Filed 10/15/13 In re Daniel O. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re DANIEL O., III, et al.,
Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B243435 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK67881)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
DANIEL O.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. Daniel G. Rooney, under a ppointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Ja mes M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly A. Roura, Associ ate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 INTRODUCTION Father, Daniel O. (Daniel), app eals from a dependency court order sustaining dependency jurisdiction over his three minor children: (1) Heaven O., age 14, whose mother is Wendy Y.; (2) Mari ah, age four, whose mother is Ashley G.; and (3) Daniel O., III (Danny), six months of age, whose mother is Tina L. Jurisdiction was sought over these children la rgely based on allegations that Daniel physically and sexually assau lted Aileen C., the four-yea r-old daughter of one of his female companions, Virginia M. Dani el asserts that the dependency court erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of Aileen C. regarding the abuse, when Aileen was found not competent to testify at trial and thus could not be crossexamined. He further asserts that substa ntial evidence did not support the findings that he assaulted Aileen, or that his thr ee children were at serious risk of physical
or sexual abuse. We affirm th e order sustaining jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Initial Police Report and Hospital Records Regarding Aileen On Sunday, October 9, 2011, Aileen wa s taken to the hospital, where staff called law enforcement. At the hospi tal, Deputy Sheriff Guadalupe Lopez interviewed Aileen’s paternal grandmot her (Grandmother), her father Mario C., and Aileen herself. According to the poli ce report, Grandmother stated that Aileen began to complain of pain in her lowe r abdominal and vaginal areas as soon as Grandmother picked her up on the after noon of Friday, October 7, 2011. When Grandmother questioned Aileen about wh at had happened, Aileen responded by holding her vaginal area with both hands a nd saying “tu-tu.” When Grandmother took Aileen to the bathroom later, she saw a clear discharge with blood in her3 underpants. When Aileen was done urina ting, Grandmother wi ped her and more clear discharge with blood a ppeared on the toilet paper. Grandmother said she waited until Sunday to tell Mario because she thought maybe Aileen had just bum ped herself and the pain was going to go away, but Aileen continued to complain of abdomin al and vaginal pain . Grandmother and Mario drove her to the hospital on Sunday evening. Deputy Lopez sat next to Aileen’s hosp ital bed and spoke with her. Aileen
was excited to have her ther e, asked her questions about her equipment, and played with her flashlight. When asked why she was in the hospital, Aileen said she was not sure. Deputy Lopez asked her if sh e felt pain anywhere , and Aileen said, “Daniel punched me,” a nd made a fist with her left hand and motioned toward her stomach. Deputy Lopez as ked who Daniel was, and Aileen looked down and did not want to talk about Daniel. Deputy L opez asked if she could draw a picture of
Aileen so Aileen could show her where she was hurt. Aileen answered, “I was holding hands with my friend and he touched us both and grabbed us right here,” as she motioned to her vagina l area. Deputy Lopez drew a sketch of a figurine, and Aileen took her pencil and drew what she described as a “sad face, ‘cause I’m
hurt of Daniel.” She also scribbled in th e hand areas and said, “Daniel hit me here
when I’m with Mom.” When asked what else Daniel did, Aileen began to scribble in the breast area and stopped and motioned with both hands in her breast area. She said, “Daniel rubbed me and my friend he re and grabbed me ha rd here,” as she motioned towards her vagina and closed he r right hand to make a grabbing motion. Deputy Lopez asked who her fri end was and Aileen said, “A girl who lives there with my mom, I don’t know.” She refused to write on the sketch and placed the pencil back on Deputy Lopez’s uniform shir t. Deputy Lopez attempted to ask her4 more questions, but Aileen stayed quiet, looked down, and played nervously with
her hands.
Grandmother said Mario and Aileen’s mother, Virginia, had been separated for two years, and per their agreement to share custody, Grandmother picked up or dropped off Aileen and her si blings Jeremiah and Nalani every other Friday. She believed Virginia had a live-in boyfriend na med Daniel. Aileen and her siblings had previously told her that Daniel punc hed them in the stom ach, and after one stay at Virginia’s home they ha d returned home with bruises.
Mario said that Grandmother had in formed him that she found blood spots and discharge on Aileen, and he reported that Aileen had co mplained of pain in her abdominal area for two days. He indi cated that during the custody proceedings regarding Aileen and her siblings, the ch ildren alleged that Daniel hit them and caused bruising. The judge in their cas e was notified of the incidents but a criminal report was not generated. In order to avoid problems, Mario only communicated with Virginia through Gr andmother, and Grandmother picked up and dropped off the children. He had not seen or communicated with Daniel and
did not know who Daniel was. Deputy Lopez spoke to the attending physician, who did not find anything abnormal but stated he was not a specialist and could not determine if foul play had
occurred. A sexual assault k it was performed on Aileen the next day, but the nurse
who administered it could not confirm or negate sexual abuse and did not question Aileen. Deputy Lopez rec overed from Mario’s house th e clothing Aileen wore on the day bloody discharge was found in he r underwear. The underwear reportedly
had been washed and worn once since the incident. The emergency physician record lists the chief complaint as an “alleged sexual assault possibly at mom’s house.” It records an observation by5 Grandmother that Aileen’s vaginal opening looked “wider than usual,” that Aileen
was afraid to be touched ther e, and that there were “a lo t of men” going to Aileen’s mother’s place. No bleeding, discharge, swelling or tenderness of the genitalia
were found. The report from the rape kit examination states that the examination neither confirmed nor negated sexual abuse. The aftercare instructions for Aileen included recommendations for treating “child vulvitis.”

II. Pre-Adjudication Investigation by DCFS
A. Witness Interviews Regarding Allegations of Abuse of Aileen
1. Aileen’s Statements During a caseworker’s private interview with Aileen, the girl appeared very shy, quiet, and apprehensive. The casew orker asked if Aileen knew what her private parts are, and she nodded her head, “yes.” When asked to point to her private parts, Aileen shook her head, “ no.” When asked two times if anyone had ever touched her private parts, Aileen stayed quiet and played with her puppy. When the caseworker asked if it was okay that she was asking these questions,
Aileen shook her head “no.” When the casew orker told her she did not have to talk to her if she did not want to, Aileen grabbed her puppy and ran inside the house. Subsequently, a deputy from the Special Victim’s Bureau questioned Aileen about whether anyone had touched her vagi na, using a drawing of a girl’s body, and Aileen said no. When asked if anyone had ever hit her, she again said no. When another dependency investigator later interviewe d Aileen, she was friendly, cooperative, and outgoing until questioned about Daniel, at which point her demeanor changed, and she became tense and quiet and would not make eye contact. She gave only limited responses to questions regarding the alleged abuse.6 When asked if Daniel had been physically abusive towards her, Aileen responded,
“I don’t want to talk about him.” When asked why, she said , “He’s mean.” She went on to state, “He threw me on the be d and it hurt.” In response to multiple further questions about possible physical a buse by Daniel, Aileen kept repeating, “He’s mean.” With respect to alleged sexual abuse, when shown a diagram of a female girl and asked if she knew wher e the private parts were, Aileen nodded “yes,” and stated, “I don’t want to talk, can I go home?” The caseworker asked if Daniel ever touched her in her private pa rts, and Aileen responded by stating, “I want to sleep in my room,” and when as ked to explain, she stated, “Mom says I have to sleep in there (referring to mothe r’s bedroom), but I want to sleep in my room.” When asked who else sleeps in the mother’s room, Aileen said, “I don’t want to talk, I am scared.” The casew orker terminated the interview because it appeared Aileen was experienci ng a great deal of distress.

2. Daniel’s Statements Daniel denied the allegations and said he was never alone with Aileen. He
stated that he lived with hi s mother as well as Tina, the mother of his youngest child, Danny. He sometimes brought hi s daughter Mariah to Virginia’s home on weekends so she and Aileen could play toge ther, but he denied ever touching either child, or any child, inappropriately. He said he was rarely alone with Mariah
either. Daniel agreed to take a polygra ph examination, which was conducted on October 25, 2011. Daniel passed all the questions except five or six regarding
whether he touched Aileen’s vagina. He later stated th at he did not believe the results, and that when the examiner was asking questions about the sexual abuse he7 kept hitting the button. The dependency c ourt ultimately excluded the evidence of the polygraph results. Daniel claimed that Grandmother was “p utting stuff in [Aileen’s] head.” He reported that Aileen’s paternal grandf ather had confronted him at Aileen’s preschool one day, cursing at him and saying he had hit the kids. Daniel claimed that when Aileen and her siblings go to Mario’s house, they come back dressed in
old clothes and once Jeremiah came back with a bruise.

3. Virginia’s Statements
In an interview with a caseworker , Virginia appeared shocked by the allegations of Daniel’s sexual abuse of Ail een and denied that th ey were true. She stated that she was always with her child ren and did not leave Daniel alone with them, and if she had to go out, the maternal grandmother watched them. She stated that she was very aware of who he r children were around because she was molested as a child by a family friend and she never wanted that to happen to her daughters. She denied that Daniel liv ed with her but stated he slept over
sometimes. When the casewo rker informed her that it was also alleged that Daniel had touched another little girl who was wi th her daughter, Virginia stated that Daniel had a daughter named Mariah, who is also four years old, who comes over to play with Aileen when Dani el has her on the weekends. Virginia stated that when the child ren are going to Mario’s home, the two girls cry and say they do not want to go. The week before, Ail een had stated, “I’m a bad girl.” When Virginia asked her what had happened, Ai leen would not tell
her. In a later interview, Virginia told a dependency investigator that she had never seen anything to lead her to suspect Daniel. Aileen had never mentioned any8 abuse or complained of pain . According to Virginia, Aileen was an active, happy girl, who liked to play with Daniel and was always excited to see him. She insisted
that Daniel was never alone with the childre n. When told that Daniel had failed a polygraph test about the molestation, Virg inia stated that this was “concerning”
and that she wanted to find out what had really happened.

4. Statements by Aileen’s Siblings Aileen’s five-year-old brother Jeremi ah denied ever being touched in his private parts. When asked if he liked Daniel, Jeremiah said, “sometimes yes,
sometimes no.” He said some times Daniel and Virginia fought, but he denied that they pushed or hit each other. He said he felt safe with Virginia and Daniel, and
with Mario. In a subsequent interview, a depende ncy investigator asked Jeremiah if Daniel had been physically abusive toward s him or any of the other children. Jeremiah stated, “I want to live with my mom but no Da niel scares me.” When asked why Daniel scares him, Jeremiah st ated, “He makes my mo m cry . . . in the car he went like this,” and Jeremiah demonstrated a slapping or pushing
movement. When asked if Daniel hits hi m, his siblings, or his mother, Jeremiah responded by stating, “He makes my mom cr y.” Daniel again said he had never been touched in his private parts and had not seen his sisters being touched there. Aileen’s two-year-old sibling Nalani was not able to provide a meaningful

statement.

5. Statements by Aileen’s Paternal Relatives
Mario stated that Aileen had never said anything about Daniel prior to this incident, but that she appeared to be afra id every time his name was mentioned.9 He also said that lately she had been really quiet and only wanted to play by herself, which was unlike he r. He had not noticed a ny sexualized behavior. In a later interview with a dependenc y investigator, Mario said he believed his daughter “100 percent” and asserted that she would not make this up. He stated that it was the police officer at the hospital who told him what Aileen had said, and Aileen had never said anythi ng to him before. He said that Aileen had told him
several months before that Daniel hit Je remiah, but that his children did not talk about Daniel much, except Jeremiah wo uld sometimes talk excitedly about Daniel’s car and about how he drives really fast. Mario also said that when he asks Aileen about Daniel she gets really nervou s, so he does not bring it up. He noticed that around the time of the hospital visit Aileen had been playing by herself and not really wanting to play or talk with anyone else, but that was better now. He also noticed that she “plays with hersel f” a lot while watching television.
Grandmother told a caseworker that on the Friday evening after she picked up Aileen, she was putting a diaper on Ail een, who sometimes still wet the bed. Aileen pointed to her private parts and said they hurt. 1 Grandmother asked her why they hurt, and Aileen said, “Daniel Ochoa touch me.” Gr andmother said she told Aileen, “No, Daniel Ochoa did not to uch you.” Aileen stated “Yes he did.”
Grandmother did not ask Aileen how or wh en Daniel touched her. Grandmother
stated that she called one of her sons and told him, but she did not tell Mario
because she was afraid he would overreac t and do something stupid. She wanted
her other son to talk to Mario. When asked why she waited until Sunday to take Aileen to the hospital, she said she was at the hospital all day Saturday with her

1 Aileen’s daycare provider reported that Aileen had not compla ined of falling or injuring herself at daycare, and had not be en crying as if sh e had injured herself.10 sick and blind husband. When asked if A ileen had ever mentioned Daniel before,
Grandmother stated that the children would tell her and Aileen’s father that Daniel
hit them.
The caseworker asked Grandmother if she had noticed Aileen exhibiting any sexualized behavior, and Gra ndmother said that about five months earlier, she noticed that Aileen was taking a long time in the bathroom, and Grandmother caught her touching herself in the bathro om. When Grandmother asked her why she was touching herself, Aileen looked at her and cried. Grandmother had also observed Aileen looking at herself in the mirror and touching her breast. On another occasion, when Mario’s adult frie nd came over for the first time, Aileen
tried to rub herself on him and sit on his lap, to the point that the friend became
uncomfortable and left. Grandmother told a dependency investig ator that she had not asked Aileen
about the abuse because she did not want to upset her more. The only thing Aileen
had said was that she did not want to s ee her mother or Dani el and that she was
scared. Aileen had been waking up in the night complaining of nightmares and Grandmother would find her curled up in a ball in the corner of the bed. She
would not talk to Grandmothe r and only wanted to talk to Mario. She had also been wetting the bed lately.

6. Maternal Relatives’ Statements Aileen’s maternal grandmother stat ed she had no concerns of abuse by Daniel, and said she and Vi rginia were always home with the children. She claimed that Mario’s family was upset that Virginia had a boyfriend. Virginia’s father, who lives in the back duplex of Vi rginia’s home, stated he had never seen Daniel hit Aileen or touch any of the ch ildren inappropriately. Aileen’s maternal11 aunt, who also lives in Virginia’s home, stated that Daniel seemed like a “good guy” and that he got along well with the kids.

B. Investigation Regarding Possible Abuse of Mariah
A caseworker interviewed Mariah a nd her mother Ashley on October 12, 2011. Ashley was very concerned about the allegations regarding Aileen and
Mariah. She stated that she had full cust ody and Daniel had been out of Mariah’s life prior to April 2011 because he had been in jail. After he got out of jail, however, Daniel was successf ul in procuring unmonitored visitation with Mariah every other weekend, beginning in Ap ril 2011, although sometimes Mariah would refuse to go with Daniel.
The caseworker assessed that Mariah was not able to tell the difference
between truth and lies and could not iden tify her body parts. The caseworker pointed to her chest and vaginal area and asked if anyone had touched Mariah there, and Mariah shook her head. The caseworker aske d if Mariah’s mother had ever helped her use the bathroom and touc hed her there, and Ma riah said, “no.”
The caseworker determined that Mariah was too young to make a meaningful

statement. Mariah had a medical examinati on on October 13, 2011, which neither confirmed nor negated the possibility of se xual abuse. Mariah told the medical examiner that she liked living with Ashl ey, but did not like staying with Daniel, although she would not explain why. Ashley reported that Mariah told her that when she stayed at the home of Daniel’s girlfriend Tina, she slept in a bed with Daniel, Tina, and Danny. She reported that she slept with Daniel when she stayed at Virginia’s house.12 Subsequently, Ashley reported that Mariah had begun havi ng toilet accidents since the allegations surfaced . Ashley had asked her if anyone touched her private parts, but Mariah would become embarrassed and not respond. Ashley had a restraining order in place against Daniel for domestic violence against her and her son, R uben, who was Mariah’s hal f-brother. When Ruben was four, and Daniel and Ashley had separate d, Daniel came to the house and he and Ashley got into an argument. Ruben becam e scared that Daniel was going to hurt Ashley and he threw his yogurt at Daniel . Daniel then kicked Ruben in the stomach, leaving Ruben gasping fo r breath and unable to breathe.

C. Daniel’s History
Daniel disclosed that he had been molested by a neighbor growing up, and
there were seven DCFS referra ls alleging sexual abuse, a ll of which were found to
be inconclusive. In addition, Daniel had a criminal history involving sexual and physical abuse of women and teenage girls. He acknowledged that was accused of inappropriate touching when he was 12 or 13 years old and stated he was arrested at age 14 for domestic violence and comm itted to the California Youth Authority until age 18. In addition to numerous drug and firearm offenses, his adult criminal history includes (1) when he was 25 years old, an offense involving a 16-year-old girl for which he initially wa s charged with forcible rape , but was convicted of the lesser offense of sex with a minor; (2) a separate conviction fo r sex with another minor girl no more than 15 years old, wh en Daniel was over 21; (3) assault of a spouse with bleach, and (4) multiple convi ctions for domestic violence involving
different women. In interviews with cas eworkers, he claimed that the police as
well as the women lied in all these cases.13 A 2004 police report regarding one of th e statutory rape offenses discloses that the 16-year-old victim contacted the Sheriff’s Department to report a rape. The victim stated she had been in a dating relationship with Daniel for approximately one month. They previ ously had consensual sex, but on the occasion in question, Daniel started to get rough with her while they were kissing and pinned her wrists against the bed. Sh e told him to stop and tried to punch him and kick him off her, and Daniel punc hed her on the head, arms and thighs, overpowered her, and pulled her jeans off and forcibly raped her, ignoring her pleas that he stop. Afterwards he threaten ed to send someone to kill her if she told the police, and she believed he could carry this threat out because he was a gang member. The police officer observed large bruises on her arms, wrists, and thighs. A rape kit examination was performed and evidence of sexual assault was found. During the subsequent investigation, th e victim reported th at Daniel had begun beating her up for no apparent reason soon af ter they began dating, but she did not report the abuse because she was afraid of him. Daniel admitted that he knew the victim was under age, but claimed the sex was consensual and denied hitting her.

III. Jurisdiction Hearing and Findings
A. Dependency Jurisdiction Allegations Dependency petitions filed with re spect to Heaven, Mariah, and Danny alleged that jurisdiction was appropri ate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a) 2 based on the fact that Daniel had punched Aileen in
the abdomen with his fists. Jurisdicti on was alleged under sec tion 300, subdivision

2 All subsequent undesignated code refere nces are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.14 (b) based on Daniel’s sexual and physical abuse of Aileen. Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (d) was alleged base d on Daniel’s sexual abuse of Aileen. In addition, as to Heaven, jurisd iction was sought under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), based on Daniel’s criminal history of sex with minors. Further, jurisdiction was sought under su bdivisions (a) and (b), based on the allegation that Heaven’s mother, Wendy Y ., inappropriately disciplined Heaven by striking her with a belt. Further, juri sdiction under subdivision (b) was asserted
based on the fact that Heaven suffers from mental and emotional problems, including depression and deficit hyperactiv e disorder, that Heaven’s mother failed to regularly provide her with psychotro pic medication, and that Heaven had exhibited aggressive and a ssaultive behavior towards a law enforcement officer. As to Mariah, jurisdiction was a dditionally sought under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), based on Daniel’s criminal history, including a conviction for sex with a minor, and under subdivision s (a) and (b) based on Daniel’s physical abuse of Mariah’s half-brother Ruben by kicking him in the stomach. Further, jurisdiction was alleged under subdivision (b) because Daniel allowed his female companion Tina, whom he knew to be a cu rrent user of methamphetamine, to have unlimited access to the Mariah. Allega tions under subdivision (j) were also included based on Daniel’s sexual and physi cal abuse of Aileen and his physical abuse of Mariah’s sibling. As to Danny, jurisdiction was a dditionally alleged under section 300, subdivision (b) based on Tina’s history of drug abuse and current use of methamphetamine and amphetamine, and because she previously had two other children permanently removed from her as a result of her substance abuse.15 B. Jurisdiction Hearing Beginning on April 4, 2012, the court he ld a joint hearing to adjudicate the four cases as to Danny, Mariah, Heaven , and Aileen and her siblings. DCFS reports memorializing the DCFS investiga tion and incorporating the police reports were admitted into evidence. Although no objection was made at trial at the time these exhibits were introduced, Daniel had previously filed objections to the admission of hearsay in the DCFS reports.

1. Testimony of Aileen The court questioned Aileen in cham bers to determine whether she was competent to testify at the hearing. Af ter asking her a number of questions, the court determined she was not competent to testify because she was not able to understand the consequences of telling lies versus the truth. The jurisdiction hearing was continued so that Daniel coul d file a motion to strike Aileen’s out-ofcourt statements as hearsay.
Daniel filed a motion to exclude Ai leen’s out-of-court statements to Grandmother on October 7, 2011, and to Deputy Lopez on October 9, 2011. The court denied the motion, finding that A ileen’s statements were admissible under In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15 ( Cindy L. ) and In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227 ( Lucero L .) Although Aileen was not compet ent to testify as she was unable to understand the duty to tell the truth, the court found that the time, content, and
circumstances of her out-of-court statemen ts bore sufficient indicia of reliability because (1) Aileen made th e majority of the statemen ts contemporaneously with reporting the physical sensation of pain in her abdomen and vagina; (2) the
statements were made close in time to the alleged incident; (3) the statements were spontaneous and did not appear to be the result of suggestive or leading16 questioning; (4) the statements were consistent over time; (5) there was no indication of a motive to lie on the part of Aileen or her relatives; (6) Aileen’s
statements were consistent with the court’s observations of the child; and (7) Aileen used terminology expected of a child of her age talking about subjects
that were not within the know ledge of a child of that ag e. The court further found that independent evidence corroborated the statements, including the bloody discharge from Aileen’s vagina.

2. Testimony of Deputy Lopez Deputy Lopez testified that she and he r partner, Deputy Ed Hernandez, had responded to Monterey Park hospital on S unday, October 9, 2011, and spoke to Grandmother first, while Aileen’s father was with the child in her hospital room.
Grandmother told her that for two da ys, Aileen had been complaining of abdominal pain. In addition, two days earlier, when Grandmother took Aileen to the restroom and wiped her, she saw discharge and blood. Grandmother said she thought Aileen might have hit herself, but she stated that she did not know what the cause of the blood and discharge coul d be. Grandmother re ported that she had told Mario earlier that day that she had found some discharge in Aileen’s underwear, and he became concer ned and decided to take A ileen to the hospital. Deputy Lopez met with Mario next, and he told her he was concerned about the discharge and the blood and he stated Aileen had never had this issue before. He stated that Grandmother had just told him what she had di scovered, a nd he had not seen the discharge or blood himself. Next, Deputy Lopez spoke with Aile en in her hospital room, while Mario
and Grandmother were outside the room. Aileen was excited and smiling, and wanted to play with Deputy Lopez’s equipment and her radio. She freely17 answered questions about her age and what she liked to do for fun. Deputy Lopez asked her if she knew why she was at the hospital, and she said she did not know. Deputy Lopez then drew a figurine of a pers on and told Aileen th at it was her, and asked her to show her on the picture if she was hurt anywhere. Aileen responded by taking the pencil from Deputy Lopez’s uniform pocket and scribbling on the hands, breast, and vaginal area of the figu re, and as she scribbled she said that Daniel rubbed her, and she used her hands to show where she was touched. She first rubbed her chest area, and then moti oned towards her vaginal area and said Daniel grabbed her there. She said that she played with another little girl and that
Daniel touched both of them in the br east area, but she would not tell Deputy Lopez the name of the other child or gi ve her any more in formation about the child. Aileen would look down and stop ev ery time she mentioned Daniel. Then she “shut down” and would not answer qu estions about where her mother was at the time, who “Daniel” was, or when sh e was hurt. Deputy Lopez said Aileen appeared to be holding something inside that she would not let out. Deputy Lopez then spoke again with Grandmother and, without explaining why she was asking, asked he r who Daniel was. Grandm other told her Daniel was Virginia’s live-in boyfriend. She provide d a description of Daniel, but she did not ask why Deputy Lopez needed the informa tion. She stated that she had seen Daniel when she picked up or dropped off Aileen at Virginia’s home, but she had
not talked to him. She had last seen him two days earlier when she picked up Aileen at Virginia’s house. Deputy Lopez then spoke with Mario again and told him what Aileen had said. He reacted angrily a nd started to curse. He wa s concerned and wanted to know what he could do to help Aileen.18 Deputy Lopez also spoke with the treating physician, who was concerned Aileen was having discharge and bleeding from her vagina. He could not see any indication of foul play, but he recommend ed a sexual assault kit because he had concerns that she may have been sexually assaulted.

C. Dependency Court Findings After the hearing, the court noted th at it considered the case “relatively close,” and that it had been concerned wh en Aileen did not qualify as a witness, but that Deputy Lopez’s testimony giving c ontext to Aileen’s statements led the court to conclude that the allegations were true by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found compelling Ail een’s statements as well as the drawing she made over the portions of her body she be lieved had been injured. Further, the court noted the corroborating evidence, specifically the blood and discharge in
Aileen’s underwear. The court noted that no evidence had been presented that
Grandmother and Mario had a motive to falsely accuse Daniel or that they had
coached Aileen to make th e accusations. The court f ound it telling that neither
Grandmother nor Mario had accused Daniel , and instead had seemed surprised by Aileen’s spontaneous statem ents to Deputy Lopez. As to Heaven, her mother pled no c ontest to the allegation under section 300, subdivision (a) regarding physical abuse by the mother. The court also sustained dependency jurisdiction under s ubdivisions (a), (b) and (d) based on Daniel’s physical and sexual abuse of Aileen, noting that Daniel’s criminal history
was relevant as well. As to Mariah, the court sustai ned jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) based on Daniel’s physical abuse of Aileen and Mariah’s sibling Ruben, and his criminal history, which the court found showed that Daniel19 was likely to “cross societal bounds.” In addition, the court sustained jurisdiction under subdivision (b) based on Daniel’s allo wing Tina, a current drug user, to have
unlimited access to Mariah. The court dismissed the allegation under subdivision (j). As to Danny, the court dismissed the allegation under section 300, subdivision (a) (based on serious physical harm inflicted on Aileen), but sustained dependency jurisdiction pursuant to subdiv ision (b) based on Daniel’s physical and
sexual abuse of Aileen as well as Tina’s drug abuse. Although the court noted that it was aware of disagreement s in the case law with resp ect to the probability of sexual abuse of a male child when his pa rent has sexually abused a female child, the court sustained jurisdiction under subd ivision (d) based on the sexual abuse of
Aileen. The court found that it was not de terminative that Danny was not the same sex as Aileen, and found it more compe lling that, like Aileen, Danny was very young and pre-pubescent. The court’s decision predated the recent Supreme Court decision in this area, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773. Father appealed from the jurisdictional orders. After the notices of appeal were filed, the court terminated jurisd iction as to Mariah. We granted County Counsel’s motion to augment the record to include the order terminating jurisdiction and providing for supervised visitation of Ma riah by Daniel. The order states that visitation must be supervised due to Daniel’s “sex abuse of [a] very young child.”

DISCUSSION Daniel alleges that the dependency court erred in su staining allegations as to him under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b ), and (d), with respect to Heaven,20 Mariah, and Danny. We conc lude that substantial evidence supported the court’s findings.

I. Daniel’s Appeal Is Not Moot
A. Danny and Heaven As a preliminary matter, County C ounsel argues that Daniel’s appeal challenging the jurisdictional findings against him is moot as to Danny and Heaven, because as to Danny, depe ndency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) is unchallenge d based on his mother’s hist ory of drug abuse, and, as to Heaven, jurisdiction is uncha llenged under subdivisi on (a) based on her mother’s physical abuse. Given the circum stances here, we disa gree that Daniel’s appeal is moot. “‘When a dependency petiti on alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency cour t’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other allege d statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ( In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)” ( In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) However, we may exercise our discretion and reach the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding when the finding could be prejudicial to the appellant or have other consequences for him outside the dependency proceedings. ( In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762- 763; In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015.) “Here, the outcome of this appeal is the difference between father’s being an ‘offending’ parent versus a ‘nonoffending’ parent. Such a distinction may have far-reaching implications with21 respect to future dependency proceedings in this case and father’s parental rights. Thus, although dependency jurisdiction over [Daniel] will remain in place because the findings based on mother’s conduct are unchallenged, we will review father’s appeal on the merits.” ( In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.)

B. Mariah County Counsel also argues that beca use dependency juri sdiction has been terminated over Mariah, the appeal from th e earlier order sustaining jurisdiction in her case is moot. We disagree. Although, as a general ru le, an order terminating ju venile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot ( In re
Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330), dismissal in such circumstances is not automatic, and instead “must be deci ded on a case-by-case basis.” ( In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605.)
In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544 is instructive. In that case, the juvenile court sustained de pendency jurisdiction after fi nding that the appellant had sexually abused his daughter and that her sibling was in danger of being sexually abused. At the subsequent dispositional h earing, the court awarded sole custody of the minors to their mother, restricted the appellant’s visitation, and terminated dependency jurisdiction. ( Id. at p. 1547.) On appeal, the court rejected the respondents’ contention that the appellant’ s appeal from the jurisdictional order
was moot due to term ination of the dependency pro ceedings. The court concluded the jurisdictional findings were review able because they were basis for the continuing custody and visitation orders and the appellant would be collaterally estopped from relitigating the jurisdictional issues in family court. ( Id. at p. 1548.) “As the jurisdictional findings are the ba sis for the restrictive visitation and22 custody orders, error in the former undermin es the foundation for the latter. [¶] The fact that the dependency action has b een dismissed should not preclude review of a significant basis for the assertion of jurisdiction where exercise of that jurisdiction has resulted in orders which c ontinue to adversely affect appellant. If the jurisdictional basis for orders restrict ing appellant’s visitation with, and custody of, [Daniel] is found by direct appeal to be faulty, the orders would be invalid.” ( Id. at p. 1548; see also In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431 [holding that despite termination of the jurisdiction of th e juvenile court, father could appeal the jurisdictional order resulting from findings that he abused his daughter in part because these findings had an adverse effect on his custody rights]; In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 716 [holding th at termination of jurisdiction did not moot father’s appeal where jurisdictional findings, “if erroneous, could have severe and unfair consequences to Father in future family law or dependency proceedings.”].) Similarly, in this case, the jurisdic tional findings regarding Daniel’s sexual abuse of Aileen were the explicit ba sis for the continuing visitation order restricting his visitation. That visitati on order would be dir ectly affected were Daniel successful in having the dependenc y court’s jurisdictional findings reversed in this appeal. Therefore, the appeal fro m the jurisdictional or der in Mariah’s case
is not moot.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supp orted Jurisdictional Findings as to Daniel Daniel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings that he physically and sexually abused Ail een, which findings in turn were used as a basis for exercising jurisdiction over Heaven, Mariah, and Danny under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d). Da niel further contends that there was no23 substantial evidence demonstrating that Heaven, Mariah, or Danny were at serious risk of physical or sexual abuse. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdictional findings, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court. We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise indepe ndent judgment, and review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence such that a r easonable trier of fact could find that the order sustaining jurisdic tion is appropriate. ( In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

A. Evidence of Physical and Sexual Abuse of Aileen by Daniel
1. Standard for Admissibility of Aileen’s Out-Of-Court Statements Regarding Abuse
Daniel contends that the dependency c ourt violated his right to due process by admitting into evidence social study reports by DCFS containing Aileen’s hearsay statements to her grandmother and Deputy Lopez suggesting that she had been physically and sexually abused. Dani el contends that the statements were inadmissible because they were uncorrobo rated. We disagree with Daniel’s contention that Aileen’s hearsay statements must be corroborated in order to be admissible. In any event, there wa s corroborating evidence of abuse. Section 355 provides that hearsay evidence contained in a social study report may be admissible and constitute comp etent evidence upon which a finding of dependency jurisdiction may be based. (§ 355, subd. (b ).) If, however, a party timely objects to the admission of specific hearsay evidence contained in such a study, that evidence “shall not be suffici ent by itself to support a jurisdictional24 finding or any ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based,” unless one of several exceptions applies. (§ 355, subd. (c)(1).) The relevant exception here is for hearsay by a minor under 12 y ears of age who is the subject of the jurisdictional hearing. (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(B).) Hearsay by such a minor is admissible in a dependency proceeding unle ss the objecting party “establishes that
the statement is unreliable because it wa s the product of fraud, deceit, or undue influence.” (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
In Lucero L. , our Supreme Court considered whether section 355 controls when the hearsay statemen t comes from a minor who is deemed incompetent to testify because he or she lacks the cap acity to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In such a case, the court he ld that, section 355 notwithstanding, due process concerns require that the depende ncy court find that “‘the time, content
and circumstances of the st atement provide sufficient indicia of reliability’” in
order for the statement to form the exclus ive basis for sustaining jurisdiction over the minor. ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1248; see id. at pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.) [out-of-court stat ements of a child who is subject to a jurisdictional hearing and disqualified as a witness because of th e lack of capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood at the time of testifying may not form the sole basis for a jurisdictional findi ng unless they show special indicia of reliability].) So long as the minor’s h earsay statements are deemed sufficiently reliable, corroboration is not necessary. ( Lucero L., supra , 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1248- 1249; see In re April C. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 599, 610, fn. 5.) Although Lucero L. is directly controlling here, Daniel fails to cite it in his opening brief, and relies on Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th 15, to argue that hearsay
statements of a child not available fo r cross-examination must be supported by “significant corroborating evidence” in or der to be admissible. However, in25 Lucero L. , the Supreme Court limited its earlier holding in Cindy L. , which had
held that the out-of-court statements of a child, including a child’s hearsay
statements contained in social workers’ reports, were admissible in dependency jurisdiction proceedings (1) if the statemen ts show particular indicia of reliability; (2) if, where the child is not available fo r cross-examination, the statements are corroborated; and (3) if interested partie s have notice that the statements will be used. ( Lucero L., supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1231.) The Lucero L. court recognized that the Legislature had amended secti on 355 in 1997 to codify a somewhat broader “child dependency” exception to the hearsay rule than that articulated in Cindy L . Whereas Cindy L. had required corroboration of a child witness’s hearsay
statements where the child was not available for cross-examination, Lucero L. held that such corroboration is not required in cases involving a “truth incompetent” minor who is the subject of a jurisdic tional hearing where the statements are sufficiently reliable

. ( Lucero L., supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1242, 1246.) Thus, under Lucero L. , Aileen’s hearsay statemen ts are admissible, whether or not corroborating evidence exists, if they are sufficiently reliable, i.e., the time, content, and circumstances of the stat ements provide sufficient indicia of reliability.

2. Aileen’s Statements Were Suffici ently Reliable to be Admissible Without Corroborating Evidence

We review for substantial evidence th e dependency court’s finding that the time, content, and circumstan ces of Aileen’s statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability. ( In re Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1248-1249 [reviewing for substantial evidence the dependency court’ s finding that hearsay statements were reliable].) Factors bearing on the inhe rent reliability of a child witness’s26 statements in sex abuse cases include, but are not limited to “‘(1) spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motiv e to fabricate. [Citation.]’” ( Id. at p. 1239.) According to Grandmother, while she was putting a diaper on Aileen after picking her up from a stay at Virginia ’s home, Aileen made spontaneous statements about Daniel touching her vagi nal area. These stat ements were made contemporaneously with statements that she was hurting and behavior suggesting that she was in pain. Further, she made the statements soon after being picked up from Virginia’s home. She then consisten tly complained of pain for the next two days. Similarly, Aileen’s statements to Deputy Lopez in the hospital about physical and sexual abuse by Daniel were made spontaneously, in reaction to general questions about whether she was hur t. Deputy Lopez did not ask Aileen who had hurt her or ask if her private part s had been touched. Asked if she felt pain anywhere, Aileen stated, “Daniel punched me,” while making a fist and directing it towards her stomach. When Deputy Lopez asked who Daniel was,
Aileen looked down and did not want to talk about him. Then, when Deputy Lopez drew the figurine and asked Aileen to show her where she was hurt, Aileen scribbled on the hands, chest, and vagi nal areas of the rough figurine Deputy Lopez had drawn, grabbed her chest area and motioning towards her vagina with a grabbing motion, and stated, “I was hol ding hands with my friend and [Daniel] touched us both and grabbed us right here.” The simp le, demonstrative manner in which Aileen conveyed this informati on was age-appropriate and supports the reliability of her statements. Moreover, the dependency court concluded that the27 reported statements were c onsistent with the court’s observations of the child’s capacity. The record shows that after providing Deputy Lopez with limited answers to her questions, Aileen “shut down” and re fused to answer the deputy’s further questions, and looked down every time Da niel’s name was mentioned. In subsequent questioning by other deputies, caseworkers and investigators, Aileen consistently was withdrawn, tense, unc ooperative, and fearful when asked about possible abuse. Further, her demeanor a nd conduct consistently demonstrated that she was afraid of Daniel. Her general statements that Daniel was “mean,” her
refusal to further elaborat e, and her general denial in response to a deputy’s questions asking whether anyone had ever h it her or touched he r vagina, were all made after she had “shut down,” and they do not diminish the reliability of her initial, spontaneous statements providi ng specific information about abuse by
Daniel. Further, there was no indication that Aileen was coached into implicating
Daniel. Aileen’s use of hand motions to describe the physical abuse and
molestation are not indicative of coached accusations. (See Lucero L., supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1250 [“Lucero’s language, wh ile not precocious, was age appropriate
and her statements had the mark of be ing made in her own words, without evidence of prompting.”].) Further, no evidence was introdu ced of any animus towards Daniel on the part of Aileen’s pate rnal relatives. It does not appear that Mario had ever met or seen Daniel, and Grandmother had seen him but had never spoken with him. Neither Grandmother nor Mario mentioned Daniel to Deputy Lopez; instead, Aileen was the first one to mention him. Moreover, although
Grandmother stated that Aileen had told her that Daniel had touched her private parts, Grandmother says she told Aileen this was not true, and she did not tell28 Mario because she was scared of his reacti on. At the hospital, Mario reacted with shock and anger upon hearing Deputy Lop ez repeat Aileen’s allegations about Daniel. These facts suggest that Aileen was not coached to allege physical and sexual abuse by Daniel and that her statements were true. In sum, we conclude that Aileen’s statements to Grandmother and to Deputy Lopez regarding physical and sexual abuse by Daniel were sufficiently reliable to
constitute substantial evid ence of such abuse.

3. Aileen’s Statements Were Corroborated Even if Aileen’s statements, standing al one, did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability, they were still properly ad mitted because there was corroborating evidence of physical and sexual abuse. ( Lucero L., supra , 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1248- 1249.) “‘Corroborating evidence is “[e]videnc e supplementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it. Additional evidence of a different character to the same point.” [Citation.] In this context, corroborating evidence is that which supports a logical and reasonable inference that the act described in the hearsay statement occurred. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( In re Christian P. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 437, 448.) “[W]ith respect to dependency jurisdictional findings, corroborative evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, (1) is sufficient if it tends to connect the allegedly offending parent with the alleged negligent act even though it is slight and ‘“entitled, when st anding by itself, to but little consideration [citations], nor does it need to establis h the precise facts”’ in the hearsay statements; (2) is sufficient if it tends to connect the allegedly offending parent with the alleged negligent act and the pa rent’s ‘“own statements and admissions,
made in connection with other testim ony, may afford corroboratory proof29 sufficient”’ to find jurisdiction; (3) need not ‘“go so far as to establish by itself, and without the aid of the testimony of [the hearsay declarant], that the [allegedly offending parent] committed the [negligent act] charged”’; (4) may include the allegedly offending parent’s ‘“own testimony and inferences therefrom, as well as
the inferences from the circumstances su rrounding the entire transaction”’; and (5) may consist of ‘[f]alse or misleading statem ents to authorities . . . or as part of circumstances supportive of corroboration. ’ [Citation.] ‘“‘[W]hether the corroborating evidence is as compatible w ith innocence as it is with guilt is a question of weight for the trier of fact [c itations].’ [Citati on.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) In this case, corroborating evidence s upported Aileen’s statements regarding physical abuse by Daniel. Grandmother had previously observed bruises on Aileen and her siblings when she returned from a stay at Virginia’s house. In addition, through her non-verbal behavior, Aileen consistently demonstrated a fear of Daniel. Moreover, Daniel had a restraining order agai nst him based on the fact that he had kicked Mariah’s then four-y ear-old sibling, Ruben, in the stomach. Further, Daniel had suffered convictions for physical abuse of his romantic partners, including teenage girls. Substantial evidence corroborating A ileen’s statements regarding sexual
abuse was also introduced. Grandmothe r found blood and discharge on Aileen’s underwear, and on toilet paper after wiping her, on the day she picked up Aileen from a stay at Virginia’s house, where Daniel was present. Grandmother also
observed that Aileen did not want to be t ouched in her private area and appeared to be in pain when Grandmother was putting a diaper on her. Further, Daniel and Virginia admitted that Daniel sometime s brought his four-year-old daughter Mariah with him to stay at Virginia’s house while Aileen was there, corroborating30 Aileen’s statements that she was holding hands with her “friend” who stayed at Virginia’s house when the abuse occurred. In addition, Grandmother and Mario reported changes in Aileen’s behavior, such as becoming more withdrawn and antisocial, having nightmares, and exhib iting some sexualized behaviors. Both Aileen and Mariah reportedly had more toilet accidents after the allegations surfaced. Finally, Daniel’s past criminal history involving sexual abuse of teenage girls constitutes additional corroborating evidence. Substantial evidence thus supported the dependency c ourt’s findings that Daniel physically and sexually
abused Aileen. “[S]ection 300 does not require that a ch ild actually be abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume jurisdiction. The subdivisions at issue here require only a ‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or ne glected. . . . ‘The
court need not wait until a child is seri ously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the step s necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” ( In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Given its findings regarding physical and sexual abuse of Aileen, the dependency court prope rly exercised jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) (substantial risk of serious non-accidental physical harm) over Heaven and Mariah, and under subdivision (b ) (substantial risk of serious physical harm) and subdivision (d) (substantial risk of sexual abuse) over Heaven, Mariah, and Danny.

A. Risk of Physical Abuse of Heaven, Mariah, and Danny Daniel first argues that it was inc onsistent for the dependency court to dismiss the allegation under section 300, subdivision (a) that Danny was at risk of physical abuse based on Daniel’s physical abuse of Aileen, but to sustain substantially identically counts under subdiv ision (a) with respect to Heaven and31 Mariah. Daniel notes that the allegati on under subdivision (a) was dismissed with respect to the dependency pe tition involving Aileen and he r siblings. He asserts that in dismissing the allegation in Aileen’s case, the court found that Daniel did not inflict serious physical harm on Aileen , and that this finding was binding with respect to the other minors. However, th e court made no such finding. Rather, the court explained that it was dismissing th e allegation under subdivision (a) as to Aileen and her siblings because abuse by a parent is required under that subdivision, and Daniel is not Aileen’s pare nt. That rationale does not apply as to Heaven, Mariah, and Danny. It is likely that the cour t mistakenly dismissed the allegation under subdivision (a) with respect to Danny, but it was not required to repeat the same mistake as to Mariah and Heaven. Daniel also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) with re spect to Heaven a nd Mariah, and under subdivision (b) as to Heaven, Mariah, and Danny, based on th e alleged risk of physical abuse. In order for the minors to be declared dependent children within subdivision (a), there must be substantial evidence that they have suffered or there is a “substantial risk” that they will su ffer, “serious physical harm” inflicted nonaccidentally by Daniel. (§ 300, subd. (a). ) Similarly, for purposes of jurisdiction under subdivision (b), DCFS must establish th at the children suffered, or there is a substantial risk that they will suffer, “ser ious physical harm or illness,” as a result of neglectful conduct by a parent in one of several specified forms. (§ 300, subd. (b); see In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.) Evidence of a single incident of serious physical harm to a ch ild may be sufficient for the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction. (See In re J.K., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439 [jurisdiction appropriate under subdivision (a) where father broke down door and struck daughter, dislocating her shoulder]; In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th32 428, 438 [jurisdiction proper where on one occasion mother used a belt on her three-year-old’s stomach a nd arms, leaving “deep, purple bruises”].) While we are not aware of any case defining the term “seri ous physical harm,” in this context the word “serious” is defined as “having . . . dangerous possible consequences.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) at p. 1136.) In this case, there was evidence that Da niel had hit Aileen and her siblings in the past, causing bruises. In addition, Aileen reported that Daniel had hit her hands, punched her in the stomach, and hurt her by throwing her hard on the bed. Moreover, Daniel had a restraining orde r against him as a result of kicking Mariah’s four-year-old sibling, Ruben, in the stomach, hard enough that he could not breathe. In addition, Daniel had a l ong history of engaging in serious domestic violence, including with his minor girlfrie nds, resulting in two felony convictions. This unrelenting pattern of physical abuse by Daniel of minors, from four years old to teenagers, constituted substantial evidence that Heav en, Mariah, and Danny
were at substantial risk of seri ous physical harm from Daniel.

B. Risk of Sexual Abuse of Heaven, Mariah and Danny Daniel challenges the exercise of ju risdiction over his three children under section 300, subdivision (d) based on the court’s finding that they were at “substantial risk” of being sexually abus ed by him. (§ 300, subd. (d).) Daniel contends that even assuming that he se xually abused Aileen, the dependency court erred in finding that Heav en, Mariah, and Danny are at substantial risk of sexual
abuse. He relies on the fact that his child ren are not related to Aileen and none of them live in the same household as him, and he further argues that his alleged touching of Aileen is not the kind of sexu ally aberrant behavior that reasonably
would lead to the conclusion that all his children are at risk.33 That Aileen is not related to He aven, Mariah and Danny does not undermine the court’s finding, particularly given th at Daniel had assumed the role of a pseudo-stepfather to Aileen as a freque nt houseguest in Virginia’s home who
shared a bed with Aileen and Vi rginia when he was there. ( Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 970 [rejecting the juvenile court’s di stinction between a stepdaughter and a biological daughter when considering wh ether sexual abuse of one child in the household puts at risk other children in th e household, and noting that focus should be on whether adult has assumed a pa renting role towards the child]; In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 523 [dismissi ng argument that jurisdiction could not
be asserted where the sex abuse victims were not siblings of child over whom dependency was sought, because all three children saw the abuser as their grandfather].) Further, de spite Daniel’s claim that he did not live in the same household as any of his children, the evid ence showed that Daniel spent significant
unmonitored time with both Mariah a nd Danny, including overnight visits. According to Mariah, when Da niel stayed in Tina’s home, he slept in a bed with Danny, Mariah, and Tina, and wh en he stayed in Virginia ’s home he slept in a bed with Aileen, Mariah, and Virginia. Thus , he had access to Mariah and Danny. And although he did not stay in a hous ehold with Heaven, he did have
unmonitored visits with her. Moreover, Aileen stated that ther e was another little girl staying at Virginia’s house who was touched by Daniel , and it was established that Mariah stayed at Virginia’s house w ith Daniel. Therefore, it is likely that the other girl being touched by Daniel was Mariah. Further, the fact that Mari ah is the same age as Aileen puts her at heightened risk of sexual abuse by Daniel. As for 14-year-old Heaven, Daniel had a histor y of sexually assaulting, a nd even forcibly raping,34 teenage girls not much older than she. In sum, Daniel’s sexual abuse of Aileen, coupled with his extensive history of se xual crimes beginning at age 12 or 13,
constitute substantial evidence that his th ree minor children were at risk of sexual
abuse. Daniel makes the additional argument th at the allegations that he sexually abused Aileen, a girl, do not support the de pendency court’s finding that his son, Danny, was at risk of sexual abuse.
In the recent decision In re I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th 766, our Supreme Court
addressed the issue of “whether a father’s sexual abuse of his daughter supports a determination that his sons are juvenile court dependen ts when there is no evidence the father sexually abused or otherwise mi streated the boys, and they were unaware of their sister’s abuse.” ( In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 770.) In that case, the daughter was 14, and she had three younge r brothers, 12–year-old twins and an eight year old. ( Id. at p. 771.) The Supreme Court found that jurisdiction over the three boys was appropriate given that fa ther’s behavior was “aberrant in the extreme,” in that he forcefully raped his daughter by placing his penis in the child’s vagina and repeatedly abused he r over a three-year period. ( Id. at pp. 770, 778.) The court held as follows: “For present purposes, we may assu me that father’s other daughter is at greater risk of sexual abuse than are his sons. But this does not
mean the risk to the sons is nonexistent or so insubstantial that the juvenile court may not take steps to protect the sons from that risk. ‘Although the danger of sexual abuse of a female sibling in such a situation may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse of a male sibling, the dange r of sexual abuse to the male sibling is nonetheless still substantial.’ [Citation.]” ( In re I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. 779- 780.)35 The Supreme Court concluded as follows : “All we are holding at this point is that when a father severely sexually abuses his own child, the court may assume jurisdiction over, and take steps to protect , the child’s siblings [including siblings of a different sex]. [¶] . . . . In upholding the assertion of jurisdiction in this case, we are not holding that the juvenile court is compelled, as a matter of law, to assume jurisdiction over all the children wh enever one child is sexually abused. We merely hold the evidence in this case s upports the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction.” ( In re I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 780.)
In re I.J. is not directly on point, in that the instant case does not involve severe or prolonged sexual abuse of a sibling. Most significant for the instant case
is I.J. ’s rejection of In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48
, and In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, to
the extent these decisions held that sexual abuse of a female child may not, standing alone, support the jurisdictional findi ng that a male child was at risk of sexual abuse. ( In re I.J., supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. 780-781.)
In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, mo re closely resembles our case with respect to the severity of the alleged abuse. In that case, the dependency court
concluded that there was substantial eviden ce that on two occasions the father had sexually abused his nine-year-old da ughter by touching her vagina under her clothes and on top of her underwear, and furt her concluded that her two younger brothers, ages eight and five, were at ri sk of sexual abuse. Despite the less shocking abuse in that case, the court c oncluded that “where, as here, a child has been sexually abused, any younger sibling w ho is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to be at ri sk of sexual abuse. . . . [A]berrant sexual behavior by a parent places the victim ’s siblings who remain in the home at risk of aberrant sexual behavior.” ( In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.)36 Notably, in I.J. , the court discussed In re P.A. and left its holding intact. ( In re I.J.,

supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776.) In the instant case, the dependency c ourt found that the fact that Danny was a boy was not determinative, because Aileen was only four years old and obviously pre-pubescent at the time of th e abuse. Thus, the court found that the closeness of Aileen’s and Danny’s ages more compelling than their sexes. Moreover, evidence was also presented that Danny had a histor y of sexually abusing teenage girls, beginning when he was a young teenager hims elf, and that he himself had been the
victim of sexual abuse as a child. The r ecord shows that Daniel has engaged in long-term aberrant sexual be haviors. Thus, dependenc y jurisdiction was properly exercised over Danny based on a risk of sexual abuse.37 DISPOSITION The orders sustaining jurisdiction are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

MANELLA, J.