T he H o no rable M i ckey R
. P enni ngt o n presi d ed ove r t he heari ng on t he m o t i o n t o s et asi d e t he i nd i ct m ent and 1 d e n ie d the m o tio n . T h e H o n o ra b le M a rk L u itje n p re sid e d o v e r th e p le a p ro c e e d ing a n d sign e d the ju d g m e n t. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 73 1- CR Ga br ie l Rio ja s BERNAL , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the 38th J udicial District Court, Medina County , Texas

Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 03 -1 2- 90 69 -C R Honora ble Mark L

uitjen, J udg e Presiding 1 Opinion by : Alma L . L ópez, Chief J ustice Sitt ing: Alma L . L ópez, Chief J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J uly 9, 2008 AFF I RMED Ga br ie l Rio ja s B e rn a l pl e d guil ty

to m ur de r a nd wa s se nte nc e d to lif

e in p ri so n. On

a pp e a l, B e rn a l c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion to se t a sid e the ind ic tme nt b e c a us e the State fa ile d to a ff

or d h im a sp e e dy tr ia l. We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04
- 07
- 00 73 1- CR

- 2- B ACKG ROUND Be rnal wa s arr ested for

capital murde r on Jul y

29, 2003. On Novembe r 6, 2003, B erna l filed
an a pp lic a tio n f

or wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s se e kin g re le a se be c a

us e of de lay and fo r l a c k o f p ro ba

ble
cause. Bernal wa s indicted on Dec ember 19, 2003. The only

issue prese nted at the he aringon Be rnal’s application for habeas corpus was a request for a bond reduc tion. The trial court g rante d this request and r educe d Be rnal’s bond. On August 5, 2005, Ber

nal filed a

second a pplication for wr it of habea s corpus re questing that he be relea sed on persona l bond or have his bail reduc ed. A he aringwas he ld on the application, and B erna l’s bond was a g ain re duced. On May 17 , 2 00 7, B e rn a l f

ile d a mot ion re qu e sti nga

c on tin ua nc e du e to c onfl icts in h is attorney ’s sche dule. On June 5, 2007, B erna l f iled a second motion for continuance ag ain base d on the u n availabilit y

of def ense c ounsel. On June 14, 2007, Ber nal filed a

motion to s et aside the indictment based on the State’ s failure to affor d Be rnal a speedy trial. Th e t ri al co u rt denied the mot ion a t a pr e -t ri a l he ari ng on June 20 , 20 07
. On Au g us t 21 , 20 07 , B e rn a l ple d g uil ty to t he of fe ns e of mur de r a nd wa s se nte nc e d to lif

e in p ri so n in

a c c or da nc e wi th a

ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt. D I S CUS S I ON

“ I n d e te rm ini ng whe th er a c ri min a l de fe nd ant h a s b e e n d e nie d h is f e de ra l or state
c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o a

sp e e dy tr ia l, a co ur

t must u se a

ba lanc ingte st i n w hic h th e c on du c t of bo th the State and the de fenda nt are weig hed.” Shaw v . S tate , 117 S.W .3d 883, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The f

actor s to be weig hed in the balance include, but are not nece ssarily limit ed to: (1) the le ng th o f t

he de lay ; ( 2) re a so ns fo r t he de lay ; ( 3) the de fe nd ant’ s a sse rt ion of his sp e e dy tr ia l r ig ht; and (4) the pre

judice to the def

endant r esulting f

rom the dela

y . Id
. at 8 8 8 -8 9
. I nco n d u c t i n g a04
- 07
- 00 73 1- CR

- 3- sp e e dy tr ia l ana ly sis , w e re vie w l e g a l is su e s de novo but give defe renc e to a trial court’s re solution of fa ctual issues. Ke lly

v . S tate , 1 63 S.W. 3d

72 2, 72 6 ( Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). I n a dd iti on to defe rringto the trial court’ s resolution of disputed fac ts, we a lso defer to the trial court’ s drawing of re asonable infere nces from the facts beca use the trial judg e’s pe rsonal knowledg e of the parties and the se quence of eve nts place him i n a better position t o drawinfere nces tha n an appe llate cour

t without such familiarity
. Id
. 1. Length of Delay The fir st factor , the leng th of the delay , is me asure d from the time the defe ndant is arr ested or for mally acc used. Shaw , 117 S.W .3d at 889. In g ener al, delay approa chingone y ear

is sufficient to trigg er a speedy trial inquiry
. Id . I n this case, B erna l was ar rested in July

of 2003 and his pre -trial hear ing w as not held until June of 2007, a delay of 48 months. This delay is sufficient to trig g er a speedy trial inquiry , and this fa ctor weig hs heavily in f avor of finding a violation of B erna l’s rig ht to a spee dy

trial. Se e id
. 2. Reason for the De lay The State be ars the initial burde n of justifying the delay
. Ma rq ue z v . S tate , 165 S.W .3d 741, 748 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref ’d). In assessingthe re asons the State off ers to justify the delay , differ ent weig hts mu s t b e assig ned to diffe rent re asons. Shaw , 117 S.W .3d at 889. A de lib e rate a tte mpt to de lay a tr ia l is we ig he d he a vil y a g a ins t the State , whi le mor e ne utr a l r e a so ns , such as ne g lige nce or

overc rowde d dockets, a

re w eig hed less hea

vily
. Marquez , 165 S.W .3d at 748. I f the re cord is silent reg ardingthe re ason for the delay , we pr esume neither a deliberate attempt by the State to prejudice the def ense, nor a valid re ason for

the delay
. Id
.04
- 07
- 00 73 1- CR

- 4- The c lerk’s r ecor d in this case does not c ontain much information re g ardingthe rea son for the delay until the continuances were soug ht in May and J une of 2007. At the hea ring , howeve r, the State explained: As the court knows this is a four defe ndant capital case . I t has prec eded [sic] at the c ourt ’s dir e c tio n. An d I ’m so rr y Ido n’ t r e c a ll the oth e r m an’s name , b ut i t w a s a capital murde r trial her e sometime bac k. I t w as conc luded her e in this county . There w a s a d is c u s s io na

b o u t t h e s e b e in g s e t a f

te r th a t. M r . B e r

n a l i s th e f

ir s t o f f o u r . We have de lay ed this case sever al times since last y ear at def ense c ounsel’s re quest or a l ac k o f s et t i n g. As pr e vio us ly

no te d, the tr ia l c ourt

is pe rm itt e d to dra

w inf e re nc e s fr om the fa c ts an d to re ly on his persona l knowledg e o f t h e parties a nd the seque nce of

events. Ke lly , 163 S.W .3d at 726-27. Although no te stimony

may be prese nted with r eg ard to ple a neg otiations, the trial court may infer they exis ted from the c ircumstance s. Id
. The State’s r efe renc e to discussions reg arding the t rial being set afte r another ca pital murder t ri al p erm i t t edt h e t ri al co u rt t o i n fe r t h at an agr ee m en tex i s t edat s o m e p o i n tt o d el ay t h e t ri al s et t i n g. The trial c ourt could have inferr ed that such a n ag ree ment was a s t ra t egy beingused in plea neg otiations. The trial court a lso could have c onsidered that a ca pital murder char g e involving f our defe ndants requir ed additional time to prepa re f or trial. B eca

use the ultimate r esponsibility for a 48 month delay

must rest with the State, this factor likely weig hs somewhat ag ainst the State, but not very heavily
. Marquez , 165 S.W .3d at 748-49. 3. Assertion of the Right A def endant is re sponsible for asserting or demanding his right to a spee dy trial. Marquez , 165 S.W .3d at 749. Failure to see k a spee dy trial makes it difficult for a def endant to pre vail on a speedy trial claim. Shaw , 117 S.W .3d at 890. “This is so beca use a de fenda

nt’s failure to make a timely demand f

or a spe edy

trial indicates strong ly

that he did not rea lly

want one a

nd that he wa s04
- 07
- 00 73 1- CR

- 5- not prejudice d by

not having one.” Id
. “ F ur the rm or e , the lon g e r the de lay [la sts ], the mor e lik e ly it is t ha t a d e f

e n d an t w h o r e a ll y w an te d a s p e e dy tr ia l w o u ld ta k e s o me a c ti o n to o b ta in o n e . ” Id
. Thus, a def

endant’ s inaction weig hs more hea vily ag ainst a violation the long er the delay
. Id. F ina lly , a de fe nd ant who se e ks a

dis mis sa l a s o pp os e d to a sp e e dy tr ia l atte nu a te s th e str e ng th o f h is speedy trial claim. Id . I n this ca s e, al t h o ug h Be rnal twice soug ht a re duction in bond, he neve r
a sse rt e d h is r ig ht t o a

sp e e dy tr ia l and on ly so ug ht d ism iss a l of

the ind ic tme nt 4 8 mo nth s a ft e r h is
arr est and on the e ve of his trial setting . This fac tor weig hs heavily ag ainst finding a

violation of Be rnal’s r ight to a spe edy trial. See id. 4. Prejudice to the D efendant Re sulting f rom the De lay Prejudice to the defendant is assessed in light of the i ntere sts which the spee dy trial rig ht was intended to protec t: (1) pre venting oppressive incarc eration; (2) minimi zing the anxiety and conc ern of the a ccuse d; and (3) limiting the possibility that the def

ense w ill be impair ed. Shaw , 117 S.W .3d
a t 89 0; Marquez , 165 S.W .3d at 749. The de fenda nt has the burde n to make some sho wi n g of prejudice
. Marquez , 165 S
. W .3d at 749. To show his defe nse wa s impaired base d on the
un a va ila bil ity of de fe ns e wi tne sse s, the defe nd ant mus t sh owwi tne sse s w e re un a va ila ble , th e ir testimony would have be en rele vant, and he used due diligenc e to locate the witnesses. Id . at 750. To sh owpr e

jud ic e ba se d o n th e dimmin g me mor ie s o f t he State’s w itn e sse s, the de fe nd ant m us t
s h o w th a t th e la

p s e s o f me mo r

y ar e in s o me w ay s ign if ic an t to th e o u tc o me o f

the ca se. Id
. Although an ex cessive delay presumptively compromises the re liability of a tria l in way s that neither pa rt y c an p ro ve or e ve n ide nti fy , thi s pr e sumpt ion is e xten uate d by the de fe nd ant’ s a c qu ie sc e nc e in the delay
. Shaw , 117 S.W .3d at 890.04
- 07
- 00 73 1- CR

- 6- Al tho ug h Be rn a l tes tif

ie d that the a c c us a tio n ag a ins t him had c a us e d him s ub sta

nti a l anxie ty
and c on c e rn and B e rn a l ha d b e e n i ncar cerat ed f or 48 mon ths , B e rn a l ma de no sh ow ingthat hi s defe nse would be impaire d by the delay
. Moreove r, B erna l’s acquie scenc e in the dela y extenuates any presumed pr ejudice. Se e id . There fore , althoug h Be rnal presented some e vidence that the delay
cause d him some anx iety , any prejudice Be rnal suff

ere d as a r esult of the dela y was minimal, and this factor w eig hs ag ainst him. See M arquez , 165 S.W .3d at 750. 5. Ba lan c ing

theFa c tor

s Although the excessive delay weig hs heavily in favor of

finding a violation, Be rnal’s f ailure to assert his rig ht weig hs heavily ag ainst such a finding as does his r equest for a dismiss al as opposed to a sp e e dy tr ia l. F ur the rm or e , the re c or d pro vid e s some e vid e nc e of a re a so n f or the de lay so thi s fac tor does not weig h heavily in favor of a violation. Finally , althoug h Be rnal testified that he was anxious , he pre sented no e vidence that his defense was impai re d
. T h er efore, bala ncingall of the fac tors, the trial cour

t did not err in deny

ing B erna l’s motion. C ONCL US I ON The trial c ourt’s judg ment is affirme d. Alma L . L ópez, Chief J ustice

DO NO T PU B L I SH