2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
3-23-2004 

# U S A v . W orley P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-2103

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du
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" U SA v . W orley " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 923. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/923NOT PRE CEDENT IAL

UN ITED STA TES CO UR T O F A PPE AL S FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

NO. 03-2103

UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. BONI TA WORLEY,

Appellant

NO. 02-3874

UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. DA VID H. BR OW N, II,

Appellant

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt

for the D istrict of Delaw are (D.C. Crim. Nos. 01-cr- 00065-2, 01- cr-00065- 1) Distri ct Judge: Hon. GregoryM. Sleet

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

March 8, 20042 Be for e: S LO VI TE R a nd N YG AA RD , Circuit Judges , and OB ER DO RF ER , Distri ct Judge * (Fil ed: March 23, 2004)

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SL OV ITE R, Circu it Judge
. Appellant s Bonita Worle y and David Brown appealfrom thei r respe ctive

conv ictions a nd se ntenc es. Th ey wer e eac h ind icted for on e cou nt of c onsp iracy to

com mit m ail fr aud und er 1 8 U .S.C . § 37 1, tw o co unt s of ma il fra ud u nde r 18 U.S .C. § 1341, one count

of trans portation of st olen proper ty under 18 U.S.C. § 2312, one count of

mo ney laun dering und er 18 U.S .C. § 1 956 (a)(1)(B )(i), and o ne co unt o f con spirac y to

comm it laundering of

mon etary instruments und er 18 U .S.C. § 195 6(h). On M ay 28, 20 02, a ju ry conv icted W orley on a ll coun ts exce pt on e cou nt of m ail fraud and o ne co unt o f trans portatio n of stolen p rope rty, and co nvicte d B row n on all

coun ts exce pt on e cou nt of tra nspo rtation o f stolen prop erty. Wo rley was senten ced to four concurr ent te rms of 37 months i mprisonment fol lowed by t hree y ears of s upervis ed relea se, a $400 s pecialassess ment, and j oint and s everal liabi lit y for rest itution in t

he

* Hon. Louis F. Oberdor fer, Unit ed State s District Court for the Dis tri ct of Columbia, s itting by

designation.3

amount of $90,775. Brown was sentenced to five concurre nt ter ms of 41 months impris onm ent fo llow ed by thre e years of supe rvised release , a $50 0 spe cial asse ssme nt, and joint and severalliabi lit

y for rest itution in t

he amount of $90,775. We have jurisdictio n to h ear the se ap peals u nder 28 U .S.C. § 129 1. W e w ill aff ir m. I. Inasm uch a s we are w riting so lely for the parties a nd th e D istrict Co urt, w e w ill recit e only

those fac ts neces sary

in deci ding thi s appeal. Brown became the campaign manager for Wilmi ngton’s f ormer Mayor J ames H. Sill s during t he 1996 election. Following Sills’s el ection, Brown became the execu tive direct or of the Wilmingtonians, an organiz ation c reate d to addres s socia l is sues and provi de solut ions for Wilmington cit ize ns . T he C ity o w ne d a ll c om pa ny p ro pe rty. Thereafter , Brown became presi dent of the organiz ation, and in thi s capaci ty was responsible for i ts dai ly operati ons including maint aining c ontrolover the f inances and any mail containi ng checks payable to the Wilimingtonians. Worley performed as a Co mm unity O utreac h Sp ecialist fo r the or ganiz ation. T he ind icted c harg es arise largely out of four incidents. First, on Ap ril 20, 20 00, the Wilm ington ians su bm itted an invo ice fo r $1,1 60 to the Census Bureau f

or work they

had done, but

Brown endorsed the che ck issue d by t he U.S . Trea sury to the Wilm ington ians o ver to W orley, wh o dep osited th e full a mo unt in4

her personal checking account. Neither appellant di sclosed to the Wilmingtonians’ accountant

that t his money

had been convert ed. Second, on October

4, 2000, t

he Wilmingtoni ans paid $3, 850 to Bowling Green of Brandywine, a drug and al cohol tr eatment fa cility , for t reatment of Worley ’s drug problems. Worley c ompleted onl y one day of treatment, and the faci lit y se nt a ref

und che ck in the a mo unt of $ 3,57 5, pa yable to D avid Bro wn in ca re o f the W ilmin gto nian s. Brown deposited t

he refund check into Worley ’s pers onal checki ng account, and Worley signe d a ch eck for $3 ,350 to Bro wn from her ac coun t. Third, w hen Sills lost the 200 0 election, M ayor James B aker took o ffice in Janu ary 2001 and adv ised the Wilmingtonians that t he City would not send additional funds, requir ed the re turn of al l proper ty (including motor vehi cles) , and i ntended t o audit t he company’s finances. Despite the impending financial coll apse of the Wilmingtonians, Brown wrote Wo rley

a $56,000 check from the Wilmingtonians’ account, ostensibly as a “consulting fee. ” Various st eps were take n to create the appearance of propriet y. In the following weeks, Worley wrot e a subst antia l number of checks from her pers onal account, including severalto “cash” and a check to Brown in t he amount of $1,600. Finally , Brown purchased a 2 001 Suburban on behalf of the W ilmingtonians, valued at approximat ely

$30,000. I n January

2001, Brown and Worleyorchest rated an alle gedly sham sale of t

he vehicl e to Worley ’s unsuspe cting s tepfat her, Robert

Starl ing, for $100, unbeknownst

to the Wil mingtoni ans’ Board of Dir ectors . On January 31, 2001,5

Brown and Worley accompani ed Starl ing to t rade the vehicl e in for a1997 Range Rover (a ty pe of Land Rover). Brown negot iate d the tr ade. Worley paid the differe nce of $4,149.25 wit

h money drawn from her account i n which the $56, 000 consult ing fee had been deposit ed the day

before, tell ing Starling t he money was a gi ft to him. Starl ing drove the ve hicle on two occasions before gi ving Worley possessi on of it. Brown and Worley drove the vehi cle for over 300 mile s during t he period be tween January 31 and Feb ruary 9. A s of th e Bo ard o f D irectors m eeting on F ebru ary 13, 20 01, the wh ereab outs of the Suburban were unknown, and the Board was unaware t hat it had been sold. Following Worley ’s convi ction, the Dist rict Court plac ed her on twenty- four hour hom e co nfin em ent, w ith el ectro nic m oni torin g, pe ndi ng s ente ncin g in this c ase . Electr onic monit oring began on August 30, 2002, and Worley’ s sente ncing was to t ake place on O ctobe r 2, 20 02. H ow ever, o n Se ptem ber 1 9, 200 2, she cut off her e lectron ic monitor and f

led her home det ention, alle gedly in an attempt t o find her daughter, who had r un aw ay, and to place her in a safe h om e. Th e pro bation offic e w as un able to locate Worley until s he surre ndered to t he U. S. Marshal’ s Servic e on September 24, 2002. The Distri ct Court c onducted a r evocati on of bail hearing on Oct ober 2, 2002, and sentenc ed Worley on December 19, 2002. II. A. Bonita Worley Worley makes three arguments on appea l. Fi rst, she appeal s from her j udgment of1 The full l ist of questi ons to which Worley object s is as follows: (1) “So Mike Harris w as lying when he said that you nev er discussed m oney with him ?” W orley’s App. at 872; (2) “So Mike Harri s gets e verything wrong. So far, we est ablis hed Mike Harris ge ts ever

yt hing wrong about what you sayand the News Journalgets ever yt hing wrong about what y ou say ; ri ght? That’s where we are right now.” Worley ’s App. at 873; (3) “So we can add Clarence Whit e to the lis t with Mike Harri s of people who li ed on the st and?” Worley’ s App. at 874; (4) “So we have the newspaper gets it al l wrong, M ike H arris ha s it all wro ng, C larenc e W hite ge ts it all wro ng. W hen it c om es do wn to David Brown, Clarence Whit e lie s on the st and and Mike Harris l ies on t he stand?” Worley’ s App. at 874; (5) “We’re going back to the lis t of al l the pe ople who got the wron g date. Bro wn d oes and now Rob ert Starling got it wron g, too; right?” W orley’s App. at 892; (6) “Mr. Wennagel from the Land Rover dealer ship, he got it wrong when he said t he [ti me] was earli er in t he day a s well. ” Worley ’s App. at 893. 6 con vi ct io n, ar gui ng t

hat re qui ri ng c o- def

end ant Bro wn t o sp ecu late abo utwhet her som e of the Government’ s witness es were lying was improper and not harml ess error. Second, she appeal s from her se ntence, arguing t hat the Distri ct Court improperly attributed t

he value of t

he Suburban to her

for the pur

pose of sent encing. Third, she argues that t he Distri ct Court e rred i n enhancing her sentence for obstructi on of just ice. 1. Whether requiring Brown to speculat e about thecredibi lit

y of othe r witnesses consti tutes reversible error for Worley’s conviction. Worley obj ects t o questi ons asking Brown whether other wit

nesses had l ied, such as, “So Mike Harri s was ly ing when he said t hat y ou never dis cussed money with him?” Worley’ s App. at 872. 1 Worley a lso obj ects t o the fol lowing excer pts fr om the Government’s summati on: “[H]e t old y ou that a ll of t he witness es the Government call ed either g ot it wro ng o r lied on the stan d w hen th ey testified d iffere ntly from wh at he sa id happe ned.” W orley’s App. at 966 . “Mike Harris lied on th e stand, acco rding to M r. Brown. Robert Starli ng lied on t he stand, accordi ng to Mr. Brown. Clar ence White,7

Maimo una M ’Backe, Bunny M iller and M r. Kakoma all either li ed on the stand or just got it wrong.” Worley ’s App. at 967. These questions and summati on remarks hi ghlight the ir reconci lable test imonialpictur es paint ed by s everal witnesse s and Brown, but Worley argues i t is revers ible e rror to ask a defendant (or her e, a co- defendant) to tes tify regarding the credibil ity of other witnesses. Worley c ontends t

hat we have plenaryreview over t his i ssue becaus e it i s a legal

one inv olv ing Fed eral R ules of E vid enc e 60 1 an d 60 2. Un ited Sta tes v. M itchell , 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998). The G overnment contends that because the scope of crossexaminati on is l eft t o the dis creti on of the trialcourt, we should revi ew for an abuse of disc retio n. United S tates v. Irizarry , 341 F.3d 273, 306 (3d Cir. 200 3). It is not necessary to choose i n this case becaus e both parties agr ee that , ass uming that an abuse of di scret ion or a lega l err or occurr ed, the evident iary ruli ng should be subj ect t o harmless error analy sis. We have defined non-constitutional harmless e rror a s “highl y pr obable that the

error did not cont

ribut e to the judgment. ” United Stat es v. Gambone , 314 F.3d 163, 177- 78 (3d Cir. 2003) (i nternalquotati on and cit ations omitt ed). “High probability requir es that t he court pos sess a s ure convic tion t hat the error

did not pr ejudic e the defendant .” Id. (internal quotation an d citation om itted). Other court s of appeal s have denounced t his t ype of ques tioning. The Court of Appeals for t

he Second Circui t noted t hat questions asking the defendant to tes tify whether another witness was either mistaken or ly ing constitut ed “improper cross-8

examinati on.” United Stat es v. Ric hter , 826 F .2d 20 6, 208 (2d C ir. 1987 ); see also Lamar v. Graves , 326 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir . 2003) ( “[W]e do not necess arily condone t he ques tions p osed to M r. Lam ar . . . .”); United Stat es v. Gest on , 299 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (9th C ir. 2002 ) (“[I]t w as plain error for the c ourt to a llow the pro secu tor to pe rsist in asking w itnesses to mak e improp er comm ents upon the testimony of oth er witnesses.”); United Stat es v. Sul livan , 85 F.3d 743, 749-50 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[W]e state the rule now emphatical ly : counselshould not ask one witnes s to comment on t he veraci ty

of the testimo ny of an other w itness” ); U ni ted St ate s v . B oyd , 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“It is therefore error for a prosecutor to induce a witness to test ify t hat another witness, and in particu lar a go vern men t agen t, has lied on th e stand .”); United Stat es v. Willi amson , 53 F.3d 1500, 1523 (10th Cir . 1995) ( noting t hat cros s examinat ion was “confro ntational and a brasive”). In only three of the si x inst ances of obj ected- to quest ioning in this case did t he Government ask co-de fendant Brown whether a wit ness was lying, s pecifi call y whether Mike Harris and Clarence White were ly ing. I n the othe r thr ee inst ances, t he prosecution asked whether another wit ness had gotten things wrong. The Second Circ uit has stat ed, “A sking a w itness w hethe r a prev ious w itness w ho g ave c onf licting tes timon y is ‘mist aken’ highl ights the obje ctive confli ct without requiring the wit

ness to c ondemn the prior witness a s a purvey or of deliberate falsehood, i.e ., a ‘li ar.’ ” United Stat es v. Gaind , 31 F.3d at 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1994). There fore, we conclude that only the cros s-examination9

of B row n re gar din g th e tes timo ny of Ha rris a nd W hite w as im pro per . Although the c ross- examinati on and summation st atements were improper, they

amo unt to h armle ss erro r. As n oted b y the First C ircuit, bec ause incon sistenc ies in test imony ar e apparent , “[p]ointing out the obvious most li kely scored t he government, at most, r hetori cal poi nts. ” Sulli van , 85 F.3d at 750. This i s especi ally true her e when the government cal led nine witnesse s other than White and Harris t o test ify about the vary ing crimina l event s, and ent ered numerous exhibits into evi dence. “T he ‘ wa s- t he

- wi t ne ss - l y i ng ’ qu es t i on. . . sh ou l d n ev er have be enpo se d.
. . . We expect t hat the office of t

he United States Att orney and other c ounsel wil l abide by t he rule. ” Sulli van , 85 F.3d at 750 (int ernal quot ation and citation omi tted) . In t he inst ant case the impropri ety

was harmless and we will not ove rtur n the convi ction on t

his ground. 2. Whether t

he District Court er

red in attri buting t

he value of

the Suburban to Worley for purposes of

sentencing. We review a dist

rict court’ s fact findings for clear error , and the inte rpret ation and app licatio n of

the s ente ncin g gu ideli nes und er a p lena ry stan dar d. United Stat es v. Brennan , 326 F.3d 176, 200 (3d Cir. 2003). The Dist rict Court did not

err i n attributing the val ue of the Suburban to Worley for purpose s of sent encing. Worley was ac quitt ed of one count of mai l fraud and one count of t ransport ation of stol en propert

y – bot h relating to t

he acquisi tion of t

he Suburban – but s he was convict ed of the cons piracy to c om mit m ail frau d. Th e indic tmen t expre ssly includ ed the even ts

concern ing the acq uisition of the Su burban in this conspiracy coun t. As the D istrict Court10

noted, “The fact t

hat the jury

acquitted Ms. Worley

of a subst antive mail fr aud charge does not under

mine it s conclus ion that she conspi red to commit mail fr aud with her codefe ndant, M r. Brow n, as the eleme nts of those tw o charge s are differen t.” Worley’s App. at 1123. It was therefore proper under U.S. S.G. § 2B1.1 t o attribute t he value of t

he Su bu rb an to W or ley. The Distric t Cou rt also fo und that the value of the Sub urba n cou ld be a ttributed to Worley unde r the r elevant conduct gui deline , U.S.S. G. § 1B1.2. The Supreme Court has made clear t

hat an acqui ttalon a charge does not prevent a court f rom considering the underlying conduct

as rel evant conduct

so long as it has been proven by a pr eponderance of th e ev iden ce. Un ited Sta tes v. W atts , 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997). In explanation of Worley’ s sente nce, t

he Distr ict Court

stat ed, “The st eps Ms. Worley took to ac quire t

he Sub urba n w ere do ne du ring the sam e mo nth in w hich th ey also too k step s to fra udu lently acquire the $56, 000 check. A port ion of that money was us ed to complet e the money laundering trans acti on involving the Suburban. Moreover, Ms. Worley was involved at every stag e of th e sch eme to acq uire an d disp ose o f the S ubu rban . Finally, she ultima tely

ma intai ned con trol o ver acc ess to the R ang e R ove r.” W orle y’s A pp. a t 11 24. A preponderanc e of the evi dence support s thi s conclus ion, including t he testimony of Starling, Wo rley’s stepfather who purchase d the Su burban for $10 0 and trade d it in for a La nd R ove r, an d W enn age l, the s ales ma n at th e L and Ro ver dea lersh ip. See App. at 62- 65.11

For these reasons, the Dist rict Court did not

err i n attributing the val ue of the Suburban to Worley

for purpose s of sent encing. 3. Whether t

he obstruc tion of

just ice enhancement

was properly applied to Worley. Worley c ut off her e lectronic monitoring devi ce on September 19, 2002, and effe ctively disa ppea red u ntil Sep temb er 24 , 2002 , at wh ich tim e she turned herse lf in to the U. S. Marshal ’s Servi ce. Worley contends t

hat she di d not int end to obst ruct t he administ rati on of just ice but

was onlyseeking t o find her daughter and pl ace her i n a secure l ocati on. We review a dis tri ct court ’s fi ndings of fact for cle ar err or, and t

he app licatio n of

sen tenc ing gui delin es u nde r a p lena ry stan dar d. Brennan , 326 F.3d at 200. Sectio n 3C 1.1 of

the sen tencin g gu ideline s prov ides a tw o-leve l enha ncem ent if “the defendant

willful ly obstruc ted or i mpeded, or at tempted t o obstruc t or i mpede, the administ rati on of just ice during the cours e of the . . . s entenci ng on the ins tant offe nse . . . .” A mo ng th e exa mp les of c ond uct to w hich th is guid eline is a pplica ble is “es cap ing or a ttem ptin g to esc ape fro m c usto dy be for e tria l or se nten cing .” U .S.S .G. § 3C 1.1 ( Co mm enta ry 4(e) ). See United Stat es v. Abuhouran , 162 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[W]e fi nd [defendant’ s] bold br eaking of t he bracel et and bra zen trip to Kennedy to be a very serio us ob struction of jus tice.”). E ven a ssum ing W orley did n ot inten d to disgui se her whereabout s from the Marshal s, t he cutt ing of her e lectronic monitoring device was purpos eful, and the gui deline commentary assumes that an esca

pe or attem pted esc ape is w illfu l. See United Stat es v. Swanson , 253 F .3d 12 20, 12 23 (1 0th12

Cir. 2001) (“[Defendant’ s] moti vations are besi de the poi nt . . . the only signi ficant questi on is whether

he willf ully fled cust ody. ”). Even i f Worleywas concerned about her daughter’ s safet

y, she could have informed the Marshal’s Service and secured t he help of law enforcement , fri ends, or family , ins tead of choos ing to es cape cust ody. The argument that Chi ld Prot ecti ve Service s had clos ed the fi le on her c hildr en such that asking t hem for help would have been futi le is unconvinci ng. In any event, the Dist

rict Court’s c onclusi on that he r explanation i s unsupport ed by the rec ord w as no t plain e rror. A ccep ting the proffer tha t her da ugh ter w ould testify to

even ts that co rrobo rate W orley’s testim ony, the D istrict Co urt no ted tha t “in spite of tha t, let me say t

hat the re were two probation offi cers at the hear ing who test ifie d she made no effo rt to con tact the P roba tion O ffice and a dvise them of C ami’s situation and h er nee d to leave t he home to help her .” Worley ’s App. at 1143. Also, Cami Worley di d test ify at the bail r evo catio n he arin g he ld o n O ctob er 2 , 200 2, af ter th e ele ctro nic m oni torin g in cide nt. During that

hearing, Cami test ifie d that s he left the house af

ter a f ight wit h her grandmother, but she di d not tes tify that he r mother came to look for her, found he r, and placed her

in a secur e home. The District Court noted at the sent encing hearing that Cami’s fai lure t o test ify that he r mother came to look for her was “an import ant oversight” tha t “wou ldn’t have req uired . . . a question to be p ut specifically” as Wo rley’s counsel s uggested. Worley’ s App. at 1136- 37. Because the Dis tri ct Court was entitl ed to conclude that Worley’ s explanation of13

her escape was unconvincing, and because Worley ’s expl anati on, even i f true, would not undermine the appli cabil ity of the obst

ructi on of just ice enhance ment, we willaffirm t he senten ce im pose d by the D istrict Co urt. B. Da vi d B r ow n Brown challenges both his judgment of convi ction and his sent ence. He argues that t here was ins uffici ent evi dence to convi ct him on t he money l aundering c ounts and that the Distric t Cou rt erred in enha ncing his sen tence for an abus e of tru st. A. Whether t

he evidencewas sufficient to support

the verdict on themoney laundering counts. Brown argues that because sal e of the Suburban was tracea ble, money la

undering did not occ ur. We apply a “part icularly

deferent ial” standar d of revie w when deciding wh ethe r a ju ry verd ict re sts o n leg ally sufficie nt ev iden ce. United States v. Dent , 149 F.3d 18 0, 187 (3d Cir. 1998 ). Th ere a re fo ur e ssen tial ele me nts o f m one y laun der ing und er 1 8 U .S.C . § 1956(a)( 1)(B)(I ): ( 1) a financial trans acti on; (2) involving proceeds of s pecifi ed unlawful

ac tiv ity; ( 3) kn ow led ge th at t he tra ns ac tio n i nv ol ve s p ro ce ed s o f s om e u nl aw fu l ac tiv ity; and (4) knowledge t

hat the trans acti on was designed i n whole or in par t to conc eal or disg uise the n atur e, loc ation , sou rce, o wn ersh ip, o r co ntro l of th e pr oce eds
. United Stat es v. O m or uyi , 260 F.3d 291, 294-95 (3d Cir . 2001). Applyi ng these el ements, the evi dence addu ced w as sufficien t to sup port the verd ict. The sale of t

he Suburban for $100 t o Starl ing complet ed a phase of t he ongoing14

offens e. See id. at 295. The automobile was then immediat ely converte d into a Land Rover, ost ensibl y under Starl ing’s owners hip, t o obscure t he fact t hat the true owner was sti ll Brown. Thi s transacti on was funded partly t hrough the i llega l convers ion of the Suburban and part ly

through t

he $56,000 sham consulting fe e provided to Worley. Thus there was a financialtrans acti on, funded through unlawfully pr ocured funds wit h the knowledge that

the funds were unl awfully procured, that was des igned to c onceal t he nature of the proceeds. Inli ght of th e e vi de nc e a nd t

he pa rt ic ul ar ly

de fe re nt ia l s tandardof re vi ew, we agree with the Dist

rict Court that

there was s uffici ent evi dence to suppor t the c onvicti on. B. Whether t

he District Court er

red in enhancing Brown’s sente nce for an abus e of pub lic or pr ivate tru st. We review a dist

rict court’ s findi ngs of fact f or clear err or and it s appli cati on of the s ente ncin g gu ideli nes und er a p lena ry stan dar d. Brennan , 326 F.3d at 200. The Distric t Cou rt over ruled B row n’s ob jection to the a buse of trus t enha ncem ent, concludi ng, “[a] bsent hi s position as Pre sident of The Wilmingtoni ans, and hi s day -to- day authori ty to engage i n legitimate t ransactions on behal f of the organizat ion he would not hav e be en a ble to acc om plish the f rau dul ent tr ans actio ns a t issu e.” B row n’s A pp. a t 89 5. Brown argues that

because hi s cri minal activit y r equired no s pecialskil ls and was not diffic ult to de tect, it wa s not a n abu se of trust. Section 3B1. 3 of the sent encing gui deline s stat es, “I f the defendant abused a positio n of

pub lic or priv ate trust, o r used a spe cial skill, in a man ner tha t signific antly15

facil itat ed the commiss ion or conce alment of t he offense, increa se by2 level s.” We have held that in consi dering whethe r a posi tion cons tit utes a pos iti on of trust for purpose s of § 3B1.3, a court must

consider : (1) wh ether th e pos ition allow s the d efen dant to com mit a diffi cult- to-det ect wrong; ( 2) the degr ee of author ity which the posi tion ves ts i n the defendant vis-a -vis t

he object of the wrongful act ; and (3) whether the re has been r eliance on the integrity of the per son occupy ing the pos iti on. United Stat es v. Par do , 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 1994). We have als o noted that the “rati onale for

increa sed punishment

is that an insi der who takes advant age of a posi tion of trust to faci lit ate a crime is t hought to be more culpabl e than one who simpl y commit s the offense. ” Id. at 1191 (q uotation and citation omitted) (em phasis in original). It i s plai n that unde r thi s analy sis, the Dist rict Court did not

err i n concludi ng that Brown abused the publi c trus t. The wrong was dif ficul t to det ect becaus e Brown was responsible for the daily financialoperations of the organizati on, and the Wilmingtonians’ accountant

reli ed direc tly

on the materials he recei ved from Brown in order t o keep the books. That

Brown exercised a

high degree of authori ty is pl ain from hi s position as President. Place ment of him in the p osition as Presiden t where h e controlled the g roup’s fin an ce s n ec es sa rily i m pl ies re lia nc e o n h is i nt eg rity. Brown ’s argument that no special ski lls were required is of no mom ent, because Section 3B 1.3 is written in the disjun ctive, and the on ly clause at issue is the “abuse [ of] a pos it io n of

pub li c or

pr iv at e tru st ” ph ra se . F urth ermor e, Bro wn’s ar gume ntth atth e crime16

was not diffi cult to detect is unper suasive because he spe cifi call y di sguised t he conversi ons in such a

manner that

did make them di fficul t to detect. We will affi rm the ruling o f the D istrict Co urt. CONCLU SI ON We will affi rm the convi ctions and sentenc es of appel lants Worley and Brown.