United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1995 BALLISTIC MISSILE

DEFENSE

Computation of

Number of Patriot

PAC-3 Interceptors

Needed Is Flawed

GAO/NSIAD-95-45

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259100 

March 17, 1995

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

At your request, we reviewed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s

(BMDO) planned production of 1,200 Patriot Advanced Capability-Three

(PAC-3) interceptors. Our specific objectives were to assess (1) how the

number of interceptors needed was determined and (2) whether the issue

of affordability was adequately resolved.

Background The theater missile defense (TMD) mission is to protect U.S. forces

deployed overseas and U.S. allies and friends from theater ballistic missile1

attacks. According to BMDO, an improved defense capability is urgently

needed because of the increasing proliferation of theater ballistic missile

weapon systems and technology to countries with the potential to threaten

U.S. and allied theaters of operations. BMDO has established as its top

priority a “core program” of improvements for TMD consisting of the

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), seabased lower tier, and

PAC-3.

During the past decade, there have been a series of upgrades to give the

Patriot, which was originally designed to destroy aircraft, a capability

against theater ballistic missiles. In July 1988, Patriot was modified to give

it an initial ballistic missile defense capability, called PAC-1. During

Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a new version of the Patriot interceptor,

called PAC-2, was deployed to defend against Iraqi Scud missiles. The Army

also began the Guidance Enhancement Missile (GEM) program to make

interim engineering improvements to the Patriot interceptor. Army plans

call for 345 GEM interceptors, with initial delivery scheduled in 1995.

The PAC-3 system upgrade—including improved ground radars, launchers,

and battle management hardware and sortware and new interceptors—is a

1

Theater ballistic missiles have shorter ranges than strategic ballistic missiles and are expected to be

used in major regional conflicts, such as Operation Desert Storm.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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$4.8 billion,2 17-year program that will begin being fielded in 1998. The

PAC-3 program is expected to increase (1) the defended area and (2) the kill

potential against higher performance missiles and chemical and biological

warheads. Interceptor production is scheduled to begin in 1997 and end in

2004, at a total cost of $2.3 billion and expected cost of $1.5 million for

each interceptor. While earlier Patriot interceptors destroyed missiles

through explosions, PAC-3 is designed to collide with them. The basic

Patriot unit—the minimum configuration that can carry out an

engagement—is the battery, and the Army has 54 of them. As figure 1

shows, a Patriot battery normally includes (1) a fire control radar set,

(2) an antenna mast group, (3) an engagement control station, (4) an

electrical power plant, and (5) eight launchers.

2

All costs in this report are in then-year dollars. The estimated costs for the engineering and

manufacturing development and production phases are $3.9 billion for fiscal years 1994 through 2004.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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Figure 1: Typical Patriot Battery for Defending a Target

PAC-2

PAC-3

16 interceptors


per launcher

4 interceptors


per launcher

Fire control


radar (MPQ-53)

Antenna


Engagement
 mast group

control 


station

Electrical 


power plant

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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The Army plans to modify three of the eight launchers in each Patriot

battery so that they are capable of firing either PAC-3 or earlier Patriot

interceptors. Each modified launcher can fire up to 16 PAC-3 interceptors

without reloading. All launchers can fire earlier versions of Patriot

interceptors, but only four of those interceptors can be loaded on each

launcher.

DOD’s Current Warfighting

Requirements

Current policy is that the Department of Defense (DOD) must be capable of

winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) anywhere

in the world. Guidance for determining DOD’s capabilities states that, for

planning purposes, one MRC in Northeast Asia and another in Southwest

Asia should be assumed, each with a duration of 60 to 120 days. Current

DOD planning calls for replenishment of ammunition stocks only after

hostilities have ended. Therefore, the number of PAC-3 interceptors on hand

at the outbreak of hostilities takes on special significance.

Results in Brief Following a recent review of the PAC-3 program, DOD approved a

procurement program that would buy 1,200 PAC-3 interceptors. However,

the actual number of PAC-3 interceptors DOD needs to buy is uncertain. The

analysis that DOD’s affordability assessment group had at the time it

developed its recommendation to buy 1,200 interceptors and the analysis

that the Army made supporting a requirement for 2,200 both contain

inaccurate data and invalid assumptions. Adjusting for some of the

problems with DOD’s analysis could increase its calculation of PAC-3

interceptors needed to about 3,442. Adjusting for the problems we noted

with the Army’s analysis could reduce its calculation of PAC-3 interceptors

needed to 1,670. DOD prepared a subsequent analysis that it believes

supported the 1,200 number. We have evaluated the subsequent analysis

and found that it used many of the same inaccurate assumptions and

contained simple mathematical errors that the analysis used by the

affordability assessment group did not have.

If the corrected estimated quantity that is needed is higher than 1,200, then

BMDO may not have adequately budgeted for the program. The $4.8 billion

program could be underfunded between $700 million and $3.4 billion. To

avoid spending on other lower priority programs that may ultimately

require more funding than can be expected to be available, it is important

that DOD accurately determine the number of interceptors needed and

adjust its program within overall ballistic missile defense budget

constraints.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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Number of PAC-3

Interceptors DOD

Needs to Buy Is

Uncertain

In its mid-1994 review, DOD approved the PAC-3 engineering and

manufacturing development phase and the planned production of 1,200

PAC-3 interceptors. A DOD-appointed affordability assessment group

concluded, based on its threat-based analysis of requirements, that 1,200

interceptors would provide moderate confidence of supporting two MRCs.

Our review indicated that the group’s analysis did not adequately

determine the number of interceptors needed because it relied on

erroneous assumptions about kills by non-PAC-3 interceptors, which

reduced the need for PAC-3 interceptors, and it assumed a perfect or

near-perfect match between enemy missiles and PAC-3 interceptors, which

is not likely to happen. Adding PAC-3 interceptors in DOD’s analysis to

overcome optimistic assumptions concerning non-PAC-3 interceptors and

the effect of the enemy tailoring its attack would increase the number

needed to about 3,442. In contrast, Army officials believe that 2,200

interceptors are needed. However, the Army’s force-structure based

analysis may support a requirement for only 1,670 because it calls for 530

interceptors that may not be needed to meet DOD’s two-MRC policy.

DOD’s Computation Is

Flawed

The affordability assessment group recommended that 1,200 PAC-3

interceptors be produced. However, the threat-based analysis it used to

develop that recommendation contained inaccurate data and questionable

assumptions concerning (1) the contribution of the THAAD system in

destroying missiles, (2) the planned capabilities of earlier versions of the

Patriot to kill missiles outside the required area called a keepout zone, and

(3) the maximum likely attack size against defended targets. Substituting

PAC-3 interceptors for the questionable contributions of the THAAD and

earlier versions of the Patriot in DOD’s analysis increases the number of

PAC-3 interceptors needed to about 3,085. Factoring in the effect of the

enemy tailoring its attack size further increases this number to 3,442.

First, DOD’s computation uses assumptions for the THAAD system that are

beyond its planned capabilities. The analysis credits THAAD with killing 225

missiles that have a maximum range too short for THAAD to kill. In addition,

not all Patriot batteries will be deployed with THAAD. In a Joint Chiefs of

Staff study in December 1993, only 33 percent of the Patriot batteries are

deployed with a THAAD battery. Substituting PAC-3 interceptors in DOD’s

analysis to destroy these 225 missiles and using the analysis’ firing

doctrine result in an increase in the estimated requirement of about 616

interceptors.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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Second, DOD’s computation assumes that earlier versions of the Patriot

interceptors will have capabilities beyond those planned for them. The

analysis assumes that they can kill 463 missiles outside the required area

called a keepout zone. However, none of the earlier interceptors will have

the capability to do this, even those with the GEM upgrade. According to

Army data, the interceptors do not meet the PAC-3 requirement of making

the kills outside the required keepout zone. Moreover, they are not as

effective as the PAC-3 against chemical and biological warheads, which was

one of the reasons for developing PAC-3. To destroy the 463 missiles the

study credited the earlier versions of the Patriot interceptors with

destroying, about 1,269 additional PAC-3 interceptors would be needed.

Third, DOD’s analysis supporting 1,200 interceptors assumed a perfect or

near-perfect match of PAC-3 and enemy missiles at each target location

without regard to the enemy’s ability to tailor its attack. For example, if

there are 10 targets to defend and the enemy has 100 missiles for attacking

these targets, such an analysis would show a need for only 100

interceptors to defend these 10 targets. Implicit in this analysis is the

assumption that the enemy would choose to evenly distribute its missiles

among the 10 targets. However, the enemy may choose to tailor its attack

and shoot 15 missiles at some targets and 5 at others. If all 10 targets are to

be protected, then the Army might decide 15 interceptors are needed to

defend each target, which would require 150 interceptors. Therefore, DOD’s

threat-based methodology should take into account the maximum likely

attack size against each defended area. Using the same factor that DOD

used in another analysis for what it calls maldistribution, DOD would need

another 357 PAC-3 interceptors.

Army’s Computation Is

Flawed

The Army’s Director of Requirements, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Operations and Plans, told the Strategic Systems Committee3

 that the

Army had determined that 2,200 PAC-3 interceptors were required. While

never used in BMDO planning or budgeting, the Army established 2,200 as

the number of interceptors needed to (1) fight two MRCs (1,728

interceptors), (2) fight one lesser regional conflict (172 interceptors), and

(3) accomplish various test objectives (300 interceptors). The 1,728

interceptors the Army says it needs to fight two MRCs is based on fully

equipping 2 launchers with 16 interceptors each, in all 54 tactical batteries.

3

The Strategic Systems Committee coordinated the review of the PAC-3 systems for the Defense

Acquisition Board. Formal Defense Acquisition Board reviews are preceded by months of staff review

and coordination to identify issues to be presented to Defense Acquisition Board members.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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However, for two reasons, accepting the Army’s analysis could result in

more interceptors than are actually needed. First, current guidance does

not require planning for lesser regional conflicts. Second, according to a

Joint Chiefs’ December 1993 study, the number of Patriot batteries needed

to fight two MRCs, in concert with other theater air defense systems, is only

45. This suggests that the Army might have more Patriot batteries than it

needs. If so, it would need only 1,440 interceptors to equip 45 batteries

plus 230 for testing, for a total of 1,670, not 2,200.

We also noted that while the Army plans to maintain 54 batteries in active

status and equipped with PAC-3 interceptors, it currently staffs only 44. It

plans to have the National Guard staff an additional four batteries in the

near future.

BMDO May Still Have

a Major Affordability

Problem

Due to the Cost Analysis Improvement Group’s unexpectedly high cost

estimate for the PAC-3 program, the Defense Acquisition Board was faced

with a serious affordability problem that it had to resolve before it could

approve the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the

program. DOD regulations require a determination that adequate resources

to support the program have been, or are committed to be, programmed

before approving a system’s entry into engineering and manufacturing

development. DOD believes it solved this problem by establishing the

number of interceptors at 1,200. However, if an accurate analysis indicates

a need for hundreds more, then the $4.8 billion PAC-3 program could be

underfunded between $700 million and $3.4 billion.

DOD’s Requirements for

Affordability

Determinations

To avoid spending money on programs that may require more funding than

can be expected to be available, DOD requires a determination, when

approving a system for engineering and manufacturing development, that

“adequate resources . . . to support the program have been, or are

committed to be, programmed.” Specifically, the regulations provide that

“a program shall not be approved to enter the next acquisition phase

unless sufficient resources . . . are or will be programmed to support

projected development, testing, production, fielding, and support

requirements.” According to an official from the Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), the word

“programmed” means budgeted in DOD’s Future Years Defense Program

(FYDP). The FYDP that was current at the time of the decision covered fiscal

years 1995 through 2000.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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DOD’s Solution to

Affordability Problem

BMDO had originally allocated funding for the PAC-3 program using 1,500

interceptors as a planning factor. This number was not based on a

requirements analysis. In preparation for DOD’s review, however, a cost

estimate was developed that showed BMDO had not allocated enough

money to buy 1,500 interceptors. Consequently, DOD’s Strategic Systems

Committee established an affordability assessment group to develop

recommendations for resolving the problem.

That group recommended reducing the number of interceptors to partially

close the affordability gap and shifting funding for the balance. It

concluded that 1,200 interceptors would provide moderate confidence that

two MRCs could be supported. The Strategic Systems Committee

recommended approval of this acquisition quantity. The affordability

assessment group determined that this quantity would require $694 million

more than BMDO had previously allocated for fiscal years 2001 and beyond.

To cover the shortfall, BMDO agreed to transfer money from other BMDO

programs. In July 1994, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and

Technology) approved PAC-3 entering engineering and manufacturing

development with the reduced quantity of 1,200 interceptors planned for

production.

Potential Unresolved

Affordability Problem

If the correct quantity is higher than 1,200, then BMDO must increase PAC-3

production funding at some point. The $4.8 billion program could be

underfunded between $700 million and $3.4 billion. To avoid spending on

programs that may ultimately require more funding than can be expected

to be available, it is important that DOD accurately determine the number

of interceptors needed and adjust its budget to provide funding for them

within overall ballistic missile defense budget constraints.

Table 1: Computation of Range of

Potential Underfunding for PAC-3

Interceptors

Dollars in billions

Adjusted quantity of

interceptors

Increase over

1,200

Underfunded

amounta

Army 1,670 470 $0.7

DOD 3,442 2,242 $3.4

aTotal is based on expected cost of $1.5 million in then-year dollars for each interceptor.

Because ballistic missile budgets are constrained, solving this problem

may entail curtailing other BMDO programs. PAC-3 is part of a core program

of three systems: PAC-3, THAAD, and a seabased lower tier. BMDO maintains

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
B-259100 

that this core program is its number one priority. In its October 1993

Bottom-Up Review report, DOD endorsed $18 billion for ballistic missile

activities for fiscal years 1995 through 1999, including $9 billion for the

three systems in the core program, saying that this represented a

$21 billion reduction from the previous administration’s defense program.

Subsequent budget decisions were reported to reduce the $18 billion by an

additional $1 billion. The administration’s request for ballistic missile

defense for fiscal year 1996 is $2.9 billion.

Recommendation to

the Secretary of

Defense

In order to preclude expenditures on other lower priority programs that

may ultimately be unaffordable if funds need to be shifted to PAC-3, the

Secretary of Defense should direct the Director of BMDO to provide both an

accurate estimate of the number of PAC-3 interceptors required and a plan

that resolves any resulting affordability problem.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. The complete

text of DOD’s comments is in appendix I. DOD agreed with much of the

information in our report; and in response to our recommendation, DOD

said it was reassessing PAC-3 requirements as part of an ongoing analysis

scheduled for completion in late 1995. DOD said that if it is subsequently

determined that more than 1,200 interceptors are needed, then it may have

to reconsider funding priorities in the post-2000 time frame and extend

planned production.

DOD disagreed with the details in our report in two principal areas. First, it

said that a subsequent analysis (1) corrected for the shortcomings of the

analysis discussed in our report and (2) supported the 1,200 procurement

objective. However, we found that the subsequent analysis also used

inaccurate data and invalid assumptions, and it contained mathematical

errors that if corrected result in a need for only 910 PAC-3 interceptors.

Although we had analyzed it in October 1994, after a DOD official had given

us a copy, we did not focus our report on it for two reasons—it was not an

accurate computation of requirements and the affordability assessment

group used the analysis we did discuss.

Second, DOD said that its acquisition procedures require only that funds be

programmed through the period covered by the current FYDP before a

weapon system can proceed into the next acquisition phase. If it

determines that more than 1,200 interceptors are needed, DOD said that it

would consider extending the planned production, which would be

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
B-259100 

outside the FYDP. We note, however, that BMDO’s approach to resolving the

original affordability problem raised by DOD’s Strategic Systems

Committee was an adjustment to BMDO’s 2001-2004 program plan, which

was outside of the 1995-2000 FYDP. The Strategic Systems Committee listed

as an open action item the affordability problem of who would pay for the

1,200 interceptors. The problem was resolved before the Defense

Acquisition Board met when BMDO agreed to make adjustments to other

programs to make available sufficient funds.

Figure 2 illustrates the issue raised by an extension of production as

envisioned in DOD’s comments. It shows that the currently planned

production of 1,200 PAC-3 interceptors would be completed in fiscal year

2004. Thus, if the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)

shows that any additional interceptors are needed, production would

begin in fiscal year 2005. If the correct number turns out to be as high as

the highest adjustment for flaws we detected (3,442), then production

would not be completed until fiscal year 2013 assuming that DOD continues

the annual production rate of 250.

Figure 2: Schedule of Patriot PAC-3 Initial Production and Potential Additional Production

Fiscal years

95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

FYDP in place at decision point

COEA completed

Start low-rate initial production

Start full production

Planned production of 1,200 PAC-3 

interceptors

Production of an additional 2,242 

interceptors at 250 a year

10/95

7/97

7/98

According to BMDO, PAC-3 is urgently needed to counter the increasing

threat posed by theater ballistic missiles. BMDO has assigned PAC-3 and the

other TMD core programs its top priority. The Congress has also recognized

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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the urgent need for fielding improved TMD systems. The fiscal year 1994

House Armed Services Committee report said that theater missile defense

should receive priority over other programs and that priority should be

given to those systems that can be deployed sooner over those that cannot

be deployed until later. Finally, DOD indicated that the COEA currently being

conducted will provide an accurate estimate of the number of PAC-3

interceptors required. However, if additional quantities are needed, DOD

said it may have to extend planned production, delaying procurement of

the total number of PAC-3 interceptors to as late as 2013.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

In light of the deficiencies in the analyses that supported the

determination of the PAC-3 production requirements, the Congress may

wish to direct the Secretary of Defense to provide a valid estimate of the

number of PAC-3 interceptors required and when he plans to produce them.

Scope and

Methodology

We examined (1) cost estimates developed by the PAC-3 product office, the

Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, the Department of the

Army, and DOD; and (2) Army and DOD analyses of requirements for PAC-3

interceptors. In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from the DOD,

BMDO, and Department of the Army. In Huntsville, Alabama, we met with

representatives from the PAC-3 product office and the Space and Strategic

Defense Command.

We performed our work between December 1993 and February 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days after its issue

date, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we

will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and the Directors, Ballistic Missile

Defense Organization and Office of Management and Budget. We will also

make copies available to others upon request.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Brad Hathaway

Associate Director, Systems

 Development and Production Issues

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See p. 9.

See pp. 9-10.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 1-4.

See comment 1.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

See pp. 6-7.

See comment 8.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7-9.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 9-11.

See p. 9.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated January 12, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. The wording on pages 1 and 2 was clarified in line with DOD’s comments.

2. During the course of our audit, the affordability assessment group

assured us we were reviewing the analysis that it had used to recommend

the 1,200 requirement. In October 1994, a representative in the Office of

the Secretary of Defense gave us a subsequent version of the analysis,

which DOD now calls the “final results.” Although we did not focus our

report on DOD’s “final results” assessment, we did analyze it to see if it

provided proper support for DOD’s 1,200 PAC-3 procurement objective. It did

not. As discussed in comments 3 through 5 below, the “final results” also

assumed allocation of enemy missiles to earlier versions of the Patriot

(PAC-2 and GEM), which results in less effective protection of our forces. In

addition, the “final results” contained several mathematical errors.

Correcting for these errors and ignoring potentially offsetting faulty

assumptions used in the analysis concerning the contribution of other

systems supports a procurement objective of only 910 PAC-3 interceptors,

not 1,200. Therefore, our conclusion that DOD needs to make an accurate

calculation of PAC-3 requirements is still correct, and DOD has said it is

currently conducting a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis that

will do this.

3. DOD is correct that the “final results” analysis used THAAD’s interceptors

only against longer range theater ballistic missiles that THAAD can

intercept. Although this corrected one problem, DOD’s solution increased

another problem because it assumed that the shorter range theater

ballistic missiles would be killed by PAC-2s and GEMs. We discuss this

problem further in our comment 5.

4. According to the Joint Chiefs’ study, only 33 percent of the Patriot

batteries may be deployed with a THAAD battery. DOD said its final results

fully accounted for that deployment strategy. We believe that it may have

partially accounted for this problem. Proper consideration of the

maldistribution problem would correct any remaining problem. (See

comment 6.)

5. We questioned using PAC-2s and GEMs in lieu of PAC-3s to attack certain

short-range theater ballistic missiles because their lesser capability would

not meet the operational requirements established for PAC-3. The “final

results” analysis also used PAC-2s and GEMs in lieu of PAC-3s. DOD justified

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

buying PAC-3 because GEM interceptors were not good enough. DOD said that

although the PAC-2 and GEM interceptors cannot enforce the same defensive

zone as the PAC-3 interceptor, operational commanders will use them to

destroy tactical ballistic missiles against which they have a high

probability of kill. DOD also said that the flexibility of the Patriot system

permits the operational commander to use PAC-3 interceptors if intelligence

information or other considerations would warrant their use. The ability of

operational commanders to allocate resources during a battle as they

believe best is not relevant to the question of using PAC-2 and GEM to reduce

PAC-3 requirements. Using interceptors with less capability than PAC-3

simply lowers the degree of protection provided.

6. DOD said that in the “final results” analysis it had added a factor equal to

about 20 percent of the procurement objective to account for not having

the right number of PAC-3 interceptors at the right place at the right time.

We were subsequently told that the 10 percent factor for contingencies in

the version used by the affordability assessment group accounted for

several factors, including maldistribution. In the “final results” analysis

DOD added another 10 percent for maldistribution, raising the total

percentage to 20 percent to account for all these factors. Although we

recognize that the tailoring of an attack is a problem that DOD should

address, our draft report did not include a specific adjustment to DOD’s

1,200 procurement objective for this factor because we had no basis for

calculating one. Using the factor DOD used in its “final version,” we have

increased the requirement calculated in the version used by the

affordability assessment group by another 357 PAC-3 missiles.

7. Contrary to DOD’ comment, the “final analysis” did use a Navy lower-tier

system to destroy part of the threat, thereby reducing the missiles PAC-3

must kill.

8. Our report raises the issue of whether DOD needs all 54 operational

Patriot batteries because a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed a

need for only 45 to meet the two-MRC requirement, which raises a question

about the need for the other 9. DOD said that in addition to the 45 batteries

needed to fulfill the two-MRC requirement, it needed 10 more—6 batteries

for permanent deployment in Saudi Arabia and 4 for the Alabama National

Guard starting in 1996. However, the Secretary of Defense’s planning

guidance states that peace operations and other small-scale operations “do

not impose requirements for additional forces beyond those needed for

two MRCs.”

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The decision on where to obtain the four batteries needed to equip the

Alabama National Guard has already been made, according to Army

officials. None of the 54 operational batteries will be transferred to the

Guard. In addition to the 54 operational batteries that the Army currently

has, it also has another 20 radars, 20 engagement control stations, and 4

information and coordination centers in storage that were originally built

for Italy but will not be sold to it. The Army plans to transfer four of the

radars and engagement control stations and one of the information and

coordination centers to the Guard. The launchers will come from either

operational readiness floats or from training and testing assets.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

J. Klein Spencer, Assistant Director

Atlanta Regional

Office

Bob Crowl, Regional Management Representative

Stan Lipscomb, Evaluator-in-Charge

Leon Gill, Site Senior

Troy Thompson, Staff Member

(707021) Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-45 Patriot PAC-3
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