Union Calendar No. 269

107TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 107–454

JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON

WHITE HOUSE

MAY 14, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of

the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. BURTON, from the Committee on Government Reform

submitted the following

SECOND REPORT

On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ‘‘Justice Undone: Clemency

Decisions in the Clinton White House.’’ The chairman was directed

to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.—COMMITTEE CORRESPONDENCE

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(2577)

APPENDIX II.—COMMITTEE SUBPOENAS

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(2967)

APPENDIX III.—MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION

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(3292)

1 U.S. Attorney: Was Clinton Bribed? Feds Hunting for Link Between Rich Pardon and Campaign Contributions, Chicago Sun-Times (Feb. 15, 2001). 2 E.J. Dionne Jr., And the Gifts that Keep on Giving, Washington Post (Feb. 6, 2001). 3 House Committee on Government Reform, Hearings on the Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich, 37, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 8, and Mar. 1, 2001) (hereinafter

‘‘Pardon Hearings, Day One or Day Two’’). 4 Id. at 164–65. 5See Minority Staff Report, House Committee on Government Reform, Unsubstantiated Allegations of Wrongdoing Involving the Clinton Administration (March 2001) (Exhibit 1).

MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM

LANTOS, HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS

TOWNS, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. PATSY T. MINK,

HON. BERNARD SANDERS, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J.

KUCINICH, HON. DANNY K. DAVIS, HON. THOMAS H.

ALLEN, HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, AND HON. DIANE

E. WATSON

On his last day in office, President Clinton issued 140 pardons

and 36 commutations. Several were controversial, particularly the

pardon of Marc Rich, and prompted criticism from across the political spectrum. Some of the most vocal critics were those who had

been strong supporters and often defenders of President Clinton.

For example, Sen. Charles Schumer said, ‘‘There can be no justification in pardoning a fugitive from justice. Pardoning a fugitive

stands our justice system on its head and makes a mockery of it.’’ 1

Rep. Barney Frank likewise said, ‘‘It was a real betrayal by Bill

Clinton of all who had been strongly supportive of him to do something this unjustified. It was contemptuous.’’ 2

These sentiments were echoed by the Democratic members of

this Committee. Rep. Henry Waxman said, ‘‘The Rich pardon is bad

precedent. It appears to set a double standard for the wealthy and

powerful. And it is an end run around the judicial process.’’ 3 At a

Committee hearing on the Marc Rich pardon, Rep. Elijah

Cummings expressed the view of many members when he said:

It’s one thing to go to trial. It’s one thing to stay here and

face the music. It’s one thing to be found not guilty. It’s

a whole other thing, in my opinion, when somebody, because they have the money, can go outside the country and

evade the system. I tell you it really concerns me because

my constituents have a major problem with that, and I do,

too.4

Chairman Burton could have chosen to build upon this consensus. He could have conducted a focused and bipartisan inquiry,

issued a report that set out the facts for the public, and avoided

the partisanship that has hampered this Committee’s work over

the past five years.5 Unfortunately, he chose to do the opposite.

The Committee’s investigation continued more than a year after

Republican congressional leaders themselves acknowledged it

3293

6 Hastert Backs Off Pardon Probe, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 11, 2001); see Letter from Rep.

Henry Waxman to Chairman Dan Burton (Mar. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 2). 7 Hastert Backs Off Pardon Probe, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 11, 2001). 8Majority Report, Introduction, at 3.

9For example, the majority devotes an entire chapter of its report to efforts by Roger Clinton

to obtain clemency for others, even though none of the people Roger Clinton recommended for

clemency ever received it from President Clinton. See Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 709–

831. 10For example, the majority report devotes great attention to allegations that Roger Clinton

participated in a scheme to sell a pardon to Garland Lincecum, a petition for whom was apparently never submitted to the Justice Department or White House. See Majority Report, Chapter

Two, at 777–798. These allegations have been denied by Roger Clinton. Swindle is Reported to

Use the Name of Roger Clinton, New York Times (June 21, 2001). 11Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 731–776. 12 Id. at 725–31. 13 Id. at 723–25.

should have ended. In an interview broadcast nationally on March

10, 2001, House Speaker Dennis Hastert said, ‘‘I think, probably

from my point of view, about all that information [that] is going to

come out, has come out’’ and ‘‘I think this is kind of winding down

on its own.’’ 6 Senator Trent Lott, then Majority Leader, expressed

similar sentiments, stating: ‘‘I’d be inclined to move on.’’ 7

Rather than wind down the investigation, Chairman Burton

chose to expand its scope. What began in January 2001 as an inquiry into the pardon of Marc Rich rapidly multiplied to include

dozens of other requests for executive clemency. The majority report states that ‘‘the Committee limited its investigation to pardons

and commutations where there was no credible explanation for the

grant of clemency, and where there was an appearance of impropriety relating to inappropriate access or corruption.’’ 8 But as reflected in its voluminous report, the majority not only investigated

requests for clemency that President Clinton chose to grant, it investigated requests that President Clinton denied.9 The majority

also devoted great attention to requests for clemency that were

pondered but never even submitted to the Justice Department or

the White House for consideration.10 It even examined unsuccessful

efforts by Roger Clinton, the President’s half-brother, to assist a

federal inmate in his petition for parole; 11 Roger Clinton’s purported role in unsuccessful efforts by the head of an association to

obtain the Secretary of Transportation as a speaker for a symposium; 12 and Roger Clinton’s apparent acceptance of fees to lobby

the Administration to ease Cuban travel restrictions.13

As part of this far-flung enterprise, Chairman Burton unilaterally issued 153 subpoenas and requests for documents. Of these,

fewer than one-third included requests for records relating to the

pardon of Marc Rich. The remainder focused on members of President Clinton’s family. Seventy-five related to Roger Clinton, twenty-three related to Hugh Rodham, and eight related to Tony

Rodham. In response to these requests for documents, private parties and government agencies produced nearly 25,000 pages of documents.

In the end, the majority’s investigation sheds little new light. It

is primarily a collection of unsupported and irresponsible statements. The majority report repeatedly suggests that corruption by

President Clinton or his Administration may explain the Rich pardon. For example, the majority states that notes of a conversation

between President Clinton and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud

Barak ‘‘raise[] the possibility that either Barak or Clinton acted on

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14Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 6. 15Majority Report, Chapter One, at 258. 16 Id. at 213. 17 Id. at 214. 18 E.g., Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 318, 328, 335, 337. 19 Id. at 100. 20 Id. at 102. 21 Id. at 342.

the Rich matter because of some promise of future financial return.’’ 14 And the majority accuses President Clinton of making ‘‘false and misleading statements.’’ 15

The majority also makes serious allegations of wrongdoing

against other Administration officials. Most notably, the majority

accuses Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder of deliberately cutting out other Justice Department officials in an effort to assist

with the Rich petition.16 It suggests, moreover, that Mr. Holder did

this because he believed Jack Quinn could help him become Attorney General in a possible Gore Administration.17

There is a critical difference, however, between bad judgment

and the corruption the majority hints at—but never establishes— in its report. The Rich pardon is indisputably a case of bad judgment. As wealthy fugitives, Marc Rich and his associate Pincus

Green did not deserve the pardons they received from President

Clinton. But it is equally evident that the sprawling record assembled by the Committee does not support the allegation that President Clinton or any other Administration official was bribed or otherwise corrupted.

Early in the investigation, former White House Chief of Staff

John Podesta, former White House Counsel Beth Nolan, and

former Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey appeared before the Committee to explain the decision-making behind the Rich

pardon. Each of these eyewitnesses testified that while they disagreed with the President’s decision, they believed that he made a

decision based on his evaluation of the merits and had no reason

to believe that a quid pro quo or any other improper consideration

influenced his exercise of the pardon power.18 There is nothing in

the record before the Committee that contradicts this testimony.

In reality, what happened was that in the waning hours of the

Administration, the process broke down, and President Clinton and

other officials exercised poor judgment. Beth Nolan explained that

in late 1999 or early 2000, President Clinton told her that he

‘‘wanted to exercise the pardon power more than he had in the

past, that he felt he hadn’t exercised it fully, and he wanted to be

sure that we had a process in place to be sure that pardons moved

quickly through the process.’’ 19 Ms. Nolan communicated the President’s instructions to speed up the review process to the Deputy Attorney General and the Justice Department’s Pardon Attorney in

several meetings beginning in early 2000.

As Ms. Nolan testified, however, these efforts produced ‘‘no movement.’’ 20 She testified that by the fall of 2000, the Pardon Attorney

had indicated that he would not process any more pardon applications.21 But despite this development, President Clinton insisted on

exercising his prerogative to receive and consider requests for clemency, even up until his last day in office. Under these circumstances, and working against the clock, the White House and

3295

22Despite the existence of guidelines on the subject, such as those set out in Title 28 of the

Code of Federal Regulations, the clemency power is reserved exclusively to the President under

the Constitution. It cannot be constrained by any executive branch regulations or by the judgments of any of the President’s subordinates. Indeed, even the majority acknowledges this point.

Majority Report, Introduction, at 29. The clemency power also cannot be constrained by Congress. The Supreme Court has made clear that the power ‘‘flows from the Constitution alone,

not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished

by the Congress.’’ Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 268 (1974). For this reason, some observers have

questioned the power of Congress even to investigate the President’s clemency decisions. For example, Stanley Brand, who served as General Counsel to the House of Representatives from

1976 to 1984, opined that the pardon controversy was not a subject ‘‘on which legislation could

be had’’ and was therefore a matter outside the bounds of legitimate congressional inquiry. See

Stanley M. Brand, A Pardon Probe: It’s None of Congress’s Business, Washington Post (Feb. 28,

2001). 23The Federalist No. 74, at 377 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982). 24 E.J. Dionne Jr., And the Gifts that Keep on Giving, Washington Post (Feb. 6, 2001).

Justice Department officials responsible for assisting the President

could not and did not conduct a full and appropriate review of

every petition.

The Marc Rich pardon was an outgrowth of this flawed procedure. It was the product of a rushed and one-sided process, and it

reflected deeply flawed judgment by the President. It was not, however, the criminal conspiracy that the majority insinuates.

I. UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING INVOLVING PRESIDENT CLINTON

Article II, section 2 of the Constitution grants the President

‘‘Power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the

United States, except in cases of impeachment.’’ The Framers of

the Constitution intentionally vested the pardon power in one person who would have sole discretion to make decisions and bear full

responsibility for the consequences.22 In 1788, Alexander Hamilton

explained why it should be so:

Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. . . . As the sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it undivided,

it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready

to attend to the force of those motives, which might plead

for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to

yield to considerations, which were calculated to shelter a

fit object of its vengeance.23

As the person entrusted with the pardon power, President Clinton should bear the full responsibility and the brunt of the criticism for disarray in the clemency review process and for his controversial decisions. This criticism has properly been widespread

and vociferous. As one commentator noted, President Clinton’s

‘‘truly remarkable achievement was in creating a consensus against

himself with his pardon of March Rich.’’ 24

Unfortunately, as with the Committee’s past investigations of the

Clinton Administration, the majority’s report goes too far. The report does not recite facts and draw reasonable conclusions. Instead,

the report intersperses suppositions with facts and draws every

possible inference against President Clinton, those who assisted

him in making clemency decisions, and individuals who advocated

clemency for others. Moreover, the report unfairly questions the

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25Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 6. 26 Id. 27Majority Report, Chapter One, at 227. 28 Id. at 103. 29See William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, New York Times (Feb. 18,

2001). 30Majority Report, Chapter One, at 103.

motives and integrity of individuals, and makes numerous unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing.

The following discussion summarizes some of the major allegations involving President Clinton in the majority report and then

compares them to the facts in the record before the Committee.

• Allegation: It is possible that President Clinton ‘‘acted on

the Rich matter because of some promise of future financial return.’’ 25

The Facts: The majority, interpreting a gap in notes of a conversation between President Clinton and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, suggests that President Clinton pardoned Marc

Rich on the promise of future financial return, a federal felony. The

majority report states:

Barak had met with Rich personally, and told Clinton that

the Rich pardon ‘‘could be important . . . not just financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.’’

Barak’s statement raises the possibility that either Barak

or Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of future financial return.26

As the majority report later acknowledges, these typewritten

notes specify that there is a gap in the note taking, and the reference may relate to Mr. Rich’s past financial support for the State

of Israel.27 The majority has not and cannot cite to any evidence

that President Clinton acted on the Rich matter because he expected a financial benefit. The majority’s innuendo is irresponsible

and contradicted by the overwhelming evidence before the Committee.

• Allegation: President Clinton ‘‘may be attempting to use

former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s interest in

the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations for

granting the Rich pardon.’’ 28

The Facts: President Clinton, in an op-ed published in the New

York Times, explained that one of the reasons he granted Marc

Rich a pardon was because former high-ranking Israeli officials and

Jewish community leaders had urged the pardon.29 The majority

disputes this explanation and concludes that President Clinton was

simply using Prime Minister Barak’s interest as pretext. As explanation, the majority states: ‘‘An examination of the transcripts of

the calls [between President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak]

shows that Barak did not make a particularly impassioned plea for

Rich.’’ 30 The majority offers no other support for its unsubstantiated conclusion.

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31 Id. at 105. 32Majority Report, Introduction, at 38. 33Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 279–437. 34 Attempting to contrast the explanation offered by President Clinton, the majority cites with

approval a ‘‘full accounting’’ published by President Bush to explain his 1992 pardon of Caspar

Weinberger and others involved in the Iran-Contra matter. See Majority Report, Introduction,

at 25. President Bush’s explanation, however, does little more than identify Mr. Weinberger as

‘‘a true American patriot,’’ note the length of various investigations into the Iran-Contra Affair,

and criticize the ‘‘criminalization of policy decisions.’’ See Proclamation 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62145

(Dec. 24, 1992). Unlike President Clinton’s published explanation, see infra note 35 and accompanying text, President Bush’s explanation made no attempt to address the criminal conduct

alleged against Mr. Weinberger and gave no substantive explanation as to why he believed a

pardon was justified. 35William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2001).

• Allegation: President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting of his decision to issue the Marc Rich and

Pincus Green pardons.31

The Facts: With the possible exception of President Gerald Ford,

who personally testified before the House Judiciary Committee

about his pardon of Richard Nixon, no President has given a more

complete accounting of a clemency decision than has President

Clinton on his decision to pardon Marc Rich and Pincus Green.

As the majority notes in its report, President Clinton took the extraordinary step of waiving all executive privilege claims with respect to the testimony of former White House officials.32 He allowed his most senior advisors and lawyers to testify before this

Committee, not only with respect to the Rich pardon, but other requests for clemency as well. John Podesta, President Clinton’s

former Chief of Staff, Beth Nolan, the former Counsel to the President, and Bruce Lindsey, Assistant and Deputy Counsel to the

President, all answered detailed questions for more than six and

half hours about their deliberative process, confidential internal

communications, and personal recommendations to the President.33

Moreover, President Clinton waived executive privilege and allowed

Committee staff to review the raw notes of conversations he had

with another head of state, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

The Committee would never have been able to obtain such detailed

information about the clemency decisions without the willing cooperation of President Clinton.34

In addition to making his former staff available for interrogation,

President Clinton published a written explanation for his pardons

of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.35 He laid out several reasons for

the pardons that he understood to be true at the time: (1) He understood that oil companies that had structured transactions like

Mr. Rich and Mr. Green had been sued civilly rather than prosecuted criminally; (2) he was told that in 1985, the Energy Department had found in a related case that the manner in which Mr.

Rich’s companies had accounted for the transactions at issue was

proper; (3) two highly regarded tax experts concluded that the companies had adhered to the tax law; (4) the companies had paid approximately $200 million in fines, penalties, and taxes to resolve

the case; (5) in 1989, the Justice Department rejected the use of

racketeering statutes in tax cases, such as the case against Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green; (6) he understood that the Deputy Attorney

General was ‘‘neutral, leaning for’’ the pardons; (7) the case was reviewed and advocated by his former White House Counsel Jack

Quinn and three distinguished Republican lawyers: Leonard GarVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01219 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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36 As the majority notes in its report, an initial draft of the statement incorrectly stated that

the ‘‘applications were reviewed and advocated’’ by Mr. Garment, Mr. Reynolds, and Mr. Libby.

(See Majority Report, Chapter One, at 261). President Clinton’s representatives notified the New

York Times of the mistake, which corrected the piece in most printed editions and published

a correction. (See Editors’ Note, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2001).) 37William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2001). 38Majority Report, Chapter One, at 258. 39 Id. at 258, 262. 40Letter from Alan M. Dershowitz to Mike Tirone, Producer, Hardball With Chris Matthews

(Jan. 25, 2001) (Exhibit 3). 41Pardon Hearings, Day 2, at 477–78. 42 Id. at 485. 43 Id. at 522. 44Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 709. 45 Id.

ment, William Bradford Reynolds, and Lewis Libby; 36 and (8) most

importantly, former high-ranking Israeli officials and Jewish community leaders had urged the pardon.37

• Allegation: President Clinton’s written explanation for

the Marc Rich pardon is ‘‘rife with false and misleading

statements.’’ 38

The Facts: In its report, the majority dismisses President Clinton’s explanation, reaching the inflammatory conclusion that ‘‘it

was rife with false and misleading statements’’ and left the Committee ‘‘wondering what the President’s true motivations were.’’ 39

While the majority may legitimately question the merit of President Clinton’s decision, its report provides no basis for the claim

that his explanation was not creditable.

Lawyers not involved in the pardon effort, such as Harvard Law

School Professor Alan Dershowitz, supported President Clinton’s

decision.40 In addition, one prominent Bush Administration official

who testified before the Committee—Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby—agreed

with most of the reasons given by President Clinton for the pardons.41 Mr. Libby represented Marc Rich before his decision to seek

a pardon and now serves as Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney. Testifying after two former federal prosecutors laid out the

strength of their case against Mr. Rich, Mr. Libby flatly stated: ‘‘I

believe that the Southern District of New York misconstrued the

facts and the law, and looking at all of the evidence of the defense

he had not violated the tax laws.’’ 42 Mr. Libby testified, moreover,

that if he had been asked to pursue a pardon during his representation of Mr. Rich, he could have put together a strong and defensible case for clemency.43

The fact that lawyers like Mr. Libby believe Mr. Rich had a defensible case for a pardon does not make the President’s decision

right. But it does indicate that it was possible for the President to

reach the decision he did without being corrupt or deceptive.

• Allegation: President Clinton ‘‘encouraged Roger Clinton

to capitalize on their relationship.’’ 44

The Facts: In its report, the majority states as a ‘‘finding of the

Committee’’ that ‘‘President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to

capitalize on their relationship’’ and that he ‘‘instructed Roger Clinton to use his connections to the Administration to gain financial

advantage.’’ 45 The majority makes similar allegations elsewhere in

this chapter. For example, it states:

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46 Id. at 717. 47 Id. at 709, 719. 48Majority Report, Chapter One, at 213. 49Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 6. 50Majority Report, Chapter One, at 214. 51The majority also contends that Jack Quinn ‘‘circumvented’’ the Justice Department by limiting his contact on the pardon petition to Eric Holder. This makes no sense, as Mr. Holder

served as Deputy Attorney General, the Justice Department official second in rank only to the

Attorney General.

Roger Clinton repeatedly treated his relationship to President Clinton as a commodity to be sold to the highest bidder. . . . Roger Clinton’s behavior was unseemly at best,

but it is even more troubling that the President himself

appears to have instigated and encouraged his behavior.46

The majority’s sole basis for this finding is a statement made by

a lawyer representing former Arkansas State Senator George

Locke. The majority apparently heard this statement from the lawyer, who had purportedly heard it from Mr. Locke. Mr. Locke had

purportedly heard it from Roger Clinton. Roger Clinton, in turn,

had purportedly heard it from President Clinton.47 Mr. Locke, on

whose credibility the majority primarily relies, had been convicted

of cocaine-related charges and served time in prison with Roger

Clinton. The unreliability of this triple hearsay should be self-evident.

The majority devotes 120 pages to Roger Clinton’s apparent efforts to influence various decisions by the President and other executive branch officials. It is telling that the evidence before the

Committee shows that he failed in each and every instance to obtain the result that he sought.

II. UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING INVOLVING OTHERS

President Clinton is not the only individual who is the target of

unsubstantiated allegations in the majority report. The following

discussion addresses unsubstantiated allegations involving other

individuals.

• Allegation: Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder deliberately assisted Jack Quinn with the Rich petition,48

worked with Jack Quinn to cut the Justice Department

out of the process,49 and probably did so out of a desire

to become Attorney General in a possible Gore Administration.50

The Facts: Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder gave ambiguously worded and ill-considered advice to the White House on the

Rich pardon petition without knowing all of the facts and without

involving others in the Justice Department. Contrary to the majority’s assertions, however, Mr. Holder was never in league with advocates seeking a pardon for Marc Rich and never sought to help

them ‘‘circumvent’’ the Justice Department. Moreover, the majority’s suggestion that Mr. Holder acted out of a desire to become Attorney General is implausible.51

The majority repeatedly exaggerates evidence received by the

Committee in an attempt to show a conspiracy between Mr. Holder

and Mr. Quinn. For example, the majority suggests that Mr. HoldVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01221 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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52Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 3. In its report, the majority attributes the following statement to Mr. Holder as though it was a direct quote: ‘‘Holder told Kekst that such a

person should ‘hire a lawyer who knows the process, he comes to me, and we work it out.’ ’’ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 101. The minority staff notes of Mr. Kekst’s interview do not reflect any mention of the words, ‘‘he comes to me, and we work it out.’’ Even if Mr. Kekst did

use those or similar words to describe Mr. Holder’s statement, his recollection is more than two

years old, and he certainly did not purport to remember Mr. Holder’s exact words. 53 Joint Interview of Gershon Kekst (March 15, 2001). 54Majority Report, Chapter One, at 208. 55 Id. 56Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 193.

er purposefully steered Marc Rich to Jack Quinn. According to the

majority report:

Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked

for Marc Rich on the pardon matter, asked Holder for a

recommendation of how to settle a criminal matter with

the Justice Department. Holder recommended that he hire

a Washington lawyer ‘‘who knows the process, he comes to

me, and we work it out.’’ Holder then explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn.52

To reach the conclusion that Mr. Holder ‘‘recommended’’ Mr.

Quinn to Mr. Kekst, the majority ascribes great significance to a

chance social encounter in late 1998 between Mr. Holder and Mr.

Kekst, who had never before met. According to Mr. Kekst, he found

himself seated next to Mr. Holder at a large corporate event. After

Mr. Holder indicated that he ‘‘worked at Main Justice,’’ Mr. Kekst

recalled asking him general questions about the system of accountability at the Department of Justice and, in particular, to whom

U.S. Attorneys were responsible. Mr. Holder apparently responded

that they were accountable to him; that was his job. He recalls asking Mr. Holder what a person would do if he believed he was the

victim of an overzealous prosecutor. Mr. Kekst said that Mr. Holder suggested hiring a lawyer in Washington, D.C., who knows the

process. He recalled that Mr. Holder then spotted Jack Quinn and

said words to the effect of, ‘‘There is Jack Quinn, someone like

that.’’ According to Mr. Kekst, Marc Rich’s name never came up in

the conversation.53

The majority also exaggerates the significance of Mr. Holder’s attempt to facilitate a meeting between prosecutors in the Southern

District of New York and lawyers representing Mr. Rich. The majority writes that ‘‘Holder had worked with Quinn during the previous year to try to force the Southern District of New York to sit

down and meet with Quinn about settling the charges against

Rich.’’ 54 The majority goes on to say that ‘‘Holder had a basically

sympathetic view of the Rich case.’’ 55 In his hearing testimony, Mr.

Holder acknowledged receiving the request from Mr. Quinn and

asking a career Justice Department official on his staff to look into

the matter. He explained that the prosecutors in New York declined the meeting and said that neither he nor anyone on his staff

ever pressed them to have the meeting.56 Mr. Holder further stated:

We simply deferred to them [the Southern District of New

York prosecutors] because it was their case. In candor, if

I were making the decision as the U.S. Attorney, I probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01222 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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57 Id. 58See id. at 192. 59Majority Report, Chapter One, at 213; Majority Exhibit 146. 60 E-mail from Jack Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Arnold & Porter, et al. (Nov. 18, 2000) (Majority Exhibit 146). 61See Majority Report, Chapter One, at 213. 62Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 342. 63See id. 64Mr. Holder testified that he believed the Justice Department would have an opportunity to

review and consider a pardon petition, even if it was submitted directly to the White House.

Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 193. The White House Counsel’s office consulted frequently with

the Justice Department Pardon Attorney, and did so until the end of the Administration. See,

e.g., Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 355. Indeed, toward the end of the Clinton Administration,

Mr. Holder asked that the White House Counsel’s office keep his office informed whenever it

needed information from the Office of the Pardon Attorney so that his office could keep track.

Joint Interview of Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President (Mar. 16, 2001).

This was normal procedure, as the Deputy Attorney General is the designated Justice Department liaison to the White House. See U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 1–2.102(D).

ably would have held a meeting. In my view, the government—and the cause of justice—often gains from hearing

about the flaws, real or imagined, cited by defense counsel

in a criminal case. But my only goal was to ensure that

the request was fully considered.57

The majority has no evidence to support its assertion that Mr.

Holder ‘‘tried to force’’ prosecutors to meet with Mr. Quinn or was

sympathetic to anything other than Mr. Quinn’s effort to set up a

meeting with the prosecutors.

The evidence before the Committee also does not prove the majority’s accusation that Mr. Holder worked with Mr. Quinn to cut

other Justice Department officials out of the pardon review process.

In retrospect, it is clear that Mr. Holder should have done more to

include other Justice Department officials in the review process. Indeed, Mr. Holder conceded as much during his testimony.58 This

mistake in judgment is not evidence of misconduct.

The majority points to a November 18, 2001, e-mail message as

proof of a conspiracy between Mr. Holder and Mr. Quinn. The subject line of the message reads, ‘‘eric.’’ 59 The text of the message

reads: ‘‘spoke to him last evening. he says go straight to wh. also

says timing is good. we shd get in soon. will elab when we

speak.’’ 60 Neither Mr. Quinn nor Mr. Holder testified about this

message, however. Indeed, as the majority itself acknowledges, it

is unclear that ‘‘eric’’ even refers to Eric Holder.61

Assuming the e-mail accurately reflects the words of Mr. Holder,

it shows that he advised Mr. Quinn to submit the pardon petition

directly to the White House. But this is not proof of wrongdoing.

As Beth Nolan testified, the Pardon Attorney in the Justice Department had indicated by then that he would not process any more

pardon applications,62 while the President was continuing to accept

clemency applications at the White House.63 Advising Mr. Quinn of

these facts is not criminal behavior, and it is consistent with Mr.

Holder’s expectation that Justice Department officials would be

consulted even if Mr. Quinn submitted the petition directly to the

White House.64 It is certainly more plausible than the conspiracy

suggested in the majority’s report.

Finally, the majority suggests that Mr. Holder helped with the

Rich petition out of a desire to be appointed Attorney General in

a Gore Administration. The majority report states:

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65Majority Report, Chapter One, at 214. 66Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 192. 67 Id. 68 Id. at 194–95, 233. 69Majority Report, Chapter One, at 133. 70 Id. at 212. 71District of Columbia Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.3.

At the time when Holder made the decision to assist

Quinn, there was still a realistic possibility of Vice President Gore winning the election. As an influential friend of

Vice President Gore, Jack Quinn would be in a key position to assist Holder’s chances of becoming Attorney General. While this may not have been Holder’s sole motivation in aiding Quinn, it was likely a powerful motivation

for Holder.65

This speculation is completely implausible. At the time when it

was still possible for Al Gore to be President, the most Mr. Holder

did was attempt to facilitate a meeting with prosecutors in New

York and talk to Mr. Quinn about submitting the pardon petition

directly to the White House. He did nothing to support the Rich petition until he gave an opinion to Beth Nolan on January 19, 2001.

This was the last full day of the Clinton Administration, and his

chances of becoming Attorney General were nil. As the second

ranking official in the Justice Department, Mr. Holder could have

given powerful support to the Rich petition long before January 19,

while the Presidential election was still in doubt. The evidence before the Committee shows that he did nothing of the sort.

Mr. Holder exercised poor judgment when he told Beth Nolan on

January 19 that he was neutral, leaning toward favorable on the

Rich petition, if there was a foreign policy benefit to be gained. As

he acknowledged, he knew little about the case against Marc

Rich.66 He was not in a position to give any recommendation on the

petition, even if there was a foreign policy benefit. Mr. Holder publicly expressed regret about this, testifying that he wished he had

ensured the Justice Department was more fully informed and involved in the pardon process.67 He also acknowledged that if he

had known everything about the case that he later came to know,

he would not have given his opinion.68

• Allegation: Jack Quinn and other lawyers representing

Marc Rich made arguments that were ‘‘false and misleading’’ 69 and ‘‘fraudulent.’’ 70

The Facts: The majority repeatedly and inappropriately disparages the lawyers involved in the Rich pardon effort, accusing them

of dishonesty and deception. The majority bases such remarks solely on its disagreement with the legal arguments advanced in the

Rich pardon petition.

Mr. Quinn and other lawyers representing Mr. Rich were carrying out their duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of their client. The

bar rules of the District of Columbia, which govern the professional

conduct of lawyers in this jurisdiction, impose an obligation of diligence and zeal within the bounds of the law.71 This rule provides

that ‘‘[a] lawyer shall not intentionally—[f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of a client through reasonably available means’’ or ‘‘prejudice or damage the client during the course of the professional relaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01224 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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72 Id. 73Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 145. 74See, e.g., Majority Report, Chapter One, at 212. 75See id. at 132. 76See Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 123. 77Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 491. 78Majority Report, Chapter One, at 102. 79 House Committee on Government Reform, Committee Meeting (Mar. 14, 2002). 80 Exec. Order 12834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993).

tionship.’’ 72 A lawyer who fails to adhere to this duty is subject to

discipline, including suspension or disbarment from the practice of

law.

President Clinton and members of his staff were well aware that

Mr. Quinn was acting as an advocate. Bruce Lindsey even told

President Clinton that ‘‘he should consider Mr. Quinn in this to be

an advocate on one side and not his advisor, and that Jack had a

client.’’ 73 In keeping with his professional responsibilities as a lawyer, Mr. Quinn had an obligation not only to advocate the pardon,

but to do so in a manner that would not prejudice his client’s interests. He had no obligation to point out the weaknesses in Mr.

Rich’s case. The responsibility to marshal the full array of facts and

arguments against the petition belonged to the government officials

involved in the decisional process.

It is revealing to contrast the majority’s treatment of Mr. Quinn,

who is a Democratic lawyer, with its treatment of Scooter Libby,

a Republican lawyer who also represented Mr. Rich. The majority

castigates Mr. Quinn for his representation of Mr. Rich and contends that he made fraudulent arguments.74 Mr. Libby is hardly

mentioned, and the majority takes great pains to point out that he

didn’t work on the pardon effort.75 But in fact, Mr. Libby represented Mr. Rich far longer than did Mr. Quinn, and he instructed

Mr. Quinn on the facts of the case and on controversial arguments

later used in the Rich pardon petition.76 Moreover, Mr. Libby chose

to represent Mr. Rich—and to accept enormous legal fees from

him—despite his personal conviction that he was a traitor to the

United States.77

• Allegation: When Jack Quinn filed the Marc Rich petition

with the White House and contacted White House staff

regarding the pardon, he violated ethical rules set out in

Executive Order 12834.78

The Facts: The majority contends that Mr. Quinn violated Executive Order 12834, which prohibits, for a period of five years, a

former executive branch employee from lobbying his or her former

agency (including the Executive Office of the President). The majority asserts that because Mr. Quinn left the White House in February 1997, his contacts with respect to the Marc Rich pardon were

prohibited by the order.

Although the executive order arguably should extend to contacts

related to executive clemency, it is not clear that it does so. In fact,

Chairman Burton indicated that the Committee was exploring legislation to close the ‘‘loophole’’ in the executive order.79

The executive order identifies six exceptions to the proscribed

lobbying activity. The second exception expressly allows ‘‘communicating or appearing with regard to a judicial proceeding.’’ 80 The

majority contends that because the clemency power is wielded by

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81The word ‘‘regard’’ is commonly defined as ‘‘to refer or relate to; concern.’’ See Random

House Webster’s College Dictionary, 1094 (2nd ed. 1997); American Heritage College Dictionary,

1149 (3rd ed. 1997). 82Majority Report, Chapter One, at 218 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. M11–189

DC (S.D.N.Y. 2001).) 83Majority Report, Chapter One, at 216. 84Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 324. 85Majority Report, Chapter One, at 143. 86Majority Report, Chapter One, at 138.

the executive, not the legislative branch, it cannot be a judicial proceeding. The majority’s interpretation, however, is not supported by

the language of the executive order. To fall within the ambit of the

exception, Mr. Quinn’s efforts needed to be ‘‘with regard to’’ a judicial proceeding.81 The criminal case pending against Mr. Rich in

New York arguably constituted such a judicial proceeding. The

President’s decision to grant Mr. Rich a pardon resolved the criminal indictment and ended that proceeding. Mr. Quinn’s contacts

with the White House appear to fall within the exception and to

be permissible.

The majority also asserts that its conclusion is supported by the

opinion of a U.S. District Court judge, who found that Mr. Quinn

acted as a lobbyist and was not hired because he was a lawyer.82

The court’s opinion in that case, however, related to the attorneyclient privilege and work product doctrine, and it did not address

the scope of lobbying as it is defined in the executive order. It does

not support the majority’s contention that Mr. Quinn violated the

ethics ban.

As the majority notes in its report, White House Counsel Beth

Nolan raised the issue of the executive order with Mr. Quinn.83 Ms.

Nolan appropriately asked an associate counsel on her staff to look

independently at the question. The associate counsel concurred

with Mr. Quinn’s interpretation of the rule and concluded that his

work was permissible.84

• Allegation: It is likely that Jack Quinn attempted to mislead the public and the Committee when he claimed that

he did not expect to be paid for his work on the Rich pardon.85

The Facts: The majority mischaracterizes Jack Quinn’s testimony

in an effort to show that he lied to the Committee about his compensation from Marc Rich. For example, the majority states:

‘‘Quinn has taken the incredible position that he did not expect to

be paid for any of his work on the Rich case after he left Arnold

& Porter’’ and ‘‘[i]t is impossible to believe that Jack Quinn did his

work on the Rich pardon out of the goodness of his heart, on a pro

bono basis.’’ 86 Mr. Quinn never said that he did not expect to be

paid for any of his work on the Rich case after he left Arnold &

Porter, or that he was working on a pro bono basis. Rather, he said

that he discussed the matter with Robert Fink, another lawyer for

Marc Rich, and came to the conclusion that he would not be paid

additional fees for his work to obtain a pardon. As the majority

notes in its own report, Mr. Quinn testified:

After leaving Arnold & Porter, I did consider and discuss

with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new arrangement. I came to the conclusion that, particularly because

3305

87Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 242. 88 Id. at 242, 266. 89 Id. at 266. 90 Id. 91Majority Report, Chapter One, at 142. 92 Id. at 181, 186.

of the fact that we were unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the Southern District, and because I didn’t

think, frankly, there would be that much more additional

time in it, and because I believed that the earlier payments had been fair and reasonable, that I would see this

through to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had

been paid.87

In his testimony, Mr. Quinn further said that he had not accepted payments after leaving Arnold & Porter for his work to obtain

a pardon, nor would he accept any such payments in the future.88

Mr. Quinn said, however, that he would accept payment from Mr.

Rich to reimburse him for expenses he incurred in connection with

the pardon controversy.89 And he said that he would accept additional fees for services other than for his efforts to win Marc Rich

a pardon. He testified:

Well, look, I don’t think it would be fair to ask me to commit never to accept moneys from him. As I’ve said to you,

if I do work that justifies my billing him for it, I will do

so. I expect to be reimbursed for the expenses I’m put to

in connection this. Those are the only moneys I anticipate

receiving from him.90

The majority claims that the testimony of Mr. Fink contradicts

Mr. Quinn. As the majority notes in its report, Mr. Fink testified

that he believed Mr. Rich and Mr. Quinn would come to a fair fee

arrangement that was consistent with his normal fee arrangements

and communicated that to Mr. Quinn in November 2000.91 It does

not appear from any of the evidence before the Committee, however, that Mr. Quinn ever concluded an agreement on fees for the

pardon effort. Mr. Quinn could have concluded that he would not

receive any additional fees for that work.

The Committee has no evidence that Mr. Quinn accepted additional fees from Mr. Rich for his efforts to obtain a pardon. Mr.

Quinn made no promise that he would not accept fees for work separate from his efforts to obtain a pardon or to reimburse him for

expenses he incurred in connection with the pardon scandal. The

Committee has no basis upon which to conclude that Mr. Quinn

misled the Committee.

• Allegation: Denise Rich’s and Beth Dozoretz’s contributions, efforts to help with the Marc Rich pardon, and

their decision to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege

against self incrimination raise ‘‘the indelible appearance

of impropriety.’’ 92

The Facts: In its report, the majority acknowledges that it was

unable to substantiate the allegation that Denise Rich or Beth

Dozoretz improperly or illegally influenced President Clinton’s decision to grant a pardon to Marc Rich. The majority nevertheless

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93 Id. 94 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956). 95Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 711, 759. 96 Id. at 731–776. 97 Id. at 773. 98See Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July, 17, 2001); see also Letter from Elaine J.

Mittleman to Chairman Dan Burton (Apr. 3, 2002) (Exhibit 4). 99 Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July 17, 2001); Joint Interview of Marie Ragghianti (July

27, 2001).

priety.’’ 93 The majority bases this conclusion on the political contributions of Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz, their lawful efforts to assist with the Marc Rich pardon effort, and their decision to invoke

their constitutional right against self-incrimination before this

Committee.

The testimony of Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz would have helped

the Committee determine the truth, and their decision to assert

their Fifth Amendment rights was a setback to the Committee’s efforts. The majority is wrong, however, to draw adverse inferences

about Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz from their assertion of their constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that

a witness’s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination does

not give rise to an inference of guilt. Calling the privilege ‘‘an important advance in the development of our liberty,’’ the Court has

explained that ‘‘[t]oo many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too

readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of a crime

or commit perjury in claiming the privilege.’’ 94

As the majority acknowledges in its own report, the Committee

could have compelled Ms. Rich’s and Ms. Dozoretz’s testimony by

conferring a grant of immunity from prosecution. The majority

elected not to pursue that option. The majority should not seek to

establish by innuendo allegations of wrongdoing that it could not

establish by the evidence.

• Allegation: Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of the

U.S. Parole Commission, hindered an FBI investigation

into Roger Clinton’s contacts with commissioners and

Commission staff and may have been trying to protect

Roger Clinton.95

The Facts: The majority report devotes over 40 pages to Roger

Clinton’s unsuccessful efforts to assist a federal inmate, Rosario

Gambino, in an application for parole before the U.S. Parole Commission (USPC).96 The majority also discusses Mr. Gambino’s unsuccessful application for executive clemency.97

As is detailed in the majority report, Roger Clinton contacted

commissioners and staff of the USPC numerous times to discuss

Mr. Gambino’s request for parole. While Roger Clinton’s repeated

contacts proved to be a nuisance to these officials, the contacts did

not violate any law or regulation.98 Moreover, U.S. Parole Commission officials were aware of the appearance of improper political influence in its proceedings. Out of an abundance of caution, Commission officials attempted to discontinue further contacts with

Roger Clinton.99 The USPC even created a policy ‘‘restrict[ing] the

ability of Commission staff from engaging in any continued series

of calls or discussions on official matters that are not in the context

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100Letter from Marie Ragghianti (Oct. 26, 1998) (Exhibit 5); Joint Interview of Michael Stover

(July 17, 2001). 101 Joint Interview of Marie Ragghianti (July 27, 2001). 102 Id. 103 Joint Interview of Tom Kowalski (July 27, 2001). 104 Id. 105 Id. 106See Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July 17, 2001). 107Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 711, 759. 108Majority Report, Chapter Three, at 1264–65.

of an agency proceeding,’’ which it communicated in writing to

Roger Clinton.100

For reasons that are not entirely clear from the Committee’s evidence, the FBI took steps to investigate Roger Clinton’s contacts

with the USPC. As part of this effort, the FBI proposed a sting operation whereby a Commission employee would set up a meeting

with Roger Clinton at a nearby hotel restaurant and introduce

Roger Clinton to an FBI agent posing as a USPC official.101 The

FBI also apparently proposed that the Commission employee wear

a body wire to record the conversation with Roger Clinton.102

Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of the USPC at the time, was

uncomfortable with the proposal and rejected it. Ms. Ragghianti explained that the Commission did not conduct meetings in restaurants, and she said that she thought the FBI’s proposed arrangements would be unprofessional and would put the commission

in bad light. She explained further that the agency could accommodate the FBI in ways other than the proposed sting and maintain

professionalism.

After the Commissioners considered the matter, the USPC did

permit the FBI to place a hidden microphone under the desk of a

USPC employee, who agreed to meet with Roger Clinton.103 According to this employee, Tom Kowalski, the FBI proposed that he

ask leading questions to draw out Roger Clinton, but Mr. Kowalski

did not feel comfortable with that approach.104 Mr. Kowalski recalls that he had a half-hour meeting with Roger Clinton, but Mr.

Clinton made no incriminating comments.105 The FBI’s investigation then apparently ended.106

In its report, the majority alleges that Ms. Ragghianti hindered

the FBI investigation and may have done so to protect Roger Clinton.107 But the evidence before the Committee shows only that Ms.

Ragghianti exercised her judgment on the appropriateness of a proposed sting operation. Although the majority may disagree with her

judgment, there is no evidence that her decision was based on factors other than her evaluation of the interests of the USPC. The

majority’s suggestion that she acted to protect Roger Clinton is unfair speculation.

• Allegation: Hugh Rodham told the White House that First

Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was aware of the clemency

petition of Carlos Vignali and that his commutation was

‘‘very important to her.’’ Either the First Lady was aware

of the petition and approved of Mr. Rodham’s lobbying

efforts or Hugh Rodham lied regarding the First Lady’s

knowledge.108

The Facts: The majority alleges that Hugh Rodham told the

White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was aware

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109See id. at 1678–79. 110 Handwritten note by Dawn Woolen, Assistant to Deputy Counsel to the President Bruce

Lindey (Majority Exhibit 22). 111 Joint Interview of Dawn Woolen (Sept. 25, 2001). 112 Id. 113Letter from Nancy Luque to Chairman Dan Burton (Mar. 14, 2002) (attaching District of

Columbia Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.6) (Exhibit 6).

of his efforts to lobby for clemency for Carlos Vignali and that his

commutation was ‘‘very important to her.’’ The majority then concludes that because both have denied discussing Mr. Vignali’s petition, either one or the other lied.109

The majority bases its contention primarily on one phone message from a former White House staff member. The phone message

is an undated, handwritten note on White House stationary that

reads:

Hugh says this is very important to him and the First

Lady as well as others.

Sheriff Baca from LA is more than happy to speak with

you about him but is uncomfortable writing a letter offering his full support.110

Committee staff also conducted a joint interview of the author of

the note, Dawn Woolen, who served as an assistant to Bruce

Lindsey in the White House. When asked about this note and what

Mr. Rodham told her on the phone, Ms. Woolen responded that she

had no independent recollection of the conversation and that she

usually paraphrased phone messages.111 Asked to interpret the

meaning of the word ‘‘this’’ in the phrase ‘‘this is important,’’ Ms.

Woolen speculated that it meant the message concerning the

Vignali commutation.112

The majority sought to interview Mr. Rodham about the issue.

But Mr. Rodham’s attorney informed the Committee that Mr.

Rodham would not testify because Mr. Rodham was constrained

from revealing his client’s confidences by the bar rules of the District of Columbia.113 The majority did not seek to interview Senator

Clinton.

These fragmentary facts do raise questions about what Mr.

Rodham may have said to Ms. Woolen. But they are wholly insufficient to support the definitive conclusions that the majority seeks

to draw.

III. CONCLUSION

Despite widespread consensus that the Marc Rich pardon and

other last-minute grants of clemency were unjustified, Chairman

Burton conducted a far-flung and partisan investigation. The majority report reflects this approach. The report does not recite facts

and draw reasonable conclusions. Rather, it mixes facts with suppositions, unfairly questions the motives and integrity of the individuals involved, and makes numerous unsupported allegations of

wrongdoing. The Committee’s extensive investigation uncovered a

clemency process in disarray at the end of the Clinton Administration and poor judgment. The majority’s insinuation of corruption

3309

114 A number of individuals wrote to Chairman Burton to protest the manner in which the

majority conducted its investigation and aspects of the majority report. Those which were copied

to the minority are attached at Exhibits 4, 6, and 7.

and serious wrongdoing in the pardon process, however, is unsubstantiated and wrong.114

HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN. HON. TOM LANTOS. HON. MAJOR R. OWENS. HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS. HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI. HON. PATSY T. MINK. HON. BERNARD SANDERS. HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON. HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS. HON. HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH. HON. DANNY K. DAVIS. HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN. HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY. HON. DIANE E. WATSON.

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

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3311

3312

3313

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(3389)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. DAN BURTON

INTRODUCTION

A number of important events have transpired since the Committee approved the report on March 14, 2002. First, former President

Clinton granted an interview to Newsweek magazine in which he

purported to address some of the issues discussed in the Committee’s report. As discussed below, almost every statement made by

former President Clinton is either false or misleading. It remains

deeply troubling that the former President is relying on deception

and half-truths rather than squarely addressing the numerous

questions raised by his eleventh-hour clemency grants.

Also in the month since the approval of the report, a number of

parties mentioned in the report, or their counsel, have provided the

Committee with letters responding to the report. The Committee

received letters from Peter Kadzik, Hugh Rodham, Los Angeles

County Sheriff Leroy Baca, and Marie Ragghianti disputing various aspects of the Committee’s report pertaining to them. I found

all of these complaints uniformly without merit and have responded to them directly. Furthermore, in each case, I have been

disturbed by the lengths to which these individuals have gone to

distort the record of their involvement in these cases.

The Committee also received documents from Jack Quinn in response to a subpoena issued by the Committee shortly before the

report was issued. These documents relate to Quinn’s efforts to receive payment from Rich even after he pledged that he would not

accept payment for his work on the Rich pardon. The documents

indicate that after the Committee’s hearings, Quinn and Rich entered into a $300,000 retainer agreement to compensate Quinn for

his time and expenses in responding to the various investigations

and inquiries into the Rich pardon. However, Quinn withheld additional documents related to other legal work for Rich, asserting attorney-client and work product privileges and claiming that the

work was unrelated to the pardon.

The Committee also received a number of critically important

documents from Marie Ragghianti, the former Chief of Staff to the

U.S. Parole Commission. Committee staff initially asked

Ragghianti to provide the Committee with any documents she had

about the Clinton-Gambino matter in an interview in July 2001.

Ragghianti indicated that she would search her files and provide

any documents that she located. Ragghianti provided no records to

the Committee for the next eight months. Then, after having her

counsel prepare a letter complaining about the Committee’s report,

she attached a number of documents previously withheld from the

Committee. Accordingly, the Committee issued a subpoena to

Ragghianti for all of her documents about Roger Clinton or Rosario

Gambino, and Ragghianti provided the Committee with relevant

3390

documents retained in her personal possession. The documents contained important new facts that bolster the report’s conclusions and

undermine Ragghianti’s criticisms.

I. COMMENTS BY FORMER PRESIDENT CLINTON

After the Committee’s report was released, former President

Clinton conducted an interview with Newsweek in which he purported to respond to the concerns raised by some of his grants of

clemency. The President’s comments are noteworthy in that they

contain a number of false statements and baseless accusations. The

relevant portion of the interview reads as follows:

Question: How low [emotionally] did you go in the months

just after you left?

Clinton: I was just angry that after I worked so hard and

after all that money had been spent proving that I never

did anything wrong for money, that I’d get mugged one

more time on the way out the door. People are free to say

that they disagreed with this or that part of the decisions

I made, but there wasn’t a shred of evidence that it had

been done for any improper motive. In fact, there is a lot

of evidence to the contrary. I thought there was a little bit

of a double standard in the way I was treated, to put it

mildly. And I still do.

Question: If you had to do it all over again, would you pardon Marc Rich?

Clinton: Probably not, just for the politics. It was terrible

politics. It wasn’t worth the damage to my reputation. But

that doesn’t mean the attacks were true. The fact that his

ex-wife—I didn’t think they got along—was for it and had

contributed to my library had nothing to do with it. I did

it for three reasons. Number one, the Justice Department

said they were no longer opposed and they were really for

it. Had I not granted it, it would have been the only one

they wanted publicly that [I] didn’t grant. Number two, he

waived his statute-of-limitations defenses so we can get

lots of money from him [in a civil suit, if Rich returns to

the United States]. Justice Ginsburg’s husband—the tax

expert—said he wasn’t guilty. And the Justice Department

under President Reagan said he was wrongly indicted in

the first place. [A claim former Reagan officials deny.] The

third thing is, I received a request from the government of

Israel. They wanted him and [Jonathan] Pollard, and I

considered Pollard an unrepentant spy and I didn’t think

I could pardon him. And I wanted to do something to support the peace process. Furthermore, [Rich’s] main lawyer

was Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff [Lewis Libby]

and they [conservative critics] tried to hide that.

Question: Do you think you were a little more open to the

argument, from personal experience, that prosecutors are

not infallible?

Clinton: Absolutely, I do. I do think that I was more vulnerable—look, I don’t know Marc Rich and wouldn’t know

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1 Jonathan Alter, Life is Fleeting, Man, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 42. 2 Business Meeting, Comm. on Govt. Reform, Mar. 14, 2002, at 76.

him if he walked in the door there. I was very sensitive

to prosecutorial abuse because I had seen it. I don’t know

that anyone is 100 percent aware of his motives. I don’t

think that’s all bad for a president to be sensitive to any

kind of abuse of power.

Question: But Rich was a fugitive. . .

Clinton: Look, I’m not justifying the fugitive status. But if

we can get a couple of hundred million dollars, whatever

it is he allegedly owes, is it in the interests of the United

States to recover from him the way we recovered from

other people who violated these oil-pricing schemes?

Question: Your brother and brother-in-law were basically

selling access to you.

Clinton: I still don’t know what the facts are, except that

the evidence is I didn’t grant anything [my brother] asked

me to grant. I had no idea that [my brother-in-law] was involved in those two cases. Had I known it, I would have

turned them down. I was just surprised and disappointed.

Question: It wasn’t a great [year] for you, was it?

Clinton: Well, Buddy dying was by far the worst thing.1

President Clinton’s interview is so replete with false and misleading statements that it is necessary to respond line-by-line.

• ‘‘I was just angry that after I worked so hard and after

all that money had been spent proving that I never did

anything wrong for money, that I’d get mugged one more

time on the way out the door.’’

By this comment, President Clinton suggests that the investigations into the Rich and Green pardons were a last-minute mugging perpetrated upon him by some sort of right-wing cabal.

However, there was a widespread consensus that the Committee’s investigation of President Clinton’s clemency grants was

justified. The following comments from Democratic Members of

Congress and mainstream media outlets show that the Committee’s investigation was justified and widely supported:

Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton observed at the business

meeting at which the report was approved, ‘‘[t]he investigation

was not only warranted; I believe that the investigation has already served an important purpose. It is impossible for me to

believe that any person contemplating running for President of

the United States or who gets that office will again participate

in the kind of pardon activity that went on at the end of the

Clinton Administration.’’ 2

The New York Times editorialized that ‘‘even [the President’s]

closest Democratic allies, people who stuck by him in other dark

hours, are expressing doubts and dismay. As Senator Herb

Kohl, a Wisconsin Democrat, put it, ‘There probably isn’t one

person across the country today who is familiar with this case

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3 A New Front in the Pardon Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A18. 4The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast, Jan. 31, 2001). 5 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,

107th Cong. 13 (Feb. 14, 2001). 6Marion McKeone, The Day Hillary Turned Her Back on Bill, SUNDAY HERALD, Feb. 25, 2001,

at 17.

who doesn’t think that it’s a question of power, connection,

money.’ Clinton said he would be willing to cooperate ‘with any

appropriate inquiry.’ That would certainly be helpful. Despite

the desire expressed by President Bush and others to close the

book on Clinton’s presidency, there is still a strong and legitimate interest in getting to the bottom of this insupportable pardon.’’ 3

Former Democratic Mayor Jerry Brown observed, ‘‘If you’re asking about pardons, the president can give any pardon he wants.

That’s in the constitution. But that doesn’t stop people from

looking into it to see was there money exchanged or was there

influence . . . that wasn’t appropriate. And that’s certainly a legitimate subject for investigation.’’ 4

At a hearing on the Rich pardon, Senator Russell Feingold stated that ‘‘I do believe that legitimate questions have been raised

about the pardon of Marc Rich, in particular, and for me, as for

many Senators and many Americans, suspicions about this pardon arise from the fact that Marc Rich’s ex-wife, Denise Rich,

was a large donor to the Democratic Party—not just a large

donor, a huge donor. . . . [Denise Rich’s contributions to the

Democratic Party] can’t help but raise some questions about

this pardon.’’ 5

The Sunday Herald reported that ‘‘die-hard loyalists like James

Carville are admitting the inquiries are ‘legitimate’ while Massachusetts Congressman Barney Frank, one of Clinton’s fiercest

defenders during the Lewinsky scandal is telling anyone who’ll

listen that he’s ‘through with the Clintons.’ ’’ 6

• ‘‘People are free to say that they disagreed with this or

that part of the decisions I made, but there wasn’t a

shred of evidence that it had been done for any improper

motive. In fact, there is a lot of evidence to the contrary.’’

Rather than directly deny wrongdoing and candidly answer

questions about his decisions in the Rich case, it seems that the

former President is attempting to establish a standard under

which he can be criticized only where criminal wrongdoing can

be established. Former President Clinton’s basic assertion that

there was not a ‘‘shred of evidence’’ of improper motive is incorrect. The Marc Rich pardon is replete with evidence that a number of the major actors had improper motives. The first and

most obvious piece of evidence is that the four major players in

the Marc Rich case—Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Denise Rich, and

Beth Dozoretz—have refused to discuss their involvement in the

case, with two of them relying on their Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination. The two people closest to President

Clinton who lobbied him on the Rich and Green pardons— Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz—have refused to testify about

their discussions with the President without a grant of prosecuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01314 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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torial immunity. The consistent refusal of key witnesses to answer questions certainly raises concerns about their motives.

Similarly, it is unclear what the former President is referring

to when he suggests that there is ‘‘a lot of evidence to the contrary’’ that there was improper motive. The clear factual record

established by the report demonstrates that there was no reasonable explanation for the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. All of the explanations offered to date by the President

are factually inaccurate or totally irrelevant.

• Question: ‘‘If you had to do it all over again, would you

pardon Marc Rich?’’ Clinton: ‘‘Probably not, just for the

politics. It was terrible politics. It wasn’t worth the damage to my reputation.’’

This is one of the most shocking statements made by President

Clinton. After all of the evidence demonstrating that Marc Rich

and Pincus Green were large-scale criminals, fugitives from justice, and traitors to their country, the President can only bring

himself to say that he ‘‘probably’’ would not grant the pardons

again, ‘‘just for the politics,’’ because it was not ‘‘worth the damage to my reputation.’’ It apparently does not concern the President that he has pardoned two of the largest tax cheats and

most wanted international fugitives in U.S. history. It apparently is not a matter of concern that a man who traded oil with

(and thus has financially supported) terrorist regimes ranging

from Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has

escaped any punishment from the U.S. legal system. President

Clinton is apparently unconcerned that a man who attempted

to renounce his citizenship to escape the law and was described

as a ‘‘traitor’’ by his own attorney is now free to return to the

United States. President Clinton is apparently not troubled that

he has undermined U.S. efforts to apprehend criminals abroad

by pardoning two of the FBI’s most wanted fugitives.

The one thing that does bother President Clinton, however, is

the damage to his own reputation. During his terms in office,

President Clinton demonstrated time and again his tendency to

elevate his own interests above the interests of the United

States. Yet, his insistence on discussing the Rich pardon only in

terms of its impact on himself still manages to demonstrate a

breathtaking level of hubris. Perhaps most important, it apparently is of no consequence to the former President that the Rich

and Green pardons send the unambiguous message that there

are two separate systems of justice: one for the rich and one for

the poor.

• ‘‘I did it for three reasons. Number one, the Justice Department said they were no longer opposed and they

were really for it. Had I not granted it, it would have

been the only one they wanted publicly that [I] didn’t

grant.’’

The former President’s claim that the ‘‘Justice Department’’ was

‘‘really for’’ the Rich pardon is factually incorrect. Apart from informal contacts with Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, the

Justice Department was never informed that the Rich pardon

3394

was even being considered until the middle of the night on January 19–20, 2001, after the decision had been made to grant the

pardon. At that point, Associate White House Counsel Meredith

Cabe informed Pardon Attorney Roger Adams that Rich and

Green were going to receive pardons and asked Adams to conduct an NCIC background check on them. Before that telephone

call, only Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder had any knowledge that the Rich pardon was being considered. Holder had

known that the Rich pardon was being considered since November 2000 but had failed to inform anyone else in the Justice Department of that fact. None of the relevant components of the

Justice Department that would have been able to provide an

educated opinion—the prosecutors in the Southern District of

New York, the Office of the Pardon Attorney, the FBI, and the

U.S. Marshals Service—were ever asked to provide their opinion about the case. Therefore, it is highly misleading to say that

the ‘‘Justice Department’’ was for the Rich pardon and completely false to claim that the Justice Department ‘‘publicly’’

supported it.

Eric Holder, of course, did privately inform White House Counsel Beth Nolan that he was ‘‘neutral, leaning towards’’ the Rich

pardon. In the context of the unrelenting opposition to the pardon expressed by White House staff, this was effectively a statement of support. However, Holder had never consulted with

anyone else at the Justice Department about the Rich pardon,

and the mere fact that the Rich case was under consideration

for a grant of clemency was kept completely secret until the

pardons were granted on January 20, 2001. At no time before

or after the pardon did any Justice Department official express

public support for the pardon.

• ‘‘Number two, he waived his statute-of-limitations defenses so we can get lots of money from him [in a civil

suit, if Rich returns to the United States.]’’

As explained in the report, President Clinton was completely

wrong in thinking that he somehow obtained a valuable concession when he asked Jack Quinn to have Rich waive his statute

of limitations defenses in exchange for the pardon. Marc Rich

did not have a statute of limitations defense to waive. As the

relevant statutes make perfectly clear, an individual who has

fled the country is not entitled to use the expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. In addition, it is

highly unlikely that there was ever any civil liability relating to

the 1983 charges against Rich and Green personally. Given that

their companies already discharged the corporate liability in a

1984 plea agreement, it is even more unlikely that any personal

financial liability would remain enforceable today. Finally, Rich

has always been willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars

to avoid criminal liability. Rather than winning some concession

on behalf of the U.S. government, President Clinton gave Marc

Rich exactly what he had wanted since 1983.

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7 James Risen and Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Diplomats Turned Aside Israeli Push on Rich’s Behalf, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at A1.

• ‘‘And the Justice Department under President Reagan

said he was wrongly indicted in the first place.’’

This claim by the former President is a complete fabrication.

The Justice Department has never made a statement that even

remotely resembles the claim made by President Clinton. The

Justice Department consistently defended the Rich and Green

indictment during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations. While it is not surprising that President Clinton would

make false statements to excuse his conduct, it is surprising

that he would make claims that are so obviously wrong.

• ‘‘The third thing is, I received a request from the government of Israel. They wanted him and [Jonathan] Pollard,

and I considered Pollard an unrepentant spy and I didn’t

think I could pardon him. And I wanted to do something

to support the peace process.’’

This familiar argument is addressed thoroughly in the Committee’s report. First, the President has overstated the extent to

which the Israeli government was pushing for the Rich pardon.

The transcripts of the conversations between President Clinton

and Prime Minister Barak in the report make it clear that

Barak did not push the President on the Rich issue. More importantly, at no point did Prime Minister Barak suggest that

the Rich pardon would have a role in the Middle East peace

process. Indeed, there is no indication that Marc Rich is a significant player in the Middle East peace process or that his pardon has had any role in the process. Even President Clinton’s

own Middle East envoy, Dennis Ross, stated that Rich ‘‘was not

a factor in the Middle East talks.’’ 7

• ‘‘Furthermore, [Rich’s] main lawyer was Vice President

Cheney’s chief of staff [Lewis Libby] and they [conservative critics] tried to hide that.’’

It is true that Libby represented Marc Rich before he sought a

pardon. However, it is telling that Clinton attempts to shift the

focus to Libby given that his own White House Counsel, Jack

Quinn, was so deeply involved in the pardon effort. Certainly,

Libby’s work on the Rich case raises none of the concerns raised

by Jack Quinn’s representation. After all, it was Jack Quinn,

not Lewis Libby, who lobbied his former subordinates in the

White House counsel’s office on behalf of Marc Rich. It was Jack

Quinn, not Lewis Libby, who likely violated ethical standards

by lobbying his former colleagues. Finally, it was Jack Quinn,

not Lewis Libby, who obtained the pardons for Marc Rich and

Pincus Green.

Moreover, President Clinton’s claim that anyone tried to ‘‘hide’’

Libby’s representation of Rich is nonsense. Libby voluntarily

testified before the Committee and answered every question put

to him. If anything, former President Clinton has repeatedly attempted to distort Libby’s representation of Marc Rich. When he

wrote his infamous column defending the Rich pardon, PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01317 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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8 Editors’ Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15. 9William J. Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001.

dent Clinton initially wrote that ‘‘the [pardon] applications were

reviewed and advocated’’ by three prominent Republican attorneys: Leonard Garment, William Bradford Reynolds, and Lewis

Libby.8 This claim was completely false, as Libby, Garment, and

Reynolds had absolutely no involvement in the pardon effort

and had never reviewed, much less advocated, the Rich pardon.

The President’s staff corrected the column so that later editions

of the New York Times stated that Libby, Garment, and Reynolds had ‘‘reviewed and advocated’’ the ‘‘case for the pardons.’’ 9

Even the corrected version of the former President’s column was

misleading and intentionally overstated their involvement in

the Rich case.

The former President fails to note that, while Libby deemed

Rich a traitor, Libby had absolutely no involvement in the pardon process. This is a crucial distinction that should not be

glossed over. Even a traitor is entitled to a legal defense, and

therefore, agreeing to represent one is defensible. However, pardoning an unrepentant traitor is indefensible.

• ‘‘I was very sensitive to prosecutorial abuse because I

had seen it. I don’t know that anyone is 100 percent

aware of his motives. I don’t think that’s all bad for a

president to be sensitive to any kind of abuse of power.’’

The former President’s suggestion that Marc Rich was a victim

of ‘‘prosecutorial abuse’’ is insulting to the numerous career Justice Department prosecutors who worked on the Marc Rich case.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green were indicted after a painstaking

investigation and after the Department obtained extensive documentary and testimonial evidence against Rich and Green.

The Rich and Green case was reviewed by a number of prosecutors at Main Justice and the Southern District of New York,

both Republicans and Democrats. President Clinton appointed

one of these men to a federal judgeship and another became a

high-level official at his Justice Department. It is implausible to

think that these dozens of prosecutors engaged in systematic

prosecutorial abuse against Marc Rich and Pincus Green for almost twenty years and that only Bill Clinton, over the objections of his own staff, was able to detect it. More important, it

is telling that the former President would hear only from

friends of Rich or his paid advocates. It displays a contempt for

law enforcement and the Central Intelligence Agency that he

would not even consider their views before accepting those of

Rich’s highly paid mouthpieces.

• ‘‘Look, I’m not justifying the fugitive status. But if we can

get a couple of hundred million dollars, whatever it is he

allegedly owes, is it in the interests of the United States

to recover from him the way we recovered from other

people who violated these oil-pricing schemes?’’

When the President of the United States pardons two unrepentant fugitives from justice, it is difficult to comprehend how he

3397

is not ‘‘justifying the fugitive status.’’ He is sending the message

that the United States is willing to grant the ultimate form of

official forgiveness to two people who opted to flee the country

and renounce their citizenship rather than face their legal responsibilities in a court of law. A series of experienced prosecutors in three different administrations decided that it was more

important to send the message that the United States took its

laws seriously than to collect a bit more money in the federal

treasury. President Clinton should have followed their lead.

Rather than reward billionaire fugitives by pardoning them and

unsuccessfully attempting to fine them a ‘‘couple of hundred

million dollars,’’ he should have supported the professionals who

had been working the case for nearly two decades by soliciting

and listening to their advice.

• Question: ‘‘Your brother and brother-in-law were basically selling access to you.’’ Clinton: ‘‘I still don’t know

what the facts are, except that the evidence is I didn’t

grant anything [my brother] asked me to grant.’’

It is extraordinary that the President would claim that he does

not ‘‘know what the facts are’’ regarding the clemency lobbying

efforts of Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham. If

it mattered to him, he could have asked his relatives the relevant questions. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that

Roger Clinton discussed the cases of Rosario Gambino, Steven

Griggs, Jay McKernan, and a number of other individuals with

President Clinton. Similarly, there is evidence that Tony

Rodham discussed Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory with the President. President Clinton has never disclosed the content of those

discussions, other than to repeat his representation that none

of them successfully obtained grants of clemency. However, the

President’s answer fails to address the many questions about

his knowledge and possible approval of Roger Clinton’s efforts

to sell his access to the President.

• ‘‘I had no idea that [my brother-in-law] was involved in

those two cases. Had I known it, I would have turned

them down. I was just surprised and disappointed.’’

The President’s denials of any knowledge that Hugh Rodham

was involved on behalf of Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell

should be viewed with some skepticism, given the inaccuracy of

his other claims in this interview. However, even if the President’s statements are true, they fail to address the obvious

question of how individuals as undeserving as Vignali and

Braswell received clemency. Moreover, the President did not address the refusal of Hugh Rodham to return more than

$150,000 to the Vignalis. In February 2001, the President and

First Lady demanded that Hugh Rodham return the $434,000

he was paid by Vignali and Braswell. Yet, Rodham returned

only $280,000, keeping $154,000 of these fees.

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10See Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 13, 2002) (Exhibit 1). 11See Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Peter

Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Mar. 15, 2002) (Exhibit 2). 12Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 14, 2002) (Exhibit 3). 13Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Nancy

Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (Apr. 16, 2002) (Exhibit 4).

II. COMMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN THE REPORT

A. Comments by Marc Rich attorney Peter Kadzik

On March 13, 2002, Peter Kadzik, an attorney with Dickstein

Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, wrote to ‘‘correct the factual inaccuracies’’ in the Committee’s report.10 Specifically, Kadzik took issue

with the description of the Committee’s efforts to obtain his testimony for the March 1, 2001, hearing regarding the Rich pardon.

As described in the report, Kadzik boarded a plane for California

despite the fact that the Committee had requested his testimony

and, in fact, intended to issue a subpoena for his attendance at the

hearing. Kadzik departed for California, apparently believing that

the Committee would not be willing to force him to return to testify

at the hearing. Kadzik was served a subpoena by a United States

Marshal when he exited the plane and returned the same day so

that he could testify at the hearing.

The central claim in Kadzik’s letter of March 13, 2002, is that ‘‘at no point before I boarded an airplane to California on February

28, 2001, did any member of the Committee’s staff inform me or

any attorney with my firm that the Committee would subpoena me

to attend the hearing.’’ As I have explained in my response to

Kadzik’s letter, his claim is utterly false.11 Between the time that

Committee staff received notice on the evening of February 27,

2001, that Kadzik was declining to testify voluntarily and his departure for California at 11:00 a.m. on February 28, 2001, there

were at least three separate communications between Committee

staff and Kadzik’s attorneys. First, Committee staff called his attorneys on the evening of February 27 to inform them that Kadzik

would be required to attend the hearing. Then, on the morning of

February 28, 2001, one of Kadzik’s attorneys informed Committee

staff that he was unable to accept service of a subpoena for Kadzik.

Then, at 9:29 a.m. on February 28, Committee staff again informed

one of Kadzik’s attorneys that the Committee was issuing a subpoena for his attendance at the hearing and asked for Kadzik’s

flight number so that he could be served. It is troubling that Peter

Kadzik would make a false assertion that is so easily disproved.

B. Comments by Hugh Rodham

On March 14, 2002, Nancy Luque, counsel for Hugh Rodham,

sent a letter complaining about a number of conclusions in the

Committee’s report.12 I have sent a response to Luque which refutes the claims in her letter.13 Luque’s letter makes a number of

inaccurate statements and baseless assertions. For example, she

objects to the report’s conclusion that Rodham extended only ‘‘partial cooperation’’ to the Committee. Yet, Luque acknowledges that

Rodham refused to discuss a number of issues relating to the

Vignali case with the Committee and refused to participate in an

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14Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2002) (Exhibit 5). 15Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Elaine J.

Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti (Apr. 11, 2002) (Exhibit 6). 16 Id. at 7–8. 17 Id. at 1–2.

interview with Committee staff. As detailed in my response of April

16, 2002, Luque’s other objections are as baseless as her claim that

Rodham fully cooperated with the Committee.

C. Comments by former Parole Commission Chief of Staff

Marie Ragghianti

On April 3, 2002, Elaine Mittleman, counsel for Marie

Ragghianti, wrote the Committee to complain about the way the report portrayed Ragghianti’s reaction to Roger Clinton’s contacts

with the U.S. Parole Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino and

the subsequent FBI investigation.14 The bulk of the letter consists

of quotations from the report which are presented in isolation and

labeled conclusory, subjective, or an unwarranted assumption. In

their original context, however, these excerpts are sound conclusions amply supported by citations to evidence. I responded extensively to her mischaracterizations in a letter to Mittleman on April

11, 2002.15

The most important factual claim in Mittleman’s letter is that

the report confuses the chronology of various FBI requests for Parole Commission assistance in its investigation of Roger Clinton.

She disputes that the FBI’s first request was to have a Parole Commission staff member introduce Roger Clinton to an undercover

agent posing as another Commission staff member. In an effort to

defend Ragghianti’s opposition to this plan, which the report correctly identifies as the FBI’s first plan, Mittleman claims that it

was actually the FBI’s ‘‘third or fourth’’ proposal. She argues that

this purported factual error in the report obscures Ragghianti’s

true and legitimate motives for opposing the plan. Ironically, however, Mittleman attached documents to her letter that undermine

her claim and support the report’s chronology.16 Many of the documents attached to Mittleman’s letter had never before been produced to the Committee, prompting staff to inquire whether

Ragghianti retained other documents in her personal possession

relevant to the investigation of the Clinton-Gambino matter. After

receiving representations that she did have additional relevant documents, the Committee notified Mittleman that the Committee

would issue a subpoena to Ragghianti. Before receiving the subpoena, Ragghianti faxed 113 pages of documents to the Committee,

most of which had not been produced by the Parole Commission.

Those documents provided important new evidence and are discussed further below in Section IV. Despite requests, neither

Mittleman nor Ragghianti has provided a written certification that

the 113-page fax contained every document responsive to the subpoena.

In addition to seeking additional documents from Ragghianti, I

posed five questions to her regarding the recently produced documents.17 The questions were aimed at obtaining information about

when Ragghianti first located the documents she recently produced, whether the Parole Commission could have produced the

3400

18Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2–3 (Apr. 15, 2002) (Exhibit 7). 19 Id. 20Letter from Steven G. Madison, Partner, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, to the

Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 4, 2002) (Exhibit 8).

same documents, and why Ragghianti retained these documents in

her personal possession after leaving the Commission. Rather than

fully cooperate with the Committee by answering the questions

candidly and forthrightly, Ragghianti provided a non-responsive

submission through her counsel that quarreled with the questions

rather than answering them. For example, in reply to the question,

‘‘When did you locate the documents responsive to the subpoena,’’

Mittleman wrote, ‘‘[t]his question implies that there was an outstanding document request for the documents responsive to the

subpoena.’’ 18 Of course, regardless of whether the question implies

what she claims, the reply does not even approach an answer to

the question. Similarly, in response to two other questions about

whether the newly produced documents had come from Commission files, Mittleman merely complained that the questions were

not explicitly limited to Ragghianti’s personal knowledge and did

not ‘‘identify what files are considered to be ‘Parole Commission

files.’ ’’ 19 That Ragghianti cannot provide information of which she

is unaware is simply an obvious truism that needs no explicit reference. Moreover, ‘‘Commission files’’ are, as anyone can deduce

with minimal thought, files that were located in the Parole Commission offices and were produced in the course of Parole Commission business. This sort of hairsplitting appears to be nothing more

than a fig leaf to cover Ragghianti’s obvious unwillingness to answer the questions posed. Why she is unwilling to cooperate fully

with the Committee’s investigation is unclear, but it may be related to the reason she was unwilling to cooperate fully with the FBI’s

investigation, which is discussed further below.

D. Comments by Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca

On April 4, 2002, Steven Madison, counsel for Los Angeles County Sheriff Baca, submitted a lengthy letter complaining about the

Committee report.20 The report took issue with Sheriff Baca’s role

in the Vignali commutation, finding that he had a close relationship with Horacio Vignali based on Vignali’s large financial contributions to Baca’s campaigns. This relationship resulted in a conversation between Sheriff Baca and the White House in which he

supported the commutation of Carlos Vignali. The report found

Sheriff Baca’s efforts on behalf of the Vignalis especially troubling

because there were numerous law enforcement reports containing

allegations that Horacio Vignali was involved in trafficking illegal

drugs and, in fact, served as the source of cocaine for his son. The

Committee was concerned with Sheriff Baca’s failure to conduct

any due diligence before he called the White House and his apparent ignorance of the serious allegations against Horacio Vignali.

Sheriff Baca made three main complaints about the report. First,

he claimed that Committee procedures were unfair. Second, he

claimed that he actually opposed clemency for Carlos Vignali.

Third, the Sheriff suggested that he was unable to conduct any due

diligence that would have led to the discovery of the allegations

3401

21Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Steven G.

Madison, Partner, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges (Apr. 12, 2002) (Exhibit 9). 22 Alison Leigh Cowan, Panel Says Top Justice Dept. Aide Held Information on Rich’s Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A23.

against Horacio Vignali. Each of the Sheriff’s complaints is without

merit, and I have responded to the complaints fully in a letter to

Sheriff Baca’s attorney.21

In my reply to Sheriff Baca, I posed a number of questions regarding his response to the Committee’s report. His letter made it

appear that the Sheriff somehow obtained certain draft pages of

the report, which Committee staff had shared with a California law

enforcement official to ensure that the report’s discussion of the allegations against Horacio Vignali did not endanger any confidential

informants. It appears that his discovery of these draft pages of the

report led Sheriff Baca to return the political contributions he received from Horacio Vignali. Among other questions, I asked the

Sheriff to explain how he learned that the Committee was going to

discuss the allegations against Horacio Vignali in the report and

how much of Vignali’s money he had returned. Sheriff Baca has refused to answer these questions by the proscribed deadline. Therefore, I must conclude that he is now refusing to cooperate with the

Committee’s inquiry. I find his refusal to cooperate with a Congressional investigation almost as disturbing as his refusal to accept responsibility for his role in the Vignali clemency matter or his advocacy on behalf of an alleged drug dealer.

E. Public Comments by the Bush White House

While the Committee did not receive a direct response to its report from the Bush White House, a spokeswoman for the White

House did provide a statement about it to The New York Times. Anne Womack responded to the report’s criticism of the Bush Administration for failing to produce documents related to the Rosario

Gambino matter, the release of which former President Clinton did

not even seek to block. Womack said that ‘‘some unproduced files

were highly sensitive and had yet to be formally requested by the

Committee.’’ 22 Anyone familiar with facts in this case would not

have made that statement in good faith. The Committee ‘‘formally

requested’’ in writing Gambino-related records from the National

Archives. On March 8, 2001, the Committee requested ‘‘all records

relating to any requests for clemency made by . . . Roger Clinton

on behalf of any individual.’’ On June 18, 2001, the Committee requested ‘‘all records relating to the consideration of an executive

grant of clemency for Rosario Gambino.’’ Contrary to Womack’s

claim, there were actually not one but two formal, written requests

that covered the documents in question.

Moreover, the National Archives acknowledged these requests in

writing. On August 2, 2001, the Archives said—in what it called its

‘‘final response’’ to our June 18th request—that ‘‘[p]ursuant to your

prior discussions with the White House Counsel’s Office, we are not

providing four responsive [Gambino-related] documents . . . that

contain internal Government deliberations.’’ It is clear, however,

that the requests were legally proper in form and should have been

complied with. The Committee requested the records by letter rather than subpoena because a subpoena was unnecessary. Under the

3402

23 44 U.S.C. § 2205(2)(c). 24See generally, Chapter One, Section II.D., ‘‘Quinn’s Fee Arrangements.’’ 25Letter from Victoria Toensing, Partner, diGenova & Toensing, to David Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 15, 2002) (Exhibit 10). 26 Id. 27 Jack Quinn Document Production JQC 00070–71 (Letter from Jack Quinn to Marc Rich

(Mar. 6, 2001)) (Exhibit 11).

Presidential Records Act, the Committee has statutory authority to

have access to the records of a previous administration through the

National Archives and without a subpoena.23

III. NEW INFORMATION ABOUT JACK QUINN’S FEE ARRANGEMENTS

The report left unresolved two issues regarding Jack Quinn’s financial relationship with Marc Rich: (1) did Quinn expect Rich to

pay him for his work on the pardon after leaving Arnold & Porter

and (2) did Rich pay Quinn after the pardons were issued.24 These

questions were initially prompted by Jack Quinn’s unbelievable

claim that he worked on the Rich pardon without any expectation

of payment and by the belated production of records that had been

withheld from the Committee on claims of attorney-client and work

product privileges for over a year. The records were produced in

the aftermath of a court decision finding that those privilege claims

were invalid. With regard to the first issue, the report detailed several newly produced e-mails indicating that Quinn was negotiating

a retainer agreement with Marc Rich just before he began working

on the pardon request. However, both Jack Quinn and Robert Fink

refused to be interviewed regarding these e-mails. With regard to

the second issue, some of the newly produced e-mails also indicated

that, after the Committee’s hearings, Quinn sought to enter a retainer agreement with Rich. Given Quinn’s statements to the Committee that he would not accept any money from Rich for his work

on the pardon effort, the mention of a post-pardon retainer agreement raised further questions. Once again, however, Quinn refused

to be interviewed about these e-mails.

Since Quinn refused requests for a voluntary interview, the Committee issued a document subpoena to him on March 6, 2002, in

an attempt to obtain some clarification of his financial arrangements with Marc Rich. On April 15, 2002, Quinn’s attorneys produced a set of responsive documents and also provided a log of documents being withheld on claims of attorney work product and attorney-client privileges.25 All of the withheld documents are described as ‘‘Privileged communication concerning work for Marc

Rich unrelated to efforts to obtain Pardon.’’ 26 It appears, therefore,

that Quinn is engaged in additional legal work for Rich on other

matters. Obviously, however, due to the assertions of privilege and

Quinn’s refusal to be interviewed, the precise nature of that work

and the total size of Rich’s payments to Quinn remain unknown.

The documents that were produced, however, may explain some

of the e-mails regarding negotiations to enter a retainer agreement

after the Committee’s hearings on the Rich matter. Rich and Quinn

apparently entered into a retainer and indemnification agreement

sometime around March 6, 2001.27 The agreement called for a payment by Marc Rich of $300,000 to retain Quinn to represent Rich

‘‘in connection with legal proceedings arising out of (but not in conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01324 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
3403

28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Jack Quinn Document Production (2001 Billing Records for Marc Rich) (Exhibit 12). 31 Id. at JQC 00107. 32Fax from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, to the Honorable Dan Burton,

Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 9, 2002) (Exhibit 13).

nection with efforts to secure) his pardon.’’ 28 Under the terms of

the agreement, Quinn provided Rich with monthly invoices detailing his time and expenses due to undertaking ‘‘unexpected additional legal work in defense of your pardon’’ to be drawn against

the $300,000 retainer.29 The agreement also retroactively covered

Quinn’s time and expenses, dating back to January 22, 2001. For

January through March 2001, Quinn billed and received from Rich

at least $128,100.30 Throughout the rest of 2001, Quinn billed another $97,240.31

Although these documents provide a slightly better understanding of Quinn’s fee arrangements with Rich, they do not explain

Quinn’s claim to have worked on the Rich pardon on a pro bono

basis. Despite the evidence discussed in the report of detailed negotiations on a retainer agreement in the summer of 2000, Quinn refuses to answer any questions about the matter, apparently standing by his earlier claims that no agreement on his compensation

was made before the pardons were granted. Moreover, the documents Quinn produced in April 2002 fail to resolve the issues

raised by the e-mails regarding retainer discussions in 2000. The

documents do explain the terms under which Quinn was reimbursed for his time, legal fees, and expenses incurred in 2001 as

a result of the various investigations of the Rich pardon by Congressional committees and a New York grand jury. However, questions remain unanswered about the nature and extent of his other

‘‘unrelated’’ legal work for Rich due to his assertions of attorneyclient privilege and his outright refusal to be interviewed by the

Committee. Without Quinn’s full cooperation, the complete picture

of his financial relationship with Marc Rich remains unknown.

IV. NEW EVIDENCE REGARDING MARIE RAGGHIANTI’S

EFFORTS TO PROTECT ROGER CLINTON

On April 9, 2002, former U.S. Parole Commission Chief of Staff

Marie Ragghianti faxed to the Committee 113 pages of documents

that had been in her personal possession since she left the Commission.32 Most of the documents had not been previously provided

to the Committee by the Parole Commission despite the fact that

they appear to have been created in the course of Commission business. Therefore, copies should have been retained in Parole Commission files. Many of the documents provide a contemporaneous

record of Ragghianti’s opinion of the unfolding FBI investigation

and thus shed new light on her motivations for opposing to full cooperation with the FBI. As a result, a new picture emerges, one

that is less flattering to Ragghianti than the original.

3404

33Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Elaine J.

Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti n.1 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Exhibit 6). 34 Chapter Two, Exhibit 42. 35See Chapter Two, n.230 and accompanying text. 36Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Draft e-mail from Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff,

Parole Commission, to Sharon Gervasoni, Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Officer, Parole

Commission (Sept. 23, 1998)) (Exhibit 14). 37 Chapter Two, n.230.

A. Factual Disputes Resolved by Newly Produced Documents

1. Ragghianti’s Knowledge of Roger Clinton’s Initial

Attempts to Influence the Commission

The newly produced documents resolve two factual disputes. As

discussed in my response to Ragghianti’s counsel, one of the newly

produced documents resolves a conflict between statements to Committee staff by Ragghianti and General Counsel Michael Stover.33

Stover said he had provided a 1996 memo to Ragghianti about his

first and only contact with Roger Clinton.34 The memo, quoted extensively in the report, illustrated Roger Clinton’s crude attempt to

exert political pressure on Stover. Roger Clinton was attempting to

arrange an improper meeting with a Commissioner to discuss the

Gambino case. Clinton pressured Stover to arrange the meeting

through repeated references to his brother’s authority as President,

explaining that President Clinton had suggested that Roger meet

with a Commissioner. Stover said he had provided the document to

Ragghianti, who had not been employed by the Commission in

1996, in an attempt to inform her of Clinton’s past misconduct and

dissuade her from meeting with Roger Clinton in the future. Marie

Ragghianti, however, denied she had ever seen the memo until her

July 2001 interview with Committee staff. 35 Her denial appears

to be false, given her own words in a document recently produced

to the Committee. The document is a 1998 draft e-mail from

Ragghianti to deputy ethics officer Sharon Gervasoni. In it

Ragghianti writes, ‘‘I suppose you are referring to my statement

that I felt that Michael [Stover] had been ‘gratuitously rude’ to

Roger [Clinton]—an inference I made based on a memo that I believe Michael S. wrote in a memo [sic] for the file[.]’’ 36 This statement establishes that Ragghianti had indeed seen the memo before

and that it was the basis for her opinion about Stover having been

‘‘gratuitously rude’’ to Clinton. This evidence also contradicts her

earlier claim that the basis of her statement about Stover being

rude was something Chairman Michael Gaines had told her.

Ragghianti unequivocally denied she had ever seen the Stover

memo. She said she was certain that if she had ever seen it, she

would have remembered it.37 Moreover, absent knowledge of Clinton’s prior inappropriate efforts to exert political pressure, it would

be somewhat understandable for staff to meet with him like any

other member of the public. Accordingly, her denial that she ever

saw the memo made the defense of her meetings with Clinton more

plausible. Given these newly produced records, however, it appears

that she was fully aware of Clinton’s prior misconduct and, therefore, should have declined further meetings with him. Additionally,

other conflicts between her versions of events and Stover’s version

3405

38Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform 13 (Apr. 3, 2002) (Exhibit 5). 39Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Elaine J.

Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti 7–8 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Exhibit 6).

of events should now be viewed in a new light, given Ragghianti’s

diminished credibility.

2. The Chronology of the FBI Requests for Assistance

from the Commission

As the report explains, Ragghianti refused to grant the FBI’s

first request for assistance from the Commission: to have Tom

Kowalski introduce Roger Clinton to an undercover agent posing as

a Commission staffer at a meeting in a local restaurant. The report

criticizes Ragghianti for opposing the undercover agent plan. In her

response, Ragghianti’s lawyer defended Ragghianti’s opposition by

claiming that the report had confused the chronology and thus misunderstood Ragghianti’s motive. In Ragghianti’s version of events,

the undercover agent plan was not the FBI’s first request but its ‘‘third or fourth,’’ 38 and her motive for opposing it was merely a legitimate concern that the Commissioners had not approved it.

Ragghianti claimed she was put in an awkward position. The Commissioners had instructed her not to discuss the FBI’s investigation

with them any further due to concerns that they might have to

recuse themselves from making a decision in the Gambino case.

Therefore, according to Ragghianti, when the FBI ‘‘revised’’ its request to include a restaurant meeting and an undercover agent,

she could not approve the plan because she could neither seek

guidance from the Commissioners nor allow involvement beyond

what they had approved.

The documents Ragghianti produced, however, contradict nearly

every aspect of her story and provide further evidence for the report’s contention that the undercover agent plan was the first proposed by FBI. Moreover, the documents also provide new evidence

that, in fact, the Commissioners had approved the undercover

agent plan. Thus, in opposing it, Ragghianti was not carrying out

the will of the Commissioners, but thwarting it. One document contradicting Ragghianti’s story was attached to Mittleman’s April 3,

2002, letter and is discussed in my reply.39 Other documents produced on April 9, 2002, also undercut her story. For example, in

Ragghianti’s typewritten notes of a March 22, 1999, meeting with

deputy ethics officer Sharon Gervasoni, she writes:

I then recounted the events of Fri. afternoon, beginning

with [Tom Kowalski’s] report that RC had called him

again, asking for an interview this week, and Tom’s subsequent call to [FBI Special Agent] Jackie Dalrymple, his

telling me afterward that they would be setting up a callback (to Roger) on Sat. which would result in a meeting at

the Holiday Inn restaurant, Tom’s wearing a body bug, etc.

I told her what the original scenario had been (& also that

I had personally opposed it—but that the [Commissioners]

had voted 2 (for)-1 (abstention) that they would not oppose

the Bureau’s plan for Tom to introduce one of their agents

as a member of our legal staff, etc.), and that the original

plan did not include Tom’s wearing a body bug. I also told

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40Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Meeting with Sharon Gervasoni, Mar. 22,

1999) (Exhibit 15) (emphasis added). 41 Id.

her of my concerns that the Commission had not been

given good legal advice re: its conduct of the entire affair,

especially since [Michael Stover’s] & my Fri. conversation

with [Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General Kevin

Ohlsen and Associate Deputy Attorney General David

Margolis] suggested that Margolis saw the Commission’s

responsibilities as I did, & not as Michael [Stover] did.

* * *

I informed her that since Margolis’s perception appeared to

match my own, as far as the Commission’s right to maintain its normal authority in directing its employee in the

conduct of USPC business (without fear of obstruction accusations), I now felt that it was appropriate to instruct

Tom that he should conduct any further business with

Roger C. as he normally would, and that this did not appear to include a meeting at a local restaurant where he

might introduce a Bureau agent as a member of our legal

staff.40

This document provides further evidence that the FBI’s original request was indeed to have an agent pose as a Commission staffer.

Moreover, it establishes that the Commissioners had explicitly approved this plan by a vote of two-to-one and that, despite this explicit approval, Ragghianti instructed Commission staffer Tom

Kowalski not to assist the FBI by introducing the undercover agent

to Roger Clinton. Far from working conscientiously to implement

the Commissioners’ will as she has claimed, Ragghianti actually

worked against it. She rationalized her determination to set aside

the Commissioners’ decision through a claim that the Commissioners ‘‘had not been given good legal advice’’ by the Commission’s

General Counsel, Michael Stover.41 Ragghianti replaced the Commissioners’ judgment with her own and vetoed the FBI’s original

plan, which the Commission had explicitly authorized. Her actions

suggest a level of opposition to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry not contemplated in the report. In light of this new evidence,

perhaps the report’s rather neutral assessment of her motivations

(that at best she was not objective) is too generous.

B. Ragghianti’s Attitude Towards the FBI’s Investigation of

Roger Clinton

In reassessing Ragghianti’s motivations, other newly produced

documents are also useful in that they provide insight into

Ragghianti’s state of mind at the time of the FBI investigation.

Several of the documents she recently produced contain her candid

and contemporaneous thoughts about the unfolding FBI investigation in an emotionally laden, diary-like tone. They contain extraordinary expressions of affinity for Roger Clinton and a desire to inform the White House about the investigation. In one document,

Ragghianti writes, ‘‘I have felt guilty about not telling the WH,

however, from what I’ve seen, it would be easy to be accused of obVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01328 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\REPORTS\78814.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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42Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes for the File, Jan. 14, 1999) (Exhibit 16). 43Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Meeting with Sharon Gervasoni, Mar. 22,

1999) (Exhibit 15). 44 Id. This document also contains yet another confirmation that the chronology in the report

is correct. Ragghianti wrote, ‘‘[Michael Stover] had strongly supported the original plan (for Tom

to introduce a Bureau agent as a member of our legal staff at a nearby restaurant, etc.)[.]’’ Id.

(emphasis added). 45 Id.

structing justice if I did.’’ 42 As explained in my response to

Ragghianti’s attorney, it is disturbing that Ragghianti would not

aspire to more than merely avoiding criminal obstruction. This

statement illustrates that, remarkably, the only deterrence against

her tipping-off the White House was indeed a fear of being held legally accountable if she did.

Ragghianti’s counsel has argued that Ragghianti ‘‘worked diligently to facilitate the FBI investigation’’ and that she objected

only ‘‘to the extent it did not interfere with or violate the Commission’s normal conduct of business.’’ The implication that

Ragghianti’s opposition to certain FBI requests was measured and

limited is contradicted by a recently produced document in which

Ragghianti described the circumstances leading to the recording of

a conversation between Clinton and Tom Kowalski in Parole Commission offices. Her notes reflect that Ragghianti was against even

this plan (a compromise from the FBI’s original undercover agent

plan). In discussing the FBI’s compromise proposal with Tom

Kowalski and Sharon Gervasoni, Ragghianti was reluctant to allow

any surreptitious recording at all. Rather, she wanted Kowalski to

simply place a recorder on the desk in front of Clinton. After being

convinced by Kowalski and Gervasoni who made ‘‘as strong a case

as possible,’’ she wrote, ‘‘finally and agonizingly, I relented[.]’’ 43

She continued, ‘‘I hardly slept that night, and came in Tuesday

morning, determined to call Margolis to clarify whether he had

meant we should record the interview with RC openly or surreptitiously.’’ 44 That Ragghianti would believe an open recording of

Clinton would be of any benefit whatsoever to the FBI’s investigation stretches credulity. According to her notes, Ragghianti did call

Margolis, and he convinced her to allow the recording to occur. The

argument he made that finally persuaded her, however, provides

further insight into her motivations. She wrote:

A recording, [Margolis] said, made it less likely that there

would be any misunderstanding. He even said that a recording might be ‘‘fairer to RC’’—in that it could get the

entire matter resolved as soon as possible. (THIS got my

attention, and rang true). He went on to say that otherwise, the whole thing ‘‘could linger forever—or indefinitely.’’ And down the road, he said, who knows what may

happen?

* * *

However, this discussion with him had persuaded me that

I really had no recourse but to allow the recording to proceed, even though it made me very unhappy.45

On the morning the recording was to occur, Ragghianti appears

to have interjected herself into the process by coaching Kowalski on

3408

46 Id. 47 Id.

how to behave during the meeting. Her objective in doing so appears to have been to prevent any unguarded discussion of the kind

the FBI wished to record. Describing her visit to Kowalski’s office

just before Clinton’s scheduled arrival, Ragghianti wrote:

I was disconcerted to find Jackie & Kevin [the FBI agents]

in his office, because, as I’ve already said, I had no idea

that they would be monitoring the visit with RC, installing

microphones in the ceiling & desk, etc. (I thought Tom

would simply place one of our little recorders in his desk

drawer.) When I saw them, I was not at all happy, but

kept it to myself[.]

I felt that they were waiting for me to leave, and I was

waiting for them to leave. But not wanting to do anything

hostile, I made a decision to just go ahead & openly tell

Tom what I had come to tell him, re: opening his mtg. with

RC by saying this would be their last mtg., etc. & then referencing my October letter, etc. I emphasized once more

that he should conduct the visit as he would normally conduct any interview, etc.

Jackie then picked up a large black canvas shoulder bag

and said I’ll go get the car & meet you (Kevin) out front.

I went out with her, but stopped at a nearby office, killing

time & waiting for Kevin to leave. He didn’t. Finally, I saw

both Tom & Kevin standing at the window, obviously

watching for RC’s arrival. At that point, I went back into

T’s office, and said, ‘‘Now remember, Tom—business as

usual!’’ And he answered, in a joking way (tho [sic] I knew

he was serious), ‘‘Yes M’am!’’ I then left, and went up to

watch & wait for RC.46

Following Ragghianti’s attempt to influence the content of the

meeting, she goes on to describe her activities during and after the

meeting. After describing Clinton’s arrival and her observations of

the agents’ movements, Ragghianti wrote:

It became increasingly clear that [the agents] must be listening to the RC/Tom meeting from their car, & I was distraught, but helpless. At that point, all I could do was

pray.

After a seemingly interminable period of time, I decided to

go see what I could see of Tom’s office. I was so distraught

that I absentmindedly went UP stairs (to the roof) instead

of DOWNstairs where Tom’s office is.47

In another document, Ragghianti describes her conversation with

Kowalski. She wrote:

Evidently, I arrived immediately following RC’s exit, and

immediately prior to Kevin & Jackie’s return—I said,

Tom—has he gone? And he said yes, he just left. I said

how’d it go & he said—it went great, he didn’t say anything out of line, it was just fine! I said thank God, are you

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48Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Conversation with Jackie Dalrymple and

Kevin O’Connell, Special Agents, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Tom Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, Parole Commission, Mar. 23, 1999) (Exhibit 17). 49 As noted in the report, the Justice Department refused to produce to the Committee a transcript or a copy of the recorded meeting. However, Tom Kowalski did write a memo summarizing the meeting on the day it occurred, March 23, 1999. Curiously, this memo was not produced

to the Committee by the Parole Commission but only recently by Marie Ragghianti. Marie

Ragghianti Document Production (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski to File, Mar. 23,

1999) (Exhibit 18). 50Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Meeting with Sharon Gervasoni, Mar. 22,

1999) (Exhibit 15). 51 Id. 52 Id.

sure? And he said, yes, he just said all the usual things— the things he’s said before, and he didn’t say anything unusual—was exactly like we thought it’d be. I was greatly

relieved.48

After the recording,49 Ragghianti was upset to learn that before

the meeting between Kowalski and Clinton, the FBI agents had

asked Kowalski to ‘‘offer to set up Roger with ‘one of our analysts’

by giving him a telephone number.’’ 50 Kowalski told Ragghianti he

had not done it and that ‘‘he figured they were probably annoyed.’’ 51 Ragghianti wrote, ‘‘My private reaction was that I doubt

they are as annoyed as I am at hearing that they asked for this,

which was certainly not in the sphere of what they knew I had

asked of Tom.’’ 52 Ragghianti’s comment demonstrates the detailed

level of control she insisted on having over the FBI’s requests and

her animosity toward any attempt by the agents to enhance the

Commission’s level of cooperation. Why should this request have

annoyed Ragghianti? If her concerns were merely to minimize

Commission involvement and insulate the integrity of its decisionmaking function, then nothing about the agents’ request should

have been annoying at all. Since it would have redirected future

contacts with Roger Clinton to the FBI rather than to the Commission, it would actually have alleviated Ragghianti’s purported concerns.

These new documents clearly demonstrate not only the factual

inaccuracies of Ragghianti’s response to the Committee’s report but

also her unusual predisposition against the FBI’s legitimate requests and toward protecting Roger Clinton from the potential consequences of his advocacy for Rosario Gambino.

[The exhibits referred to follow:]

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Æ