ANNUAL REPORT ON PIPELINE SAFETY

CALENDAR YEAR 1994

Prepared By:

U.S. Department of Transportation

Research and Special Programs Administration

Office of Pipeline Safety

Washington, DC 20590

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES AND APPENDICES......................................................................................... iii

BACKGROUND............................................................................................................................... 1

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS AND DIRECTION.............................................................................. 3

REGULATORY ACTIVITIES.......................................................................................................... 5

FEDERAL/STATE PARTNERSHIP................................................................................................. 12

COMPLIANCE................................................................................................................................. 24

ACCIDENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS.......................................................................................... 26

TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE SYSTEM.......................................................................................... 33

RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES................................................................................ 34

TRAINING AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION.................................................................. 36

DRUG/ALCOHOL TESTING, INSPECTION, AND ENFORCEMENT............................................ 39

THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990............................................................................................. 40

JUDICIAL ACTIONS........................................................................................................................ 41

REPORT UNDER THE MINERAL LEASING ACT........................................................................ 42

ii

Page

Table 1 Membership Rosters: Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee and

Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee............................ 10-11

Table 2 Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Grant Allocation............................................................ 13

Table 3 States Participating in the Federal/State Cooperative Gas and

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Program in 1994................................................... 14

Table 4 1994 Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Grant Allocation......................................... 15

Table 5 1994 State Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Personnel and

1994 State Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Personnel...................................... 16-17

Table 6 1994 Natural Gas State Inspector Qualifications and 1994 Hazardous

Liquid State Inspector Qualifications.................................................................... 19-20

Table 7 1994 State Agency Inspection Activity - Natural Gas and

1994 State Agency Inspection Activities - Hazardous Liquid............................... 21-22

Table 8 1994 Inspection and Compliance Profile................................................................... 25

Table 9 1994 Natural Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipeline

Incidents Reported by Cause..................................................................................... 26

Table 10 1994 Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline Incidents

Reported by Cause................................................................................................... 26

Table 11 Summary of Natural Gas Transmission & Gathering Pipeline

Failures, Fatalities, and Injuries (1990-1994)................................................................ 27

Table 12 Summary of Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline

Failures, Fatalities, and Injuries (1990-1994)................................................................ 27

Table 13 Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents Reported by Cause......................................... 29

Table 14 Summary of Liquid Pipeline Accidents Reported by Commodity............................. 29

Table 15 Summary of Hazardous Liquid Pipeline

Failures, Fatalities, and Injuries (1990-1994)................................................................ 30

Table 16 1994 Economic Impact of Pipeline Accidents........................................................... 31

List of Tables and Appendices

iii

Page
Table 17 1994 Pipeline Safety Training Conducted by TSI........................................................... 37

Table 18 1994 Natural Gas Pipeline Federal Land Data............................................................... 42

Table 19 1994 Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Federal Land Data...................................................... 42

APPENDIX A:1994 Natural Gas/Hazardous Liquid Enforcement

Cases Opened................................................................................................. 44

APPENDIX B: 1994 Natural Gas/Hazardous Liquid Enforcement

Cases Closed.................................................................................................... 48

APPENDIX C:1994 Natural Gas/Hazardous Liquid Enforcement Cases -

Warning Letters................................................................................................. 52

APPENDIX D:Office of Pipeline Safety Locations................................................................................ 54

Office of Pipeline Safety Regional Boundaries......................................................................................... 2

iv

Page
BACKGROUND

1

Section 60124 of Title 49 of the United States Code,

requires the Department of Transportation to report

on its pipeline safety program. This report provides an

overview of pipeline safety program activities during

Calendar Year (CY) 1994.

The Department’s pipeline mission is to protect

the people and the environment of the United

States through a comprehensive, risk-based

pipeline safety program. The Department

develops, issues, and enforces minimum pipeline

safety regulations. The code in 49 U.S.C.§ 60101

et seq. (the Pipeline Safety Law) provides for Federal

safety regulation of pipeline facilities used in the

transportation of natural gas and provides for

safety regulation of pipeline facilities used in the

transportation of hazardous liquids. The Pipeline

Safety Law provides a framework for promoting

pipeline safety through exclusive Federal authority for

regulation of interstate pipeline facilities, and

Federal delegation to the states of all or part of the

regulatory responsibility for intrastate pipeline

facilities.

The Department provides grant funding to

support states in conducting intrastate gas and

hazardous liquid pipeline safety programs;

ensures operator compliance through a risk-based

pipeline inspection plan and use of enforcement

actions as a deterrent against violators; collects,

compiles, and analyzes pipeline safety and

operating data; and, through the Transportation

Safety Institute (TSI), conducts training for

government and industry personnel in application

of pipeline safety regulations. The Department

also undertakes research with emphasis on solid

analytical methodologies and state-of-the-art

technology to provide the foundation necessary

for planning, evaluating, and implementing the

pipeline safety program.

The Department’s regulatory authority covers

approximately 1.7 million miles of natural gas pipelines

managed by almost 900 transmission and gathering

operators, over 1,400 distribution operators, 106

liquefied natural gas (LNG) operators, about 52,000

master meter operators, and over 165,000 miles of

hazardous liquid pipelines managed by more than 200

operators, as well as 2,200 miles of carbon dioxide

pipelines.

Section 60301 of Title 49 of the United States

Code authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to

assess and collect annual fees from the pipeline

industry to fund the cost of the Department’s

pipeline safety program.

Title IV of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90),

Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484, requires national

planning and response system for oil spills. The

OPS is responsible for implementing OPA 90

requirements as they apply to onshore oil pipelines

that could reasonably be expected to cause

significant and substantial harm to the environment by discharging oil into or on the navigable

waters of the United States and adjoining

shorelines.

The Department’s pipeline safety mandate is

administered, under delegation from the Secretary, by the Research and Special Programs

Administration (RSPA) through the Office of

Pipeline Safety (OPS). The functions of the

Department’s Agency Authorized Officer (AAO)

for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System

project are also assigned to OPS. Under the

organizational structure established by Executive

Order 12142 (“The Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System”), the AAO represents the

Department within the Office of the Federal

Inspector, and is responsible for monitoring and

expediting all project-related activities that fall

within the purview of the Department.
2

Eastern

Region

Southern

Region

OPS_REGIONS

DT 7/96

Office of Pipeline Safety

 Regional Boundaries

Southwest

Region

Houston

Atlanta

Washington, D.C.

Central

Region

Kansas City

Western

Region

Lakewood

iv

At the end of 1994, OPS had approximately 75

employees. About half of these employees work at

Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the other

half are located in five Regional Offices across the

country (Eastern Region--Washington, D.C.;

Southern Region--Atlanta, GA; Central Region--

Kansas City, MO; Southwest Region--Houston,

TX; Western Region--Lakewood, CO) and at

RSPA’s training facility, TSI in Oklahoma City, OK

(see regional boundary map below).
PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS AND DIRECTION

3

In 1994, a Work Redesign effort for OPS was

completed. In addition, OPS continued working

on the many aspects of the Environmental Action

Plan. OPS also focused on implementing risk

management methodology into its regulatory and

compliance program.

Work Redesign. The OPS Work Redesign effort

to restructure and establish new work procedures

and tasks was completed in 1994. Early efforts

focused on ways to improve work processes to

increase productivity and employee satisfaction.

The successful decentralization of OPS placed

additional responsibility with the Regions. Areas

of increased Regional responsibilities that were

introduced last year that have been improved,

include accident investigations, safety inspections, processing of enforcement cases, interregional inspections, and improved office procedures. Similarly, OPS Headquarters, in Washington, D.C., placed additional responsibility on

employees by having less supervision of those

employees.

The successful introduction of Lotus Notes in 1992

continues to improve efficient and productive work in

OPS. The interactive features of Lotus Notes have

proven to be a boon to the review and approval of

documents. The OPS Local Area Network

electronically tying the geographically dispersed

Regions, State Agencies and Headquarters has led to

a closer, more productive, and integrated Federal/

state pipeline safety program. This has provided OPS

the capability of sharing and reviewing documents by

all in the organization. Computer upgrades were

provided to many Federal employees and many

inspectors were provided laptop computers to

facilitate recording of inspection activities while

in the field.

OPS’ increased coordination with other Federal

agencies, states, and the pipeline industry in

programmatic initiatives have led to exemplary

partnerships. Such agencies as the U.S. Coast

Guard, Minerals Management Service of the

Department of the Interior, Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, and Environmental

Protection Administration joined RSPA in

discussions regarding the Risk-based Prioritization

process. The National Association of Pipeline

Safety Representatives (NAPSR) was instrumental in helping RSPA develop the Risk-based

Prioritization process and in discussions regarding many legislative initiatives.

Risk Management. To provide a basis for

allocating government resources to areas that

have the greatest potential to improve pipeline

safety, OPS completed the initial evaluation of

pipeline issues using a risk-based prioritization

process. OPS solicited input to the risk-based

prioritization process in the Federal Register.

OPS obtained input from pipeline operators, the

public, and other government and state agencies

in developing the risk-based prioritization

process. The process was improved by

incorporating information and recommendations

obtained from all sources, with the new

prioritization process to be used yearly or

biennially to evaluate pipeline issues and possible

solutions.

OPS placed a major emphasis into incorporating

risk management into the OPS program. The Risk

Assessment Quality Team (RAQT) was formed

as a cooperative venture of OPS and the American

Petroleum Institute’s General Committee on

Pipelines (API) to explore the applicability and

potential benefits of formalized risk management

programs within the liquid pipeline industry. OPS

and API considered this an opportunity to

maximize the effectiveness of individual efforts
4

that had been initiated in the areas of risk assessment

and risk management and to align the goals and

principles guiding the development of risk management

programs within OPS and industry. OPS plans to

further incorporate risk management concepts in other

programmatic initiatives in the future.

Environmental Action Plan. OPS accelerated

the implementation of an Environmental Action

Plan that included the prioritization of mandated

regulatory requirements in the Pipeline Safety Law,

such as: (1) hydrostatic testing of hazardous liquid

pipelines that have not been previously tested; (2)

requiring periodic inspection of pipelines in environmentally sensitive and high-density population areas

using instrumented internal inspection devices; (3)

not excepting a hazardous liquid pipeline from

regulation solely because it operates at low

internal stress; and (4) requiring liquid operators to

have a damage prevention program. Another

feature of the Environmental Action Plan was to

analyze various Geographic Information System

(GIS) mapping alternatives and determine a

strategy for creating reasonably accurate maps for

pipelines. In addition, state pipeline and

compliance programs were redirected to include:

(1) increased state grants and state participation in

the program; (2) focused inspections of hazardous

liquid pipelines and pipeline construction; and

(3) increased Federal and state inspector training.

In addition, OPS completed selection and

assignment of a state liaison person to each of the

Regions. The state liaison person will be

responsible for assisting states and to evaluate the

adequacy of each state program.

Hazardous Liquid Pipelines. In light of the

environmental provisions and required legislation

targeting hazardous liquid pipelines in the Pipeline

Safety Law, inspections of hazardous liquid pipelines

were increased in 1994. As part of the Environmental

Action Plan, OPS continued to develop regulations and studies for hazardous liquid pipelines as

required by the Pipeline Safety Law.

Natural Gas Pipelines. OPS continued to develop

regulations for natural gas pipelines as required by the

Pipeline Safety Law. Some of the most significant

legislative mandates include: prescribing circumstances for the installation of excess flow valves in

service lines; advising customers of the proper

maintenance of these excess flow valves; surveying

customers regarding their views on who should

maintain excess flow valves; and surveying distribution

operators to determine the extent to which they have

plans for the safe management and replacement of cast

iron pipelines. Data was obtained for most of these

legislative requirements during 1994.

Spill Response Planning. In 1994, RSPA

conducted preliminary reviews of 1,200 response

plans and targeted in-depth reviews of those

response plans which posed a significant and

substantial threat to the environment. During the

year, RSPA also participated in the development

of the Preparedness for Response Exercise

Program, which is a multi-agency oil spill exercise

program developed with other Federal agencies

and the oil industry.
REGULATORY ACTIVITIES

5

OPS develops regulations to assure safety in design,

construction, testing, and the operation and

maintenance of pipeline facilities and in the siting,

construction, and the operation and maintenance of

Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facilities. Regulations are

also issued to administer the pipeline safety program

and delineate requirements for onshore response

plans. These regulations are published in Title 49 of the

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): Part 190,

Enforcement Procedures; Part 191, Natural Gas

Reporting Requirements; Part 192, Natural Gas

Pipelines; Part 193, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities;

Part 194, Response Plans for Onshore Oil Pipelines;

Part 195, Hazardous Liquids Pipelines; Part 198,

State Grants; and Part 199, Drug and Alcohol

Testing.

To provide expert input during development of

pipeline safety regulations, the Pipeline Safety Law

established two pipeline safety advisory committees,

the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee

and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline

Safety Standards Committee. The Committees review

proposed regulations for technical feasibility, reasonableness, and practicability. The Committees also

provide advice to the Department on pipeline safety

and environmental issues. Each Committee is

comprised of 15 members: six from the public, five

from government, and four from the pipeline industry.

Committee member are widely respected pipeline

safety or technical experts. Committee members as of

December 31, 1994, are listed in Table 1.

Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(ANPRM): In order to obtain information to study the

need for potential future regulations, RSPA issued the

following ANPRM:

Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRDs)/

Leak Detection Systems. [Docket PS-133,

Notice 1; 59 FR 2802; January 19, 1994.] This

advance notice solicited public input for a survey

on EFRD issues. The Pipeline Safety Law mandated

that the Department issue regulations prescribing the

circumstances under which operators must used

EFRDs and other equipment used to detect and

locate pipeline ruptures on hazardous liquid

pipelines. The regulations are to be issued

following a survey and assessment of the

effectiveness of such equipment.

Proposed Rulemaking. In its continuing effort to

improve and update existing regulation, RSPA

issued the following Notices of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM’s) in 1994:

Customer-Owned Service Lines. [Docket PS135, Notice 1; 58 FR 5168; February 3, 1994.]

This proposed rulemaking is to require operators

of gas distribution pipelines, who do not maintain

customer-owned service lines, to advise their

customers of the proper maintenance of these gas

lines, and to inform their customers of the potential

hazard of not properly maintaining these gas lines.

This proposed rulemaking, in response to a

statutory mandate, is intended to ensure that

homeowners and other owners of customer-owned

services are made aware of requirements for

maintenance of those lines; the resources known to

the operator that could properly aid the customer in

doing such maintenance; any information that the

operator has concerning the operation and

maintenance of its service lines that could aid

customer; and the potential hazards of not

maintaining customer-owned service lines.
6

Customer-Owned Service Lines. [Docket PS135, Notice 2; 59 FR 13300; March 21, 1994.] This

supplemental notice relates to the above NPRM

published on February 3, 1994. This supplemental

notice clarifies that the proposed notification

requirements apply to operators of gas transmission

systems who do not maintain customer-owned service

lines. The proposed notification requirements will also

apply to above ground customer-owned service lines.

Qualification of Pipeline Personnel [Docket PS94, Notice 2; 59 FR 39506; August 3, 1994.] This

notice proposes qualification standards for

personnel who perform, or directly supervise those

persons performing regulated operation, maintenance, and emergency-response functions. This

action would amend current standards for training

personnel performing operating or maintenance

activities on hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide

pipelines, and extend those standards to personnel

performing similar functions on gas pipelines.

The notice was made to ensure that pipeline

personnel have the knowledge and skills to

competently perform their regulated functions.

Passage of Instrumented Internal Inspection

Devices. [Docket PS-126; Notice 2; 59 FR 4989;

September 30, 1994.] This notice was a Response

to Petitions for Reconsideration of the April 12,

1994, final rule. The rule requires new and

replacement pipeline facilities to be constructed to

accommodate inspection by instrumented internal

inspection devices commonly know as “smart

pigs.” In response to the two petitions received,

this notice proposed to modify the rule with

respect to replacements in gas transmission lines

located in less populated areas; and replacements

in gas transmission lines located offshore.

Final Rules: RSPA issued the following regulations in

1994:

Operation and Maintenance Procedures for

Pipelines. [Docket PS-113; Amendment 192-71;

59 FR 6579; February 11, 1994.] This final rule

established procedures to be followed in the operation

and maintenance (O&M) of gas pipeline facilities. This

action amended current standards by requiring

regulated gas pipeline operators to include detailed

procedures regarding normal and abnormal operation,

maintenance, and emergency-response activities in the

O&M manual. Operators are also required to review

and update the manual each calendar year. Finally, this

rule required regulated gas and hazardous liquid

pipeline operators to prepare and follow procedures to

safeguard personnel from the hazards associated with

the unsafe accumulation of vapor or gas in excavated

trenches.

Alcohol Misuse Prevention Program [Docket

PS-128; Amendment 199-9; 59 FR 7426;

February 15, 1994.] This final rule set forth

regulation requiring operator of gas, hazardous

liquid and carbon dioxide pipelines, and liquefied

natural gas facilities subject to the pipeline safety

regulations to implement alcohol misuse prevention program to employees who perform safetysensitive functions. This rule requires testing

under the following conditions: post-accident,

reasonable suspicion, return-to-duty, and followup testing. This rule requires operators to remove

employees who engage in prohibited alcohol

conduct from safety-sensitive functions, and not

permit them to return to their safety sensitive

functions. Operators must provide covered

employees with written materials that specifically

identify the employees covered by the rule,

explain the requirements of the rule, and establish

the consequences of engaging in prohibited

conduct. Operators must maintain records

concerning their programs and report data

regarding employee alcohol misuse to RSPA

annually.
7

Passage of Instrumented Internal Inspection

Devices. [Docket PS-126; Amendments 190-5,

192-72, 193-9, 195-50; 59 FR 17275; April 12,

1994.] This final rule amends the gas, hazardous

liquid and carbon dioxide pipeline safety

regulation to require that certain new and

replacement pipelines be designed and constructed to accommodate the passage of instrumented internal inspection devices commonly

called “smart pigs”. This action was taken in

response to the requirements of the Pipeline Safety

Law. The intended effect of these regulations is to

improve the safety of gas, hazardous liquid, and carbon

dioxide pipelines by permitting their inspection by

“smart pigs” which the latest technology for

detecting and recording abnormalities in pipe

walls.

Pressure Testing Older Hazardous Liquid and

Carbon Dioxide Pipelines. [Docket PS-121;

Amendment 195-51; 59 FR 29379; June 7,

1994.] This final rule states that operators may not

transport a hazardous liquid in a steel interstate

pipeline constructed before January 8, 1971, a

steel interstate offshore gathering line constructed

before August 1, 1977, or a steel intrastate pipeline

constructed before October 21, 1985, unless the

pipeline has been pressure tested hydrostatically

according to current standards or operates at 80

percent or less of a qualified prior test or operating

pressure. In addition, this rule created a

comparable requirement for carbon dioxide

pipelines constructed before July 12, 1991, with

the exception of production field distribution lines

in rural areas. The purpose of this final rule was to

ensure that the affected pipelines have an adequate

safety margin between their maximum operating

pressure and test pressure. This safety margin is

essential to prevention of particular kinds of

pipeline accidents.

Regulatory Review: Hazardous Liquid and

Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety Standards.

[Docket PS-127; Amendment 195-52; 59 FR

33388; June 28, 1994.] This final rule amended

miscellaneous hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide

pipeline safety standards to provide clarity, eliminate

unnecessary or overly burdensome requirements, and

foster economic growth. The changes resulted from a

regulatory review that RSPA carried out in response to

the President’s directive of January 28, 1992, on

reducing the burden of government regulation. These

changes reduce costs in the liquid pipeline industry

without compromising safety.

Transportation of Hazardous Liquids at 20

Percent or Less of Specified Minimum Yield

Strength. [Docket PS-117; Amendment 195-53;

59 FR 35465; July 12, 1994.] RSPA’s hazardous

liquid pipeline safety regulations do not apply to

steel pipelines that operate at 20 percent or less of

the specified minimum yield strength. This final

rule extended the regulation to three groups of

these pipelines: pipelines that transport highly

volatile liquids, pipelines or pipeline segments in

populated areas, and pipelines or pipeline

segments in navigable waterways. The Pipeline Safety

Law provides that DOT may not exclude hazardous

liquid pipelines from regulation based solely on

operation at low internal stress.

Pressure Testing Older Hazardous Liquid and

Carbon Dioxide Pipelines. [Docket PS-121;

Amendment 195-51A; 59 FR 41259; August 11,

1994.] RSPA published a final rule requiring the

hydrostatic pressure testing of certain older

hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipelines that

were never pressure tested to current standards.

The final rule also disallowed the use of petroleum

as a pressure test medium. Because the prohibition

on petroleum as a test medium was not specifically

proposed, RSPA indicated it would withdraw that

prohibition if it received comments that the

prohibition was not in the public interest. RSPA

received comments objecting to the prohibition

and is therefore withdrawing the prohibition and

allowing the use of petroleum as a test medium

under specified conditions.
8

Random Drug Testing Program. [Docket 48498;

59 FR 62218; December 2, 1994.] In response to

public comments, petitions submitted by industry, and

on their own initiative, the operating administrations of

the Department have revised their random drug testing

rules. As revised, the rules provide that the Operating

Administration (OA) may lower the minimum random

drug testing rate to 25 percent if the industry-wide

(e.g., aviation, rail) positive random testing rate is less

than 1.0 percent for 2 calendar years while testing at 50

percent. The random testing rate will return to 50

percent if the industry wide random positive rates

exceeds more than 1.0 percent for 2 calendar years.

For each transportation industry, the positive

random testing rate will be calculated from data

submitted to the OAs and announced yearly by the

respective Administrator or the Commandant of

the Coast Guard. Based on this revision, the

random drug testing rate for the railroad and

aviation industries is reduced by the Federal

Railroad Administration and Federal Aviation

Administration Administrators.

Alcohol Misuse Prevention Program. [Docket

49384; 59 FR 62234; Part 199; December 2,

1994.] On February 15, 1994, the Department

published final alcohol testing rules, including a

requirement that evidential breath testing devices

be used to conduct alcohol testing. The

Department also published a notice of proposed

rulemaking seeking comment on whether blood

testing should be used in very limited circumstances (i.e., for reasonable suspicion and postaccident tests, where evidential breath testing was

not available). After reviewing the comments, the

Department decided not to authorize blood testing

as proposed. The Department’s operating

administration are amending their alcohol testing

rules to require employers to submit to the

Department, reports of reasonable suspicion and

post-accident tests that could not be conducted

because breath testing was unavailable.

Waiver Under the Act. In circumstances where

absolute compliance with a pipeline safety regulation

would not be appropriate and where sufficient

alternative safeguards to the public safety are

implemented, RSPA, at its discretion, may grant an

operator’s petition for a waiver from the regulations

applicable to interstate pipeline transportation. There

were no grants of waivers to interstate pipeline

companies in 1994.

State Waivers: A state agency certified under the

Pipeline Safety Law may waive compliance with a

safety regulation applicable to intrastate pipeline

transportation, if, after receiving notice, RSPA

concurs in the action. RSPA approved the

following petition for state waivers in 1994:

January 27, 1994: RSPA approved a waiver

granted by the Virginia State Corporation

Commission to Virginia Natural Gas Company

from compliance with 49 CFR Part 193 for mobile

Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facilities. RSPA

believed that the use of mobile LNG facilities

under the alternate safety requirements would not

be a danger to public safety.

April 20, 1994: RSPA approved a waiver granted

by the Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety to

Minnegasco from compliance with 49 CFR Part

193 for mobile LNG facilities. RSPA believed

that the use of mobile LNG facilities under the

alternate safety requirements would not be a

danger to public safety.

September 27, 1994: RSPA approved a waiver

granted by The Massachusetts Department of

Public Utilities to Bay State Gas Company, The

Berkshire Gas Company, Blackstone Gas Company, Boston Gas Company, Colonial Gas

Company, Commonwealth Gas Company, Essex

County Gas Company, Fall River Gas Company,

Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Company, City of

Holyoke Gas & Electric Department,

Middleborough Gas and Electric Department,

North Attleboro Gas Company, Wakefield

Municipal Light Department, Westfield Gas and
Electric Light Department from compliance with 49

CFR Part 193 for mobile LNG facilities. RSPA

believed that the use of mobile LNG facilities under the

alternate safety requirements would not be a danger to

public safety.

October 19, 1994: RSPA approved a waiver granted

by the Michigan Public Service Commission to

Consumers Power Company from compliance with 49

CFR Part 193 for mobile LNG facilities. RSPA

believed that the use of mobile LNG facilities under the

alternate safety requirements would not be a danger to

public safety.

November 15, 1994: RSPA approved a waiver

granted by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Public Utility Commission to T.W. Phillips Gas

and Oil Company from compliance with 49 CFR

Part 193 for mobile LNG facilities. RSPA

believed that the use of mobile LNG facilities

under the alternate safety requirements would not

be a danger to public safety.

Advisory Bulletins: RSPA uses Advisory

Bulletins to inform affected pipeline operator and

all Federal and state pipeline safety personnel of

matters that have the potential of becoming safety

and/or environmental risks. During 1994, RSPA

issued the following bulletins:

January 18, 1994: ADB-94-01 informed owners

and operators of natural and other gas pipeline

facilities and hazardous liquids pipeline facilities

concerning requirements to submit supplement to

gas pipeline incidents and hazardous liquid

pipeline accident reports as required by regulations, clarifies what should be included in

estimated property damage, and cancels a

previous interpretation regarding costs to be

included in estimated property damage totals.

January 18, 1994: ADB-94-02 advised owners and

operators of gas distribution facilities regarding the

valve location and spacing requirement in §

192.181(a). It also informed of the availability of the

Guide for Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping

System prepared by the Gas Piping Technology

Committee for help in establishing location for

emergency valves.

March 1, 1994: ADB-94-03 informed pipeline

operators and state pipeline safety program managers

of pipelines that may be in a common right-of-way, in

a parallel right-of-way, or cross the railroad right-ofway. This was done to ensure that railroad companies

actively coordinate their emergency response activities

with pipeline operators and state pipeline safety

program managers, and also that they are to be

involved in the development of plans for emergency

response.

May 10, 1994: ADB-94-04 advised offshore

pipeline facility operators and offshore producers of a

National Transportation Safety Board recommendation to coordinate emergency planning and coordination between themselves and offshore producers.

9
Table 1

Membership Roster: Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee

Membership: (G) = Government; (I) = Industry; (P) = Public

(NOTE: As of 12/31/94, there were four vacancies)

Membership Roster: Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee

Membership: (G) = Government; (I) = Industry; (P) = Public

(NOTE: As of 12/31/94, there were two vacancies)

10

Samuel Davis, Jr. (I)

General Manager

City of Tallahassee

2602 Jackson Bluff Road

Tallahassee, FL 32304

Kathleen Fournier (P)

Executive Director

MISS DIG Utility Communication

System

1030 Featherstone Road

Pontiac, MI 48342-1830

John E. Gawronski (G)

Chief, Gas and Petroleum Safety

New York State Department of

Public Service

Three Empire State Plaza

Albany, NY 12223

William R. Harper (I)

Consultant

4334 Wood Trace

Owensboro, KY 42303

Ted L. Jones (I)

Manager, Operations Control

Williams Natural Gas Company

P.O. Box 3288 Mail Drop 720B

Tulsa, OK 74101-3288

Mirna Urquidi-Macdonald (P)

Associate Professor of Engineering

Science and Mechanics

The Pennsylvania State University

225A Hammond Building

University Park, PA 16802

David N. McMillan (G)

Chief, Division of Gas

New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

Two Gateway Center

Newark, NJ 07102

Richard J. Morgan (I)

Assistant Vice President

Steam Operations

Consolidated Edison Company of

New York, Inc.

708 First Avenue, 8th Floor

New York, NY 10017

Jack M. Webb (P)

Attorney at Law

2028 Buffalo Terrace

Houston, TX 77109

Barbara Willis (P)

Logistic Coordinator

Institutional Products Division

Colgate-Palmolive Company

Rt. 1, Box 198 A

Fouke, AR 71837

Chris M. Zerby (G)

Environmental Engineer

Office of Pipeline Regulation

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

825 North Capitol Street, NE., Room 7312-K

Washington, DC 20426

John M. Abboud (I)

Senior Vice President, Operations

and Engineering

Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc.

888 S. Figueroa Street

Los Angeles, CA 90017

Michael R. Gonzalez (P)

Assistant Director

Planning and Program Development

Southwest Research Institute

6220 Culebra Road

San Antonio, TX 78228-0510

Cody L. Graves (G)

Vice Chairman

Oklahoma Corporation Commission

2101 North Lincoln Boulevard

Oklahoma City, OK 73105

Kerrie Howell (P)

Vice President, Civil and Corrosion

Engineering

V&A Consulting Engineers

Suite 975, 1999 Harrison Street

Oakland, CA 94612

Chester Morris, Jr. (I)

Joint Ventures Manager

Mobil Pipe Line Company

2101 Elm Street

Dallas, TX 75270

Lisa M. Parker (P)

President

Parker Horn Company

P.O. Box 4433

Soldotna, AK 99669

Milton D. Randall (P)

Consulting Welding Engineer

12727 Campsite Trail

Cypress, TX 77429

Gary D. Robinson (P)

Vice President, Energy Development

Ecology and Environment, Inc.

368 Pleasantview Drive

Lancaster, NY 14086

Susan A. Robinson (I)

Manager, Health, Environment and

Loss Protection

Chevron Pipe Line Company

Bishop Ranch No. 8

4000 Executive Parkway

San Ramon, CA 94583-0959
Membership Roster: Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee, continued

Membership: (G) = Government; (I) = Industry; (P) = Public

(NOTE: As of 12/31/94, there were two vacancies)

Elaine I. Savage (P)

Consultant

Teltech

17 Agawam Road

Sharon, MA 02067

Eric P. Serna (G)

Chairman

New Mexico State Corporation Commission

P.O. Drawer 1269

Santa Fe, NM 87504-1269

Gary A. Smith (G)

Chief, Safety

Arizona Corporation Commission

1200 West Washington Street

Phoenix, AZ 85007

Jean Snider (G)

Interagency Liaison

Hazardous Materials Response and Assessment

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin.

c/o U.S. Coast Guard (G-MEP)

2100 2nd Street, S.W.

Washington, DC 20593

11

Table 1 (continued)
The Federal/state partnership is the cornerstone for

assuring uniform implementation of the pipeline safety

program nationwide. While the Federal Government

is primarily responsible for developing, issuing, and

enforcing minimum pipeline safety standards, Congress intended for states to take full and active safety

jurisdiction over all intrastate pipelines. States clearly

are at the front lines in delivering the pipeline safety

program, being closer to the pipeline operators and the

consumers of pipeline products than the Federal

Government. Alone, neither the Federal

Government nor the states can assure the proper

level of pipeline safety in the country today.

Together, Federal and state resources can be

leveraged to deliver a cost-effective program that

has one of the best safety records in transportation.

Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Program. The

Pipeline Safety Law provides for a state agency to

assume all aspects of the pipeline safety program for

intrastate facilities under its jurisdiction if the state

agency certifies annually that it complies with certain

provisions. A state agency must adopt and enforce

Federal safety standards established under the Pipeline

Safety Law. The state must inspect pipeline operations

on a periodic basis to ensure compliance with the

regulations. The state must also have authority to

require pipeline operators to maintain records, make

reports, and file plans for inspection and maintenance.

Additionally, the state must have injunctive and

monetary sanctions substantially the same as provided

under the Pipeline Safety Law.

FEDERAL/STATE PARTNERSHIP

12
The Pipeline Safety Law also permits a state agency

that does not qualify for certification to undertake

certain safety activities under an agreement with the

Department, principally conducting periodic inspection of pipeline operators. The state must also establish

procedures for approval of operator plans for

inspection and maintenance and must maintain records

and reports to assure pipeline operator compliance

with Federal safety standards. In the event of a

probable violation of

the standards, the

state must notify the

Department, which

initiates any enforcement action. If a

state agency does

not submit a certification or seek an

agreement, all intrastate facilities within

the state, and any

category of intrastate

facility not covered

by a state certification or agreement,

remain under the

Department’s safety

jurisdiction.

The Department may

also allow a state to

act as its agent and

inspect interstate

pipelines traversing

the state. To qualify

as an agent, a state

must demonstrate it is

satisfactorily performing all responsibilities assigned under

its certification for

oversight of intrastate

pipelines.

Beginning January 1, 1995, the Department will

require existing agents to have safety jurisdiction over

all intrastate pipelines to remain interstate agents. As

an agent, a state must notify the Department of any

probable violation discovered. However, the

Department retains responsibility for taking appropriate enforcement action.

13

Table 2

1994 Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Grant Allocation

State $ Allocation State $ Allocation

 Alabama 218,232 Nevada 93,461

 Arizona 223,331 New Hampshire 52,025

 Arkansas 165,357 New Jersey 212,210

 California 253,653 New Mexico 144,175

 Colorado 144,534 New York 303,896

 Connecticut 119,682 North Carolina 161,605

 Delaware 15,860 North Dakota 32,880

 District of Columbia 42,931 Ohio 221,298

 Florida 44,385 Oklahoma 160,153

 Georgia 200,214 Oregon 115,344

 Illinois 193,733 Pennsylvania 189,631

 Indiana 145,582 Puerto Rico 13,038

 Iowa 123,524 Rhode Island 58,469

 Kansas 220,786 South Carolina 84,917

 Kentucky 179,510 South Dakota 32,813

 Louisiana 212,773 Tennessee 201,456

 Maryland 118,841 Texas 273,723

 Massachusetts 204,742 Utah 99,776

 Michigan 207,877 Vermont 47,627

 Minnesota 239,326 Virginia 141,079

 Mississippi 106,587 Washington 99,302

 Missouri 197,323 West Virginia 184,044

 Montana 29,130 Wisconsin 94,655

 Nebraska 63,396 Wyoming 97,802

Subtotal $6,786,688

State Travel Expenses 67,500

Total $6,854,188
14

Table 3

States Participating in the Federal/State Cooperative Gas

and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Program in 1994

NATURAL GAS PROGRAM

STATE AGENCIES UNDER 5(a) CERTIFICATION (48)

Alabama Indiana Montana Pennsylvania

Arizona Iowa Nebraska Puerto Rico

Arkansas Kansas Nevada Rhode Island

California Kentucky New Hampshire South Carolina

Colorado Louisiana New Jersey Tennessee

Connecticut Maine New Mexico Texas

District of Columbia Maryland New York Utah

Florida (Public Service Commission) Massachusetts North Carolina Vermont

Florida (State Treasurer - LP Gas Division) Michigan North Dakota Virginia

Georgia Minnesota Ohio Washington

Hawaii Mississippi Oklahoma West Virginia

Illinois Missouri Oregon Wisconsin

Wyoming

STATE AGENCIES UNDER 5(b) AGREEMENT (3)

Delaware Kentucky (Municipals) Wyoming (Intrastate Transmission Lines)

STATE AGENCIES ACTING AS INTERSTATE AGENTS (11)

Arizona Michigan Ohio West Virginia

Connecticut Minnesota Rhode Island Iowa

Nevada Utah

HAZARDOUS LIQUID PROGRAM

STATE AGENCIES UNDER 205(a) CERTIFICATION (9)

Alabama Louisiana Oklahoma

Arizona Minnesota Texas

California (Fire Marshal) New York West Virginia

STATE AGENCY UNDER 205(b) AGREEMENT (2)

 Mississippi New Mexico

STATE AGENCIES ACTING AS INTERSTATE AGENTS (3)

Arizona California (Fire Marshal) Minnesota
15

Each state agency participating in the pipeline safety

program is eligible for grant funding of up to 50 percent

of personnel, equipment, and activity costs associated

with carrying out its program (see Table 2 on page 13).

The amount of funding available in any given year

depends upon the congressional appropriations

process. Since 1981, appropriations have not been

adequate to cover state requests for grant funds, and

the Department developed a formula to allocate

available funds to support state programs. Performance factors used for allocating funds in 1994

included: amount of state request; extent of state

jurisdiction over intrastate operators; number and

qualification of inspectors; number of inspection

person-days; and existence of an underground utility

damage prevention law.

In 1994, Congress appropriated $7,615,765 for

pipeline safety grant funding. The Department

allocated a total of $6,854,188 to state agencies

participating in the gas program (90 percent of the

appropriation was assigned to natural gas pipeline

activities and 10 percent to hazardous liquid

pipeline activities) (see Table 2 on page 13). Funding

in 1994 covered an average of 34 percent of overall

state requests for grant funds to defray gas program

costs.

States have overwhelmingly supported the concept of

common stewardship in gas pipeline safety. In 1994,

48 state agencies, including the District of Columbia,

and Puerto Rico, held certifications, and 3 state

agencies operated all or parts of their gas safety

programs under agreements (see Table 3 on page 14).

Additionally, 11 state agencies acted as agents on

behalf of the Department for inspecting interstate gas

pipelines. Three states did not participate in the

program: Alaska, Idaho and South Dakota.

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Program. The

Pipeline Safety Law provides for state participation in

regulating the safety of pipelines transporting

hazardous liquids under a certification or an

agreement. At present, fewer states participate in

the hazardous liquid program than in the gas

program, reflecting the fact that the number of

miles of liquid lines is significantly lower than the

number of miles of gas lines.

Table 4

1994 Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Grant Allocation

State $ Allocation State $ Allocation

 Alabama 20,391 New Mexico 14,450

 Arizona 38,859 New Y ork 27,061

 Calif ornia (FM) 203,164 Oklahoma 71,163

 Louisiana 120,745 Texas 126,114

 Minnesota 99,002 West V irginia 29,798

 Mississippi 3,330

Subtotal $754,077

State T ravel Expenses 7,500

T otal $761,577
16

Table 5

1994 Sta te Na tura l Ga s P ipe line Sa fe ty Pe rsonnel 

State Supervisory Technical Clerical

Number Pers on Y rs. Number Pers on Y rs. Number Pers on Y rs.

AL PSC 1 0.97 6 5.64 1 0.98

AR PSC 1 0.58 5 4.16 1 0.50

AZ C C 3 0.99 12 8.57 1 1.00

C A PU C 6 2.84 14 6.89 3 1.90

C O PU C 1 0.50 3 3.00 2 0.80

C T D PU C 2 0.45 3 2.75 1 0.20

D C PSC 1 0.02 2 1.02 1 0.10

D E PSC 1 0.10 2 0.76 1 0.05

FL PSC 1 0.50 6 4.28 1 0.50

FL LPG 3 0.18 4 1.05 3 0.45

GA PSC 2 1.33 5 5.00 1 8.00

IA DC 1 0.16 5 2.25 0 0.00

IL C C 2 1.02 7 6.12 1 1.00

IN PSC 1 1.00 4 3.08 0 0.00

KS C C 1 0.50 9 8.33 1 1.00

KY PSC 2 1.75 4 3.06 1 0.75

LA D N R 3 1.58 13 8.82 3 1.25

MA D PU 1 1.00 5 5.00 2 2.00

MD PSC 2 0.37 4 2.76 1 0.60

MI PSC 2 1.13 3 2.66 1 0.72

MN OPS 5 1.62 8 4.23 2 1.60

MO PSC 2 1.12 7 7.00 1 0.52

MS PSC 1 0.99 3 2.98 1 0.99

MT PSC 1 0.05 2 0.12 1 1.10

N C U C 1 1.00 3 3.00 1 1.00

N D PSC 1 0.10 2 0.34 1 0.01

N E SFM 1 1.00 2 2.00 1 0.50

N H PU C 1 0.56 2 0.31 1 1.00

N J BR C 4 1.14 5 3.38 1 1.07

N M SC C 1 1.30 3 3.00 1 1.00

N V PSC 1 0.06 3 1.81 2 0.35

N Y PSC 10 6.91 27 18.05 5 4.50

OH PU C 3 1.30 8 7.92 3 1.00

OK C C 1 0.64 8 3.13 1 0.80

OR PU C 1 0.35 2 1.26 1 0.40

PA PU C 1 0.25 6 5.25 1 1.00
17

Table 5 (continued)

State Supervisory Technical Clerical

Number Person Yrs. Number Person Yrs. Number Person Yrs.

PR PSC 1 0.25 1 0.25 0 0.00

RI DPU 1 0.16 2 0.78 1 0.05

SC PSC 2 0.40 3 2.64 1 0.80

SDPUC 1 0.00 2 0.54 4 0.05

TN PSC 1 0.81 5 4.01 1 1.00

TX RC 10 3.26 28 16.81 13 11.05

UT DC 1 0.41 2 2.00 1 0.60

VA SCC 1 0.31 4 2.98 3 0.15

VT DPS 1 0.04 1 0.64 0 0.00

WA UTC 2 0.09 3 1.89 1 0.30

WI PSC 3 0.28 4 2.28 3 0.13

WV PSC 2 0.29 6 4.37 1 0.80

WY PSC 1 0.07 3 1.03 0 0.00

Total 99 41.73 271 189.20 79 53.57

1994 State Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Personnel

State Supervisory Technical Clerical

Number Person Yrs. Number Person Yrs. Number Person Yrs.

AL PSC 1 0.02 6 0.12 1 0.02

AZ CC 1 0.01 5 0.21 0 0.00

CA SFM 1 1.00 5 5.00 4 3.00

LA DNR 2 0.20 2 1.71 2 0.90

MN OPS 3 0.34 4 0.48 2 0.40

MS PSC 1 0.10 1 0.1 1 0.10

NM SCC 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00

NY PSC 9 0.05 10 0.06 4 0.10

OK CC 1 0.04 6 1.62 1 0.20

TX RC 10 0.10 28 0.57 13 1.95

WV PSC 2 0.01 2 0.04 1 0.20

TOTAL 31 1.87 69 9.91 29 6.87

In 1994, a total of 11 state agencies participated in the

hazardous liquid program -- 9 state agencies held

certifications and two states operated under an

agreement. Furthermore, three of these states also

acted as agents on behalf of the Department for

inspecting interstate hazardous liquid lines (see Table

3 on page 14). In 1994, the Department allocated a

total of $761,577 to state agencies participating in the

liquid program, covering an average of 29 percent of

state costs (see Table 4 on page 15).

State Pipeline Safety Personnel. One of the major

state uses of Federal grant funds is for defraying

personnel costs. As of December 31, 1994, the states

reported a nationwide complement of 271 safety

inspectors (working 189 person years) in the gas

program and 69 inspectors (working 10 person years)

in the liquid program (see Table 5 on pages 16-17).

About twenty percent of the state gas inspectors have

engineering degrees from accredited engineering

schools or are registered professional engineers, and
18

have a minimum of three years experience as state or

Federal pipeline inspecting gas or liquid operators for

compliance with state and Federal pipeline safety

regulations. In addition, they have completed all the

applicable TSI training (or received an exemption) (see

Table 6 on pages 19-20).

Improving State Program Performance. The

Department is committed to moving toward full 50

percent funding of eligible state program costs on a

phased basis, tied to improved state performance.

Initially, in distributing funds, the Department placed

emphasis on assisting states to establish their pipeline

safety programs. The Department has shifted attention

to assisting states to enhance program performance. A

state’s performance would be based on the results of

RSPA’s annual field evaluation (assessing operating

practices; quality of state inspections, investigations,

and enforcement actions; and adequacy of record

keeping) and selected information provided in the

state’s annual certification/agreement (e.g., extent

of safety jurisdiction, inspector qualifications,

number of inspection person-days, adoption of

applicable regulations).

Two critical performance factors are: (1) state

assumption of safety jurisdiction over all intrastate

pipelines, and (2) adoption of minimum one-call

notification system requirements. Some state

agencies continue to have difficulty in obtaining

the necessary legislative authority to comply with

these requirements. In several instances, RSPA

staff has met with key state officials to increase

awareness of the pipeline safety program and

encourage state assumption of additional

jurisdiction and/or adoption of one-call requirements.

As a result of increasing emphasis, a number of

states have taken steps to expand their jurisdiction

over intrastate pipelines, including municipal,

master meter, and LPG systems. By the end of

1994, states reported they had jurisdiction over a

total of 10,750 gas pipeline operators with 13,314

pipeline inspection units and 318 hazardous liquid

pipeline operators with 488 pipeline inspection units

(see Table 7 on pages 21-22).

A number of states strengthened their damage

prevention programs during 1994 to comply with

minimum Federal requirements for one-call

notification systems. Outside force damage is the

leading cause of pipeline safety accidents--accounting

for 56 percent of gas distribution, 29 percent of gas

transmission and gathering, and 24 percent of

hazardous liquid incidents reported to RSPA in 1994.

One-call systems serve as critical switching centers for

excavators to notify pipeline and other underground

facility operators of their intent to use equipment for

digging, tunneling, demolition, or similar work.

Congress explicitly prescribed the minimum requirements for establishing and operating one-call

notification systems in the Pipeline Safety Law,

including:

• complete coverage of areas in states having

pipeline facilities;

• compliance with operating requirements

(system management, record keeping, etc.);

• excavator notification to one-call system of

intent to dig;

• intrastate pipeline operator participation in

one-call system;

• pipeline operator response to notices of

intended excavation activity (e.g., marking

location of pipeline);

• notification of excavators and public

availability and use of one-call system; and

• authority to enforce sanctions for violation of

one-call requirements.
19

Table 6

1994 Natural Gas State Inspector Qualifications

STATE CAT I CAT II CAT III CAT IV CAT V TOTAL

AL PSC 0 6 0 0 0 6

AR PSC 1 3 1 0 0 5

AZ CC 0 11 0 0 1 12

CA PUC 11 0 3 0 0 14

CO PUC 2 0 1 0 0 3

CT DPUC 1 0 2 0 0 3

DC PSC 0 1 1 0 0 2

DE PSC 1 0 1 0 0 2

FL PSC 0 5 1 0 0 6

FL LPG 0 4 0 0 0 4

GA PSC 0 4 0 1 0 5

IA DC 2 2 1 0 0 5

IL CC 0 6 1 0 0 7

IN PSC 0 3 1 0 0 4

KS CC 2 6 1 0 0 9

KY PSC 0 4 0 0 0 4

LA DNR 0 13 0 0 0 13

MA DPU 2 3 0 0 0 5

MD PSC 0 2 2 0 0 4

MI PSC 2 0 1 0 0 3

MN OPS 4 4 0 0 0 8

MO PSC 3 4 0 0 0 7

MS PSC 0 1 1 1 0 3

MT PSC 1 1 0 0 0 2

NC UC 0 1 0 1 1 3

ND PSC 0 1 1 0 0 2

NE SFM 0 1 1 0 0 2

NH PUC 1 0 1 0 0 2

NJ BRC 4 0 1 0 0 5

NM SCC 2 1 0 0 0 3

NV PSC 2 0 1 0 0 3

NY PSC 1 13 11 1 1 27

OH PUC 1 5 2 0 0 8

OK CC 0 6 1 0 1 8

OR PUC 0 1 1 0 0 2

PA PUC 3 2 1 0 0 6

PR PSC 0 1 0 0 0 1

RI PUC 0 0 0 2 0 2
20

Table 6 (continued)

STATE CAT I CAT II CAT III CAT IV CAT V TOTAL

SC PSC 0 3 0 0 0 3

SD PUC 0 2 0 0 0 2

TN PSC 4 1 0 0 0 5

TX RC 8 11 2 7 0 28

UT DBR 0 1 1 0 0 2

VA SCC 2 1 1 0 0 4

VT DPS 0 1 0 0 0 1

WA UTC 0 3 0 0 0 3

WI PSC 2 0 2 0 0 4

WV PSC 0 5 0 1 0 6

WY PSC 1 2 0 0 0 3 0

Total 63 145 45 14 4 271

1994 Hazardous Liquid State Inspector Qualifications

STATE CAT I CAT II CAT III CAT IV CAT V TOTAL

AL PSC 0 6 0 0 0 6

AZ CC 0 5 0 0 0 5

CA SFM 2 1 1 1 0 5

LA DNR 0 2 0 0 0 2

MN OPS 2 2 0 0 0 4

MS PSC 0 0 1 0 0 1

NM SCC 0 0 0 0 0 0

NY PSC 1 6 2 0 1 10

OK CC 0 4 1 0 1 6

TX RC 8 11 2 7 0 28

WV PSC 0 2 0 0 0 2

TOTAL 13 39 7 8 2 69

CATEGORY:

I Hav e engineering degrees f rom accredited engineering schools or are registered prof essional

engineers, and hav e a minimum of 3 y ears experience with gas or liquid pipelines

or the enf orcement of pipeline saf ety regulations at state or Federal lev el. In addition, hav e 

completed all applicable training at TSI or receiv ed an exemption.

II Hav e engineering degrees f rom accredited engineering schools, are registered prof essional

engineers, or hav e a minimum of 5 y ears experience as state or Federal pipeline

inspectors monitoring gas or liquid operators f or compliance with state

and Federal pipeline saf ety regulations. Hav e completed all applicable TSI training, or hav e

10 y ears experience and hav e completed half the applicable training.

III Hav e college degrees or minimum of 5 y ears' experience in gas or liquid pipelines.

IV Hav e less than 5 y ears' experience as state pipeline inspectors.

V Hav e less than 1 y ear experience as state pipeline inspector.
21

Table 7

1994 State Agency Inspection Activity - Natural Gas

STATE OPER- OPERATORS INSPECTION INSPECTION INSPEC- PERSON INSPECTIONS PROBABLE COMPLIANCE INCIDENTS

ATOR INSPECTED UNITS UNITS TORS YEARS MADE PER- VIOLATIONS ACTIONS LISTED ON

(S) INSPECTED SON DAYS TAKEN CERT/AGR.

AL PSC 234 234 309 309 6 5.64 1,122.5 173 95 3

AR PSC 502 96 664 160 5 4.16 489.0 294 92 0

AZ CC 1,256 834 1,280 858 12 8.57 1,648.5 2,890 55 0

CA PUC 2,861 571 2,999 681 14 6.89 1,115.0 2,144 515 13

CO PUC 114 100 171 147 3 3.00 353.5 130 32 5

CT DPUC 9 9 31 31 3 2.75 260.0 136 19 2

DC PSC 1 1 5 5 2 1.02 175.0 4 4 8

DE PSC 11 11 15 15 2 0.76 96.0 0 0

FL PSC 62 61 80 77 6 4.28 678.0 85 34 4

FL LPG 80 79 329 326 4 1.05 449.0 388 45 0

GA PSC 217 181 263 219 5 5.00 775.0 124 38 3

IA DC 65 39 111 54 5 2.25 480.0 462 54 6

IL CC 120 111 186 159 7 6.12 528.0 13 28 10

IN PSC 103 103 207 183 4 3.08 496.0 28 28 2

KS CC 183 180 227 213 9 8.33 980.1 235 78 0

KY PSC 220 91 262 104 4 3.06 384.0 139 40 2

LA DNR 370 310 455 379 13 8.82 978.0 298 86 4

MA DPU 15 15 43 36 5 5.00 670.0 42 4 5

MD PSC 96 81 109 94 4 2.76 284.0 242 66 12

MI PSC 40 404 104 104 3 2.66 259.0 51 0 3

MN OPS 45 45 71 61 8 4.23 561.0 425 46 4

MO PSC 64 56 103 92 7 7.00 574.0 326 95 4

MS PSC 157 120 201 181 3 2.98 403.0 135 12 1

MT PSC 70 69 82 76 2 0.12 56.0 38 12 0

NC UC 46 46 86 87 3 3.00 386.3 98 44 0

ND PSC 22 22 28 28 2 0.34 85.0 8 4 1

NE SFM 27 7 47 18 2 2.00 176.0 45 9 1

NH PUC 8 7 14 10 2 0.31 62.0 14 2 0

NJ BRC 67 24 91 44 5 3.38 454.0 21 22 9

NM SCC 270 153 342 203 3 3.00 194.0 145 82 0

NV PSC 45 33 55 42 3 1.81 189.0 147 37 1

NY PSC 86 35 160 100 27 18.05 4,519.0 1,335 16 3

OH PUC 278 38 408 94 8 7.92 1,016.0 120 37 6

OK CC 156 80 225 96 8 3.13 406.0 637 90 3

OR PUC 14 11 20 13 2 1.26 138.0 60 17 0

PA PUC 36 36 130 130 6 5.25 720.0 593 74 12

PR PSC 1 1 2 2 1 0.25 43.0 2 0 0
22

NARUC/NAPSR. The Department coordinates

closely with the National Association of Regulatory

Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and the National

Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives

(NAPSR). These two organizations, representing

state interests in pipeline safety matters, hold meetings

during the year and adopt resolutions to surface

pipeline safety concerns of national significance.

Table 7 (continued)

STATE OPER- OPERATORS INSPECTION INSPECTION INSPEC- PERSON INSPECTIONS PROBABLE COMPLIANCE INCIDENTS

ATOR INSPECTED UNITS UNITS TORS YEARS MADE PER- VIOLATIONS ACTIONS LISTED ON

(S) INSPECTED SON DAYS TAKEN CERT/AGR.

RI PUC 14 12 16 12 2 0.78 219 11 7 1

SC PSC 31 31 43 43 3 2.64 421 75 59 1

SD 23 0 0 0 2 0.54 0 0 0 0

TN PSC 190 190 210 210 5 4.01 423 262 83 1

TX RC 1,582 722 1,997 981 28 16.81 2269 3,502 702 60

UT DBR 623 111 661 126 2 2.00 243 289 0 1

VA SCC 9 9 31 31 4 2.98 327 12 6 3

VT DPS 40 27 40 18 1 0.64 99 17 7 0

WA 26 25 44 33 3 1.89 220 361 0 0

WI PSC 13 13 63 33 4 2.28 148 82 13 0

WV PSC 204 32 230 56 6 4.37 497 7 0 5

WY PSC 44 37 64 34 3 1.03 123 42 42 0

Total 10,750 5,503 13,314 7,008 271 189.20 27191.96 16,687 2,831 199

1994 State Agency Inspection Activities - Hazardous Liquid

STATE OPER- OPERATORS INSPECTION INSPECTION INSPEC- PERSON INSPECTIONS PROBABLE COMPLIANCE INCIDENTS

ATOR INSPECTED UNITS UNITS TORS YEARS MADE PER- VIOLATIONS ACTIONS LISTED ON

(S) INSPECTED SON DAYS TAKEN CERT/AGR.

AL PSC 3 3 3 3 6 0.12 19 4 2 0

AZ CC 6 6 7 7 5 0.21 87 0 0 0

CA SFM 79 76 104 71 5 5.00 486 43 19 14

LA DNR 31 31 42 41 2 1.71 173 105 17 0

MN OPS 8 8 18 12 4 0.48 112 1 1 7

MS PSC 2 2 2 2 1 0.10 9 2 0 0

NM SCC 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NY PSC 11 9 11 9 10 0.06 122 0 0 0

OK CC 13 11 51 19 6 1.62 194 119 17 3

TX RC 163 96 248 143 28 0.57 467.2 357 84 6

WV PSC 1 1 1 1 2 0.04 22 0 0 0

TOTAL 318 243 488 308 69 9.91 1,691 631 140 30

 Some of these inspectors also inspect gas pipeline operators and are also counted in the complement of

 271gas inspectors.

NARUC is an organization of governmental agencies

engaged in the regulation of utilities spanning the areas

of communication, electricity, energy, gas and oil, and

motor carriers. The objective of NARUC is to serve

the consumer interest by seeking to improve the quality

and effectiveness of public regulation in America.

NARUC, through its Staff Subcommittee on Pipeline

Safety under the Committee on Gas, provides RSPA
23

a two-way communication channel with state public

utility commissioners (or their equivalents) and state

pipeline safety program managers.

NAPSR is an organization of state gas pipeline

safety program managers, inspectors, and technical

personnel who support and work to enhance pipeline

safety. Each year, NAPSR holds national and regional

meetings to promote information exchange and

innovative approaches for implementing the pipeline

safety program. During 1994, NAPSR submitted two

resolutions: (1) recognizing the California State Fire

Marshal representative for his contribution to the

program; and (2) that environmental program

concerns not be pursued at the expense of the human

safety concerns of the pipeline safety program.
24

Achieving operator compliance with the pipeline safety

regulations is important in preventing accidents.

Accordingly, RSPA has increased emphasis on those

components of the overall pipeline safety programs

which contribute significantly to compliance, including

operator inspections, compliance actions, state

oversight, and accident investigations. The five

pipeline safety Regional Offices constitute the

backbone of RSPA’s compliance efforts. OPS

continued decentralization, allowing RSPA, through

its Regional Offices, to be more responsive to

operational problems. This has led to improved

regional/operator relations, more efficient utilization of

resources, and ready availability of expertise to

address unique state/regional safety and environmental

concerns.

Risk-Based Pipeline Inspection Plan. The most

fundamental way to assure compliance is through

periodic inspection of pipeline operations. RSPA

regional staff inspect interstate gas and hazardous

liquid pipeline systems, as well as the intrastate

facilities under direct Federal jurisdiction, such as

certain municipal and master meter gas systems

that are not regulated by a state agency, or

intrastate gas and liquid facilities in states where a

state agency is not participating in the program.

RSPA continued to use its risk-based pipeline

inspection plan for scheduling unit inspections

prioritized by risk. In determining the priority of

inspections, RSPA considers existing safety

problems; population density; known

environmental sensitivity of unit areas; results of

past inspections; analysis of safety-related

condition reports filed by operator; length of time

since last inspection; and Pipeline Inspection

Priority Program (PIPP) rankings.

PIPP rankings are based upon operator-supplied

information such as proportion of pipeline without

corrosion protection, leak repair history, and

pipeline material (cast iron pipe and poly vinyl

chloride (PVC) and acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene

(ABS) plastic pipe present greater risk). PIPP

COMPLIANCE

rankings also reflect RSPA inspection results and

enforcement actions.

The risk-based inspection plan enables Regional

Offices to allocate their limited inspection

resources based on risk. The inspection plan also

has built-in flexibility which allows RSPA to

devote more time to such critical activities as new

construction follow-up, drug testing inspections,

and additional accident investigations.

Inspection Activity. In 1994, RSPA’s regional

staff expended a total of 822 person-days

inspecting 267 natural gas and 189 hazardous

liquid inspection units. The state agencies

expended 28,883 person-days inspecting 7,008

natural gas and 308 hazardous liquid inspection

units (see Table 8 on page 25).

Compliance Actions. RSPA has a variety of

compliance actions available to address a probable

violation of the pipeline safety regulations. These

actions, depending on the circumstances, range

from issuing a warning letter to issuing a

hazardous facility order requiring immediate

suspension of operations or restricted use of a

facility.

In 1994, RSPA opened 210 compliance actions

against gas and hazardous liquid pipeline

operators found to be in violation of the pipeline

safety regulations. In addition, RSPA collected

penalties totalling $600,450 (see Table 8 on page

25). The state agencies initiated 2,831 natural gas

and 140 hazardous liquid compliance actions.
25

Accident Investigations and State Oversight.

RSPA staff investigate selected pipeline accidents to

determine if the regulations have been violated and

whether revisions or additions to the regulations are

needed. In addition to inspecting interstate pipeline

operators, RSPA regional staff also oversee the

intrastate natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline

safety programs of state agencies participating in the

Federal/state program, as well as the programs of

those state agencies acting as agents for RSPA to

inspect interstate operators.

Table 8

1994 Inspection and Compliance Profile 

Inspection Profile 

Program # Inspection Units Inspected Person Days Spent 

on Inspections

OPS Hazardous Liquid 189 337

OPS Natural Gas 267 485

State Hazardous Liquid 308 1,691

State Natural Gas 7,008 27,192

Compliance Actions Taken

Compliance Hazardous Facility Penalties Collected

 Program Action Orders Issued No. Amount

Initiated

 OPS Hazardous Liquid/Natural Gas 210 9 45 $600,540

 State Hazardous Liquid 140 N/A - - N/A

 State Natural Gas 2,831 N/A - - N/A
ACCIDENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS

26

Table 9

1994 Natural Gas Transmission and

Gathering Pipeline Incidents Reported by Cause

Cause Incidents Property Fatalities Injuries

Damage

Construction/Material Defect 9 $342,647 0 2

Damage by Outside Forces 23 $32,127,680 0 16

External Corrosion 13 $2,028,835 0 1

Internal Corrosion 20 $2,632,812 0 0

Other 15 $8,038,319 0 0

Total 80 $45,170,293 0 19

Table 10

1994 Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline

Incidents Reported by Cause

Cause Incidents Property Fatalities Injuries

Damage

Accidently Caused by Operator 10 $130,000 0 7

Construction/Material Defect 13 $139,000 0 10

Damage by Outside Forces 79 $10,931,166 11 57

External Corrosion 5 $3,300,000 0 2

Internal Corrosion 0 $0 0 0

Other 34 $38,760,000 10 15

Total 141 $53,260,166 21 91

The requirements and criteria for reporting gas pipeline

incidents are contained in 49 CFR Part 191. Subpart

B of Part 195 includes regulations for reporting

hazardous liquid pipeline accidents. These regulations

define damage thresholds, exclusions, and reporting

requirements. RSPA maintains data reported by

pipeline operators on incidents and accidents in the

Integrated Pipeline Information System (IPIS). IPIS is

the primary tool for storing, retrieving, and analyzing

pipeline safety data. IPIS provides operational and

statistical information necessary to perform failure and

cost-benefit analyses, as well as various other studies

supporting rulemaking, enforcement, and research.

Natural Gas Pipeline Incident Data. Criteria for

the submission of written incident reports by natural

gas distribution, transmission, and gathering operators

requires reports on all incidents, involving a release of

gas and either: (1) a death or personal injury
27

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

89 71 74 96 80

00310

17 12 15 18 19

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Failures

Fatalities

Injuries

Table 11

Summary of Natural Gas Transmission & Gathering Pipeline Failures, Fatalities, and Injuries (1990-1994)

0

50

100

150

200

109 162 103 121 141

6 14 7 16 21

52 77 65 84 91

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Failures

Fatalities

Injuries

T a ble 12

Summary of Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline Failures, Fatalities, and Injuries (1990-1994)
28

necessitating in-patient hospitalization, or (2) estimated

property damage of $50,000 or more. Reports are not

required for master meter systems or LNG facilities.

During 1994, natural gas transmission and gathering

pipeline operators reported 80 incidents, involving no

fatalities, 19 injuries, and $45,170,293 of property

damage. Natural gas distribution pipeline operators

reported 141 incidents, resulting in 21 fatalities, 91

injuries, and $53,260,166 of property damage. Of the

221 total gas incidents, 102 (46 percent) were

attributed to damage by outside forces. This is a

decrease from 1993, when 50 percent of all gas

incidents were caused by outside force damage (see

Tables 9 and 10 on page 26). Total gas incidents that

occurred in 1994 reflect the average of the preceding

4 years (221) (see Tables 11 and 12 on page 27).

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accident Data. A

reportable accident for hazardous liquids is a release

of hazardous liquid and either: (1) an explosion or fire

not intentionally set by the operator, (2) loss of 50 or

more barrels of product, (3) escape to the atmosphere

of more than five barrels a day of highly volatile liquid

(HVL), (4) death or bodily harm to any person, or (5)

estimated property damage exceeding $50,000.

During 1994, hazardous liquid pipeline operators

reported a total of 244 accidents, resulting in one

fatality, 1858 injuries (see Tables 13 and 14 on

page 29), $56,453,604 of property damage, and a

release of 161,171 barrels of product. Of the 244

hazardous liquid accidents, 57 (23 percent) were

attributed to damage by outside forces and 47 (19

percent) were attributed to corrosion (external and

internal). Hazardous liquid accidents were

somewhat higher in 1994 than the average of the

preceding 4 years (244 vs. 210). Injuries registered a

significant increase in 1994 over the average of the

preceding 4 years (see Table 15 on page 30).
29

Table 14

1994 Summ ary of Liquid Pipeline Accide nts Reported by Comm odity

Commodity # % of Total Barrels Property % of Total Fatalities Injuries

Inc idents Lost Damage

Anhydrous A mmonia 13 5.33 155 $54,117 0.1 0 0

Carbon Dioxide 3 1.23 6 $51,696 0.09 0 0

Condens ate 4 1.64 4,220 $305,000 0.54 0 1

Crude Oil 93 38.11 43,090 $24,745,488 43.83 0 2

Dies el Fuel * 13 5.33 17,029 $3,088,025 5.47 0 0

Fuel Oil 13 5.33 2,844 $1,591,610 2.82 0 0

Gasoline * 39 15.98 39,832 $14,812,374 26.24 0 1

Jet Fuel 3 1.23 727 $55,000 0.1 0 0

Kerosene 4 1.64 4,979 $56,500 0.1 0 0

L.P.G. 17 6.97 18,950 $2,865,036 5.08 1 1

Natural Gas Liquid 14 5.74 19,767 $1,185,075 2.1 0 0

Oil and Gas oline 8 3.28 3,835 $383,070 0.68 0 0

Turbine Fuel 2 0.82 900 $32,000 0.06 0 0

Various Petrol Prod 4 1.64 302 $2,074,593 3.67 0 0

Not Given 14 5.74 4,535 $5,154,020 9.13 0 2

Total 244 100.00 161,171 $56,453,604 100.00 1 7

* In addition, there were 1851 people injured from mostly minor burns and vapor inhalation from 

the failure and ignition of seven hazardous liquid pipelines during floods in mid-October in the

San Jacinto River near Houston, Texas.

Table 13

1994 Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents Reported by Cause

Cause Accidents Barrels Property Fatalities Injuries

Lost Damage

Equipment Malfunction 22 8,285 $1,159,517 0 1

External Corrosion 38 12,579 $1,833,043 0 0

Failed Pipe 11 6,744 $2,154,000 0 0

Failed Weld 21 11,804 $4,320,680 0 0

Incorrect Operation 8 2,300 $15,600 0 0

Internal Corrosion 10 1,074 $282,000 0 0

Other 77 28,896 $11,095,251 1 4

Outside Force Damage * 57 89,489 $35,593,513 0 2

Total 244 161,171 $56,453,604 1 7

* In addition, there were 1851 people injured from mostly minor burns and vapor inhalation from 

the failure and ignition of seven hazardous liquid pipelines during floods in mid-October in the 

San Jacinto River near Houston, Texas.
0

50

100

150

200

250

180 216 212 230 244

30501

7 9 38 10 7

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Failures

Fatalities

Injuries

Table 15

Summary of Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Failures, Fatalities, and Injuries (1990-1994)

30

As table 13 on page 29 illustrates, there were 1,853

injuries from outside force damage in 1994. This was

as a result of eight pipeline ruptures during floods in the

San Jacinto River in Texas where more than 35,000

barrels of petroleum and petroleum products were

released into the river. Ignition of the released products

resulted in 1,851 injuries from burns (mostly minor)

and inhalation. Crude oil, the commodity spilled most

often, accounted for 38 percent of all reported

hazardous liquid accidents but caused 44 percent of all

property damage associated with those accidents (see

Table 14 on page 29).

Economic Impact of Accidents. RSPA converts

accident data to a common denominator for

purposes of preparing cost-benefit justifications in

rulemakings and for assessing risk. The economic

impact of injuries, fatalities, and barrels of product

spilled is calculated using a dollar equivalent--

$450,000 is used for each injury, $2,500,000 for each

fatality, and $25 for each barrel of product spilled.

These dollar equivalents for injuries and fatalities are

based on a Department analysis of economic studies of

the “willingness-to-pay” concept. Property damage is

shown at the dollar level reported by the pipeline

operator. Based on these dollar equivalents, the 221

natural gas and 244 hazardous liquid pipeline accidents

reported to RSPA in 1994 accounted for a combined

economic impact of over $266 million in injuries,

fatalities, product spilled, and property damage (see

Table 16 on page 31).

Accidents of Interest. Of the pipeline accidents for

which written reports were submitted to the

Department in 1994, some are of particular interest

given environmental implications, extent of

property damage, or cause of accident.

On March 23, 1994, a 36-inch natural gas pipeline

failed in Edison, New Jersey. Cause of failure was

mechanical damage causing a crack in a gouge to

the exterior of the pipe, which over time grew to a

critical size. The fire destroyed eight apartment

buildings and an asphalt plant. Over 1,500 apartment

residents were evacuated, most of which required

relocation, and an estimated $25 million of property
31

0 100 200 300

$266,563,338

$154,884,063

$52,650,000

$55,000,000

$4,029,275

$66,132,879

$146,710,166

$53,720,293

Millions

Dollar Amount in

Total Damages

Property Damage

Injuries

Fatalities

Product Spilled

Hazardous Liquid Accidents

Gas Distribution Incidents

Gas Transmission & Gathering Incidents

Table 16

1994 Economic Impact of Pipeline Accidents *

*Conv ersion f actor f or calculating Economic Impact: $450,000 per injury ; $2,500,000 per death;

$25 per barrel of product spilled (hazardous liquid only ).
32

damage resulted from the ignition of the high pressure

natural gas escaping from the pipeline. Contributing to

the severity of the accident was the failure to promptly

stop the flow of gas to the rupture.

On June 9, 1994, one person was killed and 80

persons injured when a 2-inch natural gas

distribution pipeline failed and ignited in

Allentown, Pennsylvania. The incident occurred when

a 2-inch service line pulled out of a mechanical coupling

next to the wall of an eight story retirement home.

Property damage was reported to be over $5 million.

Post accident inspection revealed that pipe had

evidence of recent damage by mechanical equipment.

In mid-October 1994, seven hazardous liquid and one

natural gas pipelines ruptured in the San Jacinto River

near Houston, Texas due to flooding. In addition,

several other pipelines were exposed due to the

flooding but did not fail. More than 35,000 barrels of

petroleum and petroleum products were released into

the river, with the majority of the liquid spill coming

from a 36-inch fuel oil and 42-inch gasoline pipeline.

Ignition of the released products resulted in 1,851

people receiving mostly minor burns and vapor

inhalation injuries. Spill response costs exceeded $7

million, and estimated property damage losses were

about $16 million.

On October 17, 1994, a natural gas explosion

occurred in a tavern in Waterloo, Iowa. Six people

were killed and two injured as a result of the

explosion. Investigation revealed that natural gas

migrated from a leak in a service line to an adjacent

building. A crack was discovered in the 1⁄2-inch plastic

polyethylene pipe at the end of the metal insert stiffener

in the compression fitting on the tapping tee joining the

line to the main.

NTSB Safety Recommendations. NTSB did not

make any recommendations in 1994.
The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company operates the

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) which has seen

declining flow rate recently, but historically has

transported about 25 percent of the nation’s

domestically produced crude oil since 1977. The

pipeline is routed from the North Slope production

fields to the all weather port of Valdez, Alaska where

the crude oil is loaded on ships and transported to the

refineries in the Continental U.S.. The TAPS pipeline

is 48-inches in diameter and 800 miles long, divided

approximately equally between above ground and

below ground sections interspersed throughout the

800 miles.

The Joint Pipeline Office (JPO), formed in 1990

and including the Department of Interior’s Bureau

of Land Management, the State of Alaska and the

Office of Pipeline Safety, continue to have primary

responsibility for TAPS oversight. Initially the JPO

concentrated on the corrosion problems first

encountered in 1988 by running an instrumented

internal inspection device, which resulted in the 8.5 mile

pipe replacement in the Atigun Pass Floodplain. The

Working group formed to address the external

corrosion problems, with OPS in the lead role, are

developing additional protection and monitoring

alternatives for these structures.

The Department of Interior independent audit of

TAPS which determined some additional concerns

regarding integrity and reliability has produced a

final report. The JPO has been tasked to monitor

the resolution of issues identified in the report and

has developed a tracking methodology. An OPS

inspector has been assigned to this task.

Alyeska continued to develop organization

modifications to improve overall performance.

The OPS had two full time inspectors for most of

the year, but dropped to one full time inspector by

the end of the year. The OPS is considering

assigning two full time inspectors permanently.

33

TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE SYSTEM
The Department’s pipeline safety research and

technical activities provide support for development,

modification, interpretation, and enforcement of the

pipeline safety regulations. The following research was

conducted in 1994:

Improving the Safety of Marine Pipelines:

As a result of a vessel striking a natural gas liquids

pipeline in shallow water in the Gulf of Mexico in

1987, two crewmen were killed. In 1989, a similar

accident where a vessel struck a natural gas

pipeline in shallow waters in the Gulf Of Mexico

resulted in the death of 14 crew members. RSPA,

along with the Mineral Management Service of the

Department of the Interior, requested that the

Marine Board of the National Research Council

conduct an interdisciplinary review and assessment

of the many issues - technical, regulatory, and

jurisdictional - that affect the safety of marine pipelines

in U.S. offshore waters, including state waters.

The study “Improving the Safety of Marine Pipelines”

was concluded in late 1994. The study made several

recommendations to improve the safety of offshore

pipelines including: clarifying the jurisdictional division

between RSPA and MMS; developing a common

safety database; and determining that safety

regulations be based on sound risk and cost-benefit

analyses.

Study of Supervisory Control & Data

Acquisition (SCADA) Methods: The Pipeline

Safety Law requires the Department to survey and

assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting

devices (including remotely controlled valve and check

valves) and other procedures, systems, and equipment

used to detect and locate pipeline ruptures and

minimize product releases from pipeline facilities. This

study, being conducted by the Volpe National

Transportation Systems Center, will investigate and

analyze the various computer-based SCADA pipeline

leak detection systems. It will determine if any of them,

or simplified versions, are suitable for general

application in the gas and hazardous liquid pipeline

34

RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES

industry. The study will also pinpoint areas where further

research is needed to minimize leak detection time.

National Pipeline Mapping System: A joint

government/industry pipeline mapping team was

formed to determine how OPS can best obtain a

reasonably accurate depiction of the pipelines and

LNG facilities operating in the U.S. The team’s mission

is to analyze various mapping alternatives and

determine a cost effective strategy for creating a

reasonable and accurate depiction of the location of

natural gas transmission and major hazardous liquid

pipelines and LNG facilities in the U.S. A report will

be issued at the completion of this study.

Assess the Need for an Improved Inspection

Program for Master Meter Systems: Congress

has focused attention on the inspection of gas pipeline

systems for which states have not assumed jurisdiction,

including master meter systems. Master meter systems

are located at many public housing complexes and

trailer parks. The concern about the safety of these

systems is that most of them are operated by people

who are not well qualified to operate the pipeline

systems, and only have a vague understanding of the

Federal gas pipeline safety standards. This study is

assessing the need for an improved inspection program

for master meter systems. Data was gathered from a

survey of state regulatory commissions that have

regulatory authority over master meter systems.

Cast Iron Study: The purpose of this study is to

determine the extent to which operators of cast iron

pipelines have adopted a plan for the safe management

and replacement of cast iron and the elements of that

plan including anticipated rate of replacement and the

progress that has been made. Data was gathered from

a survey of the state regulatory commissions that have

authority over intrastate pipeline operators having cast

iron pipelines. This study is required by the Pipeline

Safety Law.
Safety Review and Survey of Customer-Owned

Service Lines: The purpose of this study is to review

and measure the effectiveness of state and Federal

rules, policies, and procedures with respect to the

safety of customer-owned natural gas service lines.

This review includes an evaluation of maintenance of

customer-owned service lines raises safety concerns

and the potential need for statutory or regulatory

action. This study will consider: (1) state and local

laws; (2) laws concerning property rights; (3) the views

of state and local regulatory authorities; (4) available

accident information; (5) recommendations by NTSB;

(6) costs; (7) civil liability implications of distribution

operators taking responsibilities for customer-owned

service lines; and (8) whether safety information

required by the Federal government sufficiently

addresses risks and concerns involving customerowned service lines. Data was gathered from a survey

of the state regulatory commissions that have

regulatory authority over distribution pipeline operators.

This study is required by the Pipeline Safety Law.

35
The Pipeline Safety Division of TSI is the primary

provider of training for OPS. TSI is under the

administrative direction of RSPA and receives

technical and financial support to conduct the pipeline

safety training program from OPS. TSI provides

resident training at its facilities in Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma, and nonresident training across the

country. Both resident and nonresident training are

essential to ensure that all personnel involved in pipeline

transportation have fundamental knowledge of the set

of federal pipeline safety regulations, as well as relevant

standard industry practices.

Educating Federal and state government inspectors

in regulatory and compliance requirements and

enforcement procedures continues to be the

primary focus of TSI’s resident training. Courses are

generally one week in duration and are conducted in a

conventional classroom and hands-on laboratory

setting with an average of 22 students to a class. TSI

training of state inspectors is an integral part of the

Federal/State Partnership. In 1994, 550 people

attended 26 pipeline safety classes offered by TSI (see

Table 17 on page 37).

Course offerings are continually being revised to keep

current with regulatory changes, and to meet the needs

of the pipeline industry. Since TSI reinstated industry

training, requests for classes have continued to

increase. Four classes were conducted in Regulation

Compliance Requirements for Gas Pipeline Operators

and Safety Evaluation of Pipeline Corrosion Control

Systems Fundamentals. In 1994, TSI initiated and

offered two classes in General Pipeline Safety

Awareness to both government and industry

participants. This training addressed Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and

hazardous materials regulations, and pipeline safety fire

fighting techniques.

TSI also conducts pipeline safety seminars across the

country at sites selected by state agencies. Seminars

have proven to be advantageous to states since small

operators, as well as large operators, can have more

employees attend seminars held in nearby local areas.

This results in cost savings and less worker time lost.

Seminars, consisting primarily of one to three day

sessions, are attended by an average of 114

participants, usually pipeline operator personnel. TSI

has developed seminars to meet specific state

requests. During 1994, TSI offered a total of 33

seminars which attracted 3,751 attendees from 23

states (see Table 17 on page 37).

TSI tailors seminars to meet area needs. Several

seminars have become annual events due to unique

safety issues: Alabama has cast iron and small

operator concerns; Kansas has concerns about

construction and maintenance practices (customerowned service lines, plastic pipe shortcomings, etc.);

and the New England area has concerns with aging of

gas systems, along with cast iron concerns. TSI, with

guidance from OPS, is looking at several other areas

for annual seminars to keep operators abreast of

pipeline safety changes and concerns.

The hazardous liquid program expanded in 1994 to

include hands-on, hydraulic testing demonstration

equipment in the classroom. Six hazardous liquid

courses and seminars were conducted in 1994.

TRAINING INFORMATION AND DISSEMINATION

36
37

Table 17

1994 Pipeline Safety Training Conducted by TSI

# # State & # Federal Total

Course Classes Other Students Students

Students

Safety Evaluation of Gas Pipeline Systems 2 41 6 47

Safety Evaluation of Pipeline Corrosion Control Systems I 2 37 1 38

Safety Evaluation of Pipeline Corrosion Control Systems II 2 41 3 44

Liquefied Natural Gas Safety Technology & Inspection 1 18 2 20

Joining of Pipeline Materials 2 43 0 43

Gas Pressure Regulations & Overpressure Protection 2 30 0 30

Pipeline Failure Investigation Techniques 2 32 2 34

Pipeline Safety Regulation Application & Compliance Procedures 2 34 7 41

Safety Evaluation of Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems 3 39 20 59

Regulation Compliance Requirements for Gas Pipeline Operators (Ind.) 4 117 0 117

Safety Evaluation of Pipeline Corrosion Control Systems (Industry) 2 38 0 38

General Pipeline Safety Aw areness 2 31 8 39

State Seminars

State Seminars Students

Alabama 2 354

Arkansas 1 54

California 2 209

Colorado 1 95

Florida 1 139

Georgia 1 198

Haw aii 1 37

Illinois 1 186

Kansas 1 339

Louisiana 1 149

Maine 1 129

Michigan 1 153

Minnesota 2 246

Missouri 1 197

Montana 1 46

New Jersey 1 24

New York 2 175

North Carolina 2 132

North Dakota 1 37

Oklahoma 3 424

Oregon 1 60

Utah 2 154

Wyoming 3 214

Summary: Number of Classes 26 Class Students 550

 Number of Seminars 33 Seminar Students 3,751

Total Trained 4,301
The division continued with an initiative to determine

alternative approaches to classroom training, (e.g., an

interactive video on the use of a combustible gas

indicator in responding to leak and odor complaints,

and computer-based training in the fundamentals of

corrosion). This initiative will apply a multi-media

concept through a networking computer system for

artificial intelligence training.

Information dissemination is another integral part of the

Department’s pipeline safety program. TSI provides

a manual for government pipeline safety inspectors,

including current pipeline safety regulations. Inspectors

receive the manual, referred to as the SMART Pipeline

Inspection Guide (PIG), at the time they attend the first

TSI pipeline safety class or fill out an application. The

manual is updated periodically and each recipient is

required to file addenda to the manual with

confirmation from TSI. This effort ensures that each

pipeline safety inspector has current regulations for

conducting inspections.

To promote compliance with the pipeline safety

regulations, the Department also sponsors a number of

information dissemination activities designed to

familiarize industry personnel, particularly operators of

small gas systems, with the requirements of the

regulations. TSI distributed over 7,200 of the

Department’s Small Operators’ Manuals, regulation

manuals and diskettes, antidrug-related material, and

videos on developing emergency plans in response to

requests from states, operators, and other training

participants.

38
On November 21, 1988, RSPA issued a final rule

establishing 49 CFR Part 199 entitled Control of Drug

Use in Natural Gas, Liquefied Natural Gas, and

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operations, which set forth

regulations to require operators of pipeline facilities,

other than master meter systems, used for the

transportation natural gas or hazardous liquids and

operators of LNG facilities to have an antidrug

program for employees who perform specific functions

covered by the pipeline safety regulations.

Pipeline operators with more than 50 employees

subject to drug testing under Part 199 had to

comply with the requirements by April 20, 1990.

Operators with 50 or fewer employees subject to

drug testing under Part 199 had to comply with the

requirements by August 21, 1990.

A total of 49 state agencies in partnership with

RPSA inspect for compliance of Parts 199 and 40.

Part 40 sets forth Departmental procedures for

workplace drug-testing programs in all modes of

transportation.

By the end of 1994, RSPA had participated in

numerous drug audits and had provided technical

assistance to approximately 5 states. This effort

was designed to provide in-depth, hands-on

training to assist Federal and state inspectors in

conducting comprehensive audits of operator

antidrug programs. This effort also provided

valuable assistance and guidance to numerous

operators to ensure they were in compliance with

the regulations. This effort was extended beyond

the initial scope of inspectors and operators to

assist the hundreds of contractors who must

comply with RSPA’s drug testing regulations.

During 1994, RSPA continued to strive toward

ensuring operator compliance, by initiating 42

enforcement actions against pipeline operators for

deficiencies in their testing programs. The

primary enforcement actions take were compliance

orders and notices of amendment. RSPA

continued to provide technical publications and

guidance to Federal/state inspectors, operators,

and contractors. RSPA also revised the question and

answer segment guidance package, to include

discussion of complex issues surrounding antidrug

plan formats and the monitoring of contractor

compliance. Numerous opinion letters were

issued to clarify technical issues. The model antidrug plan and the revised inspection format were

distributed.

This was the first year that RSPA required the

submission of the Management Information

System (MIS) Data Collection forms for drug

testing of pipeline personnel. From the data

provided, RSPA determined that the positive

random drug testing rate for the pipeline industry

for the period of January 1, through December 31,

1994, was 0.8 percent. Once RSPA has received

two consecutive years of drug testing data, RSPA

will be able to determine if the random testing rate

can be lowered or if it will remain at 50 percent.

On February 15, 1994, RSPA issued a final rule

(59 FR 7426) establishing Subpart B of Part 199

entitled Alcohol Misuse Prevention Program,

which set forth regulations requiring those

pipeline operators that are subject to maintain and

follow a drug testing program to also implement a

alcohol testing program.

Operators with 51 or more covered employees

must implement their programs by January 1,

1995. Operators with 50 or fewer covered

employees must implement their programs by

January 1, 1996.

Those state agencies that inspect for compliance of

the drug testing regulations, must also inspect for

compliance with the alcohol testing regulations.

The alcohol testing regulations require a limited

testing program for covered employees. RSPA

only requires post-accident, reasonable suspicion,

return-to-duty and follow-up testing. RSPA does

not require pre-employment or random alcohol

testing.

DRUG/ALCOHOL TESTING, INSPECTION, AND ENFORCEMENT

39
40

THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990

In response to several catastrophic oil spills which

damaged the marine environment of the United States,

Congress passed OPA 90 to establish a new national

planning and response system. In Executive Order

12777, the President delegated the responsibility for

implementation of OPA 90 as it applied to vessels and

transportation related facilities to the Secretary of

Transportation. RSPA issued an interim final rule for

response plans for onshore oil pipelines in 1993, which

required oil pipeline operators to submit facility

response plans for RSPA’s review and approval.

In 1994, RSPA developed the plan review criteria and

procedures it used to assess the adequacy of pipeline

facility response plans. RSPA conducted preliminary

reviews of all 1,200 response plans it received, and

proceeded to conduct in-depth reviews of response

plans that were identified as posing a significant and

substantial threat to the environment.

During 1994, RSPA also participated in the

development of the Preparedness for Response

Exercise Program (PREP). The PREP is a multiagency oil spill exercise program developed in concert

with EPA, Coast Guard, Minerals Management

Service, and the oil industry. The PREP was

developed to ensure that all four agencies with

authorities under OPA 90 would have a coordinated

exercise program, rather than having each of the

agencies develop a separate exercise program. The

PREP was very well received by the industry, and has

been cited as an example of how regulatory agencies

and industry can cooperate to develop programs that

meets the requirements of the OPA statute, while

minimizing the burden on industry.