1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 10 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### FOX v . VICE, AS EXEC UTRIX OF THE 

### ESTATE OF VICE, ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 10–1 14. Ar g u ed M a r c h22, 201 1—Dec i ded Ju n e6, 201 1 Clai min gth at h ew a s su bjec ted to dir t y tr ic ks du r i ng h i s su c c e ssfu l

c a mpaig nto bec o me the p o lic e c h ief of Vinton, La., petitionerFo x filed a st ate-c o u r t su it ag ai n s t Vi c e , the inc u mbent c h i e f, and the tow n(Vic e, forsh or t). Fox ’ s su it as ser t ed bothstate-l a wc l aims, in

cluding defam a tion, a n d federa l civil righ t s cla i m s under 4 2 U. S

. C. §198 3, including interfe r ence with Fo x’s right to seek public office. Vice rem o ved t h e ca s e t ofedera l courtb a s ed on t h e §19 8 3 cla i m s . Af

terdisc ov er y, he sought summar yjudg ment on the feder a l c l aims , whichFox co nceded we re not valid. Th e Dis t rictCourta ccordin gly dismi ssedth e mw i thpr eju d ic e an d rem a nded t h e rema ining cla i ms to s t a t e court, noting tha t Vice’s a ttorneys ’ work co uld b eus eful in the state-court proceedings. Vice th en a s ked t h e federa l courtfo r a t

torney ’s fees under §1988, submit ti ngat torneybillingrecords esti

matingthe ti me spent on the entir esuit, without differ e ntiatingbe

tween time spent on the now-dism issed federal claims and on the remaining state claims. The court granted the motion on the ground th at Fox ’ s feder a l c l aims wer e fr i v olou s, awar din g Vice fees forall work his attorneys had performed in the suit. Although the state-law allegations had not been found friv olous, the court did not require Vice to separate out the work the attorneys had done on the two sets of claims. It also declined to re duce the fee award to reflect the sur

v iv i n gstate-l a w c l aim s , n o tin gth at bothside s h a dfoc u sed onth e frivolous §1 9 8 3 cla i ms . The Fift h Circuita ffirm ed, rej e ct ing Fox ’ s ar g u men tth at ev er y c l aim ina su it mu st be fr iv olou s forth e defen

da ntt orecover a n y fees , a n d a greeing wi t ht h e Dis t rictCourtt h at the litigation had focused o n the f r ivolous federal claims.2 FOX v. VICE Sy llabu s Held : 1. When a pla i ntiff’s suitin volv es both fri v olous and non-frivolous c l aims, a c o u r t m a ygr an t r e ason ab le fees to th e defen d an t, bu t on l y for cos t s t h a tthe defenda n twould nothav eincu rred b u tfor t h e friv o lou s c l aims. Pp. 5–11. (a) Sec t ion19 88 allows th e awar d of “a r e ason ab le attor n ey ’ s fee” to “th e pr ev ail i n gpar t y” inc e r t ainc iv il r i gh ts c a ses, in c l u d in g§1983 su its. Wh ile most of th is C o u r t’ s §1988d e c i sion s h av e c o n c er n e d fees to prevailing plaintiff s , §19 88 al soautho r izes a fee award to a pre

vailing defend ant “upon a finding thattheplaintiff’s acti on was frivo

lous , unrea s o nab l e, or without founda t ion.” Christiansb u rg Ga rm ent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421. Ju st as plain t iff s mayr e c e iv e fees u n d er§1988 e v enif th eyar e n o t v i c t or iou s onev er y c l aim, Hensle yv. Eck erhart , 461 U. S. 42 4, 4 35, so too m a ya defen d an t b er e imbu r s ed forc o sts u n d er§1988 ev en if th e plain t iff’ s su it is n o t wh ollyfr iv o lous, ibid., n. 1 0

. The defe nda n t is not en titled to fees arising from these non-frivolous charges, see Christia nsb u r g

, 434 U. S., at 420 – 421, bu t th e pr esen c eof r e ason ab le alleg a tion s doe s n o t immu n i z e the pla i ntiff aga i ns t pa ying for the fees that his frivolous claims im

posed. Pp. 5–7. (b) The question then beco mes ho w to allocate fees in a lawsui t having b o th f r ivolous a n d non-friv olou s c l aims. Con gr e ss’ s pu r p ose inen ac tin g§198 8—to r e lie v edefen d an ts of th e bu r d en s as soc i ate d with fending off frivolous li tigati on—poin t s to the proper standard: Sec t ion19 88 a llows a defen d an t to r e c o v e r r e ason able att o r n ey’ s fees incurred because of, but only because of, a frivolous claim; i.e., §1 988 per m its the d e fendant to r e c e iv e onlytheportion of his fees tha the would not hav epa id b u t for the friv olou s claim. A stan d a r dallowin g more expansi v e fee-shifting would furnish windfalls to some defen

dants, who would be relieved of normal litigat ion costs merely be

ca us e the pla i ntiff’s s u it a l so includ ed frivolous clai ms. This “but-for” stan dar dmay , insome in stan c e s, allowc o mpen sat i onto a defen d an t for a t t o rney w o rk rela t i ng t ob o t hfrivolous a n d non-frivo l ous cla i ms , for ins t a n ce, if t h e frivolous cla i mreq u ires ala wyer t odo m o re work because of the defendant’s greater fi nanci a l exposure on that claim. The disposi t ive question is n o t whethe r a t t o rney cos t s a t a ll rela t e to a n o n -fr iv olous c l ai m, bu t wh eth e r the costs would h ave been in

curred in theabsence of the friv olous allegation. The answers to those inquiries will usuallytrack each other, but whe nth ey dive rge, it i s the sec o nd one thatm a tter s . The determination of fees “should not result in a second majo r litigation.” Hensle y , 461 U. S., at 43 7

. The essentia lgoal in shift i ng fees is to do rough j u s t ice, not to ac hiev e auditingper f ec tion. The tr ial c o ur t has wide disc r e tion, but m u s t a pply t h e correctb u t -for s t a n da rd. And t h e appeals courtm u st3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Sy llabu s deter m ine whetherthe tr ial c o ur t asked an d an swer ed th is bu t-for qu estion , r a th erth ansome oth e r . Pp. 7–11

.

2. Th e lower cou r ts u s ed an in c o r r e c tstan dar dinawar din gfees to Vice. The Di s t rictCourt ’ s a n a l ys is s u gg es t s t h atVice’s a t t o rneys would have d o ne muchthes a me work even if Foxha d not b r ought his frivolous claims. The c h arges ar ose out of Vice’s c o nduct in the c a mpaig n , and with r e spec t both to the fr ivolous feder a l c l aim s and t o the non-frivol ous state-l a w claims, hi s “d efense entaile d proof or de

n i al of essen t i a llyth e same fac t s. ” It thus seems likely that Vice’s at

torneys wouldhave, e. g., taken manyof the same dep o sitions. Al

thoughthe Distr i c tCour t noted the usefulness of the attorneys’ wo rk in defending a g ainst the st a t e-law claim s , it faile d to t a k eproper ac count of the o v erlap between the fr ivolous and non-frivolous claims. Its reasoning—that the close rela tionshi p between the federal and sta t e-law c l ai ms suppor t edthe awar d—c a nnot be squa r e d with the c o n gr e ssion alpolic yof sp ar in gdefe ndants from the costs only of frivolous litigation. Nor did the Fifth Ci rcuit uphold th e award on the proper gro und. It see m e dto think Vic ecould receivefees for any work us eful to defending a g ains t afr ivolous clai m, even i f his l a wyers would have done t h a twork rega rdles s . On t h is record, t h e ca s em u s t be r e tu r n ed to th e lower c o ur ts. Pp. 12–13

. 594 F. 3d 42 3, v a c a ted an d r e man d ed.

K

AGAN , J ., delivered the opin ion for a una ni mous Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 10–1 14 

### RICKY D. FOX, PETITIONER v. JUDY A N NVICE, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE 

### ESTATE OF BI LLY RAY V I CE, ET AL


### .

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e6, 2011] 

### J USTICE 

### K AGAN

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. Federal law authorizes a court to award areasonable attorney’s fee to the pr evailing party in certai ncivil rights cases. See 42 U. S. C. §1988. We have held that a defen

dant may receive suchan award if the plain t iff’s suit is frivolous. In this case, the plaintiff asserted both frivolous and non-fri v olous claims. We hold today tha ta court m a y grant reasonable fees to the defendant in this circum

stance, but only for costs that the defenda n t would no t have incurred but for the frivolous claims. A trial cour t has wide discretion in applying th is standard. But here we must v a cate the j u dgment b e low because the court used a different and incorrect stan dard in awa r ding fees. I This case arises out of an electionfor chief of police in the town of Vinton, Louisiana. T h e candidates were peti

tioner Ricky Fox (the challeng er) and respondent Billy Ray Vice (the incumbent). 1 

### By Fox’s ac count, Vice resorted to

——————

1 Vice died during the cours eof th is litigation. Pursuant to this Cou r t’ s Ru le 35.1, we su bstituted the executor of his estate as respon

dent. 562 U. S. ___ (2011). But for th e sake of clari t y, we refer to th e2 FOX v. VICE Opinion of theCourt 

### an assortment of dirt ytric k s to tr y to for c e F o x out of th e race. In particular, Vi ce se nt an anonymous letter to Fox threatening to publish damaging charges against him if h e remained a candidate. Vice also arranged for a third party to publicly accuse Fox of using rac i al slurs an d then to file a criminal complaint against Fox repeating those alleg a tions. And when prosecutors ignored that faux complaint, Vice leaked it to the press. Yet a ll of these machinations failed; Fox won the ele ction. And Vice got an even greate r comeuppance: He was subsequen t ly convi cte d of criminal extortion for his election-related conduct. Fox, howev e r, chose not to let the matter re st; he filed this suit in Louisianastate court against Vice and the town of Vi nton, also a respondent here. Fox’s compla int asserted both state-law claims, including de famation, and federal civil rights claims under 4 2 U. S. C. §1983, includ

ing interfer ence with h i s right to seek public office. Vic e and the town (Vice, for short) removed the case to federal court on the basis of the §1983 claims. At the end of discovery in the suit, Vice move d for sum

mary judg ment on Fox’s federal claims. Fox conceded that the claims were “no[t] valid,” App. 169, and the District Court ac cor d ingly dism issed them with preju d ice. In the same ruling, the cour t declined t o exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Docket No. 2:06–cv–135 (WD La., Oct. 16, 2007), Ap p. to Pet. for Cert. 38a– 40a. The court instead remanded the now slimmed-down case to state cour t for adju d i cation. In doing so, t h e DistrictCourtobserved that“[a]nytri al preparation , legal res e arch, and discovery may be used b y the parties in the state court proce e dings.” Id., at 40a. Vice then asked the federa l court for an awar d of attor

ney’s fees under §1988, arguing th at Fox’s federal claims were “baseless and without merit.” App. 198. Vice stated

—————— res p ondenta s Vice.3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### that his lawyers had had to participate in five lengthy depositions and review numerous records to defend against Fox’s charges. Id., at 199

. In suppo rt of his fe e request, Vice submitted atto rney billing records estimat

ing the time spent on t h e whole su it, without differentiat

ing between the federal and state-law claims. See Supp. App. 8–67. The Distric tCourt g r a n ted the motion for attorney’s fees on the ground that Fox’s federal claims were frivolous. Although the state-law allegations had not been foun d frivolous (and indeed remained l i ve), the court did not require Vice to separate ou t the work his at torneys had done on th e two sets of claims. Docket No. 2:06–cv–135 (WD La., Sept. 22, 2008), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Ac

cording to the court, s u ch “segregation” was unnecessary because the “various cl aims arose out of the same transac

tion and were so interrelated th at their pr osecution or defense ent a iled proof or denial of essential l y the same facts.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Simi

larly, the c o urt declined to reduce the fee award to reflect the survivi n g state-la w claims. “[T]hrougho u t the litig a tion,” the court state d , both sid e s “focus[ed]” on Fox ’ s frivolous §1 983 claims. Id., at 32 a–33a. The court there

fore concluded that Vice should receive all of the fees he reasonably incurred in defend ing the suit—a total of $48,681. Id ., at 34a. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 594 F. 3d 423 (CA5 2010). The maj o rity firs t rejected Fox’s contention that all claims in a su it must be frivolous for the defen

dant to recover any fe es. That rule, the court explained, would “ ‘allow plaintiffs to prosecute frivolous claims with

out consequenc[e]’ ” so long as th ey added asingle non

frivolous cl aim. Id. , a t428 (quoting Tutor- Sa liba Corp. v. Hailey, 452 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (CA9 2006)). The Court of Appeals then turned to the District Court ’ s d e cision that Vice was entitled to fees for all time thus far spent on the4 FOX v. VICE Opinion of theCourt 

### case, even though sta t e-law clai ms remained unadjudi

cated. Repeating the trial cour t ’ s view tha tthe whole litigation had focused on the frivolous federal claims, the Fifth Circui tupheld the fee award. See 594 F. 3d, at 428. Judge Southwick disse nted. He agreed that Vice was entitled to some reimbursement for fees. Id., at 430. Bu t he thoughtthe Distri ct Cour t h a d erred indeclining to “allocate the fees separately between the successful claims and the unsuccessful” ones just because all of them were “interrelated.” Ibid. “ [W]hen some claims are dismiss e d as frivolous and others are not,” h e stated, th e defendants should receive fees onl yfor “the legal workallocable sole l y or dominan tly to the dismissed” cl aims. Id., at 431. Be

cause in this case “alm ost all of the defendant[s’] discovery and factualanalysis would have been necessa ry even if no federal claims had been brought,” he concluded, the fee award shou ld have been much smaller. Ibid. The Fifth Circuit’s decision dee p ened a Circuit split about whether and to what exten ta court may award fe es to a defendant under §1988 when a plaintiff asserts both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. 2 

### One Court of Appeals has forbidden any com p ensation unless all of the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous. See Balmerv. HCA, Inc. , 423 F. 3d 606, 617 (CA6 2005). Others have rejected this approach, but struggl ed with how to allocate fees in a suit that in

volves a mi x of frivolo u s and non -frivolous cl aims. Com

pare, e.g., 594 F. 3d 42 3 (CA5 2010) (opinion below), with Colombrito v. Kelly , 764 F. 2d 122, 132 (CA2 1 985) (declin

ing to award fees when the frivolous claim“added no additional testimony or expense to the trial”). We granted

——————

2 The parties d onot di spute for purpos es o f ar g u ment her ethat this case involves both kinds of claim s . The District Cou r t deemed the federa l cla i ms frivolous , a n d Fox ha s not as ked us to dis t urb tha t ruling. See Brief for Petitio n er 26, a n d n. 2

. The court rema nded the sta t e-law c l ai ms to sta t e c o ur t, and Vic ehas as sumed i nthis Cour t t h at they are not f r ivolous. See Br ief for Respondents 8, n. 5.5 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### certiorari to resolve these question s . 562 U. S. ___ (2010). II Our legal system generally requires each party to bea r his own litigation expenses, inclu d ing attorn ey’s fees, re

gardless whether he wins or loses. Indeed, this princi ple is so firmly entrenchedthat itis known as th e “America n Rule.” See Alyeska Pipeline Se rvice Co. v. W ilder ne ss Society , 42 1 U. S. 240, 247 (19 75). But Congress has authorized courts to de viate fr om this background rule in certain typ e s of cases by shifting fees from one party to another. See Burlin gtonv. Da gue , 505 U. S. 557, 562 (1992) (listing federal fee-shifting provisions). The statute involved here, 42 U. S. C. §1988, allows the award of “a reasonabl e attorney’s fee” to “the prevailin g party” in various kinds of civil rights cases, inc l uding suits brought un der §1983. Most of our decisions addressing this provision have concerned th e grant of fees to prevail

ing plaintiffs. When a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation, we have stated, h e serves “as a ‘private attorney g e neral, ’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. ” Newmanv. Piggi e ParkEnter p ris es, Inc. , 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam )

. H e therefore “shou l d ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee” from the defendant—the party whose mis

conduct cre ated the need for legal action. Ch ristiansbur g Garm ent Co . v. EE OC, 434 U. S. 4 12, 416 (19 78) (internal quotation marks omit ted). Fee shifting in such a case at once reimburses a plaintiff for “what it cos[t] [him] to vindicate [civil] rights,” Riversid ev. Rivera , 47 7 U. S. 561, 577–578 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), an d holds to account “a vi olator of federal law,” Chris t ian s burg , 434 U. S., at 418. In Christiansburg , we held that §1988 also a u thorizes a fee award to a prevailing defendant, but under a different standard reflecting the “quite dif f erent equitable consid

-6 FOX v. VICE Opinion of theCourt 

### erations” at sta k e. Id

. , at 419. In enacti ng §1988, we stated, Con gress sought “to protect defendants from bur

densome lit igation having no lega l or factualbasis.” Id., at 420. Ac cordingly, §1988 authorizes a dist rict court to award a ttorney’s fees to a defendant “upon a finding tha t the plaintif f’s action was frivolous , unreasonable, orwith

out foundation.” Id., at 421; see also Kentuckyv. Grah am , 473 U. S. 159, 165, n. 9 (1985). These stan dards would be ea sy to apply if life were like the movies, but that is usually not the case. In Hollywood, litigation most oftenconclude s with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party fully triu m phant an d the other utterly pro s trate. The court in such a case would know exactly how to award fees (even if that anti-climactic scen e is generally left on the cutting- r oom floor). But in the real world, litigation is more complex, involvi n g multiple claims for relief that implicate a mix of legal theories and have differ e nt merits. Some clai ms succeed; others fail. Some charges are frivolous; others (even if not ultimately successful) have a reasonable bas is. In sh ort, litigation is messy, and courts m u st deal with this u n tidiness in awarding fe es. Given this reality, we have made clear that plaintiffs may receive fees under §1988 even if they ar e not victori

ous on eve r y claim. A civil rights plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected aviolation of federal law and, in so d o ing, has vindic ated Congress’s statutory pu r poses. That “result i s what ma tters,” we explained in Hensl e yv. Eckerh ar t , 461 U. S. 4 24, 435 (19 83): A cou r t should compensate the plainti ff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome, even if “the plain t iff failed toprevail on every contention.” Ibid

. The fee award, of course, should not reimburse the plain

tiff for wor kperforme d on claims that bore no relation to the grant o f relief: Such wo rk “ca nnot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of th e ul timate result achieved.”7 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### Ibid. (internal quotation marks o m itted)

. B u t the pres

ence of these unsuccessful claim s does notimmunize a defendant against paying for th e attorney’s f ees that the plaintiff reasonably in curred inremedying a breach of his civil rights. Analogous principles indicate th at a defendant may deserve fees even if not all the plaintiff’s claims we re frivolous. In this context, §1988 serves to relieve a defen

dant of exp e nses attributable to frivolous charges. The plaintiff acted wrongl y in levelin g such allegations, and the court may shift to him the rea s onable cos t s that those claims imposed on his a dversary. See Christiansburg , 43 4 U. S., at 42 0–421. That remains true when the plaintiff’s suit also in cludes non- frivolous claims. The defendant, of course, is n o t entitled to any fees arising from these no n frivolous charges. See ibid. But the presence of reason

able allegat i ons in a s u it does not immunize the plaintiff against pa ying for the fees th at his frivolous claims imposed. Indeed, we have previously said exactly this much. In Hensl e y , we noted th e possib ilit y that a plaintiff might prevail on one contention in a suit while also asserting an unrelated frivolous cla i m. In this situation, we explained, a court could properlyaward fees to both parties—to the plaintiff, to reflect the fees he incurred in bringing th e meritorious claim; and to the defendant, to co mpensate for the fees he paid in de fending against the frivolous one. See 461 U. S., at 435, n. 10. We thus made clear that a court may reimburse a defendant for costs under §1988 even if a plaintiff’s suit is not wholly frivolous. Fee

shifting to recompense a de fendant (as to recompense a plaintiff) is not all-or-nothing: A defendant need not show that every claim in a complaint is frivolous to qualify for fees. The questio n then beco mes on e of allocation: In a law

suit involvi n g a mix of frivolous a n d non-frivolous cla i m s ,8 FOX v. VICE Opinion of theCourt 

### what work may the de fendant rec e ive fees for? Vice con cedes, as he must, that a defendant may not obtain com

pensation for work un related to a frivolous claim. Bri e f for Respondents 42, n. 13. Similarl y, we think Fox would have to con c ede (once he has lostthe argument that the presence of any non-frivolous claim preclude s a fee awa r d) that the defendant may receive reasonable f ees for work related exclusively to a frivolous claim. The question in dispute concerns work thathelps defend against non

frivolous and frivolous claims alik e—for example, a depo

sition eliciting facts rel e vant to both allegations. Vice proposes authorizing the tria lcourt to award fees for wor k th at is “fairlyattributabl e” to the f r ivolous por

tion of thel a wsuit. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 45. But that standard is in truth no sta n dard a tal l. The ver y question u n der consideration is: What fees may be fairly attributed to frivolous claims under §1988? To answer “Those that are fairly attribut able to frivolous claims” is just to rest ate this qu estion. An d thatnon- response re sponse would leave to each and every trial c o urt not only the implementation, but also the invention, of the applica

ble legal st andard. W e do not think trial co urts would appreciate t hat lack of guidance. And yet mo re important, we do not think such an empty and amorphous test would ensure that all fee awards to defendants comport wit h Congress’s purpose in enacting §1988. That congressiona lpolicy po ints to a different and more meaningful standard: Section 1988 allows a defendant to recover rea s onable attorney’s fees incurred because of, but only becaus e of, a friv olous claim

. Or what is the sam e thing stated as a but- f or test: Section 1988 permits the defendant to receive only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for the frivolous c l aim. Reca ll that the relevant purpose of §198 8 is to relieve defendants of the burdens associa t ed with fe nding off frivolous litiga

tion. See su p ra , at 5– 6. So if a frivolous claim occasioned9 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### the attorne y ’s fees at issue, a court maydecide that t h e defendant should not have to pay them. But if the defen

dant would have incu rred those fees anywa y, to defend against non -frivolous claims, then a court has no bas is for transferring the expense to the plaintiff. Suppose, for example, that a defendant’s at torn ey conduc ts a deposition on matters relevant to both a frivolous and a non-frivolous claim—and more, that the lawyer would have taken an d committed the same t i me to this deposition even if th e case had involved only the non-frivolous all e gation. In that circum stance, the work does not implicate Congress ’s reason for allowing defendants to collect fees

. The defen

dant would have incurred the expe nse in any event; he ha s suffered no incremental harm from the frivolo u s claim. I n short, the defendant ha s never shouldered the burden that Congress, in enacting §1988, wan t ed to relieve. The b a s ic American Rule thus continues to operate. 3 

### A standa r d allowing more expansive fee-shifting would furnish windfalls to some defendants, makingthem better off because they were s ubject to a suit including frivolous claims. For under any more permissive tes t , the simp le presence of a frivolous claim would allow the court to shif t

——————

3 The test set out here diffe rs from the o n e we adopted in Hensleyv. Eck erhart , 461 U. S. 424, 4 35 (19 83), to g o v e r nfee awar ds to plain t iff s inc a ses in v o lv in gbothsu ccessfu lan d u n s u c c e ssfu lc l aims. See supra , at 6–7. Th at differ e n c e r e fl ec ts th e disp arate legisl ativ e purposes we hav er e c o g n ized in the two setting s. See Ch ristian s b u r g

G a rm ent Co. v. EEOC, 43 4 U. S. 412, 4 1 9

– 4 20 (1 97 8); supra , at 5– 6. Co n gr e ss au th or ized fees to p l aintiffs to compensa te the mforthe c o s t s of r e dr essi ng civil right s viola t ions ; a ccor d ingly, a plaintiff may receive fees for all wor k r e latingto the ac c o mplishment of that result, even if “the plaintiff failed to prevail on ever y contention raised. ” Hensley , 461 U. S., at 435

. Byc o ntr a st, Congr e ss author ized fees t odefendants to r e mov ethe burden associated with fending of f friv olous cla i m s ; a ccordin gly, a defenda n tm a y reco ver for f ees t h a t t h os e cla i m s ca u s ed himt oincur. In ea ch cont ext , t h e s t a n da rd for a lloc a t i ng fees in“ m i xed” cas e s matches the relevant congre ssional purpose.10 FOX v. VICE Opinion of theCourt 

### to the plaintiff some of the cost s of defending against regular, non-frivolous charges. So two defendants (call them Vice and Rice) could face identical non-frivolous allegations, but becau s e Vice also confronted a fri v olous claim, he m i ght end by payingless than Rice to his attor

neys. The chance assertion—for Vice, the downright lucky assertion—of the frivolous claim could relieve him not onl y of the incremental costs of that claim but also of costs that he, like Rice, would have had to pay in its ab sence. Sec

tion 1988 provides no warran tfor that peculiar result; that statu t e was “never intend ed to produce windfalls” for parties. Se e Farrar v. Hobby , 50 6 U. S. 103 , 115 (1992 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, the “but-for” st andard we require may in some cases al low compensation to a defendant for at

torney wor krelating to both friv olous and non-frivolous claims. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff asserts on e frivolous and one non-frivolou s claim, but that only th e frivolous all e gation can legally res u lt in a damages award. If an attorney performs work us eful to defending agai nst both, but did so only because of the defendant’s monetary exposure on the frivolous charge, a court m a y decide t o shift fees. Or similarly, imagine that the frivolous clai m enables removal of the case to federal co urt, whichin turn drives up litigation expe nses. H e re too, our standard would permit awardi ng fees forwork relevant to both claims in or der to reflect the increased costs (if any) of the federal forum. And frivolous claims may increase the cost of defending a suit in ways tha t are not reflected in th e number of hours billed. If a defendant could prove, for example, that a fri v olous clai m involved a specialized area that reasonably caused him to hire more expensive coun

sel for the entire case, then the court may r e imburse t h e defendant for the increased marginal cost. As all these examples s h ow, the dispositive q u estion i s not whether attorney co sts at all r e late to a non-frivolous claim, bu t11 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### whether th e costs would have been incurred in the a b

sence of the frivolous allegation. The answ e rs to thos e inquiries w ill usual ly track each other, but when they diverge, it is the second that matt ers. We emphas ize, as we have before, that the determina

tion of fees “should not result in a s e cond major litigation.” Hensl e y , 46 1 U. S., a t 437. The fee applicant (whether a plaintiff or a defendant) must, of course, submit appropri

ate documentation to meet “the burden of establishin g entitlementto an a w ar d.” Ibid. B u t t r ial courts need no t , and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade account

ants. The essential goa lin shifting fees (to eit h er party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may ta ke i n to accounttheir overa ll sense of a suit, and m a y use estimates in ca lculating a n d allocating an attorney’s time. And appe llate courts must give sub

stantial deference to th ese determinations, in light of “the district court’s superio rundersta n ding of th e litigation.” Ibid.; see Webb v. Dy er County Bd. of Ed. , 471 U. S. 234, 244 (1985). We can h a rdly think of a sphere of judicial decisionma king in which appellate micromanagement has less to recommend it. But the tria lcourt must apply the correct stan dard, an d the appeals court mustmake sure that has oc curred. Se e Perduev. K e nny A. , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 14) (“Determining a ‘reasonable a ttorney’s fee’ is a matt er that is committed to t h e sound discretion of a trial judg e,

. . . but the judge’s discretion is not unlimited”); Cf. Koon v. United S t ates , 518 U. S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it m a kes an error of law”). That mean s the t r ial courtmus tdetermin e whether th e fees requested would not have accrued but fo r the frivolous claim. And the appeals court must determine whether the trial court asked and answered that question, rather thansome other. A tri al co urt has wid e discretion when, but only when, it calls the game by the right rules.12 FOX v. VICE Opinion of theCourt 

### III The task remains of ap plyingthese principles to the fee award Vice received. The Di stric tCourt’s a nalysis sug

gests that Vice’s attorneys would have done much the same work even if Fox had not brought his frivolous claims. As noted earlier, see supra , at 3, t h e court ac

k n owledged that Fox’s federa l and state-law claims were “interrelated,” App. to Pet. for Ce rt. 28a (internal quota

tion marks omitted). The charge s “arose out of the same transaction”—Vice’s conduct in th e campaign—and their “defense entailed proof or denial of essential l y the same facts.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitte d). It there

fore seems likely that Vi ce’s attorneys would a tleast have conducted s i milar fact- gathering a ctivities—t aken many of the same depositions, produced and reviewe dmany of the same documents, and so forth. Indeed, the DistrictCo urt highlighted the usefulness of the attorneys’ work to d e fending aga i nst the sta t e-law clai ms: In its order remand

ing those claims, the court noted that the “tr ial prepara

tion, legal research, and discovery” done in the federal court could “be used by the parties in the state court pro

ceedings.” Id. , at 40a. The Distric tCourt’s d e cision to award fullattorney’s fees to Vicefailed to t a k e proper account of this overlap between the frivolous and non-frivolous clai ms. Rather than apply the but-for standard we have set out, the court indicated t hat the par a mount factor was the parties’ “fo

cus” in the litigation. Id. , at 33a. The court did not ad

dress whet her the “interrelated[ness]” of the claims meant that Vice would have incurred part or most of his fees eve n if Fox had asserted only the non-frivolous state-law claims. To the contrar y , the courtsuggested t hat the clos e relationship between the feder a l and state-law claims supported Vice’s re quest to recover all of his attorney’s fees. See id. , at 28a; supra , at 3. That reas oning stands the appropriate analysis on its head. It cannot be squared13 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### with the congressional policy of s p aring defendants from the costs of frivolous litigation. Nor did the Court of Appeals uphold the award of fees on the ground that we would require. The majority ar ticu

lated a standard that, taken alone, might be read as con

sistent with our opinion; acco rding to the court, a defen

dant should receive fees for “work which can be distinctly traced to a plaintiff’s frivolous claims.” 594 F. 3d, at 429

. But the co urt seemed to think t hat its test permitted awarding Vice fees for any wo rk useful to defending against a frivolous cla i m, even if l a wyers would have don e that wor kr e gardless. Indeed, this very point divided th e majority an d the dissent. Judge Southwick objected to the fee award on the ground that “almost all [ o f] the defen

dant[s’] discovery and factual analysis would have been necessary even if no federal claims had been brought.” Id., at 431. But the majority never responded to that a r gu ment or otherwise engaged th is crucial qu estion. The majority instead merely reiterated the Dist rict Court ’ s reasoning that the par t ies had principally “focus[ed]” on the §1983 allegations. That finding, as we ha ve explained, is irrelevant if Vice’s atto rneys wo uld have performed the same work to defend against the state-law cla i ms. On this rec o rd, we mu st return t h e case to the lower courts. See, e.g., Perdu e , 559 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–15); Pennsylvaniav. Delaware Valley Citiz e ns’ Counci l for Clean A i r , 478 U. S. 546, 566–568 (1986); Hensl e y , 461 U. S., at 43 8–440. In a suit of th is kind, involving both frivolous and non-frivolous claim s , a defendant may re

cover the reasonable attorney’s fees h e exp e nded solely because of t h e frivolous allegations

. And that is all. Con

sistent with the polic y underlying §1988, the defendan t may not re ceive compensation for any fees t hat he would have paid in the absence of the frivolous claims. We there

fore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proc eedings consistent with this opinion

. It is so orde red.