Filed 5/13/15 In re Z.G. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Z.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B259416 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK95356)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
N.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Lo s Angeles County, Timothy Saito, Judge. Affirmed. Maureen L. Keaney, unde r appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Dawy n R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Depu ty County Co unsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *2 N.G. (mother) appeals the juvenile cour t’s order exercising jurisdiction over her infant daughter Z.G. pursuant Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j) 1 based on a prior sustained petition involving Z.G.’s sibli ngs. We find substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s order and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND
1. Petition Mother has four children: 10-year-old S.W.; eight-year-old K.S.; two-year-old K.W.; and six-month-old Z.G. Only Z.G. is involv ed in this appeal, although her halfsiblings are dependents of the court. The pr ior sustained allegations involving the halfsiblings stated in relevant part: “[Mother ] has a history of substance abuse and is a current user of amphetamine, methamphetami ne, cocaine and marijuana, which renders
the children’s mother in capable of providing regular care for the children. The mother used cocaine and marijuana, during her pregna ncy with the child [K.W.]. On 8/28/12, the mother had a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine, methamphetamine and cocaine. On 8/28/12 and on prior occasions in 2012, the mother was under the influence of amphetamine, methamphetamine and cocaine, while the children we re in the mother’s care and supervision. Remedial services failed to resolve the family ’s problems in that
the mother continued to use illicit drugs. The mother’s s ubstance abuse endangers the children’s physical health and safety and creates a detrimental home environment, placing the children at risk of physical harm and damage.” 2 As part of the March 19, 2013 disposition of the siblings’ case, mother was given monitored visitation and ordered to participate in individual counseling, alcoho l and drug counseling, and aftercare, and to submit to random drug testing.

1 All statutory citations are to the Welf are and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

2 There was also a sustained allegation that mother had engaged in a violent altercation with K.W.’s father, but that is not at issue here.3 Z.G. was born prematurely in April 2014, and remained in the hospital for over two months on a ventilator, respirator, and supplemental oxygen due to her underdeveloped lungs. 3 On May 12, 2014, DCFS obtain ed a warrant to remove Z.G. from mother’s custody, which DCFS executed by placing a hospital hold on Z.G. DCFS filed a dependency petition for Z.G. on May 21, 2014, a lleging as follows under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j): “[Mother] has a history of substance abuse, including amphetamine, methamphetamine, co caine and marijuana, which renders the mother incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the child. The child’s siblings . . . are current dependents of the Ju venile Court due to the mother’s substance abuse. The mother had failed to regular[ly] participate in a Juvenile Court ordered substance abuse rehabilitation program, af ter care program, random drug testing and individual counseling. The mother’s subs tance abuse endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk of physical ha rm and damage.” That day, the juvenile court ordered Z.G. be detained from mother. 2. Mother’s Past Drug Use Mother admitted using methamphetamine and cocaine in 20 10 and 2011 and marijuana since she was 15 or 16 years ol d. She claimed all of her use of methamphetamine and cocaine occurred with in a six-month period. When she was pregnant with K.W., she believed she had misca rried so she used cocaine at a New Year’s Eve party, which caused her to test positive for drugs when he was born. In August 2012—four months after giving birth to K.W. and two months after a team decisionmaking meeting—she went on a “party bus” to Las Vegas and used marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine, at which point the siblings were taken away.

3 At the time of Z.G.’s birth, mother test ed positive for opiates, although Z.G. tested negative. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, however, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) acknowledged it did not have an expert to testify that mother was using drug s at the time Z.G. was born and declined to pursue that fact as part of the basi s for exercising jurisdiction over Z.G.4 3. Mother’s Compliance w ith Treatment Programs At the time of the jurisdiction/disposition report in this case, mother reported being sober for a year and being in her thir d treatment program. She first enrolled in
services at the New You Center in 2012 for three months and believed she had completed parenting and domestic violence classes. She then enrolled at the Valley Women’s
Center for one month. DCFS confirmed she had enrolled in substan ce abuse, parenting, domestic violence, and anger management pr ograms at the New You Center in 2012,
where she had obtained certif icates in parenting skills , counseling, and anger management, and she had enrolled in substa nce abuse treatment at the Valley Women’s
Center for one month. But she had not completed either program, having been discharged for lack of attendance. She ha d not attended individual counseling, which was an important component of substance ab use treatment and could not be adequately addressed in a 12-step program. She was most recently enrolled in subs tance abuse treatment at the Family Counseling Center after Z.G. was born. Sh e had not gone into a program right away
because her brother was killed after her childre n were removed. DCFS reported that, as of July 10, 2014, mother was in compliance with a “Full Dr ug Program.” A July 1, 2014 letter from a counselor at the Family Counseling Center indicated mother was consistently attending a subs tance abuse education program with twice weekly group sessions and once monthly individual sessions, as well as a 12-step program elsewhere. However, DCFS noted mother was not enrolled in any mental heal th services at the time. The social worker reported sp eaking to mother on July 2, 2014, and mother indicated she had an assessment appointment for individual counseling that day. Mother said she would call the social worker after the appointme nt, but she never did. On July 9, 2014,
the social worker even tually spoke with mother, but wa s unable to determine whether the
assessment was done. Starting in August 2014, mother’s attendance at the Family Counseling Center faltered. DCFS reported that on August 6, 2014, mother stated he r Medi-Cal funding for her substance abuse program had been termin ated, but she would be applying for another5 type of assistance. As of August 14, 2014, however, her coun selor at the Family Counseling Center had not heard from her an d she had not attended the program during the first half of August. DCFS reported she wa s not enrolled in mental health services at the time nor had she complied with a full drug program with aftercare, and DCFS was “strongly opposed” to releasing Z.G. to mother. Between August 27, 2014, and September 10, 2014, mother had attended one group session and one individual session at the Family Counseling Center. As of Sept ember 10, 2014, she s till was not enrolled in any mental health program and was not compliant with a full drug program. In a September 2014 letter, the counse lor at the Family Counseling Center
informed DCFS mo ther still did not have medical in surance to pay for the substance abuse program. She reported mother was doi ng well and believed mother could complete the program and followup group sessions if payment was not an issue. She said mother was a “leader” in group sessions and was ve ry good about doing her class assignments
but wanted mother to attend more often to learn the tools need ed to stay sober. She also believed mother’s 12-step program was helping, but she felt mother sh ould find a sponsor to help her stay sober and deal with the challenges of raising her children. She recommended treatment program group sessi ons three times per week, random drug testing, and ongoing outside 12-step meetings once or twice a week. On September 11, 2014, mo ther informed the social worker her drug treatment program was allowing her to attend for free and she was going to the Department of
Public Social Services to a pply for assistance the next da y. The social worker told
mother to call after the appointment, but mother never did. 3. Mother’s Complian ce with Drug Testing Between May 10, 2013, and November 18, 2013, mother tested negative six times
and failed to show for her tests six times. Between November 18, 2013, and August 16, 2014, she tested negative 14 times and missed four tests. Her drug testing was terminated on September 5, 2014, and a new testing re ferral was submitted on September 10, 2014. Thereafter, she failed to test on September 15 , 2014. She was aware of her missed drug tests, explaining that she missed one beca use she was in the hospital and missed another6 because she was visiting Z.G. She claimed to have informed the soci al worker of both
missed tests. She did not explain the reasons for missing the other tests, which DCFS treated as the equivalent of positive tests.
4. Mother’s Visitation Mother had consistently visited Z.G. while she was in the hospital and mother was permitted to breast feed her. Her visitation w ith Z.G. thereafter was sporadic. Between June 30, 2014, and Augus t 7, 2014, she visited Z.G. four times and canceled five visits,
which included one visit that was canceled because she br ought a small child she was babysitting. She visited Z.G. two more times in August 2014 , but canceled a third visit, claiming she had to attend a “Multidisciplin ary Assessment Team” meeting, which she
never attended. She visited Z.G. twice in Se ptember. Her visitation with the siblings was also inconsistent, even after the soci al worker set up a visitation schedule. 5. Jurisdiction/Di sposition Hearing On October 2, 2014, the juvenile court began a contested combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing for Z.G. an d a section 366.22 hearing for the other siblings. At the hearing, the social worker expressed concern about the safety of the
children with mother du e to mother’s unresolved substanc e abuse issues, her inconsistent program attendance and visitati on, and her lack of individu al counseling. The social worker also believed there were no precautions that could be taken to protect the children with mother residing in the same househol d with their caregivers. Likewise, the dependency investigator testif ied DCFS could not release Z.G. to mother because she had not sufficiently addressed her substance abuse issues.
Mother testified she was currently involved in one-on-one and group substance abuse counseling and a ttended sessions Mondays and Fridays for the two months. She was unable to attend more frequently due to th e loss of her Medi-Cal benefits. She also attended four 12-step meetings a week, ha d a sponsor, and was on step 10. She acknowledged her drug use harmed her childre n and took full respon sibility for it. She also acknowledged she had no t yet completed a substance abuse program, but she had7 learned through her 12-step program that drug use was not worth losing her children. She learned how to control her anger and to identify her “triggers.” County counsel argued Z.G. was at risk be cause mother had a history of drug use, failed to complete a drug treatment program, and failed to attend in dividual counseling. Mother’s counsel argued there was no nexus be tween mother’s history of substance abuse and any risk to Z.G., so the co urt should either dismiss the petition or sustain only the j-1

count. The court dismissed count b-1 and sustained count j-1 as to Z.G. It declared Z.G. a dependent of the court and ordered reunifi cation services, including a substance abuse program with aftercare, random drug tests, a nd individual counseling. For the siblings,
the court terminated reunification services a nd set a section 366.26 he aring. In doing so, the court acknowledged mother had made recen t progress in her case plan and had shown some insight into her substance abuse issu es. It believed she was “very close to adequately addressing these issues, and it may be the subject of a [section] 388 [hearing],” 4 but concluded she had not yet adequate ly addressed her drug abuse issues, had not maintained consistent visitation, an d had not followed through with individual counseling. It viewed her as in the proce ss of learning how to deal with the drug abuse issues, which was why consistent program at tendance was important. It allowed mother
to have one unmonitored visit a week with the children, with all other visits monitored. Mother timely appealed the findings as to Z.G. only.
DISCUSSION DCFS has the burden of proving by a pr eponderance of the evidence that the children are dependents of the court under section 300. ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 ( I.J. ).) “‘In reviewing a challenge to the su fficiency of the evid ence supporting the jurisdictional findings and dispos ition, we determine if substa ntial evidence, contradicted

4 Section 388 generally permits a parent to petition the court to change, modify, or set aside any order or terminate jurisdic tion of the court based on a change of circumstances or new eviden ce. (§ 388, subd. (a).)8 or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evid ence to support the findings and or ders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favor able to the court’s determinations; and we note that the issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the eviden ce or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘“[T]he [appellate] court must re view the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to de termine whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate].”’”’” ( Ibid. ) Subdivision (j) of section 300 allows a ju venile court to exercise jurisdiction over a child if “[t]he child’s sib ling has been abused or neglect ed, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substa ntial risk that the ch ild will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” The juvenile court must make two findings pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j): “( 1) the child’s sibling has been abused or neglected as defined in specified other subdivis ions and (2) there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in those subdivisions.” ( I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Mother does not dispute the first finding was satisfied by the sustained petition involving Z.G.’s siblings alleging mother’s drug us e created a substantial risk to them. ( In re Joshua J. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 984, 992.) Thus, the only question is
whether substantial eviden ce supported the juvenile court’s finding there was a
substantial risk Z.G. would be abused or ne glected under one of th e relevant subdivisions
of section 300. In considering the risk to a child, section 300, subdivision (j) directs the juvenile to consider a host of factors, including “the ci rcumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child , the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, a nd any other factors the court considers probative in determini ng whether there is a substantia l risk to the child.” “‘The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly indicat es that the trial court is to consider the9 totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the
child is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j). The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused
than the court would have in the ab sence of that circumstance.’” ( I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) “‘In determining whether the child is in present need of the juvenile court’s protection, the court may consider past events.’” ( In re Francisco D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 73, 81.) Although we agree with the juvenile court that mother made strides to address the
substance abuse issues that led to the rem oval of the siblings, there was substantial evidence that mother had not ye t adequately resolved those issues, creating a substantial risk of physical harm to Z.G. pursuant to section 300, subdivisi on (b). That provision provides in pertinent pa rt that a minor comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk th at the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervis e or protect the child, or . . . by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substanc e abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) This statutory definition consists of three elements : “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent of one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious phys ical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” ( In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 567 ( Ricardo L. ).) Mother’s past substance abuse was seve re and it seriously impaired her judgment with regard to her children. She admitted using methamphetamine and cocaine in 2010 and 2011, and using marijuana si nce she was 15 or 16 years old. While she was pregnant with K.W., she believed she had miscarried, but instead of seekin g medical confirmation of that, she went to a New Year’s Eve party and used cocaine. Then, four months after
K.W. was born and two months after a te am decisionmaking meeting, she went on a “party bus” to Las Vegas and used mariju ana, cocaine, and methamphetamine. Mother10 also failed to comply with the juvenile court’s orders in th e siblings’ case, indicating she had not yet adequately addresse d and resolved these issues. She did not attend individual counseling as ordered and sh e was removed from two substance abuse programs for lack of attendance. She had enrolled in a third pr ogram at the Family Counseling Center after Z.G. was born, but by August 2014, she had stopped regularly attending. She missed a total of 11 drug tests, which th e juvenile court was entitled to treat as the equivalent of positive tests. ( In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217.) As county counsel contended in the juvenile court, so me of mother’s missed tests occurred around the time her brother was killed, suggesting she may have been timing her missed tests to hide a relapse. While mother attempted to explain two of her missed tests, she gave no explanation for the other nine. Mother’s laps es are particularly serious because Z.G. was only six months old at the time of the jurisd iction/disposition hearin g and the absence of adequate supervision and care for a child of such “‘tender years . . . poses an inherent risk to [her] physical health and safety.’” ( Id. at p. 1216.)
Mother likens this case to In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal. App.4th 822 and
Ricardo L. , but both cases are read ily distinguishable. In David M. , the court found insufficient evidence to support a section 300, subdivision (j) alle gation because the only evidence offered by the ag ency to substantiate the allegati ons leading to the sibling’s case was the prior sustained petition from four years before the current jurisdiction hearing. While the agency noted the mother failed to complete he r reunification plan, it offered no
evidence of what services were offered to her or what the circumstances were surrounding her failure to fulfill her plan. ( David M. , at p. 832.) Similarly, in Ricardo L.
, the court found insufficient ev idence to sustain a section 30 0, subdivision (j) allegation
because there was no evidence of the problems that led to the ex ercise of jurisdiction over the siblings beyond the petition itself or of the reunification services offered to parents and what services they failed to complete. ( Ricardo L., supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 567-568.) Here, in contrast, the siblings’ pe tition was sustained a year and a half before Z.G.’s jurisdiction/disposition hearing, an d the juvenile court was presented with
evidence of both mothe r’s drug abuse leading to the su stained petition over the siblings11 and mother’s failures since th at time to comply with the juvenile court’s orders for

treatment. As the Legislature has declared in the analogous circumstance of assessing whether to return a child to a parent’s physical custody, “The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie eviden ce that return would be detrimental.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a); see § 300.2 [“The provision of a hom e environment free from the negative effects of substance abuse is a nece ssary condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being of the child . Successful participation in a treatment program for substance abuse may be consider ed in evaluating the home environment.”].) The evidence sufficiently suppor ted the court’s determination that mother had not yet
resolved her serious substance abuse issues that led to the removal of the siblings, creating a substantial risk of harm to Z.G. and justifying the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j).
DISPOSITION The jurisdictional order is affirmed.

FLIER, J.
WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.