H. Res. 468

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

October 7, 2002.

Resolved,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Transatlantic Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2002’’.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The House of Representatives makes the following findings:

(1) Since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played an essential role in guaranteeing the security, freedom, and prosperity of the

United States and its partners in the Alliance.

(2) NATO, founded on the principles of democracy,

individual liberty, and the rule of law, has proved to be

an indispensable instrument for forging a trans-Atlantic

community of nations working together to safeguard the

freedom and common heritage of its peoples and promoting stability in the North Atlantic area.
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(3) NATO is the only institution that promotes a

uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues

concerning the security of North America and Europe

and remains the only multilateral security organization

demonstrably capable of conducting effective military operations and preserving security and stability of the

Euro-Atlantic region.

(4) The security, freedom, and prosperity of the

United States remain linked to the security of the countries of Europe.

(5) NATO remains the most visible and significant

embodiment of United States engagement in Europe and

therefore membership in NATO remains a vital national

security interest of the United States.

(6) NATO enhances the security of the United

States by providing an integrated military structure and

a framework for consultations on political and security

concerns of members which could impact the Alliance.

(7) The security of NATO member countries is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe, and the

consolidation and strengthening of democratic and free

societies on the entire continent is of direct and material

importance to the NATO Alliance and its partners.

(8) The sustained commitment of the member countries of NATO to a mutual defense has been a major
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contributing factor in the democratic transformation of

Central and Eastern Europe.

(9) Members of the Alliance can and should play a

critical role in addressing the security challenges of the

post-Cold War era and in creating the stable environment needed for Central and Eastern Europe to successfully complete political and economic transformation.

(10) NATO should remain the core security organization of the evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture in

which all countries enjoy the same freedom, cooperation,

and security.

(11) NATO’s military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its members, and

should be capable of projecting power when the security

of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis

for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO

members to defend common values and interests.

(12) NATO must act to address new post-Cold War

risks emerging from outside the treaty area in the interests of preserving peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, including—

(A) risks from rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical

weapons and their means of delivery;
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(B) transnational terrorism and disruption of

the flow of vital resources; and

(C) conflicts outside the treaty area stemming

from unresolved historical disputes and the actions

of undemocratic governments and sub-state actors

who reject the peaceful settlement of disputes.

(13) All NATO members should commit to improving their respective defense capabilities so that NATO

can project power decisively and sustain operations over

distance and time.

(14) The requirements to provide collective defense,

to project power, and to sustain operations dictate that

European NATO members possess military capabilities

to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly

with the United States in high-intensity conflicts.

(15) NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative, which

is intended to improve the defense capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the deployability, mobility,

sustainability, and interoperability of Alliance forces,

must continue to be pursued by all members of the Alliance in order to develop balanced capabilities.

(16) With a few exceptions, European members of

NATO have been deficient in maintaining required military capabilities and providing defense spending at levels
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adequate to meet these capability shortfalls. Failure of

the European NATO members to achieve the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative

could weaken support for the Alliance in the United

States over the long term.

(17) Members of the Alliance must also recognize

that the campaign against new and emerging threats to

the security of the Alliance requires other non-military

capabilities and efforts to be effective. Thus, the need to

enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally between Alliance members and partners and within the Alliance collectively, the facilitation of enhanced

coordination among Alliance member’s law enforcement

agencies, and improved police and judicial cooperation

and information exchanges are critical to the overall effort.

(18) NATO has embarked upon an historic mission

to share its benefits and patterns of consultation and cooperation with other nations in the Euro-Atlantic area

through both enlargement and active partnership.

(19) NATO has enlarged its membership on four

different occasions since 1949.

(20) The NATO summit meeting to be held in the

fall of 2002 in Prague will provide an historic opportunity to chart a course for NATO in the new millen-
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nium by reaffirming the importance of NATO to the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region, by addressing new threats, developing new capabilities, and by extending invitations to additional countries of Europe to

become members of the Alliance.

(21) The governments of NATO member countries

have stated that enlargement of the Alliance is a further

step toward the Alliance’s basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic

region.

(22) The enlargement process of NATO helps to

avert conflict, because the very prospect of membership

serves as an incentive for aspiring members to resolve

disputes with their neighbors and to push ahead with reform and democratization.

(23) The Partnership for Peace, created in 1994

under United States leadership, has fostered cooperation

between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a path to future membership in

the Alliance.

(24) At the Washington Summit of the NATO Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state and government issued a communique declaring ‘‘[we] pledge

that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a

position to further the principles of the [North Atlantic]
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Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the EuroAtlantic area’’.

(25) In 1999 NATO launched a Membership Action

Plan designed to help interested Partnership for Peace

countries prepare for membership by offering advice and

assistance on programs and membership-related issues.

(26) The Membership Action Plan establishes certain political, economic, social, and military-related goals

that aspiring candidate nations are expected to meet, including the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for democratic procedures and the rule of law,

human rights, democratic control of the military and

other military reforms, and a commitment to stability

and well-being through economic liberty and social justice.

(27) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, nine nations of Europe issued a statement (later joined by a

tenth) declaring that their countries will cooperate in

jointly seeking NATO membership in the next round of

NATO enlargement and since then have taken concrete

steps to demonstrate this commitment, including their

participation in Partnership for Peace activities and

their commitment to the concept of the Membership Action Plan.
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(28) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw, Poland, President George W. Bush stated ‘‘[all] of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black

Sea and all that lie between, should have the same

chance for security and freedom—and the same chance

to join the institutions of Europe’’.

(29) The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include as full and equal members additional democracies

in Europe will serve to reinforce stability and security in

Europe by fostering their integration into the structures

which have created and sustained peace in Europe since

1945.

(30) As new members of NATO assume the responsibilities of Alliance membership, the costs of maintaining stability in Europe will be shared more widely. The

concurrent assumption of greater responsibility and development of greater capabilities by new members of

NATO will further reinforce burdensharing.

(31) The membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland has strengthened NATO’s ability to

perform the full range of NATO missions by providing

bases, airfields, and transit rights for NATO forces during Operation Allied Force in the Balkans, by their contributions of military forces to NATO missions in Bosnia
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and Kosovo, and by their support for Operation Enduring Freedom.

(32) The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland,

due to their similar recent history, have bolstered

NATO’s capability to integrate former communist nations into a community of democracies and have served

as mentors to other countries that aspire to join NATO.

(33) In supporting NATO enlargement all candidate countries must be fully aware of the costs and responsibilities of NATO membership, including the obligation set forth in Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty that new members be able to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and further to ensure

that all countries admitted to NATO are capable of assuming those costs and responsibilities.

(34) For those candidate countries that receive an

invitation to join NATO at the Prague Summit, the

process of joining NATO does not end with the invitation but rather with meeting the full responsibilities of

a NATO member, including the completion of issues

identified by the Membership Action Plan, which will

continue beyond Prague.

(35) In considering the enlargement of NATO at

Prague and in issuing invitations to the candidate countries who have made significant progress toward achiev-
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ing their objectives in the Membership Action Plan established by NATO, there is a recognition that each

country invited to join NATO should accede on a common date but before the date on which the next announced NATO summit is to take place.

(36) The countries that will be invited to begin accession negotiations with NATO at the NATO summit

in Prague should not be the last such countries invited

to join NATO and there should be a continuing process

and progress toward the admission of additional democracies in Europe beyond 2002 depending on the degree

to which those countries meet the criteria set forth in

NATO’s Membership Action Plan.

(37) The process of NATO enlargement entails the

consensus agreement of the governments of all 19

NATO member countries and ratification in accordance

with their constitutional procedures.

SEC. 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

The House of Representatives makes the following findings:

(1) The admission into the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) of new members from countries in

Eastern and Central Europe, such as the Czech Repub-
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lic, Hungary, and Poland, will not threaten any other

country.

(2) Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attached particular importance to the development of constructive and cooperative relations with the Russian Federation in order to overcome remaining vestiges of confrontation and competition in order to strengthen mutual

trust and cooperation between NATO and the Russian

Federation.

(3) In 1994, building on previous efforts at cooperation, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace Program, further enhancing the emerging NATO-Russian

Federation dialogue.

(4) On May 27, 1997, in an expression of strong

commitment to work together to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, the heads of

state and government of NATO and the Russian Federation signed the ground-breaking ‘‘Founding Act on

Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between

NATO and the Russian Federation’’.

(5) On March 18, 1998, the Russian Federation

formally established its mission to NATO and appointed

a senior military representative to facilitate military and

defense-related cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation.
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(6) Since 1998, NATO and the Russian Federation

have worked cooperatively with each other in the

Balkans and elsewhere setting the stage for the ability

of an enlarged NATO to continue the cooperative spirit

embodied in the Founding Act.

(7) On May 28, 2002, in an historic step toward

the Alliance’s long-standing goal of building a secure, cooperative, and democratic Euro-Atlantic area, NATO

took the decisive and substantial step of deepening the

NATO-Russian Federation relationship by establishing

the new NATO-Russia Council.

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

The House of Representatives declares the following to

be the policy of the United States:

(1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) should remain the primary institution through

which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern.

(2) The member states of NATO should reaffirm,

at the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002, the continued

importance of NATO, renew their commitment to

strengthen the transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity

within NATO, maintain a vigorous capability to carry

out collective defense, and harmonize security policies

and strategies for transatlantic affairs.
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(3) At the Prague Summit, the Alliance, while

maintaining collective defense as its core function,

should as a fundamental Alliance task, continue to

strengthen national and collective capacities to respond

to new threats wherever such threats occur, including

from abroad.

(4) The Alliance, in addition to the strategic concept adopted by the Allies at the summit meeting held

in Washington in 1999, must recognize the need to develop new capabilities, and agree to consider acting upon

the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction and terrorism by intensifying consultations among political and military leaders, and by developing comprehensive capabilities to counter these threats

to the international community.

(5) The Alliance should make clear commitments to

remedy shortfalls in areas such as logistics, strategic airlift, command and control, modern strike capabilities,

adequate shared intelligence, and the other requirements

identified by NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative necessary to provide the ability to carry out the full range

of NATO’s missions.

(6) The Alliance must ensure a more equitable

sharing of contributions to the NATO common budgets
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and to overall national defense expenditures and capability-building.

(7) The President, the Secretary of State, and the

Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy

forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the

United States in high intensity conflicts, thus making

such NATO allies more effective partners.

(8) The member states of NATO should commit to

enhanced intelligence-sharing, law enforcement, police,

and judicial cooperation, and expanded information exchanges within and among Alliance members in order to

meet the challenges of new and emerging threats.

SEC. 5. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) while maintaining its essential and inherent

right to make its own decisions, the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) should seek to strengthen

its relations with the Russian Federation as an essential

partner in building long-term peace in Europe, and to

that end, the new NATO-Russia Council, in which member states and the Russian Federation will work as equal
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partners on mutually-agreed matters, should be welcomed and supported;

(2) while retaining its primary commitment to collective defense, NATO enlargement should be carried out

in such a manner as to underscore to the Russian Federation that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including the Russian

Federation; and

(3) in seeking to demonstrate NATO’s defensive

and security-enhancing intentions to the Russian Federation, it is essential that neither fundamental United

States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness

and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized.

SEC. 6. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND

DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR

NATO.

It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) at the Summit to be held in Prague in the fall

of 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) should extend invitations for accession negotiations to any appropriate candidate country that meets

the objectives and targets for NATO membership as outlined in the Membership Action Plan process established

by NATO in 1999, including—
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(A) a commitment to the basic principles and

values set out in the Washington Treaty;

(B) the capability to contribute to collective defense and the Alliance’s full range of missions; and

(C) a firm commitment to contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of crisis and

conflict, and to be willing and able to assume the

responsibilities of NATO membership;

(2) the candidate countries of Albania, Bulgaria,

Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia should be commended on the significant progress

such countries have made thus far in political and economic liberty and military reform necessary for meeting

the objectives for prospective members of NATO as set

out in their own Membership Action Plans;

(3) each candidate country, despite recognized

Membership Action Plan deficiencies requiring further

refinement, could in its own way contribute to stability,

freedom, and peace in Europe as a whole, as many of

such countries have done thus far in the Balkans and in

Afghanistan, and would make a positive contribution toward furthering the goals of NATO should it become a

NATO member country;
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(4) having made significant progress in reforming

their societies and their military forces, and having developed reasonable, affordable, and sustainable plans to

be able to work within the Alliance structure and to contribute positively to the collective defense of the Alliance

and other NATO missions, the candidate countries of

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have met in a satisfactory manner,

the criteria established by NATO in the Membership Action Plan process, would likely make a positive contribution to NATO, and should be invited to begin the accession process to join the Alliance at the Prague summit;

(5) with respect to candidate countries invited to

join NATO, such countries should accede on a common

date before the next announced NATO summit is to take

place;

(6) after the Prague summit those candidate countries invited to join the Alliance should continue to participate in the Membership Action Plan until accession,

and the accession process should take into account work

conducted under the Membership Action Plan; and

(7) the process of NATO enlargement should continue beyond the inclusion of such candidate countries

invited to join NATO at Prague, to include those candidate countries not so invited at Prague as well as other
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democratic European countries which may express interest in joining the Alliance, and which agree to utilize the

Membership Action Plan to facilitate such NATO enlargement.

Attest:

Clerk.