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SUDAN: CONSOLIDATING PEACE WHILE

CONFRONTING GENOCIDE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 22, 2005

Serial No. 109–108

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

JOAN O. CONDON, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 10

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

State: Prepared statement ................................................................................... 22

Ms. Elisabeth T. Kidder, Director, Survivors United to Save the Women 

of Darfur: Prepared statement ............................................................................ 47

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 55

Responses from the Honorable Robert B. Zoellick to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California ................................................................ 56

(1)

SUDAN: CONSOLIDATING PEACE WHILE 

CONFRONTING GENOCIDE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. The challenges we face today in Sudan are perhaps among the most difficult of our time. On the one hand, the peaceful resolution of a decades-long civil war between the North and South is critical, an 

opening that could provide untold opportunities for peace, economic 

development and democratic aspirations. 

On the other hand, a genocidal conflict rages in the Darfur region of western Sudan, a conflict which claims up to 10,000 lives 

per month. 

Finally, the odious regime responsible for atrocities in both of 

those wars has offered the United States valuable support in the 

global war on terrorism. It is all too easy to see one of these developments as more important than the other, but I believe that 

would be a mistake. Let us learn the lessons of our past failures 

in Sudan. 

The war between the North and South claimed the lives of over 

2 million Sudanese and was punctuated by incredible brutality, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forcible conscription, enslavement, mass murder, arson and rape. The United 

States poured hundreds of millions of dollars into humanitarian relief for Sudan but never bothered to engage in a high-level effort 

to resolve the conflict until President Bush appointed Senator John 

Danforth as a special envoy in 2001. 

In the 1990s, when the war between the Government in Khartoum and rebels in the South was at its peak, the Sudanese Government sought a diplomatic rapprochement with the United 

States. Khartoum, we were told, was willing to turn over a very 

well-known terrorist to U.S. law enforcement. But because of the 

war between North and South, and because of concerns about 

Khartoum’s atrocious conduct in the war, the offer was refused. 

Later, President Clinton described his failure to accept that offer 

as the biggest mistake of his Presidency. The terrorist was Osama 

bin Laden. 

In Darfur today, the Sudanese Government is employing many 

of the same tactics it used in the South. No one knows the precise 

2

number of those who have perished as a result of the genocide, but 

numerous observers place the figure at roughly 300,000. Over 2 

million Darfurians have been forced from their homes. Entire villages have been razed. There are widespread reports of arbitrary 

killing, abduction, looting, torture and rape. 

Now, just as in the 1990s, reports of a visit to the United States 

by the Sudanese intelligence chief, who allegedly has shared valuable information relating to the war on terrorism, have sparked 

outrage among those who rightly are concerned by genocide in 

Darfur. 

In this context, there are three temptations that must be resisted 

today. The first is to focus solely on the crisis in Darfur at the expense of solidifying the historic North-South Peace Accord. The second, is to allow the end of the conflict between North and South 

to blind us to the grave human tragedy unfolding in Darfur. The 

third, is to allow the Government of Sudan’s reported cooperation 

in the war on terrorism to outweigh all of the above. 

There will be no easy answers, but we must hold these three 

equally vexing challenges in our heads and be sure that we do not 

sacrifice one challenge to meet the others. The consequences of 

shortsightedness, as we saw on September 11, 2001, and continue 

to see today in Darfur, are horrifying. Before turning to the esteemed Ranking Democratic Member, allow me to note that the 

Committee will entertain 1-minute remarks by any Member who 

feels compelled to make them. 

I do, however, encourage restraint. We have a great deal to cover 

today, and we want to make sure that we allow enough time for 

questions. 

With that, I turn to my friend, the distinguished Ranking Democratic Member Tom Lantos, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want 

to thank you for holding this most important hearing on the horrendous situation in Sudan. 

Before dealing with Sudan, I would like to ask Deputy Secretary 

Zoellick to carry to Secretary Rice our strong admiration for the 

powerful, historic and courageous speech she made in Cairo and in 

Saudi Arabia on the importance of opening up non-democratic regimes. This is the first time in history that an American Secretary 

of State in Cairo and in Riyadh made speeches calling on democratization by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and I strongly applaud her efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, with this forum and others, our Committee continues to press diligently for more action to stop the human rights 

abuses in the Darfur region of Sudan, even as the international 

community chooses to maintain its focus on securing the peace. 

After 20 years of civil war, South Sudan has been liberated. But 

it now faces the daunting task of achieving stability and prosperity. 

While South Sudan now has the good fortune to look toward the 

future, Darfur still is in the midst of a genocide that harkens back 

to the worst moments in human history. As the only survivor of the 

Holocaust ever elected to Congress, I feel particular kinship to the 

people of Darfur. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know well, my commitment to promoting 

human rights stems from my own early experiences with oppresVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

sion and genocide. But we need not look back as far as World War 

II to find an example of a situation in which more timely intervention could have prevented a tragedy. 

This week, my wife and I have the privilege of meeting in my office a genuine hero, Paul Rusesabagina. His courageous action during the senseless ethnic violence of Rwanda during the 1990s saved 

over 1,000 lives and has been commemorated in the remarkable 

film, Hotel Rwanda. Mr. Chairman, the world could use more heroes, but the situation that gave rise to this one must not be allowed to play out on the African Continent again. 

While there is no doubt that one has to deal with the devil at 

times to bring peace, we should not let Khartoum cover a multitude 

of sins just because it reluctantly and belatedly reached an accord 

with South Sudan. 

International pressure, led by the United States, has reduced the 

large-scale violence against the people of Darfur over the past few 

months, primarily in the areas where the African Union monitors 

have been present. 

Yet, Mr. Chairman, in areas where there are no monitors, genocide by attrition continues. Protection of civilians in the Darfur region has been pitifully poor. For some months now, I have been 

calling for the United Nations to implement a clear, immediate, civilian protection strategy to safeguard the people of Darfur from 

genocide. 

African Union troops responsible for monitoring the cease-fire in 

Darfur were given neither the mandate nor the capacity to enforce 

it. Even more sickening, the African Union deployment required 

the consent of the sponsors of genocide sitting in Khartoum. The 

African Union now plans to increase its ranks in Darfur to 7,731 

troops by September. But this is still woefully insufficient to monitor Darfur, a territory the size of France. 

In my judgment, no fewer than 15,000 troops are needed to protect civilians against Khartoum and its Arab militias. 

Mr. Chairman, even increasing the troop strength in Darfur is 

not enough. The African Union needs to add teeth to its mandate 

of the forces in Darfur so that soldiers can take any measure necessary to protect citizens from attack. The African Union finally 

has agreed to augment its deployment with logistical communications and other support from NATO and the European Union. 

But even if that happens—and it will take some time before that 

happens—I strongly urge NATO and the European Union to step 

into the breach and to implement a robust protection mission until 

the AU troops can fully deploy. With the defeat of the European 

Constitution by both Holland and France, Europe is in disarray. I 

can’t conceive of a more effective and meaningful and lifesaving 

move by the European Union than to take military action in Darfur 

to save lives. If the European Union does that, if the European 

Union provides NATO with the necessary forces and commitment, 

we will rapidly forget the collapse of the Constitution. 

Mr. Chairman, the genocide in Darfur is not just an African crisis. It is a crisis of all humanitarians, and as such, it obligates all 

of us to act with great urgency. I want to commend Secretary 

Zoellick for his outstanding work in Africa, and I look forward to 

4

his testimony for what the United States is prepared to do to stop 

the slaughter in Darfur. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

We will now entertain 1-minute statements for those who wish 

to make them. 

First, Mr. Leach of Iowa. 

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Two years ago the Government of Sudan, responding to the formation of two rebel movements in the Western Darfur region, initiated a terror campaign, as we all know, against the residents, 

through direct attacks on rebels and civilians and through a militia, known as the Janjaweed. State-sponsored violence has displaced more than 2 million residents of the region and killed between 180,000 and 400,000 persons in Darfur. 

This, on top of the genocide that has happened in the South, 

where 2 million people have been killed and 4 million displaced. 

The United Nations referred to the killing and displacement of people as ethnic cleansing. I am happy to say that our President, 

President Bush, Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza 

Rice and other members of our government have called it for what 

it is, a genocide. 

Today, an estimated 10,000 residents in Darfur continue to die 

each month. Most of these deaths, as we know, are due to illness 

or starvation as a result of attacks on humanitarian supply shipments by Darfur rebels. Mr. Chairman, the African Union mission 

in Sudan has asked for and has been given primacy in preventing 

further killings of civilians in safeguarding humanitarian supplies 

in Darfur. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. This is a good sign, and hopefully, 

they will be successful. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Mr. Lantos, for calling this very important meeting. I believe 

that this is a very timely hearing, because I would like to know 

what the United States policy toward Sudan is. Up to now, it 

seems very unclear. There is one government that stands out in today’s world as the most heinous, the most abusive, the most unconscionable evil regime; that is the former National Islamic Front 

(NIF) Government, now called the National Congress Party. 

This regime, which came to power through a bloody coup in 1989, 

has not ceased to stretch the limits of the mind of the ability to 

comprehend a brutality that one human can inflict upon another 

human, nor has it ceased to challenge the international community’s threshold for witnessing human suffering. 

Not only did the NIF Government harbor Osama bin Laden—the 

Bush Administration’s primary foe in the war on terror, who masterminded the tragic events of September 11th and the bombing of 

the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Embassies and the assassination 

attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—the same genVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
5

tleman who was invited to the United States, Mr. Gosh, was the 

one in charge of all those activities. They tell me that leopards 

don’t change spots. 

It turns out the people of the Nuba Mountains, where they had 

a well orchestrated campaign to kill, they then went after the 

South with the new oil money and viewed the bombardment with 

the Antonovs——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PAYNE. This government is wrong, and I look forward to your 

testimony. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Deputy Secretary, I welcome the chance to work with you. You 

showed great commitment to Africa as the U.S. Trade Representative. Now you have thrown yourself into the Sudan crisis. Moving 

ahead will require the energetic commitment you gave to the 

United States-Africa trade agenda. The last Congress came to the 

conclusion that the Sudanese Government was responsible for genocidal killing in Darfur. The Administration seconded that finding, 

and President Bush signed legislation affirming it. 

In January, I travelled to Darfur, a trip that reconfirmed the 

genocide finding for me. We were in Tine, a town formerly of 

20,000, where there are 200 survivors. 

If we believe the genocide is occurring in Darfur, and I know that 

other factors are in play, including land disputes, but if these don’t 

void the genocidal factors, then we should act with great urgency. 

You have gone to the Sudan, and the United States has done far 

more than many other countries, many of which don’t wish to believe that genocide is occurring. But I can’t help but sense that 

greater urgency is needed. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I just want to associate myself with the remarks 

of the Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos. I think he really got this 

right. There is no time. There ought to be a sense of urgency, and 

I would even extend this to the involvement of the United States 

in any action that would be undertaken by the EU, by NATO. Obviously, we are a member of NATO. But genocide, this is the ultimate act of terrorism. 

If there is a war on terror that needs immediate intervention, it 

is happening in Darfur. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am just—thank you very much for coming today, and I would 

be very interested in the testimony. I would hope that as we move 

forward and look at what is going on in Sudan and try to find longterm solutions to the challenges we face, I hope that we also take, 

not just a long-term approach to Sudan, but a regional view of 

what it is going to take to have peace in that area. As you know, 

first we had the Sudanese civil war. Then you have this Darfur 

genocide. 

From what I understand, the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia this moment is about to explode unless we pay more attention 

6

to it. If that happens, it is going to engulf that whole area. All the 

good work we have done for Sudan and even what we do to help 

in Darfur, is going to be for naught. 

So I would admonish the Administration to start paying some attention. We can do something to stop a conflict between Ethiopia 

and Eritrea. We should be doing it. It will have incredible implications on your ability to do your job in Sudan and these other challenges we face. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Lee of California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, want to welcome you, Deputy Secretary, and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. 

I want to also follow up with Mr. Payne’s comment and questions 

with regard to United States policy toward the Sudan. I believe it 

was in April the United States Government hosted, or at least invited and had discussions with the top intelligence chief of the 

Sudan, and now we are in a hearing, and you may clarify this 

later, that a high-level delegation may be visiting the United 

States. 

Also, I am hearing that there are discussions with regard to the 

lifting of sanctions against this regime. So I wanted to—and during 

the questioning, I want to clarify from you what is taking place. 

I had the privilege to visit the Sudan with Chairman Royce, and 

what I saw was unbelievable. Genocide is occurring. There should 

be no discussion with regard to the lifting of sanctions. And yes, 

we have to deal with the war on terror, but we have got to figure 

out a way to address the war on terror with Sudan if, in fact, that 

is the case, but using that as leverage to get that country to end 

the genocide against the thousands and thousands of people. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. LEE. And so I look forward to a response. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, there is certainly no greater problem, more of a conundrum, in the world that we confront in Sudan. 

It is extremely important. I hope that we will take this into consideration during all of our deliberations and during every time we 

have an opportunity to address a member of the Administration, 

that we never made a single ounce of progress, ever, in the entire 

time that we have been working in this area, without confronting, 

without making it impossible for Khartoum to do anything else. 

They only did what they did when we took away all other options. 

It wasn’t because they wanted peace. It was because they had no 

other option at that time, and they look forward to the, I think, 

time when we aren’t looking as carefully at this. 

The complexity of those challenges require high-level commitment on the part of the United States over a long period of time. 

Appointing a special envoy to Sudan would commit that attention 

without elevating our diplomatic presence there, and I would like 

to hear where the Administration is in the process of evaluating 

this proposal. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

7

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Blumenauer. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I have enjoyed, in the past, interacting 

with you given sort of the focus that you have in trying to solve 

difficult problems and intellectual challenges. I think none probably that confront you is any more onerous than what you are 

going to be talking through today. 

I would hope—I have already extended my apologies for jumping 

across to a hearing. I will be back. But I would like to explore with 

you ways that you think that Congress could have a more focused 

presence in this troubled area. A number of my colleagues have 

been there. I have entertained this notion that we might be able 

to have a sustained series of efforts so that every Member of Congress who wishes over the course of the next year and a half, could 

actually spend some time on the ground, and that could be done 

on an ongoing basis. So that, if there were a series of visits—and 

hopefully, in some cases, repeat visits—that it might give some additional attention, some leverage, and we would be willing to work 

in a cooperative fashion. I would like to explore that a little bit further with you. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Paul of Texas. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In 2003, the Government of Sudan and its outlaws began a campaign to slaughter their own people in Darfur. In less than a year’s 

time, the Sudan’s Government forces and their militia, the 

Janjaweed, have killed thousands of civilians, forced over 100,000 

civilians to flee to neighboring Chad, and displaced more than 1 

million people. 

The U.S. Administration and Congress have both called this evil 

campaign genocide. However, the time for name-calling is over. A 

decade ago, nearly 1 million innocent people were slaughtered in 

Rwanda, and the world hid their faces and failed to act. This cannot be repeated in Sudan. The United States, the United Nations, 

the European Union, and the African Union must do more to ensure that genocide stops. 

Every day that there is failure to act, more victims are doomed 

to die. Reminds me of a statement that my grandfather used to 

make: ‘‘When all is said and done, more was said than done.’’ I 

would like to see the United States policy on what the exact plan 

is. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Boozman. He is not here. 

Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I will yield back my 1 minute. 

Chairman HYDE. The Chair appreciates Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, we are all acutely aware of the fact that, down the 

road, we are going to be asked, what did we do in Congress, what 

did we do in the Administration to stop the genocide going on in 

8

Darfur? I don’t think any of us are yet comfortable with the answer 

that we can give. We all want to do more. 

We don’t think we are doing enough. Nothing that has been 

asked of the Congress has been refused. Nothing that the Administration asks of Congress to help stop the genocide in Darfur will 

be refused. Indeed, we are struggling to determine what we can do 

proactively to halt the slaughter. This is a litmus test, not only for 

the Congress and Administration but for the United Nations, too, 

as Mark Brown testified a month or so ago. 

I agree with Mr. Lantos. I think we need to do everything possible to beef up the African Union troops to at least 15,000, and 

I would appreciate hearing your testimony, not what we are doing, 

but what more we can be doing to make that happen. I appreciate 

your being here and look forward to hearing what you have to say. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No comments at 

this time. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much. 

I wish I could take representative Shelley Berkley’s 1 minute. 

But I had the good fortune to travel with the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa over to the Sudan. As we know, since the beginning of the genocide and before many tens of thousands of innocent civilians have been killed, one in every three Darfurians has 

been displaced, and 200,000 people have been forced into refugee 

camps. 

We went in with Don Cheadle, the actor who played the role of 

the hotel manager, Paul Rusesabagina, and they stayed overnight 

there. While they walked among the people, they told us very clearly, people who look like us—and I remember one tall, young man, 

circling his face—had been killed. The children drew pictures of 

bloody sheets with planes of the insignia of the government flying 

over. 

So I welcome Deputy Secretary Zoellick and hope that you can 

inform us how our Government is responding to this genocide. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you for your generosity, Mr. Chair. In 

order to be able to ask my question, I yield back the time. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to associate myself with the remarks of our Ranking 

Member. It is good to see my friend again, Ambassador Zoellick, 

once again in a different capacity. This, unfortunately, though reminds me of an event I attended a couple of months ago, in February of this year, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the 

ending of the Nazi death camps and I continually heard over and 

over again: Never again, never again, never again. 

But there apparently seems to be no end to the ‘‘never-agains,’’ 

because we continue to have this problem throughout the world. I, 

too, am interested in hearing what the plan of our Government is 

to cease the genocide in Darfur and what plan we have to bring 

9

assistance in getting that assistance to the people who need it, to 

the displaced people of Darfur, as well. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the rest of my time. 

I haven’t used it all, I don’t believe. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Crowley. 

Thank you, Mr. Chandler. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see you again, Mr. Deputy Secretary. I, too, came to hear 

your testimony today. It seems to me, you know, particularly the 

President of the United States, Secretary of State Powell, this Congress with its loudest voice, has indicated that genocide is taking 

place. I know there was a letter that was sent to you. I guess, from 

that reply, maybe you don’t think so. I would like to know why. 

There has been some different issues with reference to you. It 

has been reported that up to 400,000 individuals have been killed. 

I think that you came out with a number that was something like 

60,000 to 160,000—I don’t know the discrepancies or how you came 

to that number. So I would be interested in hearing how that is. 

The fact of the matter is that there is, in my opinion, genocide 

has taken place, and we are not doing what we need to do to stop 

the killings. I would like to know what the Administration’s plan 

is. 

I know that the AU—and I hear that the AU is intending to 

come in—but that is not going to happen until 2006. What message 

are we leaving the people if in fact we do nothing until 2006 to secure them? How can we stop a genocide unless—and people who 

die—unless there is some security there? 

I look forward to hearing what the Administration’s policies are 

so we can make sure that we don’t have this continue on our 

watch. 

Chairman HYDE. We are very fortunate to have the Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B. Zoellick, with us today. Prior to his current appointment, Mr. Zoellick served as the 13th U.S. Trade Representative and as Undersecretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs. 

From 1985 to 1988, Mr. Zoellick served at the Department of 

Treasury as Counselor to Secretary James Baker, Executive Secretary of the Department and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Policy. 

Mr. Zoellick has also served as Executive Vice President at 

Fannie Mae, Professor of National Security at the Naval Academy, 

research scholar at the Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs at Harvard, and Senior International Advisor to Goldman 

Sachs. 

Mr. Zoellick, I am pleased that you are serving as the Secretary’s 

point man on Sudan. You are a seasoned veteran who undoubtedly 

is up to the task. I do, however, seek your assurances that the Administration’s interest in Sudan does not end with you. The overlapping and complex crises in Sudan not only deserve but absolutely require serious and sustained attention by both the Secretary of State and the President. 

I should note that I have been working with the gentleman from 

New Jersey, Don Payne, and other Members of this Committee to 

10

develop bipartisan legislation which keeps pressure on the regime 

in Khartoum to end the crisis in Darfur and encourages the expansion of the African Union mission in Darfur so that it achieves the 

size, capacity, and mandate necessary to provide civilian protection 

and offers the President maximum flexibility to support the deployment and reinforcement of such an expanded mission. 

I look forward to working with you to see that these critically important objectives are realized. 

Mr. Zoellick, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, 

DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Lantos, Members of the Committee. 

Mr. Lantos, I will be pleased to relay your compliments to the 

Secretary when she gets back later this week. 

As all the statements suggested, I know there is extremely 

strong interest in this Committee, as there is across the United 

States, in the problems of Sudan and Darfur. 

Mr. Chairman, just to underscore one of the points you made in 

the opening comment, I have discussed this with the President, as 

well as the Secretary of State at length. Both of them are extremely interested in the issue. It is one of the reasons that they 

asked me to focus on Darfur and the issues of Sudan. I will discuss 

some of this in the PowerPoint testimony. I tried to present this 

in this format because sometimes I think it is a little bit more userfriendly. But I will try to move through it quickly so we have plenty of chances to get through questions. 

The second slide is just a map. It is a good reference point. 

But, on page 3, you see, I have tried to identify the goals of 

United States policy, because I think it is very important, amidst 

all the challenges, that one has a clear sense of what one is trying 

to achieve, and that is a unified and peaceful Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counterterrorism; 

a participatory and inclusive democratic government in a Federal 

system that respects human rights, shares resources for the benefit 

of all Sudanese, and a key aspect of that are free, fair and democratic elections at the local, regional and national levels within 4 

years. 

To make this happen, we have to have an end to violence in 

Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other groups, the voluntary 

return of people to their homes and, of course, accountability for 

the perpetrators. 

In the meantime, I will come back to some of the particulars on 

this, we have to make sure we provide the humanitarian care and 

security for the internally displaced people and other civilians in 

Darfur, as well as the refugees in Chad, and try to improve conditions in South Sudan. 

I want to focus on economic development and effective integration of all areas of Sudan and to the global economy; thereby ending one of the problems for Sudan, which has been a recurring 

cycle of famine and suffering leading to cross-border violence, as 

well as some of the points that Mr. Rohrabacher is referencing, and 

the refugee flows. 

11

In the process, we want to try to strengthen the African Union’s 

capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, mediate political conflicts, trying to demonstrate a success in Darfur 

and all of Sudan, and, in the process, also demonstrate strong 

United States support for Africa’s peaceful development and democracy. 

The next slide, page 4, tries to give a quick sense of background 

and context. Because, as I know many of you that have visited and 

talked to others and me about this, is that there are a number of 

complex strands here coming together, and I just thought it would 

be useful to try to highlight some of them. Most important is that 

Sudan as a country has been marked by ethno-religious 

exclusivism since the Khartoum traders and mercenaries first 

carved out this region in the conquest of the Nile Valley in the 19th 

century. 

So, historically, you have a country that has been dominated by 

a very small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators. They 

tend to be drawn from a limited set of tribes, frankly three Arab 

tribes north of Khartoum. Because of this, the country at large has 

had a large Arab cultural-religious orientation. The ties are traditionally to Cairo, to Damascus in the past years, to Saudi Arabia, 

and not to the rest of Africa. 

So what that has produced is Khartoum fundamentally operates 

as an Arab metropolis that is surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses. 

So in the South, you have traditional African tribal structures, 

animist and Christian communities. 

In the West, in Darfur, you have had a fascinating historical 

mixing over the centuries of African and Arab-Muslim tribes. Some 

have come from the West over a long migration, some of them economic, some of them religious. You have ancient Saharan peoples 

and Arab tribes from the North. 

Economically, this has led to a mixture. You have nomads and 

also farmers, and this creates a very complex network where livelihood has been based on desert-edge villages, very dependent on 

rain and ‘‘boom-and-bust’’ agriculture and grasses. As I will talk 

about, this has been one of the precipitators of the problem in the 

region. If we are really going to address this problem over time, understanding some of the economic and ethnic connections will be 

important to address. 

In the North, you have a mixture of Arab tribes, and they predominate in the urban areas. 

And in the East, you have this general egalitarian pastoral Beja 

that have ancestral ties to Egypt and the Nubians. 

Now, in the past, and this basically references up to 1989, the 

history of the system is a very weak center, Khartoum, that has 

tended to co-opt regional constituencies to create a power base, 

which is based on this Arab sort of center with the tribes from 

north of the Nile. 

Just to give you an example, since we focused on Darfur; Darfur 

was the Independent Fur Sultanate, so Dar was the land of the 

Fur dating back to the 17th century. This was overthrown by the 

British at the start of the 20th century, in 1916. The way that the 

British then ruled the country was through a series of imperial naVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tive administrations that awarded homelands with paramount 

chiefs. This displaced the older, more fluid social order. 

Now a key point for today is some of the nomadic groups didn’t 

get lands in this process. As I noted, this set a long fuse for the 

future when some of those groups ran out of area for their grasses. 

The rule depended on the effectiveness of local leadership in government. This was and remains a very important aspect for tribal 

conferences to try to help settle disputes. 

Sudan achieved its independence in 1956. As some of you alluded 

to, this is the largest country in the continent. It borders nine other 

countries. So what happens in Sudan affects a lot of others, it has 

an estimated 40 million people. 

Now the roots of the conflict date back to this point that I mentioned about a strong resentment from the periphery of the Muslim-Arab domination at the center. So the strife really starts with 

independence in 1956, when the Southern groups start to struggle 

for their potential independence. There is a peace agreement in 

1972, and that failed because it was not fully implemented, a caution for all of us today related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement we signed earlier this year. 

The Government of Sudan (GOS) imposed Shari’a Law in 1983. 

This re-triggered the Southern civil war now under the leadership 

of Dr. John Garang, a Southerner who had been part of the Sudanese military, integrated as part of the 1972 peace implementation. 

As many of you who know him, he was educated in the United 

States, went to Iowa State, as I recall, also had military training 

here. An important point, this battle in the South was the first use 

by the Government of Sudan of government-mobilized militias as 

a counterinsurgency strategy, interestingly and, in some cases, a 

tragic irony, drawing on some of the cattle herding areas of Darfur. 

It is a basic strategy of brutality, starvation, and robbery. Of 

course these tactics, these counterinsurgency tactics, have been 

turned against Darfur 20 years later. So in the North-South struggle, as I think Mr. Lantos and the Chairman mentioned, you had 

some 2.5 million people die over the course of this 21-year struggle. 

So, meanwhile, in Darfur, in the mid-1980s, this trouble really 

starts with the drought and famine in 1984. This led to the breakdown of this fragile social structure that I mentioned, including the 

migratory patterns between the settled agriculturalists and the 

herders. 

An important part, as many of you may recall, Libya, which was 

trying to go after Chad in 1987, uses the region as sort of a backdoor for movement. It formed something called the Arab Legion. 

This is very important, because the description I gave you of this 

region suggests you had a mixing of Arabs and Africans over centuries in this region. The sharp borders between Arabs and Africans had not really been drawn until you start this racial ideology 

of Arabism that comes out of the Chad movement. Frankly, this is 

connected to some of the definitions of genocide, at least the United 

States view of them. 

In 1989, General Bashir overthrows the government, establishes 

this Revolutionary Command Council for the National Salvation. 

The National Islamic Front that is run by Dr. Turabi takes over 

as the leading party. You also have economic effort, a terrible 

13

hyperinflation during this period, that wipes out the traditional 

middle class. Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the South. Meanwhile, he is also trying to use an Islamic embrace on Darfur, but 

without any real effects on development. 

Just again, to give you a sense of the interconnecting conflicts 

here: In 1972, there is a declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against 

a group that is associated with the SPLA. That is the Southern 

group in the Nuba Mountains. This tries to create an Islamic state 

by force, but it fails. 

In 1998 the army, the militia, uses starvation efforts in the oilfield zones of Upper Nile Province in Southern Sudan. This is 

against Southern Sudan and a little further north. But, again, the 

focus now—and this is understanding the regime—is on money and 

power. This is not an Islamic purpose. 

In the 1990s, as a number of you mentioned, Turabi hosts Osama 

bin Laden. The United States attacks Sudan in August 1998 at a 

suspected weapons of mass destruction facility. In 1999, partly precipitated by this, you have a split within the Islamic movement in 

Khartoum, and President Bashir arrests Turabi. 

September 11, 2001, the Government of Sudan starts to accelerate its reorientation toward the United States. This goes back to, 

I think, to Mr. Tancredo’s and some of the other points. This clearly is a recognition of reality. It is not a change of heart. Bashir is 

fearful of Sudan’s association with terrorists. The Government of 

Sudan cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily. So, in a 

sense, you have politics driven by exhaustion. They are worn down 

by decades of war, failure of the ambitious, ideological projects. 

These are the conditions that led to the negotiation of the NorthSouth Accord that was signed in January 2005. This accord creates 

the possibility of a new pattern of power-sharing among geographically-defined constituencies and some prospects for development, in 

part through energy resources. The government, of course, is looking toward greater international acceptance. 

But outside Khartoum, you have got a potential conflict. You 

have got an impulse, on the one hand, for equality and another one 

for emancipation. These pull in opposite directions, because the peripheries have to decide: Should they try to get the strongest possible representation at the center to overcome the history of Sudan, 

or should they try to break away? 

Khartoum’s old habits also haven’t changed, a caution that many 

of you have made properly. They are fearing separation, but they 

also have the tension of negotiated power-sharing. So, in 2002, 

some Darfurians were complaining of Arab militia harassment. The 

problem festered. What launched the genocide was an early attack 

on a police station by some rebel groups in 2003. 

So even as Khartoum is negotiating with the South, starting in 

2002, it turns to the old habits. It unleashes the Army as well as 

a brutal militia counterinsurgency in Darfur. 

Again, at least I think there is some thought that what was also 

going on in Khartoum is that some were feeling that maybe others 

in Khartoum were maybe giving away too much in the North-South 

negotiation. So you have the extraordinary tragedy, the large-scale 

loss of life, widespread raids and destruction of villages. Over 2 

million people forced from their homelands, violence carried out by 

14

government forces, the Arab militia, Janjaweed, and the rebel 

groups, the SLA and JEM, which I will come back to, which have 

their own internal conflicts. 

Some of the Darfur rebels, the SLA, have ties with some of the 

rebels, particularly John Garang’s SPLM. These are the larger 

groups, the SPLA—the JEM group, just to add to the complexity, 

actually have ties with Turabi, the person who was pushed out. 

The United States made a finding of genocide again in Darfur in 

2004. This is a point I will be happy to come back to. 

The UN did not find genocide. They found crimes against humanity in 2005. Many people will recall—Mr. Lantos made this point—

the Nuremberg Trials were crimes against humanity. The United 

States’ position is that it is genocide. 

But one point is that, at least in terms of dealing with this internationally, my own view is, while we are not changing our position 

on genocide, crimes against humanity are bad enough for most people to work on. So rather than get too caught up in the labels, what 

we should try to do is focus on the problems here. It is not changing anything about it. Frankly, I don’t think it is best for us to get 

diverted in the fight with the UN whether it is crimes against humanity or genocide. We have our view. Frankly, it goes back to 

some legal questions in international law about whether or not 

there are some ethnic issues. Frankly, I believe our position is 

right, but the key thing is we have got to focus on solving the problem. 

Again, as some people mentioned—Mr. Rohrabacher—when we 

look at Sudan as a whole, we focus on the South, we focus on 

Darfur. There are other potential problems out there, in the Eastern and Northern provinces, and we have to be careful as we proceed and try to prevent a flare-up of violence elsewhere. 

Indeed, some of you may have seen, there was a report in the 

Financial Times this morning about eastern Sudan, where the Beja 

people that I referenced took 20 Sudanese soldiers captive. This is, 

I expect, one of their moves to try to sort of influence the overall 

process. 

But as we have seen, starting with the attack on the police station in Darfur in 2002/2003, a little spark with a lot of wood could 

lead to big flare-ups. 

As a number of you also mentioned, there is a very strong African interest as a whole. You have got the largest country in Africa. 

It has got nine neighbors. They are Arabic. They are African. 

Frankly, it is not only the worry about the spillover, but it is the 

worry that all of Africa is basically divided on old colonial lines and 

the worry about the break-up of states. Also, the African Union is 

in a process of trying to strenthen its ability to try to deal with African problems. 

So a quick run through. 

Now, turning to page 10, the North-South Accord, just to get to 

the baseline. This agreement was begun in negotiations in 2002, 

signed in January 2005. This is the one that Senator Danforth 

played an important leadership role in. It is a fair political arrangement, based on this changed concept of power and wealth 

starting to lead to national elections in 4 years. It has got very, 

very detailed implementation requirements. I emphasize that beVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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cause we have an agreement; it is starting, but there is a tremendous amount to do in order to make this work. 

I highlighted some of the key ones: Commitments to develop an 

interim Constitution, which is going on right now; a bicameral national legislature; process for competitive elections; a new institution of the Presidency that would draw the Southerners in with the 

Khartoum Government; allocation of ministerial posts in this new 

Government of National Unity; oil revenue sharing; joint integrated 

military units; human rights provisions. 

We are now in what is called the Pre-Interim Period. This is supposed to be completed by July 9th, at which time the North and 

the South are supposed to create a Government of National Unity. 

Dr. Garang actually becomes the first Vice President in this new 

government. 

One of the things we have been pressing for is to move that process forward, and then that triggers a 6-Year Interim Period. Part 

of the South’s ongoing leverage is they have the ability to opt out 

of this process at the end of the 6-Year Interim Period. 

Now, the next page, 11—and a number of you referenced this—

CPA and Darfur. And as the Chairman put it, you could add the 

terrorism element here. It is the challenge of trying to reinforce upward spirals or arresting downward spirals. So the CPA creates a 

political and, indeed, fundamental constitutional framework for trying to share authority and wealth, which does create the possibility 

of ending the conflicts, not only in the South but in Darfur and the 

potential ones in the East and other regions. 

Garang and his group, the SPLM’s involvement with the new 

Government of National Unity, should help resolve Darfur. Garang 

has made the point that the government shouldn’t spend $1—he 

used the local currency—in terms of the fighting in Darfur. 

Also, an important signal, the backing by the U.S., substantially 

with the Congress, has helped, including financial resources and 

countries around the world for the North-South Accord. This creates a positive incentive for others to try to come to terms within 

this potential political framework. So the potential upward spiral 

is the CPA implementation, a new Sudanese Government approach, an expanded African Union mission on the ground, focusing 

also on reconciliation in Darfur and other areas, within this political framework. 

But there is the potential downward spiral, and a point that I 

and others have emphasized, which is that if we have an ongoing 

tragedy in Darfur, this will preclude United States support for the 

new government and the CPA implementation. So what could be 

coming together could drag the process down. 

On page 12, I just tried to identify some of Darfur’s key needs. 

The first is to try to supply food and basic necessities for the people 

forced off the land, an estimated 2 million. Also, and beyond food, 

we obviously have to improve the security inside and outside the 

camps. You have all read, we have all encountered, the terrible stories of people not being able to leave the camps, but there is also 

a problem in terms of needing to get the African Union police in 

the camps to try to protect them. 

But, frankly, those two parts aren’t enough. That just stabilizes 

the situation at best. One also has to push for a political reconciliVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ation among the government, the rebel groups, and various tribes. 

This is one reason I referenced some of the historical aspects. We 

are also going to have to give people a chance to return to their 

homes, that is, we are going to need to address some of the longterm economic and social issues. 

This has been complicated by the drought that has exacerbated 

human needs in the displaced populations. The good news for now 

is that the food is flowing, and I want to compliment the people 

with USAID and the contractors that have worked with them. They 

have done a fantastic job with the NGOs. I know you have had a 

chance to visit. I have visited the camps. 

Here is a striking fact: 86 percent of the food delivered to Darfur 

is from the United States of America. We had the Europeans in 

town, and one of the points that the President and I have emphasized is that they need to upgrade their support for this. Because, 

frankly, in the South, we are supplying 90 percent of the food. 

We have also focused on the need for the Government of Sudan 

and the rebels to halt the harassment of the NGOs. A key component which many of you referred to is the need to expand the AU 

mission. We have just gotten the AU security forces to up to about 

2,700. Over the course of this year, we have urged them, they have 

agreed, to expand to 7,700. 

There is some discussion among the African Union about possibly 

going up to a higher number. They have referred to 12,000. But, 

frankly, each of these takes work. Frankly, one of the reasons I 

was in Rwanda before I was in Darfur and Khartoum the last time 

is that Rwanda has good troops. They have been willing to put the 

troops in there. We, through U.S. forces and NATO, had to supply 

the transport, the logistical planning support. We tended to be 

linked up with the Rwandans in doing that. The deployment for 

these forces is supposed to begin in the start of July. We are pressing to try to get it done in the July-September time frame. 

I made a reference to police. As many of you know who have 

been there, you have military forces. You also have police contingents coming from a number of African countries. These are very 

important because there are some 200 overall camps, but 90 major 

camps. We have to get police in those camps to try to protect people. 

A modest point, but it gives some sense of how we are trying to 

focus on diplomacy, we pressed the Government of Sudan to support the African Union’s role and NATO’s role, which they did. This 

is sovereign territory. If you are going into a sovereign territory 

without somebody’s approval, you are declaring war. So it is important to get somebody to come in and agree to this, and it is an important step that they agreed. 

In part, as some of you have made the point, it is the recognition 

of, frankly, the failure of their policy. Their belief that their future 

power, holding of power is not a change of stripes, as the Congressman mentioned. It is clearly their own calculation of what is in 

their self-interest, which is why one wants to keep the pressure on. 

The United States support, as I mentioned, has been airlift for 

Rwandans, as I mentioned. Some of you mentioned the work I have 

done in Africa before, if you are going to ask people to do things, 

17

it is nice to go there to thank them and the Rwandans have some 

of the best forces. 

Going back to Mr. Lantos’ point, I also wanted to make a point, 

because I visited the genocide memorial there, which is a very impressive museum and reminder for all. With the Congress’ help we were able to allocate some $50 million quickly, because these troops have to have facilities and a 

place to stay. So, frankly, we started to move that money already 

to start to get the construction for these quarters; and an important component since I talked to both the AU and the NATO forces 

is a complicated area, the planning and logistics operation, that, 

frankly, NATO is best positioned to perform. 

Now the Government of Sudan military has pulled back, but you 

still have the Janjaweed militias operating. According to the UN 

Secretary-General’s report—and this conforms with one I have 

seen—there appears to be less violence, but there is increased banditry. 

You should know the U.S. headed off some particular individual 

conflicts. In other words, with our contacts, we could see forces 

massing, whether they were Janjaweed militia or others. I called 

Vice President Taha in Khartoum. We contacted the African Union 

forces and made the point that additional slaughter would just 

make this harder for everybody to try to move ahead. 

So, in addition to trying to deal with it at the macro level, I can 

assure you we are dealing at some pretty micro-village level here 

to try to stop conflict. 

An important point that I alluded to is that the rebel groups are 

still active. The SLA is the bigger one. They are fighting each other 

right now. In fact, part of the violence you see in Darfur is, as we 

push the peace reconciliation, the rebels are, not surprisingly, trying to strengthen their own position relative to one another. So 

some of the conflict you have had, has been rebel on rebel. Also, 

frankly, the rebels probably associate with some of the bandits trying to get food from some of the convoys. 

An important point here is then how do we try to create a process for peace or reconciliation? Here, again, the African Union has 

been in the lead in peace talks in Abuja, in Nigeria. It is important 

for the African Union to play a leadership role, but they need our 

support. 

The key mediator is the former Prime Minister of Tanzania 

Salim, who I spoke to in the past week to try to coordinate with, 

pledge our support; and in doing so we are obviously trying to work 

with some other European countries, other African countries. This 

process just restarted again on June 10; and it is fitful, is the best 

way to say it. 

Frankly, this is also where the North-South struggle fits in with 

Darfur. Dr. Garang has some influence over the SLA. So when Dr. 

Garang was here I emphasized, I hope you emphasized, that we 

need his help in terms of solving the Darfur problem. 

In March, we were able to get the three UN resolutions on economic sanctions, on accountability, also one that I will mention in 

terms of starting the UN forces in the North and South. The goal 

here for Darfur is to try to create a secure environment for the political and tribal reconciliation so people can return home, and I 

18

emphasize ‘‘voluntarily.’’ Because sometimes there are movements 

made but not voluntarily. So food, security, but a peaceful accord 

will extend. 

The followup is disarming the militias, and then recognizing this 

problem is not going to stop with that. You still have problems with 

restarting life, getting people back to villages and dealing with 

some of these long-term issues of land and grazing rights and 

water and some of the tribal tensions that exist through that. 

Now the follow-through on the CPA, the North-South Accord, I 

attended a conference in Oslo to try to emphasize the importance 

of it and the commitment for donors to support the North-South 

Accord. There were some $4.5 billion in pledges. I have outlined 

here some of the U.S. funding, and the U.S. is by far the most generous player. Obviously, that depends on the support that we get 

from the U.S. Congress. 

The third UN resolution, 1590, authorized the 10,700 observer 

force for Southern Sudan. In addition, there are some civilian 

forces. So, again, I know most of you followed this closely. This is 

a UN peacekeeping force in the South that is different than the AU 

force in the West. This deployment started in May. We are aiming 

for completion by December 2005. I got a report this week of some 

slowdown because this is the rainy season. 

One other item I want to draw to your attention—some of you 

may have encountered this group. There is a fantastic small group 

of a civilian protection monitoring team, led by some retired U.S. 

military officers that operate out of the South. It uses planes to try 

to investigate incidents. They have a lot of credibility. They were 

scheduled to come out in June. But because the UN forces were a 

little longer in coming on—and I saw them when I was in the 

South in Rumbek—we were able to extend that, agreeing with the 

UN and finding some money to do that. 

It is a good example, frankly, of how—as I am sure many of you 

know—whether it is NGOs, former military officers, small numbers 

of people make a huge difference. And these are very dedicated 

people. 

The food shortage problem, however, is now greater in the South 

than it is in Darfur; and this is a point I want to emphasize. Because if we want to make the North-South Accord work, and if 

John Garang wants to stress how this is a new day, it is going to 

be hard to do so if people come back and they don’t have food. 

Again, we are in a position where the United States has provided 

90 percent of the food deliveries. Again, when I was in Rwanda, I 

talked about this with Commissioner Michel, one of the European 

Union commissioners; and the President and I raised this this 

week again with the European Commission and the European—

Luxembourg, the European Chair. 

Another point that I want to mention, because I know some of 

you had an interest, there is another strife that has been in the 

South, which is the Lord’s Resistance Army, this terrible situation 

where they draw children in and force them to fight. This was part 

of this whole counterinsurgency strategy in that this was part of 

the government, Khartoum’s, efforts against Uganda. Over the past 

couple of years, as the government has taken a new approach, they 

19

have now let the Ugandans cross into Sudanese territory to fight 

these guys. 

I talked to President Museveni when I was in Rwanda, the President of Uganda. They are making some headway, but the SPLM, 

John Garang’s group, has recommended a three-part effort—SPLM, 

Ugandan and Government of Khartoum—to try to further squeeze 

the Lord’s Resistance Army. And that is something I pressed for in 

Khartoum on my last trip. 

I also mentioned to make this work that we have to have set up 

the Government of Southern Sudan, and if any of you have been 

to Rumbek or the South, you know there is a lot of work to do here. 

We sent an interagency assessment team. There has also been a 

security team we did with a number of other countries. We started 

about $20 million for programs to assist in the formation of this 

government. We have some additional money in the 2006 request. 

I can’t emphasize enough the importance of showing progress in 

the South, pushing both the Government of Sudan and the Southern forces on the implementation in an inclusive fashion. So, yes, 

we have the South and Khartoum in agreement. But, as I mentioned, you have other groups—fortunately, some of the Northern 

tribes just reached an agreement to be included. But the strife I 

read about, the report of today from the East, this is probably a 

signal of other groups that are not included. So we have to press 

both parties to try to make this as inclusive as possible. 

We are pressing very hard to keep this on track, including the 

formation of the Government of National Unity by July 9; and then 

we are going to have to work through a very challenging transition 

where, again, we have some aid support as we try to transform the 

nature of this government. That we hope will create the conditions 

for a safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese. 

So keep in mind there is about 2 million Sudanese from the 

South that are located around Khartoum in IDP camps. Then all 

this has to be backed by new policies at the national, local and provincial level, security and community level, conflict resolution, economic development, health and education. I mentioned this partly 

going back to the history, because local government has been the 

key to Sudanese success when it has occurred. So in this structure 

one also has, with our aid and our political efforts, to try to maintain and build local capabilities within a Federal structure that is 

being created under the CPA. 

So, in summary, we have to work with Sudan on multiple transitions: From war to peace; centralization to genuine federalism and 

devolution of power; emergency needs from food to a development 

strategy; and military rule to democracy. 

As I mentioned, you have upward and downward spiral potentials here. And a sensitive point, but one I will identify for you, is 

that for all work done on the North-South Accord, and when I have 

gone I have tried to emphasize this to the parties, that our ability 

to help on the North-South Accord depends critically on a solution 

to Darfur. Some people are sensitive to this. They don’t want to 

give up the North-South Accord for Darfur, at least that is my 

view. And the sense that I picked up from many of you is that you 

have to solve both together and you have to solve all the country’s 

problems together. 

20

In the course of this, there is obviously a complex amount of multilateral diplomacy, starting with our African partners. Obviously, 

the UN Special Representative Jan Pronk is a good person there. 

I have had a chance to work with him on a number of issues. Arab 

states, Britain, and Canada have put in forces. 

I talked to my friend, Pierre Pettigrew, Canadian Foreign Minister, formerly the trade minister, because they want to make a 

special effort, and they are being coordinated in this. 

Norwegians have done an important job, the Dutch, and, of 

course, NATO and the EU. 

As I mentioned, I have been to Sudan twice, to Khartoum, 

Darfur twice, different parts, Rumbek. I may return for this July 

9th creation of the Government of National Unity. It is part of how 

one tries to use the diplomatic aspects to kind of press people 

across the line. 

But we obviously are going to need congressional support and resources. So I had a chance to talk to Mr. Blumenauer a little bit 

before, and would be pleased to work with the Committee and others about visits to help reinforce the message to all parties because 

we know this is not going to be a smooth or clear-cut path. 

I have raced through this, but you can see there is a tremendous 

amount of complexity here. Even the North-South Accord, if you 

look through all its implementation provisions, it is an enormous 

achievement. But it has to be implemented, and that is where we 

have a lot of work to do together. 

Just to show what you have also got here, I added a couple of 

sort of maps to give you a little feel. The map on page 17 is the 

expansion of the AU forces. So the current camps are in red. The 

blue ones are the expansion that you will have. So this is a sort 

of a picture of the Darfur area. 

On page 18, you have a small sort of map for Southern Sudan, 

the peacekeeping forces. So here you see you don’t just have African countries, because this is a UN peacekeeping mission divided 

into six sectors. 

On page 19, I just tried to give you a little summary of the 

United States assistance to Sudan. We include Chad because we 

have some 200,000 refugees in Chad on this, divided into the 

Darfur/Chad and the other Sudan. I note on the bottom there that 

this does not count the UN peacekeeping for Sudan, which goes to 

supply the funds for the North-South Accord. With that you had 

over $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2005, estimated over $800 million in 

fiscal year 2006. You will see that it is an estimate. 

One of the reasons why I couldn’t just put our budget request in 

here is that big parts of this is food aid; and the way that food aid 

is requested, as many of you know, it is a general account and then 

we have to sort of try to allocate it. But this tries to give you some 

sense of that. 

On page 20—I won’t go into all the details for this but, knowing 

the interest, I thought you might want to have it. I tried to divide 

it so you can see how the aid is broken down: First for Darfur and 

Chad with the humanitarian side, fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 

2006. Then, you see the next chart is the nonhumanitarian aid for 

Darfur and Chad. Then the following one takes Sudan, non-Darfur, 

21

gives you a sense of humanitarian numbers; and the last one gives 

you a sense of nonhumanitarian aid. 

So this is heavily the reconstruction. So this last chart gives you 

a better sense of some of the efforts to build the implementation 

of the North-South Accord. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going on a little bit, but I know 

the interest and would be happy to take any of the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zoellick follows:]

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Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I hope I will not embarrass my good friend, the Secretary, by 

saying this was probably the best presentation I have had in 25 

years of sitting on this Committee, both orally and in terms of the 

prepared materials. 

The State Department is now embarking on a new mission, 

which is called the Pedagogic Mission of the Department of State, 

which we sorely need. I want to commend you and congratulate 

you, Mr. Secretary. You raise so many issues that it will be difficult 

to focus on just a few in the limited time I have. 

Let me hark back to the end of last week when Chairman Hyde 

and I had two competing proposals for UN reform. Those were competing proposals in terms of penalties. They were virtually identical 

in terms of describing the problem. Clearly, your presentation demonstrates the ultimate absurdity of having the Sudan perform a 

function under the UN Human Rights Commission while participating and perpetrating some of the most outrageous human rights 

violations in contemporary history. So our hearings and our legislation do tie together. 

I have one specific area—two, really, two specific areas—I would 

like to explore with you. The first one is, I know I speak for every 

single Member of this Committee on both sides in saying that what 

we appreciated most about your presentation was its candor. Some 

time back, a high-ranking official gave us a cookie-pusher, soft and 

gentle, nonsubstantive presentation; and I cautioned him that if 

that goes on, the hearings will be empty. Let me assure, you, Mr. 

Secretary, the hearings where you will appear in the future will be 


219770023.eps
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attended by every Member of this Committee because we appreciate candor. 

I also want to call my colleagues’ attention to the fact that—you 

have referred to it several times during a very complex and invaluable presentation—that the United States carries the bulk of the 

financial burden of aid; and, obviously, we carry and will carry the 

bulk of logistical support for the African Union troops. This is a reminder to all of my colleagues who emphasize that all we do is engage in military ventures. I am very proud of what we are doing 

in this area; and I think it is very important that we, in our own 

appraisal of our own foreign policy, have some balance and recognition of what the United States is doing globally. 

My key question relates to a time line. It is self-evident that, 

given all of the deficiencies, the African Union forces in sufficient 

numbers will not be in place any time soon. Whether they will be 

there at the end of the year or middle of next year or whatever, 

they will be inadequate, inadequately prepared, inadequately supplied, equipped—you name it. Has the Administration considered 

the possibility of calling a NATO emergency session, to call on our 

NATO allies, particularly the ones who have no forces in the two 

main areas where we are currently committed, so that an interim 

major NATO force could be put in place to prevent what we correctly call genocide? 

In point of fact, it was the House that designated what is going 

on in Darfur genocide the first time. The Senate followed suit, and 

then we had the UN calling it a gentler name. It seems to me that 

here we have a ready-made, more-than-capable and, to a very large 

extent, underutilized NATO contingent that could be supplemented 

by non-NATO advance-country forces, ranging, as you have indicated, from Canada to Sweden, to participate in an immediate 

major deployment to prevent continued large-scale loss of human 

lives. 

The picture is not that complex. The details are complex. Your 

presentation was extremely valuable to all of us who follow the situation closely. I know I speak for all of my colleagues. We learned 

a great deal. But the underlying realities are very simple. Hundreds of thousands of people over a period of time—millions—have 

been killed. Tens of thousands are being killed now; and we have 

well-equipped, ready-to-go forces in many countries capable of deployment. What would be more helpful in dealing with the issue 

and dealing with our global public relations dilemma than the 

United States taking the lead in calling for a NATO emergency session to deal with this crisis? 

Secretary? 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Lantos; and 

thank you for the kind words and the support you have given me 

and the Secretary over the years. I appreciate it. 

First, the AU’s roll is particularly important here, so I don’t want 

to skip over this. It is particularly important in dealing with the 

problems of Darfur and Sudan but also important in terms of Africa in general. I wish it weren’t so, but this may not be the last one 

of these. So one point I want to draw attention to is that many of 

you dealt with this under the old OAU form, and the OAU was created a couple of years ago. 

36

The Africans are making a very strong effort to try to develop capabilities on the military side as well as the mediation side. And 

those are the core, the catalysts that we needed to work with in 

this process. I have had a chance—I know many of you had a 

chance—to visit the soldiers, the Nigerian general in command, the 

others that back them from Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, others. So 

where at all possible, Mr. Lantos, we want to try to make it work 

for them. 

And that goes, I guess, to the second point. You suggested it is 

going to take a long time. I hope not, and we will see over time. 

I believe it need not. 

In other words, one of the reasons I was out there again and the 

Secretary stressed with a number of the AU political officials—and 

obviously this goes to member states, Rwanda, Nigeria and others—is that I believe we should start to get those forces in during 

July and starting in early July. Frankly, we are pressing to get 

them there during the July-August-September period, and that is 

one reason why, to show the critical need for support. As I alluded 

to, they can’t go in unless we build the facility. So we work with 

a group called PAE to build the facilities for them to go. 

So I do believe we can expand this mission. Whether we get exactly the 7,700, I can’t say, but certainly double it and more quickly, and including the police forces. 

Then the question is, how best do we support this? And that does 

come back to NATO. 

Just to show some of the interconnections, on the first trip that 

I took on this post I visited some 13 NATO countries. I came back 

to the North Atlantic Council, and I started to get people to think 

about this possibility, about the fact that, given the problems in 

Sudan and Darfur, that we would want to try to get NATO backing. And those of you who dealt with NATO issues over the years 

know this is actually a pretty tremendous step to be able to get 

moving forward. 

Of course, there was some tension with the European Union; and 

we emphasized, look, we will get help wherever we can. We are not 

trying to be just NATO and not European Union. We do believe 

that NATO tends to have more of the military planning and logistics capability in here. So the focus with NATO now has been the 

airlift logistics, but, importantly, the operation and planning capacity, including that of the U.S. 

Now that does mean there are some people on the ground, with 

the Canadians, United States, British, French, rather small 

amounts related to support capacity. 

One last aspect, one I think we need to think about with this—

which sort of NATO forces. You know, we didn’t have colonies in 

Africa, but the Europeans did. So I think one of the challenges 

here, as we have seen in problems like Somalia and elsewhere, is 

whether outside non-African forces—to the degree and on the first 

order, it may seem like they are expanding security, but that can 

degrade very quickly. So that is one more reason why—at least it 

is my view—that we ought to try to make the African Union process work: For their good, for Sudan’s good and for—frankly, the 

long-term development of this African capability. 

37

But we will have an ongoing conversation on this. If I am wrong 

and we don’t get the forces in, then we have to talk. 

I tell you honestly, Mr. Lantos, it would be a big challenge to get 

NATO to agree to put large-scale ‘‘boots on the ground’’ effort; and 

I think it could end up creating a different conflict in Africa. I am 

not sure how the Africans would react to this as well. That is why, 

as I tried to emphasize here, I think we have something moving, 

and at least my goal is to try to get it moving as quickly as possible 

to see if we can upgrade the amount of security forces and police. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to echo the comments. This is quite a tour de force, 

and I think you have a balance that is about right. I would just 

like to stress when we look at a perspective, which is awfully difficult, I know, in issues of this kind, there is a moral issue. Members of this Committee have defined it rather well. You have defined it exceptionally. There is a geopolitical issue that is real. 

There is a legal issue that isn’t inconsequential. 

Here there have been several references to the distinction between genocide and a crime against humanity. I would just like to 

mention one aspect to this, and that is the United States House of 

Representatives formally declared this to be a genocide. The Senate 

did. The United States Administration did. The implications for 

law are that we are parties to the Genocide Convention, and that 

obligates every party to do whatever it can to bring this genocide 

to an end. 

I only raise this from two perspectives. One is philosophical, literally obligates the United States to act unilaterally, although it is 

obviously far wiser to operate multilaterally; and so all of your observations about emphasizing the OAU are well taken. But, secondly, it implies that the Congress is behind you, if not ahead of 

you. And I stress this because you do not have to feel constrained 

when you make decisions that are for the good of humanity. Congress is with you. And I stress this as strongly as I can. 

Secondly, and just as an offshoot, you noted as an aside that one 

of the leaders of the Southern part of Sudan, one of the great, impressive leaders of Africa, John Garang, is a graduate of a university in the United States that happens to be in my State. This, to 

me, is very symbolic of another set of issues, and that relates to 

how the United States Government deals with visas. By that I 

mean we have people around the world in important parts of government of various societies that have been educated in the United 

States. For our Government to take too constrained an approach at 

this time of accepting people at our academic institutions can be 

very counterproductive of the national security interest of the 

United States. 

We also look at national security as an implied constraint. But 

this is an exceptional example of why it should imply the exact reverse, and I just ask that you take that perspective back to the Department. 

Finally, I was going to ask the question, but you addressed it in 

the end of your statement. It relates to the regional dimension of 

this particular conflict, particularly as it relates to Uganda and 

38

Khartoum supporting certain Ugandan movements that may be unsettling to the Southern part of Sudan. I think you have indicated 

you have addressed this in your diplomacy, and I want to congratulate you on that. 

Finally, I would echo two thoughts—or one thought of Mr. Lantos 

and upgrade it. He indicated that this was a tutorial session, but 

it is also reflective of diplomacy that is active, and we appreciate 

your leadership. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Excuse me, Mr. Payne. I am informed that Mr. 

Zoellick must leave at 12:30. So I would appreciate any succinctness we can muster in asking questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as succinct as 

I can. Let me thank you once again for calling this very important 

hearing. 

I want to make a point or two. First of all, I think it is quite 

clear that a comprehensive peace agreement clearly states that we 

should continue to provide aid to South Sudan regardless of the situation in Darfur, and so I hope that the Administration is clear 

that we are going to work—I would like to see more attention given 

to Darfur, but I don’t think there should be an impact on the support for Southern Sudan. 

Also, I would like to, as Mr. Leach said, this question of genocide 

that was declared by the House and the Senate and by Secretary 

Powell for the Administration, I was somewhat disturbed at your 

2nd of June, 3rd, 4th meeting where you questioned whether genocide declaration was actually Mr. Powell’s alone and not necessarily the Administration. 

And of course, as Mr. Meeks mentioned, the downplaying of the 

number of deaths which, of course, are estimated, because they are 

difficult to get accurate numbers. But you are downgrading from 

50,000 to 150,000 to from the 300,000 to 400,000 that had been indicated by NGOs on the ground. I think, in my opinion, that sends 

a wrong message. 

That happened during World War II where one of our assistant 

secretaries testified before Congress, Breckenridge Long, that 

520,000 Jews had been let into the United States at that time in 

1942. Half of that number were let into the United States as refugees, and less than half of those were Jews. 

So to allude to in one way we escalated numbers and to de-escalate I think, in my opinion, tends to send a wrong message. The 

fact that we have allowed the head of the intelligence organization 

from Sudan to come into our country, and now a high-level delegation is here, seems to me to be downplaying what is happening. 

I think that the American people, 80 percent say we should be 

doing more. I have children writing books, sending pictures of 

where the deaths are happening in Sudan. I am not so sure that 

our Administration realizes the importance of this. 

Just yesterday in New Jersey, a bill was passed to divest $5 billion of funds from the pension funds of New Jersey companies 

doing business in Sudan, regardless where they are from. The Assemblyman Payne—I am very proud of my brother—had the bill 

39

pass in the House and Senate, and next week it will be signed by 

the Governor of New Jersey. 

The United States people are outraged. Even to say that in the 

Nuremberg trials in 1948 they said it was simply crimes against 

humanity. It is a disgrace that that is what it is allowed to be considered when the holocaust of 6 million Jews occurred. It should 

not have occurred in the first place. But then in the Nuremberg 

trials, to say it was just against humanity and therefore we should 

perhaps not be so disturbed, that crimes against humanity may be 

what we should call this and not really genocide. 

I think we are going in the wrong direction. We are going down, 

rather than up. 

The question of tribalism is, you know, is the genocide—the 

Janjaweed were recruited from the North. It had nothing to do 

with the neighbors of people who lived in Darfur for years and always had little squabbles but worked it out. They were recruited, 

armed, paid for and encouraged by the Government of Sudan; and 

to talk about this long herd-versus-farmer issue, I think we are 

sending the wrong message. 

I think there should be a special envoy, that it is absolutely impossible for us to take this seriously without having a special 

envoy. The longer we go without a special envoy dealing with this 

situation once again proves to me that the Government of this 

country is looking to end its policy against Sudan. I think there is 

a move to try to normalize—these same people that we are putting 

all our faith in were the same ones that allowed Osama bin Laden 

to come in, the same ones that helped try to assassinate Mubarak, 

the same ones that allowed the terrorist attack on our Embassies 

in Dar-es-Salaam and in Nairobi; and these are the same people 

that are brought over here with taxpayers money in an executive 

jet to come to meet them in the United States. 

I think it is wrong. I think the policy is wrong. 

I would like to ask, is there going to be a special envoy appointed 

for Sudan? 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Congressman Payne, I think you have a number 

of comments and questions in there; and I would like to try to address them since others have been raised. 

Let me start on the deaths, because I know this has been reported. It’s probably of interest to many of you. I don’t know how 

many people have died in Darfur. I don’t know of anybody who 

does. 

Mr. PAYNE. But you disputed the figures. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. I will explain what I did. 

Mr. PAYNE. Please. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. And it is actually kind of interesting in light of 

what you said. 

I was asked by a reporter, ‘‘Does the State Department have an 

estimate?’’ And rather than dissemble, rather than hide, I gave 

them the estimate of our intelligence and research office, which is 

now the explanation that is put on the Web site. And I explained 

the range estimate, the period, and the covering sort of additional 

deaths. 

I will point out that the World Health Organization, from which 

a lot of this is drawn, also did a collaborating—the Center for ReVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
40

search on Epidemiology released a 42-page document about Darfur 

counting the deaths and mortality estimates for multiple survey 

data. And their numbers are about the same as the numbers that 

came out of our intelligence and research. The UN numbers are 

pretty close, and they haven’t even explained the origin. 

Now you do have one estimate that has come from a group of 

about a 400,000 range, and that is based on an extrapolation from 

two sources, including some research that was funded by USAID, 

that tried to take the highest levels of violence and disease and 

uniformly apply them over a 26-month period, suggesting there 

was no change over this period. 

Now I will add, Mr. Payne, when I mentioned to the reporters, 

I said, ‘‘I don’t know what the numbers are. There are higher-range 

estimates.’’

It is actually kind of interesting. I was doing what, sometimes, 

the Congress urges U.S. officials to do, to be honest about their reports, explain the logic, explain the estimates; and then some people find that wrong. Well, to be honest, we want to have a truthful 

exchange. I am explaining to you what I know, the basis of the 

numbers. It is on the Web site. It is based by a series of studies. 

But, you know, people can draw their own estimates. But I frankly 

don’t think that is a point to be criticized for. 

Second, on genocide—and, again, I am glad you raised this because it is important to clarify it. Because I think, and this is 

where you and I probably have a very strong agreement, there is 

very intense feeling out there in the country on this. I have talked 

to Jewish groups, Evangelical Christian groups, African American 

groups, which you and I are both encountering. So people want to 

know that their Government, the Executive Branch as well as the 

Congress, is intensely involved in this. I am trying to explain during the course of this—and people can criticize, make suggestions 

on how we do it. I don’t mean to presume we have all the solutions. 

But on the genocide point, you are exactly right. Secretary Powell 

talked about it being genocide. The President talked about it being 

genocide. I talked about it being genocide when I was in Darfur 

with the Sudanese officials around. 

However, the report that you are picking up was, again, another 

explanation where what I pointed out to some reporters was that 

after the United States found it was genocide, we urged the UN to 

do an investigation. The UN did an investigation. They came up—

and this goes back to some of the points Mr. Leach mentioned—

with crimes against humanity. 

I don’t think crimes against humanity is a mild charge. Probably, 

indeed the reason you didn’t have genocide at the time of the Nuremberg trials, was that the term actually was invented afterward 

based on that experience. My point is, we find it genocide; the UN 

finds it crimes against humanity. Either compels our action. 

Now other people that you and I work with—for example, President Mbeki is cautious about some of this terminology. My point 

is, we have got our position. I don’t really think the important 

thing is for us to get in a fight with the UN and South Africans. 

I want to try to work the problem. So no difference in terms of the 

findings, and I appreciate Mr. Leach’s point about what that signals in terms of overall support. 

41

You also asked about the intelligence point, and this is something I think that Chairman Hyde mentioned as well. I think we 

can try to achieve both aims about counterterrorism and sending 

a message to the Government in Khartoum, and that is what we 

are tying to do. 

The cooperation on counterterrorism has been important. It will 

continue to be important. But, again, just to give you a sense of 

how we try to do this is that, when the intelligence official came 

to the United States, we coordinated with the intelligence agencies. 

The State Department actually saw the intelligence official, and we 

coordinated with our intelligence officials to drive home the message that counterterrorism cooperation was not enough, that we 

had to have action on Darfur and the implementation of the NorthSouth agreement. 

Now let me explain why I think this is very important. There are 

different power centers in Khartoum. I mean, none of us know for 

sure about all of the relationships. I want the information going 

back through every channel of power in that system that we have 

to have action on Darfur and Sudan. So it is—you know, it is a 

point that I fully understand people’s anxiety that you focus on 

counterterrorism, not others. That is not what we are doing. So, 

again, I think we have a shared view on that. 

On special envoys, again, I know a point that is of symbolic importance for a lot of people is that—I have been mulling this over—

I have talked about this with the Secretary, about whether we 

should appoint a special envoy on top of it. But here is the real 

challenge. Right now, I have been serving as the special envoy, and 

that has certain advantages for the United States. So I am in the 

meeting with the European Union, with the President, and I can 

press for food and I can talk to Sulana about this, that and the 

other thing. I have a rank around the world from past actions, current actions; and the Sudanese are aware of that, the Southerners 

are aware of that. It actually extends the reach of working on this 

problem, and that is one reason I was trying to describe it in some 

depth. 

But you are also right. I have a lot of other things to do. So I 

am trying to figure out actually what combination of special representative, envoy or support—but, again, in the honest spirit that 

Mr. Lantos suggested, my caution on this is I don’t want to suggest 

actually any lessening of interest. It says something to the world 

that, frankly, that I have been doing what I have been doing on 

this and I want to keep doing it. So that is the balance that we 

need to try to strike. So I am very much open to the idea about 

how to try to do that in a way that adds to our overall effectiveness. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I 

agree this is a very, very fine presentation, Mr. Secretary, that you 

provided to the Committee. 

Let me just ask you, there is a historical frustration with the inability or the lack of honesty in using the genocide word. We saw 

it in Rwanda, when the previous Administration would not say 

that word. We saw it in the Balkans and, interestingly enough, the 

International Criminal Court meeting on Srebrenica and others, 

42

those who have been held to account, have been convicted on the 

crime of genocide. But, at the time, there was an inability or an 

unwillingness to do so. We saw the same thing in Sudan itself, and 

it is frustrating because there is a degree—both are egregious 

wrongs. Genocide, and I have read the Genocide Convention many 

times, does compel action; however, it is not explicit as to what 

that action must be. 

Let me ask you a couple of specific questions. What is the scope 

of the mandate of the African Union’s mission in Sudan with regards to civilian protection? We have heard some complaints that 

like Srebrenica, like other Balkans lessons that I hope we have 

learned—and July 11 will be, as you know, the 10th anniversary 

of the killing of some 8,000 people with Dutch peacekeepers basically meeting with Mladic and allowing the boarding of buses for 

people to go to slaughter. There has been some concern about the 

civilian protection issue, if you could touch on that. 

Secondly, the capacity of the African Union peacekeeping mission 

to do its job, is the number right? Are 7,700 security forces up to 

10,000, is that the right number? How is that arrived at? Should 

there be more? Is it 15,000? Is it 30,000? Do the African countries 

have that capability and capacity to provide more peacekeepers? 

Thirdly, safeguards with regards to trafficking. I have held two 

hearings this year alone on the issue of rape of 13-year-olds and 

others in the Congo. And you know that zero tolerance very quickly 

became zero compliance when it came to many of those peacekeepers. But certainly many did a laudable job and are doing it in 

the Congo. But that is outrageous. What kind of safeguards are 

being put into place? 

And, finally, on the issue of refugees, we know about Rwanda 

and other terrible tragedies in the past. Virtually none of those individuals were given the possibility of resettlement elsewhere. We 

know many people do want to be repatriated into their own homeland, but there are others for whom that is just not a viable option 

and durable solution. Will there be an effort? Is an effort being 

made to bring some of these people perhaps to the United States? 

And, finally, on food aid, you pointed out 86 percent of the food 

aid delivered in Darfur is provided by the United States, 90 percent 

in non-Darfur Sudan. The World Food Programme says that 1.8 

million people were fed in May; yet there were many hundreds of 

thousands that went unfed. What are we going to do to get our 

friends and allies to fork over more food aid to fill in that gap? 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Okay, Mr. Smith, I think I got them, but fill me 

in if I haven’t. 

On the mandate, the first one, we can get you the precise language about protection. In general, at least as I understand it, the 

African Union mandate is actually broader than the normal UN 

peacekeeping mandate. I am not sure that it covers what could be 

the sort of combat operations sort of side, but earlier this year, 

when the African Union reviewed its mandate, it came to the conclusion that it had enough flexibility within the current terminology that there is not a need to seek additional authority, but 

that they should exercise that authority more actively. 

We said, by the way, we would always support an extension of 

the mandate, but, of course, they are an African force, they are AfVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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rican boots on the ground. But, in addition, it comes back to what 

we have seen is, where the African Union forces are present, it has 

a major effect on the violence. Now that is in part because you no 

longer have the Government of Sudan and military actions. So this 

is where the diplomacy intersects. They no longer have the helicopters flying. They no longer have the gun ships. So the African 

Union is really trying to deal with rebels and Janjaweed militia. 

That is where that capability is and under that mandate seems to 

be able to handle, and now it is a question of more of them. 

So going into your second question, on capacity, there are at least 

two elements. One is numbers, and I have described what we are 

trying to do to get the numbers up. And the Rwandans are ready. 

I have got a set of different countries, if you would want, that have 

committed battalions; and the Rwandans are sort of ready to go. 

We have actually worked out with our air transports starting to 

bring them in July. There are some that have partially committed, 

but we don’t have it fully sort of nailed down yet. 

But, in addition to the numbers, this is where our sort of financial support is important. Because we also have to have some communications, equipment, and others. Because you have a mobility 

issue here in being able to cover the camps and being able to get 

out quickly to villages and issues that sort of might be at risk. 

I will mention, I guess, some possible risk is I know the Committee took on the peacekeeping fund in a most recent vote. You 

know, we took the $50 million for the African Union force from that 

peacekeeping fund. So please don’t urge me to do more and then 

starve me at the same time. I mean, this is where the two really 

do come together. 

In terms of the—I wrote down the trafficking of persons? 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Yes. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. I want to make sure I have this. If it is the—in 

general, on trafficking of persons, you know that the Secretary had 

Sudan as a tier 3 country again. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I am speaking about the peacekeepers——

Mr. ZOELLICK. Okay, and——

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY [continuing]. And whether or not they 

are going to be out training and monitoring to ensure that they 

don’t do what happened in the Congo. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. From what I have seen, it is a very professional 

group. But it is a good caution and a good warning going forward. 

You know, I know you have traveled to lots of different places in 

the world. I tried to go out to even some of the Northern camps 

with their smaller units. These are impressive people doing a very 

difficult job, and so I have had no sign of that, but it is a good caution. 

On refugees and return, refugees—as you know, we deal with the 

non-internally displaced, so that is the people across the border, for 

example, Chad or some in Libya; and I think in Chad there is an 

estimate of about 200,000. 

I think—again, this is a question that I am not sure any of us 

can answer today. One of the worries is will refugees or the internally displaced people be willing to go home? The sense that I got 

from talking to people in Sudan and talking to people who know 

44

Sudan much better than I do is, if the peaceful conditions return, 

they do want to go home. These are people very tied to the land. 

But it still has some of these issues here that we talked about in 

terms of the water and the land rights and sort of others; and that 

would include, I believe, you know, the refugees in Chad. 

So the goal here again is to keep the conditions where people 

want to go home, feel they are safe to go home, have a chance to 

rebuild their lives. So we haven’t yet gotten to the question of, well, 

what if they don’t, which is the other question I think is inherent 

in that. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. The point is, we never got to that 

question on Rwanda; and the offer of resettlement was not provided to those individuals. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. And then, fifth, on the food aid, we are trying to 

do a number of things. We are working—and I know you make efforts on this, too—with the World Food Organization to talk to others. The European Union—traditionally, we provide about 50 percent of the food. The European Union normally is a big donor. I 

think they got caught in some of their own bureaucratic processes. 

So I am modestly hopeful, after the push that we have done over 

the past couple days, that they will expedite it. They provide 

money to buy the food. We normally provide the food. But it is an 

issue that, of course, needs bearing attention. And you can all help 

us on this. There is, obviously, the G–8 Summit. Everybody is talking about concerns for Africa, and I keep saying if Europe is concerned about Africa, help us get some food to these people. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Barbara Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary. 

Let me say a couple of things. First of all, the United States is engaged in a major operation of war in Iraq, $350 billion, under the 

premise that there were weapons of mass destruction. We don’t 

know when the end of the war will be. 

I want to ask you, with regard to Sudan, given the magnitude 

of the military involvement in Iraq, what have discussions been 

within the State Department with regard to a peacemaking force 

in the Sudan? And I am not talking about invading or bombing the 

country, but I am talking about putting together an international 

force. I don’t believe there was much criticism, and I have to ask 

you if the African Union is troubled by that. 

If, in fact, we wanted to do that in order to stop this horrendous 

carnage, I don’t believe that there was much criticism with regard 

to the British forces in Sierra Leone or the French and Belgian 

troops in the Congo. So the first thing I want to know, is what the 

dialogue has been about that. Again, I am not talking about invading or bombing a country, but I am talking about peacemaking 

troops. 

Secondly, I want to find out from you if the United States is considering lifting sanctions. We hear that you may be, but yet you 

didn’t mention that, I believe—I don’t believe, in your statement. 

Along with Congressman Payne, my State in California, we are 

moving toward divestment. There are at least 44 companies with 

the California Pension Retirement System doing business or with 

investment in the Sudan, 8 billion plus. We are trying to figure out 

45

how much. But the consideration of lifting sanctions, I think, sends 

the wrong message if that is what you are trying to do. 

And, thirdly, let me ask you, with regard to the Arab world and 

Arab leaders, I met with the President of Algeria, high-level Egyptian officials, the President of Egypt. Quite frankly, I was very disappointed with their response in terms of their understanding of 

what was taking place as it relates to genocide; and I am wondering how we are weighing in with the Arab world to bring this 

in focus in terms of the death and destruction and the raping of 

the women and the destroying of the villages and all of the genocidal acts that are taking place. 

So those would be my three questions to you. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Okay, let me start with the last one, because it 

actually connects to Mr. Payne’s a little bit in that this is a balance, frankly, of sort of time and level, because I work on other 

Egyptian issues, including some on the economic side and the democracy side. I have actually raised with the Prime Minister of 

Egypt and others when he was here about the importance of being 

able to come back to them and work with them on some of these 

exact concerns to send the right message. 

Egypt has tended to play a constructive role related to some of 

the reconciliation that has been done in the North. There was a recent sort of agreement on this. But I agree with your general point, 

that I think the sort of recognition across the Arab world about the 

genocide in Darfur has not been as great as one would like it to 

be. 

Just to take that a step further, it is also—again, where you can 

interconnect these pieces—when I was in Jordan and talking with 

King Abdullah, who also has some ties with the Government in 

Sudan but has been a very good friend of the United States, again, 

I was starting to make the point that I may need him at times to 

make pressure on some of these players. 

Libya plays a role, as al-Ghadafi has tried to play a role. It is 

a little uncertain as to whether now it is trying to reach peace or 

just add to their influence in the process. 

So you know, each country is varied; and we are trying to work 

with those players in addition to trying to work with the African 

countries as part of creating the right context for the program that 

I have outlined here. 

Taking it in reverse order, in lifting sanctions, I don’t know 

where that has come from. We have not had any sort of plans to 

lift sanctions. 

Now, one thing is you have this Government of National Unity, 

and depending on what their actions are over time—John Garang 

is part of this government. That is something that, of course, we 

may or may not get to the point where we discuss with players, 

with the Congress and others, but that requires major change of 

actions along the way. It requires a change of the government according to the overall strategy. But we don’t have any plans to lift 

sanctions. 

I will add, there are about five or six different types of sanctions, 

okay? So one that does get discussed is that there is a—about their 

position in terms of cooperation and terrorism, and there is a—I 

forgot the right term. They are classified as having not been coopVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
46

erative to terrorism. Frankly, they have been cooperating on terrorism. But even if that one were changed, you would still have the 

series of others that wouldn’t allow the types of economic interaction. 

Then on the peacemaking question—and, again, I don’t mean to 

split terms here, but I am going to try to answer what I think—

the focus on peacemaking in that term of art tends to be more of 

a sort of a military action, and I think what you are focusing on 

would be more the kind of enforcement or peacekeeping-type of operations. But if I am wrong, correct me, and——

Ms. LEE. Well, yes, but military presence to bring—to help secure the peace. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Okay. On that, I do think, Congresswoman, there 

would be sensitivities on the African side on this; and that is what 

I was trying to answer to Mr. Lantos’ question. 

The African Union has taken this as a belief that Africa needs 

to empower itself to deal with Africa’s problems, of course with the 

support of others. So we have—and this is one of the things that 

Secretary Rice is personally engaged in. We talked to President 

Konare, the former President of Mali, who is now head of the African Union, about making sure they would be comfortable with the 

NATO support presence. But I do think there would be a difficulty 

with that. 

And there would also be the problem—I think it was Mr. Lantos’ 

question I mentioned—is that if you had the American or western 

European troops, I honestly don’t know what this could trigger 

with some of the dangerous people you have there. I am thinking 

here of the Somalian incident. I think we all agree you have got 

some bloodthirsty, cold-hearted killers here. How do they use some 

of these things against the purpose? 

So if we can make the African Union forces work, that is the best 

of all. Then they can’t say, ‘‘Oh, it is the United States, or the British or the colonial powers, that are telling Sudan what to do. By 

the way, let’s bring in new terrorist killers to go after them.’’ So 

that is why the focus has been on trying to get the African Union 

forces to work. 

But we have—to complete this, we have discussed with DoD and 

others about the type of support and logistics. And sometimes—

when I was in Darfur the first time, I was taken around by a Lieutenant Colonel Ron Capps, who is the Foreign Service Officer who 

was called up as a reservist. He was with me in the Darfur camps, 

and he is now back on a rotation in the United States, I hope to 

see him this week. So we did have some forces there. 

Ms. LEE. Do you think 10,000 to 12,000 AU troops is sufficient? 

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired some time 

ago. Sorry, Mr. Zoellick. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Sorry. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. McCollum is recognized for 30 seconds. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. No more time for questions, but in light of the fact that the U.S. Government is corroborating and collaborating with a state sponsor of terror, a country 

that is conducting, as we have discussed today, genocide against its 

own people, I would ask unanimous consent that this Committee 

formally schedule a classified briefing at the highest security level 

47

1Frontline interview with Anthony Lake, Apr. 1, 2004. 

2 Romeo Dallaire, Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda, NY TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004. 

possible with senior officials of the Department of State and the 

CIA to provide Members of this Committee with the counterterrorism and intelligence provided to the United States Government 

officials that allows us to work so closely with the Government of 

Sudan. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

I seek unanimous consent to include the written testimony of 

Elizabeth Kidder, Director of Survivors United to Save the Women 

of Darfur, in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kidder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ELISABETH T. KIDDER, DIRECTOR, SURVIVORS UNITED

TO SAVE THE WOMEN OF DARFUR

CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN DARFUR IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE LASTING PEACE IN THE

SOUTH SUDAN

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, and Members of the Committee, thank you 

for the opportunity for Survivors United to Save the Women of Darfur (Survivors 

United) to submit written testimony for the record. We appreciate your interest in 

gathering a variety of perspectives on the important issues of the genocide in 

Darfur, implementation of the Sudan North-South peace agreement and America’s 

role and responsibilities in relation to the two. 

Survivors United is an organization comprised primarily of women who have experienced sexual violence at some point in their lives, and because they intimately 

know its devastating effects, are committed to bringing about an end to the ongoing 

genocidal rape of women and girls by Government of Sudan soldiers and their proxy 

militia, the Janjaweed. 

CIVILIAN PROTECTION MATTERS MOST—EVEN IF THIS MEANS UNILATERAL ACTION BY

THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

If you take one thing away from this written testimony, we hope it will be this: 

there is still time to save lives in Darfur. Please keep civilian protection at the forefront of U.S. policy options. Every day women and girls in Darfur, many already 

traumatized by the loss of their loved ones and the horrifying living conditions in 

which they now find themselves, suffer unspeakable horrors at the hands of GoS 

soldiers and the Janjaweed. 

UN and Administration officials continue to call for a ‘‘political solution’’ to the 

genocide in Darfur, ignoring both the reality on the ground and the lessons of the 

past. Anthony Lake, who served as President Clinton’s national security advisor 

during the genocide in Rwanda, now believes that it is incredibly dangerous to rely 

on ‘‘political solutions’’ or ‘‘peace agreements’’ alone. ‘‘[Y]ou’re always supposed to be 

for a peace process,’’ Lake said during an interview with PBS’s Frontline, ‘‘and 

you’re always supposed to believe they will succeed. In fact, they seldom succeed, 

if they’re not backed up by the realities on the ground and by the threat or the use 

of power.’’ 1

Romeo Dallaire perhaps said it best: ‘‘I am afraid that moral condemnation, trade 

penalties and military efforts by African countries are simply not going to be enough 

to stop the killing—not nearly enough.’’ 2

THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE AFRICAN UNION WILL EVER MEET THE PROTECTION

NEEDS IN DARFUR

To maintain security in Bosnia after hostilities ended, NATO sent 50,000 troops, 

and the same size force was sent to Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo, at roughly 4000 square 

miles is 2.5% of the land area of Darfur. At the date of this writing, a total of 2300 

AU troops have been deployed to Darfur. Although the African Union has set a goal 

of 7,000 troops by September, there is no credible evidence to indicated that this 

will occur. The GoS equipped the Janjaweed with weaponry such as G4 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, AK47s, Doshka 12.7mm tripod mounted machine 

guns, and Hound rocket launcher systems. If the situation were not so tragic, the 

48

3 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AJP–

3.4.1 ¶ 0209 (March 2002) [hereinafter NATO PSO]. 4 NATO PSO at ¶ 0334 (emphasis added). 5Power, supra. 6 UN rights officials tell Security Council international police are required in Sudan, UN News 

Centre (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story . . . 7 Africa needs Europe’s help with peacekeeping, senior UN official says, UN News Center (Oct. 

15, 2004)), at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12247 . . . (emphasis added) 

absurdity of the suggestion that 2300 AU troops could protect more than two million 

people from these thugs would be laughable. 

NATO’s peacekeeping manual advises ‘‘[m]ission success requires that the PSF 

must be adequately led, trained, organized, equipped and armed. This will give it 

credibility with the parties and thereby the ability to achieve its operational objectives.’’ 3 The manual specifically states that in situations of genocide, ‘‘[o]nly a PSF 

prepared for combat can operate in such an environment, curtail human rights 

abuses, and create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can redress the 

underlying causes of the conflict and address the requirements of peace building.’’ 

According to NATO, for any peacekeeping operation to be effective, 

‘‘it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is 

a reflection of the parties’ assessment of the force’s capability to accomplish the 

mission. . . . [T]here should be no doubt that it is fully capable of carrying out 

its responsibilities and is supported by the political will to do so. Therefore the 

national military components must be well equipped and self sufficient, as well 

as prepared and trained for their mission.’’ 4

The African Union is a fledgling security organization, and while their achievements in Darfur are laudable, they are not equipped to accomplish the most vital 

task of protection.

In an article published in the New York Times in April 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked, ‘‘We know what is happening in Darfur. The question 

is, why are we not doing more to put an end to it?’’ Annan continued:

‘‘[G]iving aid without protection is like putting a Band-Aid on an open wound. 

Unarmed aid workers, while vitally necessary, cannot defend civilians from 

murder, rape or violent attack. Our collective failure to provide a much larger 

force is as pitiful and inexcusable as the consequences are grave for the tens 

of thousands of families who are left unprotected.’’

Colin Powell, in an interview on the Michael Reagan radio show in September 

2004 acknowledged:

‘‘[W]e must bear in mind that the 3,000 to 5,000 troops presently contemplated 

are not nearly sufficient for a true peacekeeping mission in an area the size of 

France—facing threats from not only the insurgency forces, but regime-allied 

militia (Janjaweed) forces, pervasive banditry that has come in the wake of conflict, as well as Khartoum’s regular military, security, and ‘‘police’’ forces. . . . 

Credible assessments by military experts suggest that the necessary peacekeeping 

force is in the range of 50,000 troops.’’

Intervention by a multinational peacekeeping force is the approach favored by the 

people who really matter to this discussion: the Fur, Masselit and Zaghawa tribes 

targeted by the GoS in Darfur. Samantha Power, author of A Problem from Hell: 

America and the Age of Genocide, found that ‘‘almost all the displaced Africans [she] 

spoke with in Darfur said they would trust only Western forces to bring peace. African troops were too susceptible to bribes, they said, and African governments would 

end up siding with Khartoum, as they had in the past.’’ 5 Similarly, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour noted that the IDPs ‘‘expressed their 

faith and total dependence on the international community for protection—this is 

where they think their security lies.’’ 6 On October 15, UN Under-Secretary-General 

Jean-Marie Gue ́henno added his voice to those calling for international intervention, 

arguing that, ‘‘[e]fforts by industrialized countries to train troops from Africa in 

peacekeeping are welcome but cannot substitute for those nations deploying their 

own forces to the continent.’’ 7

Because the force is simply not equipped to do the job, Khartoum has been free 

to operate in a theatre with zero accountability despite the presence of the African 

Union. It is imperative that current AU contingent in Darfur be augmented by a 

peace enforcement force that has the kind of training, interoperability, and communications, intelligence and transport capabilities that is the hallmark of the United 

States Armed Forces. 

49

8Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2005) 9Page Fortna, Peace Operations-Futile or Vital? (January 12, 2004). Paper commissioned by 

the United Nations Foundation for the work of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 

and Change, January 2004. 10 House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of William P. 

Pope), available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international—relations/109/pop031005.htm. 11The Security Council, . . . Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 

. . . Demands that the Government of Sudan, in accordance with its commitments under the 

8 April 2004 N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Security Protocol, 

immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region. . . . U.N.S.C. Res. 1591 (March 29, 2005). 

WITHOUT AN END TO THE GENOCIDE IN DARFUR, THE NORTH–SOUTH PEACE

AGREEMENT WILL FAIL

An end to the genocide in Darfur is critical to the success of the North-South 

peace agreement. How are Africans in the South supposed to trust in a peace agreement as they watch the GoS slaughter Africans in the West using the exact same 

means that they used to kill two million South Sudanese? The instability caused by 

the Darfur crisis further diminishes the already shaky odds that The Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be a success. As Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed 

out in an article for a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘[h]alf of all civil wars that 

appear to have been resolved by peace agreements tragically slide back into conflict 

within five years. This slip can have catastrophic consequences . . .’’ 8

Despite the aggressive rhetoric of Khartoum on the subject of foreign military deployment for protection of civilians in Darfur, the North-South peace agreement is 

more likely to fall apart absent an end to the Darfur genocide. In fact, a study by 

the Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, ‘‘empirically demonstrated that the presence of international peacekeepers has an observable positive impact in solidifying peace when compared to situations when belligerents are left to their own devices to make or honor a peace agreement.’’ 9

Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism William Pope recently testified to the 

Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation that, ‘‘[f]rom long 

experience, we know that impersonal training or equipment packages cannot be 

simply dropped into the hands of our partners and reasonably be expected to get 

results,’’ rather, effective peacekeeping operations in Darfur will require, ‘‘customized programs, hands-on training, locally appropriate equipment, and ongoing 

mentoring. . . . [and] frequent, face-to-face contact . . .’’ 10

FUTURE RESOLUTIONS MUST CONTAIN A CREDIBLE THREAT: THREE POSSIBLE OPTIONS

Before discussing two possible solutions to the protection gap in Darfur that will 

likely have great influence over the behavior of the GoS, we believe that it is necessary to briefly discuss an option that will not. Survivors United takes the position 

that a no-fly zone, even if it enforced by the United States, is inadequate to protect 

the people in Western Sudan. There are several reasons we take this position. First, 

Khartoum has already destroyed a majority of the African tribes’ villages with aerial 

bombardment and displaced the population to camps, and while these attacks have 

by no means stopped, this phase of the genocide is largely over. 

Second, the majority of the survivors of the genocide are women and girls who 

fear not an air attack, but the daily trek to gather firewood. A no-fly zone will not 

protect them from kidnapping and sexual torture by the Janjaweed. Third, the Security Counsel already put a no-fly provision in the last resolution (1591),11 so an additional one would be illogical backtracking. Furthermore, despite the fact that the 

Security Counsel, by authorizing the no-fly zone under Chapter VII in resolution 

1591, impliedly threatened Khartoum with military action should they violate it, the 

bombing has not stopped; the Janjaweed have not been disarmed, the murder and 

rape continues, and at least 50,000 people have died. 

If a no-fly zone is the approach Congress is going to take, it is essential that the 

Government of Sudan understand, from the language of the resolution itself, that 

a single violation will result in immediate military action by the United States. Otherwise, the threat will not be taken seriously. If provisions are written in such a 

way that NATO, the UN or the EU are required to get involved in order for the 

no-fly zone to be enforced, Khartoum will view them as largely an exercise in impotent political rhetoric. 

The wording of future legislation passed by Congress matters a great deal. Hollow 

threats or symbolic legislation will be counterproductive, because it will decrease the 

credibility of the U.S. and derail the momentum of advocacy groups because the 

public will believe that the U.S. has taken action to stop the genocide. Included in 

50

12Katie Humphrey, Power examines U.S.’s role in genocide at Crain Lecture, MEDILL NEWS 

(Feb. 14 , 2003), available at http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/inside/2003/power.html 13 Usama bin Laden, Fatwa: Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land 

of the Two Holy Places, AL QUDS AL ARABI (London) (Aug. 1996). 14 Usama bin Laden, Video Address, Al-Jazeera satellite television (Nov. 3, 2001). 15Deborah L. West, Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen (2005). 16 Chaim Kaufmann, See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

(July/August 2002). 17The Responsibility To Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 

State Sovereignty 71 (2001). 18 Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 115 (Hans Binnendijk & Stuart Johnson, eds.), National Defense University (Nov. 12, 2003) (quoting ‘‘one senior DOD official’’). 

the appendices of this testimony is model legislation drafted by Survivors United 

implementing a no-fly zone over Darfur. It cannot be emphasized enough, however, 

that a no-fly zone alone, unlike the solutions described below, is not an adequate 

solution to the civilian protection gap in Darfur. 

SOLUTION ONE: A U.S. PEACE ENFORCEMENT BRIGADE

Little could be more counter-productive than a perceived failure of the United 

States to intervene militarily to stop genocide in a second Muslim nation at this 

time. ‘‘There’s no way to ensure American security without understanding that 

genocide and allowing it imperils U.S. security,’’ journalist Samantha Power explains. ‘‘Not only is it totally wrong to allow it as a global community . . . but it 

actually is the case that Bosnia, the failed state that was allowed to rot, became 

a training ground for Osama Bin Laden.’’ 12

Years of inaction in Bosnia left more than 300,000 dead, and damaged the reputation and credibility of the United States in ways that our nation would not fully 

understand for several years. Three years before the NATO air strikes, a London 

newspaper ran a piece that angrily denounced UN inaction:

‘‘in Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . massacres that send shivers in the body and shake 

the conscience. All of this and the world watch and hear, and not only didn’t 

respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the USA 

and its’ allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves. 

. . . All false claims and propaganda about ‘Human Rights’ were hammered 

down and exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims.’’ 13

Bin Laden’s fatwa, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land 

of the Two Holy Places, like the genocide it referenced, barely scratched the surface 

of American collective consciousness when it was published in 1996. It was not until 

the message was repeated on a videotape in November 2001 that the real impact 

of our failure to act in Bosnia came to light. On the tape, bin Laden refers to, ‘‘a 

war of genocide in Bosnia in sight and hearing of the entire world. . . .’’ 14

By ignoring the genocide and continuing to cooperate with Sudan, the U.S. is 

‘‘send[ing] the wrong signal about U.S. values and intentions,’’ which will inevitably 

‘‘lead to increased animosity against the U.S., exacerbating the potential for violent 

rebellion against the regime and its perceived allies.’’ 15

On the other hand, living our values will redeem the United States’ reputation 

in the international community. Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda, Chaim Kaufmann writes, ‘‘The rest of the world does not act because the United States does 

not.’’ 16 Because the Congress, the Secretary of State and the President have all labeled the atrocities in Darfur ‘‘genocide’’, it is essential that the United States lead 

the effort to protect civilians. The authors of The Responsibility to Protect note that, 

‘‘[i]n mobilizing political support for intervention for human protection purposes, as 

for anything else, a great deal comes down to the leadership of key individuals and 

organizations. Someone, somewhere has to pick up the case and run with it.’’ 17 In 

this case, the United States has already assumed this role, and because of this, another call for a ‘‘stronger AU force’’ or ‘‘more AU troops’’ will be a painfully hollow 

gesture. As a senior DoD official recently remarked, ‘‘the United States can only expect to maintain its credibility as leader in such situations if it demonstrates the 

willingness to commit its own forces.’’ 18

Many people believe that, because of the war in Iraq, the military is ‘‘stretched 

too thin’’ to intervene in Darfur. This viewpoint is reminiscent of the ‘‘peacekeeping 

fatigue’’ of the early 1990s (Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and other conflicts resulted in 

repeated interventions by the United Nations and United States) that prevented 

President Clinton from sending troops to Rwanda to stop the genocide in 1994. The 

51

19Press conference by President George W. Bush (April 28, 2005). 20 Rep. Duncan Hunter (R—CA), Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee. Washington Journal, C-Span television broadcast, (June 10, 2005). 21 Contrary to popular wisdom, there are also economic incentives to intervention. As NATO 

explained, ‘‘engagement by a credible PSF will generally prove the most cost effective option in 

the longer term.’’ NATO PSO at ¶ 0422. 22P.W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., POLICY REVIEW.

truth is, not only is the United States capable of contributing troops to a multinational intervention force, but it is in the best interest of the military to do so. 

The ability of the United States Armed Forces to spare the troops required to intervene in Darfur has recently been reaffirmed by both the President and the Chairmen of the House Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Duncan Hunter. The 

President was recently asked if he felt that the number of troops deployed in Iraq 

was limiting his options elsewhere in the world. He responded,

‘‘The person to ask that to, the person I ask that to, at least, is to the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs, my top military advisor. I say, do you feel that we’ve limited 

our capacity to deal with other problems because of our troop levels in Iraq? 

And the answer is, no, he doesn’t feel we’re limited. He feels like we’ve got plenty of capacity.’’ 19

As was emphasized by Congressman Hunter during his appearance on the Washington Journal television show on C-Span, there are 2.5 million people in America’s 

defense establishment, and only 140,000—less than 10%—are currently serving in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. As Mr. Hunter said, this country has the capability to put 

5000 troops—more than double the current AU force—on the ground in Darfur tomorrow to protect women and girls from gang-rape and children from being burnt 

alive.20 Why then, would Congress not authorize the President to deploy that brigade should Khartoum continue to commit unspeakable crimes in Darfur? 

SOLUTION TWO: PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS UNDER U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL

If the Congress is unwilling to risk the lives of its soldiers to stop genocide and 

protect the people of Darfur, another option is to bring the power of the largest 

economy in the world to bear on Sudan by appropriating the funds necessary to deploy a peace enforcement force provided by private firms operating under U.S. command and control. 

This option has emerged from the shadow of past debacles, and is now considered 

to be a workable solution in cases that nations are unable or unwilling to deploy 

adequate force to intervene in a crisis. Organizations such as the International 

Peace Operations Association, an association of companies that support international peace and stability operations, have developed detailed codes of conduct 

and standards, and are often able to deploy faster than even NATO. In fact, the 

United States already employs these companies in Iraq. 

Military provider firms would most likely be the least expensive option, short of 

deploying U.S. troops.21 The majority of private security personnel are fully trained 

former members of the police or military. The findings of Executive Outcomes, a private security firm that operated in the 1990s, are worth quoting at length: 

‘‘Executive Outcomes performed a business exploration of whether it would have 

had the capacity to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Internal plans claim that the 

company could have had armed troops on the ground within 14 days of its hire 

and been fully deployed with over 1,500 of its own soldiers, along with air and 

fire support (roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Marine force that first deployed 

into Afghanistan), within six weeks. The cost for a six-month operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide was estimated at $150 million 

(around $600,000 a day). This private option compares quite favorably with the 

eventual U.N. relief operation, which deployed only after the killings. The U.N. 

operation ended up costing $3 million a day (and did nothing to save hundreds 

of thousands of lives).’’ 22

While Survivors United believes that it is in the best interest of the U.S. military 

to participate in peacekeeping operations, and would prefer that Congress authorize 

the President to use United States Armed Forces to stop genocide in Darfur, as we 

have emphasized, the most important objective is civilian protection, and therefore 

fully endorse the use of private military provider firms under U.S. command and 

control. 

52

CONCLUSION

It has been nearly a year since Congress declared that genocide was occurring in 

Darfur, and since that resolution was passed, more than 350,000 people have died. 

Again and again, over a period of more than a year, our nation’s leaders have 

pledged, meaninglessly, never again to stand by without taking action to prevent 

genocide. It is essential that Congress carefully craft the language of future resolutions so that the there is no question in the minds of the leadership in Sudan as 

to the seriousness of the U.S. government’s commitment to do whatever is necessary 

to stop the murder and rape of Africans in Darfur. 

Thank you again for this chance to share the perspectives of Survivors United to 

Save the Women of Darfur. 

APPENDIX A 

AUTHORIZATION OF A NO–FLY ZONE TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN DARFUR SUDAN

(a) Enforcement of a no-fly zone pursuant to resolution 1591. 

(1) The Congress finds that, in resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council created a no-fly zone prohibiting the Government of Sudan from conducting flights 

using military air traffic and non-military aircraft performing military missions, including reconnaissance or logistics, in and over the Darfur region of the Sudan. 

(2) The President shall take measures, including military action and the use of 

necessary force, to ensure compliance with the no-fly zone described in subsection 

(1). 

(3) In order to carry out his responsibilities for the management during the fiscal 

year 2005 of operations conducted under subsection (2), the President may——

(A) utilize options that employ technological capabilities to intercept and jam communications between the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed; and 

(B) make use of equipment such as aerostats, airships, or unmanned aerial vehicles to achieve situational awareness. 

(C) assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to perform necessary functions with respect to such operations. Members of the Armed Forces assigned under this subsection shall have as their primary functions logistics management, transportation, fiscal management, and contract administration. 

(D) direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government of an aggregate value not 

to exceed $100,000,000.00 in any fiscal year. 

(4) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may 

be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for commodities and services provided under subsection (3). 

(5) It is the sense of the Congress that the U.S. should encourage NATO and the 

EU to contribute similar support to conduct operations under subsection (2).

As a part of the credible threat, Congress must indicated that, should the President 

choose to take measures to enforce the no-fly zone, it will be fully funded (see provisions (3)(b) and (4)). 

APPENDIX B 

Rep. Hunter: A Brigade [for Darfur]? Absolutely! 

SURVIVORS UNITED TO SAVE THE WOMEN OF DARFUR

PRESS RELEASE

Representative Duncan Hunter, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, 

appeared on C-Span’s morning talk show, Washington Journal last week. Elisabeth 

Kidder, Director of Survivors United to Save the Women of Darfur 

(survivorsunited.com), as a call-in guest, was able to ask Rep. Hunter a question. 

Since late 2003, Survivors United has called on the President and Congress to 

work with the UN, NATO, the EU or act unilaterally if necessary, to ensure that 

an effective, capable and credible peace enforcement force is deployed to Darfur to 

protect civilians. 

The first line of argument for those who oppose US involvement to stop the genocide usually involves the war in Iraq and its effect on the nation’s military. With 

this in mind, Kidder asked Rep. Hunter whether the US could ‘‘field a brigade 

[5,000 troops] tomorrow’’ if necessary, or if critics were correct that the Armed 

Forces are dangerously overstretched. 

The following was Representative Hunter’s answer to the Director’s question:

53

23 Rep. Duncan Hunter (R—CA), Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee. Washington Journal, C-Span television broadcast, (June 10, 2005).

Oh absolutely! We have, there are about 2.5 million Americans in the defense 

establishment. That is active and reserve and guard. There’s 140,000 of those 

personnel, that’s less than 10%, in Iraq and about another 20,000 in Afghanistan. So in terms of personnel you have a 2.5 million person force just to make 

it very simply broad terms and 140,000 of those persons—that’s less than 10%—

are in the war fighting theatres. And you have obviously other Americans deployed around the world. But those are the two war fighting theatres. 

So yes, if the question is, are we totally tied down to the point that we 

couldn’t put a brigade out to handle a brush fire, the answer is, absolutely, we 

could handle that brush fire. Now if you get to the point where you’re asking 

about major wars . . . let’s say we had a major land war—we could handle it. 

We’d have to handle it in a different way than perhaps we’ve handled it in the 

past. 

We could handle a major war. Nonetheless, we put into the defense bill an 

additional 20,000 Army personnel last year and an additional 2,000 United 

States Marines and we’re putting in an additional 10,000 on the Army side an 

additional 1000 marines on the Core side. I think we do need to bolster the 

force, but again, you have a 2.5 million person military and only 140,000 of 

those folks are in Iraq and only about 20,000 in Afghanistan.23

Given the confidence of Rep. Hunter in the capability of the United States Armed 

Forces, Survivors United calls on him to co-sponsor H.R. 1424, the Darfur Genocide 

Accountability Act, which would give the President the ability to do whatever is necessary to stop the genocide that has taken 400,000 lives in Western Sudan.

Chairman HYDE. The last questioner before our Secretary has to 

go, Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary. 

If the Ranking Member’s comments earlier on were correct—and, 

first of all, I certainly agree with his characterization of your presentation. But if he was correct in that, because you did so well in 

preparing for this and delivering the information, that from this 

point on your testimony will always be received by the Full Committee. That is a fulfillment of the old adage that no good deed goes 

unpunished. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. I was thinking the same thing. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I am sure you were. I am just saying it for you. 

I will only ask one question and then yield what time I might 

have left to Mr. Burton, as he has a question or two also. 

Mine deals specifically with the ICC. I met not too long ago with 

the chief prosecutor. We talked to him about what it is he may 

need from us, what help he may need from us. I just want to make 

sure that there are no problems, to the best of your knowledge, 

that would prevent us from being able to supply him with whatever 

information he needs in having American officials work with him. 

I know, of course, in referring to the fact that we abstained from 

the resolution, that set the ICC in motion on this issue. But there 

is, of course, that provision in law in the American Service Members Protection Act which permits the U.S. Government to render 

assistance in efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan 

Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, other members of al-Qaeda, other 

leaders of Islamic Jihad and the other foreign nationals accused of 

genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. So with that 

proviso and with the amendment that we added to the State Department authorization, do you see any obstacles that would preVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jan 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062205\21977.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
54

vent us from being able to provide the kind of support that you 

may need to pursue his quest for justice through the ICC? 

Mr. ZOELLICK. I don’t. If I learn of any, I will get back to you 

on it. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. The section that you mentioned I looked at too; 

and I know of the amendment that you had proposed to this. 

If I could, Mr. Tancredo——

Mr. TANCREDO. Certainly. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. If I could, Mr. Tancredo, I also want to make sure 

our lawyers talk to your staff. When I read the amendment once, 

I was worried it might accidently limit us in one way, which I know 

is not your purpose. So if we could have a little freedom to follow 

up with you, but the purpose is the same. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay. Although I am intimidated by having your 

lawyers talk to my staff, because I don’t have any lawyers on my 

staff. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Well, they may do better. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. First of all, let me just say that in World War II 

when Churchill worked with Stalin, he said he would work with 

the devil himself if it meant the defeat of Hitler, or words to that 

effect. So I understand sometimes the necessity of sometimes dealing with somebody in a country like the Sudan who may have been 

involved directly or indirectly with the genocide. I just can’t figure 

out why they brought him to the United States. Looks like they 

could have met with these people outside the country, which would 

have reduced this problem. 

One question I have, Mr. Secretary, is that some time ago, during the Clinton Administration—I think even before that—there 

were several terrorist training camps in and around Khartoum and 

the Sudan. Al-Qaeda was being trained there and even Osama bin 

Laden was there one time. 

What I would like to know, is there information that there are 

still training camps in Khartoum or around Khartoum and in the 

Sudan? If so, are we getting any information on that? If you can 

give us that. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. I do not know of any. Chairman Wolf, who as we 

know has a strong interest in these issues, brought to my attention 

a report—I think it was actually also covered in the Washington 

Times recently. We brought—some FBI and intelligence people met 

with the people that had the report. He was kind enough to invite 

some of the people from the State Department there as well. 

They are obviously pursuing it, because of the history that you 

mention. We do not have any verification of that, you know, at this 

time, but it is something that one needs to continue to pursue. 

Chairman HYDE. Well, I want to thank you, Mr. Zoellick, for 

your marvelous testimony, very instructive. This is obviously a 

matter that will continue to occupy our attention, and we look forward to hearing from you again very soon. 

Mr. ZOELLICK. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:37, the Committee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

As you all know, Sudan has been ravaged by over two decades of civil war and 

the recent crisis and genocide in Darfur, in Western Sudan, has only added to that 

devastation. 

The US Congress has declared that the atrocities in Darfur are genocide and the 

Bush Administration blamed the Government of Sudan for the ongoing genocide. 

Let us remember that the Sudanese government is responsible for the killing of up 

to 300,000 people since 2003, and the displacement of 1.9 million people 

And the violence and fear has not ended. 

The government supported Janjaweed, and their militia allies, continue to carry 

out violence against civilians, including the murder of men, women and children. 

The government even continues to intimidate and punish those who speak out 

against rape and violence, including aid workers. 

The authoritarian government of Sudan, which seized power in 1989, represses 

freedom of assembly, association, movement and speech. 

That is why, while I am glad that our government took the lead in calling these 

atrocities genocide, I am concerned by recent Administration statements which seem 

to be backtracking and the lack of real follow-through in confronting the Khartoum 

government. I think we must be very cautious about taking it easy on the Government of Sudan either in the name of security or out of fear of disrupting the NorthSouth peace process. 

I recall that the President said, in reference to the war on terror, ‘‘You are either 

with us or against us.’’ I believe, when it comes to stopping genocide, you are either 

with us or against us. That’s why I cannot understand how the US government 

could fly a high-level intelligence official from Sudan to meet with government officials here in the United States at tax payer expense. This is a man who is largely 

responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. What kind of message does that send to the 

Government of Sudan? 

We cannot and should not send a signal of recognition or reconciliation to the 

Government of Sudan, which our own President has accused of committing genocide. 

We must send a clear message that the Government of Sudan must completely 

divorce itself from the Janjaweed and guarantee that those who participated in or 

who are complicit in genocide are brought to justice. 

I, too, am glad that Sudan is, according to the State Department report on terrorism, improving its cooperation with the US on terrorism. But they still must be 

held accountable for the devastation and genocide in Darfur. 

The Humanitarian Crisis 

When it comes to hunger in Darfur, the bottom line right now is that we have 

the illusion of stability. 

But the reality is there is no sustainable source of food in Darfur. There are no 

crops and there will be no crops. There will be no food and no basis for an economy. 

The minute that international food aid goes away, the illusion of stability will end. 

So we cannot hide behind the current illusion of stability. First, we must take action to guarantee that food supplies will not run out by getting the donor community not only to commit but to actually provide the money for food. Second, we must 

eventually create a secure environment so that people can return to their homes or 

find new land to plant their own their own food, restart their economy and their 

lives. 

56

We cannot forget that this is the worst humanitarian crisis that the world faces 

today. 

And, even if peace came today, that crisis would not be over. 

New Jersey Legislation on Sudan 

I believe that each of us must take action to stop genocide. That is why I am a 

strong supporter, in my own State of New Jersey, of legislation which would prohibit New Jersey from investing certain public funds in companies that do business 

in Sudan. The bill will require the State of New Jersey to divest state administered 

pension funds from companies, banks, and financial institutions that have ties to 

Sudan, without requiring any premature sale investments that would hurt the State 

of New Jersey. 

As we learned from South Africa, money talks, and we cannot allow our public 

money to support the genocide in Sudan. 

All of us here today, politicians, Americans and global citizens cannot make the 

same mistakes that we did in the Armenian, the Jewish, the Bosnian, and the 

Rwandan genocides. 

The people of Sudan need our help and they need it now. While the recent pledges 

of aid to Africa are both welcome and necessary, we must ensure that the money 

is getting where it needs to go; is helping the people who need it most; and is not 

taking away from other development/assistance programs. But above all, we must 

ensure that these promises do in fact turn into food and assistance for the Sudanese 

people. 

There will be no peace in Sudan without the help of the international community. 

Together, we have an obligation to intervene and put an end to the devastation and 

human suffering in Sudan and work towards a sustainable peace. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

Question: 

What is your expected time-line for the implementation of the measures you outlined in your testimony (e.g. deployment of troops, providing food to displaced persons)? 

Response: 

We fully support the African Union Mission in Sudan’s (AMIS) planned expansion 

from approximately 2,700 to 7,700 personnel. Deployment of additional African 

Union (AU) troops from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Kenya began 

July 1 and will continue through September 2005. 

Food aid programs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable 

groups in Sudan are ongoing. The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) is 

responsible for over 90% of food deliveries to all areas of Sudan, including Darfur, 

southern Sudan, eastern Sudan and transitional areas. USAID and WFP have identified priority areas for food delivery in southern Sudan and transitional areas like 

Southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Abyei. USAID and WFP will continue to 

work to ensure that the needs of IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable people in 

these areas are met. We are currently funding 86% of food deliveries to Darfur and 

90% of food deliveries to southern Sudan. We are also working to leverage other 

donor resources for food aid to southern Sudan to ensure that the WFP operation 

has sufficient resources to deliver through the year. 

Question: 

What more can the United States Government do to compel the Government of 

Sudan to disarm the militias? 

Response: 

Disarmament of militias is key to a lasting peace in Darfur. The Government of 

Sudan (GOS) must comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions demanding that the government cease support for militias in Darfur. We fully support 

the U.N. Security Council resolutions that call for disarming militias and are pressing the government diplomatically to comply. In every meeting with senior GOS officials in Washington and Khartoum, we underscore the need for the Government of 

Sudan to take proactive steps to cease support for militias and to take steps to hold 

those responsible for atrocities accountable. 

57

The United States sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1591 which provides 

for targeted sanctions, including a visa ban and asset freeze, against those who impede the search for peace, as another expression of our determination to pressure 

those most responsible for the continuation of the conflict. UN Resolutions also call 

for a ban on military flights and an arms embargo—all intended to hasten an end 

to the conflict. 

We are also working with the African Union (AU) and other partners to support 

the expansion of AU forces in Darfur from the current 2700 to over 7700 personnel. 

The AU mission has been very effective at reducing violence and preventing attacks 

in areas where it has deployed; expansion of the force will provide additional protection to civilians and displaced persons. 

Finally, we are actively supporting AU-led peace talks in Abuja. With U.S. support, the parties signed an important Declaration of Principles July 5 that sets the 

stage for further negotiations on wealth and power sharing. 

The new Government of National Unity, including SPLM Chairman John Garang 

as First Vice-President scheduled to be sworn in on July 9, 2005, will also change 

the dynamics, giving the new government additional incentive to end support for the 

militias and bring the conflict to a close. We will continue to press forward on each 

of these fronts with the ultimate goal of peace in Darfur. 

Question: 

What additional resources does the United States Government (State, USAID, and 

any other agencies) require from Congress in order to provide the most robust possible response to the genocide? 

Response: 

We appreciate Congress’ indispensable support of our Sudan programs and initiatives, including the $50 million in FY 05 supplemental funds approved to assist with 

the expansion of the African Union mission in Darfur. Funding requirements are 

constantly changing as the situation on the ground evolves. The African Union is 

expanding its force. Drought is exacerbating an already complex humanitarian situation. The Sudanese are just now embarking on the implementation of an extraordinarily complex peace agreement. We all share the goal of helping those who have 

been displaced to restart normal livelihoods as the security situation allows. We are 

carefully monitoring the needs and pressing the potential donor sources and will 

keep Congress informed of additional resources that may be required. 

Question: 

What steps need to happen in order to get additional international forces into 

Darfur? 

Response: 

Planning for the expansion of the African Union mission in Darfur is ongoing in 

anticipation of the imminent arrival of additional military forces and civilian police. 

The U.S. has already finished constructing some camps to house additional troops 

and is in the process of constructing others. In addition, the U.S. has agreed to airlift some of the expanded contingent. NATO and the EU have also agreed to provide 

transport, logistical and planning support and are gearing up to do so. Deployment 

of additional AU troops is scheduled to begin in July and to be completed by September 2005. FM Ismail assured Secretary Rice and Deputy Secretary Zoellick during his recent visit to Washington that the Government of Sudan will fully cooperate with the AU and NATO to facilitate AU expansion. The United States will continue to press the GOS to assure their full cooperation. Other donors are providing 

transport and funds for most operational costs. 

Question: 

As you are currently acting as your own ‘‘Special Envoy for Darfur,’’ what additional help might you and your office need to permit you to devote additional time 

and resources to our Darfur efforts? 

Response: 

I do not work alone on Sudan. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Constance 

Newman and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Ranneberger, as well as 

Senior Representative on Sudan Charles Snyder and the Africa Bureau’s Sudan Programs Group, all provide support and work the issues on a daily basis. State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is working with all relevant agencies 

to help coordinate a conflict transformation strategy that can lead to sustainable 

peace. We have senior U.S. representatives at the African Union-led Abuja peace 

talks on Darfur, and U.S. advisors supporting implementation of the Comprehensive 

58

Peace Agreement. In addition, the small but dedicated staff of the U.S. Embassy in 

Khartoum plays an important role in supporting and communicating our policies 

and programs. We are prepared to devote additional staff and resources—and will 

work with Congress to identify additional needs—as appropriate.

Æ