Filed 5/27/15 In re R.B. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re R.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B255002 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VJ43802)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Ange les County, Fumiko Hachiya Wasserman, J udge. Affirmed. Tonja R. Torres, under appo intment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Ge rald A. Engler, Chie f Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant De puty Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Anal ee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorney General, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————2 A minor argues the juvenile court abus ed its discretion when it found him unsuitable for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ ) and instead declared him a ward of the

court. We find no error and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND On the afternoon of September 23, 2013, a high school security officer found appellant R.B. crouched behind a car in the school parking lot ar ound 2:00 p.m., when appellant was supposed to be in class. The security officer escorted appellant to the vice principal’s office where appellant’s backpack was searched. A knife with a four-inch

blade was found insi de the backpack.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 1 wardship petition filed on December 5, 2013, alleged that appellant possessed a knife on school grounds in violation of Penal Code section 626.10, subdi vision (a)(1), a felony. Appellant denied the allegation. The juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the knife recovered from his backpack. Appellant requested that th e court reduce the alleged offense to a misdemeanor. The court granted that request and appellant admitted the truth of the allegation. The matter procee ded to disposition an d the court sustained the petition. The court found appellant suitable for DEJ, pursuant to section 725. Nevertheless, the court declined to order DEJ and declared appella nt a ward of the court under section 602 2 and ordered him placed home on probation.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 In pertinent part, section 602, subdivisio n (a) states: “[A]ny person who is under 18 years of age when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is w ithin the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.”3 DISCUSSION Appellant maintains that once the juve nile court reduced the allegation to a misdemeanor, it should have imposed a no nwardship probation under section 725, subdivision (a), instead of declaring him a ward of the court and ordering him home on probation. We conclude otherwise. We review a juvenile court’s commitm ent decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the decision. It is the juvenile court’s duty to determine the most appropria te placement for the minor. ( In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329–1330; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) Under this standard, we “‘“indulge all reasonab le inferences to support the decision of the court and will not disturb its factual findings wh en there is substantia l evidence to support them.”’” ( In re Robert H. , at p. 1330; In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135 [juvenile court determination will be reve rsed only if court acted beyond the scope of reason].)

Section 725 states that: “After receiving and considering the ev idence on the proper disposition of the case, the court may enter judgment as follows: “(a) If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section . . . 602, by reason of the commission of an offense ot her than any of the o ffenses set forth in Section 654.3, it may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor on probation, under the supervis ion of the probation officer, fo r a period not to exceed six months . . . . If the minor fails to comply with the conditions of probation imposed, the court may order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court. “(b) If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section . . . 602, it may order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.”4 It is undisputed that appellant was both e ligible and suitable for DEJ under section

790. 3 Appellant argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in declaring him a ward of the court under section 602 and placing hi m on probation because numerous positive circumstances weigh in favor of nonwardship probation. Namely, he was 17 years old at the time of this, his first and only criminal offense; his crime was minor and nonviolent; he admitted that he simply “fa il[ed] to think before he act[e d]”; he does not use drugs and is not involved in gang activ ity; his family actively supports him; he has good grades notwithstanding his learning disability; and seve ral teachers wrote letters on his behalf to the court. The probation report acknowle dged these positive factors and recommended that appellant be “placed on 790 DEJ grant of probation.” The juvenile court did not sp ecify the positive or negative factors that impacted its decision. Nevertheless, we conclude the co urt reasonably could have been concerned by negative aspects of appellant’s case. For exam ple, in urging the court not to reduce the

3 A minor is eligible for DEJ under secti on 790, subdivision (a) if all the following circumstances exist: “(1) The minor has not previo usly been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense. “(2) The offense charged is not one of th e offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707. “(3) The minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilita tion, Division of Juvenile Facilities. “(4) The minor’s record does not indicat e that probation has ever been revoked without being completed. “(5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing. “(6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal Code. “(7) The offense charged is not rape, sodo my, oral copulation, or an act of sexual penetration specified in Section 289 of the Penal Code when the victim was prevented from resisting . . . , or when the victim was at the time incapable . . . of giving consent, and that was known or reasonabl y should have been known to the minor at the time of the offense.”5 alleged offense to a misdemeanor, the district attorney argued that appellant appeared to lack “remorse and a willingness to admit the offense.” Further, as evidenced in the probation report, appellant made contradict ory representations about why he took the knife to school in the first place. At on e point he claimed to “use[] the knife for protection,”––which, by implication, meant he carried it regularly and was prepared to wield it defensively, if necessary. Later, he contradicted that statement, saying he had mistakenly left the knife in his backpack after a camping trip. Appellant also conceded that “not thinking ha[d] gotte n him in trouble” on more than one occasion, and said his “plan” for the future was to “think before he act[ed].” On this factual record, we cannot conclude the court’ s implicit conclusion that appellant was unsuitable for DEJ was an ab use of discretion. Based on apparent contradictions in appellant’s statements a nd his youthful impetuosity, the court could reasonably conclude he would benefit from more restrictiv e measures than are afforded under DEJ and a longer period of supervision than the maximum of six months available for a nonwardship DEJ probation under section 725, subdivisio n (a). After all, “[t]he purpose of the juvenile court is to protect both the minor under its jurisdiction and the public . . . . [Citations.] Central to the ju venile court’s mission are the care, treatment, guidance, and rehabilitati on of the delinquent juvenile. [Citation.]” ( In re Walter P

. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99 , fn. omitted.) The question of whether a minor deemed eligible for DEJ is also suita ble for DEJ rests with in the juvenile court’s discretion. ( In re

R.C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1441 [after pr osecution determines “minor is eligible for DEJ[, and] court finds . . . minor [bot h] suitable for DEJ and [will] benefit from education, treatment, and rehabilita tion efforts, it may grant DEJ”].) While another court might have found otherwise on this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denyi ng DEJ and declaring appellant a ward of the court. The trial c ourt retains the ultimate discretion in deciding whether it is appropriate to gran t DEJ to an eligible minor. ( In re Sergio R . (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 597, 603; § 602, subd. (a).) Even if the pros ecuting attorney finds the minor eligible for DEJ and the probation departme nt finds the minor suitable, the court’s6 disposition is based on its independent determination. ( In re Sergio R. , at p. 604; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800.) We also find that the juvenile court c onsidered the circumstances that may have mitigated appellant’s conduct. These circ umstances were contai ned in his probation report and/or were brought to the court’s a ttention by appellant’s counsel. The court considered them; it just did not find them pe rsuasive. “‘Sentencing courts have wide discretion in weighing aggrav ating and mitigating factors [citations], and may balance them against each other in qualitative as we ll as quantitative terms. ’ [Citation.] One factor alone may warrant impos ition of the upper term [citati on] and the trial court need not state reasons for minimizing or disregardi ng circumstances in mitigation [citation].” ( People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401 .) These principles are equally applicable to a juvenile court’s decision whethe r to grant a juvenile DEJ. Thus, we reject any contention that the court abused its di scretion in denying DE J because mitigating circumstances may outnumber ag gravating circumstances.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.