THE DECISIVE PHASE OF COLOMBIA’S WAR 

ON NARCO-TERRORISM

by 

Dario E. Teicher 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 28 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War 

on Narco-Terrorism 

Dario E. Teicher 

January 2005 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 28 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 28 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i

The Author................................................................................................. iii

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. Plan Colombia ....................................................................................3 

III. President Alvaro Uribe Velez Assumes Power ..................................5 

IV. President Uribe Seizes the Initiative.................................................10 

V. Measures of Effectiveness ................................................................15 

VI. Conclusions.......................................................................................20 

Notes..........................................................................................................25 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

i 

The Author 

Commander Dario E. Teicher is the Chief for Security Cooperation

Plans, U.S. Southern Command, under the SCJ5 Strategy, Policy and 

Plans Directorate. He is responsible for developing and executing the U.S. 

Southern Command Theater Security Cooperation Strategy in Latin 

America and the Caribbean as directed by the Secretary of Defense. 

Commander Teicher is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force’s Air War 

College, and holds an M.S. in Telecommunications Management from 

Naval Post Graduate School and a B.S. in Computer Science from NY 

Maritime College. He is a 1999 graduate of the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College. Also, CDR Teicher is a graduate of the Joint and 

Combined Warfighting School, Senior Program, Joint Forces Staff 

College, where he was the recipient of the 2002 General Douglas 

McArthur Writing Award having coauthored “Operation Sea Lion: A 

Joint Critical Analysis.”

iii 

The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War 

on Narco-Terrorism 

Dario E. Teicher 

Key: Est. Members

FARC (15000-20000) 

ELN (3000-6000)

AUC (10000-16000)

Major Coca Areas

FARC’s Zona del 

Despeje 

Proposed ELN 

Safe Haven

Figure 1. Areas of Greatest Enemy Activity in 20011

I. Introduction 

Background 

The chapter “The Colombian War and the Narco-Terrorist Threat” 

published in The Homeland Security Papers: Stemming the Tide of Terror

defined the strategic value of Colombia to the U.S., identified the enemies 
2 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

besieging the government of Colombia, and illustrated what remains a 

difficult conflict to resolve. It also concluded that perhaps the war in 

Colombia, which appeared to be a lost cause in late 2001, was in fact 

entering the decisive phase.2

 This chapter focuses on this definitive

period, where in late 2004 victory is perhaps within Colombia’s grasp. 

In early 2002, the final days of Colombian President Andres 

Pastrana’s administration were marred by an unending internal war against 

right wing and leftist narco-terrorists and criminal cartels. During his 

administration the narco-terrorists reached their zenith of power (see 

Figure 1). For example, the right-wing paramilitary groups, under the 

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) umbrella organization, were 

demanding legal status and greater political power. The two major leftist 

groups, the largest being the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia (FARC) and the other the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional

(ELN), threatened the capital and were able to operate in every region of 

Colombia. Furthermore, all of these groups were well armed due to the 

immense sums of narco-dollars, which maintain them in the field to this 

day.3

In a desperate bid for peace, President Pastrana ceded to the FARC a 

vast safe-haven (approximately the size of Switzerland), known as the 

Zona del Despeje (see Figure 1), in exchange for participation in peace 

talks. Regardless, the FARC continued illicit trafficking and even

engaged in terrorist acts while “talking peace.” A similar offer was under 

consideration for dealing with the ELN.4

The Drug Cartels 

As discussed in “The Colombian War and the Narco-Terrorist

Threat,”5

 the notorious Colombian Cartels of the 1980s were “rolled up” 

and gave way to 

“...many small technologically and socially sophisticated, 

and less integrated cartels. In other words, the new drug 

lords of Colombia blend well into high society and are not 

excessive in their use of violence.”6

Additionally, the Plan Colombia mission statement has as an

emphasis to “...break the links, between the illegal armed groups and the 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 3 

criminal drug industry that supports them.”7 Without the illegal armed 

groups, the cartels simply can become a police matter, although one 

should expect continued U.S. and Colombian military support. 

Current Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez’s priority is to force

the illegal armed groups to the peace table or militarily defeat them. He is 

focused on the military threat posed by these narco-terrorist groups, which 

can seize and hold terrain to create “ungoverned space” (a lawless area).

II. Plan Colombia 

The Focus of Plan Colombia 

President Pastrana ran on a peace platform. He intended to make 

peace with the FARC (the most powerful of the narco-terrorist groups), 

while seeking radical social reforms to make peace and tranquility 

possible and permanent. His vehicle was Plan Colombia, a six-year 

strategy to overhaul almost every aspect of Colombian society.8

The plan was developed with considerable U.S. assistance and in

essence focused on five critical areas: 

• Curbing narco-trafficking 

• Reforming the justice system

• Fostering democratization and social development 

• Stimulating economic growth 

• Advancing the peace process9

Therefore, it is not a war plan but instead a national strategy to

achieve social change and peace. Despite financial and political

difficulties, the plan remains the foundation for victory in Colombia. 
4 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004, 2005

est. req.

In $ millions

Economic/Social

Military/Police

Plan Colombia

Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Colombia (1997-2005)10

Funding Plan Colombia 

President Pastrana envisioned a $7.5 billion budget to execute Plan

Colombia. Colombia pledged $4.0 billion, while calling on the international

community to provide the remaining $3.5 billion.11

Plan Colombia was launched in October 1999, with high 

expectations. One year later it became apparent the international 

community, led by the European Union, had balked and Colombia could 

only muster national funds totaling less than half of its stated goal. One 

explanation given was that members of the international community did 

not agree to more military aid and regarded Plan Colombia as a fig leaf for 

increasing military assistance and U.S. involvement.12

In fact, more than 75% of the U.S. Plan Colombia grant was aimed at

the military and the national police (see Figure 2).

13 The European Union 

was right but more U.S. military assistance became vital after President 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 5 

Pastrana’s failed peace attempt. The peace talks dragged for over three 

years, consuming the Pastrana administration and stalling military 

operations against the FARC.14

Fortunately, Pastrana did achieve one major goal under Plan 

Colombia. The initiative served to more meaningfully commit the United 

States to assisting Colombia.15 Figure 2 illustrates the year 2000 (Plan

Colombia U.S. aid package) as the high-water mark of U.S. assistance but 

there’s every indication Colombia will continue to receive sufficient aid

and well above the pre-Plan Colombia years. 

III. President Alvaro Uribe Velez Assumes Power 

Security First 

On January 9, 2002, Colombia’s President Andres Pastrana’s peace 

initiative ended in absolute failure as government Peace Commissioner 

Camilo Gomez declared the end of the Despeje.16 The decision was

purely academic because on August 7, 2002, President-elect Alvaro Uribe 

would assume office promising an uncompromising hard-line towards the 

narco-terrorists.17

Nevertheless, Plan Colombia remains the strategic foundation for 

waging Colombia’s war on narco-terrorism but the emphasis has changed 

to “advancing the peace process” from a position of strength. Therefore, 

the Uribe administration at the outset assumed three fundamental tasks: 

• Reacquire national territory 

• Establish permanent government presence...to provide law and 

order, development opportunities, and other services 

• Negotiate with the three illegal armed groups to end the fighting18

President Uribe is committed to the achievement of these tasks, which 

are at the core of his administration’s “Democratic Defense and Security

Policy (DSP).” The thrust of the DSP is 

“...to provide the state with the capacity to confront illegal 

armed groups by controlling more territory with more 

troops and newly created special military and police 
6 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

units... While its goal is to defeat the insurgents, the DSP 

does not close the door on the possibility of negotiated 

settlements. On June 29, 2003, President Uribe symbolically

launched the DSP in Putumayo...[However,] Implementation 

of most of the measures contemplated in the DSP began 

immediately following Uribe’s inauguration.”19

Through the DSP, President Uribe means to shape the strategic 

environment in favor of Colombia to give peace a chance, something 

Pastrana failed to do. Uribe is steadfast in his belief that without a secure 

environment the social and economic issues identified in Plan Colombia

cannot be achieved. During a recent interview, President Uribe said, 

“Poverty and misery are induced because of terrorist 

activity... Because of violence people do not invest, and in

the absence of investment, it is impossible to create

employment, it is impossible to affiliate people to social 

security, it is impossible to collect taxes, it is impossible to

pay public debts, it is impossible to expand social 

investment...”20

Uribe Mobilizes Colombia 

The election of President Uribe has revitalized Plan Colombia.

Particularly, he is focused on the interdiction of narco trafficking and 

forcing peace on his terms. Uribe’s two pillars to achieve success are to 

genuinely commit Colombia to the war effort and to ensure continued U.S. 

assistance. 

In 2001, the Colombian Armed Forces numbered 125,000 in a nation 

of over 40 million people; meaning approximately 0.3% of the population 

was under arms, with only 30,000 soldiers actually engaged in 

counterinsurgency operations.21 By comparison, during El Salvador’s

civil war (1980-92), a small nation of 5 million people mobilized an armed 

force of over 50,000 (one percent of the population), which forced the 

insurgents to the peace table and demobilization.

22

Consequently, within days of the inauguration, Uribe’s administration 

announced several measures (later incorporated into the DSP) to commit 

the nation to the war effort: 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 7

• Uribe quickly promulgated a decree invoking emergency powers, 

which provides authority to recruit quickly up to 6,000 soldiers for 

two elite mobile brigades, as well as 10,000 new police officers

and 100,000 civilian informers... 

• He imposed a 1.2% war tax on approximately 400,000 upper 

income individuals and businesses...to raise the $800 million

needed for an expanded military effort. 

• He initiated the Plan Meteor unarmed citizen police informant 

network. 

• His administration announced a plan to arm thousands of peasants 

(news accounts cited some 15,000 – 20,000 [campesino soldiers]) 

to be the first line of defense against guerillas and paramilitaries in

areas where there is no military presence.23

Additionally, even though Plan Colombia calls for a 50% reduction in 

cocaine production in six years, the Pastrana administration seriously 

limited aerial fumigation of coca fields.24 President Uribe removed all 

restrictions on aerial spraying and is nearly meeting the goals set in Plan 

Colombia.25 According to the 2004 U.N. World Drug Report, Colombia 

by 2003 had experienced a 30% decrease in cocaine production since 

1999, which is considered the peak year for coca cultivation.26 In fact,

coca production has been in a steady decline every year since 2001 and 

Uribe means to force the downward trend until “...not one gram of 

cocaine, not one gram of heroin, would come out of Colombia.”27

U.S. Military Assistance

U.S. Southern Command (the U.S. military regional command 

responsible for security cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean) 

is assisting Colombia in perhaps consolidating victory during this window 

of opportunity presented by the election of President Alvaro Uribe. 

According to General James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. Southern

Command: 

“President Uribe is a unique leader who has galvanized the 

will of the people and motivated his armed forces. He has 
8 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

personally demonstrated that one individual can change the 

course of events. Without his personal leadership, energy, 

and dedication, I don’t think the Colombians would have 

achieved the remarkable progress we have seen. Yet his 

personal charisma and drive only go so far, and he well 

knows it. That is why he is building the structures to 

sustain momentum and institutionalize success beyond that 

of his term and beyond that of Plan Colombia.”28

Therefore, U.S. Southern Command is managing and applying 

available U.S. security cooperation resources to assist Uribe in sustaining 

momentum. For 2005, in addition to continued support for fumigation and 

other counter-narcotics programs, the Bush administration has requested 

from Congress assistance for Colombia, which includes: 

• Operational support (training, supplies, repair parts maintenance 

and infrastructure) and specialized equipment, including weapons, 

night vision goggles and communications, to the Army. The focus 

of this support will be on the elite mobile brigades, the Rapid 

Reaction brigade (known by the Spanish acronym FUDRA) and 

the Comando and Lancero Battalions. 

• The Colombian Army 5th Mobile and 18th Infantry Brigades, 

trained in 2003 to provide protection to the Caño Limón-Coveñas

oil pipeline, a key element of Colombia’s economic infrastructure,

will receive additional munitions, equipment and training. 

• ...Establishing a national training center and developing an 

automated logistical system. 

• FMF [Foreign Military Financing] funding [to]...support the 

Colombian Navy and Air Force and include the provision of 

interdiction boats, additional combat aircraft, training and

infrastructure improvements, maintenance and operational support 

for Colombia’s C-130 transportation fleet. 

• ...Funds to purchase battlefield medical treatment, CSAR [combat 

search and rescue] and medevac-related equipment and training for 

Army and Air Force units. 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 9 

• FMF...[support for] naval interdiction programs by providing 

secure communications equipment, spare parts, and assistance to 

establish an operations center. 

• Riverine forces...[receiving] spare parts and other logistic support. 

• The AKI [Anti-Kidnapping Initiative], which provides tactical and

investigative training and equipment to the Colombian 

Government’s military and police anti-kidnapping units (Unified 

Action Groups for Personal Liberty -Spanish acronym “GAULA”.)

It is also assisting in the establishment of an interagency antikidnapping Joint Task Force, developing an interagency database 

to collect, analyze and disseminate information on kidnappings and 

assist in upgrading Colombian facilities. Three GAULA units have 

completed training.29

One more item that is making a difference is the Planning Assistance 

Teams (PAT) program. These teams are assigned to key Colombian 

military operational-level (or higher) headquarters, where they assist in 

planning and coordination, and represent U.S. commitment to the war on 

narco-terror.30

These teams, along with the U.S. Embassy Country Team, have been 

eyewitnesses to President Uribe’s mobilization of Colombia and the 

decisive edge provided by adequate U.S. support. Currently, the PATs 

and the other U.S. assistance programs are contributing to what many

regarded as impossible two years ago, a Colombia on the strategic 

offensive, which may push the narco-terrorists to a final defeat or the

peace table on the Colombian Government’s terms. 

Restrictions on U.S. Military Assistance 

Initially, under Plan Colombia and prior, the U.S. Congress created an 

imaginary separation between narcotics interdiction and counter-terrorism, 

where Congress wanted to ensure no possibility of direct U.S. involvement 

against the narco-terrorists. For example, under the Plan Colombia grant, 

“...helicopters, training and other assistance [went] to three Colombian 

Army counter-narcotics battalions,” which was an artificial differentiation 
10 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

from counter-insurgency and included operational restrictions, which 

limited the units to obvious narcotics trafficking targets.31

In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Congress has agreed with the Bush 

administration. The President’s 2002 National Security Strategy 

announced, “In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and 

extremist groups that challenge the security of the state, and drug 

trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups.”32 

Congress calls it; “...Expanded Authority to use counter-drug funds for 

counter-terrorism missions in Colombia because it concluded that there is 

no useful distinction between a narco-trafficker and his terrorist activity – 

hence, the term narco-terrorist...”33

Regardless, the U.S. Congress expressed concern “...about “mission 

creep” – the possibility that U.S. personnel may find themselves embroiled 

in Colombia’s conflict.” As a result, a provision that first appeared in the 

2000 Plan Colombia aid package and has been renewed each year 

established a maximum of 400 U.S. military personnel and 400 U.S. 

citizen contractors, who could be in Colombia at any given time.34 For

fiscal year 2005 and 2006, the U.S. Congress voted an increase to the 

“Colombia Cap” of 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors.35 

However, the law still forbids the U.S. Armed Forces, including 

contractors, from participating in any combat operation.36 Note: On 

February 13, 2003, three defense contractors were captured by the FARC 

following the crash of their aircraft. The Colombian Cap would not apply 

to a future U.S. rescue attempt.37

IV. President Uribe Seizes the Initiative 

The Strategic Objectives of Plan Colombia 

U.S. policymakers have acknowledged the intertwined nature of the 

enemy, i.e., the blend of the narcotics trade with terrorism. Therefore, the

Plan Colombia Strategic Objectives serve Uribe to focus a broad war on

narco-terrorism. The six objectives are: 

• Strengthen the fight against drug trafficking and dismantle the 

trafficking organizations through an integrated effort by the armed 

forces. 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 11

• Strengthen the judicial system and combat corruption. 

• Neutralize the drug trade’s financial system and seize the resources 

for the state.

• Neutralize and combat the agents of violence allied with the drug 

trade. 

• Integrate national initiatives into regional and international efforts. 

• Strengthen and expand plans for alternative development to the

areas affected by drug trafficking.38

Additionally, Plan Colombia has a stated goal, which says, “Over the 

next six years, the goal is to reduce the cultivation, processing, and 

distribution of narcotics by 50%.”39 However, President Uribe’s aim is 

‘zero tolerance’ and peace through strength to force the illegal armed 

groups to demobilize. Consequently, while Plan Colombia initially called 

for the military to primarily “strengthen the fight against drug 

trafficking...” Uribe correctly revised the main effort to, “neutralize and 

combat the agents of violence allied with the drug trade.” 

The Phases of Plan Colombia 

Plan Colombia presents three strategic phases to end the Colombian 

conflict: 

• Phase 1: Short-range military, police and judicial effort aimed at 

Putumayo and the south and planned for one year. 

• Phase 2: Medium-range military, police, judicial and social effort 

aimed at the southeastern and central parts of the country, and 

planned for 2-3 years.

• Phase 3: Extend the integrated effort throughout the country over 3-6 

years.40

In December 2001, Phase 1 of Plan Colombia began with the 

introduction of two U.S. trained, counter-narcotic (CN) focused, battalions

and their CN brigade headquarters. A third CN battalion would be ready 

in May 2002. Accordingly, the CN brigade was deployed to Putumayo 

and Caquetá;41 two cocaine rich departments in the southwest of Colombia 
12 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

(see Figure 3). By any measure, this unit is one of the best equipped and 

trained in the Colombian Army. According to Major General Gary D. 

Speer, who was Acting Commander, U.S. Southern Command, “The 

FARC now avoids head-on engagements against the Colombian military 

in Putumayo and Caquetá Departments because of the training and 

capabilities of the CN Brigade.”

42

On January 11, 2002, with the collapse of the peace talks, President 

Andres Pastrana ordered 10,000 government troops to eliminate the 

Despeje (see Figure 1). In accordance with the terms of the peace talks,

Pastrana granted the FARC 48-hours to depart, which they used to 

withdraw in good order. Later, the military entered but, without a plan to 

stay, the land would soon return to being “ungoverned space” and a 

possible killing ground for right wing or leftist terror. One campesino 

(peasant farmer) echoed the sentiments of the inhabitants by saying, “We 

were scared before the troops left, scared of the guerillas while they were 

here, and we’re scared of what will come next. We’re kind of used to 

being scared.”43 It was a false start to Phase 2 of Plan Colombia. 

FARC Activity Prior to Phase 2 

Through 2000, FARC terrorist activity in the center of the country 

increased. The FARC 53rd Front began systematic terrorist attacks against 

55 municipalities in the departments of Cundinamarca and Meta. In

response, the Colombian military launched a series of small inconclusive 

offensives against the 53rd Front.44

In 2001, as “peace talks” staggered, the FARC threatened to conduct an

urban terrorist campaign in Bogotá and other major urban centers.

45 By

2002, FARC urban terrorism was accelerating. Bogotá and other cities were

under siege. For example, “On April 14, 2002, FARC urban militias 

exploded a bomb in Barranquilla in a failed attempt to kill front running 

Colombian presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe.”

46 Also, Uribe’s 

inauguration was greeted with another attempt on his life, when a

“...suspected rebel mortar attack rocked Bogotá... Three of the blasts went

off just blocks from the parliament building where Mr. Uribe was taking the 

oath of office.”47

In 2003, it was Uribe’s turn to strike back effectively and with 

measurable results. In the center of Colombia, the government forces were 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 13

gaining the upper hand. A major setback for the FARC was “...the killing of 

five midlevel FARC commanders in Cundinamarca Department near 

Bogotá...” by government forces.

48 By the end of 2003, “The Colombian 

military effectively cleared the area around Bogotá of terrorist fighters.”49

Meanwhile, in Arauca, the U.S. training of the Colombian 5th Mobile 

and 18th Infantry Brigades showed dramatic results defending the Caño

Limon Oil Pipeline (see Figure 3). Primarily the ELN, but also the FARC,

attacked the pipeline a record 170 times in 2001, shutting-down oil-flow all 

year, with the spills causing an environmental nightmare. Fortunately, 

throughout 2003, the narco-terrorists were under pressure and only able to 

muster “...below two dozen...” attacks.50

Caño Limón-Coveñas 

Oil Pipeline 

Key:

FARC 

AUC 

Supporting Effort 

Main Effort 

Major Coca Areas

ELN 

Main

Effort 

2003 - Clearing 

Operations 

5th & 18th 

Brigades Area of 

Operations 

CN Brigade

Area of 

Operations 

Figure 3. Plan Patriota51
14 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

Phase 2: Plan Patriota 

By all accounts, Uribe is courageous, a workaholic, and a demanding 

taskmaster. He is a “man of action” and expects the same from his 

generals or they will be removed. To which Uribe says, “I demand a great 

deal from them. In Colombia, our entire future depends on advancing the

security agenda.”52

By June 2004, with U.S. equipment and training sufficiently 

absorbed, reliable U.S. assistance flowing under “Expanded Authorities,”

and his aggressive philosophy understood by his generals, President Uribe

launched Colombia’s most ambitious military offensive. News 

organizations were soon reporting on Plan Patriota and over 17,000 

Colombian soldiers advancing into the FARC heartland.53

Phase 2 of Plan Colombia was well underway. As illustrated in

Figure 3, the main effort is the methodical advance into the old Despeje 

and other south-central areas of previously ungoverned space. The other

ongoing operations (see Figure 3) serve to support the main effort and 

include: 

• The interdiction of narcotics in Putumayo and the FARC lines of 

communications leading into Ecuador. 

• Clearing operations in Cundinamarca and Meta to maintain the 

security of the capital. 

• Operations in Arauca and along the oil pipeline to keep the oil 

flowing and pressure the ELN. 

The challenge for Plan Patriota “...is to recover and maintain

control...over a vast territory that has long been under FARC influence.” 

It will be a long and difficult operation, but Uribe intends to retain control 

of acquired territories, to establish law and order, and to continue to offer 

peace on his terms.54
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 15

V. Measures of Effectiveness

The Effort to Reelect Uribe 

President Alvaro Uribe was elected to end the violence by imposing a 

hard-line on the narco-terrorists. With a 70% popularity rating, “...most

Colombians think he has delivered.”55 If the measure of success for a 

politician is reelection, then Uribe should be well on his way. 

Unfortunately, Title VII, Chapter I, Article 197 of the Colombian 

Constitution, prohibits a second 4-year term.

56

In a recent interview, Luis Edgar Devia Silva, a.k.a. Raul Reyes of the 

FARC Secretariat, discussed the FARC strategy in response to Plan 

Patriota. It is to retreat deeper into the vast wilderness of Southern 

Colombia, prepared to resume attacks, and there wait for President Uribe’s 

term to expire in August 2006.57

However, polls released on August 8, 2004, by leading Bogotá daily 

El Tiempo indicated that 68% of the people favored Uribe’s reelection.

Additionally, President Uribe who ran as an independent has the support 

of Colombia’s Conservative Party and enough members of the other major 

party (The Liberals) may be breaking ranks “...in favor of a presidential 

reelection bill....” If election politics continue to unfold along current

lines, the narco-terrorists may be awaiting Uribe’s departure until 2010.58

Demobilization of the AUC 

From the outset, President Uribe has indicated he would treat the

AUC on a par with the FARC and ELN, and “...he would seek dialogue 

with those groups operating outside the law, on the condition that they 

give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire.” His predecessor never dealt 

with the AUC.59 

In October 2002, Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace, Dr. Luis 

Carlos Restrepo Ramírez, and five Roman Catholic Bishops met with the 

AUC leadership. As a result, the AUC declared an indefinite cessation of 

hostilities. Some member groups concurred and others did not. 

Nonetheless, by December 2003, President Uribe was ready to appoint a 

commission to explore the demobilization of the AUC.60
16 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

Although often accused of tolerating right wing abuses, the 

Colombian Government has cracked down on paramilitary groups that 

have not joined the AUC cease-fire and the demobilization talks. One 

example is the Casanare Peasant Self-Defense Forces (ACC), which is in

great disarray having recently suffered serious casualties inflicted by the

Colombian military including the wounding of the ACC leader.61

For the AUC, demobilization has caused the fracture of what already

was loosely knit groups. When leaders of the three eastern blocs

(Centauros, Self Defense Forces of Meta and Vichada, and Arauca 

Victors) agreed to disarm, violence erupted among the member groups. 

For example, on September 21, 2004, opponents to demobilization killed 

Miguel Arroyave (leader of the 6,000 strong Centauros Bloc).62

Nevertheless, the leaders of 10,000 – 12000 self-defense group members 

are involved in peace talks, while another 2,000 – 4,000 remain outside

the process. Estimates are that already 3,500 members from the various 

illegal groups have accepted demobilization.63

The State of Dialogue with the FARC and ELN 

In January 2002, President Uribe tried to engage in quiet dialogue 

with the ELN. However, by December 2002, the ELN suspended the talks 

claiming that Uribe’s stubbornness, the enlistment of campesino soldiers, 

the use of citizen informants, etc., were all leading the country away from 

peace and towards an expanded “unjust war.”64

One more factor weighing on the ELN leaders is the history of leftists

seeking to work within Colombia’s political system. For example, in 

1985, the FARC formally established the Patriotic Union (UP) Party to 

legally run candidates in the electoral process and through 1988, “...over 

3,000 UP members and 150 elected officials would (have) be (been) 

assassinated...”65 Not surprisingly, the FARC continues to reject U.N.

mediators’ in their attempts to open a dialogue between the rebel group 

and the government.66

However, Uribe has dramatically changed the security environment in

Colombia. The country remains, for example, the kidnap capital of the 

world but the trends are undeniably positive. In 2003, the overall 

homicide rate dropped by 20%, terrorist incidents dropped by 49%, and 

kidnappings by 39%. These trends continue into 2004.67
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 17

Furthermore, the government and armed forces of Colombia have met 

criteria set by the U.S. Congress related to human rights. Specifically, the 

U.S. State Department official statement of September 24, 2004, says: 

...That the Colombian Armed Forces are suspending military 

officers credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of

human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary 

organizations, cooperating with civilian prosecutors and 

judicial authorities in prosecuting and punishing such 

members, severing links with paramilitary organizations, and 

dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks; 

and that the Colombian Government is prosecuting and 

punishing those members of the Armed Forces credibly alleged 

to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have

aided or abetted paramilitary organizations.68

Colombian military professionalism is also reflected in public 

opinion, where the armed forces are second only to the Church as the most

respected institution in Colombia. Further evidence is the demobilization 

program, where 77% of the illegal combatants who desert, have

surrendered to the government forces knowing their human rights will be 

respected.69

Finally, whereas no dialogue exists between the leftist groups and the 

government, the battlefield success of the armed forces, coupled to a

growing demobilization program, is making it difficult for the illegal

groups to fill their ranks. To date, the AUC has formally demobilized 

approximately 1,000 combatants. Additionally, the leftist groups have

suffered over 2,000 desertions, with reports of “...deteriorating living 

conditions...plummeting morale...and internal discipline [being] enforced 

with harsh measures.”70

The Consolidation of Colombia and U.S. Socioeconomic Support 

As already discussed, Plan Patriota operations are the main effort to 

recover ungoverned space in the FARC-controlled south-central regions of 

Colombia. Furthermore, actions are being taken by all government 

agencies “...to consolidate state presence throughout Colombia.” For 

example, U.S. trained “Carabinero squadrons,” which are rural mobile 
18 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

police, support the “...Colombian National Police units now deployed in 

every single municipality (1,098 total) in Colombia, (thus) fulfilling a key 

commitment undertaken by President Uribe at the outset of his 

administration.”71

In this process of state consolidation, the United States is a vital 

partner. The U.S. Plan Colombia aid package addressed non-military state 

consolidation issues and represents over 25% of the $860 million grant, 

not including equipment and training for the national police. A review of 

the list of programs and initiatives financed under each component of the 

2000 Plan Colombia grant, shows that socioeconomic programs for state 

consolidation were well represented (these programs are highlighted in 

italics below). 

I. Support for Human Rights and Judicial Reform.

- Protecting non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned 

with human rights 

- Strengthening human rights institutions 

- Establishing human rights units within the Colombian National

Police (CNP) and the Colombian attorney general’s office 

- Training judges and prosecutors 

- Providing funding to train and support Colombian law 

enforcement personnel in anti-corruption, anti-money

laundering, and anti-kidnapping measures 

II. Expansion of Counter-Narcotics Operations into Southern 

Colombia. 

- Training and equipping the second and third counter-narcotics 

battalions in the Colombian Army

- Procurement and support of 14 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters; 

procurement, refurbishment, and support of 30 UH-1H Huey II 

helicopters

- Support for 15 UH-1N helicopters for use by the Colombian 

army

- Help for persons displaced by conflict in the region 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 19

- Developmental assistance, including technical and agricultural

assistance to farmers in southern Colombia 

III. Alternative Economic Development. 

- Support alternative and economic development programs in 

Colombia to assist small farmers who now grow coca and 

opium poppies 

- Assist internally displaced persons 

- Voluntary eradication programs 

- Assistance to local governments 

- Environmental programs to protect fragile lands and 

watersheds 

IV. Increased Interdiction.

- Upgrading the radar systems in four U S Customs Service P-3 

airborne early warning interdiction aircraft

- Upgrading the Colombian Air Force OV-10 aircraft

- Support Colombian air interdiction programs,

- Support and provision Colombia’s riverine interdiction 

program

- Support the Colombian navy’s counter-narcotics intelligence

infrastructure

V. Assistance for the Colombian National Police. 

- Procurement, training, and support for two UH-60 Blackhawk 

helicopters

- Funds to procure 12 UH-1H Huey II helicopters 

- Funds to purchase Ayers S2R T-65 agricultural spray aircraft 

and OV-10 aircraft 

- Funds were also available for communications equipment, 

ammunition, spare parts, training, and logistical support72
20 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

Estimates are the United States will continue to provide over $700 

million in total aid per fiscal year to Colombia for the foreseeable future.73 

Therefore, despite the priorities of waging combat operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the U.S. Government is committed to assisting Colombia in

achieving final victory in the war on narco-terror. 

VI. Conclusions 

Plan Colombia Remains Relevant 

Plan Colombia was drafted as a six-year counter narcotics plan, which 

would end in 2006. In fairness to the plan, it was never funded to capacity 

making the timeline flawed. Nonetheless, the intertwined nature of 

counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism means the focus of the plan and its 

strategic objectives remain relevant. Narco trafficking is being curbed 

through efforts such as aerial eradication and the employment of the 

Counter Narcotics Brigade. 

Meanwhile, military operations, the largest being Plan Patriota, are

breaking the link between the terrorist groups and the narcotics industry. 

Within the context of Plan Colombia, President Uribe is shaping the 

strategic-operational environment to force demobilization and to forge an 

advantageous peace with all illegal armed groups. 

Key to his success has been Expanded Authorities and U.S. training 

and equipment, which have provided the edge. No combination of leftist 

fronts or AUC paramilitary groups can directly take on the mobile 

brigades and other elite formations of the Colombian military. Also, the 

revised “Colombia Cap” means U.S. personnel will be able to support fullscale operations across the depth of the country. Therefore, Colombia 

may soon be ready to transition into Plan Colombia, Phase 3.

In short, Colombia does not need a new strategic plan but it will need

a new operational plan to follow up the success of Plan Patriota and to

execute Phase 3 of Plan Colombia. Consequently, future U.S. funding and 

personnel must be prepared to support a new execution plan to Phase 3, in 

what may be the final offensive of a forty-year war. 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 21

The Possible Spillover of the Narcotics Trade 

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03

Metric T

ons

Bolivia Colombia Peru

Figure 4. Cocaine Production 1990 - 200374

The Plan Patriota offensive has dislocated FARC operations. As

admitted by FARC Commander Raul Reyes, leftist forces are retreating 

deep into the south of Colombia. Every indication is that while Uribe is 

President, he will be relentless in pursuit and keep to a “zero tolerance”

narcotics policy. 

Figure 4 shows cocaine production in the “source zone.” Since the 

mid-1990s, Peru and Bolivia witnessed dramatic drops in cocaine 

production. Unfortunately, the reductions in Peru and Bolivia were offset 

by equally dramatic cocaine production increases in Colombia. 

The October 1999 start of Plan Colombia coincides with the 

beginning of a cocaine production downward trend in Colombia, which 

has accelerated during the Uribe years. There already is evidence of
22 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

FARC and other Colombian cocaine enterprises spilling into all countries 

bordering Colombia and beyond, such as, Bolivia and Paraguay.75 As

pressure continues to increase narco traffickers in Colombia, one may see 

a major spike in drug trafficking in one or more of these countries. 

It is a situation, which U.S. Southern Command must monitor 

carefully and be prepared to sound the alarm. Timely security cooperation 

with Peru, Bolivia, and other potential spillover countries, should occur 

within the context of a regional Counter Narcotics strategy to avoid the 

possible “Colombianization” of another country in the future. 

The Consolidation of Military Success may be in Doubt 

One election can have tremendous historic significance on the 

fortunes of a country if the gains can be consolidated. In two years, 

President Alvaro Uribe has achieved more to end the Colombian conflict 

than many would have imagined possible. He did this by keeping to the 

“three fundamental tasks” of not relinquishing acquired territories, 

establishing law and order, and offering peace on his terms. 

Uribe has mobilized Colombia’s resources for war and is using U.S. 

security cooperation to gain the decisive edge. He has the leftists groups 

on the run and the right wing groups seriously talking peace. Also, most 

major trend indicators point in Colombia’s favor. Murder and kidnapping 

rates are decreasing. Cocaine production continues to fall, and he has 

brought a national police presence to every municipality in Colombia. 

There are two major concerns, which risk blemishing this success 

story. One is that President Uribe cannot run for reelection unless the

Colombian Constitution is amended. If the efforts to amend the 

Constitution fail, the FARC and the other illicit traffickers are betting the

next Colombian President will not be as dynamic. The second concern is 

Uribe’s social and economic agenda, which recently received a serious 

setback. 

General James Hill in testimony before Congress stated that Uribe 

was “...building the structures to sustain momentum....”76 Clearly, with

continued U.S. training and equipment, the Colombian security structure 

should retain its edge over the narco-terrorists but political fortitude in a 

post-Uribe Colombia is an unknown. Also, the program for reforming the 

economic and social structure must be addressed further. 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 23

In fact, in an effort to move his socioeconomic agenda, President 

Uribe brought a 15-point referendum before the Colombian public. On 

October 25, 2003, Colombians voted on each of the following points: 

1. Persons that in any unlawful way have earned money from any 

official institution could never again be government employees or

have contracts with any government institution. 

2. That the vote of the congressional members should be nominal and 

public, so the people could know how each congress member votes 

on the different laws. 

3. That the substitutes [someone who sits-in and votes] will be 

eliminated for the Congress, state corporations, and city councils. 

4. That the Congress should be responsible for designing the National 

Expenditures Budget after publicly consulting with the country and

its regions. 

5. That members of Congress should not be involved in the 

administrative matters of the Congress. These functions should be 

executed by an independent entity. 

6. To reduce the number of congressional members. 

7. That members of congress, state corporation deputies, and city 

council members should lose their investiture for unlawful 

financing of their electoral campaigns or by unlawful management

of public assets. 

8. That government pensions cannot exceed 25 times the minimum 

national salary per month. 

9. To eliminate the states’ and counties’ controllers. Their functions 

should be assumed by the General Country’s Office of Controlling

Public Spending which will help civic organizations, whether state

or privately managed. 

10. To eliminate the so-called “economic aids” [public campaign 

funds] given to members of congress. 
24 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

11. That the savings obtained by eliminating the states’ and counties’

Offices of Controlling Public Spending should be only spent on 

education and health. 

12. That the resources coming from oil or other royalties should be 

mainly for education and health. 

13. No increases, for two years, of the functioning expenditures of the 

government and the salaries of public employees that earn more

than two times the minimum national salary per month. 

14. That the parties or political movements that do not have at least 2% 

of the total votes for Congress or 5% of the total votes for

President cannot present candidates for national or local election. 

15. That the referendum should apply as soon as it is voted for.77

Despite prior polling numbers indicating overwhelming support, 14 of 

15 points failed and Uribe’s effort to combat corruption and reform the 

nation’s economy suffered a major setback. The one success was the first 

referendum item, which called for officials convicted of corruption to be

barred from government employment.

78 

The following day in local elections, “One of the offices at stake was 

that of mayor of...Bogotá, the country’s second most important elected 

office. By electing a former union leader and an outspoken critic of

Uribe’s security and economic policies, Luis Eduardo “Lucho” Garzon, as 

Bogotá’s new mayor, voters again dealt a blow to Uribe.”79 

With the election of a leftist as mayor of Bogotá and the failure of the 

referendum, Uribe suffered two serious political defeats but he remains 

very popular with the Colombian people. Perhaps a combination of 

Election Day violence, vote fraud, and a prior Gallup poll finding of voter 

apathy, conspired against him.

80

Colombia’s problems are deeply rooted in a culture of violence, 

corruption, and economic inequality. President Uribe is addressing the

violence, through effective security initiatives and combat operations, but

Plan Colombia also calls for social and economic reform, and Uribe’s 

referendum to address these issues failed. One must consider that 

Colombians are not heeding the warning, when Uribe says, “we have the 

snake almost defeated. If we let go now and allow it time to breathe, the 

snake not only will survive but will grow again.”81
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 25

Notes 

1. S. Johnson, “Helping Colombia Fix its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence,

and Insurgency,” Backgrounder, No. 1435 (26 April 2001), The Heritage Foundation, 4.

2. D. E. Teicher, “The Colombian War and the Narco-Terrorist Threat,” in The

Homeland Security Papers: Stemming the Tide of Terror, eds. M. W. Ritz, R. G. Hensley,

Jr., and J.C. Whitmire, (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, February 

2004), 25-27, 36. 

3. Ibid., 25-27. 

4. Ibid., 28. 

5. Ibid., 25. 

6. Quoted in Teicher, 25. 

7. “The Plan Colombia,” October 1999, in Colombia Project, The Center for 

International Policy, 20 March 2000, n.p., On-line, Internet, 29 September 2004, 

available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/plancolombia.htm.

8. Ibid. 

9. “The U.S. – Colombian Initiative,” ONDCP Fact Sheet, Office of National Drug

Control Policy, January 2002, n.p., On-line, Internet, 28 September 2004, available from 

http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/international/factsht/us-columbia. 

html. 

10. “U.S. Aid to Colombia Since 1997: Summary Tables,” Colombia Program, The

Center for International Policy, 27 September 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 15 October 

2004, available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm.

11. “Plan Colombia,” Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.

Department of State, 14 March 2001, n.p., On-line, Internet, 28 September 2004, 

available from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042pf.htm.

12. I. Vacious, A. Isacson, and A. Steele, “Is Plan Colombia Dead?,” Colombia

Project, The Center for International Policy, 27 October 2000, n.p., On-line, Internet, 29

September 2004, available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/102701.htm. 

13. Ibid. 
26 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

14. B. Ruiz, “Colombia’s Flash Point of No Return,” Peace Process, bertruiz.com,

10 January 2002, n.p., On-line, Internet, 28 September 2004, available from

http://bertruiz.com/1010682520/index_html.

15. Vacious, et al., op. cit. 

16. Ruiz, op. cit. 

17. M. S. Nina, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns

(Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS21242, 14 June 2002), 1.

18. J. A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy,” Strategic Forum, No. 

194 (October 2002). 

19. “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy.” ICG Latin America

Report No. 6, 13 November 2003, i, ii, 1.

20. A. V. Uribe, interviewed by N. Cavuto, Fox News, “Exclusive One on One

Interview with Alvaro Uribe Velez, President of the Republic of Colombia,” 29

September 2004, Your World with Neil Cavuto.

21. J. P. Sweenet, “Tread Cautiously in Colombia’s Civil War,” Backgrounder, No. 

1264 (25 March 1999), The Heritage Foundation, 15. 

22. J. S. Corum, “The Air War in El Salvador,” Airpower Journal, Summer 1998. 

23. K. L. Storrs, and M. S. Nina, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002

Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors (Washington, D.C.:

CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31383, 8 January 2003), 12. 

24. “The Plan Colombia,” op. cit. 

25. R. Galarza, “Colombia’s Uribe is a Man of Action,” Free Republic, 9 October

2003, n.p., On-line, Internet, 30 September 2004, available from 

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/996398/posts. 

26. United Nations, 2004 World Drug Report, Executive Summary, Volume 1:

Analysis, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004), 17. 

27. Galarza, op. cit. 
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 27

28. “Testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United

States Southern Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States

House of Representatives,” 24 March 2004, in U.S. General Outlines Existing and

Emerging Hemispheric Threats, International Information Programs, U.S. Department of

State, 25 March 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 1 October 2004, available from

http://usinfo.state.gov/utils/printpage.html. 

29. A. Isacson, and E. Stoner, “Highlights of the Bush Administration’s 2005 Latin

America Aid Request,” CIP Memorandum, The Center for International Policy, 19

February 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 29 September 2004, available from

http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/03022601.htm. 

30. United States General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Specific Performance

Measures and Long-term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been

Developed, (Washington, D.C.: Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-08-783, June

2003), 17. 

31. Storrs, et al., op. cit., 10. 

32. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of

America, (Washington, D.C.: September 2002), 10. 

33. “Testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United

States Southern Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States

House of Representatives,” op. cit. 

34. I. Vaicius, “The U.S. Military Presence in Colombia,” CIP Memorandum,

Colombia Program, The Center for International Policy, 26 February 2003, n.p., On-line, 

Internet, 1 October 2004, available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/03022601.

htm.

35. Editorial, “Sliding into Colombia’s Morass,” Chicago Tribune, 12 October

2004. 

36. Vaicius, op. cit. 

37. “U.S. Team Hunts Colombia Hostages,” World, CBS News.com, 27 February

2003, n.p., On-line, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2003/02/27/world/main542258.shtml. 

38. “The Plan Colombia,” op. cit. 
28 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

39. Ibid. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid. 

42. “Written Statement of Major General Gary D. Speer, United States Army, 

Acting Commander, United States Southern Command Before the 107th Congress, 

House Appropriations Committee on International Relations,” in Colombia Program, 

The Center for International Policy, 11 April 2002, On-line, Internet, 8 October 2004, 

available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02041105.htm. 

43. M. Hodgson, “Troops Close in on Colombia’s Rebel Haven,” The Guardian

Review, Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004, 12 January 2002, n.p., On-line, Internet, 1 

October 2004, available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4333997-110466, 

00.html. 

44. “Increased FARC Activity in Cundinamarca and Meta Departments,” Global

Security, 6 April 2000, n.p., On-line, Internet, 11 October 2004, available from

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2000/04/000406-col-osac.htm.

45. M. S. Nina, Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options, (Washington, D.C.:

CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31330, 12 February 2001), 11. 

46. “Statement of Asa Hutchinson, Administrator Drug Enforcement

Administration, Before the House Committee on International Relations,” Library of 

Congress, April 24, 2002, n.p., On-line, Internet, 16 October 2004, available from

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/hutc0424.htm.

47. L. Goodman, interviewed by R. Kouguell, VOA News Report, “Interview

Transcript of Dr. Louis Goodman, Dean of the American University School of 

International Service,” in Global Security, n.p., On-line, Internet, 11 October 2004,

available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/mil-020808-

274cdb37.htm. 

48. “Western Hemisphere Overview,” Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003 Office 

of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism, U.S. Department of State, April 2004, n.p., Online, Internet, 11 October 2004, available from http://www.global

security.org/security/library/report/2004/pgt_2003_31640pf. 

49. “Testimony of Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Hearing of the House Government Reform
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 29

Committee: The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia

Successes and Remaining Challenges,” Colombia Program, The Center for International 

Policy, 17 June 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 16 October 2004, available from

http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040617nori.htm. 

50. “Colombia,” Country Analysis Brief, Energy Information Administration, U.S. 

Department of Energy, July 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 11 October 2004, available 

from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/colombia.html. 

51. “The Plan Colombia,” op. cit. 

52. Galarza, op. cit. 

53. C. Vieira, “Colombia: Plan Patriota Starts to Come-out of the Shadows,” Inter

Press News Agency, 25 June 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 8 October 2004, available from

http://www.ipsenespanol.net/interna.asp?idnews=29841. 

54. Ibid. 

55. Galarza, op. cit. 

56. “Colombian Constitution of 1991, including Reforms until 2004,” Political

Database of the Americas, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Center for Latin

American Studies, 2 June 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 16 October 2004, available from

http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html. 

57. “Colombian Rebel Group Vows to Keep Up the War (Desperation Alert),” El 

Conservador, in Free Republic, 28 May 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 16 October 2004, 

available from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1144269/posts. 

58. S. Lussenden, “Presidential Reelection Project Fractures Colombia’s Liberal

Party,” 10 August 2004, INTELLIBRIDGE, e-mail, U.S. Southern Command, 4 October

2004. 

59. N. M. Serafino, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional

Concerns, (Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS21242, 14 June 

2002), 6.

60. Storrs, et al., op. cit., 13. 
30 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism

61. G. Leech, “Colombian Army Selectively Targets Paramilitaries,” Colombia

Journal, Colombia Journal Online, 4 October 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 17 October 

2004, available from http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia195.htm.

62. “Miguel Arroyave was Killed by Didier, alias ‘Knife’, the Old Paramilitary

Commander of Guaviare,” El Tiempo, Negotiations, Editorial Home of El Tiempo, S.A., 

21 September 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 16 October 2004, available from

http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/NEGOCIACION/negociacion/ ARTICULO-WEB-

_NOTA_INTERIOR-1800425.html. 

63. “Testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United

States Southern Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States

House of Representatives,” op. cit. 

64. “ELN Guerillas Suspend Talks with Colombian Government,” Agence France 

Presse, NewsEdge Insight, 24 December 2002, n.p., On-line, Internet, 17 October 2004, 

available from http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/c11923c0ad0b900649256c9a 

000c1cea?OpenDocument.

65. “An Overview of Recent Colombian History,” Colombian Human Rights

Network, 14 October 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 17 October 2004, available from

http://colhrnet.igc.org/timeline.htm. 

66. “ELN Guerillas Suspend Talks with Colombian Government,” op. cit. 

67. “Testimony of Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Hearing of the House Government Reform

Committee: The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia

Successes and Remaining Challenges,” op. cit. 

68. “U.S. Certifies Colombia has Met Human Rights Standards,” The Americas,

Office of the Press Spokesman, International Information Programs, U.S. Department of 

State, 24 September 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from

http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2004/Sep/28-460892.html. 

69. “Testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United

States Southern Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States

House of Representatives,” op. cit. 

70. “Testimony of Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Hearing of the House Government Reform
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 31

Committee: The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia

Successes and Remaining Challenges,” op. cit. 

71. Ibid. 

72. “Plan Colombia,” Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.

State Department, 14 March 2001, n.p., On-line, Internet, 28 September 2004, available 

from www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042pf.htm.

73. “U.S. Aid to Colombia since 1997: Summary Tables,” Colombia Program, The

Center for International Policy, 20 February 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 27 September 

2004, available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm.

74. United Nations, op. cit., 17.

75. R. L. Millet, “Colombia’s Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War,” 

Strategic Studies Institute, Special Series, (October 2002), 2. 

76. “Testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United

States Southern Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States

House of Representatives,” op. cit. 

77. O. G. Almodovar, “Colombia: The Referendum Vote (U),” (U.S. Southern

Command Joint Intelligence Center, October 2003), 8, (Secret/No Foreign) Information 

extracted is unclassified. 

78. “Colombian Council Releases Referendum Results; Only One Question

Approved (U),” El Tiempo, 2 January 2003, in FBIS, The Americas, South America,

Document Id: LAP20040102000081, FBIS, 2 January 2004, n.p., On-line, Internet, 22

October 2004, available from http://www.fbis.cia.sgov.gov/doc_lib/2004/001/02/ 

LAP20040102000081N.html, Information extracted is unclassified. 

79. G. Leech, “Double Defeat for Uribe as Colombia Turns Left,” Colombia

Journal, Colombia Journal Online, 27 October 2003, n.p., On-line, Internet, 18 October 

2004, available from http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia195.htm.

80. “Killings Mar Colombia Vote,” World News, CNN.com, 25 October 2003, n.p.,

On-line, Internet, 18 October 2004, available from http://www.cnn.com/

2003/WORLD/americas/10/25/colombia.referendum.ap/.

81. Galarza, op. cit. 
32 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism
The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism . . . 33

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

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The Counterproliferation Papers 

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34 . . . The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism