United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

William V. Roth, Jr., U.S. Senate

January 1996 ARMY ACQUISITION

Medium Trucks Passed

Key Operational and

Technical Tests

GAO/NSIAD-96-4

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-266242 

January 8, 1996

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

United States Senate

Dear Senator Roth:

In response to your request, we reviewed the Army’s testing of its Family

of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV). Because of previous FMTV test failures,

we reviewed the performance of the FMTV trucks during the Army’s

recently completed technical and operational testing. Our primary

objective was to determine whether the FMTV demonstrated that it could

meet contractual and operational requirements.

Results in Brief The FMTV trucks passed technical and operational tests, paving the way for

the Army’s August 29, 1995, decision to approve full-rate production.

Following the contractor’s modifications of the vehicle to correct

deficiencies identified in previous testing, the Army conducted (1) a

limited follow-on technical test to determine whether the trucks could

meet contractual reliability and performance requirements and (2) a full

operational test to determine whether it could meet its operational

reliability and other mission requirements when operated and maintained

by soldiers. The trucks exceeded reliability requirements in both tests and

met most performance requirements. In those cases where the

performance did not meet requirements, the Army determined that the

performance levels were satisfactory.

While the FMTV trucks overall performed satisfactorily, many of the

technical test vehicles were not produced on the production line and/or

were retrofitted to correct past deficiencies. Also, the contractor pretested

both the technical and operational test vehicles and corrected deficiencies

prior to delivering them to the Army for testing. However, the FMTV

contract allows the Army to verify that the contractor has corrected the

problems identified during testing through tests comparing the quality and

performance of full-production trucks with that of the approved final

configuration. If the Army’s comparison tests include full-production and

retrofitted trucks, it should have adequate assurance that the trucks

continue to meet the Army’s performance and reliability, availability, and

maintainability (RAM) requirements.

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Background The FMTV program is one of the Army’s largest acquisition programs at a

projected cost of $15.9 billion. With deliveries starting in 1993, the Army

plans to purchase, over a 30-year period, 87,598 FMTV trucks to replace its

aging medium truck fleet. The program consists of a family of 2.5- and

5-ton trucks based on a common truck cab and chassis. The 2.5-ton trucks,

called light medium tactical vehicles, consists of cargo and van models and

a 2.5-ton cargo trailer. The 5-ton trucks, called medium tactical vehicles,

consists of seven models—cargo, long wheel base cargo, dump, tanker,

tractor, van, and wrecker—and a 5-ton cargo trailer.

The Army is procuring the FMTV as a nondevelopmental item using a

competitive testing approach. Army officials considered this approach low

risk because of the availability of modified commercial components

applicable to the FMTV. Under this approach, the Army contracted for FMTV

prototypes with three contractors, tested the prototypes against each

other, and awarded a production contract to the winning contractor. On

October 11, 1991, the Army awarded a $1.2-billion, 5-year contract for the

production of the first 10,843 trucks to the winning contractor. The

contract did not include the production of the 5-ton tanker and van models

or the cargo trailers. These vehicles will be produced at a later date if

funding is available. The contractor is currently in the third year of

production under this contract.

Previous FMTV Tests Because the winning contractor’s prototype performed well during the

competitive testing, the Army planned to perform only a technical test

(Production Qualification Test) and an operational test (Initial Operational

Test and Evaluation) before making the full-rate production decision. Also,

the Army decided that the two tests could be performed concurrently. The

Production Qualification Test was to determine whether the FMTV models

fulfill the Army’s requirements and meet contract specifications. The

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation was designed to determine

whether and to what degree the FMTV could accomplish its mission when

operated and maintained by soldiers in the expected operational

environment.

The contractor experienced some production start-up problems that

delayed the start of the production and operational testing 6 and 10

months, respectively. The Army began the production test in June 1993

and the operational test in October 1993. The operational test was

suspended in December 1993 because the trucks were not able to meet

their operational reliability requirements. Following the operational test

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suspension, the contractor identified over 50 problems and began

developing fixes for these problems. The Army completed the full

20,000-mile production test in December 1994, but the trucks exhibited

poor reliability and failed to meet some performance requirements. By the

end of the production test, the Army had identified over 90 problems that

the contractor needed to correct.

In June 1994, the Army began a series of limited user tests to help the

contractor identify and validate potential solutions to the continuing

problems. In August 1994, the Army started a second operational test with

some of the FMTV models. In September 1994, operational and limited user

testing was suspended. Test personnel were not available to conduct the

testing because they were deployed to the Haiti peacekeeping mission.

According to Army test assessment officials, the vehicles were not meeting

their reliability requirements at the time the second operational test was

suspended.

The Army conducted a limited 12,000 miles per vehicle production test

from February 1995 to June 1995 and a new and complete operational test

from April 1995 to June 1995. The limited production test was 60 percent

of the mileage of the first test, which called for each vehicle to complete

20,000 miles of RAM testing. Army test assessment officials believed a

12,000-mile test was sufficient as the majority of the previous problems

occurred in the first 8,000 miles of testing. Each van was run 20,000 miles

because they were not included in the original test. In addition, all the

dump truck’s RAM problems identified during the original production test

were either chassis, engine, or drive train problems. According to Army

test assessment officials, since the dump truck has the same chassis,

engine, and drive train as the 5-ton cargo, which was being retested, there

was no need to retest the dump truck in the RAM portion of the production

test.

FMTV Passed

Production and

Operational Tests

The FMTV’s performance during the recently completed limited production

and operational tests significantly improved. The trucks passed both tests.

The Army test data in tables 1 through 3 reflect the test results that

supported the Army’s decision to proceed to full-rate production. This data

shows that all models of the truck met their RAM requirements during the

tests. However, there were different results for some models according to

the analysis performed by the Defense Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation (DOT&E). For systems that are ready to enter full-rate

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production DOT&E is required to independently assess the system’s

operational test and provide a report of that assessment to Congress.

DOT&E’s assessment does not enter into the Army’s full-rate production

decision. DOT&E’s results are included in tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Reliability Results of

Production Qualification Test and

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Production Qualification

Test (MMBHMF)a

Initial Operational Test and

Evaluation (MMBOMF)b

FMTV model Requirement Army results Requirement Army results

DOT&E

result

2.5-ton cargo 3,000 12,000 2,200 over 8,279 8,424

5-ton cargo 2,700 over 12,000 2,000 6,386 3,198

Dump 2,700 Not tested 2,000 2,812 1,688

Tractor 3,300 4,800 2,500 3,606 1,967

Van 2,700 10,000 2,000 4,346 3,380

Wrecker 2,300 4,800 1,900 4,720 2,754

aMean miles between hardware mission failures.

bMean miles between operational mission failures.

Table 2: Availability Results of

Production Qualification Test and

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Production

Qualification

Test

Initial Operational Test

and Evaluation

(Percent of time available)

FMTV model Requirement Army results Army results

DOT&E

results

2.5-ton cargo 91 98 96 95

5-ton cargo 88 98 96 91

Dump 88 Not tested 90 83

Tractor 88 95 89 84

Van 91 98 93 93

Wrecker 90 97 93 86

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Table 3: Maintainability Results of

Production Qualification Test and

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

(Mean miles between essential maintenance actions)

FMTV model Requirement

Production

Qualification Test

Initial Operational

Test and Evaluation

2.5-ton cargo 450 2,182 3,369

5-ton cargo 250 1,286 1,521

Dump 250 Not tested 937

Tractor 250 857 952

Van 450 1,429 942

Wrecker 250 706 767

DOT&E’s assessment of the operational test resulted in a general reduction

from the Army’s test results. As can be seen in tables 1 and 2, all FMTV

models met or exceeded their reliability and availability requirements

using the Army operational test results. Based on the DOT&E data, however,

the dump and tractor models did not meet their reliability requirement,

and the dump, tractor, and wrecker models did not meet their availability

requirement.

DOT&E noted that the FMTV family reliability would probably be a better

measure of the reliability of the dump and tractor models because they

had no failures of model unique subsystems and the failures that occurred

did not appear to be directly related to the models’ missions. Using the

family reliability for the dump and tractor models, DOT&E concluded that

all models met their reliability requirements.

DOT&E also noted that the operational tempo during the test was increased

20 percent above the normal wartime operational tempo and concluded

that the increased operational tempo would cause more failures during the

test and decrease the trucks availability. Because of the increased

operational tempo during the test, DOT&E concluded that the dump, tractor,

and wrecker models should be considered to have adequate availability

and, therefore, all models met their availability requirements.

In addition, all models met or nearly met their performance requirements,

and the Army was willing to accept this level of performance as

satisfactory. The Army has agreed to accept FMTV models, which do not

fully meet four contractual performance requirements—external air

transport, speed-on-grade, full-load cooling, and interior noise

requirements.

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• The contract requires all FMTVs to be externally air transportable—lifted by

helicopter—without damage. However, in 4 of 17 lift tests, the FMTV

windshield cracked. Army officials believe that a slightly different rigging

during external transportation and a thicker windshield the contractor

proposes to install should correct the cracking problem. The Army has

agreed to accept the results of these fixes regardless of whether they

correct the problem because the Army does not currently plan to use

helicopters to air transport its trucks.

• The contract requires that each truck model with various loads maintain

certain speeds on 2- and 3-percent road grades. Within the Army, there

was a disagreement on whether this requirement should be tested with the

cooling fan locked on to simulate the greatest load on the engine or with it

locked off. The vehicles were tested both ways. With the fan locked off, all

models except one met this requirement. With the fan locked on, three

models missed meeting the requirement. The Army agreed to accept these

results because the FMTV trucks’ performances were an improvement over

the current truck fleet.

• The contract requires that the engine oil, engine coolant, and transmission

temperatures not exceed certain temperatures when operated under a full

load on the engine and drive train, defined as a 0.6-tractive force. All FMTV

models except the wrecker met these requirements. The Army test

evaluation officials said that they believe the wrecker’s inability to meet

this requirement will have minimal operational impact.

• The contract requires that the interior noise be low enough that operators

do not need hearing protection. This means that the interior noise may not

go over 85 decibels. However, the 5-ton cargo and the van exceeded the

interior noise requirement at 80 kilometers per hour, and the wrecker

exceeded this requirement at 16 kilometers per hour. The Army has agreed

to accept the need for single hearing protection on some models at some

speeds.

Test Vehicles Modified

Before the Tests

The trucks the contractor provided the Army for its most recent testing

may not have been production representative vehicles because (1) either

the Army or the contractor modified some test trucks off the production

line and/or (2) the contractor tested the trucks and corrected any

problems identified prior to delivering the trucks to the Army for testing.

The Army was required to conduct the production and operational tests

with production or production representative vehicles. The FMTV contract

required the contractor to provide production representative vehicles for

the production test. Defense regulations require that production or

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
B-266242 

production representative vehicles be used in operational tests supporting

the full-rate production decision. The operational test was designed to

support the FMTV full-rate production decision.

All of the trucks used to demonstrate the RAM portion of the limited

production test were newly produced trucks. However, some of them

were produced before all of the required changes could be incorporated

into the production line and had to be modified off the production line to

incorporate those changes. Also, the trucks used for the performance

portion of the limited production test were a combination of newly

produced trucks and trucks used during the first production test. The

trucks used in the first production test were modified at the test site to

incorporate the required changes; however, some of these trucks did not

receive all the required changes. All of the trucks used during the

operational test were produced after the modifications were incorporated

into the production line.

The contractor conducted a test of about 1,000 miles per truck on the

limited production test trucks and about 600 miles per truck on the

operational test trucks before delivering them to the Army. According to

Army test officials, the contractor performed this test to check a new

electrical system installed in the test trucks. However, according to

Defense Plant Representative Office officials who monitored these tests,

the contractor corrected any problems found on the trucks during the test.

Although these problems did not require the contractor to make hardware

modifications to the test trucks, they did require the contractor to modify

the production process.

Additional Actions

Resulting From the

Testing

The contractor is required to develop corrective actions for all of the

problems identified during the recent production and operational testing.

If the corrective actions are design changes, they are to be incorporated

into the final approved FMTV configuration—the truck design incorporating

all required changes against which the production trucks will be

compared.

Problems identified during the tests included the following six deficiencies

that the operational assessment officials labeled as major safety

deficiencies.

• The starter sometimes did not disengage and overheated, which could

result in an electrical fire.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
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• The brake lines were too close to the exhaust system and could be

damaged during an exhaust system leak. Such damage could result in the

loss of brakes.

• The bumper was not compatible with the government-furnished tow bar,

which could cause a loss of control of the towed vehicle.

• The wrecker main winch free spool switch was too close to the other

switches and might be accidentally engaged during recovery operations.

Accidentally engaging the switch could cause a loss of control over the

vehicle being recovered.

• The tractor’s gladhandle, a fixture for attaching the air hose that allows air

pressure to be applied to the brakes on a towed trailer, was not

compatible with all trailers. This incompatibility could cause a towed

trailer’s brakes to fail.

• A transmission indicator light was too bright in the blackout mode, which

could cause a reduction in the driver’s night vision.

According to Defense and Army assessment officials, the contractor must

correct these deficiencies before the trucks can be fielded. The contractor

is working on correcting these deficiencies.

As of June 30, 1995, the contractor had produced 2,163 trucks, and the

Army has conditionally accepted 842 of them. The contractor is required

to retrofit all these trucks and any additional trucks that were produced

before the final configuration is determined. The 1,474 trucks produced

during the first 2 program years of the contract will require an extensive

retrofit effort, essentially replacing everything but the frame. Retrofitting

trucks produced during the third program year will not be as extensive.

The Defense Plant Representative Office has estimated that the cost of the

retrofit could be as high as $24 million, and the Army may be required to

pay as much as $11.8 million for modifications it wanted over and above

those required to meet contract requirements. This estimate was made

before the recent testing was completed and does not include the cost of

additional modifications required as a result of these tests. The office is

currently working on a new retrofit cost estimate.

The FMTV contract allows the Army to verify that the contractor has

corrected the problems identified during testing through tests comparing

the quality and performance of full-production trucks with that of the

approved final configuration. The contract calls for the Army to conduct

up to three of these comparison tests per program year using two trucks

per test. Each truck will be tested for 10,000 miles in up to 120 days.

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If the Army’s comparison tests include full-production and retrofitted

trucks, it should have adequate assurance that the FMTV trucks continue to

meet the Army’s RAM and performance requirements.

Agency Comments The Department of Defense concurred with our report and recommended

that we include the operational test data from the recent DOT&E report. We

have incorporated this data throughout the report where appropriate.

The Department also noted that the Army plans to perform the

comparison tests on both retrofit and new production vehicles to verify

that the quality and performance of the vehicles will continue to meet the

requirements. We believe these tests will be responsive to our

observations on the differences in the Army’s and DOT&E’s operational test

results, the modifications of test vehicles, and the needed corrections of

identified major safety deficiencies.

The Department’s comments are provided in their entirety in appendix I.

Scope and

Methodology

We interviewed and obtained documents from officials in the U.S. Army

headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Program Executive Office for Tactical

Wheeled Vehicles, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command,

Warren, Michigan; U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, Maryland; U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; U.S. Army Test and Experimentation

Command, Fort Hood, Texas; U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation

Command, Arlington, Virginia; and Defense Plant Representative Office,

Stewart and Stevenson, Sealy, Texas. Also, we observed the operational

test scoring conferences at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. We conducted our

review between August 1994 and August 1995 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

We plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days from its issue

date, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we

will send copies of the report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority

Members of the House Committees on Government Reform and Oversight,

on National Security, and on Appropriations; the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the Senate Committees on Governmental Affairs, on

Armed Services, and on Appropriations; and the Secretaries of Defense

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
B-266242 

and the Army. We will also send copies to other interested parties upon

request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas J. Schulz

Associate Director, Defense

 Acquisitions Issues

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 9.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Robert J. Stolba

Lawrence D. Gaston, Jr.

Chicago/Detroit Field

Office

Robert W. Herman

Gregory A. Kalin

Daniel J. Martin

(707089) Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-4 Army Acquisition
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