United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

August 1995 B-2 BOMBER

Status of Cost,

Development, and

Production

GAO/NSIAD-95-164

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-261736 

August 4, 1995

Congressional Committees

The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal

year 1994 called for us to report to the congressional defense committees

at regular intervals on the total acquisition costs of the B-2 bomber

program through the completion of the production program. Our first

report was issued on September 8, 1994.1

 This, our second report,

discusses (1) the Air Force’s progress in acquiring 20 operational B-2

aircraft2

 within cost limitations set by the Congress and (2) the extent of

the progress achieved in flight testing, production, and modification

efforts.

Results in Brief The 1994 Defense Authorization Act limits B-2 program acquisition costs

to $28,968 million, expressed in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars. A recent

Air Force cost estimate indicates the final cost for 20 operational aircraft

will be about $28,820 million in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars, or 

99.5 percent of the legislated amount. Expressed in then-year dollars, the

current estimated cost totals $44,389 million; 91 percent of this amount

has been appropriated through fiscal year 1995. Appendix II shows more

detailed funding information.

Although ground and flight tests have demonstrated the structural

integrity, flying qualities, and aerodynamic performance of the B-2’s flying

wing design, our review of the program’s progress indicates that there are

many important events yet to be completed. Many risks can impact the

ultimate cost and completion of the 20 operational B-2 aircraft. For

example, the flight test program is only about half complete, and

modification efforts required to deliver 20 fully operational B-2s did not

begin until July 1995. The completion of flight tests and the modification

efforts are scheduled concurrently, and deficiencies that are operationally

important or costly to correct could be identified before the test program

is completed.

After 14 years of development and evolving mission requirements,

including 6 years of flight testing, the Air Force has yet to demonstrate that

the B-2 design will meet some of its most important mission requirements.

1

B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-94-217, Sept. 8, 1994).

2

This includes 5 test aircraft to be reworked to an operational configuration and 15 production aircraft.

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As of May 31, 1995, the B-2 had completed about 44 percent of the flight

test hours planned for meeting test objectives.

Test progress has been slower than planned. The test program is planned

for completion in July 1997, but our analysis of the tests to be completed

and the time that may be needed to complete them indicates that

completion by July 1997 is optimistic. Our analysis of the Air Force’s

planned efficiency in completing flight testing shows that the Air Force

might need an additional 55 aircraft test months3

 to complete test program

objectives as currently planned.

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the test program will be

completed by July 1997, as currently planned. To provide additional test

time, the Air Force is considering extending the time that test aircraft will

remain in the active flight test program. It is also exploring ways to

consolidate flight tests or reduce them to ensure flight test objectives will

be completed by the planned date. The Air Force expects to complete an

assessment of the test program in August 1995 but could not provide

details of its assessment at the time we completed our review.

The flight test program depends on timely delivery of effective integration

software to bring together the functions of the various B-2 subsystems so

that the aircraft and crew can perform the planned military functions. In

the past, B-2 integration software was delivered late, without all the

planned capabilities, and with deficiencies that significantly affected the

Air Force’s ability to complete flight testing on schedule. Software has

been a source of development problems on other aircraft such as the B-1

and C-17.

The change in emphasis on the B-2 mission from nuclear to conventional

increased the need to integrate precision conventional weapons into the

B-2 aircraft. The B-2 is to be equipped with an interim precision weapon,

Global Positioning System (GPS) Aided Munition (GAM), and finally with the

Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). An important precision weapon

recently canceled was the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile. Funding to

integrate that missile with the B-2 was included in the B-2 cost limitation.

Depending on when design information is available, integration costs for a

replacement weapon, and any other new weapons, may be funded

separately and may not be counted as part of the B-2 cost limitation.

3

An aircraft test month is the availability of one test aircraft for 1 month. It equates to about 20 gross

flight test hours.

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After 9 years of producing and assembling aircraft, Northrop Grumman,

the prime contractor, continues to experience difficulties in delivering

B-2s that can meet Air Force operational requirements. For the most part,

aircraft have been delivered late and with significant deviations and

waivers. All corrections are scheduled to be incorporated into B-2 aircraft

during planned modification programs scheduled for completion in

July 2000. Incorporation of precision strike capabilities is also to be

completed as part of the planned modification program.

DOD, in February 1995, concluded a lengthy effort to define a depot support

plan. The plan includes a mix of contractor and organic support for

defined functions and components.

More detailed information on these issues is included in appendix I.

Agency Comments DOD partially agreed with the findings in this report. DOD agreed that

significant events needed to deliver 20 fully operational B-2s have yet to be

completed, but it did not believe our report adequately addressed the

progress and successes achieved in the B-2 program. DOD emphasized that

approval of the depot support plan was a major accomplishment and

restated several accomplishments that we believe were adequately

covered by the report. DOD stated that it expects to complete the B-2

development and test program within established budgets and the overall

limitation established by the Congress. The DOD response and our

comments are included in appendix III.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed available documents and records and interviewed officials at

the B-2 program office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the

Combined B-2 Test Force, Edwards Air Force Base, California; the Air

Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the 509th Bomb

Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri; DOD and the Department of the

Air Force, Washington D.C.; and the Northrop B-2 Division, Pico Rivera

and Palmdale, California. Documents included cost estimates, financial

and program management reports, test schedules and plans, delivery

acceptance reports, and many others that allowed us to assess the current

status of the B-2 program. Interviews with Air Force and contractor

financial and technical managers provided information on issues not

included in formal reports.

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We performed our review from September 1994 through July 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other

interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix IV.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to

Complete the B-2

Program

8

History of the B-2 Program 8

Air Force Estimates B-2 Costs Will Be Less Than the

Congressional Limitation

10

Most B-2 Funds Have Been Appropriated 12

Status of B-2 Flight Testing 12

B-2 Deliveries Are Behind Schedule 18

Modification Program Plans Still Evolving 20

Appendix II 

B-2 Program Fiscal

Year 1996 President’s

Budget

22

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

23

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

30

Tables Table I.1: Amounts Included in Cost Estimate for Defined

Requirements, Contingencies, Reserves, and Undefined Efforts

11

Table I.2: Estimated Unit Costs of B-2 Bombers in Constant Year

1995 and Then-year Dollars

12

Table I.3. Status of Block 20 and Block 30 Flight Testing for

Essential Employment Capabilities

14

Table I.4: B-2 Delivery Performance through June 30, 1995 19

Figure Figure I.1: Overlap in B-2 Flight Testing, Production, and

Modification Efforts

9

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Contents

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAM GPS Aided Munition

GPS Global Positioning System

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

MILSTAR Military Strategic Tactical Relay Program

OT&E operational test and evaluation

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

TF/TA terrain-following/terrain-avoidance

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

History of the B-2

Program

The B-2 development program was initiated in 1981 and was followed by

approval in 1987 to procure B-2 aircraft concurrently with development

and testing. The Air Force’s early plans were to acquire 132 operational

aircraft; however, the number was reduced in the early 1990s to 

20 operational aircraft. At about the same time, the B-2’s mission emphasis

was changed from being principally a strategic bomber capable of

delivering nuclear weapons to a conventional bomber capable of

delivering precision-guided munitions.

B-2 operational requirements specify that the B-2 weapon system have low

observable characteristics and sufficient range and payload to deliver

nuclear weapons or precision-guided conventional weapons anywhere in

the world with enhanced survivability. The B-2 combines conventional and

state-of-the-art aircraft technology, such as special shaping and radar

absorbing materials, to achieve low observability (stealth) characteristics,

high aerodynamic efficiency, and large payload capacity. The blending of

these technologies makes it a complex and costly aircraft to develop and

produce.

The Air Force plans to initially accept the 15 B-2 production aircraft in

three configuration blocks: the first 10 in a block 10 configuration, the

next 3 in a block 20 configuration, and the last 2 in a block 30

configuration. The configurations are to be based on capabilities that are

to be demonstrated during the flight test program. Air Force officials said

the block 10 configuration, for which testing has been essentially

completed, basically provides a training aircraft with limited combat

capability. Block 20-configured aircraft are intended to have an interim

precision strike capability that does not exist in block 10. Aircraft to be

delivered in a block 30 configuration, after completion of all development

and operational tests, are planned to be fully effective for conventional as

well as nuclear operations. Test aircraft, which have been modified to

incorporate most block 20 and block 30 features, are being flown in the

ongoing flight test program to demonstrate these capabilities. Initial

delivery of all aircraft is scheduled to be completed by January 1998.

To enhance the capability of the aircraft initially accepted in block 10 and

block 20 configurations, the Air Force has developed modification

programs. As a near-term interim capability enhancement, the Air Force

plans to upgrade five block 10-configured aircraft to a block 20

configuration by March 1997. It also plans to modify all block 10 and block

20 aircraft to the block 30 configuration and to rework five test aircraft

into a block 30 configuration by July 2000. Figure I.1 shows the

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

concurrency in the B-2 development, production, and modification

programs.

Figure I.1: Overlap in B-2 Flight

Testing, Production, and Modification

Efforts

The Department of Defense (DOD), in February 1995, announced its plan

for providing depot support for the B-2. The plan includes a mix of

commercial and organic sources for providing various functions and/or

maintaining various components. For example, the engines are to be

maintained by the Air Force, software support is to be provided by

commercial sources, and airframe maintenance is to be provided by

Northrop Grumman at Palmdale, California.

As of January 1995, about 50 percent of the B-2 supplier base for raw

materials and standard parts was inactive. In addition, major

subcontractors had completed delivery of major aircraft subsections

needed for assembling the B-2 weapon system. For fiscal year 1995, the

Congress appropriated $125 million to protect the option to produce

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

additional B-2s for 1 year. These funds are in addition to the congressional

cost limitation.

On February 9, 1995, the Air Force awarded a contract to Northrop

Grumman, the prime contractor, for $92.8 million to reestablish critical

industrial base capabilities to support a potential subsequent purchase of

additional B-2s. The contract includes an effort for a base period valued at

$50.4 million and four contract options to extend the period of

performance. Efforts to be accomplished include (1) establishing source

or capabilities for critical unavailable or out-of-production parts,

(2) updating work orders and manufacturing plans, (3) restoring selected

facilities, and (4) providing and validating tooling for production.

Participants include Northrop Grumman, major subcontractors, and other

vendors that have either completed or will soon complete B-2 program

activities.

Air Force Estimates

B-2 Costs Will Be Less

Than the

Congressional

Limitation

The Air Force estimates that acquisition of the B-2s can be completed for

$28,820 million (1981 dollars), which is about 99.5 percent of the

congressional limitation in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars. In then-year

dollars, the Air Force’s estimate is $44,389 million, which includes

$24,808 million for development and $19,581 million for procurement. As

shown in table I.1, the estimate includes about $1,324 million for

contingencies and other reserves.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

Table I.1: Amounts Included in Cost

Estimate for Defined Requirements,

Contingencies, Reserves, and

Undefined Efforts

Then-year dollars in millions

Cost category

Defined requirements $43,065

Undefined efforts:

Potential contract cost overruns $206

Contract contingencies:

Delivery incentives $63

Ozone depletion liability 1

Environmental and health 62

Rate adjustments 125

Idle facilities 130

Total contract contingencies 381

Management reserve:

Procurement $463

Development 274

Total undefined efforts $737

Total contingencies and undefined efforts 1,324

Total estimated cost $44,389

The Air Force’s cost estimate to complete the B-2 program included

$43,065 million for defined requirements and amounts for potential costs.

The amount shown for potential contract cost overruns is related to the

Northrop production contract and is in addition to the estimated cost at

completion of the contract as shown in the B-2 Selected Acquisition

Report as of December 31, 1994. Including such amounts in the cost

estimate indicates that the Air Force may be expecting further schedule

delays and cost difficulties in completing the contract.

DOD commented that it believed the use of contingent liabilities and

management reserves represented prudent steps to deliver B-2 capabilities

and remain within the cost limitation. Although we agree that such actions

may be prudent, we nevertheless continue to believe that including such

large amounts for a potential cost overrun in the cost estimate indicates

the expectation that such an event is a reasonable possibility.

Unit Costs of B-2s The unit costs for B-2s, expressed in different categories, are shown in

table I.2. These cost categories are consistent with categories the Air

Force used to explain projected costs of 20 additional B-2s proposed by

Northrop Grumman. Costs included in each category were (1) recurring

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Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

flyaway costs incurred for the manufacture of each aircraft; (2) total

aircraft flyaway costs, which included recurring flyaway costs and certain

nonrecurring costs; (3) procurement costs, which included flyaway costs

and support costs; and (4) program acquisition costs, which included

procurement costs as well as development and military construction costs.

Table I.2: Estimated Unit Costs of B-2

Bombers in Constant Year 1995 and

Then-year Dollars

Dollars in millions

Category

Constant 1995

dollars

Then-year

dollars

Recurring flyaway costa $965 $907

Aircraft flyaway costa 1,086 1,027

Procurement costa 1,362 1,305

Program acquisition costb 2,517 2,247

aUnit flyaway and procurement costs were based on production of 15 B-2 bombers.

bSince 5 test aircraft are to be modified into operational aircraft as part of the development

program, the program acquisition unit cost is based on 20 B-2 bombers.

Most B-2 Funds Have

Been Appropriated

Almost 91 percent of the $44,389 million total estimated cost to complete

the B-2 program has been provided to the Air Force through fiscal year

1995. The Air Force’s cost estimate included $3,988.1 million in research,

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funding that

remains to be appropriated from fiscal years 1996 through 2004. Appendix

II shows more detailed funding information for this period.

Major efforts remaining within the RDT&E program are flight testing and

modifications to the five test aircraft to make them fully operational. The

major efforts still to be funded in the procurement appropriation involve

procuring spares, software support, and other support.

Status of B-2 Flight

Testing

Significant flight testing remains to validate performance of key B-2

subsystems as well as to demonstrate the full operational capability of the

B-2 weapon system. As of May 31, 1995, almost 6 years after the flight test

program began, the Air Force had completed about 44 percent of flight test

point hours planned to meet objectives. Achieving test objectives has been

hampered primarily by software problems and late aircraft deliveries.

Because significant amounts of testing remain to be completed by the

scheduled July 1997 completion date, the Air Force has been reassessing

schedule and content of the test program.

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Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

Most Operational

Effectiveness Testing for

Block 20 and Block 30

Configurations Has Not

Been Done

The remaining testing creates the potential that further deficiencies that

are operationally important and/or costly to correct could be identified.

Although test points, including structural integrity, flying qualities, and

handling are essentially complete, critical flight testing to demonstrate the

operational effectiveness of block 20 and block 30 configurations remains.

Of 4,503 test points planned to be demonstrated for block 20 and block 30

configurations, about 1,270, or about 28 percent, had been completed as of

February 1995. Some significant B-2 features to be tested did not have

approved test points or procedures as of February 1995.

Significant testing is planned to demonstrate that the B-2 meets its

essential employment capabilities for block 20 and block 30-configured

aircraft as defined by the Air Force. Meeting the essential employment

capabilities requires demonstration of the (1) radar and other aircraft

signatures to ensure low detectability, (2) defensive avionics system to

permit B-2 crews to respond to adversary defenses, (3) terrain-following

and terrain-avoidance (TF/TA) system to permit low level flight, (4) radar

and navigation systems to ensure safe and accurate navigation and

targeting, and (5) integration of weapon systems to ensure accurate and

effective destruction of targets. Table I.3 shows some of the test points

planned to demonstrate that the block 20 and block 30 configurations can

effectively meet the essential employment capabilities and the number of

test points completed as of February 28, 1995. Test points are considered

complete when flight test aircraft have flown the test points and an

analysis indicates that appropriate and sufficient data were collected.

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Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

Table I.3. Status of Block 20 and Block 30 Flight Testing for Essential Employment Capabilitiesa

Block 20 Block 30

Essential employment capability Test points

Test

points

completed

Percent

complete Test points

Test

points

completed

Percent

complete

Signature NA NA NA 1,241 149 12

Mission effectiveness 591 59 10 284 0 0

TF/TA system 35 29 83 542 120 22

Radar 214 20 9 286 22 8

Navigation 16 8 50 4 0 0

Fixed target effectiveness 269 189 70 127 69 54

Command and control 2 2 100 0 NA NA

Air refueling 2 0 0 14 10 71

All weather/flying qualities 864 593 69 NA NA NA

Mission planning 6 0 0 6 0 0

Total 1,999 900 45 2,504 370 15

aThe Air Force provided updated test point data as of May 31, 1995, that had a net increase of

3,134 test points. This increase has not been reviewed or verified and is therefore not included in

this table.

In late June 1995, the Air Force provided updated test point information

through May 31, 1995, that showed a net increase in test points of 3,134 for

block 20 and block 30 aircraft. This increase makes the total test points

7,637. Most of the test points added (3,524) were in the all weather/flying

qualities category of essential employment capabilities and were shown as

completed at the time they were added. The addition of this significant

number of completed test points has changed the percent complete for the

identified block 20 and block 30 test points from 28 percent to 62 percent.

We did not review the new test point information to ascertain its accuracy

or basis for being added.

Some critical tests have not been planned and/or approved. These tests

include dedicated operational test and evaluation (OT&E) flight testing, as

well as

• some functions of the defensive avionics system,

• the interface and operability with the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),

• some features of a subsystem integration effort called GPS Aided Targeting

System,

• the interface with Military Strategic Tactical Relay Program (MILSTAR),

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Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

• the contrail management system, and

• the interface and operability of MK-82 and MK-62/M117 weapons.

Progress and Issues in

Remaining Test Efforts

Achieving test objectives on the planned schedule has been hampered by

late delivery of test aircraft, modifications to correct problems, software

problems, changes to the B-2 primary mission, and other factors. Selected

test issues and test progress in some critical operational features are

described below. Test progress measures discussed below represent only

the completion of test points for block 20 and block 30 capabilities and do

not include the significant amount of flight testing completed for the block

10 capabilities.

Radar Signature Achieving acceptable radar signatures, the most critical stealth feature

needed for B-2 operational effectiveness, has been a problem. Of 1,241 test

points defined for block 20 and block 30 configurations, 149 (12 percent)

had been completed as of February 1995. Difficulties in achieving the

planned radar signatures in early B-2 flight tests resulted in intense

follow-on tests, modeling of corrective designs, modifications to test

aircraft, and substantial retesting. Temporary, but achievable, radar

signatures were defined by the Air Force for acceptance of block

10-configured aircraft; however, the block 10 radar signature does not fully

meet the contract specifications or essential employment capability

defined for a block 30 conventional precision strike mission.

The planned block 30 configuration is to include changes to achieve the

final planned radar signatures for both conventional and nuclear

operations. However, testing of the changes on a block 30-configured

aircraft cannot begin until August 1995, when modifications are scheduled

to be completed on a test aircraft. The planned block 30 radar signature

will not conform to all parameters of the original contract radar signature

specifications; however, the block 30 signature has been determined to

meet operational requirements and be as operationally effective as the

original signature specifications.

Mission Effectiveness Planned demonstration of mission effectiveness includes tests to evaluate

the B-2’s survivability. Of 875 planned test points, 59 (7 percent) had been

completed as of February 1995. Test categories include detection and

survivability testing, defensive avionics testing, and dedicated OT&E.

The purpose of detection and survivability testing is to evaluate whether

an adversary’s defenses can detect the B-2 and determine the degree of

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Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

survivability of the B-2 against simulated or real threat systems. This

testing started in December 1994 with a B-2 test aircraft that had not been

modified to the planned block 30 radar signature. The Air Force has

declined to discuss test results until the testing is completed. More

operationally realistic survivability testing will be done with a B-2 test

aircraft that has been modified with the block 30 radar signature.

Defensive avionics are important for providing the crew accurate and

timely information on the locations of adversary weapon systems that may

be a threat to the aircraft. However, no defensive avionics are included in

the block 10 configuration. In our September 1994 report, we noted that

flight testing of the defensive avionics was stopped in April 1994 because

two of four frequency bands were too easily overloaded, making them

inoperable. A more complete design of the defensive system software is

supposed to correct the overload problem and provide the capability that

is to be incorporated in the block 20 configuration by July 1996. Although

testing resumed in March 1995, it is too early to determine if testing will be

completed on schedule.

Dedicated OT&E for the block 20 configuration is scheduled for March and

April 1996 and for the block 30 configuration in July 1997. However, the

Air Force has not approved test plans for the block 30 configuration.

TF/TA subsystem The TF/TA subsystem has encountered numerous problems in testing. Of

577 TF/TA test points planned, 149 (26 percent) had been completed as of

February 1995. Our September 1994 report pointed out that subsystem

testing below 600 feet had been delayed from May 1994 to June 1995

because of the immaturity in radar software and other radar problems.

According to Air Force officials, the most critical radar milestone

remaining for this subsystem is the radar failsafe analysis, which is needed

to begin TF/TA flight testing below 600 feet and is scheduled for June 1995.

As of July 19, 1995, the failsafe analysis was not complete, but Air Force

officials said it would be complete by August 1995.

Additional problems were identified in 1995. For example, problems with

the phased array radar antenna delayed TF/TA testing and could be a

reliability issue in the future. Further, Air Force officials told us the TF/TA

mode of the B-2 radar cannot distinguish rain from other obstacles,

making the subsystem inoperable in the rain. These officials said they

were trying to find a solution to these problems.

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Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

Fixed Target Effectiveness B-2 flight testing is to evaluate the integration of munitions and precision

weapons with the B-2. Of 396 planned test points, 258 (65 percent) had

been completed as of February 1995. GPS Aided Munition (GAM), which is

the first and an interim munition with enhanced accuracy, began B-2 flight

testing in April 1995, and it is scheduled to be certified for use by

June 1996. JDAM will replace GAM and is scheduled to complete testing by

July 1997.

Other precision weapons for the B-2 have not been identified and will

probably not be integrated until after the initial program is completed. For

example, the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile, which was to have

provided an important standoff capability for the B-2, was to be integrated

within the program’s cost limitation. Integration costs for its replacement,

and any other new weapons, may require funds in addition to the B-2 cost

limitation, depending on when the replacement or new weapons are

available.

Test Schedule and Content

Being Reassessed

The Air Force will find it difficult to complete the test program by July

1997 as currently planned. As of May 31, 1995, the Air Force had flown

2,690 hours, or 61 percent, of the estimated 4,400 flight test hours required.

The 4,400 test hours includes flight time to a test area, refueling time, and

other non-productive flight time. The Air Force has only been able to

complete 1,189, or 44 percent, of the estimated 2,720 test point hours (or

flight test hours actually available to conduct detailed tests) needed to

satisfy specific test objectives.

Our analysis of the Air Force’s planned efficiency in completing test

requirements and the amount of testing required to complete the test

objectives shows that the Air Force might need an additional 55 aircraft

test months. Air Force officials pointed out they are capable of exceeding

planned efficiency rates for flight testing during selected and short periods

of actual testing. However, they have not been able to sustain this level of

performance over time. They said they are considering extending the

amount of time that test aircraft will remain in the active test program,

which will require the Air Force to change the schedules for upgrading the

test aircraft to the block 30 configuration.

Air Force officials are concerned about the amount of flight tests that

remain and intend to complete the test program as currently scheduled

(July 1997). To ensure the planned schedule can be achieved, the Air

Force has been analyzing the content and schedule of remaining flight

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Program

tests. Air Force officials are also considering ways to reduce or

consolidate tests or improve test efficiencies. For example, the Air Force

is considering limiting tests to those necessary to demonstrate essential

employment capabilities instead of requiring completion of all

specification tests, which in some cases would be more demanding and

time-consuming and, according to Air Force officials, may not be

necessary to demonstrate current B-2 mission requirements.

The flight test program depends on integration software to bring together

the functions of the various B-2 subsystems so that the aircraft and crew

can operate as a military weapon system. Integration software is required

for subsystems such as offensive and defensive avionics, the TF/TA

subsystem, navigation subsystem, flight controls, and crew/cockpit

instrumentation. In the past, B-2 integration software was delivered late,

without all the planned capabilities, and with deficiencies that had an

adverse impact on the Air Force’s ability to complete flight testing on

schedule. Additional deliveries of integration software are scheduled for

September 1995 through January 1997 to support the flight test program.

The past delays in delivering effective software contribute to the Air

Force’s concern that the current flight test schedule might not be

achievable.

At the time of our review, the Air Force’s analysis of the test program

content and schedule and development of a plan to complete block 20 and

block 30 testing and delivery had been ongoing for several months and

was not complete. Details as to how the test program will change were not

available.

B-2 Deliveries Are

Behind Schedule

As of June 30, 1995, 6 flight test aircraft and 7 of 15 production aircraft had

been delivered. The first seven production aircraft were delivered, on

average, 57 days behind schedule and had major deviations and waivers.

Actions to correct deviations and waivers are to be included in the block

30 modification program.

The Air Force has provided financial incentives for Northrop Grumman to

deliver both production and block 30 modified aircraft earlier than the

contract schedule. Northrop Grumman, however, was not able to deliver

the first seven aircraft at the accelerated schedule dates. For these and

other reasons, the Air Force and Northrop Grumman are developing a

delivery schedule that more closely represents the contract schedule.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

Late Deliveries of Aircraft

Having Numerous

Deficiencies

Northrop Grumman has delivered seven production block 10 aircraft with

an average of 65 major deviations and waivers. Of the first seven aircraft

delivered, two were delivered on time in accordance with the contract

schedule. Table I.4 shows the delays in delivery based on the contract.

Table I.4: B-2 Delivery Performance

Through June 30, 1995

Aircraft

Actual

delivery date

Contract

delivery date

Days

late

Major

deviations/

waivers

8 12/11/93 12/17/93 –6 57

9 08/16/94 03/30/94 139 61

7 08/29/94 08/29/94 0 58

11 10/27/94 10/18/94 9 61

10 12/29/94 07/25/94 157 75

12 02/16/95 01/20/95 27 66

13 06/26/95 04/14/95 73 79

A principal cause for these delays was unacceptable performance

discovered during production flight acceptance testing. In particular, these

delays reflect the problems that Northrop continues to have in

manufacturing aircraft with an acceptable radar signature. Because of the

problems, additional time was required to investigate anomalies, fix or

repair problems, and do several more acceptance flight tests than planned.

The delivery delays would have been even greater had the Air Force not

accepted those aircraft with several deviations and waivers to the

specification. Some of these were expected at the time of delivery because

of the overlap of production with developmental flight testing. Others,

however, represented manufacturing problems.

The average number of major deviations and waivers on the seven

delivered production aircraft was 65, but the total number has increased

on the more recent of these seven deliveries. For example, the first

production aircraft was delivered with 57 major deviations and waivers.

The seventh production aircraft was delivered with 79—34 of which were

identical to ones on the first aircraft. These deviations and waivers do not

preclude the aircraft from being used for training, but they do affect the

aircraft’s capability and restrict how the aircraft will be flown. Also, in a

few cases, some deviations, such as nonconforming tailpipe coatings and

deficient high frequency radio performance, preclude the B-2 from having

the minimum level of mission capability.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

Deviations and waivers included radar signature performance that did not

meet operational requirements, incomplete offensive and defensive

avionics capabilities, and aircraft structures that did not meet design

requirements—radar radome, elevons, rudder, and aft deck. Some of these

deviations have reduced the way the B-2 can be used. For example, the B-2

wing receives a special coating to protect it from rain damage when flying

through a rain storm. The coating applied during production was

discovered to be inadequate when flown in moderate to heavy rain,

resulting in damage to delivered aircraft. The Air Force restricted flying

these aircraft in rain until this coating could be replaced with one that

meets design requirements.

Accelerated Schedule

Being Reassessed

In December 1993, Northrop Grumman adopted an internal plan to

accelerate deliveries of the last two production aircraft and of block

30-modified aircraft. Northrop believed an accelerated schedule would

provide a higher probability of achieving contract schedule and offer

significant cost savings. The Air Force concurred and agreed to pay

Northrop a maximum award fee of $50 million if it met the accelerated

schedule and accomplished certain other management actions.

Although the contract provides for an incentive to accelerate delivery, the

Air Combat Command is not able to support aircraft delivered in

accordance with the contract schedule. This Command reports it has

shortages in B-2 operations and maintenance funds totaling $249 million

for fiscal years 1997 through 1999. According to Command officials, the

expected funding will not support the contract schedule and the

accelerated schedule would make the funding shortage worse. In addition,

the accelerated schedule could result in (1) aircraft being delivered that

were less complete than previously planned and (2) insufficiently trained

crews and staff that would be needed to effectively operate more B-2s. The

Air Force and Northrop Grumman are reassessing the accelerated

schedule.

Modification Program

Plans Still Evolving

Modifications, which began in July 1995, are scheduled to be complete in

July 2000 and are scheduled to require 15 to 30 months per aircraft over

this 5-year period. The modifications are scheduled to be done

concurrently with the remaining flight testing of critical subsystems and

overall demonstrations of operational capability. These modifications are

necessary, in part, as a result of (1) assembling aircraft before the design

problems and limitations were discovered in development tests,

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of Efforts to Complete the B-2

Program

(2) deferring actions to correct manufacturing-related problems, and

(3) changing the mission emphasis from nuclear to conventional.

Northrop estimates the price of the modification programs, excluding

conventional mission improvements, to be $820 million. However, this

estimate is subject to change since the scope of the block 20 and block 30

modification programs continues to evolve and will likely continue to

change as flight testing and manufacturing, which will be concurrent,

uncover new problems. If this results in aircraft being delivered with

limited operational capability and in post-delivery modifications, as did the

overlap between initial production and flight testing, then modifications

beyond block 30 may be needed, which will increase costs. Until the

details of the new schedule are defined and agreed upon and the scope of

effort is more defined, the schedule risks and costs associated with the

block 20 and block 30 modifications cannot be fully assessed. Further,

estimated costs for the block 30 modification program were based on an

assumption that deliveries would be accomplished on Northrop’s

accelerated schedule, which caused the estimate to be lower than if the

estimate were based on the more realistic contract schedule. If Northrop

fails to achieve the accelerated schedule, the estimated cost of the

modification program is likely to increase.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix II 

B-2 Program Fiscal Year 1996 President’s

Budget

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 10-11.

See comment 2.

Now on pp. 13-15.

See comment 3.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 1.

Now on pp. 15-16.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 16.

Now on p. 17.

See comment 5.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 17-18.

See comment 6.

Now on pp. 18-20.

See comment 7.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 20.

See comment 8.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated July 25, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. Additional information concerning this matter has been added to the

body of the report.

2. DOD’s comment and our evaluation are included in the body of the

report.

3. The applicable section of the report was modified to recognize that the

structural, flying qualities, and aerodynamic performance tests were

essentially complete.

4. The purpose of our analysis was to show the amount of testing

remaining to be completed to demonstrate the essential capabilities of a

conventional conflict capable B-2 (block 20 and 30 aircraft). DOD did not

provide an alternative method or data for measuring the testing remaining

to be accomplished.

5. Although development of a replacement weapon for the Tri-Service

Standoff Attack Missile is currently under consideration, the Air Force has

received no direction concerning integration of the potential replacement

weapon with the B-2.

6. DOD officials told us they believe the test program will be completed by

July 1997 as currently planned, but recognize that certain planned tests

that are no longer needed will be eliminated. Air Force officials noted that

an evaluation of the test program is near conclusion and is to be reported

to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in August 1995.

7. The form DD250 acceptance document lists both major and minor

deviations and waivers. Our report—table I.4—shows only the major

deviations and waivers; however, DOD counted all deviations and waivers

as major when preparing its response to our report.

8. This section of the report was revised to reflect the DOD comments that

the operational impacts of the schedules are being continually reassessed.

We note that the DOD comments did not refute the position taken by the

Air Combat Command that earlier delivery of block 30 aircraft could not

be accommodated with existing operations budgets.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Robert D. Murphy

Cincinnati Regional

Office

Michael J. Hazard

Jeffrey T. Hunter

Los Angeles Regional

Office

James F. Dinwiddie

(707044) Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-164 B-2 Bomber
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