U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

49–011 2006

109th Congress, 2d Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 109–91 

REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF 

AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING 

COMMUNICATION 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, 

PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291–4 

FEBRUARY 28, 2006.—Referred to the Committee on International 

Relations and ordered to be printed 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARINGE:\Seals\Congress.#13

ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
(1) 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, February 22, 2006. 

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Consistent with the authorities relating to 

official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit 

drug trafficking (Public Law 107–108, 22 U.S.C. 2291–4), and in 

order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am providing a report 

prepared by my Administration. This report addresses the matter 

of assistance for interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING

ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
(3) 

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT

ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING

Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. § 2291–4 in calendar 

year 2005. The President signed Presidential Determination 2005– 32 on August 17, 2005, for Colombia and Presidential Determination 2006–02 on October 16, 2005, for Brazil. In doing so, the President certified that (1) interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected 

to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia’s and 

Brazil’s airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat 

posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of Colombia 

and Brazil; and (2) Colombia and Brazil have appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent loss of life in the air and 

on the ground in connection with such interdiction, which shall at 

a minimum include effective means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force is directed against the aircraft. 

COLOMBIA

(A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program in 

Colombia began operations. In making a third certification for Colombia in August 2005, the President determined that 

narcotrafficking continued to pose an extraordinary threat to Colombia’s national security on the basis of several factors, including: 

Colombia is still the world’s largest producer of cocaine and a supplier of high quality heroin; Colombia faces a growing cocaine 

abuse problem; Colombian drug trafficking officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed groups to protect their organizations; illegal revenue from the Colombian drug trade disrupts the 

licit Colombian economy; and narcotrafficking presents a corrosive 

threat to the democratic institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly, drug trafficking also serves as the primary 

source of funding for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) and an important source of funding for the Colombian 

United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations by the Department of State. 

As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of Colombia 

(GOC) observed over 250 unidentified flights in its airspace in CY 

2005. Although this number is approximately half the number of 

flights observed in CY 2005, the concerns raised in the President’s 

determination for Colombia in previous reports are still valid and 

applicable. 

(B) United States Government safety oversight of Colombia’s 

ABD program includes approved procedures, as outlined in a Bilateral Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety checklist; 

and three primary United States Government safety monitors: a 

ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor (ASM), and a 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
4 

Joint Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S) ABD watch officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD safety 

triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be involved in all 

events in which Phase I, II, and III actions (as described below) are 

taken against an unidentified, assumed suspect (UAS) flight in the 

air. The basic procedures for intercepting a UAS flight are as follows: 

Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the GOC detects 

or is informed of an aircraft operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for possible ABD action (a ‘‘track of interest’’), information on that aircraft shall be gathered by the 

GOC from all reasonably available sources, including radar 

systems, radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic 

systems (which help determine whether the plane is traveling 

on a filed flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant 

air traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the 

aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by the 

Battle Command Officer (BCO) in the Colombian Air Force’s 

Command and Control Center, based upon certain factors set 

our elsewhere in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information provided to GOC and United States Government 

participants in the ongoing action. 

Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has preliminary reasons to believe that an aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit 

drug trafficking, that aircraft shall be tracked and monitored. 

If tracking is intermittent, positive re-identification shall be 

made with reasonable certainty before the ABD event may continue. If the GOC has been unable to identify the track of interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be considered 

suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF procedures and may be intercepted. 

Phase I—Interception. The interception phase (Phase I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft by radio 

and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to determine the 

identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this 

Phase, the GOC determines that the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking (on the 

basis of several considered factors), the CAF may order the 

intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place suitable for 

a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft does not 

comply with the procedures and instructions given by the CAF, 

the pilot may request permission to proceed to Phase II. 

Phase II—Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing tracer 

rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted 

aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor’s order. If all 

of the procedures required under the Agreement have been followed, if the information gathered continues to indicate that an 

aircraft is suspect, and if the aircraft fails to respond to the 

interceptor’s order to land, the GOC may, in accordance with 

the following, move to Phase III. 

Phase III—Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the 

Air. If, after warning shots are fired under Phase II, the interVerDate Aug 31 2005 05:39 Mar 03, 2006 Jkt 049011 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HD091.XXX HD091

ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
5 

cepted aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor’s 

directions, the Colombian interceptor aircraft may only fire 

weapons at the intercepted aircraft if he requests and receives 

permission to do so (Phase III). The Commander of the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such requests. The 

COCAF may approve such request after verifying that all procedures required under the Agreement have been followed. 

Upon receipt of the authorization, the interceptor aircraft shall 

warn the intercepted aircraft, using ICAO radio communications procedures and the appropriate frequencies, that it will 

be fired upon if it refuses to comply. 

The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in an attempt 

to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable opportunity to obey the 

previously issued orders to land before the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to follow the interceptor’s directions. It is 

acknowledged that even the minimum level of force could result in 

loss of life. If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot 

down, the interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate notice to the Colombian Air Force Command and Control 

Center of the location of the intercepted aircraft. 

The Agreement requires similar identification and warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been located 

on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains additional strictures on the use of force, including a prohibition on the use of force 

against state or commercial aircraft, aircraft that have been filed 

and are not significantly deviating from a flight plan, aircraft 

whose pilots appear to be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots 

genuinely appear to be under duress. 

The United States Government initially trained the GOC’s pilots 

and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft involved in 

the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as well as training 

of new Colombian personnel are ongoing as the program matures. 

Semiannual reviews of the program address any issues that arise 

in the program’s implementation. Further, the United States Government receives weekly and monthly reports on program events. 

(C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program in 

Colombia consists of the following: 

The United States Government provides a number of positions to 

Colombia’s ABD program. These positions include a DOD JIATF–

S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground Safety Monitor in the Colombia Air Force Command and Control Center (CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft; 

and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board U.S. tracking and detection/monitoring aircraft. Both Monitors and the Host Nation 

Rider Assistant are fluent in Spanish. 

JIATF–S, as Tactical Commander, exercises command and control of U.S. ABD assets through JIATF–S’s Joint Operations Center 

(JOC). The JIATF–S Command Duty Officer is the Tactical Commander’s senior watch officer at the JOC. The Ground Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative at the CAFCCC during ABD operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative on GOC 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
6 

tracking aircraft and is available to observe decisions made by 

GOC personnel, communicate with the U.S. Ground Safety Monitor 

and the JIATF–S Command Duty Officer, and report to them 

whether the agreed-upon procedures are being followed. The Host 

Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. representative who assists the 

Host Nation Rider. The Counter Drug Operation and Coordination 

Center, which is located in the CAFCCC, assists in coordination, 

information exchange, and analysis between JIATF–S and 

CAFCCC. An employee of the Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. 

Embassy in Bogota ́ is devoted exclusively to overseeing implementation of this program. 

The United States Government has provided five Citation aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD program and provides ongoing radar information and intelligence. Additional United States Government assets (both aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 

can provide support for this program under the conditions contained in the Agreement. Further, the GOC has agreed that the 

five United States Government-supported ground-based radars and 

the Peace Panorama System (which is the airspace management 

system linking ground-based radars in Colombia to a central radar 

picture) constitute United States Government support for ABD. 

(D) From January 1, 2005, until December 31, 2005, the GOC, 

with the assistance of the United States Government as described 

in section (C), identified over 250 Unidentified Assumed Suspect 

(UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over 27 of these flights 

were determined to be legal flights. The GOC was in a position to 

act upon approximately 200 of the remaining flights. The GOC 

forced four suspect drug trafficking aircraft to land, destroyed two 

of those aircraft on the ground, impounded five aircraft in Colombia, arrested six persons, and seized 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in 

connection with illegal aerial drug trafficking. Another three aircraft with 2.1 metric tons of cocaine were impounded in Guatemala 

as a result of Colombian coordination with JIATF–S and Honduran 

authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace heading toward 

Mexico. The United States Government is unaware of any deaths 

or injuries resulting from these actions. 

BRAZIL

(A) Brazil’s ABD program began operations on October 17, 2004. 

In making a second certification for Brazil pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 

§ 2291–4, the President determined that narcotrafficking poses an 

extraordinary threat to Brazil’s national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of this threat, as demonstrated by 

radar surveillance confirming that narcotraffickers are making 

widespread use of aerial routes to bring cocaine and other narcotics 

into Brazil. The amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 

metric tons of cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to onehalf of it remaining in-country. In addition, there are suspected ties 

between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled widespread 

urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
7 

as organized criminal gangs fight to control a share of the lucrative 

enterprise. 

(B) The Government of Brazil (GOB) possesses an infrastructure 

that is capable of independently implementing its aerial interdiction program. The goal of Brazil’s interdiction program is to facilitate the safe landing of intercepted aircraft so that law enforcement personnel may take control of the aircraft on the ground. As 

a last resort, however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may authorize the use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if it refuses 

to respond to the full range of program actions taken by the Brazilian Air Force. The GOB has established a multi-stage procedure 

to identify, intercept, warn, and, if necessary, take action against 

an aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit 

drug trafficking. The basic procedures are as follows: 

Identification. When the GOB detects an aircraft that displays irregular air traffic traits, it will consider that aircraft to 

be ‘‘unidentified’’ and a candidate for possible aerial interception. The GOB will proceed to gather information on that aircraft to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected 

to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the GOB 

is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate, the aircraft will 

be considered ‘‘suspect’’ by the Brazilian Air Force and may be 

intercepted. 

Interception. During interception, the GOB will attempt to 

determine with greater certainty the identity of the intercepted 

aircraft. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures to identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or 

electronic observation of the nationality markings, registration 

number, license number, or identifying features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will further attempt to gather information regarding the intercepted aircraft that may help determine whether the intercepted aircraft is reasonably suspected 

to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The tracker 

or interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications with the intercepted aircraft through radio communications or visual signals and order the intercepted aircraft to 

change its routing or to land if factors continue to support a 

determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit 

drug trafficking. 

Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the firing of warning 

shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft 

that he must comply with the interceptor’s order if the gathered information continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor’s order 

to land. Warning shots may only be ordered and authorized by 

the Airspace Defense Senior Authority or the Air Operations 

Commander after verification that all requisite procedures 

have been satisfied. The intercepting aircraft will fire the 

warning shots from a position that will permit the intercepted 

aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft, but that will avoid 

damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted aircraft that 

comply with the orders of the interceptor aircraft after warning 

shots have been fired will be escorted to land at a designated 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
8 

airfield where law enforcement authorities will subject it to 

ground control measures. 

Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air. If, after 

warning shots are fired, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor’s directions, the aircraft 

will be designated as ‘‘hostile’’ and will, after appropriate authorization from Brazilian authorities, be subject to being shot 

down. The Brazilian Air Force Commander-in-Chief may only 

authorize the use of lethal force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been followed. The first burst of fire 

used against the intercepted aircraft will be as brief as possible 

and preferably without using ammunition capable of causing a 

tank explosion. After the first burst of fire, the pilot of the 

intercepting aircraft will relay information regarding the effect 

of the fire to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft 

lands, the Brazilian federal police will attempt to take control 

of the aircraft for law enforcement purposes. 

(C) Brazil’s interdiction program differs from Colombia’s in that 

Brazil independently administers its program. The GOB is solely 

responsible for all actions relating to each aerial interdiciton event, 

but has agreed to share pertinent operational information about 

such events after the fact with the United States in a timely and 

transparent manner. Although the GOB neither requires nor has 

requested a direct U.S. role in support of its program, various 

agencies of the United States Government currently provide assistance to Brazil that could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction 

program, such as cooperative law enforcement programs, intelligence-sharing, and approvals of military sales. Additionally, U.S. 

companies such as Raytheon are positioned to provide relevant assistance in the future. 

(D) Brazilian authorities publicly claim that the combined resources of the System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM) 

monitoring system and the Air Force have virtually eliminated 

trafficker flights through national airspace. They explain that the 

continued flow of drugs and weapons through Brazil is due to 

smugglers responding to the aerial interdiction deterrent by converting to overland routes. While Brazil’s ABD program appears to 

have caused some traffickers to change their routes and methods 

of transshipment, airborne drug trafficking remains a viable 

threat. 

U.S. interaction with Brazil on aerial interdicition issues has focused primarily on the role of the Brazilian Air Force. The United 

States Government is unaware of any incidents in which the Air 

Force used lethal force against aircraft under Brazil’s interdiction 

program or any deaths or injuries resulted from action related to 

this program. However, in April 2005, the Brazilian police fired on 

a civil aircraft, suspected of narcotrafficking, as it attempted to 

take off, resulting in the death of the pilot. The GOB reported that 

the police were acting in self-defense. In response to United States 

government questions regarding the incident, the GOB further indicated that the police: (1) are permitted to use force against civil 

aircraft only in self-defense; (2) have been informed of their role in 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING
9 

pursuit of aircraft suspected of narcotrafficking and of procedures 

to be adopted to minimize loss of innocent life; and (3) are aware 

of the prohibition of the destruction of civil aircraft in service, established in the Convention on Suppression of Illegal Acts Against 

the Security of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on September 23, 

1971. 

The GOB has shared its official statistics for the operation of its 

interdiction program between January and September 2005 with 

the United States Government on the condition that the information is treated confidentially. This data is not included in this report, but can be made available upon request to Members and staff. 

The U.S. Embassy in Brasilia is also seeking the operational statistics for the remainder of 2005 from the GOB and will make that 

information available upon request as well. 

Æ 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with HEARING