May 3, 2010 

The Honorable Phyllis Borzi 

Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefit Security Administration 

US Department of Labor 

Washington, DC 20210-0002 

The Honorable J. Mark Iwry 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Retirement and Health Benefits 

US Department of the Treasury 

Washington, DC 20220-0002 

Nancy J. Marks 

Division Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel 

Tax Exempt and Government Entities 

Internal Revenue Service 

US Department of the Treasury 

Washington, DC 20224-0002 

RE: RIN 1210-AB33 

Dear Ms Borzi, Mr. Iwry, and Ms Marks: 

As the Director of the Pension Research Council and Boettner Center at the Wharton 

School of the University of Pennsylvania, the oldest pension research group in the United 

States, I am pleased to respond to your Request for Information Regarding Lifetime 

Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans. Replies to several 

of your questions are provided, based on my over 30 years of research and consulting in 

the retirement security arena. I have not dealt with all the questions but rather focused my 

remarks on areas of particular relevance to my own research, teaching, policy, and 

industry work. 

The Administration is to be commended is to be congratulated for highlighting this 

important issue and focusing regulatory attention on the matter. We are pleased to offer 

our perspective based on our extensive experience serving the needs of plan sponsors and 

participants. 
The following are key points addressed in the submission: 

 

• There is an increasing need for lifetime payout products as Baby Boomers move into 

retirement, as these products help protect against rising longevity risk. 

• Nevertheless many workers do not appreciate the need for lifetime income and 

policies to enhance their appeal may be needed. 

• Increased financial literacy and education for participants may be needed, along with 

greater transparency and standardization in the lifetime income product marketplace. 

• Pension plan sponsors will be more likely to offer payout products with longevity 

protection if additional safe harbor provisions and guidelines are made available. 

Thank you for your kind consideration. If you need additional information, please contact 

me at mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu or at 215 898 0424. 

Sincerely yours, 

Dr. Olivia S. Mitchell 

Executive Director, Pension Research Council 

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
Responses to RFI on Lifetime Income Options in Retirement Plans (RIN 1210-AB33) 

Submitted May 3, 2010, by Dr. Olivia S. Mitchell 

1. From the standpoint of plan participants, what are the advantages and disadvantages 

for participants of receiving some or all of their benefits in the form of lifetime payments? 

Payout programs which provide periodic and regular income for the remainder of one’s life are 

useful in several ways. They help participants payout assets so as to minimize or eliminate 

running out of money due to longevity risk. They can also be a convenient tool for participants 

seeking an income stream from a pool of saving. In this context, guaranteed lifetime income 

benefits protect beneficiaries from outliving their assets so they will be less likely to be destitute 

in old ages. Additionally, a steady stream of income will benefit the financially less literate who 

are unable to budget and plan effectively. And older retirees who may lose the ability to manage 

their finances will be better protected against mis-selling of financial products. Disadvantages of 

lifetime income payments include the fact that that buyers must trust financial providers to 

remain solvent, to provide benefit flows that are inflation-protected, and that are not eroded by 

fees and charges. Also, a subset of retirees is already well covered by pre-existing annuities (via 

Social Security and defined benefit pensions) so will not need additional annuitization from their 

defined contribution plans. 

 

Ultimately, enlighted plan sponsors will view plan education and advice as central to helping 

participants spend their retirement assets wisely, in all types of plans. 

2. Currently the vast majority of individuals who have the option of receiving a lump sum 

distribution or ad hoc periodic payments from their retirement plan or IRA choose to do so 

and do not select a lifetime income option. What explains the low usage rate of lifetime 

income arrangements? Is it the result of a market failure or other factors (e.g., cost, 

complexity of products, adverse selection, poor decision-making by consumers, desire for 

flexibility to respond to unexpected financial needs, counterparty risk of seller insolvency, 

etc.)? Are there steps that the Agencies could or should take to overcome at least some of 

the concerns that keep plan participants from requesting or electing lifetime income? 

At retirement, most who have the option to take a lump sum do so because of several reasons: 

- In defined benefit plans: participants may be concerned about underfunding in the plans 

so they may fear sponsor bankruptcy risk (particularly when promised benefits exceed the 

PBGC maximum); also the discount rate used in computing their lump sums may be 

favorable; 

- In defined contribution plans: Many plan sponsors tend not to offer annuities ‘inside’ the 

plans, fearing that if they do it will expose them to potential fiduciary liability claims if 

the annuity provider fails to make good. 

- In all plan types: there are a number of behavioral finance errors participants may make. 

For instance they may believe they can invest ‘better” than the plan sponsor and 

overestimate their expected returns; they may not fully understand that sponsor fees and 

charges may be less than what they pay managing the money on their own. Also financial 

advisers may recommend taking the lump sum so they can earn commissions on the 

money management. Participants also tend to underestimate the chance they will live 
very long lives, hence not be aware of the benefits of longevity risk protection; 

conversely they suffer from lump-sum illusion, thinking that a small accumulation will be 

sufficient to live on for a long time. In many cases annuity products are very complex, 

with numerous riders and fees, which makes the product very difficult to understand. And 

those with small account balances will find that annuitization is expensive and not very 

appealing. 

To encourage participants to do more to elect lifetime income instead of lump sum payouts, the 

Agencies could: 

- Increase participants’ awareness of longevity risk using benefits calculators that 

emphasize “tail” survival risk, instead of focusing on life expectancy; 

- Encourage annuitization in both defined benefit and defined contribution plans with tax 

advantages, particularly if the payouts are inflation indexed; 

- Clarify safe harbor practices for plan sponsors seeking to include annuities as default 

payout options; 

Nevertheless,, as per current practice, most retirement income decisions are likely to utilize 

nonguaranteed or portfolio-based solutions rather than annuity contracts.

3. What types of Lifetime Income are currently available to participants directly from 

plans (in plan options), such as payments from trust assets held under a defined benefit 

plan and annuity payments from insurance contracts held under a defined contribution or 

defined benefit plan? 

It is unusual for defined contribution plans to offer annuities in the current payout environment. 

Some provide a means for participants to take minimum distributions as required by law, though 

a common approach seems to be to roll over the funds to an IRA and then use some withdrawal 

rule of thumb (e.g. 4% per year). This does not provide longevity risk protection. Defined benefit 

plans traditionally only offered an annuity option but currently a great many offer lump sum 

payouts which participants tend to take. 

4. To what extent are the Lifetime Income options referenced in question 3 provided at 

retirement or other termination of employment as opposed to being offered incrementally 

during the accumulation phase, as contributions are made? How are such incremental or 

accumulating annuity arrangements structured? 

A handful of insurance companies offer deferred annuity purchases during the worklife, in the 

context of defined contribution plans. The recent global financial crisis seems to be spurring 

employee interest in such products. 

5. To what extent are 401(k) and other defined contribution plan sponsors using employer 

matching contributions or employer non-elective contributions to fund Lifetime Income? 

To what extent are participants offered a choice regarding such use of employer 

contributions, including by default or otherwise? 

This is a very new area and not much information is available as of yet. I believe that using 

employer and/or employee non-elective contributions to purchase deferred annuities would be an 

attractive idea to make sure part of the retirement accumulations take the form of an annuity. 

However the details matter, including fees and charges. 
7. What product features have a significant impact on the cost of providing lifetime income 

or other arrangements designed to provide a stream of income after retirement, such as 

features that provide participants with the option of lifetime payments, while retaining the 

flexibility to accelerate distributions if needed? 

Most products providing longevity risk protection are offered by insurers, so costs will vary 

state-to-state depending on local state insurance regulations. In addition macroeconomic 

conditions will be influential including the interest rate and inflation environment; mortality 

patterns (current and predicted) are also important. Finally, product-specific features will vary. 

8. What are the advantages and disadvantages for participants of selecting Lifetime Income 

payments through a plan (in-plan option) as opposed to outside a plan (e.g., after a 

distribution or rollover)? 

Having an in-plan option for annuitization is likely to be less expensive than retail purchase; 

there is less adverse selection and the potential for scale economies will make the product 

cheaper. On the other hand, if the in-plan annuity is priced using unisex tables, this will make it 

less attractive to men than to women. 

9. What are the advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of the plan sponsor of 

providing an in-plan option for lifetime income as opposed to leaving to participants the 

task of securing a lifetime income vehicle after receiving a plan distribution? 

A possible disadvantage from the plan sponsor’s perspective is that the sponsor will likely have 

some fiduciary liability for the in-plan option. It would also be necessary to clarify who bears the 

costs of selecting the provider, etc. 

10. How commonly do plan sponsors offer participants the explicit choice of using a portion 

of their account balances to purchase a lifetime annuity, while leaving the rest in the plan 

or taking it as a lump sum distribution or a series of ad hoc distributions? Why do some 

plan sponsors make this partial annuity option available while others do not? Would 

expanded offering of such partial annuity options -- or particular ways of presenting or 

framing such choices to participants -- be desirable and would this likely make a difference 

in whether participants select a lifetime annuity option? 

I am unaware of any data with which to answer the factual question. As noted above, partial/no 

annuitization may be suitable for someone with a generous defined benefit plan or for whom 

Social Security provides a high replacement rate. Annuitization may have an unintended and 

perhaps undesirable effect of raising incomes to the point where some retirees may become 

ineligible for government benefit programs (e.g. Medicaid, SSI). On the other hand, if Social 

Security benefit growth must be curtailed, given the program’s financial problems, the value of 

annuitization can be expected to grow. 

11. Various “behavioral” strategies for encouraging greater use of lifetime income have 

been implemented or suggested based on evidence or assumptions concerning common 
participant behavior patterns and motivations. These strategies have included the use of 

default or automatic arrangements (similar to automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans) and a 

focus on other ways in which choices are structured or presented to participants, including 

efforts to mitigate “all or nothing” choices by offering lifetime income on a partial, gradual, 

or trial basis and exploring different ways to explain its advantages and disadvantages. To 

what extent are these or other behavioral strategies being used or viewed as promising 

means of encouraging more lifetime income? Can or should the 401(k) rules, other plan 

qualification rules, or ERISA rules be modified, or their application clarified, to facilitate 

the use of behavioral strategies in this context? 

Many studies in the behavioral economics and finance arena have reported that so-called default 

provisions such as auto-enrollment and target maturity date investments help participants accrue 

more retirement wealth. There is far less empirical evidence on the impact of defaults for the 

payout phase. It is likely that default provisions will be insufficient to get the assets to “stick” in 

payout products without investment in education and information regarding longevity risk. 

12. How should participants determine what portion (if any) of their account balance to 

annuitize? Should that portion be based on basic or necessary expenses in retirement? 

Economic models show that the optimal demand for annuitization depends on households other 

assets (defined benefit and social security benefits, housing assets, financial assets, insurance), 

human capital (susceptibility of labor income to shocks including health shocks), risk aversion, 

and bequest intentions. It would be useful to provide participants with a calculator that can help 

assess retirement income needs and how to translate these income flows into present values 

needed to buy annuities. 

Some countries such as Singapore have recently mandated deferred annuities that should be 

sufficient to pay the government-set poverty or subsistence income level; the remainder of one’s 

account can be taken out as a lump sum if desired. 

13. Should some form of lifetime income distribution option be required for defined 

contribution plans (in addition to money purchase pension plans)? If so, should that option 

be the default distribution option, and should it apply to the entire account balance? To 

what extent would such a requirement encourage or discourage plan sponsorship? 

See question 12: retirees could be informed if they have sufficient income to ensure at least a 

poverty or subsistence amount from all available income sources including the pension annuity. 

14. What are the impediments to plan sponsors' including lifetime income options in their 

plans, e.g., 401(k) or other qualification rules, other federal or state laws, cost, potential 

liability, concern about counterparty risk, complexity of products, lack of participant 

demand? 

To date the payout products are difficult to compare and hard to assess in terms of their 

“money’s worth.” It would be useful to have a common metric to compare these with., 

particularly guaranteed lifetime/minimum withdrawals benefits. The patchwork of state 
insurance laws and guarantee funds make it difficult for participants to figure out and value 

insurers’credit worthiness. 

15. What are the advantages and disadvantages of approaches that combine annuities with 

other products (reverse mortgages, long term care insurance), and how prevalent are these 

combined products in the marketplace? 

Product complexity is a problem for plan sponsors and participants; it would be useful to have a 

common metric to compare them with (e.g. the “money’s worth” net of fees). Bundling can 

permit less expensive products since providers may achieve a natural hedge by offering two 

types of cover: e.g. life insurance and annuities. On the other hand, it is unclear that non-jobrelated products like reverse home mortgages will easily be bundled with factors more related to 

the job (e.g. life and disability). 

16. Are there differences across demographic groups (for example men vs. women) that 

should be considered and reflected in any retirement security program? Can adjustments 

for any differences be made within existing statutory authority? 

Those with lower than average life expectancy will, on average, receive a lower money’s worth 

than those anticipated to live longer. For instance, women live longer on average than men, so 

they are more likely to benefit from longevity insurance than men. Similarly, racial and ethnic 

minorities have different expectancies and so may benefit differentially than the majority 

population. Also Blacks, Hispanics, and women are also less financially literate and 

knowledgeable, suggesting they may benefit more from advice and product explanations. 

17. What information (e.g., fees, risks, etc.) do plan participants need to make informed 

decisions regarding whether to select lifetime income or other arrangements designed to 

provide a stream of income after retirement? When and how (i.e., in what form) should it 

be provided? What information currently is provided to participants, who typically 

provides it, and when and how is it provided to them? 

Participants tend to underestimate their chances of survival to age 85, implying they will 

undersave and under annuitize. Accordingly more information could be provided regarding how 

expensive it is to retire, what Social Security benefits might be and how much more they will be 

if retirement is deferred, and how expensive healthcare (including long-term care) might be. This 

will make annuities more salient and a logical solution to the longevity risk problem. 

This information can be provided via on-line calculators, employer education seminars, and 

webinars. 

 

18. Is there a need for guidance, regulatory or otherwise, regarding the extent to which 

plan assets can be used to pay for providing information to help participants make 

informed decisions regarding whether to select lifetime income or other arrangements 

designed to provide a stream of income after retirement, either via an in-plan or out-of 

plan option? 
It would be useful to find was for plan sponsors to provide educational material and advice 

regarding the sensible spending of retirement income. 

20. To what extent should plans be encouraged to provide or promote education about the 

advantages and disadvantages of lifetime annuities or similar lifetime income products, and 

what guidance would be helpful to accomplish this? 

In my view it would be most useful to ask plan sponsors of defined contribution plans report to 

participants what the annual income benefits might be from the participant’s current account 

balance, so that each participant would gain a better idea of the potential retirement income 

stream could be obtained on the current market with this accrual. 

21. Should an individual benefit statement present the participant's accrued benefits as a 

lifetime income stream of payments in addition to presenting the benefits as an account 

balance? 

Such a report would be helpful to participants. Of course it would be necessary to provide ‘safe 

harbors’ to plan sponsors regarding standardized assumptions when projecting income payouts. 

It would be essential to also indicate the risks of annuitization including the loss of access and 

liquidity, decline in flexibility, and company default risk. 

22. If the answer to question 21 is yes, how should a lifetime stream of income payments be 

expressed on the benefit statement? For example, should payments be expressed as if they 

are to begin immediately or at specified retirement ages? Should benefit amounts be 

projected to a future retirement age based on the assumption of continued contributions? 

Should lifetime income payments be expressed in the form of monthly or annual payments? 

Should lifetime income payments of a married participant be expressed as a single-life 

annuity payable to the participant or a joint and survivor-type annuity, or both? 

In my view, both monthly and annual payments would be useful regarding payout options. Also 

both single life and joint/survivor options should also be depicted, along with the impact of 

taking early versus deferred benefit payments. 

23. If the answer to question 21 is yes, what actuarial or other assumptions (e.g., mortality, 

interest, etc.) would be needed in order to state accrued benefits as a lifetime stream of 

payments? If benefit payments are to commence at some date in the future, what interest 

rates (e.g., deferred insurance annuity rates) and other assumptions should be applied? 

Should an expense load be reflected? Are there any authoritative tools or sources (online or 

otherwise) that plans should or could use for conversion purposes, or would the plan need 

to hire an actuary? Should caveats be required so that participants understand that 

lifetime income payments are merely estimates for illustrative purposes? Should the 

assumptions underlying the presentation of accrued benefits as a lifetime income stream of 

payments be disclosed to participants? Should the assumptions used to convert accounts 

into a lifetime stream of income payments be dictated by regulation, or should the 

Department issue assumptions that plan sponsors could rely upon as 

safe harbors? 
Interest rate and load assumptions should be the same as used in generating estimated lifetime 

income benefits. In my view, it would be helpful to present both immediate and deferred payouts 

given current accruals would be most useful, as well as projections assuming current 

contributions continue to some future date (e.g. the normal retirement age under Social Security). 

Each estimate would of course need to be caveated with a statement that contributions and 

benefits are not guaranteed. 

24. Should an individual benefit statement include an income replacement ratio (e.g., the 

percentage of working income an individual would need to maintain his or her preretirement standard of living)? If so, what methodology should be used to establish such a 

ratio, such as pre-retirement and post-retirement inflation assumptions, and what are the 

impediments for plans to present the ratio in a meaningful way to participants on an 

individualized basis? 

Research suggests that participants do not understand percents, so replacement rates in 

retirement are not likely to be maximally informative. Also plan calculations generally ignore 

Social Security, private saving, and other sources of retirement income, as well as household 

liabilities (for heathcare/longterm care costs). For this reason an individual benefit statement 

could be wildly off target, without participant sign-off to include the other sources of retirement 

income. 

25. How do the 401(k) or other plan qualification rules affect defined contribution plan 

sponsors' and participants' interest in the offering and use of lifetime income? Are there 

changes to those rules that could or should be made to encourage lifetime income without 

prejudice to other important policy objectives? 

Clear and well-defined safe harbor rules would help limit sponsor liability and might enhance 

willingness-to-offer. 

26. Could or should any changes be made to the rules relating to qualified joint and 

survivor annuities and spousal consents to encourage the use of lifetime income without 

compromising spousal protections? 

Research on the REA suggests that spousal consent rules should remain in defined benefit plans. 

27. Should further guidance clarify the application of the qualified joint and survivor 

annuity rules or other plan qualification rules to arrangements in which deferred in-plan 

insurance annuities accumulate over time with increasing plan contributions and earnings? 

Defined contribution plans often do not use deferred annuity contracts within their retirement 

plans. 

28. How do the required minimum distribution rules affect defined contribution plan 

sponsors' and participants' interest in the offering and use of lifetime income? Are there 

changes to those rules that could or should be made to encourage lifetime income without 
prejudice to other important policy objectives? In particular, how are deferred annuities 

that begin at an advanced age (sometimes referred to as longevity insurance) affected by 

these rules? Are there changes to the rules that could or should be considered to encourage 

such arrangements? 

Federal tax policy requires minimum distributions to generate some level of taxable income from 

tax-deferred accounts while participants are in the payout phase after age 701⁄2 ; the problem is 

that this income stream is not guaranteed nor inflation-adjusted, nor does it carry a longevity 

guarantee. The concern is that participants might tend to believe that these income streams are 

“appropriate” drawdown rules. An alternative is to tax annuitized payouts more favorably than 

phased withdrawal schemes, which would enhance the appeal of lifetime income risk protection. 

29. Are employers that sponsor both defined benefit and defined contribution plans 

allowing participants to use their defined contribution plan lump sum payouts to 

``purchase'' lifetime income from the defined benefit plan? Could or should any actions be 

taken to facilitate such arrangements? Should plans be encouraged to permit retirees who 

previously took lump sums to be given the option of rolling it back to their former 

employer's plan in order to receive annuity or other lifetime benefits? 

Allowing DC participants to buy a “DB-like” benefit has been proposed by many participants. 

Some large employers offer this currently to their participants, though few participants are 

covered by this specific strategy. Currently most private sector employers disallow participants 

from using defined contribution assets to buy defined benefit income benefits (though this is 

more common in the public sector). When defined benefit plans are underfunded, allowing lumpsum payouts is costly to the plan. Additionally, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 

(PBGC) may not be able to guarantee employee rollovers. 

31. To what extent could or should the Department of Labor make changes to the safe 

harbor under 29 CFR 2550.404a-4 to increase its usage without compromising important 

participant protections? What are those changes and why should they be made? 

Existing safe harbor could be improved to recognize more payout options. Additionally, the safe 

harbor could better protect fiduciaries from liability resulting from negative future events that 

could not be foreseen. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that plan sponsors cannot easily 

evaluate insurer credit quality, so they may find it difficult to obtain competitive pricing 

information on an apples-to-apples basis. 

32. To what extent could or should the safe harbor under 29 CFR 2550.404a-4 be extended 

beyond distribution annuities to cover other lifetime annuities or similar lifetime income 

products? To which products should or could the safe harbor be extended? 

Defined contribution plan fiduciaries currently have limited relief from ERISA fiduciary 

responsibility provisions where participants or beneficiaries control the assets in their accounts. 

This could be extended to payouts as well. 
36. What are the costs and benefits to a plan sponsor of offering lifetime annuities or 

similar lifetime income products as an in-plan option? Please quantify if possible. 

Today most employees will change jobs before retirement, so they would be ill-advised to incur 

the costs for a guarantee from which they are likely to benefit. Lifetime payout guarantees may 

be more suitable for older individuals seeking to buy the guarantee and who expect to annuitize 

or otherwise convert their balance to a guaranteed income stream at retirement. These could be 

offered only on a voluntary choice basis, given the features’ costs. 

37. Are there unique costs to small plans that impede their ability to offer lifetime annuities 

or similar lifetime income products as an in-plan option to their participants? What special 

consideration, if any, is needed for these small entities? 

Smaller retirement plans generally pay higher all-in fees because they lack economies of scale; if 

small plans offer certain guaranteed income products such as deferred or immediate income 

annuities, guarantee costs will be added to their already above-average recordkeeping and 

investment management fees. Moreover, small plans may lack the negotiating power of large 

plans to drive down such costs. For this reason, analysts conclude that small-town participants 

face even higher fees in guaranteed options, certain retirement income solutions and thus risk can 

be shown to boost fees among smaller plan participants, with only little marginal benefit. Some 

retirement income solutions may still be resilient to small plan cover because that segment of the 

recordkeeping market is more likely to be served by insurance companies. 

38. Would making a lifetime annuity or other lifetime income product the default form of 

benefit payment have an impact on employee contribution rates? If so, in which direction 

and why? 

Selecting as a default the lifetime income benefit would likely have an important impact on how 

people manage their retirement payouts. Whether it would also have an impact on individual 

employee contribution rates is unknown. Some workers could raise contribution rates if they 

believed their current contribution levels (and/or investment returns) were insufficient to fund 

retirement payouts. Others might conclude that the lifetime income products provided enough to 

establish an acceptable standard of living in retirement thereby freeing them to redirect some of 

their savings to other consumption. 

 
Related Studies 

Ameriks, John and Olivia S. Mitchell. 2008. Recalibrating Retirement Spending and Saving. Oxford University 

Press. 

Blitzstein, David , Olivia S. Mitchell, & Stephen P. Utkus, eds. 2006. Restructuring Retirement Risks. Oxford 

University Press. 

Bodie, Zvi & Olivia S. Mitchell. 1996. “Pension Security in an Aging World”. In Securing Employer-Provided 

Pensions: An International Perspective, eds Z. Bodie, O.S. Mitchell & J. Turner. Philadelphia, PA: Univ. 

of Pennsylvania Press: 1-30. 

Brown, Jeffrey, Olivia Mitchell, James Poterba, & Mark Warshawsky. 1999. “Taxing Retirement Income: 

Nonqualified Annuities and Distributions from Qualified Accounts”. National Tax Journal. LII,3, 1999: 

563-592. 

Brown, Jeffrey, Olivia S. Mitchell, James Poterba, & Mark Warshawsky. The Role of Annuity Markets in Financing 

Retirement. MIT Press, 2001. 

Brown, Jeffrey, Olivia S. Mitchell, & James Poterba. “Mortality Risk, Inflation Risk, and Annuity Products.” 2002. 

In Innovations in Financing Retirement., eds. Z. Bodie, B. Hammond, & O. S. Mitchell. Philadelphia, PA: 

Univ. of Pennsylvania Press: 175-197. 

Dus, Ivica, Raimond Maurer, & Olivia S. Mitchell, 2005.“Betting on Death and Capital Markets in Retirement: A 

Shortfall Risk Analysis of Life Annuities versus Phased Withdrawal Plans.” Financial Services Review. 

Lead article. (14): 169-196. 

Fong, Joelle, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Benedict Koh. Forthcoming. “Longevity Risk and Annuities in Singapore.” In 

Robert Clark and Olivia S. Mitchell, eds. Reorienting Retirement Risk Management. Oxford University 

Press. 

Horneff, Wolfram, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ivica Dus. 2007. “Following the Rules: Integrating 

Asset Allocation and Annuitization in Retirement Portfolios. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. 42:

396-408. 

Horneff, Wolfram J. Raimond H. Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Michael Z. Stamos. 2010. “Variable Payout 

Annuities and Dynamic Portfolio Choice in Retirement.” Journal of Pension Economics and Finance. 9, 

April: 163-183. 

Horneff, Wolfram, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Michael Stamos. 2009. “Asset Allocation and Location 

over the Life Cycle with Survival-Contingent Payouts.”Journal of Banking and Finance. (33) 9 September: 

1688-1699.

Koh, Benedict S., Olivia S. Mitchell and Joelle HY. Fong. Forthcoming. “Collective Investments for Pension 

Saving: Lessons from Singapore’s Central Provident Fund Scheme.” Pensions: An International Journal.. 

Lusardi, Annamaria, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Vilsa Curto. Forthcoming. “Financial Literacy among the Young: 

Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy.” Journal of Consumer Affairs. 

Madrian, Brigitte, Olivia S. Mitchell, & Beth Soldo, eds. 2007. Redefining Retirement. Oxford University Press. 

Maurer, Raimond, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla. 2009. “Managing Contribution and Capital Market Risk 

in a Funded Public Defined Benefit Plan: Impact of CVaR Cost Constraints.” Insurance: Mathematics & 

Economics. (45): 25-34. 

Maurer, Raimond, Olivia S. Mitchell and Ralph Rogalla. 2008. “The Victory of Hope over Angst? Funding, Asset 

Allocation, and Risk-Taking in German Public Sector Pension Reform.” Frontiers in Pension Finance, Dirk 

Broeders, Sylvester Eijffinger, and Aerdt Houben, eds.. De Nederlandsche Bank. Edward Elgar: 51-81. 

Maurer, Raimond, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla. “The Effect of Uncertain Labor Income and Social 

Security on Lifecycle Portfolios.” In Robert Clark and Olivia S. Mitchell, eds. Reorienting Retirement Risk 

Management. Oxford: OUP. NBER WP 15682 

McCarthy, David & Olivia S. Mitchell. Forthcoming “International Adverse Selection in Life Insurance and 

Annuities.” In Shripad Tuljapurkar, Naohiro Ogawa, & Anne Gauthier, eds. Riding the Age Waves: 

Responses to Aging in Advanced Industrial States. Elsevier.

McCarthy, David & Olivia S. Mitchell. 2002. “Estimating International Adverse Selection in Annuities”. North 

American Actuarial Journal. October: 38-54. 

Mitchell, Olivia S. 2002. “Developments in Decumulation: The Role of Annuity Products in Financing Retirement. 

” In Ageing, Financial Markets and Monetary Policy, eds. A. Auerbach & H. Herrman. Berlin: SpringerVerlag: 97-125. 

Mitchell Olivia S. and Stephen P. Utkus, eds. 2004. Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral 

Finance. Pension Research Council. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Mitchell Olivia S. and Kent Smetters, eds. 2003. The Pension Challenge: Risk Transfers and Retirement Income 

Security. Pension Research Council. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 

Mitchell, Olivia S., Brett Hammond, and Anna Rappaport. 2000. Forecasting Retirement Needs and Retirement 

Wealth. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 

Mitchell, Olivia S., John Piggott, Michael Sherris, and Shaun Yow. 2006. “Financial Innovations for an Aging 

World.” In Demography and Financial Markets, eds. C. Kent, A Park, D Rees. Reserve Bank of 

Australia/Australian Treasury: Report of the G-20 Meetings. Pegasus Press: 299-336. 

Muermann, Alexander, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Jaqueline Volkman.2006. “Regret, Portfolio Choice, and Guarantees 

in Defined Contribution Schemes.” Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. 39: 219–229. 

Turra, Cassio and Mitchell, Olivia S. 2008. “The Impact of Health Status and Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures 

on Annuity Valuation.” In John Ameriks and Olivia S. Mitchell, eds Recalibrating Retirement Spending 

and Saving. Oxford University Press: 227-250. 

Mitchell, Olivia S., James Moore, & John Phillips. 2000.“Explaining Retirement Saving Shortfalls”. In Forecasting 

Retirement Needs and Retirement Wealth, eds. O.S. Mitchell, B. Hammond, & A. Rappaport. Philadelphia, 

PA: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press: 139-166. 

Mitchell, Olivia S., James Poterba, Mark Warshawsky, & Jeffrey Brown. 1999. “New Evidence on the Money’s 

Worth of Individual Annuities”. American Economic Review. December: 1299-1318. 

Mitchell, Olivia S. & James Moore. 1998. “Can Americans Afford to Retire? New Evidence on Retirement Saving 

Adequacy”. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65 (3) December: 371-400.