United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1994 ARMY AVIATION

Modernization Strategy

Needs to Be

Reassessed

GAO/NSIAD-95-9

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-257915 

November 21, 1994

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Chairman

The Honorable James B. Hansen

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Oversight

 and Investigations

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In response to your request, this report discusses the validity of the Army’s plan for

modernizing its aviation fleet and describes alternatives to the strategy’s proposed armed

reconnaissance and light attack helicopter. It also identifies funding issues surrounding the

Army’s decisions to acquire its aviation fleet.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to

the Secretaries of Defense and the Army and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Copies of this report will also be made available to others on request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director of Systems

Development and Production Issues, who may be reached on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff

have any questions. Major contributors are listed in appendix II.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General
Executive Summary

Purpose Of the $6.2 billion the Army plans to spend on aviation modernization

during fiscal years 1995-1999, $4.7 billion, or about 76 percent, will be

spent on two helicopter programs—the Comanche and the Longbow

Apache. However, significant changes have occurred in the threat

environment and in the force structure that could substantially change the

number and mix of helicopters the Army needs to buy.

The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, requested

that GAO review how the Army is modernizing its aviation force, in

particular its attack and reconnaissance helicopters. GAO’s objectives were

to determine whether (1) the Army’s plan for modernizing its aviation fleet

is still valid, (2) there are alternative aircraft systems to the ones the Army

plans to acquire, and (3) the Army’s funding plans include all of the

helicopter systems that it says it needs.

Background The foundation of the Army’s current aviation modernization strategy was

originally documented in the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan

approved by the Secretary of the Army on November 2, 1992, which was

modified by the February 1993 Aviation Restructure Initiative prepared by

the Army Aviation Warfighting Center. The objectives of the Army’s

modernization efforts were to (1) correct deficiencies in the Army’s

aviation force structure, particularly in its reconnaissance and attack

capabilities; (2) reduce aviation maintenance and support requirements;

(3) reduce aviation operating costs; and (4) retire old aircraft. These

objectives were to be achieved within anticipated funding levels.

To carry out its modernization strategy, the Army intends to (1) procure

about 1,300 Comanche helicopters, some with enhancements provided by

the Army’s Longbow program, (2) modify 761 existing Apaches with some

or all of the Longbow upgrades, and (3) purchase approximately 350

Kiowa Warrior helicopters to use until the Comanche is introduced. The

Army plans to use the Apache as an interim armed reconnaissance

helicopter until the Comanche is fielded. Of the $6.2 billion the Army plans

to spend on aviation modernization during fiscal years 1995-1999,

$4.7 billion, or about 76 percent, will be spent on the Comanche and the

Longbow Apache helicopters.

On September 1, 1993, the Secretary of Defense released the results of the

Bottom-Up Review. This review, which evaluated the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) modernization efforts, supported the continuation of the

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Executive Summary

Army’s aviation modernization initiative but with a reduced force

structure. The review recommended that the force be cut from 20 divisions

to 10 active divisions and approximately 5 reserve divisions by the end of

1999.

Results in Brief The Bottom-Up Review used different total force structure and unit

composition data than the Army to determine the size of the Army’s attack

and reconnaissance fleet. The Army’s estimates of the quantities of

helicopters needed are higher than those subsequently identified by DOD.

Therefore, the validity of the Army’s aviation modernization strategy is

now questionable.

In addition, the Army overstated expected benefits and understated

technical risks associated with the major systems that comprise its

modernization strategy. While the Army believes that it can accomplish its

modernization objectives, some users—field commanders and pilots—are

concerned that implementation of the current procurement plan could

result in an inappropriate mix and quantity of helicopters and, therefore,

adversely impact their operational effectiveness.

Additionally, DOD and Army studies have not fully considered alternative

helicopters and weapon systems that could accomplish many of the

planned roles and missions of the strategy’s centerpiece—the Comanche.

Decisions to use alternative helicopters could alter the mix and quantity of

helicopters in the Army’s projected fleet. The lack of full consideration of

alternatives raises further doubts about the validity of the strategy.

For its aviation modernization strategy, the Army has chosen to use most

of its available resources to procure Comanche helicopters and upgrade

Apache helicopters while deferring or canceling funding of other Army

helicopter modernization programs, such as medical evacuation and cargo

helicopters, that the Army believes are important to the performance of its

aviation missions. Further, the Army’s Comanche program will be short

about $540 million through fiscal year 2004. To address this shortfall, the

Army plans to streamline the developmental stages of the Comanche

program, thereby increasing the risks associated with entering production

before the program has been tested and shown to meet specifications.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

The Validity of the Strategy

Is Now Questionable

The Army’s aviation modernization strategy may no longer be valid. GAO

found that:

• The Army’s current aviation modernization strategy may overstate

helicopter quantities because (1) the size of the total force structure in the

strategy used as a basis for computation does not reflect the Bottom-Up

Review’s recommended reduced force structure and (2) unit force

structure data used by the Army to calculate helicopter quantities for air

cavalry units is much higher than data used in DOD’s Bottom-Up Review.

• The two major helicopter acquisitions under the strategy, the Comanche

and the Longbow Apache are costly, face considerable technical risk, and

may not provide the enhanced capabilities promised. For example, some

DOD officials and Army aviation users consider the Comanche’s projected

maintenance requirement unrealistic.

• Some users believe that decisions to implement the strategy may not

reflect their views and may adversely impact the operational effectiveness

of some units. For example, some users believe the decision to move an

active attack battalion to the reserves will reduce the ability to effectively

carry out rapid deployment missions.

Alternatives Not

Adequately Considered

In addition, DOD and Army studies have not fully considered alternative

helicopters and weapon systems that could accomplish many of the

planned roles and missions of the strategy’s centerpiece—the Comanche.

The Army looked at some alternative helicopters and aircraft in

developing past Comanche cost and operational effectiveness analyses;

however, in developing its current aviation modernization strategy, the

Army did not fully consider alternative aircraft that can meet the Army’s

aviation needs. Recent DOD reviews of force structure and roles and

missions also failed to adequately explore the issue of alternative

helicopters or weapon systems in meeting the Army’s aviation needs.

Decisions to use alternative helicopters could alter the mix and quantity of

helicopters in the Army’s projected fleet. The lack of full consideration of

alternatives calls into question the validity of the strategy.

In light of the changing resource environment, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense, in August 1994, directed the services to develop program options,

including termination, to selected major defense acquisition programs, one

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Executive Summary

of which was the Comanche. GAO did not examine the pros and cons of

terminating the Comanche, but it did identify three U.S.-built alternative

helicopters that it believes could, if upgraded, perform many of the

Comanche’s roles and missions.

Army Aviation Strategy

Focuses on Two Key

Helicopter Programs

Declining budgets mean that the Army cannot afford to fund all of its

modernization requirements, including those in its Aviation Modernization

Plan. To implement its Aviation Modernization Plan, the Army has chosen

to fund the Comanche procurement and Apache upgrade programs while

deferring or canceling other helicopter modernization programs, such as

medical evacuation and cargo helicopters, that the Army believes are

important to the performance of its aviation missions. DOD maintains that

the Army’s modernization program reflects the tight budget environment

and the priorities placed by the Army on all of its competing programs.

Further, the Army faces an estimated $540 million shortfall in the

Comanche program. To address this shortfall, the Army is proposing to

streamline the Comanche acquisition program. According to Army

officials, under its streamlining proposal, it plans to eliminate some

testing, buy fewer prototypes, and shorten the developmental phase of the

acquisition process by concurrently doing things that normally should be

done sequentially, thereby increasing risks associated with entering

production too soon. Concurrent development and production have

caused DOD significant problems in the past on other systems. Problems

found in developmental testing that have to be corrected in already

produced or concurrently produced models significantly increase overall

program costs.

Recommendation GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army revise the Army’s aviation

modernization strategy in order to consider (1) the revised force structure,

(2) the validated mix and quantity of helicopters for each aviation unit, and

(3) an analysis of appropriate alternative capabilities to satisfy the aviation

mission’s various roles. This could be done at the same time the next

Aviation Modernization Plan is prepared.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

In reviewing the Army’s revised Aviation Modernization Plan currently

planned to be submitted in January 1995, the Congress should consider

whether it adequately addresses the issues raised in this report. The

Congress may also wish to consider requiring the Secretary of the Army to

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Executive Summary

forego any acquisition streamlining initiatives for the Comanche program

until the revised modernization strategy is submitted.

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

DOD generally agreed with the thrust of GAO’s findings; however, it asserted

that the Army’s strategy did incorporate user concerns and that the Army

had adequately considered alternative aircraft in developing the strategy.

DOD pointed out that the revised Army Aviation Modernization Plan should

be issued in January 1995, and Army leadership intends to provide it to the

Congress and the Secretary of Defense. Also, DOD noted that the Army

intends to take another look at the streamlining proposal. Therefore, DOD

did not believe GAO’s recommendation and matters for congressional

consideration were necessary.

GAO has revised the report to incorporate DOD’s suggested technical

corrections and to more fully explain the basis for the conclusions

regarding user perceptions. However, after careful consideration of DOD’s

comments, GAO continues to believe that its recommendation and matters

for congressional consideration concerning streamlining are still valid.

Although the Army is revising its Aviation Modernization Plan, neither DOD

nor the Army provided any indication of how the revised plan would

address GAO’s concerns. Moreover, DOD provided no analyses that

alternative aircraft options had been studied in developing the Army’s

aviation modernization strategy. GAO has, therefore, revised the matters for

congressional consideration to suggest that the Congress carefully review

the Army’s plan to ensure that it addresses the issues in this report.

GAO has consistently reported on its concerns with concurrent

development and production of DOD’s weapon systems. Therefore, GAO

continues to believe that the Army should postpone any acquisition

streamlining initiatives at least until the Aviation Modernization Plan is

reviewed by the Congress and until the future of the Comanche program is

determined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s review of selected major

acquisition programs and their alternatives.

DOD’s comments are addressed in the body of this report where

appropriate and are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with

GAO’s evaluation.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Army Aviation Modernization Strategy 10

Determining Army Aviation Requirements 12

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 12

Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s

Aviation

Modernization

Strategy Is Now

Questionable

16

Strategy Does Not Reflect Anticipated Force Reductions 16

Differences Exist in the Military About Strategy’s Unit Force

Structure

18

Strategy Relies on Costly and High-Technical Risk Helicopter

Development

18

Strategy May Not Reflect Users’ Concerns 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Chapter 3 

Aviation

Modernization

Strategy Did Not

Adequately Consider

Alternatives

24

Army Plans Lack Full Consideration of Alternatives 24

Possible Alternative Helicopters to Perform the Comanche’s

Missions

25

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Chapter 4 

Army Aviation

Strategy Focuses on

Two Key Helicopter

Programs

28

Helicopter Programs Were Canceled or Deferred 29

Future Funding of Deferred Programs May Be Difficult 30

Streamlining Proposal Increases Risk 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Contents

Chapter 5 

Conclusions,

Recommendation,

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration, and

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

33

Conclusions 33

Recommendation 33

Matters for Congressional Consideration 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 36

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 54

Tables Table 2.1: Our Estimates of Interim and Objective Force Aircraft

Requirements

17

Table 2.2: Our Analysis of Impact of Division Cuts on Selected

Helicopter Requirements

17

Abbreviations

COEA cost and operational effectiveness analysis

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The Army’s current aviation modernization strategy was documented in

the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan, which was modified by the

February 1993 Aviation Restructure Initiative and validated by the

September 1993 Department of Defense’s (DOD) Bottom-Up Review. In

determining its aviation requirements, the Army has designated the

Comanche helicopter as the centerpiece of its aviation modernization

strategy.

Army Aviation

Modernization

Strategy

The Army’s latest biennial Aviation Modernization Plan, issued in

January 1993, was to be the Army’s aviation modernization guide into the

21st century. However, as the Army was developing the plan, the world

situation was changing. Evolving national military strategy expanded the

Army’s roles in national assistance, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug

activities, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism. The focus of

the national warfighting doctrine changed from a major European war to

regional conflicts. The dependence on foreign-based U.S. troops was

replaced by one of rapidly deploying U.S.-based troops overseas.

The Army’s total research, development, and acquisition budget declined

by 36 percent for fiscal years 1990 through 1994. Army acquisition funding

decreased about 50 percent during this time; however, research and

development funding was more stable—remaining in the $5 billion a year

range.

Army officials realized before the 1993 update to the Aviation

Modernization Plan was issued that it would not reflect the global and

budgetary changes taking place. Therefore, the Aviation Center at Fort

Rucker, Alabama, began an effort with the intent of redesigning the

aviation force structure to resolve the problems associated with

downsizing and affordability. The resultant Army’s Aviation Restructure

Initiative was issued February 3, 1993.

The current aviation modernization strategy is the product of the 1993

Aviation Modernization Plan and the Aviation Restructure Initiative. The

objectives of the Army’s modernization efforts were to (1) correct

deficiencies in the Army’s aviation force structure, particularly its

reconnaissance and attack capabilities; (2) reduce aviation maintenance

and support requirements; (3) reduce aviation operating costs; and

(4) retire old aircraft. These objectives were to be achieved within

anticipated funding levels. According to the Army, modern armed

reconnaissance and attack helicopter capabilities are required to project a

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

force worldwide and achieve battlefield dominance. A modernized Apache

fleet and the Comanche, when fielded, would provide those capabilities.

To carry out its modernization strategy, the Army intends to (1) procure

about 1,300 Comanche helicopters, some with enhancements provided by

the Army’s Longbow program, (2) modify 761 existing Apaches with some

or all of the Longbow upgrades, and (3) purchase approximately 350

Kiowa Warrior helicopters to use until the Comanche is introduced. The

Army plans to spend $6.2 billion in research, development, and acquisition

funds to modernize its helicopter fleet during fiscal years 1995-1999. Of

that amount, $4.7 billion, approximately 76 percent, will be spent on the

Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters, with which the Army

intends to perform future reconnaissance and attack missions.

The implementation of the strategy is scheduled to begin in fiscal year

1995 and is split into two phases. Design goals have been established for

the interim time frame—from initiation through the year 2015—and for the

objective force—beyond the year 2015 when the Comanche is to be fully

fielded. As of February 1993, the Army owned 7,914 helicopters,

comprising 10 different types. The strategy calls for 4,965 helicopters,

consisting of 5 types—the Chinook, Blackhawk, Apache, Comanche, and

Light Utility Helicopter.

In its September 1, 1993, report, DOD’s Bottom-Up Review concluded,

among other things, that the Army should have 10 active and 5 reserve

divisions in order to maintain the capability to win 2 nearly simultaneous

major regional conflicts. Regarding the Army’s attack and reconnaissance

fleet, the review concluded that the Army’s modernization plan provided

significant improvements and a balanced, deployable, and sustainable

fleet. A group of outside experts evaluated the review’s analysis and

concluded that the Army’s plan to acquire the Comanche and the Longbow

Apache would provide significant improvements in both reconnaissance

and attack capabilities. According to the review, the life-cycle cost

estimate of this option was $75.6 billion. At the conclusion of the study,

the Secretary of Defense endorsed the Army’s aviation modernization

strategy with the Comanche as its centerpiece. The current life-cycle cost

estimate for the Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters,

according to program officials and program documents, is about

$157 billion, of which about $51.6 billion is for research, development, and

acquisition.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Determining Army

Aviation

Requirements

The Army’s process for determining its aviation requirements and

consolidating them into its budget request involves varying degrees of

analysis at three levels of the Army’s organization. The Army Aviation

Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, drafts an aviation branch assessment.

This assessment is developed following guidance in the National Military

Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, and Field Manual 100-5 on

Operations and incorporates input provided by Army aviation users. The

branch assessment is a fiscally unconstrained prioritized list of

requirements—perceived deficiencies in the force that need to be

resolved.

The Center sends its assessment to the Training and Doctrine Command

where it is combined with assessments from the Army’s 16 other branches.

The Command evaluates the branch assessments and develops a list of

needs for the entire Army. Based on this analysis, the Command decides

what the Army must have to be an effective fighting force and produces a

list of Army-wide aviation requirements—the Warfighting Lens Analysis.

The Command sends this analysis to the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations and Plans and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Research, Development, and Acquisition. After reviewing the analysis, they

generate the Long-Range Research, Development, and Acquisition

Plan—the Army’s fiscally constrained 15-year strategic plan for

procurement. This plan helps form the basis for the Army’s portion of

DOD’s budget request.

Objective, Scope, and

Methodology

The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, requested

that we review how the Army is modernizing its aviation force, in

particular its attack and reconnaissance helicopters, which represent the

major portion of the Army’s aviation modernization investment. Our

objectives were to determine whether (1) the Army’s plan for modernizing

its aviation fleet is still valid, (2) there are alternative aircraft systems to

the ones the Army plans to acquire, and (3) the Army’s funding plans

include all of the helicopter systems that it says it needs.

We conducted the majority of our review at the U.S. Army Aviation and

Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri; the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort

Rucker, Alabama; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort

Monroe, Virginia; DOD and the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

In addition, we visited Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Hood, Texas, to

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

obtain the aviation user’s perspective on requirements. To obtain data on

helicopter capabilities, we visited Bell Helicopter Textron, Fort Worth,

Texas; Boeing Defense and Space Group, Helicopter Division,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems, Mesa,

Arizona; and United Technologies, Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford,

Connecticut. We also visited the Comanche Joint Program Office in

Trumbull, Connecticut.

To determine whether the Army’s helicopter modernization plans were

still valid, we interviewed cognizant Army officials involved in the aviation

requirements setting process. The purpose of these interviews was to gain

a balanced perspective on the requirements process from those at all

organizational levels who are involved in its implementation. Officials that

we talked to who were directly involved in the process of developing the

requirement were located at the office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff

for Operations and Plans; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition; the offices responsible for developing

requirements data for input to and preparation of the Warfighting Lens

Analysis at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; and offices

responsible for preparing branch assessments, which reflect critical inputs

to the requirements process such as threat analyses, doctrine,

organizational structure, training, and equipment, at the Army Aviation

Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

We also talked to active unit commanders, pilots, and aviation

maintenance personnel at the brigade, battalion, and squadron levels who

provide input to the process and eventually implement the decisions the

process produces. These individuals represented Force Package I and

Force Package II units. Commanders and pilots in Force Package I units

are those that deploy first and, therefore, require the highest level of

equipment support and training. Commanders and pilots of Force 

Package II units are those that immediately follow Force Package I units in

a deployment.

Because these units are among the first to enter a conflict, we believed

that they would be keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of

the systems they use in the missions they perform. Therefore, they could

provide valuable insights into the current mission deficiencies in the

Army’s aviation systems and how the Army’s planned strategy would

address those deficiencies. This approach was especially important in our

assessment of the Comanche’s capabilities to correct deficiencies in the

reconnaissance and light attack missions as there are no production

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

representative prototypes to evaluate. We were able to obtain users’

perceptions on how the requirements process responded to their

observation on needed and unneeded capabilities in the Comanche

helicopter.

We also obtained documentation on the roles, missions, and doctrinal

employment of helicopters and the results of previously conducted studies

or tests that evaluated a helicopter’s performance or its requirement. In

addition, we obtained the supporting data used in the Bottom-Up Review

evaluation of force structure options for Army attack and reconnaissance

helicopters. We used this data to perform our own analysis of aviation

requirements for several force structure options, including the 16-division

option considered in the Bottom-Up Review.

To determine if the Army considered alternative aircraft in developing its

aviation modernization strategy, we interviewed key Army aviation

officials and helicopter contractors involved in the aviation requirements

setting and acquisition process. We developed a data collection instrument

to obtain performance capabilities and specific mission information on

various Army helicopters from both the Army and contractors, which we

used for comparison purposes. We also obtained Army documentation and

studies on various aircraft in the force structure and underdevelopment.

Throughout the review, we attempted to obtain and evaluate copies of any

studies that looked at alternative strategies. DOD and Army officials were

unable to provide such studies.

To determine whether the Army’s funding plans included all of the

helicopters that it said it needs, we interviewed DOD and Army personnel

involved in the budgetary process and responsible for establishing the

short- and long-term funding estimates. We also interviewed

representatives from the Congressional Budget Office, the Defense Budget

Project, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Brookings

Institution to discuss defense budget projections. We obtained and

assessed funding estimates contained in the fiscal year 1995 President’s

Budget, the fiscal year 1995 Future Years Defense Program, Selected

Acquisition Reports, and Research and Development and Procurement

Cost Driver Reports. We compared this data to the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Plan to determine which systems the Army is funding. In

addition, we interviewed Army aviation program management personnel

and obtained data supporting cost estimates developed for future aviation

requirements.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

We conducted our review from March 1993 through August 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now Questionable

The validity of the Army’s aviation modernization strategy is now

questionable. The Army’s estimates of the quantities of helicopters needed

are higher than those identified in the DOD’s Bottom-Up Review. The

Army’s estimates were not based on the same total force structure and

unit composition data as DOD’s estimates. In addition, the Army overstated

expected benefits and understated technical risks associated with the

Comanche and the Longbow Apache programs that represent the bulk of

its modernization strategy. While the Army believes that it can accomplish

its modernization objectives, some users are concerned that their needs

may not have adequately been considered and that implementation of the

current procurement plan could result in an inappropriate mix and

quantity of helicopters and, therefore, adversely impact operational

effectiveness.

Strategy Does Not

Reflect Anticipated

Force Reductions

The total force structure used as the basis for computing requirements in

the Army’s aviation modernization strategy is higher than the force

structure used in DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review assessment. While the

Army’s strategy is based on a force structure of 20 divisions, the

Bottom-Up Review recommended reducing the number of Army divisions.

The Bottom-Up Review supported the continuation of the Army’s aviation

modernization initiative but with a reduced force structure. It

recommended that the Army reduce its force structure to 10 active and

approximately 5 reserve divisions by the end of fiscal year 1999. According

to DOD, decisions regarding the structure of the reserve component have

been left to the Army. The Army is currently basing its aviation

modernization plans on an 18-division force—10 active and 8 reserve,

according to Army Force Organization and Development officials. The

aviation assets required to support the future force, whether it be 15 or 18

divisions, will be less than what is needed for the current 20-division

structure.

According to Army officials, estimates of the number of helicopters

needed to implement the strategy are very fluid. The overall total changes

as program manager decisions on aspects of the modernization plan

change. For example, estimates of the number of Blackhawks and Kiowa

Warriors changed as program decisions under the Aviation Modernization

Plan and Restructure Initiative changed. To show the impact of varying

force structure assumptions on estimates of quantitative requirements for

helicopters, we obtained and analyzed aircraft requirements data,

including training and float requirements, for those Army organizational

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

units performing aviation missions. After we completed our analysis, the

Army officials responsible for providing aviation data to the Bottom-Up

Review validated our computations on the numbers of helicopters

affected.

We estimated that the Army would need 4,696 aircraft in the fiscal years

1995-2015 time frame for a 20-division force. For the same time frame,

4,539 helicopters would be needed to fill an 18-division structure and 

4,222 helicopters would be needed for a 15-division force structure.

Our analysis shows that the number of divisions will have little immediate

impact on the helicopter fleet. However, it will eventually impact the

Army’s procurement plans for the Longbow Apache, the Comanche, and

the Blackhawk programs as prescribed by the proposals in the aviation

modernization strategy and, ultimately, estimates of the strategy’s cost.

Table 2.1 shows aircraft quantitative requirements for the interim and

objective forces based on our projections.

Table 2.1: Our Estimates of Interim and

Objective Force Aircraft Requirements

Number of divisions

Aircraft in the

interim structure

Objective force

aircraft (8 aircraft

cavalry troop)

Objective force

aircraft (12

aircraft cavalry

troop)

20 4,696 4,669 4,956

18 4,539 4,512 4,777

15 4,222 4,195 4,428

The Aviation Restructure Initiative reduced the number of Longbow

Apache, Blackhawk, and Comanche helicopters needed to fill the current

20-division force structure. Table 2.2 shows how additional division

cuts—depending on the structure chosen—could further reduce the

requirement for these systems in the objective force.

Table 2.2: Our Analysis of Impact of

Division Cuts on Selected Helicopter

Requirements

Helicopters

Helicopters

needed for 20

division force

Helicopters

needed for 18

division force

Helicopters

needed for 15

division force

Longbow Apache 761 528 528

Blackhawk 2,252 2,171 2,016

Comanche 0a 1,520 1,325

aThe Comanche is not intended to be fielded until the year 2003.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

Differences Exist in

the Military About

Strategy’s Unit Force

Structure

There are differences of opinion throughout DOD and the Army over the

number of helicopters needed to perform the air cavalry troop role in the

Army’s objective force. The Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations and Plans and the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker,

Alabama, both document the requirement for the air cavalry troop to be 

12 aircraft per troop. This is the basis used under the Aviation Restructure

Initiative and, therefore, the Army’s strategy. However, the Bottom-Up

Review performed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which

evaluated the continuation of the Comanche program, based its decisions

on using eight aircraft in the cavalry troop in the objective force. The

Comanche Training and Doctrine Command System manager’s and

program manager’s offices also used eight aircraft in a cavalry troop to

develop the Comanche’s future tactics, techniques, and procedures. As

table 2.1 shows, the difference between using 8 or 12 aircraft in the cavalry

role in the Army’s current 20-division force is 287 aircraft.

Although the Bottom-Up Review eventually recommended a 15-division

force structure, it used a 16-division force structure for its computations.

However, the 16-division structure included 2 more attack battalions than

it should have. It also used 8 helicopters in a cavalry troop instead of the

required 12. These inconsistencies resulted in DOD underestimating some

of the helicopters it needs and overestimating others.

For example, our analysis shows that using a 16-division force structure

with the required number of 12 helicopters in the cavalry troop and

eliminating the 2 extra attack battalions, the Army would need 1,378

Comanches. This amount is 192 more than the Bottom-Up Review

estimated the Army needed. The cost of the option would increase by

approximately $6.7 billion, which is the amount needed to procure the

additional 192 Comanches at a unit cost of $35 million.

Strategy Relies on

Costly and

High-Technical Risk

Helicopter

Development

DOD’s Bottom-Up Review recommended that the Army continue on its

course of developing the Comanche and the Longbow Apache despite this

being the most costly option. According to the review, this option has a

life-cycle cost estimate of $75.6 billion and is more than $23.6 billion

higher than the lowest cost option, which would terminate the Comanche

program but retain the Longbow Apache and procure additional Kiowa

Warriors. The Bottom-Up Review report noted that this higher cost was

“not a significant discriminator, given the improvements in capability both

systems (the Comanche and the Longbow) provide.” However, it also

noted that “there were technical and cost-growth risks associated with this

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

option that need to be monitored and carefully managed, since both

systems are on the cutting edge of technology . . . .” Since the Bottom-Up

Review was issued, the life-cycle cost estimate has increased to

$157 billion, of which $113 billion is for the Comanche and $44 billion is

for the Longbow Apache.

Comanche Maintenance

Requirements Unlikely to

Be Achieved

The Comanche helicopter, which is in the demonstration/validation phase

of its development cycle, is designed to include advanced avionics and

targeting, increased maneuverability, greater firepower, and cutting edge

low observability features. One of the advantages intended by this

advanced technology is that the Comanche will have a significantly lower

maintenance man hours/flight hour requirement than existing helicopters.

However, because this expected maintenance requirement is considered

unrealistic, overall aviation operation and support costs may be

significantly understated.

According to many active unit users, it is unlikely that a sophisticated

aircraft, such as the Comanche, will achieve the required 2.6-maintenance

man hours/flight hour. As a matter of comparison, DOD has determined the

Apache has a 14.5-maintenance man hours/flight hour average and the less

sophisticated Kiowa Warrior a 9.5-maintenance man hours/flight hour

average. Realizing that the Army’s requirement was not realistic, the Office

of the Secretary of Defense increased its estimate of the Comanche’s

maintenance man hours/flight hour ratio to between 3.2 and 4.9 for the

Bottom-Up Review analysis. In an April 1990 study, DOD’s Cost Analysis

Improvement Group developed an independent estimate of

9.0-maintenance man hours/flight hour for the Comanche.

If DOD’s higher maintenance man hours/flight hour ratios were used in the

most recent Comanche cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA),

the Comanche may not have been ranked the most cost-effective system.

The 1990 Comanche COEA ranked the Comanche third behind the Longbow

Comanche and the Longbow Apache for operational effectiveness.

However, once the Comanche’s low maintenance ratio was applied, the

Comanche was ranked first overall. The COEA noted that the maintenance

man hours/flight hour estimates for each alternative helicopter was the

principal support for determining system costs.

The extent to which the Comanche will be able to meet the planned

2.6-hour requirement will not be demonstrated until the year 2000, after a

significant amount of money has been spent. If the Comanche is unable to

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

meet this ambitious requirement, the operation and support costs

associated with this system will significantly increase. In addition,

maintenance personnel levels are programmed based partially on the

maintenance man hours/flight hour requirement for the system. If the

actual maintenance man hours/flight hour ratio is higher than projected, a

shortage of necessary maintenance personnel would result. While this

potential shortage would impact operation and support costs, it would

also negatively affect the effectiveness of units and the affordability of the

strategy.

Longbow Technology Falls

Short of Some

Expectations

The Army plans to modify the Apache helicopter to improve its target

acquisition capabilities by adding the Longbow technology enhancements.

The Longbow Apache program includes: airframe improvements, radar

modifications, and a Longbow compatible Hellfire missile with

fire-and-forget capability.

The Longbow system being designed for the Apache helicopter falls short

of achieving the capabilities the Army originally required for stationary

target tracking. The Longbow Apache stationary target indicator

requirements have been reduced.1

 In addition, the value of the current

Longbow technology is questionable, according to an assessment

performed by the Bottom-Up Review panel. The current Longbow system

can detect (locate a target) and classify (determine whether it is a wheeled

or tracked vehicle), but it cannot recognize (tank or armored personnel

carrier) or identify (the type of tank—Soviet T-72) targets.

Longbow program officials believe that future Longbow developments

could improve the ability of Army helicopters to recognize and identify

targets through the integration of Longbow radar information with data

from a second generation forward looking infrared system. Accordingly,

the Longbow improvements increase the effectiveness and survivability of

the Apache. Demonstration of the Longbow capability still involves

high-technical risk.

Strategy May Not

Reflect Users’

Concerns

According to DOD, the requirements generation process is a complicated

operation that serves as the basis for the modernization strategy. The

process begins with recommendations from the users at the lower

organizational levels. Those recommendations are then considered in

11Acquisition of the Longbow Apache System (Report No. 94-015) DOD Inspector General,

November 9, 1993.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

relation to the overall mission of the Army, the emerging threat, national

military strategy, and available resources. DOD advised us that while not all

specific concerns may be incorporated, they are considered. DOD indicated

that the Comanche capabilities, for example, were based on real user

inputs of the operational requirements needed to successfully accomplish

cavalry and attack missions within the anticipated combat, environmental,

and geographic spectra. This is not consistent with the views of users we

interviewed.

Although the Army’s leadership believes that the current strategy will

accomplish its modernization objectives, some active unit commanders,

pilots, and aviation maintenance personnel at the brigade, battalion, and

squadron levels who provide input to the requirements setting process are

concerned that the process, and ultimately the resultant modernization

strategy, may not have adequately considered lower level

recommendations and users’ views. Some users told us that requirements

are often determined by advocates in the process. They also stated that

implementation of the strategy will change the operational mix of some

units and, therefore, reduce their operational effectiveness.

The difficulty in trying to reconstruct the evolution of decisions generated

by the requirements determination process is that the principals involved

do not document the decisions made. According to DOD and Army officials,

the information exchanged between proponents at different levels of the

process that influence decisions is not recorded, but can be significant. As

DOD said, while the requirements process may consider all concerns, they

may not be incorporated in the final decision.

Concerns on Capabilities

Acquired Under the

Strategy

Active unit helicopter users, the Army’s Aviation Center, an Army test of

scout helicopters, and the Warfighting Lens Analysis, in some instances,

support different system procurements and capabilities than what the

Army’s aviation modernization strategy supports. For example, the

strategy prescribes using the Apache attack helicopter as the scout in the

attack battalion; however, a number of the attack battalion pilots and

commanders we interviewed stated they preferred using the Kiowa

Warrior in this role. According to some Army personnel, the fact that

user’s desires and lower level recommendations do not always agree with

the Army’s overall modernization strategy may be partially due to the

advocacy driven nature and culture associated with the acquisition

process.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

According to numerous aviation users that we interviewed, they did not

need all of the costly capabilities being designed into the Comanche to

perform their assigned roles. For example, these aviation users told us

that:

• The requirement that the Comanche self-deploy across the Atlantic, is a

high-risk operation and, therefore, is not realistic. Examples of difficulties

cited in performing such a mission include: pilot fatigue, inadequate or

nonexistent training, and safety problems.

• The majority of Comanches are being procured to fill the cavalry scout

role. However, the Comanche’s 170-knot speed will be greater than what is

needed by cavalry scout units that fly slow, nap-of-the-earth missions.

• The Comanche’s low-observability requirement serves to increase the

airframe and crew’s survivability, while also increasing the aircraft’s

effectiveness in accomplishing its mission. However, when the Comanche

is configured for the light attack mission, it requires the use of external

wings. The external wings increase the radar cross section of the

Comanche and, therefore, the Comanche will be more easily detected by

enemy forces.

Concerns on Strategy’s

Impact on Operational

Effectiveness

To reduce maintenance support costs, the strategy proposes limiting the

type of helicopters in aviation attack battalions by taking Blackhawk

helicopters out of these battalions and consolidating them in general

support battalions. Many active users expressed concern that this will

leave the aviation attack battalions without the ability to perform missions

such as recovery of downed air crews without relying on a separate

command structure to supply these aircraft. For example, active unit users

told us that in conducting air crew rescue missions, the first 30 minutes

are critical to the recovery of pilots and their helicopter. In this time

critical operation, an attack battalion commander will have to request

aircraft from a general support battalion and compete against other units’

needs. In their opinion, obtaining the Blackhawks for an air crew rescue

mission under these circumstances could take longer than 30 minutes.

Also, they are concerned that, in the future, the attack battalions might be

deployed without the maintenance support provided by the general

aviation support battalions; thereby, limiting its ability to perform its

assigned missions.

According to division officials, moving one of the 101st Air Assault

Division’s three currently active attack battalions to the reserves, as

prescribed in the strategy, will reduce the division’s ability to effectively

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 2 

Validity of the Army’s Aviation

Modernization Strategy Is Now

Questionable

train to carry out its mission. According to 101st Division’s commanders,

placing one of the active attack battalions in the reserve will make it

nearly impossible for the division to maintain the necessary training and

readiness required for it to perform its rapid deployment mission.

According to the commanders, it is already very difficult to meet the

current training demands of the division with three active attack

battalions. It will become even more difficult to do so with one less attack

battalion.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD generally agreed with our findings concerning the strategy’s (1) failure

to consider force structure changes in computing helicopter requirements;

(2) reliance on costly and high-technical risk helicopter development; and

(3) potential adverse impact on operational effectiveness, the military’s

use of inconsistent unit force structure data in aviation studies, and that

advocates influence the decision process. DOD questioned our estimates of

helicopter quantities associated with a particular force structure, noting

that such estimates need to be based on a detailed breakout allowing for

training and float requirements. DOD asserted that the strategy did consider

user concerns.

We realize that unit size, mission, training, and float affect the

determination of helicopters needed by the Army. Our analysis is based on

data developed at the unit level and was validated by those Army officials

directly responsible for providing aviation data for the Bottom-Up Review.

As DOD has acknowledged, the requirements process is complicated; that is

why we have described it in the introduction to the report. The purpose of

our interviews was to obtain a balanced perspective on the requirements

process and resultant strategy from those who are involved in the final

decision and those who provide user input to the decision process—the

pilots and maintainers. We have revised the introduction of the report to

more fully describe the types of interviews we held and the purpose of

those interviews. We have also modified those sections of the report that

discuss these issues to present a more balanced description of user

perceptions of the process and resultant strategy.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 3 

Aviation Modernization Strategy Did Not

Adequately Consider Alternatives

The Army looked at some alternative helicopters and aircraft in

developing past Comanche COEAs; however, in developing its current

aviation modernization strategy, the Army did not fully consider

alternative aircraft that can meet the Army’s aviation needs. Recent

defense reviews of force structure and roles and missions also failed to

adequately explore the issue of alternative helicopters or weapon systems

in meeting the Army’s aviation needs.

However, should the Comanche be delayed or not be produced, DOD has

alternative attack and reconnaissance helicopters which, if upgraded, have

the ability to conduct many of the Comanche’s roles and missions.

Alternatives may become more affordable and, therefore, may be more

attractive in light of anticipated force structure changes; they could impact

decisions regarding the mix and quantity of helicopters in the Army’s

projected fleet.

Army Plans Lack Full

Consideration of

Alternatives

The Army did not consider alternatives to the Comanche in either the 1993

Aviation Modernization Plan or the Aviation Restructuring Initiative. Army

officials told us that they felt that the issue of alternatives had been

sufficiently addressed in the Comanche’s two COEAs and other earlier

studies. While each of the two COEAs looked at some alternative

helicopters and aircraft, they did not consider all alternative helicopters.

Both supported the continued development of the Comanche. Also, DOD, in

two recent force structure reviews, did not adequately consider alternative

helicopters or weapon systems.

The 1987 Comanche COEA considered alternative aircraft—a tiltrotor

aircraft and modifications to existing helicopters. It noted that while

modifying existing helicopters will cost less, none will meet all of the

Comanche’s requirements. The 1990 Comanche COEA considered

modifications to existing Army helicopters and two foreign helicopters. It

noted that “the (Comanche) alternative provides the Army with the most

cost and operationally effective way of modernizing its light (scout and

attack) fleet.” Neither analysis considered the Marine Corps Super Cobra,

or alternative weapon systems, such as fixed-wing aircraft or tactical

missile systems.

Two recent defense reviews, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman’s review of

roles and missions and the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review,

looked at force structure alternatives. Each failed to adequately explore

the issue of alternative helicopters or weapon systems. For example, in

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 3 

Aviation Modernization Strategy Did Not

Adequately Consider Alternatives

addressing the future course of theater air interdiction missions, the

Chairman’s review of military roles and missions focused on fixed-wing

aircraft and did not fully acknowledge other interdiction capabilities such

as the Army’s Tactical Missile System or attack helicopters.

The Secretary’s Bottom-Up Review of attack and armed reconnaissance

helicopters was limited to three options—different helicopter force

structures—and did not consider fixed-wing aircraft, tactical missiles, or

unmanned aerial vehicles. The Marine Corps’ Super Cobra and other

non-Army helicopters were also excluded from consideration.

Possible Alternative

Helicopters to

Perform the

Comanche’s Missions

On August 18, 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense—noting the desire

for a military pay increase and improvements in areas such as readiness,

sustainability, and quality of life—directed the services to develop

program options to selected major defense acquisition programs that he

identified in his memorandum. One of those programs was the Comanche

helicopter program. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary’s memorandum

stated, “The Army should develop a program alternative that terminates

the Comanche.”

We did not examine in detail the pros and cons of terminating the

Comanche as part of this review. However, we have identified three

U.S.-built alternative helicopters that we believe could, if upgraded,

conduct many of the Comanche’s roles and missions. Use of alternative

helicopters could alter the mix and quantity of helicopters in the Army’s

objective force.

The Marine Corps’ Super

Cobra

The Marine Corps’ Super Cobra, a substantially improved twin-engine

version of the Army’s Cobra helicopter, could perform armed

reconnaissance or attack missions. It can carry several different weapons,

including up to eight Hellfire missiles or two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

The Marines are currently planning to upgrade the Super Cobra helicopter

with, among other things, a four-blade rotor system that is expected to

substantially improve flight performance. With this upgrade, the Super

Cobra’s maximum airspeed is expected to increase from 170 knots to 

210 knots. Other expected advantages of the four-blade rotor are a 

170-percent increase in vertical rate-of-climb, a 40-percent increase in

payload, and a 70-percent reduction in rotor vibration levels.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 3 

Aviation Modernization Strategy Did Not

Adequately Consider Alternatives

The Army’s Apache and

Longbow Apache

The Army’s Apache performs many of the missions the Comanche is being

developed to perform. The Comanche is being developed as a

multimission aircraft that can perform both armed reconnaissance and

attack missions. The Apache, the Army’s premier attack helicopter, has

demonstrated, during Operation Desert Storm, that it can also perform

armed reconnaissance missions. Also, the Army is planning to use the

Apache as an interim armed reconnaissance helicopter until the

Comanche is fielded. Both helicopters give the Army a lethal attack

capability and vital armed reconnaissance capability.

The Army is currently testing improvements to the Apache, such as the

Longbow fire control and radar system. These improvements will include

greater reliability, fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, and digitized

electronics. If these technology enhancements are demonstrated, the Army

plans to equip 227 Apaches with the Longbow radar. This technology is

expected to improve combat effectiveness 16 fold over the current model.

In addition, in the 1990 COEA, the Longbow Apache was ranked higher, for

operational effectiveness, than the basic Comanche aircraft. Other planned

improvements on aircraft carrying the Longbow radar include enhanced

target acquisition and weapons accuracy, and the ability to hand over

targets to other Apaches.

The Army’s Kiowa Warrior The Army’s Kiowa Warrior is a much improved version of the early model

Kiowas that can perform armed reconnaissance missions. The Kiowa

Warrior incorporates a mast-mounted, stabilized sight that can be used day

or night to laser designate targets, for itself or other armed helicopters. It

is the Army’s first helicopter capable of operating on the digitized

battlefield—a capability to be incorporated into the Comanche. In an

armed configuration it can carry several different weapons, including up to

four Hellfire missiles. Possible upgrades to the Kiowa Warrior include,

among others, a night flying system, integrated helmet display system,

inertial navigation system, digital map display, engine upgrade for

improved hot day performance, conformal auxiliary fuel tanks for

increased range, an upgraded mast-mounted sight, and an improved data

modem. Many users believe the lethality, low observability, deployability,

and speed of the Kiowa Warrior when combined with certain upgrades or

doctrinal changes would resolve many of the deficiencies the Comanche is

expected to resolve.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 3 

Aviation Modernization Strategy Did Not

Adequately Consider Alternatives

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD disagreed with our assertion that the Army did not adequately

consider alternative aircraft in the development of the strategy. DOD

contends that the 1987 and 1990 Comanche COEAs looked at alternative

aircraft.

Throughout our review of the Army’s aviation modernization strategy, we

asked DOD and Army officials to provide copies of studies that showed that

DOD and the Army had looked at alternative aircraft in the development of

the strategy. We have not been provided any such studies to evaluate. The

fact that some aircraft were looked at in past Comanche COEAs does not

address (1) the thrust of our finding or (2) the Deputy Secretary of

Defense’s August 1994 call for the Army to develop a program alternative

that terminates the Comanche.

In our opinion, DOD’s response reflects the approach that has previously

prevented the Army from fully considering alternatives. The Army has

established the Comanche’s projected performance and capabilities as the

baseline standard against which all alternative aircraft are judged. We

continue to believe that in developing the strategy—especially in today’s

budget environment, the Army should, at least, seriously consider the

capabilities of other aircraft to perform the attack and reconnaissance

missions called for in the Aviation Modernization Plan.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 4 

Army Aviation Strategy Focuses on Two Key

Helicopter Programs

Declining budgets mean that the Army cannot afford to fund all of its

modernization requirements, including aviation modernization. Therefore,

the Army is faced with making major decisions on how to fulfill its mission

in the face of reduced resources. To achieve its mission objectives, the

Army has opted to modernize its force through the acquisition of weapon

systems that it states would provide the necessary technological

advantages on the battlefield.

For its aviation modernization strategy, the Army has chosen to use most

of its available resources to procure the Comanche helicopter and upgrade

the Apache helicopter and defer or cancel funding of other Army

helicopter programs. The option the Army has chosen to modernize its

aviation fleet has a life-cycle cost currently estimated at $157 billion. This

acquisition plan excludes an estimated $15.7 billion in other Army

helicopter programs that the Army’s modernization plans have indicated

are important to the performance of its aviation missions.

In addition, the Army is faced with an estimated $540 million shortfall in

the Comanche program. The Army is proposing to streamline this

acquisition program in order to deal with the shortfall. However, DOD

officials have expressed concerns about the risk associated with the

Army’s proposal. The Army’s plan calls for eliminating some testing,

buying fewer prototypes, and shortening the developmental phase of the

acquisition process by concurrently doing things that normally should be

done sequentially, thereby increasing risks associated with entering

production too soon.

It should be noted that we reported in May 1992 and again in March 1994

that given real and probable development cost increases, an uncertain

operating and support cost environment, and questions about the role of

the Comanche compared to other Army helicopters, the Congress may

wish to reconsider the need to purchase the Comanche.1

 Terminating the

program could produce hundreds of millions in budget savings through

fiscal year 1999.

1

Comanche Helicopter: Program Needs Reassessment Due to Increased Unit Cost and Other Factors

(GAO/NSIAD-92-204, May 27, 1992) and Addressing the Deficit: Budgetary Implications of Selected

GAO Work (GAO/OCG-94-3, Mar. 11, 1994).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 4 

Army Aviation Strategy Focuses on Two Key

Helicopter Programs

Helicopter Programs

Were Canceled or

Deferred

According to DOD, the Army cannot fund all of its modernization programs,

and the Army’s aviation modernization program reflects the tight budget

environment and the priorities placed by the Army on all of its competing

programs. In deciding to fund the development of the Comanche and the

Longbow Apache helicopters, Army officials indicated that they could not

afford other aviation program requirements identified in the Army’s

Aviation Modernization Plan and Restructure Initiative. The Army’s

funding plans, therefore, defer or cancel about $15.7 billion in other

helicopter programs that its modernization plans indicate are important to

the performance of its aviation missions.

Army officials provided the following examples of aviation programs that

were included in the January 1993 Aviation Modernization Plan and the

Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative but are excluded from the Army’s

current spending plans.

• The Chinook cargo helicopter will have to be modernized because the

Army cannot afford to replace it with a new aircraft program in the near

future. Although various degrees of modernization could be undertaken, a

major modernization program could cost as much as $6.8 billion.

• The Army’s medical community needs modern medical evacuation

capability to replace its current outdated fleet. The cost to modify each

aircraft could be as much as $1.9 million. The medical community needs

about 400 of these aircraft. Therefore, total modification costs could be as

much as $760 million.

• The Army canceled production of the Blackhawk utility helicopter

because of affordability concerns; therefore, there is no production

funding after fiscal year 1996. Based on the Army’s previous modernization

plans, 605 aircraft were needed. At a production rate of 60 aircraft per

year, a total of $4.4 billion in funding would be needed to finish production

of this aircraft.

• Depending on the modernization option chosen for the Huey utility

helicopter, total program costs range from $705 million to $2.8 billion to

modernize up to 1,000 helicopters.

• The Light Utility Helicopter was originally intended to replace the Vietnam

era Huey and Blackhawk helicopters that are currently performing the

light utility role. The Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan shows a

requirement for 491, and the Aviation Restructure Initiative shows a

requirement of 131. No cost estimates for Light Utility Helicopter

modernization options were available at the time of our review.

• The Congress usually provides funding for the Kiowa Warrior program as

an add on to the Army’s budget. If the Army had to fund the total Kiowa

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 4 

Army Aviation Strategy Focuses on Two Key

Helicopter Programs

Warrior production requirement, it would need a total of $881 million.

Since the Kiowa Warrior retrofit program is a necessary companion to the

production program, program officials plan to request $89 million for fiscal

year 1996 to retrofit 36 aircraft.

Future Funding of

Deferred Programs

May Be Difficult

Further declines in defense funding and predicted increases in funding for

existing programs may have a significant impact on the Army’s ability to

fund canceled or deferred aviation programs. During fiscal years

1990-1994, the Army’s budget declined from $79 billion to $61 billion, a

23-percent reduction. That compares to a 14-percent reduction in DOD’s

budget during the same time frame. During the same time frame, the Army

experienced a 36-percent reduction to its research, development, and

acquisition funding. DOD funding for these areas declined by 31 percent.

Army officials told us they expect further reductions in the Army’s budget.

Recently, DOD identified an unexpected $20 billion shortfall for fiscal years

1996-1999. As a result, planning guidance reduced the Army’s overall

budget projection by $2.5 billion for those years, according to Army

officials. This $2.5 billion reduction could have a significant impact on the

Army’s aviation modernization strategy.

DOD also predicted increases in Army funding requirements during the

fiscal years 2000-2010 time frame in an April 1993 report2

 provided to the

Congress on selected Army helicopter modernization programs. According

to this report, aviation’s share of the Army’s research, development, and

acquisition budget during the fiscal years 2000-2010 time frame may

increase from the historical average of about 14 percent to about

28 percent. DOD’s analysis assumed the Army budget would remain

constant at the fiscal year 1999 level. Army officials we spoke with

acknowledged that the Army faces increased funding requirements in this

time frame. This is brought on by the procurement of major weapon

systems such as the Comanche, Longbow Apache, Bradley Fighting

Vehicle, Abrams Tank, and Advanced Field Artillery System.

Our recent report on DOD’s Future Years Defense Program points out that

more programs have been included in DOD’s future years plans than

spending plans will support.3

 As previously discussed, the Army has

2

Tactical Air (Helicopter Portion): Report to Congress Addressing Comanche Light Armed Scout

Helicopter, Apache-Longbow, and Apache-C, April 1993.

3

Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to Billions in Overprogramming

(GAO/NSIAD-94-210, July 29, 1994).

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 4 

Army Aviation Strategy Focuses on Two Key

Helicopter Programs

documented $15.7 billion in aviation programs that it will not be able to

support and, therefore, has decided to develop its spending plans for

modernizing its aviation fleet around the procurement of the Comanche

and upgrade of the Apache.

Streamlining Proposal

Increases Risk

Despite the Army’s effort to cancel or defer some aviation programs to

afford its modernization strategy, the Army is faced with a current

shortfall on the Comanche program estimated at $540 million. This

shortfall exists because of planned reductions in the Army’s funding for

fiscal years 1995-2004.

In December 1993, the Comanche’s prime contractor team submitted an

estimate of $819 million to complete a streamlined engineering and

manufacturing development phase. That estimate was revised downward

to $540 million when the contracting team “scrubbed” the estimate. In

May 1994, the Army submitted its plan to “streamline” the Comanche

program to the Secretary of Defense for approval. However, according to

program officials, DOD expressed concern regarding the proposed

reduction in prototypes and program schedule slippage that they believe

would cause higher risk associated with the increased concurrency in the

program. The plan proposed merging the prototype and engineering and

manufacturing development phases into one development phase and

having two developmental prototypes and three low-rate initial production

helicopters instead of the original six developmental prototypes.

The Army acknowledges DOD’s concerns that its plan to truncate the

developmental phase will introduce concurrency into the Comanche

acquisition program and, therefore, increase risks associated with entering

production too soon. We have reported on problems associated with

increased risks of concurrent development and production on other

systems.4

 For example, we have reported on various programs that

problems found in developmental testing, which have to be corrected in

already produced or concurrently produced models, significantly

increases overall program cost and may result in an aircraft that does not

meet performance requirements. Therefore, we are also concerned that

the Army’s approach will lead to the same problems that DOD has

experienced under those acquisition programs with concurrent

development and production. As previously mentioned, we have

4

Acquisition Reform: Role of Test and Evaluation in System Acquisition Should Not Be Weakened

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-124, Mar. 22, 1994).

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 4 

Army Aviation Strategy Focuses on Two Key

Helicopter Programs

specifically reported on our concerns about the affordability of the

Comanche program.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed that the Army does not have adequate resources to implement

all of its modernization programs. DOD also said it may have difficulty in

obtaining sufficient future funds for its aviation programs and that

streamlining the Comanche’s developmental phase of acquisition will

increase concurrency and its associated risks.

DOD indicated that it was in the process of formulating its fiscal year 1996

budget and, therefore, specific resource shortfalls for Army aviation

programs cannot be substantiated at this stage. Likewise, DOD pointed out

that the estimated $540 million shortfall associated with the Comanche

program represented the difference between the Army program manager’s

cost estimate and the contractor’s rough order of magnitude estimate of

the funds needed to execute the streamlined engineering and

manufacturing development phase of the program through fiscal year

2004. According to DOD, the amount of the shortfall, if any, has not yet

been validated.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 5 

Conclusions, Recommendation, Matters for

Congressional Consideration, and Agency

Comments and Our Evaluation

Conclusions As it proceeds with its aviation modernization strategy, we believe the

Army needs to resolve several inconsistencies and make a final decision

regarding its total force structure and unit force composition. The total

force structure the Army chooses—15 or 18 division—will have an impact

on the number and mix of helicopters in the Army’s future helicopter fleet.

In light of anticipated reductions in future Army budgets and concomitant

force structure changes, we believe alternatives to the Army’s current

aviation modernization option may become more attractive. Should the

Comanche be delayed or not produced, we believe alternative attack and

reconnaissance helicopters exist that have the ability to conduct most, if

not all, of the Comanche’s roles and missions.

Like the other services, the Army is faced with a major dilemma—how

does it fulfill its mission in the face of reduced resources. To achieve its

mission objectives, the Army has opted to modernize its force through the

acquisition of weapon systems that it states would provide the necessary

technological advantages on the battlefield. For its aviation modernization

strategy, the Army has chosen to procure the Comanche helicopter and

upgrade the Apache—an option that can only be funded at the expense of

other aviation modernization programs that the Army’s modernization

plans indicate are important to the performance of its aviation missions.

In addition to predicted future funding shortfalls, the Army is already

faced with a funding shortfall in the Comanche program of about

$540 million and, therefore, wants to “streamline” the Comanche

acquisition program. To us, this is just another name for introducing

concurrency to the program and, therefore, increasing the risks associated

with entering production too soon.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of the Army revise the Army’s aviation

modernization strategy in order to consider (1) the agreed upon force

structure, (2) the validated mix and quantity of helicopters for each

aviation unit, and (3) an analysis of appropriate alternative capabilities to

satisfy the aviation mission’s various roles. This could be done at the same

time the next Aviation Modernization Plan is prepared.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

In reviewing the Army’s revised Aviation Modernization Plan currently

planned to be submitted in January 1995, the Congress should consider

whether it adequately addresses the issues in this report. The Congress

may also wish to consider requiring the Secretary of the Army to forego

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Chapter 5 

Conclusions, Recommendation, Matters for

Congressional Consideration, and Agency

Comments and Our Evaluation

any acquisition streamlining initiatives for the Comanche program until

the revised modernization strategy is submitted.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD pointed out that the Army’s revised Army Modernization Plan, a

subset of which is the Aviation Modernization Plan, should be out by

January 1995, and Army leadership intends to provide it to the Congress

and the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, DOD felt that our recommendation

and the matters for consideration concerning the need for a revised

strategy were not necessary. DOD also pointed out that since the Army now

intends to take another look at the streamlining proposal in the third

quarter of fiscal year 1995, our matters for congressional consideration

concerning streamlining were unnecessary.

We have revised the report to incorporate DOD’s suggested technical

corrections and to more fully explain the basis for the conclusions

regarding user perceptions. However, after careful consideration of DOD’s

comments, we continue to believe that our recommendation and matters

for congressional consideration concerning streamlining are still valid.

Although the Army is revising its Aviation Modernization Plan, neither DOD

nor the Army provided any indication of how the revised plan would

address our concerns. Moreover, DOD provided no analyses that alternative

aircraft options had been studied in developing the Army’s aviation

modernization strategy. We have, therefore, revised the matters for

congressional consideration to suggest that the Congress carefully review

the Army’s plan to ensure that it addresses the issues in this report.

We have consistently reported on our concerns with concurrent

development and production of DOD’s weapon systems. In fact, in our

May 27, 1992, report on the need to reassess the Comanche program, we

raised our concern about concurrency and recommended that the

Secretary of the Army eliminate concurrency to the extent practicable. At

that time, DOD agreed with our recommendation and noted that it planned

to consider the issue in its next scheduled program review.

We continue to believe that Army “streamlining” initiatives should be

postponed at least until the Aviation Modernization Plan has been

reviewed by the Congress and until the future of the Comanche program is

determined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s review of selected major

acquisition programs and their alternatives.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2 and 10-11.

See comment 2.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 28.

See comment 1.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 29-30.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

Now on pp. 30-31.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 31-32.

Now on pp. 16-17.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 6.

Now on p. 18.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

Now on pp. 18-19.

See comment 1.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 19-20.

See comment 8.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 20.

See comment 9.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 20-21.

See comment 1.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 21.

See comment 1.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 22-23.

Now on pp. 24-26.

See comment 1.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 32.

See comment 1.

Now on pp. 5

and 33-34.

See comment 1.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5

and 33-34.

See comment 1.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated September 20, 1994.

1. We have modified the report to incorporate and address this comment.

2. Our statement is not meant to evaluate the seriousness of the threat; it is

a description of the world condition within which Army aviation

modernization decisions are being made. The Bottom-Up Review

acknowledges that “. . . the Army is reducing the size of its helicopter fleet

as part of its overall force structure, . . .”.

3. As we stated in the report, program managers believe that

modernization of the Chinook is required and, therefore, they are

requesting funds to start such a program in the fiscal years 1996-2001

budget cycle.

4. The Light Utility Helicopter was originally intended to replace the

Vietnam era Huey and Blackhawk helicopters that are currently

performing the light utility role. However, the Light Utility Helicopter is

still a concept under study, and the Army canceled Blackhawk production.

When the Army canceled production of the Blackhawk, we believe it put

itself in the position of again considering whether to include most, if not

all, 1,000 Huey helicopters in the extension program to achieve the desired

light utility helicopter capability.

5. We have deleted this information from the report.

6. DOD officials responsible for putting together the Bottom-Up Review’s

report told us that they analyzed various force structures, including a

20-division force structure, but when it became obvious that the number of

Army divisions was going to be reduced, they turned their focus to a

16-division structure. (Also see comment 1.)

7. The numbers in our analysis show the impact of DOD and Army decisions

on computations of helicopter quantities and, therefore, the validity of the

quantities in the strategy. DOD’s response further highlights the point we

are making in the report. DOD conceded that decisions regarding the

number of helicopters in an air calvary troop are still under consideration.

According to DOD, emerging analysis indicates that 12 or more might be the

optimal number. Once that number and the size of the divisional units are

settled, DOD noted that the number of armed reconnaissance aircraft

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

needed will be determined. Therefore, the quantities in the strategy will

have to be adjusted.

Additionally, the Bottom-Up Review’s estimate of the cost of the Army’s

modernization option will have to be adjusted. As previously discussed,

the Bottom-Up Review estimate reflects Comanche quantitative

requirements based on eight aircraft for an air calvary troop. (Also see

comment 1.)

8. DOD lists the planned initiatives the Army is emphasizing to ensure that

the Comanche achieves its low maintenance goal. However, DOD does not

rebut the fact that the Bottom-Up Review and DOD’s Cost Analysis

Improvement Group believe the Comanche’s maintenance goals are

understated. Also, DOD does not explain why the less sophisticated Kiowa

Warrior has a much higher maintenance rate than that projected for the

more sophisticated Comanche.

9. The report points out that program officials believe Longbow

improvements can increase the effectiveness of Army helicopters. DOD

cited individual capabilities of the Longbow radar and the Hellfire missile

and concluded that, combined, these subsystems increase the

effectiveness and survivability of the Apache.

The individual subsystems may have the capabilities DOD cites; however,

the Longbow Hellfire system has not been fully tested as an integrated

system. Therefore, it is not possible to verify whether the systems will

work together or provide the increased effectiveness DOD’s response

implies has already occurred.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Thomas J. Schulz

Derek B. Stewart

Robert J. Stolba

Laura L. Durland

John P. Swain

David B. Best

Gregory K. Harmon

Michael T. Nolan

Kansas City Regional

Office

Gary L. Billen

Robert D. Spence

Lauri A. Bischof

(707010) Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a

single address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (301) 258-4097 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Mail

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100
GAO/NSIAD-95-9 Army Aviation