Fort Bliss, Texas. The movement

of people, equipment, and supplies to ports of embarkation is the first

stage of a major operation, called “fort to port” movement. Figure 3.1

displays the fort to seaport movement for selected heavy divisions.

1

Heavy divisions consist of the armored and mechanized units that are trained for mobile warfare and

equipped with tanks and armored fighting vehicles.

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RRF Readiness Exceeds Other Deployment

Components and Is Not Supportable

Figure 3.1: Key Fort to Port Movements

1st Cavalry Div

Air Assault

Mechanized Infantry

Armor

Port of Embarkation

Beaumont

Jacksonville

Savannah

Cargo Ship

Ft Benning Ft Stewart

Ft Bliss

3rd Armored


Cavalry Regt

Ft Hood

3rd Brigade


24th Infantry Div (Mech)

Ft Campbell

101st Airborne Div (Air Assault)

24th Infantry Div (Mech)

Source: GAO.

We reported in 1992 that fort to port cargo movement during Operation

Desert Shield was constrained by deteriorated rail facilities that could

have threatened the Army’s ability to move equipment to seaports rapidly.2

2

Operation Desert Shield: Problems in Deploying by Rail Need Attention (GAO/NSIAD-93-30, Nov. 13,

1992).

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RRF Readiness Exceeds Other Deployment

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Although the equipment reached the ports on time despite serious rail

deficiencies, movement of equipment for Desert Shield was on a smaller

scale and took a longer time than strategic mobility plans require today.

Current deployment plans call for moving the same amount of cargo in 

8 weeks that was moved during the first 6 months of the Persian Gulf War.

The Army has a plan that identifies needed improvements to the

transportation infrastructure in the continental United States to meet the

cargo flows assumed in DOD’s mobility study. The Army’s plan identifies

improvement projects such as acquiring rail cars and upgrading or

constructing facilities, highway, and rail networks and ports for receiving,

storing, and loading Army equipment and supplies. These improvements

are projected to cost about $550 million and be funded through fiscal year

2001. As of August 1994, only $28 million had been spent on these projects.

At the Army’s planned funding levels, some projects will take 15 to 

20 years to complete and, therefore, will not be in place by the 1999 time

frame assumed in the mobility study.

Army officials acknowledged that many infrastructure conditions remain

essentially the same since the war. The deployment problems of three key

contingency divisions and the improvements identified by the Army are

discussed below. (The Mobility Requirements Study assumes that these

three divisions are a part of an early response.)

• The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deploys from Fort Campbell,

which is approximately 630 miles from its seaport of embarkation in

Jacksonville, Florida. The mobilization plan for this division relies heavily

on the use of rail transportation. However, this method of transportation

could not be used during Desert Shield because of deteriorated conditions

and limitations of the Hopkinsville, Kentucky, rail interchange.

The Army has identified approximately $23 million in infrastructure

improvements that are necessary to meet the requirements in DOD’s

mobility study. Projects identified include rail upgrades, additional track

(for a Hopkinsville bypass), and a pallet warehouse. In addition, 200 rail

cars are to be acquired for Fort Campbell to execute the mobility plans. At

the time of our review, none of the rail cars had been delivered.

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• The 1st Cavalry Division deploys out of Fort Hood, which is about 

320 miles from its seaport of embarkation in Beaumont, Texas. The

division’s mobilization plan calls for the lead brigade to move to this

seaport by rail. However, the existing rail system at Fort Hood cannot

support these deployment requirements, according to the Military Traffic

Management Command’s 1993 Engineering Study.

Infrastructure improvements totaling $69 million have been identified.

Projects include rail upgrades, additional tracks for storing and switching

rail cars, a warehouse, and airfield upgrades. In addition, 512 rail cars are

needed for prepositioning at this installation, but only 14 percent had been

delivered at the time of our review.

• The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed at Fort Stewart is only

40 miles from its designated seaport of embarkation in Savannah, Georgia.

Fort Stewart was one of the first units during Desert Shield to transport

large numbers of heavy tracked vehicles by rail. However, train speeds

were restricted to 10 miles per hour or less, compared with 25 miles per

hour under normal circumstances, because of deteriorated rail conditions.

Fort Stewart needs $30 million in infrastructure upgrades and construction

to meet deployment goals. Projects identified include rail passing tracks, a

container handling facility, and a cargo staging area. Of the 220 rail cars

needed to meet mobility requirements, 42 percent are currently located at

the fort.

The Army believes that many infrastructure improvements have been

accomplished that are necessary to support the initial surge units, as

demonstrated by readiness exercises. The Army conducts these exercises

to train heavy units in the continental United States on strategic

deployment. However, only a portion of a division takes part in the

exercises. For example, in September 1993, the Army conducted an

exercise moving selected military equipment for a brigade task force of the

1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood to Beaumont. The equipment used for

this exercise only accounted for 474 of 1,975 pieces of the brigade task

force. In 1994, the Army conducted a similar exercise with 900 pieces of

equipment. Movement of an entire division has not yet been tested in the

exercises to date.

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Ability to Unload

Ships Is Limited in

Underdeveloped

Overseas Ports

The Army’s ability to meet its mobility requirements is also affected by its

capability to deliver forces to underdeveloped or damaged overseas

seaports. The Joint Logistics Over the Shore is a system of floating

causeways that the Army can use to unload ships when the ships cannot

enter a foreign seaport. As part of that concept, auxiliary crane ships will

be used to unload RRF ships. Overall, the auxiliary crane ships are not kept

in as high a readiness status as the surge cargo ships. Of the nine crane

ships in the RRF, four are maintained in a 5-day status and five are

maintained in a 10-day status.

The Army plans to unload equipment and supplies from ships within 

48 hours of the ships reaching their overseas destination. A recent DOD

Inspector General report determined that the Army would not be able to

meet its 48-hour requirement if all the factors—including the ships’

distances from shore, the ocean conditions, the number of crane ships

available, and the number of watercraft (small ships, tugboats, and floating

causeways)—were not optimal. Army officials are planning on improving

the effectiveness of the Joint Logistics Over the Shore concept through

training and additional acquisition.

Surge Sealift

Requirements Are Not

Supportable

The mobility study examined a range of potential crises, including regional

wars in Europe, the Middle East, and Korea, in the 1999 time frame. The

most logistically demanding scenario examined, because of the number of

forces and the distances involved, was a major regional war in the Middle

East. DOD used a model’s3

 results to support the study’s recommendation

that the RRF maintain 36 ships in 4-day status and 27 ships in 5-day

readiness.

Our analysis of DOD’s model for the Middle East scenario does not support

the study’s recommendation. The study’s model assumed that 6 RRF

roll-on/roll-off ships, not 36, would be needed at the seaports of

embarkation by day 4 and that 8 other RRF ships, not 27, would be needed

at the seaports by day 5. By the 10th day, the model assumed that only 

36 ships would have arrived at the seaports. DOD officials could not explain

the wide discrepancy between the model’s data and the mobility study’s

recommendation; however, DOD officials confirmed that they believe this

recommendation is still valid.

DOD is conducting another review of its strategic mobility requirements.

This review will be based on the requirement from the October 1993

3

The model applied was the Model for Inter-theater Deployment by Air and Sea.

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Bottom-Up Review to fight two regional conflicts nearly simultaneously.

DOD anticipates issuance of a report by January 1995.

In addition to DOD’s ongoing mobility study, the Transportation Command

is conducting an RRF modernization study. The objectives of this study are

to determine the optimum RRF size, composition, and readiness to meet

surge sealift requirements. The study’s final recommendations will be

submitted to DOD’s Joint Staff/Transportation Command working group for

inclusion in an update to the Bottom-Up Review report.

Conclusions DOD’s determination of the number of RRF ships it wants maintained at

various readiness levels is overstated, given (1) the current ability of the

Army to get from the forts to the ports and (2) the disparity between the

output of the analytical model and the mobility study’s recommendation.

The results of DOD’s updated mobility study should guide future RRF ship

readiness levels.

Given these problems, we believe DOD needs to provide more realistic

readiness requirements to MarAd. We recognize one lesson of the Persian

Gulf War—RRF ships need to be more ready than they were at that

time—however, we also believe that the government should not pay to

keep an excess number of ships in a high-priority status.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander in

Chief, Transportation Command, to annually review RRF ship readiness

requirements provided to MarAd and ensure that they are in line with

current military deployment capabilities.

DOD Comments and

Our Evaluation

DOD generally agreed with our findings and concurred with our

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. DOD stated that RRF readiness

requirements are reviewed annually in cooperation with MarAd as part of

budget reviews. DOD also noted that RRF readiness levels are currently

being examined as part of the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up

Review Update.

DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix I.

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Chapter 4 

Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

MarAd and DOD agree that a viable U.S. merchant marine industry is the best

source for mariners to crew the RRF in an emergency. However, future

declines in the pool of U.S. mariners seem likely and would affect MarAd’s

ability to adequately crew these ships. The Department of Transportation

has proposed legislation designed to help support the U.S. merchant

marine industry. If, however, this legislation is not implemented or does

not adequately support a mariner labor pool capable of providing enough

mariners for the RRF, other measures will need to be taken. Both DOD and

MarAd have studied the idea of a merchant marine reserve program to either

supply or augment the required crew. Maritime labor unions, who are

opposed to reserve programs, have proposed other alternatives, such as

chartering commercially useful RRF ships to U.S. operators. DOD is also

examining a proposal that has the potential of eventually increasing the

available U.S. merchant marine labor pool.

RRF Crewing

Requirements

The RRF currently requires around 3,700 mariners for 108 ships. To meet

DOD’s Mobility Requirements Study, the RRF will require approximately

4,800 mariners, as shown in table 4.1. DOD is currently reevaluating the size

and composition of the RRF in an update of the Mobility Requirements

Study. Once DOD determines the number and type of ships in the RRF,

crewing levels in accordance with Coast Guard regulations and MarAd

recommendations can be reestablished.

Table 4.1: Estimates of RRF Crewing

Requirements to Meet DOD’s Mobility

Study Recommendations

Ship type

No. of

ships

MarAd

recommended

crew size

Total crew

requirement

Auxiliary crane 10 39 390

Breakbulk 48 34 1,632

Heavy lift 7 37 259

Roll-on/Roll-off 36 33 1,188

Troop 2 70 140

Tankers 36 33 1,188

Total 139 4,797

Source: DOD.

According to DOD, if the RRF crewing requirements remain about 4,800, and

the U.S. merchant marine labor pool continues to decline, steps must be

taken to ensure that an adequate pool of qualified mariners is in place.

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Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

U.S. Merchant Marine

Pool Is Declining

Crews for the RRF come from the labor pool that exists to operate ships in

the active U.S. commercial fleet. Each merchant mariner job supports

about two mariners in the labor pool to allow for training, vacations, and

job rotations. The U.S. commercial ocean-going labor pool, from which

crew members are drawn, currently consists of about 21,000 mariners

competing for about 9,300 shipboard jobs. Therefore, MarAd should not

have a labor supply problem for crewing RRF ships in the near term.

Events in the maritime industry have had a direct impact on the potential

crewing of RRF ships. During the 1960s, commercial ships registered in the

United States typically went to sea with crews of more than 

40 persons. The average crew size has since declined in response to

labor-saving technology and automation. For example, the introduction of

automated boiler controls during the mid-1960s and diesel-powered ships

during the 1970s reduced crew size. As a result, the number of shipboard

jobs decreased. For example, in 1970, the 843 ships in the U.S.-registered,

ocean-going fleet provided around 40,000 jobs. By 1993, the number of

ships had declined to 350, and only about 9,300 jobs were available. The

gradual decline in the pool of qualified and available mariners needed for

the RRF is shown in figure 4.1.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
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Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

Figure 4.1: Decline in U.S. Merchant

Mariners and Seafaring Employment

for the Years 1960 Through 1990

Number in Thousands

0

20

40

60

80

100

1960 1970 1980 1990

Year

Seafaring Employment

Merchant Mariners

Source: GAO.

Resolving Future

Crewing Concerns

The Department of Transportation and DOD have conducted numerous

studies that address the continued decline in the merchant marine

industry. General and specific proposals have been suggested to aid the

industry. Thus far, Transportation, DOD, and others involved, such as

unions and ship operators, have been unable to reach consensus on

specific programs or crewing alternatives. Therefore, action has not

occurred.

1994 Maritime Security

Program

Transportation has proposed legislation—the Maritime Security Program

(H.R. 4003 and S. 1945)—to the 103rd Congress to help revitalize the U.S.

Merchant Marine. The $1 billion, 10-year program proposes subsidizing up

to 52 U.S.-registered liner ships. One of the program’s goals is to provide

additional sealift capacity for national emergencies. Therefore, this

program would help maintain an active pool of U.S. mariners that can

provide the necessary crews to operate RRF ships during an emergency.

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Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

However, the specific number of mariners the program may ultimately

provide to RRF vessels is not known.

Expansion of Naval

Merchant Marine Reserve

In 1986, the Navy examined crewing alternatives for the RRF and DOD sealift

ships. One alternative was to expand the existing Merchant Marine

Reserve component of the U.S. Naval Reserve. At that time, the Merchant

Marine Reserve’s purpose was to maintain an organization of merchant

marine officers who were trained to operate merchant ships and a

shoreside cadre assigned to naval activities supporting strategic sealift.

The expanded program would include inactive, qualified mariners. The

cost to implement this alternative was estimated to be $10 million

annually. The Congress directed Transportation to explore establishing a

civilian reserve program.

Creation of a Civilian

Reserve

In 1987, MarAd examined the concept of creating a civilian merchant marine

reserve program.1

 Qualified mariners who were not actively sailing but

were willing to commit themselves under contract for service when

needed would form the base for this program. MarAd envisioned that the

program would be comprised of 6,480 mariners and estimated its cost to

be $46 million a year. By 1991, MarAd had completed another study that

included the concept of a civilian merchant marine reserve. MarAd studied

four options that could increase mariner availability. These options ranged

from a program with 500 members costing between approximately

$3 million and $6 million annually to a program with over 2,000 mariners

costing about $19 million annually.

Studies completed after the Persian Gulf War also called for the need to

consider a civilian reserve. For example, a 1991 Department of

Transportation Inspector General report recommended that a civilian

reserve program based on MarAd’s 1991 study be implemented. In addition,

a 1991 DOD and Transportation RRF working group report recommended

that the agencies jointly pursue efforts to formulate a civilian merchant

marine reserve program.

New Naval Reserve Units In 1986, the Navy examined an alternative establishing specific new Naval

Reserve units dedicated to manning all defense sealift ships. These units

would be comprised of about 9,000 personnel who are members of

1

The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to establish and maintain a voluntary organization

for the training of U.S. citizens to serve on U.S. merchant ships (46 App. U.S.C. 1295e).

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
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Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

existing naval reserve programs and naval retirees. The cost of this

alternative was estimated to be $46 million annually.

In 1988 and 1989, the Navy told the Congress a number of its concerns

about the use of naval reservists for crewing RRF ships. The Navy stated

that (1) naval reservists would not be available until DOD mobilization,

even though RRF ships would most likely be requested to be activated

before that time; (2) civilian mariners, not Navy reservists, have the

expertise in operating RRF ships; (3) no training capability is currently

available in the armed forces for training personnel to operate civilian

ships; and (4) crewing RRF ships with naval reservists would change their

noncombatant status under international law.

Maritime Labor Union

Views

Maritime labor unions have opposed government efforts to establish any

merchant marine reserve. They believe that a government reserve program

would limit potential future jobs. They also believe that the potential

implementation of any merchant marine reserve program shows a lack of

support for the U.S. commercial merchant marine industry and that

government funds should be directed toward aiding the maritime industry.

Maritime labor unions have proposed that commercially useful ships in the

RRF be chartered to U.S. operators. This proposal would help maintain a

trained and experienced crew available at no cost to the government. The

chartered rate would be set at the market rate and would be reduced if

there were no U.S.-flag competitors. The terms of the charter would

include a guarantee that an operational ship would be made available to

DOD when needed. However, because these ships would be engaged in

active shipping, some ships would have to first unload cargo and then

return to the United States when notified and, therefore, might not be

available to help meet DOD’s surge shipping requirements.

Another maritime labor union proposal is to develop a designated cadre of

volunteers from within the ranks of the unions to be trained and available

for surge call-up. This cadre would consist of three times the number of

crew members required for RRF ships to account for mariners currently at

sea and others not immediately available. DOD would set the standards for

training, and mariners would receive 2 weeks paid training aboard RRF

ships. The cost of training, mariner wages, subsistence, transportation, and

ship activity would be provided by DOD, according to this proposal. The

cost for this proposal was not provided.

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Remains a Concern

Other Recent Proposals At the RRF crewing workshop we sponsored in April 1994, MarAd presented

an emergency crewing concept that would allow the unions time to

assemble regular crews from the commercial sector. Under the proposal,

teams of 10 to 15 inactive mariners would assist ships’ managers to

activate RRF ships. The activation teams would then step aside once union

crews reported to the ships. If some mariners were not available from a

union, then team members could be tasked to fill those slots. MarAd stated

that 2,000 mariners would be needed for this program. MarAd estimated that

the initial cost would be $2.2 million and that the program would

eventually cost around $11 million annually. However, funding to develop

this program was not approved in MarAd’s fiscal year 1995 budget.

DOD is currently considering a concept to move Navy ships, such as oilers,

combat stores ships, and salvage ships, into the Military Sealift Command.

Civilian mariners could crew these ships, which is a practice the Military

Sealift Command currently uses for crewing its fast sealift ships. This

concept could result in an increase in the size of active mariner pool and

therefore the number of mariners available to the RRF. The number of

mariners that could become part of the active pool would depend upon the

mariner-to-billet ratio used by the Military Sealift Command. This concept

may also result in substantial Navy cost savings because civilian crews

aboard Sealift Command auxiliary ships are generally smaller than Navy

crews aboard ships assigned to Navy battle forces.

Conclusions In 1986, the Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries recognized the warning signs of a declining pool of mariners

when he said that “inadequate manning is the Achilles heel of emergency

sealift.” The Persian Gulf War clearly demonstrated how vulnerable the

RRF could be if sufficient numbers of properly skilled mariners are not

available to sail when the ships are ready. However, since the war, little

has been done to improve the likelihood that RRF ships will be adequately

crewed in the future. Neither DOD nor MarAd has proposed alternatives that

seem to garner universal consensus—including from the Congress, the

Coast Guard, maritime unions, and ship operators. Our workshop was the

first time many of these players were together discussing this issue.

Crewing the RRF will become a major problem as the pool of available

mariners declines and the requirements remain stable or grow.

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Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Maritime

Administrator to annually assess whether an adequate number of

experienced U.S. merchant mariners would be available to crew RRF ships

within DOD’s specified time frames. If these assessments indicate that the

number of qualified mariners may not be sufficient, the Secretary should

propose a specific merchant marine crewing alternative to the Congress.

Transportation

Comments and Our

Evaluation

Transportation partially concurred with our recommendation to annually

assess the number of qualified U.S. mariners available to crew RRF ships

and, if necessary, report crewing options. Transportation said it maintains

maritime workforce statistics on the size and the composition of U.S.

merchant mariners and that the Coast Guard is making progress toward

improving the accuracy regarding availability of mariners. However, this

information is not reported to the Congress in conjunction with defense

requirements. We believe that MarAd’s assessment would be an appropriate

first step to define the effect that the declining U.S. merchant marine pool

might have on national security.

Transportation said that the recommendation should focus on the need for

reemployment rights legislation for U.S. merchant mariners if called upon

to serve during a war or national emergency. It pointed out that

reemployment rights were discussed in our workshop report. While

Transportation acknowledged that consensus has not been achieved on

certain proposals—such as a civilian merchant marine reserve or

expansion of the naval merchant marine reserve—it believes that

identified crewing proposals have the potential to achieve consensus.

Transportation stated that our workshop was particularly beneficial

toward providing a forum to meet this end. Transportation also noted that

it is hopeful that its Maritime Security Program, designed to strengthen the

U.S. merchant marine, will pass the Congress this fall.

We do believe that reemployment rights for U.S. mariners equivalent to the

rights and benefits provided any member of a reserve component of the

Armed Forces would be fair and equitable. However, the number of

mariners who would be influenced to serve on RRF ships by this incentive

is unknown and, therefore, the impact of such a program cannot be

determined. In view of the continuing decline in the pool of U.S. mariners,

we believe the central issue of how to crew RRF ships in the future has not

been adequately addressed. Therefore, we believe that an annual

assessment of the crewing issue could clearly identify specific actions

needed to meet defense objectives related to sealift requirements. Further,

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Chapter 4 

Future Availability of Merchant Mariners

Remains a Concern

the Congress has considered legislation for reemployment rights three

times, and has not approved it twice, and at the time of issuance of this

report, passage was still uncertain as was Maritime Security Reform

passage.

The full text of Transportation’s comments is reproduced in appendix II.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 10 and 11.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 14-20.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 21-24.

See comment 1.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 24 and 25.

See comment 2.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 25 and 26.

See comment 3.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 27-32.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 30-32.

Now on pp. 5 and 26.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 32-33.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated October 3, 1994.

GAO Comments 1. Our report acknowledges that the Army’s strategic mobility program

identified infrastructure improvement projects necessary to meet the

cargo flow time frames required in DOD’s mobility study. However, our

main point is that the Army lacks the capability today to transport cargo

from the fort to the port in sync with the RRF ship readiness. Further, our

report notes given current funding levels, most infrastructure

improvement projects will not be completed by the Mobility Requirements

Study goal of fiscal year 1999. The additional concerns DOD expressed

concerning readiness status are addressed in comment three.

2. Our report focuses on the Army’s current ability to unload cargo at

underdeveloped seaports rather than on the Army’s intention to improve

future capabilities.

3. After evaluating DOD’s comments, we revised our caption for this section

to more accurately reflect the narrative presented. DOD did not provide any

additional data to explain the large disparity between our data analysis

and the recommendation. DOD also stated that military judgment had been

a factor in establishing the RRF readiness requirements but the ongoing

strategic mobility review suggests that lower levels of readiness would

provide a “more exact match to port loading capability.” We agree.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

See comment 1.

Now on p. 2.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 10.

See comment 2.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

See comment 2.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 1.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Now on p. 14.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 16.

See comment 2.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Now on p. 19.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 20.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 27.

See comment 3.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Now on p. 29.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 29.

See comment 3.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Now on p. 32.

See comment 3.

Now on p.32.

See comment 3.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of

Transportation

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Transportation’s

letter dated September 29, 1994.

GAO Comments 1. Our final report has been modified to reflect Transportation’s specific

and technical suggestions.

2. After evaluating Transportation’s comments and verifying our sources,

we believe the facts are accurately presented. We did not change our final

report.

3. Our commentary concerning the reemployment rights issue are found

on pages 33 and 34. .

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Norman Rabkin, Associate Director

Bob Eurich, Assistant Director

Brenda Farrell, Evaluator-in-Charge

Penny Berrier, Evaluator

Colin Chambers, Evaluator

Karen Blum, Communications Analyst

Norfolk Regional

Office

Lawrence Dixon, Senior Evaluator

Carolyn McClary, Evaluator

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Related GAO Products

The National Defense Reserve Fleet—Can It Respond to Future

Contingencies? (GAO/LCD-76-226, Oct. 6, 1976).

A Time to Consider Alternative Sources of Quick-Response Sealift

Capability (GAO/LCD-78-244, Feb. 7, 1979).

Navy Sealift: Observations on the Navy’s Ready Reserve Force

(GAO/NSIAD-86-168, Aug. 18, 1986).

Army Deployment: Better Transportation Planning Is Needed

(GAO/NSIAD-87-138, June 18, 1987).

Industry Concerns Regarding the Policies and Procedures of the Military

Sealift Command (GAO/T-NSIAD-88-40, Aug. 8, 1988).

Part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet Is No Longer Needed

(GAO/T-NSIAD-91-44, July 11, 1991).

Strategic Sealift: Part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet Is No Longer

Needed (GAO/NSIAD-92-3, Oct. 7, 1991).

Desert Shield/Storm: U.S. Transportation Command’s Support of

Operation (GAO/NSIAD-92-54, Jan. 9, 1992).

Shipbuilding: Navy’s Plan to Acquire Additional Strategic Sealift

(GAO/NSIAD-92-224, July 30, 1992).

Operation Desert Shield: Problems in Deploying by Rail Need Attention

(GAO/NSIAD-93-30, Nov. 13, 1992).

DOD’s Mobility Requirements: Alternative Assumptions Could Affect

Recommended Acquisition Plan (GAO/NSIAD-93-103, Apr. 22, 1993).

Management Reform: GAO’s Comments on the National Performance

Review’s Recommendations (GAO/OGC-94-1, Dec. 3, 1993).

Letter to the Maritime Administrator (GAO/NSIAD-94-96R, Jan. 7, 1994).

Strategic Mobility: Serious Problems Remain in U.S. Deployment

Capabilities (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-165, Apr. 26, 1994).

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
Related GAO Products

Strategic Sealift: Summary of Workshop on Crewing the Ready Reserve

Force (GAO/NSIAD-94-177, June 6, 1994).

(703084) Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-95-24 Ready Reserve Force
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