[Cite as State v. Cobb, 2024-Ohio-2608.]

COURT OF APPEALS

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

 Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.

Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

-vsCase No. 2023 CA 0051

BRYANT KEITH COBB

 Defendant-Appellant O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Richland County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 0497

R

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 8, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JODIE SCHUMACHER DARIN AVERY

Prosecuting Attorney 105 Sturges Avenue

Richland County, Ohio Mansfield, Ohio 44903

MEGAN HOBART 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

38 South Park Street, Second Floor

Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0051 2

Hoffman, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Bryant Keith Cobb appeals the judgment entered by 

the Richland County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of no contest 

to possession of a fentanyl-related compound (R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(11)(d)) and 

possession of cocaine (R.C. 2925.11(A),(C)(4)(c)), and sentencing him to an aggregate 

term of incarceration of six to nine years. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On June 6, 2022, Electronic Monitoring Officers Andrew Armstrong and 

Daniel George visited Appellant’s home. Appellant was on electronic detention 

supervision with Officer Armstrong. Appellant previously signed a document containing 

the conditions of his electronic supervision conditions, which included Appellant’s consent 

to a search of his person, motor vehicle, or place of residence, without a warrant and at 

any time, by a supervising officer. Officers Armstrong and George went to Appellant’s 

home to search for weapons Officer Armstrong had instructed Appellant to dispose of. In 

addition to finding the weapons in Appellant’s home, the officers found suspected 

controlled substances.

{¶3} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury with possession 

of a fentanyl-related compound as a second-degree felony, possession of cocaine, 

tampering with evidence, possession of a fentanyl-related compound as a fourth-degree 

felony, and possession of tramadol. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence taken 

from his house. The trial court overruled the motion, finding Appellant consented to the 

search of his home and person when he signed the conditions of electronic detention 

supervision.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0051 3

{¶4} Appellant pled no contest to the charge of possession of a fentanyl-related 

compound as a second-degree felony and possession of cocaine. The remaining charges 

were dismissed. Appellant was convicted upon his pleas of no contest and sentenced to 

an aggregate term of incarceration of six to nine years. It is from the August 25, 2023 

judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.

{¶5} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, 

the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve 

questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 1995-Ohio-243; 

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer 

to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those 

findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, (4th 

Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this 

Court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of 

law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing 

State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, (4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States 

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, (1996). That is, 

the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard 

of review. Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn 
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0051 4

from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra

at 698.

{¶6} Appellant argues his consent to search was involuntary because his only 

options were to sign the conditions of electronic detention supervision or go to prison. 

The Ohio Supreme Court has held the fact a defendant is faced with two unattractive 

choices does not invalidate consent to search:

As the Carchedi court stated: “In deciding to accept the terms of a 

commutation and parole, a prisoner is forced to choose between the 

prospect of continued incarceration and the prospect of an agreement which 

may somehow restrict his or her constitutional rights. The government, in 

effect, is offering to allow the prisoner to regain his or her freedom in return 

for a promise to abide by rules which, to a greater or lesser extent, limit the 

exercise of fundamental rights. In this respect the transaction is no different 

from other agreements in which the government conditions its grant of a 

substantial benefit on the relinquishment of a known constitutional right.” 

Id., 560 F.Supp. at 1016.

{¶7} State v. Benton, 82 Ohio St.3d 316, 321, (1998).

{¶8} We find the fact Appellant was faced with the choice to sign the consent to 

search as a condition of his electronic detention supervision or go to prison did not render 

the consent involuntary, based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Benton, supra. 

The assignment of error is overruled.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0051 5

{¶9} The judgment of the Richland County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, J.

Gwin, P.J. and

King, J. concur