[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-12276

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cv-00148-RH-GRJ

YVELAN PIERRE, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

D. PADGETT, 

Department of Corrections Officer, 

J. SLAUGHTER, 

Department of Corrections Officer,

J. LAHR, 

Department of Corrections Officer, 

SADLER, 

Department of Corrections Officer, 

FREEMAN, 

Department of Corrections Officer, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees,

CLAY,

Department of Corrections Officer,

 Defendant.

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________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(April 3, 2020)

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Yvelan Pierre, an inmate incarcerated with the 

Florida Department of Corrections, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive-force case 

against several correctional officers (“Defendants”), alleging that they beat him up 

and pepper-sprayed him while he was shackled. Concluding that Plaintiff’s 

evidence established no more than a de minimis physical injury under the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the district court granted partial summary 

judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive 

damages. The court then held a bench trial on Plaintiff’s nominal-damages claim. 

At the end of the trial, the court found in favor of Defendants, ruling that they had 

not violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and were entitled to qualified immunity 

in any event. Plaintiff challenges those rulings on appeal. After careful 

consideration, we affirm. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against six correctional officers from

Taylor Correctional Institution (Sergeant Sadler, and Officers D. Padgett, D. 

Slaughter, J. Lahr, Matthew Coulliette, and Freeman),1 claiming that they had 

violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive 

force against him in retaliation for his filing of grievances.

2

 He alleged that, after 

filing a Staff-Abuse Report, he was scheduled to be transferred from Taylor 

Correctional Institution to another correctional facility. In preparation for his 

transfer, Defendants placed Plaintiff in ankle shackles and handcuffs secured by a 

black box. Then, according to Plaintiff, Officers Clay and Slaughter threatened 

that: “You think this is over don’t you? Well we got something for you, we’re 

going to beat your ass.” Plaintiff alleged that Officers Lahr, Slaughter, and 

Freeman attacked him without provocation during the transfer, hitting the back of 

his head, dropping him to the ground, and then punching, kicking, dragging, and 

pepper-spraying him while he was down. Plaintiff further alleged that Sergeant 

Sadler and Officer Coulliette joined in the beating, and that Officer Padgett 

brought a camera but was told by Sergeant Sadler to wait until the beating was 

done before recording. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants addressed him 

1

 Plaintiff’s complaint erroneously identified Officer Coulliette as “Officer Clay.” The error 

was corrected after Plaintiff discovered “Officer Clay’s” real name.

2

 Plaintiff is an inmate serving a life sentence. 

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using a racial slur, and that Sergeant Sadler had said, “I told you we was going to 

get you. I told you I would have the last say.” As a result of the incident, Plaintiff 

claimed that he had suffered “emotional stress, duress, and mental anguish.” He 

sought $30 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. 

After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing in 

relevant part that Plaintiff was not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages 

because he had not suffered a “physical injury” within the meaning of the PLRA, 

and that he could not recover nominal damages because his complaint did not 

request such relief. Plaintiff opposed the motion, attaching his Post-Use-of-ForceExam Record, which noted that Plaintiff had several abrasions, some bruising, a 

small amount of blood in his right nostril, two small nodules over and behind his 

right ear, and some redness and burning on his face caused by a chemical agent. 

The exam record also noted that Plaintiff had complained of pain in his lower back 

and neck, but that there was no redness, bruising, swelling, or deformity. 

A magistrate judge prepared a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), 

recommending that the district court grant Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment as to compensatory and punitive damages, but not as to nominal 

damages. The magistrate judge reasoned that the PLRA precluded claims for 

compensatory and punitive damages absent a showing of more than a de minimis 

physical injury, and that Plaintiff’s injuries, which did not require medical 

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treatment and included only scratches, abrasions, and some minor bruising, did not 

meet that standard.3

 Reading Plaintiff’s filings liberally, however, the magistrate 

judge concluded that he had requested nominal damages. Plaintiff did not timely

object to the R&R, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

recommendations. 

Plaintiff then moved for reconsideration, attaching belated objections to the 

R&R. He argued that establishing excessive force under the Eighth Amendment 

did not require a showing of more than a de minimis physical injury, and that his 

injuries were more than de minimis in any event. On March 22, 2017, the court 

granted Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, considered his untimely objections, 

and adhered to its prior ruling. The court noted that, although force rather than 

injury was the relevant factor for an Eighth Amendment claim, the PLRA 

prohibited prisoners from recovering damages absent a showing of a more than de 

minimis physical injury. As for the significance of Plaintiff’s injuries, the court 

readopted the magistrate judge’s determination that they were no more than de 

minimis. 

3

 See Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Under the [PLRA] and our 

caselaw, an incarcerated plaintiff cannot recover either compensatory or punitive damages for 

constitutional violations unless he can demonstrate a (more than de minimis) physical injury.”).

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After the court issued an order directing the clerk to seek pro bono counsel 

to represent Plaintiff in his trial for nominal damages,4 Plaintiff moved to strike or 

correct the court’s order, arguing that he should be permitted to seek compensatory 

and punitive damages at trial. On November 28, 2017, the court denied Plaintiff’s 

motion to strike, noting that it had already ruled that he could only seek nominal 

damages. 

Because no right to a jury trial attaches to a claim for nominal damages, the 

district court issued an order stating that it would hold a bench trial. Plaintiff did 

not object to that order, but did file a separate motion to stay the proceedings 

pending an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the court’s ruling on damages had 

denied him his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court denied the 

motion. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found in favor of 

Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to prove a constitutional violation 

and that, in any event, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity due to the 

absence of clearly established law prohibiting their conduct. 

On March 22, 2018, the court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. 

Plaintiff then moved to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial, arguing, 

among other things, that the court erred in concluding that he could recover only 

4

 As Plaintiff represented himself at trial pro se, we assume that pro bono counsel was not 

available.

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nominal damages, and that the court’s factual findings at trial were against the 

great weight of evidence. On April 30, 2018, the district court denied the motion 

to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial. 

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on May 31, 2018. The notice specified that 

he was appealing from (1) “the order denying Plaintiff[’]s motion to strike and 

correct court order November 28, 2017,” (2) “the [final] judgment rendered in 

favor of all the Defendants March 22, 2018,” and (3) “the order denying 

[P]laintiff[’]s motion for new trial and [to] alter or amend the judgment April 30, 

2018.” We appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff before this Court. 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Plaintiff raises two arguments. First, he contends that the district 

court erred in granting Defendants partial summary judgment on his claims for 

compensatory and punitive damages. Second, he argues that the district court 

erred in entering judgment for Defendants after a bench trial because the record did 

not support the court’s findings of fact. After considering a jurisdictional issue 

raised by Defendants, we address each of Plaintiff’s arguments. We discern no 

error below, and therefore affirm the district court’s rulings.

A. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that we lack jurisdiction to review the 

district court’s summary judgment ruling that Plaintiff could not recover 

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compensatory or punitive damages because Plaintiff’s notice of appeal did not 

reflect an intent to appeal that ruling. We disagree. “[A]n appellate court has 

jurisdiction to review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are 

specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal.” Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 

F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, “we will 

not expand [a notice of appeal] to include judgments and orders not specified 

unless the overriding intent to appeal these orders is readily apparent on the face of 

the notice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, “we always construe pro se

pleadings liberally,” and because “only a final judgment or order is appealable, the 

appeal from a final judgment draws in question all prior non-final orders and 

rulings which produced the judgment.” Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1208–

09 n.5 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, because Plaintiff’s notice of appeal challenged “the judgment rendered 

in favor of all the Defendants March 22, 2018”—that is, the court’s final 

judgment—we have jurisdiction to review prior non-final rulings that produced 

that judgment, including the district court’s summary judgment ruling, which 

resulted in a bench trial rather than a jury trial. Id. (holding that we had 

jurisdiction to review a motion-to-dismiss ruling where the pro se plaintiff’s notice 

of appeal did not mention the motion to dismiss but “specifically referenced ‘the 

[final] judgment entered . . . on February 6th 2013’”); see also Barfield v. Brierton, 

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883 F.2d 923, 930 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The plaintiff seeks review of the entire final 

judgment which implicates all non-final orders preceding it, including the stay.”). 

We therefore proceed to the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal.

B. Summary Judgment

On summary judgment, the district court ruled that Plaintiff could not 

recover compensatory or punitive damages under the PLRA because the scratches, 

abrasions, and minor bruising he received amounted to no more than a de minimis 

physical injury. Plaintiff challenges this ruling on appeal. We discern no error and 

affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We review a district court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo considering all the facts and reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 

F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009).

Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil 

action “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior 

showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). We have interpreted that 

provision as preventing a prisoner from recovering compensatory or punitive 

damages unless he can show that he suffered a physical injury. Brooks v. Warden, 

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800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, absent a physical injury, a prisoner 

may recover only nominal damages on a successful claim. Id. at 1307–08. 

Further, we have held that, “in order to satisfy section 1997e(e) the physical injury 

must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant.” Harris v. Garner, 190 

F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.), op. reinstated in relevant part on reh’g en banc, 216 

F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000). 

In his briefing, Plaintiff confuses the requirements for recovering damages 

under the PLRA with the standards for proving an Eighth Amendment excessiveforce claim. Because the “core judicial inquiry” for an Eighth Amendment claim 

concerns “the nature of the force” rather than “the extent of the injury,” it is true 

that a prisoner need not prove that he suffered a more than de minimis injury to 

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39–40 

(2010). But, as the district court explained, to recover compensatory and punitive 

damages under the PLRA, it is not enough to establish an Eighth Amendment 

violation. A prisoner must also establish a “physical injury,” meaning an injury 

that is more than de minimis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307; 

Harris, 190 F.3d at 1286. Thus, when Plaintiff argues that the district court erred 

in granting Defendants partial summary judgment on damages because, “[n]o 

matter how minimal the ultimate injury turned out to be to [Plaintiff], the use of 

force against him was excessive,” he misses the point. 

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Here, we agree with the district court that Plaintiff’s physical injuries were 

no more than de minimis. He suffered only scrapes, scratches, and minor bruising 

or swelling. In the scheme of things, these are trivial harms, which Plaintiff 

happened to sustain during an altercation with correctional officers, but which are 

not atypical nor usually noteworthy in the ordinary course of daily life.

5 Compare

Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding, in the 

context of a Fourth Amendment excessive-force case, that “minor bruising which 

quickly disappeared without treatment” was the kind of “minimal . . . injury 

involved in a typical arrest”), with Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (concluding, in a Fourth Amendment excessive-force case, that 

“lacerations, injuries to [the plaintiff’s] teeth and jaw, damage to his left eardrum, 

and emotional distress” were not de minimis injuries). Plaintiff’s relatively 

insignificant injuries are certainly not what the PLRA had in mind when it required 

5

 Although Plaintiff contends that being pepper-sprayed established a more than de minimis 

physical injury, the evidence presented at summary judgment did not show that the pepper spray 

caused any harm beyond a temporary burning sensation. Absent some additional injury other 

than momentary discomfort, we fail to see how the discomfort associated with being peppersprayed transforms the harm Plaintiff suffered into a more than de minimis “physical injury” any 

more than the discomfort caused by scratches and bruises renders those relatively trivial injuries 

more than de minimis. C.f. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (noting that “pepper spray ordinarily causes only temporary discomfort”); cf. Danley 

v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Any injuries or discomfort Danley suffered as a 

necessary result of a dose of pepper spray were neither substantial nor long lasting.”), overruled 

in part on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Notably, the record does not suggest that Plaintiff required medical treatment to address any 

minimal harm caused by the pepper spray.

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the existence of a “physical injury” as a prerequisite for filing a lawsuit for “mental 

or emotional injury suffered.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see Harris, 190 F.3d at 1286 

(noting that “Congress was clearly trying to preclude some part of the litigation 

routinely pursued by prison inmates from being brought,” and that “allowing 

prisoners to surmount this new statutory hurdle with purely trivial allegations of 

physical injury would make no sense”). Indeed, it is undisputed that Plaintiff 

healed without the need for any medical treatment, which explains why he only 

sought damages for “emotional stress, duress, and mental anguish.” 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in ruling on summary judgment

that Plaintiff failed to establish a “physical injury” under the PLRA, and thus that 

he could not recover compensatory or punitive damages. Brooks, 800 F.3d at 

1307.

C. Bench Trial

As noted, the district court conducted a bench trial to determine whether the 

Defendants had used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

The court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to prove that the force used by the 

defendant officers was constitutionally excessive. On appeal, Plaintiff contends 

that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion. We disagree. Following a 

bench trial, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

conclusions of law de novo. Renteria-Marin v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 537 F.3d 

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1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). “We will not find clear error unless our review of the 

record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 

F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).

“Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial 

setting if it is ‘applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ and 

not ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 

1205 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “To 

determine if an application of force was applied maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm, a variety of factors are considered including: ‘the need for the 

application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force 

used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts 

made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 

1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). “Not only that, but 

we must also give a wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve 

discipline and security, including when considering decisions made at the scene of 

a disturbance.” Sears, 922 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 

1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007)).

In reaching its conclusion that Defendants did not use excessive force, the 

district court found the following facts: In March 2011, officials at Taylor 

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Correctional Institution decided to transfer Plaintiff to another institution because 

he had threatened officers. On April 11, the transfer process began. While 

escorting Plaintiff, Officer Lahr responded to what the district court referred to as 

“some jawing” by non-forcibly slapping Plaintiff in the back of the head. Plaintiff 

then turned on Officer Lahr “with some vigor,” a move that Officer Lahr perceived 

as an attempted head-butt. In response, Officers Lahr and Slaughter took Plaintiff 

to the ground. When Plaintiff refused to comply and continued to resist, Officer 

Lahr sprayed him with a chemical agent. Because Plaintiff continued resisting 

while on the ground, the court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in

pepper-spraying him to restore order. 

On appeal, Plaintiff concedes that “[p]epper spray is an accepted non-lethal

means of controlling unruly inmates.” Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th 

Cir. 2008), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 

610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, he argues that, because there 

was no evidence that he was resisting or disobeying orders while on the ground,

the district court erred in concluding that Defendants did not use excessive force. 

See id. at 1309 (“When jailers continue to use substantial force against a prisoner 

who has clearly stopped resisting—whether because he has decided to become 

compliant, he has been subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated—that use of force 

is excessive.”). 

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The record, however, belies Plaintiff’s argument. At trial, Officer Lahr 

testified that Plaintiff “continued to be combative” while on the ground, “fighting,” 

“attempt[ing] to kick me and Officer Slaughter,” and “not ceasing [his] actions.”

Officer Lahr further testified that Plaintiff “w[asn’t] listening to what I was telling 

[him,]” and that “after giving [Plaintiff] several verbal orders,” which he did not 

follow, Officer Lahr “broke the seal on [his] M-4 and applied the chemical agent to 

[Plaintiff’s] upper torso.” Officer Slaughter offered a similar account, testifying 

that, after they “told [Plaintiff] to cease his actions or chemical agents [would] be 

applied,” “Lahr broke his seal and sprayed Plaintiff,” who was “very combative 

and [was] kicking and rolling around” on the ground. 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that, before he 

was pepper-sprayed, Plaintiff had continued to actively resist even while he was on 

the ground. Given that finding, the district court did not err in concluding that 

Officers Lahr and Slaughter reasonably applied pepper spray to restore order. See 

Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307 (“If there were nothing before us but the initial use of 

pepper spray following Danley’s second failure to obey Allyn’s order to return to 

the cell, we would readily conclude that there was no Fourteenth Amendment 

violation.”). 

Even assuming that we were to determine that the efforts taken by 

Defendants to restrain Plaintiff constituted excessive force, Plaintiff still would not 

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prevail because Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified 

immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). To 

show that an official who acted within the scope of his discretionary authority is 

not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff must establish both that “(1) the 

defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established 

at the time of the alleged violation.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cty., 601 F.3d 1152, 

1158 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). 

The district court noted that had Plaintiff been compliant once brought to 

ground—that is, had he ceased resisting orders and physically defying the 

officers—the law is clearly established that the use of pepper spray at that point 

would have been excessive. Yet, having credited the testimony of the officers at 

the bench trial that Plaintiff had continued to kick and flail, refusing to obey the 

officers’ directives to cease, the district court noted that there was no law clearly 

establishing that the use of spray at this point would have constituted excessive 

force. Accordingly, qualified immunity applied. We agree with the district court’s 

determination on this point as well. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary 

judgment to Defendants on damages, as well as the district court’s final judgment 

in favor of Defendants.

AFFIRMED.

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