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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 109TH CONGRESS

1st Session

S. PRT.

2006

109–43

‘‘PLAN COLOMBIA’’:

ELEMENTS FOR SUCCESS

STAFF TRIP REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v

Past and Present of ‘‘Plan Colombia’’ ..................................................................... 1

Overview ................................................................................................................... 2

Additional Analysis ................................................................................................. 6

Appendix I ................................................................................................................ 14

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

December 29, 2005.

Dear Colleagues:

The committee recently sent Mr. Carl Meacham of the professional staff to Bogota ́, Colombia to assess specific aspects of ‘‘Plan

Colombia.’’ This six-year U.S. aid package, which was intended to

eliminate Colombia’s production of illicit crops and domestic terrorism, recently expired.

On September 23, 2005, the Government of Colombia (GOC) provided a draft proposal to the U.S. Department of State for an extension of Plan Colombia. The consultation process between the Department of State and the GOC is ongoing. With this in mind, I

am pleased to share with you his trip report. I believe it provides

significant insight and a number of important recommendations on

drug eradication and interdiction, the demobilization of rightist

paramilitary fighters, and progress regarding assistance to the

GOC in advancing the defense and expansion of government presence in Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC paramilitaries) controlled areas.

I hope you find this helpful as the Committee on Foreign Relations considers its continued support for Plan Colombia. We look

forward to continuing to work with you on these issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR,

Chairman.

(V)

(1)

1 ‘‘Plan Colombia: A Progress Report,’’ CRS Report for Congress, Connie Viellette, May 9,

2005.

‘‘PLAN COLOMBIA’’:

ELEMENTS FOR SUCCESS

From December 11–14, 2005, a member of the professional staff

from the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

(SFRC) traveled to Bogota ́, Colombia. During this trip, staff visited

with Colombia’s President, Alvaro Uribe, and members of his Cabinet. Staff also met with representatives of relevant multilateral organizations, foreign diplomats, an influential Colombian Senator,

Rafael Pardo, Ideas Para La Paz President Sergio Jaramillo, and

the Chief Editor of Semana magazine, Rodrigo Pardo. (See Appendix I for complete list).

At the request of the Chairman, the purpose of the trip was to

examine three issues:

• Drug Eradication and Interdiction;

• Demobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters; and

• Progress regarding assistance to the Government of Colombia

(GOC) in advancing the defense and expansion of ITS presence

in Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC paramilitaries)

controlled areas.

PAST AND PRESENT OF ‘‘PLAN COLOMBIA’’

Plan Colombia (Public Law 106–246), which began in 2000, was

developed by former Colombian President Pastrana (1998–2002) to

end the GOC’s long-standing armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development. The Andean

Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports Plan Colombia. In addition, Colombia receives assistance

from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the Department of Defense’s central counternarcotics account. ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY 2000 through FY 2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion. When FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to GOC is $4.5 billion.1 The

U.S. Congress will continue support for Plan Colombia beyond

FY 2005 through ACI $469 million and FMF $90 million funding

for FY 2006. Plan Colombia is also receiving $1.7 million for International Military Education and Training (IMET) and $4.1 million

for Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining (NADR).

From Plan Colombia’s inception, the objectives of the GOC and

the USG have differed in some aspects, although there is a significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the

2

2 United States Embassy—Bogota ́, Colombia, Country Team Briefing, December 12, 2005

flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help the

GOC promote peace as it contributes to the regional security of

South America. The three topics examined in this report are important to meeting USG objectives.

The GOC has not formally announced its plans for a follow-up

program. However, on September 23, 2005, the GOC provided the

U.S. Department of State with a draft document describing its proposed Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP), which seeks continued U.S. assistance for 2006–2010.2 The PCCP envisages four

programmatic pillars that roughly correspond to the areas the USG

supported through Plan Colombia (Pillars I-III), with the addition

of the peace process (including demobilization and reintegration) as

pillar IV. These pillars are:

• Fight Against Terrorism, Narcotics Trafficking, and International Organized Crime

• Strengthening Governmental Institutions and the Justice System

• Economics and Social Revitalization

• Process for Peace and Re-Integration

The USG has informed the GOC that it supports the broad priorities contained in the draft plan. The USG has not submitted a formal draft for consultation to relevant committees in the U.S. Congress.

Primary Recommendations:

1. In order to remain flexible, staff strongly recommends

that USG support for Plan Colombia be extended on a year

to year basis, working in the context of continued cooperation with the GOC to ensure rigorous implementation of

relevant priorities, especially related to drug eradication

and interdiction and the effective demobilization of the

AUC, FARC, and ELN. Policies toward the GOC must be

continually evaluated, given very fluid circumstances inside Colombia and its neighboring countries.

2. Staff strongly encourages the U.S Department of

State to brief in a time sensitive manner and seek input

from the relevant committees in the U.S. Senate and

House on their consultations with the GOC regarding the

PCCP. Failure to address Congress’ concerns could weaken

support for future extensions of Plan Colombia in the U.S.

Congress.

OVERVIEW

Since President Alvaro Uribe’s election in 2002, he has striven to

build a close relationship with the USG. With the expiration of

Plan Colombia this relationship has been subject to review in the

following areas:

3

3More than $6 billion spent on Colombia and other countries (during FY 2000–2005) in the

region for counter narcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform efforts. According to

the report entitled ‘‘DRUG CONTROL, Agencies need to plan form likely declines in drug interdiction assets, and develop better performance measures for transit zone operations.’’ Report to

Congressional Committees by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), November

2005. 4 United States Embassy—Bogota ́, Colombia, Country Team Briefing, December 12, 2005. 5 ‘‘DRUG CONTROL, Agencies need to plan form likely declines in drug interdiction assets,

and develop better performance measures for transit zone operations.’’ Report to Congressional

Committees by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), November 2005.

DRUG ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION

The lack of reliable evidence of well-documented progress in the

war against drugs and neutralizing paramilitaries is disappointing

considering the billions of dollars the U.S. Congress has appropriated to finance drug interdiction and eradication since 2000.3

In 2005 coca eradication broke the 136,000 hectare record and

destroyed the equivalent of 160 metric tons of cocaine; and though

cocaine seized in 2004 almost tripled to 325 metric tons of cocaine,

and is expected to be larger for 2005, 4 Colombia continues to provide about 90 percent of the cocaine available in the U.S., in spite

of the appropriated funds being earmarked for Department of State

programs in Colombia to fight drug trafficking and terrorism

through Plan Colombia.

The GOC claims to have made considerable progress eradicating

drugs and interdicting drug shipments, as well as substantial

progress in eliminating the internal terrorist threat. Both the

United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime and the White

House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) lend credence to these claims in the form of glowing statistics indicative of

Colombia’s good work.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), on the other hand, has

criticized all of these rosy reports. It says that ONDCP’s assessments of the amount of cocaine entering the United States in 2004

are too broad in range to be ‘‘useful for assessing interdiction efforts.’’ 5 Even some Colombian officials have cautioned that while

the statistics presented by the UN and White House are encouraging, more time is needed to determine if current efforts will yield

real progress. They refer, for instance, to the impact of possible

drug warehousing in Venezuela and Mexico on price and supply.

However, given the absence of a consensus from respected organizations on the success of Plan Colombia in stemming the flow of

cocaine to the United States, this does not bode well for efforts to

push for its extension, at least at its current funding levels, without policy changes.

The administration has incorporated existing programs in

supplementing Plan Colombia’s drug interdiction efforts. These efforts can be improved. Of particular importance to staff in this regard is the opinion of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials

about the lack of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and rapid intercept capability for interdiction (at this time, the Colombians have

no radar detection MPA or substantive helicopter intercept capability.) Without adequate MPA resources, it is impossible to detect

and pinpoint drug-smuggling vessels in the open waters of Colombia’s coasts. Although P-3 aircraft have been successfully utilized

in the Caribbean, along with MPA provided by the U.K. GovernVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:23 Jan 06, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 25278.TXT SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
4

6 Confidential assessment prepared for the president of Colombia on whether peace talks

should begin with the nation’s main paramilitary, as sited in Washington Post, June 23, 2003

news article entitled ‘‘Colombian Fighters’ Drug Trade Is Detailed; Report Complicates Efforts

to End War.’’ 7 ‘‘Colombia: Paramilitary Demobilization Update,’’ Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota ́, Colombia, Dec. 2005.

ment, their use is being reduced and replacements are not available. As a result the DEA and North Coast Colombian police and/

or military are unable to respond to intelligence on drug trafficking

because of the lack of maritime patrol aircraft.

Therefore, our ability to respond to real-time information about

smugglers and traffickers is seriously limited. This is a major concern since Plan Colombia’s main purpose is to stop drug smuggling

into the United States.

Recommendations:

1. It is strongly urged that additional Maritime Patrol

Aircraft (MPA) resources be acquired to support the maritime interdiction efforts on Colombia’s North Coast and

west into the Pacific Ocean.

2. It is strongly advised that the USG, particularly the

Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland

Security, develop and coordinate reliable performance

metrics to accurately measure the flow of cocaine into the

United States. Once this is done, all parties will have accurate metrics on success or failure.

DEMOBILIZATION OF RIGHTIST PARAMILITARY FIGHTERS

This demobilization is closely linked to realizing Plan Colombia’s

goals on drug eradication and interdiction. The Uribe administration’s own study on demobilization, prepared two years ago, concluded that paramilitaries are responsible for at least 40 percent of

the cocaine trafficking in Colombia.6 An effective demobilization

would represent a victory in the war on drugs. The full demobilization process is scheduled to begin during the first quarter of 2006

with implementation of ‘‘The Peace and Justice Law,’’ signed by

President Uribe in July 2005, which attempts to establish a legal

framework to neutralize the AUC.

Though the GOC reports that 13,592 paramilitaries have handed

their weapons over, fulfilling the introductory phase of the full demobilization process, these efforts have been problematic, and success is dependent largely on the co-operation of terrorist groups,

who must surrender their arms and agree to allow drug traffickers

to face U.S. justice through extradition.7

There has also been some criticism of the ‘‘Peace and Justice

Law’’ by Colombian government officials. The Peace Commissioner,

Luis Carlos Restrepo, has stated that he knows full well that demobilization is a complicated ‘‘monster of four heads,’’ specifically referring to problems with government coordination of reintegration,

legal processing and monitoring of demobilized combatants,

verification that ex-combatants are no longer involved in illegal

criminal activities and victim reconciliation and reparations—the

demobilization’s four key elements. Staff’s opinion is that the law

will be ineffective because it relies on the AUC’s willingness to coVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:23 Jan 06, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 25278.TXT SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
5

operate in the implementation of its own demise. In addition the

GOC has not built a strong framework for the law’s implementation.

Recommendations:

1. Staff strongly recommends that the USG condition

any funding support of the GOC’s demobilization effort on

its ability to improve the demobilization law’s implementation, with special attention devoted to the reintegration,

legal processing and monitoring of demobilized combatants, verification that ex-combatants are no longer involved in illegal criminal activities and victim’s reconciliation and reparations. The USG should strongly encourage

the GOC to name a ‘‘Demobilization Czar’’ to help make

the implementation more effective.

2. Staff strongly recommends that the USG press the

GOC to start acting immediately and much more aggressively in investigating and building up cases against paramilitary commanders and locating and confiscating their

illegal assets. In this regard, the U.S. State Department

and U.S Embassy in Bogota ́ should examine how best the

USG can provide technical assistance to the GOC in its

search for illegally obtained assets and land.

3. Staff strongly recommends that the USG ask the GOC

to ensure that extradition arrangements with the USG not

be weakened by the ‘‘Peace and Justice Law’’.

PROGRESS REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA THE (GOC) IN ADVANCING THE DEFENSE AND EXPANSION OF

THEIR PRESENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA

(FARC) AND UNITED SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF COLOMBIA (AUC

PARAMILITARIES) CONTROLLED AREAS

At stake is the survival of a state that has been battered and undermined by leftist rebels, who have long controlled the countryside, rightist paramilitary armies, and an out-of-control drug trade

that funds both sides (right and left) and fuels the cycle of chaos,

violence and impunity. Experts say the burden is simply too much

for Colombia to shoulder alone, but note that an important element

of engagement with Colombia is strengthening its security and

other institutions. In this regard, presently, Plan Colombia is the

best structure in place to provide the framework for the Colombian

government, working with the U.S. Military Group (MILGRP), to

advance and facilitate social services in areas that have traditionally suffered from little state presence and pressure from illegal

armed groups and at the same time strengthening the state. Plan

Patriota, the GOC’s military campaign to extend government control and security presence throughout the national territory, has

made significant accomplishments, starting with the clearing of the

Bogota ́ area in 2003. Today 17,000 Joint Task Force troops in

south-central Colombian jungles have destroyed more than 380

6

8 United States Embassy—Bogota ́, Colombia, Country Team Briefing, December 12, 2005.

FARC encampments, including many with guest houses for visiting

narco-traffickers.8

At the time of the writing of this report, the Colombian Government had offered to demilitarize a small area of southern Colombia

to begin peace negotiations with the FARC and also has recently

begun peace negotiations in Cuba with the National Liberation

Army (ELN).

Recommendations:

1. Staff strongly recommends that efforts by the GOC in

advancing the defense and expansion of their presence in

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC

paramilitaries) controlled areas should continue to be

funded as necessary subject to review and with the appropriate oversight.

2. Though, skepticism exists regarding the FARC’s response, these are positive developments and the Uribe

Government should be supported. Staff believes that the

GOC efforts demonstrate clear attempts to bring about

peace and should be facilitated and supported by the U.S

Embassy in Bogota ́ appropriately.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

DRUG ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION

As of November 2005, over 132,000 hectares of coca and 1500

hectares of opium poppy had been sprayed since the beginning of

2005. Ground fire against spray planes is well below 2003’s record

levels but remains problematic.

Interdiction operations are on target to match or exceed 2004’s

record seizures. Through July 2005, the Colombian National Police

(CNP) had seized more than 65 metric tons of cocaine and coca

base, and the Colombian navy had seized more than 75 metric tons

of cocaine. In 2004 Government of Colombia forces seized 178 metric tons of cocaine and coca base. Cocaine seizures reportedly rose

from 117 metric tons in 2001 to 196 in 2004. And just last month,

White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) head

John Walters announced the price of cocaine rose 19 percent and

purity declined 15 percent over a seven-month period this year—

evidence to him that cocaine is getting scarcer.

7

Nevertheless, a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report

on the reliability of key U.S. Government data on cocaine trafficking, price, and purity questioned these numbers and advised

that the U.S. Government needs to do a better job at obtaining

more reliable data. The ONDCP estimated that between 325 and

675 metric tons of cocaine entered the United States in 2004, a

range that is too broad to be useful, the report added.

Although noticeable progress has been made regarding interdiction, with the exception of Operation Firewall, a cooperative U.S.

and Colombian maritime interdiction initiative on the North Coast

of Colombia, there are no other organized and capable partner nation maritime source or transit zone programs. This is an extremely important activity in the war on drugs, as it is estimated

that approximately 70% of cocaine trafficking to the United States

occurs by water transport.

8

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South

In any event, Operation Firewall has achieved significant success

with the direct and/or assisted seizures of approximately 32 metric

tons of cocaine in FY 2004 and 47 tons in FY 2005. However, this

program has been severely limited by the lack of Maritime Patrol

Aircraft (MPA) and rapid intercept capability mentioned above (at

this time, the Colombians have no radar detection MPA or substantive helicopter intercept capability). Without adequate MPA resources, it is almost impossible to detect and pinpoint those drugladen smuggling vessels in open waters. Although P-3 aircraft have

been successfully utilized in air, especially given the increase in

suspect air activity from Venezuela, their use is being reduced and

replacements are not available.

9

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South

Recommendations:

1. Staff recommends additional dedicated assets to support the Firewall program and to enhance coordinated

interdiction efforts with Joint Interagency Task Force

South (JIATF-South) that is envisioned to compliment

joint maritime activities. The importance of MPA to the

Maritime Interdiction program (JIATF-South and Firewall) can not be understated.

2. Staff recommends a refueling platform to assist Maritime Interdiction vessels coordinated through JIATF-South

operations to cover the eastern pacific coast of Colombia

(EASTPAC).

DEMOBILIZATION OF ‘‘RIGHTIST’’ PARAMILITARY FIGHTERS

Colombia’s demobilization will be a challenge. The ‘‘Justice and

Peace Law’’ to govern the process falls short regarding the establishment of a strong framework for dismantling the paramilitary

groups. The law lacks the effective enforcement structure necessary

to ensure that paramilitaries disclose information about their

groups’ criminal operations or surrender their illegally acquired

wealth. Under the law there is a very real possibility that Commanders convicted of atrocities will receive very short sentences,

even if it becomes clear that they have lied to prosecutors, kept

most of their illegal assets, drug labs and wealth, or continued to

engage in illegal paramilitary activity after they have ‘‘demobilized.’’ When these leaders re-enter society, their wealth, political

power, and criminal networks will have remained intact, allowing

10

them to replace their weapons and troops with ease if they choose,

or form their own laundered and ‘‘legitimate’’ narco-gangs.

Though President Uribe’s record of extradition throughout his

term (08/07/02 to 12/15/05) is excellent (at 315), of particular concern to the United States under the new ‘‘Peace and Justice Law’’

is its ambiguity regarding the extradition of paramilitary commanders who have been indicted in the United States. It appears

they can escape extradition by serving reduced sentences for their

crimes in Colombia and then claim double jeopardy.

Extraditions from Colombia to the United States

Colombia United

States Others Total

Total Extraditions: From 1991 Through 8/6/1998

Total extraditions by nationality, 7/4/91 through 8/6/98 ............. 0 7 8 15

Total Extraditions: Pastrana and Uribe

Individuals extradited by nationality during the Pastrana administration, 8/7/98 to 8/6/2 .......................................................... 51 4 9 64

Individuals extradited by nationality during the Uribe administration1 8/7/02 to 12/15/05 ...................................................... 304 1 10 315

Total extraditions from 07/04/91 to 12/15/05 .............................. 355 12 27 394

Total Extraditions: From 1/1/05 Through 12/15/05

Total extraditions in 2005 ............................................................. 131 0 3 134

1 Note: The total of 315 includes ten (10) individuals that Pastrana approved for extradition but were extradited after Uribe took office.

Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota ́ , Colombia, Dec. 2005.

Extradition provides President Uribe with an effective weapon, a

symbolic sword, to deter paramilitary commanders from acting

with impunity and encourages their adherence to agreements. Up

to now President Uribe has used extradition with clear resolve.

This sword must not be blunted by ambiguity.

State Department figures on the demobilization of the

paramilitaries show that approximately 13,592 (as of December 15,

2005) paramilitary troops have handed over their weapons. That

completes the introductory phase of the full demobilization process,

which is to begin its full implementation through the ‘‘Peace and

Justice Law’’ during the first quarter of 2006. Approximately

10,000 paramilitaries remain to demobilize.

COLOMBIA: PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION UPDATE1

Demobilized Numbers: 22,218

• 13,592—paramilitaries have demobilized collectively, as of 12/15

• 8,626—illegal armed members have demobilized individually, as of 12/15

• FARC 4,292, AUC 3,040, ELN 1,176, Dissidents 229

Demobilized CRO Registered, DAS Certified, Jailed, Deaths, SENA and Employed

• CRO: 8,973, 7 CROs (Medellin, Turbo, Monteria, Sincelejo, Cucuta, Antioquia,

Cali) plus 2 mobile CROs

• DAS certified: 4,658; Jailed: 126; Deaths: 135; SENA: 3,223

11

• Employed: Of the 8,618 demobilized that have registered at the CROs, 1,500

are working

• 14% fromal sector, 7% productive projects, 79% informal sector

Paramilitary Groups Left to Demobilize: 10,000

• Approximately 10,000 paramilitaries remain to demobilize

• 3,000 from the North Bloc

• 3,000 from the BCB (over 25 fronts)

• Independent groups:

• Elmer Cardenas Bloc with 800 members

• Mineros Bloc with 2,000 members

• Self-Defense Mid-Magdalena Bloc

• Two remaining fronts from the Centauros Bloc

• Demobilization deadline: February 15 (According to Pretelt)

1Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota ́, Colombia, Dec. 2005

Recommendations:

1. Staff strongly recommends that the USG encourage

the GOC to create strong regulations for the law’s implementation (at the time this report was written implementing language had not been signed by President Uribe)

and forcefully implement them.

2. Staff strongly recommends that the USG request that

the GOC ensure that regulations provide an interpretation

of the law’s eligibility requirements (including turnover of

assets, cessation of illegal activities, and release of hostages) that is as strict as possible, establish rigorous procedures for verifying that the requirements are met, and prescribe effective sanctions for those who fail to meet them.

3. To preserve the possibility for extradition, staff recommends that the USG request that the GOC ensure that

regulations should prohibit the GOC’s Attorney General’s

Office from bringing charges under the law for crimes with

which demobilized individuals have been charged in other

countries.

ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA IN ADVANCING THE

DEFENSE AND EXPANSION OF THEIR PRESENCE IN FARC AND PARAMILITARY CONTROLLED AREAS

United States Government assistance to Colombia under Plan

Colombia is premised on combating the interrelated issues of drug

trafficking and terrorism and includes training, material aid, and

guidance to the security forces and other institutions. Establishing

a state presence throughout national territory lies at the core of

bringing peace to Colombia. Increasing state activity in 2005 may

have been responsible for keeping FARC violence localized and

below 2004 levels. Nonetheless, the FARC attacked indigenous

towns, electrical towers, rural highways, military and police outposts. While the attacks were partially directed at military targets,

civilians were also indiscriminately killed. Reductions in violence,

however, did occur and are due for the most part to the effective

implementation of military policy:

12

Plan Patriota: Plan Patriota, the GOC’s military campaign to extend government control and security presence throughout the national territory, is composed of two major phases: Phase 1, the

planning and preparation for the forceful removal of armed groups;

and Phase 2, which was divided into three components: 2A, 2B,

and 2C, to implement Phase 2. Phase 2A, which took place from

June to December 2003, resulted in the removal of the FARC from

Bogota ́ and Cundinamarca Department. Phase 2B, which began in

February 2004 and continues, includes Meta, Caqueta, and

Guaviare Departments, involved the removal of the FARC from

those areas. This is a large part of the area that comprised the

‘‘despeje,’’ or the area President Pastrana had conceded to the

FARC. Phase 2C, which is the forceful removal of FARC from

Antioquia Department, was scheduled to begin late in 2005, but

has been postponed.

Colombian Military Reports on Results for Joint Task Force Omega (in Charge of Phase

2B), 2004–2005

2004 2005 Total

Battles 505 317 822

COLMIL Troops Killed ........................................................................ 67 25 92

COLMIL Troops Injured ..................................................................... 328 78 406

FARC Members Killed ....................................................................... 264 204 468

FARC Members Captured ................................................................. 217 394 611

FARC Deserters ................................................................................. 97 76 173

Materiel Captured

Guns, Rifles, Support Arms .............................................................. 265 431 1,451

Explosive Devices ............................................................................. 2,752 3,074 5,826

Explosives (KLS) ............................................................................... 16,335 28,339 44,674

Grenades ........................................................................................... 4,440 5,962 10,402

Munitions .......................................................................................... 630,428 826,022 1,456,450

Communication Equipment .............................................................. 235 363 598

Mined Camps ................................................................................... 206 88 294

FARC Camps ..................................................................................... 421 619 1,040

Caches .............................................................................................. 117 363 480

Cultivated Hectares .......................................................................... 1,277 1,167 2,444

Coca Paste and Base ....................................................................... 10,292 869 11,161

Laboratories ...................................................................................... 32 196 228

Vehicles ............................................................................................ 255 117 432

Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota ́ , Colombia

The Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has reduced

the FARC ranks from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year. Information provided by the Office of the Colombian President reports that

11 FARC-run villages were recaptured, more than 400 FARC

camps were destroyed, 1,534 explosive devices and 323 gas-cylinder

bombs were seized, 2,518 combatants were killed, and a large

amount of ammunition and weapons were taken. FARC drug trafficking activities also were reduced. As of September 2004, the Government reported that the Colombian military had located and destroyed more than 47 tons of solid chemical supplies, 18,000 gallons

of liquid precursors, half a ton of cocaine base, and $34,000 in cash.

13

In addition, with support from the U.S. Military Group

(MILGRP), the Colombia Government formed an interagency center

to facilitate social services in seven areas that have traditionally

suffered from little state presence and pressure from illegal armed

groups. The ‘‘Center for Coordinated Integral Action’’ focuses on

providing immediate social services, including documentation and

medical clinics, and establishing longer term projects, such as economic reactivation. Approximately 40,000 individuals have been

enrolled in state health care, judges, investigators, and public defenders have been placed in all 16 municipalities of the Plan

Patriota area, and a public library was recently opened in the town

of San Vicente del Caguan, which had long been dominated by the

FARC.

At the time this report was written, President Uribe and the

GOC had accepted an ‘‘international commission’’ (representatives

from France, Switzerland, and Spain) suggestion to establish a 65

square mile ‘‘security zone’’ in the Valle del Cauca to conduct hostage exchange talks with the FARC; and the GOC had begun conversations with the ELN in Cuba.

Regarding the FARC, the international commission handed the

proposal to the GOC and the FARC on December 13. The FARC

has not yet replied, and experts, including staff, viewed the likely

response from FARC with some skepticism. Some 30 families live

in the proposed security zone, a rural area that contains several

small governmental facilities and a church. Uribe said the proposal

contemplates 40 international observers in the security zone to

verify that no armed actors are present, either GOC forces or guerrillas. The security zone would exist for seven days prior to any

GOC-FARC meeting (to allow the FARC to get to the zone) and for

seven days following the conclusion of the talks (to allow the FARC

to leave). The International Committee of the Red Cross would observe the process, along with a committee representing the European facilitators. Colombian sovereignty and law would remain in

effect in the security zone.

Regarding the ELN, the meeting between the GOC and the ELN

in Cuba (which began in mid-December 2005) is the first formal encounter between them in almost four years. Few are optimistic success will come easily. The talks will be exploratory with an open

agenda, assisted by Norway, Spain and Switzerland, the group of

civil society guarantors of the ‘‘Casa de Paz’’ initiative, and other

members of Colombian civil society. The first meeting will be in

Cuba, primarily to schedule future sessions. Subsequent meetings

would likely take place in Europe. The ELN leadership reportedly

settled on Cuba rather than risk legal jeopardy in Europe, given

their designated status as a terrorist organization. Cuba’s role will

be limited to that of host.

Recommendation:

Staff strongly recommends that efforts by the GOC in

bringing about peace and in advancing the defense and expansion of their presence in FARC and ELN areas continue to be funded as necessary subject to review and with

appropriate oversight.

14

APPENDIX I

STAFF HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS IN

COLOMBIA:

Colombian Government Officials

President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe

Minister of Defense, Camilo Ospina Bernal

Vice President of Colombia, Francisco Santos’ Director for

Human Rights, Carlos Franco

Prosecutor General, Mario Iguaran

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alejandro Borda Rojas

Vice Minister of Defense, Jorge Eastman

Vice Minister of Defense, Hernando Sanin

Presidential Counselor, Juan Lozano

Presidential Advisor, Jaime Bermudez

Direccio ́n de Policia Judicial—(Dijin), Director, Gen. Oscar

Naranjo

Attorney General of Colombia, Edgardo Maya

Colombian Government Legislative Branch

Senator Rafael Pardo

United States State Department, U.S. Embassy Bogota ́, Colombia

U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Wood (POL. PAS, NAS,

AID, DATT, MILGRP, DEA, ORA Officers)

Diplomatic Community

Representatives from British, Canadian, Chilean, Swedish,

Swiss, and Dutch Embassies

Multilateral Organizations

Michael Fruhling, UN Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights in Colombia

Juan Pedro Schaerer, International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC), Head of Delegation in Colombia

Sergio Caramagna, Head of the Organization of American States

(OAS) Mission in Support of the Peace Process

Think Tanks

Sergio Jaramillo, President, Ideas Para La Paz

Press

Rodrigo Pardo, Chief Editor, Semana Magazine

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