This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 JANE CARLTON, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3 v. No. 32,796 4 CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE and 5 CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 6 ALBUQUERQUE, 7 Defendants-Appellees, 8 consolidated with 9 JANE CARLTON, 10 Plaintiff-Appellant, 11

v. 12 CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE and 13 CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 14 ALBUQUERQUE, 15 Defendants-Appellees, 16 consolidated with 17 AVALON BUILDING GROUP, LLC, 182 Plaintiff, 1

v. 2 CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE and 3 CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 4 ALBUQUERQUE, 5 Defendants. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Alan M. Malott, District Judge 8 Landry & Ludewig, L.L.P. 9 Glenn R. Smith 10 Stephanie Landry 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Yenson, Lynn, Allen & Wosick, P.C. 14 Patrick Allen 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellee 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 19
{1}Plaintiff Carlton (hereinafter “Plaintiff” ) appeals from the district court’s order 20 dismissing her complaint for lack of ripeness, finality, and the right to appeal. We 21 issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. Plaintiff has 223 filed a memorandum in opposition to our notice. We have considered Plaintiff’s 1 response. We hold that Plaintiff has not demonstrated error, and therefore, we affirm. 2
{2} In this appeal, Plaintiff raises challe nges to actions of the City of Albuquerque 3 (“the City”) that could have resulted in the re-zoning of Plaintiff’s property that likely 4 would have prohibited her plans to construct a multi-story, high density apartment 5 building in downtown Albuquerque. Significantly, Plaintiff informs this Court for the 6 first time in her memorandum in opposition th at the City approved her building plans 7 in March 2013. [MIO 4] Plaintiff’s docketi ng statement was filed in this Court in 8 April 2013. [Ct. App. File] We remind counselfor Plaintiff of the obligation of candor 9 toward this Court. SeeRule 16-303(A) NMRA. Plaintiff a sserts that the fact that the 10 City has approved her plans proves that she wa s correct in her clai ms against the City. 11 [MIO 5] We believe that the City’s ultimate approval of Plaintiff’s building plans 12 supports the district court’s conclusion, and this Court’s proposed summary 13 affirmance thereof, that Plaintiff’s claims were not ripe. See New Energy Economy, 14 Inc. v. Shoobridge , 2010-NMSC-049, ¶ 18, 149 N.M. 42, 243 P.3d 746 (“The mere 15 possibility or even probability that a person may be adversely affected in the future 16 by official acts fails to satisfy the actual controversy requirement.” (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted)). For example, Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and 18 injunctive relief under the 2006 settlement ag reement has been rendered moot by the 194 City’s approval of her building plans. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. 1 Pub. Serv. Comm’n , 1991-NMSC-018, ¶ 26, 111 N.M . 622, 808 P.2d 592 (“We will 2 not wait for the [agency’s] final decision if the issue will return to us without 3 alteration. One factor that weighs heavilyon our resolution of these [ripeness and 4 finality] issues is what the [agency] has said it has done and will do.”). 5
{3} In our notice, we asked Plaintiff to cl arify which of her cl aims were properly 6 brought in her petition for writ of certiorariand which claims were properly brought 7 in this direct appeal, and w hy. We also noted that Plaintiff did not provide us with 8 sufficient information about the DNA Sector Plan or the Rezoning Resolution to 9 understand the nature and manner of the City’s actions and how Plaintiff’s claims fit 10 into them. See, e.g. , NMSA 1978, Section 3-21-8(A)(2008) (“The zoning authority 11 shall provide by resolution the procedure to be followed in considering appeals 12 allowed by this section.”). We further explained that Plaintiff did not give us the full 13 context for the 2006 settlement agreement, upon which her right to non-historic 14 zoning was based, and we questioned whether it could be relied upon for an assertion 15 of vested rights, particularly in light of th e fact that Plaintiff had not sought a building 16 permit under the terms of the agreement. [RP 65-72] We pointed out these gaps in the 17 information Plaintiff provided us in an effort to understand the procedure the City 18 followed, how Plaintiff was a ggrieved, and how her claims might be ripe absent a 195 final determination from the City on Plaintiff’s building plans. We note that the plans 1 were submitted to the City af ter she initiated the district court suit and after the City 2 enacted the moratorium on zone changes and issuance of building permits. [RP 400- 3 401] 4
{4} Whether a claim is properly brought in a petition for writ of certiorari or in a 5 direct appeal and the ripeness of a clai m are significant questions for this Court 6 because they are related to and effect our ability to accept and decide the claim. See, 7
e.g. , Mills v. New Mexico State Bd. of Psychologist Exam’rs , 1997-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 10- 8 11, 123 N.M. 421, 941 P.2d 502 (discussing th e two-pronged jurisdictional question 9 presented about the administrative appeal and deciding that the due process claim was 10 properly brought in a petition for writ of certio rari and that the due process claim was 11 ripe for review on the basis that the agency ’s action was sufficiently final, given that, 12 otherwise, the plaintiff would be denied judicial review); Manning v. Mining & 13 Minerals Div. , 2006-NMSC-027, ¶ 54, 140 N.M. 528, 144 P.3d 87 (Minzner, J. 14 dissenting) (“Lack of ripeness, like lack of standing, is a potential jurisdictional 15 defect, which ‘may not be waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, 16 even sua sponte by the appellate court.’” (quoting Gunaji v. Macias , 17 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 20, 130 N.M. 734, 31 P.3d 1008)). 186 {5} In response to our notice, Plaintiff states that the petition for writ of certiorari 1 was filed “with respect to the dismissal of [her appeal] of the City’s zoning actions[,]” 2 and that Plaintiff “had separate claims i nvoking the original jurisdiction of the district 3 court[.]” [MIO 10] This is not an adequateexplanation, and far from the information 4 we need about matters fundamental to th e appeal. In response to our requests for 5 specific information, Plaintiff recites paragraphs from her first amended complaint, 6 which we possess in the record proper, and indicates that we should not need any 7 more information given the standard of re view for dismissals under Rule 1-012(B)(6) 8 NMRA. [MIO 17-22, 24-27] Plaintiff’s res ponse complains that our notice examined 9 the 2006 settlement agreement, suggesting that we should be accepting her factual 10 representations about the applicability of the settlement agreement without trying to 11 understand it. [MIO 29-34] Th e 2006 settlement agreement, however, is the basis for 12 Plaintiff’s direct cause of action in distri ct court for declaratory and injunctive relief 13 and her breach of contract claims. 14
{6} Courts do not simply accept a party’s assertion of jurisdiction without 15 independent examination. See Smith v. City of Santa Fe , 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 16 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 (stating that where a potential jurisdictional problem is 17 presented at any stage in anadministrative proceeding, th e appellate court must decide 18 it first before reaching the merits and even should raise the matter sua sponte). We 197 need to be apprised of basic facts underlyi ng a party’s cause of action when they are 1 related to jurisdiction, and courts are entitled to look beyond the complaint to 2 understand whether there is a potential jurisdictional defect. See, e.g. , Prot. & 3 Advocacy Sys. v. City of Albuquerque , 2008-NMCA-149, ¶ 17, 145 N.M. 156, 195 4 P.3d 1 (permitting the district court to require further information, beyond the 5 complaint, under Rule 1-012(B), to assist inthe court’s consideration of whether the 6 plaintiff has standing); S. Union Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm’n , 7 1997-NMSC-056, ¶ 23, 124 N.M. 176, 947 P.2d 133 (Minzner, J., dissenting) (“If the 8 Rule 12(b)(1) motion is a factual attack on the jurisdictional allegations of the 9 complaint – i.e., the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged by the plaintiff is 10 challenged – the court may receive any co mpetent evidence, such as affidavits, 11 deposition testimony and the like, in order to determine the factual dispute.” (citing 12 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice¶ 12.07[2.-1], at 12-52 (2d ed. 13 1996))). The matters about which we sought more information – the proper procedure 14 for Plaintiff to raise her various claims, the 2006 settlement agreement, and the City’s 15 procedure in re-zoning – were matters beforethe district court and matters properly 16 before this Court. Regardless of whether her claims are more appropriately reviewable 17 under Rule 1-012(B) or Rule 1-056 NMRA, Pl aintiff’s refusal to follow our request 18 for more information does not demonstrate th at the district court erred by dismissing 198 for lack of ripeness. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc. , 1 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the appellate court 2 presumes that the trial court’s were co rrect; and the burden is on the appellant to 3 clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred). 4
{7} To support her position that her claims were ripe, Plaintiff states that her 5 damages claims in the form of attorney fees and the “loss of certain constitutional 6 rights” had already accrued as a result the City’s misconduct at the time of the district 7 court’s dismissal. [MIO 4-5] As indicatedin our notice, however, the City planning 8 and approval process had not c oncluded when the district court dismissed. Plaintiff 9 does not clarify the factual or legal basis for the damages she seeks or why they arise 10 under the district court’s original jurisdic tion. Neither does she explain the process 11 instituted by the City or the terms of th e DNA Sector Plan or the Rezoning Resolution. 12 And she does not allay our concerns th at the 2006 settlement agreement might not 13 provide her with rights that could be immedi ately vindicated in district court. Given 14 these gaps we have no basis upon which to hold that the district court erred. 15
{8} Additionally, Plaintiff refers us to no au thority that would permit her to pursue 16 her claims without a final determination fro m the City on her building plans. We also 17 note that the uncertainty with which Plaintiff leaves us cautions us against going so 189 far as to state that all her claims are moot . Rather, we simply hold that Plaintiff has not 1 established that the district court erred by ruling that her claims lacked ripeness. 2
{9} For the reasons stated in this opinion and in our notice, we affirm the district 3 court’s dismissal for lack of ripeness. 4
{10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

6 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

9 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 10

11 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 12