UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4215

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

WILLIE MITCHELL, a/k/a Bo,

Defendant – Appellant.

 No. 09-4357

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHELTON HARRIS, a/k/a Little Rock,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 09-4359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.
2

SHELLY WAYNE MARTIN, a/k/a Wayne,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 09-4361

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHAWN GARDNER, a/k/a Goo,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. 

(1:04-cr-00029-AMD-1; 1:04-cr-00029-AMD-2; 1:04-cr-00029-AMD-3; 

1:04-cr-00029-AMD-4)

Argued: May 13, 2011 Decided: June 15, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,

in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Duncan joined.

ARGUED: Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, 

Maryland; Paul Martin Flannery, ROSENBERG, MARTIN & GREENBERG, 

LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Thomas Leonard Crowe, LAW OFFICES OF 

THOMAS L. CROWE, Baltimore, Maryland; Adam Harris Kurland, 

HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellants. Robert Reeves Harding, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sicilia 

Englert, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellant Willie Mitchell; Barry Coburn, COBURN & COFFMAN, PLLC, 
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Washington, D.C., for Appellant Shawn Gardner. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted Willie Mitchell, Shelton Harris, Shelly 

Wayne Martin, and Shawn Gardner of racketeering conspiracy in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and, individually, of various 

murders as well as drug and firearm offenses. The four 

defendants worked together and depended on one another to sell 

drugs, to operate a rap music business, and to rob and murder 

several of their criminal associates. In this consolidated 

appeal, the defendants raise a total of sixteen issues. After a 

thorough review of all sixteen issues, we find none to have 

merit, and we address only three evidentiary issues: the 

exclusion of Herb “Coach” Lynch’s testimony, the exclusion of 

Gardner’s prior state court murder conviction, and the 

introduction of the defendants’ courtroom behavior and pro se

pleadings.

I.

“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and 

such rulings are subject to harmless error review.” U.S. v. 

Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1997). “In order to find a 

district court's error harmless, we need only be able to say 

with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without 

stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment 

was not substantially swayed by the error.” Id. (internal 
5

citation marks omitted). With this framework in place, we turn 

to each issue.

II.

First, Mitchell argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in excluding the testimony of “Coach” Lynch. As a 

defense to the racketeering conspiracy charge, the defendants 

argued that the evidence demonstrates they were only involved in 

multiple, lesser conspiracies, not a single racketeering 

conspiracy. In support of this defense, Mitchell wanted Lynch 

to testify as to his whereabouts during various time periods 

within the racketeering conspiracy, specifically the time 

Mitchell spent either incarcerated or working at the Hickey 

School, a juvenile detention center. Mitchell alleges that 

Lynch would have testified that during those time periods 

“Mitchell had a rigorous daily schedule of school and practices 

that left little time for anything else . . . and that it would 

have been difficult for him to participate in a conspiracy while 

he was incarcerated or working at Hickey [School].” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 99.)

Prior to Lynch’s testimony, one of the jurors informed the 

court that he knew Lynch as his son’s athletic mentor and 
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trainer.1

We believe that any error in excluding Lynch’s testimony 

was harmless. Lynch was not going to testify as to evidence 

regarding any of the charged conduct. Moreover, Mitchell’s 

counsel called substitute witnesses that provided similar 

testimony. Therefore, in light of the Government’s overwhelming 

evidence of guilt presented throughout the trial, there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict even without 

this challenged evidence.

 The juror saw Lynch every two days at his son’s 

practices and planned to continue seeing Lynch on this schedule 

throughout the trial. Based upon this information, the 

government moved to excuse the juror, but the attorneys for all 

four defendants opposed the motion. The court offered several 

options to Mitchell’s counsel, including entering a stipulation 

as to Lynch’s testimony. After Mitchell’s counsel refused these 

options, the district court decided to preclude Lynch’s 

testimony because the evidence was amenable to a stipulation, 

all defense counsel opposed dismissing the juror, and there was 

a “truly intimate relationship between this juror and this fact 

witness.” (J.A. 822.)

 1 During voir dire, Mitchell’s counsel did not provide 

Lynch’s first name, referring to him as “Coach” Lynch. The 

juror knew Lynch as “Herb Lynch, Certified Personal Trainer.” 
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III.

Next, Gardner argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in excluding evidence of his prior state court murder 

conviction. Gardner had previously been convicted in Maryland 

state court and sentenced to a life term for the murder of Tanya 

Jones-Spence, one of the murders also charged in this case. 

Likewise, the Government’s cooperating witness, William 

Montgomery, had also testified in the state trial. Therefore, 

in this trial, the district court instructed Gardner’s counsel 

that when cross-examining Montgomery he could bring out the fact 

that Montgomery had testified in a prior proceeding before a 

jury. However, the court forbade counsel from introducing

evidence of Gardner’s conviction in that proceeding. 

Only relevant evidence is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 

403. Even assuming evidence of Gardner’s prior conviction was 

relevant, such evidence may be excluded when its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the potential for “unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. In this case, the district court excluded 

this evidence because of its concern about confusion of the 
8

issues, waste of time, and the potential for prejudice to both 

Gardner and the other defendants.2

We find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in holding that the probative value of evidence of 

Gardner’s prior state conviction was substantially outweighed by 

its potential for jury confusion and prejudice and, thus, should 

be excluded. Presenting this jury with a previous jury’s guilty 

verdict for the exact crime charged in this case would have 

certainly been both prejudicial and confusing.

 

IV.

Finally, all four defendants argue that the district court 

abused its discretion by allowing the Government to introduce 

evidence of their pre-trial courtroom behavior and pro se

pleadings. Specifically, during pretrial hearings, the four 

defendants repeatedly engaged in disruptive behavior through 

coordinated and identical demonstrations. The defendants gave 

 2 Specifically, the court stated it was primarily concerned 

about the prejudicial effect such evidence would have. “[O]nce 

we go there [putting the conviction and sentence before the 

jury], it is beyond me how in any coherent way you can maintain 

innocence through a non-concession of guilt when you’ve told the 

jury or had the Court tell the jury or conceded in front of the 

jury that there has been a trial, Montgomery testified, a jury 

listened to that evidence as well as other evidence, and found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gardner had committed this 

murder or, and/or aided and abetted in the commission of this 

murder and/or conspired to commit this murder.” (J.A. 1211.)
9

identical speeches rejecting the jurisdiction of the district 

court over them as live “flesh and blood” men and denouncing the 

Government, the district court, and their attorneys. They also 

submitted identical pro se pleadings. 

In its fourth superseding indictment, the Government 

alleged that the racketeering conspiracy continued through the 

trial and that a purpose of the conspiracy was “[p]reventing and 

obstructing the arrest and prosecution of members and associates 

through . . . disruption of court proceedings.” (J.A. 457-458.) 

In order to prove this charge, the Government introduced the 

above evidence of the defendants’ coordinated behavior. On 

appeal, the defendants argue that the introduction of this

evidence violates their Sixth Amendment right to mount their own 

defense. 

We again conclude that, even assuming the district court 

abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, any error was 

harmless. The jury convicted all four defendants not only of 

the racketeering conspiracy but also of multiple, substantive,

predicate counts. The evidence presented throughout the nine 

week trial detailing the four defendants’ concerted activities 

in furtherance of the racketeering enterprise was abundant and 

sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict even without this 

challenged evidence.
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V.

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the convictions of 

Willie Mitchell, Shelton Harris, Shelly Wayne Martin, and Shawn 

Gardner.

AFFIRMED