UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 02-1077
L I Z Z I E K. M A Y FI ELD , A PP EL L ANT ,

v. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Re mand fr om t he U. S. Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F e de ra l Cir c uit
(De cided De cembe r 21, 2006 )

Linda E. Blauhut

and Michae l P. Horan , both of Washington, D.C., wer e on the brief f or the a pp e lla nt. Paul J. Hutter , Ac tin g Ge ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , As sis tant G e ne ra l Co un se l; David L. Quinn , Deputy Assistant Gene ral Counsel; and Alice M. Szynk lewski , all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief

for the a ppellee.
Be fore GREENE, Chief Judge , and KASOL D and MOO RMAN, Judges

. KASOL D, Judge : L izz ie K. May field, the surviving spouse of veter an E s t ey M ay fi eld, appea ls through c ounsel a May 23, 2002, decision of the Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd) that de nie d h e r c la im f

or de pe nd e nc y

and ind e mni ty

c omp e ns a tio n ( DI C) be c a us e he r h us ba nd ' s d e a th was not ser

vice c onnecte d. Mrs. May field' s arguments on appea l all center ed on the a dequac y of the notice she ha d been pr ovided, as re quired by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) a

n d 3 8 C

. F.R. § 3.159(b) , and whether the Boa rd had provided an adequate statement of re asons or ba ses for its dec ision that noti ce was suff icient. An April 2005 decision of this Court aff irming the B oard' s decision on this matter

wa s re vers e d b y

the U. S. Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F e de ra l Cir c uit

(F e de ra l Cir c uit ) b e c a

us e thi s Court had found that the r equire d section 5103(a ) notice ha d been pr ovided by a Mar ch 15, 2001, letter c ontained in the rec ord on appea l but not a ddresse d by the B oard. The matter wa s remande d2

for f urther a ction. See Mayfield v . Nicholson , 444 F.3d 1328 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006) [hereinaf ter Mayfield II

]. I n light of the Feder al C ircuit' s limit ed determination that this Court made a f actua l finding from the rec ord t hat s hould have been made by the B oard in the f

irst instance, this Court remande d the matter for t he li mited purpose of the Boa rd' s rende ring a finding as to the ade quacy of the notice pr ov ide d in

thi s c a se
. Pur su ant t

he re to, the B oa

rd fo un d th a t th e Ma

rc h 2 00 1 le tte r p ro vid e d M rs
. M ay f ie ld th e n o ti c e r e qu ir e d b y s e c ti o n 5 1 0 3 ( a ) an d § 3

. 159(b). S ee Lizz ie K. M

ay fie ld , BV A 0 0

- 1 4 2 7 4 , a t 3 ( Su

p p le me n ta l D e c is io nA u g
. 8 , 2 0 0 6 ) [h e r e in a f te r Su p p
. D e c
. ]. Mrs. M ay f

ie ld c o n te n d s th a t th e B o ar d e r r e d w h e n it ( 1 ) f

o u n d th a t th e n o ti ce she was pr ov ide d w a s a de qu a te , ( 2) de te rm ined t hat a Janu ary 20 02 Sup ple me nta l State me nt o f t he Ca se (S SOC ) w a s a

su bs e qu e nt d e c isi on

on he r c a se , a

nd (3 ) r e lied on ha

rm le ss e rr or

a s a ba sis fo r i ts finding that notice wa s adequa te. See Appellant' s Supplemental Memorandum of L aw ( App. Supp. Memo.) at 6- 15 (filed Sept. 11, 2006). The Secre tary rebuts ea ch ar g ument, and fur ther a sserts that the dec ision of the Boa

rd is plausible and not cle arly err oneous, and that it should be af firmed. See Secre tary ' s Supp. Response to Appellant' s Memorandum of L aw at 2-8 (filed Sept. 25, 2006). F or the re asons stated be low, the Court will affirm the Ma y 23, 2002, decision of the Boa rd as supplemented by

the B oard' s Aug ust 8, 2006, finding that notice was a dequate

.

I. AN AL YSI S OF ISSU ES A. Adequa cy

of Notice A B oard f inding r eg ardingthe ade quacy of notice is a finding of fact t hat ca n be set a side or

reve rsed if it i s clea

rly err oneous. See O verton v . Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 427, 432 ( 2006) (c iting M a y fi e ld I I , 4 4 4 F.3d at 1335 (whethe r sec tion 5103(a) notice provided wa s adequate is a fa ctual de t e r m i n a t i o n t o b e m a d e b y t h e B o ar d i n t h e f i r s t i n s t an c e )

. N o t i c e m ay a l s o b e d e f e c t ive a s a matter of law, and revie w of this ty pe of a sserted e rror

is conducted de novo. See , e.g. , Mayfield II , 4 4 4 F. 3 d at 1333 (holdi ng as a matter of law that postdecisional documents do not satisfy section 5103(a) notice re quirements). The req u i re m en t s of sec tion 5103(a) a re w ell established. Upon r ece ipt of a complete or sub s ta n ti a ll y c o mp le te a

p p li c a ti o n , th e Se c r e ta

r y is r e qu ir e d

to a d v is e th e c la im an t o f w hat3

informati o n o r ev idence , if any , is nece ssary to substantiate the claim, and w ho is responsible for providing what, if a

ny , information or e vidence

. See 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 3( a ); Mayfield II , 444 F.3d at 13 32 ; O v e r ton , 20 Vet .App . at 43 3; Quartuccio v . Principi , 1 6 V e t

. A p p
. 1 8 3 , 1 8 7 ( 2 0 0 2 )

. In ad d i t i o n , t h e S ec re t ary

i s re qu i re d t o "r eq u es t t h at t h e cl ai m an t p ro v i d e a n y ev i d en ce i nt h e c l ai m an t 's possession that pertains to the cla im." 38 C .F.R. § 3.159(b)( 2) (2006). I n this inst ance , the B oard found that such notice had bee n provided to Mrs

. M ay fi el d , including notific ation of the ty pes of evidenc e that she should submit. See Supp. Dec. at 6-7. Mrs. May field ar g ues that, contra ry to the Bo ar d 's fi n ding, the Marc h 2001 letter did not provide a dequate notice. She conte nds that section 5103(a ) re qui re s ca s e-specific notifica tion of what evide nce is mi ssing from her application that is nece ssary to substantiate her c laim and that the statut e is co ns tr

ue d too narr ow ly if g e ne ra l noti fi c a tio n of w hat is ne e de d to su bs tanti a te a

c la im i s pe rm itt e d to su ff

ic e
. I n su pp or t of he r c on te nti on s, Mr s. Ma y fi e ld m or e sp e c if

ic a lly argue s th a t to be ade quate, not i ce m u s t "expressly descr ibe the kind of e vidence neede d to substantiate her particula r cla im," and that section 5103(a) cannot be satisfied by advising her of the " nature of the evidenc e" that is nece ssary to substantiate her c laim. App. Supp. Memo. at 8. She further contends that notification to submit additi onal evidenc e that supports her claim does not satisfy

section 51 03 (a ), and of

fe rs by wa

y of e xamp le the pr op os iti on

that if e vid e nc e fr om a

pa rt ic ula r s pe c ia lis t is require d to substantiate her c laim, she should be so notified. I t is not e ntirely clea

r what fine distinction Mrs. May field seeks to make betwe en notification of the " nature of the e vidence " ne cessa ry to substantiate a cla im and notification of the " kind of evidenc e" neede d to substantiate a claim. Certainly , to the extent she arg ues that g ener al notification to submit evidenc e that supports her claim ca nnot satisfy

section 5103(a), s h e is corr ect. See M a y fie ld II , Overton , and Qu ar tuc c io , a ll su pra . Equally

cer tain, if evidenc e fr om a par ticular specia list i s require d to substantiate a claim, the claimant should be notified of that require ment. Id .;
s ee a l s o Dingess v. Nicholson , 1 9 V e t

. A p p
. 4 7 3 , 4 8 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ( w h e na p p l i c a t i o ns u g g e s t s s p e c if ic information is require d to substantiate claim, notice must be tailore d to so notify claimant). Howeve r, neither of the above circ umstances exis ts in Mrs. Ma y field' s case . Although, a s the B oard f

ound, she wa s n o tified to provide any evidenc e that supports her claim, it was

su pp le me nta

ry to t he mor e sp e c if

ic no tic e sh e wa s p ro vid e d a s to wh a t w a s n e c e ssa ry to s ub sta nti a te4

her c laim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) ( requiring t h at n o t i ce i nclude a "r equest that the c laimant pr ov ide any

e vid e nc e in t

he c la ima nt' s p os se ssi on

that pe rt a ins to the c la im" ); Sup p. De c . at 3- 6; R

. at 833-36. Othe r sec tions of the M ar ch 2 0 0 1 l et t er, as found by the B oard, infor

med her of the in formation or evidence nece ssary to substantiate her c laim and who is responsible f or providing what, if a ny , information or e vidence

. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a); S u p p
. De c. at 3-6; R. at 833-36. Mrs. May field does not de monstrate that the Boa rd' s finding s are clea

rly err oneous. See O verton , 20 Vet.App. a

t 4 3 5 ( " T he appe llant car

ries the bur den of pe rsuasion re g ardingcontentions of er ror." );

se e als o Locklear v . Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 410, 416- 17 (2006) (Court unable to f ind error when

argume nts are " fa

r t oo te rs e to w arr ant d e ta ile d a na ly sis by

the Cou rt " ); Coker v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.Ap p
. 4 3 9, 442 (2006) ( "Court r equire s that an appe llant plead with some par ticularity the al l ega t i o no f e rr o r s o t h at t h e C o u rt i s ab l e t o re v i ew an d as s es s t h e v al i d i t y

o f t h e ap p el l an t 's arguments.")

. Withre g ard

to b e ingno tif

ie d w he n e vid e nc e fr om a pa rt ic ula r s pe c ia lis t is nec e ssa

ry to substantiate a c laim, Mrs. May field does not cite to a ny authority for the proposition that evidence fr om a pa rt ic ula r s pe c ia lis t is re qu ir e d to su bs tanti a te he r c la im, and the Court c an f ind no ne . I t is

se lf -e vid e nt t hat if su c h e vid e nc e is n ot r e qu ir e d to su bs tanti a te a c la im, the re is n o r e qu ir e me nt t o
no tif y Mr s. May fi e ld t

hat it is. Fur ther, to the e x tent Mrs. May field ar g ues that sec tion 5103(a) r equire s notification of the sp e c if ic ina de qu a c ie s in

the e vid e nc e su

bmi tte d w itha

c la im a pp lic a tio n, thi s argume nt w a s r e c e ntl y reje cted be cause such ac tion would require a ssessing a nd w e ig h in g th e in f o r mation prior to rende ring a dec ision on the claim. See Lock lear , 20 Vet.App. at 416. Such prea djudication is simply not called for by section 5103(a ), and suc h a pre liminary adjudication would be inc onsistent with the entire statutory scheme g overningthe adjudication of a VA claim, which provides for an extensive revie w and appeal process. Se e Di ng ess , 19 Vet.App. at 489-91 (ana ly zing statutory

scheme of sec tion 51 03 (a ) n oti c e ); see also Jarre ll v. Nicholson , 20 Ve t.A pp . 326 , 330 -3 2 (e n banc ) ( dis c us sin g c la im pr oc e ssi ngand

a pp e a ls) ; Be rn ar

d v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 384, 392- 93 (1993) ( citing, e.g. , 3 8 U .S. C. §§ 5104, 7105(d)( 1) and 38 C.F .R. §§ 3.103(a), 19.29, 19.131 ( 1992)). As noted above , section 5103(a ) re quires pre adjudicator y notice that is provided by the Se c re tary up on re c e ipt of a c omp le te or

su bs tanti a lly

c omp le te a

pp lic a tio n. Th e " du ty

to n oti fy de a ls5

wi th evi den ce gath eri ng, n ot th e anal y si s o f alread y gathe red evi den ce." Locklear , 20 Vet.App. at 415. Be cause the g ather ing of information and e vidence prec edes the Secre tary ' s analy sis and adjudication of the claim, and be ca u s e s ec t ion 5103(a) de als only with information and evide nce g a the ri ngpr ior to the ini tia l a dju dic a tio n o f a c la im, " it w ou ld b e se ns e le ss t o c on str ue that st a tut e as imposing upon the Secre tary a leg al obligation to rule on the pr obative value of information and

e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in conne c tio n w itha c la im p ri or

to r e nd e ri nga

de c isi on on the me ri ts o f t

he c la im it sel f." Id. at 416. Upon re view of the rec ord as a whole, the B oard' s finding that Mrs. May field wa s provided adequate notice c oncer

ning how to substanti at e h er claim, as re quired by section 5103(a ) and § 3.159(b), is plausible and not c lear ly err oneous. See Ove rton , 20 Vet.App. at 432 (citing Mayfield II

, 4 44 F .3 d at 13 35 ); se e als o Supp. Dec. at 3.

B . Su pp le me nta l State me nt o f t he Ca se Mrs. May field fur

ther a rg ues that the January

2002 SSOC s h e wa s p ro v ided is not an

" a dju dic a tio n d e c isi on " on he r a pp e a l. A pp
. S up p. Me mo. a t 10 -1 1. She the re fo re c on te nd s th a t, even if the Marc h 15, 2001, notice letter provided a dequate section 5 1 03(a) notice, she w as not the re a ft e r p ro vid e d a

n a dju dic a tio n o f h e r c la im that sh e c ou ld a pp e a l to t he B oa rd , a s is re qu ir e d to

r e me dy in a d e qu a te n o ti c e p r io r to th e in it ia l a d ju d ic ation. S

ee Mayfield II

, 444 F.3d at 1333-34 (timing-of

-notice e rror s can be "c ured" by notification followed by rea djudicati o n ); Pricke tt v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 370, 376 (2006) ( "T he F eder al Circuit specific ally mentioned two re medial

meas u re s : (1) The issuance of a f ully compliant [section 5103(a)] notification, followed by (2)

re a dju dic a tio n o f t

he c la im. " ); Pelegrini v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 112, 122- 24 (2004) ( "pr oper subsequent VA pr ocess" can c ure er ror in ti ming of notice). H er a

rg ument, howeve r, is without merit. This argument was re cently reje cted by

this Court i n Pr ic k

e tt , 20 Vet.App. at 377-78, which held that a Statement of t h e C as e (S OC ) that complies with all applica ble due pr ocess a

nd notification requir ements constitutes a re adjudication dec ision. There is no statutory

or re g ulatory

prohibition on the use of an SSOC to announce a decision

a ft e r t he re a dju dic a tio n o f a

c la im. I ndeed, th e re g ulatio ns c on te mpl a te that an SSO C ma y be so used, althoug h an S SOC may also be used to a

nnounce othe r cha

ng es since the last SOC or SS OC was issued. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.31 (SSOC "w ill be fur nished," inter alia, w hen " additional pertinent6

evidenc e is rec eived a fter a n [S OC] or the most recent [SS OC] has been issued" or " for a ny other

rea son the [S OC] or a prior [SS OC] i s inadequate" ), 19.37 (a) (2001) (whe n, afte r an a ppeal ha s been initiated but before it is t ransf err ed to the B oard, e vidence is re ce i v ed by the VA r eg ional office (RO), it " will be ref

err ed to the appr opriate r ating or auth o ri z ati on activity for r eview and dispositi on ," a

nd, there afte r, i f an SOC or S SOC had previously been issued, the R O will issue a new SSOC (empha sis added))

. Fur ther, a lthough Mrs. Ma

y field notes that the c over le tter to the January 2002 SSOC states that it is " n o t a d ec i s i o n o n the appe al" and ar g ues that this indicates that the SSOC was not an adjudicative de cision at all, she fa ils to not e that this cover letter also stated that the SSOC contains chang es or a dditions t o the orig inal SOC and advised her that she had 60 da

y s to submit additional information or the matter would be returne d to the Boa rd. R. at 1048. Mor eover , the J anuar y 2002 SSOC expli citly

states that " [s] ervic e connection for the ca use of [Mr. May field' s] death is denied," and this statement is pr ovided direc tly under the subheading "D ecision" and followe d by a sec tion titled "R ea s o n s and B ases" in which the RO explains the basis for the de cision. I n fac t, had the J anuar y SSOC been se nt without a cover letter, it ea s ily

could have been c onstrued as a final decision. Take n in context, t he cove r letter is not a de scription of the SSOC as a nonadjudicative decision; rathe r, it is notice that the SSOC is not the final decision on her appea l. The J anuar y 2002 SSOC complied with the applica ble due pr ocess a nd notification requir ements for a dec ision, see Pr ic k e tt , su pra , a nd , base d o n th e re c or d a s a wh ole , th e B oa

rd ' s f a c tua l de te rm inatio n th a t Mr s. May fi e ld' s " c a se was read judic a te d in

[the Janu ary

20 02 SSO C]" is p la

us ibl e and

no t c le a rl y
e rr on e ou s. Sup p. De c . at 8; R. at 15 5- 56 ; se e als o B utt s v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 532, 535 (1993) ( en ba nc ) ( qu e sti on s o f f

a c t r e vie we d und e r t

he " c le a rl y e rr on e ou s" sta

nd ard se t f or th i n 3 8 U .S. C. § 7261(a) (4))

. C. Authority of the B oard to Consider Ha rmless Error Mrs. May field lastly argues that, beca use the statutes c reating a nd g overningthe B oard do not expl icitly state t hat t he Board may consider ha rmless err or, the B oard la cks the a uthority to do

so. Mrs. May field is r efe rring to the Boa rd' s finding that "a

ny defe ct with respe ct to the timing of the [section 5103(a)] notice wa s harmless er ror." Supp. De c. at 8. I n support of her proposition, she notes that 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) dir ects the Court to take due ac count of the ru l e o f prejudicial7

err or. She fur

ther a rg ues that no such dire ction is provided in the statutory provisions g overningthe Boa rd. See R ussello v. United Stat es , 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (" ' [W ]here Cong ress include s pa rt ic ula r l a nguag e in o ne se c tio n o f a statut e bu t om its it i n a

no the r s e c tio n o f t

he same Ac t, i t is g ener ally presumed that Congre ss acts intentionally and purpose ly

in the disparate inclusion or

ex cl u s i o n
. '" ( qu o t i n g United S t a t es v. W ong Kim Bo , 4 72 F .2 d 7 20 , 7 22 (5 th C ir . 1 97 2) )) . M rs
. May f i e l d c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s o m i s s i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t C o n g r e s s d i d n o t i n t e n d f o r t h e B o a rd

to consider ha

rmless err or. He r conte ntion fails for the r easons state d below. F ir st, it d oe s n ot f

oll owthat, be c a

us e Con g re ss inc lud e d a dir e c tiv e to the Court that it mu st

c on sid e r harmless e rror

in ever y case , the l ack of

such direc tion to the Boar d means that the B oard is not permitted to c on sid e r h arm le ss e rr or . T o th e e xten t th e int e rp re tiv e c ano n r e lie d o n b y Mr s. May field and e nunciated in Ru sse llo , su pra , is a pplicable here , its application would lead only to a

c on c lus ion t hat th e Board is n ot r e qu ir e d to c on sid e r h arm le ss e rr or in a ll o f i ts c a se s, no t th a t it could not consider harmless e rror when a ppropriate . Moreove r, the interpr etive ca non relied on by Mrs. May field applies whe n the statutory provisions are spe aking to the same related conce pt. That canon is inapplica

ble her e bec ause the statutory provisions in question speak to the obliga tions of the Cou rt and of the B oa rd , two sep arate e nti tie s w ithe nti re ly dif fe re nt p ur po se s and pr oc e dure s. Com pa re 38 U.S.C. §§ 7100-7112 (Boa rd) with 38 U.S.C. §§ 7200-7299 (Court). Se c on d, any

c on c lus ion

tha t th e B oa rd may no t c on sid e r t

he do c tr ine of

ha rm le ss error i s inconsistent with reg ulation, see 38 C.F .R. § 1 9. 9 ( 20 06 ) ( pr ov idi ngtha t a re mand by the B oa rd to the RO to c or

re c t a pr oc e dura l de fe c t is re qu ir e d o nly wh e n " e sse nti a l f

or a pr op e r a pp e llate de c isi on " ); see also Chev ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) ( Court give s defe renc e to executive depa rtment' s regula

ti o n ma king r easona

ble interpre tation of statutory

scheme ), as we ll as the adjudicativ e and appellate natur e of the Boa rd, cf

. Be rn ar d , 4 Vet.App. at 394 ( holding that Boa rd must assess pre

judice bef

ore a ddressing issue not addre ssed by RO). Finally , the B oard f

ound in this case that Mr s . May field wa s provided ade quate notice , fo llo we d b y re a dju dic a tio n of he r cl a im an d a rig ht to ap pe a l to the B oa rd . T his fi nd ingis p la

us ibl e in light of the record as a whole and is not clea rly err oneous. Se e Gi lbe rt v . D e rwi ns k i, 1 Vet.App. 49 , 52 -5 3 (1 99 0) (s ta tin g that the Court re vie ws fa c tua l fi nd ing s of the B oard un der a “cl e a rl y8

err oneous” standa

rd of r eview) . As a matter of law, the provision of ade quate notice followed by

a re adjudication "c ures" any timing problem associate d with ina dequate notice or the lack of notice prior to an initial adjudication. See M ayfield II , 444 F.3d at 1333-34. Thus, assuming arguendo that the B oard la cks authority

to find harmless er

ror in its own rig ht, suc h finding in this ca se wa s nonprejudicia l. Id . at 1337 ( Court sh a ll t a ke du e a c c ount o f t he ru le of pr e jud ic ia l e rr or ); se e als o 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( b) (2 ); Conway v. Principi , 353 F.3d 1369 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004).

II. CO NC LU SION T h e M ay 2 3 , 2 0 0 2 , d ec i s i o no f t h e B o ar d , as s u p p l em en t edb y i t s Au gu s t 8 , 2 0 0 6 , fi n d i n g, is AFF I RMED.