Filed 8/23/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re J.R., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B314532

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04863)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Terry T. Truong, Temporary Judge. 

Conditionally reversed and remanded with instructions. 
2

Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating 

his and mother’s parental rights and finding that the child, J.R.,

was adoptable. We conditionally reverse that order because the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS or the agency) violated mother’s due process rights.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 

law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) Except in emergent 

circumstances, this provision guarantees reasonable notice and a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive

a person of a protected liberty or property interest. (See Today’s 

Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 197, 212, 214; Gilbert v. Homar (1997) 520 U.S. 924, 

930–931.) Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest 

in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their 

children, the due process clause requires child welfare agencies to 

exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify 

them of dependency proceedings. (See In re DeJohn B. (2000) 

84 Cal.App.4th 100, 106 (DeJohn B.); In re Mia M. (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807 (Mia M.).) This is no idle command. It 

requires a thorough and systematic investigation to protect a 

parent’s fundamental liberty interest. (Mia M., at p. 808.) 
3

This case presents a textbook example of a due process 

violation. DCFS initiated dependency proceedings concerning

J.R. on the ground that his father physically abused him. Even 

though father told the agency at the outset of the proceedings 

that mother resided in El Salvador, the record does not show that 

DCFS made any attempt to ascertain mother’s location in that 

country. Instead, DCFS undertook a search of federal records

and databases concerning California residents, and it later

purported to serve mother with notice through publication in a 

Los Angeles-based newspaper. Further, after mother

(a) contacted DCFS on the telephone, (b) disclosed to the agency

her cellular telephone number and her address in El Salvador,

and (c) provided J.R.’s birth certificate upon receiving a request

through social media for that document, DCFS did not use any of 

that contact information to afford mother proper notice of the 

proceedings. The agency’s failure to do so deprived her of an 

opportunity to persuade the juvenile court not to terminate her

parental rights.

Father appeals the order terminating both parents’ 

parental rights.

1 Father’s appeal is predicated solely on DCFS’s 

infringement of mother’s right to proper notice. DCFS’s principal 

defenses are that father lacks standing to raise mother’s notice 

claims and any error on its part was harmless. 

We conclude that father has standing to assert DCFS’s 

violation of mother’s due process rights. Under the unique 

circumstances of this case, we exercise our broad remedial 

discretion to reverse the order terminating both parents’ rights

based on this due process claim, thereby conferring standing on

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
4

father to maintain this appeal. First, father’s appeal is the only 

practicable means by which the agency’s contravention of 

mother’s due process rights can be remedied. Second, affording 

mother proper notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard

(a) allows mother to seek reunification with her son, and

(b) promotes participation of all relevant parties, thus providing 

the juvenile court with a full picture of the relevant facts. Third, 

allowing J.R.’s interest in permanency and stability to bar father 

from raising mother’s constitutional claim would turn the 

dependency scheme on its head by rewarding DCFS’s failure to 

provide mother with any meaningful opportunity to protect her 

rights. In sum, we conclude that granting father standing to 

raise mother’s due process claim by conditionally reversing the 

termination order as to both parents effectuates the underlying 

purposes of the juvenile dependency scheme. 

Reaching the merits of the due process claim, we conclude 

the agency’s violation of mother’s right to due process was not 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the child’s 

interest in permanency and stability counsels in favor of a 

conditional reversal of the termination order as to both parents to 

avoid any undue delay in his permanent placement. Upon 

remand, DCFS shall exercise reasonable diligence to locate and 

properly serve mother. If mother does not appear within a 

reasonable period of time, then the juvenile court shall reinstate 

the termination order as to both parents.
5

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition 

of this appeal.

1. The dependency petition, the detention report, the 

detention hearing, and the first amended petition

On August 1, 2019, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency 

petition concerning J.R., who was then eight years old. In the 

petition, DCFS alleged jurisdiction was proper under Welfare and

Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) because 

father had physically abused the child. 

Accompanying the petition was a detention report.3 Father 

told the agency that he and J.R. migrated from El Salvador to the 

United States in August 2018. Father claimed mother lived in 

El Salvador, and further claimed father raised the child as a 

single parent because mother abandoned J.R. when he was one 

and a half years old. On the first page of the detention report, 

DCFS listed mother’s address as “[w]hereabouts unknown in 

El Salvador.” 

On August 2, 2019, the juvenile court held a detention 

hearing. At the hearing, the court asked father whether he had 

mother’s contact information. Father replied, “I don’t. She left 

us when [J.R.] was a little boy, and we haven’t heard from her.” 

The juvenile court thereafter detained J.R. from his parents. 

2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

3 The remainder of this paragraph summarizes pertinent 

aspects of the detention report.
6

On August 28, 2019, DCFS filed a first amended petition, 

which added jurisdictional allegations against mother pursuant 

to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). DCFS averred that 

mother, whose “whereabouts [were] unknown,” had “failed to 

provide the necessities of life for [J.R.], including food, clothing, 

shelter and medical care.” 

2. The jurisdiction/disposition report and hearing

On August 29, 2019, DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition 

report. The report represents that DCFS personnel initiated a 

due diligence search for mother, but that the “search did not 

locate the whereabouts of the mother due to the limited 

information the father [had] provided.” Attached to the report is 

a declaration of due diligence concerning that search. Although 

some of the abbreviations and terms utilized in the declaration of 

due diligence are not clearly defined, the declaration does show 

that the agency limited its search to only federal government 

databases (e.g., federal prison records) and databases of 

information concerning persons located in California (e.g., records 

from the Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters and the county 

jail). 

On September 10, 2019, the juvenile court held a combined 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court sustained the 

jurisdictional allegations included in the first amended petition, 

declared J.R. a dependent of the court, removed J.R. from the 

custody of his parents, and ordered DCFS to provide family 

reunification services to father. Pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(1), the court ordered DCFS not to provide 
7

reunification services to mother.

4 The court ordered the agency

to allow mother to have monitored visits with J.R. “upon the

mother contacting DCFS first.” 

3. The section 366.21, subdivision (e) and the 

section 366.21, subdivision (f) status review hearings

On March 10, 2020, the juvenile court held a status review 

hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e). The court 

found that returning J.R. to father’s physical custody would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to the child, father’s 

progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes 

necessitating placement had been substantial, and DCFS had 

offered reasonable services to enable the child’s safe return home.

The court ordered the agency to continue to provide reunification 

services to father. 

A status review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, 

subdivision (f) was held on September 16, 2020. J.R.’s counsel 

told the court that, “through some means that [counsel was] not 

completely sure of,” J.R.’s foster caregiver found mother in 

Honduras, and the caregiver “has spoken to the mother as had” 

J.R. The attorney remarked that it was “baffling to [her] that 

DCFS [had] not called the mother and gotten any information 

from” her. 

After J.R.’s counsel made these representations, the 

juvenile court ordered DCFS to “follow up in contacting mother to 

4 Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent 

part: “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or 

guardian . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing 

evidence, . . . [¶] . . . [t]hat the whereabouts of the parent or 

guardian are unknown.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1).)
8

get her thoughts and impression of this case and whether she has 

anything else to offer at her residence in Honduras.” 

Additionally, the court once again found that returning J.R. to 

father’s physical custody would create a substantial risk of 

detriment to him, father’s progress toward alleviating or 

mitigating the causes necessitating placement had been 

substantial, and DCFS had offered reasonable services to enable 

J.R.’s safe return to father’s custody. The court ordered DCFS to

continue to provide father with reunification services.

4. DCFS’s September 18, 2020 telephone conversation 

with mother, and the foster caregiver’s sister’s 

contact with mother via social media

On October 20, 2020, DCFS filed a last minute information 

report, wherein the agency stated that it received a telephone call 

from mother on September 18, 2020. Because of the significance 

of this telephone conversation to the instant case, we recount 

much of this report’s description of the call: “On 9/18/20, [a 

DCFS social worker] received a What’s App telephone call from 

mother . . . . Mother[ ] reported that she was currently ‘stuck in 

Guatemala for about a year now after she went searching for her 

son, [J.R.] Mother reported that she has not been able to go back 

to her home Country of El Salvador due to the worldwide

pandemic. Mother reported that she raised her son up until 

three years ago when father forced her to sign his passport 

application. Mother reported that father told her that he was 

going to Guatemala for work and needed [J.R.] and her to go with 

him. After he forced her to sign the passport application she was 

kidnapped by local gangsters. Mother reported that she was 

about to be shot and killed but her neighbors had contacted the 

police and they saved her life. Mother never returned to her 
9

home as the people that kidnapped her were local gang members 

that father was friends with. Mother reported that she believes 

that father paid the gang members to have her killed. . . . Mother 

reported that she has been searching for her son and wants him 

returned to her. . . . [¶] Mother sells cell phones in El Salvador. 

Mother denied any history of mental health or medical issues. 

Mother reported that [J.R.] was not of school age when she was 

caring for him . . . .”5

A last minute information report that DCFS filed on 

January 26, 2021 indicates that at an unspecified point in time, 

J.R.’s foster caregiver gave the agency J.R.’s birth certificate, a 

copy of which is included in the record.6 On January 25, 2021, a 

social worker asked the foster caregiver how she had obtained the 

birth certificate. The caregiver responded that “her sister, who[ ] 

resides in . . . El Salvador, was able to contact mother . . . through 

social media,” and that mother provided the birth certificate to 

the caregiver’s sister. The caregiver “reported that she [had] not 

had any further contact with her sister or [J.R.’s] mother . . . 

regarding [the] child’s case.” 

5 The agency’s “delivered service log” includes an entry 

pertaining to the September 18, 2020 call, which shows mother 

supplied the social worker with mother’s cellular telephone 

number and her “family home address” in El Salvador. The 

remainder of the log entry is comprised of essentially the same 

information that is included in the October 20, 2020 last minute 

information report. Neither the last minute information report 

nor the delivered service log entry discloses how mother acquired 

the social worker’s telephone number or why J.R.’s counsel 

apparently believed mother was in Honduras. 

6 The remainder of this paragraph summarizes relevant 

aspects of this last minute information report.
10

5. The section 366.22 status review hearing

On February 25, 2021, the juvenile court held a status 

review hearing pursuant to section 366.22. The court found that 

returning J.R. to father’s physical custody would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to the child, and that DCFS had 

offered reasonable services to enable J.R.’s safe return home. 

Further, the court terminated father’s reunification services on 

the ground that although father was “in substantial compliance” 

with the case plan, he had “failed to establish that it [was] in the 

best interests of the minor” for father to continue to receive 

reunification services. The court stated that J.R. was not 

comfortable having visits with father because of “the significant 

trauma that [J.R.] suffered at father’s hands,” and that it was 

“unrealistic to expect [J.R. would] be in a different position” if the 

reunification period were further extended.

Upon terminating father’s reunification services, the court

scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for June 23, 2021. The 

certificate of mailing accompanying the minute order for the 

hearing shows that the court clerk did not mail the “Notice of 

Entry of the above minute order of February 25, 2021 and Notice 

of Intent to File Writ, Petition for Extraordinary Writ form(s)” to 

mother because her whereabouts were “unknown” to the court.7

(Some boldface & some capitalization omitted.)

7 The juvenile court is required to notify the parties that

“ ‘direct appellate consideration of the propriety of the [order]

setting [a section 366.26 hearing] may be had only by petition for 

extraordinary writ review of the order.’ [Citation.]” (See In re 

Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355, 370 (Serenity S.).)
11

6. DCFS’s efforts to locate and serve mother in advance 

of the section 366.26 hearing

On March 11, 2021, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to 

provide mother with notice of the section 366.26 hearing via 

publication in the Daily Commerce & Pace News, a Los Angelesbased newspaper of general circulation in California. DCFS’s 

request for the publication order was supported by a declaration 

of due diligence. The declaration shows the agency conducted a 

search of the same databases it had reviewed in connection with

the declaration of due diligence submitted in advance of the 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing, and that these new “search 

efforts were [also] unsuccessful in locating” mother. On 

May 20, 2021 and June 4, 2021, DCFS filed reports for the 

upcoming section 366.26 hearing, wherein the agency asserted it 

had served mother by publishing notice of the hearing in the 

Daily Commerce & Pace News on March 23, 2021, 

March 30, 2021, April 6, 2021, and April 13, 2021. 

7. Father’s section 388 petition, the section 366.26 

hearing, and father’s notice of appeal

On June 23, 2021, the juvenile court found that notice of 

the section 366.26 hearing was proper, and continued the hearing 

to August 25, 2021 to allow DCFS to assist J.R.’s foster caregiver 

in securing copies of her divorce decrees.8 Although the court

initially stated that no further notices were necessary, it later 

ordered DCFS to “send courtesy notice to father for the next 

8 In one of the reports DCFS prepared in connection with 

the section 366.26 hearing, the agency indicated that the foster 

caregiver needed to obtain these documents in order to be 

considered a prospective adoptive parent for J.R.
12

date.” Additionally, the court scheduled a permanency planning 

review hearing for January 3, 2022. 

On August 23, 2021, father filed a petition pursuant to 

section 388 in which he asked the court to set aside the 

February 25, 2021 order terminating his family reunification 

services. Father asserted he was entitled to this relief because he 

had been “enrolled in individual therapy for over two months 

and . . . gained further insight into why [he had] a case” in 

dependency court. 

The section 366.26 hearing resumed on August 25, 2021. 

The juvenile court denied father’s section 388 petition on the 

grounds that it did not state new evidence or a change of 

circumstances, and that the relief sought was “not in the child’s 

best interest.” Next, the court terminated the parental rights of 

mother, father, and “anyone else that claims to be a parent” to 

J.R., found that J.R. was adoptable, and designated J.R.’s foster 

caregiver as his prospective adoptive parent. The court found 

that January 3, 2022 was “[t]he likely date by which the agency 

[would] finalize the adoption.” The certificate of mailing 

accompanying the minute order for this hearing indicates that 

the “Notice of Entry of the above minute order of August 25, 2021 

and Appeal Rights form(s)” were not mailed to mother because 

her “whereabouts [were] unknown” to the court. (Boldface

omitted.) Later that day, father appealed the findings and orders 

issued on June 23, 2021 and August 25, 2021. 

8. The proceedings following the section 366.26 hearing

The juvenile court ultimately continued the permanency 

planning review hearing from January 3, 2022 to 

December 27, 2022. As a result, J.R. has not yet been adopted
13

and the juvenile court still has jurisdiction over the dependency 

proceedings.

9

DISCUSSION

A. We Deny DCFS’s Motion to Dismiss This Appeal

Because Father’s Appeal Was Timely, He Has 

Standing, and We Exercise Our Discretion to Reach 

the Merits in Spite of DCFS’s Other Defenses

DCFS moves to dismiss the appeal, arguing: (1) father

failed timely to appeal the juvenile court’s finding that notice was 

proper; (2) father lacks standing to argue that DCFS failed to 

provide mother with adequate notice of the proceedings; and 

(3) the forfeiture, waiver, invited error, unclean hands, and 

disentitlement doctrines bar father from maintaining this appeal.

As discussed in greater detail below, we conclude that father’s 

appeal is timely and that he has standing to maintain this 

appeal, and we exercise our discretion to reach the merits 

notwithstanding DCFS’s invocation of the forfeiture, waiver, 

invited error, unclean hands, and disentitlement doctrines. 

Consequently, we deny DCFS’s motion.10

9 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s 

docket and the January 3, 2022, January 26, 2022, and 

June 21, 2022 minute orders that continued the permanency 

planning review hearing to December 27, 2022. (See Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subds. (c)–(d), 459.)

10 In its motion to dismiss, DCFS also contends that father 

may not secure reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and 

dispositional orders because he did not timely appeal them. 

Although we agree with DCFS on this point (see Discussion, 
14

1. Father timely appealed the juvenile court’s finding 

that notice of the section 366.26 hearing was proper

DCFS points out that “[a]t the initial section 366.26 

hearing for [J.R.] on June 23, 2021,” the juvenile court found that 

“ ‘notice [was] proper for the [366].26 hearing’ ” and “ ‘[n]o further 

notices [were] necessary.’ ” DCFS argues father cannot challenge 

that finding because he filed the notice of appeal on 

August 25, 2021, which is more than 60 days after June 23, 2021. 

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1) [“[A] notice of appeal 

must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment 

or the making of the order being appealed.”].)

11 

“ ‘A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be 

appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any 

subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.’ 

[Citations.] As a result of these broad statutory terms, ‘[j]uvenile 

dependency law does not abide by the normal prohibition against 

interlocutory appeals . . . .’ [Citations.]” (In re S.B. (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 529, 531–532 (S.B.).) Notwithstanding this exemption

from the bar against interlocutory appeals, “ ‘one does not appeal 

from a finding; one appeals from a judgment or from an order 

that the Legislature has designated as appealable.’ 

part E, post), we find that this procedural issue concerns the 

proper scope of father’s appeal from the order terminating 

parental rights rather than a ground for dismissing the appeal. 

(See Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 (Sara 

M.) [“An appeal from the most recent order in a dependency 

matter may not challenge earlier orders for which the time for 

filing an appeal has passed.”].)

11 Undesignated rule citations are to the California Rules 

of Court.
15

[Citation.] . . . [R]eview of findings is normally obtained by 

appeal from the ensuing judgment or order.”

12

In this context, the appealability of an order depends on 

whether it “substantially affected” the interests of a party, i.e., 

the order rendered him or her an “aggrieve[d]” party. (See S.B.,

supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 534, 537.) In S.B. for instance, the high 

court deemed appealable an “order [to] search for an adoptive 

family” that was issued pursuant to section 366.26. (See S.B., at 

p. 531 & fn. 1.) The S.B. court reasoned that although this order 

did not terminate parental rights, it nonetheless “substantially 

affected” “[t]he interests of parents and children” because the 

order had the effect of “limit[ing] the permanency planning 

options to adoption or guardianship” and “ ‘eliminat[ing] the 

option of long-term foster care . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See id. at 

pp. 533–537.) Relying on this reasoning, our Supreme Court 

rejected Court of Appeal decisions “holding that appeals by 

parents from [these] orders were premature” because they were 

“mere continuances of section 366.26 hearings . . . .” (See S.B., at 

p. 534.)

At the conclusion of the June 23, 2021 hearing in this case, 

the juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing to 

August 25, 2021. It was at that second hearing that the court

12 (See S.B., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 534, italics added, 

citing, inter alia, Code Civ. Proc., § 906 [“[T]he reviewing court 

may review . . . any intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or 

decision which involves the merits or necessarily affects the 

judgment or order appealed from or which substantially affects 

the rights of a party . . . . The provisions of this section do not 

authorize the reviewing court to review any decision or order 

from which an appeal might have been taken,” italics added].)
16

terminated father’s and mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 366.26. Before the juvenile court issued the termination 

order on August 25, 2021, father could not have sought appellate 

review of the finding that notice of the section 366.26 hearing was 

proper because, unlike the order at issue in S.B., the 

June 23, 2021 continuance order did not substantially affect the 

parent-child relationship. In fact, the continuance order delayed 

the legal injury that father claims resulted from the finding of 

proper notice, to wit, the extinguishment of parental rights.

Therefore, we consider the August 25, 2021 order terminating 

father’s rights to be the “ensuing . . . order” from which father 

may seek review of the notice finding (see S.B., supra, 

46 Cal.4th at p. 534; Code Civ. Proc., § 906), and we reject 

DCFS’s assertion that his appeal is untimely. A contrary holding 

would compel parties to a dependency case to file multiple

potentially unnecessary protective appeals, thereby consuming

scarce judicial resources. (See City of Gardena v. Rikuo Corp.

(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 595, 599 [observing that “ ‘ “piecemeal 

disposition and multiple appeals in a single action [can] be 

oppressive and costly” ’ ”].)

2. Father has standing to argue that DCFS failed to 

provide mother with proper notice of the proceedings

“[T]he general rule is that ‘ “[a]n appellant cannot urge 

errors which affect only another party who does not appeal.” ’ 

[Citations.]” (In re Joshua M. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 801, 807

(Joshua M.).) A corollary to this general rule is the principle 

that, “ ‘[w]here the interests of two parties interweave, either 

party has standing to litigate issues that have a[n] impact 

upon the related interests.’ ” (See In re Caitlin B. (2000) 

78 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1193.) Consequently, whether father has
17

standing to assert alleged violations of mother’s right to notice of 

the dependency proceedings depends on whether mother and 

father have “intertwined interests . . . .” (See ibid.)

Father argues that if he establishes that DCFS failed to 

provide mother with proper notice, then the order terminating 

parental rights should be reversed as to both parents. In essence,

father contends that both parents’ interests are intertwined

because, under the facts of this case, the reversal of the order 

terminating mother’s parental rights would justify reversal of the 

order terminating his rights.

As we explain in greater detail below, conditionally 

reversing the order terminating both parents’ rights based on a 

violation of mother’s right to due process falls within our broad 

statutory discretion to fashion appropriate appellate relief. We

further conclude that conditional reinstatement of both parents’ 

rights would be appropriate here because this constitutional 

violation would otherwise probably go uncured, thereby 

thwarting the dependency system’s objectives of family 

reunification and ensuring that the disposition of a dependency 

petition is based on all material facts and circumstances. 

Because the fate of mother’s and father’s respective parental

rights thus depends upon whether mother’s due process claim is 

meritorious, their interests are “intertwined,” meaning that 

father has standing to raise mother’s due process challenge.

Code of Civil Procedure section 43 provides that a 

reviewing court “may affirm, reverse, or modify any judgment or 

order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or 

order to be entered, or direct a new trial of further proceedings to 

be had.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 43, italics added.) Code of Civil 

Procedure section 906 employs nearly identical language to 
18

define the powers of a reviewing court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906.) 

These provisions thus confer broad discretion in formulating an 

appellate disposition.

13

DeJohn B. demonstrates that an appellate court’s 

expansive authority to fashion appellate relief includes the

discretion to reinstate the rights of one parent based on an error 

in the termination of the rights of another parent. There, a 

mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing 

that the relevant child welfare agency failed to “even attempt to 

notify her of the six-month review hearing where the court 

terminated reunification services and scheduled a permanency 

hearing.” (See DeJohn B., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) The 

father appealed that order as well, even though he otherwise 

“[had] no independent challenge . . . .” (See ibid., italics added.) 

Instead, he “argue[d] his parental rights [had to] be reinstated if

[the] mother prevail[ed].” (See ibid.)

The Court of Appeal agreed with the mother and reversed 

the order terminating her rights. (See DeJohn B., supra, 

84 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) Although the DeJohn B. court 

recognized that reversal of an order terminating rights of a 

13 (See Crane v. Dolihite (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 772, 792–

793 [indicating that Code Civ. Proc., §§ 43’s & 906’s use of the 

term “may” demonstrates that they grant “discretionary 

authority” to reviewing courts]; Davis v. County of Fresno (2018) 

22 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1140 [holding that these two statutes 

delineate the “discretionary authority of [a] reviewing court in 

formulating relief”]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil 

Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 11:48, p. 11–17

[“The courts of appeal and the supreme court are given broad 

powers in the disposition of appeals,” citing Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 43].)
19

parent based on a claim of error belonging solely to another 

parent was “not automatic,” the court exercised its discretion to 

reinstate father’s parental rights. (See id. at p. 110.) The Court 

of Appeal “perceive[d] no legitimate purpose to be served by 

leaving [the children] without a father and whatever legal 

benefits or entitlements that may come to them through the 

paternal side of the biological family.” (See ibid.) The court 

explained that since it was “reinstating [the] mother’s rights 

pending further proceedings[,] . . . . [t]he children [were] once 

again in limbo, and no one kn[ew] at th[at] time whether they 

w[ould] be adopted or permanently returned to their mother.” 

(See ibid.) The Court of Appeal summarized the rationale for its 

appellate disposition as follows: “In short, it is in the minors’ 

best interests to reinstate father’s parental rights.” (Ibid.) 

Although DeJohn B. did not address whether, and if so 

under what circumstances, a parent has standing to raise an 

appellate claim belonging to another parent, the decision 

illustrates the breadth of an appellate court’s remedial authority. 

In essence, the DeJohn B. court exercised its discretion to

reinstate the father’s rights, notwithstanding the absence of any 

error as to him, because doing so achieved one of the fundamental 

objectives of the juvenile dependency scheme—i.e., protecting 

the best interests of the minor. (See In re Luke M. (2003) 

107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1424 (Luke M.) [“[T]he underlying purpose 

of dependency law is to protect the welfare and best interests of 

the dependent child.”]; see also In re Mary G. (2007) 

151 Cal.App.4th 184, 192, 208, 212 (Mary G.) [citing DeJohn B.

for the proposition that an appellate court may reinstate both 

parents’ rights if doing so is in the child’s best interest, 
20

notwithstanding the “absen[ce of] any independent error 

pertaining to” one of the parents].)

Turning to the instant case, if we did not employ our

remedial authority to, in effect, grant father standing to raise

DCFS’s violation of mother’s right to notice, then this 

constitutional error would most likely go uncorrected. Mother 

would not be able to file her own appeal of the August 25, 2021 

order terminating her parental rights because the 60-day

jurisdictional deadline for doing so has long since passed.

14 Even 

assuming arguendo that this procedural barrier would not

preclude mother from seeking relief via a habeas petition,15

mother lacks a meaningful opportunity to pursue that remedy. 

When a DCFS social worker last spoke with mother, she was in 

either El Salvador or Guatemala, and there is no indication that 

the agency ever notified her of the nature of the proceedings or 

any of her rights relating thereto. (See Discussion, parts B–C, 

post.) Expecting mother to inform herself of her legal rights and

to file a successful habeas petition thereafter would be 

unreasonable and a hollow remedy for a violation of her due 

process rights.

14 (See rule 8.406(a)(1); In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 

246 (A.R.) [characterizing rule 8.406(a)(1)’s 60-day deadline as “a 

jurisdictional deadline, meaning that courts lack the power to 

extend it”].) 

15 (Cf. A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 243, 255–256 & 

fns. 5 & 6 [holding that “[w]hen an attorney fails to file a timely 

appeal [of an order terminating parental rights] in accordance 

with a client’s instructions, the parent may seek [habeas] relief

based on the attorney’s failure to provide competent 

representation”].)
21

Furthermore, remedying this due process violation by 

reversing the order terminating parental rights affords mother 

an opportunity to seek a new jurisdictional and dispositional 

hearing on the ground that DCFS failed to exercise due diligence 

in attempting to locate her and notify her of that proceeding.

16 

This remedy serves the minor’s best interests: “ ‘[I]t is implicit in 

the juvenile dependency statutes that it is always in the best 

interests of a minor to have a dependency adjudication based 

upon all material facts and circumstances and the participation 

of all interested parties entitled to notice.’ [Citation.] The right 

to counsel and participation not only protects the parent’s 

interests but also ensures that the juvenile court has the fullest 

picture of the relevant facts before disposing of a dependency 

petition.” (In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1076 

(Christopher L.).) It follows that exercising our broad discretion 

to reverse the order terminating both parents’ rights serves an

underlying purpose of the dependency scheme, i.e., protecting the 

best interests of the child. (See Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1424.)

We acknowledge that J.R. has a countervailing interest in

“a stable and permanent placement in a family unit . . . .” (See 

DeJohn B., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) Nevertheless, “[w]e 

must evaluate that right in the context of mother’s compelling 

interest as a parent and her due process right to be notified of the 

proceedings.” (Ibid.) We are concerned with the 

16 (See Discussion, part B, post [explaining that DCFS 

failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate 

mother prior to the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing]; 

Discussion, part C, post [noting that mother may challenge prior 

rulings for lack of proper notice].)
22

“ ‘depriv[ation] . . . of that “most basic of civil rights”—the

[parent’s] care, custody, and companionship of’ ” her child. (See 

id. at pp. 109–110.) Furthermore, we conclude that DCFS’s 

search efforts in this case “are unreasonably lacking, and that 

[its] failure to notify [mother] l[ed] to a prejudicial delay in 

participation.” (See Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 811; 

Discussion, parts B–C, post.) Under these circumstances, 

allowing J.R.’s interest in a permanent placement to “act as a 

counterbalance to the agency’s due diligence obligations would 

turn one of the key goals of the dependency statutory scheme on 

its head, reducing the chance of family reunification while 

simultaneously rewarding inadequate efforts to notify parents.” 

(See Mia M., at p. 811.) The juvenile dependency scheme 

recognizes that promoting family reunification may sometimes 

delay implementing a stable and permanent home for a child 

within its jurisdiction.17 Additionally, because a conditional 

reversal of the order terminating mother’s and father’s rights 

allows the juvenile court to reissue the termination order if 

mother fails to appear after receiving proper notice (see 

Discussion, part D, post; Disposition, post), our decision to confer 

standing upon father will not result in an undue delay of J.R.’s 

permanent placement.

We reject DCFS’s argument that the Joshua M. decision 

establishes that father lacks standing to raise mother’s claims of 

error. In Joshua M., after the juvenile court terminated a 

17 (See, e.g., In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 762

(D.N.) [“[U]nder unusual and rare circumstances, ‘the statutory 

and constitutional interests of the parent and child in 

reunification if possible prevail[ ] . . . over’ [statutory] limits [on 

reunification services].”].)
23

mother’s and a father’s respective parental rights, the mother 

appealed the decision, asserting that the father’s attorney 

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Joshua M., 

supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) In particular, the mother 

argued that the father’s “counsel failed to ensure that reasonable 

services were provided to the father while he was incarcerated, 

that the [child welfare agency] did not give proper consideration 

to the placement of [the child] with the paternal grandmother, 

that counsel failed to request that the dependency be dismissed 

upon the father’s release from prison and that counsel failed to 

file a writ petition challenging the termination of services to the 

father.” (See id. at p. 807.) In rejecting the mother’s contention 

that she could assert father’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the Court of Appeal found that “the father [had] never 

complained about the ineffective assistance of his counsel and the 

issue was never raised below.” (See id. at pp. 807–808.)

In contrast to the case before us, the father in Joshua M.

was represented by counsel and participated in the underlying

dependency proceedings (see, e.g., Joshua M., supra, 

56 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 [noting that the father attended the 

section 366.26 hearing with his attorney]). Here, mother never 

appeared, either personally or through counsel. Further, 

although the mother in Joshua M. claimed that the father’s 

attorney should have filed a writ petition after the 12-month 

hearing, she did not claim that the father was unaware of, or 

otherwise unable to, exercise his right to appeal the subsequent

order terminating his parental rights.

18 (See Joshua M., at 

18 Indeed, the Court of Appeal observed that “the father’s 

lack of interest” in the case was “fully documented” because, 
24

pp. 809–810.) It thus seems that the father in that case had an 

opportunity to—but did not—raise the ineffective assistance 

claim at issue (e.g., by filing a notice of appeal and joining in 

mother’s arguments). In further contrast, mother here expressed 

an interest in reuniting with J.R., but DCFS failed to afford her 

an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Accordingly,

reversal of the entirety of the termination order is necessary to 

safeguard a parent’s fundamental rights in the instant case; the 

same was not true in Joshua M.

We observe that conditional reinstatement of father’s 

parental rights is significant appellate relief for him, 

notwithstanding the fact this disposition does not automatically

entitle him to reunify with J.R.19 There are potential 

circumstances in which father would benefit if mother appeared

after the matter is remanded. For instance, if mother ultimately 

obtains custody of J.R., father may ask the court to allow him to 

“[a]side from three visits with his son, he did not comply with any 

aspect of [the] reunification” plan. (See Joshua M., supra, 

56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 809–810.)

19 Because father did not file a notice of intent to file a writ

petition contesting the prior order terminating his reunification 

services and setting a section 366.26 hearing, he cannot challenge 

that order in this appeal. (See Serenity S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 370 [“[O]rdinarily, . . . ‘direct appellate consideration of the 

propriety of the setting order may be had only by petition for 

extraordinary writ review of the order.’ ”]; rule 8.450(e)(1) [“A 

party seeking writ review . . . must file in the superior court a 

notice of intent to file a writ petition.”].)
25

visit J.R.20 On the other hand, if termination of father’s parental 

rights were not conditionally reversed, then this option would be

unavailable to him.21

Lastly, our decision to allow father to seek reinstatement of

both parents’ rights on account of an error in the termination of 

mother’s rights is consistent with the approach undertaken by 

rule 5.725(a), a provision the Judicial Council has adopted to 

implement the purposes of the dependency scheme.

22 The 

provision states that as a general rule, “[t]he court may not 

terminate the rights of only one parent under 

section 366.26 . . . .” (See rule 5.725(a).) The rationale is that 

“[t]he purpose of termination of parental rights is to free the child 

for adoption,” and “[t]he rights of all parents—whether natural, 

20 (See § 361.2, subds. (a) & (b)(1) [“If the court places the 

child with [a] parent [with whom the child was not residing at the 

time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child 

within the provisions of section 300], the court may do any of the 

following: [¶] . . . Order that the parent become legal and physical 

custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable 

visitation by the noncustodial parent.”].) 

21 (See § 366.26, subd. (i)(1) [“Any order of the court 

permanently terminating parental rights under this section shall 

be conclusive and binding upon the child[ and] upon the parent or 

parents . . . . After making the order, the juvenile court shall 

have no power to set aside, change, or modify it.”].)

22 (See rule 5.501(b) [“[The juvenile court rules] implement 

the purposes of the juvenile court law . . . .”]; rule 5.501(c)(2) 

[“Insofar as these rules may add to existing statutory provisions 

relating to the same subject matter, these rules must be 

construed so as to implement the purposes of the juvenile court 

law.”].)
26

presumed, biological, alleged, or unknown—must be terminated 

in order to” achieve that objective. (See rule 5.725(f).) Because

we have found that freeing J.R. for adoption at this time is not 

appropriate, rule 5.725(a) counsels in favor of affording J.R. the 

potential benefits from having two parents. (See DeJohn B., 

supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 110 [indicating that former rule 1463

was consistent with the appellate court’s decision to reinstate 

both parents’ rights based on the mother’s due process claim];

Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 208 [stating that former 

rule 1463 is now rule 5.725].)

In sum, we hold that father has standing to maintain this 

appeal because, under the unique facts of this case, DCFS’s 

failure to afford mother with constitutionally adequate notice of 

the proceedings warrants the reversal of the order terminating 

both parents’ rights.

3. We elect to reach the merits of father’s appeal, 

notwithstanding DCFS’s other defenses

DCFS argues that because “father never objected to any 

alleged notice issues as to mother” during the proceedings below, 

his appellate claims are “forfeited and waived and/or the error[s 

were] invited.” DCFS further maintains that we should dismiss 

father’s appeal pursuant to the unclean hands and disentitlement 

doctrines because he allegedly “prevented DCFS from locating 

mother by providing an inaccurate name [citation], show[ed] a 

pattern of refusing to attend meetings for [J.R.], such as school 

IEP and MAT assessments,” and threatened J.R.’s foster 

caregiver. 

As we explain in Discussion, part B, post, whether DCFS

discharged its constitutional obligation to serve mother properly

with notice of the dependency proceedings is a pure question of 
27

law. Furthermore, the public’s interest in the due administration 

of justice weighs in favor of adjudicating this claim of error

because mother lacks any meaningful opportunity to present this 

claim on her own. (See Discussion, part A.2, ante.) Accordingly, 

we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of this appellate 

claim.23 

B. DCFS Violated Mother’s Right to Due Process y 

Failing to Afford Her Proper Notice of the 

Proceedings

As a preliminary matter, we observe that neither party has 

identified the standard of review applicable to father’s claim that 

DCFS violated mother’s due process rights by failing to provide 

23 (See Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 

190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767 [holding that application of the waiver 

doctrine is a matter committed to the court’s discretion]; 

In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 298, fn. 2 

[“[A]pplication of the forfeiture rule ‘is not automatic.’ [Citation.]

When an appellant raises a question of law, for example, the 

appellate court can exercise its discretion to address the issue.’ ”]; 

Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs 

(The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:248.13, p. 8–185 [“Application of the 

doctrine of invited error is not automatic; it is discretionary with 

the appellate court.”]; Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000) 

83 Cal.App.4th 436, 446–447 [“The defense of unclean hands . . . 

applies only where it would be inequitable to grant the [litigant] 

any relief. [Citations.] . . . The decision of whether to apply the 

defense based on the facts is a matter within the . . . court’s 

discretion.”]; In re A.K. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 281, 285 

[“ ‘Appellate disentitlement “is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a 

discretionary tool that may be applied when the balance of the 

equitable concerns make it a proper sanction.” ’ ”].)
28

her with adequate notice of the dependency proceedings.24

Because the parties do not dispute the facts concerning this due 

process claim, the instant alleged constitutional error presents a 

purely legal question that is subject to de novo review. (See 

Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 806 [“[We] consider de novo 

whether inadequate notice violated [a parent’s] due process 

rights.”]; Shewry v. Begil (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 639, 642 

[“Matters presenting pure questions of law, not involving the 

resolution of disputed facts, are subject to de novo review.”].)

“ ‘In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires 

parents be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise 

them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to 

defend.’ [Citation.]” (Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807.) 

“ ‘There is no due process violation where a child welfare services 

agency has exercised reasonable diligence to provide notice to a 

parent whose whereabouts are unknown. [Citation.] On this 

score, reasonable diligence “denotes a thorough, systematic 

investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith.” [Citation.] 

It includes searching not only “standard avenues available to 

help locate a missing parent,” but “ ‘specific ones most likely 

under the unique facts known to the [agency], to yield [a parent’s] 

address.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 807–808.) Put 

24 The parties’ failure to address this issue does not bar us 

from determining the proper standard of review. (See People v. 

Taylor (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090 & fn. 5 (Taylor) [holding 

that the court could determine the correct standard of review

without first requesting supplemental briefing thereon because, 

even though the parties had failed to “tackle[ ] that issue” in their 

appellate briefing, “[t]hey certainly had the opportunity” to 

address that question as it “is present in every case”].)
29

differently, “[s]ocial services agencies, invested with a public

trust and acting as temporary custodians of dependent minors, 

are bound by law to make every reasonable effort in attempting 

to inform parents of all hearings. They must leave no stone 

unturned.” (DeJohn B., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.)

Because DCFS asserted that mother’s whereabouts were 

unknown, the agency bore the burden of documenting its 

attempts to locate mother and serve her.25 As we explain below, 

DCFS’s records do not show that the agency exercised reasonable 

diligence in this endeavor.

26

25 (See § 294, subd. (f)(7) [“Notice to the parents [of the 

section 366.26 hearing] may be given in any one of the following 

manners: [¶] . . . [¶] If a parent’s identity is known but his or her 

whereabouts are unknown and the parent cannot, with 

reasonable diligence, be served [at the hearing at which the

section 366.26 hearing was scheduled or via mail or personal or 

electronic service], the petitioner shall file an affidavit with the 

court at least 75 days before the hearing date, stating the name 

of the parent and describing the efforts made to locate and serve

the parent.”].)

26 Although the juvenile court’s ruling that mother was 

given proper notice of the section 366.26 hearing is the only 

finding that is subject to this appeal (see Discussion, part E, 

post), we also consider whether DCFS provided mother with 

proper notice of prior hearings because that issue is relevant to 

our analysis of whether: (1) rule 5.725(a) confers upon father 

standing to maintain this appeal; and (2) DCFS’s violation of 

mother’s right to due process was prejudicial. (See Discussion, 

part A.2, ante; Discussion, part C, post.) Absent from DCFS’s 

briefing is any argument that we cannot examine its prior efforts

to provide notice to mother for those limited purposes. (See D.N., 

supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 767 [“ ‘ “Although it is the appellant’s 
30

Father informed the agency prior to the detention hearing

that mother resided in El Salvador, but father told the court at 

the hearing that he did not have her contact information. 

Similarly, prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, J.R. 

told DCFS that his mother lived in El Salvador and that he 

did not have any contact information for her. 

The declaration of due diligence accompanying the

jurisdiction/disposition report provides no indication that DCFS 

contacted the El Salvadoran government in order to locate 

mother.

27 Rather, the agency reviewed federal records and 

databases concerning persons in California. (See Factual &

Procedural Background, part 2, ante.) Although we acknowledge 

that the name for mother that father initially provided to the 

task to show error, there is a corresponding obligation on the part 

of the respondent to aid the appellate court in sustaining the 

judgment. ‘[I]t is as much the duty of the respondent to assist 

the [appellate] court upon the appeal as it is to properly present a 

case in the first instance, in the court below.’ ” ’ ”].)

27 In support of our conclusion that DCFS could have 

contacted El Salvadoran government officials, we, sua sponte,

take judicial notice of a County of Los Angeles webpage that

(a) shows the consulate general of El Salvador is located in the 

county, and (b) provides the consulate’s telephone and facsimile 

numbers. (See Consulate General of El Salvador

https://locator.lacounty.gov/lac/Location/3176563/consulategeneral-of-el-salvador (as of Aug. 12, 2022), archived at 

https://perma.cc/CH4Y-PR4A; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459;

cf. Placerville Historic Preservation League v. Judicial Council of 

California (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 187, 191, fn. 1 [taking judicial 

notice of certain geographic and demographic facts supplied by a 

county’s official website].) 
31

agency turned out to be partially incorrect,

28 that fact does not 

establish that discussing the matter with El Salvadoran officials 

would have been futile. The birth certificate for J.R. that DCFS 

later acquired provides mother’s correct name and shows that 

J.R. was born in El Salvador. The contents of this birth 

certificate suggest that had DCFS contacted El Salvadoran

government personnel at the outset of the proceedings, those 

officials may have been able to retrieve this record and used it to

identify correctly mother for DCFS. El Salvadoran officials then

could have attempted to locate mother and place her in contact 

with the agency. Thus, DCFS’s failure to enlist the assistance of

this foreign government is inconsistent with DCFS’s duty to 

“leave no stone unturned.”29

At no point thereafter did DCFS cure this constitutional 

defect. The agency’s status review reports for the hearings held 

pursuant to section 366.21, subdivisions (e) and (f) do not show 

that the agency made any further attempts to locate mother 

before she contacted DCFS on September 18, 2020, nor does 

DCFS assert it undertook any such efforts. Furthermore, DCFS’s 

records of the September 18, 2020 telephone call provide no 

28 Although father provided DCFS with the correct first

and middle names for mother, the two surnames he supplied 

were inaccurate. 

29 (DeJohn B., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 102; cf. In re 

Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 705, 713 (Daniel F.)

[criticizing a child welfare agency’s failure to “contact[ ] the 

Mexican consulate or the Mexican social services agency . . . for 

assistance to locate or serve Father” after mother and several 

other relatives told the agency that father lived in Mexico; the 

agency instead searched “databases of records for California and 

Alameda County”].)
32

indication that the agency informed her of the nature of the 

pending dependency proceedings, including the fact that the 

juvenile court could ultimately extinguish her parental rights.30

It follows that the agency did not provide mother with 

constitutionally adequate notice at that time. (See Mia M., 

supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807 [“ ‘ “[Due process requires that 

the] parent [be] advised of the nature of the hearing giving rise to 

th[e] opportunity [to be heard], including what will be decided 

therein. Only with adequate advisement can one choose to 

appear or not, to prepare or not, and to defend or not.” ’ ”].) 

Also, during the September 18, 2020 telephone call, mother 

gave the social worker her cellular telephone number and her 

home address in El Salvador. Although DCFS’s records of the 

September 18, 2020 call do not clarify whether mother stated she

was in Guatemala or in El Salvador at that time,

31 this social 

worker had an opportunity to eliminate any uncertainty by 

asking mother for her current residence, or DCFS could have 

later attempted to resolve any lingering ambiguity by calling the 

cellular telephone number that mother had provided. In 

30 (See also Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1076

[“ ‘ “Once reunification services are ordered terminated [by the 

juvenile court], the focus shifts to the needs of the child for 

permanency and stability.” ’ ”. . . . “ ‘[T]he court must order 

adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental 

rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a 

compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child.’ ”].) 

31 For instance, while the October 20, 2020 last minute 

information report states mother “reported that she was currently

‘stuck in Guatemala for about a year now[,]’ ” it also states that 

“[m]other sells cell phones in El Salvador.” (Italics added.) 
33

addition, DCFS reported that on January 25, 2021, J.R.’s foster 

caregiver disclosed that her sister was able to contact mother 

through social media. Thus, the agency had been presented with

yet another potential avenue for obtaining mother’s then-current 

contact information. (See Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 809 [noting that a child welfare agency may use social media to 

obtain contact information and thereafter properly notify a 

parent].) Nevertheless, entirely absent from the record is any 

evidence that DCFS attempted to give mother notice of the next

status review hearing, which was held on February 25, 2021. 

In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, DCFS once again

failed to contact mother via telephone, mail, or social media. 

Rather, upon confirming that mother’s location could not be 

found in the databases the agency had reviewed prior to the 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing, DCFS served mother by 

publishing a notice of the forthcoming hearing in a Los Angelesbased newspaper of general circulation in California. (See 

Factual & Procedural Background, part 6, ante.) In light of 

DCFS’s awareness that mother was in either El Salvador or 

Guatemala when it last heard from her, we find that publication 

in a Los Angeles-based newspaper did not give her “ ‘notice that 

[was] reasonably calculated to advise [her] an action [was]

pending and afford [her] an opportunity to defend’ ” against the 

termination of her rights. (See Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 807; see also id. at pp. 808–809 [noting that service by 

publication will not satisfy due process if it is not the “ ‘most 

likely means of . . . notify[ing]’ ” the parent].) This is particularly 

so given that DCFS had far better methods of contacting mother, 

including dialing the telephone number she had provided to 

them.
34

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that DCFS failed to 

exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and serve 

mother with notice of the dependency proceedings. The agency 

thus deprived mother of her constitutional right to due process of 

law. 

C. DCFS’s Violation of Mother’s Right to Due Process 

Was Prejudicial

The parties dispute whether DCFS’s failure to provide 

mother with proper notice of the proceedings is per se reversible 

as structural error or subject to a harmless error analysis. 

We need not resolve this issue because, as discussed below, even 

if arguendo this due process violation were subject to a harmless 

error analysis, that analysis would require reversal of the order 

terminating parental rights.

The Chapman32 standard of prejudice governs our review 

of whether DCFS’s violation of mother’s due process rights 

compels reversal.

33 (See In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 

32 (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)

33 DCFS argues that because “there was no error of a 

constitutional dimension[, r]eversal is not warranted . . . unless it 

is reasonably probable the parent would have achieved a more

favorable result in the absence of the error.” We reject that 

contention for the reasons provided in Discussion, part B, ante.

Additionally, DCFS intimates that certain “courts will not 

reverse” based on an alleged due process violation “absent a 

reasonable probability the parent would have achieved a more 

favorable outcome but for the error.” Neither decision DCFS cites

supports that proposition. (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th

588, 625–626 [applying the reasonable probability standard to a
35

389, 391; id. at p. 394 [“In determining the effect of ‘most 

constitutional errors,’ appellate courts can properly apply a 

Chapman harmless error analysis.”]; Christopher L., supra, 

12 Cal.5th at p. 1073 [same]; Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 806 [“An error in attempted notice is subject to a harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.”].) “ ‘The 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman “requir[es] the 

beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 

to the [adverse ruling].” [Citation.] . . . [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” 

(See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463, third bracketed 

insertion added.)

DCFS fails to discharge its burden of showing that the

infringement of mother’s right to due process was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. DCFS asserts that mother “would 

likely not have participated at the section 366.26 hearing” 

because “the evidence establishes mother knew that [J.R.] was in 

claim that the juvenile court violated a statute by adjudicating a

dependency petition in the parent’s absence, but rejecting the 

parent’s related due process claim because “one can say with 

confidence that ‘[n]o other result was possible’ even if he had 

been present,” thereby indicating that the high court subjected 

the constitutional claim to a different harmless error standard

than the statutory claim]; Daniel F., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 704, 716 [rejecting a child welfare agency’s claim of harmless 

error under the reasonable probability test in an appeal from the

denial of a section 388 petition predicated on the child welfare 

agency’s failure to properly notify the father of the proceedings; 

there is no indication in the opinion that the father sought

reversal under the Chapman standard]; see also In re H.E. (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘[A]n opinion is not authority for a 

proposition not therein considered.’ ”].)
36

DCFS’s custody, but she chose not to ask for visits with the child 

and chose not to participate in the dependency proceedings . . . .” 

The agency further asserts that “even had mother appeared at 

the section 366.26 hearing, the evidence establishes that she 

would not have obtained a more favorable outcome [at] that 

hearing,” given that “[t]he only way for mother to avoid 

termination of her parental rights would be to establish the 

beneficial-relationship exception,” which required her to show she 

“maintained regular visitation and contact with the child.” 

We agree with DCFS that “[t]he evidence shows that at 

least since September 18, 2020, mother was aware that [J.R.] was 

in the custody of [the agency] as she called the social worker.” 

Yet, there is no indication in DCFS’s records of the 

September 18, 2020 telephone conversation that the social 

worker informed mother that she could request visits with J.R. or

otherwise participate in the dependency proceedings. Thus, 

DCFS has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that if the 

agency had afforded mother constitutionally sufficient notice of 

the section 366.26 hearing, she would have failed to appear. 

Additionally, mother’s statement to DCFS that she “want[ed J.R.] 

returned to her” belies the agency’s claim that mother would 

have been unwilling to make an appearance.

DCFS also fails to demonstrate that had mother appeared 

at the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court still would have 

terminated her parental rights. In focusing solely on 

section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)’s beneficial-relationship 

exception, DCFS overlooks the fact that mother could have

prevented the juvenile court from terminating her parental rights 

by filing a section 388 petition contesting the validity of its prior 
37

orders barring her from reunifying with J.R.

34 Mother also could 

have asked the juvenile court to exercise its authority to “change, 

modify, or set aside” these prior rulings sua sponte.

35 

Given our conclusion that DCFS failed to provide mother

with constitutionally adequate notice of the proceedings (see 

Discussion, part B, ante) and the agency’s failure to address 

whether the court would have vacated its previous rulings on 

that basis, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 

mother’s appearance at the section 366.26 hearing would have 

34 (See Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807 [“ ‘A 

section 388 petition is the appropriate method for raising a due 

process challenge based on lack of notice.’ ”]; id. at pp. 795–796 

[“Seeking a new jurisdiction and disposition hearing,” father 

“filed a petition under . . . section 388 . . . . [¶] Finding prejudicial 

error, we reverse the court’s order denying father’s section 388 

petition and vacate the order terminating parental rights as to 

[the child].”]; Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1079–1080 

[“[T]he statutory scheme provides a mechanism for 

reconsideration of the court’s prior orders . . . . Section 388 

authorizes a parent . . . to petition the juvenile court ‘to change, 

modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to 

terminate the jurisdiction of the court.’ ”].)

35 (See Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 

144 Cal.App.4th 92, 98–99, fn. omitted; see also In re Marriage of 

Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 215 [“ ‘If a court believes one 

of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to 

correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that 

belief.’ ”].) 
38

been futile. Thus, DCFS’s contravention of mother’s fundamental 

right to due process was prejudicial.

36 

D. We Conditionally Reverse the Order Terminating 

Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights

We now turn to deciding the proper disposition, which we 

conclude is a conditional reversal of the order terminating 

parental rights.

37 We find instructive cases in which the juvenile 

court has terminated parental rights, but the appellate court has 

concluded there was prejudicial error in failing to afford proper 

notice to an Indian tribe as required by the Indian Child Welfare 

Act of 1978 (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Upon invalidating 

a termination order based solely on an ICWA notice error, a

36 Father further contends that DCFS failed to comply

with certain statutory provisions governing the proper method of 

service in dependency proceedings. We acknowledge that 

“[c]ourts generally should avoid resolving constitutional issues if 

a case can be decided on statutory grounds.” (Citizens to Save 

California v. California Fair Political Practices Com. (2006) 

145 Cal.App.4th 736, 745.) Nevertheless, we exercise our 

discretion to reach the constitutional claim because (a) of the 

importance of the due process violation in question, and (b) it is 

unclear whether resolving father’s statutory claim would allow us 

to avoid deciding the constitutional issue, given that errors of 

state law “generally do[ ] not warrant reversal unless there is a 

reasonable probability that in the absence of the error[s], a result 

more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.’ 

[Citation.]” (See Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1073.)

37 Because the proper scope of reversal is a question 

presented in every appeal, the parties’ failure to explicitly

address this issue does not prevent us from resolving it. (Cf.

Taylor, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090 & fn. 5.)
39

Court of Appeal can issue a conditional reversal, to wit, a reversal 

of the order with instructions to reinstate it “if no Indian tribe 

intervenes after proper notice is given.” (See In re Francisco W. 

(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 699, 702–704, 706, 711

(Francisco W.) [referring to this disposition as a “limited 

reversal”]; In re A.W. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 659, 667–668

[utilizing the alternative term “conditional[ ] reversal[ ]” to 

identify this disposition].)

Just as an Indian tribe may decline to intervene upon 

receiving notice that complies with ICWA, mother could choose 

not to appear after DCFS cures the violation of her right to due 

process. Should that occur, then allowing father to relitigate 

whether his parental rights should have been terminated would 

undermine J.R.’s interest in obtaining “ ‘[a] stable, permanent 

placement, and [a] full emotional commitment, as promptly 

as reasonably possible . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Francisco W., 

supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 706.) Accordingly, we conclude that 

the order terminating parental rights should be reinstated if 

mother does not appear after being afforded proper notice and a 

reasonable opportunity to be heard.38 (See CREED-21 v. City of 

San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 517 [“ ‘ “[R]easonable 

notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard . . . is all that is 

required [for due process].” ’ ”].)

38 If any “postjudgment change of circumstances affecting 

[J.R.’s] adoptability” arise, our conditional reversal would not 

necessarily preclude the juvenile court from revisiting the order 

terminating parental rights. (See Francisco W., supra, 139 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 709–710 [finding that section 366.26, 

subdivision (i)(2) provides a mechanism by which a child may 

request the reinstatement of parental rights].) 
40

E. Because Father Did Not Timely Appeal the 

Jurisdictional and Dispositional Orders, Those 

Orders Are Beyond the Scope of This Appeal

In his opening brief, father argues that “[r]eversal for lack 

of notice would void not only the judgement terminating parental 

rights, but also the jurisdiction and disposition orders,” and he

asks us to instruct the juvenile court to “conduct new properly

noticed jurisdictional and dispositional hearings as to 

mother . . . .” In response, DCFS contends that father may not

challenge the juvenile court’s prior jurisdictional and 

dispositional orders because he did not timely appeal from those 

rulings. Father counters in his reply that DeJohn B. and Mia M.

support his request for new jurisdictional and dispositional

hearings for mother.

Our review of the juvenile court’s docket confirms that 

father did not appeal the jurisdictional and dispositional rulings 

issued on September 10, 2019. Furthermore, the 60-day deadline 

for appealing these prior rulings expired long ago. (See 

rule 8.406(a)(1).) Therefore, the jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders are not properly before us. (See Sara M., supra,

36 Cal.4th at p. 1018; see also In re Athena P. (2002) 

103 Cal.App.4th 617, 624 [“ ‘ “The first appealable order in the 

dependency process is the dispositional order. [Citation.]” ’ 

[Citation.] . . . [A]ny challenge to the jurisdictional findings 

would have to be raised in an appeal from the dispositional 

order.”].) 

Additionally, father’s resort to DeJohn B. and Mia M. on 

this point is unavailing. In each case, the juvenile court had 

denied a parent’s section 388 petition to set aside prior rulings for 

lack of proper notice. (See DeJohn B., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 105–106; Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 795–796.) 
41

Because a section 388 petition is an appropriate vehicle to 

challenge prior orders (see Discussion, part C, ante), an appellate 

court reviewing an order denying a section 388 petition is 

empowered to grant the relief sought therein, i.e., setting aside

those prior rulings. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 43 [providing that a 

reviewing court “may affirm, reverse, or modify any judgment or

order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or 

order to be entered”]; id., § 906 [same].) As we explained earlier 

in this part, only the order terminating mother’s and father’s 

parental rights is properly before us, and reversing that order 

does not, in and of itself, invalidate the juvenile court’s prior 

jurisdictional and dispositional rulings.
42

DISPOSITION

We deny plaintiff and respondent Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Service’s (DCFS’s) motion to 

dismiss this appeal. The August 25, 2021 order terminating 

parental rights is conditionally reversed, and the matter is 

remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to order DCFS

to exercise reasonable diligence as described in this opinion in 

attempting to locate and serve mother with proper notice of the

dependency proceedings. If mother fails to appear in the 

proceedings within a reasonable period of time after DCFS has 

discharged this obligation, then the juvenile court shall reinstate 

its order terminating parental rights as to mother and father. If

mother makes an appearance within a reasonable period of time

after proper service is effected, then the juvenile court shall

undertake further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.