1The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-3547

___________

Vanessa Thornhill, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner *

of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED]

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 1999

Filed: March 24, 1999

___________

Before McMILLIAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and

NANGLE,1 District Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Vanessa Thornhill appeals from a final order entered in the United States

District Court2 for the Western District of Missouri affirming the decision of the
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Commissioner of Social Security denying her social security disability benefits.

Thornhill v. Apfel, No. 97-4021 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (hereinafter “slip op.”).

Jurisdiction in the district court was based on 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Jurisdiction in this

court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For reasons stated below, we affirm the order of

the district court. 

Thornhill applied for social security disability benefits on October 27, 1992,

alleging that, as of that date, she was disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act due to a combination of carpal tunnel syndrome, psychological

impairments, and disabling pain, among other things. Following a hearing, the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) entered an order dated August 23, 1996, concluding

that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because there

were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which Thornhill

could perform. She requested review by the Social Security Administration Appeals

Council. By letter dated December 4, 1996, the Appeals Council denied her request

for review. The decision of the ALJ therefore became the final decision of the

Commissioner, and Thornhill appealed the decision to the district court. Thornhill

moved for summary judgment and, upon review, the district court held that “the ALJ

properly determined based on the record as a whole that Plaintiff could perform other

work in the national economy and was therefore not disabled.” Slip op. at 14.

Thereafter, Thornhill appealed. 

For reversal, Thornhill argues that the district court erred in holding that

substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s decision. More

specifically, she maintains that substantial evidence does not exist in the record to

support the ALJ’s findings with respect to the credibility of her subjective complaints

of pain, the full extent of her psychological and other impairments, or the combined

effect of her impairments. She also contends that the ALJ improperly considered the

vocational expert’s testimony, misinterpreted the applicable law, and did not fully and

fairly develop the record in this case. We have carefully reviewed the parties’
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arguments on appeal and the record in this case, including the district court’s order

and the ALJ’s order. Upon review, we agree with the district court that the ALJ did

not err in evaluating the vocational expert’s testimony or in interpreting applicable

law, that the record was adequately developed, and that there is substantial evidence

on the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s decision. The order of the district court

is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.