NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0085n.06 Case No. 07- 2352 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT DARION TURNER, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. KEN NE TH R OM AN OWS KI, Wa r de n, Respondent-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEF ORE: BA TC HELD ER , C hie f Judg e ; M OORE and CO LE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Chief Ju dge. Pe tit ion e r D ari on Turn e r ( “ Turn e r”) a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his pe tit ion fo r wr it of ha be a s c or pu s. B e c a

us e Turn e r f

a ile d to c omp ly with the applicable one-year statute of l imitations , and because we find that equitable tolling is not appropr iate in this case, w e AF FI RM the judgment of the district c ourt in denying T urner ’s petition fo r wri t of

ha be a s c or pu s, a lbe it o n a lte rn a tiv e g ro un ds

.

P ROCEDURAL HIST ORY On J une 14, 1993, Turne r wa s convicted in state c ourt of two counts of se cond-de g ree murder

and on e fe lony

fi re arm of fe ns e . T ur

ne r a pp e a le d his c on vic tio n to the Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls, raisingtwo claims: (1) that the tria l court err ed in admitting evidenc e of the J une 16 shooting ; and (2) that the prosecutor enga g ed in misconduct by not reve aling the details of a plea ba rg ain re ache d with one of the state ’s witnesses. The Court of Appea ls affirme d Turner ’s conviction on De cembe rNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

O n O c to b e r 6 , 2 0 0 9 , T u rn e r fil e d a M o tio n fo r J u d ic ia l N o tice o f S ta te C o u rt R e c o rd s , s u b m it ti n g c e rta in 1 do cumen t s f

i l ed dur i ng T ur ner ’ s s t at e c our t procee di ng s . W hi l e i t i s not ent i r el y cl ear t hat a mo t i on f or j udi ci al not i ce i s t h e appr opr i at e met h od f or bri n g i n g t h e c on t en t s of t h e s t at e c ou r t re cor d t o ou r a t t en t i on , w e g r an t T u r n er ’ s M ot i on f o r Ju d i cial N o t i ce t o t he ex t en t ne ce ssary f o r co nsid era t i o n o f

t he st ate c o urt rec o rd s. 2 21 , 1 99 4. I n J anu ary 19 95 , T ur ne r f ile d a n a pp lic a tio n f

or le a ve to a pp e a l to the Mic hig an Su

pr e me Court, raising the same claims he had raised in his initial appea l and addingtwo new c laims: (1) that t h e v er d i ct was a g ainst the g reat weig ht of the evide nce; a nd (2) that a

ppellate c ounsel was ineffe ctive for

failing to rai s e t h e fi rs t claim. The Michig an Supreme Court denied Turne r’s
a pp lic a tio n on Nov e mbe r 21, 19 95 , b e c a us e it w a s n ot p e rs ua de d th a t th e qu e sti on s p re se nte d s ho uld be re viewed. 1 I n October

2002, almost seven y ear s after his sentence beca

me final, Tur

ner f iled a motion for r elief f

rom judg ment with the sta t e trial court, a lleg ing pr osecutoria l misconduct, ineffe ctive assistance of trial and appellate counsel, newly discovere d evidenc e of a ctual innoce nce, de fec tive jury instructions, and denial of due proce ss due to the cumulative e ffe ct of e rror s. The trial c ourt denied the motion i n J u n e 2 003, and later denied Tur

ner’ s motion for rec onsideration. In Marc h 20 04 , th e Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls de nie d le a ve to a pp e a l f or fa ilure to e sta

bli she nti tle me nt t o relief under Michig an Court Rule 6.508(D), and in Dec ember 2004, the M ichig an Supreme Court denied lea

ve to appe al for the same re ason. Petitioner filed his h ab ea s p eti tion with the dist rict cour t in Febr uary 2005, raising eleve n claims for r elief. The State of Mi chig an filed a motion to dism iss in S eptember 2005, arguing that Turner had failed to c omply with the one-year statute of limit ations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. On September

23, 2005, Turner

filed a motion to expand the record, claiming that the pre liminaryNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

3

e xami na tio n tr ans c ri pts o f his c o- de fe nd ant M ark Smith w ou ld c or

ro bo rate Smith’ s a ff

ida vit attesting that Smit h and other s committed the crimes, a nd that Turner was not i nvolved. On Mar ch 22, 2006, the district court stay ed the c ase pe nding resolution by the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court of Ho us e v . B e ll , 547 U.S. 518 (2006), a case in which the district court believed ex isting pre cede nt reg arding actua l innoc ence claims would be re examined. The district court a lso dismi ssed, without prejudic e, al l pendingmotions, i ncluding Turner ’s motion to ex pand the r ecor d and the State’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss. Turn e r t he n f ile d a re ne we d mo tio n to e xpand the re c or d, a sk ingthat th e State be re quired to produc e the tra nscripts of the pr eliminary examination of Sm ith. On No ve mbe r 8, 20 06 , the dis tr ic t c ourt iss ue d a n o rd e r l if tin g its sta y and or de ri ngthe State to p ro du c e the tr ans c ri pts of c o- de fe nd ant Smith ’s pr e lim ina ry e xami natio n. Th is o rd e r e xpre ssl y stated that “[t] he Court subsequently will adjudicate [the State’s] moti o n t o d i s m iss the habea s pe tit ion .” Turn e r s ub se qu e ntl y re ne we d a numbe r of

his mot ion s th a t ha d b e e n d e nie d w he n th e c a se was stay ed, but did not ag ain re new his motion to ex pand the r ecor d, which had be en addr essed by the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re qu ir e me nt t hat th e State pr od

uc e the tr ans c ri pts . T he S tate did no t r e ne w i ts Mo tio n to Di smi ss. The State failed to pr oduce the reque sted transcr ipts in a tim ely manner and Turne r filed a reque st that the district cou rt fi n d t h at the State had w aived its statute of limitations defense by failing to comply

with the district court’s orde r. The State r esp o n d ed t h at “[ d]espite dili g ent and repe ated e ffor

ts,” it could not locate the r equeste d transcr ipts. The State indicated it was not e ven
sure that th e tr ans c ri pts ha d e ve r be e n pr e pa re d. Turn e r re sp on de d that he kn e w that the tr ans c ri pts
e xiste d a nd that he ha d b e e n p re vio us ly pr ov ide d w iththo se tr ans c ri pts by his tr ia l c ouns e l.No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

4

On September

28, 2007, the district court issued its Opinio n and Order whic h denied Turn e r’ s h a

be a s p e tit ion . T he dis tr ic t court ne ve r a dd re sse d th e State ’s Mo tio n to Di smi ss, addre ssing Tur

ner’ s claims on their merits “r eg ardle ss of whethe r they are barr ed from revie w by the statu t e of lim itations or the doctrines of exhaustion and procedur al def ault,” bec ause ne ither pro ced ur a l de fa ult , e xha us tio n, no r s tatut e of

lim itatio ns de fe ns e s w e re “ jur isd ic tio na l ba

rs to substantive review o f [ T urner ’s] claims.” Be cause the district court did not addre ss the State’s
s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s ar gu m en t s , i t m ad e no fi n d i n g re gar d i n g t h e ap p l i cab i l i t y o f e qu i t ab l e t o l l i n g, which would re quire a showing of ac tual innocenc e, but it did discuss the claims in which Turner
asser ts actual innocence

. The dist rict cour t denied Turne r’s re quest for a n evidentiar

y hear ing a nd de nie d T ur

ne r’ s p e tit ion

on the me ri ts. AN AL YSI S I. STATUT E OF LIMITATIONS The Antiterr orism and Effec tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( “AED PA”) provide s for aoney ear period of limitations that beg ins to run on “the date on which the judg ment become s final by the c on c lus ion

of dir e c t r e vie w ( or

the e xpir a tio n o f t

he tim e fo r s e e kin g su c h r e vie w) .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 24 4( d) (A ). Whe n a

pr iso ne r’ s c on vic tio n b e c ome s fi na l pr ior to A ED PA’ s e ff

e c tiv e date , h e is entitled to a one- y ear

g rac e period in which he ma y file his petitions. McClendon v . Sherman , 329 F .3 d 4 90 , 4 94 -9 5 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 3) . M or e ov e r, wh ile the pe ri od of lim ita tio ns is to ll ed while s tate po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s are on g oin g , th e pe ri od do e s n ot r e se t up on the re so lut ion

of tho se state proce eding s. Searcy

v. Carter , 246 F.3d 515, 519 ( 6th Cir. 2001).No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

5

Be cause Turner ’s convict i o n b ec ame final prior to the passa g e of A EDPA, the per iod of limit ations beg an to run on April 24, 1996. Id. at 517. I t expi red 365 da y s later, on Apr il 24, 1997, more than f

ive y ear s prior to Turner ’s s tate post -convic tion effor ts. I t is clear, the ref

ore, that Turner failed to file his habea s petition within the one-year period of limitations, as required by AEDPA. Turn e r a rgue s, ho we ve r, tha

t th e State wa ive d any po ten ti al stat ute of lim itatio ns de fe ns e wh e n it failed to ra ise it properly

befor e the district cour

t and when it fa iled to comply with a district court order requiring it to provide cer tain transcr ipts. Turner’ s arguments are unsupported by the re cord. Th e State re sp on de d to Tur ne r’ s hab e a s pet iti on

by fi lin g its Mo tio n to Di smi ss, sp e c if ic a lly

ra isi ngits statut e of li mi tat io ns argume nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis se d a ll p e nd ingmot ion s, inc lud ingthe Mo tio n to Di smi ss, wi tho ut p re jud ic e , w he n it s tay e d th e c a se pe nd ingthe Sup re me Court’s decision in Ho us e v . B e ll

. Turner argues that beca use the State failed to re new the Motion t o Di s m i s s , i twa i v edi t s s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s ar gu m en t s . Bu tT u rn er i gn o re s t h e e x p re s s l an gu age in the district c ourt’s order lifting the stay , which indicated that the court would consider the motion to dis mis s af

te r ce rt a in tr ans c ri pts we re pr od uc e d. Whil e the State lik e ly sh ou ld h a ve re ne we d it s Motion to Dism iss out of an abundance of caution, it was not unreasonable for the State to c onclude that the district court, in decla ring that it would adjudicate the Motion to Dismiss, had rene wed the Mo tio n to Di smi ss su a s

po nte . Turner argues that the State’s fa ilure to rene w the Motion deprived him of the op po rt

un ity to s up ple me nt t

he re c or d w itha dd iti on a l e vid e nc e in l ig ht o f t he Sup reme Court’s decision in Ho us e v . B e ll , but he fa ils to ide nti fy any su c h e vid e nc e tha t he c ou ld o r w ou ld have pr ovided.No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

6

Turner next arg ues that the State’s f ailure to pro v i d e the transc ripts ordere d by the district court “depr ived the court of potentially critica l e vidence supporting Mr . Turner ’s equitable tolling
c la im. ” Th is a

rgume nt, e sse nti a lly

an a rgume nt fo r dis c ov e ry -r e late d san c tio ns purs ua nt t o F e d. R. Civ . P. 37 , is ma de wi tho ut f a c tua l or le g a l su pp or t. We reviewa district cour t’s denial of a

motion for discovery s anctions for an abuse of discretion. Rivet v . State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 316 F. App’ x 440, 448 (6th Cir. 2009) (c iting First Bank of M

arietta v

. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. , 307 F.3d 501, 510 ( 6th Cir. 2002)). The State attested that it attempted to find the re quested tra nscripts, but was not eve n sure whe ther they had eve r bee n prepa

red. The only evidenc e that Turner provides to contra dict the State’s asse rtions is his own s tate me n t th a t h e p o s s e s s e s th e m, o r a t le a s t p o s s e s s e d th e m a t o n e ti me . We are thus prese nted with a pec uliar circ umstance, where a par ty urg es sanc tions for the opposing party ’s fa ilure to produce evidenc e, t h e existence of which evidenc e is supported only by a sworn statement that the reque sting party knows it e x ists bec ause he possesses it. We f ind that T urner ’s sworn state ment is insufficient to support a findingthat the district court a bused its discretion in declining to sanction the State fo r f

a ili ngto p ro du c e the re le va nt t ra ns c ri pts
. Havingfound Turne r’s objec tions to be without m erit, we now hold that Turner’s petition is untim ely

and bar red by the statute of limitati o n s . There fore , we will consider the merits of T u rn er ’s p et i t i o no n l y

i f h e c an es t ab l i s ht h at h e i s en t i t l edt o eq u i t ab l e t o l l i n g. II. EQUITABL E TOL LING I f a pe titioner fails to file his ha beas petition within the per iod of limit ations, he must show that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida , 5 60 U.S.

_ _ , _ _ S. Ct
. _ _ _ , 2 0 1 0 WLNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

B eca us e of

t he f act ual back gr ound of

t he cas e befo re i t , t he H ol l and C o urt did no t dir ect l y ad d res s t he 2 r equi r ement s f

or e qui t abl e t ol l i ng i n t he cont ext of an act ual i nn ocenc e cl ai m. H owever , i t di d re af f i r m t hat “ a pet i t i oner i s e n t i t l e d t o e qu i t a bl e t ol l i n g on l y i f h e s h ow s ( 1) t h a t h e h a s be en pur s ui ng hi s r i g h t s di l i g e n t l y , a n d ( 2) t h a t s om e ext r aordi nar y ci r cums t anc e st oo d i n hi s way and prev ent ed t i mel y f i l i ng . ” H ol l and , 560 U
. S. a t ___, __ S. Ct
. a t ___, 2 0 1 0 W L 23 4 6 5 4 9 , * 1 2
. W e t heref o re ho l d t hat T urner b ears t he b urden of p roo f i n showing t hat he i s ent itl e d to eq ui t ab l e t o l l i ng. 7 2346549, *12 (June 14, 2010); McClendon , 329 F.3d at 492 (“ Be cause th[ e] statute of limit ations 2 [und e r 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 44 (d )( 1) ] is n ot j ur isd ic tio na l, .

. . sta te pr iso ne rs wh o f

a il t o f ile tim e ly petitions may

still file fe dera l habea s corpus petiti ons if the prisoner s can show that they are entitled to a n e qu ita ble tol lin g of

the statut e of

lim itatio ns .” ). Turn e r a

rgue s th a t he is en tit le d to e qu ita ble tolling bec ause he has made a cr edible showingof ac tual innocenc e. Souter v. Jone s , 395 F.3d 577, 5 8 8 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Sc hlu p v . D e lo , 5 1 3 U
. S
. 2 9 8 , 3 2 6

- 2 7 ( 1 9 9 5 ) )

. W e h a v e s t a t e d , g e n e r a l l y, that equitable tolling “ should only be g rante d sparing ly ,” Id. (q u o t i n g Coo k v . S te ga ll , 295 F.3d 517, 52 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 2) ), and

the Sup re me Court

ha s st a te d th a t th e a c tua l inno c e nc e e xce pti on sh ou ld “re main rar e,” be ing a

pplied only

in the “extr aordinary

case .” Sc hlu

p v . D e lo , 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) ( internal quotation marks omitted). Th e a c tua l inno c e nc e e xce pti on a llo ws fo r e qu ita

ble tol lin g if

the pe tit ion e r “ pr e se nts evidenc e of innoc ence so strong that a court cannot have conf idence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 316. I f “it is more likely than not that no rea sonable juror would have f ound [hi m] g uilty

bey ond

a re a so na ble do ub t,” the pe tit ion e r m ay “ pa ss t hr ou g h th e g a te way and argue the me ri ts o f h is underly i ng claims.” Id. at 327. In order to raise a

cre dible claim of a ctual, factual , innocenc e, Turner must provide “new reliable evidence . . . that was not prese nted at trial.” Souter , 395 F.3d at 591.No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

8

B e c a use S outer was the f

irst such “e x traordina

ry case ,” out of many

petitions that had attempted to show the ne ed for equitable tolling, id. at 589, it will be helpful to examine the level of evide nce r equire d. I n Souter , only one piec e of ev i d ence , a pint-sized bottle which Souter admitted to ha

ving the night of

the murder , linked him to the victim’s death. Id. at 581, 590. The t es timony of three experts linked Souter to the victim. Id. at 590. One, the medical e x aminer, te sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t th e bo ttl e wa s th e c a us e of the vic tim ’s wo un ds , but la te r state d th a t he wa s o nly speculating a

bout the cause

. Id. The second was a forensic pathologist who t estified at trial that the wounds wer e ca

used by the bottle, but later c ompletely rec anted that testimony

and stated that it was unlikely that the bottle was the murde r we apon. Id. a t 59 1. Th e thi rd te sti fi e d th a t th e bo ttl e wo uld have ha d a sharp edg e which would have matched the victim’s wounds, but other evidenc e showe d that the par

ticular ty pe of bottle would likely

not have ha d a shar

p edg e. Id. Souter also provided photogr aphic e vidence that direc tly contra dicted other

trial testimony

. Id. The pa nel found that the evidenc e, taken as a whole, was both ne w and sufficie ntly cre dible to require equitable tolling. Id. at 597. I n sharp c ontrast to the strongevidence of innoc ence that exis ted in Souter , T u rn er b ri n gs
ve ry little c re dib le e vid e nc e of inn oc e nc e to h is p e tit ion . H is “ ne w r e lia ble e vid e nc e ” c on sis ts s ole ly of several affidavits: (1) his own a ffidavit, asse rting that Br enda Matthews, a fr iend, would testify that he wa s w ithhe r fr om 11 :00 p. m. to mid night o n th e night o f t

he fi re ; ( 2) an a ff

ida vit fr om K e ith Campb e ll, a

fr ie nd , s tatin g tha

t a c qu itt ed co-def

e nd ant D y

ro ne Turn e r h a d a dmi tte d h is o wn g uil t and Turne r’s innocence ; (3) an a ffidavit fr om co-de fenda nt Mark Smith, admitt ing his own guilt and

a tte sti ng to Turn e r’ s inn oc e nc e ; (4 ) an a ff ida vit fr om L uth a ir B a ldw in, a

fr ie nd , s tatin g that w itn e ssNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

Sm i t h w a s a l s o c on v i c t e d o f t w o c ou n t s of

s e c on d- de g r e e mu r de r a n d o n e c ou n t of f e l on y f i r e a r m. 3 9 Ronald Arnold admitted lying when he te stified reg ardingTurner ; and (5) a n aff idavit from Michae l Arnold, who attests that he called a friend’ s house sometime on the nig ht of the fire and Turne r
ans we re d th e ph on e , w hic h T ur ne r p re suma

bly vie ws a s e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh ingan a lib i. Turn e r a rgue s th a t w e are “ ill e qu ipp e d to c on sid e r” the fa c t- int e ns ive qu e sti on of e qu ita ble tolling, and r equests that we rema nd for a n evidentiar

y hear ing. Fi rst Ci ty Bank v . Na t’ l Cr e dit Union Admin. Bd. , 111 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 1997) (re manding case for de termination of whe ther statute of limitations barred pla intiff’s claims). Unlike t he circumstance s fac ed by the panel in Fi rst City , howeve r, the district cour t in t h i s ca s e m ade substantial f actua l findings r eg ardingTurner ’s claims of actua l innoc ence . Turner also argues that the district cour t was applying a

differ ent leg al standard f rom t hat which we must apply

in determining whether

to apply equitable tolling. H oweve r, we f ind that the district court ade quately revie wed the “new e vidence ” in light of the fa ctual re cord in this case, and that the rec ord is there fore sufficie ntly develope d for us to dete rmine whe ther the
ev i d en ce o ff

er edb y T u rn er i s s u ff i ci en tt o s h o w t h at h e i s en t i t l edt o eq u i t ab l e t o l l i n g. I n order to determine whether

it is “more likely

than not that no rea sonable juror would have found [him] g uilty

beyond a re asonable doubt,” Souter , 395 F.3d at 596 (brac kets in orig inal), we
mus t c on sid e r T ur

ne r’ s n e w e vid e nc e in t

he c on te xt of

a ll the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l. The de aths for which Turne r wa s convicted oc curr ed as the re sult of a fire in a re sidence at 6305 L inwood (the “ Residence ”) on June 18, 1992. Two day s prior to the fire, Turner , co-de fenda nt Mark Sm ith (“Smith”), and another individual threate ned those living at the Residenc e if they didn’t 3 let Turner sell drug s from the Residenc e. When the residents ref used, Turner

and his companionsNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

R o na l d d i d no t relate his st o ry t o p o l i ce unti l aft er he w as arre st ed o n d rug c ha rge s two m o nths l ater, i n A ug ust 4 1 9 9 2 , at wh i ch t i m e h e to l d p o l i ce wh at he k ne w ab o ut t he f i re. I n r e tu r n for h i s assi st an ce , t he d rug ch arg e a ga i nst R o nal d was r ed uced and he recei ved a l i f et i m e o f pro b at i o n. D yro ne wa s ac q uit t ed o f all ch arg es. 5
P o l i ce l at er f

o und em p t y gasol i ne co nt ai ners at Sm i t h’ s res i d ence, al o ng wi t h am m uni t i o n. 6
Y o ung was one o f

t he wi t ness es who t est i f i ed as t o t he June 1 6 s ho o t i ng. 7
T he evi dence at t r i al es t abl i s hed t hat t he f i r e wa s ca us ed by a l i qui d acce l er ant , an d an a bundanc e of gl as s was 8 f o und at t he R esi d ence, b ut t here was no co ncl usi ve evi d ence o f a bo t t l e o r wi ck. 10 brandished f

irea rms and beg an shoo t ing ( the “F irst Shooti ng ”). Ronald Ar nold (“Ronald”) lived 4 in the neig hborhood and heard the g unshots. Shortly there afte r, he saw Turner with a pistol. The next day , one day

prior to the fire , Ronald overhe ard Turner admit that he had been involved in the First Shooting be cause those at the Residenc e re fused to move. On the day of the fir e, Ronald saw Turner , Smit h, and another co-de fenda nt, D y rone Turner (“D y

rone” ), at Turner ’s grandmother’s

5 house wit h beer

bottles containing what Ronald testified a ppear ed to be g asoline. Ronald testified 6 that he hea

rd Turne r say

that those at t he R esidenc e had to move, and that Dy rone sugg ested that they could burn them out. T h at s am e d ay , an individual who lived at the Residenc e, Jerome Young (“Y oung ”) sa

w Dy rone showingoff a

g un. 7 Sometime between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the nig ht of J une 18 , 1992, Young , who sold drug s from the Residence , hear d a horn outside a nd went to see if a prospe ctive customer had

arr ived. He sa

w three men in a ca

r, one of whom threw s o m et h ing that looked like a Molotov cockta il into t he now- open doorw ay . A fire beg an at that doorway and, within minutes, shooting 8 beg an at the only other doorwa y to the Residence . Young looked out a par tially -obstructe d second story window and sa

w Turne r, Smith, Dy

rone, and a fourth unidentified i ndividual firingtheir g unsNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

N o s h el l c as i n g s w er e ev er r ec ov er ed. 9 11 at the sec ond entra

nce. Young has only one ey e, wea rs g lasses, and had smoked coc aine a half-hour 9 befor e the fire beg an, but he positively identified the thre e co- defe ndants, and stated that they wer e
wea ring dark, hoode d sweatshirts at the time of t he shoot ing. Resident Bobby Smit h testified that someone thre w fire bombs into t he Residenc e and that he hea rd gunshots at the other e ntranc e, but he did not see who threw the firebombs or who was shooti ng . Wit h one door bloc ked by fire a nd another by g unfire, those living at the Re sidence had to find other w ay s to escape
. Two fa iled to do so and died in the fir e of soot and smoke inhalation. Ron a ld t e sti fi e d th a t he re c e ive d a ph one c a ll n oti fy

inghim of the fi re , a

nd he we nt t o inv e s ti g a te
. O n h is w ay to th e Re s id e n c e , h e h e ar d g u n s h o ts
. T e n mi nu te s late r , he saw Turner , Smit h, and two other

men runningawa

y from the Residence towards Turne rs’ g randmother ’s house. Ronald testified that they

wer e we aringdark, hoode d sweatshirts. S lightly more than a

wee k later, Ronald ov er h ea rd Turner admit he had be en involved in the fire beca use those who lived ther e ref used to move
. Ronald also overhe ard Turner take cre dit f or making the fire bombs that were used. At trial, S m i t h prese nted one witness who c laimed Smith was with her, at her home, from 11:00 p.m. t o 3 :00 a.m. on the nig ht of the fire . Dy rone a lso presente d one witness, F rede rick Washi n gt o n (“ W ashi ng ton”), who te stified that he wa s at Ronald’s house on the nig ht of the fire

. Washington testified that he went with Rona ld to see the fire, but that he did not hear g unshots and did n o ts e e an y o n e r

u n n i n g aw ay

f r o mt h e f i r e . T u r n e r p r e s e n t e d

n o w i t n e s s e s a tt r i a l , v e r b a lly assentingto the waiver

of a sing le alibi witness and dec lining to testify himself.No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

12

I n his briefs and at oral argument, Turner repe atedly

cate g orized the prec edingevidenc e as
weak and ar g ued that the State’ s case rested on the ey e-w itness of testimony of a “ coked- up, onee y e d d ru g de a le r” and

a “ ro g ue ’s g a lle ry

of c ri min a ls, dr

ugus e rs , a

nd dr ugde a le rs .” Whil e his d e s c r i p t i o no f

Y o un g , t h e S t a t e ’ s p r i m ar y e ye - w i t n e s s , i s p e r

h a p s m o r e c o l o r f

u l t h ann e c e s s ar

y, Turner is corre ct that he ha s only one eye, is nea

rsig hted (a lthough it is undisputed that he was
we ari nghis g la sse s th e night o f t he fi re ), and

ha d u se d c oc a ine a

pp ro xima te ly

30 min ute s p ri or to the fire. And it is true that—as is of ten the case in c riminal prosec utions—most of the State’s witnesses had le d less than exemplary lives. Howeve r, Turner has neve r ar g ued that his counsel, or
c ouns e l for his c o- de fe nd ants , fa ile d ad e qu a te ly to i mpe a c h th e State ’s wi tne sse s. Th e jur y wa s a lso pr e se nte d w ithe vid e nc e of the di sre pu ta

ble natur e s o f T ur

ne r a nd his c o- de fe nd ants . T a ke n a s a wh ole , w e c ann ot c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e a g a ins t T ur ne r w a s w e a k, a s T ur

ne r a lle g e s. Considered in

th e li ght o f

th e r e ma in in g evidenc e ag ainst him, the additional evidence offe red by Turner is insufficient to ca u s e u s to lose all confidenc e in the outcome of the trial. Turne r’s
asser tions reg ardingMs. Matthews’ supposed a libi testi mony are troubles o m e fo r a number of
re a so ns , n ot t

he le a st o f whic h is the fa c t th a t T ur ne r e xpre ssl y wai ve d h is r ig ht t o h a ve Ms. Matthews testify . Ms. Matthews’ supposed alibi testimony is also suspect bec ause Tur ner ha s not produce d an af

fidavit from Ms. Matthews herse lf indicating that she would be willing to testify on Turn e r’ s b e ha lf

, e ve n th ou g h h e c la ims to h a ve kn ow n f or ov er 17 y e ars a

bo ut h e r w ill ingne ss t o testify . Finally , it is not clea r t hat M s. Matthews’ testimony , even if offe red pr ecise ly

as desc ribed by Turner , would be at all useful in e stablishing fac tual innocenc e. Turner argues that Ms. Matthews would testify

that she was with him at a friend’s house starting at 11:00 p.m., but the rec ord indicate sNo . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

13

that the fire beg an sometime betwe en 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. The re cord doe s not indicate the time require d to travel fr om the Residence to the friend’ s house, but up to one hour may have pa ssed betwee n the fire and the be g inning of the time period for

which Ms. Matt h ews mi g ht provide an alibi. This new evidenc e provide s almost no support for Turne r’s c laim of ac tual innocenc e. Th e a ff ida vit fr om M ike Ar

no ld s uf fe rs fr om m any

of the same pr ob le ms a s T ur ne r’ s c la ims reg ardingMs. Matthews’ testimony . Mr. Arnold attests that he hear d g unfire on the night of June 18, 1992, later f

ound out a

bout the fire a

nd went to see the fire , and only then telephone d the frie nd’s hous e an d hear d Turner

on the other e nd of the line. Eve n if judg ed fully cre dible, Mr. Arnold’s testimony establishes only that Turner was at the friend’ s house at some point on the nig ht of the fire

. Mr. Arnold’s a ffidavit, ther efor e, provide s littl e to no support for Tur ner’ s claim of ac tual innocenc e. The remaining aff

idavits also offe r onl y weak support for Turner’ s claims. Mr. Campbell’s aff idavit purports to show that Dy rone has admitted g uilt and absolved Turne r, y et Dy rone, who has been a cquitted on all cha

rg es, has ne ver a dmitted guilt in his own sworn aff idavit. Mr. Ba ldwin’s

a ff ida vit a lso purp or

ts to a bs olv e Turn e r of g uil t by c la imi ng that Ron a ld a dmi tte d to f a br ic a tin g his te sti mony in o rd e r t o obta in a de a l on his own c ri min a l cha rg e s, y e t Ro na ld h a s n e ve r r e c ante d h is testimony in a sworn aff

idavit. The af

fidavits of Mr. Campbell and Mr . Ba ldwin also suffer from beingreple te with inadmissible hearsa y . Finally , Smit h’s af

fidavit also admits gu i l t and absolve s Turner of all guilt, y et that testim o n y d irec tly contra dicts Smi th’s testimony at trial, whe re he

a sse rt e d h is i nn oc e nc e . A s n ote d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt , a

re a so na ble jur or wo uld fi nd it d if fi c ult to find Smit h’s af

fidavit cre dible beca

use either he is lying now

or he w as lying the n.No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

14

None of the af fidavits submitt ed by

Turne r p ro v i des re liable support for his a ssertion of

a c tua l inno c e nc e , n or

are the y su ff

ic ie nt, c umu lativ e ly , to show that Tur ne r i s e nti tle d to e qu ita

ble tolling. Turne r ar g ues, howe ver, that we should rema nd for an evidentiar

y hear ing in or der to a llow him to fu rt her de velop the re cord in support of his c laim of ac tual innocenc e. The district court considere d and denied Turner ’s motion for evidentiar y hear ing, a decision that we ty pically revie w for a bu s e o f d i s cretion. Sawyer v. H ofbauer , 299 F.3d 605, 610 ( 6th Cir. 2002). “In deciding wh e the r t o g ra

nt a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , a fe de ra l court mus t con sid e r wh e the r suc h a h e ari ngc ou ld enable an applica

nt to prove the pe tition’s factual a lleg ations, which , i f t ru e, would entitl e the applicant to fe dera l habea s relief .” Schriro v. Landrigan , 55 0 U .S. 46 5, 47 4 ( 20 07 ). F e de ra l c ourt s
mus t take AE DPAsta

nd ards i nto a c c ount i n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngis appropr iate. Id. (c i t i n g Maye s v. Gibson , 210 F.3d 1284, 1287-88 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Whether [t he petitioner’s] alleg ations, if prov en , wo u l d entitle him to habeas re lief is a question g overne d by [AEDPA] ”))

. As set forth a

bove, our a

naly si s o f t he AED PA standards, a s applied to this case, le ads us to conclude that Turner

is not entitl ed to habe as re lief bec ause h e fa iled to file his habea s petition within th e o n e - y e ar p e r io d o f li mi tati o n s an d b e c a u s e h e is n o t e n ti tl e d to e qu it a b le to ll in g . Even Turn e r’ s r e qu e st f

or an e vid e nti ary

he ari ng on his a c tua l inno c e nc e c la ims mus t be de nie d b e c a us e “the r ecor d ref

utes [Turner’s] fac tual alleg ations or otherw ise prec ludes . . . relief .” Id. Neither

the exis ting r ecor d nor t he additional affidavits submitted by Turner are sufficie nt to cast any

signific ant do ub t on the g uil ty ve rd ic t r e nd e re d by

the state c ourt , a

nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to ho ld an evide ntiary

hear ing on suc h insubstantial factua l alleg ations. Id. at 475.No . 07-2352, Turner v. Romanowski

15 CO NC LU SION Acc ording ly , and for

the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.