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*********************************************** 
IN RE PROBATE APPEAL OF MICHAEL NGUYEN

(AC 42922)

Lavine, Alvord and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decree of the Probate

Court ordering his involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital for

treatment of his psychiatric disabilities. The plaintiff had been admitted

to the hospital pursuant to a physician’s emergency certificate. Prior to

the expiration of the certificate, the plaintiff signed a voluntary application to be admitted to the hospital as a patient, but, a few hours later,

he gave the hospital three business days’ notice in writing of his desire

to leave. Four days later, the plaintiff’s primary clinician filed on behalf of

the hospital a petition in the Probate Court for the plaintiff’s involuntary

commitment to the hospital. That same day, the Probate Court, pursuant

to the statute (§ 17a-498) that governs commitment hearings, appointed

two psychiatrists to examine the plaintiff and to report their findings

to the court on a physician’s certificate form. Following a hearing, at

which a treating psychiatrist at the hospital and the appointed psychiatrists testified, the Probate Court issued a decree in which it found by

clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had psychiatric disabilities and was gravely disabled and that a less restrictive placement was

not available and ordered the plaintiff’s commitment to the hospital for

treatment. The plaintiff appealed from the decree to the trial court,

which affirmed the Probate Court’s decision, and the plaintiff appealed

to this court. Held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the Probate Court exceeded

its statutory authority by involuntarily committing him because the hospital failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in § 17a498 (e); although the hospital staff failed to comply with certain notice

requirements of that statute, that failure did not nullify the statutory

authority of the Probate Court to hold an involuntary commitment hearing, as the plain language of § 17a-498 does not condition the Probate

Court’s exercise of power.

2. Although the Probate Court improperly admitted into evidence a police

report that documented an anonymous complaint that the plaintiff had

told someone at his therapy group that he had homicidal fantasies, that

evidentiary impropriety constituted harmless error, as the police report

was admitted in reference to the issue of whether the plaintiff was a

danger to others and the Probate Court found that he was not.

3. The plaintiff’s claim that the Probate Court improperly admitted two

physician’s certificates into evidence because § 17a-498 (c) does not

provide that sworn certificates by psychiatrists are evidence was unavailing; the plain and unambiguous meaning of § 17a-498 (c) dictates that

the Probate Court must require, and therefore consider as evidence, the

certificates of at least two physicians as a prerequisite to involuntarily

committing a person, and it does not make sense that the Probate Court

would be prohibited from considering those required certificates unless

formally admitted into evidence.

4. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the Probate Court’s

findings that he was gravely disabled and that a less restrictive placement

was not available were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion, there having been substantial evidence in the record to support those findings; the Probate Court reasonably could have inferred

from the substantial evidence, including the plaintiff’s homicidal fantasies, persecutory delusions and objections to medication, that he was

in danger of serious harm as a result of an inability to provide for his

own basic needs and that he was incapable of determining whether to

accept hospital treatment because his judgment was impaired.

Submitted on briefs April 6—officially released August 11, 2020

Procedural History
Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for the

district of Hartford ordering the involuntary commitment of the plaintiff to a psychiatric hospital, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford

and tried to the court, Scholl, J.; judgment affirming the

decision of the Probate Court, from which the plaintiff

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Peter M. Van Dyke, filed a brief for the appellant

(plaintiff).

Mitchell Lake and Rebecca M. Harris, filed a brief

for the appellees (defendant Kevin Cobb et al.).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The plaintiff, Michael Nguyen (respondent), appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court

affirming the decision of the Probate Court for the district of Hartford ordering the involuntary commitment

of the respondent to The Institute of Living (institute)

for treatment of his psychiatric disabilities. On appeal,

the respondent claims that the Superior Court erred in

determining that his substantial rights were not prejudiced when the Probate Court (1) lacked jurisdiction

and exceeded its statutory authority because the institute failed to comply with the notice requirements of

General Statutes § 17a-498 (e),1

(2) improperly admitted

a police report and two physician’s certificates into

evidence, and (3) entered an order that was clearly

erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an

abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise

of discretion because it was based on inadmissible evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history. The respondent was admitted to the institute

on November 30, 2018, pursuant to a physician’s emergency certificate (emergency certificate). On the morning of Friday, December 14, 2018, prior to the expiration

of the emergency certificate, the respondent signed a

voluntary application to be admitted as a patient in the

institute, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-506 (a),2

whereby he agreed to abide by the rules and regulations

of the institute and to give at least three business days’

written notice if he wished to terminate his hospitalization before his discharge was ordered. A few hours

later, the respondent completed a form, in which he

gave the institute three business days’ notice of his

desire to leave.

On Tuesday, December 18, 2018, the defendant Kevin

Cobb3

(petitioner), a licensed clinical social worker and

the respondent’s primary clinician, filed on behalf of

the institute a petition in the Probate Court for the

respondent’s involuntary commitment to the institute,

alleging that the respondent ‘‘has psychiatric disabilities

and is dangerous to himself or others or gravely disabled

in the following respects . . . . [He] presented to the

hospital upon concern over statements [that he] made

in the community and the findings of several weapons

and bomb making instructions at [his] home by [the]

local police department. [The respondent] presents

with symptoms that align with a psychotic disorder.

Continuation of suspiciousness and paranoia toward

both [institute] staff and peers remain consistent. [The

respondent] feels he [does not] need medication. Further, [the respondent] misinterprets information as to

be threatening. His judgment and insight are impoverished. The treatment team feels a longer period of hospitalization is needed at this time to further stabilize [him]

on medication.’’
That same day, pursuant to § 17a-498 (c) (1), the

Probate Court appointed two psychiatrists, Michael

Nelken and Gregory Peterson (appointed physicians),

to examine the respondent and to report their findings

to the court on a physician’s certificate.4 Thereafter,

the respondent filed a notice, also pursuant to § 17a-498

(c) (1), that he wished to cross-examine the appointed

physicians at the scheduled commitment hearing.

The involuntary commitment hearing took place

before the Probate Court on January 2, 2019. Peter

Sugarman, a treating psychiatrist at the institute, and

the appointed physicians testified. A police report from

November 28, 2018, was admitted into evidence, which

documented an anonymous complaint that the respondent had told someone at his mediation therapy group

that he had homicidal fantasies. Following the hearing,

the Probate Court issued a decree in which it found that

the respondent was not a danger to others; however,

it found by clear and convincing evidence that he was

gravely disabled. The Probate Court also found that a

less restrictive environment was not a viable option for

the respondent because he remained under an order

for involuntary medication and he was neither participating in his treatment plans nor was he communicating

his intent to comply with the treatment plan upon discharge. Accordingly, the Probate Court ordered that

the respondent be committed to the institute for the

treatment of his psychiatric disabilities. The respondent

appealed to the Superior Court from the January 4,

2019 decree of the Probate Court pursuant to General

Statutes § 45a-186 et seq.5

In that appeal, the respondent

raised claims identical to those presently before this

court. The Superior Court agreed with the respondent’s

claim that the admission of the police report as evidence

in the Probate Court proceeding was improper but concluded that it constituted harmless error. The court

rejected the respondent’s other claims and affirmed the

decision of the Probate Court. This appeal followed.

We begin with the standard of review applicable to

probate appeals, which is set forth in General Statutes

§ 45a-186b. Section 45a-186b provides in relevant part:

‘‘[T]he Superior Court shall not substitute its judgment

for that of the Probate Court as to the weight of the

evidence on questions of fact. The Superior Court shall

affirm the decision of the Probate Court unless the

Superior Court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In

violation of the federal or state constitution or the general statutes, (2) in excess of the statutory authority of

the Probate Court, (3) made on unlawful procedure,

(4) affected by other error of law, (5) clearly erroneous

in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, or (6) arbitrary or capricious

or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion. . . .’’ This standard of review also applies when an appeal from the

decision of a Probate Court is taken to our appellate

courts. See DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 320 Conn. 178, 191,

128 A.3d 901 (2016); see also Falvey v. Zurolo, 130 Conn.

App. 243, 256–57, 22 A.3d 682 (2011).

I

The respondent first claims that the Probate Court

exceeded its statutory authority by involuntarily committing him because the institute failed to comply with

the notice requirements set forth in § 17a-498 (e). Specifically, the respondent argues that, because there is

no evidence that he was offered voluntary commitment

status pursuant to §§ 17a-498 (e) and 17a-506, the Probate Court exceeded its statutory authority, and lacked

jurisdiction, to conduct a commitment hearing. We

disagree.

In addressing this claim, we are mindful that the

‘‘Probate Court is a court of limited jurisdiction prescribed by statute, and it may exercise only such powers

as are necessary to the performance of its duties. . . .

As a court of limited jurisdiction, it may act only when

the facts and circumstances exist upon which the legislature has conditioned its exercise of power. . . .

Such a court is without jurisdiction to act unless it does

so under the precise circumstances and in the manner

particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Henrry P. B.-P., 327 Conn. 312, 324, 173 A.3d

928 (2017).

The statute at issue, § 17a-498 (e), sets forth certain

rights of the respondent relating to a hearing on an

involuntary commitment application, including the

opportunity to elect voluntary commitment status prior

to adjudication. Section 17a-498 (e) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘The respondent shall be given the opportunity

to elect voluntary status under section 17a-506 at any

time prior to adjudication of the application, subject to

the following provisions: (1) In the event that a patient

is in the hospital, the patient shall be informed by a

member of the hospital staff within twenty-four hours

prior to the time an application is filed with the court,

that he or she may continue in the hospital on a voluntary basis under the provisions of section 17a-506, and

any application for involuntary commitment by the hospital shall include a statement that such voluntary status

has been offered to the respondent and refused . . . .’’

We agree with the respondent that (1) there is no

evidence indicating that a member of the institute staff

informed the respondent that he could continue in the

hospital on a voluntary basis and (2) the petition for

involuntary commitment failed to include a statement

that the respondent was offered voluntary commitment

status and that he refused. See General Statutes § 17a-
498 (e). We conclude, however, that the failure of the

institute staff to comply with the notice requirements

of § 17a-498 (e) does not nullify the statutory authority

of the Probate Court to hold an involuntary commitment

hearing because the plain language of § 17a-498 has not

‘‘conditioned [the Probate Court’s] exercise of power.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Henrry P.

B.-P., supra, 327 Conn. 324.6 We therefore reject the

respondent’s claim.7

II

We now turn to the respondent’s evidentiary claims.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the rules of evidence apply to involuntary commitment proceedings.

See General Statutes § 17a-498 (h) (‘‘[t]he rules of evidence applicable to civil matters in the Superior Court

shall apply to hearings under this section’’).

A

The respondent claims that the Probate Court

improperly admitted a police report into evidence

because the report was not authenticated and did not

satisfy the business record exception to the hearsay

rule. We agree; however, we conclude that this error

was harmless.

At the hearing, Sugarman testified that the respondent was a danger to others. Sugarman’s testimony was

predicated on a police report from November 28, 2018,

which documented an anonymous complaint that the

respondent had told someone at his mediation therapy

group that he had homicidal fantasies.8 Counsel for the

petitioner proffered that police report as foundational

support for Sugarman’s conclusion that the respondent

was a danger to others. Counsel for the respondent

objected to the admission of the police report on the

grounds that, inter alia, there was no one to authenticate

the record and the record contained inadmissible hearsay. The Probate Court admitted the police report into

evidence over the respondent’s objections.

‘‘An out-of-court statement used to prove the truth

of the matter asserted is hearsay and is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies. . . . Police

reports are normally admissible under the business

records exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in

General Statutes § 52-180.9

. . . Witness statements

contained within the reports, however, do not fall within

this exception.10 . . . To be admissible under the business record exception, the report must be based entirely

upon the police officer’s own observations or upon

information provided by an observer with a business

duty to transmit such information.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnotes in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Pirolo v. DeJesus, 97 Conn. App. 585, 588–89, 905 A.2d

1210 (2006).

Moreover, ‘‘[a]uthentication is . . . a necessary preliminary to the introduction of most writings in evidence
. . . . A proponent may authenticate a document by

demonstrating proof of authorship of, or other connection with, [such] writings. . . . In general, a writing

may be authenticated by a number of methods, including direct testimony, circumstantial evidence or proof

of custody. . . .

‘‘The requirements for authenticating business record

are identical to those for laying a foundation for its

admissibility under the hearsay exception. It is generally held that business records may be authenticated

by the testimony of one familiar with the books of the

concern, such as a custodian or supervisor, who has

not made the record or seen it made, that the offered

writing is actually part of the records of the business.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Emigrant Mortgage Co. v. D’Agostino, 94 Conn. App. 793, 811, 896

A.2d 814, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 919, 901 A.2d 43 (2006).

The police report did not fall within the business

record exception to the hearsay rule because it was

not based entirely on the police officer’s own observations or on information provided by an observer with

a business duty to report such information. See Pirolo

v. DeJesus, supra, 97 Conn. App. 589. Specifically, the

police report contained statements made by numerous

individuals other than the reporting police officer or an

observer with a duty to report, including those of an

anonymous complainant, the respondent, and the

respondent’s father. The police report was also improperly admitted because the petitioner failed to authenticate the report through direct testimony, circumstantial

evidence, or proof of custody. See Emigrant Mortgage

Co. v. D’Agostino, supra, 94 Conn. App. 811–12. We

therefore conclude that the police report was improperly admitted into evidence.

In any event, we are satisfied that the admission of

the police report constituted harmless error. ‘‘When

a court commits an evidentiary impropriety, we will

reverse the trial court’s judgment only if we conclude

that the trial court’s improper ruling harmed [a party].

. . . In a civil case, a party proves harm by showing

that the improper evidentiary ruling likely affected the

outcome of the proceeding.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DeNunzio v. DeNunzio,

supra, 320 Conn. 204.

As stated previously, counsel for the petitioner proffered the police report in reference to Sugarman’s

assessment that the respondent was a danger to others.

The Probate Court ultimately concluded, however, that

‘‘based on the testimony by both the treating psychiatrist . . . Sugarman, and the two [appointed physicians], the court does not find proof that the respondent

is presently a danger to others. He has not repeated

any threats of harm and has maintained his composure

during his stay at the [institute] and during the court

hearing.’’ The Superior Court concluded on appeal that
the admission of the police report was harmless

because ‘‘[it] was admitted in reference to the issue of

whether the [respondent] was a danger to others and

the Probate Court found that he was not.’’ The respondent did not address this conclusion by the Superior

Court and failed entirely to brief the harmfulness prong

of his evidentiary claim. See, e.g., State v. Durdek, 184

Conn. App. 492, 504–505, 195 A.3d 388 (to establish

reversible error, appellant must prove existence of both

erroneous ruling and resulting harm), cert. denied, 330

Conn. 934, 194 A.3d 1197 (2018). We agree with the

Superior Court that the admission of the police report

was harmless error and therefore reject the respondent’s claim.

B

The respondent’s second evidentiary claim is that

the Probate Court improperly admitted two physician’s

certificates into evidence because § 17a-498 (c) does

not provide that sworn certificates by psychiatrists are

evidence. We reject his claim.11

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant. On December 18, 2018, pursuant to § 17a498 (c) (1), the Probate Court appointed Nelken and

Peterson to examine the respondent and to report their

findings on physician’s certificates. Peterson examined

the respondent and reported his findings on December

23, 2018. Nelken examined the respondent on December

20, 2018, and reported his findings on December 26,

2018. At the commitment hearing, the certificates completed by the appointed physicians were not proffered

by either party to be admitted into evidence. The hearing transcript, however, reveals that the Probate Court

had the two certificates in its possession and considered

them.12 Counsel for both parties questioned the

appointed physicians regarding their respective certificates and, at times, had portions of those certificates

read into the record. Following the hearing, the Probate

Court issued a decree stating in part: ‘‘The sworn certificates of two physicians, at least one of whom is a

practicing psychiatrist, have been filed in court and

were admitted into evidence pursuant to [§] 17a-498

(c). [Counsel for] the respondent, filed a request for the

two independent psychiatrists to testify at the hearing

. . . . Both [appointed physicians] were present and

provided testimony as witnesses at the hearing.’’

(Emphasis added.) To resolve the respondent’s claim,

we must determine whether the Probate Court properly

considered the two certificates as evidence, pursuant

to § 17a-498, in reaching its decision.

Section 17a-498 (c) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The

court shall require the certificates, signed under penalty

of false statement, of at least two impartial physicians

selected by the court, one of whom shall be a practicing

psychiatrist . . . . Such certificates shall indicate that

the physicians have personally examined the respon-
dent not more than ten days prior to such hearing. . . .

Each such physician shall make a report on a separate

form provided for that purpose by the Probate Court

Administrator and shall answer such questions as may

be set forth on such form as fully and completely as

reasonably possible. Such form shall include, but not be

limited to, questions relating to the specific psychiatric

disabilities alleged, whether or not the respondent is

dangerous to himself or herself or others, whether or

not such illness has resulted or will result in serious

disruption of the respondent’s mental and behavioral

functioning, whether or not hospital treatment is both

necessary and available, whether or not less restrictive

placement is recommended and available and whether

or not the respondent is incapable of understanding

the need to accept the recommended treatment on a

voluntary basis. Each such physician shall state upon

the form the reasons for his or her opinions. Such

respondent or his or her counsel shall have the right

to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses who

testify at any hearing on the application. If such respondent notifies the court not less than three days before

the hearing that he or she wishes to cross-examine

the examining physicians, the court shall order such

physicians to appear.’’

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is

not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative

policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles

governing the same general subject matter . . . . The

test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when

read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. Going Forward, Inc., 281

Conn. 417, 421–22, 915 A.2d 298 (2007). ‘‘We will not

torture the plain wording of a statute to impart a meaning not expressed by its unambiguous language.’’ Palosz

v. Greenwich, 184 Conn. App. 201, 215 n.14, 194 A.3d

885, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 930, 194 A.3d 778 (2018).

‘‘Honest disagreement about the interpretation of a statutory provision does not . . . make the statute ambigu-
ous or vague.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Dudley, 332 Conn. 639, 646, 212 A.3d 1268 (2019).

We conclude that the plain and unambiguous meaning of § 17a-498 (c) dictates that the Probate Court

must require, and therefore consider as evidence, the

certificates of at least two physicians as a prerequisite

to involuntarily committing the respondent. Section

17a-498 sets forth the principal components of involuntary civil commitment procedure. See State v. Dyous,

307 Conn. 299, 301 n.2, 53 A.3d 153 (2012). The statute

provides that the Probate Court ‘‘shall require the certificates, signed under penalty of false statement, of at

least two impartial physicians selected by the court,

one of whom shall be a practicing psychiatrist . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-498 (c). It

does not make sense that the Probate Court would be

prohibited from considering those required certificates

unless formally admitted into evidence. Our construction of the statute is supported by the fact that ‘‘[s]uch

respondent or his . . . counsel shall have the right

to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses who

testify at any hearing on the application. If such respondent notifies the court not less than three days before

the hearing that he or she wishes to cross-examine

the examining physicians, the court shall order such

physicians to appear.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-498 (c). That is, the respondent’s ability to

challenge the statements contained in the certificates

would serve little purpose if the court were prohibited

from considering the statements therein as evidence.

Accordingly, we reject the respondent’s claim.

III

The respondent claims that the Probate Court’s findings that he was gravely disabled and that a less restrictive placement was not available were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse

of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion because they were based on inadmissible evidence.13 We disagree.

As stated previously, on appeal, we shall affirm the

decision of the Probate Court unless the ‘‘substantial

rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced

because the findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are . . . (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole

record, or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized

by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise

of discretion.’’ General Statutes § 45a-186b. ‘‘Given that

§ 45a-186b was also a component of the legislature’s

probate reform in 2007, there is a lack of appellate

jurisprudence regarding its application. . . . The language of § 45a-186b, however, is virtually identical to

the language used in General Statutes § 4-183 (j) of

the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Given the

similarity of this statutory language, our application of
§ 4-183 (j) is instructive.

‘‘As this court has previously noted, the scope of our

review regarding an administrative appeal is restricted.

A court must determine whether there is substantial

evidence in the administrative record to support the

agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or

substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions

of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view

of all of the evidence, whether the agency [or court],

in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . The substantial

evidence standard is satisfied if the record provides a

substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue

can be reasonably inferred. . . . As an appellate court,

we do not review the evidence to determine whether

a conclusion different from the one reached could have

been reached. . . . The goal of our analysis is simply

to decide whether the trial court’s conclusion was reasonable. . . . Using this standard as a backdrop, we

will give deference to the Probate Court’s determination

of the credibility of witnesses and its factual determinations.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Falvey v. Zurolo, supra, 130

Conn. App. 256–57.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of the respondent’s claim. At the commitment hearing, Sugarman, Peterson, and Nelken testified

as to the respondent’s condition. All three physicians

testified that the respondent is gravely disabled. All

three opined that the respondent’s psychiatric disability

resulted in serious disruption of his mental and behavioral functioning and that his psychiatric disability will

result in a serious disruption of his mental and behavioral functioning in the future. They further opined that

hospital treatment is necessary for the respondent, that

a less restrictive placement is not recommended, and

that the respondent is not capable of understanding the

need to accept treatment on a voluntary basis.

Sugarman diagnosed the respondent with ‘‘delusional

disorder, rule out schizophrenia.’’ He testified that the

respondent harbors unusual beliefs despite the fact that

they may not be real and that the respondent is prone

to misinterpreting, such as his delusional thoughts that

people are going to turn against and take control of

him. Sugarman further testified that the respondent is

suspicious, guarded, paranoid, and mistrustful of others. Sugarman stated that the respondent has misinterpreted innocent events in a dangerous way in the past

and may do so in the future unless he is properly treated.

Sugarman testified that if the respondent were released,

he would not be compliant with his medication regimen,

group therapy, or individual therapy. Moreover, the only
place that the respondent can go is to his father’s house,

which Sugarman believed was unsafe because the

father might encourage the respondent’s thinking and

does not support his treatment. Due to the respondent’s

mental state, Sugarman opined that the respondent

would not be able to behave in an appropriate manner

and to find his way in society. Sugarman further testified

that the respondent was on an involuntary medication

order. Sugarman had no doubt that the respondent

should be involuntarily committed.

Peterson diagnosed the respondent with schizophrenia. Peterson opined that the respondent was gravely

disabled because his perception of reality is impaired.

He further opined that the respondent remains paranoid

and delusional, with ongoing fantasies of killing others.

Peterson testified that the respondent has no insight

into the nature and seriousness of his situation.

Peterson testified that the respondent told his therapist

that he had a fantasy of wearing a mask and walking

through a school with a rifle.

Nelken diagnosed the respondent with ‘‘paranoid

schizophrenia, chronic.’’ Nelken opined that the respondent was gravely disabled because he is too fearful and

agitated to manage on his own. Nelken opined that the

respondent became homicidal from persecutory delusions. Nelken opined that the respondent is permanently disabled and requires a structured setting to support his treatment. Nelken testified that the respondent

had an unusual self-concept and attitude toward the

world. Nelken stated that it was ‘‘evident to [him] that

this is a young man who is struggling with feelings that

he doesn’t know how to control any way except by

physical rigidity and . . . very careful speech. This

. . . is somebody who’s in grave distress.’’ Nelken testified that the respondent has homicidal fantasies, has

threatened people at gunpoint, and was struggling to

regulate his emotions. Nelken further testified that the

respondent objects to the medication he was being

given. Nelken also testified that the respondent was

unable to discuss his difficulties while he was in the

armed services: ‘‘He is unable to . . . comprehend how

it was that he was separated from the service or . . .

to make any account of his actions at that time. He’s

not able to discuss his internal processes. And I said

at the outset, he gives very unusual and bizarre evidence

of attempting to physically restrain himself as a way of

controlling his emotions and his actions.’’

Following the hearing, the Probate Court found as

follows: ‘‘The testimony provided by the three psychiatrists does indicate that at this time the respondent is

gravely disabled. And while the [c]ourt does agree that

many individuals with the respondent’s present diagnosed condition are able to live in a less restrictive

environment, at this time, this does not seem to be a

viable option in the present case. The testimony [of the
physicians is consistent in] that the [respondent] was

not participating in his treatment plans or communicating his intents for discharge with the treatment plan.

He remains under an order for involuntary medication.

The [c]ourt is aware that the respondent’s father is

seeking alternative treatment programs and believes

that these should be explored as part of his discharge

plan. Therefore, the court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the respondent has psychiatric disabilities

and is gravely disabled. The court further finds that a

less restrictive placement is not available at this time.’’

The respondent was thus involuntarily committed

pursuant to § 17a-498 (c) (3), which provides in relevant

part: ‘‘If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has psychiatric disabilities

and is dangerous to himself . . . or others or gravely

disabled, the court shall make an order for his . . .

commitment, considering whether or not a less restrictive placement is available, to a hospital for psychiatric

disabilities to be named in such order, there to be confined for the period of the duration of such psychiatric

disabilities or until he . . . is discharged or converted

to voluntary status pursuant to section 17a-506 in due

course of law. . . .’’ ‘‘Gravely disabled’’ is defined pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-495 (a) as a person who,

‘‘as a result of mental or emotional impairment, is in

danger of serious harm as a result of an inability or

failure to provide for his or her own basic human needs

such as essential food, clothing, shelter or safety and

that hospital treatment is necessary and available and

that such person is mentally incapable of determining

whether or not to accept such treatment because his

judgment is impaired by psychiatric disabilities.’’

We are not persuaded by the respondent’s claim that

the Probate Court’s findings that he was gravely disabled and that a less restrictive placement was not

available were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a

clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. There is

substantial evidence in the record that the respondent

was indeed gravely disabled and that a less restrictive

placement was not a viable option at that time. Specifically, the Probate Court reasonably could have inferred

from the substantial evidence, including his homicidal

fantasies, persecutory delusions, and objections to medication, that the respondent was in danger of serious

harm as a result of an inability to provide for his own

basic needs and that he was incapable of determining

whether to accept hospital treatment because his judgment is impaired. We therefore conclude that the Probate Court’s findings were not erroneous as the respondent claims.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 17a-498 (e) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The respondent
shall be given the opportunity to elect voluntary status under section 17a506 at any time prior to adjudication of the application, subject to the

following provisions: (1) In the event that a patient is in the hospital, the

patient shall be informed by a member of the hospital staff within twentyfour hours prior to the time an application is filed with the court, that he

or she may continue in the hospital on a voluntary basis under the provisions

of section 17a-506, and any application for involuntary commitment by the

hospital shall include a statement that such voluntary status has been offered

to the respondent and refused . . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 17a-506 (a) provides: ‘‘Any hospital for psychiatric

disabilities may receive for observation and treatment any person who in

writing requests to be received; but no such person shall be confined in

any such hospital for psychiatric disabilities for more than three business

days, after he or she has given notice in writing of his or her desire to leave,

unless an application for commitment has been filed in a court of competent

jurisdiction. Such person shall be informed at the time of such admission

concerning such patient’s ability to leave after three days’ notice pursuant

to this subsection and shall also be informed that an application may be

filed under subsection (e) of this section in which case such patient’s ability

to leave may be delayed in accordance with the provisions of said subsection.’’

3

Joanne Fogg-Waberski, the superintendent of the institute; Michael Nelken, a psychiatrist; Gregory Peterson, a psychiatrist; and the respondent’s

father were also named as defendants.

4 The findings of the appointed physicians were reported to the court on a

form titled, ‘‘PHYSICIAN’S CERTIFICATE/INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT/

ANNUAL REVIEW/PERSON WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES’’ (physician’s certificate).

5 General Statutes § 45a-186 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) Any person

aggrieved by an order, denial or decree of a Probate Court may appeal

therefrom to the Superior Court. . . . (d) An appeal from a decision rendered in any case after a recording of the proceedings is made under section

17a-498 . . . shall be on the record and shall not be a trial de novo. . . .’’

6 Concomitantly, the respondent argues that the Probate Court lacked

jurisdiction. We do not agree. We conclude that the institute’s failure to

offer the respondent voluntary commitment status did not deprive the Probate Court of jurisdiction over the involuntary commitment proceedings

because the notice requirement of § 17a-498 (e) is not jurisdictional, and

the respondent has not cited any legal authority to indicate otherwise.

General Statutes § 17a-497 (a) addresses the Probate Court’s jurisdiction

over involuntary commitment proceedings, and, notably, the notice requirement of § 17a-498 (e) is not implicated: ‘‘The jurisdiction of the commitment

of a person with psychiatric disabilities to a hospital for psychiatric disabilities shall be vested in the Probate Court . . . . In any case in which the

person is hospitalized in accordance with the provisions of sections 17a498, 17a-502 or 17a-506, and an application for the commitment of such

person is filed in accordance with the provisions of said sections, the jurisdiction shall be vested in the Probate Court for the district in which the hospital

where such person is a patient is located. . . . The Probate Court shall

exercise such jurisdiction only upon written application alleging in substance that such person has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to

himself or herself or others or gravely disabled.’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 Although the following facts do not affect our resolution of this claim,

we view them as worth noting. The respondent signed a voluntary application

to be admitted to the institute on December 14, 2018, which was four days

prior to the petitioner’s filing a petition for the respondent’s involuntary

commitment. That voluntary application set forth the notice requirements

of § 17a-506 (a). The record does not indicate whether, pursuant to § 17a498 (e), the respondent was informed, within twenty-four hours prior to the

petition for involuntary commitment being filed, that he could continue at

the institute on a voluntary basis.

8 Specifically, the police report stated that an anonymous complainant

asked the respondent about his homicidal thoughts, and he stated that ‘‘he

could see himself wearing all black, a mask, body armor and a rifle while

walking down a hallway.’’

9

‘‘The business records exception is codified in General Statutes § 52-

180, which provides in relevant part: ‘(a) Any writing or record, whether in

the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or

record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible as

evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge finds
that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the

regular course of the business to make the writing or record at the time of

the act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. . . .’ See also Conn. Code Evid. § 8-4.’’ Pirolo v. DeJesus, 97 Conn.

App. 585, 588 n.1, 905 A.2d 1210 (2006).

10 ‘‘Statements of witnesses contained within a police report add another

level of hearsay. These statements, therefore, must fall within an exception

to the hearsay rule to be properly admitted. Hutchinson v. Plante, 175 Conn.

1, 5, 392 A.2d 488 (1978) (‘[i]tems in a business entry not based on the

entrant’s personal knowledge add another level of hearsay . . . and some

exception to the hearsay rule must be found to justify admission’ . . .).’’

Pirolo v. DeJesus, 97 Conn. App. 585, 589 n.2, 905 A.2d 1210 (2006).

11 The respondent also claims that the Probate Court improperly admitted

two physician’s certificates into evidence because (1) no party moved to

admit the sworn certificates into evidence, and (2) even if the petitioner

had proffered them as evidence, they contained inadmissible hearsay. We

need not reach these claims given our determination that the Probate Court

properly considered the certificates pursuant to § 17a-498 (c) (1). See Conn.

Code of Evid. § 1-1 (b) (‘‘[t]he Code and the commentary apply to all proceedings . . . except as otherwise provided by the . . . General Statutes’’).

12 Prior to hearing the testimony of the appointed physicians, the Probate

Court stated: ‘‘Dr. Nelken, we’ll be right with you. . . . And you’ve been

sworn and he stated his name for the record. . . . I believe that . . . counsel for the patient, the respondent, would like to ask some questions of you

in regard to . . . [two] outside psychiatrists, um, physician’s certificates

that are required to be . . . provided to the court along with . . . an involuntary commitment petition.’’

13 We resolve this claim consistent with our evidentiary conclusions found

in part II of this opinion. In other words, we do not consider the content

of the police report; however, we do consider the contents of the physician’s certificates.