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ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF:

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND

U.S. INTERESTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 29, 2012

Serial No. 112–190

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 10

Ms. Danielle Pletka, vice president, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, 

American Enterprise Institute ............................................................................ 16

Robert Satloff, Ph.D., executive director, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement ............................................ 12

Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Robert Satloff, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 59

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 60

(1)

ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND 

U.S. INTERESTS 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. I’m 

sorry to Mr. Berman and his side of the aisle, I know that the 

Democrats are caucusing as we speak. We tried to find a convenient time but everybody’s caucusing all day, a lot of caucusing. 

After recognizing myself and my friend, the ranking member, for 

7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize for 3 

minutes, the chairman and the ranking member of the subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia for their opening remarks. I will then recognize other members seeking recognition, for 

1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses, and without objection, the witness’ prepared statements will be made part of the 

record and members may have 5 days to insert statements and 

questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the 

rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Two weeks ago, the Middle East again erupted, and Israel was 

forced to defend herself against the persistent and ongoing barrage 

of rocket attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian extremists. 

Israel’s successful military operation, Pillar of Defense, eliminated 

Hamas’ top leaders and disabled several rocket launch sites depleting Hamas’ operational capabilities. This is not just about specific 

actions by Hamas in Gaza, but about a Palestinian Authority that 

does nothing to reign in Hamas and other Palestinian extremist 

groups, and allows intolerance and incitement to violence against 

the Jewish State to fester. 

There have been public reports indicating that the Palestinian 

Authority has continued to pay the salaries of both Palestinian extremists in Israeli prisons, and pledged to pay for Hamas’ salaries 

if they were to enter into a power-sharing agreement with the PA. 

And today, as we know, Palestinian leader Abbas plans to exacerbate the problem by presenting his bid for a non-state membership 

at the United Nations instead of initiating direct talks with Israel 

in order to bring long lasting peace to the region. 

2

What will the day after the vote look like? There must be consequences for Ramallah’s rejectionism and continued irresponsibility. 

The constant sound of sirens as rockets from Palestinian extremists head toward Israeli towns and cities is a sobering reminder of 

the imminent threats facing the Jewish State. Israel is surrounded 

by rogue regimes and terrorist organizations that wish to wipe her 

off the map. Fortunately, the United States and Israel have collaborated in developing the Iron Dome anti-missile system which 

saved so many lives during the recent attacks. I would be interested in hearing from our witnesses, their thoughts on if and how 

this successful model can be replicated with other critical regional 

allies such as Jordan for future cooperative activities. 

We face serious challenges region-wide, from Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities, to the ongoing violence in Syria, to transitions region-wide. The central questions I hope our witnesses will 

address in their testimony, what now? Where do we go from here? 

Hamas has a lot of weapons left in its arsenal and intends to rearm, with Iran providing weapons to be smuggled through the 

Sinai. The Egyptian Government has yet to crack down on arms 

smuggling through the Sinai or crackdown on the use of Sinai as 

a sanctuary for violent Palestinian extremist groups to launch rockets at Israel. Yet, the administration seemed to go out of its way 

to praise the Morsi government for making the ceasefire agreement 

happen. According to news reports, administration officials indicated off the record that President Obama was investing heavily in 

Morsi and views him as someone with whom the U.S. could do 

business. Of course then Morsi immediately engaged in a massive 

domestic power grab, claiming virtually unlimited powers. 

What steps should the Congress take to hold the Morsi government accountable for its actions? What further conditions should be 

placed on U.S. political, economic and military support to Egypt? 

For example, 1 month after our Embassy in Cairo was attacked, 

without any adequate protection from Egyptian authorities, the 

Obama administration requested a transfer of $450 million in cash 

assistance to Egypt. This was met by strong Congressional opposition, but what more can we do? 

Earlier this year, the Obama administration decided to send economic aid to the Palestinians over Congressional objections. This 

included the use of taxpayer funds for such dubious projects as 

cash for work in Gaza, scholarship for Palestinian students, office 

refurbishments, and improvements to the PA agencies and ministries. 

In the last 3 years alone, the United States has provided over $2 

billion in U.S. assistance to the Palestinians. Yet this did not serve 

as an inducement for the Palestinians to act responsibly, to effectively fight extremism, to pursue sustained unconditional direct negotiations with the Israelis, or to abandon their unilateral statehood scheme at the U.N. At a time when our own economic situation is in dire straits, should the U.S. be helping the Palestinians 

rebuild their economy and providing them with millions in hardearned U.S. taxpayer dollars while Palestinian extremists embrace 

violence and undermine the peace process? 

3

Finally, we cannot forget the existential threat that a nuclear 

Iran poses to Israel, U.S. allies and national security interests in 

the region. I am deeply concerned that the administration’s foolish 

embrace of yet another round of negotiations will only embolden 

the Iranian regime. Rather than embarking on this dangerous and 

foolhardy course, we must accelerate and expand our sanctions and 

work with likeminded allies to strengthen their bilateral sanctions 

regimes, to compel the Iranians to verifiably and permanently 

abandon their dangerous policies. 

As events unfold, we must closely analyze our foreign policy objectives in the region and scrutinize every taxpayer dollar being 

spent in this fragile economic environment to ensure that we are 

able to regain lost leverage and effectively pursue our national security objectives. 

And with that I am pleased to yield to my friend, the ranking 

member, Mr. Berman, for his opening statement. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and 

also thank you for calling this important hearing at this critical 

time. I would like to offer a few observations regarding the recent 

fighting and regarding the Palestinians’ profoundly regrettable effort to achieve statehood recognition through a U.N. vote rather 

than through direct negotiations with its neighbor Israel. 

First of all, regarding the fighting let’s be clear. Contrary to 

media shorthand, the hostilities began long before Israel killed 

Ahmad Jabari, the leader of Hamas’ military wing. Hamas and 

other Gaza extremists fired more than 800 rockets into Israel this 

year prior to Jabari’s death. During some of these barrages, 1 million people in southern Israel, one-eighth of Israel’s total population, the equivalent of 40 million Americans, were forced into 

bomb shelters, paralyzing the region. No country in the world 

would sit by and allow itself to be attacked in this way, especially 

when targeted by terrorists who oppose its very existence. 

Second, amidst the recent visits of Arab and Turkish officials to 

Gaza, let’s remember why we have to stand steadfastly against any 

legitimization of the de facto Gaza authority. Hamas is an Iranianbacked terrorist group that is sworn to Israel’s destruction. They 

are not remotely a peace partner. There should be no loosening of 

the Quartet’s conditions for dealing with Hamas, nor should we 

loosen ours. 

In that regard, I can’t help but note once again Hamas’ astonishing cruelty and disregard for human life, not only Jewish life 

but Palestinian life. They show their contempt for Palestinian civilians by burying their rockets next to hospitals and mosques and in 

crowded neighborhoods, creating a cynically crafted quandary for 

Israel, which is caught between the sacred mission of protecting its 

own citizens and the terrible prospect that some innocents may die 

as it does so. And we know that Hamas is never more pleased than 

when it can accuse Israel of a civilian massacre. 

Israel’s own constantly improving efforts to limit loss of innocent 

life stands in stark contrast to Hamas’ cruelty. As we know, Israel 

has saved countless lives by warning Palestinian civilians to evacuate before striking targets. Every loss of innocent human life is 

a tragedy, but Israel deserves credit for keeping civilian casualties 

4

remarkably low while attacking nearly 1,500 Hamas targets in 

densely populated Gaza. 

Third, the Obama administration deserves commendation for its 

support of Israel, steadfast support from the outset and throughout 

this crisis. President Obama made clear that he was in his words, 

‘‘fully supportive of Israel’s right to defend itself from missiles landing on people’s homes and workplaces.’’ And he emphasized that 

his administration would, and I quote again, ‘‘continue to support 

Israel’s right to defend itself.’’ Administration spokesman also repeatedly made clear that Israel would ‘‘make their own decisions 

about the tactics they use,’’ and they pledged additional support for 

Iron Dome and stepped-up efforts to stop Hamas’ smuggling. And 

once it became clear that Israel wanted a cease-fire the administration helped seal that deal as well. 

Fourth, Prime Minister Netanyahu deserves credit for his restraint. By choosing not to go forward with a ground operation he 

saved countless Israeli and Palestinian lives. 

And I think this body can be justifiably proud of its own role in 

saving innocent lives through our funding of the Iron Dome defense 

system. Israeli lives were saved and the tenor of hostilities dramatically altered by Iron Dome’s amazing ability to destroy nearly 

90 percent of rockets before they landed in populated areas. Palestinian lives were saved because Iron Dome prevented the kind of 

atrocities that would have left Israel no choice but to respond more 

harshly. 

And fifth, as we look in the future, nothing will be more critical 

to calming Israel’s Gaza border than ending the smuggling of arms 

from Iran and elsewhere into Gaza. In that regard, Egypt bears a 

particularly heavy responsibility. 

Lastly, a word about what’s happening at the U.N. today and its 

context. President Abbas, the leader of the PLO and of the Palestinian Authority, is seeking U.N. General Assembly support for recognition of Palestine as a so-called ‘‘non-member state.’’ Whatever 

the vote on that proposition, the whole world knows that Palestine 

isn’t yet a state, that it has virtually none of the attributes of statehood enumerated in international law. 

We will watch closely to see what the PLO does in the aftermath 

of this vote. If they continue to internationalize their claims, for example, through cases at the International Criminal Court or the 

International Court of Justice, or if Abbas continues to refuse to return unconditionally to the negotiating table, I have no doubt that 

the impact on U.S.-Palestinian relations will be devastating. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I 

look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. I am pleased 

to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I know we want to get 

to our distinguished panel of witnesses this morning so I will try 

to be brief. 

In the last week we have heard a lot of references to truce between Hamas and the state of Israel. Unfortunately using that 

term is, I am afraid, wishful thinking. Hamas is a terrorist organization. Terrorism is what it does. And any lull in that terrorist acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:21 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\112912\76979 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

tivity will only be a time-out in which it rebuilds, re-arms and reorganizes. Its goal is and always has been the destruction of Israel 

and the extermination of the Jewish people. 

And I think that anybody who thinks that the truce negotiated 

last week is anything more than an intermission in that battle 

ought to step back and take a look at Hamas’ history in Gaza. It 

is fraught with violence directed at both Israel and at its Palestinian counterparts associated with Fatah. 

In the 7 years since Israel withdrew from Gaza, it has launched 

thousands of missiles including hundreds in the months before 

Israel finally took military action to protect itself. And now as a result of the so-called truce agreed upon last week we will hopefully 

have a period of relative calm in the region. But the length of that 

calm will depend on the actions of the key players in the region, 

especially Egypt which has been credited by the Obama administration with being the key player for negotiating the cease-fire. 

Will the Morsi administration follow through with its role as 

peacemaker, or will it appease its radical Muslim Brotherhood base 

and look the other way while arms continue to be smuggled into 

Gaza to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hamas offshoot for the sole purpose of attacking Israel? I am afraid it is more likely to be the latter. 

We have got an excellent panel of witnesses, as I said before, 

here this morning, and I think we all look forward to hearing them 

address these important issues. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

I will now recognize members to speak for 1 minute. Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Fifteen hundred rockets and mortars entered 

Israel aimed at apartment buildings, schools and hospitals. The 

facts are uncontested that they were aimed almost exclusively at 

civilian target, 1,500 separate war crimes. Egypt has basically a 

10-mile border with Gaz. It allows those tunnels to operate and 

take the rockets in. If we are going to praise Egypt for helping to 

end this barrage of missiles against Israel, we must also condemn 

Egypt for allowing those rockets to be smuggled through their territory. 

Palestinians asked Israel to withdraw from Gaza, Israel did, now 

the leaders of Gaza demand the ‘‘liberation of Tel Aviv.’’ This effort 

to delegitimize Israel and to delegitimize Israel’s right to defend 

itself needs to be turned back. This hearing is one small part of 

that. And finally, I should commend the President for his steadfast 

support for Israel’s right to defend itself. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

I am honored to recognize Mr. Smith, the chairman on the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, Hamas was 

not holding its own in this conflict despite its obnoxious use of terror missiles aimed at civilians reminiscent of the Nazi’s V1 and V2 

rocket attacks on Londoners during World War II. Israel’s Iron 

Dome anti-missile system is reported to have been 85 percent sucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:21 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\112912\76979 HFA PsN: SHIRL
6

cessful in engaging those missiles headed for population areas of 

up to 70 kilometers from their launch sites. 

A ground war launched by Israel could have further degraded 

the ability of Hamas and other Palestinian groups that threaten 

Israel with continuing missile attacks by enabling further Israeli 

strikes on the Palestinian missile storage facilities. So the Hamas 

concession to temporary peace can in no way be construed as a 

commitment to lasting peace, but rather a realization of the danger 

of defeat. Paradoxically, the truce actually offers Hamas an opportunity to restock and reposition their missiles. 

Madam Chair, I would ask that my full statement be made a 

part of the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. SMITH. And I am testifying on behalf of Hurricane Sandy victims over on the Senate side at 11:30, so I will go and hopefully 

be back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Lovely, thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. And I thank our distinguished witnesses for their 

work. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Rohrabacher who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am 

looking forward to hearing the testimony today. Let me just state 

that it shouldn’t escape any of us that the Middle East is in turmoil and we need to compare this to what it was like 6 years ago 

before this administration. And it seems to me that the policies and 

the approach that brought by this administration to the Middle 

East have left us with turmoil and less of a chance for peace, and 

the launching of more and more rockets into Israel by Palestinian 

irreconcilables as well as the Iranian Mullah regime deciding that 

they can provide more and more rockets to the Palestinian 

irreconcilables. If anybody is responsible, who is responsible for all 

of this? All we know is our enemies seem to be of encouraged by 

the current policy of this administration because they are now 

more aggressive than they were 6 years ago. 

We all remember the apology tour. We all remember the lack of 

support for America’s friends. We all remember the fact that this 

administration didn’t say a word to help the students in Iran when 

they were about to stand up against the Mullah regime. We are 

now facing the consequences not of a proof of sincerity which this 

administration——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Sorry, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. But a projection of weakness by 

the Obama administration. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Royce is recognized, the chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. I was actually in Haifa in 

2006 during the rocket attacks during the Hezbollah war and actually saw the targeting of civilian population sites there, and at one 

point even the trauma hospital that I visited. And so I saw what 

7

it was like to see a society paralyzed. It was a ghost town there. 

Out of that, however, came the Iron Dome. And in a few short 

years, from the drawing board to implementation, we had a system 

there that proved its mettle and protected Israelis from rocket attack. 

I think that that Iron Dome gave leaders in Israel breathing 

room. It prevented more bloodshed. I think Congress should be 

very proud of the role it played in the Iron Dome. I will tell you 

that I am very skeptical about Egyptian commitments that were 

made here and I am skeptical about them being upheld. And with 

Iran’s backing, the Islamic resistance movement will re-arm. Iran 

is getting and generating more and more weaponry down there, 

and that is without a nuclear weapon. Imagine how emboldened 

Iran will be with a bomb. So the stakes are very high, Madam 

Chair, and I appreciate you holding this hearing. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

On Saturday, the Post and Courier of Charleston, South Carolina, published a thoughtful editorial in response to the Associated 

Press article that deemed Israel a winner in the cease-fire agreement and it stated, ‘‘After all, given its brutal, duplicitous track 

record, Hamas can’t be realistically trusted to keep its word about 

anything, especially when offering assurances it will stop firing 

rockets into Israel.’’

Sadly, due to shameless propaganda, Israel is often misrepresented when it responds to attacks. We must not forget that 

Hamas fires missiles and rockets first, and Israel has every right 

to defend itself. In fact, it is Hamas who intentionally targets civilians with its indiscriminate rocket attacks. Hamas also has rockets 

provided by Iran, a nation that is fueled by hatred of Israel, who 

dwells on reminding the world it can provoke war in the Middle 

East. I am grateful America stands by Israel, and I yield the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Poe, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, is recognized. 

Mr. POE. The eyes of the world were on the Gaza Strip for 8 days 

as sirens wailed and rockets rained down on our ally, Israel. It 

started when Hamas launched over 8,000 rockets into Israel since 

2005. These rockets didn’t come from nowhere. For months, Iran’s 

mullahs shipped long-range rockets into the Sudan, shipped them 

through Egypt before smuggling them through tunnels and assembling them in Gaza. 

Israel responded by doing what any other responsible nation 

would do, it defended itself. Now that the cease-fire is in place, the 

United States needs to show that there are consequences for attacking a sovereign nation both for Hamas, but especially for Iran. 

We should have stricter enforcement sanctions and pass tougher 

sanctions on Iran. Iran and Hamas both should be held accountable 

for these attacks. Israel has the moral right and legal duty to defend itself. There is a cease-fire but only until Hamas obtains more 

Iranian missiles. Hamas is the puppet but Iran is the puppeteer, 

and we should recognize that. I yield back. 

8

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. It is just the way it is. 

Mr. Kelly, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, vice chair, is 

recognized. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I had the opportunity actually to sit in front of Prime Minister Netanyahu, and when we 

talked about Israel’s role in that region of the world he said, understand this, that in that region we are you and you are us. I don’t 

think anything could be more clear than that. And as we go into 

this hearing today, I think it is really important that we understand, you can talk the talk but you better be able to walk the 

walk. And we need to send a message not just to Israel’s current 

enemies, but as the world goes on and continues to spin out of control, especially that region, that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with 

Israel and we will never back down on any commitment to make 

sure that we protect our closest ally and friend in that region of 

the world. 

So Madam Chair, thank you for having this, and the witnesses, 

thank you for being here. We have some other questions when it 

comes to the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty and Palestine’s end run now 

to get some legitimacy. I think those are things that we have to 

meet head on and be very clear in our language about it and not 

put some kind of a spin on it that lets people interpret it as something different than what it is, and that is our total commitment 

to Israel and its survival. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Kelly. 

Congressman Turner of New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am interested in what 

our distinguished panel can tell us about what may happen in the 

U.N. vote. What mischief may be caused if the Palestinians prevail, 

and what the United States is doing about it and what we should 

be doing about it, and a long-term basis, do you see any role of 

Egypt here in absorbing some responsibility in Gaza from a protectorate to whatever? But your views would be appreciated. Thank 

you, I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. Burton, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and 

Eurasia, is recognized. 

Mr. BURTON. It is great to see my old buddy, Elliott Abrams, 

again. We have known each other for 30 years, but you never age. 

You still look young like—let me, I am not going to say much right 

now. I will listen to the witnesses. 

But ever since the Arab Spring began, the entire northern tier 

of Africa and the Gulf States have been in a state of flux, and I 

think that is one of the contributing factors. Iran is trying to destabilize that entire region, and Israel is the one that is bearing the 

brunt of it. And all I can say is that we need to give Israel all the 

support they need to make sure that they survive, because Iran is 

determined with its allies to destroy it. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. In August 2011, I 

was in Israel and we heard a presentation by a lady from southern 

Israel. She lived on a collective farm, a kibbutz, and she came and 

she talked with us about how they teach their children about Code 

9

Red, the threat that they have every day. Coloring books about the 

color red, board games like Chutes and Ladders where if you land 

on Code Red you go to the bomb shelter. She presented to us a box 

of both rocket and bomb fragments, her collection that she had 

picked up on the yard of her home. 

I don’t have a bomb or rocket fragment collection, and I would 

be willing to bet not anyone in this room does. This is an existential threat that Israel lives under every day. They should have the 

right to defend themselves. And with that Madame Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Bilirakis, my colleague from Florida. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very 

much, and thank you for holding this hearing. 

For years, Israelis have lived under the constant threat of attack 

from Gaza using rockets, many of which were supplied from Iran 

and smuggled into the country. A few weeks ago we saw Israel exercise its right to defend itself. The cease-fire which began November 21st appears to be holding for now, but we know Iran will continue in its efforts to arm Hamas. 

Iran has also been active in Syria. Tens of thousands of Syrians 

have been killed and many more have become refugees in neighboring Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. The future of Syria is uncertain but the conflict brings increased security concerns for Israel 

and the region at large. I look forward to asking questions. I look 

forward to your testimony. Thank you, I appreciate it. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you. 

And we are honored to have as our guest, Mr. Green of Texas. 

I understand you don’t have an opening statement, or you wanted 

to ask a question. I wanted to make sure that you had a minute 

if you wanted to say something. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank you especially for allowing me the opportunity to be heard. I think it goes 

without saying that any nation that is under assault has the right 

to defend itself. I am eager to hear what our panelists have to say 

so as to get a better understanding of some of the nuances that I 

may not have captured from viewing this from afar. I thank you 

again. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. We are honored to 

have you. 

And now it is my pleasure to introduce our excellent set of panelists starting with Elliott Abrams who as Mr. Burton points out is 

a good friend of our committee for many years. He is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. After serving on the staffs of Senator ‘‘Scoop’’ Jackson and 

Moynihan, he was an assistant Secretary of State in the Reagan 

administration and received the Secretary of State’s Distinguished 

Service Award from Secretary George P. Shultz. 

Mr. Abrams joined the Bush administration in January 2001, as 

a special assistant to the President and senior director of the NSC 

for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Organizations. 

From December 2002 to February 2005, he served as the special 

assistant to the President and senior director of the National Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs. He served as 

10

deputy assistant to the President and deputy national security advisor for Global Democracy Strategy from February 2005 to January 2009, and in that capacity supervised both the Near East and 

the North African Affairs and the Democracy, Human Rights, and 

International Organizations directorates of the National Security 

Council. Wow. 

And then we will hear from Danielle Pletka who is the vice president for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at AEI. Before joining 

this organization she served 10 years as a senior professional staff 

member for the Near East and South Asia on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Ms. Pletka writes regularly on the 

Middle East and South Asia, U.S. national security, terrorism and 

weapons proliferation, and for a range of American newspapers and 

magazines. Ms. Pletka’s writings and interviews have appeared in 

the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, CNN, CBS News, the Los Angeles Times and many others. She 

has testified before Congress on the Iranian threat and other terrorist activities in the Middle East, and she has also written extensively on deterring a nuclear Iran and Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Welcome to you as well. 

And next we will hear from Robert Satloff who has served as the 

executive director of the Washington Institute since ’93. Dr. Satloff 

is an expert on Arab and Islamic politics as well as U.S.-Middle 

East policy. He has written and spoken widely on the Arab-Israeli 

peace process, the Islamist challenge to the growth of democracy to 

the region, and the need for bold and innovative public diplomacy 

to Arabs and Muslims. The author or editor of nine books or monographs, Dr. Satloff’s views on the Middle East issues frequently appear in major newspapers and he regularly comments on major 

news programs, talk shows and National Public Radio. Dr. Satloff 

is the creator and host of a weekly news and interview program on 

Alhurra, the U.S. Government supported Arabic satellite television 

channel that is broadcast in the Middle East and Europe. 

A distinguished panel, indeed, and thank you, Dr. Satloff, for giving me your latest edition from the Washington Institute. Thank 

you so much, and we will begin with Mr. Abrams. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you very much. I should start by saying it 

has been a great pleasure over the last few years to come and testify before the committee and see this tag team of the chairman 

and ranking member, and all things change but I have been honored and very pleased to be able to testify before you. 

I want to just say a word first about the Gaza war at the local 

level and then the broader, regional level. At the local level it is 

obviously the successor to what happened in December 2008 and 

January 2009, Cast Lead. Then as now, Hamas and other terrorist 

organizations shot hundreds of mortars and rockets into Israel, and 

then as now, it was only a matter of time before Israel reacted. 

Throughout 2008 Israeli officials were telling the Bush White 

House, if this continues we are going to have to go into Gaza. 

11

Why did Hamas do this now, I think, is an interesting question, 

now, because it obviously forced Israel to react. We don’t really 

know the answer but I can give you three theories. The first is that 

with this U.N. initiative, the Palestinian Authority in the West 

Bank was kind of taking center stage and Hamas wanted to grab 

it back for the armed struggle. The second is that if Hamas isn’t 

fighting, isn’t launching rockets, some of the young men under its 

control start leaving and going to places like Islamic Jihad. They 

didn’t sign up to police the borders, they signed up to attack Israel, 

and if Hamas isn’t doing it others are. They are going to lose some 

popularity in the places they need it. 

Thirdly, and I think as Mr. Chabot has said this, why does 

Hamas commit acts of terrorism? It commits acts of terrorism because it is a terrorist group. They are terrorists. That is what they 

do. They didn’t conquer Gaza so that they could improve the quality of the schools and have more efficient government services. 

They conquered Gaza to use as a base to attack Israel. Now whether they benefit from this war, I think, depends in no small part on 

Egypt, as many of you have said. 

We tried, when Israel left Gaza in 2005, to work out a border regime that would prevent Iranian arms from going in. We failed. 

Israel and Egypt tried again in January 2009, and we in the 

United States tried. And we got all sorts of promises, but we failed. 

Egypt can do this, and it is in Egypt’s interest as well as ours and 

Israel’s that it do so. So I urge you, as you consider this question 

of aid to Egypt, to think hard about this issue. 

It is also clear as several of you have said that those missiles, 

particularly the Fajr missiles that hit or were aimed at Tel Aviv 

and Jerusalem, weren’t made in workshops in Gaza. They came 

from Iran. And it is a reminder that this kind of subversion, aggression, military action is coming from the Iran that doesn’t have 

nuclear weapons as has been said here. One can only assume that 

with nuclear weapons they will be far more militant, far more aggressive throughout the entire region. 

I wanted to just mention two other things before I end. One of 

them on Egypt, one on Jordan which, Madam Chairman, you mentioned. On Egypt, we made a mistake, I believe, for most of the last 

30 years under Hosni Mubarak of not caring very much about what 

went on inside as long as the foreign policy was responsible. I urge 

that we don’t make that mistake again. That we do not take the 

position that, well, President Morsi did okay during the Gaza war 

so who cares whether there is democracy in Egypt or not? This 

would be, I think, a tremendous mistake for the United States. 

Finally, on Jordan. We have seen in the last few months demonstrations of increasing size. Why now? Why 2012 and not previous years? One of the key reasons, I think, is economic. Jordan 

is suffering under the burden of Syrian refugees, approximately 

200,000 of them, and increased energy prices, because that gas 

pipeline that used to go from Egypt to Israel and Jordan has been 

closed, so they are now buying on the spot market and they are 

paying a lot more. If we seek stability in Jordan we should help 

it address these issues. 

We are generous as an aid donor, you vote this aid. The Gulf 

Arabs have not been so generous, not this year. They have given 

12

next to nothing. And I think this should be a key goal of the United 

States policy in that region, to ask them to act and act fast to help 

Jordan remain stable and survive this very difficult year. 

The time is up so I will stop with that, and thank you again for 

inviting me. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]


76979a-1.eps
13


76979a-2.eps

greatlv in 2009, 20lO, and 2011, but the number grew again this past year. The weekend of November lOII saw over 100 missiles, rockets, and mortars fired into Israel, so an Israeli response was inevitable. 

\\,h)' did Hamas 00 this? \\,h)" did it in essence seek to force such an Israeli move? The answer is unclear but 

I would offer some theories. I iiTst, the Palestinian Authority in the \Vest l~ank was at center stage with its 

UN membership initiative. llamas seem_ed marginal while that diplOluatic effort was playing out. \Vith this 

war llamas has once again grabbed center stage. Second, llamas commits acts of terror flmdamentally 

because it is a terrorist group. 113111a5 did not seize Gaza so as to iInprove school perfornlance or 111edical 

carc, or prove it could collect garbage efficiently. It seized Gaza to usc it as a base for attacking Israel and the 

PA leadership in Rarnallah. The raison d'ctre of I Iarnas is fighting Israel with acts of violence. Third, in the 

I110nths whcre HaInas tricd to stop attacks on Israel by other groups such as Islanuc Jihad bccausc it did not 

at that InOlncnt \vant to force an Israeli response, Hainas lost support frOln Y01UIg fighters. They signed up 

to fight, not to be bureaucrats, and SOlne huned to other groups. So Hainas ,-"as, by fighting, seeking to 

reclaim its terrorist leadership mant1c. 

\\'l1t~ther Hamas henefits from the war depends largely on t\\'o things. First, will Egypt police the horder 

between Sinai and Gal,a, and prevent anns resupply to Hamas? After Tsraelleft GaJ',a in 200S this question 

arose, and it arose again in January 2009 after "Operation Cast Lead." In 200S the United States negotiated 

an elaborate plan for border management, and it must be said that it failed totally-and fast. And in both 

2005 and 2009 the government of Ugypt under President Mubarak did nothing to prevent llamas £ro111 

smuggling in arms. 

So we need to do bcttcr this tunc-or rathcr, Egypt does. I carl see no i':gyptiarl national security interest in 

having Iran ann I IaI11as, or haying I Iarnas attack Israel, or having I Iarnas provoke another and perhaps 

widcr conflict. So I think there is a cllaIlCe here, aIld we should usc this opporhlluty to press for it. In your 

consideration of the foreign aid we give Egypt, I urge you to hayc tIus front and center. \Vhy give security 

assistance ifit is not used in part to protect Ugypt's security in the Sinai, and thereby to prevent regional 

conflicts spurred by Iran? 

Let Inc turn now to the regional picture, and Iran. 

Those nussiles that werc aimcd at T cl Ayiy and Jerusalein were not built by Paicstiluans in Gaza. They arc 

all Iraluan and represent yet another front in Iran's efforts to produce conflict, attack Israel, \veaken U.S. 

interests, and support radical forces. TIle presence ofTranian Revolutionary Guards in Sy'ria, fighting to 

preser\'e the Assad regime, is another example ofTran's reach. There are very many other examples-in 

Afghanistan, in fraq, and in Yemen, for example, Tn that sense one may say the fighting in Syria and Gal,a 

are proxy wars with fran. fran's decision to supply these missiles to Hamas demonstrates just how far it will 

go in attacking Israel-so far. Of course it may go further, and continues to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Let n1e read to you froin a Reuters report aflast week: 

Iran is enriching Uranitllll at a constant pace and international sanctions alilled at making 1 ehran suspend the actiyity 

are having no visible impact, the U.N. nuclear watchdog chief said in llllusually blunt remarks on 'I'uesday .... lAJsked 

\"ihether s<lnctions h<ld produced any deterrent effect, liALA Director General YukioJ Amano told reporters in Paris: 
14


76979a-3.eps

"\Ye arc verifying rhe activities ar the nudear sires in Iran and we do not sec any effect. They are, for e:\:ample, 

producing enriched uranium up to S percent and 20 percent \\ ith a quite constant pace." :\.mano, who'>e in"pectors 

regularly visit Iran's nuclear falilities, added: "It has not changed. We have observed that the progression of 

enrichment has been constant. There has been a steady, gradual increa<;e in (he amollnt." 

rhttp://www.reuters.com/artide/2012/11/20/11udear-irall-idUSL5E8MKA.67201211201 

The Gat;a conflict is a reminder of two things with respect to Iran. First, that the Iranian threat is not only 

nuclear and prospective. Iran is today creating violence in the Middle East, and is the largest state supporter 

of terrorism in the world. Second, this is all being done by an Iran \\:ithout nuclear weapons. One nlUst 

aSSllIne that an Iran that has successfully defied the world and obtained nuclear weapons \vould be even 

more aggressive. 

Lct Inc nukc bricf conUllcnts and Egypt and Jordan, and thcn concludc. 

It has been widely said that \I:gypt's new Muslim Brotherhood govermnent behaved sensibly during the 

GaLa conflict, and I agree. Lgypt benefitted frOlll this because it returned to center stage in the .Middle East 

and the Arab world, and because it helped avoid a grOlUld war it did not want. 

But Prcsident Morsi instantly took adYalltagc of the world-widc accoladcs to seize lllorc power at hOllle. 

Those who thought hc was a dull burcaucrat, an apparatchik, a transitional figure, wcrc proycd wrong. 

Ironically, thosc \vcrc thc exact things said ofHosni Mubarak when he rosc to thc prcsidcncy by accidentin that case thc assassination ofPrcsidcnt Sadat. But like Mubarak, Morsi seClllS to have a will to power and 

is scizing nlOrc andlllore of it. Sadly it appears that those who argued Morsi was no delllOcrat arc being 

provcd right. 

U.S. policy should seek an Egyptian foreign policy that protects the Tsrae1-Fgyptpeace treaty and prevents 

Hamas from being re-armed by Iran. 111ese are in Egypt's interests as wel1. Rut we shollld not make the 

mistake we made for thirty years with Mubarak, basically paying no attention (except in 2004-2(06) to his 

crushing of all moderate, liberal, democratic political forces. \Ve have seen the counter demonstrations 

when he nlade his moves last \\/eekend, by tens of thousands ofLgyptians-~md we kno\\/ that he won the 

presidential election only by 51 to 4~ percent. So millions of Egyptians want a moderate, secular state, and 

we should be supporting their right to freedom of speech, press, and assembly, to future free elections, and 

to an indepcndent judiciary. 

As to Jordan, we havc in the past fe,,,, lllonths seen dClllonstrations ofinCfcasing size. \Vhy now, in 2012, 

and not last year? I belicye the ccntral rcason is cconoluic. Duc to increascd cncrgy prices and to the btu'dcll 

of caring for Syrian rcfugces, the goverUlllcnt ofJ ordau is lUldcr very severc fiscal prcssure. Thosc of us who 

seck stahility in Jordan shol,ld help it addrcss those issllcs. Thc United Statcs is a generolls donor and 

should continne to be so, but vve need to \vork harder to press the Gulf oil producing nations to help. In past 

years they haye, and recently the UAIl's foreign minister said the Gee wouldhclp again. On November 20 

he stated that Jordan's deficit was growing and that "we, in the UAF and the Gulf Cooperation Coullcil, are 

studying ways to close or minimi/,e this deficit." They should act fast-and will need a strong Saudi 

cOlnmitment to lnake the numbers work. I can think of few actions our own government could ta.ke now to 
15


76979a-4.eps

foster Middle East stability that would be 1110re useful than persuading the Gee nations to help Jordan, 

now, and generously. 

Madam Chairman, 

1 thank you again for inviting me to address the COlllll1ittee, and am happy to ~lilS\\:er any questions you and 

other Inel11bers of the Comnrittee Inay have. 
16

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, and 

I especially like those three reasons why you think it happened 

now. 

Ms. Pletka, thank you so much. 

STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, VICE PRESIDENT, 

FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Ms. PLETKA. Madam Chairman, thank you very much for having 

me. I just want to take a moment if I might, as Elliott did, and 

I think Rob will as well, to say thank you to both you and to Mr. 

Berman. It has really been a pleasure working with you for these 

years, and I look forward to doing so in the future as well, but 

thank you for your really fine stewardship of this committee. You 

deserve a great deal of commendation, and I know you have it from 

our community here in Washington. 

Back to the reason that we are here today. I don’t think it is any 

secret to anyone who follows the Middle East that there has been 

an enormous transformation in that part of the world, not just with 

the Arab Spring but really a broader transformation. We have seen 

Iran come to the brink of having a nuclear weapon. We have seen 

Hezbollah take over Lebanon, something that we don’t talk about 

enough, in addition to all of the post-Arab Spring changes that we 

have seen throughout the Middle East and North Africa. 

Part of the problem is that we still seem very flummoxed about 

what to do about that as a matter of national policy. We sit by and 

we wring our hands, we bemoan the troubles that we are seeing, 

but we really don’t try to do enough about it. And I don’t include 

the committee in this condemnation, but generally speaking I think 

that the attitude is one that the events are going too fast for us 

to be able to influence. And I would argue that that is not correct. 

I think that trouble that we are facing is really underscored with 

this war with Hamas in Gaza, because all of a sudden you did see 

a realignment of the region in a way that is most unfortunate. 

Many of us had hoped that with democracy the region would turn 

inward and look more at the economic problems that are challenging these countries, look more at the challenges of developing 

democracy, and instead they have really done what is the habit of 

the last 50 years, which is to turn to the question of the Palestinians as the excuse and the topic of conversation that compels them. 

So what are the options that are before us? When we think about 

each of these countries, in many of these situations we are looking 

at countries that are major recipients of U.S. assistance. In the 

case of one of Hamas’ big supporters, Turkey, we are looking at a 

NATO ally. So what exactly are we supposed to do both about the 

PA and the Fatah which governs the West Bank, Hamas which is 

in Gaza, the partnership that they are again talking about, obviously the bid for non-member statehood inside the General Assembly today? 

I think that we have a number of options. The problem is that 

what we are doing now isn’t, in my opinion, right. It is not really 

a form of engagement. We have two forms of abdication of responsibility instead that are being advocated. The first is from those who 

suggest that what we really ought to do is wash our hands of the 

17

region. Let us cut off all aid to all of these countries right now. Let 

us just stop it, rid ourselves of this problem. That in and of itself 

is a form of abdication of responsibility because this part of the 

world matters to us. Even if we turn our back they are going to 

come and follow us, and we do care about our partners in the region. We care a great deal about Israel, the only real democracy. 

The other form of abdication is this sort of passive willingness to 

let the region drift. That is what we really see, I believe, from the 

White House. We just wring our hands, and the President engages 

when there is a crisis. He calls Morsi a few times. But at the end 

of the day they don’t really do much. Once they are disengaged 

they are truly disengaged. 

And you see that by the way if you look at the pattern of assistance to Egypt. I was gobsmacked, if I can say so, that the ask for 

foreign assistance to Egypt in both military assistance and economic support was exactly the same this year as it was last year, 

as if nothing had happened. Waivers are waved through. Conditions that are put on by the Congress are ignored. And yet it all 

seems to continue along. The same is true for the Palestinians. 

The right approach, I think, if we recognize that we have a stake 

in the future is to walk a very fine line. It is, first of all, to recognize that we can’t just continue to behave as if it is status quo 

ante. We can’t treat Morsi as if he is the new Mubarak, which I 

think is the approach of the administration. Gee, you did a great 

job mediating that whole thing between the Israelis and Hamas. 

Let me give you some more money. And I am not really worried 

about your power grab. I am not really worried about that smuggling. That is the message we hear. We could do a lot more to ensure that aid is going for the things that we want it to go for and 

that if it doesn’t go for that that there aren’t benefits on the other 

side. 

The same is true in places like Lebanon, by the way. We have 

given $1 billion in assistance to the Lebanese armed forces and yet 

we see that Hezbollah is continuing to attack Israel from the north, 

sponsor terrorism. Again, I think that a lot more vigilance toward 

the conditionality and a lot more guidance from Congress will be 

very helpful. The challenge of Turkey, I am about to run out of 

time. But I hope we will have an opportunity to talk about it in 

question and answer, because it is very, very important. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]

18


76979b-1.eps

Testin~ony of Da111elle PIetka, "rice President, foreign and Defense Policy Studies, 

,'\merican Fnterprise T nstitute 

Before the 

u.s. House of Representatives Committee on roreit,TTI Affairs on "Israel's Right to Defend Itself: 

Implications on Regional Security and U.S Interests" 

Thursday, :';ovember 29, 2012 
19


76979b-2.eps

?vfadame Chairman, l\,fembers of the Committee, it is my pleasure to join you for this timely hearing on the 

regional ,md national security ilnplications of the recent hostilities hehveen Hanus and the State of IsraeL 

Over the last decade, the l\liddle East has wldergone a tra11sfof1nation as dranutic as the one that shaped the 

post-"war independence era in the .Arab "\'lorId. \X'11ile those changes are all familiar to the tTlembers of this 

Committee, it is worth re\o iC\ving them quickly if only to underscore their breadth and depth. Consider that a 

dictator has heen ousted in Iraq ,md a ne"\v and den10cratically elected goVef11111e11t has C0111e to power. That 

from Tunis!a to L!bya to Yemen to Egypt, Bahrain and Syria, the people of the region have turned on their 

tormentors and - where they are able -- voted in nC\v leaders. 'J hat I ran has gone from nuclear ambitions to 

the threshold of a nuclear "\veapon. That Hezbollah nm'l controls the govenlnlent of Leb(U1on. That the 

I lashemitc dynasty in Jordan is at risk. And that the Arab J.cague has taken a position against not one but t\vo 

of its own tc.)f the tirst time .in history. 

And \vhcre is the lnited States in today-'s l\.'1iddle f-<.astern rnaelstrom? Unfc.xtunately, largely on the sidelines, 

"\vringing its hands, hoping to restore, if not dIe status quo (U1te, dlen at least dIe pseudo stability of the age of 

Arab dictators. 

Let's step hack tor a n10ment and consider the question hefore this hearing: Israel's Right to Defend Itself. 

Tsrael's right to self-defense is not in doubt here in \",\7ashington. Flsf'\vhere, increasingly, not only is Tsrael's 

right to self-defense, hut its actual right to exist is in question. Indeed, those \vho arrayed then1selves on the 

side ofTTamas in the recent figllting pose a long term challenge, certainly fix Tsrael, but also for the Cnited 

States. 

To \\-·horn did llamas look fi)r moral, diplomatic, economic and military sustenance after it launched a barrage 

of attacks against Israel? To Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Lehanon and Iran. Others nuy have mouthed support for 

Hatnas, but it was this group of stahvarts that stood behind the terrorist group untIl the end. 

\"'\,llat are the implications for the Cnited States? Tn the case of Tt-an, none that "\vere not obvious before Caza 

\",\7e know T ran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Yes we should have a more proactive policy that addresses 

Iran's dangerous proliferation of nlissiles throughout the ivt:iddle East and looks nl0re clearly at the 

implications of a proliferator to terrorists on the verge of having a nuclear weapon But this is not a hearing 

ahout Iran. 

Similarly "\vith respect to Qatar, "\ve arc "\vell a\vare of that state's tendency to play all sides of the field, and find 

ne\v sides that "\vere never played hefore. nut Qatar's lamentahle lack of pnnciple is not ne\vs. 

\X/hat of'l'urkey, Lehanon and Egypt? Should the U111ted States sit on the sidelines and "\vatch passively as a 

~AT(J ally and two recipients of U.S. assistance atTange dlenlsdves on dle side of terrorists? 
20


76979b-3.eps

Tndeed, \ve might ask the same regarding the Palestinian /\uthority in Ramallah. \\,11ile nlany suppose that 

llamas' motivation in attacking Tsrael \vas to gain parity \\.·ith its Palestinian political ri\al, Fatah, and harness 

the \vind ofIsLunist extrenlistn etnanating fro111 the post-l\rah Spf111g IvTiddle East, the ivfahtnoud Ahhas 

government had an opportunity to look responsible in the eyes of its western donors by eschewing the 

violence. Instead, various FA figures have claitned that they too \vere a part of the great "victory" against 

Israel; ;md today, .:\bu ~vhzen will tUiTI to the United Nations General .:\ssen1bly to seek non-lnelnber state 

observer recognition, slapping all those who requested he not do so - President Rarack Obama included - in 

dle face. 

\\,1ut can the United States do? Ivlany in \Xiashington have suggested that our leverage is litllited, that the 

nlctions of dle l'U:ab Spritlg are an "itlternal affair" that \ve need to do Inore behitld dle scenes. Odlers, 

predictably, resurrect the peace process as a panacea. 'rile administration's position seems to be to coast 

ahead as iflitde of great InOlnent has occurred, while turnitlg our foreign policy focus to Asia. 

Indeed, there are plenty on hoth sides of the aisle, itl the Executiye Branch and itl Congress, \vho suggest that 

the United States abdicate its trachtlonal role itl the 7\Tiddle East and silnply adapt to its drift into extremism. 

There are t\vo styles of abdication recommended: 111(:' first, tlv(xed in certain quarters of the Congress, is the 

exhortation to end aid to those \vho displease us in the ?vfiddle Fast. That's very satisfying, has certain clarity 

to it, and saves taxpayer tnoney to hoot. Aid to Egypt a11d the Palestinians alone \vas tnore than $2 hillion in 

r,{2012 

A second type of ahdication appears to he favored hy the \X,1lite House and itnTolves occasional cnsis 

management (during tIle Ca:.-:a crisis, the President made tl1ree calls to Fgy:ptian President ~fol1amed ~{orsi in 

one 24 hour period, and SiX calls over the COll1:se of a \veek), hut othe1'\vise a cOlnplacent passivity. In this 

vision, ivforsi is treated as the new 1,fubarak. Y';>1lat \yas aid last year? $1.55 billion. Let's keep it there (llllt 

throw in some debt relief to boot. The attitude the administrat10n conveys is that aid is an entitlement for the 

countries that receive it, a view shared itl foreign capitals as \vell. It is not a source ofleverage, and should not 

be considered one. 

The right approach is to recognize that \,ve have a stake itl dle future of dle ~v'IidlUe East, not just itl peace 

bet\veen T sracl and its neighbors, but in the course of the political and economic lives of thcse countries. 111ey 

can develop 111 ways dlat are positive to their O\V11 and our itlterests, or the reverse. l\nd \ve can itlHuence dlat 

course a great deal, if we choose. 

How we choose to influence the region is a genuine challenge: \"Xle must \valk a fine line. Tf \ve cut off all aid 

in anger, \\ie lose some of our levcrage. Tf \vc open the flood gates and allow aid to spill out \villy nilly, \ve 

leave leverage on the table, unused. 

Take Egvpt lor starters. The 111.U11bers in question are breath-taking. $1..S5 bIllion in U.S. aid ($1.3 billion to 

the 111i11tary and $250 million in eco11otTlic assistance), one btlhon more in debt rehef, and $"",-.8 btlhon in 

promised T\'fF support. This is not chump change to 7\/forsi, for whom economic success will be the 

barometer by which he is judged by the Egyptian people. Right now dnt aId is on hold, as it should be. \'·11Y 

is the hold right? Because the Congress must dermmd answers from the administration about how our aid and 

deht forgiveness is g0111g to further .American values and .Americ;111 priorities itl Egypt. The fact that there has 

been little substantial change to tlle cOll1position of our assistm1Ce package since tlle overtl1fo\v ofHosni 

1\'1ubarak is a case in point. 
21


76979b-4.eps

,'\nd here's another question: \\/e are providing $1.3 billion to the Fgyptian military, presumably in part to 

bolster its ability to ensure security on the border \vith T srael, in part to ensure there is a balance of ()()\ver 

\vithin Egypt. But al Qaeda is no\v operating in the Sinai. l\.nd 111 Cairo, the military appears uninterested in 

playing any domestic role, consistent with Egyptian democracy, including that of guarantor of civil freedoms 

So \vhat is that aid for again? \X1ut is it huying? 

l\iore trouhling still is that all of the conditionality that c.ongress has rightly put on econ01nic assistance to 

Egypt - 111cluding certifications regarding rule of h\.y, de1110cratic tr::111s1tion, civil freedonls and treatnlent of 

Coptic Christians - haH' been ignored by the administration. Rather, the President and his delegates have 

chosen to exercise \varver authorities, a clear adnlission that Egypt is not on track to ineet the conditions laid 

out in law. Those \.yaivers nmst either be tightened or relnoved altogedler. 

Similarly, we nl1gl1t question the aid we provide to Lehanon. Since the 2U07 Hezhollall \var \.vith Israel, the 

Cnited States has provided more than $1 binion in assistance to Lebanon, much of it security oriented 

assistance to theoretically support the authority of the Lehanese j\nned Forces. Yes, the Satl1e LAF that has 

\l/atched as Hezbollah has rearmed itself \vith tens of thousands of missiles from Trail. T s it not appropriate to 

ask at a cC'l"tain moment \vhether that money is doing anything at all to rnoderate TTe/:bollah's behavior? 

Should .!unericm taxpayers truly be subsidizing the Hezbollah-donlinated Leh:U1ese governnlent? \\;'1lat 

message is being sent by continuing to do so even as T Tczbollah supports and fights alongside Bashar al Assad 

in Syria? 

\\;7e can run through a similar litany for the Palestinians Aid is authori/;ed and appropriated by the Congress, 

but the conditions placed upon assistance are Inore often \vaived or disregarded dla11not. If Egypt doesn't 

\vant delTlOcratization assistance, surely it should not receive investment seed lTlOney. If Lebanon doesn't \.vlsh 

to disafrll llezbollah, then what is the purpose of anning ',md training the LAb'? 

Tn short, aid provides us leverage if it is used \visely, monitored constantly, and adjusted regularly Cutting off 

aid deals us, at least in part, out of the ganle of the ~iIiddle East. It may ultullately be the only course available, 

but it should not the tirst choice 

Our challenge in faculg Turkey's transition away fr0111 dle .Ataturk tradition of secularisnl and tolerance is 

much greater. Turkey is at once an any, a serious economy, a democracy and a growing po\verhouse in the 

broader Middle East. On d,e other hand, Turkey has paid lit de price for its support for terrorism in d,e 

region, its violation ofTran sanctions or Its gro\ving domestic abuses. Clearly \ve cannot th\vart tlle \vl11 of tlle 

'J'urkish people; nor should We' remain silent in the face of a go\'crnrncnt that has the dubiolls honor of the 

highest rate of unpris0111TIent for joun~alists U'} the \vodd. Should the U.S. continue to \vork \vith the _A.l1kara 

government on issues of common concern like Syria? )'es. Should our relationship remain the same in light 

of other serious prohlems? ~o ... And in that vein, constantly underscoring thc close personal friendship 

Denveen Barack Ubanu and Recep TaYY1p Erdog<m 1S h1ghly mappropnate. 

ThU'lk of it this \vay; \.ve, the Cnited States, have enorn'lOUS politiCal, economic ;md lTIilltary po\ver. 1.{uch of 

that power resides in the hands of the President, who has chosen not to usc it to support U.S. ideals and 

principles. Radler, he is pouring both political ;md econon'lic resources U'lto govenllTIents that are \vorking 

<.hrecdy agd111st U.S. mterests. ConSTfess has an opportunrty to lead, but 1S be111g stymied. Results? Esrypt 

supports 1 Lunas, and only belatedly acts a:;; a constructive force to end thc violence begun by its friends in 

Gaza. Lebanon supports Assad. Qatar and Turkey pour oil on the flU11es 
22


76979b-5.eps

Perhaps the ongoing hUtTlan catastrophe in Syria is the clearest symbol of our uninterest. Before that conflict 

is done and .Assad is dead or in c:'<.ilc, the civ1l \\'ar in Syna \vill spill o\,cr to Irag, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel and 

Jordan. But the United States is hanging hack, doing little where it lnust and nothing \vhen it can. 

It is possihle that \ve \villnot he ahle to steer the lvliddle East do\vn a lnore moderate path; indeed, it is 

possible that \vith the best of intentions and the cleverest use of America's po\ver, we \vill fail. Right no\v, 

ho"\vever, \ve are sitting on the sidelines and \vatching as the region transitions tron1 secular autocracy to 

IsI;1111ist autocracy. That is a d;111gerous mistake. 
23

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I am sure that it will 

come up. Thank you. 

Dr. Satloff? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SATLOFF, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SATLOFF. Madam Chairman, let me join my colleagues in 

thanking you for your leadership of this committee. It has been a 

privilege to provide testimony today and before. May I also express 

my admiration and thanks to the ranking member? Mr. Berman, 

I truly hope our Nation continues to find ways to benefit from your 

wise leadership and from your excellent counsel and stewardship 

of American foreign policy. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We won’t count that time against you. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Thank you, thank you. 

We heard talk about the Gaza conflict. I would like to suggest 

two larger regional trends to put the Gaza conflict into context. The 

Gaza conflict underscored first that Israel is at the heart of two 

megatrends that are defining today’s Middle East. These two 

megatrends are, on the one hand, the spread of Iran’s hegamonic 

ambitions, and on the other hand, the spread of Sunni radical extremism. In most of the region these two trends are fighting each 

other. Syria, Bahrain, for example. However, in the Arab-Israeli 

arena these two trends have found a way to join forces as seen in 

the division of labor between, on the one hand, Iran’s provision of 

rockets and weapons to Hamas, and on the other hand, the growing 

Sunni provision of political support to Hamas, Egypt, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkish. These two trends which fight everywhere else, on 

Israel’s border fight together. This is a very dangerous situation for 

Israel’s security and for our friendship and relationship with Israel. 

Secondly, just in the Arab-Israeli arena itself, Gaza represents 

something bigger than just a conflict between Hamas and Israel. 

It represents what I would call ‘‘the end of the 40-year peace’’ between Arab and Israeli states. 

Now I know it might sound a bit incongruous, but the fact is 

since 1973 there has been no state-to-state conflict in the ArabIsraeli arena. This is quite a big difference from the first 25 years 

of Israel’s history. That is an enormous change and it has provided 

an opportunity for Israel’s growth, development and the development of a U.S.-Israel strategic relationship. 

However, however, now with Hamas’ strong political backing 

from regional states, future historians will look back as this as the 

first episode of interstate conflict and certainly interstate competition in the Arab-Israeli arena in a quarter century. This isn’t to 

suggest that war will occur tomorrow, quite the contrary. It may 

take some time. But it will only be postponed for tactical reasons 

between an Islamist Egypt and a potentially Islamist Syria and a 

radical Sunni impact in the Arab-Israeli arena, and in a strategic 

sense, I think conflict is likely in the long term. 

Now with this disquieting turn of events what can the United 

States do? Let me focus very briefly on five issues. First, strengthen U.S.-Israeli cooperation. It is extremely important that the conflict in Gaza ended with the United States as supportive of Israel 

as when the conflict began. That was a vital message to Iran and 

24

a vital message to other Arabs such as the Saudis. This needs to 

be expanded. 

Secondly, deny Hamas a political victory. Hamas lost on the battlefield. They could win on the political battlefield depending on 

what happens with the Palestinian Authority, depending on how 

Hamas and the PA may come together. We have a vital interest in 

ensuring that any reconciliation in which Hamas becomes part of 

the PLO does not happen, and that what happens out of New York 

ends up in unconditional negotiations between Mahmoud Abbas 

and Israel. That is urgent. 

Thirdly, incentivize more moderate behavior from Egypt. Egypt 

could go either way. They are moderate on a Monday, radical on 

a Tuesday. Is Morsi an ideologue or a national leader? We don’t 

know. Clearly he is committed to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. We can’t change that ideology, but through our conditionality we can help to change his behavior. And I commend to your 

attention a new report issued by my Institute yesterday by former 

Congressman Vin Weber and former White House counsel, Gregory 

Craig, urging constructive conditionality, clear in terms of the U.S. 

relationship with Egypt. 

Fourth, Syria. This is the battleground where the forces of extremism on both sides are battling it out. We have to be more deeply 

engaged, Madam Chairman. We are not in the game, and the game 

will eventually be defined by those who are in it. 

Last, let me echo my friend, Elliott Abrams’, comment about Jordan. The Saudis have provided zero aid to Jordan this past year. 

That is why Jordan is on the brink of utter despair and perhaps 

the undermining of the kingdom. This is irresponsible. We need to 

do everything we can to change that situation to protect the only 

Arab country still actually talking to Israel. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff follows:]

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TESTIMONY DELIVERED TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMlVIITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

* * * 

"THE GAZA CONFLICT AND THE END OF THE FORTY-YEAR PEACE" 

By 

DR.ROBERTSATLOFF 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

HEARING TITLED: "ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. INTERESTS" 

NOVEMBER 29,2012 

Madame Chainnan, 

At the outset, I would like to express my personal gratitude to the Chairman, with whom I 

have had the pleasure of working from her earliest days in this role, for the opportunity to 

express my views on the critical issues of this hearing. And let me add a note of 

appreciation and admiration to the Ranking Member, who I have known for many years 

and with whom I have had the privilege of traveling to the Middle East; I hope our nation 

continues to benefit from your wise leadership and devotion to public service for many 

years to come. To all members of the Committee, thank you. 

Recent days have witnessed an important turning point in modem Middle East history - a 

phrase I do not utter lightly. I tum the Committee's attention less to the specific events of 

the Gaza conflict but rather to the context in which the conflict transpired and concluded. 

• Hamas rocket attacks against Jerusalem and its environs during the recent conflict 

marked the first time Israel's capital came under long-range attack from an Arab 

military for the first time since the 1947-49 war. 

• With the launching of rockets from Gaza and Sinai and the shooting of artillery 

shells from Syria, all during the month of November 2012, Israel was on the 

receiving end of long-range fire over three international borders for the first time 

since the 1967 war. 

• The potential for Islamists in Syria, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, to emerge as 

the dominant force in the military opposition to Bashar al-Assad and to playa 

leading role in a post-Assad regime raises the prospect that Cairo and Damascus 

will be governed by ideological allies for the first time since before the 1973 war. 

• Last week's declaration by the Supreme Guide of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, a 

man to whom Egypt's current president has sworn fealty, calling for "jihad" 
26


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against Israel when Muslims achieve the requisite unity and, in the interim, the 

arming of Hamas and other "resistance" forces to carry on the fight against Israel 

is the most bellicose and provocative statement by an Egyptian leader since the 

signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979. 

• The visits this month to Gaza of the Qatari emir, the Egyptian prime minister and 

the Tunisian foreign minister highlight the normalization of Ham as in Arab 

politics and the most serious challenge to the Arab consensus in support of the 

Palestine Liberation Organization and its step-child, the Palestinian Authority, 

since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. 

Individually, each of these items deserves careful scrutiny and close analysis, as they 

each have unique causes and specific military and political ramifications. Taken together, 

they constitute a seismic shift in the make-up of Middle East politics. 

Indeed, I believe it is appropriate to view the Gaza cont1ict as marking the beginning of a 

new era in the Middle East - an era defined by the end of the region's Forty Year Peace. 

I know that it is incongruous to think of the Middle East - the region so closely 

associated with terrorism, assassination, suicide bombs, intifada and civil war; the region 

of Saddam, Qadhafi, Khomeini, and Bin Ladin -- as having enjoyed a Forty Year Peace. 

But that is exactly what characterized inter-state relations between Israel and Arab states 

in the era since the October 1973 war. 

In its first twenty-five years of independence, Israel's history was characterized by multistate war with intermittent bouts of unsuccessful diplomacy. Six Arab armies invaded the 

fledgling Israel in 1948; Israel fought four Arab armies in June 1967; twelve Arab armies 

participated, to varying degrees, in the 1973 war. In the forty years since, Israel has 

fought no wars against an Arab state. During this period, its history has been 

characterized by frequently successful diplomacy with intennittent bouts of terrorism and 

asymmetric war against non-state actors. 

While the difference between these two realities may not be great to the grieving mother, 

the widowed wife or the orphaned child, the difference is profound in strategic terms. For 

the past forty years, Israel knew no state-to-state attack on any of its borders. The main 

threat on its borders came from a non-state actor, Hizbollah, and from the intra-state 

threat of rebellion, terrorism and insurrection known as the first and second uprisings 

(popularly known as inlifadas). 

Further afield, of course, Israel was a target for Saddam Hussein's long-range missiles 

and the two ends of the Iran's threat spectrum, terrorism and nuclear ambitions. But there 

is a profound difference between the urgency and reality of regional war and the 

challenges Israel has faced over the past forty years. Indeed, it is this difference that gave 

Israel the freedom and latitude to develop from a broken, near-bankrupt, third-world 

economy to a first-world economic and technological power and, along the way, to 

emerge as an important strategic asset to the United States. 

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With Ramas' strong political backing from regional states, future historians might very 

well view the Gaza coni1ict as the first episode of a new era of renewed inter-state 

competition and, potentially, inter-state coni1ict in the Arab-Israeli arena. This is not to 

suggest that full-scale Arab-Israeli war is in the oning - quite the contrary. Israel's 

potential adversaries, such as Islamist-led Egypt and an Islamist-led post-Assad Syria, 

may quite likely be consumed with other priorities, such as sorting out internal socioeconomic problems or resolving domestic ethnic disputes, for years or even decades to 

come. This focus on problems at home may, for a long time, mask the strategic shift now 

underway - a shift in which countries that used to share strategic interests in preventing 

direct state-to-state conflict may find tactical ways to postpone conflict to another day. 

But that doesn't make the shift any less real or menacing, either for Israel or U.S 

interests. 

What makes this development particularly worrisome for friends of Israel is that it puts 

the Jewish state at the heart of two mega-trends that are deiining what can be termed the 

"new new Middle East." The "old new Middle East," a region of peace, trade and 

regional cooperation, reached its heyday in the mid-1990s, when Israelis were welcome 

everywhere from Rabat to Muscat. The "new new Middle East" is the region defined by 

the twin threats of Iranian hegemonic ambitions and the spread of radical Sunni 

extremism, a vast area where Israelis are not only unwelcome but where they are building 

fences along their borders to separate themselves from the turbulence swirling around 

them. 

In some parts of the region, such as Syria and Bahrain, these two trends are fighting each 

other, whether directly or via proxies. But in the Arab-Israel arena, these two trends have 

found a way to join forces, as seen in the division oflabor between Iran's provision of 

rockets and weapons to Hamas and the growing Sunni (Egyptian-Qatari-TunisianTurkish) provision of political support to Hamas. That these two trends, which battle each 

other ferociously elsewhere in the Middle East, can find common ground in their battle 

against Israel does not augur well for Israel's strategic situation in the future. Indeed, 

given the injection of Iran into the Arab-Israeli arena via its patronage of Hizbollah and 

arming of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it may be necessary to the traditional term "ArabIsraeli conflict" into "Islamist-Israeli conflict," which would truly underscore the 

retrograde nature of current regional dynamics. 

Despite this disquieting turn of events, there is much the United States can do, 

individually and with partners, to mitigate this negative shift and to advance U.S. 

interests in security and peace. In that regard, I offer these brief observations: 

• Strengthen US-Israel cooperation: The fact that the Gaza conflict ended with 

the Obama administration as strongl y supporti ve of Israel and its right to selfdefense as when the conflict began has strategic reverberations, both to Iran and 

to Arab states that share with Israel fear ofTran's hegemonic goals and nuclear 

ambitions. Indeed, failure to have provided clear, public support for Israel in this 

3 
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crisis would have made more likely unilateral Israeli action against Iran's nuclear 

program and Arab coming-to-terms with Iran's regional objectives. It is 

important for Washington to build upon this positive display ofbilateral 

cooperation to ensure that Israel has the tools it needs to deter any further 

adventurism along its borders, including additional support for the Iran Dome 

anti -missile system, and that regional players see that such cooperation extends to 

operational cooperation and coordination in addressing the Iranian nuclear threat, 

in all its aspects. 

• Deny Hamas a political victory The achievement of a Gaza ceasefire would be 

undermined if it led to Ramas capitalizing on the recent contlict to improve its 

political standing vis-a-vis the Palestinian Authority. For all its problems - and 

they are legion - the PA is a fundamentally ditferent sort of political entity than 

Ramas and its leadership advances a fundamentally different sort of political 

agenda than does the Ramas leadership. Ramas is committed to perpetual war 

against Israel and sees diplomacy as a tool in that conflict. For its part, he PA has 

renounced violence and the armed struggle; while its current diplomacy, including 

its reckless appeal to the United Nations, makes mockery of its commitment to a 

solely negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, one should not belittle 

the fact that it still advocates diplomacy, not violence, as the tool to achieving its 

aims. It is important for the Obama administration to work with Ramallah, 

Jerusalem and supportive Arab and European capitals to ensure that the P A does 

not collapse from lack of Arab financial support, thereby undermining the slim 

reeds of security cooperation and economic relationship that still remain the 

pillars of Israeli-Palestinian ties, and to prevent Ramas from capitalizing on the 

popularity of confronting Israel to erode the diplomatic option supported, at least 

in theory, by the P A. This could include, for example, convincing Mahmoud 

Abbas that the logical follow-on to his United Nations gambit would be to open 

long-stalled negotiations with Israel, without preconditions. 

• lncentivize moderate behavior from the "new Egypt": One of the most 

important outcomes of the Gaza conflict was the emergence of Islamist-Ied Egypt 

as a pivotal player in the "new new Middle East" Ideologically, President 

Muhammad Morsi and his government share a worldview much closer to Ramas 

than to Washington. Nevertheless, Morsi played a "constructive" role, to quote 

President Obama, in achieving the Gaza ceasefire. The reason is simple - given 

the crushing economic problems facing Egypt, Morsi calculated he had more to 

lose in terms of U.S. aid and support for international loans ifhe acted as an 

unvarnished ideologue than if had to gain by contributing to the ceasefire. And 

along the way he has succeeded in lowering the bar on what Washington expects 

from Egypt - he has ended all political contact with Israel and relegated EgyptIsrael ties to the dark shadows of intelligence and military professionals, for 

example, and onl y uses the term Israel when uttering phrases like "Israeli 

aggression." Still, the lesson for the Administration is critical - while it may be 

impossible to moderate the Muslim Brotherhood's Tslamist ideology, it is 

eminently possible to moderate its political behavior through the intelligent use of 

4 
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76979c-5.eps

American leverage. This principle now needs to be applied to all aspects of the 

US.-Egypt relationship, with a special focus on the "regional peace" and 

"strategic cooperation" issues so central to US. interests. Tn the Gaza context, this 

should include conditioning a portion of Egypt's foreign military assistance on 

counter-terrorism measures in the Sinai and counter-smuggling efJorts to prevent 

the re-supply of Hamas, the failure of which would certainly undermine the 

prospects for a lasting ceasefire. 

More generally, I would like to take the opportunity to bring to the Committee's 

attention a new bipartisan task force report issued yesterday by The Washington 

Institute on this topic. Written by former Republican congressman Vin Weber and 

former Obama White House counsel Gregory B. Craig, this report is titled 

~'ngagement without illusions: Building an interest-Based Relationship with the 

'Nell' Egypt. ' 

In this report, Messrs. Weber and Craig advocate a policy of presenting Egyptian 

leaders with a set of choices that would give them a pathway to act as responsible 

national leaders rather than as religiously inspired ideologues. Specifically, they 

have the following recommendations: 

\) that the President agree to certify to Congress that Egypt is fulfilling two welldefined baskets of commitments -- on "regional peace" and on "bilateral 

strategic cooperation" -- as a condition of continued provision of U.S. aid and 

political backing for international loans. 

2) that through private conversation and public messaging, the president and 

congressional leaders should explain to Egyptians an additional "informal 

conditionality," i.e., how difficult it would be for the United States to maintain 

a close and mutually beneficial relationship with a government that was 

moving backward on constitutional democracy or that engaged in substantial 

violations of human rights or measures against women and religious 

minorities. 

3) that the Administration should use a portion of Egypt's military aid-at least 

$100 million to start, and increasing over time--to incentivize more 

aggressive efforts to combat terrorism in Sinai, given the urgency of this issue 

to U.S. interests. 

4) that the Administration engage with the broadest possible spectrum of 

political actors in Egypt, especially the non-Islamist opposition. Not only is 

this a way to guard against the widely held impression that Washington 

actually made the Brotherhood's rise to power possible, but strengthening 

non-Islamist opposition presents the best opportunity for pulling the 

governing Islamists in a more moderate direction. 

Taken together, Messrs. Weber and Craig argue that building a businesslike 

relationship with Egypt based on a clear strategic bargain - offering benefits for 

cooperation and penalties for non-compliance - is in the best interest of both our 

countries. I commend the report to you. 

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• Hasten the demise of Bashar al-Assad's regime: One unfortunate consequence 

of the Gaza contlict was to detlect attention from the regional contlagration with 

far greater strategic consequence - the fighting in Syria. The outcome in Syria 

will have enormous impact on the shape of regional politics for years to come. 

Regrettably, at this point, it is dim cult to see any "good" outcome - the options 

range from "bad" to "worse." In my view, there is no chance that Assad can 

"win," in the sense of restoring his previous role as the undisputed master of a 

pacified and compliant Syria. However, with Iran and its Hizbollah allies doing 

their best to support Assad by killing their way into an ethnic showdown pitting 

Alawites and their collaborators against the country's majority Sunni population, 

with every passing day chances for a broad-based, pluralistic, consensual, multisectarian post-Assad regime are slipping away. In the meantime, while Syria's 

Muslim Brotherhood was always going to play an important role in a post-Assad 

arrangement, every day brings increasing likelihood that even more radical Sunni 

jihadists will have a dominant position in a successor regime. America's interest 

is to bring about the end of Assad's regime as swiftly as possible, to make 

palatable change more likely and radical, destabilizing change less likely. The 

Obama administration's reluctance to support the anti-Assad forces with the 

judicious supply of weaponry and protection is, in my view, a miscalculation of 

strategic magnitude. As recent reportage from Syria suggests, there is a real 

possibility that the regime's army is beginning to crack. The "endgame" may 

evolve slowly or, alternatively, it could come about with breathtaking speed. The 

opportunity to shape the post-Assad environment will go to those actors who 

played pivotal roles in bringing about Assad's demise. For the United States, it is 

getting late but it is not yet too late to act 

• Prevent the collapse of Jordan: Another key U.S interest overshadowed by the 

Gaza contlict is the threat of deepening instability in Jordan, an anchor of regional 

peace and partner with the United States on numerous fronts. Jordan faces a 

daunting set of domestic and international challenges. At home, threads of 

opposition that normally would be at loggerheads with each other - the 

Palestinian-led Islamist movement and the East Bank-led, largely secular "Hirak" 

movement - have joined forces in their criticism of what they view as omciallysanctioned corruption and faulty economic management. This has produced the 

largest protests the kingdom has seen in many years. Abroad, Jordan fears being 

squeezed by the Islamist powers emerging in its immediate neighborhood -

Egypt, Syria and the increasingly popular Hamas. While Jordan has benefited 

greatly from generous U.S. economic support, one of its other main source of 

foreign aid - Saudi Arabia - has inexplicably dried up, forcing the kingdom to 

adopt painful austerity measures that exacerbate its political crises. Addressed 

individually, Jordan could survive these challenges; but they seem to be coming at 

the kingdom all at once and Jordan's ability to absorb them is limited. F or the 

Obama administration, a weakening of Jordan's commitment to its pro-West, propeace orientation, let alone a weakening of Jordan's stability, would be a 

disastrous blow to U. S. interests, one that makes much more likely the return to 

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inter-state contlict in the Arab-Israeli arena. It is important for Washington to 

enlist the help of Jordan's current and erstwhile friends, including Riyadh, to take 

measures now, before it is too late, to preserve stability in Jordan. 

These are the most urgent policy priorities in the Arab-Israeli arena. Further afield, there 

is much the United States can do to address the twin challenges ofIran's hegemonic 

ambitions and the spread of radical Sunni extremism, but they are outside the scope of 

today's hearing. I hope to have the opportunity to address those wider issues on another 

occasion. 

Madame Chairman, while I opened on a pessimistic note, pointing out that we appear to 

be witnessing the end of a forty-year era of Arab-Israeli state-to-state peace, I would like 

to close on an optimistic one. It has to do with US leadership. 

The creation of that era of peace whose end I now bemoan was due in large part to 

American leadership, with successive U.S. administrations recognizing that strengthening 

the US.-Israel relationship and building diplomatic alternatives to conflict were two 

pillars of what proved to be a successful U.S. strategy to secure American interests in a 

volatile Middle East. 

Today, despite all the talk about multi-polarity, energy independence, American decline, 

and the urgency of a strategic tilt toward Asia, the Middle East remains a region of vital 

importance to the United States and there is no outside power that even comes close to 

the United States in its ability to wield influence in it. To be sure, we cannot make the 

Middle East in our image, nor can we turn back the tides of Middle East history. But I 

believe that U.S. leadership, creatively conceived and effectively applied, remains the 

indispensible element in preserving our interests and those of our allies, such as Israel, in 

the face of the dangers of the "new new Middle East." I look fonvard to working with 

you and the Administration to ensure the wise and efficient exercise of that leadership. 

Thank you. 

7 
32

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, excellent point. Thank you 

so much for wonderful testimony. I will begin the questioning period, and I would like to ask this to all the three of you. 

The Iranian regime has clearly been a key enabler of Hamas, of 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, all the extremist groups that are operating in Gaza. They provide arms, funding, political support. By 

continuing to support Hamas and other extremists, what do you believe are the strategic objectives that Iran has in the Levant, particularly for Egypt, and do you believe that Iran will now introduce 

more advanced weapons systems into Gaza? And lastly, what policies or programs could the U.S. pursue to effectively counter Iran’s 

efforts in this area? I will start with Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I need about 4 hours to answer those questions because they are very tough. Iran is looking for influence in the 

Sunni Arab world, and believes that one of the great ways to do 

it is to appear to be the enemy of Israel. They are counting on hatred of Israel among Arab populations to gain them popularity, because what they are doing at home in Iran is clearly not gaining 

them popularity. What they are doing in Syria is losing them popularity, where they are helping the regime slaughter people who 

happen to be Sunni Arabs. So it is partly that—just seeking to gain 

more for themselves, and also of course they want to attack Israel 

and they want to help anybody who is willing to, any group that 

is willing to attack Israel. 

Ultimately, the only way to solve that problem is regime change, 

and that may take 1 year and it may take 21 years, and we obviously don’t know but I wish we had a more honest debate about 

this, more or less in the way we talked about the Soviet Union. We 

dealt with the Soviet Union but we also made it clear that we 

thought in the long run the answer to the problems it created was 

the end of that regime in Russia. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me just go to the other panelists. 

We only have 3 minutes left. Thank you, Ms. Pletka and Dr. 

Satloff. 

Ms. PLETKA. It is actually very interesting, you ask a very important question. I think that at the beginning of the Arab Spring the 

Iranians were very worried. This really seemed to be a Sunni phenomenon. Democratic revolutions, Sunnis ousting their leaders, 

and feeling empowered. And we all talked a lot about the gulf between the Sunni and the Shia and the implications for that and the 

problems that Iran would face as a result. In fact, you even saw 

that in Gaza, fascinatingly, when Hamas broke with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Iranians were very angry with them 

and, in fact, ousted them from a number of regional meetings and 

indicated that they were going to lessen their support for Hamas, 

and that they were going to throw a lot more of it to Palestinian 

and Islamic Jihad. And you saw, fascinatingly, members of PIJ converting to Shia. And last year, on the holiday that the Shia just 

celebrated, Ashura, there was a Hamas-led round-up of Palestinian, Gaza-living, Shia converts, and they were all arrested. And 

this was sort of the phenomenon of the region at large, right happening right there. 

But what the Iranians have managed to do and with the help, 

frankly, of the Egyptians, the Turks and others, and the Qataris 

33

as always, is to turn this around again to make it much more about 

Israel than it ever was before, and to try and use that populism 

to save face, as Elliott rightly said, and to benefit themselves in the 

region. Very interesting and very bad of us. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Satloff? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Madam Chairman, let me make two brief points on 

either end of the supply chain. First, about Iran. You are absolutely right that what the Iranians want to do, and they are doing 

this for clear reasons. They want to undermine any sense of stability on the Eastern Mediterranean as they are active elsewhere 

in the region. 

On a policy level, I think that we tend to focus our policy too 

much by isolating the nuclear issue and not recognizing how the 

nuclear ambitions of Iran are connected to an entire Iranian strategy. We tend not to focus on what I would call Iran’s ‘‘ground 

game,’’ what Iran is doing on the ground, in Iraq, in Syria, in the 

Arab-Israeli arena. We tend to focus the nuclear issue in one basket and everything else separately. This is a comprehensive challenge that the Iranians are posing to us. 

Secondly, Egypt, and here an operational suggestion. The Egyptians do not want to invest their military in stopping the smuggling 

or in stopping the flow of weapons over the Gaza border. I would 

support and I urge, and this report I mentioned earlier recommends as well, that we begin to do a micro conditionality in our 

military assistance to Egypt, which specifically targets a certain 

amount of money, perhaps $100 million to start, specifically for 

spending in Sinai on counterterrorism and counter-smuggling. The 

Egyptians will fight this because all they want are tanks and airplanes. But it is very important that we begin a conversation with 

them with money on the table to move them to focus on this most 

important of urgent issues. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you to all 

three of you. 

Mr. Berman is recognized. Thank you, Howard. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Focus if 

you would for 5 minutes, or as much of that 5 minutes as I leave 

you, on the isolation of Hamas. We saw in this recent thing, the 

Emir of Qatar, the Prime Minister of Egypt, a group of 10 Arab foreign ministers, the Turkish Foreign Minister, all coming for hosted 

visits to Gaza. Turkish Prime Minister indicates he won’t be far behind. And we all remember the Gaza-Cast Lead-Erdogan reaction 

back in 2008. 

How should the U.S. relate to these visits? These are countries 

we generally enjoy friendly relations with. Should we be indifferent 

to them? Should we actively discourage them? How? These visits 

undoubtedly erode the legitimacy of the PA and Ramallah as the 

rightful governing body for Palestine, for Palestinians in both the 

West Bank and Gaza. Does it have additional significance, operational significance for Hamas, leading to a dilution of the now 

long-standing Quartet’s requirements that Hamas renounce violence, recognize Israel, accept previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, or are these visits not to be made much of, minimal in impact as long as the U.S., the EU and like-minded countries conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:21 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\112912\76979 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

tinue to regard Hamas as a terrorist group and recognize the PA? 

Is there something significant happening here? 

Ms. PLETKA. It is a question you have been grappling with as a 

committee for a long time, how to best isolate Hamas. I find that 

if we spend a lot of time talking about these visits we aggrandize 

them more than they deserve. 

I think there are two important things to look at. The first is, 

where is Hamas going? It is no longer in Damascus. Where is its 

leadership going to be based? Is it going to be based in Gaza, in 

which case Gaza is as we now know a terrorist state, or is it going 

to be in Qatar or in Cairo? Because when it was in Damascus we 

designated Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism. Are we going to 

do the same for where they land next time? That is part one. 

Part two, for all of these incredibly peripatetic leaders who like 

to go and visit Gaza, what are they doing for the Palestinian people, not for Hamas? That is the question I would like them to answer publicly. What are you going to be rebuilding? What budget 

payoffs are you going to be doing? What streets are you going to 

pave? What sewer system are you helping? Because what they really do is look for publicity. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, the Qatari announced $400 million. 

Ms. PLETKA. Let us see them deliver it. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, yes, good point. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Mr. Berman, I take a somewhat more jaundiced 

view of the visits to Gaza. I think these are very serious challenges 

not just to the Palestinian Authority, but to the idea that there 

could be a diplomatic resolution of the conflict between Israelis and 

Palestinians. The rise of Hamas’ legitimacy undermines the very 

notion that we have spent decades trying to advance, which is that 

the resolution to this conflict is done at the negotiating table. Every 

leader that goes to Gaza, although they say they want to support 

the people of Gaza, in fact, undermine the chances for peace. 

Now we can hold Egypt more responsible, which is very important, but I think we have to also look to Ramallah. If the Palestinian Authority wants to commit suicide we can’t stop them, but 

we have a very strong interest in retaining the idea that peace is 

something to be negotiated. And that is the best antidote to Hamas’ 

political success. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would only add, Mr. Berman, I think if these 

countries are going to start treating Gaza like a separate entity, 

Israel can do so as well. And one of the things that I think the 

Israelis ought to do is, for example, hand Gaza over to Egypt when 

it comes to things like electricity. They are now part of the Israeli 

grid, which is ludicrous. I think the integration of Gaza more into 

the economy of Egypt is one way of responding to these visits. 

Mr. BERMAN. It is a hostile act to Egypt. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and again thank you for your leadership over the years on 

many of these Middle Eastern questions as well as some of the 

more vexing questions that we face internationally. First, let me 

note that I again repeat what I stated in my opening 1-minute, fast 

35

little statement. It appears to me, and I have been here for 24 

years, and Elliott and I worked in the Reagan White House years 

together, so that is 31 years altogether, Elliott. And Elliott, all had 

a full head of hair at the time and——

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. Like Mr. Fortenberry, if you remember. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But let us just note this is, I am looking back 

now and looking at what I have learned over the years, and it 

seems to me that the turmoil that we are now experiencing in the 

Middle East is a result of specific policy and approaches made by 

this administration, specifically a projection of weakness when the 

administration believes it is projecting sincerity. 

We could see that in the beginning when the President went on 

an apology tour throughout the Middle East trying to prove how 

sincere he was going to be, and also trying to prove how sincere 

he was to the mullahs, how he refrained from supporting the democratic opposition in Iran after a phony election there. And of course 

we have had a lack of support for the other democratic elements, 

not only Iran, but our friends throughout the Middle East when 

they became, got under pressure, we weren’t there to support them 

so that we could prove our sincerity to the old Middle East as a 

whole. 

I think this has left the wrong impression among decision makers in the Middle East that we are weak. They do not see sincerity 

as strength. And I think that the worst possible example of this is 

the last example, which is the latest display of the administration’s 

irrational approach to sincerity, was President Obama’s insistence 

for almost a week after the crime that the deaths of four American 

diplomatic personnel in Benghazi was a result of movie rage instead of radical Islamic terrorism, which are words that he doesn’t 

seem to be able to put together, radical Islamic terrorism. 

And what I would like to ask for the panel is, how does the President’s willingness to bend over backwards and blame movie rage, 

and let us note when he blames movie rage what he is really blaming is freedom of press in the United States because we permit 

them to make movies that somebody might be outraged over, rather than blaming bloodthirsty, radical Islamic terrorists who are active in that region, and does this bending over backwards to blame 

the movie rage rather than the terrorists, doesn’t this result in 

more rockets being fired by the Palestinian irreconcilables into 

Israel and more rockets being provided to those irreconcilables by 

the Iranian Mullah regime? 

And I will start with Elliott, and what do you think? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I will try to be very brief. When I talk to many 

Israelis and many Gulf Arabs, they have a very similar take on the 

situation. That is, that they worry a lot about the weakness they 

believe is being projected by the United States. 

I worry a lot about an American conclusion that those guys are 

winning and are the wave of the future. In Egypt today, thousands 

and thousands and thousands of people out in the streets protesting the Morsi power grab. When he won he won 51–48. Fortyeight percent of the people, a little bit more, of Egypt voted against 

him. They did not want a Muslim Brotherhood President. So they 

36

are willing to struggle against Islamic extremism, and their question for us is, are we willing to help them? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Anybody else have a comment on that? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, to me, the most visible place where 

American leadership is at stake is in Syria right now. Syria is the 

battleground where the Iranians are fighting a last-ditch effort to 

maintain influence and control of the key resistance link from Beirut to Tehran, and where other forces—some radical, some 

Jihadists—but where other forces are trying to defeat them. We 

have a clear interest in Iran’s defeat. I believe, while we have 

shown leadership in some very important areas such as U.S.-Israel 

cooperation, I bemoan the fact that we haven’t shown leadership on 

this most important strategic battleground in today’s Middle East. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Ms. PLETKA. I couldn’t agree with Rob more about Syria. The 

only area that I think we really need to dig down onto is the question of our aid to these countries. Are they an entitlement for 

Egypt, for Lebanon, for the Palestinians, or should they come with 

conditions? Should they be altered every year? Should they be revisited every year? Should they be serving our interests, and 

should they be predicated on serving those interests, shared interests by the way with a lot of the people of the region, as Elliott 

rightly said? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Dana. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Satloff, you have proposed the idea that we 

earmark some of our military aid to Egypt. There is discussion of 

increasing total aid. You are proposing that this come out of the 

aid we are currently providing, and what do you think of the Egyptian and others who argue that we should keep the military aid 

and increase the economic aid to Egypt? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, I focus, I mean I am not trying to 

avoid the answer, but my focus is not so much on a particular dollar amount but how we use the aid to advance a better U.S.-Egyptian relationship, a relationship where our interests are not at the 

moment being adequately addressed by the Government of Egypt. 

Aid, in and of itself, is not a huge amount of the Egyptian economy. 

What is really important about our assistance is what it signals to 

the international community, the IMF, international donors, et 

cetera, because the Egyptians are on a fiscal cliff that is far steeper 

than ours. And so we can use this moment and including inside the 

military aid, some of it, to get them to address our interests in a 

way they aren’t doing right now. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I would point out that while the cease-fire is 

preventing rockets from being fired at Israel, and the Egyptians deserve some credit for negotiating that, all those rockets are in Gaza 

precisely because Egypt has not patrolled a 10-mile long border. 

Mr. Abrams, should we be providing, covertly, money to those 

who are waging war or other conflict against the Iranian Government, particularly Iranians Kurds, the Baloch, and other ethnic minorities? 

37

Mr. ABRAMS. I am not fully familiar with what we are doing 

right now, but generally speaking my answer to that would be no. 

I think the battle against that regime is mostly going to be political. I think the people of the country already hate that regime, 

and I think we should be doing more to denounce it and make it 

a pariah state. I think we should do much better than we are doing 

in broadcasting and access to internet. I worry that by giving aid 

to some of the minorities you might turn other pieces of the population against you or give the regime excuses for further repression. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Should we be funding dissident Farsi-speaking 

groups? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think we should be doing that. If we can do it effectively so that the regime doesn’t find out, I think we should very 

much be doing that more or less in the way we have in past years 

in other countries. 

Mr. SHERMAN. One of the benefits of being a Member of Congress 

is I get to ask questions that are impossible to answer. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What is the likelihood that Israel will attack, arrange nuclear facilities in the next 12 months and what are the 

main factors in that decision? How important are the opinions of 

the American people, Congress and administration to that Israeli 

decision? 

Mr. ABRAMS. My answer to that would be they are very important. But if the Israelis conclude this is A, that it is an existential 

threat, and B, that they can actually have a successful military attack, they will do it even if they believe they will have a lack of 

support from Washington. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you think they will do it or not? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think that if the negotiations do not succeed in 

producing something——

Mr. SHERMAN. Got you. 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. By the spring, yes, I do. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And Ms. Pletka, would an Israeli attack necessarily be limited to the nuclear facilities, or would Israel, might 

Israel instead, in effect, hold hostage everything above the ground 

in Iran and all of its infrastructure, in demanding that U.N. inspectors be able to dismantle those nuclear facilities that cannot be 

bombed? 

Ms. PLETKA. It seems it is not only your privilege to ask impossible questions but that you actually enjoy it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is the nature of privileges. 

Ms. PLETKA. I have absolutely no idea what Israeli military planning is for Iran. Everything that we understand about how they 

look at the challenge, and everything that we understand from a 

variety of open sources about how the Iranians have configured 

their defenses and have configured their nuclear sites, would indicate that the Israelis are only interested in a very limited strike 

on Iran that would include their nuclear sites. But again I am only 

guessing. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And finally I would point out that if the electric 

grid of Gaza is plugged into Egypt that diminishes or takes away 

one possible pressure point that Israel could use in a non-lethal 

way. And I yield back. 

38

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, thank you, Madam Chair. I was going to ask a 

question of Ms. Pletka, and it has to do with the debate over Egypt 

and the direction. And that one observer made an observation this 

week that Western analysts continue to misread Morsi, imagining 

that his primary political challenge is to improve the Egyptian 

standard of living. Not so. His real challenge is to consolidate the 

power of the Brotherhood. I was going to ask you if you think that 

author is off the mark or not. 

Ms. PLETKA. It is probably at the center of the debate that is 

going on in Washington right now about the nature of the Morsi 

leadership, the intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood. We can endlessly parse the differences. There are great generational differences inside the Muslim Brotherhood. It is not a monolith, like 

any political party is not a monolith. And so I imagine that there 

are those within the Muslim Brotherhood who seek only to consolidate its power, and there are others who actually seek to retain 

power. 

If Egypt is going to remain a democracy, then the President of 

Egypt whether he is from the Muslim Brotherhood or anything else 

is going to have to respond to the dire economic needs of the Egyptian people. The Egyptian economy is in a very bad place. And although Rob talked about the amounts being very small, I sat down 

and looked at what they were. One-point-fifty-five billion dollars in 

U.S. aid, $1.3 billion for the military, $250 million in economic assistance, $1 billion more in debt relief from the U.S. taxpayer, and 

$4.8 billion in promised IMF support. We should think of those 

numbers as important to the Egyptians and they give us a lot of 

leverage. 

Mr. ROYCE. You would think that. But I will tell you what gave 

me pause and why when I read that piece in the Journal last week 

I was thinking about this. You have a situation where we all see 

that the Egyptian economy needs help, and then you have this 

massive power grab that comes from Morsi as the IMF loan is still 

in the process. It hasn’t been finalized. And what struck me about 

the timing of it was as though the power grab was more important 

than the economic resurgence of Egypt. 

Ms. PLETKA. Well, wait a minute. Look at it from his perspective. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes? 

Ms. PLETKA. We have conditions on our assistance that suggest 

that in the event of such a power grab, in other words that democracy is not proceeding at a pace, no protections for minorities, for 

Christians, for women, et cetera, that our aid will not go forward. 

But it has. Also I didn’t hear much of a peep from the IMF suggesting that that power grab is going to interfere with Egypt receiving that aid. The problem is not with Morsi. He is making the 

correct calculation that he can do what he wants. The problem is 

with those parties that choose to continue to provide the assistance 

in the face of what he does. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, you are saying then that in a way their actions 

are contingent upon the State Department that would be willing to 

actually cut off the spigot in the face, let us say, of noncompliance 

39

with respect to civil society or rights to the Coptics or these rule 

of law issues that we have spelled out, and given the fact that this 

has been ignored by the administration, ignored by the State Department, he is actually correctly reading our lack of desire to really try to enforce the conditionality, and as a consequence simply 

shrugging and saying, well, I will do the power grab in the middle 

of this based upon what I have seen so far. 

So you would argue that if we would apply the conditions that 

we have made in terms of aid we might be able to see better compliance with respect to these rule of law issues and respect for minority rights in Egypt? 

Ms. PLETKA. We can certainly make an effort, and we would at 

least do it with a clear conscience that we hadn’t been subsidizing 

bad behavior on the part of the Egyptian Government. 

Mr. ROYCE. There is another issue I want to bring up but I am 

going to ask Mr. Abrams. The Washington Post reports this morning that Qatar is bankrolling a new generation of Islamists across 

the Middle East, raising questions about its vision for the region 

and whether some of its policies are in direct conflict with U.S. interests. And as you go down the laundry list, the most hardcore 

elements in the Libyan struggle were funded there by Qatar. They 

assisted the Shahab. There is a report this morning that shoulderfired missiles appearing in Syria are compliments of their funding. 

And then of course you have got the visit of the Emir to Gaza last 

month pledging hundreds of millions in aid. And so I would just 

ask you about your read on Qatar here. 

Mr. ABRAMS. We are almost out of time, but I think that story 

was accurate and I think the Qataris are relying on us to protect 

them from Iran, but then in the Sunni Arab world are engaging in 

support of Islamist elements that are really against the interests 

of the United States, and continuing to use Aljazeera in ways that 

harm the interests of the United States. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Elliott. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr. 

Royce. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for conducting this 

hearing, and thank you to our witnesses. I think it is critically important of course that the United States maintain our unwavering 

support for the state of Israel, and while no one should live under 

the constant threat of violence, this is the reality as you know for 

the people of the state of Israel on a daily basis. And it is difficult 

to understand how that reality will change until Hamas recognizes 

Israel’s right to exist and rejects violence. 

So my first question is, what do you think is the likelihood of the 

cease-fire continuing for a sufficient period of time to create the 

space for a real dialogue, and are there things that we can do or 

should be trying to do in the Congress to enhance the likelihood 

that that cease-fire remains intact? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Well, first, Mr. Cicilline, as a native Rhode Islander, I thank you very much for your question. I think it is quite 

unlikely that this cease-fire lasts. The cease-fire is an interlude for 

Hamas to re-arm. The Iranians will try to re-arm them. It will be 

40

up to the Egyptians and others to try to stop them. The Egyptians 

will only do it if we incentivize them properly to do it. 

The best thing that we can try to do to try to deprive Hamas of 

a political victory from this is to use our influence in Ramallah 

with the Palestinian Authority to try to get them to reengage in 

direct diplomacy with the Israelis unconditionally, which would isolate Hamas. Right now the PA is isolated. Hamas is riding high. 

We have to change that dynamic, and that could only be done with 

a little bit more leadership and backbone from the head of the Palestinian Authority. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And actually that leads nicely to my second question, is what do you think it the impact of the activities at the 

United Nations? How is that to play out, and are there things we 

either should do in response to that in the context of what is happening in the region or should not do? And obviously others can 

chime in. 

Mr. ABRAMS. The Israeli Government seems to have taken the 

position in the last week that what is more critical is what the PA 

does after that vote, and I think we should also focus on that. The 

British Government said recently that they won’t vote for this resolution at the U.N. today unless they get assurances from President 

Abbas, for example, that he won’t try to go to the International 

Criminal Court. I think we should base our reaction on what he 

does, whether he uses that vote, in essence, to make trouble and 

try to embitter relations between Israel and the PA. 

Mr. SATLOFF. I agree with Elliott. On the one hand he could 

choose to compete with Hamas for the radical side of the Palestinian world or to underscore that he has a different path. If he 

chooses to compete he will lose, because Hamas has better ways to 

be radical. They can shoot and kill. He can’t. If he does, he is gone. 

So we have to encourage him to choose the diplomatic path. Right 

now we are doing this, I think, in a very quiet, soft way, and this 

is where I urge even more forceful American diplomacy and leadership to try to compel him to engage in diplomacy. It should be in 

his interest. If it isn’t, then there is a serious problem in Ramallah. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, I am sure. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia 

Subcommittee, is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to all the 

panel members this morning. It seems to me that Hamas and its 

anti-Israel allies have used this latest turmoil in the region to advance the much broader delegitimization of Israel strategy that has 

really been in play for some time now. For instance, Hamas and 

its allies focus on the human cost of Israeli strikes, and an often 

sympathetic media is quick to cooperate with a photo of an injury 

or a tragedy or death which if they are civilians clearly that is not 

what is intended. 

But we hear little about unprovoked attacks on civilians in 

Israel. We are told over and over how many Israeli rockets were 

fired into Gaza, but we rarely hear about the thousands of rockets 

launched into Israel for years and hundreds that were launched in 

the month leading up to what, I believe, was a measured Israeli 

response to Hamas terrorism. We see it constantly at the U.N. 

41

which spends an inordinate amount of time considering anti-Israel 

resolutions. Their delegitimization of Israel campaign is sophisticated, well organized and ongoing. Our response in the U.S. it 

seems is inadequate, muffled. 

What can the current administration do that it is not doing now 

to promote a counter-campaign and reverse this dangerous trend? 

How should we, how should the administration, how should Congress deal with this delegitimization of our strongest ally in the region, Israel? Maybe I will start with Elliott and go down the line, 

if I can. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think the delegitimization gains strength when 

there is an appearance of a gap between the United States and 

Israel. And I think that has happened in the last 4 years. I think 

it closed a bit during this war because the administration gave 

strong support to Israel throughout the war. I think that has got 

to continue. When we say things either, or do things in the White 

House or at the United Nations that give evidence of deep disagreement between the U.S. and Israel, it is a huge encouragement for 

the delegitimization campaign. And that, I think, we turned a corner here perhaps in this war and I would like to see us going in 

a better direction. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Ms. Pletka? 

Ms. PLETKA. In adding to the vein of what Elliott just said, one 

of the most interesting things that you hear from Gulf leaders is 

their shock at the gap that had opened up between Israel and the 

United States over recent years. They view that as a barometer of 

American friendship and loyalty. If you won’t stand by Israel, how 

can we trust you to stand by us against Iran? And the answer is 

of course that they don’t. 

In the direct question of what we can do to fight this 

delegitimization campaign, we can ensure that there are consequences. We provide an enormous amount of money to various 

U.N. agencies, not to speak of the U.N. itself. We don’t need to do 

that. It is not that important. The American taxpayer will thank 

you if you don’t do it. So if we did it to UNESCO, you, the Congress 

did it, there is no reason not to continue down that line to others 

who recognize a Palestinian state. If they don’t want U.S. money 

they don’t need it. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Dr. Satloff? 

Mr. SATLOFF. A slightly different suggestion, Congressman. If 

you look closely at the Gaza cease-fire, the actual text, there is 

nothing in this text that suggests that there will be any prevention 

of the importation of rocketry into Gaza. There is no international 

document. There is no international resolution which makes it beyond the pale. Even if it will be infringed upon, even if it will be 

violated, I would like to see the U.N. Security Council pass a resolution calling on all member states to prevent the importation or 

transfer of military weapons and articles into Gaza. At least the 

world will be on record, and I think that will be very important. 

Ms. PLETKA. May I say a word? You mean like the resolution 

that we saw stopping weapons from being transferred into Lebanon 

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tion that is violated every single day without comment from any 

party including by the way the United States, not to speak of the 

U.N. Security Council? 

Mr. CHABOT. I have got less than half a minute left. Let me take 

over here for that small portion of time I have. I just wanted to 

make one point. I find it particularly commendable, Israel informing, because a lot of the rocket making facilities and other are in 

residential areas or near mosques and near schools, that they were 

actually trying to notify civilians, yet we still see, the Washington 

Post just had a picture showing probably a tragedy, but there were 

also stories about, perhaps some of these things were film or pictures from Syria and other things. But I think Israel really did try 

to avoid civilian casualties here and should be commended for that. 

Yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

Pleased to yield to Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to 

our panel. Mr. Abrams, good to see you again. Let me ask, maybe 

you, Dr. Satloff, how did Iron Dome work in the recent unpleasantness? 

Mr. SATLOFF. By all accounts the Iron Dome performed quite 

magnificently. I mean it not only stopped an extraordinarily high 

number of rockets, but one of the main elements of Iron Dome is 

that it can, in a blink of an eye, determine whether a rocket is 

headed into an area in which it has to actually send an anti-missile 

to stop. So it can determine just like that whether it deserves being 

shot at, which saves an enormous number of Iron Dome rockets. 

Now there isn’t an unlimited supply at which the Israelis are beginning to address, but it performed, I think, beyond any reasonable expectation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And this was a collaborative effort with the 

United States Government, with the Obama administration——

Mr. SATLOFF. This was on a——

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Trying to provide an extra security 

screen? 

Mr. SATLOFF. This, I think, is one of the finest examples of U.S.-

Israel strategic cooperation. It didn’t only benefit Israeli civilians, 

it added to Israel’s deterrence and it added to the sense around the 

region that the United States is willing to spend money to prevent 

these sorts of things, which strengthens America’s sense of deterrence against adversaries more broadly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And in some ways it is in contrast, is it not, to 

the protection and promised attempts at protection during the Kuwait war, the Persian Gulf I, when we, the United States, attempted to assure Israel and provide some security measures. 

What was the missile program? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Patriots. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Patriot missile. But compared to Iron Dome, performance was significantly below what you just described, would 

that be fair? 

Mr. SATLOFF. No. Congressman, the technology is very different. 

We are today at a much more advanced ability to address incoming 

rocketry. I think that the United States did a valiant effort in the 

Iraq crisis to provide the technology that we had. What Iron Dome 

43

represents is a joint U.S.-Israel development of entirely new and 

advanced technology to address this current weapons system. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, fair point. I was simply saying in terms of 

the goal apparently we did a much, technology, other investments 

and so forth, but we are doing a much better job of actually achieving that goal this time than we were able to do for whatever reasons, mostly technology maybe, but I mean there were real disappointments with the Patriot missile, after the fact, at that time 

as I recall. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Yes. Thankfully, we are better today at it than we 

were then. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Mr. Abrams, do you concur with Dr. Satloff’s 

analysis? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Fully. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Question, and maybe to you, Ms. Pletka, first, 

what do you think Israel’s response should be and will be with respect to the non-member or state observer status at the United Nations for the Palestinians? 

Ms. PLETKA. I am always reluctant to tell other countries what 

to do because I don’t like it when other countries try and tell us 

what to do. I understand that the Israelis——

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right, then what if we reframe the question. 

What do you think their response will be? 

Ms. PLETKA. Well, I think the Israelis, as I believe Elliott made 

clear, I think the Israelis have decided that they are going to judge 

more by the actions that the Palestinians take in the wake of this 

decision than by the decision to seek the status by itself. It is quite 

a contrast from the last iteration of this where the Israelis fought 

very hard to ensure that the Palestinians wouldn’t take that 

course. I think they recognize that victory is in the cards for the 

Palestinians and they want to ensure that the Palestinians receive 

every incentive to behave responsibly in the aftermath. We will see 

if they do. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am going to run out of time, so final question. 

I would like both you and Mr. Abrams maybe to just clarify what 

you were saying about President Morsi. I thought, maybe I missed 

it, Elliott. You raised the question about the percentage of the vote 

he got, and I guess I am a little puzzled by that. I mean many 

American Presidents have actually been minority Presidents, and 

I could think of one of your favorites in recent history who didn’t 

even get the popular vote and, nonetheless, was sworn in as President. And to question legitimacy—okay. 

Mr. ABRAMS. No, I didn’t mean to question legitimacy. He clearly 

won. It seemed to be a free election. But it shows us that the Muslim Brotherhood candidate just got 51 percent of the vote, and almost half of Egyptians didn’t want a Muslim Brotherhood President. So the resistance to the Brotherhood and Islamization of 

Egypt, if you will, is very widespread in Egypt. That was the only 

point I was making. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ah, okay. Thank you. Thank you for your clarification. 

Mr. CHABOT [presiding]. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

44

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Kelly, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KELLY. All right, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is 

great that we can meet in these beautiful rooms and dress nice and 

have really nice talk about what we would really like to see happen 

in the world. We realize that at some point there need a good dose 

of reality. I don’t think these people are wired the same way we 

are, and we continue to think that if somehow we talk nice and 

play nice and continue to fund bad activity that eventually they 

will come in to think the way we think. I don’t think history plays 

out that way. In fact, I think it is attributed to Einstein that the 

definition of insanity is to do the same thing over and over again 

and expect a different result. 

Now Ms. Pletka, you make some really good references to us giving money to people, aid, taxpayer money or taxpayer-backed loans 

that we are borrowing from other people, 42 cents on the dollar, 

and sending it overseas and thinking that somehow if we give 

these people enough money they are going to play nice. In my lifetime at 64, I have never been able to buy off people who have evil 

intents by just giving them money. It kind of emboldens them. 

The numbers that you talked about are staggering, and the fact 

that we set conditions and then don’t enforce them, why? I mean 

I have only been here 20-some months, and thank God I actually 

lived a normal life. I am trying to understand how anybody in the 

world could sit here and watch what is going on and continue to 

think that somehow this is going to change, when I know and you 

know that the only time news is made in the Mideast is when 

Israel fights back. Then it becomes some kind of a horrible military 

effort. 

So please, what conditions? I mean and at what point do we 

wake up and say, you know what, we are cutting off your allowance. You are not going to school, you are not playing by the rules, 

and you know what, doggone it, we are not going to fund this. 

These numbers are staggering. 

Ms. PLETKA. The numbers that are involved are staggering. Our 

aid to a variety of countries in the Middle East, of course Israel included, is very substantial, and for many years made up the majority of the foreign assistance that the U.S. taxpayer gave out internationally. 

I sat down and looked over the conditions on aid to Egypt, and 

I was actually very impressed. Anybody who says that our Members of Congress don’t do anything all day hasn’t read these bills. 

They are very thoughtful conditions. They are important conditions. The problem is that each one comes with a waiver. And the 

problem with waivers is that invariably they are exercised, and it 

is that that needs to be stopped. 

I believe that we have a strong interest in remaining engaged. 

I don’t think we should wash our hands either of Egypt or Jordan 

or the Middle East or the Palestinians. We have a stake in their 

future. We turned around and walked away from Afghanistan 

when we shouldn’t have and al-Qaeda rose up in that place. I don’t 

think we should walk away, but we need to go to work every day. 

The Iranians come to the table and fight every day for their agenda 

in the region. We just drop in occasionally when we feel like it to 

45

wag our finger or say thank you. That is our problem and that is 

mainly an executive branch problem. And the problem is that their 

feet need to be held to the fire. If I were in your place, I would be 

taking waivers away and making sure that conditions are adhered 

to. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, I appreciate that. I think a total commitment is much better than an impassionate involvement from time 

to time. The Palestinian Authority, they are going to ask the General Assembly today to have a non-member observer state status, 

okay. And I think this is kind of crazy when you look at that entity 

and say, this is the same as the Holy See in Vatican City. Let us 

give them the same type of legitimacy. 

What could we have done to prevent that from happening, the 

United States now? What statements could we have done? How 

could we have better articulated that that maybe the other people 

in the world would have sat up and take notice? Elliott, please. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, we did once back them off on this, and that 

would lead me to believe that maybe if we had pushed harder 

maybe they would have agreed to postpone it again. I don’t think 

that is a thing that happens this week. I think that there were 

some American diplomats, I am told, up in New York a few days 

ago trying to get the Palestinians to back off, but they weren’t 

going to do that 3 days in advance. I am talking about 3 months 

ago, 6 months ago. It seems to me that had we pushed harder and 

put more of the relationship on the line maybe we could have gotten them to back off yet again. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, long-term policies or long-term strategy is certainly better than at 5 minutes to midnight running out and trying 

to talk to some folks. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. 

Mr. KELLY. Okay. I am greatly concerned, and also some colleagues, that we sent a letter to the President and the Secretary 

of State about the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. I am greatly worried 

about that because oftentimes things happen when you are not 

looking, and this would give some legitimacy again to some very 

bad players in the world. 

Do you see anything that we are doing at an administration level 

that is making sense to securing that part of the world and establishing some type of permanent peace? I know it is kind of an openended question. You have 10 seconds to answer it. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, first, U.S.-Israel security cooperation 

is very important as a pillar of building a peace. Secondly, what we 

are doing quietly in the Persian Gulf, the fact that there are now 

on a regular basis two carriers in the Persian Gulf is a very important signal of American commitment. It is not enough, and the Iranians can see through this and see around it like what they are 

doing in Gaza. But there are elements out there that can be built 

upon to advance our interests more effectively. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, in conversations I have had with——

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, all. 

Mr. CHABOT. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be 

given 1 additional minute. Okay, the gentleman given 1 minute. 

46

Mr. KELLY. Thank you. The conversations I have had, I have had 

an opportunity to travel that part of the world, and one of the questions, underlying questions, of every one of these countries we 

stopped at they said, when is the U.S. going to be a leader again? 

Not leading from behind, but when is the U.S. going to actually establish some very strong lines that established us as a strong ally 

and friend, and not one that you are not sure. This wordsmithing 

that takes place in this town is incredible. I know for sure that 

anything I am told is not the truth. But there is no strategy. If we 

do not lead from the position of strength there will not be peace 

in the world. And us leading from behind is a false, these are 

flights of fantasy that somehow we are going to somehow change 

the direction of that region of the world. It just isn’t going to happen. Because this one, I have said this many times, if it walks like 

a duck and quacks like a duck, this is a duck. If we continue to 

think it is some kind of a swan, we are crazy. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The gentleman from New York, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Engle is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. I thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to thank our distinguished panelists for being here, all of you, and Mr. Abrams. I 

always like it when Elliotts can testify. I think it enhances all 

kinds of dialogues. 

Let me say that my way of thinking is this. I am for a two-state 

solution. The way they are going, to ever get peace in the Middle 

East is for both sides to sit down and negotiate across the table 

with no preconditions. I think it is preposterous that the Palestinians make every kind of demand on Israel as a precondition for 

even sitting down and talking, when the preconditions they want 

to get out of Israel are really final status issues. And to me, if you 

are really serious about peace you sit down and talk. 

And to my way of thinking, the reason why peace has been elusive, it is not a lot of different issues that people say, it is the fact 

that 64 years after the establishment of a state of Israel as the national homeland for the Jewish people, the Palestinians refuse to 

accept Israel as a Jewish State. And being a Jewish State doesn’t 

mean that only Jewish people can live in that state. It means that 

it is the homeland of the Jewish people. 

And the Palestinians should read the United Nations resolution 

in 1947 which partitioned Palestine, it clearly states, into an Arab 

State and a Jewish State. And I would remind the Palestinians 

that when that happened Israel accepted the partition and declared 

their state. And the Arabs who could have had their state right 

then and there, instead of taking their state immediately attacked 

Israel and tried to destroy it. And that happened again and again. 

And when they talk about settlements there were no settlements 

between 1948 and 1967, and the Palestinians in the Arab world 

still didn’t make peace with Israel. So it really makes my blood boil 

with all these things. And obviously what is happening at the U.N. 

today is just a shame because rather than enhancing peace I think 

it really sets it back. 

I want to ask though about Turkey, because I have been very 

much chagrined over Turkey and the destructive role it is playing 

47

rather than the constructive role it used to play. Last week, Israeli 

and Turkish newspapers reported that talks were conducted in Geneva between representatives of Israel and Turkey talking about 

normalizations between the two countries. I particularly was galled 

at Prime Minister Erdogan’s calling Israel a terrorist state given 

Turkey’s need to respond to the PKK, they think nothing about 

going into Iraq to get at what they call ‘‘Kurdish terrorists,’’ but 

they deny Israel the right to protect itself from terrorists. 

So I am wondering, what prospects does anyone on the panel see 

for these talks and for resolving any differences? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, I had thought that there was a reasonable chance in the moment after Israel’s January 22nd election 

if, indeed, as polls suggest, the current government or some variation thereof gets re-formed. That because of Netanyahu’s strength 

and Erdogan’s relative weakness, Erdogan is weaker today than he 

was 5 years ago politically, the economy in Turkey is hurting compared to 5 years ago, and because of the urgency of Syria as an 

issue that they share, I had thought that there is a chance that 

reconciliation might work. 

But I do think, however, that the talks you referred to probably 

are not going to succeed, and that Erdogan’s statements about 

Israel as a terrorist state truly poison this situation, and then, in 

fact, Erdogan has taken Turkey out as a key player. He sort of 

marginalized his own country. And this is, given what they have 

done nefariously in recent years, this is not such a bad thing but 

it does marginalize and make it less likely that we will see an 

Israeli-Turkish reconciliation. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. In getting back to the discussions between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Back in 2000, 2001, when 

Arafat as far as I am concerned was offered a lot, Palestinian state 

on 97 percent of the West Bank, land swaps, part of Jerusalem, billions of dollars of aid, he said no. And it reminds me of Abba 

Eban’s old slogan about how the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. 

What many people don’t know is that in 2008, when Ehud 

Olmert was Prime Minister he offered even more in behind the 

scenes negotiations, I call it ‘‘the sun and the moon and the stars,’’ 

and the Palestinians still said no. So I think when countries at the 

U.N. today are pointing fingers at why there is no peace, and unfortunately they will be one-sided and point fingers at Israel, I 

think that the history has shown us that if we are going to point 

a finger at one side for not having peace it should clearly by the 

Palestinian side. And I just want to know if anybody would like to 

comment. 

Mr. CHABOT. If you could keep your remarks relatively brief because the gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Okay. Yes, I agree with interpretation, and I was 

in the government when Olmert made those offers. They were even 

more generous than the ones that Barak had made, and yet there 

was no Palestinian reply. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

48

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, who is the chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Kelly, you talked about a normal life awhile 

ago, and I want you to know that you are not going to lead a normal life for all the time you are here in Congress. This is probably 

the last time I will be speaking from this dais. I have been here 

30 years. And so I really appreciate all my colleagues and I appreciate to this being the last panel because I have known Elliott for 

all of the 30 years, when I didn’t have grey hair and you had hair. 

Let me start off, Mr. Satloff, by saying, you said we ought to do 

something in Syria. Russia and Iran are supporters of Assad. What 

would you do? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, I think there is a lot the United 

States can do to support the military opposition to Bashar Assad 

without getting any American soldiers anywhere near the territory 

of Syria. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just interrupt you. There are al-Qaeda 

operatives there and other radical groups, and one of the things 

that I have been concerned about in my 30 years here, I believed 

when I first came that there ought to be democracy around the 

world. We ought to work for every single country to be democratic, 

and then I started seeing radical groups winning elections and 

making things even worse. 

And the thing that concerns me right now is the entire northern 

tier of Africa is in a mess. Gaddafi was a bad guy, but we had 

Members of Congress talking to him just a year or 2 ago. He was 

a bad guy. He was going to go into Benghazi and wipe out some 

radicals down there, and we said, we can’t let that happen. It 

would be a humanitarian disaster. So we got rid of Gaddafi and 

now the radicals are running that area and they killed our Ambassador and some other people and we can’t even go in there anymore. So sometimes you get things you really don’t want. 

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has said they wanted the destruction of Israel. They have said that for years. In my mind they 

are still a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, we supported that 

change there. We said the Arab Spring was not a bad thing. So the 

entire northern tier of Africa has changed. It is in a state of flux 

and we really don’t know where it is going. 

And in Syria we have got a real mess and it is a civil war, and 

what concerns me is we don’t know what is going to happen. We 

don’t know who is going to take over and what impact it will have 

on our interests. And one of the things I think I have learned over 

the years is that before you do something you try to figure out 

what is going to happen afterwards. You look down the road. This 

administration did not look down the road in Libya. They did not 

look down the road in Egypt. And now they are talking about doing 

what you are suggesting in Syria and we don’t know what is going 

to happen next. 

And so my concern is that we have a foreign policy and a Secretary of State and a President that says, okay, if this happens 

what do we have to deal with later? Are we going to still give foreign aid? I agree with what Ms. Pletka said that foreign aid should 

be conditional. It should be reviewed annually. There should be a 

49

Sword of Damocles hanging over these people knowing that if they 

don’t at least work with us they are going to have that sword fall 

on them. They are not going to get anything else. There has got 

to some carrot and a stick approach, and right now it just seems 

like there are just carrots, and I think it is a mess. I think that 

is, and I am going to say one more thing about Iran. 

Iran is working not only in that northern part of Africa and the 

Middle East, they are working in Azerbaijan trying to undermine 

that government. They are working in the Gulf States. I was just 

over in Bahrain and elsewhere, they are sending people over there 

to try to work with people to keep them whipped up to throw out 

that government, and that government is a government that has 

worked with us for probably 30, 40 years. And we have got the 5th 

Fleet in there, which is extremely important for us as far as security in the region. 

So I will end up by just saying that I think that our foreign policy needs to be much more farsighted. We need to look ahead before we support something, and make sure we are not jumping 

from a flame into a raging fire. And I am afraid right now there 

is going to be a major war in the Middle East and I don’t think 

it is going to be 3 or 4 years. I think it is going to be quicker than 

that because of our foreign policy. Now if you want to say something in 16 seconds, you are welcome. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say something in 16 or 12, 

how much I have appreciated working with Mr. Burton in these, 

it is 30 years. Years when it looked like the Republican minority 

might be permanent. Years when there were some very tough foreign policy fights and everyone in the Reagan and Bush administrations certainly knew that one of the people that you could always count on to fight for the President and for the country was 

Mr. Burton, so thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. I feel the same way about you, buddy. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

On behalf of the chair and the other members of the committee, 

I would like to thank both Mr. Berman and Mr. Burton for their 

long service to this institution, and it is a better place because both 

of you have served here, and we appreciate your service and wish 

you the best in the future. 

And Mr. Marino from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. I apologize for being late, so 

I may ask a question that has already been asked but please 

amuse me if you would. I was a prosecutor for almost 20 years. I 

was a district attorney and a United States attorney. I have tried 

many cases myself. Capital murder cases, terrorist cases, you name 

it I tried it. And there was a certain period of negotiation that took 

place between the prosecution and defense, but at some point the 

prosecution had to draw the line in the concrete and say this is it. 

All offers are off the table and we are going to trial. I see we are 

at that point right now. 

And Secretary Abrams, if you could answer this question for me, 

and if any other members want to chime in afterwards, please do. 

What is the downside, and we know this administration has not 

done it, I don’t foresee President Obama doing it, but what is the 

downside to making it very clear concerning Israel, Palestine, Iran, 

50

Syria, any of those other terrorist countries of simply saying, whatever Israel wants, we, the United States, are right there with 

them, side-by-side, backing them, doing what they feel is best to 

protect the people of their country? What is the downside of that? 

Because we keep pandering to these terrorists. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think your fundamental point is right, Mr. 

Marino, that we will bring more security for Israel, we will bring 

more security for the U.S. and we will bring the possibilities of 

peace much closer if it is understood that we are a closely supportive of Israel. Any form of distance just encourages Hamas and 

other terrorist groups. It encourages Iran to think they have got an 

opportunity here. So distancing ourselves from Israel is only going 

to produce fewer chances for peace and it is only going to harm 

American interests in my view. 

Mr. MARINO. Ms. Pletka? Am I pronouncing that correctly? 

Ms. PLETKA. I agree with both you on what was at the heart of 

what you said, but I think this is really a larger problem. This isn’t 

just about the United States and Israel. I think if you asked the 

President, he would say that he has been a staunch ally of the 

state of Israel. Now I don’t agree with that assertion. Nonetheless, 

the problem is really one of where the U.S. stands in the world. It 

is not just where we stand on the question of Israel. It is where 

we stand in the Middle East. It is where we stand on the question 

of Iran. Are we going to negotiate with Iran and allow them to 

have a nuclear capability? Because I can tell you that that is what 

they think and that is what our allies think. If we are adrift as a 

nation in shaping our foreign policy and unsure of whether we wish 

to lead the world or we wish to just sort of play along with the 

world, then we are going to have these problems in more places 

than just the Middle East. 

Mr. MARINO. I agree with you completely, but again reaching 

back to my experiences of prosecutor, it only took me one time in 

a major homicide case to prove to defense and defendants more so 

that the deal is off the table, because the next time it rolled around 

they said, he pulled the trigger before, he will do it again. 

Dr. Satloff? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, America’s traditional role in pursuing peace and security around Israel has been, one, to be a close 

ally of Israel, and then secondly, to try to be an honest broker of 

peace. Now too many people interpret ‘‘honest broker’’ as the opposite of close ally when, in fact, one becomes a more effective honest 

broker the closer one is with your close ally. And so what is very 

important, if you want to pursue peace and security together, is to 

merge the concepts of close ally and honest broker instead of, as 

is so often advocated, instead of separating that we can be a balanced distance mediator instead of a close partner in helping to 

achieve peace and security. 

Mr. MARINO. I understand your position but this is rhetorical. 

How has that been working lately? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Well——

Mr. MARINO. It hasn’t been, and I want to make it clear on that. 

It hasn’t been, what I have learned through my career, my studies 

abroad, my emphasis on the Middle East. I have a friend from Iran 

who just left the country before the Shah was overthrown, and she 

51

has said to me on numerous occasions and until today, you will 

never negotiate with terrorists until you go to the table with a bigger club than they have, and use it. 

And in closing, my position is, the way we get the point across 

is to stand very, very closely with our friends and get the point 

across to our enemies. And just for the record, and I have said this 

time and time again, whatever Israel wants to do to protect the interest of their people which protects the interests of this country, 

I am there with them side-by-side, no holds barred. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. We are going to go to a quasi-modified second round 

here for the purpose of allowing Mr. Berman to ask a few additional questions. We will give him up to 5 minutes. The gentleman, 

the ranking member is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. And I promise not to do it at the next hearing. 

Thank you very much. There was this article in the New York 

Times a day or two ago sort of about the strange things going on 

now. The Sunni-Shia tensions, how it is playing out in the context 

of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

And I guess the question I have is, sort of what that part of the 

conflict, how that affects Israel, most particularly can Hamas pull, 

we talk about all the things Hamas has been sort of getting from 

these visits, but do they have any problem in balancing the support 

from Iran with their support from the Egypt-Qatar-Turkey folks? 

Do they risk something here? They apparently didn’t risk, they got 

the Iranians mad but not mad enough to stop the supply, by turning against Assad. How long can they successfully play that game? 

That is one question I have. And maybe they can succeed in playing both sides of this. 

And the second question, if you had asked me 6 months ago I 

would have said if the Palestinian Authority pursues the U.N. 

strategy we should fundamentally change the nature of our relationship with them. I am aware of countries and individuals drawing red lines and then, well, did I draw that right, red line, and 

changing it. If keeping the PA at least at this moment in time alive 

and given the problems with the Arab support for the PA, do we 

want to base an aid decision to the Palestinian Authority on what 

happens sometime today, or do we want to base it on some of the 

issues you folks have talked about? What is their approach to the 

criminal ICC? Maybe just as, or more importantly, what is their 

approach on the very interesting choice of imitating Hamas or 

making it clear that a negotiation is the way to achieve the goal. 

And is that a better way to decide the aid question? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Can I just begin by saying, Mr. Chairman, I have 

a plane to catch, and if you will allow me to be excused to go to 

the airport. 

Mr. BERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, on your first question, as long as our 

side, the side of diplomacy, is not even in the game then I am sure 

that Hamas is able to balance support from both Sunnis and Shia. 

Nothing succeeds like success and Hamas looks like it is doing very 

well. And they are able to have posters in Gaza thanking Iran, as 

52

well as cashing the checks from the Emir of Qatar and welcoming 

other aid from other Sunni states. It really comes down, I think, 

to invigorating the idea that there is an alternative. 

And this goes to your second question. I agree with what I believe is the thrust of your question which is, however reckless the 

Palestinians are at the U.N. today, this should not be the sole criteria, in my view, for determining the American relationship with 

them. There are at least two other things that are going on that 

are very positive, and that is security cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel which has prevented terrorism between, coming from the West Bank against Israel. We don’t forget 

that if we were sitting 10 years ago today we would be talking 

about bombs going off in cafes and schools and buses in Israel. And 

that hasn’t happened now in years. It is not only because of the PA 

but the PA plays an important role. 

And second, the economy in the Authority is functioning, such as 

it is. We need to try to build on that. We have to try to incentivize 

Mahmoud Abbas to act on his interest and to engage in negotiations. But if there is no diplomacy for an extended period of time, 

Hamas will win. Palestinians will see them as more successful, 

even if they offer no solution to the conflict with Israel. 

Ms. PLETKA. People used to say that there are two sure things, 

death and taxes. I would add there a corollary, there are three sure 

things. Death, taxes and then belief that the peace process will 

solve all the ills of Israel and the Arabs. I don’t believe it. I don’t 

agree with Rob on this, though I have great respect for him. I think 

that the Palestinians have to get their own house in order and that 

that is very important. That doesn’t mean that we end our relationship with them, but a Palestine that it does not have its house in 

order cannot make peace with Israel, especially cannot make a 

peace that will last that will be built on a solid foundation. That 

is part one. Part two——

Mr. BERMAN. Though how do you get your house in order with 

Hamas out there? 

Ms. PLETKA. First of all, why did Hamas gain the popularity it 

had? Because of the malfeasance of Fatah. 

Mr. BERMAN. Absolutely. 

Ms. PLETKA [continuing]. A million people. Fine. When that happens your job is to show the contrast and to show it properly, not 

to play publicity games like went into the United Nations. That is 

old Palestine behavior and that is what we are seeing. No, no, look 

at me, I can kill more Jews than you can so I am better. Now everybody loves me. Nobody cares about corruption, failure of civil society, failure of governance. 

We spend a lot of time talking about Fatah and Hamas and not 

a lot of time talking about the Palestinian people who have suffered more at the hands of their own government than they ever 

have at the hands of Israel. That should be the mission is to 

straighten their house in order and then hope to build a peace 

process that will be far easier on two stable societies rather than 

on one unstable one. 

May I just take an additional 5 seconds and say something about 

the Sunni-Shia divide that you talked about? I think this is one of 

the most understudied and misunderstood conflicts in the region in 

53

the fact that we have allowed Iran to take the mantle of protector 

of the Shia, who are truly downtrodden in much of the Middle 

East, is really wrong. The fact that we allowed the Government of 

Bahrain that the complicity of the Saudis to trample on the freedoms of the Shia in Bahrain was wrong. The same is true in 

Yemen. The same is true throughout the region. And we need to 

do a lot better in understanding the Shia of the Middle East and 

competing with the Iranians to protect their interests, interests of 

minorities and majorities. 

Mr. BERMAN. Not to mention the Shia of Pakistan. 

Ms. PLETKA. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. CHABOT. And the gentleman’s time has expired. 

Ms. PLETKA. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. On behalf of Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, I would 

like to thank the panel for their excellent testimony here this afternoon. If there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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76979n.eps

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

u.s. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0\28 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

November 26,2012 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on 

the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, November 29,2012 

II:OOa.m. 

Israel's Right to Defend Itself: Implications for Regional Security and U.S. 

Interests 

The Honorable El1iott Abrams 

Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations 

Ms. Danielle Pletka 

Vice President 

Foreign and Defense Policy Studies 

American Enterprise Institute 

Robert Satloff, Ph.D. 

Executive Director 

The Washinb>lon Institute for Near East Policy 

By Direction of the Chairman 

'whe1lever jYcu:tlcahfe 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF FULL COMl'vIITTEE lIEARDlG 

Day_---"'T'-'11"'u'-'rs'-'d"'a"'v_~Dale 11129112 _~~Room._--=21,-,7-"2-,,RIooI,,-,O~B",----_ 

Stal'ting Time 11:00 a.m. Ending Time 1:04 p.m. 

Recesses :,." .. , .. ! ~to ~~) <-to -l <-to ~~) <-to -l <-to -l <-to-l 

!'residing Memher(s) 

Rep. Ileana Ros-LehliJten~ Rep. Steve Chabot 

Check all of Ihe following that apply: 

Open Session IZl Executive (closed) Session D Televised IZl 

TlTI.~: OF HEAIUN(~: 

Electronically Recordcd (taped)1Zl 

Stcnographic Record IZl 

Israel's RighI 10 Defend Itself: Tml'licatinn.<filr Regional Security and [ZS. Interest> 

COMl\UTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Attendance attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Al Green, Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting nulke aUached? YesE] NoD 

(If "no", please list helmv and include title, agenc:r, department, ()r mgani3uti()n.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List anyslatements submitted)or the record,) 

Rep. Smith (SFR) 

Rep. Connolly (SFR) 

Dr. Satloff (SFR) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

Tll\IE AlIJOllI{NElll:04 p.m. 

I can Marter, Director of Committee Operations 
58

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Hearing/Briefing Title: Israel's Right to Defend Itself: 

Implications for Regional Security and U.S. Interests 

Date: 11/29/12 

Present Member Present Member 

X Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL X Howard L. Berman, CA 

X Christopher Smith, NJ Gary L. Ackerman, NY 

X Dan Burton, IN Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS 

Elton Gallegly, CA X Brad Sherman, CA 

X Dana Rohrabacher, CA X Eliot Engel, NY 

Donald Manzullo, IL Gregory Meeks, NY 

X Edward R. Royce, CA Russ Carnahan, MO 

X Steve Chabot, OH Albio Sires, NJ 

Ron Paul, TX X Gerry Connolly, VA 

Mike Pence, IN Ted Deutch, FL 

X Joe Wilson, SC Dennis Cardoza, CA 

Connie Mack, FL Ben Chandler, KY 

X Jeff Fortenberry, N E Brian Higgins, NY 

Michael McCaul, TX Allyson Schwartz, PA 

X Ted Poe, TX Chris Murphy, CT 

X Gus M. Bilirakis, FL Frederica Wilson, FL 

Jean Schmidt, OH X Karen Bass, CA 

Bill Johnson, OH William Keating, MA 

David Rivera, FL X David Cicilline, RI 

X Mike Kelly, PA X AI Green, TX 

Tim Griffin, AK X Sheila Jackson-Lee, TX 

X Tom Marino, PA 

X Jeff Duncan, SC 

Ann Marie Buerkle, NY 

Renee Ellmers, NC 

X Robert Turner, NY 
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76979d.eps

Opening Statement 

"Israel's Right to Defend Itself: Implications 

For Regional Security and U.S. Interests" 

Representative Christopher H. Smith 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

November 29, 2012 

Rayburn 2172 

An escalating clash between the State of Israel and lslamist militants in Gaza has been 

quelled for the moment, but the cease-fire remains fragile and dependent on interests that have 

little to do with a peaceful resolution of the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. 

Hamas was not holding its own in this conflict despite its obnoxious use of missiles 

aimed at civilians that are reminiscent of Nazi V2 attacks on London during World War II. 

Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile system is reported to have been 85% successful in engaging 

missiles headed for population areas up to 70 kilometers from their launch sites. A ground war 

launched by Israel could have further degraded the ability of Hamas and other Palestinian groups 

to threaten Israel's population with continuing missile attacks by enabling further Israeli strikes 

on Palestinian missile storage facilities. So the Hamas concession to temporary peace can in no 

way be construed as a commitment to peace, but rather a realization of the danger of defeat. 

Paradoxically, the truce actually offers Hamas an opportunity to restock and reposition missiles 

Egypt appears to have negotiated a cease-fire to at least appear to maintain the country's 

position as a peace-broker between Israel and the Palestinians and preclude a potential cutoff of 

U.S. assistance. Last year, the United States provided $1.3 billion in military assistance and 

$250 million in economic aid to Egypt. At a time when President Morsi 's government is facing 

a backlash over his Iran-like seizure of executive power, an Israeli -Palestinian war next door 

would be a complication he doesn't need. However, a significant portion of his population is 

supportive of Hamas, as is Morsi himself, who accused Israel of committing an "assault on 

humanity" prior to negotiating a cease-fire 

So the cease-tire has no certainty oflasting beyond the needs of Ham as or Egypt's 

Islamist government. 
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The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-ll) 

HCFA Full Committee: Israel's Right to Defend Itself: Implications for Regional Security and 

U.S. Interests 

THURSDAY November 29, 2012 

llam 

After eight days of conflict between Hamas-Ied militants and Israel, the two parties agreed to a 

cease-fire. For now, the agreement has worked to contain the most recent violence in the 

region. As we've seen time and time again, a cease-fire is not likely to be a long-term solution; if 

anything, it underscores the need for peace in the Middle East. In order for such a peace to 

exist and for stability to flourish, rational actors must come to the table with the intent to 

negotiate a long-term agreement. First and foremost, this requires Hamas to: recognize the 

right of Israel to exist, forswear violence, and accept previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements 

that imply a two-state solution. 

With regard to the Palestinian militants' response to Operation Pillar of Defense, there are 

several issues that require greater scrutiny. The first is the future of Egypt's role in Middle East 

peace. According to news reports, Egyptian authorities played a role in broke ring the November 

21 cease-fire. This is a positive development, but the future Israel-Egypt relationship is still 

unclear in the wake of a post-Mubarak Egypt. Another issue is Iran's role in supplying arms, 

such as Fajr missiles, to Hamas. When Iran is facing crippling sanctions and a plummeting 

currency, it does not behoove Tehran to continue supporting violent militants. This raises the 

question of where Iran sees itself in the future Middle East. Supporting violent militants and 

ignoring international opinion on Iran's foreign policy has not served the regime or people of 

Iran well. 

The United States has been steadfast in its belief in Israel's right to defend itself. Whether it is 

through support for the Iron Dome missile defense system, or the ability and willingness to 

bring parties to the negotiating table, the U.S. can and does have a role to play in Middle East 

peace. Continuing this role requires the United States to be a fair and credible actor. It is folly 

for any observer to claim that certain preconditions-such as the previously mentioned ones 

regarding Hamas-indicate favoritism toward any specific party. The preconditions are 

common sense and have long been a part of United States policy vis-a-vis a long-term Middle 

East peace. With regard to the November 21 cease-fire, all parties who agreed to end violence 

and stop the grave loss of life took a welcome first step. But a long-term peace requires lengthy 

and thorough negotiations by entities that respect peace. 

On the issue of the Pa lestinians, the United States has strategic reasons for ensuring that 

Palestinians have access to basic services. For FY13, the U.S. State Department proposed $370 

million through USAID to the Palestinian people for four specific sectors: governance, rule of 

law, civil society; health, education, social services; economic development; and humanitarian 

assistance. State also proposed $70 million in funding through the International Narcotics 

Control and Law Enforcement Account. It is important to note that USAID has strict vetting 
61

Washington Institute Strategic Report submitted for the record by Robert Satloff, 

[NOTE: ‘‘Engagement without Illusions’’ by Vin Weber and Gregory B. Craig, a 

f Ph.D., executive director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is not reprinted here but is available in committee records.]

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