### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 08 -00 049 -CR

Sham ane F or c e y , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 274TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 2002 -02 3 , HO NORAB LE JACK H. RO B ISO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Appellant Shamane For cey was indicted f

or the off enses of ag g ravated robbe ry

and attempted ca

pital murder. For cey pleade d g uilty to the char g e of a g g ravated robbe ry , a first-de g ree felony , see Te x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 2 9. 03 (We st 200 3) , pur su ant t o a ple a a g re e me nt, and

the State dis mis se d th e c ha

rg e of a tte mpt e d c a

pit a l murd e r. Th e tr ia l c ourt a sse sse d punis hme nt a t 25 y e a rs ’
c on fi ne me nt a

nd a $1 0, 00 0 f ine
. Whil e F or c e y did

no t in iti a lly

a pp e a l hi s c on vic tio n, an o ut- of -t ime appea l was g rante d by

t h e T ex as Court of Criminal Appea ls and the trial cour t cer tified For cey ’s rig ht to appeal. On appea l, F orce y argues that his g uilty plea wa s involuntary

beca use (1) the trial court fa iled to admonish him t hat he ha d a rig ht to withdraw his plea if the pl ea a g ree ment was not followed, (2) the trial cour t failed t o fo l l o w the plea ag ree ment, and (3) he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistance of counse l beca use his trial counsel f

ailed to inform him of hi s rig ht to withdraw the plea
. Be cause we ha

ve dete rmined that the trial c ourt inad v er tently assessed a

fine e x cee ding the pleaThis informant later g ave a written statement t h at d i ffe red slig htly from the initial 1 conver sation he had w ith police, as desc ribed in the police repor t. Accor ding to the w ritten statement, F orce y

had bra g g ed about the r obbery to the informant’s c ousin, who t hen tol d the story to t he inf or mant. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 2 ag ree ment but that this error did not re nder F orce y ’s g uilty plea involuntary , we modify the tri al court’s judg ment and af

firm the judg ment as modified.

BACK GR OUND On J uly 28, 2001, a man e ntere d a conve nience store in Caldwell County and robbe d the store manag er at g unpoint. Acc ording to the statement of the store mana g er, the man who robbe d him pulled the trigg er on his gun, but the g un never fired. Seve ral da

y s later, L uling police office rs
serve d an unre lated wa

rra nt on an individual who stated that he had hear d Shamane F orce y brag g ing about robbing a loca l convenienc e store, inc luding that he had pull ed the trigg er on his g un, but that it did not fire. The police went to For cey ’s re sidence and spoke w ith his gra ndmother, but wer e 1

u n a b l e t o c o n t a c t

F o r c e y. F o r c e y tu r

n e d h i m s e l f i nt o t h e Lu l i n g P o l i c e D e p art m e n tl a t e r t h a td a y. Af te r r e c e ivi nghis Miranda wa rn ing s, For cey gav e a tape- rec orded state ment admitting to the

2 robber y but denying ha

ving pulled the trig g er on his g un. After plea ne g otiations, Force y and the State r eac hed an a g ree ment for a maxi mum sentenc e of 50 y ear s and a $2,000 f ine for the count of ag g ravated robbery , with the S tate ag ree ing to dismi ss the attempted murde r cha rg e. F orce y

signe d a plea ag ree ment, which conta ined an
a dmo nis hme nt t

hat if the tr ia l c ourt

c ho se no t to fo llo w the punis hme nt r e c omm e nd a tio ns fo un d in the plea a g ree ment, “De fenda nt shall be permitted to withdrawhis plea of guilty or nolo contender e (no conte st).”3 Prior to acc epting For cey ’s g uilty plea, the trial court a sked, “B efor e y ou signe d and initialed [the plea ag ree ment] in this c ase, did you rea d the document, understand it completely and g o over it with y our attorney
. . . ? ” F orce y responde d, “Ye s, sir.” The tr ial court then que stioned For cey reg ardinghis understanding of the plea -bar g ain proc ess, stating , “And do y ou understand that if that ju dg e de c ide s th a t th e 50 -y e ar s e nte nc e is t oo le nie nt, that y ou sh ou ld h a ve more tim e in i n c ar c e r at i o na s p u n i s h m e n t , t h e nt h e p l e a b ar g a i ni s t o t a l l y

s e t a s i d e ? .
. . A r e y o uaw ar e o f t h a t ?” Ag ain, For cey

responde d, “Ye s, sir.” During the plea hearing , the trial cour t mentioned the 50-y ear cap on imprisonment f

ive times. No mention was made of the $2,000 fine c ap by

any party at either the plea he aringor the punishment hea ring
. I n both its written judgment a n d o ra l pronounce ment, the trial cour t assessed punishment at 25 y ear s’ conf inement and a

$10,000 fi n e, ex cee ding the maxi mum fine of $2,000
un de r t he pl ea agr e e me nt. Af te r h is c on vic tio n, F or c e y fi le d a pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s,
a lle g ing , a

mon g oth e r t

hin g s, tha t tr ia l c ouns e l w a s ine ff

e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals g rante d For cey an out-of- time appea l, and this appea l followed. Th e re is s ome dis pu te re g ard ingwh e the r F or c e y wa s a ble to re a d and wr ite a t th e tim e he e nte re d h is p le a . F or c e y te sti fi e d at th e he ari ngon his peti tio n f

or wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s th a t, de sp ite havin g g ra du a te d f ro m hi g h s c ho ol, he c ou ld n ot r e a d o r w ri te a t the tim e he ple a de d g uil ty in th is c a s e . H is tr ia l c o u n s e l, h o w e v e r , te s ti f ie d th a t s h e b e li e v e d F o r c e y w a s a b le to rea d and
co mp re h en d t h e p l eap ap er s t h at h e s i gn ed
. Fu rt h er m o re , Fo rc ey ac kn o wl ed geds en d i n g a t wo -p age handwr itten letter to the trial cour t on Aug ust 20, 2002, t h e m o nth after his plea wa s entere d, reque sting that the tria l court re duce his sente nce.4 I n f ind ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw, the tr ia l c ourt stated th at it “in te nd e d to stay within the plea bar g ain and wa s unawa re at the time of sentenc ing that there w as a c ap on the fine. I n this Court’s experience , it is extremely unusual to have a

cap a s high a s fifty

(50) y ear s on a first de g ree felony

that includes a cap on the f ine.” The court fur

ther stated, “Neither

the State nor the def ense nor any one made the C ourt awa re that it had exceede d the fine c ap. Ha d any one broug ht it to my attention, Iwould have r efor med the sente nce to $2,000.00.” I n th re e po int s o f e rr or , F or c e y argue s th a t hi s g uil ty

ple a wa s in vo lun tary

be c a us e (1) the trial court failed to a dmonish him of his r ight to w ithdraw his ple a if the plea a g ree ment was not followed, (2) the sentenc e imposed exceede d the terms of the plea ag ree ment, and (3) his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to inform him of his rig ht to withdraw the plea
.
DI SCU SSIO N I n his fir st issu e on a

pp e a l, F or c e y argue s tha t his guil ty ple a wa s in vo lun tary

be c a us e the trial cour

t failed to admonish him reg ardinghis ri ght to withdraw the plea when the se ntence exceede d the plea ag ree ment. Prior to a cce pting a g uilty plea made pursuant to a plea barg ain, a tria l
c ourt mus t a dmo nis h th e de fe nd ant o f t he fa c t th a t th e ple a a g re e me nt is no t bin din g on the c ourt , inform the def

endant whe ther the court will a cce pt or reje ct the plea

ag ree ment, and if the a g ree ment is rejec ted, per

mit the defenda

nt to withdraw hi s plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a )(2) (We st Su pp . 2 00 8) . In th e pr e se nt c a se , th e tr ia l court ina dv e rt e ntl y e xce e de d th e ple a

a g re e me nt i n
se nte nc ingF or c e y , w ith ou t in fo rm inghim that th e ple a

a g re e me nt ha d b e e n r e

je c te d o r g ivi nghim
an o pp or tun ity to w ith dr aw. Th e a dmo nis hme nt re qu ir e d by art ic le 26 .1 3 may be g ive n or a lly or in writing , id. art. 26.13(d) , and the plea ag ree ment, signe d by

both Forc ey

and his counsel, included5

a wr itten admonishment reg ardingthe rig ht to withdraw the plea in the event that the plea a g ree ment
wa s r e je c te d by the tr ia l court
. Ho we ve r, in l ig ht o f t he dis pu te re g ard ingwh e the r F or c e y wa s a ble to rea d or write at the time of trial, as we ll as the fac t that the trial court se ntence d For cey outside the ple a a g re e me nt wit

ho ut inf or min g him that the ple a

a g re e me nt h a d b e e n r e

je c te d, we wi ll a ssume without deciding that the written a dmon i s h m en t wa s inadequate under the circ umstances. See Go nz ale s v . S tat e , 963 S.W .2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.—San Anto n i o 1 9 9 8, no pet.) (noting that voluntariness of plea

is determined by

totality of circ umstances surr ounding e ntry of plea ). I n revie wing a trial court’s failure to admonish a defe ndant under article 26.13, we will not overturn the convic tion unless, afte r ex amining the rec ord, we conclude that the def endant was not aw are of the c onsequenc es of his plea and that h e wa s m i sled or har med by the lack of
a d mo n is h me nt. Bu rn e tt v . S tat e , 8 8 S. W.3 d 6 33 , 6 38 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). I n th is c on te xt,

“ ha rm ” me ans that “ a

pp e lla nt p ro ba bly wo uld no t ha ve ple a de d guil ty

bu t f or the fa ilure to admonish.” Id. at 638 n.14. Reversa l is only war rante d if “the err or may have had a ‘s u b s t an t i al influence ’ on the outcome of the proc eeding .” W e bb v . S tat e , 15 6 S
. W
. 3 d 653, 655 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pe t. ref’ d).

We may assume fr om the trial court’s statements on the rec ord that, had it been aw are that th e se nte nc e imp os e d e xce eded t he ple a a g re e me nt, it w ou ld h a ve mod if ie d th e se nte nc e to ref lect a $2,000 f

ine. Se e Sta te v . A gu ile ra , 165 S.W .3d 695, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that trial court may

modify sentenc e “on the same day as the assessment of the initial sente nce a nd befor e the c ourt adjourns for the day”). Such a

modification would have rende red a ny further
a dmo nis hme nt i na

pp lic a ble to F or c e y

be c a us e he wo uld no lon g e r have ha d a rig ht to withd ra w h is plea. Se e Car

ra nz a v . S tat e , 980 S.W .2d 653, 655-56 (Te x . Crim. App. 1998) (noting that failureI n addition, Forc ey ’s testimony at the wr it hearingref

lects an unde rstanding of the 3 conseque nces in the e vent that the trial c ourt reje ct ed t h e p l ea ba rg ain, as we ll as an over

riding conce rn with the amount of jail time he r ece ived, ra ther than the amount of fine imposed. He testified that his counsel had revie wed the plea paperw ork wit h him, and that “the Judge said if he do es n ’t g o along with the plea ba rg ain that it’ll be dropped a nd both char g es will be picke d up aga i n . ” F o rc ey

re p ea t ed l y ex p re s s ed d i s s at i s fa ct i o n wi t h t h e am o u n t o f j ai l t i m e he re ce i v ed , s t at i n g, “ Idid n’ t w ant 2 5 y ears ,” and

c omp la ini ngthat hi s tr ia l c ouns e l ha d a ssu re d h im h e wo uld

on ly rec eive a ten-y ear sentenc e. 6 to admonish is harmless err or wher e admonishment is le g ally inapplicable to de fenda

nt). Ther efor e, we conclude that the t rial court’s failure to orally admonish Forc ey reg ardingreje ction of the plea barg ain and his rig ht to withdraw the plea did not have a substantial e ffe ct on t h e o u t come of the pr oc e e din g a nd that Fo rc e y su ff e re d n o h arm

a s a re su lt. For cey ’s first point of er ror is over

ruled. 3 I n For cey ’s sec ond point of err or, he a rg ues that his plea wa s rende red in v o l untary when the tr ial court re

jected the plea barg ain by imposing a fine g reater than the plea a g ree ment’s maxi mum of $2,000. We have the a uthority to modify

the judg ment of the trial court on appea l, see Tex. R. App. P . 43.2(b), includingmodify ing punishment to acc urate ly ref lect the intent of the trial court. Se e Mc Cra

yv . S tat e , 876 S.W .2d 214, 217 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 1994, no pet.) (modify ing jud g me nt s o th a t se nte nc e wa s w ith in a pp lic a ble ra ng e of punis hme nt whe re tr ia l c ourt ’s int e nt t o imp os e ma ximum se nte nc e wa s c le ar f ro m r e c or d) ; se e als o Big le yv . S tat e , 865 S.W .2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (modifying judg ment to refle ct conviction of le sser-inc luded offe nse); Mc Gi ll v . S

tat e , 2 00 S.W. 3d

32 5, 32 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 6, no pet .) (m od if y ingjud g me nt t o delete de adly -we apon finding not supported by evidenc e). In its finding s of fact and c onclusions of law issued in conne ction with Forc ey ’s habe as petition, the trial cour t rec o m m en ded that the sentenc e be modifie d to “set the fine at the stated $2,000.00 a s the trial court intende d.” Given the7

trial court’ s clea

r intent to sentenc e For cey within the confine s of the plea a g ree ment, we modify the judgme nt to refl ec t a s en t ence of 25 y ear s’ incar cer ation and a $2,000 f ine, rather than a

$10,000 fine. This modification re nders F orce y ’s sec ond point of err or moot.

I n For cey ’s third

p o in t o f e rror , he ar g ues that his g uilty plea wa s rende red involuntary by the ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of his tr ia l couns e l in fa ili ng to inf or m him o f h is r ig ht t o w ith dr a w h is ple a wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt

imp os e d a $1 0, 00 0 fin e . Whe n an a pp e lla nt ch a lle ng e s the vo lun tari ne ss of his plea on the ba sis of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, we r eview “(1) whether counsel’s a dvice was within the ra

ng e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in c riminal case s and if not, (2) whether there is a rea sonable proba bility that, but f

or counsel’s err ors, he would not have pleade d g uilty and would have insisted on g oing to tria l.” Ex Parte M orrow , 952 S.W .2d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
. Wi th o u t a d dr e s s in g w h e th e r F o r c e y ’ s tr ia l c o u n s e l a c te d w it h in th e n e c e s s ar

y rang e of
c omp e te nc e , w e c on c lud e that F or c e y ’s ple a wa s v olu nta ry be c a us e he c ann ot e sta

bli sh a re a so na ble probability

that he would have withdrawn his plea if counsel ha d informed him of his rig ht to do so. As previously addre ssed in r elation to Forc ey ’s first point of er ror, we can a ssume that, had counse l br ou g ht t he ple a ba rg a in t o th e tr ia l c ourt ’s a tten tio n at th e se nte nc inghe ari ngin a n atte mpt to withdraw the plea, the tr ial court would have modified the se ntence to refle ct a f ine of $2,000 a

nd F or c e y wo uld no lon g er h a ve ha d a

ri g ht t o w ith dr aw. I n li g ht o f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s state d in te nt t o sentenc e F orce y

within th e conf

ines of the plea

ag ree ment, we c annot conc lude that, but for tria l counsel’s a ctions, Forc ey would have w ithdrawn his pl ea . As a re sult, Force y ’s third point of
err or is overr

uled.8 CO NC LU SION Be cause we ha

ve dete rmined that the trial c ourt inadver tently assessed punishment
e xce e din g the ple a

a g re e me nt, bu t th at Forcey ’s g uil ty ple a wa s n on e the le ss v olu

nta ry , w e wi ll modify the t rial court’s judgme nt to assess punis hment at 25 y ear s’ imprisonment and a $2,000 f ine, rathe r than a

$10,000 fine, a

nd we will af

firm the judg ment as modified.

___________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: September

10, 2008 Pub lis h