United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Readiness, Committee on Armed

Services, House of Representatives

October 1994 DOD FORCE MIX

ISSUES

Greater Reliance on

Civilians in Support

Roles Could Provide

Significant Benefits

GAO/NSIAD-95-5

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-257847 

October 19, 1994

The Honorable Earl Hutto

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request, this report identifies opportunities for the services to achieve

operational efficiencies and budget savings through greater use of civilian personnel in support

positions. On average, each civilian support employee costs about $15,000 less per year than a

comparably graded military person. The report also addresses the need to include requirements

for civilian employees and contractors in contingency planning processes to ensure that they

will be fully prepared to deploy to future conflicts, when needed. This report contains

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the

secretaries of each of the military services.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and House Committees on

Appropriations and Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Director, Office of Management

and Budget; the Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; and the

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. Copies will also be made available to other interested parties

upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military Operations

and Capabilities Issues, who may be reached on (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any

questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Frank C. Conahan

Assistant Comptroller General
Executive Summary

Purpose As the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to downsize its work

forces, DOD officials increasingly express concern for maintaining high

operational requirements. Using civilians in support positions has been

cited as a cost-effective way to help ensure that the best use is made of

military personnel.

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House

Armed Services Committee, GAO examined DOD’s guidance and

decision-making processes for determining whether to use civilians or

uniformed personnel. Specifically, GAO examined (1) DOD and the military

services’ efforts to replace military personnel in support positions with

civilian employees and (2) the adequacy of planning for the future use of

civilian employees and contractor personnel to support military

operations in combat areas. GAO also followed up on actions taken to

correct problems identified after DOD and the services assessed civilian

deployments to the Persian Gulf War.

Background The structure of the armed forces is based on the DOD Total Force Policy,

which recognizes that all elements of the structure—such as active

military personnel, reservists, civilian employees, defense contractors, and

host nation military and civilian personnel—contribute to national

defense. Civilian employees have been associated with the military

establishment since the American Revolution, and today remain a

significant part of DOD. Over time, civilians have filled support positions

that were previously held by uniformed personnel. In fiscal year 1994,

civilian employees constituted approximately one-third of DOD’s active

personnel, performing functions such as airplane, ship, and tank repairs;

communications and logistical support; and operation and maintenance of

military installations. Many civilian employees have agreed to continue to

perform these functions in foreign areas and to deploy to armed conflicts,

as needed, to support the military forces. Thousands of other civilians

support DOD under contracting arrangements.

Results in Brief Although DOD and the military services have general policies to use civilian

personnel where possible, the services currently use thousands of military

personnel in support positions that, according to DOD and service officials,

could be civilian. Replacing these military personnel with civilian

employees would reduce peacetime personnel costs and could release

military members for use in more combat-specific duties.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Executive Summary

DOD and the services have made various efforts to use more civilians by

converting military positions to civilian ones in the past, but the results

have not been well documented. The extent of change appears limited,

since the ratios of military and civilian personnel have not changed

significantly in recent years. Managers are reluctant to replace military

personnel with civilian employees because, with current downsizing, both

positions might be lost. Budget allocations and civilian personnel

requirements decisions often have been made in isolation of each other,

and sometimes have prevented officials from receiving sufficient funds to

support civilian replacements.

Some DOD and service officials have informally cited potential

deployability to a theater of conflict as a basis for maintaining military

incumbency. As demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War, however,

deployability was not a basis for excluding civilians, although problems

occurred because of inadequate attention to civilian deployment planning.

The services have taken actions to correct some of the problems identified

during the Persian Gulf deployment, but they have not completely

identified their future potential wartime requirements for DOD civilian

employees or contractor personnel who perform combat-essential

functions nor taken adequate steps to ensure that these personnel will

continue their services during future crises.

Principal Findings

Opportunities Exist to

Replace Military Personnel

in Support Positions With

Civilian Employees

The services have assigned many military personnel to support functions,

such as personnel management and data processing, that are typically

performed by civilian personnel and do not require skills gained from

military experience. The services use military personnel and civilian

employees, in varying degrees, to perform similar functions, which

suggests that more support positions could be filled by civilians. For

example, 17 percent of the Air Force’s computer operators are civilians,

while about 68 percent of the Army’s computer operators are civilian, and

about 53 percent of the Navy’s are civilian.

Based on aggregate data for major job categories within each service, GAO

identified thousands of positions that seem to have potential for civilian

incumbency, but are instead now held by military personnel. Although

using civilians has operational and budgetary advantages, determining the

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Executive Summary

appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel requires judgment by

DOD officials. Operationally, civilians provide more continuity in certain

positions and release the military for combat-specific functions; on the

budget side, they are generally less costly than military personnel. Some

DOD-sponsored cost studies indicate that, on average, a civilian employee

in a peacetime support function costs the government about $15,000 less

per year than a military person of comparable pay grade.

Impediments Limit the

Future Replacement of

Military Personnel in

Support Positions With

Civilians

According to several DOD and service officials, decisions to use military or

civilian personnel are often made by military leaders who prefer to use

military personnel because they believe they can exercise greater control

over such personnel. DOD directives and service regulations provide

general guidance to help managers decide when military or civilian

personnel should be used; however, the existing guidance allows for broad

interpretations. Managers who are inclined to use military personnel can

fill support positions with military members for reasons such as training,

discipline, rotation, background, or even tradition.

Service officials are reluctant to identify existing military personnel in

certain support positions to replace with civilian employees, in part,

because civilian requirements and budget allocation decisions are often

made independently of each other. Local commanders fear that, because

of downsizing, they might not receive adequate funds to hire civilian

replacements, or that they might even lose the replacement positions

through civilian reduction targets imposed from higher headquarters. For

example, at one location GAO visited, 2,200 military positions were

identified in 1991 for replacement by civilian employees. A command

official said the command lost about 2,000 of these military personnel, but

gained only 800 civilians. According to this official, the command’s budget

was reduced, in part, due to downsizing, before civilians could be hired.

When funds are allocated to replace military personnel with civilians in

support positions, the services may not have to use the funds for that

purpose. Funds for civilian personnel are derived from several accounts

that may be used for a variety of purposes. For example, in addition to

civilian personnel costs, the operation and maintenance appropriation

funds expenses such as the purchase of fuel, supplies, and repair parts for

weapons and training of military personnel.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Executive Summary

Improved Planning Is

Needed for Future Civilian

Deployments

Civilian employees and contractor personnel have historically supported

the military forces in wartime theaters of operations. While many

opportunities exist for greater peacetime use of civilians, a need also

exists to better identify those who might have to deploy to operational

theaters and properly prepare for such situations. Available DOD reports

show that over 5,000 DOD civilian employees and nearly 9,200 contractor

personnel voluntarily deployed to the Persian Gulf area to support the

military forces during the Gulf War. However, the services were not fully

prepared to deploy civilians to combat zones. This lack of preparation

resulted in many problems; some—such as civilians deploying without gas

masks and without proper training in their use—could have had serious

consequences.

Although DOD and the services are currently addressing many of the

administrative problems associated with civilian deployments that were

identified in the Gulf War, they have not adequately addressed several

important operational issues affecting future deployments. Requirements

for civilian support functions in theaters of operations have not been

included in joint staff and service contingency planning processes. Civilian

employees who perform essential combat-support functions have not been

completely identified, screened for medical fitness, and trained in basic

survival skills.

DOD does not have reasonable assurances that essential combat support

provided under commercial contracts during peacetime will continue to be

performed during future crises. The services do not know how many

contractor personnel perform essential combat-support functions,

although a 1990 DOD instruction requires them to review existing contracts

and determine which functions are combat-essential. While some DOD

officials dismiss the significance of this issue, stating that contractor

companies should be responsible for knowing how many personnel might

need to deploy, GAO believes that proper identification of such civilians is a

necessary first step to ensuring that they are adequately trained and

prepared to deploy, if needed.

Recommendations GAO is making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) increase the use of civilians in

peacetime support positions and (2) ensure that essential functions

provided by DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel will be

continued in future contingencies.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Executive Summary

Agency Comments DOD concurred with all of GAO’s findings and recommendations and agreed

to take action to address the recommendations. (DOD’s comments are

presented in their entirety in app. V.)

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Civilians Are a Significant Component of DOD’s Work Force 10

Prior Efforts Replaced Some Military Personnel With Civilians 11

Different Systems for Military and Civilian Personnel Affect

DOD’s Costs and Control Over Its Forces

12

DOD Policies for Determining Personnel Requirements 13

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 15

Chapter 2 

Opportunities Exist

for More

Cost-Effective

Peacetime Use of

Military and Civilian

Personnel

18

Many Military Personnel Perform Civilian Support Functions 18

Variations Exist Among and Within the Services 20

Replacing Military Personnel With Civilians Can Save Personnel

Costs and Achieve Operational Benefits

22

Impediments Limit the Services’ Ability to Achieve

Military-to-Civilian Conversions

25

Conclusions 28

Recommendations 29

Agency Comments 29

Chapter 3 

Civilian Deployment

Problems During the

Persian Gulf War

Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

30

DOD Used Thousands of Civilian Employees and Contractors in

Combat Areas During the Persian Gulf War

30

Operational Planning Shortfalls Created Problems With Civilian

Deployments to the Persian Gulf War

31

Some Corrective Measures Are Being Taken 33

Operational Planning for Future Contingencies Does Not Fully

Integrate Civilian Roles

34

Conclusions 38

Recommendations 39

Agency Comments 39

Appendixes Appendix I: Active-Duty Military and Civilian End Strengths for

Selected Fiscal Years

40

Appendix II: Civilians Within the Military Services as a

Percentage of Personnel by Programming Categories

43

Appendix III: Comparison of Military and Civilian Compensation 46

Appendix IV: Civilian Specialists Deployed to the Persian Gulf

War

50

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Contents

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense 51

Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report 55

Tables Table 1.1: Active-Duty Military and Civilian End Strengths for

Selected Fiscal Years, as of January 1994

11

Table 1.2: Military Positions Targeted for Conversion to Civilian

During Fiscal Years 1991 through 1993

12

Table 2.1: Enlisted Military Personnel and Civilian Equivalents

Occupying Support Positions DOD-wide, as of November 1993

19

Table 2.2: Variations Among the Services in Using Enlisted

Military Personnel to Fill Civilian Equivalent Positions

21

Table 2.3: Number of Military Positions That Can Potentially Be

Replaced With Civilians

23

Table 2.4: Differences Between Annual Government Costs for

Military and Civilian Personnel Stationed in CONUS, for Selected

Comparable Pay Grades, as of January 1994

24

Table 3.1: DOD Civilians and Contractor Personnel Deployed for

the Persian Gulf War

30

Table II.1: Civilians Within the Military Services as a Percentage

of Personnel by Programming Categories for Fiscal Year 1987

43

Table II.1: Civilians Within the Military Services as a Percentage

of Personnel by Programming Categories for Fiscal Year 1994

43

Table III.1: 1994 Average Cost Comparison of Annual Military and

Civilian Compensation Between Comparable Pay Grades in

CONUS

46

Table III.2: 1994 Annual Regular Military Compensation,

including retirement benefits, in CONUS

48

Table III.3: 1994 Annual Civilian Compensation in CONUS 49

Abbreviations

CONUS Continental United States

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

RMC Regular Military Compensation

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Civilians comprise a significant portion of the Department of Defense’s

(DOD) personnel strength; civilian employees alone account for one-third

of DOD’s full-time work force. These civilians provide important support to

military combat forces in peacetime and in war. Some deploy and provide

needed support within theaters of operation.

With the transition to an all-volunteer active-duty military force, DOD

adopted the “Total Force” policy in 1973, which recognized that the

reserves, retired military members, civilian government workers, and

private contractor personnel could add to the active forces in ensuring the

national defense. The objectives of DOD force management policies are to

(1) maintain, during peacetime, as small an active-duty military force as

possible and (2) use civilian employees and contractor personnel

wherever possible, to free the military forces to perform military-specific

functions. In 1990, DOD reported to the Congress that in implementing the

Total Force policy, it had, among other things, improved use of the DOD

civilian employee, contractor, and host nation support communities.1

Civilians Are a

Significant

Component of DOD’s

Work Force

In fiscal year 1994, DOD’s programmed civilian end strength was estimated

at 923,000 personnel, with an estimated cost of about $42 billion in salaries

and benefits. These civilians work for each of the military services; in

Defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency or the Defense

Finance and Accounting Service; and in other organizations, such as the

Offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Civilian employees currently represent over one-third of DOD’s total

full-time equivalent force. This ratio has remained relatively constant since

1987, as table 1.1 shows. (App. I shows the same information by service

and the Defense agencies.)

1

“Host nation support” refers to civilian and/or military assistance rendered in peace and war by a

foreign nation to the U.S. military forces located on or in transit through the host nation’s territory.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Active-Duty Military and

Civilian End Strengths for Selected

Fiscal Years, as of January 1994

Numbers in thousands

Fiscal year Military Civilian Total

Percent

civilian

1987 2,174 1,133 3,307 34.3

1993 1,705 937 2,642 35.5

1994 1,611 923 2,534 36.4

1995 1,526 873 2,399 36.4

1996 1,496 846 2,342 36.1

1999 1,453 794 2,247 35.3

Source: Office of the DOD Comptroller.

Note: Figures for prior years are actual; figures for the current and future years are projected as of

January 1994.

As table 1.1 also shows, both military and civilian personnel end strengths

have declined since 1987, when DOD was at its peak strength. Based on its

fiscal year 1995 budget, DOD estimates that, by 1999, it will achieve a

33-percent reduction in its military end strength and a 30-percent

reduction in civilian end strength since 1987.

While most civilians support the military forces both at home and abroad

in peacetime and at home during times of war, some civilians historically

have deployed with and supported the military forces within theaters of

operations. As far back as the American Revolution, civilians served as

wagoneers and drivers to tow artillery and move supplies. During the

Persian Gulf War, DOD used over 14,000 civilian employees and contractor

personnel to support its military forces.

According to DOD’s April 1992, final report to the Congress on the Conduct

of the Persian Gulf War, civilian expertise contributed directly to the

success achieved. DOD and service officials also generally recognize that

during peacetime civilians cost less than military members of comparable

pay grades.

Prior Efforts Replaced

Some Military

Personnel With

Civilians

Responding to various legislative provisions over the past 20 years

requiring the use of the least costly form of personnel consistent with

military requirements, DOD has gone through periods of concentrated

efforts to replace military positions with civilian ones. For example, in the

1970s, the services replaced nearly 48,000 military personnel in support

positions with 40,000 civilian employees. As shown in table 1.2, the

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

services, in recent years, targeted nearly 20,000 military positions for

conversion to civilian ones. The services, however, did not maintain

adequate records to substantiate the achievement of the intended

conversions or validate the savings.

Table 1.2: Military Positions Targeted

for Conversion to Civilian During

Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1993

Service FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 Total

Air Force 3,046 3,045 3,045 9,136

Army 1,777 1,778 1,777 5,332

Navy 1,670 1,669 1,668 5,007

Total 6,493 6,492 6,490 19,475

Source: Based on data provided by service comptroller officials.

Different Systems for

Military and Civilian

Personnel Affect

DOD’s Costs and

Control Over Its

Forces

Significant differences exist in the way military and civilian positions are

managed. These differences affect DOD’s costs and control over its forces.

The military personnel system is often described as a centrally managed,

“closed” system, meaning that persons recruited with no prior military

service are generally brought in at entry-level positions and progress

through the ranks, whether in the enlisted pay grades or the officer corps.

Decisions pertaining to assignment, promotion, rotation, and retention are

centrally controlled at service headquarters. The military personnel

management system operates totally under policies and guidance

established by DOD, which helps ensure that military leaders have control

over their personnel.

The civilian personnel system, on the other hand, is often described as a

more “open,” or decentralized, system. Such a system allows new hires to

enter an organization at various levels, depending on each person’s

qualifications and experience. Although most civilians begin their

government service at lower, entry-level pay grades, managers are not

restricted to hiring them at lower-graded entry levels. Civilian employees

are also subject to the federal civilian personnel regulatory framework

that governs such issues as hiring procedures, working hours, overtime,

and job retention rights.

Unlike their military counterparts, who are employed “globally” and can be

transferred anywhere, civilian employees are generally employed at the

local installation level. Career opportunities are generally identified at the

local level. While civilian personnel management is described as being

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

decentralized, local managers view their control over civilian force

management as limited because budget guidance and downsizing goals,

established at higher organizational levels, can mandate reductions in

end-strength levels and constrain their hiring authority.

Unlike funding for military personnel, funding for civilian personnel is not

aggregated into a single account that permits close monitoring. Rather,

funding for civilian personnel is spread among several accounts within the

DOD budget. For example, funding for most civilian personnel is included

in the operation and maintenance appropriation in the DOD budget—an

account that also includes spare parts, fuel for equipment, and military

training.

DOD Policies for

Determining

Personnel

Requirements

DOD’s policy is to establish its total personnel requirements at (1) the

minimum level and least cost necessary to carry out assigned peacetime

missions aimed at deterring aggression and (2) a level sufficient to retain

capability to quickly respond to any combat needs that develop. The first

priority is major combat forces such as fighter pilots, tank crews, sailors,

and submariners. Combat forces are exclusively military, whether

active-duty or reserve.

After combat forces are determined, remaining forces are to be

established to adequately support the combat forces. Support forces may

include active-duty military, reserve military, civilian employees,

contractor employees, and host nation personnel.

Determining Requirements

for Peacetime Support

Functions

Each service has implemented its own procedures for determining

peacetime personnel requirements in support positions. These

procedures—labeled by the different services as efficiency reviews,

manpower surveys, or engineering studies—are intended to identify the

most efficient personnel mix for performing assigned missions and tasks.

Although some variations exist in service procedures, decisions on

peacetime personnel resources generally should include two major

considerations. First, service officials are to identify a task to be

performed and establish the number of personnel needed, by specific skill,

to perform the task. Second, they are to determine whether civilian

employees, contractor personnel, or military members are the most

appropriate source of the required skills, based upon DOD and services

policies.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

These policies generally state that civilians are to be used in support

positions that do not require military incumbency for reasons of law,

training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, or that do not

require military background for successful performance of the duties

involved. When military incumbency is not essential, yet the work must be

done by government personnel, civilian employees are to be used. If the

workload is not military essential and not required to be done by

government workers, contractor personnel may be used; however,

decisions to use contractor personnel must be supported by cost

comparisons.

Determining Wartime

Requirements for Support

Functions

The execution of military operations may require the use of additional

military and civilian personnel to bring the peacetime force structure to

required wartime levels. The buildup of forces to sustain a contingency

operation is called mobilization; contingency planning, or mobilization

planning, is the broad umbrella under which the services determine their

wartime personnel and materiel requirements.

Military requirements are determined through analyses of numerous

strategies and assumptions about how to fight a war and the need for a

range of phased, incremental increases in force capability. Military forces

needed immediately are programmed into the peacetime active-duty

military. Other military forces needed for later deployment can be

programmed into the reserves.

Requirements for civilians in theaters of operations will depend on the

nature of the contingency and the types of military units involved. To

ensure that DOD civilian employees would perform critical support

functions in-theater during a conflict, DOD established the

emergency-essential civilian employee program in 1985. One objective of

this program is to obtain written statements from combat-essential

employees affirming that they understand the commitments of their

positions and that they will continue to perform their functions while

other civilians are being evacuated from combat areas. In 1990, after

criticism from our office and the DOD Inspector General,2 DOD required the

services to implement procedures to ensure that contractor personnel who

perform combat-essential support functions will continue their services

in-theater during conflicts.

2

Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (GAO/NSIAD-84-73, Mar. 14,

1984) and Retention of Emergency-Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities, Office of the

Inspector General, DOD (Report No. 89-026, Nov. 7, 1988).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Concerned about the extent to which DOD is addressing civilian personnel

requirements as it downsizes and restructures its total force, the Chairman

of the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness

asked us to review the decision-making processes the services use to

determine whether a position should be military or civilian. In response to

this request we examined (1) DOD and service efforts to replace military

personnel in peacetime support positions with DOD civilian employees and

(2) the adequacy of planning for the future use of DOD civilian employees

and contractor personnel to support military forces in theaters of

contingency operations. We were also asked to follow up on actions taken

to correct problems identified by DOD and the services that were

associated with the deployment of civilians to the Persian Gulf War.

To identify trends and opportunities for replacing military personnel in

support positions with civilian employees, we reviewed DOD and service

criteria for determining when a position should be military or civilian. We

obtained perspectives from personnel management officials on efforts to

identify functions that civilians can perform. We also obtained available

data on the number and types of military positions converted to civilian

under a 1989 Defense Management Review Decision and interviewed DOD

officials to identify reasons for not achieving the intended conversions. In

addition, we obtained data from the Defense Manpower Data Center

(DMDC) on the number of military personnel in support positions and

identified potential opportunities to replace military personnel in such

positions with civilians.

We validated the potential for significant cost savings by reviewing

(1) several studies comparing the cost of military and civilian personnel

and (2) the differences in ranks or pay grades for previously made

conversions, when data were available. We did not identify the full range

of military positions that might be candidates for conversion to civilian, or

the specific pay grades of the civilian replacements. Our analysis with

respect to this issue was limited to comparisons between military

personnel and DOD civilian employees. We did not evaluate potential cost

savings that might result from replacing military members with contractor

personnel.

To determine the extent to which DOD and the services are identifying the

need and properly planning for the use of civilian employees and

contractor personnel in future operational contingencies, we reviewed DOD

and service regulations. We interviewed officials in service headquarters’

requirements and operations directorates, comparable officials at various

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

installations we visited, and officials of the Joint Staff. We obtained

statistical information from DMDC on the number and occupational series

of emergency-essential civilians in each of the services for the last 5 years.

We compared these data across the services to identify patterns and

followed up with officials at the locations we visited to validate the data.

To determine the number of DOD civilian employees and contractor

personnel who deployed to the Gulf War, the functions they performed,

and problems associated with their deployment, we reviewed DOD’s

April 1992 final report to the Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,

with a particular focus on the “Civilian Support” appendix. We also

reviewed “lessons learned” reports prepared by various service

components and special studies performed by outside organizations under

contract to the services. We conducted a group interview with

representatives of several defense contractors who provided civilian

support in the Persian Gulf. We also interviewed officials in the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).

We performed our work at the following service headquarters, major

commands, and installations:

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness,

Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the DOD Comptroller, Washington, D.C.;

• Joint Staff Directorates for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments;

Operational Plans and Interoperability; and Manpower and Personnel,

Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii;

• U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

• Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel and Logistics, Washington,

D.C.; Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia; Headquarters

Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia; Army Training and

Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; Army Combined Arms Support

Command, Fort Lee, Virginia; Army Combined Arms Command, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas; Army Pacific Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii;

Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado;

and Headquarters U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;

• Air Force Headquarters Directorates for Civilian Personnel, Programs and

Evaluations, and Plans and Operations, Washington, D.C.; Air Combat

Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Air Force Materiel Command,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air

Force Base, Hawaii; and

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• Offices of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Bureau of

Personnel, Washington, D.C.; Navy Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia; Navy

Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and subordinate commands in San

Diego, California.

We conducted our review between January 1993 and June 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We

obtained DOD comments on a draft of this report. The comments have been

summarized in chapters 2 and 3 and are presented in their entirety in

appendix V.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 2 

Opportunities Exist for More Cost-Effective

Peacetime Use of Military and Civilian

Personnel

Although DOD policy is to use civilians wherever possible, large numbers of

military personnel perform technical, management, administrative, and

other functions that civilians typically do. The services vary in the degree

to which they use military or civilian personnel to perform similar

functions. Opportunities exist for DOD to replace thousands of military

personnel with civilian employees and, in so doing, save personnel costs

and achieve operational benefits. In some instances, valid reasons exist for

not replacing military support personnel with civilians. In other instances,

replacements that should be made are impeded by a variety of factors.

Some factors, such as current practice or broad directives and regulations,

permit the continued use of military personnel. Other factors, such as

downsizing and funding, limit the number of civilian replacements.

Many Military

Personnel Perform

Civilian Support

Functions

The 1994 DOD Manpower Requirements Report indicated that more than

245,000 military personnel throughout the services and defense agencies

were serving in noncombat program areas such as service management

headquarters, training and personnel, research and development, central

logistics, and support activities. Appendix II defines each of the program

areas and shows the percentage of civilians in each area for fiscal years

1987 and 1994.

Many job categories, such as finance, administration, data processing, and

personnel, within broad DOD programming areas, generally do not require

knowledge or experience acquired through military service; skills to

perform such functions are available in the civilian labor sector. Some DOD

and service officials believe that a great majority of such positions should

be civilian. Yet, DMDC data indicate that many of these job categories are

filled more by military members than civilian employees. Table 2.1 shows,

for example, that enlisted personnel and civilian employees of equivalent

pay grades occupy 66 percent and 34 percent of the positions in data

processing, respectively.

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Personnel

Table 2.1: Enlisted Military Personnel

and Civilian Equivalents Occupying

Support Positions DOD-wide, as of

November 1993

Percent of positions occupied

General job categorya Enlisted Civilian

Data processing 66 34

Personnel and recruiting 64 36

Administration 31 69

Accounting and finance 26 74

Source: Occupational data from DMDC.

aThese general job categories are composites of specific occupational specialties. For example,

the data-processing category includes the occupational specialties of computer programmers

and computer operators/analysts.

DMDC also maintains data on officer personnel, but the data do not clearly

reveal the extent to which officers perform civilian functions. Many

officers assigned to headquarters organizations and staff offices are

classified as operational, even though they might primarily perform

administrative functions. For example, an aircraft pilot assigned to

manage personnel requirements functions at a local command would still

be classified as a pilot in the DMDC database. However, our analysis of

other data in DOD’s 1994 Manpower Requirements Report indicates that

nearly 48,000 active-duty military officers, about 20 percent of the services’

total officers, were allocated to organizations outside of the services to

perform a wide range of noncombat functions.

Service officials stated that many officer positions are needed in DOD-wide

activities because of career progression requirements. For officers to be

promoted to senior levels, they need experience in a “joint” activity. In

many instances, however, these joint experiences may not occur within

the officer’s military specialty and may have limited applicability to

developing joint battle staff experience. Further, such assignments often

last only 2 years, which may not provide enough time to develop the

expertise to perform the duties proficiently. These frequent reassignments

may also disrupt the continuity of key operations. At one joint command

we visited, for example, about one-third of the management staff,

including all of the directorate chiefs, rotated in 1 year alone. A command

official said stability of the workforce and continuity of operations are

important reasons for them to use more civilians.

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Personnel

Variations Exist

Among and Within the

Services

According to DMDC data, the services vary significantly in the degree to

which they use military and civilian personnel to perform similar

functions. For example, the services collectively employ more than 21,000

enlisted military and civilian equivalent personnel whose primary

occupational specialty is computer operator. Only 17 percent of computer

operators in the Air Force are civilian, whereas in the Navy more than

53 percent are civilian, and in the Army about 68 percent are civilian. 

Table 2.2 shows the occupational specialties with the greatest variations.

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Personnel

Table 2.2: Variations Among the Services in Using Enlisted Military Personnel to Fill Civilian Equivalent Positions

Air Force enlisted and civilian

personnel

Army enlisted and civilian

personnel

Navy enlisted and civilian

personnel

Occupational specialty Number

Percent

civilian Number

Percent

civilian Number

Percent

civilian

Administration, general 39,154 59.6 55,518 76.9 34,445 67.7

Auditing and accounting 4,370 42.7 5,332 88.5 4,396 100.0

Computer

operators/analysts 11,279 16.7 4,663 67.5 5,639 53.4

Construction equipment 1,919 57.5 11,247 78.9 2,277 44.3

Electricians 3,615 41.9 1,906 86.5 7,111 81.9

Electronic instruments 20,027 44.2 8,059 82.7 8,223 77.4

Fire fighting and damage

control 8,164 34.5 2,934 92.1 3,880 100.0

Food service, general 6,322 14.1 14,986 18.4 14,198 6.6

Information and education,

general 5,038 52.9 5,309 88.7 2,553 76.2

Law enforcement, general 10,229 4.6 17,191 6.4 3,509 72.6

Mechanical and electrical

equipment 4,590 100.0 5,043 75.0 12,033 85.9

Medical administration and

logistics 6,108 19.8 6,626 50.6 1,468 100.0

Motor vehicle operators 5,491 43.3 14,280 23.4 1,929 100.0

Personnel, general 12,082 27.1 21,770 40.0 8,842 44.8

Recruiting and counseling 1,328 9.0 3,934 5.3 1,592 27.5

Security guards 16,782 2.2 1,896 100.0 1,496 57.8

Supply administration 25,109 40.7 42,206 32.3 24,390 45.7

Transportation 9,255 16.0 3,656 59.1 1,894 82.4

Utilities 10,428 42.9 8,604 88.8 13,052 73.4

Warehousing and

equipment handling 9,026 49.5 9,645 86.6 7,904 100.0

Total enlisted and civilian

functions 491,419 27.1 674,843 28.2 603,177 27.3

Source: Occupational specialty data provided by DMDC.

Some service officials attribute much of the variations to the unique

missions of each service that require them to use personnel differently.

For example, some Air Force officials explained that they have broad

responsibilities to safeguard U.S. nuclear weapons and believe military

security guards are more appropriate for this mission. Other DOD and

service officials in the civilian personnel and manpower requirements

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offices attribute the differences to the existing military culture, in which

officials prefer to use military personnel instead of civilians. These

officials state that there is no reason why the services cannot be more

consistent.

Some DOD and service manpower officials explained that some of the

military positions, which otherwise could be civilian, are needed to

provide adequate time in the continental United States (CONUS) for service

members rotating from tours abroad. They said that, as the United States

continues to reduce it forces overseas, the need to maintain large numbers

of rotation positions will also decline. Requirements officials said the

Army and the Air Force are reducing their number of positions held for

rotation purposes. They said the Navy is also adjusting, to some extent, the

number of positions held for rotation downward.

We also observed differences within the services. For example, the Navy

uses civilians in the Pacific Fleet to perform its shore personnel staffing

analyses (called efficiency reviews), while the Atlantic Fleet uses many

military personnel for the same function. According to service officials, the

Atlantic Fleet is substantially behind the Pacific Fleet in reviewing all of its

shore facilities. Atlantic Fleet officials attribute the delays to the frequent

turnover of military personnel. Such turnover, the officials said, prevents

military members from developing the level of expertise needed to

efficiently perform the reviews. Atlantic Fleet officials explained that they

currently do not have adequate funds to hire civilians to do their efficiency

reviews and are forced to rely on available military personnel, who are

always going through a learning curve. The Pacific Fleet, on the other

hand, uses civilians who, because of longer tenures, have become more

proficient in completing the studies.

Replacing Military

Personnel With

Civilians Can Save

Personnel Costs and

Achieve Operational

Benefits

Significant differences exist between the compensation costs for

comparable military and civilian pay grades; replacing the thousands of

military personnel who perform civilian functions with civilian employees

of comparable ranks can offer significant potential to save personnel

costs. Using civilians in certain support positions also provides

operational advantages for DOD because a greater proportion of military

strength can be devoted more directly to combat-related functions. Some

civilians already have technical expertise that would require additional

training for military personnel to acquire, especially in areas such as

high-technology communications. Civilians also provide continuity in their

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Peacetime Use of Military and Civilian

Personnel

positions and provide institutional memory, since they are less subject to

the frequent assignment rotations associated with military personnel.

Increasing the percentage of civilians in specific occupations will free up

military positions to be used for other purposes. If, for example, all the

services adopted a 50-to-50 ratio between military members and civilians

in personnel management—a function DOD officials describe as primarily

civilian—about 5,200 military positions would be available for conversion

to civilian ones. Similar patterns exist in the areas of data processing and

disbursing. Using the 50-to-50 ratio, table 2.3 shows over 14,000 positions

within four occupational specialties where large numbers of military

personnel perform functions that civilians potentially could do.

Table 2.3: Number of Military Positions That Can Potentially Be Replaced With Civilians

Military end strength Military end strength Military end strength

Air Force Army Navy/Marine Corps

Job specialty Current 50-to-50 Ratio Current 50-to-50 Ratio Current 50-to-50 Ratio

Military positions

that could be

replaced with

civilian ones

Personnel 8,810 6,041 13,063 10,885 4,884 4,634 5,197

Analysts 9,401 5,640 1,518 1,518 3,519 3,386 3,894

Programmers 3,246 1,623 1,602 801 1,139 570 2,993

Disbursing 1,283 990 2,737 1,986 3,306 2,210 2,140

Total 22,740 14,294 18,920 15,190 12,848 10,800 14,224

Difference between

current and 50-to-50 ratio 8,446 3,730 2,048 14,224

Source: Occupational specialty data from DMDC.

Some of our reports and other DOD-sponsored studies show that civilian

employees generally cost the government less than military personnel. The

differences vary by pay grade, but, as table 2.4 shows, the average

difference is about $15,000 per person per year for peacetime support

functions performed in CONUS.

1

 (App. III provides more detail on the

components of military and civilian compensation by pay grade.)

1

Several reasons account for these differences. Military personnel do not contribute to their retirement

systems or health insurance; civilians pay a portion of such expenses. Military personnel routinely

receive allowances for housing and subsistence, while civilians do not. Many service members receive

special financial incentives according to occupational specialty. Although training costs are not

included in most comparisons of military and civilian costs, they are a major factor in the cost of using

military or civilian personnel.

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Personnel

Table 2.4: Differences Between Annual

Government Costs for Military and

Civilian Personnel Stationed in

CONUS, for Selected Comparable Pay

Grades, as of January 1994

Military compensation Civilian compensation

Grade Pay Grade Pay Difference

O-5 $92,277 GS-14

GS-13

$79,824

66,887

$12,453

25,390

O-4 76,116 GS-12 55,524 20,591

O-3 60,871 GS-11

GS-10

47,837

42,824

15,034

18,047

E-8

E-7

53,313

46,144

GS-6 28,370 24,943

17,774

E-6 39,815 GS-5 25,507 14,308

Source: Based on grade comparability tables in DOD Directive 1000.1 and cost data from DOD’s

Office of Compensation.

Savings to be achieved from military-to-civilian conversions will depend

on whether DOD eliminates a position from its military end strength or

retains the position and reassigns the military member to another unfilled

military-specific position. The savings may be even greater than they first

appear from table 2.4 because civilian replacements, in the past, have

sometimes been made at lower grades than the comparability table

suggests. For example, at one command we visited, two supply

management officers at the O-3 level were replaced with GS-9 civilians,

even though comparison studies show that the comparable civilian pay

grade for an O-3 officer is GS-11. On average, the replacement of just two

military O-3 personnel with two civilian GS-9 personnel would result in a

potential cost savings to the government of more than $46,000 in 1 year

alone, if the military positions were eliminated from the service’s end

strength. (Even if the two military O-3 personnel were replaced with

civilian GS-11 personnel, the government would still save more than

$30,000.)

DOD officials said civilian employees can be paid at grades lower than their

military counterparts because civilians either enter government service

with specific expertise or they develop more expertise at an earlier stage

in their careers since they do not rotate as frequently. DOD officials also

told us that, for similar reasons, there have been cases where one civilian

replaced more than one military member, thus resulting in greater savings

than a one-for-one replacement would suggest.

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Personnel

Impediments Limit

the Services’ Ability to

Achieve

Military-to-Civilian

Conversions

DOD and service officials recognize that opportunities exist to replace

military personnel with civilian employees. In fact, DOD requirements

officials have recently initiated a study that will, in part, examine the

potential for replacing military personnel with civilians within OSD, JCS, and

all defense agencies and field activities. This study, to be completed in late

1994, was initiated after a DOD task force determined that the “military

essentiality” of some positions was not always apparent.

The Air Force has recently initiated an internal study that will examine,

among other things, opportunities to replace officers with civilians. During

our review, data were not available to suggest how many positions might

be affected, and a time frame for completing the study was not provided.

However, we believe that making these replacements will be difficult

without special attention by DOD officials to overcome existing barriers,

such as military culture, downsizing, and funding.

Broad Guidance Allows

Use of Military Personnel

in Support Positions

Although DOD’s and the services’ general policies call for the use of civilian

personnel where possible, they also allow service managers wide latitude

in filling positions with military personnel. No single directive explains

how DOD’s “Total Force” policy should be implemented or the specific

criteria to use in determining the appropriate mix of personnel. Therefore,

because of the broad nature of the guidance, tradition, and cultural

preferences, DOD and the services often merely maintain the status quo on

military incumbency.

Guidance on the mix of personnel needed to perform DOD functions is

contained in several DOD directives—some dating back to 1954—and in

service regulations. For example, DOD Directive 1100.4, “Guidance for

Manpower Programs,” August 20, 1954, states that civilian employees shall

be used in positions that do not require military incumbency for reasons of

law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, or that do

not require military background for successful performance of the duties

involved and that do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or

compatible with civilian employment. DOD Directive 1400.5, “DOD Policy for

Civilian Personnel,” March 21, 1983, provides little specificity on civilian

functions or positions.

Service implementing regulations expand the requirements for military

incumbency outlined in the DOD directive. These regulations clearly define

personnel requirements for combat functions, since only military

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Personnel

personnel are expected to perform such roles. For example, the Manual of

Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, June 11, 1990,

requires military members if the person must engage in or be prepared to

engage in combat.

In the case of support positions, which may be appropriate for civilians to

fill, the service regulations still tend to give greater emphasis to military

incumbency. Army Regulation 570-4, “Manpower Management,”

September 25, 1989, for example, states that all support positions will be

military if they have tasks that, if not performed, could cause direct

impairment of combat capability. However, this does not reflect current

Army operations, since civilians routinely perform equipment maintenance

functions that are important to maintaining combat capability.2

Service regulations enable officials to use military members in certain

administrative, security, and supply personnel positions simply because

they have traditionally done so. In addition, a preference for using military

personnel has often existed because the military personnel system

provides a high degree of management control.

Informally, DOD and service officials have often cited probable

deployability to theaters of operations in wartime as a basis for

maintaining military incumbency. However, this position does not reflect

current practice, since thousands of civilians were deployed to the Persian

Gulf War.

DOD and service officials told us they are in the process of updating and

consolidating some of these policies. They did not, however, have firm

dates for completing the updates.

Downsizing Limits

Potential Numbers of

Civilian Replacements

Due to changes in the world security environment and budget constraints,

DOD is reducing the size of its military and civilian workforces. By fiscal

year 1999, active-duty military end strengths are to be reduced by

33 percent from the 1987 peak strength. Approximately 73,000 active-duty

military personnel reductions are currently planned in the end strength

between the beginning of fiscal year 1995 and the end of fiscal year 1999,

based on DOD’s 1995 budget.

2

Army Maintenance: Strategy Needed to Integrate Military and Civilian Personnel Into Wartime Plans

(GAO/NSIAD-93-95, Apr. 29, 1993).

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Personnel

In theory, DOD could achieve many of its military reductions by replacing

military personnel with civilian employees. However, the simultaneous

downsizing of civilian employees works against such replacements.

Civilian end strengths, by fiscal year 1999, are to be reduced by 30 percent

from the 1987 peak strength. Over 79,000 civilians are programmed for

reduction from the DOD workforce between fiscal years 1995 and 1999,

based on DOD’s 1995 budget. In addition, executive branch efforts to

reduce the number of high-graded (GS-14 equivalent and above) civilian

positions throughout the federal government impairs attempts to reduce

or replace officers. Many officer positions, if converted, may likely be

replaced with high-graded civilians.

DOD officials explained that, especially during this period of downsizing,

their civilian personnel end strengths have been driven more by available

dollars than by requirements. Local officials said they have little, if any,

incentive to identify military-to-civilian replacements during the

drawdown. Officials see little opportunity to obtain the necessary funding

to support new civilian positions, particularly in the wake of what they

sometimes view as arbitrary cuts in end strengths and budgets. Likewise,

they expressed concern that while funding might be provided at one point,

this would not preclude subsequent reductions as part of broad guidance

to meet other reduction targets.

Inadequate Integration

Between Requirements

and Budgeting Processes

Hampers

Military-to-Civilian

Replacements

Many DOD and service personnel managers identified the inadequate

integration between the process for determining civilian requirements and

the budget process that funds these requirements as a barrier against

replacing military personnel with civilians. Although local commanders

determine their civilian requirements based on estimated workloads and

request budgets to cover the costs of such requirements, budgets are

allocated from higher levels and often do not support the identified

requirements. According to some DOD and service officials, constant

pressures to reduce the defense budget and personnel strengths compel

them to allocate anticipated reductions across all defense programs on a

proportional basis. According to local officials, the reductions are

perceived as having been made arbitrarily, without fully considering

civilian requirements.

As a result, local officials have become reluctant to identify military

positions for conversion to civilian ones because they fear they will

ultimately lose both positions. From a commander’s perspective, the

military position will be deleted from the installation’s military end

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Personnel

strength because this process is centrally managed. Before civilians can be

hired, the budget may be reduced by service headquarters and the

installation will be unable to hire the civilians.

For example, at one command we visited, 2,200 military members were

identified in 1991 for replacement with civilian personnel. These

replacements were to be achieved in stages between 1991 and 1995. A

command official told us that they lost approximately 2,000 military

members, but gained no more than 800 civilians even though the command

had no change in workload. This result was attributed to the fact that

higher command levels significantly reduced this installation’s budget

before the civilian positions could be filled. This official said hiring

civilians often takes 6 months because of the required lengthy processes of

advertising vacancies and reviewing applications.

Even when funds are allocated to replace military personnel in support

positions with civilians, the services may not be required to use the funds

for that purpose. Funds for civilian personnel are derived from several

accounts that may be used for a variety of purposes. For example, the

operation and maintenance appropriation funds the purchase of fuel,

supplies, and repair parts for weapons and equipment, and training of

military personnel, in addition to civilian personnel.

Conclusions Although DOD and the military services have general policies requiring

them to use civilian personnel where possible, the services currently vary

in the extent to which they use thousands of military personnel in support

positions that, according to DOD and service officials, could be civilian. No

single answer is apt to be found to precisely identify the appropriate mix

of military and civilian personnel. However, achieving greater consistency

among the services by increasing the proportion of civilians performing

data processing, personnel management, and other similar functions could

free up thousands of military personnel for reassignment.

Eliminating military positions and replacing them with civilians can save

significant personnel costs, since some cost analyses estimate that, during

peacetime, each civilian costs about $15,000 per year less than a military

person of comparable pay grade. The high degree of variation among the

services in how they use military or civilian personnel to perform similar

functions suggests a need for high-level oversight by OSD and/or the JCS to

ensure balanced consideration of personnel requirements across the

services.

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Personnel

However, various interrelated factors discourage commanders from

pursuing military-to-civilian conversions or replacements. These factors

range from a traditional preference for military personnel where possible,

to concerns over retaining civilian positions in the current downsizing

environment.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a joint review

board and provide it with a mandate to work with the services to ensure a

thorough and consistent review of military support positions that may

have potential for conversion to civilian.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to

identify military positions that should be replaced with civilians and

eliminate, to the extent possible, existing impediments to using civilians

when they would be less costly.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our findings

and recommendations. DOD stated that it will review the military

essentiality of positions in its support structure and report its results to the

Congress by April 30, 1995, in accordance with requirements of the fiscal

year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. This review will entail

recommendations by the military services for converting military positions

to civilian. DOD is also aware that various cost analyses acknowledge a less

costly civilian substitute for military personnel performing similar type

work. However, DOD policies governing military versus civilian manpower

mix are not predicated upon the comparative cost factor alone, nor

modified based on a single conflict experience.

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Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

Thousands of civilians deployed to the theater of operation in support of

U.S. military forces during the Persian Gulf War. Civilian deployments for

that operation revealed important administrative weaknesses related to

the use of civilians in such circumstances; many of those weaknesses are

now being addressed by DOD or one or more of the services. That

deployment also demonstrated up-front operational planning problems

with the deployment of civilians that have not been completely resolved.

DOD Used Thousands

of Civilian Employees

and Contractors in

Combat Areas During

the Persian Gulf War

During the Gulf War, the United States deployed over 14,000 civilians, both

government employees and contractor personnel,1

 to the theater of

operations. (About 500,000 military personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf

War.) According to DOD’s April 1992 report to the Congress on the Persian

Gulf War, civilians worked aboard Navy ships, at Air Force bases, and with

virtually every Army unit. Only the Marine Corps did not employ

significant numbers of civilians in-theater. Civilians served in a wide

variety of support positions, including transportation, maintenance and

repair, and other weapon system support roles. (App. IV provides a more

detailed account of the types of civilian specialists deployed in support of

the Gulf War.) DOD’s April 1992 report to the Congress on the Conduct of

the Persian Gulf War acknowledges that civilian expertise was invaluable

and contributed directly to the success achieved.

The services acknowledge that they did not have good data systems to

track civilians in-theater during the Gulf War, particularly for contractor

personnel. Given these limitations, table 3.1 shows how the numbers break

down among the services and between DOD civilian employees and

contractor personnel.

Table 3.1: DOD Civilians and

Contractor Personnel Deployed for the

Persian Gulf War

Number of civilians deployed

Type of civilian Air Force Army Navy Total

DOD government employees 213 2,000 3,000 5,213

Contractor personnel 154 3,898 5,126 9,178

Total 367 5,898 8,126 14,391

Source: DOD and service after-action reports on the Persian Gulf War and studies by outside

organizations under contract to the services.

1

DOD and service data systems did not systematically keep track of all civilian employees and

contractor personnel who deployed to support the Gulf War. The estimate is drawn from available

service data and contractor studies.

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Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

Historically, DOD civilians and contractor personnel have served in theaters

of operations during wartime; however, the Persian Gulf War deployment

was somewhat different from scenarios expected during the Cold War.

U.S. defense planning for the threat of war in Europe during the Cold War

era relied upon host nation support, augmented by U.S. reserve forces, to

help meet support requirements. Defense planning also relied partly on the

assumption that some civilians working for DOD in Europe would continue

to perform their functions in time of conflict. These employees were

designated as emergency essential; as such, they were expected to remain

in the area when combat began.

U.S. military leaders now expect that, with the collapse of the Soviet

Union, future conflicts will more likely occur against regional powers,

similar to the Persian Gulf War against Iraq. U.S. forces will be expected to

operate in areas that have little or no military support infrastructure.

Therefore, DOD officials expect that they will have to deploy more support

capability from the United States, some of which will be provided by

civilian employees and contractor personnel.

Operational Planning

Shortfalls Created

Problems With

Civilian Deployments

to the Persian Gulf

War

DOD and service officials acknowledge that they were not adequately

prepared to process, deploy, or support civilians in the Persian Gulf

theater of operations, although a 1990 DOD directive required that

emergency-essential civilians be identified and prepared for potential

deployment. Specifically, this directive required emergency-essential

employees to sign agreements stating that they accept certain conditions

of employment, including relocating to foreign areas during crisis

situations to perform their duties. The directive also required the services

to provide emergency-essential civilians with protective equipment and

work-related training.

According to the services’ after-action reports on the Persian Gulf War, a

number of problems arose in deploying civilians to the Gulf War and

caring for them in the theater. Some problems, including those described

below, could have had serious consequences. Many of these problems

were attributed to poor planning.

• Most of the civilian employees had not been previously designated as

emergency essential.

• Many civilians were not screened to ensure that they were medically fit to

serve in desert conditions. Some arrived in the desert with medical and

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Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

physical limitations, such as severe heart problems and kidney disorders,

that precluded them from effectively performing their duties.2

• Some deploying civilians did not initially receive protective gear, such as

gas masks, because civilians were not included on military equipment and

supply lists. Nor were adequate efforts made to ensure that civilians were

trained in the use of such equipment.

• Dental records, which are an important source of identification, were not

available for deploying civilians because dental screenings had not been

done.

• Some civilians did not receive identification cards, provided under terms

of the Geneva Convention, to identify them as noncombatants.

Other problems, while not as grave, also indicated a lack of preparation

for civilians in-theater.

• Clear procedures did not exist to ensure that civilians received medical

care, housing, or transportation comparable to that received by military

members.

• Procedures were not in place to provide for overtime or danger pay in this

environment.

• Questions existed concerning whether civilian life insurance policies

contained war exclusion clauses that would have precluded their survivors

from receiving accidental death benefits had the civilians been killed while

there.3

• Unlike military personnel, civilians were not entitled to free mailing

privileges.4

Our discussion with representatives of several contractors who deployed

personnel to the Persian Gulf War indicated they were delayed in getting

personnel and equipment to the theater of operations. They reported

having to arrange for their own transportation. They also reported

receiving little assistance from DOD in helping them prepare their

employees for deployment.

2

Army Maintenance: Strategy Needed to Integrate Military and Civilian Personnel Into Wartime Plans

(GAO/NSIAD-93-95, Apr. 29, 1993).

3

In a July 1993 letter interpreting existing regulations for the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance

program, the Office of Personnel Management—which has regulatory oversight over

government-sponsored life insurance—determined that civilians who deploy with the military are not

considered in “actual combat.” Therefore, they are entitled to accidental death and dismemberment

benefits if covered by the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance. This letter did not discuss civilian

employees covered by other insurance policies or contractor personnel regardless of their insurance

coverage.

4

The Congress, in Public Law 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993, extended free mail privileges to civilian

employees of DOD while assigned to overseas areas during armed conflicts.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 3 

Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

Some Corrective

Measures Are Being

Taken

Each service has modified some of its regulations to respond to the

problems identified during the Persian Gulf War. The definition of

emergency-essential civilian employees has been clarified, and

requirements for training, identification cards, and medical evaluations,

among other things, have been defined. However, these changes have not

yet been fully implemented.

The Army, in particular, has responded very extensively. For example, the

Army issued an extensive annex to the Army Mobilization and Operations

Planning and Execution System and revised its civilian mobilization

planning regulations. The Army Materiel Command has published a guide

for deploying and processing its civilians. The guide addresses the key

problems identified during the Gulf War. DOD officials indicate that they

would like to use the Army’s deployment guide as a prototype for the other

services.

Some problems identified during the Gulf War are only partially solvable

by DOD and will require coordinated action with other agencies. For

example, DOD officials acknowledge that civilians should be entitled to

danger pay when serving in hostile areas; however, specific designation of

foreign areas subject to danger pay requires a formal determination by the

Secretary of State. The Army’s Civilian Deployment Guide outlines how

such pay is to be provided and its relationship to other pay and

allowances.

Similarly, rules governing overtime pay limits are controlled by the Office

of Personnel Management. Waivers to the pay caps may be granted by the

Office of Personnel Management when appropriate forms are completed

by the civilian employees. According to DOD and service civilian

mobilization officials, steps will be taken during future civilian deployment

processing to ensure that DOD employees are aware of the forms and

waiver request procedures.

The above actions are oriented to DOD civilians, not civilian contractor

personnel. Some officials said they believe contractor companies should

be responsible for ensuring that their employees are ready for potential

deployment, as well as caring for them while in-theater. These officials

believe, however, that DOD should be responsible for ensuring the

noncombatant status of civilian contractor personnel by issuing them

Geneva Convention identity cards.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
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Civilian Deployment Problems During the

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Planning Shortfalls

Operational Planning

for Future

Contingencies Does

Not Fully Integrate

Civilian Roles

DOD and the services have not fully integrated into their wartime planning

systems requirements for essential wartime support that civilian

employees and contractor personnel will perform in-theater during future

conflicts. Such planning includes identifying civilian personnel

requirements, designating emergency-essential employees, and ensuring

the availability of contractor personnel for potential deployments.

Civilian Requirements Are

Not Being Fully Identified

Officials in DOD, JCS, and service contingency planning offices acknowledge

the importance of DOD civilian employees and civilian contractor support

to war-fighting efforts. To some extent, each also acknowledged that

adequate planning is not currently being done, and sometimes pointed to

each other’s office to take the lead in this area.

For example, DOD and some service personnel officials told us that

requirements for wartime civilian support should be identified during the

service-level operational planning for potential contingencies. During such

planning, the services examine the requirements outlined by regional

war-fighting commanders in chief in their various contingency plans, and

develop time-phased force deployment plans for meeting the regional

commanders’ needs.

Service operational planners told us that civilians were not included in

prior operational plans or force deployment plans, nor are they anticipated

to be in the future, in part, because service policies for these functions

deal only with military personnel. Moreover, these officials believe civilian

deployment issues are the responsibility of civilian mobilization planners,

not operational planners.

On the other hand, some service civilian mobilization planners told us that

civilian requirements should be included in the operational and

deployment plans to ensure that civilians will have the proper equipment,

such as gas masks. According to these officials, the major barrier to

effective planning for civilian support in military operations is a hesitation

by military leaders to fully accept (1) civilian wartime roles and (2) their

responsibility for such civilians in the combat area.

DOD mobilization officials expressed the view that civilian requirements

should be integrated in joint staff and service contingency planning

processes. They do not believe civilians should be included in the

military-oriented deployment plans because these plans cover units, rather

than individuals. These officials believe that civilians should be handled

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
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Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

like some reservists who deploy as individuals rather than with units. They

also believe current mobilization and contingency planning policies do not

adequately address civilian deployment issues. These officials told us they

plan to consolidate DOD mobilization policies into a single directive, rather

than continuing with multiple directives that address only certain aspects

of the issue. These officials would like to assign responsibility to the

Chairman, JCS, to ensure that war-fighting commanders in chief recognize

civilian wartime support functions in their planning processes, but

provided no time frame to complete this action.

Mobilization and Training

Exercises Can Identify

Civilian Deployment

Problems

Two military exercises, one before the Persian Gulf War and one more

recently completed, have pointed out civilian deployment problems and

the need for improved planning. The military exercise Proud Eagle 90 was

the first major DOD-wide exercise to recognize civilian mobilization as a

significant element. The exercise was designed to include all command

levels in testing how well plans, policies, and procedures would work in

responding to a world crisis. Many of the problems that subsequently

surfaced in the Persian Gulf War were identified during this exercise,

including vagueness in defining what constitutes an emergency-essential

civilian, absence of an accurate civilian personnel data system, lack of

clear understanding of civilian entitlements, and inadequate processing

procedures.

According to DOD officials, no DOD-wide exercise with a specific objective

of evaluating mobilization issues has been held since Proud Eagle 90, due

to the constraints of ongoing contingency operations. However, civilian

deployment-related issues did surface in a recent U.S. military exercise in

Egypt. An after-action report noted that emergency-essential civilian

employees were not trained in accordance with DOD directives.

Emergency-Essential

Employees Are Not Being

Fully Identified

Once requirements for potential civilian deployments to theaters of

operations have been identified, action is then required to formally

designate such personnel as emergency essential, to better facilitate

deployment action, if and when it is required. The services have varied in

the extent to which they have identified emergency-essential personnel

and the extent to which such designations pertained either to the potential

for overseas deployments or to peacetime contingencies in the United

States.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
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Planning Shortfalls

Data available from DMDC shows fluctuations over time in the numbers of

civilian employees designated as emergency essential by the services.

During fiscal year 1987, for example, over 1,100 civilians were designated

as emergency essential. This number rose to about 2,700

emergency-essential civilians in 1990 and declined to nearly 1,900 in fiscal

year 1993. The Army has consistently maintained the largest number of

such designations and the Navy the least. The data do not show any

emergency-essential designations for the Navy until 1991.

Our review of the data showed that many administrative personnel were

designated as emergency essential, despite policy guidance stipulating that

such designations include only those civilians who perform critical

combat-support functions. Many secretaries, clerks, and other

administrative personnel were designated emergency essential because

they were stationed in overseas areas and had a key role in base

operations. Service officials told us they realize these types of personnel

generally will not remain in an area during a conflict or deploy elsewhere

to a combat area to support military forces.

Other variations in emergency-essential designations also reveal some

confusion over the definition. For example, the services designated as

emergency essential many employees who were required to work in the

United States during emergencies with no likelihood of deployment. In

other cases, emergency-essential designations were given to employees

who were required to report to work in the United States when other

personnel were excused for such reasons as snowstorms.

According to DOD and DMDC officials, the emergency-essential designations

in their database are understated because many commands are still

implementing the 1992 guidance for identifying and reporting

emergency-essential information. Although these officials did not provide

a time frame for updating the database, they said they are working with

the services to ensure that personnel not expected to deploy to combat

areas are removed from the lists. We believe such data are likely to remain

understated until DOD and the services fully assess civilian deployment

requirements as part of contingency planning efforts.

Planning for Future

Civilian Contractor

Deployments Also

Remains Problematic

Various DOD and service officials, and published studies, recognize a

growing dependence on contractor personnel to support high-technology

military systems. In November 1990, DOD issued a policy instruction

intended to ensure the continuation of essential contractor services during

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 3 

Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

hostilities. Yet, little has been done to develop data on persons who

perform combat-essential functions under contracts or to ensure the

continuity of such contracts. Disagreement exists among DOD, the services,

and contractors as to who should be responsible for the readiness and

safety of contractor personnel performing essential wartime support.

The 1990 instruction directs the services to develop and implement plans

and procedures that would reasonably assure the continuation of essential

services during crisis situations. Requirements of the directive include,

among other things, the following:

• The services must review all contracts annually to determine which

functions will be essential during crisis situations.

• The services must maintain a current, generic description of the essential

contractor service, the number of contractor employees, and equivalent

staff years required to perform the essential services.

The directive does not specify what assistance contractors can expect to

receive from DOD, other than the issuance of Geneva Convention identity

cards. Representatives of several contractors that deployed personnel to

the Persian Gulf War said they received little assistance from DOD to help

them prepare their employees for deployment, and said such assistance

might have prevented deployment delays.

One mechanism the services use to ensure continuation of services has

been the inclusion of a “crisis clause” in contracts. At some locations we

visited, boilerplate language had been included in some of the contracts

related to essential functions. In general, this language states that the

contractor shall be responsible for performing all requirements of the

contract notwithstanding the existence of any state of war or emergency

and states that failure to perform may subject the contractor to a

termination of the contract for default.

However, mobilization and operational planners at local commands could

not tell us whether all of the command’s contracts had been reviewed for

their wartime essentiality. Neither local commands, service headquarters,

nor DOD officials could provide summary data on contractor employees

performing essential combat-support functions as required by DOD, or

verify whether all contracts had been reviewed. Some officials said they

did not need to know the number of personnel because contractor

companies are responsible for deploying and protecting their employees.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
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Civilian Deployment Problems During the

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Planning Shortfalls

The DOD Inspector General reported in 1988 and 1991 that no major

command could provide data concerning all contracts vital to combat or

crisis operations.5

 According to the reports, a contributing factor was the

absence of a central DOD activity with oversight over contractors with

wartime essential functions. During our review, officials in the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, who must

monitor the implementation of the DOD directive, said that oversight is still

decentralized, and, while several organizations have some responsibility,

no single headquarters organization wants to assume full control. For

example, contracting for logistics support of major weapon systems is

delegated to the managers of individual weapon programs in the systems

acquisition chain, while war planning associated with using these systems

rests with operational support personnel. According to the Personnel and

Readiness officials, such decentralization slows efforts to address

contractor deployability.

Conclusions Although DOD officials have informally cited potential deployment to

theaters of operations as reasons for retaining military incumbents in

selected support positions, civilians have historically deployed to combat

areas to support the military forces. The recent Persian Gulf War showed

that, to the extent civilians are to be used in combat areas, improved

up-front contingency planning is needed.

The services are making progress in developing and implementing policies

to prevent problems that arose during the deployment of civilian

employees and contractor personnel to the Persian Gulf War. However,

they still have not adequately addressed civilian support requirements in

their existing war-planning processes. They have not fully identified

civilian employees or contractor personnel who perform combat essential

functions and who might be called to deploy. Some confusion exists

among organizations involved with contractor support for military

operations on what assistance DOD should provide and who should be

responsible for the readiness and safety of these personnel.

Proper identification of civilian employees and contractors would help

ensure that deploying individuals are properly trained and prepared to

enter combat areas. Many personnel officials believe recognition of

5

Civilian Contractor Overseas Support During Hostilities, Office of the Inspector General, Department

of Defense (Report No. 91-105, June 26, 1991) and Ensuring Retention of Emergency-Essential

Civilians Overseas During Hostilities, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (Report

No. 89-026, Nov. 7, 1988).

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Chapter 3 

Civilian Deployment Problems During the

Persian Gulf War Highlight Operational

Planning Shortfalls

wartime requirements for civilians must come from the JCS before service

planners will include civilians in their operational plans.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS clarify

organizational responsibility for ensuring that civilian support to military

operations is considered during contingency planning processes. These

officials should direct operational planners to integrate civilian

requirements for DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel into

appropriate plans for deploying forces to combat areas.

We also recommend that the service secretaries direct commanders of

major support organizations to establish time frames for reassessing their

needs for emergency-essential civilian employees. The commanders

should expeditiously purge existing lists of administrative persons to

prevent unnecessary spending on training for persons who will not deploy

to theaters of operation. The commanders should ensure that

emergency-essential civilians (1) receive appropriate training, including

basic survival skills; (2) participate in job-related DOD-wide training

exercises; and (3) are otherwise prepared to deploy to combat areas when

needed.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify the type of

assistance, such as deployment processing, training, transportation,

housing, or care in-theater, that DOD will provide to contractors who

perform essential, combat-support functions. The Secretary should also

direct the service secretaries to establish time frames for identifying

contractors and the personnel who provide essential combat-support

services, and initiate actions to ensure that such personnel will be

prepared to deploy to combat areas, if needed.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our recommendations and agreed to pursue, in fiscal

year 1995, initiatives to ensure that military operational planning includes

necessary civilian support. DOD also agreed to request all subordinate

organizations to validate their requirements for emergency-essential

civilian employees and contractor personnel and provide for required

training. DOD noted, however, that deployment-related issues affecting

contractors are complex and will probably not be resolved over the next

fiscal year.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix I 

Active-Duty Military and Civilian End

Strengths for Selected Fiscal Years

Army

Fiscal year Military Civilian Total

Percentage

civilian

1987 780,800 412,200 1,193,000 34.6

1990 750,600 380,400 1,131,000 33.6

1993 572,400 294,200 866,600 33.9

1994 540,000 293,500 833,500 35.2

1995 510,000 281,000 791,000 35.5

1999 495,000 268,800 763,800 35.2

Source: The Department of Defense (DOD) Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the

Office of the DOD Comptroller.

Note: All figures are rounded. Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals; those for 1994-1995 are

projections, as of July 1994.

Air Force

Fiscal year Military Civilian Total

Percentage

civilian

1987 607,000 264,300 871,300 30.3

1990 539,300 248,900 788,200 31.6

1993 444,400 201,700 646,100 31.2

1994 425,700 201,500 627,200 32.1

1995 400,100 195,400 595,500 32.8

1999 388,800 175,700 564,500 31.1

Source: DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the Office of the DOD Comptroller.

Note: All figures are rounded. Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals; those for 1994-1999 are

projections, as of July 1994.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix I 

Active-Duty Military and Civilian End

Strengths for Selected Fiscal Years

Navy

Fiscal year Military Civilian Total

Percentage

civilian

1987 586,800 331,500 918,300 36.1

1990 582,900 320,500 903,400 35.5

1993 510,000 267,000 777,000 34.4

1994 471,500 250,500 722,000 34.7

1995 441,600 227,300 668,900 34.0

1999 393,900 202,400 596,300 33.9

Source: DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and Data from the Office of the DOD Comptroller.

Note: All figures are rounded. Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals; those for 1994-1999 are

projections, as of July 1994.

Marine Corps

Fiscal year Military Civilian Total

Percentage

civilian

1987 199,500 21,600 221,100 9.8

1990 196,700 20,500 217,200 9.4

1993 178,400 18,200 196,600 9.3

1994 174,000 17,900 191,900 9.3

1995 174,000 18,000 192,000 9.4

1999 174,000 17,000 191,000 8.9

Source: DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the Office of the DOD Comptroller.

Note: All figures are rounded. Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals; those for 1994-1999 are

projections, as of July 1994.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix I 

Active-Duty Military and Civilian End

Strengths for Selected Fiscal Years

Defense agencies

Fiscal year Military Civilian Total

Percentage

civilian

1987 9,200 97,800 107,000 91.4

1990 10,000 102,500 112,500 91.1

1993 176,900 155,800 332,700 46.8

1994 175,600 159,600 335,200 47.6

1995 171,300 151,700 323,000 47.0

1999 Not available Not available Not available Not available

Source: DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the Office of the DOD Comptroller.

Notes: All figures are rounded. Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals; those for 1994-95 are

projections, as of July 1994.

Military end strengths include personnel accounted for in the services.

The decrease in the percentage of civilian personnel in the Defense agencies results primarily

from the transfer of common functions from the military services to Defense-wide agencies and

the accompanying reassignment of military personnel performing such functions. Examples

include the transfer of various medical personnel to the Defense Health Program and the transfer

of DOD’s common transportation mission to the U.S. Transportation Command.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix II 

Civilians Within the Military Services as a

Percentage of Personnel by Programming

Categories

Table II.1: Civilians Within the Military

Services as a Percentage of Personnel

by Programming Categories for Fiscal

Year 1987

Percentage of employees that are civilians

Programming category Air Force Army Navy DOD-wide

Central logistics 94.2 92.2 96.5 95.2

Combat installations 31.0 76.0 57.7 50.6

Communications/intelligence 17.1 18.6 17.2 22.9

Force support training 6.7 28.2 10.5 10.0

Joint activities 17.7 25.0 36.1 24.4

Medical support 18.3 44.6 27.5 32.9

Research and development 44.7 79.4 84.5 71.9

Service management headquarters 35.1 66.8 65.7 54.4

Strategic forces 10.4 25.0 13.6 11.3

Support activities 55.3 76.3 52.8 65.0

Tactical/mobility 16.2 6.1 2.3 6.1

Training and personnel 24.7 28.8 13.4 27.6

Aggregate of above categories 30.3 34.6 36.1 34.3

Source: DOD Manpower Requirements Reports for selected fiscal years.

Note: DOD-wide data includes civilian personnel assigned to Defense agencies, such as the

Defense Logistics Agency.

Table II.1: Civilians Within the Military

Services as a Percentage of Personnel

by Programming Categories for Fiscal

Year 1994

Percentage of employees that are civilians

Program category Air Force Army Navy DOD-wide

Central logistics 86.9 96.2 94.7 94.1

Combat installations 30.9 78.0 44.0 50.1

Communications/intelligence 21.9 32.0 20.0 29.9

Force support training 8.4 25.9 9.9 9.5

Joint activities 7.5 16.2 22.4 25.3

Medical support 19.9 52.5 27.6 35.3

Research and development 46.5 84.6 89.4 80.7

Service management headquarters 39.5 66.9 54.7 53.0

Strategic forces 22.9 40.0 24.7 24.3

Support activities 47.9 77.4 58.2 66.8

Tactical/mobility 24.8 3.5 4.5 7.7

Training and personnel 36.8 35.2 19.4 38.0

Aggregate of above categories 31.8 35.0 34.3 36.2

Source: DOD Manpower Requirements Reports for selected fiscal years.

Note: DOD-wide data includes civilian personnel assigned to Defense agencies, such as the

Defense Logistics Agency.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix II 

Civilians Within the Military Services as a

Percentage of Personnel by Programming

Categories

Definitions of

Program Categories

Central logistics covers program elements for the operation of supply

depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement

offices. It also includes centralized repair, modification, maintenance, and

overhaul of equipment, and activities such as industrial preparedness.

Combat installations contain elements for the operation and maintenance

of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift, and sealift commands.

Functions include real property maintenance, base communications,

housekeeping, and installation administration.

Communications and intelligence include centrally managed

communications and intelligence-gathering activities.

Force support training covers advanced flight training conducted by

combat commands, Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct

support of combat units, and certain Army and Marine Corps unit training

activities.

Joint activities cover billets that are outside the control of each service.

They includes requirements for the Joint Staff, unified commands, the staff

of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, and those personnel

assigned to support other federal agencies.

Medical support includes medical care in regional medical centers and

related research and development programs in support of medical

research, equipment, and clinics.

Research and development includes major defense-wide activities

conducted under centralized control of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. Specific areas include meteorological, topographic,

oceanographic, and navigational activities.

Service management headquarters includes organizations to support

service combat and support commands, such as U.S. Army, Europe and

U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet.

Strategic forces include nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and

surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of

and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military

forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix II 

Civilians Within the Military Services as a

Percentage of Personnel by Programming

Categories

Support activities include operation and maintenance of installations of

the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, and training and

administrative commands.

Tactical/mobility forces include (1) land forces of the Army and Marine

Corps; (2) air components of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps such

as fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons, direct

support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and

operational headquarters for these forces; and (3) Naval forces such as

forces aboard warships, antisubmarine warfare vessels, amphibious

forces, and forward logistical supporting forces, intermediate maintenance

activities and telecommunications units. Mobility forces of the Air Force,

Army, and Navy include airlift, sealift, and land movement of passengers

and cargo. They also include sea port systems, traffic management, and

aerospace rescue and recovery. Special operations forces are also

embedded in this category.

Training and personnel includes staff and faculty for formal military and

technical training conducted under centralized control of service training

commands. It also includes personnel-related activities such as recruiting,

centrally funded welfare and morale programs, and civilian career training.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix III 

Comparison of Military and Civilian

Compensation

This appendix sets forth the principal definitions and methodology

underlying the cost estimates presented in chapter 2 and shows cost

differentials by pay grade between military and civilian personnel (see

table III.1). The methodology is based in part on a 1988 RAND Note,

prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force

Management and Personnel.1

 Except where otherwise indicated, the

estimates are based on unpublished data obtained from the Department of

Defense (DOD); figures used here represent defense-wide averages, and all

costs are in 1994 dollars.

Table III.1: 1994 Average Cost

Comparison of Annual Military and

Civilian Compensation Between

Comparable Pay Grades in CONUS

Military compensation Civilian compensation

Grade Pay Grade Pay Difference

O-10 through

O-7

$170,836

through

$130,534

ES-6 through

ES-1

$141,047

through 

$113,257

$29,789

through

$17,277

O-6 110,663 GS-15 95,853 14,810

O-5 92,277 GS-14

GS-13

79,824

66,887

12,453

25,390

O-4 76,116 GS-12 55,524 20,591

O-3 60,871 GS-11

GS-10

45,837

42,824

15,034

18,047

O-2 48,240 GS-9

GS-8

37,756

34,953

10,484

13,287

O-1 36,064 GS-7 31,294 4,770

E-9

E-8

E-7

63,011

53,313

46,144

GS-6 28,370 34,641

24,943

17,774

E-6 

E-5

39,815

33,750

GS-5 25,507 14,308

8,243

E-4 29,234 GS-4 22,840 6,394

E-3

E-2

E-1

24,361

22,274

20,163

GS-3

GS-2

GS-1

20,417

18,720

15,727

3,944

3,554

4,436

Notes: Numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

Data are based on military and civilian grade level comparisons established for Geneva

Convention purposes (DOD Instruction 1000.1, Jan. 30, 1974).

1

Adele R. Palmer and David J. Osbaldeston, “Incremental Costs of Military and Civilian Manpower in

the Military Services,” A RAND Note (July 1988), N-2677-FMP.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix III 

Comparison of Military and Civilian

Compensation

Military

Compensation

All personnel entitled to active-duty compensation receive the sum of four

main elements of military compensation included in Regular Military

Compensation (RMC); basic pay, basic allowance for quarters (including

any variable or overseas housing allowance), basic allowance for

subsistence (or subsistence in kind), and Federal income tax advantage.

RMC is the basic level of compensation every service member receives,

directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday, that is consistent

with all military personnel of a particular pay grade, years of service, and

family size. For the purpose of comparing military and civilian

compensation, an additional amount is included in the RMC to account for

the nontaxibility of the allowances for quarters and subsistence. This is

known as “federal income tax advantage.” Federal income tax is computed

using the standard deduction and 1994 tax rates, including the earned

income tax credit.

Military personnel may also receive other elements of compensation,

depending on their military specialty (such as physician), where they are

stationed, the nature of their duty assignment, and so forth. For example,

some personnel may be entitled to a variable housing allowance if they are

stationed in a high-housing-cost area of the United States and are not

assigned to government quarters. Other personnel may receive hostile fire

(or imminent danger) pay for serving in hostile areas that may subject

them to physical harm or imminent danger. The RMC data in this report are

applicable only to personnel in the continental Unites States (CONUS)

because they include the variable housing allowance, but not the overseas

housing allowance.

For the purpose of this report we used all cash pay grade averages for RMC

from DOD’s Selected Military Compensation Tables: January 1994 Pay

Rates Report.2

 Table III.2 shows the annual RMC, including retirement

benefits, received by military personnel. The retirement benefits are

actuarially costed as a percentage (36 percent as of FY 1994)3

 of

active-duty basic pay. An actuarially-costed retirement benefit assumes

that if the percentage of basic pay is set aside annually in an interest

bearing account, it would accrue enough principal and interest to pay off

future benefits as needed. We did not include other costs associated with

providing such benefits as medical care, training, or unemployment

compensation.

2

Department of Defense, OASD, Directorate of Compensation, “Selected Military Compensation

Tables: January 1994 Pay Rates,” undated publication.

3

Source: DOD Office of the Actuary.

Note: The actuarially determined percentage is also known as the Normal Cost Percentage.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix III 

Comparison of Military and Civilian

Compensation

Table III.2: 1994 Annual Regular

Military Compensation, Including

Retirement Benefits, in CONUS

Grade

Military

base pay

Retirement

benefits (36%

of base pay)

Regular military

compensation

(RMC)

Total (Retirement

benefits and RMC)

O-10 $108,202 $38,953 $131,883 $170,836

O-9 99,212 35,716 122,596 158,312

O-8 89,896 32,363 112,845 145,208

O-7 79,333 28,560 101,974 130,534

O-6 66,364 23,891 86,772 110,663

O-5 53,816 19,374 72,903 92,277

O-4 44,313 15,953 60,163 76,116

O-3 35,385 12,739 48,132 60,871

O-2 27,581 9,929 38,311 48,240

O-1 20,051 7,218 28,846 36,064

E-9 36,095 12,994 50,017 63,011

E-8 29,653 10,675 42,638 53,313

E-7 24,993 8,997 37,147 46,144

E-6 20,983 7,554 32,261 39,815

E-5 17,393 6,261 27,489 33,750

E-4 15,137 5,449 23,785 29,234

E-3 12,035 4,333 20,028 24,361

E-2 11,200 4,032 18,242 22,274

E-1 9,994 3,598 16,565 20,163

Note: Numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

Civilian

Compensation

For the purpose of this report, civilian compensation consists of base pay,

other pay, and benefits. Base pay is regular salaries and wages; other pay

includes overtime and holiday pay; and benefits include life insurance,

health benefits, worker’s compensation, and pension and retirement

benefits. We used a 17 percent average civilian compensation adjustment

factor for other pay and regular benefits for nonwage-rate workers.4

 The

adjustment factor for other pay and regular benefits was multiplied by the

annual base amounts to calculate civilian annual direct costs.

4

Although this adjustment factor is taken from the 1988 RAND Note, DOD officials stated that the

factor has not changed significantly in recent years. Therefore, for the purpose of this report we have

used the same adjustment factors to calculate direct costs per civil service staff year in CONUS as of

1994. Source: Adele R. Palmer and David J. Osbaldeston, “Incremental Costs of Military and Civilian

Manpower in the Military Services,” A RAND Note, (July 1988), N-2677-FMP.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix III 

Comparison of Military and Civilian

Compensation

Table III.3 provides average adjusted basic pay for general schedule and

senior executive service positions in CONUS. The average adjusted basic

pay is equal to basic pay plus any locality adjustment. Average adjusted

basic pay was taken from the Office of Personnel Management’s Central

Personnel Data File. The base pay for senior executive service

professionals is an average of all locality pay areas in the United States

provided by the Office of Personnel Management.

Table III.3: 1994 Annual Civilian

Compensation in CONUS

Grade

Average adjusted

basic pay)

Adjustment factor

for other pay and

regular benefits

(17% of base pay)

Total (base pay,

other pay, and

regular benefits)

ES-6 through

ES-1

$120,553

through 

$96,801

$20,494

through

$16,456

$141,047

through

$113,257

GS-15 81,926 13,927 95,853

GS-14 68,226 11,598 79,824

GS-13 57,168 9,719 66,887

GS-12 47,456 8,068 55,524

GS-11 39,177 6,660 45,837

GS-10 36,602 6,222 42,824

GS-9 32,270 5,486 37,756

GS-8 29,874 5,079 34,953

GS-7 26,747 4,547 31,294

GS-6 24,248 4,122 28,370

GS-5 21,801 3,706 25,507

GS-4 19,521 3,319 22,840

GS-3 17,450 2,967 20,417

GS-2 16,000 2,720 18,720

GS-1 13,442 2,285 15,727

Note: Numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix IV 

Civilian Specialists Deployed to the Persian

Gulf War

Civilian employees Contractor personnel

Service Number Functions Number Functions

Contracting Maintenance

Training Transportation

Logistics Logistics

Plumbing ADP support

Food service

Mortuary

Maintenance and

supply

Postal services

Engineering

Quality assurance

ADP specialists

Transportation

Army Total 2,000 3,894

Maintenance/

equipment

Maintenance

Civil engineers Transportation

Mortuary affairs Aircraft specialists

Air Force Total 213 154

Engineering Ship crews

Medical personnel

Linguists

Science advisors

ADP specialists

Merchant marines

Navy Total 3,000 5,126

DOD Total 5,213 9,178

Total DOD

civilian

employees and

contractors 14,391

Source: DOD and service after-action reports on the Persian Gulf War and studies by outside

organizations under contract to the services.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 29.

Now on pp. 5 and 29.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 39.

Now on pp. 5 and 39.

Now on pp. 5 and 39.

Now on pp. 5 and 39.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Norman J. Rabkin

Barry W. Holman

Valeria G. Gist

David E. Moser

Brenton E. Kidd

Leah B. Cates

Denver Regional

Office

Thomas R. Kingham

Maricela Camarena

Pamela K. Tumler

(391217) Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-5 DOD Force Mix Issues
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