Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.csce.gov

THE CHECHEN CONFLICT

AND RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC

DEVELOPMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

MARCH 6, 1996

[CSCE 104-2-10]

 
THE CHECHEN CONFLICT AND RUSSIAN

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1996

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Commission met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a.m., in

room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, The Honorable Christopher Smith [Commission Chairman] presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin Cardin.

Also present: Sergei Kovalev, Jack Matlock, Jr., and Anatol Lieven.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

 Mr. Smith. The Commission will come to order. Good morning,

ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to this hearing of the Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe on the subject of the crisis in

Chechnya and its effect on democratic development in Russia. My

name is Congressman Chris Smith, and I am Chairman of the Commission. The Commission is a bipartisan agency of the Federal Government mandated to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords

and related documents, and the situation in Chechnya is one in which

the Commission is greatly concerned. Moreover, we should make no

mistake about it; developments in Chechnya will inevitably affect longterm development in Russia, and developments in Russia will inevitably affect our own country and the rest of the world.

Former Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev once called the war in

Afghanistan a ``bleeding wound'' as the Soviet army was bogged down

in what was seemingly an unwinnable war there. From afar the

Chechen conflict appears to be a bleeding wound that could derail the

development of democracy in Russia. President Yeltsin himself has

stated that his reelection depends on ending the conflict, yet he appears committed to a military victory, and he has surrounded himself

with hardline advisers on Chechnya.

Chechen military forces have been clearly hurt by the weight of the

Russian military machine, and Moscow has shown that, despite

pledges as a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to seek to avoid civilian casualties during hostilities in

its own territory, it is quite capable and willing to call in artillery and

airstrikes on civilian targets at the least provocation. Still, while many

Chechens would welcome an end to hostilities, Chechen military lead1
2

ers still appear committed to total removal of Moscow's political authority in light of the many atrocities carried out against the civilian

population.

We had hoped that with the signing of the OSCE-brokered military

agreement in July 1995 between Russian and Chechen representatives that there would be a light at the end of the tunnel for the people

of Chechnya: Chechens, Russians, Ingush, and other ethnic groups

caught up in the terror of war. Unfortunately that has not happened.

The war drags on. Casualty lists on both sides mount. People disappear, including a prominent American humanitarian aid worker and

an American freelance journalist. Entire families are split and dislocated. The breakdown in law and order has forced humanitarian organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, to withdraw to a safer

location.

Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the OSCE mission in Grozny is now

coming under question. The mandate of the mission includes promoting reconstruction of the ``constitutional order'' and investigating

human rights violations. Other than the now-lapsed military agreement, results have been meager. Although, in fairness, the circumstances have certainly been trying.

When the Commission held its first hearings on Chechnya in January of last year, I noted that the hostilities had remained localized.

They no longer have. Brutal and devastating conflict has spread to

southern Russia and the neighboring Russian Federation territory of

Dagestan. Armed hijackers claiming sympathy for the Chechen cause

have seized a passenger ship in a Turkish port. A packet of radioactive material was found in a Moscow park after a journalist received

a tip from Chechen commandos who claimed that they had buried it

there.

When Moscow made its official full-scale military assault on Grozny,

I felt that the administration's response was too easily interpreted to

Moscow as a green light from the United States to continue full military activities. I would also note that in response to the hostage situation and the carnage in January of this year, the Secretary of Defense said that the Russian Government was acting ``entirely correctly

in resisting this hostage-taking effort.'' Now, for the record, I would

also reject hostage-taking and assaults on civilians. Nevertheless, I

wonder what kind of message that statement sends to Moscow, given

the Russian military's disdain so far for avoiding civilian casualties.

The United States, of course, is not perfect in dealing with hostage

situations, but we do try to learn from our mistakes and take corrective action and measures when government officials and agencies

exceed their authority.

Our witnesses today are exceptionally qualified to examine the

Chechen crisis and its effect on democratic developments in Russia.

It is our pleasure to welcome back to Capitol Hill our colleague

from the Russian Duma, Sergei Kovalev, although I'm sure Mr.

Kovalev would have preferred not to speak again on the subject of

Chechnya, as he did before this body in January of last year. Mr.

Kovalev is a biologist by profession, but we know him better for his

outstanding work in the field of human rights. A former political prisoner in the Soviet Union, he is currently a member of the Russian

State Duma and was re-elected in the December 1995 Duma elec-
3

tions. Mr. Kovalev recently resigned from President Yeltsin's Human

Rights Commission in protest against policy shifts in the Yeltsin administration, specifically the excessive use of force in Chechnya.

Our next witness was ``our man in Moscow'' for 4 years, and during

those years that really shook the world when the former Soviet Union

changed dramatically and forever hopefully. Ambassador Jack

Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991, is

now Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International

Diplomacy at Columbia University, in New York City. A 35-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service, his well-received book on the collapse of the Soviet Union, ``Autopsy of an Empire,'' was published in

November of last year.

Our third witness, Mr. Anatol Lieven, is a journalist well known

for his perceptive and informative reporting from Moscow and numerous other locales in the former Soviet Union. From 1990 to 1995,

Mr. Lieven was with the Times of London in the Soviet Union, and he

has been covering the Chechnya crisis since 1992. He was commended

by the British Press Association last year for his coverage of the Russian bombardment and attack on Grozny. Currently a Senior Fellow

at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Mr. Lieven is also author of the book,

``The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the Path

to Independence.''

Gentlemen, I very deeply appreciate your readiness to appear before the Commission today and look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF SERGEI KOVALEV, MEMBER, RUSSIAN DUMA

Interpreter. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kovalev has asked that I read

part of his statement in English, and he has decided to depart a little

bit from the rest of his prepared statement, so I will read part of it,

and then he will read in Russian, and I will translate. Thank you very

much.

``Dear colleagues, ladies, and gentlemen, when, a year ago, I had

the honor of appearing before you, the situation in Russia was tragically undefined. The city of Grozny had already been destroyed, thousands and thousands of innocent persons had already perished. The

trust of Russian society in the authorities who had unleashed the

war, after having declared their commitment to democracy, human

rights, and freedom, had been undermined. But there was still hope

for an early peace, for a return to a slow but continual advance of

Russia toward democracy and freedom. Since then, many events have

taken place that have dispelled these hopes.

``We have seen terrorist attacks in Budennovsk and Kizlar, attempts

at negotiations, and the resumption of military activity in its most

despicable, drawn-out, and cruel form. We have seen an unjustified,

punitive operation carried out in Samashki and a shameful act of

revenge in Pervomaiskoe. We have seen in Chechnya phony elections

declared genuine and valid. We have gone through parliamentary

elections that have demonstrated a lack of cohesion between democratic politicians and brought victory to Communist forces who were

able to take full advantage of public discontent.

``We see that with every passing day resources and power have

become increasingly concentrated in the hands of force structures and

special services outside of civilian control. We see how the state apparatus ever more assertively rids itself of employees who are sympa-
4

thetic to democracy and puts in their place people of the opposite

persuasion, frequently incompetent, besmirched, in fact, with lies and

blood. We continue to hear every day blatant and senseless

disinformation emanating from highly placed government officials.

We choke on pre-election demagoguery, behind which there lies nothing except the desire for power.''

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] Mr. Chairman, at this point

I'm going to sharply depart from the written testimony that I had

already submitted to the Commission. I'm doing this to draw attention to a series of circumstances associated with Chechnya that I believe have serious implications, and the political developments in my

country. Mr. Chairman, I will not go into details. These details have

already been examined and written down by our observer mission in

Chechnya itself. These results have already been published. They've

been published in English. I have given these booklets to Mr. Finerty

[Commission staff member]. I trust that the Commission will be able

to acquaint themselves with them.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked me to evaluate the latest statement

by President Yeltsin regarding Chechnya. Mr. Chairman, these statements are unclear but they all come to one thing; they come to a parallel attempt to try to find a peaceful solution, but to isolate and to

destroy the groups of Chechen partisans. Lately we have seen the

results of this attempt to isolate and destroy these Chechen partisan

groups. For instance, Federal forces only in the past few days have

destroyed several populated Chechen areas. In eastern Chechnya,

the following villages have been entirely destroyed: Novo Grozneusky,

Sharoi, Aleroi, Centroi, and several others. The western part of Chechnya right now is being subjected to a cruel attack. A village called

Bamut was actually destroyed last year. On the road to Bamut, the

Federal forces attacked, shot up, and caused civilian industry--injuries to a village, Arshty, which is not even in Chechnya, but an Ingush

village.

Not only that, the town of Sernovodsk, which has at least 15,000

people, including refugees, has also been subjected to an aerial shelling. We have also heard that in this former resort, Sernovodsk, because of the shelling, at least 3,000 people are buried under the rubble

as a result of the air attack.

It appears that the plan that Yeltsin is supposed to announce tomorrow, the 7th of March, will include a military attack and will try

to destroy these military units. In any event, it certainly appears that

these military efforts are a very substantial element of the efforts,

and I am ashamed to say it, of peace creating the peace. Naturally,

these military actions cause the opposite effect, and I just got a phone

call this morning from Moscow. We have heard that for about 12 hours

now in the capital, in Grozny, Chechen partisans have broken through

into the center of the town and are now besieging the government

building.

I have come here not only with this information, but also with a

criticism, so to speak, also to the West and to the United States. This

criticism, so to speak, seems to me entirely natural.

So as not to go into much detail, I will just present one clear and

simple example. Everybody remembers how the mission of the OSCE

in a cowardly manner left Grozny in December of last year. It left

because it said there was no guarantee of its own security there. How-
5

ever, everybody understood that it was not a security concern, and

they were not afraid of bombs. They were afraid of the elections that

took place on December 17. Everybody knew that they were really

afraid of the phony election and the falsification, and the worst kind

of falsification, and falsification of elections organized by the Federal

Government itself. This mission, representing a high-level international organization, really did not want to get into a quarrel with the

government that had organized these elections.

But for me the most offensive thing that I received concerning this

was not an explanation that I got just from anywhere, this was from

the foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag. ``Don't you understand that the departure of the mission was actually a demarche,

that this was a protest against the elections?'' I had to ask them, I

said, though, ``But do you know any Russian politician who would

interpret your fleeing as a protest?''

Unfortunately, the attitude of the West to many events taking place

in Russia, tragic events taking place in Russia, reminds one of the

actions and the attitude of that mission in Chechnya.

So in concluding my somewhat long presentation, I would like to go

back to the recommendations made by my respected colleague Academic Andrei Sakharov. In 1987 when a new era was just opening up

in my country, Andrei Dmitrevich said that ``Russia needs assistance,

but it needs pressure.'' This is a complex task for the countries of the

civilized world, because both support and pressure must be strictly

designated and it must be clearly applied in doses. But if we really

want to reinforce our hope to live in a secure and stable world, we

really don't have any other choice, because an isolated and aggressive Russia is more dangerous, much more dangerous for itself and

the world than a Russia that has been integrated into the world community. This requires open and transparent policies, not only for

Russia itself, but for the countries of the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Kovalev, thank you very much for your excellent

testimony.

I'd like to invite Ambassador Matlock to make his presentation at

this point.

STATEMENT OF JACK F. MATLOCK, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION

Amb. Matlock. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor

to appear before this Committee, and in particular to share the platform with Sergei Kovalev and Anatol Lieven, both of whom are better

informed about current conditions in Chechnya than I am. As I wrote

a year ago, Sergei Kovalev is one of the few heroes emerging from the

tragedy of the war in Chechnya. His actions in documenting the atrocities that have been committed have played a key role in alerting his

own countrymen and the world public as a whole to the situation

there. One would despair for the prospects of creating a democracy in

Russia were it not for people like Sergei Kovalev working within that

society. Among the journalists reporting on developments in what

was once the Soviet Union none have reported with greater depth

and understanding than Anatol Lieven. So it is a privilege to join

them here at this table.
6

The war in Chechnya continues without an end in sight. At times,

President Yeltsin has seemed to understand the importance of ending the conflict, but more frequently his decisions have prolonged it.

We can hope that the desire to improve his standings before the Presidential election in June will give President Yeltsin the strong motivation to stop the fighting, but we yet see little concrete evidence that

this will happen.

Meanwhile, the damage to Russia mounts. The bungled attempt to

subdue Chechnya has laid bare the weakness of the Russian armed

forces, just as earlier the failure to deal with the problem by administrative means revealed a weakness and indeed corruption of the Russian administrative and law enforcement bodies. It is a tragic conflict

in which there can be and will be no winners. All friends of Russia

should appeal to the Russian authorities to end this senseless conflict, not only because it is an affront to humanity, but also because it

is damaging to Russia itself.

As we condemn the methods used to deal with the Chechen rebellion, however, we should be careful not to idealize or condone those

Chechen leaders who created the conditions that precipitated the

Russian military intervention. We should recognize that the Russian

authorities confronted an armed rebellion, not a peaceful effort to

achieve national autonomy or independence. Dzhokar Dudayev and

his associates seized power in 1991 by a military coup d'etat and never

allowed an unfettered vote in what was then Chechen-Ingushetia.

No self-respecting government could allow such a situation to persist

within its borders without efforts to bring it to an end. The Russian

Government obviously chose the wrong method in December 1994

when it mounted a full-scale military invasion, but this should not

obscure the shared responsibility of Chechnya's breakaway regime

that chose from the outset to use military force rather than the tools

of democracy to achieve its political goals.

In short, the invasion of Chechnya is not comparable to the Chinese slaughter of peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, and

the Chechen rebellion is not comparable to the peaceful democratic

movements in the Baltic states, which sought--ultimately successfully-

-to free their countries from Soviet rule. Brutality and guilt are not

the exclusive possessions of one side in this tragic conflict.

That makes it particularly difficult for foreign governments to deal

with the issue. I certainly agree with Sergei Kovalev when he said

this is a complex issue, not one that is easy to determine just what is

the right amount of pressure and what the right doses are. In one

sense, the Russian Government has a right to suppress armed rebellion within its borders, and few governments would wish to challenge

this principle. Nevertheless, in another sense the methods used have

violated solemn commitments undertaken by the Russian Government, in the Helsinki Final Act, in particular. But these are political

commitments which do not have the force of law or treaties. I need

not remind this Commission that the U.S. Government has never

wished to give them the force of law or treaties, because of our own

constitutional system.

Now some Americans argue that the U.S. Government should do

more overtly to put Russia under pressure to end the war in Chechnya, by such steps as curtailing economic and political cooperation

with Russia as long as the war persists. In my judgment, such steps
7

would not be wise. They would be most unlikely to shorten the war,

but would entail a serious political cost and in my judgment a cost to

the cause of democratization in Russia. If aid projects are meeting

their goals, they should be continued, because the proper goals are to

strengthen the forces of democracy within the country. Both the U.S.

and Russia stand to benefit, and these projects should not be turned

on and off for extraneous reasons, not matter how important. Political sanctions are even more inappropriate since they reinforce the

false image many Russian ``superpatriots'' have of the United States

as an enemy power. There is no rational reason for Russia and the

United States to be enemies. In fact, I think our basic interests are

very similar and run in parallel and are not in conflict. However, we

should be careful not to strengthen the hand of chauvinist forces in

Russia by appearing to desire dismemberment of the country.

Does this mean that we have no means of pressure, that we should

stand by and do nothing? Certainly not. Our official representatives

should make a consistent effort in their private dialog with the Russian Government to press for an end to the war and for more regard

for the human rights of Russian citizens in the area. Private pressure

can often be more important than public pressure. I myself was a

party to bringing enormous private pressure on Gorbachev in 1990

and '91 not to authorize the use of force in the Baltic states. That was

successful. Whatever pressures we have been able to bring to bear on

the Russian Government today unfortunately have not been successful. But I can testify that private pressure can have results, and it is

very appropriate in a circumstance such as the one we face now.

This is also an issue in which public organizations, like Helsinki

Watch, and other unofficial non-governmental human rights organizations have a very important role to play. They should bring to light

atrocities when they occur. The only comment I would make on that

is that they should be evenhanded about it. It is just as much an

atrocity to kill and kidnap innocent civilians by acts of terrorism as it

is to bombard defenseless cities, though more people may die from

the latter. Such tactics should not and must not be condoned anywhere and for any reason.

We should also urge the Russian Government to expand the role of

the OSCE representatives in mediating the conflict, and if those representatives indeed have shown cowardice and lack of judgment in

their previous actions, I think that we should press the OSCE to change

them. I think there is a real role here to play, and I think that we

should press hard for a more active OSCE role in mediating the conflict. The representatives of the OSCE can set a very useful precedent

for peacemaking if they can secure the cooperation of both sides to

the conflict. But I would simply add here that I think pressure should

be brought on Dudayev and the people around him to drop what is

clearly a position that is unacceptable to the Russian Government,

that is that the independence of Chechnya be recognized before there

can be any negotiations. I think this sort of demand under existing

conditions would be non-negotiable with any government I can think

of.

So we should bring pressure to bear not only on the Russian Government, but also on the other side.
8

Ultimately, it is Russia herself that is most damaged by the conflict, and the Russian political leadership should have no higher priority than bringing it to an end. We can best show our friendship for

the development of a democratic Russia by impressing this truth upon

the Russian authorities.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Lieven.

STATEMENT OF ANATOL LIEVEN,

SENIOR FELLOW AT THE U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Mr. Lieven. Thank you, sir. I'd like to say what an honor it is to

appear alongside Dr. Kovalev, one of the great defenders of human

rights and democratic values in Russia, and alongside Ambassador

Matlock. I should also like to pay tribute to my colleague, Yelena

Masiuk of Russian Independent Television, who is with us here. She

is one of those Russian journalists who by their courageous and dedicated reporting in Chechnya have helped to pierce through the screen

of Russian Government disinformation about that conflict at considerable risk to their own lives.

I shall depart somewhat from my prepared statement, so as not

simply to repeat what Dr. Kovalev and Mr. Matlock have said.

The prospects for peace in Chechnya do indeed now look grim. Last

year's truce brokered by the OSCE has definitely broken down. To

judge by what I saw and heard during my last visit to Chechnya in

December, there is little reason for optimism about the chances of

future cease-fires, at least as long as the present leaders of Russia

and Chechnya remain in office.

The Yeltsin administration, as Dr. Kovalev said, is urging the OSCE

to recognize the legitimacy of its government in Chechnya, the government of Doku Zavgayev; but this government is clearly opposed

by the great majority of Chechens and Mr. Zavgayev's so-called election in December was, indeed, a farce. The Russian Government has,

in fact, signed an agreement with Mr. Zavgayev, promising Chechnya very wide autonomy, but the separatist forces under President

Dzhokar Dudayev continue to insist on full independence and refuse

any contacts whatsoever with the Russian-backed Chechen authorities. President Yeltsin's promises of a new peace formula appear wholly

insincere, and it does seem that his statement tomorrow is likely to

consist mainly of a promise of further military measures against the

Dudayev forces.

I won't go into detail about the latest military moves. The Chechen

independence forces have greatly intensified their attacks on the

Russians in recent weeks. The Russians have greatly intensified their

bombardments of towns and villages thought to harbor Chechen fighters. Casualties among civilians have been extremely high, according

to my colleagues down there. There can be little doubt that a continued intensification of the fighting will lead to further human rights

abuses by Russian troops. They could also, of course, very well add to

further terrorist attacks by the Chechen forces both in Russia and

possibly in the outside world.

Last year's truce failed for two reasons, which I fear will operate in

the future as well. The first is that, as Mr. Matlock said, at bottom

there is nothing to talk about. Mr. Dudayev's demand for full inde-
9

pendence and the prior withdrawal of all Russian troops is unacceptable to the Yeltsin government and probably to any other Russian

administration. Now, under a different Russian leadership, and perhaps a Chechen one, some sort of face-saving formula might indeed

be found; but the Yeltsin government has now invested massive political capital in its own Chechen allies and in the fight against

Dudayev. Real compromise with the separatists will be probably a

fatal humiliation for Yeltsin.

As for Mr. Dudayev, he lacks the diplomatic skill, in my view, to

negotiate a compromise, and he also probably does not have sufficient authority over his own forces to get them to accept any deals

short of full independence. Now, while Dudayev does have undeniable authority in Chechnya, it is not necessarily true that he enjoys

the support of a majority of Chechens. I found him unpopular even

among some of his own fighters. But there is no way that these fighters or their commanders are going to get rid of their president at

Russia's behest. For example, this is true of the leading Chechen military commander, General Aslan Maskhadov. He is widely seen as a

more rational and responsible figure than Dudayev, and there is evidence of differences between him and the president. But General

Maskhadov, like the other leading Chechen commanders, is also a

passionately committed Chechen nationalist, and he has rejected all

the Russian attempts to drive a wedge between him and President

Dudayev and get him to sign a separate peace. What you often hear

Chechen fighters saying is ``I'm not fighting for Dudayev, but for

Chechnya, and I will fight on until I am dead or Chechnya is independent.'' That's pretty much Maskhadov's position as well.

The only significant neutral political figure left in Chechnya is the

former Russian parliamentary chairman, and of course arch-Yeltsin

rival, Ruslan Khasbulatov. He still does seem to have considerable

support among ordinary Chechens, many of whom are desperate for

peace. But for obvious reasons the Yeltsin administration has sidelined him. He's also detested by Dudayev and the pro-independence

forces, so that even if some post-Yeltsin government were to try to

use him as an intermediary, his chances of bringing about peace appears slight.

Nevertheless, perhaps the prospects for at least a pragmatic ceasefire do exist. Last year, General Maskhadov does seem sincerely to

have tried to get the truce then to stick. That was also true of his

Russian counterpart, General Anatoly Romanov. The problem is that

neither of them fully controlled the forces on their respective sides.

The Chechen independence fighters are obviously very loosely structured, and as long as there are Russian troops in Chechnya to attack,

they will go on attacking them, whatever their orders from above are.

That's exactly what happened last year.

On the Russian side, apart from the differences between the hawks

who now surround Yeltsin and more dovish or reasonable figures in

Moscow, there are local Chechen allies, not necessarily politically very

significant, but very well armed and very rich, whose own political or

even physical survival depends on their preventing any agreement

between Dudayev and Moscow. In November of last year, General

Romanov was critically injured by a car bomb in Grozny, which also

finally killed off the cease-fire. The Russian Government, of course,
10

blamed the Dudayev forces, but I have heard a widespread suspicion,

even on the Russian side, that the real perpetrators may have been

pro-Russian Chechens determined to wreck any peace process.

Now, despite the latest evidence of the war spreading, the fighting

in Chechnya has not yet led to a general anti-Russian revolt in the

Caucasus, and it seems to me unlikely to do so for two reasons. The

first is that the Chechens are actually not very popular in the North

Caucasus region, because they often behave rather arrogantly toward

their fellow Caucasians. You may say that in view of their achievements that is understandable. The fact is it does not make them very

much liked. Their attitude toward their fellow Caucasians was indeed demonstrated during the raid into Daghestan when they took

numerous Daghestani hostages. The second reason is that while Russians are indeed generally loathed in the North Caucasus, every North

Caucasian republic, except Chechnya, also has deep internal ethnic

divisions and anti-Russian revolt would therefore be likely to lead to

a whole series of civil wars.

Nor has the fighting in Chechnya so far affected relations between

Russia and other Russian autonomous republics, like Tatarstan,

Bashkortostan, and Yakutia, except insofar as it has clearly led to a

diminution of the authority of the Russian central government. As

the last Russian parliamentary elections showed, these republics now

occupy very strong and rather stable places in the Russian polity,

and their ruling groups are being wooed both by the Russian Government and the Russian opposition.

As Mr. Matlock said, in a historical perspective, the most striking

thing about the Chechen war may be just how weak and incompetent

it has shown the Russian army today to be. Although the Russian

army has displayed intense brutality, I do not think the Russian army

today can be viewed as much of a threat to the outside world. Partly

because the Russian public, although it has been very passive in the

face of the war in Chechnya, has also clearly not supported it. This is

a very unpopular war in Russia.

There is a danger, however, that Russian attitudes toward this war,

and toward the Chechens, could be radicalized. If the Chechen independence forces, which carry out really bloody terrorist attacks in

Moscow and elsewhere in the heart of Russia, this might lead to the

deportation of the Chechen community from Moscow, something that

the Russian security forces have reportedly privately threatened.

Perhaps pogroms against Chechens and even Caucasians in general.

It could also lead to much greater Russian military ruthlessness within

Chechnya. Despite the great brutality which has occurred, Russian

behavior in Chechnya has at least partly been modified by a Russian

desire to keep some Chechen allies. If you got an upsurge of Russian

racial feeling against Chechens in general, then all borders could go

down.

There is some hope that these terrorist attacks will not take place.

I interviewed the Chechen military commander, Shamil Basayev, in

December, and although he said he thought such attacks would be

justified, morally justified--after all, his own family was largely wiped

out in a Russian bombing attack--he didn't actually say that he would

carry them out. I also saw evidence of a pragmatic and careful moderation in that regard among the Chechen commanders. Mr. Basayev,

for example, is reported to have disapproved of the latest raid into
11

Daghestan. Nonetheless, in the coming months there will obviously

be a great temptation for the Chechens to use this weapon to weaken

Yeltsin in the run-up to the Russian elections.

In view of all these threats, the West clearly has an interest and

duty in trying to bring about a cease-fire, and therefore in trying to

avoid these dangers. The West, through the OSCE, must also try to

put pressure on the Russians to limit the nature of their attacks in

Chechnya and to follow up human rights abuses such as the arrest

and subsequent disappearance of Chechen civilians. Under the new

OSCE leadership of Switzerland, it is possible that the OSCE will, in

fact, do this. The Swiss have said that they have an interest in this.

Last year the OSCE was limited in that regard by its design not to

offend the Russians and to bring about negotiations. I think the West

should give full support to the Swiss and to the OSCE in putting pressure on the Russians in this regard.

As far as peace negotiations are concerned, it is very difficult. The

Russians insist on the impossible condition of the recognition of their

Chechen administration, while General Dudayev, when I met him in

December, expressed himself in the most contemptuous and hostile

terms about the OSCE, the United Nations and indeed the West in

general. It is difficult therefore to see that either side has a serious

interest in Western mediation.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I am very sorry not to be able

to give a more hopeful picture or more positive advice. I myself believe that the tremendous courage and tenacity demonstrated by the

Chechen separatist forces will, in fact, sooner or later achieve independence for Chechnya, given the underlying lack of will demonstrated

by the Russian side. I also believe that this independence is justified

in terms of Chechen history. What I fear is that this independence is

likely to come only through further and greater bloodshed.

Thank you.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Lieven, for your very sobering assessment. I will now recognize the distinguished gentleman from Maryland, Commissioner Ben Cardin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

 Mr. Cardin. Well, let me apologize for being late. This hearing is

extremely important. We have not had enough debate here in Washington on what you are bringing to our attention. Your testimony is

extremely important to this Commission. I look forward to reading

the testimonies of those that I missed and analyzing the information

to see what is an appropriate role for the U.S. Congress and our government here in trying to move forward the solution to the atrocities

that have taken place. Hopefully, our Commission will hold a dialog

to find an appropriate role for our work. Congress and the administration should work together, playing a constructive role in bringing

the parties together and working for a solution that will stop the human rights problems and establish a workable circumstance. So with

that in mind, I look forward to that work.

Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Cardin. Maybe that would

be a good transition to what might be a good first question. Ambassador Matlock, you might want to begin by focusing on what the U.S.

Government should be doing. We all know that Vice President Gore

has a very close relationship with Mr. Chernomyrdin. I, for one, have
12

been very critical of the administration particularly in the early days

believing that they had given, however unwittingly, a green light to

the atrocities committed in Chechnya; and we heard from others, including Yelena Bonner, and Mr. Kovalev who seemed to echo that

there was no penalty at all, particularly in the first month of the invasion, from the U.S. Government. Even one of our own at the State

Department said this is analogous to our own civil war and said it is

an ``internal affair,'' which meant to Yeltsin and anyone else involved

that there would be no penalty. Perhaps you would want to touch on

that and what we ought to be doing as a government to try to mitigate this problem.

Amb. Matlock. Well, obviously this subject should be one at the

top of any agenda for political talks. I think that most of the pressure

and persuasion we try to bring to bear should be in private, because I

believe there are real dangers in appearing to set double standards.

After all, when we are faced with armed rebellion, we do insist that

we have the right to put it down. Fortunately, recent rebellions have

been of much smaller magnitude and one can argue with much less

reason. Now, we may criticize the wrong methods or say excessive

force was used. Nevertheless, we would not look very kindly at foreign governments trying to bring pressure to bear, particularly publicly, when we are compelled to use force in our country.

I think particularly given the current state of disarray in Russian

politics, all the forces that Dr. Kovalev has pointed to in his testimony make this a particularly delicate time to be seen making what

many Russians would consider an overt attempt to break up their

country. We should recognize that the Russian Government was faced

with a dilemma and a very serious dilemma. The leaders of the rebellion in Chechnya were not people who conducted elections, fair elections, got themselves elected and were going after independence in a

constitutional way at a time when their voices might have been heard.

Certainly they could have gotten complete autonomy, as many other

republics have been able to in Russia, had they followed the right

method. But they didn't.

Where was the world community in '91 in condemning what Dzhokar

Dudayev and a few others did in besieging Russian military bases, in

taking arms? Actually what he did was very similar, in fact, to what

the legislature in South Carolina did in regard to Fort Sumter in 1861,

with the one difference that the South Carolina legislature was an

elected legislature. Dudayev simply gathered arms, took his fighters

in, seized the capital, and then carried out fake elections where in

most cases the evidence is that the ballot boxes were not even opened

so people could vote, and then claimed to have been elected.

This was at a time where the Russian Government and the Soviet

Government were pressing for free elections, which he refused to permit.

Faced with this I think it was very hard for our government at the

outset to say that the Russian attempt to subdue the rebellion was

wrong. As the war became more brutal, violations of human rights

multiplied. What should logically have been a surgical police action,

of it had to come to that, became an all-out war and like most all-out

wars full of atrocities. By now, many more people have suffered from

the atrocities committed by Russian forces than by the Chechens.

That is absolutely clear.
13

Nevertheless, we should recognize that the pressure we should bring

to bear must be graduated and designed to be maximally effective.

Simply confronting the Government of Russia at every point publicly

will probably not bring the results we want. More can be achieved

privately.

Now, this does not mean that other people should remain silent.

This does not mean that this Commission should not make some strong

public statements about its judgment, though I would hope that these

would be evenhanded and recognize that the Russian Government

was faced with an extreme provocation in this instance. Therefore

they had no easy solutions, given the weakness of their administrative apparatus.

We also should not forget the past actions of the Dudayev group.

They went outside Chechnya. They invaded Abkhazia. They, through

their actions, contributed to a situation where there are nearly 200,000

refugees from Abkhazia in the republic of Georgia today, and that

situation has not been corrected. Now, in doing so they had the cooperation of some local Russian forces. This was hardly a matter of simply fighting for national liberation. They have been a problem in the

area, and I think we have to recognize that without in any way excusing the atrocities that the Russian Government has done. But we do

have to recognize that the Russians had a problem and a responsibility to deal with it. They should have dealt with it in a different way.

They did not.

But the main thing that I want to get across here is in dealing with

it, we should not assume that this is a conflict of Russian-American

interests. It is in Russia's own interest to solve this peacefully. I think

it is immaterial in the long run to Russia's interest whether Chechnya is technically independent or not. But I do think that any Russian Government is going to refuse to accept the independence of

Chechnya, brought about solely by force of arms, particularly since

there is no proof that the majority of Chechens have ever freely chosen that, much less the other non-Chechens in the area who also have

rights. Now these rights, of course, have been seriously damaged by

the Russian actions. The Russians may have killed more Russians

and non-Chechens than they have Chechens because often the

Chechens could leave the cities before they were bombed and take

refuge whereas the Russians and the others had no place to go. So

ironically the damage has been great to everyone in that area. The

tragic war in Chechnya presents the U.S. Government with a dilemma

also in dealing with it officially and publicly. In communicating with

the Russian Government, our approach should be that Chechnya is a

serious problem for all of us, but particularly damaging to Russia. We

want to do what we can in a constructive way to help Russia get out of

this dilemma. If we follow that attitude I think we will have more

influence than simply criticizing everything that happens publicly,

and particularly I think it would be dangerous to use other elements

in the relationship as levers. That would be my judgment.

Mr. Smith. You, I am sure, have seen the many statements that

Mr. Hoyer, Mr. D'Amato, the co-chair, and I, and other members of

the Commission----

Amb. Matlock. Yes.
14

Mr. Smith. [continuing] have made. We have been balanced, but

we have also been extremely critical of the means, believing that the

means do not justify the ends.

Amb. Matlock. I think quite properly so, quite properly so.

Mr. Smith. There were warnings given before the December invasion that seasoned hands might have picked up as, hey, this is something that has to be squelched before it becomes an all-out conflict,

which unfortunately it became. Many of us have been concerned and

have raised questions about Mr. Yeltsin's seeming inability to use

economic and particularly diplomatic means to try to resolve this.

They went right back to form, using brute force and excessive brutality to try to bring the Chechens to submission. No one is here to defend Dudayev. Our thought is to say, look at all these innocents killed,

as you pointed out yourself.

Amb. Matlock. Yes.

Mr. Smith. [continuing] Now the concern remains with Bosnia. In

a sense, the reason that, in my view, Bosnia has finally lent itself to a

diplomatic solution is that, one, a greater Serbia has been established;

two, the Croats and the Bosnians, but especially the Croats, showed a

capability of using force, despite the embargo, to make the diplomacy

work. Suddenly the Bosnian Serbs knew that there was a counterforce, so now it is time to negotiate. Three, they were spent. Bosnian

Serbs had so engaged to the point where there was little else to be

done. Our great concern is that in Chechnya this will grind on until

more thousands of people are dead. There's no sense of urgency within

our own administration to take initiative on this either publicly or

even privately. There's no evidence that I see of this being very strongly

prosecuted on a private, diplomatic channel, saying that's enough;

the crisis has to be solved.

Amb. Matlock. Well, I would strongly urge the administration to

pursue it very vigorously privately.

Mr. Smith. I will be happy to yield to my good friend.

Mr. Cardin. I appreciate the Chairman's yielding.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your very frank views on how we can

be effective in trying to influence what is happening in Russian politics. You have shown your great skills and your response to the

Chairman's question.

One of the things that is obvious from what has been mentioned is

that whatever solution or whatever plan we come up with must be

deeply steeped in the politics of what is happening in Russia. One

thing I have learned since I have been in Congress is that many times,

we are not good judges of what is happening in local politics. For

example, what the papers think would be important to us or what we

think would be important to Russian politics, in fact, is not, and

Russia's view of what is important in U.S. politics is not always correct.

I'm wondering whether you could give us an assessment of how

important this conflict is in Russian politics today. Regarding the

approaching elections in Russia, does Mr. Yeltsin need to show some

movement in order to be successful politically? How important is this

conflict on the radar screen or is this just one of many issues that are

confronting the Russian voter?
15

Amb. Matlock. I think my colleagues here at the table would have

a better sense of that than I. I would just say in general I have been

surprised at how passive the Russian population has been on this

issue. Of course for a long time they seemed relatively passive regarding Afghanistan. It turned out they were not nearly so passive in

the final analysis when they could express their views. But I think

for most Russians probably there are mixed emotions, and there are

other issues. Chechens are not popular with Russians because unfortunately some Chechens have been notoriously involved in brutal

crime and so on, and so that means that on the one hand if there

could be a quick military victory, that would probably be very popular. Obviously this has not happened. As it drags on, it is one of

Yeltsin's disabilities.

But for most Russians probably their economic situation is going to

affect their vote more. Whether or not Yeltsin can restore enough of

his credibility to place in one of the two top positions in the first ballot, which would give him a chance in the run-off, I could not predict.

Certainly the continuation of the war in Chechnya does not help. He

himself has said he cannot be elected unless it is solved. But as others

have indicated, his ideal solution seems to be applying more military

force, hoping that he would have a clean-cut military victory. I don't

think that's going to happen.

Mr. Cardin. Thank you.

Mr. Smith. Would either of you gentlemen care to answer that?

Mr. Cardin. What is the political impact of a potential solution to

the conflict on the coming elections?

Mr. Lieven. Well, the Russian population has accepted the war in

Chechnya as it tends passively to accept most things. It's true there

has been a shift in feeling. Initially, I think, public feeling was strongly

against the war. Above all, through some of the Chechen terrorist

attacks, this has led to a more anti-Chechen feeling, perhaps a stronger support for the Yeltsin government policies. But I do not think

there is any question but that the handling of the war in Chechnya

has diminished Yeltsin's popularity.

Mr. Cardin. How would Russians view outside influences, such as

the West, playing a role in the resolution of this conflict?

Mr. Lieven. You know, to be honest, Russians at the moment, and

I mean even Russian liberal public opinion, what's left of it, let alone

the masses, are not very receptive to Western influence. There is a

pretty strong anti-Western feeling in Russia today. I am afraid that

what Ambassador Matlock said about a perhaps hostile response from

the Russian Government against public Western influence might also

be the reaction of some of Russian public opinion. I can see, you know,

even some liberal Russian newspapers perhaps, you know, going in

for a lot of language about double standards if they were able to portray the West as supporting an Islamic terrorist movement against

Russia, you can imagine how that would play in Moscow. It might be

totally unfair, but that is how it would be presented, I am afraid. So I

am also not very optimistic about the opportunities for Western influence.

What I would say on the other hand is that this whole business

plays out for the Yeltsin administration, one thing I think which is

clearly going to be strengthened by Chechnya is a great Russian public distaste for military adventures and military operations. That was
16

already apparent in public attitudes to Afghanistan. It was apparent

in opinion polls about Tajikistan. I am sure it is going to be true in the

future. They are going to be very unwilling to get involved in more

shambles like this one.

Mr. Cardin. Thank you. It is useful.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Kovalev, would you like to respond, too?

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] There's a lot of myths that are

growing by leaps and bounds with regard to politics, policies and circumstances in Russia today. But on the other hand, the world is constructed rather simply. One should assume that if there are in Russia

anti-Western attitudes, which do exist, these anti-Western attitudes,

and I would point out particularly that they have recently been rather

carefully cultivated, not only by the aggressive nationalists and the

Communists, but even by the government that's in power now.

One should not think that this is just a reaction to Western pressure, Western opposition or Western non-acceptance of Russia. This

is just a return to the old ideology that has been around for a long

time in the Soviet Union. This ideology has been around in the Soviet

Union from around the 1930's when this ideology replaced the ideology of classical communism. Don't you remember back in the '20s and

the early '30s the Communists proudly called themselves cosmopolitans? You remember that after the war, however, there began the

campaign against the cosmopolitans. Russia became the homeland of

elephants.

Amb. Matlock. This does not have the political connotations in

Russia that it does here.

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] This ideology actually used

Communist slogans as just a camouflage, as a facade. Now this ideology is growing strongly in Russia, and this is not a reaction against

MD30Western pressure. Really, the West should not be so smug as to

assume that it has that much to do with events in Russia. But the

slogans here are no longer the slogans of communism now, but slogans against the rights of the individual and of freedom. Using these,

it is actually pretty easy to stir up aggression or aggressive attitudes

within people and politicians who themselves are already inclined in

this direction.

But there is a fairly stable and not-so-small portion of the population that clearly is inclined toward progressive, democratic, actually

pro-Western feelings. In fact, the schism in the population now is so

deep and so clear that to really change these numbers numerically

from the outside is not possible. These folks are like they are, and

their positions are clearly defined.

Of course, another problem is that the democrats are themselves

split. They are not united. The question then for the West is whom to

support and on whom to exert pressure.

There is another way that the world is built simply. We heard, for

instance, references to Abkhazia and Central Asia. Yes, in fact,

Basayev was a combatant in Abkhazia. It is a long story to really say

how he wound up there and whose side he was on. But why don't we

look on what the position of the Federal Government is in Abkhazia

and the position of the Federal Government in Tajikistan.

The Federal Government is supporting the same positions in

Abkhazia, in Central Asia, and in Bosnia, as a result of this resurrected ideology, to which I referred earlier. Just not to go into a long
17

story, we always support the bums. I understand that is a simplified

picture of the world around Moscow, but I think it is really sufficient.

Of course, we know that the West also has a rather historical experience of appeasing aggressors. Again, the West will find itself in a

dangerous position of those who turned out to be the victims of criminals when they tried to appease them.

Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Kovalev, last week I heard testimony

on the rising tide of anti-semitism, as I chair the International Operations and Human Rights Committee. We had an extensive series

of witnesses talk about the rising tide in Russia and elsewhere. One

witness was Alla Gerber, one of your colleagues in the Duma. She

made a very strong appeal that democrats in Russia ought to unite

behind Boris Yeltsin as the best and last hope of defeating the Communists. Now, you have testified that, and said that the pro-democracy electorate outnumbers the repressive forces in Russia, and you

pointed out again just a moment ago that they are split. They are not

united behind any single candidate. If not Yeltsin, who? Is there a

candidate who truly believes in democracy? Is there somebody on the

horizon, perhaps, around which the people could rally?

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] Difficult question. There is at

the moment, there is really only one candidate with any sort of claim

to being the candidate about which the democrats could unite, and

that is Mr. Yavlinsky.

With regard to President Yeltsin, and perhaps within a certain

number of the electorate a quick or early victory in Chechnya would

raise him higher than his present ratings in popularity. But remember that his chances would be raised particularly in that element of

the population that prefers that the police do not go after criminals,

but go after dark-skinned people. Democrats would go vote for Yeltsin

with a feeling of shame and only to keep Zyuganov from winning.

But actually neither a quick nor a slow victory in Chechnya will

take place. This is clear to any unbiased expert. Only Mr. Lobov,

Yeltsin's expert on this, can say something like, ``Oh there won't be

any partisan war in Chechens because they're not used to that kind

of thing; it's not part of their nature.'' I guess you can't make every

politician just read an elementary school primer.

There won't be any military victory in Chechnya. Yeltsin is again

making his latest catastrophic mistake. His chances are very small.

His only chance, his really best chance is that there are many people

in Russia who do not want Zyuganov. Unfortunately, Mr. Yavlinsky

is young. He is rather weak. He doesn't come off as an expression of a

male character.

But on the other hand we should not think that he has no chance of

winning, because there are serious people in our ranks of democrats

who are capable of counting. But remember before the campaign you

have to not only count your chances, but you also have to make your

chances. If the democrats do get their act together and unite, and if

they carry on a decent campaign, actually the chances of Yavlinsky

going over the barrier and becoming one of the two candidates for the

second round are not really that bad. Even if you look at the results of

the December elections, probably about 15 or 16 percent Yavlinsky

could pick up. But if he does get into the final two, his chances go up
18

considerably, very greatly. For instance, if it's Yavlinsky versus

Yeltsin, Yavlinsky's got it. It would be a little bit more difficult with

Mr. Zyuganov.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Lieven, in your statement you maintain that now

there is nothing to talk about since Russia is determined to maintain

its territorial integrity while General Dudayev demands full independence. You also mentioned that the General is contemptuous and

hostile toward the OSCE and Western diplomacy.

In December of last year, Mr. Kovalev was quoted in the German

press as saying that the OSCE mission in Chechnya was guilty of

criminal cowardice when it left Chechnya rather than dealing with

the so-called elections in Chechnya in December 1995.

The mission has also been criticized by Chechen representatives

for its alleged lack of diligence in investigating human rights abuses.

The bottom line: What is the role of the OSCE in Chechnya?

Mr. Lieven. Well, I think it is true, as I mentioned, that under

Hungarian leadership, the OSCE did not press hard last year on the

question of human rights abuses. That was because the Hungarians

were concentrating absolutely on trying to bring about a cease-fire--

and ultimately a peace settlement, and for a while they did play a

major and very positive role in bringing about a cease-fire. So they

played down the human rights abuse angle because they were anxious not to offend the Russians. Whether that was the right thing to

do, I myself wouldn't like to say. They obviously thought they were

aiming for the greater good.

The collapse of the cease-fire left the OSCE, when I saw them in

December, extremely demoralized. Frankly, they did not know what

to do. They were also very unfortunate in the loss of their Hungarian

chief in a car accident--he was injured--and the replacement by a man

who was very much criticized, and his personal relations with Dudayev

became absolutely terrible.

What they should have done about the elections I do not know.

Probably they could and should have condemned them more openly.

Not just gone away, because it's true that especially among the

Chechens, the Chechens do not much respect people who retreat, who

go away in a circumstance like that.

As far as the whole OSCE role is concerned, though, what makes it

very difficult for them and basically what has led to this great hostility and contempt from Dudayev and his supporters, is that of course

the OSCE is bound to operate within its charter and rules, which of

course recognize Russian territorial integrity within Russia's existing borders, which most unfortunately but, you know, as signed by

the OSCE, include Chechnya. The OSCE is also, of course, committed

only to approve the revision of borders by mutual agreement. That, of

course, makes their freedom of maneuver very slight. It's impossible

for them in principle to approve of Dudayev's position, even if there

wasn't the clear risk that if they were to take a pro-independence

position, the Russian Government would simply have nothing more

to say to them and would indeed expel them.

That's why I'm not optimistic about the OSCE's role in bringing

about a general peace settlement and agreement, at least as long as

Yeltsin remains in power, and perhaps as long as Dudayev remains

in power as well.
19

What I do think they may be able to do, if only as you indicated, sir,

through the mutual exhaustion of both sides at some stage, is bring

about another pragmatic cease-fire. I think we should back them in

trying to do that.

I also think, as I indicated in my statement, that they can play a

positive role in trying to put a limit on human rights abuses by the

Russian forces. There is some room for maneuver there. They can

play, as I indicated, on Russia's desire to keep at least a facade of

having some Chechen allies.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Kovalev? And Ambassador Matlock, if you'd like to

respond to that as well.

Amb. Matlock. Well, no, I think I've already addressed what little

I know about the issue. Fundamentally, I think at this point the outcome of the Russian election is unpredictable and that probably Chechnya is not going to be the issue uppermost in the mind of most Russian voters. However, I do think that the continuation of the war there

is no benefit to Yeltsin, and he has a long way to go before he is going

to be a truly credible candidate. It is conceivable he can win. But I do

not think he could win today. Of course the war in Chechnya is one of

the factors that does tend to weigh him down, though it does not have

the force in Russian public opinion as a whole as some other issues, at

least in my judgment.

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] With regard to OSCE or even

perhaps more so to the Council of Europe, I think actually that the

role of these organizations could actually be the defining point for

resolving this crisis and defining the future of Russia. I think you

can't overestimate the role of OSCE and the Council of Europe. Why

did I first just mention the recent entry of Russia into the Council of

Europe? For instance, it was not really that difficult to insist upon a

list of criteria entered by the Council of Europe for Russian entry into

the Council. The list was full. It was concrete and it had the necessary details.

Now, for this list of criteria for Russian entry into the Council of

Europe and to see that it is fulfilled by Russia, there is only one thing

missing. The only thing that now leaves to be done is you have to

have the determination of the Council of Europe to monitor this list

and to monitor Russia's implementation of this list of criteria upon

which it was accepted into the Council. This determination is something absolutely necessary for the West. I don't have in mind only

pressure on my country. This could also be consultative. This could

be material help, and this could be well-meaning criticism. The important thing is here that a Russian backing-away or an obvious backing-away from this list of criteria--any sort of backing away should be

followed up closely and Europe must not forget this.

But you also have to remember that many of our problems cannot

be simply taken care of in a few months. They will demand much

time. Therefore the Council of Europe was faced with the fact that,

yes, you had to monitor these situations closely, but some of these

situations, like, for instance, our penitentiary system, will take at

least 5 years to straighten that out.

I should say that actually I am getting a little bit tired of coming

and being a type of defender of Dudayev. I do not like Dudayev any

more than the Ambassador does. But you still have to remember that

not so long ago the still fragile peace in the Middle East was actually
20

achieved by negotiations with terrorists, and one of them even won

the Nobel Peace Prize. That is the way the world is. Let me assure

you that Dudayev is no worse than Yasser Arafat. But the price of

punishing Dudayev, as I see it, is at least 45,000 innocent people, and

I think that is high.

I should also say that there are many myths going on around the

career of Dudayev. If you compare the legitimacy of, say, Zavgayev,

the one who was elected December 17th, and Dudayev, I would say

that Dudayev is at least 10 times more legitimately in power. Dudayev

did not get his weapons so much by stealing it, but they were actually

given to him as gifts.

Mr. Cardin. You may have noticed that the Chairman has left because of the vote that is on the House floor. He will be back very

promptly so we are going to try to continue the hearing. When the

next bells ring, we will probably take a very brief recess until the

Chairman has returned to the Chair and I will leave to vote, and

would ask if you could remain in your seats, because we would like to

conclude the hearing as quickly as possible, understanding the schedules of the people that are here.

Let me just make an observation, and that is it is difficult for us to

predict the internal politics of Russia or what impact our actions will

have in Russia. But we do know that OSCE and the Council of Europe can play a very critical role in this matter, particularly now that

Bosnia is somewhat off the immediate radar screen as far as a crisis

area needing a lot of attention. We should determine what member

states want to work with us, using the OSCE and the Council of Europe in a constructive way to bring about a solution in this area. In an

informal way, Mr. Ambassador, we should strategize as to what states

may be interested in working with us, using the OSCE and the Council of Europe in a much more constructive way to bring about some

solution in this area.

Amb. Matlock. Yes, let me say that I think that Dr. Kovalev's comments on the way the Council of Europe can be used were right on

target. I think that is something that we should try to impress upon

our allies in the Council of Europe. It is important to keep these criteria under constant review and to keep the pressure on the Russian

Government.

I totally agree with him that, though final decisions are not going

to be made by foreigners, the influence of international organizations

such as the OSCE, such as the Council of Europe, can be enormous

when it's used in the right way. I think that monitoring conditions

that have been set forth is the right way.

Mr. Smith. With your patience we are going to take a very brief

recess.

Mr. Lieven. Excuse me, sir. I am afraid I shall have to leave fairly

soon----

Mr. Smith. Certainly.

Mr. Lieven [continuing] Because I have a talk. I just wanted to

say, perhaps in conclusion, to follow up the point about Russian internal politics, I do think it would be a mistake to attach too much

hope to the prospects of the democratic parties in Russia. Most unfortunately, their electoral achievements do not seem to justify that.

They have not called out the votes. Therefore I think one must be
21

aware, which of course is a tragic fact to have to recognize, that probably the vote in June will be between Yeltsin and the Communists,

and therefore that one is facing a choice of evils.

Mr. Smith. I appreciate that observation. Certainly we understand

your schedule and appreciate your testimony. The Committee will be

in short recess.

[Whereupon the committee took a short recess.]

Mr. Smith. The Commission will now come back to order. Mr.

Kovalev and Ambassador Matlock, with the attitudes of the Russian

society seemingly so against the war in Chechnya, why has popular

disapproval of the war not moved President Yeltsin to change his

hard-line policy? What is it that is causing him to stay so fixed on the

military solution? Mr. Ambassador, would you like to start?

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] This is my own hypothesis that

I could offer you. In fact, I do not have a hypothesis for you; I can just

paraphrase my conversation recently with the former Minister of

Foreign Affairs of Russia, Kozyrev. This conversation is already a

year old, but I think it is still pertinent. Even then Minister Kozyrev

said the Security Council, the Russian Security Council that made

the decision to use military force in Chechnya, was misled by experts

who promised in Chechnya almost a bloodless blitzkrieg. Now we

understand we have got ourselves stuck in Chechnya. They all understand it, and the President understands this, too. But if the President and these were to admit this, they would be at the head of the

list of guilty parties. Then he will not have any chance to win the

election. At that time, Kozyrev was asking me about Zhirinovsky, but

now he would probably ask me about Zyuganov. That basically is the

explanation.

My hypothesis actually goes a little bit further. I said to Kozyrev

after this conversation, I said, I don't believe that all your experts

and all the members of the security council were fools. Wasn't there

anybody who expressed a doubt that in the North Caucasus you would

get this sort of bloodless, lightning quick victory? Incidentally, the

security council was meeting already after the 26th of November. It

was the hostilities of November 26th in Grozny that was the deciding

factor in favor of military action in Chechnya. The Minister of Security totally shamed himself. He made this statement--by his actions-

-he made this statement that after the 26th there won't be any

Dudayev in Grozny. So after this total defeat on November 26th it

was really easy to realize that you wouldn't have some walk in the

park as far as the military victory was concerned in Chechnya.

Personally I could just explain the position of the Security Council

in a very simple way. According to the old Soviet habit--I am emphasizing here the Soviet habit--an advisor is not supposed to give his

boss the wisest advice. The advisor is supposed to follow which way

the boss is leaning anyway. So the Security Council, including Kozyrev,

they guessed that Yeltsin wanted to show that he is a determined

individual and he is not about to untie a knot, but he's just going to

cut it. There was another angle, too, to try to cover up the mistake

that he made on November 26th. That is the way they resolve a lot of

very important issues in Russia nowadays. I can remember once when

they were slaughtering cows in Ryazan' during Khrushchev's time.

The first secretary, Mr. Ladyonov, decided that he was going to overtake the oblast of Iowa in the output of meat.
22

Amb. Matlock. Iowa. That Ryazan' oblast would surpass Iowa in

meat production.

Interpreter. I'm sorry. The state of Iowa in meat production.

Mr. Kovalev. [Through Interpreter] So he just had all the stock

slaughtered. All the American specialists and the agricultural experts

just couldn't figure it out. Why are the Bolsheviks just slaughtering

their stock? I read that these experts thought that they had maybe

managed to get two calves as opposed to one when a cow gives birth.

Or maybe they'd managed to produce a calf in a month and a half. It

was not anything like this. Ladyonov wanted to win a medal, and he

got his medal.

Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador.

Amb. Matlock. Well, it is always impossible to say for certain what

goes on in the mind of another person, but Dr. Kovalev's explanation

of Yeltsin's likely motivations sounds absolutely correct to me. The

dilemma he finds himself in now. Though Yeltsin knows it is a mistake, he is not in a position either politically or--if he should lose the

next election--maybe legally to admit that he made that mistake. That

is the dilemma he has, and it is not a pretty one.

Mr. Smith. I have one final question, Mr. Ambassador. What are

your recommendations on financial assistance and how we should

condition aid. Mr. Kovalev in his testimony said, you know, give assistance and apply pressure. Should the IMF be providing loans?

Should we be trying to influence that?

Amb. Matlock. I think the IMF loans should be based upon financial performance. Russia is not going to be able to pull out of its economic difficulties without a stable currency. As long as it follows policies that will lead to that, I think those loans should stay in place. I

do not think they should be connected with other things. There are

other types of pressure, such as the type he described in using the

Council of Europe or using the OSCE and in private diplomacy, which

should be used and used very vigorously. But I am not in favor of

tying things like the currency stabilization loans, because I think there

are other issues at stake, and one way one can preserve some leverage over the process of economic reform, which is quite imperfect up

to now, is by maintaining these loans as long as the conditions are

met. Each loan and each of the aid projects should have its conditions, but they should be defined within the area to which it is addressed. I am dubious about tying them to other issues.

Mr. Kovalev. [Through interpreter] I'm not a specialist in how diplomats exert pressure on their counterparts. I know that there are

many ways and there are many specialists. But I would say that I do

know that the aid that goes, for instance, to working to support civil

society must be worked out together, and the people who give the

money must also be involved in the dispersal.

Mr. Smith. I want to thank our very distinguished witnesses for

their very generous time this morning, and now it is afternoon. This

hearing does help all of us become better informed. We will widely

disseminate the hearing text, the record to the colleagues on both the

House and the Senate side. I do thank you very much. This hearing is

adjourned.

Amb. Matlock. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon at 12:00 p.m., the Commission adjourned.]
23

STATEMENT BY SERGEI KOVALEV, MEMBER OF THE STATE

DUMA OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

HEARING ON CHECHNYA AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN

RUSSIA

MARCH 6, 1996

Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

When, a year ago, I had the honor of appearing before you, the

situation in Russia was tragically undefined. The city of Grozny had

already been destroyed, thousands and thousands of innocent persons had already perished. The trust of Russian society in the authorities who unleashed the war, after having declared their commitment to democracy, human rights and freedom, had been undermined.

But there was still hope for an early peace, for a return to a slow but

continual advance of Russia toward democracy and freedom. Since

then, many events have taken place that have dispelled these hopes.

We have seen terrorist attacks in Budennovsk and Kizlar, attempts

at negotiations and the resumption of military activity in its most

despicable, drawn-out and cruel form. We have seen an unjustified

punitive operation carried out in Samashki and a shameful act of

revenge in Pervomaiskoe. We have seen phony elections in Chechnya, which have been declared genuine and valid. We have gone

through parliamentary elections that have demonstrated a lack of

cohesion among democratic politicians and brought victory to Communist forces who were able to take full advantage of public discontent. We see that with every passing day resources and power have

become increasingly concentrated in the hands of "force structures"

and special services outside civilian control. We see how the state

apparatus ever more assertively rids itself of employees sympathetic

to democracy, and puts in their place people of the opposite persuasion, frequently incompetent, besmirched, in fact, with lies and blood.

We continue to hear every day blatant and senseless disinformation,

emanating from highly placed government officials. We choke on preelection demagoguery behind which there lies nothing except the desire for power.

Against this political backdrop, deterioration in the human rights

situation should come as no surprise. Human rights violations in

Russia have acquired a systematic and crude character, and not only

on the territory of Chechnya. For specific facts and their substantiation, I would refer you to the detailed, although far from exhaustive,

study of this problem contained in the recently released Report of the

President's Commission on Human Rights. Incidentally a majority of

the Commission's members have since resigned from the President's

administration. (An English-language summary of this report for 1994-

95 is available. )
24

An analysis of the situation in Russia shows that the vector of political and legal transformation is not headed in the direction of democracy and freedom. In my opinion, Russia is now going through a

full- blown crisis of democracy. It is perhaps only a matter of months

before this crisis reaches its fatal conclusion.

What is the outlook? Nowadays in Russia the major contenders for

power, for the future of Russia, are forces that are equally alien to

democracy, equally prepared to deny its legal and humanitarian values, and equally dismissive of public opinion.

On the one hand, we have today's power elite, who have established

themselves and fortified their positions under the cover of democratic

slogans. In reality, their basic goal was to redistribute state property

and economic and political influence, and to dislodge the old Communist nomenklatura from key posts. Having carried out their basic task,

they are naturally attempting to retain the fruits of their conquest.

Democratic slogans used as an instrument of destruction are now out

of place; they may, and they must, be compromised. It is not in the

interest of this power elite to create a rule of law state. More appropriate for their current ambitions is the old principle of derzhavnost-

-the principle of state power standing above the individual and society. The dangers of a victory by this power elite are obvious even

now. It would mean a complete derailment of political reforms, a subsequent reliance on force as the method of rule, politics of secrecy and

unpredictability, the development of ultra patriotic ideology, and as a

result, the orientation of Russia not toward the democratic West but

toward the totalitarian East.

On the other hand, there are forces contending for power that are

united under communist slogans, but in fact they are little different

than competitors. Taking advantage of obvious miscalculations in the

economic and social policies of the government, these forces mobilize

large numbers of voters who are nostalgic for those times when they

were responsible for nothing, when the government provided them

with a meager, but relatively carefree existence. The victory of the

Communists, despite the restraint of their public slogans, will lead to

a thirst for revenge, and the destruction of those fragile shoots of

democracy, to which our country gave birth in the past decade. You

can be sure that this force will make full use of the ideology and

methodology of derzhamost, which is organic to Russian communism.

I probably don't even need to mention the aggressive isolationism of

the Communists, which the West still remembers.

There is still a third organized force in Russia--nationalism. Today,

however, it plays more of an auxiliary role. On one flank, it surreptitiously saturates the ideology of derzhavnost and communism with

an additional charge of fascism and xenophobia, while on the other it

draws to itself the impulse of public fear.

Any one of these three forces might win in Russia, but their victory

would mean the defeat of democratic reforms, and a rejection of the

priority (or at least, the parity) of human rights over the principle of

political expediency. And in quick order, the victors will begin to speak

in tough terms not only to their fellow citizens, but also to the West,

which will naturally engender a tough response.

A dramatic paradox of this situation is that the only force opposing

antidemocratic tendencies in Russia is badly organized. But at least

this is no longer just a handful of dissidents as in the Brezhnev era. if
25

in our country civil society is gaining strength and a free press is still

functioning, the credit for this does not belong to Yeltsin, but to democratically-thinking politicians, civic activists, and simply honest

people. The intellectual and spiritual face of Russia is represented by

and large by people of democratic convictions. And democratic voters

outnumber the anti-democratic electorate. But democrats, unfortunately, have not learned to conduct politics in a well-coordinated and

clear fashion; true, they also haven't learned to deal in dirty tricks.

Therefore, their chances are not great. But we can hope that the democratic forces will unite, and if it is impossible to win, at least a unified

democratic opposition will be created, which will help limit the totalitarian tendencies of any antidemocratic regime.

This is the political reality of contemporary Russia. I understand

that you are interested most of all in the influence that the changes

in Russia may have on world politics and on the politics of the United

States.

I don't consider it possible to give any kind of advice. But, as I see

it, the democratic nations of the West should have a two-track policy,

which was expressed by Academic Sakharov in his day: assistance

and pressure. Assist, and effectively assist--the growing civil society

and democratic movement in [our] country. Exert pressure, and strong

pressure--on those forces that oppose peace, human rights, and

progress. At the same time, one should realize that commitment to

democracy is defined not by government posts and slogans but by

concrete actions.

A union of the West and Russia is indispensable. And the problem

is not that, otherwise, an isolated Russia, with its nuclear technology, will fall into the arms of the East. Partnership with Russia must

be based not on fear, but on your desire to help the society of Russia

recover from the totalitarian disease, to help the culture of Russia

return to our shared home. Only together can we overcome the global

dangers of the 21st century: a deficit of energy sources, ecological

catastrophe, and the new threat of nuclear confrontation. For this

reason, the West must take upon itself the arduous, daily commitment to support the process of genuine, and not nominal, entry of

Russia onto the path of democracy.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE BY JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA

It is an honor to appear before this Committee, and in particular to

share the platform with Sergei Kovalev, who is far better informed

about conditions in Chechnya than I am. As I wrote a year ago, he is

one of the few heroes emerging from the tragedy of the war in Chechnya. His actions in documenting the atrocities which have been committed have played a key role In alerting his own countrymen and

the world public as a whole to the situation there. One would despair

for the prospects of creating a democracy in Russia were it not for

people like Sergei Kovalev.
26

The war in Chechnya continues without an end in sight. At times,

President Yeltsin seems to understand the importance of ending the

conflict, but more frequently his decisions have had the effect of prolonging it. We can hope that the desire to improve his standing in

advance of the presidential election in June will give President Yeltsin

a strong motivation to stop the fighting, but we as yet see little concrete evidence that this will happen.

Meanwhile, the damage to Russia mounts. The bungled attempt to

subdue Chechnya has laid bare the weakness of the Russian armed

forces just as, earlier, the failure to deal with the problem by administrative means revealed the weakness and, indeed, corruption, of

the Russian administrative and law enforcement bodies. It is a tragic

conflict in which there can be, and will be, no winners. All friends of

Russia should appeal to the Russian authorities to end this senseless

conflict, not only because it is an affront to humanity, but also because it is damaging to Russia itself .

As we condemn the methods used to deal with the Chechen rebellion, however, we should be careful not to idealize or condone the

Chechen leaders who created the conditions which precipitated the

Russian military intervention. We should recognize that the Russian

authorities confronted an armed rebellion, not a peaceful effort to

achieve national autonomy or independence. Dzhokar Dudayev and

his associates seized power in 1991 by a military coup d'etat and never

allowed an unfettered vote in what was then Chechen-Ingushetia.

No self-respecting government could allow such a situation to persist

within its borders without efforts to bring it to an end. The Russian

government obviously chose the wrong method in December 1994

when it mounted a full-scale military invasion, but this should not

obscure the shared responsibility of Chechnya's breakaway regime

that chose from the outset to use military force rather than the tools

of democracy to achieve its political goals.

In short, the invasion of Chechnya is not comparable to the Chinese slaughter of peaceful demonstrators in Tianamnen Square, and

the Chechen rebellion is not comparable to the peaceful democratic

movements in the Baltic states which sought -- ultimately successfully -- to free their countries from Soviet rule. Brutality and guilt are

not the exclusive possessions of one side in this tragic conflict.

That makes it particularly difficult for foreign governments to deal

with the issue. In one sense, the Russian government has the night to

suppress armed rebellion within its borders, and few governments

would wish to challenge this principle. But in another sense, the methods used have violated solemn commitments undertaken by the Russian government in the Helsinki Final Act, in particular. But these

are political commitments which do not have the force of law or treaties.

Some Americans argue that the U.S. Government should do more

to put Russia under pressure to end the war in Chechnya, by indulging in sharper criticism of the acts of violence in the region and curtailing economic and political cooperation with Russia so long as the

war persists. In my judgment, such steps would not be wise. They

would be most unlikely to shorten the war but would entail a serious

political cost. If aid projects are meeting their goals, they should be

continued. Both the U.S. and Russia stand to benefit, and they should

not be turned on and off for extraneous reasons. Political sanctions
27

are even more inappropriate since they reinforce the false image many

Russian "superpatriots" have of the United States as an enemy power.

There is no rational reason for Russia and the United States to be

adversaries, and we should not strengthen the hand of chauvinist

forces in Russia by appearing to desire dismemberment of the country.

Does this mean that we should simply stand by and do nothing?

Certainly not. Our official representatives should make a consistent

effort, in their private dialogue with the Russian Government, to press

for an end to the war and for more regard for the human rights of

Russian citizens in the area. This is an issue on which public organizations like Helsinki Watch and other unofficial human rights organizations have an important role to play. They should bring to light

atrocities when they occur, and they should be even handed about it.

It is Just as much an atrocity to kill and kidnap innocent civilians by

acts of terrorism as It is to bombard defenseless cities. Such tactics

should not and must not be condoned, anywhere and for any reason.

We should also urge the Russian Government to expand the role of

OSCE representatives in mediating the conflict. They can set a very

useful precedent for peacemaking if they can secure the cooperation

of both sides to the conflict.

Ultimately, it is Russia itself that is most damaged by the conflict

and the Russian political leadership should have no higher priority

than bringing it to an end. We can best show our friendship for the

development of a democratic Russia by impressing this truth upon

the Russian authorities.

TESTIMONY BY ANATOL LIEVEN, SENIOR FELLOW, UNITED

STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

 The prospects for peace in Chechnya look grim. Last year's OSCEbrokered truce between the Russian army and the Chechen independence forces has now definitively broken down. To judge by what I

saw and heard during my last visit to Chechnya in December, there

is little reason for optimism about the chances of future cease fires, at

least as long as the present leaders of Russia and Chechnya remain

in office.

The Yeltsin administration is urging the OSCE to recognize the

legitimacy of the Russian-backed government of Doku Zavgayev, but

this government is opposed by the great majority of Chechens, and

Mr Zavgayev's so-called ``election'' in December was a farce. The Russian government has signed an agreement with Mr Zavgayev promising Chechnya the widest possible autonomy, but the separatist forces

under President Dzhokhar Dudayev continue to insist on full independence, and refuse any contacts with Mr Zavgayev. President

Yeltsin's promises of a new peace formula worked out by a commission under Premier Chernomyrdin appear wholly insincere, and may

be intended mainly to throw blame for failure onto the Prime Minister.

The Chechen raid in January into the neighboring republic of

Daghestan, which led to the mass taking of civilian hostages and a

bloody siege, has once again exposed the extreme weakness and demoralization of the Russian armed forces, which proved incapable of
28

preventing the escape of most of the Chechen fighters involved. The

Chechen fighters have followed up this success with a series of attacks on Russian convoys. The Russians have responded with punitive bombardments of villages both in Chechnya and neighboring

Ingushetia, causing numerous civilian casualties. There can be little

doubt that a continued intensification of the fighting will lead to further human rights abuses on the part of Russian troops, and further

terrorist actions by the Chechen separatists.

Last year's truce failed for two reasons, which will also threaten

any future attempt at a ceasefire. The first is that at bottom there is

nothing to talk about. Dudayev's demand for full independence and

the withdrawal of all Russian troops is unacceptable to the Yeltsin

government and probably to any Russian administration. Under different leaderships, some sort of face-saving formula might be found,

but the Yeltsin administration has now invested massive political

capital in its Chechen allies and in the fight against Dudayev. Compromise with the separatists would be a massive and probably fatal

humiliation for Yeltsin--after all, in recent weeks he has threatened

to have Dudayev executed.

As for Dudayev, he lacks the diplomatic skill and self-discipline to

negotiate a compromise, and he probably also does not have enough

authority over his own men to get them to accept a deal short of full

independence. It is not true that Dudayev personally enjoys the support of a great majority of Chechens; indeed, I have found him widely

unpopular even among pro-independence fighters. But there is no

way that these fighters or their commanders are going to get rid of

Dudayev at Russia's behest. This is true for example of the leading

Chechen military commander, General Aslan Maskhadov. He is widely

seen as a much more rational and responsible figure than Dudayev,

and there is evidence of deep differences between him and the President; but General Maskhadov is also a passionately committed

Chechen nationalist, and he has rejected all Russian attempts to get

him to abandon Dudayev and sign a separate peace. You often hear

Chechen fighters say the following, in different variants: ``I am not

fighting for Dudayev, but for Chechnya, and I will fight until I am

dead or Chechnya is independent.''

The only significant neutral political figure in Chechnya is former

Russian parliamentary chairman and Yeltsin rival Ruslan

Khasbulatov, who still seems to have considerable support among

ordinary Chechens, many of whom, while they hate the Russians,

also dislike Dudayev and are desperate for peace. But for obvious

reasons, he has been completely sidelined by the Yeltsin administration. He is also detested by Dudayev and the pro-independence forces,

so that even if some future Russian government were to try to use

him as an intermediary, his chances of taking power and bringing

about peace appear very slight.

Nevertheless, despite the lack of prospects for a general political

agreement, General Maskhadov does seem sincerely to have tried to

get last year's truce to stick, and that was also true of his Russian

counterpart, General Anatoly Romanov. The problem is that neither

of them really controlled all the forces on their respective sides. The

Chechen independence forces are obviously very loosely structured,

and as long as there are Russian troops in Chechnya, some of them

will go on having a crack at them, irrespective of agreements or or-
29

ders from above - which is exactly what they did throughout the period of the truce. On the Russian side, apart from the differences between hawks and doves in the administration in Moscow, there are

Chechen allies whose own political or even physical survival depends

on their preventing an agreement between Dudayev and Moscow. In

November of last year, General Romanov was critically injured by a

car bomb in Grozny which also finally killed off the ceasefire. The

Russian government of course blamed the Dudayev forces; but there

is also a widespread private suspicion, even on the Russian side, that

the real perpetrators may have been pro-Russian Chechens determined to wreck any peace process.

Despite predictions last year, the Chechen war has not led to a

general anti-Russian revolt in the North Caucasus, and seems unlikely to do so, for two reasons. The first is that the Chechens are

widely disliked for their arrogance and contempt for their fellow Caucasians - an attitude demonstrated by the taking of Daghestani hostages in January. The second reason is that while the other North

Caucasians may dislike the Russians, every other North Caucasian

republic but Chechnya also has profound internal ethnic divisions.

Anti-Russian revolt would therefore almost inevitably set off a whole

series of bloody local civil wars - and the leaders of the other republics know this. Islam is also generally weaker in these areas than in

Chechnya.

Nor has Chechnya affected relations between Moscow and other

autonomous republics like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia,

except insofar as it has tended to weaken the authority of the central

government. As the last parliamentary elections showed, these republics now occupy very strong places in the Russian polity, guaranteed by treaties with Moscow. Their ruling groups are wooed by both

the Russian government and the Russian communist and nationalist

oppositions.

In a historical perspective, the most striking aspect of the Chechen

War may be seen as its revelation of the weakness of the Russian

army, and the lack of desire of the Russian people for military operations, even against an enemy as widely disliked as the Chechens. At

present therefore, the idea of a direct Russian military threat to

Ukraine, the Baltic States or Eastern Europe seems pure fantasy.

There is a danger however that Russian attitudes towards Chechnya could be radicalised if the Chechen independence forces carry

out bloody terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere in the heart of

Russia. This might lead to the deportation of the Chechen community in Moscow--something, which the Russian security services have

reportedly already privately threatened--and a greatly intensified

campaign of terror against the population of Chechnya itself, something which has so far been inhibited by the Russian desire to keep at

least a few Chechen allies. This could also spill over into spontaneous

Russian attacks on Caucasians in general, thereby spreading antiRussian feeling and the possibility that the war might in fact spread.

As the seizure of a ferry off Istanbul by Chechen sympathizers in

January shows, the Chechens may also be able to carry out terrorist

acts beyond Russia's borders.

When I interviewed Chechen military commander Shamil Basayev

in December, he said that he regarded terrorist attacks in Russia,

even to the extent of attacking Russian nuclear power stations, as
30

morally justified in view of Russian tactics within Chechnya - for example, a Russian bombing raid which killed much of his own family.

However, I also saw him assure a meeting of local Chechen notables

that he would prevent attacks on Russian troops in their area, so as

not to draw down Russian reprisals. Mr Basayev is also believed to

have disapproved of the latest raid into Daghestan, which appears to

have been the work of Dudayev. There is some hope therefore that

Chechen commanders will in fact be restrained in their use of the

terrorist weapon - but the temptation to use it so as to weaken the

Yeltsin administration in the run-up to Russia's June presidential

elections will obviously be immense.

The West clearly has a strong interest in trying to act through the

OSCE or other bodies to bring peace to Chechnya, or at least to bring

about a new ceasefire. It is possible that sheer mutual exhaustion

will in fact sooner or later lead to this. At present however both sides

are hostile to any Western mediation. The Russians insist on the impossible condition of the recognition of their Chechen administration;

while Dudayev, when I met him in December, expressed himself in

the most contemptuous and hostile terms about the OSCE, the UN

and the West in general, describing us as cowards and Russian slaves.

He seems to be motivated by a mixture of the Islamic feeling which

has grown noticeably in Chechnya during the war, and by sheer rage

at the West's failure to side with Chechnya against Russia.

I am sorry not to be able to give a more hopeful picture or more

positive advice. I myself believe that the tremendous courage and

tenacity demonstrated by the Chechen separatist forces will sooner

or later achieve independence for Chechnya, given the underlying

lack of will demonstrated by the Russian side; I also fear that this

independence is likely to come only through further and greater bloodshed.