GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Committee on Armed Services, House of

Representatives

July 2000 COMBATING

TERRORISM

Action Taken but

Considerable Risks

Remain for Forces

Overseas

GAO/NSIAD-00-181

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 34

Appendix III: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 39

Tables Table 1: Service AT/FP Requirement, Proposed Spending Plan,

Shortage, and Percentage of Requirement Fulfilled for

Fiscal Year 2001 18

Figures Figure 1: DOD Program Objectives Memorandum Process 16

Figure 2: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection

Requirement the Services Plan to Fund in the European

Command 20

Figure 3: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection Funding

Requirement the Services Plan to Fund in the Pacific

Command 21

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

AT/FP antiterrorism/force protection
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285538 Letr

July 19, 2000

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Skelton:

In November 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing

five Americans. In June 1996, terrorists attacked the U.S. military complex

at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans and wounding

hundreds more. In September of that year, the Secretary of Defense named

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his principal advisor on

antiterrorism/force protection.1 The Chairman later announced his goal

that the Department of Defense (DOD) would become the recognized

leader in antiterrorism/force protection throughout the world. Even though

a terrorist attack has not occurred at a U.S. military installation since

Khobar Towers, protecting U.S. forces against terrorism remains a top DOD

priority. In late 1996 through June 1997, we evaluated DOD’s efforts to

protect U.S. forces stationed overseas from terrorist attacks. We reported

that DOD had not taken the steps necessary to promote a comprehensive,

consistent approach to antiterrorism that would give commanders at all

levels the tools they needed to fulfill their antiterrorism responsibilities.2 In

addition, we noted that (1) DOD lacked prescriptive, measurable physical

security standards to determine whether antiterrorism measures were

sufficient; (2) DOD lacked assurances that the antiterrorism programs

implemented by local commanders met a consistent minimum standard for

all overseas personnel; and (3) many U.S. military personnel stationed

overseas were not specifically covered by the antiterrorism plans

1

DOD’s antiterrorism/force protection program seeks to (1) reduce the likelihood that DODaffiliated personnel, their families, facilities, and materiel will be subject to a terrorist attack

and (2) mitigate the effects of such attacks should they occur.

2

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas

(GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).
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of either the geographic combatant commander3 or a country’s State

Department representative (e.g., U.S. ambassador or chief of mission). We

made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that were

directed toward developing common standards and procedures and to

ensuring that security responsibility for all DOD personnel overseas was

clear.

As you requested, we evaluated DOD’s efforts since our last report to

improve its antiterrorism/force protection program. This report discusses

• the extent to which DOD has made improvements to its

antiterrorism/force protection program overseas,

• changes in DOD’s process for assessing and reporting vulnerabilities at

overseas installations, and

• the adequacy of antiterrorism/force protection funding and staff.

To conduct this work, we visited 19 sites in Europe, the Middle East, and

the Pacific. We also visited four of the five geographic combatant

commands as well as most of the service commands in Europe, the Middle

East, and the Pacific. We are not discussing installation specific

information in this report for security reasons. Our scope and methodology

are in appendix I.

Results in Brief Overall, military forces stationed overseas are better protected today than

they were 3 years ago. The Joint Staff has developed DOD-wide

construction standards to ensure that antiterrorism/force protection

measures are included in new construction. In addition, DOD has signed

agreements with the Department of State and U.S. ambassadors or chiefs of

mission to protect DOD personnel not under the jurisdiction of

commanders. Geographic combatant commands have created permanent

antiterrorism/force protection offices, hired permanent antiterrorism/force

protection staff, and developed systems to monitor progress to correct

vulnerabilities. Installation commanders are more aware of their

responsibility to protect their forces from terrorist attack and, despite

3

Operational control of the U.S. combat forces is assigned to the nation’s Unified Combatant

Commands. A Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more

services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is normally organized on a geographical

basis. The five geographic combatant commands are the Central Command, European

Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command, and Joint Forces Command.
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funding constraints, have addressed many security vulnerabilities.

However, significant security and procedural antiterrorism/force

protection problems continue at many installations. For example, some

installations have not developed plans to deal with terrorist attacks, others

have no effective means of stopping unauthorized vehicles from entering

the installation, and some lack secure access to important intelligence

information.

Commanders are better able to determine their vulnerability to terrorist

attacks than when we last reported. Vulnerability assessments are now

being conducted more routinely and are based on a defined set of criteria.

However, vulnerability assessment reports do not provide specific actions

to rectify problems mentioned in the reports. Additionally, there is no

comprehensive method in place to share solutions to common problems

among different installations.

Limited antiterrorism funding and trained staff have affected the ability of

commanders to correct known vulnerabilities. Funding for antiterrorism

protection has been, and will likely continue to be, significantly less than

what installation and geographic combatant commanders have determined

they require, despite the fact that senior DOD leaders have designated

antiterrorism/force protection as a high priority item. For example, some

overseas service commands have repeatedly received less than 50 percent

of the money the commands believe they require to correct or mitigate

vulnerabilities. According to antiterrorism/force protection managers, this

level of funding has limited their ability to address vulnerabilities. Congress

requires DOD to provide information on proposed antiterrorism/force

protection funding and projects as part of its consolidated combating

terrorism budget submission; however, it does not require DOD to provide

information on the number of projects that remain to be funded. Without

information on the types of projects that need funding, Congress does not

have an accurate picture of the extent of the risk that U.S. forces face from

terrorism. In addition, installations we visited did not have adequately

trained personnel dedicated to managing and implementing antiterrorism

solutions.

We are making recommendations to improve the vulnerability assessment

reporting process, increase congressional visibility of unfunded

antiterrorism/force protection projects to correct or mitigate

vulnerabilities, and improve the training program for antiterrorism/force

protection managers. In written comments to our draft report, the

Department of Defense agreed with our recommendations to improve the
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vulnerability assessment reporting process and the training program for

antiterrorism/force protection managers. The Department disagreed with

our recommendation to increase congressional visibility of unfunded

projects that would correct or mitigate vulnerabilities because it believes

that the current planning, programming, and budgeting system is effective

and ensures that high priority items are funded. Despite the Department’s

position, we believe this information would enhance congressional

oversight and make Congress more aware of the types of risk that

servicemembers face every day. As a result, we have added a matter for

congressional consideration that would require the Department of Defense

to provide Congress with detailed information on the unfunded projects.

Background The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the

Secretary of Defense for antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) policy.

While this office focuses on policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the Combating Terrorism directorate within the Joint Staff focus on

implementing DOD’s AT/FP program. The Joint Staff’s responsibilities

include reviewing the services’ AT/FP budgets, developing standards,

managing the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment program, and

representing the geographic combatant commanders on AT/FP matters.

DOD policy makes commanders responsible for protecting their forces

from terrorist attacks. For forces overseas, the responsibility rests with the

geographic combatant commander and the installation commander, with

the support of the service headquarters. The geographic combatant

commanders are responsible for developing antiterrorism policies that

apply at the installations in their areas of responsibility and that take

precedence over service or other DOD component AT/FP policies. They are

also responsible for determining the threat levels for each country in their

area of responsibility, identifying the money and manpower needed to

achieve sufficient AT/FP, and working with the services to provide the

resources necessary. Finally, because all risks cannot be eliminated, the

geographic combatant commanders are responsible for determining the

types of risks their forces will face as they undertake their missions.

Installation commanders are responsible for protecting the people, assets,

and facilities under their command from terrorist attacks. The installation

commander, working with the installation AT/FP manager, is responsible

for ensuring that AT/FP standards established by DOD, the geographic

combatant commanders, the services, and the service headquarters are

implemented. Additionally, because DOD recognizes that not all
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vulnerabilities can be addressed, installation commanders practice risk

managementto decide what risks can be accepted and what risks are too

great to be accepted. When the risk is unacceptable, the commander is

responsible for taking action to mitigate the risk.

Although geographic combatant commanders have overall responsibility to

protect forces assigned to them, individual services are responsible for

funding an installation’s AT/FP needs and for providing the required

number of trained personnel. The majority of funds used for AT/FP

activities (excluding the cost of military personnel) are located in the

services’ Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Operation and

Maintenance appropriations are generally used to fund readiness activities,

equipment maintenance, recruiting, pay for civilian employees (including

contract security guards), and the everyday costs of running an installation.

A number of subactivities within this appropriation fund specific expenses.

Examples of the subactivities include real property maintenance, depot

maintenance, and base operating support. The base operating support

subactivity pays for expenses such as utilities, communications, security,

building repair, and maintenance. Traditionally, the services have included

funds for AT/FP in the base operating support subactivity, and AT/FP

activities must compete against other activities for the same limited

funding.

Shortly after the Khobar Towers bombing, the Secretary of Defense

established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Combating Terrorism

Readiness Initiative Fund.4 The Fund, which is managed by the Joint Staff,

was not intended to relieve the services of their responsibility to fund

AT/FP projects; rather, it was intended to provide funding for emergency or

other unforeseen high-priority, combating terrorism needs. In fiscal year

2000, the Fund totaled $15 million$10 million of Operation and

Maintenance funds and $5 million of procurement funds. This level of

funding is scheduled to continue through fiscal year 2002. In fiscal years

2003 through 2007, the Fund will be reduced to a total of $10 million a year

according to DOD.

4

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5261.01A, Aug. 1, 1998, Combating

Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund.
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Commands at All

Levels Have Acted to

Protect Their Forces,

but Challenges Remain

Since we last reported in 1997, DOD has improved its AT/FP program.

Improvements have been made at the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant

command, and the installation levels. Specifically, more guidance is

available to help develop and implement programs; many physical security

vulnerabilities have been corrected; and in cases where vulnerabilities

cannot be corrected, commanders have taken actions to mitigate potential

damage. Such actions included adding fragment retention film to windows,

installing barriers, moving personnel into base housing, erecting fences,

and moving parking lots. Although improvements in AT/FP have been

made, physical security and procedural problems (i.e., a lack of personnel

alerting systems and access control and AT/FP plans) continue to put U.S.

forces at risk of terrorist attack.

Joint Staff Has Taken Action

to Improve

Antiterrorism/Force

Protection

The Joint Staff has taken significant actions to improve commanders’

AT/FP programs. First, in December 1999, DOD issued standards

(developed under the guidance of the Joint Staff) for new construction in

the first volume of the DOD Security Engineering document. The remaining

two volumes are expected to be completed by December 2002. The new

construction standards are minimum standards and provide guidance for

design criteria, protective strategies, and the costs for protective measures

against higher threats. Second, the Departments of Defense and State have

signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and over 90 country-level

Memorandums of Agreement have been signed between the geographic

combatant commanders and their local U.S. ambassadors or chiefs of

mission. These agreements clarify who is responsible for providing AT/FP

to DOD personnel not under the direct command of the geographic

combatant commanders. These agreements cover 75 percent of these

personnel (about 7,400 people). The State Department has set a goal for

completing the remaining Memorandums of Agreement by summer 2000.

The Joint Staff also administers the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund, which has allocated over

$80 million to installations in the U.S. and abroad since 1997.5 At several

locations we visited, this Fund was the installation’s primary source of

5

The Joint Staff allocated $23.94 million (including $10 million in money that became

available at the end of the fiscal year) in fiscal year 1997, $35.098 million (including

$20 million in money that became available at the end of the fiscal year) in fiscal year 1998,

and $14.942 million in fiscal year 1999. As of March 2000, the Joint Staff had allocated

$8.5 million in fiscal year 2000.
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funding for AT/FP improvements. Some improvements provided by this

Fund include perimeter lighting, fences, road barriers, guard shacks, and

explosive detectors.

In addition, the Joint Staff has also sponsored vulnerability assessment

teams and educational initiatives. The Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability

Assessment teams, which were initiated in September 1996, have

completed 243 vulnerability assessments worldwide. As discussed in more

detail below, these assessments bring a level of expertise, a consistent level

of quality, and a standardized methodology not previously available to

installation commanders. These assessment teams have also provided

educational opportunities for local AT/FP managers by teaching them how

to write AT/FP and weapons of mass destruction response plans. The Joint

Staff has also been actively developing outreach programs, including

CD-ROMs and a quarterly newsletter designed to share good AT/FP ideas

and to help AT/FP managers improve their programs.

Actions Taken by

Geographic Combatant

Commands

The geographic combatant commanders and overseas service headquarters

have also taken action to improve the management of their AT/FP

programs. U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Forces Korea have established

full-time AT/FP offices and designated full-time AT/FP staffs since our last

review. Military force structure limitations and continuity problems (due to

personnel rotations) are being addressed at U.S. Army Europe and the 8th

Army in Korea through the creation of full-time civilian AT/FP positions.

Three geographic combatant commandsU.S. European Command, U.S.

Southern Command, and U.S. Central Commandhave developed

vulnerability monitoring systems that help commanders to be aware of

vulnerabilities and to monitor progress toward resolution of issues

identified by vulnerability assessments. In addition, recognizing a need for

additional training for AT/FP managers, U.S. European Command

developed a 5-day course to introduce AT/FP managers to a variety of

aspects of the AT/FP program. Finally, all of the geographic combatant

commands we visited now have command-specific construction standards.

At the time of our last report, only the Central Command had developed

construction standards.

Installation Commanders’

Actions

Installation commanders have made progress in institutionalizing AT/FP

programs, increasing AT/FP awareness, and reducing physical security

vulnerabilities. Commanders at all the installations we visited had

designated AT/FP program managers. Also, every installation we visited
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had an AT/FP awareness program and in some cases, used the local armed

forces cable network to convey AT/FP messages. To assist in making

decisions on AT/FP priorities and funding issues, nearly all the installations

we visited had established AT/FP working groups or councils.

When funding was available, commanders addressed vulnerabilities. When

vulnerabilities could not be fully addressed, commanders took action to

mitigate the potential damage from a terrorist attack. Some of the actions

have included increasing surveillance of the road, closing gates, and better

protecting the people in buildings by applying fragment retention film to

the windows and moving people away from the vulnerable side of the

building.

Notwithstanding Progress,

Problems Remain

Notwithstanding improvements, significant physical security and

procedural AT/FP problems remain at many installations. The problems we

observed during our installation visits included physical security and

procedural issues. The Joint Staff’s vulnerability assessments at

93 installations in 1999 found many of the same problems we observed.

Some of these problems are described below:

• Poor installation AT/FP planning. Some installations we visited in the

U.S. European Command and the U.S. Pacific Command had not

completed their AT/FP installation plans almost 3 years after DOD

established this requirement. The Joint Staff assessments identified

poor or nonexistent AT/FP planning at many installations and further

noted that some installations had AT/FP plans, but did not exercise them

as required by DOD instruction. Planning is imperative so that all

personnel will know what to do and how to react in any given situation.

Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the

importance of AT/FP planning in a message to the geographic combatant

commanders and the service chiefs.

• Lack of access control. Some of the installations we visited in the U.S.

Pacific Command had no gates and/or no effective means of stopping

unauthorized vehicles from entering the facility. We were told of one

instance where a pizza delivery vehicle drove onto base without

stopping because the driver failed to realize he was entering the base.

The AT/FP manager at one large installation told us that a barrier system

designed to stop cars was broken and that there were no plans to fix it

because it was not cost-effective to keep it in working order in cold

weather. The Joint Staff compilation report also noted that barriers at

installation main gates were either nonexistent or poorly placed and
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that installation perimeter gates did not have an effective means of

preventing a high-speed vehicle approach. The report also noted that

vehicle access controls at the gates were inefficient, inconsistent, or

nonexistent; in many instances, installations lacked vehicle inspection

equipment and guards either were unaware of control procedures or did

not always follow them.

• Poorly maintained or overgrown perimeter fences. At one installation in

the U.S. European Command, the perimeter fence had been cut,

presumably by students, to create shortcuts on and off base. In the

Pacific Command, we found egregious examples of encroachment on

perimeter fences in which host nation housing leaned against the

perimeter wall and drainage pipes were inserted through the perimeter

wall by local residents.

• Lack of personnel alerting systems. This equipment is designed to alert

all personnel in a given area to terrorism and other emergencies. At least

one expert believes that a properly functioning personnel alerting

system would have saved lives at Khobar Towers. Personnel alerting

systems were lacking at many installations we visited.

• Lack of access to timely intelligence information. Some installations

were not connected to intelligence databases via secure lines, which

could delay the transmission of intelligence information to AT/FP

personnel. Some installations possessed one secure computer for many

users and other installations had no secure computers available at the

installation.

• Shortage of security forces. In one country we visited, a Navy base was

forced to use sailors without a security background to meet its basic

every day AT/FP responsibilities. One Air Force base we visited is

routinely short of experienced security personnel because it regularly

deploys security force personnel to the Middle East. Also, we found that

in other countries Army intelligence personnel often deploy, leaving

installations without an adequate local intelligence capability to meet

AT/FP needs. This was a major vulnerability issue noted in the Joint

Staff assessments as well.

• Shortage of AT/FP staff. A majority of the installation AT/FP managers

we interviewed told us that they lacked sufficient AT/FP staff to

complete the myriad program requirements established by DOD and the

geographic combatant commanders. Approximately 66 percent of the

AT/FP managers we met with have other full-time jobs and have been

assigned the responsibility for AT/FP as an additional duty. One

subordinate command official told us that the staff was so busy with

non-AT/FP matters that they had no time to do any AT/FP

planningthey simply put out AT/FP “fires.” One manager believed that
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the lack of full-time AT/FP managers indicated that the service did not

really place a high priority on AT/FP.

Vulnerability

Assessments Have

Improved, but

Weaknesses Remain

Since our last report in 1997, vulnerability assessments have been

conducted more routinely and have been based on a defined set of criteria.

Through vulnerability assessments, DOD, the geographic combatant

commands, and the services evaluate their ability to defend against a

terrorist attack and highlight security weaknesses that terrorists could

exploit. In 1997, vulnerability assessments differed in frequency, approach,

and quality. Within DOD, commands did not have a common understanding

of how to conduct a vulnerability assessment or what constituted a high

quality assessment. In addition, some vulnerability assessment reports

failed to provide specific information on the vulnerabilities found at

installations.

This situation has improved in the last 3 years. DOD guidance now requires

that all installations undergo a higher headquarters AT/FP vulnerability

assessment at least once every 3 years (individual commands may elect to

require more frequent assessments). At a minimum, according to DOD

policy, all of these higher headquarters assessments must assess the

following functional areas: (1) counterintelligence, law enforcement, and

intelligence support; (2) physical security; (3) vulnerability and response to

a threat; (4) force protection plans and programs; (5) host nation, local

community, interservice, and tenant support; and (6) activity-specific

characteristics. A Joint Staff, geographic combatant command, or service

vulnerability assessment can satisfy assessment requirements. In the

following paragraphs, we evaluate the vulnerability assessments conducted

by these entities since our last report.

In September 1996, the Joint Staff through the Defense Threat Reduction

Agency began to conduct Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments

at installations.6 The teams conducting the assessments have since been

working to identify installation vulnerabilities and present options for

commanders to mitigate vulnerabilities with a focus on avoiding mass

casualties. During a week long on-site assessment, the team reviews site

specific plans, programs, and procedures. Areas they assess include

6

At the time, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was known as the Defense Special

Weapons Agency. The name change, the result of a merger of four organizations, took place

in October 1998.
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physical security systems, guard-force procedures, incident response,

structural engineering, infrastructure engineering, intelligence processes,

and ability to manage the consequences of an attack. The teams compile

reports outlining the various problems or vulnerabilities and make

recommendations for ways to improve AT/FP. Because AT/FP is a

commander’s program, DOD does not require commanders to correct the

vulnerabilities noted in the reports.

AT/FP personnel told us that the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability

Assessments served to educate the command to vulnerabilities and were

useful in planning projects and prioritizing them against available

resources. However, some changes could make this tool even more

valuable. The assessment teams have not been providing a commander

with specific directions on how to deal with vulnerabilities. For example,

the report may mention that the installation’s windows need fragment

retention film,7 but it would not tell the commander if installing the film is

more or less important than fixing other vulnerabilities, or advise the

commander as to what type of film might be the best fix for the problem,

nor would it outline how other installations have dealt with similar issues.

In addition, some AT/FP personnel found that the reports could be more

user-friendly. We were told that the reports are difficult to read and

understand, too long, and poorly structured.

Additionally, other installations facing similar problems cannot take

advantage of the advice provided in the assessment team’s report because

DOD has no formal, comprehensive mechanism to share best practices or

lessons learned. This condition is particularly unfortunate for installations

that are too small to receive Joint Staff-sponsored assessments or

installations that independently identify vulnerabilities between

assessments and could benefit from the teams’ expertise secondhand.

The Joint Staff is responding to some of the commanders’ and AT/FP

officials’ concerns. For example, Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability

Assessment team leaders told us that the executive summary of future

assessment reports will highlight those vulnerabilities that the team

believes to be the most pressing. The vulnerabilities in the executive

summary, while not in priority order, will be segmented into two

categoriesthose that can be addressed with little or no money and those

7

Fragment retention film is a thin, optically clear film that is applied to glass to minimize the

spread of glass fragments when the glass is shattered.
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that will require funding. This differentiation should make it easier for a

command to take immediate action on some vulnerabilities. Additionally,

an e-mail account has been established to allow (1) AT/FP managers to ask

questions and (2) assessment team members to provide potential solutions

to specific issues. Finally, according to Joint Staff officials, they have

started to list all observations with bullet points for improved readability.

In addition to the Joint Staff-sponsored assessment teams, the geographic

combatant commands and the services sponsor a number of other

vulnerability assessment teams. For example, U.S. Central Command has

formed the Joint Rear Area Coordinator assessment team, and U.S. Army

Europe has formed teams to assess installations in their area of

responsibility. Both the Air Force and the Navy have established teams, as

have the Air Forces’ overseas service headquarters such as the Pacific Air

Force and U.S. Air Force Europe. The service- and command-level teams

generally assess installations that the Joint Staff-sponsored teams do not

assess.

These assessments differ in quality from the Joint Staff-sponsored

assessments since these teams generally do not have the same level of

expertise and tend to be inconsistent in their makeup. On the other hand,

these assessments can be helpful in that the teams visit even the smallest

installations and provide a unique local- or service-centered perspective.

Services Have Not

Adequately Funded or

Properly Staffed the

Antiterrorism/Force

Protection Program

Although DOD makes the geographic combatant commanders responsible

for protecting U.S. forces from terrorist attack, it is up to the services to

provide the necessary personnel and funding to correct vulnerabilities and

upgrade facilities. Notwithstanding AT/FP’s high priority status within

DOD, funding for AT/FP has been, and will likely continue to be,

significantly less than what installation and geographic combatant

commanders feel they need to meet DOD’s goals. Commanders and AT/FP

program managers we met with stated that insufficient service
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funding had limited their ability to meet their AT/FP responsibilities.8

Although Congress has taken action to obtain more information about

AT/FP financing, DOD is not required to provide Congress with information

about unfunded AT/FP projects that would correct or mitigate

vulnerabilities. In addition, DOD has not provided AT/FP managers with the

training necessary to serve as AT/FP advisors to installation commanding

officers.

Development of the

Services’ Funding Plans

Starts at the Installations

Every 2 years, the services develop the Program Objectives

Memorandums,9 which outline the services’ spending plans for the

following 6 years. The Program Objectives Memorandums are the starting

point for the budget requests that are sent to Congress annually. Figure 1

details the steps in this process.

8

We have only included data for the Pacific and European Commands because this report

focuses on protecting troops overseas and the majority of U.S. troops stationed overseas are

located in these two commands. The Central Command is not included because the Army

and the Air Force provide no AT/FP funds for their installations in the Central Command. At

those installations, AT/FP requirements are funded by host nations or funds provided by

Congress for contingency operations. The Navy provides AT/FP funds for its installations in

Bahrain. According to Navy Central Command officials, AT/FP funding has been sufficient

to meet their AT/FP requirements. The Southern Command was excluded because of the

limited number of troops it has located outside of the United States.

9

The Program Objectives Memorandums are developed in even numbered years. At the time

of our report, the services were developing the fiscal year 2002 through 2007 Program

Objectives Memorandums. In the odd years, the services review the previously developed

Program Objectives Memorandums to ensure that they still address the needs of the

services. For example, in fiscal year 2001 the services will review their spending plans for

fiscal years 2003 through 2007. In fiscal year 2001, the services will also review the fiscal

year 2002 spending plan to make any necessary adjustments before submitting the plan as

its budget request to Congress.
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Figure 1: DOD Program Objectives Memorandum Process

Source: GAO analysis of DOD’s Program Objectives Memorandum process.

As the figure shows, the process begins with an installation commander

providing a prioritized list of unfunded requirements, including AT/FP

requirements to the major service commands. At the services’ major

commands, the installations’ requirements are combined, prioritized (using

guidance from the service and geographic combatant commander), and

forwarded to the service headquarters for consideration. At the service

headquarters, AT/FP requirements compete against other requirements for

funds. The service secretary approves the Program Objectives

Memorandum and submits it to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for

approval where subject matter experts, such as those in the Joint Staff

Installation

commanders

determine

requirements

for their

installations.

(1) Geographic

combatant commanders

review all requirements

and determine priorities.

(2) Commander reviews

completed Program

Objectives

Memorandums.

Joint staff gathers

all information from

all geographic

combatant

commanders and

assesses unfunded

requirements.

Office of the

Secretary of Defense

(OSD) reviews

service Program

Objectives

Memorandums and

alternatives with Joint

Staff and provides

alternatives for

funding.

Geographic

Combatant

Commander

Deputy

Secretary of

Defense

selects from

list of

alternatives

and directs

services to add

certain items to

their program if

necessary.

Service

Secretary

Service headquarters

receive input on

geographic combatant

commanders’ and

overseas service

headquarters’ priorities

and review all service

requirements to

determine overall

requirements.

Service

secretaries review

and approve

Program

Objectives

Memorandums.

Installations

Major

Command

Service

Headquarters

Joint Staff OSD

Deputy

Secretary

of Defense

Major

commands

determine

requirements

across all

installations

in area. (1)

(2)
B-285538

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

office responsible for AT/FP issues, review them and develop alternative

funding plans. If the Deputy Secretary of Defense is convinced that the

services’ spending plans need to be adjusted, he will direct the services to

adjust their plans. After the Program Objectives Memorandum process is

completed, the budgeting phase begins with the services developing

detailed budget estimates. These estimates are also reviewed by the subject

matter experts, and are approved or revised by the Deputy Secretary of

Defense. The budget is then finalized and sent to Congress. The Deputy

Secretary of Defense has directed the services to increase AT/FP funding

every year since 1996.

Past Funding Has Not Met

Needs

Although we could not obtain complete funding data for all the service

commands we visited, the data that is available reveals that funding for

AT/FP requirements in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 has been significantly less

than many commanders of overseas installations in the Pacific and Europe

required,10 as the following examples indicate:

• In fiscal years 1999 and 2000, the Pacific Air Forces received

approximately 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of funds needed to

meet their AT/FP requirements. In fiscal year 1999, $120,000 of the

$3.2 million AT/FP requirement was funded. For fiscal year 2000,

$52,000 was provided to meet $2.5 million of AT/FP requirements.

Projects that installations deferred included improving blast protection,

applying fragment retention film to windows to reduce the hazards of

flying glass, and developing new AT/FP training materials.

• For fiscal year 2000, the Army in Korea needed $44.6 million for civilian

gate guards and AT/FP physical security improvements and equipment.

However, the Army only provided 22 percent ($9.8 million) of the

requirement. According to the commanding general of the Army in

Korea, without additional funding the Command will have to divert

funds, including unit training money, to pay for the required guards. This

diversion will result in reduced readiness. Projects to improve

communications, blast protection, and access control remain undone

due to a lack of funds.

• In fiscal year 1999, the U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet received $30.3 million, or

about 60 percent, of its $50.4 million requirement. In fiscal year 2000, it

10We did not validate the AT/FP requirements provided to us by the commands. The

requirements presented in this report represent the funding that the commands believe they

need to address their AT/FP vulnerabilities.
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

received $28.1 million, or 54 percent, of its $52 million requirement.

Projects to improve base access control, lighting, and communications

remained unfunded at the time of our visit.

• The Army Command in Europe was unable to provide us details about

its requirements for fiscal year 1999 or 2000. However, according to

documents from the Army in Europe, in both fiscal years the Army failed

to provide sufficient funds to contract for all of the civilian security

guards required to implement the geographic combatant commander’s

decision to limit access to U.S. bases in Europe.

Planned Funding for Fiscal

Year 2001 Leaves

Commands Underfunded

Again

The services’ proposed AT/FP spending plans for fiscal year 2001 left every

command in the Pacific and in Europe with unfunded requirements. For

example, the Army’s spending plan for its forces in Europe totaled only

54 percent of its requirement, while the Air Force budget for its command

in the Pacific totaled 3 percent of the requirement. Table 1 outlines the

services’ requirements and proposed spending plans, the resulting

shortage, and the percentage of the requirement the spending plan fulfills

for fiscal year 2001.

Table 1: Service AT/FP Requirement, Proposed Spending Plan, Shortage, and Percentage of Requirement Fulfilled for Fiscal

Year 2001

a

Data does not include increases made at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense after the

service secretaries approved the budget proposals.

Source: Command- and service-provided data.

In August 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Army and the

Air Force to increase the funding levels for AT/FP in fiscal year 2001. At

that time, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed (1) the Army to add

$32.5 million to its AT/FP budget for Europe and $7 million to fund contract

Dollars in millions

Army:

Pacific

Navy:

Pacific

Air Force:

Pacific

Army:

Korea

Air Force:

Europe

Navy:

Europe

Army:

Europe Total

Required 6.8 53.6 2.2 35.5 19.6 24.5 132.3 274.5

Proposed

spending

6.3 27.0 0.06 12a 7.1a 17.6 71.2a 141.3

Shortage 0.5 26.6 2.1 23.5 12.5 6.9 61.1 133.2

Percent of

requirement

fulfilled

92 50 3 34 36 72 54 51
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security guards at installations in Korea and (2) the Air Force to add

$12.5 million to its AT/FP budget for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. As a

result, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s AT/FP requirements are fully funded

for fiscal year 2001. Also, according to an official from the U.S. Naval

Forces in Europe’s AT/FP office, the AT/FP program is fully funded for

fiscal year 2001 because it received contingency funds and supplemental

funds in fiscal year 1999. These funds allowed the program to address some

fiscal year 2001 requirements in fiscal year 1999. The remaining overseas

service headquarters remain underfunded.

Funding for the Future

Looks Bleak

The services’ current funding plans for fiscal years 2002 through 2005

continue the trend of under funding AT/FP requirements. According to a

document developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for use

during the 1999 review of the services’ fiscal year 2001 to 2005 Program

Objectives Memorandums, the services did not provide

• funding for physical security improvements validated by vulnerability

assessments,

• full funding for investments arising from establishment of AT/FP

standards, or

• full funding for contract security guards.

As figures 2 and 3 show, the planned AT/FP funding for Army, Air Force,

and Navy forces in Europe and the Pacific is consistently below funding

requirements. The figures reflect current requirements and planned

spending levels.
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Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Figure 2: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection Requirement the Services

Plan to Fund in the European Command

Note: Data for Army and Navy does not include military manpower. Data for the Air Force includes

some military manpower.

Source: GAO’s analysis of service and command data.

0 %

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2002 2003 2004 2005

Fiscal year

Army Navy Air Force
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Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Figure 3: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection Funding Requirement the

Services Plan to Fund in the Pacific Command

Note: Data includes operation and maintenance requirements only.

Source: GAO’s analysis of service and command data.

At the time of our review, the services were updating their fiscal year 2002

through 2005 spending plans. The Joint Staff estimates that the services

will need to add an additional $700 million over the current levels of

spending to address AT/FP requirements. According to Joint Staff officials,

costs for AT/FP continue to rise because new requirements are continually

being identified as threat and terrorist tactics change.

According to an Army official, AT/FP requirements are the fastest growing

requirement in the Army budget today. He estimated that the Army’s AT/FP

unfinanced requirement is growing at $80 million per year.11 Despite this,

the Army did not anticipate increasing AT/FP funding for fiscal years 2002

11This is an estimate for the Army-wide program, not just the AT/FP programs in Korea,

Europe, and the Pacific.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2002 2003 2004 2005

Fiscal year

Army Army Korea Navy Air Force
B-285538

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

through 2007. According to an Army official responsible for developing the

Program Objectives Memorandum, the Army is reluctant to increase

spending until it can develop a model that can predict the level of

protection obtained for dollars spent. As a result, the Army in Europe has

significantly less money than it believes it needs to adequately secure its

installations. Specifically, the Army’s proposed funding plan for fiscal

years 2002 through 2007 underfunds its forces in Europe by $44.2 million in

fiscal year 2002 alone, with a total of $226.5 million for fiscal years 2002

through 2007.

The Air Force had anticipated increasing AT/FP spending for fiscal

year 2002 when it updated its fiscal year 2002 to 2005 spending proposal

this year because requirements were growing as commanders identified

vulnerabilities and developed projects to correct them. However,

ultimately, the Air Force did not increase funding for its forces in Europe

and the Pacific. For fiscal years 2002 through 2007, these forces have

unfunded requirements of $37 million and $13 million, respectively.

The Navy hopes to be able to increase AT/FP in its fiscal year 2002 spending

plans, but plans beyond fiscal year 2002 are uncertain. A Navy official

responsible for making AT/FP funding recommendations for a small

portion of the Navy’s AT/FP budget told us that he would recommend an

increase in some AT/FP spending for fiscal year 2002. The same official told

us that it was unlikely that the remaining years of the Program Objectives

Memorandum (fiscal years 2003 through fiscal year 2007) would be funded

at the fiscal year 2002 level.
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DOD Provides Congress

With Limited

Antiterrorism/Force

Protection Funding

Information

During consideration of the fiscal year 2000 DOD budget, the Senate

Committee on Armed Services expressed concern over its inability to

obtain information about DOD’s programs to combat terrorism. In its

report, the Committee said,

“With current budget submissions, it is difficult for the committee to determine the scale of

the Department’s effort to combat terrorism, the effectiveness of the effort, how well the

Department’s efforts respond to the threat, and how the DOD programs fulfill the overall

government policy and strategy in this area.”12

To improve its oversight of combating terrorism activities (which include

AT/FP), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to provide it with a

consolidated combating terrorism budget justification (among other

things).13 Congress directed that the consolidated budget justification

provide details on how the services intend to spend the combating

terrorism funds they are requesting and to provide this information by

appropriation as well as by functional areas.14 Congress did not require

DOD to supply any information about unfunded AT/FP projects that would

correct or mitigate vulnerabilities. The first consolidated budget

justification was submitted in support of the fiscal year 2001 budget request

in February 2000.

Program Managers Are

Inadequately Trained

Each installation is required to have an AT/FP manager who serves as the

“subject matter expert and advisor” to the commander. In general, the

AT/FP managers we met were not adequately trained to manage their

installations’ programs and to complete the tasks assigned by the

geographic combatant commanders and services.

DOD has not established specific qualifications for these managers. There

are, however, specific tasks that are required of the commanders by DOD

directive. Insight can thus be gained into the capabilities required of the

AT/FP program managers in support of an installation commander. Based

12S.Rept. 106-50, at p. 353 (1999).

13National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L.106-65, section 932 (1999),

adding a new section 229 to chapter 9 of title 10, United States Code.

14DOD has determined that its AT/FP program consists of seven functional areas: physical

security equipment, physical security site improvements, physical security management and

planning, security forces/technicians, law enforcement, security and investigative matters,

and research, development, test and evaluation.
B-285538

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

on these tasks, a manager must be able to adequately plan and exercise an

AT/FP program, advise the commander on setting threat conditions,

perform physical security vulnerability assessments, coordinate AT/FP

response plans for subordinate and tenant organizations on the installation,

routinely review the effectiveness of daily security measures, conduct

residential security assessments of off-base housing, provide base

engineers with military construction requirements, train base personnel,

and conduct ongoing awareness programs.

The only formal training DOD offers for these managers, which can be

waived by a commander, is designed to teach managers how to provide

basic terrorism awareness training to installation personnel. It does not

emphasize how to develop or manage an AT/FP program. No formal AT/FP

program management training that instructs personnel on how to manage

an AT/FP office, garner funding, or that teaches best practices exists. At

some installations we visited, the primary method of developing AT/FP

expertise was through on-the-job training. As a result, nearly all of the

AT/FP managers we interviewed believed they were unprepared to do their

jobs:

• Many of the AT/FP managers were not aware of all DOD and geographic

combatant command AT/FP requirements. For example, DOD requires

that all installations undertake a physical security vulnerability

assessment once every 3 years. This requirement was not met at most

installationssome AT/FP managers were not familiar with this

requirement and others did not know how to conduct a physical security

vulnerability assessment.

• Many installations did not have AT/FP plans or had poor ones. These

plans are supposed to include procedures to (1) collect and analyze

terrorist threat information, threat capabilities, and vulnerabilities to

terrorist attacks; (2) enhance AT/FP protection; and (3) respond to

terrorism incidents. The plans we reviewed at installations we visited

varied in size and scope, from just a few pages to 15 volumes. It was

clear that the AT/FP managers had no uniform understanding of what

was expected of them in this regard.

• Many installations have never practiced using the AT/FP plans. The plan

helps to determine their ability to protect personnel and assets against

terrorist attack. If a plan is written, but not workable, it is of little use in

an emergency.
B-285538

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

• One AT/FP manager we interviewed did not understand the difference

between the concepts of THREATCONS and threat levels,15 despite the

fact that his position requires that he act as an advisor to the

commander on these topics.

Changes are planned for the AT/FP manager training as a result of a

recently completed Joint Staff study of the training. The study found that

the current training fulfills current standards but does not teach an AT/FP

manager how to be a force protection manager. To make improvements,

the Joint Staff (1) reviewed the applicable directive; (2) surveyed the

geographic combatant commands, the services, and the defense agencies;

and (3) observed current service AT/FP manager training courses. As a

result, the Joint Staff drafted a new standard outlining a curriculum that

would include training on installation AT/FP manager duties, how to write

plans, and how to conduct assessments. While DOD would set the

standards for what is taught, each service would still be responsible for

independently developing the course of study and completing the training

for its own personnel. This could lead to differences in the training from

one service to another. For example, one service has already mentioned

that it would like to implement a 2-week training course, rather than the

current 1-week course. The new standard is currently under review, and it

is unclear when it will be implemented.

Conclusions While all risks cannot be eliminated, they have been reduced through the

improvements DOD has made in its ability to protect U.S. forces located

outside the United States from terrorist attack. Commanders have used

vulnerability assessments to determine the vulnerabilities they face and

have developed strategies for correcting those vulnerabilities. The

vulnerability assessment reports issued by the Joint Staff do not, however,

contain all the information that could be useful to the commander. Also, the

Joint Staff has not developed a system to share assessment results, which

represents a lost opportunity to learn from the mistakes and lessons of

other installations and which could reduce the risks that servicemembers

face. As a result of these weaknesses, significant vulnerabilities that place

U.S. forces at risk will remain until the services provide the funds and

15According to DOD, threat level classification is a set of standardized terms used to quantify

the level of terrorism threat on a country-by-country basis. Threat levels are estimates with

no direct relationship to specific threat conditions [THREATCONS]. Threat levels should

not be confused with threat conditions.
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trained personnel that commanders, who are charged with protecting the

forces, have determined are needed. Congress does not receive information

about the unfunded antiterrorism/force protection projects designed to

correct or mitigate vulnerabilities, leaving it unaware of the level of risk

that U.S. military members overseas are facing, which limits its ability to

provide effective oversight of DOD’s efforts and determine appropriate

funding levels. Furthermore, while no amount of money or number of

personnel can completely eliminate the risk of a terrorist attack, not

providing the necessary resources to address identified antiterrorism/force

protection program requirements will leave U.S. military personnel

unnecessarily vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Recommendations To improve the effectiveness and increase the impact of the vulnerability

assessments and the vulnerability assessment reports, we recommend that

the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

improve the vulnerability assessment reports provided to installations.

Although the Joint Staff is planning to take some action to improve the

value of these reports, we believe the vulnerability assessment reports

should recommend specific actions to overcome identified vulnerabilities.

In addition, the Joint Staff should develop an antiterrorism/force protection

best practices or lessons learned program that would share

recommendations for both physical and process-oriented improvements.

The program would assist installations in finding answers to common

problemsparticularly those installations that do not receive Joint Staff

Integrated Vulnerability Assessment reports or others who have found

vulnerabilities through their own vulnerability assessments.

To provide Congress with the most complete information on the risks that

U.S. forces overseas are facing from terrorism, we recommend that the

Secretary of Defense direct the services to include in their next

consolidated combating terrorism budget submission information on the

number and types of antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not

been addressed by the budget request and the estimated cost to complete

these projects. Information on the backlog of projects should be presented

by geographic combatant command.

To ensure that antiterrorism/force protection managers have the

knowledge and skills needed to develop and implement effective

antiterrorism/force protection programs, we recommend that the Secretary

of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

and Low-Intensity Conflict to expeditiously implement the Joint Staff’s
B-285538

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

draft antiterrorism/force protection manager training standard and

formulate a timetable for the services to develop and implement a new

course that meets the revised standards. Additionally, the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

should review the course content to ensure that the course has consistency

of emphasis across the services.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

To improve congressional oversight of the risks that U.S. forces overseas

are facing from terrorism, Congress may wish to consider requiring the

Department of Defense to provide, as part of its Combating Terrorism

Budget Justification documentation, information on the number and type

of antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not been addressed by

the budget request and the estimated cost to complete these projects.

Information on the backlog of projects should be presented by geographic

combatant command.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with two of our

recommendations and disagreed with one. The Department’s comments are

reprinted in appendix II. In addition, the Department also provided

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Although DOD agreed with our recommendation regarding improvements

to the vulnerability assessment reports and the need to develop an AT/FP

best practices and lessons learned program, it did not agree to include in its

vulnerability assessment reports specific solutions for identified

vulnerabilities. As we noted in our report, providing information on

solutions would make the reports more useful to AT/FP managers. DOD

also stated that it is currently sharing best practices through the Joint

Staff’s quarterly AT/FP publication and believes that two computer-based

systems now in development will also share best practices. While the

quarterly newsletter and the computer-based systems are improvements,

they are not a best practices program. An effective AT/FP best practices

program requires the systematic analysis and cataloguing of problems and

proven solutions and thus would be dependent upon DOD’s willingness to

identify specific fixes to AT/FP problems.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to improve AT/FP manager

training and stated that revised training standards are being coordinated

throughout DOD and that the services are revising their courses to meet the
B-285538

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

new standards. However, DOD’s response did not specifically address a

timetable for implementing the training program or indicate that course

content would be reviewed for consistency across all the services. Such

steps would provide greater assurance that DOD will implement an

effective AT/FP manager training program.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the services provide

Congress with detailed information on unfunded AT/FP projects that would

correct or mitigate vulnerabilities. DOD noted that vulnerabilities may be

corrected through procedural changes that do not require funding. The

Department stated that AT/FP requirements compete against other “critical

mission essential” requirements and that it believes that the current

planning, programming, and budgeting system is effective. We

acknowledged in our report that AT/FP requirements are in competition

with other activities. We did not comment on the effectiveness of the

planning, programming, and budgeting system except to note that the

services had not provided sufficient funds for the AT/FP program in every

year since 1996. In addition, AT/FP managers told us that the existing levels

of funding limited their ability to address vulnerabilities. Our

recommendation that DOD provide Congress with this additional

information would not change DOD’s current budgeting process. In the

past, Congress has required DOD to provide detailed information on

unfunded depot maintenance projects and on the backlog of real property

maintenance projects to improve its oversight of programs. Since DOD did

not agree with our recommendation, we have added a matter for

congressional consideration suggesting that Congress require this

information.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at

(202) 512-5140. Key contributors to this assignment are listed in

appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Norman Rabkin

Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has

made improvements to its antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) program

overseas, we visited installations in the European, Pacific, and Central

Commands and met with commanders and AT/FP managers and discussed

AT/FP improvements as well as problems. We toured the installations to

inspect current vulnerabilities and actions taken to correct past

vulnerabilities. We also met with AT/FP managers at four geographic

combatant commands (European, Central, Pacific, and Southern), U.S.

Transportation Command, and the services’ major commands to discuss

improvements that they had made in their . programs since 1997 and to

obtain their views on continuing problems. At the installation and

geographic combatant commands and the services’ major commands, we

reviewed funding documents, AT/FP plans and orders, project lists,

minutes of working group meetings, and letters and memorandums

documenting command positions on AT/FP. We also reviewed classified

Internet resources available from the U.S. Central Command, U.S.

European Command, U.S. Southern Command, and the U.S. Army Europe.

We interviewed key members of the Joint Staff Directorate for Combating

Terrorism, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict), the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the

Department of State to obtain information on AT/FP improvements since

1997 and on plans for future improvements. We also obtained their views

on problems at the installation, command, and service levels. We reviewed

pertinent DOD and service documents, including directives, regulations,

and guidance on combating terrorism.

To determine if changes in DOD’s process for assessing and reporting

vulnerabilities at overseas locations have enhanced the commander’s

ability to determine the AT/FP vulnerabilities at installations in their area of

responsibility, we reviewed and evaluated vulnerability assessments

conducted by the Joint staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment teams and

the service teams for the facilities we visited, and discussed the value of

vulnerability assessments with installation commanders, AT/FP managers,

geographic combatant commanders’ AT/FP officers, and AT/FP managers

at the services’ major commands overseas. We obtained their views on

vulnerability assessment problems and potential solutions as well. We also

met with the program manager and deputy program manager of the AT/FP

program at the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment office to

obtain their views on the problems we learned about during our installation

visits. Finally, we attended several AT/FP conferences and trainings held by

the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

and Low-Intensity Conflict) to obtain additional information from

installation and service AT/FP managers, commanders, and civilian leaders.

To examine the adequacy of AT/FP funding and staff, we interviewed

service AT/FP managers and those officials responsible for funding AT/FP

from the Departments of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy and

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, to obtain information on prior year

funding as well as proposed levels of funding. At each installation and

command visited, we met with resource managers or others responsible for

determining AT/FP requirements and obtained documents on previous

levels of funding and requirements as well as documents that outline future

funding requirements and programmed levels of funding. We also reviewed

program decision memorandums and program budget decisions relating to

AT/FP funding, but we did not attempt to validate the requirements

identified by the installations or the commands. We also reviewed

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Combating Terrorism Readiness

Initiatives Fund submissions for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000 to

determine what types of projects were funded by the Joint Staff. We

discussed the adequacy of AT/FP training with representatives of the Joint

Staff, reviewed the proposed changes to the AT/FP standards for training

and discussed training shortcomings with installation AT/FP managers and

the AT/FP staff of the geographic combatant commands.

The geographic combatant commands and the component commands we

visited or contacted were:

• U.S. Central Command, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, U.S. Naval

Forces Central Command, U.S. Army Forces Central Command;

• U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Europe,

U.S. Air Forces in Europe;

• U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Commander in Chief,

Pacific Fleet, U.S. Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Forces

Japan, Commander Naval Forces Japan, U.S. Army Japan, 5th Air Force

Japan;

• U.S. Forces Korea, Commander Naval Forces Korea, 8th U.S. Army

Korea, 19th Theater Army Area Command, Korea, 7th Air Force Korea;

and

• U.S. Southern Command.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

The overseas sites we visited, by country, were:

Bahrain

• Naval Support Activity Bahrain

Germany

• Ramstein Air Base

• 104th Area Support Group

Italy

• Aviano Air Base

• 22nd Area Support Group, U.S. Army

• Naval Support Activity Naples

Japan

• Fleet Activity Yokosuka

• Yokota Air Base

• Camp Zama

Korea

• Osan Air Base

• 20th Support Group, U.S. Army

• 34th Support Group, U.S. Army

Kuwait

• Camp Doha, U.S. Army

Saudi Arabia

• Eskan Village

• Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard

Modernization Program

• Prince Sultan Air Base

• U.S. Military Training Mission
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Spain

• Naval Support Activity, Rota

Turkey

• Incirlik Air Base

We conducted our review from June 1999 through May 2000 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 3.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated June 30, 2000.

GAO Comments 1. We disagree with DOD’s implication that the requirements (the funds

the installations need to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities) as

highlighted in this report have not been validated and therefore should

not be reported to Congress. These requirements reflect the judgment

of senior flag officers in the Pacific and European commands who are

responsible for protecting U.S. forces from terrorist attack and are in

the best position to validate requirements. We also disagree that the

report does not acknowledge that commanders are ultimately

responsible for determining and prioritizing requirements and

resources to reduce physical security vulnerabilities. In our report, we

clearly state that commanders are responsible for determining what

actions to take to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities and that

commanders believe that they have not received sufficient funds to

correct the vulnerabilities they have determined need attention.

Similarly, we have noted that AT/FP needs must compete against other

service needs and that this competition begins at the installation level.

Additionally, we have, at the request of DOD, included additional

information about the Department’s budget process to provide a more

in-depth picture of the funding process.

2. The dollar figures in our draft report were provided by the service

elements of the geographic combatant commands. During a meeting

with service representatives to discuss our report, some concerns were

raised as to the currency and accuracy of the funding data. While our

draft report was at DOD for comment, we again met with service AT/FP

staffs and resource managers to discuss the figures and the services

provided new data with the necessary documentation. This new data

has been incorporated into our report and does not alter our

conclusions.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

3. We do not assume that all vulnerabilities are validated requirements.

This report discusses only those AT/FP requirements that overseas

commanders have validated and forwarded to the services for funding.1

It should be noted that DOD’s planned funding for AT/FP projects for

fiscal years 2002 to 2007 is $700 million less than required. This level of

funding challenges DOD’s stated commitment to combating terrorism.

1

At the suggestion of the Joint Staff, we have clarified this point in our report.
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-181 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III

GAO Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

Acknowledgments Raymond Decker, Carole F. Coffey, Jim Reid, and Tracy A. McCaffery

Brown made key contributions to this report.

In memory of Donald L. Patton (1942-2000) under whose skilled leadership

this review was conducted.

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