Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT 

Friday, October 7, 2005 SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR 

MATERIALS 

Poor Planning Has 

Complicated DOE’s 

Plutonium Consolidation 

Efforts 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

GAO-06-164T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-164T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-164T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, House of Representatives 

October 7, 2005

SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE's 

Plutonium Consolidation Efforts 

As GAO reported in July 2005, DOE cannot yet consolidate its surplus 

plutonium at SRS for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan 

to process the plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required 

by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without 

such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS 

cannot receive all of the plutonium from DOE’s Hanford Site because it is 

not in a form SRS planned to store. Specifically, about 20 percent of 

Hanford’s plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which 

Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as part of its efforts to cleanup 

and demolish its closed nuclear facilities. However, SRS’s storage plan 

assumed Hanford would package all of its plutonium in DOE’s standard 

storage containers. Until a permanent disposition plan is developed, more 

plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost 

savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer. In 

particular, continued storage at Hanford will cost approximately $85 million 

more annually because of increasing security requirements and will threaten 

that site’s achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan. 

In addition, DOE lacks the necessary capability to fully monitor the 

condition of the plutonium to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at 

SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems 

to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring 

capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release that 

could harm workers, the public, and the environment. DOE had planned to 

construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that already had 

safety systems needed to work with plutonium. However, this building 

would not have had sufficient security to conduct all of the required 

monitoring activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety 

problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it 

would have SRS’s storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium 

monitoring. 

Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE’s Surplus Plutonium 

Hanford

Rocky

Flats

Los Alamos

Consolidation

Permanent disposition

Sources: MapArt and GAO.

Savannah River

Site

Lawrence

Livermore

Yucca

Mountain

Plutonium is very hazardous to 

human health and the environment 

and requires extensive security 

because of its potential use in a 

nuclear weapon. The Department 

of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 

metric tons of plutonium that is no 

longer needed by the United States 

for nuclear weapons. Some of this 

plutonium is in the form of 

contaminated metal, oxides, 

solutions, and residues remaining 

from the nuclear weapons 

production process. To improve 

security and reduce storage costs, 

DOE plans to establish enough 

storage capacity at its Savannah 

River Site (SRS) in the event it 

decides to consolidate its 

plutonium there until it can be 

permanently disposed of. GAO was 

asked to examine (1) the extent to 

which DOE can consolidate this 

plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS’s 

capacity to monitor plutonium 

storage containers. 

What GAO Recommends

In its July 2005 report, GAO made 

two recommendations to ensure 

that DOE develops a 

comprehensive strategy for 

plutonium consolidation, storage, 

and disposition and that its cleanup 

plans are consistent with this 

strategy. DOE generally agreed 

with the recommendations and 

stated that its recently created 

Nuclear Materials Disposition and 

Consolidation Coordination 

Committee will develop a strategic 

plan for the consolidation and 

disposition of plutonium. 
Page 1 GAO-06-164T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE) efforts to consolidate surplus plutonium. My testimony 

today is based on our report issued in July 2005, entitled Securing U.S. 

Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate 

Plutonium (GAO-05-665). 

DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by 

the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the 

form of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining 

from the nuclear weapons production process. When the United States 

stopped producing nuclear weapons in 1989, it had plutonium inventories 

located in numerous DOE facilities throughout the United States, 

including the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky Flats Environmental 

Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 

Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and 

the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. DOE recognizes that 

consolidation could reduce costs and improve security for stored 

plutonium. Although DOE has not made a final decision to consolidate, it 

has proceeded with plans to establish enough storage capacity at SRS in 

the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until it can be 

processed into a form for permanent disposition and disposed of in a 

geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment. 

Inhaling a few micrograms creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone 

cancer and inhaling larger doses can cause immediate lung injuries and 

death. In certain forms, plutonium can spontaneously combust in the 

presence of oxygen at temperatures above room temperature. Because of 

these hazards, plutonium must be stabilized and packaged appropriately to 

minimize the risk of accidental release. In addition, facilities storing 

plutonium must be properly equipped with safety systems that prevent it 

from escaping into the surrounding air, land, or water in the event a 

storage container is breached. 

In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium storage that it 

believes will allow it to safely store plutonium for a minimum of 50 years. 

DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear effort to stabilize and package 

plutonium at its sites across the United States into 5-inch-wide, 10-inchlong storage containers. Under DOE’s standard, once the plutonium is 

safely packaged, DOE must periodically monitor the storage containers for 

changes in the plutonium’s condition, particularly any pressurization or 
Page 2 GAO-06-164T 

corrosion of the containers. Such monitoring includes annually x-raying a 

sample of storage containers to evaluate potential pressurization. Storage 

containers may also be cut open to evaluate the plutonium inside and the 

container itself for potential corrosion. An effective monitoring program is 

intended to detect damaged storage containers or inadequately stabilized 

plutonium and will help ensure the continued safe storage of the material. 

In addition to plutonium’s health and environmental hazards, DOE has 

long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site containing 

plutonium could have devastating consequences for the site and its 

surrounding communities. Therefore, plutonium requires extensive 

security because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon; to create an 

improvised nuclear device; and to create a so-called “dirty bomb,” in which 

conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. For 

many years, a key component of DOE security has been the development 

of the design basis threat, a classified document that identifies the 

potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. Since September 11, 

2001, the size of the potential threat has increased significantly and DOE is 

facing challenges in improving its security measures to respond to the 

increased threat.1

Our July 2005 report examined (1) the extent to which DOE can 

consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS’s capacity to monitor 

plutonium storage containers. We reviewed plutonium storage, 

monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE’s Office of 

Environmental Management, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety 

Performance Assurance, and National Nuclear Security Administration; 

DOE’s operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River 

Company); and DOE’s security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, 

Inc.). In addition, we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at SRS and 

interviewed officials with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an 

independent federal agency established by the Congress in 1988 to oversee 

the safety of DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. The work on our report 

was conducted from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 1

See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully 

Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004) and 

GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 

Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis 

Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005). 
Page 3 GAO-06-164T 

In summary, DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. DOE has 

not yet completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for 

permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional 

plutonium to SRS. In addition, DOE’s plutonium consolidation efforts have 

been hindered because DOE relied upon its individual sites to 

independently develop plans to achieve their own goals instead of 

developing an integrated consolidation plan. Specifically, Hanford was 

preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the 

cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. About one-fifth of 

Hanford’s plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods. 

Because disassembling the fuel rods would delay cleanup activities, 

Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan calls for shipping these rods intact to 

SRS inside special shipping containers. However, SRS’s storage plan 

assumed Hanford would disassemble the fuel rods and package the 

plutonium in DOE’s standard storage containers. Despite these 

inconsistencies, DOE approved both Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan 

and SRS’s plutonium storage plans. Although SRS’s plutonium storage 

facility has sufficient space to store the fuel rods, several steps are 

necessary before DOE would be able to ship the fuel rods to SRS, 

including obtaining Department of Transportation certified shipping 

containers for the fuel rods. However, until DOE develops a plan to 

process the plutonium for permanent disposition, additional plutonium 

cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and 

security improvements that plutonium consolidation could offer. In 

particular, continued plutonium storage at Hanford will cost 

approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing security 

requirements and will threaten that site’s achievement of the milestones in 

its accelerated cleanup plan. 

In addition, DOE currently lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the 

plutonium storage containers as required by DOE’s storage standard. 

According to the Safety Board, the facility at SRS that DOE plans to use to 

store the plutonium—Building 105-K—is not equipped to conduct the 

needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because Building 105-K 

lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and filtration, DOE’s standard 

storage containers cannot be removed from their outer packaging—35-

gallon steel drums used to ship the containers to SRS. Without a 

monitoring capability that would detect whether the stored plutonium is 

becoming unstable and damaging the storage containers, DOE faces 

increased risks of an accidental plutonium release at SRS that could harm 

workers, the public, and the environment. Because Building 105-K lacks 

the capability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE had planned to construct 
Page 4 GAO-06-164T 

a monitoring capability in another building at SRS—Building 235-F—that 

already had the ventilation and filtration systems needed to work with 

plutonium. However, following changes in 2004 to DOE’s design basis 

threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to conduct all 

of the monitoring activities required by DOE’s storage standard. In 

addition, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has reported that, 

like Building 105-K storage facility, Building 235-F lacks adequate fire 

protection as well as having other serious safety concerns. Given these 

challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have Building 105-

K upgraded to allow storage and monitoring activities to be centralized in 

one facility. 

In our report, we made two recommendations to ensure that DOE 

develops a comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, 

and disposition and that its facilities cleanup plans are consistent with this 

strategy. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that 

its recently created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation 

Coordination Committee will develop a strategic plan for the consolidation 

and disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Since our 

report was issued in July 2005, DOE’s committee has been continuing with 

its work developing the strategic plan. 

To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and 

inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard 

for the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years that sets 

plutonium stabilization and packaging requirements. Stabilization is 

achieved by heating the material to remove moisture that could lead to a 

buildup of pressure, which would increase the risk of rupturing a 

container. Plutonium storage containers designed to meet the standard 

consist of an inner and outer container, each welded shut. The inner 

container is designed so that it can be monitored for a buildup of pressure 

using analytical techniques, such as radiography, that do not damage the 

container. Containers must also be resistant to fire, leakage, and 

corrosion. 

Plutonium stabilization and packaging are completed at Rocky Flats, 

Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers 

from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging are still ongoing at 

Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once 

stabilization and packaging are completed, DOE estimates that it will have 

nearly 5,700 plutonium storage containers stored at locations across the 

United States that could eventually be shipped to SRS. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-06-164T 

SRS’s plutonium storage plans originally called for the construction of a 

state-of-the-art Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility that would have 

provided long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium 

containers in a secure environment. DOE changed its storage plans and 

cancelled the project in 2001 because it expected to store the plutonium 

for only a few years until a facility to process the plutonium for permanent 

disposition was available. Instead of building a new facility, DOE decided 

to use two existing buildings at SRS for plutonium storage and monitoring 

operations: Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was 

originally a nuclear reactor built in the early 1950s and produced 

plutonium and tritium until 1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold 

standby condition until its complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor 

components were removed and the facility is now primarily used to store 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Building 235-F was also 

constructed in the 1950s and was used until the mid-1980s to produce 

plutonium heat sources that were used to power space probes for the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of 

Defense. The building is currently used to store plutonium. 

After the design basis threat was changed in October 2004, SRS was forced 

once again to reevaluate its storage plans. Because the new design basis 

threat substantially increased the potential threat that SRS must defend 

against, Building 105-K and Building 235-F would need extensive and 

expensive upgrades to comply with the new requirements. SRS estimated 

the total cost of this additional security at over $300 million. SRS further 

estimated that it could save more than $120 million by not using Building 

235-F for storage and therefore decided in April 2005 to consolidate 

plutonium storage in Building 105-K. 

DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons. 

First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form 

for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.2

 DOE proposed two facilities at 

SRS to process its surplus plutonium into a form for permanent 

disposition: a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility to convert plutonium 

into fuel rods for use in nuclear power plants and a plutonium 

immobilization plant where plutonium would be mixed with ceramics, the 

mixture placed in large canisters, and the canisters then filled with high-

 2

Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001). 

DOE Cannot 

Currently Consolidate 

Its Plutonium at SRS 
Page 6 GAO-06-164T 

level radioactive waste. The canisters would then be permanently 

disposed of at Yucca Mountain. In 2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE 

cancelled the plutonium immobilization plant, eliminating the pathway to 

process its most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable for 

permanent disposition. Section 3155 of the act provides that if DOE 

decides not to construct either of two proposed plutonium disposition 

facilities at SRS, DOE is prohibited from shipping plutonium to SRS until a 

plan to process the material for permanent disposition is developed and 

submitted to the Congress. To date, DOE has not developed a disposition 

plan for the plutonium that would have been processed in the 

immobilization plant. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE requested $10 

million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that would process this 

plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design work would be 

completed and a plan prepared. 

Second, even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition 

had been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS would 

still be unable to accommodate some of Hanford’s plutonium because 

Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plans and SRS’s storage plans are 

inconsistent with one another. DOE approved both plans even though 

Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan called for shipping some of its 

plutonium to SRS in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. 

Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of 12-foot-long 

nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE standard 5-inchwide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods were to be used in 

Hanford’s Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The reactor has been closed, and 

the fuel rods were never used. Hanford’s plutonium is currently being 

stored at the site’s Plutonium Finishing Plant—the storage containers in 

vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in large casks inside a fenced area. 

Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to 

accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. 

Although Hanford’s original cleanup plan called for demolishing the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to 

accelerate the site’s cleanup. Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan that was 

approved by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management now calls for 

shipping the storage containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of 

fiscal year 2006 so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant by the end of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford 

planned to ship the fuel rods intact to SRS. 

Nevertheless, SRS’s July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that Hanford 

would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in approximately 1,000 
Page 7 GAO-06-164T 

DOE standard storage containers before shipping the material to SRS. 

Although Building 105-K has space to store the fuel rods intact, several 

steps would be necessary before DOE could ship the fuel rods from 

Hanford to SRS. First, there is currently no Department of Transportationcertified shipping container that could be used to package and ship the 

fuel rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among other things, to 

prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under the National 

Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K’s safety 

documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel rods 

are stored, they would have to be disassembled before processing the 

plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack the 

capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study 

establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of a 

facility to process the plutonium for disposition. 

The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the 

department’s failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. DOE 

has not developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for plutonium 

consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its facilities’ 

requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent 

disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE 

will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that 

plutonium consolidation could offer. According to DOE officials, the 

impact of continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will 

be relatively minor because both laboratories had already planned to 

maintain plutonium storage facilities for other laboratory missions. 

However, according to Hanford officials, continued storage at Hanford 

could cost approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing 

security requirements and will threaten the achievement of the goals in the 

site’s accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically, maintaining storage vaults at 

Hanford’s Plutonium Finishing Plant will prevent the site from 

demolishing the plant as scheduled by September 2008. 

Under DOE’s plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be 

periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a 

monitoring capability that can detect whether storage containers are at 

risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium 

release that could harm workers, the public, and the environment. 

Monitoring activities must occur in a facility that, among other things, is 

equipped to confine accidentally released plutonium through effective 

ventilation and appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must have a fire 

DOE Cannot 

Currently Fully 

Monitor the Condition 

of Stored Plutonium 
Page 8 GAO-06-164T 

protection system to protect storage containers and prevent their contents 

from being released in a major fire. 

According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K is not currently equipped 

with adequate ventilation or fire protection. Specifically, SRS removed the 

High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters that were used in the 

building’s ventilation system when it was a nuclear reactor. Such filters 

could prevent plutonium from escaping the building in the event of a 

release from the storage containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks 

automatic fire detection or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium 

storage containers cannot safely be removed from inside the outer 

packaging used to ship the containers to SRS. The outer package—a 35-

gallon steel drum—is used to ship a single storage container and is 

designed to resist damage during transportation and handling. The outer 

package confines the plutonium in the event the storage container inside is 

breached. In addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of 

protection from fire for the storage container inside. 

Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, in 

some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the 

condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage 

containers must be removed from their outer packaging. SRS plans to 

establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating it in a 

specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the stored 

plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of rupturing a 

storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be packaged 

into new storage containers. The only facility at SRS currently capable of 

restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has closed in preparation for 

decommissioning.3

Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage 

containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building 

235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was already 

equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to handling 

plutonium—multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan systems 

 3

This facility—FB Line—was constructed in the early 1960s to convert plutonium solutions 

into solid forms to be used in nuclear weapons components. In recent years, its primary 

mission has been to stabilize scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at SRS and package 

the stabilized plutonium into storage containers. FB Line ceased operations and transferred 

its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in March 2005. 
Page 9 GAO-06-164T 

that use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is further 

filtered through a sand filter before entering the outside atmosphere.4

Currently, Building 235-F is limited to removing storage containers from 

their outer packaging and x-raying the containers to evaluate potential 

pressurization. Although DOE has installed equipment in Building 235-F 

that can puncture the storage container to relieve pressure, Building 235-F 

currently lacks the capability to conduct destructive examinations. 

Destructive examinations consist of cutting containers open to take 

samples of and analyze the gases inside and examining the containers 

themselves for indications of corrosion. In addition, destructive 

examination allows plutonium inside the container to be analyzed to 

detect any changes in the plutonium’s condition. Building 235-F also 

currently lacks the capability to restabilize and repackage plutonium. 

In addition, Building 235-F faced several other challenges that would have 

affected its ability to monitor plutonium. Because of changes in the design 

basis threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store 

Category I quantities of plutonium.5

 SRS officials estimate that 972 storage 

containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium metal. Although 

these storage containers are at relatively low risk for rupture, SRS would 

have been unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K to 

monitor their condition. According to SRS officials, security measures 

could have been established in Building 235-F if a safety issue had arisen 

that required opening a Category I container. 

 4

Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete enclosures and filled 

with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As air flows upward through the bed, the rock, 

gravel, and sand filter out plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then 

flow into the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S. nuclear facilities 

since 1948. Although initially expensive, sand filters can remove a large amount of 

radioactive material, require relatively little maintenance, and are fire resistant. 

5

Category I material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium 

in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test devices; (2) pure products 

containing higher concentrations of plutonium or highly enriched uranium; and (3) highgrade materials, such as carbides, oxides, solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with 

Category I special nuclear material vary but include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or 

test device at or near design yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of 

producing a nuclear yield, theft for use in a nuclear weapon, and the potential for sabotage 

in the form of radioactive dispersal. 
Page 10 GAO-06-164T 

Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety 

concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported the 

following: 

• The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the 

building lack fire detection and alarm systems. 

• The building’s nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been removed. 

A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile material, such as 

plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained nuclear chain reaction. 

The immediate result of a nuclear criticality accident is the production of 

an uncontrolled and unpredictable radiation source that can be lethal to 

people who are nearby. 

• A number of the building’s safety systems depend upon electrical cables 

that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their estimated life. 

When electrical cables age, they become brittle and may crack, increasing 

the potential for failure. 

• SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could 

present a hazard in the event of an earthquake. 

• The building’s ventilation system still contains plutonium from its previous 

mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space probes. This 

highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for example, during a fire 

or earthquake and could pose a hazard to workers in the building. 

Once again, DOE’s monitoring challenges demonstrate its failure to 

adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive 

strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its 

storage standard, DOE’s plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art 

storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety Board 

had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE’s plans have subsequently 

changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 million to begin 

modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it would only use 

the building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE plans to install 

the necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment in Building 105-K, 

a 50-year-old building that was not designed for such functions. This 

decision underscores that DOE’s lack of careful planning has forced SRS 

to focus on what can be done with existing facilities, eliminating options 

that could have been both more cost-effective and safer than current 

plans. 
Page 11 GAO-06-164T 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Sherry McDonald, Assistant Director; and Ryan T. Coles 

made key contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360636) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER