United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

August 1995 LONGBOW APACHE

HELICOPTER

System Procurement

Issues Need to Be

Resolved

GAO/NSIAD-95-159

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259390 

August 24, 1995

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

This report presents the results of our review of the Department of the

Army’s Longbow Apache weapon system. Because this program is

scheduled to enter production later this year, we focused specifically on

whether (1) critical issues related to the production of the aircraft and the

producibility of its missiles had been addressed and (2) the Longbow

Hellfire missile procurement plan was adequately developed. We also

reviewed the need for full consideration of all cost-effective alternatives to

the production of this attack helicopter system. We believe that the

information in this report will be useful as you review the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) plans for this program.

Background The Army plans to upgrade its AH-64A Apache attack helicopter, already

considered by the Army to be the most advanced attack helicopter in the

world, into a new version known as the AH-64D Longbow Apache. All 

758 helicopters in the Apache fleet will be modernized with new avionics

and be capable of firing both the laser-guided Hellfire missile and a

radar-aided Longbow Hellfire “fire-and-forget” missile that is under

development. These improvements are designed to, among other things,

allow the Apache to conduct precision attacks in adverse weather,

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automatically engage multiple targets, and operate on the digital battlefield

of the future. Additionally, 227 of the 758 upgraded Apaches will be

equipped with a new mast-mounted, millimeter-wave fire control radar

and more powerful engines.

The Longbow Apache weapon system is composed of three

components—a modernized Apache helicopter, a fire control radar, and a

Longbow Hellfire missile. In December 1990, it reached milestone II, the

decision point for entering the engineering and manufacturing

development phase. A production decision—milestone III—is expected in

October 1995, and fielding is planned to begin in 1997. DOD has requested

$552.3 million for this system in fiscal year 1996—$354.8 million for the

aircraft and $197.5 for the missile.

Since its inception, the Longbow Apache program has expanded in scope

and size, and program acquisition costs1

 have more than doubled. In 1991,

the Army planned to develop and procure only 227 radar-equipped

modernized Apache helicopters and almost 11,000 Longbow Hellfire

missiles.2

 In May 1993, the program was restructured to include

modernizing the entire Apache fleet of 758 helicopters and procuring over

13,000 Longbow Hellfire missiles.3

 Largely because of this restructuring,

the estimated cost to develop and procure the Longbow Apache weapon

system increased from $5.4 billion to $12.3 billion between 1991 and 1994.

Program acquisition costs again increased; this time by about $630 million

between 1993 and 1994.

As we reported in 1994, in implementing its aviation modernization plan,

the Army chose to fund procurement of both the RAH-66 Comanche

reconnaissance and attack helicopter and Longbow Apache attack

helicopter while deferring or canceling other helicopter modernization

programs.4

 Since then, production of the Comanche program has been

deferred. The Army plans to equip some of its Comanche helicopters with

the Longbow Hellfire missile and a modified version of the Longbow radar.

1

Program acquisition cost includes research, development, test, evaluation, and acquisition costs, and

is expressed in escalated dollars.

2

Longbow Apache Helicopter: Key Factors Used to Measure Progress in Development Need to Be

Changed (GAO/NSIAD-92-43, Nov. 21, 1991).

3

Longbow Apache Selected Acquisition Report, Dec. 31, 1992, as amended, June 1, 1993.

4

Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed (GAO/NSIAD-95-9, Nov. 21, 1994).

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Results in Brief During the Longbow Apache’s ongoing engineering and manufacturing

development phase, concerns have been raised by DOD test and acquisition

officials about selected Longbow Apache test events and missile

producibility. Some of the concerns that have yet to be resolved are (1) the

performance of the Longbow Hellfire missile against targets with multiple

countermeasures, (2) the performance of the radar against stationary

targets, and (3) the producibility of the missile’s transceiver. We believe

that resolution of these concerns is critical to a successful transition of the

Longbow Apache weapon system to production and that Congress should

be apprised of their resolution prior to approving production funds for the

program.

The current Longbow Hellfire procurement plan is inadequate because

(1) it will procure about 3,200 missiles that are not required at an

estimated total cost of between $540 million and $750 million and 

(2) a significant number of the missiles will be procured before Longbow

Apache aircraft are available and will lose up to one-half of their shelf life.5

Because of DOD’s concern about the high cost of the missile, the Army is

implementing a cost-reduction plan that includes a 5-year production

contract requiring congressional notification. However, if the procurement

is reduced, the Army will have to renegotiate the contract terms to

determine what savings can be achieved. We believe Congress should be

apprised of the quantities, cost, and operational impact of the Longbow

Hellfire procurement plan before approving the 5-year contract for

production of the Longbow Hellfire missile.

DOD guidance for developing a cost and operational effectiveness analysis

(COEA) requires that (1) a wide range of alternatives be considered,

including conceptual systems and (2) all reasonable options should be

represented, including even doubtful alternatives, in order to establish

their merit. While the Army has recently agreed to conduct a Longbow

Apache COEA for the milestone III production decision, the value of that

analysis will be limited because of its timing and the Army’s decision not

to look at all attack helicopter alternatives, including the Comanche

helicopter. We believe Congress needs to be aware of the cost

effectiveness and military worth of the Longbow Apache weapon system

as compared to alternatives such as the Comanche, prior to appropriating

funds for production of these systems.

5

Shelf life is the expected length of time an item can be in the inventory before it must be used or

refurbished.

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Critical Testing Issues

Have Yet to Be

Resolved

Since the Longbow Apache weapon system entered the engineering and

manufacturing development phase in 1990, concerns have been raised by

DOD test and acquisition officials about various aspects of the program.

These concerns could have a potentially serious impact on the Longbow

Apache program and, therefore, should be resolved.

For example, the performance of both the Longbow radar and Longbow

Hellfire missile are concerns. Poor results during specific segments of

early proof-of-principle testing and later testing demonstrated that the

radar and missile have had difficulty meeting some important test goals.

Radar problems include misidentification and nondetection of some

targets and difficulty in developing radar-related software for different

terrains. Missile problems include less-than-satisfactory performance

against targets defended with multiple countermeasures such as smoke

and active jammers.

The reliability, availability, and maintainability of the Longbow Apache

helicopter are also concerns. In September 1990, we reported on the low

availability rates of the basic Apache helicopter due to reliability,

availability, and maintainability problems. Because the Longbow Apache is

a major modification of the basic Apache helicopter, we also noted that

(1) the Apache’s existing logistical support problems may affect the

Longbow Apache and (2) the Longbow Apache should clearly demonstrate

its logistical supportability before proceeding into production.6

 In July

1994, a DOD test official noted that the logistics reliability of the Longbow

Apache was a recurring issue. Also, in its October 1994 Longbow Apache

readiness and support assessment for long-lead production, DOD affirmed

its concern with logistics reliability when it noted that the logistics

reliability parameter for the fire control radar, which was incorporated in

the Acquisition Program Baseline in February 1992, was deleted in

March 1994. After discussions between DOD and the program office, the

logistics reliability parameter was put back into the baseline.

Questions have also been raised about the ability to produce the Longbow

Hellfire missile’s transceiver in mass quantities. The Army found that the

initial transceiver design did not meet all of the specification requirements

and was not designed to be compatible with automated production

processes. As a result, the transceiver was redesigned, but the Army could

not provide us with the qualification test results because the results have

not been fully analyzed. While the Army maintains that this problem is not

6

Apache Helicopter: Serious Logistical Support Problems Must Be Solved to Realize Combat Potential

(GAO/NSIAD-90-294, Sept. 28, 1990).

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expected to affect missile performance, it does acknowledge that the

problem has delayed missile testing and validation.

DOD test and acquisition officials told us that resolution of these concerns

is important to the overall success of this program and, therefore, DOD

needs to make sure they are resolved by milestone III. According to DOD,

developmental and operational testing has been completed; however, the

classified test results have not been analyzed and authenticated.

Therefore, DOD has not issued a report on Longbow Apache testing.

According to the program manager, the Longbow Apache weapon system

performed so well in its operational testing that the Army was able to

conclude testing early. However, a DOD developmental test official

informally expressed dissatisfaction with the Longbow Apache’s

operational test, specifically that multiple countermeasure testing may not

be completed and that missile, radar, and aircraft test results had not been

integrated to give a total system picture. According to a DOD operational

test official, results may not be as good as the program manager observed,

but they are generally good. He noted that (1) there are a few weak points

but data had not been synthesized and validated to determine their

significance and (2) although the system did not meet every specification

exactly and was not tested against all jammers and reactive armor, it

performed successfully in the field.

As previously discussed, one of the concerns with the Longbow Apache

weapon system is the missile’s inability to perform against active

countermeasures like jammers. It would seem, therefore, that operational

testing would have included tests against all jammers. In June 1995, DOD

confirmed that the analysis of test results is currently ongoing and is

expected to be a key factor in the milestone III decision.

Longbow Hellfire

Procurement Plan Is

Inadequate

Our review indicated that the Longbow Hellfire missile procurement plan

is inadequate because (1) it will procure about 3,200 missiles that are not

required at an estimated cost of between $540 million and $750 million and

(2) a significant number of the missiles will be produced before Longbow

Apache aircraft are available and will lose up to one-half of their shelf life.

At DOD’s direction, the Army has developed an $862 million cost-reduction

plan, which includes a 5-year production contract that would require

congressional notification. However, if the procurement is reduced, the

Army will have to renegotiate the contract terms to determine what

savings can be achieved.

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Longbow Hellfire

Requirements Are

Overstated

The Army plans to procure about 3,200 more Longbow Hellfire missiles for

the Longbow Apache program than are required. While the Army has

approved plans to procure 13,311 Longbow Hellfire missiles, a

computational error resulted in this requirement being overstated. This

error may result in program costs of between $540 million and

$750 million, depending upon whether the Army achieves its recently

adopted cost-reduction goals.

Using corrected data, we calculated that the total procurement objective

for the Longbow Hellfire missile program should be 10,108 for the

Longbow Apache. The Army approved program of 13,311 missiles for the

Longbow Apache is, therefore, overstated by approximately 3,200 missiles.

An official in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and

Plans, who is responsible for munitions requirements, confirmed that the

procurement objective was overstated. According to him, the

overstatement occurred because the Army used the wrong model for

calculating the procurement objective.

The exact cost of these unneeded missiles is dependent on whether or not

the Army achieves the cost reductions expected under the missile

cost-reduction plan. If all of the planned cost-reduction initiatives are

achieved, the unit cost may be reduced to $169,000 and, therefore, the cost

of the approximately 3,200 unneeded missiles could be about $540 million.

If none of the reduction initiatives are achieved, the unit cost may remain

$234,000 and, therefore, the cost of the unneeded missiles could be about

$750 million.7

Significant Portions of

Missiles’ Shelf Life May

Expire Before Aircraft Are

Available

The timing for fielding the Longbow Apache helicopter and delivering the

Longbow Hellfire missile differs to such an extent that significant portions

of the missiles’ shelf life will expire before Longbow Apache helicopters

are scheduled to be available to use them. The missiles have a designed

shelf life of 10 years and program officials told us that, based on

experience with the laser Hellfire missile, it is possible to extend that shelf

life to 15 years. In its comments to this report, DOD stated that a 15-year

shelf life is reasonable. The Army plans to accept the last Longbow Hellfire

missiles in fiscal year 2005 and field the last Longbow Apache helicopter

to operational units in fiscal year 2014.

7

These estimates are based on projected average unit costs. Actual cost reductions would depend on

when missile reductions take place.

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We calculated that the Longbow Apache fleet will require 7,168 Longbow

Hellfire missiles in fiscal year 2010; however, the missile inventory is

projected to be 13,2538

 missiles in fiscal year 2005. Therefore, by 2010,

over 6,000 missiles will have used at least one-half of their designed

10-year shelf life and one-third of their anticipated 15-year extended shelf

life waiting to arm a helicopter.

Current Army procurement plans call for the Longbow Hellfire missile to

be used on the Comanche helicopter. An Army official informed us that

the Army might shift some or all of the 3,200 missiles unneeded for the

Apache Longbow to the Comanche program, if it is produced. Our analysis

shows that, even if their use on the Comanche is approved, a significant

portion of the shelf life of those missiles will expire before they are

needed.9

 The Comanche would likely need only approximately 234

Longbow Hellfire missiles by 2010.10 Therefore, about 2,966 of the

unneeded 3,200 missiles the Army plans to have procured would spend at

least one-half of their designed shelf life and one-third of their anticipated

15-year extended shelf life without a helicopter to carry them.

Longbow Hellfire

Procurement Risks Have

Increased

DOD directed the Army to reduce the procurement cost of the Longbow

Hellfire missile. In December 1994, DOD approved the Army’s plan to

reduce missile procurement costs from $3.1 billion to $2.3 billion, thereby

reducing the procurement unit cost from $234,000 to $169,000.11 This

compares to the latest procurement unit cost of $53,000 for the

laser-guided Hellfire II missile. The Army plans to buy the 13,311 Longbow

Hellfire missiles in 8 years instead of 10, significantly increasing the

numbers of missiles produced per year, beginning in fiscal year 1998. This

is expected to reduce the contractor’s costs, which will be reflected in

lower unit costs. Integral to the cost-reduction plan is a 5-year production

contract for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 that will require congressional

notification.

8

This reflects a reduction of 58 missiles from the planned buy of 13,311. The 58 will be used for testing.

9

DOD has delayed a Comanche full production decision until July 2006. The planned six early

operational capability aircraft to be built by 2001 will not be armed until 2004. See our report,

Comanche Helicopter: Testing Needs to be Completed Prior to Production Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-95-112, May 18, 1995).

10This is based on a review of aircraft fielding information and an assumption that each fielded aircraft

will require only six Longbow Hellfire missiles.

11The procurement unit cost excludes $386.8 million in program research, development, test, and

evaluation costs. If this $386.8 million were included, the unit cost would be $263,000, prior to the

approval of the cost-reduction plan.

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A December 1994 memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition and Technology) releasing funding for the Longbow Hellfire

cost-reduction effort noted that it contains higher cost risk than previously

existed in the program. The assessment cautioned that the plan’s savings

depend on quick congressional notification of the 5-year contract and the

Army’s timely development and implementation of the reduction

initiatives. It also noted that the 5-year contract proposal represented a

substantial portion of the projected savings.

The Army’s current procurement plan (the cost-reduction plan) is

predicated on a peak production rate of 183 missiles per month and a

reduced production timeframe. A large part—$468 million—of the total

cost reduction is dependent upon the 5-year contract the Army presently

plans to ask Congress to approve in 1999. If the 5-year contract is not

approved or the procurement plan is reduced, the Army will have to

renegotiate contract terms to determine what savings, if any, can be

achieved. Moreover, these savings may be obviated by the costs that will

be incurred to replace the missiles acquired under the cost-reduction

program’s accelerated delivery plan when they become unusable because

their shelf life expired.

Army Has Not

Considered All

Alternatives to

Production of the

Longbow Apache

DOD Directive 5000.2 requires a COEA to determine the most cost-effective

alternative available and military worth12 to the government during the

early stages of a system’s development. This requirement may be waived

for classified programs. DOD and Army officials told us that at the July 1989

milestone I, the decision point for starting a new acquisition program, the

Longbow Apache weapon system was a classified radar program and did

not meet the monetary threshold for a COEA. According to these officials,

the Army was not required to do a COEA. By the December 1990

milestone II, the program was unclassified, and the program met DOD’s

criteria for requiring that a COEA be conducted, including the monetary

threshold. Despite DOD guidance, the Army did not complete and submit an

adequate COEA.

In May 1994, noting that an appropriate COEA had not been conducted for

milestones I or II, DOD again directed the Army to conduct a Longbow

Apache COEA for milestone III to compare alternative approaches to satisfy

the Army’s need for a heavy division attack helicopter. According to a DOD

official, the Army plans to complete the COEA in August 1995.

12Military worth is the measure of how a system performs its mission in a competitive environment,

including the potential of the system. It is measured against the operational concept and operational

effectiveness.

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While DOD originally intended that the Army evaluate the Comanche as an

attack alternative to the Longbow Apache, the Army subsequently

convinced DOD that it should exclude from the COEA any analysis of the

Comanche as an attack alternative. The Army’s stated position was that

the Comanche (1) was a high-value asset that would not be used as an

attack helicopter in a heavy division and (2) would not be available for the

attack role until after 2006, and, therefore, would not meet the Army’s

attack requirement at the turn of the century. According to DOD officials,

the Comanche alternative was excluded from the Longbow Apache COEA

because it would not meet the Army’s near- to mid-term heavy attack

helicopter requirement.

The DOD and Army positions on the availability of the Comanche seem to

contradict DOD’s own guidance for developing a COEA. This guidance

requires that (1) a wide range of alternatives be considered, including

conceptual systems and (2) all reasonable options should be represented,

including even doubtful alternatives, in order to establish their merit.

Moreover, the program schedule shows that low-rate initial production

and full-rate production for the Comanche are planned for 2004 and 2006,

respectively.

The Army’s current position that the Comanche would not be used as an

attack helicopter in a heavy division appears questionable because 

(1) it contradicts a prior Army assessment of the Comanche’s capabilities,

(2) the Comanche and Apache have many similarities in attack

capabilities, and (3) the Comanche recently vied for a British contract for

an attack helicopter. In 1986, the Army reported to the Senate Armed

Services Committee that if the Comanche should meet “the Army’s full

expectations, [it] may well prove to be a viable alternative to eventually

replace the AH-64 [Apache] . . .” In our May 27, 1992, report on the need to

reassess the Comanche program, we pointed out the similarities in the

attack capability of the Comanche and Apache helicopters.13 At that time,

DOD noted that configuring the Comanche as an anti-armor attack aircraft

by mounting its external wings and additional missiles provides a very

lethal attack asset; however, it reduces the aircraft’s capability to perform

the reconnaissance mission. In addition, the Comanche’s contractors

recently entered it in a competition with the Longbow Apache and other

helicopters for a key contract to provide the British government attack

helicopters.

13Comanche Helicopter: Program Needs Reassessment Due to Increased Unit Cost and Other Factors

(GAO/NSIAD-92-204, May 27, 1992).

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Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Defense direct the Secretary of

the Army to (1) modify Longbow Hellfire missile procurement

requirements to reflect accurate computational factors and shelf life

projections and (2) include comparisons to all alternative attack

helicopters, especially the Comanche in its detailed cost-effectiveness and

military worth analysis of the Longbow Apache program.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Congress may wish to consider restricting access to fiscal year 1996

Longbow Apache weapon system production funds until the Secretary of

the Army provides a report to Congress detailing the results of

(1) developmental and operational testing as related to the issues in this

report, (2) the Longbow Hellfire missile requirements, and (3) the analysis

of the program’s comparative cost-effectiveness and military worth. Also,

when the Army submits its 5-year contract for Longbow Hellfire missiles,

Congress may wish to ensure that the Army has recomputed the number of

missiles needed, reconciled the timing of the missile deliveries with the

availability of the helicopters, and recomputed the expected cost

reductions to be achieved in approving the multiyear contract.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Concerning our recommendation to modify Longbow Hellfire missile

procurement requirements, DOD acknowledged that the requirements

should be reviewed and indicated that all requirements will be reviewed

using the capabilities-based requirements process in accordance with the

Secretary of Defense’s direction. DOD also indicated that the Army is

considering alternatives to accelerate Longbow Apache deliveries to better

match missile fielding dates.

While DOD’s intent to recompute missile requirements is a step in the right

direction, we believe that because it will not be done until January 1996,

3 months after the milestone III decision, it will be too late to benefit the

Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Congress in their decision making.

Expediting the requirements recomputation would help these

decisionmakers and, at the same time, help DOD in formulating alternatives

to better match missile and aircraft fielding dates.

DOD’s proposal to accelerate aircraft deliveries is not reasonable because

decisions on Longbow Apache production should not be driven by the

Army’s missile cost-reduction plan. Longbow Apache production

schedules were developed to meet the Army’s need for an improved attack

helicopter within the funding limitations that exist. Given the cost of the

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aircraft compared to the missile, we believe it would be more reasonable

to match missile production to aircraft deliveries. Additionally, as noted in

the report, DOD’s alternatives need to consider the cost to replace those

missiles that become unusable when the shelf life expires because of the

cost-reduction program’s accelerated delivery plan.

Regarding our concerns on the lack of full consideration of alternatives in

the cost-effectiveness analysis of the Longbow Apache weapon system,

DOD stated that the formal COEA to be done to support the October 1995 DAB

review would not include the Comanche as an alternative because it could

not meet the Army’s near- to mid-term heavy attack helicopter

requirement.

As we previously indicated, we believe, based on DOD’s own guidance, that

the multirole Comanche should be included in any analysis. Low-rate

initial production is scheduled for 2004 with initial operational capability

and full-rate production scheduled for 2006. DOD’s guidance for developing

a COEA requires that (1) a wide range of alternatives be considered,

including conceptual systems and (2) all reasonable options should be

represented, including even doubtful alternatives, in order to establish

their merit. Moreover, including the Comanche in the COEA could provide

important cost-benefit information that could affect production decision

milestones for the Comanche.

Concerning our matters for congressional consideration, DOD commented

that (1) DOD has not yet submitted a request for the multiyear procurement

for the Longbow Hellfire missile and that Congress can reconsider DOD’s

position after the request and (2) Congress does not need to restrict fiscal

year 1996 funds because the DAB, in making its production decision, will

consider the weapon system’s developmental and operational testing

concerns and its cost-effectiveness.

After carefully reviewing DOD’s comments, we continue to believe that

Congress may wish to restrict access to program funds until the Army

provides the type of information we suggest. In our opinion, Congress

needs this information before milestone III if it is to make an informed

decision on the future funding of the program. DOD points out that the DAB

will review developmental and operational testing results concerning

critical technical issues and transceiver producibility will be addressed in

the cost-reduction program. However, as noted in our report, testing may

not have adequately addressed all of the issues discussed. Further, the

focus of the cost-reduction program could change if missile quantities are

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reduced to the levels we believe are valid. The Army will not recompute

requirements for the Longbow Hellfire missile until the next budget cycle,

3 months after the October 1995 milestone III review.

We have modified our suggestion about the multiyear contract to clearly

indicate that the contract has yet to be submitted to Congress. We still

maintain, however, that Congress needs to know the correct missile

requirement for the program and how the recomputed missile requirement

will impact the savings the Army expects to achieve by using the multiyear

contract.

Finally, as previously discussed, we do not believe the Army’s planned

COEA will provide an adequate evaluation of the Longbow Apache’s

comparative cost-effectiveness and military worth as it will not consider

all alternative attack helicopters, especially the Comanche.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine whether critical issues related to the production of the

aircraft and the producibility of its missiles had been addressed, we

reviewed various program research, development, and acquisition

documentation related to the Longbow Apache weapon system. We

interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington,

D.C.; Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri;

Air-to-Ground Missile Systems Project Office, Missile Command,

Huntsville, Alabama; Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen,

Maryland; and Operational Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia.

Developmental and operational test results are classified, and DOD had not

analyzed and authenticated them by the end of our review.

To determine whether the Longbow Hellfire missile procurement plan was

adequately developed, we interviewed cognizant Army officials involved in

the missile requirements setting process and performed our own analyses

on the missile inventory and requirements data provided. We talked to

officials located in the Air-to-Ground Missile Systems Project Office,

Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama, and the Office of the Army’s

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, including the Aviation

Division, Combat Support/Combat Service Support/Common Systems

Division, and Requirements Program and Priorities Division, Washington,

D.C.

To determine whether the Army conducted a thorough comparative

cost-effectiveness study, including alternative helicopter systems, we

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reviewed related DOD directives and guidance as well as other DOD and

Army documents. We interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary

of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Army Aviation and Troop Command, St.

Louis, Missouri; and Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Rucker,

Alabama.

We conducted our review from August 1994 to May 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are also sending copies of this report to the Chairman, Senate Armed

Services Committee; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Governmental

Affairs, and the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight;

the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretaries

of Defense and the Army. We will also provide copies to others upon

request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Thomas J. Schulz,

Associate Director, Systems Development and Production Issues. Please

contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix II.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 11-12.

See pp. 10-11.

See pp. 11-12.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3 and 8-10.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3 and

4-5.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3 and 5-8.

Now on p. 10.

See p. 11.

Now on p. 10.

See pp. 10-11.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 10.

See pp. 11-12.

Now on p. 10.

See pp. 11-12.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Robert J. Stolba

John P. Swain

David B. Best

Gregory K. Harmon

(707087) Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-159 Longbow Apache Helicopter
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