United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1995 MILITARY

CAPABILITIES

Stronger Joint Staff

Role Needed to

Enhance Joint Military

Training

GAO/NSIAD-95-109

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-256469 

July 6, 1995

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan

Chairman

The Honorable Owen B. Pickett

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ike Skelton

House of Representatives

This report responds to a request that we review the effectiveness of the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) management of joint training activities. We

found that, although some actions have been taken to improve joint

training, DOD has not taken the full range of actions needed to correct

long-standing program weaknesses.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations and

Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Secretary of Defense; the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director, Office of Management

and Budget and other interested parties. Copies will also be made

available to others on request.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
B-256469 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions. The major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
B-256469 

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Executive Summary

Purpose Today, U.S. military strategy emphasizes that air, land, sea, and special

operations forces must be capable of working together in large-scale

combat and noncombat operations. The major regional conflict

represented by Operation Desert Storm, the humanitarian relief efforts in

Rwanda and Somalia, and the operation to restore democracy in Haiti

illustrate the diverse missions U.S. forces can expect to perform.

Because U.S. forces must be adequately prepared for joint operations, the

former Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on

Military Forces and Personnel and Readiness, House Committee on Armed

Services (now the Committee on National Security), asked GAO to

determine (1) the scope of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) joint

training activities, (2) the effectiveness of the management of these

activities, and (3) the actions that have been taken and any additional

actions needed to improve joint training.

Background Although the program has multiple purposes, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program is the primary method DOD uses to

train its forces and staff for joint operations. In fiscal year 1994, the

regional commanders in chief (CINC) conducted about 200 live and

computer-simulated military exercises under this program. Some exercises

are conducted primarily to train U.S. forces for joint operations, while

others are done for different reasons, such as to gain U.S. access to a

region or foster relationships between U.S. military forces and those of

other nations.

Responsibilities for joint training are divided among various DOD entities.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness provides

overall policy and program review of all military training programs. Two

entities of the Chairman’s Joint Staff have key roles. First, the Operational

Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) is the Joint Staff’s focal point

for joint training and, as such, monitors and coordinates the joint training

activities of CINCs, formulates joint training policies, and advises the

Secretary of Defense on joint training priorities. Second, the Joint

Warfighting Center assesses existing joint doctrine, establishes the need

for new doctrine, and helps the regional CINCs develop training programs

for their overseas forces.

The U.S. Atlantic Command trains most U.S.-based forces and provides the

other regional CINCs with forces for joint operations and exercises as

needed. Each of the regional CINCs determines joint training requirements

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Executive Summary

and then plans, conducts, and evaluates joint exercises in its respective

areas of operation. The services train their forces in basic service skills

and provide forces to the CINCs for use in their joint exercises.

GAO reviewed DOD’s joint training in 1979 and 1985 and found both times

that program effectiveness was impaired by inadequate Joint Staff

oversight.1

Results in Brief Although the CJCS Exercise Program is the primary means to train U.S.

forces for joint operations, inadequate Joint Staff oversight has led to

perpetuating a program that provides U.S. forces with little joint training.

The vast majority of the exercises was conducted for reasons other than to

provide joint training. These reasons were to maintain U.S. access or

presence in a region or to foster relations with foreign military forces.

Although these objectives are important, they have taken precedence over

training U.S. forces for joint operations.

The J-7 has not provided the strong leadership needed to ensure that the

full range of program management tasks required for an effective joint

training program are carried out and coordinated. It has not (1) critically

reviewed planned exercises to ensure that the program provides joint

training benefits to the fullest extent possible, (2) ensured that problems

surfacing in the exercises are identified and addressed, or (3) monitored

enough exercises to gain first-hand knowledge of the problems. The

diffusion of responsibilities among several entities heightens the

importance of a stronger J-7 coordinating role for joint training.

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have recently taken steps

aimed at improving joint training. Notably, they have strengthened the

roles of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the Joint Warfighting Center.

However, other CINCs have voiced concerns about the U.S. Atlantic

Command’s new joint training program and operational strategy and

appear reluctant to use the Joint Warfighting Center’s technical assistance.

A stronger J-7 role is needed to ensure that these concerns are adequately

addressed if more uniformity in joint training is to be achieved and if the

U.S. Atlantic Command’s new strategy is to effectively prepare U.S. forces

for joint operations.

1

Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Military Exercises—An Important Tool for Military Readiness

(GAO/LCD-80-2, Dec. 11, 1979) and Management of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program Has

Been Strengthened but More Needs to be Done (GAO/NSIAD-85-46, Mar. 5, 1985).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

CJCS Exercises Provide

Little Joint Training

Opportunities

In 1994, DOD spent over $400 million to conduct over 200 exercises under

the CJCS Exercise Program, yet less than one-third of the exercises had

joint training as their primary focus. The major reason for the small

number of joint training exercises being conducted was that the program’s

other objectives—gaining access to foreign seaports and airstrips, showing

a U.S. military presence in a region, and enhancing military-to-military

relationships—have taken precedence over those related to joint training.

Of 121 exercises conducted by the commanders of the Central, European,

and Pacific theaters in fiscal year 1994, GAO found that 73 percent of the

exercises were designed to meet objectives such as a show of U.S. military

presence in a region. Only 27 percent of the 121 exercises were designed

to train forces or commanders for joint operations. Moreover, almost

60 percent of the exercises involved only a single service and should not

be characterized as joint.

A Joint Staff working group, which reviewed the CJCS Exercise Program in

late 1994, had similar findings. It found that only 17 percent of the

exercises had joint training of U.S. forces as their primary focus.

Stronger J-7 Oversight Role

Is Needed

Inadequate oversight by the J-7 has been a major factor contributing to the

limited amount of joint training being conducted for U.S. forces. The J-7

has not reviewed the CINCs’ planned exercises to ensure that they provide

joint training benefits or that they focus on correcting past problems.

The process for analyzing exercise results is also flawed. The J-7 has relied

on CINCs to evaluate their own joint exercises, but has not implemented

meaningful standards to guide their evaluations. The J-7 has not been

aware of some problems because it has conducted few independent

exercise evaluations: it only evaluated 4 of the 200 exercises conducted in

fiscal year 1994. Moreover, the J-7 has permitted remedial action projects,

which are aimed at correcting identified problems, to be closed before

their corrective actions were tested in joint exercises. As a result of these

deficiencies, not all serious problems have been reported and those that

were reported have frequently recurred.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Executive Summary

DOD Has Taken Steps to

Improve Joint Training, but

Stronger Consensus on

Approach Is Needed

In recent years, numerous actions have been taken aimed at improving

joint training. For example, the Secretary of Defense, upon the

recommendation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), increased the

joint training and operational responsibilities of the U.S. Atlantic

Command. The Joint Staff has also developed and issued numerous joint

doctrinal publications and additional joint policy guidance. It has also

increased the capabilities of its Joint Warfighting Center to provide

technical assistance to CINCs in planning and evaluating their joint training

programs.

The U.S. Atlantic Command has developed a field training program for

U.S.-based forces; a simulated training program for U.S.-based

commanders, which began in 1995; and a new joint force deployment

strategy for the regional CINCs’ use. In fiscal year 1995, the Joint

Warfighting Center plans to provide technical assistance to the CINCs on 

11 exercises and to assess 30 joint doctrinal publications.

Despite these efforts, additional actions are needed to ensure that the full

benefits of recent changes are achieved. For example, other CINCs were

concerned about accepting forces trained by the U.S. Atlantic Command

due to the differences in tactics, terrain, and procedures. They were also

concerned that the Command, in focusing its training on U.S.-based

officers as joint task force commanders, was targeting the wrong

audience. They said they would select commanders from their own

theaters, not from U.S.-based forces.

Other CINCs were also skeptical about the soundness of the U.S. Atlantic

Command’s new joint force strategy, which requires integrating forces

from the individual services in nontraditional ways. They questioned

whether these force packages would provide the necessary military

capabilities. They also feared that problems would arise since there may

be insufficient time to train these forces with others in the theater before

an operation began.

Finally, although Joint Warfighting Center officials believe that their

technical assistance will help make the regional CINCs’ joint training

programs more uniform, some CINCs doubted that they would use this

assistance since they considered themselves able to develop their own

programs. Two CINCs said they had their own simulated training capability,

and therefore, did not need such assistance from the Center. On this latter

point, GAO noted that DOD was proceeding to develop two simulation

centers in the Tidewater, Virginia, area—one at the U.S. Atlantic Command

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Executive Summary

and one at the Joint Warfighting Center—despite questions about possible

duplication.2

 No consensus on any of these matters had been reached at

the time of GAO’s review.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the

Chairman, JCS, improve oversight of joint training activities by ensuring

that a full range of specific management actions related to joint training

are taken by the appropriate DOD entities. It also recommends that the

Secretary and Chairman seek a stronger consensus among CINCs with

respect to the U.S. Atlantic Command’s new joint training and force

deployment strategies. GAO’s specific recommendations are included in

chapters 3 and 4.

Agency Comments DOD agreed with many of GAO’s findings, but did not agree to take the full

range of actions GAO recommended. Its position was that (1) the level of

joint training exercises being conducted was adequate to achieve

proficiency in joint operations, (2) current Joint Staff oversight of joint

training would continue but not be increased, and (3) the concerns of the

CINCs about the new joint training and operational strategies had been

addressed. GAO continues to believe that the problems that have hindered

joint training in the past are likely to recur without increased program

oversight by the Joint Staff.

2

This potential overlap was the subject of a GAO inquiry to the Secretary of Defense, Joint Simulation

Training (GAO/NSIAD-94-249R, Aug. 18, 1994).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Contents

Letter 1

Executive Summary 4

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Responsibility for Joint Training Is Divided Among Several DOD

Organizations

12

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program Established to

Meet Joint Training and Other Needs

15

Our Prior Reviews Noted Weaknesses in Joint Staff Program

Oversight

16

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Chapter 2 

CJCS Exercise

Program Has

Provided Marginal

Joint Training

Benefits

19

Majority of CJCS Exercises Do Not Have Joint Training

Objectives

19

Most Exercises Do Not Provide Challenging Training for U.S.

Forces

22

Recent Joint Staff Review Surfaced Similar Findings 23

Agency Comments 24

Chapter 3 

Stronger Joint Staff

Oversight Needed to

Improve Joint

Training

25

The J-7 Staff Has Not Critically Reviewed the Content of CINC

Training Plans

25

Objective Standards to Measure Joint Exercise Results Have Not

Been Set

27

Few Independent Evaluations of Joint Exercises Are Made 29

Stronger J-7 Coordinating Role Is Needed 30

Conclusions 31

Recommendations 32

Agency Comments 33

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Contents

Chapter 4 

Actions Are Being

Taken to Improve

Joint Training, but

Greater Consensus on

Strategies Is Needed

36

The Joint Staff Is Actively Working to Improve Joint Training 36

USACOM Assigned to Train Most Forces 38

CINCs Have Expressed Concerns About New Joint Training

Initiatives

39

Conclusions 44

Recommendation 45

Agency Comments 45

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 48

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 64

Table Table 1.1: Joint Training Activities of DOD Entities 15

Figures Figure 2.1: Breakdown of Exercises Conducted by the Central,

European, and Pacific Commands in Fiscal Year 1994 by Major

Purpose

20

Figure 2.2: Breakdown of Single and Multiservice Exercises

Conducted by the Central, European, and Pacific Commands in

Fiscal Year 1994

22

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

USACOM U.S. Atlantic Command

RAP Remedial Action Project

REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have conducted

numerous joint operations. These operations have involved a wide range

of military missions, such as the Persian Gulf War; humanitarian relief

missions in Rwanda and Somalia; response to natural disasters, such as

Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki; and the deployment to restore the

government of Haiti. However, after-action analyses of these events have

continued to identify many weaknesses in U.S. forces’ capability to

effectively operate together as a joint force, suggesting the need for

increased joint training. Joint training uses joint doctrine to prepare joint

forces and staffs to respond to the operational requirements of the

regional commanders in chief (CINC).

The services have historically emphasized the need to train their various

components together to ensure that their tactics are synchronized.

However, the complexity of current joint operations, which often involve

the integration of diverse land, sea, and air assets from all military

services, makes joint training even more essential to the effective

execution of joint military operations. In addition, U.S. military forces

have been substantially reduced—from a total of 3.3 million personnel in

fiscal year 1989 to 2.7 million personnel in fiscal year 1994. The

Department of Defense (DOD) plans to further reduce its forces to

2.4 million personnel by the end of fiscal year 1997.

Another significant change is that most military personnel will now be

stationed in the United States. In the past, large combinations of

forward-based forces responded to meet the operational requirements of

the regional CINCs. With a smaller, predominantly U.S.-based force, CINCs

are highly dependent on forces being deployed from the United States to

provide operational support. Future operations will increasingly be joint,

and U.S.-based forces will need to train together to provide the needed

joint force capability to the CINCs. Finally, given the much smaller force,

the services may have to integrate their forces in new ways, such as the

deployment of Army forces aboard a Navy aircraft carrier in Haiti. Joint

training is essential if such innovations are to succeed.

Responsibility for

Joint Training Is

Divided Among

Several DOD

Organizations

Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433), defines

the responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CINCs, and individual military services for

joint training. DOD and Joint Staff policies have further defined their

respective roles as follows:

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is

responsible for providing overall policy and program review for all military

training programs. For joint training, this office has confined its oversight

to reviews of funding requests for planned exercises.

• The Joint Staff is responsible for joint training. Its responsibilities include

(1) providing for the integration of combatant forces into an efficient team

of land, naval, and air forces; (2) developing joint doctrine and joint

training policies; (3) advising the Secretary of Defense on joint training

priorities; (4) overseeing CINC activities; (5) establishing a uniform system

for evaluating joint training and assisting CINCs in conducting assessments;

and (6) designating a Joint Staff focal point to monitor and coordinate

joint training policies with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CINCs,

and the services.

• CINCs are responsible for (1) determining joint training requirements for

forces within their areas of operation; (2) developing training plans; and

(3) directing all aspects of joint training, including the conduct and

evaluation of joint exercises.

• The services are responsible for training their forces in basic service skills,

such as infantry, armor, and aviation, so that they can be integrated with

forces from the other services, when needed, in joint exercises and

operations.

In defining specific responsibilities for his Joint Staff, the Chairman

designated the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) as

the joint training focal point. The Chairman also assigned certain

responsibilities for joint training to the Joint Warfighting Center.1

 These

include (1) assessing joint training doctrine and establishing the need for

new doctrine, (2) helping CINCs design and evaluate their joint exercises,

(3) assisting CINCs in training their forces using computer simulations, and

(4) arranging for the services to provide personnel to serve as opposition

forces in CINC exercises.

In a Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of

the United States, issued in February 1993, the Chairman, JCS, noted the

need to improve training for joint operations. The report stated that, as

U.S. forces decline, “it is more important than ever that the remaining

forces are trained to operate jointly. U.S. military strategy requires forces

that are highly skilled, rapidly deliverable, and fully capable of operating

effectively as a joint team immediately upon arrival.”

1

The Joint Warfighting Center was established in 1993. Although it is organizationally an entity under

the J-7, its commander reports directly to the Chairman, JCS.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To achieve these objectives, the Chairman recommended that U.S.-based

forces assigned to the Army’s Forces Command, the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet,

the Air Combat Command, and Marine Forces Atlantic be combined under

a single joint command—the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The

Chairman also recommended that USACOM be responsible for the joint

training of these forces and for deploying them in response to military

crises, U.N. peacekeeping operations, and natural disasters. In

October 1993, the Secretary of Defense assigned these added

responsibilities to USACOM.

2

 With the overall reduction in U.S. military

forces and return of some forces that were formerly stationed abroad to

the United States, USACOM now commands about 2 million military

personnel—more than 75 percent of all U.S. forces.

Table 1.1 summarizes the major activities performed by the DOD entities

involved in joint training. These activities stem from title 10

responsibilities as implemented by DOD and Joint Staff policies.

2

USACOM also retained its former responsibilities as a warfighting CINC responsible for the defense of

the continental United States and Canada.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Joint Training Activities of DOD Entities

Joint Staff

DOD organization

Joint training activity OSDa J-7 JWFC USACOM Other CINCs Services

Planning

Determining joint training needs X X

Establishing and implementing joint

training policy

X X

Planning joint exercises X X

Providing technical assistance in

exercise design

X

Conducting exercises and providing resources

Conducting joint exercises X X

Providing forces and equipment X

Providing opposition forces X X X

Funding transportation X

Funding operational costs X

Providing computer simulation

training for CINC forces overseas

X X

Providing computer simulation

training for U.S.-based forces

X X

Evaluating

Conducting assessments of

performance during exercises

X X

Conducting independent

assessments of CINC exercises

X X

Documenting joint problems X X X X

Correcting joint problems X X X X

Performing program oversight X X

aOffice of the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff

Exercise Program

Established to Meet

Joint Training and

Other Needs

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program is the

primary method used to train forces and staff for joint operations. The

joint training objectives of this program, which began in the early 1960s,

include (1) preparing U.S. forces to conduct war and other lesser

operations; (2) helping the Chairman, JCS assess the readiness of the CINCs’

forces; and (3) validating the adequacy of joint doctrine, strategies, tactics,

material, and forces. Besides these joint training objectives, the program is

also used for other purposes, such as to support military objectives

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

resulting from U.S. treaty obligations with other nations, support regional

security by demonstrating the capability of U.S. military forces, or foster

relationships between U.S. military forces and those of foreign nations.

Under the program, approximately 200 exercises are conducted annually

throughout the world. The regional CINCs plan and conduct the actual

exercises, which consist of both live and simulated exercises aimed at

training forces in joint operations. These range from a show of force in a

region to operations that would be associated with a major regional

conflict.

The J-7 directorate apportions available airlift and sealift transportation

funding among the various exercises and pays these costs out of funds

designated for the exercise program. The services absorb the operating

costs associated with their participation in the exercises and do not report

these costs to the J-7. There is no separate appropriation specifically for

the CJCS Exercise Program. According to a J-7 budget official, funding for

the program is included in two budget accounts: (1) Operation and

Maintenance, Defense-Wide [Agencies] and (2) Military Construction,

Defense-Wide [Agencies]. The official said that because there are no

separate budget line items for this program, the J-7 does not know

precisely how much it costs. The official estimated that it cost $420 million

in fiscal year 1994 to conduct joint exercises, about 75 percent of which

was the cost of transporting forces and equipment to and from the

exercises. However, the official emphasized that this should be considered

only a rough estimate of the program’s cost.

Our Prior Reviews

Noted Weaknesses in

Joint Staff Program

Oversight

We conducted two prior reviews of the CJCS Exercise Program in 1979 and

1985 and in both instances pointed to the need for stronger Joint Staff

program oversight.3

 We noted that DOD could not be assured that the

program was effectively training forces for joint operations due to a

complex and fragmented management system with insufficient oversight

by the Joint Staff. In both instances, we recommended that the Joint Staff

assume a stronger management role and, specifically, that it critically

evaluate planned exercises.

3

Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Military Exercises—An Important Tool for Military Readiness

(GAO/LCD-80-2, Dec. 11, 1979) and Management of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program Has

Been Strengthened But More Needs to Be Done (GAO/NSIAD-85-46, Mar. 5, 1985).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The former Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on

Military Forces and Personnel and Readiness, House Committee on Armed

Services (now the Committee on National Security), requested that we

provide a current assessment of DOD’s joint training program. Our

objectives were to determine (1) the scope of DOD’s joint training activities,

(2) the effectiveness of the management of these activities, and (3) the

actions that have been taken and any additional actions needed to improve

joint training.

To determine the scope of DOD’s joint training program, we gathered

information on the CJCS Exercise Program and analyzed the exercises

conducted by the Central, European, and Pacific combatant commands

under this program. These three commands conducted 65 percent of the

joint exercises held in fiscal year 1994. We examined the exercises

conducted in fiscal year 1994 and those planned for fiscal year 1995 to

determine whether the three commands included tasks in their exercise

plans to deploy forces as a joint task force or train commanders and staffs

in joint operations. J-7 and CINC officials identified these two criteria as

critical in training forces for joint operations and agreed that this was an

appropriate basis for assessing the joint training value of the exercises. We

did not analyze whether these planned tasks were actually performed. To

confirm our analyses, we provided summaries of our work to the CINCs’

staffs.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the management of joint training

activities, we identified the roles and responsibilities associated with joint

training by reviewing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986, prior legislation, and Office of the Secretary of

Defense and Joint Staff guidance. We also discussed joint training

responsibilities with officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff’s J-7 directorate and

Joint Warfighting Center, and CINC training and operations officials. To

assess what problems have recurred in joint training exercises and

operations and how these problems were addressed, we analyzed

information in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System and J-7’s

Remedial Action Project Status Report for 10 recent joint exercises and

operations, including Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

To determine what actions have been taken to improve joint training and

what further actions might be needed, we collected documentation on

actions taken by USACOM, the Joint Staff’s J-7 directorate and Joint

Warfighting Center, and CINCs and discussed these changes with

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 1 

Introduction

appropriate officials. In particular, we examined recent initiatives to

improve management and emerging issues and concerns stemming from

USACOM’s recent changes in joint training strategy.

We conducted our work from October 1993 to December 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 2 

CJCS Exercise Program Has Provided

Marginal Joint Training Benefits

A key training principle is for U.S. forces to train as they will fight.

Because current U.S. military strategy is based on forces operating

together as joint teams, Joint Staff training guidance emphasizes the need

for the services to train jointly. The CJCS Exercise Program is the primary

method used to train forces and commanders for joint operations.

However, this program has multiple objectives and, in reviewing the

exercises conducted by three CINCs in 1994 and those planned for 1995, we

found that nearly 75 percent did not have joint training objectives. Instead

of training forces and commanders for joint operations, the majority of the

exercises were conducted for other reasons, such as maintaining U.S.

access or presence in a region. More than half of the exercises involved

only a single service. A recent Joint Staff Working Group review of this

program identified findings similar to ours.

Majority of CJCS

Exercises Do Not

Have Joint Training

Objectives

Hundreds of exercises have been conducted under the CJCS Exercise

Program. However, the majority of the exercises provided little joint

training value for U.S. forces because they (1) were designed to meet

nontraining objectives or (2) involved only a single service.

Most CJCS Exercises Are

Held to Achieve Presence

or Access Objectives

Exercises included in the CJCS Exercise Program are conducted for several

reasons. Although some exercises are conducted to train forces and

commanders in joint operations, the vast majority are carried out to gain

or maintain U.S. access or presence to seaports and airstrips, promote

regional stability by a show of U.S. military forces, or foster relationships

with other nations’ military forces (hereafter referred to as presence or

access exercises). As such, these exercises do not have joint training

objectives and, accordingly, many involve only a single military service.

For example, U.S. participation in some CJCS exercises involves only a

single Navy ship.

In contrast, exercises designed to train joint forces involve assembling

units from two or more services so that they can perform joint tasks.

Examples of such joint tasks include attacking enemy targets with air,

naval, or ground cannons, rockets, and missiles; conducting deceptive

tasks to give the enemy a false picture of reality; and constructing

obstacles to delay the enemy.

J-7 training guidance specifies that a critical element of effective joint

operations is a well-trained staff that is proficient in the various tasks

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Chapter 2 

CJCS Exercise Program Has Provided

Marginal Joint Training Benefits

required. Exercises designed to train commanders and staff in joint

operations consist of such tasks as forming a joint staff to plan the

operation; conducting command and control procedures; and collecting,

disseminating, and analyzing intelligence data. During the course of our

work, J-7 and CINC officials also stressed the importance of a highly trained

joint task force staff to successful joint operations.

Although it is important to accomplish both training and other objectives,

we found the vast majority of the exercises conducted by the U.S. Central,

European, and Pacific Commands for fiscal year 1994 and planned for

fiscal year 1995 were designed to demonstrate presence or access rather

than to provide joint training for U.S. forces. In 1994, 88 of 121 exercises

(73 percent) conducted by the 3 CINCs were done for reasons other than for

joint training. Of the remaining 33 exercises designed to provide joint

training, 20 deployed a joint task force. Figure 2.1 shows a breakdown of

the exercises conducted by the Central, European, and Pacific Commands

in fiscal year 1994.

Figure 2.1: Breakdown of Exercises

Conducted by the Central, European,

and Pacific Commands in Fiscal Year

1994 by Major Purpose

73% • Presence or Access Exercises

•16%

Joint Force Deployments

•11%

Joint Staff Training

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Marginal Joint Training Benefits

For fiscal year 1995, 113 of the 150 exercises (75 percent) planned by these

CINCs were to be carried out for presence or access purposes. Similarly,

despite the importance of training commanders and staff to conduct joint

operations, CINC exercises have provided relatively few such training

opportunities. Of the 33 exercises conducted in 1994 that provided joint

training, 13 exercises trained commanders and their staff in joint

operations. Of 37 joint training exercises planned for fiscal year 1995, 

19 will provide joint staff training.

The lack of adequately trained joint task force staffs has hindered the

effectiveness of exercises and operations since 1987. For example, Joint

Universal Lessons Learned reports from Reforger exercises in 1987, 1988,

and 1992; and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91; and

Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-93 noted that joint task force staffs were

not adequately trained prior to deployment to the theaters of operation,

thereby hindering operational effectiveness. The problem had not been

corrected at the time we completed our fieldwork in December 1994,

although efforts are underway to improve joint task force training. 

(See ch. 4).

In reviewing these same exercises conducted by the Central, European,

and Pacific Commands in 1994, we also found that about 60 percent of

them involved only a single service, as shown in figure 2.2. Although

included in the CJCS Exercise Program, such exercises could hardly be

classified as joint.

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Figure 2.2: Breakdown of Single and

Multiservice Exercises Conducted by

the Central, European, and Pacific

Commands in Fiscal Year 1994

41% • Multi-service

59%•

Single service

Most Exercises Do

Not Provide

Challenging Training

for U.S. Forces

J-7 and CINC officials offered two main reasons to explain why so little joint

training has been done. First, the objectives of gaining access to seaports

and airstrips, maintaining presence in regions, and fostering relations with

foreign nations’ forces have taken precedence over training U.S. forces for

joint operations. Second, because foreign forces have varying levels of

operational capability, the complexity of tasks included in exercises with

these forces must frequently be matched to the capabilities of the foreign

forces rather than the capabilities of U.S. forces. In some regions, foreign

forces are simply not prepared to participate in large-scale joint exercises,

according to the officials.

In a September 1994 speech before the Association of the U.S. Army’s

Institute of Land Warfare, the Chairman, JCS, commented on the status of

joint training exercises and the need for improvements. The Chairman

noted that joint doctrine was not being used in the training exercises and

that the quality of the training had frequently embarrassed him. He added

that current joint exercises reminded him of the types of exercises the

services had engaged in many years ago.

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Recent Joint Staff

Review Surfaced

Similar Findings

Based on concerns of the Chairman, JCS, that the exercise program might

not be providing efficient and effective training despite a growing number

of exercises in the program, a Joint Staff working group initiated a review

of the exercise program in October 1994.1

 The review covered the

exercises conducted by the five geographical CINCs—USACOM, and the

Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands—and the five

functional CINCs—the North American Air Defense, Space, Strategic,

Special Operations, and Transportation Commands.

During the first phase of the study, which was conducted from October

through December 1994, the working group analyzed the purpose of the

exercises and the type of training they provided. Similar to our findings,

the review showed that most exercises were being held primarily for

presence or access purposes or other nontraining purposes, rather than

for joint training. Of the 174 program exercises planned for fiscal year 1995

by the 5 geographical CINCs, the review showed that only 17 percent of the

exercises had joint training as their primary focus.2

 The working group

made the following recommendations to the Joint Staff:

• Stem the increase in the number of exercises.

• Assess the impact of treaty and politically arranged exercises on joint

operations training.

• Continue to review the joint exercise program to ensure that the exercises

support operational plans and cancel or revise those exercises not meeting

this objective.

• Review the process for evaluating joint exercises to ensure that CINCs

design exercises that address prior lessons learned.

The Joint Staff had planned to conduct a second phase of the study, which

would implement the recommendations of the first phase. However, J-7

and USACOM officials told us the Chairman was not satisfied with the depth

of the first phase. It now appears that a more detailed review of the

program will be made before the recommendations are implemented.

1

The working group consisted of representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, J-7, and

services.

2

In commenting on our report, DOD stated that over 88 percent of the fiscal year 1995 exercises would

use joint forces in the execution of the National Military Strategy. It should be noted that the majority

of these exercises are done for presence or access reasons and do not have joint training as their

primary focus.

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Agency Comments DOD concurred with our findings regarding the percentages of exercises in

the CJCS Exercise Program devoted to joint training. However, it disagreed

that the reason for the small number of joint exercises was that other

program objectives had taken precedence over those related to joint

training. DOD maintained that the number of exercises conducted in 1994

was adequate to meet joint training needs.

We found no basis to support DOD’s assertion. During our fieldwork, J-7

and CINC officials acknowledged that no formal analyses had been

conducted to determine the number of joint exercises needed to achieve

proficiency in joint operations. In contrast to DOD’s assessment that the

current level of joint training is adequate, the May 1995 report of the

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces concluded that

joint training was not being done well and needed more emphasis.3

3

Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

(May 24, 1995).

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Inadequate oversight by the Joint Staff’s J-7 directorate has been a major

factor contributing to the limited amount of joint training being done

under the CJCS Exercise Program. Although 10 U.S.C. gives the regional

CINCs responsibility for conducting joint training, the J-7 has been

designated as the focal point for overseeing the CINCs’ joint training

activities. Despite this oversight responsibility, the J-7 directorate has not

conducted the range of activities that this responsibility entails. For

example, it has not

• critically evaluated the content of CINC-developed joint exercise plans on a

routine basis to ensure that their exercises provide beneficial training and

address past problems,

• developed meaningful standards to assist CINCs in evaluating their

exercises, or

• conducted a sufficient number of independent exercise evaluations to

ensure that problems are identified and addressed.

The diffusion of responsibilities among several DOD entities heightens the

importance of a stronger J-7 coordinating role.

The J-7 Staff Has Not

Critically Reviewed

the Content of CINC

Training Plans

Although the Joint Staff has taken some limited actions based on our prior

recommendations, many of the problems we noted 16 years ago have

continued. For example, instead of independently analyzing the planned

CINC exercises as we recommended, the Joint Staff assigned this

responsibility to CINCs. The J-7 staff, which has oversight responsibility for

joint training, has limited its reviews of CINC training plans to (1) evaluating

the CINCs’ need for transportation—airlift and sealift—and other resources,

such as ammunition, fuel, and equipment, to conduct the exercises and

(2) ensuring that these needs were met.

J-7 officials said that they have not routinely reviewed the content of the

exercises because CINCs are in a better position to determine their training

needs and design joint exercises. However, as our analysis showed, this

system has permitted a large number of exercises to be conducted that

provide marginal joint training opportunities for U.S. forces. Following our

1979 report, the Joint Staff issued guidance requiring CINCs to submit

detailed descriptions of their training objectives. However, by 1985, we

were once again reporting that because of insufficient oversight by the

Joint Staff, CINCs were either not submitting the required information or

providing general information that was not helpful in assessing the merits

of the exercises.

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Similarly, as previously noted, until the Joint Staff reviewed the exercise

program in the fall of 1994, it had little knowledge of how much the

program provided in the way of joint training experiences. This was the

first critical review that the Joint Staff had conducted of the program.

Although our position has been that these reviews should be routinely

conducted, the Joint Staff views its assessment of the exercise program as

a special effort that will terminate in 1995.

The J-7 Staff Has Not

Ensured That Past

Problems Were Addressed

Because the J-7 staff has not routinely or critically reviewed CINC training

plans, it also has no assurance that actions taken to address past problems

have, in fact, corrected them. Under its Remedial Action Project (RAP)

program, the J-7 staff identifies problems and has the appropriate

organization try to correct the problems. For example, the Joint

Warfighting Center would be charged with correcting problems stemming

from weaknesses in joint doctrine. In fiscal year 1994, the J-7 began using

its Joint Universal Lessons Learned System to prepare annual summaries

of problems identified in joint exercises and operations; CINCs then are to

use these summaries to plan future exercise tasks. Although J-7’s efforts to

identify and correct problems are steps in the right direction, its failure to

review the CINCs’ planned exercises prevents it from ensuring that

common problems identified in the past are tested or that actions taken to

correct them are effective.

Once the J-7 staff is satisfied that a designated entity has taken a

corrective action, it closes the RAP item and considers the problem to be

corrected. Joint Staff guidance states that the most common method to

assess the effectiveness of corrective actions is through joint exercises.

However, such testing is not required, and the J-7 permits RAP items to be

closed through other means, such as conducting a study of the action

taken or performing some other type of evaluation.

CINC officials said that they seldom test whether prior problems have been

corrected in their exercises because (1) the Joint Staff has not required

them to do so and (2) they had insufficient time to analyze past problems

before planning future exercises. One CINC training official stated that joint

exercises consist merely of accomplishing events rather than training and

that problems identified during prior exercises may be “lessons recorded”

but not necessarily “lessons learned.” The views of this official reflect a

systemic problem in planning joint exercises that surfaced in a 1990 joint

exercise. The lessons learned report noted the following:

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“Players generally had no awareness of Joint Universal Lessons Learned or Remedial

Action Projects from previous exercises. The apparent absence of continuity or long-term

perspective on the part of exercise planners and players tends to cause repetitious [lessons

learned items] and a lack of focus of exercise objectives.”

Despite the report’s recommendation, the Joint Staff has not required that

exercise objectives be focused on RAP items from previous exercises. The

lack of a requirement may contribute to the fact that problems in joint

operations have tended to recur. For example, those conducting the first

phase of the Joint Staff working group exercise review reported that

lessons learned from prior exercises had not been sufficiently analyzed.

They noted that inadequate training of joint force commanders was cited

as a key problem in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the

Somalia relief effort. Yet, our review showed that less than 15 percent of

the exercises conducted in fiscal year 1994 and those planned for fiscal

year 1995 would focus on training joint task force commanders.1

 Although

the Joint Staff is attempting several solutions to improve proficiency in

joint operations, such as USACOM’s new joint training strategies, it has not

increased the number of exercises to test the effectiveness of these efforts.

Objective Standards

to Measure Joint

Exercise Results Have

Not Been Set

The Chairman, JCS, delegated responsibility for evaluating joint exercises

to the regional CINCs. After completing the exercises, CINCs must report

whether they achieved the training objectives. The J-7 staff uses the CINCs’

evaluation reports to determine what actions are needed to address joint

training problems. However, the J-7 staff has not provided CINCs with any

objective standards to evaluate joint exercises. As a result, CINC

evaluations tend to be subjective and do not critically assess their forces’

readiness for joint operations.

In 1993, the Joint Staff developed a list of common joint tasks for CINCs to

use in planning joint exercises and operations. However, these tasks were

broad—for example, deploying joint forces and employing theater

strategic firepower. Joint Staff training guidance cites the importance of

linking these broad joint tasks to more specific performance standards to

assess how well the tasks are performed. Although it has issued some

general guidance on setting the standards, the Joint Staff has let CINCs

develop these standards. J-7 officials provided examples of the types of

objective standards that CINCs could use to measure force deployment and

firepower tasks. Standards for force deployment could include whether

11The Joint Staff working group’s study of the CJCS Exercise Program did not analyze the amount of

training devoted to joint task force commanders. However, the study showed that 17 percent of all the

exercises planned for fiscal year 1995 would provide joint training.

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the correct types of forces were deployed and whether they arrived at

their theater of operations on time. Training standards for strategic

firepower could assess whether the proper amount of firepower was

available, how quickly it was delivered, and how long it could be

sustained.

The problem of assessing exercises without clearly defined standards was

noted in a 1992 report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned based on

its observations of U.S. Army forces that participated in the Return of

Forces to Germany (REFORGER) joint exercise. The training objectives for

Army units were to

• exercise corps land/air battle staff in a mobile environment,

• train brigade through corps battle staffs,

• exercise and understand emerging North Atlantic Treaty Organization

strategy,

• train multinational corps in command and control procedures, and

• reduce the burden on the host country.

In assessing the results of the exercise, the Center noted the following:

“The majority of exercise objectives did not have measurable, objective standards

associated with them; rather the exercise objectives were subjective in nature. The

majority of exercise objectives in REFORGER 92 could be easily accomplished solely as a

function of time and posture of units (i.e., all unit players participate from 26 SEP to 

9 OCT). . . . None of these exercise objectives can be measured in a negative manner. Since

no accompanying standards were included, automatic success was achieved through these

objectives. As long as all REFORGER player units participated from [the] start of the exercise

to [the] end of the exercise, all of the Army objectives were met. This is . . . hardly a fair

and objective measure of success.”

The Center recommended that large exercises not be planned or

conducted without measurable training objectives. A Center official who

wrote the report told us that he briefed U.S. Army officials on his findings

and recommended actions in an after-action meeting to discuss exercise

results. He also prepared a lessons learned report for submission to the

Joint Staff. However, Army officials did not submit the report to the J-7

directorate.

J-7 and CINC officials told us that the situation described in the Center’s

1992 report continues to exist. CINCs often set subjective standards and

consider training objectives to be met if forces merely participate in

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exercises and perform their assigned tasks. Without measurable standards,

exercise evaluations are of little value in judging the readiness of U.S.

forces to conduct joint operations, according to these officials.

The J-7 staff recognizes the need for objective training standards and is

working with CINCs to develop a universal joint task list that would assist

them in developing such standards. An example of a revised task with a

measurable standard would be to “conduct long-range fires with a certain

percent of attrition rates for threat forces.” The J-7 staff expects the

revised tasks and standards to be developed by December 1995 but does

not believe they can be integrated into exercises until fiscal year 1998.

Few Independent

Evaluations of Joint

Exercises Are Made

The J-7 staff relies on CINCs to evaluate their own exercises and observes

few exercises to gain first-hand knowledge of the problems that occur. As

a result, the J-7 staff is not aware of all the problems, some of which could

have serious implications. For example, in fiscal year 1994, J-7 staff

observed only 4 of the 200 exercises conducted (2 percent). J-7 staff

officials told us that they cannot observe more exercises at current

staffing levels. The Evaluation and Analysis Division in the J-7 has only

three personnel assigned to observe CINC exercises.

Before submitting evaluation reports to the J-7, the CINCs’ staffs discuss

exercise results and the problems that occurred. Among other things, the

staffs decide on the nature of problems, determine any joint implications,

and recommend corrective actions. The staffs also decide whether CINCs

should report the problems to the J-7 directorate for inclusion in the

lessons learned system or if CINC staff should correct them on their own.

J-7 officials told us that the CINCs’ process of screening problems from

joint exercises could allow some serious problems to go unreported. As

noted above, this lack of reporting was demonstrated in the Center for

Army Lessons Learned report on the lack of measurable exercise

objectives in the 1992 REFORGER exercise. The Center documented the

problem and prepared an evaluation report; however, the matter was not

forwarded to the J-7 and, consequently, could not be entered into the

tracking system. Although J-7 officials observed this exercise, they did not

attend the briefing of Army officials and consequently were not aware of

the problem.

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Stronger J-7

Coordinating Role Is

Needed

A major factor contributing to the lingering problems in joint training is

the diffusion of joint training responsibilities among several DOD entities

without a strong Joint Staff focal point. As noted in chapter 1, joint

training responsibilities are divided among the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, two Joint Staff entities (J-7 directorate and the Joint Warfighting

Center), USACOM, the remaining regional CINCs, and the individual military

services.

J-7 Staff Must Delegate

Tasks Due to Its Small Size

The Joint Staff designated its J-7 directorate the responsible entity for

coordinating joint training activities; however, this entity lacks the staff to

effectively conduct all desirable management tasks commensurate with its

oversight role. As a result, it has had to delegate some responsibilities to

other DOD entities, thereby heightening its coordinating role. For example,

in fiscal year 1995, the two J-7 offices responsible for joint training—the

Joint Exercise and Training and the Evaluation and Analysis

Divisions—have 35 staff. The J-7 suboffice responsible for observing CINC

exercises has only three staff. Although officials in this latter J-7 office

believe they should conduct additional independent evaluations, it was not

possible because the process of independently evaluating a single CINC

exercise takes about 6 months.

The J-7 staff acknowledged that a broader range of oversight

responsibilities was desirable, but not possible because of their limited

staff. Therefore, they have limited their role to developing joint doctrine

and policy, coordinating exercise schedules, and entering data into the

lessons learned system and delegated other responsibilities to the Joint

Warfighting Center and CINCs. This approach appears reasonable, given the

current budgetary climate that makes it unrealistic to assume that

additional resources would be forthcoming to increase the J-7 staff.

Shifting Coordinating Role

to the Joint Warfighting

Center or USACOM Does

Not Appear Practical

At first glance, it would appear that either the Joint Warfighting Center or

USACOM might be better equipped than J-7 to provide more comprehensive

oversight of joint training. However, reassigning this role to either entity

would have drawbacks. For example, the Joint Warfighting Center has

been given increased responsibilities for joint training, with responsibility

for helping CINCs develop their exercise programs and integrate computer

simulations into the actual exercises. With the merger of two separate

organizations, the Center has had a substantial personnel increase and

would appear to be able to assume more authority. However, 145 of the

202 staff at the Center are contractors that provide technical and other

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support—personnel who would not be well-suited to conducting the range

of oversight responsibilities required.

Joint Warfighting Center personnel were not anxious to assume additional

responsibilities for critically reviewing CINC joint training plans since the

Center—headed by a major general—might not command sufficient

authority to oversee the activities of CINCs, who are 4-star general officers.

Also, the Center has not yet established credibility with CINCs, who will

have to be convinced of the value of the Center’s services before they will

use the assistance offered to them. (See ch. 4.) Similarly, USACOM, having

been given a major role in joint training and a substantial staff, would

appear to be in a better position than the small J-7 staff to coordinate joint

training activities and provide the needed program oversight. However, J-7

and USACOM officials felt that, given USACOM’s current responsibilities to

train U.S.-based forces, provide forces to CINCs, and function as a

combatant CINC for the Atlantic region, an expanded role would not be

feasible. Such a role would concentrate too much authority in one CINC,

reinforce already strained relations between USACOM and the remaining

CINCs, and remove training and operational responsibilities that are

rightfully assigned to each of the warfighting CINCs, according to the

officials.

The Commander of the Center and the USACOM Director of Training both

agreed that joint training needed closer oversight. However, they

disagreed on how to accomplish this objective. The USACOM Training

Director believed that oversight responsibility should not be centralized

under one organization and felt that CINCs were in the best position to

perform the task. The Center Commander stated that a stronger focal

point for joint training was needed but that, given resource constraints, it

would be unrealistic to expect the J-7 directorate to assume the role. He

concluded that J-7’s current approach of assigning responsibilities to the

other entities and then attempting to coordinate the activities was, in

effect, the only practical way to manage joint training activities.

Conclusions We have reviewed DOD’s joint training activities two other times over the

last 16 years. Both times, we found weaknesses in the program and

recommended that the Joint Staff be directed to play a stronger role in

overseeing joint training activities. Although the Joint Staff has taken steps

aimed at strengthening joint training, it has neither ensured that the full

range of management initiatives needed to correct long-standing problems

were carried out nor that they were adequately coordinated.

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In our opinion, effective Joint Staff oversight should include a routine,

critical review of the content of planned CINC exercises. The purpose of

this review would be to ensure that the exercises contain the maximum

number of activities that provide joint training, even though the primary

objectives for conducting them may be for other than joint training

purposes. In addition, such reviews would enable the Joint Staff to ensure

that planned exercises test whether past problems have been overcome

and that joint training remedial action items are not closed without

problems having been corrected. Integrating measurable evaluation

standards into joint exercises and independently evaluating the exercises

are also essential elements of an effective oversight program.

The full-range of program oversight needed goes beyond the current

capability of the Joint Staff’s J-7 directorate or any other single

organization. The J-7 directorate would need a large increase in its staff to

perform all necessary functions. However, because the J-7 is responsible

for overseeing joint training activities, it is in the best position to advise

DOD on which organization—Joint Warfighting Center, USACOM, or the other

regional CINCs—should be assigned responsibilities that were currently not

being performed. Assigning responsibilities to other organizations does

not absolve the J-7 directorate from its oversight responsibility for joint

training. If the United States is to effectively carry out joint military

operations in the future, the J-7 staff must be proactive in ensuring that all

delegated responsibilities are effectively carried out and coordinated.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the

Chairman, JCS, improve the oversight of joint training activities by ensuring

that the appropriate DOD entities take the following management actions:

• Routinely review the CINCs’ plans for the CJCS Exercise Program to ensure

that each exercise (1) provides maximum joint training value without

compromising its primary purposes and (2) includes tasks that test the

effectiveness of actions taken to correct previously identified problems.

• Ensure that exercises held to achieve presence or access or other

objectives include joint training tasks, to the extent possible.

• Ensure the development of measurable joint training standards and

expedite their integration into joint training exercises so that the exercises

can be more effectively evaluated.

• Examine what additional resources might be used to permit more

independent exercise evaluations to be made.

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• Close remedial action projects only after the effectiveness of corrective

actions are demonstrated either in joint exercises or, if this is not

appropriate, through alternative means.

We also recommend that, once these specific responsibilities have been

assigned, the J-7 increase its monitoring of the related activities to ensure

that the full range of desirable management activities are effectively

carried out.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our finding on the need to improve Joint Staff

coordination of joint training activities. However, it only partially

concurred with our recommendation that additional Joint Staff oversight

was needed. DOD stated that, rather than increasing oversight, it needed

more time for actions aimed at improving joint training to mature. DOD

pointed to many of the ongoing Joint Staff initiatives we discussed in our

report as evidence that progress is being made.

While we agree that these initiatives are steps in the right direction, we

continue to believe that the Joint Staff must improve oversight of joint

training activities if lingering problems are to be corrected. For example,

DOD implied in its response that the Joint Staff is currently conducting

critical reviews of planned joint exercises. However, as our report notes,

the primary focus of these reviews has not been to critique the exercise

plans but rather to determine what resources were needed to conduct

them. Routine critical reviews of the exercise plans would permit the Joint

Staff to (1) assure itself that the exercises include tasks testing whether

past problems have been corrected, (2) suggest inclusion of tasks where

common proficiency across the force is important, and (3) suggest how

exercises done primarily for presence or access reasons might include

some tasks with joint training value.

With respect to presence and access exercises, DOD said that most of these

exercises include some joint training. However, when we asked for

documentation to support this position, we were advised that DOD would

have to query CINCs for this data—a step we had already taken when

making our own analysis of the exercises. According to the CINCs’ own

assessments, the vast majority of these presence and access exercises do

not include joint training tasks. DOD said that it is currently categorizing

the planned exercises according to their primary purposes and would

begin to balance the training and strategic requirements of the program.

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DOD further stated that it will continue to emphasize the need to achieve

joint training whenever possible.

With respect to our recommendation on measurable joint training

standards, DOD said that developing such standards is a CINC responsibility

and that current joint doctrine is intended to guide them in this process.

DOD added that the Joint Staff’s current effort to develop a universal joint

task list would be a useful tool to CINCs in developing standards. We

recognize the importance of joint doctrine, essential tasks, and the CINCs’

input in developing standards for assessing joint exercises. However, as

we point out, unless these standards are made so that performance in joint

exercises can be objectively and uniformly measured, DOD may never have

a true picture of how prepared U.S. forces are to engage in joint

operations. In our opinion, the Joint Staff is in the best position to develop

common joint training standards. Although we recognize that such

standards would need to be adapted for theater-unique factors, such

standards would provide a basis for objectively and uniformly determining

the proficiency of U.S. forces in critical joint tasks.

With respect to our recommendation that more exercises be

independently evaluated, DOD stated that the J-7 staff would continue to

independently review selected CINC-sponsored exercises even though there

was no requirement to do so. As our report notes, due to its small staff, the

J-7 staff was only able to observe 4 of 200 exercises held in fiscal year

1994. We believe that this small number of evaluations is insufficient to

provide assurance that problems surfacing in exercises are promptly and

accurately reported. We have revised our recommendation to suggest that

the Joint Staff examine what additional resources might be used to permit

more independent exercise evaluations to be made.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to close remedial action

projects only after demonstrating their effectiveness in joint exercises. It

opposed focusing exercises objectives on RAP items from previous

exercises. DOD stated that exercise objectives should focus on those

missions that CINCs must accomplish to support national security and

military strategies and plans. Further, it stated joint exercises were only

one method of validating a RAP or corrective action. We recognize that

testing the effectiveness of some RAP solutions—such as absence of a

training policy in a particular area—is not always feasible in joint

exercises. However, according to Joint Staff training guidance, testing RAP

solutions in joint exercises is a common method to validate the

effectiveness of corrective actions. As our report notes, CINCs seldom

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conduct such tests because they are not required to do so. In our opinion,

testing RAP items in joint exercises is a vital part of assessing the CINCs’

capabilities to support national security strategies and meet operation plan

requirements. Further, the failure to require such testing, when

appropriate, reduces the effectiveness of collecting data on problems and,

in our opinion, is a major reason contributing to recurring joint training

and operational problems. We continue to stress the importance of testing

remedial actions through the joint exercise program. However, we have

modified our recommendation to recognize that, in some instances, it may

be appropriate to close remedial action projects if their effectiveness can

be demonstrated through alternative means.

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The procedures for managing and conducting joint training and operations

are evolving. Over the last few years, the J-7 staff has developed and

issued numerous joint doctrinal publications, issued additional joint policy

guidance, and increased the capabilities of the Joint Warfighting Center to

provide technical assistance to CINCs in their joint training programs. The

Secretary of Defense, upon the recommendation of the Chairman, JCS,

increased the joint training and operational responsibilities of USACOM. To

discharge these new responsibilities, USACOM developed a new joint

training program for U.S.-based forces and revised the operational strategy

for deploying them to the regional CINCs.

These actions—aimed at correcting past problems—are steps in the right

direction. However, CINCs have reservations about USACOM’s new joint

training program and operational strategy and appear reluctant to use the

Joint Warfighting Center’s technical assistance. A stronger Joint Staff role

is needed to ensure that these concerns are adequately addressed.

The Joint Staff Is

Actively Working to

Improve Joint

Training

The Joint Staff’s J-7 directorate and Joint Warfighting Center have issued

joint doctrine, developed common terminology, and enhanced their

technical assistance to CINCs. Additional actions are planned, but their

impact will not be realized for several years.

The Joint Staff Has

Developed Much Joint

Doctrine and Common

Terminology

Sound joint doctrine is essential to successful joint operations since it

establishes the fundamental principles to guide military actions, provides

the common perspective from which forces can plan and operate, and

fundamentally shapes the way U.S. forces train for war. Common

terminology is critical to the individual services communicating effectively

with each other and avoiding confusion on the battlefield. Yet, lessons

learned reports from past operations and exercises revealed that joint

operations were being hindered by a lack of joint doctrine and common

terminology.

In response to these findings, the Joint Staff has issued numerous joint

doctrinal publications over the last 2 years and recently prepared a

dictionary of common terms that should be used in joint operations. As of

March 1995, the Joint Staff had issued 59 of 102 planned joint doctrinal

publications; it expects to issue the remainder by the end of fiscal year

1996. These publications cover a wide range of joint operations, from the

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use of nuclear weapons to humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping

missions.

To help overcome the problem of inconsistent terminology for joint

training and operations, the Joint Staff issued a Universal Joint Task List in

October 1993. The list represents a compilation of all joint tasks that

forces must be capable of performing. It also provides a common basis for

CINCs to use in planning, conducting, and assessing joint exercises and

operations. Examples of joint tasks include conducting operational

maneuvers, such as deploying forces to a theater, employing them, and

overcoming obstacles; conducting intelligence, such as collecting

information on the enemy threat and vulnerability; and providing combat

service support, such as repairing equipment, providing health services,

and conducting prisoner-of-war operations.

New Responsibilities

Assigned to the Joint

Warfighting Center

In May 1993, the Chairman, JCS, gave new joint training responsibilities to

the Joint Warfighting Center. The Center was created in 1993 by merging

two existing Joint Staff organizations—the Joint Warfare Center located at

Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the Joint Doctrine Center located at the Naval

Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia.1

 The new Center is responsible for

(1) providing training assistance to CINCs in joint exercise design,

execution, and assessment and (2) assisting the Joint Staff in developing

and assessing joint doctrine and establishing the need for new doctrine.

In fiscal year 1994, most of the Center’s activities focused on relocating to

newly refurbished facilities at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and defining the roles

and responsibilities of the new organization. A technical staff of military

and contractor personnel began assessing the CINCs’ needs for computer

simulation support for joint exercises and designing computer simulation

packages to train CINC forces and staff in their theaters of operations.

At the CINCs’ invitation, the Center plans to help train overseas forces and

staff in joint operations. To provide more uniform training, the Center

plans to help CINCs design exercises based on the Joint Staff’s universal list

of joint tasks. The Center will also offer its technical support in using

simulation models in the CINCs’ joint training activities.

For fiscal year 1995, CINCs have requested the Center’s technical assistance

on 11 of the 212 planned exercises. For these exercises, the Center will

11The Joint Warfare Center’s former mission was to provide computer simulation support for joint

exercises. The Joint Doctrine Center’s mission was to assess and develop joint doctrine.

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(1) identify training requirements and develop joint exercise plans,

(2) provide observers and controllers to the CINCs’ exercises, and/or

(3) assess exercise results. The Center also plans to assess the adequacy of

30 joint doctrinal publications covering such topics as joint operations,

peacekeeping, and airspace control.

In commenting on our report, DOD noted that it remains to be seen how

much computer-driven simulations can replace field training exercises. To

the extent that such substitutions become possible, DOD suggested that the

future CJCS Exercise Program may not be representative of the past

program.

USACOM Assigned to

Train Most Forces

Given new responsibilities for joint training of U.S.-based forces, USACOM is

now responsible for training about 2 million military personnel—more

than 75 percent of all U.S. forces. It developed a new joint training

program and introduced an innovative operational strategy based on joint

force packages.

USACOM Has Developed a

New Joint Training

Program

The joint training program consists of three levels of training. Under the

first level, the services train their own personnel in the basic skills needed

to conduct military operations, such as infantry tactics, armor, aviation, or

support skills. Under the second level, USACOM trains five major force

groups in joint tasks through field and computer-simulated exercises.

These forces include those in the Army’s 18th Airborne Corps and II

Corps, 8th Air Force, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and the Navy’s 2nd

Fleet. This level of training will begin with six exercises in fiscal year 1995

and increase over time to eight exercises annually.

USACOM is also responsible for the third level of training, which uses a

combination of academic seminars and computer-assisted exercises to

train staffs in commanding joint task forces. Using a hypothetical

real-world scenario, a joint task force team is assembled to plan and direct

a mission from deployment to redeployment. The training emphasizes joint

planning, decision-making, and the application of joint doctrine. USACOM

began some portions of the training in fiscal year 1994 and plans to

conduct its first complete program in fiscal year 1995. By fiscal year 1998,

USACOM expects to conduct six such exercises.

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USACOM’s New

Operational Strategy Is

Based on Joint Force

Packages

In 1993, USACOM also developed a new strategy for deploying forces to

regional crises. A key principal of this new strategy is to develop packages

of U.S.-based forces from the various services, which USACOM could

provide to the warfighting CINCs based on the specific situation. These

joint force packages would provide varying levels of capability that could

be tailored to the specific conflict scenario. By planning these packages in

advance, USACOM officials believe that they will be able to quickly provide

the forces CINCs need. In developing the packages, USACOM asked the other

CINCs to assess what capabilities are needed for various missions. In a

crisis, USACOM, in concert with the affected CINC, would identify and deploy

the appropriate force package to the CINC’s area of operation. USACOM will

focus on training these packages in joint operations since some packages

will entail deploying forces in nontraditional ways.

USACOM expects this strategy to help overcome past problems of forces

being inadequately trained for joint operations. In the past, CINCs requested

forces directly from the services when crises arose. This created problems

because forces from the various services had not always trained together

prior to their deployment. Even if they had, there might have been

significant differences in the tasks performed, as well as the procedures

and terminology used.

An advantage of USACOM’s strategy is that when a crisis occurs, CINCs will

have a predetermined list of forces available as a starting point, which they

can then tailor as needed to the specific situation. For example, if the

predetermined forces are too large for the operation, a CINC could select a

portion of the force package or a smaller force package more appropriate

to the situation. Although USACOM hopes that CINCs will request its

predetermined force packages, they are not required to do so. It remains

the CINCs’ prerogative to mix and match forces. USACOM is developing

standard joint task force packages for foreign disaster relief, seaport

operations, and crisis response. However, as of January 1995, it did not

have an estimated time for completing these packages. Appropriate

training will follow this planning effort.

CINCs Have

Expressed Concerns

About New Joint

Training Initiatives

CINCs have raised serious concerns about USACOM’s new joint training

program and operational strategy and appear reluctant to use the Joint

Warfighting Center’s technical assistance. J-7, Joint Warfighting Center,

and USACOM officials are aware of the concerns and believe that, over time,

they will be resolved. However, the disagreements among CINCs, USACOM,

and the Center were at an impasse at the time of our review.

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Reservations Over

USACOM’s Joint Training

Programs

CINC officials expressed strong concerns about the soundness of USACOM’s

joint training program. The concerns focus on whether USACOM (1) can

adequately train U.S.-based forces for overseas CINCs and (2) is targeting

its joint staff training toward the correct audience.

In a March 1994 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed

Services, the former USACOM commander stressed the importance of

developing a program that provides CINCs with highly trained forces.

However, officials from the European and Pacific Commands told us they

questioned whether USACOM could adequately train U.S.-based forces for

their use. They cited two reasons that will make it difficult for USACOM to

train forces for overseas CINCs: (1) the increasingly diverse missions that

forces are expected to conduct and (2) the CINCs’ different terrain, tactics,

and procedures. In the past, CINCs had large forces permanently assigned

to them and trained these forces. Thus, the forces were familiar with the

CINCs’ terrain and operating procedures, and CINCs had first-hand

knowledge of their readiness. Now that CINCs will have to rely more on

forces stationed in the United States, they have less assurance of force

readiness and are reluctant to use U.S.-based forces without further

training. Because of these concerns, one CINC issued instructions requiring

that all forces deployed to his theater train with forces already in the

theater prior to undertaking any mission.

Central and European Command officials stated that USACOM’s program to

train personnel to command joint forces is also targeting the wrong

audience. The program focuses on training commanders and staffs from

the U.S.-based forces under USACOM’s control. However, CINC officials said

that joint task force commanders are typically selected from their own

theaters of operation. One CINC issued guidance to this effect. CINC officials

cited recent operations by the European Command in Rwanda and

Somalia and USACOM’s efforts in Haiti to demonstrate their point. In those

instances, the joint force commanders were selected from European and

Atlantic Command personnel, respectively.

The Commander of the Joint Warfighting Center agreed that commanders

are generally selected from the affected theater of operation. However, the

Commander believed that as personnel rotate between assignments in the

United States and the regional commands and become familiar with the

differing missions, terrain, and procedures, this matter will resolve itself.

USACOM officials are aware of the CINCs’ concerns about the new joint

training strategies but also believe that, over time, their concerns will be

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allayed. They agreed that (1) USACOM could not train U.S.-based forces for

every conceivable task and condition in the various CINC theaters and

(2) joint force commanders would usually come from the affected region.

USACOM officials emphasized that CINCs, not USACOM, were responsible for

training their forces stationed in their areas to their regional-unique needs

but believed that the additional training required for new forces would be

minimal. These officials, including the USACOM Training Director, noted the

following:

• The recent changes to joint training and operational planning, such as the

identification of a common set of joint tasks and preplanned joint force

packages, should enhance training and minimize training differences.

• The new strategies are an improvement over past CINC training approaches

that lacked uniformity and did not train forces for joint tasks.

• The Joint Warfighting Center is available to CINCs to help train their forces

and commanders to joint standards.

The strategy is too new to evaluate how much additional training time

forces and commanders trained by USACOM will need before CINCs can

effectively integrate USACOM-trained forces into their joint operations.

Upcoming USACOM joint exercises are designed to test the validity of the

new training strategy.

Concerns Over USACOM’s

Joint Force Packaging

Concept

Officials at all three CINCs we visited were concerned about the soundness

of USACOM’s plan to provide predetermined joint force packages. Their

concerns focused on whether the strategy provides CINCs with sufficient

capabilities to conduct joint operations.

The United States used to have the capability to form large amphibious

joint task forces to augment the CINCs’ forces. Typically, these forces

centered around an aircraft carrier and its associated destroyers, guided

missile frigates, and submarines and an amphibious ready group housing a

large complement of ground forces and their associated equipment. The

Navy had a large complement of nearly 600 ships available to form large

task forces. For example, the European Command used to have about

320,000 forces stationed overseas and could form large task forces of up to

19 ships for year-round deployment. In 1994, the Command had only about

146,000 forces stationed overseas and will have only 100,000 forces by

fiscal year 1996. Further, because the Navy has only about 390 ships

available (a 35-percent reduction), it can no longer support CINCs with

large task forces. For example, USACOM joint forces, to be deployed in 1995

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to the European Command, will consist of only 11 to 14 ships and will be

available for only 9 months—a 25-percent reduction.

In a March 1994 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed

Services, CINCs from both the Central and European Commands stated that

the joint force packages provided by USACOM so far had failed to fully

support mission requirements. With smaller joint forces, they had to make

trade-offs in the types of capabilities available. They each cited examples

of two USACOM deployments in 1993. As part of the first deployment—an

exercise in the Persian Gulf—USACOM placed Marines on board a Navy

aircraft carrier. The former Central Command commander, said that when

the carrier deployed to the coast of Iraq, not enough Marines and

equipment were on board. Further, carrying the Marines forced the carrier

to displace the normal complement of F-14s and other aircraft, thereby

reducing air combat capabilities, according to the former CINC.

In a second deployment, a carrier battle group and an amphibious group

traveled from the Mediterranean area to conduct operations in Bosnia and

Somalia. However, according to the former Central Command CINC, the

joint force was reorganized from its standard package, some Marines and

aircraft were removed, and the battle and amphibious groups were

separated. One group deployed for operations in Bosnia and the other

went to Somalia—an action that resulted in neither group having the

capabilities to meet their missions, according to the Central and European

Command CINCs. Both CINCs felt that separating the two groups was not

sound and that the new joint forces provided only limited air and ground

capabilities. The Central Command CINC was also concerned about

USACOM’s joint force strategy in an August 1994 letter to the Chairman of

DOD’s Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. He stated

that

“the concept . . . is not the panacea for forward presence, deterrence, and crisis response.

Force structure, roles, missions, and functions decisions should not count so heavily on

this concept; rather, [such decisions should count on] joint synergism in general, so that we

may reduce forces to a point where they are strategically flexible but not operationally

hollow.”

CINC officials expressed similar concerns during our visits. They said that

USACOM’s joint force packaging strategy represents a threat to command

capabilities when forces deviate from their traditional configurations.

According to the Central Command Deputy Director for Operations, units

separated and combined with portions of other units provide less than

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their normal capability. Although the joint forces deployed by USACOM are

based on the CINCs’ determination of their needs, CINC officials stated that

USACOM’s guidance had not enabled them to accurately determine their

joint force requirements.

USACOM officials were aware of the CINCs’ concerns about the new joint

force packaging strategy and explained that the strategy is an attempt to

meet the CINCs’ needs with smaller forces. Further, the reality is that the

United States no longer has the capability to operate in the configuration

of the large amphibious groups. They said that the Command’s operational

strategy is evolving and that they are working with CINCs to define more

precise joint force requirements.

CINCs Are Reluctant to

Request Joint Warfighting

Center Assistance

It is too early to tell what impact the Joint Warfighting Center will have on

the CINCs’ joint training programs. Officials at two regional commands

stated that they are capable of developing their own joint training

programs and, therefore, do not plan to extensively use the Center’s

services. Further, two of the three regional commands that we visited have

developed their own simulation centers to support their training, and

command officials stated that they did not need the Center’s services.

Nevertheless, Center officials pointed out that the CINCs’ use of their

services could help make joint training more uniform across the force and

that the CINCs’ approach of “going it alone” could simply perpetuate past

problems.

Our review showed that each CINC trains its staff differently for joint

operations. The Pacific Command has a formal training program built

around a permanent force of personnel trained in joint operations. A team

of 30 personnel from all services trains twice a month. The training

includes classes on crisis action planning and development of operational

plans and orders. When a mission begins, the Pacific Command joint task

staff assists the joint task force commander in the initial phases of the

operation.

Neither the Central nor European Commands conduct a similar training

program for joint task force staff. The European Command uses joint

exercises to train staff. Command officials told us that in 1994, it revised

three exercises to include training staff in joint operations. In fiscal year

1995, the Command plans to significantly increase this training by

conducting 12 such exercises. The Central Command does not have a

formal joint training program for its staff, and it has not revised any

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exercises to provide better training opportunities. In fiscal year 1994, the

Command conducted two exercises that trained staff in joint operations.

CINCs do not plan to extensively use the Center for simulation support

because they either have their own simulation centers or place little

priority on simulated training. Both the European and Pacific Commands

have centers with the capability to conduct large-scale simulation

exercises, for both live exercises and exercises to train staff in joint

operations. The Central Command does not have a simulation center and

has used the former Joint Warfare Center to support its training. However,

the last exercise the Center conducted for the Central Command was in

1990. According to Central Command officials, they conduct few

simulation exercises because they train extensively with forces from other

nations, which have little experience with or capability to use simulation.

Finally, USACOM is developing its own simulation training facilities in the

Tidewater, Virginia, area, even though the Center is developing its

simulation facility nearby.2

The Commander of the Center recognized the CINCs’ limited use of the

Center, but stated that CINCs are not required to use the Center. The

Commander hopes that by extensively marketing the Center’s services,

CINCs will use it more.

Conclusions Numerous actions have been taken aimed at improving joint training.

However, they will not be effective unless the Chairman, JCS, exerts a

strong leadership role and resolves the impasse over USACOM’s joint

training and operational strategies and the role of the Joint Warfighting

Center. The new strategies are vast departures from past practices, which

gave virtually all decision-making authority for joint training and force

deployment to CINCs. Accordingly, some resistance by CINCs is

understandable. However, the CINCs have raised basic concerns about the

soundness of the new strategies. The success of the new strategies is

questionable—unless CINCs feel confident that their concerns have been

addressed and the strategies have been adequately tried and tested.

Moreover, a lack of consensus among the CINCs could perpetuate past

problems in joint training and operations. In our opinion, top-level DOD

officials must address the CINCs’ concerns if the strategies are to succeed.

2

This potential overlap was the subject of our inquiry to the Secretary of Defense, Joint Simulation

Training (GAO/NSIAD-94-249R, Aug. 18, 1994). DOD did not respond to our inquiry requesting it

reconsider the need for two centers and has proceeded to construct them.

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Similar attention must be paid to the CINCs’ reluctance to use the Joint

Warfighting Center’s services. Uniform training is important given the

substantially reduced size of DOD’s forces and the flexibility needed to

deploy forces anywhere in the world. The Center can fulfill an important

role in making CINC training efforts more uniform across the force, but only

if CINCs use its services.

Recommendation To improve the uniformity of joint training and promote USACOM’s efforts to

strengthen joint training and operational capabilities, we recommend that

the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Chairman, JCS, take

appropriate actions to achieve a stronger consensus among the CINCs

about (1) USACOM’s new strategies for training joint task force commanders

and their staffs and the use of joint force packages and (2) the merits of

the Joint Warfighting Center’s technical assistance.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our recommendation but said that the CINCs’ concerns

about USACOM’s joint training and force deployment strategies had already

been addressed. DOD supported its position by citing a draft response from

one CINC to questions submitted for the record in testimony before the

House Committee on National Security in March 1995. In his response, the

CINC said that he had reached agreement with USACOM on how forces

provided to his theater would be trained. However, he did not comment on

the overall soundness of the training and operational strategies that this

CINC’s staff told us during our work. With regard to joint force packaging,

he emphasized that he must continue to have a strong influence over the

forces deployed for joint operations and that these packages must be

robust and responsive to deal with anticipated missions and unforeseen

contingencies.

These were the same reservations that the CINCs’ staffs voiced during our

review. Further, contrary to DOD’s position that it had addressed the CINCs’

concerns about the new joint training and operational strategies, the

Commission on Roles and Missions, in its May 1995 report, noted that the

CINCs’ concerns had not been resolved. For example, the Commission

noted improvements were needed for evaluating joint training and

assessing joint readiness and that CINCs must have greater influence over

training and packaging the forces used in joint operations. It also found

that USACOM’s new capacity as “joint force integrator” has not been

adequately developed and defined and CINCs must adequately understand

and accept this concept. Based on these lingering concerns, we have

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retained our original recommendation that would focus top-level attention

on achieving a stronger consensus on these strategies.

DOD disputed our finding that CINCs appeared reluctant to seek assistance

from the Joint Warfighting Center. It said that the Center would support 

17 joint exercises during fiscal years 1995 and 1996. It should be noted that

these exercises represent only about 4 percent of the 400 exercises

planned and may suggest the CINC’s continuing reluctance to extensively

use the Center’s technical assistance.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
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Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-5 and

12-16.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6 and 19-22.

Now on pp. 6 and 22.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6 and 23-24.

Now on pp. 6 and 30-31.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6 and 25-27.

Now on pp. 6 and 27-29.

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Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6 and 29.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6 and 30-31.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 7, and

36-39.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 38-39.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 7, and

40-44.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8 and 32-33.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8 and 45.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Carol R. Schuster

Barry W. Holman

Rodney E. Ragan

Christine D. Frye

Kansas City Regional

Office

Joseph F. Lenart, Jr.

(703041) Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-95-109 Military Capabilities
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