COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00028-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.S.D.L.S., 

A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., 

AND Y.S., CHILDREN

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FROM 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is an ultra-accelerated appeal.2 In a single issue, Appellant Mother 

argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate court to dispose of 

appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably 

possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal was filed). We note that under 

that rule, our opinion is required to issue on or before July 17, 2013.
2

court‘s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of her 

five children—E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., and Y.S. We will 

affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Overview

Mother testified3at the termination trial that she had never been married, 

that she had been pregnant almost every other year for twenty years, that she 

had given birth to eleven children, that she could not recall each of their 

birthdates, and that she did not have custody of any of her eleven children at the 

time of the termination trial.4The children at issue in this appeal include 

E.S.D.L.S., a female born on November 28, 1999; A.A.D.L.S., a male child born

on April 13, 2006; P.H.D.L.S., a male child born on February 29, 2008; S.D.L.S., 

a female child born on March 5, 2010; and Y.S., a female child born on January 

18, 2012. Because Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the jury‘s best-interest finding, we set forth the evidence presented at trial that 

will be used in the Holley analysis below.

 

3Mother, who speaks only Spanish, utilized an interpreter to testify at the 

termination trial.

4

Two of Mother‘s children, M.D.L.S. and R.S.L.S. who are not involved in 

this appeal, were living with their grandmother in Mexico because when their 

father went to jail, Mother struggled to provide food ―and everything else‖; the 

grandmother offered to help, the children went to stay with her, and then the 

grandmother refused to return the children. 
3

B. Mother’s Housing and Employment History

At the termination trial, Mother detailed her housing history, stating that 

she had moved many times in the four years prior to the termination trial because 

she was struggling financially and was kicked out by her landlord. Mother said 

that she was able to pay rent and provide for her five children prior to their 

removal by the Department of Family and Protective Services (―the Department‖) 

because the father of Y.S. provided for them and because Mother received food 

stamps. Mother had lived at her current address on 24th Street for two months 

prior to the termination trial. 

The home in which Mother was living at the time of the termination trial 

contained two bedrooms: J., the father of Mother‘s older boys who are not 

involved in this appeal, slept in one bedroom with two of the boys; the third boy 

slept on the couch; and Mother slept in the other bedroom. Mother was 

supposed to pay rent to J., but she had not paid him any rent as of the time of the 

termination trial. She understood that J. could kick her out at any time and 

testified that she was making an effort to get an apartment. 

At the time of the termination trial in November 2012, Mother had $30; she 

did not have a bank account and did not have any money saved. The last time 

that Mother had a regular paying job was in June 2012 when she cleaned offices. 

During the six months that she worked cleaning offices, she was paid every two 

weeks and received approximately $200 to $280. She testified that she was 

cleaning one or two houses and offices at the time of the termination trial. 
4

C. First Removal When S.D.L.S. Was Born with Cocaine in Her System

A Family Based Safety Services (FBSS) case was opened in March 2010,

and the Department removed the children because Mother and S.D.L.S. tested 

positive for cocaine when S.D.L.S. was born. 

D. Domestic Violence

Mother attended counseling in November 2010 and reported to her 

counselor that her partner had been verbally and mentally abusive to her and her 

children throughout the relationship. The counselor‘s notes, which were admitted 

into evidence at the termination trial, state that the ―husband‖ abuses ―when they 

eat the food‖ and that he had recently threatened to hit Mother with a belt and 

had taken his belt off as if to hit her. The counselor‘s notes state that Mother‘s 

children had asked her to leave him and move them to a new home because 

they did not want to continue living in the home with him. Mother told the 

counselor that she takes her children out of the home when her partner is mad. 

Mr. D.L.S., the father of several of the children involved in this appeal and 

presumably the ―partner‖ Mother had mentioned during counseling, was arrested 

in November 2010 for sexually abusing Mother. Mother recalled telling the 

Victims‘ Assistance office that she did not want Mr. D.L.S. to go to jail because 

he would not be able to help her with the children and that was the only 

assistance that she had at that time. Despite that Mr. D.L.S. had sexually 

assaulted Mother, she wanted him free to support her because she was 

―struggling a lot being all by [her]self‖ and because, in Mother‘s opinion, he is a 
5

good father to the children. Mother‘s understanding was that ―he could be put to 

work‖ to support her. Mother believed that her problems started when Mr. D.L.S. 

mistreated her, not when S.D.L.S. tested positive for cocaine. 

E. Children Are Returned to Mother

Mother ultimately completed her FBSS services, and the children were 

returned to her. 

F. Second Removal When Y.S. Was Born with Cocaine in Her System

Elizabeth Cuevas, the Department caseworker for Mother, testified that 

Mother‘s children came into care in January 2012 because Mother and Y.S. 

tested positive for cocaine at Y.S.‘s birth and because Mother admitted to using 

cocaine while caring for the children. The Department attempted to place the 

children with Mother‘s roommate and Mother‘s mother, who were living in the 

home that the children had been removed from. Mother was not allowed to come 

back to the home, but she came back and locked her mother out so that she 

could not care for the children. Mother‘s roommate and Mother‘s mother were 

unable to protect the children from Mother.5The Department was thus forced to 

remove the children from the home.

After the Department removed the children, they drug tested all of the 

children, and S.D.L.S. tested positive for methamphetamine at twenty-two 

 

5Mother‘s mother told Cuevas that she was fearful of Mother and did not 

feel like she could be protective of the children. The ―Child‘s Service Plan‖ noted 

that ―Maternal grandmother fears [M]other and has to sneak out [of] the house 

with the children in order to bathe them and provide them with food.‖ 
6

months old.

6

 Mother told Cuevas that she did not know how S.D.L.S. had tested

positive for methamphetamine. Mother testified at trial, however, that she had 

left S.D.L.S. with her mother and sister and that ―they do have pills over there 

prescribed by the doctor.‖ 

Cuevas testified that when the children came into the Department‘s care, 

they were ―obviously neglected. They had infestations of lice that were very 

difficult to remove.‖ Cuevas said that one of the children was so delayed that the 

Department thought he could not speak either Spanish or English, but after 

working with the speech therapist, he was able to communicate. Cuevas testified 

that the children had ―come a long way‖ since the removal. At the time of the 

termination trial, all five children had been placed together in a dual-licensed,

adoption-motivated placement. 

Cuevas testified that Mother‘s oldest child, E.S.D.L.S., had made 

statements indicating that she had been abused or neglected. E.S.D.L.S. had 

stated that she had been withheld from school to take care of the children while 

Mother was not present, that Mother could be mean and violent towards the 

children, that all of the children had been locked in the closet as a form of 

punishment,7and that she wanted Mother to get help and to be nice to them. 

 

6

The notes from Cook Children‘s Hospital, where S.D.L.S. was taken for 

the drug test, reveal that she presented with bruises on her chest, chin, and right 

abdomen. 

7

The ―Family Service Plan‖ dated February 28, 2012 states, ―All children 

fear retribution as they have been locked in closets and denied food for not doing 
7

E.S.D.L.S. knew that Mother used drugs and said that Mother needed help. 

E.S.D.L.S. had inquired of Cuevas whether Mother was still using drugs and 

whether she was completing her classes to enable her to have the children 

returned.

G. Mother’s History of Drug Use

Mother started using cocaine after E.S.D.L.S was born in 1999.8 Mother 

used cocaine approximately four times while she was pregnant with S.D.L.S. 

Mother attended drug classes after she gave birth to S.D.L.S., but she used 

drugs again after taking the classes. 

Mother testified at the termination trial that she had previously used 

cocaine but that she was no longer a drug user. Mother last used cocaine in 

January 2012 on the day before she gave birth to Y.S. Mother testified that she 

has never lived in a drug house or in a house where other people used drugs. 

Mother testified that it was hard for her to discuss her cocaine use because 

she did not like ―[t]o tell what [she] was doing.‖ Mother said, ―I wasn‘t an addict 

or anything, but once in a while.‖ Mother testified that she was able to parent her 

children while she was using cocaine because, ―like I told you, I was not using as 

much and I wasn‘t an addict and I was always keeping an eye on my children.‖ 

 

what their mother wants.‖ The Court-Appointed Special Advocate‘s report noted 

that S.D.L.S.‘s only word was ―cucui,‖ which E.S.D.L.S. explained to her foster 

mother was a monster that Mother had said would ―get‖ S.D.L.S. if she made 

noise in the closet. 

8Mother testified that she had never used marijuana or methamphetamine. 
8

Mother was not initially aware that she had put her children in danger when she 

had used cocaine; according to notes from her counseling, Mother displayed a 

lack of insight into the role that substance abuse has played in her life and 

believed that she could stop using at any time. But at the time of the termination 

trial, Mother could see the damage of how she had hurt her children, was ―very 

remorseful,‖ and regretted using cocaine. Mother explained that she had hurt her 

children by using drugs, which had resulted in their being removed from Mother 

and in their missing the love and affection that she provides. Mother testified that 

she had changed a lot; at the time of the termination trial, she was thinking more 

about her children and behaving better with them so that the Department would 

return them to her. 

H. Mother’s Service Plan and Her Compliance

Mother‘s service plan in the present case required her to obtain an 

appropriate living environment for the children and to provide Cuevas with a copy 

of the leasing agreement; Mother, however, had not obtained an appropriate 

living environment for the children or provided Cuevas with a leasing agreement. 

Cuevas testified that throughout the case, Mother had never provided an address 

to enable Cuevas to make a home visit.9

 

9Nor had Mother provided Cuevas with information related to the location 

of her children‘s fathers. 
9

Mother‘s service plan required her to obtain legal employment and to 

provide Cuevas with monthly pay stubs; Mother had not provided documentation 

to show that she was employed at the time of the termination trial. 

Mother‘s service plan required her to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and 

Narcotics Anonymous meetings and to provide Cuevas with copies of the 

monthly sign-in sheets; Mother had not attended any meetings. Mother‘s service 

plan required her to locate a sponsor and to provide Cuevas with the sponsor‘s 

name and phone number; Mother had not done this. 

Mother‘s service plan required her to participate in individual counseling

with Opportunities Counseling Center; Cuevas testified that Mother had 

completed this task at the time of the termination trial.10 Contrary to Mother‘s 

testimony that the counselor at Opportunities Counseling Center had made a 

recommendation that the children be returned to Mother, the counselor, 

according to Cuevas, had recommended the opposite.

Mother‘s service plan required her to attend and to participate in Safe 

Haven‘s eight-week program for domestic violence; Mother had not completed 

this task. 

Mother‘s service plan required her to refrain from criminal activity and 

illegal acts; Cuevas was not aware of any criminal activity that Mother had 

engaged in. 

 

10Mother, however, testified that she had not participated in individual 

counseling during this case. 
10

Mother‘s service plan required her to attend all scheduled visitations with 

her children;11 Mother had missed three or four visits and had arrived late to 

some visits. Mother had not given reasonable explanations for arriving late to the 

visits, and the Department had canceled some visits because Mother had arrived 

more than twenty minutes late. The children had already been transported fortyfive to fifty minutes to attend the visits and then had to return without seeing 

Mother. The children did not like when Mother missed a visit; ―[i]t would upset 

them, especially [E.D.L.S.], the oldest child.‖

Mother‘s service plan required her to attend Resource Recovery for a drug 

assessment and drug treatment; Mother completed the drug assessment, which 

recommended that she attend outpatient services for six months. Mother 

completed half of her outpatient classes. Mother provided three oral swab drug 

tests during the case, which were negative, but she failed to appear for two 

requested hair follicle tests. 

Cuevas requested that Mother participate in the Safe Haven CPS classes. 

Mother testified that she had attended one class at Safe Haven on the Friday

before the termination trial. 

I. Mother’s Plan for the Children

Mother testified that she is ready to keep her five children safe. Mother

said that her sister-in-law would help her with the children. Mother testified that if 

 

11Mother‘s visits occurred every other Friday. 
11

the children were returned, she would live on 24th Street in the house with J. and 

his three children. Mother asked the trial court to allow her children to come live 

with her even though she did not have enough places for all of them to sleep at 

the two-bedroom house on 24th Street. 

J. Recommendations

Cuevas stated that she could not tell from interactions with Mother or her 

service providers whether Mother had made any lifestyle changes. Cuevas

testified that terminating Mother‘s parental rights was in the children‘s best 

interest. Cuevas asked that the Department be named the permanent managing 

conservator with the right to place the children up for adoption. 

The Court-Appointed Special Advocate‘s report stated that Mother had not 

demonstrated enough progress to reduce the risks associated with Mother‘s drug 

history, the extensive concerns regarding her instability, and her inadequate care 

of the children. CASA recommended that the trial court terminate Mother‘s 

parental rights to all five children. 

The children‘s ad litem, James Masek, testified that the trial court should 

follow the Department‘s recommendation because he had not seen a change in 

Mother‘s lifestyle and because the children were now thriving in foster care. 

K. Trial Court’s Disposition

After hearing the above testimony and reviewing the evidence, the trial 

court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had violated Texas 

Family Code section 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), and (P) and that termination of
12

Mother‘s parental rights to E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., and Y.S.

is in the children‘s best interest. This appeal followed.

III. LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 

BEST INTEREST FINDING

In her sole issue, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court‘s best interest finding. Specifically, Mother 

argues that insufficient evidence was introduced at trial indicating that Mother 

would not be able to adequately provide for the emotional, physical, mental, or 

spiritual needs of the children now or in the future; Mother contends that the 

evidence at trial—that she had accessed State of Texas benefits for the children 

and had fed them—is sufficient to conclusively demonstrate that she has the 

ability to care for and parent her five children.

A. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to 

erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, 

privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except the child‘s 

right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West 2008); Holick v. Smith, 

685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, ―[w]hen the State seeks to sever 

permanently the relationship between a parent and a child, it must first observe 

fundamentally fair procedures.‖ In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 n.1 (Tex. 2012)

(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–92 

(1982)). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe 
13

involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Id.; Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 

20–21.

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012), § 161.206(a) 

(West 2008). Due process demands this heightened standard because ―[a] 

parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value  ̳far more precious 

than any property right.‘‖ E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. 

at 758–59, 102 S. Ct. at 1397); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see

In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for 

termination and conservatorship). Evidence is clear and convincing if it ―will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of 

the allegations sought to be established.‖ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 

2008).

In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under 

section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one ground 

listed under subsection (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is 

in the best interest of the child. Id. § 161.001; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 

2005). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely 

on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of 

Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 

625, 629 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh‘g).
14

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination 

cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the challenged ground for 

termination was proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We 

review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment. 

Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder 

could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder 

could have disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is 

contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to 

termination if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence 

unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.

We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the appearance 

and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is the factfinder‘s province. Id. at 573, 

574. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer 

to the factfinder‘s determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id. at 

573.

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to 

the factfinder‘s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re 

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire 

record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that

termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the 

child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). 
15

If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder 

could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder 

could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its 

finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the 

child‘s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Prompt and 

permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be 

in the child‘s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2008). 

Nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact in a termination case may use in 

determining the best interest of the child include:

(A) the desires of the child;

(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future;

(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the 

future;

(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote 

the best interest of the child;

(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency 

seeking custody;

(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;

(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the 

existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
16

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted).12

These factors are not exhaustive; some listed factors may be inapplicable 

to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of 

just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. On the other hand, the 

presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a 

finding. Id.

B. Analysis of Evidence Under the Holley Factors

Mother focuses her combined legal and factual sufficiency argument on 

two of the Holley factors: the children‘s emotional and physical needs now and in 

the future and the parental abilities of the person seeking custody. We will weigh 

each of the nine factors set forth above.

With regard to the desires of the children, the evidence revealed that

E.S.D.L.S., the oldest child who had acted as the other children‘s caretaker while 

Mother had used drugs, had told the CASA volunteer that she did not want to 

return home. The CASA volunteer noted ―[t]he children are sometimes 

affectionate with their mother, seem at ease during visits, and are glad to eat the 

food their mother usually brings,‖ but ―the children have not displayed any 

noticeable emotion when leaving the visits.‖ Mother, however, told her counselor 

 

12Because Mother‘s appellate brief references and utilizes only the Holley 

factors in her analysis, we focus on these factors rather than the statutory 

factors.
17

in August 2012 that S.D.L.S. and P.H.D.L.S. seemed sad and cried when she left 

after a visit and that they told her that they want to live with her. The trial court 

was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination of at least 

Mother‘s parental rights to E.S.D.L.S.

With regard to the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in 

the future, the children require basic needs: food; shelter; clothing; routine 

medical and dental care; a safe, stimulating, and nurturing home environment; 

and friendships and recreational activities appropriate to their ages. Here, when 

the children came into care, they had untreated lice infestations that were difficult 

to remove, and S.D.L.S. was dirty and bruised; A.A.D.L.S. had not been enrolled 

in school, was developmentally delayed, and had speech difficulties; and 

E.S.D.L.S. had missed numerous days of school while she was in Mother‘s care. 

Mother also moved the children frequently as her housing situation fluctuated. 

Based on the physical neglect of the children by Mother and her housing 

instability, the trial court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of 

termination.

With regard to the emotional and physical danger to the children now and 

in the future, four of the five children were age six or under and could not protect 

themselves. The notes from Mother‘s counseling session three months prior to 

the termination trial states, ―Client does not appear to understand the importance 

of taking care of her and her children or protecting them from harm,‖ and ―[s]he 

has a long history of making poor judgments regarding decisions that affect her 
18

children.‖ The record demonstrates that Mother had lived with men who were 

abusive to both her and the children and that Mother was abusive to the children, 

locking them in the closet and scaring them with stories about monsters who 

would ―get them‖ if they were not quiet while they were locked in the closet. 

Mother had used cocaine and had given birth to two children who were born with 

cocaine in their systems, yet Mother minimized her drug use. Moreover, the trial 

court could have reasonably concluded that Mother either used 

methamphetamine or exposed the children to someone who had used 

methamphetamine because S.D.L.S. tested positive for the substance when she 

was removed from Mother‘s care following Y.S.‘s birth. Due to the prevalent 

physical abuse and drug abuse, the trial court was entitled to find that this factor 

weighed in favor of termination.

With regard to her parenting abilities, the evidence detailed above reveals 

that Mother did not provide for her children‘s physical and emotional needs and 

that she had not eliminated the physical and emotional dangers. The testimony 

at trial also demonstrated that Mother had not worked the bulk of her services, 

including finding employment and leasing a place to live that would 

accommodate her and her five children. Although Mother claimed to have 

changed a lot because she was thinking more about her children and behaving 

better with them, neither Cuevas, the children‘s ad litem, nor the CASA volunteer 

had seen Mother make progress in her parenting during the case. The trial court 

was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.
19

With regard to the programs available to assist Mother and to promote the 

best interest of the children, the record reveals that Mother‘s counselor provided 

her with information regarding community resources and strongly encouraged 

her to call and obtain information on them but that Mother ―usually agrees to call 

resources but doesn‘t follow up due to language, financial[,] & transportation 

barriers.‖ The record revealed that Mother had taken advantage of benefits from 

the State in the past in order to provide food for her children, but during the 

pendency of the case, she had not worked the services available to her to 

promote the best interest of the children. The trial court was entitled to find that 

this factor weighed in favor of termination.

Mother‘s plan for the five children was to move them into the two-bedroom 

house with her on 24th Street, in which five people were already living. The 

Department planned for the children to be adopted, and the children were in an 

adoption-motivated placement at the time of the termination trial. The trial court 

was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.

The stability of the home that Mother had proposed for the children was in 

flux, as she noted that J. could kick her out at any time. The record did not 

reveal any instability in the home that the Department had proposed for the 

children. The trial court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of 

termination.

With regard to the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that 

the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, the analysis set forth 
20

above—which details Mother‘s drug use; her failure to meet her children‘s 

physical and emotional needs; her failure to address the physical and emotional 

dangers to the children, including abuse and locking them in the closet; and her 

failure to take advantage of the services that were offered to improve her 

parenting skills—reveals that the existing parent-child relationship between 

Mother and each of the five children is not a proper relationship. The trial court 

was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.

With regard to any excuse for Mother‘s acts or omissions, Mother‘s 

counselor noted that Mother had struggled financially and had struggled due to 

the language barrier, that she lacked skills and a motivation to gain skills, and 

that she lacked follow-up on recommendations. Mother repeatedly failed to 

acknowledge her drug problem, even after going through FBSS services when 

S.D.L.S. was born with cocaine in her system. At the time of the termination trial, 

Mother had recognized that her drug use had hurt her children and testified that 

she regretted using cocaine. The trial court was entitled to find that this factor 

weighed neither in favor of nor against termination.

After weighing the evidence as it relates to the Holley factors, we hold that 

the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court‘s 

finding that termination of Mother‘s parental rights to her five children is in the 

children‘s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2); Jordan v. 

Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)

(holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court‘s finding 
21

that termination of mother‘s parental rights was in child‘s best interest when most 

of the best interest factors weighed in favor of termination); In re M.R., 243 

S.W.3d 807, 820–21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding evidence 

factually sufficient to support best-interest finding because parents exposed 

children to domestic violence and drug abuse, mother had failed to obtain 

housing and employment, and children flourished in foster care); In re J.L.C., 194 

S.W.3d 667, 675–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (holding evidence 

factually sufficient to support best-interest finding because although mother had 

attended parenting classes and was attempting to overcome her drug addiction, 

mother had difficulty putting her child‘s needs ahead of her own; had exposed 

child to drugs when pregnant and continued to use after child was removed; was 

involved in a life of crime, unemployment, homelessness, and addiction; and 

could not provide a stable home). We therefore overrule Mother‘s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Mother‘s sole issue, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment 

terminating her parental rights to E.S.D.L.S., A.A.D.L.S., P.H.D.L.S., S.D.L.S., 

and Y.S.

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: May 30, 2013