SUMMARY 

February 22, 2018 

2018COA22 

No. 16CA1446, People In Interest of J.C. — Juvenile Court — 

Delinquency — Sentencing — Special Offenders — Mandatory 

Sentence Offender — Repeat Juvenile Offender 

A division of the court of appeals considers the scope of a 

juvenile court’s sentencing authority pursuant to the Children’s 

Code, and concludes that a juvenile’s sentence to an indeterminate 

one-to-two-year term of commitment in the custody of the Division 

of Youth Corrections (DYC), with a mandatory minimum term of one 

year, is illegal for two reasons. 

First, the division holds that nothing in the juvenile sentencing 

statutes authorizes an indeterminate sentence to commitment to 

the DYC, and that any such sentence must be determinate. 

Second, the division concludes that a mandatory minimum 

sentence to DYC commitment is authorized only if the juvenile 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. 
qualifies as a special offender under section 19-2-908, C.R.S. 2017. 

In deciding this second issue, the division holds that a juvenile 

doesn’t qualify as a mandatory sentence offender pursuant to 

section 19-2-516(1), C.R.S. 2017, or a repeat juvenile offender 

pursuant to section 19-2-516(2), when, as in this case, the multiple 

adjudications required by those provisions occurred in the same 

hearing. 

Accordingly, the division vacates the sentence and remands 

the case. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA22

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1446 

Jefferson County District Court Nos. 14JD168, 14JD191, 14JD400 & 14JD522 

Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

In the Interest of J.C., 

Juvenile-Appellant. 

SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

Division VII 

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES 

Fox and Freyre, JJ., concur 

Announced February 22, 2018 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee 

The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Tara Jorfald, Lakewood, Colorado, for JuvenileAppellant
1 

¶ 1 The juvenile court sentenced J.C., a juvenile, to an 

indeterminate one-to-two-year term of commitment in the custody 

of the Division of Youth Corrections (DYC), with a mandatory 

minimum term of one year. We conclude that the sentence is 

illegal, for two reasons. First, nothing in the juvenile sentencing 

statutes authorizes an indeterminate sentence to DYC commitment; 

any such sentence must be determinate. Second, a mandatory 

minimum sentence to DYC commitment is authorized only if the 

juvenile qualifies as a special offender under section 19-2-908, 

C.R.S. 2017. J.C. doesn’t qualify as such an offender, and therefore 

the juvenile court had no statutory authority to impose a 

mandatory minimum sentence. In deciding this second issue, we 

hold that a juvenile doesn’t qualify as a mandatory sentence 

offender pursuant to section 19-2-516(1), C.R.S. 2017, or a repeat 

juvenile offender pursuant to section 19-2-516(2), when the 

multiple adjudications required by those provisions occur in the 

same hearing. 

¶ 2 Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the case with 

directions. 
2 

I. Background 

¶ 3 J.C. pleaded guilty to charges in three separate cases, 

pursuant to a global plea agreement, on the same day during a 

hearing addressing all three cases. She pleaded guilty first to a 

third degree assault charge, then to a second degree criminal 

trespass charge, and finally to a second degree assault charge. The 

court accepted the pleas and adjudicated J.C. delinquent in all 

three cases. 

¶ 4 At the sentencing hearing for all three cases, the prosecutor 

argued that because there were three adjudications, two of which 

were for violent offenses, the court should commit J.C. to DYC 

custody for two years. When the court asked the prosecutor 

whether she was requesting that the court sentence J.C. as a 

“mandatory offender,” the prosecutor said, “Yes.” In sentencing 

J.C., the court said, “I’m going to impose a DYC commitment, a 

mandatory minimum of one year, but up to two years.” The 

sentencing orders for each case reflect a sentence of “1-2 YEARS 

DYC.” Corresponding orders to the Department of Human Services 

(DHS) (which includes the DYC) in each case say, “This juvenile was 
3 

additionally found to be: A mandatory sentence (third time) offender 

pursuant to Sec. 19-2-908, C.R.S.” 

¶ 5 J.C. filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 

35(a). She argued that the court lacked authority to sentence her to 

a mandatory minimum period of confinement as a mandatory 

sentence offender because the three adjudications required for the 

relevant statute to apply had all occurred at the same hearing. The 

court denied the motion. In doing so, the court said it had no 

“record that [J.C.] was actually sentenced as a mandatory sentence 

offender. The minute order does not reflect such a finding and no 

transcript was filed with the Motion to show that such a finding was 

made.” Rather, the court said, it had imposed “the mandatory 1 

year and a maximum of 2 years in DYC” based on “the totality of 

the circumstances.” Apparently in the alternative, the court said 

that nothing in the relevant statute defining mandatory sentence 

offender, section 19-2-516(1)(a)(I), requires that the three 

adjudications be entered on separate dates. 

¶ 6 J.C. then filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging both 

ineffective assistance of plea counsel and that she hadn’t 

knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally pleaded guilty. Common to 
4 

both claims was her assertion that her lawyer hadn’t told her that 

by pleading guilty she could be sentenced as a mandatory sentence 

offender. The court summarily denied the motion, ruling, as now 

relevant, that because “it has not been shown that the court relied 

on this classification in its sentencing,” she hadn’t shown prejudice. 

J.C. appeals the court’s denial of the Crim. P. 35(c) motion. 

II. Discussion 

¶ 7 J.C.’s opening brief argues that the juvenile court erred by 

summarily denying her petition for postconviction relief because she 

had alleged that neither her lawyer nor the court had advised her 

“that she would be sentenced as a repeat juvenile offender” and that 

she was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance and the 

court’s failure to advise her. That prejudice was that she wouldn’t 

have pleaded guilty if she’d known she would be sentenced to a 

mandatory minimum term of confinement. 

¶ 8 After reading the parties’ briefs and the record, we asked the 

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the following four 

issues: 

1. Notwithstanding the district court’s 

statements in denying J.C.’s Crim. P. 35(a) 

motion, did the district court sentence J.C. as 
5 

a mandatory sentence offender or repeat 

juvenile offender pursuant to § 19-2-908, 

C.R.S. 2017? 

2. If not, what statutory authority did the 

district court have to sentence J.C. to a 

“mandatory minimum” period of commitment? 

3. If so, did J.C. qualify as a mandatory 

sentence offender under §§ 19-2-516(1) and 

19-2-908(1)(a)? Explain. 

4. If so, did J.C. qualify as a repeat juvenile 

offender under §§ 19-2-516(2) and 19-2-

908(1)(b)? Explain. 

¶ 9 Having reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs and the 

relevant law, we conclude that J.C.’s sentence is illegal. We 

therefore vacate the sentence. And because we vacate the sentence 

on which J.C.’s Crim. P. 35(c) claims are premised, we also 

conclude that her Crim. P. 35(c) motion is moot. 

A. We May Consider the Legality of J.C.’s Sentence 

¶ 10 Initially, the People invite us to hold that J.C. abandoned the 

issue of the legality of her sentence because she didn’t appeal from 

the order denying her motion to correct an illegal sentence. They 

acknowledge that Crim. P. 35(a) authorizes a court to correct an 

illegal sentence “at any time.” Nonetheless, they urge us not to 

consider this issue because, they argue, (1) the word “may” in that 
6 

rule creates an option, but not an obligation for an appellate court 

to vacate an illegal sentence;1 and (2) therefore we should apply the 

familiar principle of appellate practice that a party waives for appeal 

an issue that she doesn’t reassert on appeal. 

¶ 11 The People’s argument, however, overlooks the more directly 

relevant principle that “[a]llegations that a particular sentence is 

void or illegal require inquiry into the subject matter jurisdiction of 

the sentencing court and may not be waived.” Downing v. People, 

895 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Colo. 1995); see People v. Hinchman, 196 

Colo. 556, 530, 589 P.2d 917, 920 (1978). Indeed, when there’s a 

question as to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a court has 

an obligation to address it, even if the parties haven’t raised it. See 

People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 9; Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, 

¶ 22; see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 

541 (1986) (an appellate court has an “obligation” to consider a trial 

court’s jurisdiction, even if the parties conceded it); Archer W. 

Contractors, Ltd. v. Benise-Dowling & Assocs., Inc., 33 So. 3d 1216, 

 

1 Crim. P. 35(a) says that “[t]he court may correct a sentence that 

was not authorized by law or that was imposed without jurisdiction 

at any time.” 
7 

1270 (Ala. 2009) (“[W]e are obligated to address the absence of [a 

trial court’s] subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.”). 

¶ 12 The “at any time” language of Crim. P. 35(a) merely gives effect 

to this principle. So a defendant may raise the legality of his 

sentence for the first time on appeal. Downing, 895 P.2d at 1050; 

Hinchman, 196 Colo. at 530, 589 P.2d at 919-20. And a court may 

raise the issue on its own. People v. White, 179 P.3d 58, 61 (Colo. 

App. 2007) (citing Guerin v. Fullerton, 154 Colo. 142, 144, 389 P.2d 

84, 85 (1964)). In any case, save perhaps when issue preclusion or 

some other similar doctrine applies, see In re Marriage of Mallon, 

956 P.2d 642, 645-46 (Colo. App. 1998), a substantial question as 

to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, whenever or however raised, 

isn’t one a court is free to duck. 

¶ 13 We decline the People’s invitation. 

B. J.C.’s Sentence Is Illegal 

¶ 14 “An illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by law, 

meaning that it is inconsistent with the sentencing scheme 

established by the legislature.” People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76, 

¶ 11; see Delgado v. People, 105 P.3d 634, 636 (Colo. 2005). While 

it’s true that “a trial court normally has broad discretion to craft a 
8 

sentence it deems appropriate for a particular [juvenile] offender,” 

A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 15, “in exercising its discretion, the 

sentencing court may not depart from the statutory sentencing 

scheme to impose what it considers to be a more appropriate 

sentence,” People in Interest of J.S.R., 2014 COA 98M, ¶ 34; see

People v. Dist. Court, 673 P.2d 991, 995 (Colo. 1983) (A court “may 

not impose a sentence that is inconsistent with the terms specified 

by statutes.”). This is so because “it is the prerogative of the 

legislature to define crimes and prescribe punishments.” Fierro v. 

People, 206 P.3d 460, 461 (Colo. 2009). 

¶ 15 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. See People v. 

Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20; Jenkins, ¶ 11. This case requires us 

to interpret statutes to determine the legality of the sentence, and 

such interpretation we also review de novo. See, e.g., Marsh v. 

People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 19. 

1. Sentencing to DHS Commitment Generally 

¶ 16 Section 19-2-907, C.R.S. 2017, of the Children’s Code 

delineates a juvenile court’s sentencing options. It limits a court’s 

authority to sentence a juvenile to DHS commitment, as opposed to 

other sentencing options, to essentially two situations: (1) as 
9 

allowed when the court adjudicates the juvenile a special offender 

pursuant to section 19-2-908, see § 19-2-907(2); or (2) as allowed 

when the court adjudicates the juvenile for an offense that would 

constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult, 

pursuant to section 19-2-909(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, or section 19-2-

921(3)(c), C.R.S. 2017, see § 19-2-907(1)(a). Applying this 

framework to this case gives rise to two questions. Can a juvenile 

court sentence a juvenile to an indeterminate term of DHS 

commitment, as the juvenile court did in this case? And when is a 

mandatory minimum term of DHS commitment required? We 

answer these questions in turn, and in answering the second also 

decide whether J.C. qualifies for mandatory minimum sentencing. 

2. Indeterminate Sentencing 

a. A Court Must Sentence a Juvenile to a Determinate Sentence 

¶ 17 As noted, section 19-2-907 catalogs a court’s sentencing 

options in a juvenile case. It doesn’t say anything expressly about 

determinate or indeterminate sentencing (it cross-references other 

sentencing statutes), but other statutes do. Section 19-2-921(3)(a) 

flatly says, “As provided in section 19-2-907, commitment of a 

juvenile to the department of human services shall be for a 
10 

determinate period.” And the statutes specifically addressing 

certain categories of juveniles who may (or must) be sentenced to 

DHS commitment expressly say that a sentence imposed 

thereunder shall be for a “determinate period.” §§ 19-2-601(5)(a)(I), 

C.R.S. 2017 (aggravated juvenile offenders); § 19-2-909(1)(a) (a 

juvenile adjudicated for an offense that would constitute a felony or 

misdemeanor if committed by an adult); § 19-2-921(3)(b) (same as 

section 19-2-601(5)(a)(I)); § 19-2-921(3)(c) (same as section 19-2-

909(1)(a)). 

¶ 18 Perhaps this is a good place to explain what the term 

“determinate sentence” means, and to draw the distinction between 

such a sentence and an indeterminate sentence. 

¶ 19 For purposes of juvenile sentencing, the term “determinate 

period” is actually defined by statute. Section 19-1-103(40.5), 

C.R.S. 2017, says that it 

means that the department of human services 

may not transfer legal or physical custody of a 

juvenile until the juvenile has completed the 

period of commitment imposed by the court, 

unless otherwise ordered by the court; except 

that the department may release the juvenile 

on parole prior to completion of the determinate 

period, as provided in section 19-2-1002. 
11 

(Emphasis added.) This definition obviously contemplates a point 

in time at which the period of commitment is deemed completed. 

Absent some such definitive point in time, authorities 

contemplating a transfer of legal or physical custody or parole 

couldn’t know when to take such action. 

¶ 20 The definition in section 19-1-103(40.5) is therefore consistent 

with the common understanding of determinate sentence: a 

sentence for a fixed or definite length (for example, one year). An 

indeterminate sentence, on the other hand, is a sentence for a 

range of time (for example, one to two years). See Hildebrandt v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 355, 359-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the 

difference between a determinate sentence and an indeterminate 

sentence); State v. Artis, 893 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Neb. 2017) (same); 

compare § 18-1.3-404(1), C.R.S. 2017 (governing duration of 

sentences for felonies and providing that such sentences shall be 

for a “definite term”), with § 18-1.3-904, C.R.S. 2017 (a court must 

“commit a sex offender to the custody of the department for an 

indeterminate term having a minimum of one day and a maximum 

of his or her natural life”). 
12 

¶ 21 With this understanding of determinate sentences in mind, we 

see that sections 19-2-601(5)(a)(I), -909(1)(a), -921(3)(b), 

and -921(3)(c) plainly don’t allow for sentences to a range; rather, 

they require sentences to fixed, definite periods. 

¶ 22 Only one other statute, section 19-2-908, provides for 

sentencing juveniles to DHS commitment. Unlike the other statutes 

mentioned above, it doesn’t use the words “determinate period.” 

What it requires (subject to a court’s determination otherwise), is 

that special offenders be sentenced to DHS commitment for a term 

of “not less than one year.” § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b), (c); see also § 19-

2-908(1)(d) (providing that aggravated juvenile offenders, a class of 

special offender, must be sentenced according to section 19-2-601); 

§ 19-2-601(5)(a)(1)(B), (C) (requiring a sentence for “a determinate 

period of at least three” years). Despite the fact section 19-2-908 

doesn’t use the term “determinate period,” we think it clear enough 

that it also contemplates determinate sentences, for two reasons. 

¶ 23 First, as noted, section 19-2-921(3)(a) says that sentences to 

DHS commitment provided for under section 19-2-907 “shall be for 

a determinate period,” and section 19-2-907 expressly refers to 
13 

sentencing of special offenders under section 19-2-908. § 19-2-

907(2). 

¶ 24 Second, the apparent purpose of the sentencing provisions in 

section 19-2-908 is to limit the court’s discretion in setting 

sentences for special offenders by requiring mandatory minimum 

terms of commitment. Nothing in that statute even hints at 

indeterminate sentencing. 

¶ 25 Based on our review of the entire juvenile sentencing scheme, 

we conclude that a court may not sentence a juvenile to DHS 

commitment for an indeterminate term: a determinate sentence is 

required. 

b. J.C.’s Indeterminate Sentence Is Illegal 

¶ 26 The court sentenced J.C. to one to two years in DYC. That’s 

an indeterminate sentence. It’s therefore illegal. We vacate the 

sentence and remand for resentencing. 

3. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 

¶ 27 Even though we’ve decided that J.C.’s indeterminate sentence 

is illegal, we address whether the court may sentence her to a 

mandatory minimum period of commitment because the issue is 
14 

likely to arise on remand. We conclude that there’s no mandatory 

minimum provision that applies to J.C.’s three adjudications. 

a. Sentencing as a Special Offender 

¶ 28 Again, section 19-2-907(2) says a court shall sentence a 

juvenile adjudicated as a special offender pursuant to section 19-2-

908. Section 19-2-908, in turn, creates four categories of special 

offenders, two of which are relevant here: mandatory sentence 

offenders and repeat juvenile offenders. § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b).2 

When a court sentences a juvenile as a mandatory sentence 

offender or repeat juvenile offender, it may sentence her to DHS 

commitment “for not less than one year.” § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b). This 

“not less than” language is synonymous with a mandatory 

minimum sentence.3

¶ 29 So this statute clearly authorizes (indeed, if applicable, 

presumptively requires) a mandatory minimum term of DHS 

 

2 The other categories are violent juvenile offenders and aggravated 

juvenile offenders. § 19-2-908(1)(c), (d) C.R.S. 2017; A.S v. People, 

2013 CO 63, ¶ 16. No one asserts that J.C. qualifies as either. 

3 Under section 19-2-908, the court may sentence a special offender 

to “an alternative sentence or a commitment of less than one year” 

if it determines that such a sentence or term “would be more 

appropriate.” § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b), (c). 
15 

commitment. We turn, then, to whether J.C. qualifies as either a 

mandatory sentence offender or a repeat juvenile offender. 

i. J.C. Isn’t a Mandatory Sentence Offender 

¶ 30 At the outset, we again note that after J.C. filed her motion to 

correct an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a), arguing that the 

court didn’t have any authority to sentence her as a mandatory 

sentence offender, the court said that it didn’t have “a record” that 

it had sentenced J.C. as a mandatory sentence offender. The 

People say the court didn’t sentence J.C. as a mandatory sentence 

offender. (J.C. doesn’t take a clear position on the question.) 

¶ 31 Appellate courts generally defer to a lower court’s construction 

of its own rulings. See State v. Denya, 986 A.2d 260, 269 (Conn. 

2010); Commonwealth v. Lebo, 713 A.2d 1158, 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1998) (affording “great deference” to a court’s interpretation of its 

own order); Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 179 P.3d 786, 788 

(Utah 2008) (same); Leitao v. Commonwealth, 573 S.E.2d 317, 319 

(Va. Ct. App. 2002) (“We defer to the trial court’s interpretation of 

its own order.”). But in this case we can’t. In the sentencing orders 

sent to DHS, the court said it was sentencing J.C. as a mandatory 

offender, and the court said at sentencing that it was sentencing 
16 

J.C. to “DYC commitment, mandatory minimum one year.” We also 

observe that, in ruling on J.C.’s post-sentencing motions, the court 

appears to have been less than certain that it hadn’t sentenced J.C. 

as a mandatory sentence offender. In any event, we feel we must 

decide if it may do so on remand, particularly in light of the juvenile 

court’s alternative ruling that J.C. is eligible for sentencing as a 

mandatory sentence offender. 

¶ 32 Section 19-2-908(1)(a) provides that “[t]he court shall place or 

commit any juvenile adjudicated as a mandatory sentence offender, 

as described in section 19-2-516(1), out of the home for not less 

than one year.”4 Section 19-2-516(1) defines such an offender, in 

relevant part, as a juvenile who “[h]as been adjudicated a juvenile 

delinquent twice . . . and . . . [i]s subsequently adjudicated a 

juvenile delinquent.” (Emphasis added.) 

¶ 33 A guilty plea that the court accepts plainly constitutes an 

“adjudication” under the statute, so there’s no question J.C. was 

“adjudicated” a total of three times by entering three guilty pleas. 

 

4 Section 19-1-103(85), C.R.S. 2017, defines “[p]lacement out of the 

home” as “placement for twenty-four-hour residential care in any 

facility or center operated or licensed by the department of human 

services.” 
17 

See § 19-1-103(2) (“‘Adjudication’ means a determination by the 

court that . . . a juvenile has pled guilty to committing a delinquent 

act.”). But was J.C. “subsequently adjudicated” when she entered 

her third guilty plea in the same hearing as the first two? We 

conclude that she wasn’t. 

¶ 34 When interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the General 

Assembly’s purpose or intent in enacting the statute. Martin v. 

People, 27 P.3d 846, 851 (Colo. 2001). We start by attributing to 

the words and phrases used in the statute their plain and ordinary 

meanings. People v. Perez, 238 P.3d 665, 669 (Colo. 2010). And we 

consider the words or phrases at issue in context — both in the 

context of the statute of which the words or phrases are a part and 

in the context of any comprehensive statutory scheme of which the 

statute is a part. People v. Hill, 228 P.3d 171, 173-74 (Colo. App. 

2009); see Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 20 (a court must 

“read the scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and 

sensible effect to all of its parts”); Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32, 

¶ 15. 

¶ 35 If, after applying these principles, we determine that the 

relevant words or phrases are unambiguous, we enforce them as 
18 

written, and we won’t resort to other rules of statutory construction. 

People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Colo. 1994); People v. 

Shores, 2016 COA 129, ¶ 16. 

¶ 36 Again, the plain language of the statute defining mandatory 

sentence offender requires that the juvenile “[h]as been adjudicated 

a juvenile delinquent twice” and “[i]s subsequently adjudicated a 

juvenile delinquent.” § 19-2-516(1)(a)(I), (b)(I) (emphasis added). 

Though the statute doesn’t define “subsequent,” we know that it 

entails the passage of some time. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1656 

(10th ed. 2014) (defining “subsequent” as “occurring later; coming 

after something else”). And, of course, “has been” indicates the 

same thing — that the first two adjudications occurred before the 

first. See A.S., ¶ 17 (“A ‘mandatory sentence offender’ is a juvenile 

who is adjudicated delinquent (and/or revoked from probation for a 

delinquent act) for a third time.”). 

¶ 37 The People essentially argue that “subsequent” can mean as 

little as a few minutes.5 Perhaps that’s so in other contexts. But in 

 

5 Oddly, in our view, J.C. appears to buy this argument. The 

concession is troubling, but not controlling. See People v. Knott, 83 

P.3d 1147, 1148 (Colo. App. 2003) (“We are not bound by the 

parties’ concessions as to the applicable law.”). 
19 

the context of this statute, such an interpretation would rob the 

word “subsequent” of any real meaning. See People v. J.J.H., 17 

P.3d 159, 162 (Colo. 2001) (we don’t presume the legislature uses 

language idly, with no intent that meaning should be given to it). 

For “subsequent” to retain any significance in this context, it must 

entail the passage of enough time for the juvenile to experience the 

consequences, i.e., the sentences, of her first two adjudications. 

Were the passage of such time irrelevant, the General Assembly 

could’ve simply defined a mandatory sentence offender as a juvenile 

who has been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent three times, or who 

has committed three acts for which the juvenile has been 

adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Instead, the General Assembly 

chose to define the term in a way that turns on the timing (“has 

been,” “subsequent”) of the adjudications as much as the number of 

adjudications.6 

 

6 The People’s reliance on People in Interest of J.C.P., 151 P.3d 635 

(Colo. App. 2006), is misplaced. In that case, the division said the 

mandatory offender provision “makes no reference to the date of the 

commission of the offense underlying the prior adjudications. It 

requires only that a juvenile be adjudicated delinquent after the 

entry of two prior delinquency adjudications.” Id. at 636-37. This 

case doesn’t involve any question as to the effect of the dates of the 

offenses. 
20 

¶ 38 The clear objective of the statutory scheme reinforces our 

interpretation. See Martin, 27 P.3d at 851-52 (“In interpreting a 

comprehensive legislative scheme, we must construe each provision 

to further the overall legislative intent behind the statutes.”). As the 

supreme court has put it, 

[o]ne of the fundamental differences between 

the juvenile system of justice and an adult 

criminal prosecution “is the overriding goal of 

the Children’s Code to provide guidance and 

rehabilitation of an adjudicated delinquent 

child in a manner consistent with the best 

interest of the child and the protection of 

society rather than fixing criminal 

responsibility, guilt, and punishment.” 

J.J.H., 17 P.3d at 163 (quoting S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 91 

(Colo. 1988)); see also A.S., ¶ 14 (“The juvenile justice system aims 

to provide guidance, rehabilitation, and restoration for the juvenile 

and to protect society, rather than focusing principally on criminal 

conduct and assigning criminal responsibility, guilt, and 

punishment.”). This emphasis on rehabilitation indicates that the 

General Assembly intended to provide juvenile offenders with an 

opportunity to benefit, and learn from, prior sentencing before 

facing enhanced sentencing for a third adjudication. 
21 

¶ 39 For these reasons, we conclude that J.C. wasn’t “subsequently 

adjudicated” for a third time. It follows that the court couldn’t 

legally have sentenced her to a mandatory minimum term of 

commitment as a mandatory sentence offender. Her sentence is 

therefore illegal for this reason as well. 

ii. J.C. Isn’t a Repeat Juvenile Offender 

¶ 40 Section 19-2-516(2) defines a repeat juvenile offender as one 

who “has been previously adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and is 

adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a delinquent act that 

constitutes a felony.” (Emphasis added.) 

¶ 41 The People (and J.C., for that matter) argue that J.C. qualifies 

as a repeat juvenile offender because she first pleaded guilty to 

what would, if she were an adult, constitute two misdemeanors and 

then pleaded guilty to what would, if she were an adult, constitute a 

felony (the second degree assault charge). So, the argument goes, 

she “was previously adjudicated” (for the two misdemeanors) before 

being adjudicated for the felony. But this argument fails for the 

same reasons the People’s argument concerning mandatory 

sentence offenders fails, and more. 
22 

¶ 42 We interpret “previously” as the reciprocal of “subsequently” in 

section 19-2-516(1). The plain language of this provision similarly 

emphasizes a passage of time between the first adjudication and the 

latter. And, of course, the statute’s emphasis on rehabilitation 

applies to this provision as well. These observations lead us to read 

“previously” to require time for a juvenile offender to experience the 

consequences of her misdemeanor sentence before facing an 

enhanced sentence for an ensuing felony. 

¶ 43 Additionally, to interpret the provision as the parties urge 

could lead to absurd results. See, e.g., Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 

20, ¶ 16 (“[W]e avoid statutory interpretations that defeat legislative 

intent or lead to absurd results.”). If we accepted the parties’ 

interpretation, a juvenile such as J.C. would face a different 

sentence depending on which plea she entered first during a 

hearing on multiple charges; if she pleaded guilty to the 

misdemeanor first, the court would be required to sentence her as a 

repeat juvenile offender, but if she pleaded guilty to the felony first, 

the provision wouldn’t apply. We can’t fathom that the General 

Assembly intended such an arbitrary outcome. 
23 

¶ 44 In sum, we conclude that section 19-2-908 also excludes J.C. 

from the category of repeat juvenile offenders. Therefore, the court 

couldn’t legally have sentenced her to a mandatory minimum term 

of commitment as a repeat juvenile offender, and can’t do so on 

remand.

b. Sentencing Under Section 19-2-921 

¶ 45 In her supplemental brief, J.C. says that if the court didn’t 

sentence her as a special offender, it didn’t have statutory authority 

to sentence her to a mandatory minimum of one year of DHS 

commitment. The People, however, seem to argue that section 19-

2-921(3)(c) provides such authority. Their argument fails. 

¶ 46 Section 19-2-921(3)(c) allows a court to commit a juvenile to 

DHS if the court adjudicates the juvenile “for an offense that would 

constitute a felony or a misdemeanor.” But, as discussed above, 

that provision simply allows a sentence to commitment only for a 

“determinate period” that “shall not exceed two years.” It sets a 

ceiling, but unlike section 19-2-908, sets no floor. A court therefore 

isn’t limited to imposing any particular minimum period of 
24 

commitment in sentencing a juvenile under this provision. Put 

another way, it can’t be read as allowing a mandatory minimum.7

III. Conclusion 

¶ 47 The Children’s Code sentencing scheme didn’t afford the court 

the authority to impose an indeterminate sentence or a sentence to 

a mandatory minimum term of commitment. Consequently, the 

sentence is illegal. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand 

the case to the district court with directions to resentence J.C. 

Because we vacate the sentence on which J.C.’s Crim. P. 35(c) 

claims are premised, those claims are moot. 

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE FREYRE concur. 

 

7 This analysis also applies to section 19-2-909(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, 

which is strikingly similar to section 19-2-921(3)(c), C.R.S. 2017. 

And it applies to sentencing of aggravated offenders under section 

19-2-601(5)(a), C.R.S. 2017, which also requires imposition of a 

“determinate” sentence.