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U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY UPDATE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 

NONPROLIFERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 27, 2005

Serial No. 109–99

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

EDWARD BURRIER, Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Henry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Office 

of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State ............... 5

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Henry A. Crumpton: Prepared statement ................................... 7

APPENDIX 

Responses from the Honorable Henry A. Crumpton to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

International Terrorism and Nonproliferation .................................................. 29

Response from the Honorable Henry A. Crumpton to question submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Texas ....................................................................................... 30

(1)

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY UPDATE 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2005, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND NONPROLIFERATION,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today, the 

Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation is 

focusing on a U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Update. 

Last month, the Subcommittee heard testimony on the evolving 

nature of the terrorist threat facing us and how to update the National Security Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. Some witnesses 

characterized al-Qaeda as a movement or an ideology, rather than 

a formal organization. There was a discussion of preventing terrorists’ access to WMD; the importance also of more precisely defining 

the terrorist threat. We talked about the virtual Caliphate on the 

Internet and about the imperative of stepping up the struggle for 

goodwill throughout the Muslim world. 

Since that hearing, on October 6, President Bush delivered a 

major address in which he discussed in detail the ideology behind 

terrorist acts and described the enemy as he has never described 

him before. He labeled the enemy with several similar terms, including ‘‘Islamic radicalism.’’ President Bush went on to describe 

Islamic radicalism as more like, in his words, ‘‘a loose network with 

many branches than an army under a single command, yet these 

operatives, fighting on scattered battlefields, share a similar ideology and vision for our world.’’

I welcome the President’s move from the generic ‘‘War on Terrorism’’ to the more specific ‘‘Islamic Radicalism,’’ and I commend 

the 9–11 Commission’s use of ‘‘Islamist terrorism’’ to define the 

threat, which ranges from Africa to Southeast Asia, from the Middle East to the Caucasus. We have been throughout this region, 

and this is the key concern put forward by parliamentarians and 

by heads of state throughout this region. 

Language choices impact U.S. policy, but they also impact how 

the American people perceive the threat facing our Nation. Also of 

significance since the Subcommittee’s last hearing, is the release of 

a letter from al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the 

leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and although we should not rely too 

heavily on a single source of intelligence, the letter provides inVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:31 Jan 11, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\ITN\102705\24203.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
2

sights into al-Qaeda’s strategic goals for the Middle East, as well 

as the state of al-Qaeda itself. Zawahiri frequently mentions being 

isolated. He mentions asking for information. He speaks for not 

knowing what appeared on Al-Jazeera. Indicating further difficulty 

for al-Qaeda’s leadership, Zawahiri mentions funding problems that 

they are having. 

We are making progress in strangling the al-Qaeda organization, 

yet its philosophy, unfortunately, continues to breathe freely. I am 

afraid we have been losing the battle for ideas. Anti-Americanism 

is rampant. We do, however, know of one area in which we have 

been able to bolster our image. The humanitarian response to the 

tsunami in Southeast Asia helped to improve attitudes toward us, 

toward the United States, throughout that region. 

To that end, the tragic earthquake that recently struck South 

Asia is, frankly, an opportunity in a region critical to our struggle 

against Islamist terrorism. The U.S. has been a leader in the earthquake relief effort, with an initial $50 million pledge and, of course, 

critical logistical support. Some with radical agendas are active, 

too, competing with us for goodwill. Given the long-term struggle 

we are in, we should make the most of this situation. We can help 

people, as we should, and change attitudes, but in the long run, we 

will save lives, too. We will save American lives. 

The President’s speech on terrorism made comparisons to the 

Cold War. That analogy is apt in several ways. As policymakers, 

we need to be preparing the American people, in my opinion, for 

a long struggle, yet I sense that the Nation’s concentration is drifting, largely because this is an unconventional war. Indeed, a recurrent theme in radical propaganda is that the West has a short attention span. In Afghanistan, where we see worrying signs, the 

Taliban likes to say, ‘‘The Americans have the watches, but we 

have got the time.’’

This struggle will require a sustained commitment by our country, all elements of national power, and a good measure of creativity. We must fight complacency, for two threats are growing at 

a worrisome pace: Jihadist ideology seems to be taking hold in 

many quarters of the globe while WMD knowledge and materials 

are proliferating. The link of these two are of paramount concern 

to this Subcommittee. We look forward to hearing from the Administration about this critical challenge, and I will turn to the Ranking Member for any opening comments he may have. Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. I regret, I was a few minutes late due to a markup in the Financial Services Committee. I want to thank the Ambassador for 

taking on a very important role. I regret that it took you so long 

to be appointed and confirmed, but you are there, and I want to 

thank you for drawing the connection between terrorism on the one 

hand, and nuclear proliferation on the other. 

When I look at this Administration, I see an Administration that 

believes that stopping terrorism and proliferation is the most important goal except for all of the others, because putting aside what 

is going on in Iraq, it seems that every time our desire to stop terrorism, put pressure on terrorism, stop nuclear proliferation conVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:31 Jan 11, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\ITN\102705\24203.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

flicts with any other goal, terrorism and nuclear proliferation is 

pushed off to the side. A few examples: Our policy toward China. China is investing $70 

billion in Iran, and I am sure we have told them we would prefer 

they don’t. We are willing to invest the money in a postage stamp, 

but we have a goal of free trade with China. They have access to 

our markets, a $150 billion trade surplus with us. Have we ever 

said that our interest in preventing China from investing in Iran 

and Iranian oil fields, in violation of the objectives of ILSA, et 

cetera, have we ever said that that is more important than cheap 

tennis shoes? No. Our desire for cheap consumer goods comes first; 

our desire to put pressure on Iran, second. 

When it comes to North Korea, a big, ballyhooed success. Actually, North Korea today is working, unimpaired, toward building 

its eighth, ninth, tenth, or eleventh nuclear bomb. Have we ever 

said that Chinese subsidies to North Korea have to be turned off 

for a day or two if they are going to have access to our markets? 

Of course not, because the goal of protecting Americans comes second to the goal of profits for those who sell consumer goods. 

When it comes to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, we passed it here in Congress. What did we do? Japan announces over $2 billion of 

investment in Iranian oil fields, and the official position of the Administration is, we have no belief that it is happening or no notice 

that it is happening because our subscription to the Wall Street 

Journal ran out, because this was published in all of the major financial papers. So our policy toward enforcing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is, we absolutely refuse to do it, even if in clear violation 

of statute, even if a felony is committed in the White House. That 

is okay because our relationship with Japan and our access to 

cheap electronic goods and our desire to have free trade, our desire 

to have American oil companies make profits in Iran comes first. 

Our interest in stopping terrorism comes second; this at a time 

when a leading German magazine reports that 25 relatively high 

members of al-Qaeda are walking the streets in Iran, not under 

house arrest, but free to plot the next 9/11. 

When it comes to our dealings with Russia, we seem to have put 

stopping the Iranian nuclear program at the bottom of the list. We 

are going to continue to do business with their space agency because meeting our obligations to the international space program 

comes first. Stopping a nuclear bomb from being smuggled into the 

United States from Iran: Secondary in this Administration. 

But then sometimes we punish Russia for just being Russia, not 

in an effort to get them to change nuclear proliferation policy, but 

just in an effort to carry out our vestigial desire, it seems to me, 

left over from the Cold War, desire to surround Russia, and so we 

are financing a pipeline to go around Russia and around Armenia 

to bring Caspian oil out through Turkey. Why not through Russia? 

Because of a desire expressed in many different ways in this Administration to deprive Russia of influence in the states of the 

former Soviet Union. So our goal with Russia seems to be space 

first, diminishing their influence in their former affiliated states 

second. And it is hard to see where our policy is toward stopping 

their cooperation with the Iranian nuclear program since we have 

not been willing to sacrifice any other goal. 

4

Now, when I say not sacrifice any other goal, our diplomats are 

willing to pound the table. They work hard. They will work until 

3 o’clock in the morning to write strongly-worded statements. I 

don’t fault them for lack of hard work, dedication, and intestinal 

fortitude; it is just other than willing to give up the sleep of our 

diplomats, we are not willing to concede any other issue. 

When it comes to our relationship with Egypt, we want a smooth 

relationship with Egypt. We give them a couple of billion. They go 

in, and they fight us at the IAEA conference on the issue of whether full fuel cycle is available to formerly nonnuclear states. We 

don’t even mention it. Why? Because a smooth relationship with 

Egypt comes first, and stopping nuclear proliferation is a matter as 

to which we are unwilling to sacrifice any other important issue, 

even maintaining a smooth relationship with a country that we are 

giving billions of dollars of aid. 

So I look forward in your testimony, Ambassador, to you telling 

me which corporate profits we are willing to sacrifice in order to 

achieve our terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation goals, which 

major goals we are willing to subordinate to the goal of keeping 

Americans safe from terrorism and especially nuclear terrorism. I 

compliment you for your effort. You are part of a government that 

is willing to have you work until 3 o’clock in the morning on your 

objectives but isn’t willing to sacrifice cheap tennis shoes. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the Cold War, the 

United States, for whatever political policy reasons, made some unholy alliances in the name of containing the Soviet Union. When 

it comes to the war on terror, I am interested in hearing how you 

think the United States should juggle the need for practical 

counterterrorist policies versus other U.S. policy interests like 

human rights or democracy promotion. It is just as important for 

this Committee to know what sort of human rights safeguards are 

in place for the State Department’s antiterrorism assistance program, which your office coordinates. So I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. This morning, the Subcommittee on International 

Terrorism and Nonproliferation is joined by the State Department’s 

new Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Henry A. 

Crumpton. Ambassador Crumpton is responsible for coordinating 

all U.S. Government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments and participates in the development, 

coordination, and implementation of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 

reporting directly to our Secretary of State. 

Before joining the State Department, Ambassador Crumpton 

served in the Central Intelligence Agency where he was an Operations Officer, both at headquarters and abroad, and played an integral part in United States action taken in Afghanistan before 

September 11th. This Subcommittee, and, indeed, this Congress, is 

grateful to Ambassador Crumpton’s years of service to further the 

security of our country. We look forward to working with Ambassador Crumpton in his new capacity in pursuit of this same goal. 

This is his first testimony to the Congress since his confirmation 

proceedings, and we welcome him here today. I will ask you to 

5

summarize your printed report, if you would, Ambassador 

Crumpton, if you can do that in 5 minutes, and then we will go to 

our questions. Thank you, sir. 

Let me point out that there is a button right there. There you 

go. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Sherman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thanks 

for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal 

written statement and ask that you include my full testimony in 

the record. 

We face a rapidly evolving, global battlefield and a transformative enemy that embraces terrorism in new ways and thus 

poses unique challenges. For some, terrorism serves to define their 

political agenda and to provide them identity. For example, alQaeda without terrorism is nothing. Hezbollah uses terrorism to 

achieve political goals such as boosting their power and prestige to 

win seats in Lebanon’s Parliament. Iran and Syria export terrorism 

to serve their narrow, selfish national interests. The FARC in Colombia, in concert with narco-traffickers, terrorizes for political and 

economic gain. 

So terrorism not only has various adherents and forms; it may 

serve various ends. We must understand these differences to formulate and implement more effective and enduring strategies. 

To further complicate this challenge, note the shifting terrain 

upon which this war is waged. Our foes exploit the explosive 

growth of media and the Internet, as well as the ease of travel and 

communication around the world. With the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, terrorists acquire new tactics and new weapons, 

such as multiple-shaped charges detonated along our convoy routes 

in Iraq; suicide bombers trigger explosive-laden backpacks in soft 

target sites in London and Bali, enemy operatives seek to develop 

expertise in biological and chemical weapons, as revealed in anthrax labs and training manuals seized in Afghanistan in 2001 and 

2002. 

The enemy is also learning to deploy in smaller numbers, in 

teams or individuals or even remotely, with increased lethality. 

From an operational perspective, these enemy forces are developing 

into microtargets with macro impact. The enemy learns and adapts 

and takes advantage of our modern, progressive, global society. We 

must learn and adapt also. 

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks 4 years ago, we 

and our allies have waged an unremitting war against al-Qaeda, its 

associates, and its supporters. As the President noted in his October 6th speech, in the last 4 years, we have stopped 10 major alQaeda attacks, 3 aimed at our Homeland. While we and our international partners have made great strides, we must do more. 

In the case of al-Qaeda and affiliates, we confront a loose confederation of extremist networks. According to Australian strategist 

David Kulcullen, this confederation has many of the characteristics 

6

of a globalized insurgency. Its aim is to overthrow the existing 

international system and replace it with a radical, totalitarian, 

pan-Islamic ‘‘Caliphate.’’ Its methods include intelligence collection, 

analysis, counterintelligence, deception, denial, propaganda, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and in places like Iraq, open warfare. 

So while we speak of ‘‘terrorists,’’ we must focus not only on ‘‘terrorism’’ but, rather, all of the methods our enemy employs. We 

must also focus on their strategy and attack that as well. 

Al-Qaeda gains strategic strength from making local conflicts 

their own, from aggregating these conflicts, from deploying 

operatives on a global scale. We must, therefore, cut the links, material and ideological, from al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and prevent 

al-Qaeda from recruiting more allies. We must cut these links and 

isolate the enemy. Toward that end, we must cut these ties while 

we simultaneously attack three strategic objectives: Enemy leadership, enemy safe havens, and the conditions the enemy exploits to 

advance their cause. 

We must engage these strategic targets with all of the instruments of state craft, to include diplomacy, military power, the rule 

of law, economic power, and intelligence covert action. We must orchestrate these instruments in harmony, for each particular environment, for each specific target. This requires intensive intelligence collection and analysis followed by sharp and quick action. 

More than ever, the intelligence sensor must be linked to the policy 

conductor at all levels. This is yet another challenge. We must simultaneously work at four levels: Global, regional, national, and 

local. 

I mentioned Iraq. This is another example where al-Qaeda seeks 

to claim a local conflict as their own. Al-Qaeda and its allied foreign fighters seek to hijack, transform, and direct local Sunni 

Baathist insurgents in Iraq. They not only want to defeat the 

United States and our allies, but also the notion of democracy in 

the Middle East. 

How we define the various enemy forces, cut their links, and isolate them, in partnership with our local allied forces, will be the 

key to breaking the insurgency. Success in Iraq and all CT conflicts 

depends upon the success of our partnerships. The State Department, with the cooperation and support of other Federal agencies, 

works to build the political will and practical capacity of other governments and non-state actors, such as international organizations, 

to combat terrorism. 

As we seek to defend our Homeland and to attack the terrorist 

enemy, we must also find a way to counter the appeal of violent 

ideologies, and we are working to develop a comprehensive strategy. As the President noted in his October 6th speech, the most 

vital work will be done within the Islamic world itself. So we must 

listen to Muslim reformers, to Muslim allies, and support their efforts to bring forth Islamic democracy as in Iraq. 

Finally, we must provide a more effective policy context at all 

levels to enable these operators and implementers to orchestrate 

the instruments of statecraft. We must engage the enemy, especially its leadership, with unrelenting vigor. We must deny the 

enemy safe haven. We must address the broader conditions that 

7

terrorists exploit, providing viable, attractive alternatives to the 

disaffected. Toward that end, we must continue to build international partnerships. 

All of this will take time. All of this will require the kind of sustained, determined, focused effort that will last as long as required. 

We must steel ourselves for a long, hard, and complex war. But we 

have done this before, and we have won. We will do so again. The 

American people expect no less. 

Thank you. I welcome your questions and your comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crumpton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you include my full testimony in the record. 

Since 1776 the United States has often waged war against tyranny and terror. 

Sadly, throughout the last couple of centuries terror has been an enduring tactic 

employed by our enemies. In this modern era we face a rapidly evolving global battlefield and a transformative enemy that embraces terrorism in new ways, and thus 

poses unique challenges. Certainly, globalization, modernization, and the development of democracy and free markets afford us many wonderful opportunities for 

peace and prosperity. Yet, this globalization dynamic imposes political and cultural 

stress, and reactionary forces exploit this stress and employ terrorism as a means 

and, sometimes, as an end. For some, terrorism serves to define their political agenda and to provide them identity. Al-Qaida, without terrorism, is nothing. Hizballah 

uses terrorism to achieve political goals, such as boosting their power and prestige 

to win seats in Lebanon’s parliament. Iran and Syria export terrorism to serve their 

narrow, selfish national interests. The FARC in Colombia, in concert with narcotraffickers, terrorizes for political and economic gain. So, terrorism not only has various adherents and forms, it may serve various ends. We must understand these differences, to formulate and implement more effective and enduring strategies. 

To further complicate this challenge, note the shifting terrain upon which this 

war is waged. Our foes exploit the explosive growth of media and the internet, as 

well as the ease of travel and communication around the world. These advancements have made possible the rapid movement of operatives, expertise, money, and 

explosives. Terrorists no longer depend on personal contact to plan, organize and 

conduct their attacks: they use the media and the internet to advance key messages, 

rally support, share experiences, recruit, train, and spread fear. 

With the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, terrorists acquire new tactics 

and new weapons, such as multiple shaped charges detonated along our convoy 

routes in Iraq. Suicide bombers trigger explosive-laden backpacks in soft target 

sites, in London and Bali. Enemy operatives seek to develop expertise in biological 

and chemical weapons, as revealed in anthrax labs and training manuals seized in 

Afghanistan in 2001–2002. 

The enemy is also learning to deploy in smaller numbers, in teams or individuals 

or even remotely—with increased lethality. From an operational perspective, these 

enemy forces are developing into micro targets with macro impact. This trend is 

challenging our notion of warfare, operationally, legally, politically, and even philosophically. 

The enemy learns and adapts, and takes advantage of our modern, progressive, 

and global society. We must learn and adapt, also. 

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks four years ago, we and our allies 

have waged an unremitting war against al-Qaida, its associates and its supporters. 

We have been on the offensive, and taken the fight to the enemy in a campaign of 

direct and continuous action that has degraded the ranks of al-Qaida’s leaders and 

operatives; constricted the space that terrorists operate in and transit through; and 

choked the enemy’s lifeblood by cutting off key funding channels and sources. These 

offensive measures continue to bolster the security of the United States and its citizens and interests abroad. As the President noted in his 6 October speech, in the 

last four years, we have stopped ten major al-Qaida attacks, three aimed at our 

homeland. 

While we and our international partners have made great strides, we must do 

more. 

8

In the case of al-Qaida and affiliates, we confront a loose confederation of extremist networks targeting the United States, its allies and interests, and the broader 

international system. According to Australian strategist David Kilcullen, this confederation has many of the characteristics of a globalized insurgency. Its aim is to 

overthrow the existing international system and replace it with a radical, totalitarian pan-Islamic ‘‘Caliphate.’’ Its methods include intelligence collection, analysis, 

counterintelligence, deception, denial, propaganda, subversion, terrorism, insurgency 

and open warfare. So, while we speak of ‘‘terrorists’’ we must focus not only on ‘‘terrorism,’’ but rather on all the methods they employ. We must also focus on their 

strategy, and attack that as well. 

Al-Qaida gains strategic strength from making local conflicts their own, from aggregating these conflicts, from deploying operatives on a global scale. We must, 

therefore, cut the links, material and ideological, from al-Qaida and its affiliates and 

prevent al-Qaida from recruiting more allies. We must cut these links and isolate 

the enemy. These links include ideology, finances, intelligence, communication, cultural affiliation, training, and other support infrastructure. Toward that end, we 

must cut these ties while we simultaneously attack three strategic objectives:

• Enemy leadership;

• Enemy safe havens, which include 

— geographic space, such as state sponsors of terrorism, failing states, 

ungoverned areas where terrorists can train and organize; 

— cyberspace, which provides internet-based means for communication, 

planning, resource transfer and intelligence collection; and 

— ideological space, which includes belief systems and cultural norms that 

enhance the enemy’s freedom of action;

• The conditions the enemy exploits to advance their cause—local groups, grievances, communal conflicts and societal structures that may provide fertile soil 

in which extremism flourishes.

As the President stressed in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 

we must engage these strategic targets with all instruments of statecraft, to include 

diplomacy, military power, the rule of law, economic power, and intelligence/covert 

action. We must orchestrate these instruments, in harmony for each particular environment, for each specific target. This requires intensive intelligence collection and 

analysis, followed by sharp and quick action. More than ever, the intelligence sensor 

must be linked to policy conductor, at all levels. 

This is yet another challenge in this global war, the challenge of multiple level 

operations. We must simultaneously work at four levels: global, regional, national, 

and local. This is where we can break the links that al-Qaida seeks to forge. Breaking these links helps eradicate or diminish enemy safe haven, usually in border 

areas which confounds operations based exclusively on national level operations. 

This is also how to attend to the local conditions that the terrorist seek to exploit; 

deny them disenfranchised and angry young men as recruits, and deny them the 

operatives for terrorist attacks. 

This is not just an academic outline, but a viable operational method that has 

worked. In Afghanistan in 2001–2002, the United States placed an emphasis on 

local, national, regional, and global conditions, on fracturing enemy forces, on employing all instruments of statecraft, and on providing hope and opportunity for the 

dispossessed. In Southeast Asia, from where I have just returned, the rapid US response to the tsunami in Sumatra helped accelerate a peace accord in Aceh. The 

strong regional leadership of the Malaysian government may forge a peace accord 

between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, perhaps 

helping to deny safe haven in Mindanao for JI operatives that threaten Indonesia 

and the region. And, in southern Thailand, a local conflict must be addressed, before 

al-Qaida and affiliates can exploit to their own ends. 

There is another example where al-Qaida seeks to claim a local conflict as their 

own: Iraq. Al-Qaida and its allied foreign fighters seek to hijack, transform, and direct local, Sunni, Baathist insurgents in Iraq. They view Iraq as a training ground 

and indoctrination center for Islamic extremists from around the world. They not 

only want to defeat the US and our Iraqi allies, but also the notion of democracy 

in the Middle East. The enemy is recruiting, especially from countries in the Middle 

East and North Africa. Networks endeavoring to funnel would-be combatants to Iraq 

have been disrupted in several European countries. In the near future, some of 

these battle-hardened fighters from Iraq could return to their home countries or our 

own, exacerbating domestic conflicts or providing new skills and experience to existing extremist networks in the communities to which they return. Iraq, therefore, 

9

presents local, national, regional, and global consequences and opportunities, for the 

enemy and for us. 

How we define the various enemy forces, cut their links, and isolate them, in partnership with our local allied forces, will be the key to breaking the insurgency. In 

addition, as Secretary Rice said when she testified before your counterparts in the 

Senate (October 19), we and the Iraqi government will succeed when we:

• Keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven from which Islamic extremists can terrorize the region or the world.

• Demonstrate positive potential for democratic change and free expression in 

the Arab and Muslim world, even under the most difficult conditions.

• Turn the corner financially and economically, so there is a sense of hope and 

a visible path toward self-reliance.

Success in Iraq and all counterterrorism conflicts depends upon the success of our 

partnerships. The State Department, with the cooperation and support of other Federal agencies, works to build the political will and practical capacity of other governments and non-state actors, such as international organizations, to combat terrorism. We have intensified old relationships and built new ones with foreign militaries, intelligence services, law enforcement authorities, foreign ministries, and 

banking officials to advance our common counterterrorism goals. We are working 

with foreign civic groups, provincial officials, tribal authorities, business leaders, 

educators, and a growing array of private sector partners who have vested interests 

in political stability, liberal institutions such as free markets, and democracy. 

We have sought to focus the resources and abilities of a wide variety of multilateral organizations to build a seamless global counterterrorism web. Immediately 

after 9/11 we pressed the UN to set new, higher international standards for combating terrorism. We have worked to encourage all countries to ratify and implement the existing international conventions and protocols on counterterrorism. 

President Bush signed the UN Nuclear Terrorism Convention on September 14, the 

first day it was open for signature. We are working closely with our allies to secure 

final agreement on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism which 

will close additional gaps in international law. We are coordinating with allies who 

have the ability to provide assistance—such as the EU and the G–8—to build will 

and capacity to combat terrorism around the globe. 

We ask, encourage, and when necessary pressure other governments to counter 

existing threats within their borders or to prevent a terrorist problem from taking 

hold. If these foreign governments do not have the means, we coordinate the resources of the State Department, the Intelligence Community, DOD, the Justice Department, the FBI, Treasury, Homeland Security, and other agencies to provide the 

tools and training required. Because of the US government’s collective efforts, our 

foreign partners have successfully identified and interdicted terrorist groups, passed 

legislation to criminalize terrorism and terrorist finance that meets international 

standards, and improved their ability to enforce those laws and prosecute those who 

violate them. And, our partners are teaching us about the nature of the enemy, 

about the conditions they exploit, and about the benefits of such partnerships. 

As we seek to defend our homeland and to attack the terrorist enemy, we must 

also find a way to counter the appeal of violent ideologies. Similar to the Cold War, 

we must understand the social and political conditions that terrorists exploit, and 

address these conditions while we simultaneously engage the enemy directly. We 

and our allies must convince these exploited populations that alternatives of prosperity, freedom, and hope are possible. Ultimately, we will beat al-Qaida’s hateful 

intentions and twisted ideology by deploying our most powerful weapon: the ideals 

and values upon which this great country was founded. These ideals and values, 

however, should not be imposed, but rather we must create the political space for 

others to establish their own brand of liberal institutions and democracies, to suit 

their needs. 

We are working to develop a comprehensive strategy to de-legitimize terrorism 

and to encourage efforts by the majority of Muslims who reject violent extremism. 

As the President noted in his 6 October speech, ‘‘the most vital work will be done 

within the Islamic world, itself.’’ In his excellent book ‘‘No god but God,’’ Reza Aslan 

notes that it will take many years to defeat those ‘‘who have replaced Muhammad’s 

original version of tolerance and unity with their own ideals of hatred and discord.’’ 

But, he adds, that ‘‘the cleansing is inevitable, and the tide of reform cannot be 

stopped. The Islamic Reformation is already here.’’ So we must listen to Muslim reformers and support their efforts to bring forth Islamic democracy, as in Iraq. 

10

We are not only broadening our partnerships in the Islamic world, but refining 

our pubic diplomacy, becoming more effective in countering extremist propaganda, 

and advancing our broader strategy in concrete ways. Specifically,

• The President has launched a new effort to promote freedom and democracy. 

In a September 19 address to the United States Institute of Peace, the President’s Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend underscored the President’s freedom agenda and its importance in our 

counterterrorism strategy.

• The US will further encourage economic prosperity based on free market and 

free trade principles.

• The US will support international educational reform that demands intellectual integrity and tolerance, and prepares young people to compete in an 

international economy, as an alternative to systems that promote ignorance, 

fear, and paranoia.

• The US will advocate women’s rights. One half of the world’s population 

needs not only a voice, but a leadership role in all countries.

• The US will work bilaterally and multilaterally to address local and regional 

conflicts that global terrorists seek to exploit.

So, we must provide a more effective policy context, at all levels, to enable those 

operators and implementers to orchestrate the instruments of statecraft. We must 

engage the enemy, especially its leadership, with unrelenting vigor. We must deny 

the enemy safe haven. We must address the broader conditions that terrorists exploit, providing viable, attractive alternatives to the disaffected. Toward that end, 

we must continue to build international partnerships. All of this will take time; all 

of this will require the kind of sustained, determined, focused effort that will last 

as long as required. We must steel ourselves for a long, hard, and complex war. But 

we’ve done this before, and we have won. We will do so again. The American people 

expect no less. 

Thank you. I welcome your questions or comments.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crumpton. Let 

me start with something noted by the 9–11 Commission. They said: 

‘‘It is, therefore, crucial to find a way of routinizing, even 

bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination.’’

Speaking of imagination, you were warning about Afghanistan 

before 9/11—so was I, and yet for a variety of reasons, you weren’t 

heard on that subject. Are we hearing disparate voices today, and 

are we moving forward with that bureaucratizing of imagination 

and unfashionable views? I wanted to ask you that, and I wanted 

to ask you, in your opinion, what threats are we not paying sufficient attention to, like we weren’t with respect to what was underway in Afghanistan at the time with the militancy of al-Qaeda and 

the Taliban? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I think there is a need for greater investment in intellectual capital in the CT policy arena. I think that 

we need to work more closely with the private sector, with universities, with think tanks, and not only here in the U.S. but around 

the world. I think one example of that is Global Trends 2020. It 

was a publication issued by the National Intelligence Council 

where they reached out to the global private sector. I think this is 

what will help us sustain a more focused effort, a more creative effort, as you mentioned. 

I also think that as we continue to assign different officers from 

different parts of the Executive into CT bureaucracies, this crossfertilization breeds creativity. I had the great honor to serve in the 

FBI for a year, from 1998 to 1999, and I learned a lot there. The 

Department of State reaches out to other agencies, and we also detail our people to them. This is the type of creativity that I think 

11

is what you are talking about and will lead to greater depth and 

flexibility in our strategy. 

Mr. ROYCE. Building on that, Ambassador, what areas do you 

think we should be looking at in this Subcommittee? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think that WMD, as Mr. Sherman noted, is 

going to be an increasing challenge, specifically, bioterrorism. Nuclear, as horrible as the prospects may be, for the most part, we 

are able to know where highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is located, 

we are able to work through current infrastructure and work with 

allied governments and work through a variety of mechanisms, but, 

frankly, what concerns me as much, in fact, is the bio threat. A lot 

of that is rooted in the nature of the threat. Laboratories can be 

established in very small areas. It is a more difficult intelligence 

target, and in terms of working across various governments, it also 

brings us new challenges. 

Mr. ROYCE. You have seen some considerable evidence on this 

front in terms of these attempts, and that is something you feel we 

should be looking at. Let me ask you, are you satisfied with the efforts on the part of the international community, on the part of the 

United States at this point? Or does more need to be done to monitor and to increase human intelligence with respect to bioterrorism? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I think more needs to be done across the 

board. 

Mr. ROYCE. Much has been made about the porous entryways 

into the United States. Coming from a border State, I know just 

how porous those borders are, and I have often said that border security must be a pillar of our national security policy. I think that 

is amplified by our CIA director, who is also concerned about a device coming across that border. 

From a counterterrorism approach, what more can be done on 

that front, and how close is your interaction with other government 

agencies on this specific issue of the potential of WMD moving 

across that border? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think that borders are difficult, if not impossible, to seal, especially in the type of globalized environment in 

which we live and on which we depend. I think we can continue 

to work toward greater defensive measures, including the use of 

technology, but I also think that, perhaps even more importantly, 

intelligence must be used where we can deploy our finite resources, 

intelligence that tells us where the greatest threats are and which 

border points they are trying to use. 

Regarding our interaction with other government agencies, it is 

close and growing closer. As an example, in my office, we have just 

welcomed a detailee from TSA, and we hope to have more. Also, we 

work closely in our agency with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and others. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you one last question. Yesterday, Iran’s 

President declared that ‘‘Israel must be wiped off the map,’’ to use 

his words yesterday, and this came as Islamic Jihad, which is a 

group allied to Iran, killed at least five Israelis with a suicide 

bombing in Hadera. In your opinion, is a new terror offense against 

Israel underway? 

12

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think it is a continuation of a terrorist offensive against Israel that has been going on for years. I think that 

the comment by the Iranian leadership is not surprising. It is 

something that they have maintained, and it just underscores why 

we believe that Iran is the number-one state sponsor of terrorism 

in the world today and why they pose such a threat. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, with the election of this new head of state and 

with his choice of words, it does seem to me to rachet up the rhetoric over what we have heard in the past. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. The rhetoric may have increased, but 

from what we have seen, both their intentions and their capabilities and their actions continue to pose a threat and have been for 

years since they killed our Marines in Beirut in 1983. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Crumpton. We will go to 

Mr. Sherman now for his questions. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, the question I kind of previewed 

in my opening statement is, can you identify when the Administration has sacrificed an important public policy goal in order to 

achieve some more important antiterrorist or antiproliferation 

goal? Have you lost every bureaucratic fight in the State Department or in the Administration? When I say ‘‘you,’’ I don’t mean you 

personally so much as those who believe that stopping proliferation 

and terrorism should be our highest goal. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Well, Mr. Sherman, I believe that the Administration has placed CT and CP at the top of their agenda, and I 

think that has been demonstrated by the resources allocated to 

these efforts. I can certainly speak to counterterrorism in terms of 

the reform, both legislative and within the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, with all due respect, I know we 

have put in the hard work, I know we have put in the resources, 

but, for example, we have to decide whether we want our oil companies to do business with Iran through their foreign subsidiaries. 

Were you even involved in any discussions as to whether our 

antiterrorism efforts would be more important than the profits that 

these oil companies and oil service companies can make by doing 

business with Iran and their foreign subsidiaries? Have you been 

involved in discussions like that? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I have been involved in discussions 

about Iran policy with the White House——

Mr. SHERMAN. But as far as our companies making profits, have 

you been in a meeting where you could have said, ‘‘To hell with 

whether this or that company is making a profit; they are just 

going to have to stop doing business in Iraq.’’? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I have not been in a meeting where we have discussed multinational profits in Iran. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Which basically means that in making the decision—in effect, by not making it, the voice of counterterrorism is 

not even heard on the decision, or perhaps the nondecision, to act, 

or in this case, clearly, not act, against American oil companies 

doing business in Iran. 

What about the decision to ignore Japanese investment in Iranian oil fields? Were you given the opportunity to present the case 

13

that we should raise that to the highest level and impose sanctions? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Sherman, we are evaluating CT and CP policy every day. We look at all of the aspects of national power, and 

we look to multinational partners, both in the public and the private sector——

Mr. SHERMAN. So far, you haven’t been able to do that. 

Mr. CRUMPTON [continuing]. That will help us when we look at 

issues like Iran, state sponsors like Iran. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So far, although you have evaluated what we 

should do, you have never been given the opportunity in the highest councils to say, ‘‘Stop ignoring Japanese investment in Iranian 

oil fields.’’ Is there any time when you have advocated doing something specific and immediate that would adversely affect the profits 

of any corporation? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Sir, I have advocated, for many years, CT operations, CT policies, irrespective to the profit motive of any corporation, American or otherwise. As far as I know, sir, I have never 

been in any discussion where we have considered the profit of an 

American company in our policy deliberations because the CT effort 

is paramount. It far outweighs corporate interests. For you to imply 

that corporate profits somehow outweigh the lives of Americans, I 

reject that, and, frankly, I find it insulting. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is just coincidence, and I am sure you personally are not concerned with these profits. I just don’t think they 

give you any power at all to do anything that would even allow you 

to advocate any action that would adversely affect the profits of 

any corporation, domestic or foreign, which is why I asked you: 

Have you ever advocated a specific policy which would adversely affect—I know you are going to tell me that you have never tried to 

protect the profits of these foreign corporations or these domestic 

corporations or these international corporations—but have you ever 

advocated a policy that would adversely affect the profits of any 

corporation? Any example you can give us. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Our policies are made to protect American lives 

and American interests irrespective of the profits of any corporation, American or otherwise. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, you are simply repeating yourself, and I am given a limited amount of time by this Subcommittee. What you are saying is, you cannot name an instance 

but that you believe that your effective advocacy of CT policy has 

never conflicted with an identified corporate interest. 

On the other hand, I identified such things as putting pressure 

on China and threatening their access to United States markets 

and a whole list of others in my opening statement where we could 

have taken action adverse to the interest of corporate profits that 

could have, and you can argue both ways—I am not saying that the 

ideas I threw out were trouble free, but even in my opening statement I identify several CT policies that would have adversely affected corporate profits. 

And you do this full time, and while you are not a protector of 

corporate profits, it just so happens none of the policies that this 

Administration has even considered would adversely affect the corporate profits of any corporation. And maybe that is just a coinciVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:31 Jan 11, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\102705\24203.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

dence because maybe there is never a possible counterterrorism or 

counterproliferation policy that adversely affects corporate profits, 

or maybe it is just that this Administration has put all of those 

possible policies off the table. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Sherman, I disagree. We have sanctions on 

Libya, on Sudan, on Iran that deny United States corporations economic opportunity, and there are other examples also. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, those have been imposed by Congress, and 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I think this Administration has put comprehensive sanctions on Sudan. The consequence, by the way, of those 

policies, of course, is that the major player in Sudan today is the 

government-owned oil company in China who is the major beneficiary. Now, myself and Mr. Tancredo and others have helped and 

assisted with driving that policy and have backed the Administration on this, but I think it does indicate some of the complexities 

with the fact that there certainly is no United States presence of 

any corporation in Sudan. We have got sanctions certainly that the 

Administration has enforced across the board. 

I think it is interesting that a consequence of this is now that 

most Sudanese oil goes to China. Perhaps it explains some of the 

deeper consequences, the unforeseen consequences, of that particular approach, and I just wanted to point that out. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to oversimplify policy. 

Sanctions are never trouble free, and no absolutist statement that 

I might make for rhetorical flourish would fail to have an exception, and, in fact, we have not allowed our oil companies to do business in Sudan; on the other hand, we have not even mentioned the 

possibility of interrupting Chinese exports to the United States if 

China doesn’t cooperate with us on the issue of Sudan. 

Mr. ROYCE. And I grant you, we haven’t sanctioned Japan. We 

haven’t closed off trade with Japan, as you have raised that point, 

but as I mentioned, there are some side effects to such policies as 

to——

Mr. SHERMAN. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act would apply to only 

one Japanese company, not to the entire country. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go to Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Crumpton, there is a book, if you have not had the opportunity to review, I would suggest that you do so. I found it really 

quite compelling. It is called Infiltration, by a gentleman by the 

name of Paul Sperry, and among the things that he brings out is 

the significant threat posed by the proliferation of Wahhabi-connected mosques in the United States, all funded by the Saudis. 

Many of them not too far from where we sit, by the way, identified 

as perhaps some of the most radical, are being led by people who 

are the most radical members of the Wahhabi sect, and certainly 

the kind of religious perspective that they hold presents, I think, 

to many people a significant concern. 

Not only is it a concern about what is being said in these 

mosques and what is being said in the schools that are supported 

all around the world by Saudis, but the effect of that. Where do we 

go from there? Are these people who come out of these mosques 

15

and out of these schools already primed and ready to go in terms 

of enlistment into radical organizations? 

And the question, of course, becomes one of, what can we do 

about this? What are our options? If we know that there is a concerted effort, because certainly there is a great deal of evidence to 

suggest that there is a concerted effort on the part of the Saudis, 

to—I will use the title of the book—to infiltrate Wahhabism and 

radical Islamic ideology into the United States, thereby helping to 

recruit terrorists here. And based on the fact that these mosques 

would certainly, if ever challenged about this, would certainly raise 

the issue of religious freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom 

of association, what is it we can do about what I consider to be a 

very, very serious and insidious sort of phenomenon that has all 

the earmarkings, it seems to me, of infiltration? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I was in Saudi Arabia last month, meeting with 

our Saudi partners. We had wide-ranging discussions, including the 

question of ideology and including the question of Saudi money. 

They have made some progress. They have established a financial 

intelligence unit to track funding. I have asked them also about the 

ability to track the money from the charitable organizations. They 

need to do more in that regard. I expressed my disappointment 

that they have not yet established a commission to overlook these 

charitable organizations and determine where this funding is 

going. 

You raised a good question about whether this is religion. Is it 

freedom of religion, or is it something else? Is it perhaps a competing political ideology? This is something that we have discussed 

with the Saudis, and we need to engage them further. 

I think the Saudis have realized, since May 2003, that they have 

a problem, certainly inside their borders, and they have taken action inside their borders. In fact, when I was there, some of their 

security forces were engaged in a fire fight, and some of their men 

lost their lives. 

The question that you ask is beyond the Saudi borders. Specifically, here in the United States, what are the Saudis doing about 

this? They know that we have concerns. I have raised it with them, 

and we will continue to engage with them and work with them to 

make sure that this radical ideology does not take hold and does 

not spread. 

I am encouraged by the Riyadh declaration earlier this year 

when the Saudi Government made some public comments about 

the need for moderation, about the need to have a more pluralistic 

view. They have taken some small steps toward reform within their 

government, within their borders, and I hope that will also follow 

in terms of their reform of their efforts beyond their borders. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Ambassador, I must tell you that although 

I do not share the Ranking Member’s enormous concern about 

what he paints as sort of a corporate headquarters inside the State 

Department, I must also tell you that with regard to Saudi Arabia, 

it does seem to me that we have a reluctance to do anything beyond, as you have said and others in front of us at this Committee 

have said, and that is raise objections. 

We have talked with them. We have told them about our concerns, but this, it seems to me, has not had even the slightest effect 

16

on what they are doing in terms of their support of these Wahhabi 

mosques and of madrassahs around the world, and specifically in 

the United States. Again, it just appears this way, and I am looking for any correction you may want to give me in terms of the way 

we are viewing it, but it appears that the more pressure that is put 

on them by Islamic radicals inside their own kingdom, the more 

they simply respond by saying, ‘‘Look, we are going to crack down 

on you here, and we are going to give you an open checkbook essentially. Go away and do this someplace else, and we will allow you 

to do that. We will fund it as long as you sort of leave us alone, 

leave the ruling family intact, and stop this sort of insurgency—a 

little, tiny insurgency, maybe you could call it—inside Saudi Arabia.’’

It is certainly not just here, but it is in Washington, DC. It is 

certainly in the areas around Detroit, an area where there are 

huge concentrations of Muslims in a Muslim community, and there 

are these enormous advantages that they have because they have 

both the money, and they use our laws and the freedoms of the 

United States to advance their very nefarious purposes. And it just 

seems to me that we have to have some strategy to deal with that, 

even if it is not politically correct. It is a very dangerous situation 

we face here. Again, get the book. It is very unsettling, I will tell 

you. I would just love to know that we have some counterintelligence operation that is designed to deal specifically with that particular problem: The Saudis’ funding of mosques, the funding of 

these schools in the United States. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Sir, the Saudis have taken some steps. As I 

noted, they have started a financial intelligence unit. They are 

sharing information with us. They have reduced some support. 

They are looking at changing the curriculum and their books. They 

have changed some of the curriculum, but they still have a long 

way to go, and we have expressed that to them. We will be following up with a meeting in the first week of December with our 

Saudi counterparts to continue this discussion and to move forward 

on our strategy with them. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Cardoza of California. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearing, and welcome, Mr. Ambassador. At the beginning, I want to 

also say, Mr. Chairman, that I want to thank you for your amendment yesterday on the Floor. It was one that the country needed. 

I wish we had gotten more votes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Cardoza. 

Mr. CARDOZA. The Chairman issued a memorandum to the Members of the Committee, and on page 10 it has a table that outlines—have you seen this, Mr. Crumpton?—it outlines the number 

of foreign fighters that we have captured in Iraq since April 2005, 

and it lists the number as 312, and then it goes on to list the different countries that these foreign fighters have allegedly emanated from. 

The Administration, in the past, has said numerous times that 

the foreign fighter situation was driving the insurgency in Iraq. Is 

that your feeling at this time? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think there are many reasons for the insurgency in Iraq. I don’t think we can say it is simply the foreign 

17

fighter. They are a minority there. I think General Abizaid has 

talked about that. As I noted in my opening statement——

Mr. CARDOZA. I am sorry I missed that. I apologize. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. The foreign fighters seek to hijack the insurgency, to claim it as their own, and to exploit the insurgency and 

exploit those conditions in Iraq for their own unique political ends. 

We are encouraged by the recent democratic institutions that are 

forming in Iraq, by the turnout for the referendum. We are very 

positive about where Iraq is going to go, although we know it is 

going to take a long time. There have been many bumps in the 

road. 

What is critical is that these nascent, liberal institutions gain 

traction and that we keep them afloat, and we keep them moving 

in the right direction because that is the last thing that foreign 

fighters and al-Qaeda want. They fear democracy. They fear success in Iraq. As noted earlier, I think the letter to Zarqawi underscores their fear of our success in Iraq. 

Mr. CARDOZA. I would agree with you on several points. I am not 

sure I agree with you on the ultimate outcome yet because I think 

that is still in the balance, and I think we have to be vigilant to 

make sure it goes in the right direction. That is why I am asking 

the questions today. 

Have you had an opportunity, sir, to review any of the work and 

the literature by Ken Pollock of the Brookings Institute, any of the 

editorials he has written for the New York Times? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I have read some of his articles and columns but, 

frankly, not recently. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Okay. Well, he talks about a counterinsurgency 

strategy that he believes, in my conversations with him, that the 

British did very well as they finally learned to overcome the terrorism in northern Ireland. He talks about it as being an ‘‘ink spot 

strategy’’ where you develop a concentration of security and let that 

security spread and show people the path. In fact, I subscribe to 

the fact that we should be doing more of that in Iraq and that the 

Administration’s strategy has been one of more general political 

strategy and not securing economic stability. There are less hours 

of electricity produced in the country now than there was under 

Saddam. We have all heard the statistics. 

I will not belabor that, but I would suggest that the Administration take a look at some of these strategies of concentration in different parts of the country that are more stable, showing the path 

to the Iraqi people that they have a better future through stability 

than through terrorism. I believe it is not necessarily driven by foreign fighters. I do agree with your assessment that they take advantage of the situation. 

I also wanted to mention that I agree with Mr. Tancredo. I think 

his two points on the Saudis and the Wahhabi problem are of grave 

danger to this country and are in direct confrontation with the 

goals that you have talked about as far as the counterterrorism 

strategy. 

I have one final question that I am concerned about. In my community, several months ago, when I first came to Congress about 

21⁄2 years ago, my local sheriff mentioned to me that drug money 

had been funneled back. There was a bust where $5 million of drug 

18

money had been—I think Hezbollah was the terrorist organization 

that he thought the drug money went back to, the sale of the 

drugs, the smuggling. And I am very concerned about this link 

with drug cartels to terrorism, and wonder if you are seeing any 

of that in any other areas of the country, if you are seeing a growing link between drug lords and narcotics trafficking and terrorism, 

terrorist organizations. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. If I may first comment on your point 

about Saudi Arabia and then address your question. There is an 

excellent book called No God But God, and the thesis is that there 

is an ongoing Islamic reformation, really revolution. There is great 

debate, great conflict, within the Muslim world right now, and 

Saudi Arabia is a part of this. We need to find ways to encourage 

those moderate voices that believe in an Islamic democracy as we 

are trying to see established in Iraq. 

This is a complex issue. It is going to take a long time, but in 

the end, I have no doubt that moderate Islam will prevail. 

Your question about drug money and terrorism, the nexus; there 

is a nexus. If you look at opium production in Afghanistan, clearly 

some of the Taliban have profited from that. Colombia; and, again, 

I mentioned this in my opening statement, the alliance between the 

narco-traffickers and the FARC in Colombia, in particular, is another example. It is a problem, and I think it underscores how nonstate actors, including narco-traffickers, are a threat to this Nation 

and our people. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Mr. Chairman, if I could have just a moment more 

to ask a follow-up. 

My concern about the link between drugs and terrorists is not 

just the fact that they are funding their organizations through this, 

but they also have the supply mechanisms to be able to smuggle 

into our country very dangerous materials that could be used in 

terrorist attacks domestically, and that is one of the reasons why 

I raised the question. And I would like to have any comments that 

you might be able to share with the Committee on that topic. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I share your concerns. It underscores 

the need for the intelligence that will point us to the right people, 

to the right places where they are trying to infiltrate. It is not only 

narcotics; it is human smuggling, another area of concern. We have 

a long way to go, sir, in determining all of those routes and all of 

those networks. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Sir, we have been less than successful in the fight 

against drugs, and I am very concerned that it is just an open 

pathway into our Nation to smuggle very dangerous materials into 

this country. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three questions, 

and I will try to get through those as quickly as possible. 

I am reading a book called Ghost Wars that won the Pulitzer 

Prize. You have probably read it yourself. It is very insightful 

about the CIA’s involvement in Afghanistan. The year 1979 was a 

pivotal year. You had the shah in Iran overthrown, the Islamic revolution, and then you also had the Sunni Arabs forming the 

mujahadeen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. 

19

Just in reference to the Ranking Member’s comment, the Clinton 

Administration advocated the interests of Unocal and Afghanistan 

when the Taliban was coming to power. But I want to focus on 

three areas. 

One is human intelligence. What you get in reading the book is 

that we shifted away from human intelligence in the nineties and 

started to rely more on the electronic. Where are we today? What 

is the state of our human intelligence capabilities? 

Number two: With Iran raising its head again and its alliance in 

our own hemisphere with people like President Chavez in Venezuela, who has also aligned himself with Fidel Castro, it seems to 

me it is bringing the threat of Islamic terrorism into our own hemisphere. Can you comment, if you can in an open hearing, on the 

current threat in our own hemisphere from Latin America penetrating our own porous borders and causing us harm? 

And then, finally, I had a trip with the Homeland Security Committee. We visited with King Abdullah in Jordan, and I had a glimmer of hope in terms of changing the ideology in terms of he said 

he had met with the council of the top 12 Imams in the region and 

was attempting to get them to issue fatwas, or religious edicts, condemning this extreme interpretation of jihad and the Islamic faith. 

That gave me just a glimmer of hope that perhaps by changing 

within their own religion with these fatwas, which are laws, that 

we have some hope of, as you predicted, the moderate Muslim 

world prevailing. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. Thank you. Your first question: What 

is the state of human intelligence? I agree with your assessment 

of human intelligence in 1990. At one point, I think the CIA only 

brought in about a dozen people for a training class in the year. 

The funding was cut. Resources were down to the bare bones. That 

takes a long time to rebuild. 

Importantly, there is great interest in service within the intelligence community. I think, last year, perhaps the year before, 

more than 130,000 Americans applied for employment with the 

CIA. The CIA has gone to great extremes, thanks to the generosity 

of Congress, to bring in more people, and I, unfortunately, will not 

be able to go into detail in this particular forum, but I am encouraged by their recruitment efforts and by their training. I am also 

encouraged by the performance of those officers overseas in such 

harsh places as Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I might also note that the human intelligence partnership with 

our military special operations forces is closer than ever, and I 

think that is going to continue to be a requirement for us to succeed in this war. Sir, I would be glad to speak with you in a private 

session, if you wish, about the state of human intelligence. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Your second question about Islamic terrorism in 

our own hemisphere; this goes back to some of the earlier questions 

about the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, whether 

it be narcotics trafficking or human smuggling. It is a concern. 

When you look at the Caribbean, when you look at some of the 

Islamic movements in the Caribbean as a concern, when you look 

at the number of special-interest aliens, many from the Middle 

East, that cross from Mexico into your home state; those are large 

20

numbers. When you look at the presence of Hezbollah fund-raising 

organizations in various parts of Latin America, there has, for 

many years, been a problem in the tri-border area. It is a real 

issue. It is a real concern. 

We are working diligently with our partners there in South 

America and Central America and also with the Organization of 

American States. There is a focus on counterterrorism. We are 

working very closely with the Department of Homeland Security in 

working the borders. 

I should emphasize this. The Department of Homeland Security, 

relatively new, is taking great strides in the right direction. Now, 

I believe there are more than 1,600 of their officers assigned overseas in various Embassies, and that number will grow, and as they 

are integrated into some of our foreign operations, I think it will 

make us stronger back here in the Homeland. 

So I share your concerns about the problem here in the hemisphere. We are acutely aware of it, and we are working through 

both bilateral and multilateral fora to address these concerns. 

Mr. MCCAUL. If I could make just a quick comment. I think one 

of the biggest threats to our national security are the OTMs, the 

Mexicans coming across. I worked with Border Patrol in my prior 

career, and they don’t have anyplace to put them. They don’t have 

any detention space down there, and they are given a notice to appear, and they don’t show up. I think that is something that we 

are going to address in short order in the Congress. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. Thank you. In your third question, you 

referred to King Abdullah in Jordan and his efforts to rally moderate Muslims. He is a leader in the region. I am also encouraged 

by the efforts of the Malaysian Government. I just returned from 

Southeast Asia Tuesday night and had fruitful discussions with the 

leaders in Malaysia and Indonesia and some of their efforts. Pakistan; President Musharraf has taken some bold steps trying to reform the madrassas in his country, trying to work with moderate 

clergy. The Riyadh declaration earlier this year; I mentioned what 

the Saudis are trying to do. 

I believe that there is a growing consensus, a growing alliance, 

among these various Muslim states that they have to get into the 

fight. I think they understand that more than ever. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate your testimony here today. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Weller of Illinois? 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Ambassador, thank 

you for your time before the Subcommittee today. I want to continue a portion of the line of questioning which my friend from 

Texas opened up, Mr. McCaul. All too often, I feel, as we discuss 

terrorism around the world, we often ignore—certainly our friends 

in the media ignore and many others ignore—our own neighborhood, Latin America and the Caribbean. So I appreciate the comments you have already begun. 

I have had the opportunity to visit the tri-border region, Ciudad 

del Este, and I have personally had a chance to assess that area 

in the last few years. I spent time in Colombia trying to get a hanVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:31 Jan 11, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\102705\24203.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

dle on what the FARC and other narco-trafficking terrorist groups 

are up to. 

Can you share with us what type of evidence you see out there, 

if there is any, where Middle East terrorist groups have linked up 

with the identified terrorist groups here in our own hemisphere, 

the FARC, for example, or others? We know the IRA has played a 

role with the FARC. What about the Middle East terrorist groups? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. No, sir. I cannot recall any intelligence pointing 

to that kind of link. I think you do have a common overlap, though, 

in the criminal infrastructure. I think FARC and other extremist 

groups here in our hemisphere work among the same criminal elements that Hezbollah and others do. I see that three-way link as 

pretty common. Whether it is money laundering or document fraud 

or human smuggling, they use similar methods. 

Mr. WELLER. The narco-trafficking is clearly identified as a 

source of financing for terrorism but also violations of IPR, trafficking in pirated goods and products, entertainment, software, 

CDs are also a source of funding. When I was in Ciudad del Este, 

the local prosecutor showed us a warehouse full of several million 

dollars’ worth of pirated CDs and software that they had seized. 

Hamas and Hezbollah have been identified as using the tri-border region as a source of funding. Where else in Latin America do 

you see Hamas and Hezbollah operating in a way to gain additional funding for their terrorist activities? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. There are parts of the Caribbean where we have 

certainly seen some tribal. There are parts of Central America 

where we have seen some operatives, where we have seen financial 

transactions. In the Caribbean, in the southern part of the Caribbean next to Venezuela and Colombia, we have seen some activity 

there. 

I should note that when you talk about Hezbollah, they really 

are a global terrorist network, and although they have been relatively quite outside the Levant, they remain a formidable force, in 

large part because of their sponsorship by Iran, the training they 

have received, the experience they have gained from the engagement against the Israeli forces. In some ways, you could argue that 

Hezbollah may be more of a threat than al-Qaeda, given their network, given their expertise, given their state sponsorship. So you 

are right to be concerned. 

Mr. WELLER. The current President of Venezuela has made positive statements about Iran’s desire to obtain nuclear technology 

and has been visibly seen cozying up to the current Iranian leadership. Do you see an expanded Iranian presence in Latin America 

and the Caribbean? Have you seen any increased activity through 

their diplomatic efforts or any other outreach? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. No, sir, but I will be glad to check and get back 

to you on that. 

Mr. WELLER. I would appreciate that. 

Just generally, how do you assess the cooperation of our friends 

in Latin America and the Caribbean, the cooperation of the governments of our friends throughout the hemisphere, when it comes to 

identifying those who are raising money through illegal activities: 

Narco-trafficking, piracy, and other sources of fund-raising? How do 

22

you assess overall the level of cooperation, and also, are there areas 

where we can make some improvement? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. If you exclude Cuba and Venezuela, I would say 

cooperation ranges from good to outstanding. That, of course, can 

vary from country to country, and even within a particular country 

it can vary, beginning with law enforcement or with intelligence or 

with immigration. It would be hard for me to capture all of that 

in great detail in this timespan, but I can say that, given what I 

have seen just in the last couple of months in terms of not only information sharing but in the need to coordinate counterterrorism 

policy, it is going in the right direction. 

I think these governments fully realize the threat that they are 

under, and I think, when you talk about weapons of mass destruction and our efforts to educate them and raise their awareness, 

they are receptive to that. But, honestly, sir, we have a long way 

to go, and most of it in Latin America is not about political will; 

rather, it is about capacity or lack thereof. Part of our effort is to 

help, whether it is with the interdiction program, the terrorist 

interdiction program, which we fund, or other areas of support. We 

are working with them closely. 

Mr. WELLER. Trinidad recently had a series of bombings, and 

there was a radical Muslim leader who was arrested and since then 

released. Do you see any ties between this particular group in Trinidad and any of the international terrorist organizations from the 

Middle East? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I recall there is a link, and I will be 

glad to get some specifics for that, if you want. 

Mr. WELLER. Okay. I would appreciate a briefing on that. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Certainly. 

Mr. WELLER. In closing, Mexico is one of our most important 

friends and allies anywhere in the world. Of course, we share a 

common border, and there is much frustration regarding the smuggling of human cargo across the Mexican and United States border. 

At the same time, Mexico has a southern border with Guatemala 

and Belize. How do you assess Mexico’s efforts to make their own 

borders more secure, preventing criminal activity from crossing 

from their side into ours, as well as criminal activity crossing from 

the south, north into their territory? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. I think the Mexican Government has the political will, but they are straining under a lack of capacity. This is 

aggravated, of course, by the narco-trafficking, especially along the 

Mexican-Texas border, and that is exactly the kind of area that terrorist will seek to exploit, so they have a long way to go, sir. 

Mr. WELLER. But the Guatemala-Belize border for Mexico; how 

do you see their efforts there? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Again, I see some political will, but there is a 

question of capacity. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. And do you see political will on the southern border 

as well or an absence of political will there, Ambassador 

Crumpton? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Referring to——

Mr. ROYCE. On our side of the border. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. On our side of the border? 

23

Mr. ROYCE. If I might make a suggestion, maybe we could go to 

a second round, and we will all keep it to 3 minutes each. But, yes, 

let us just address the issue of lack of political will on the part of 

Mexico and maybe also the lack of political will on the part of the 

United States. I will tell you why I think that is a serious concern. 

Going back to your comment that on a recent trip to Southeast 

Asia, you said you had concerns, that you were frightened about 

the terrorist efforts to acquire WMD. I know a number of Border 

Patrol officers that are also frightened, and I don’t know anyone 

quite as frustrated as they are in dealing with a situation in which 

they feel things have been programmed to fail, and let me give you 

an example. 

Seventy percent of those from countries of concern, 70 percent of 

OTMs overall, when they are apprehended, there isn’t detention 

space. We have a few thousand men and women on the Border Patrol. We have 700,000 people in law enforcement in this country, 

and yet we don’t use that State and local law enforcement in order 

to try to back up those several thousand. 

It just seems to me, if homeland security really was a priority, 

these issues would be addressed. So I would ask you about that. 

I also wanted to ask you, on another front, the earthquake in 

South Asia. Robert Kaplan, a military writer, said hunting down 

al-Qaeda in its lair will be impossible without the goodwill of the 

local population. That attitude can be generated by relief work of 

the kind taking place in Kashmir. It is the classic counterinsurgency model: Winning without firing a shot. 

You mentioned the tsunami in your testimony but not the earthquake. I thought I would ask you about your thoughts there. Democracy can be a decades-old or maybe centuries-old project, but 

humanitarian relief is immediate and can have a very real impact 

on hearts and minds. 

Lastly, according to a report published, as you mentioned, in the 

New York Times, 312 foreign nationals have been captured in Iraq 

since April of this year. That includes 41 from Sudan. Sudan is a 

country of significant congressional interest, given its complicity in 

the ongoing genocide in Darfur and its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in the past. The State Department contends that 

Sudan is taking the right steps when it comes to terrorism, but 

then we see this significant influx of fighters into Iraq, 41 of whom 

have been detained since April. So how does Sudan fit into the 

transnational terrorism picture? Those would be my closing questions. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The first question, regarding our southern border, Secretary Rice and Secretary Chertoff 

have launched a joint initiative to look at foreign counterterrorism 

and homeland counterterrorism policies and how we can pull these 

together. 

I take your points—regarding the challenges faced by our Border 

Patrols. I will go back to an earlier comment I made. We need to 

increase our defensive efforts, but we also need to increase our intelligence so we know where to put the finite resources we have. 

The second question——

Mr. ROYCE. Well, if you want a force multiplier, I suggested just 

now one way to get one. We have in excess of 700,000 State and 

24

local law enforcement personnel in this country. In terms of utilizing bed space for OTMs, it would seem to me, if there really was 

the will, with all of the military bases and everything else we have 

at our disposal, we would be in some position other than releasing 

70 percent of those apprehended. So I think if we are going to be 

serious about this, we ought to drive home the point that, to date, 

we haven’t established any kind of policy that is really going to address the issue of border security. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I will take that on, and I will be glad 

to raise it with my partners in DHS. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I will let you continue, Ambassador. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. The second question, regarding goodwill 

of population to have an enduring, effective counterterrorism policy; I wholeheartedly agree. Robert Kaplan wrote an excellent article about what the U.S. military, working with our Embassy in Manilla, has been able to do in Basilan down in Mindanao. It was 

about building roads and building wells and building economic capacity, in addition to securing that area from Abu Sayef. If there 

is a model in Southeast Asia, it is probably Basilan. 

It is the same kind of thing that Mr. Kaplan was talking about, 

I think, in Kashmir. It is the same thing that we used in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban. It is about listening to local partners and about building not only goodwill but trust. It is about 

finding common ground and offering locals an opportunity to not 

only secure their economic well-being but to enhance their pride, 

their honor, their prestige, and I think where you see effective 

counterterrorism/counterinsurgency policies, that is what is done. 

Your third question about Sudan: Sudan has made great strides 

since 2000, since Frank Taylor went there and laid out a roadmap 

for their counterterrorism objectives. Sadly, Darfur is an ugly blot, 

and I spoke with the Sudanese foreign minister about this in New 

York just a few weeks ago. Until that is resolved, there is really 

no way that we can take them off the current list. There are efforts 

underway. With our help, through the offices of the African Union, 

there are meetings in Nigeria with the rebel factions with the Sudanese Government, but we don’t know where that is going to go. 

We don’t now how long that is going to take. 

So despite what I must note are some noteworthy efforts on the 

part of Sudan in terms of what they have done in terms of securing 

a peace accord with the rebels in the south and establishing a government of national unity, in terms of sharing information with us 

on terrorism, in terms of closing down some of the offices there, 

until Darfur is settled, I don’t see any movement on our part. 

Mr. ROYCE. I concur on that point. Thank you. I am going to go 

to Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. First, I want to pick up where I was 

before, but then I want to go to a completely different area. You 

did correctly point out that our companies are restricted, to some 

extent, making money in Sudan and Iran due to sanctions we applied before September 11th. I was simply voicing the hope that 

after 9/11, we would have changed our trade and investment policies so as to achieve counterterrorism objectives, that we would 

have begun enforcing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act against Iran as 

25

well as Libya, that we would have changed our trade and investment policies toward Iran, toward China, toward Russia, toward 

certain Japanese oil companies. And, in fact, since 9/11, we have 

not changed, and apparently not seriously discussed inside the Administration changing, our trade and investment policies toward 

achieving counterterrorism objectives. The one change we did make 

was we weakened the Iran Nonproliferation Act in Congress on the 

Floor last night. Of course, we weakened it far less than the Administration had urged us to. 

So I would hope that your office would become a voice within the 

Administration to try to explore all of the ways we can use our 

trade and investment policy more aggressively than we did before 

September 11th to try to achieve counterterrorism objectives. 

Now, shifting completely, there are a number of organizations 

that are on the terrorist list that once deserved to be on it that 

would like to get off of it. The best example I know of an organization that was listed as a terrorist organization and then removed 

was the Irish Republican Army, and it does not make one a terrorist just to be an insurgent. George Washington was a violent insurgent. But a terrorist is one who targets noncombatants. 

Are there any defined standards by which we look at an organization and say, ‘‘Yes, you were a terrorist organization in 1990; yes, 

you were a terrorist organization in 1995, but you have changed 

your tactics, you have announced that you have changed them, you 

have actually changed them, you have adopted a bargaining position that is at least within the realm of reasonableness.’’? What 

steps should the MEK or the Tamil Tigers take, and is there any 

chance that we will actually have a statement out of the State Department defining what the standards are? What standards would 

be applied to the Tamil Tigers, the MEK, or others who wish to 

clean up their act? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Well, I think, as you outlined, when any organization targets innocent civilians with political violence, they are defined as a terrorist organization. Until that is not only renounced 

but demonstrated over time, until they participate in the legitimate 

political dialogue, I don’t think they can be taken off that list, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. How long a period should there be between when 

an organization renounces terrorism and ceases terrorism before 

they would get off the terrorist list, and would actions of insurgency, military actions against military targets, prevent it from 

being removed from such a list? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Well, the time line also depends on who they target. MEK is an example. They killed Americans during the seventies. They participated in the takeover of the Embassy in Tehran. 

So it also depends on who they targeted and what these individuals 

responsible for these crimes are doing within that organization. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we would be tougher on an organization that 

killed 100 Americans in a terrorist attack than one that killed 100 

Sri Lankans in a terrorist act. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. It is a question of U.S. law and international 

law, both. It also depends on the geopolitical environment. It depends on progress toward their participation in legitimate government. There is a variety of factors, sir. 

26

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me use this opportunity to urge your office to 

coordinate with others in the Administration to try to issue some 

sort of standards so that groups that wish to clean up know what 

the standards are that they would be held to and have an incentive 

to clean up their act, and it may very well be that there are certain 

acts of terrorism so heinous and so directed at our own citizens 

that a group would never get off the list. So I guess, among the 

standards are whether the organization has a reasonable bargaining position to resolve the conflict that it is in, whether it has 

renounced terrorism in word and deed and for how long, and, finally, you introduced an idea which I hadn’t thought of which is, 

no matter how long ago it was—well, how long ago and how heinous were the acts of terrorism that they are now trying to live 

down? 

So, hopefully, we would let people know what we would like to 

see and what the rewards might be, and I yield back. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Sherman, I don’t believe we could issue a 

particular set of standards that would be comprehensive. I do, however, believe that we can and have issued roadmaps for specific organizations, just like we have for countries. Sudan is an example. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Tancredo of Colorado. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, sir. 

Let me follow on that issue of the MEK especially because, you 

know, it is not just the fact that they have, I think, renounced any 

sort of violence against the United States, which has certainly been 

an observable thing, that is to say, there has been nothing for those 

30-some years since the allegation that they were involved in the 

attack that killed at least one American serviceman in Iran; not 

only that, but, of course, it seems to me, if you are being somewhat 

subjective about this—which you are saying that you are, because 

you are not going to put it into any sort of objective set of criteria 

for us to determine whether they should come off—well, then 

wouldn’t the subjectivity of this allow you to look at the fact that 

they have been most helpful in giving us information that we have 

used against the regime in Iran? 

They have been enormously helpful not only in that regard, but 

as I understand it, now we actually provide them security. The 

group in Kabashraf in Iraq, we actually provide security for them 

now. They are not being held there against their will; they are actually being given a status that is quite peculiar, in that if they are 

still on the terrorist watch list, but we are protecting them, it 

leaves a lot of interesting questions for us that I think should be 

taken into consideration when we are dealing with this issue in the 

subjective way that you have described. 

But the real issue that I want to get into is your comments about 

Mexico showing some degree of support for our efforts. There does 

seem to be a desire to help us. How would you interpret Mr. Jorge 

Castaneda’s remarks to the Senate last month, the past foreign 

minister and potential Presidential candidate in Mexico, when he 

told us in no uncertain terms when we asked him whether we 

could expect any help from Mexico in our war on terror, essentially, 

and he said, ‘‘You can expect nothing from us unless you satisfy a 

certain set of requirements, and that is, one, open your borders. 

Allow the people who are Mexican nationals in your country the opVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:31 Jan 11, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\102705\24203.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
27

portunity to stay there, even though they came there illegally, and 

not only that, but give us a lot of foreign aid, and if you do those 

things,’’ he said, and only those things—I think he said ‘‘the whole 

enchilada’’—I think that is the phrase he actually used—they want 

all of that before they would ever help us in securing our borders 

or, especially looking at the transit through their country from 

other areas. Very, very concerned about that and very hard for me 

to understand that that can be interpreted as being some supportive position taken by their government. 

And, lastly, the State Department and, I think, Homeland Security have suggested that there is no reason—I think the actual 

wording they used there—there is no evidence that any terrorists 

have come across the southern border into the United States or 

come across either border, northern or southern, illegally and are 

now in the United States. 

I have talked to FBI agents who have arrested people who are 

in this country and who came across the southern border and were 

arrested for terrorist-related activities. The idea that we may not 

have interdicted them at the border, well, I guess that is encouraging to somebody. And also I have talked to people within the law 

enforcement establishment that suggest that there has been contact between al-Qaeda and MS–13 for the purpose of helping to 

transport people into this country. How do you square all of these 

things, more on the last couple of things even than the MEK, especially Jorge Castaneda’s statement? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. That is an excellent example of a challenge that 

we have to surmount. This notion that countries, that organizations, must work with us because it is an obligation, because it is 

an issue to be managed with the United States, in fact, the partnership we offer is not one of obligation; it is a partnership of opportunity for other countries because this is not just about U.S. interests; it is about the interests of civilized nations. It is about morality. It is about economic interdependence. If there is another attack here in the Homeland like 9/11, the economic impact will not 

only be felt here but certainly in Mexico, as it was after 9/11. 

I believe that our neighbors and our partners around the world 

must understand this. This is not about U.S. interests only; it is 

about the interests of global, civilized society, about global economic prosperity, about the growth of liberal institutions. Now, 

that goes back to issues of public diplomacy, it goes back to issues 

of education, and it goes back to, I think, building greater networks 

of trust, greater networks of communication, because it is not just 

about us. It is truly about our global community, and I hope that 

in our discussions with our partners, that we will be able to underscore that with Mexico and with other countries. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Do you have any idea, if you will indulge me just 

for one moment, Mr. Chairman, do you have any idea how many 

people have been arrested in the United States for either being terrorists, terrorist watch list, involved with some sort of terrorist activity who have, in fact, come into this country illegally, either 

across the borders or into the United States on visas and overstayed? 

Mr. CRUMPTON. No, sir. I don’t have a specific number, but I will 

be glad to get one and get back to you. 

28

Mr. TANCREDO. I would certainly appreciate that. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Sure. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. 

Just in closing on MEK, this was a group that was outlawed in 

the United States back in the late seventies because of their attacks—actually their killing of Americans during the Iranian revolution and, you know, their involvement with Saddam Hussein’s 

genocidal campaigns against the Kurds. They have participated in 

attacks on civilians and also political assassinations of the Iranian 

diaspora or the Iranian ex-pats who don’t share their political 

views. So I think a lot will be decided by whether or not they discontinue those types of practices, including political assassinations. 

I want to thank Ambassador Crumpton for his testimony. I think 

this was an excellent introduction of you to us, and we look forward 

to working with you, and I can think of no more important issue 

than terrorism and WMD, your areas of expertise. We wish you the 

best. As you know, this Committee has a great interest in what has 

been a problematic annual report, and so myself and my colleagues 

will probably have a few questions for the record we hope you could 

answer, and, again, I thank you and wish you the best, Ambassador Crumpton. 

Mr. CRUMPTON. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity. 

Mr. ROYCE. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(29)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HON- ORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND

NONPROLIFERATION

Question: 

The State Department’s last two annual reports to Congress on terrorism have been 

problematic. First the numbers were inaccurate and then the statistics reporting attacks were omitted. How do you propose to improve the way the report is produced? 

Response: 

As you know, the reporting statute was amended in December 2004 to include certain new requirements. Some of these requirements (e.g., the requirement that we 

report, to the extent practicable, statistical information concerning the number of 

individuals that have been killed, injured or kidnapped by terrorist groups during 

the course of the year) relate to information that the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) compiles in accordance with its statutory mandate to be the primary 

organization for analyzing and integrating intelligence that the USG possesses or 

acquires on international terrorism and counterterrorism. We have been working 

with NCTC to ensure that all statutorily required statistical information is appropriately prepared and presented in the 2005 report. Both we and NCTC are committed to producing a report that satisfies the needs of the Congress and the requirements of the statute. 

Our efforts to produce the 2005 report are already underway, and we look forward 

to continued consultation with Congress as we move forward in this process. 

Question: 

What is your opinion of House passed legislation (H.R. 2601, Section 1102) that 

would require a single Patterns report? The proposal requires more specific assessments in the country-by-country section, to include negative reports on country cooperation, which may be classified, if necessary. 

Response: 

We believe that the existing reporting requirements (including new requirements 

introduced in December 2004, which will become effective for the first time this 

year) create the framework for the kind of useful, authoritative reporting that Congress seeks, and that further amendments are not required. 

With regard to our opinion on legislation that would require a single Patterns re- port, we note that the reporting statute (22 USC δ 2656f ) already requires a single 

report. We are preparing to meet this requirement by, among other things, arranging for the National Counterterrorism Center to provide for inclusion in the report 

certain information (e.g., statistical information that is required under the December 

2004 amendments) that by statute falls within their purview. 

As to the proposed changes to the country assessment requirements, we believe 

that the reporting statute already creates an appropriate framework for us to provide all relevant information to Congress, including pertinent information about foreign governments’ cooperation (or failure to cooperate) with our counterterrorism activities. To the extent that this information may be classified, we note that the current statute already permits us to include classified information in a classified 

annex to the report. 

30

RESPONSE FROM THE HONORABLE HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question: 

Many of the countries we are providing antiterrorism assistance to have recent histories of human right abuses perpetrated by their government’s agents—both military 

and police. As we speak, one of the more egregious cases—Morocco, for instance—has 

their military and police forces illegally occupying Western Sahara and undermining 

the stability of the region. 

In light of this, can you explain your role in our counter-terrorism initiatives? 

What assurances can you demonstrate that we are proceeding in a way that does not 

undermine human rights concerns and standards? 

Answer: 

All units of foreign security forces identified to receive Anti-terrorism Assistance 

Training (ATA)—in Morocco and worldwide—are thoroughly vetted for human 

rights abuses both by the U.S. Embassy and the Department of State before any 

training can occur. If credible evidence that the unit in question is associated with 

human rights abuses, no ATA training or assistance will be provided. 

In addition, National Agency Checks (NAC) and local record checks are conducted 

on every ATA participant. The RSO must verify via cable to the Department that 

all candidates for training received favorable records checks. Verification must accompany the list of participants transmitted to the Department. The RSO and post 

must ensure that records checks are comprehensive and encompass a prudent period of time. Post is advised that individuals who have violated the human rights 

of others, been associated with persons indicted for war crimes, and/or engaged in 

corrupt or criminal practices, are ineligible to receive ATA training. 

The NAC checks are normally conducted by the Embassy LEGATT (FBI) at a 

nearby post or directly with Washington. Also post Consular Sections will also do 

their checks before a visa is issued to the participants. 

Morocco has been the victim of terrorism, and is an important partner in our efforts to combat terrorism in North Africa. ATA training is a critical element in enhancing Morocco’s practical capacity to fight terrorism, and all Moroccan participants in ATA training are carefully selected and vetted.

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