### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT May 1 1, 2004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1333 1

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 9 9- 03 39 3- CV-AJ MIS TY KINGSLAND , Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us CITY OF MIAM I, a Fl or ida Munic ipa l C or

por at ion , RAM ONDE ARMAS , in di vi du al ly, E. VAL ENZUEL A, i n d i v i du a l l y, J. BA LI KE S, i n d i v i du a l l y, D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ay 1 1, 200 4)Honora ble Richard W. Goldber g , J udg e, United States Court of International Trade , * sitti ngby desig nation. King sland does not appe al summary judgme nt as to her c laims ag ainst the City of 1 Mia mi, but on ly

a s to he r c la ims a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant o ff ic e rs . 2 Before W IL SO N and KRA VI TC H, Circuit Judges, and GO LD BE RG , Judge. * W IL SO N, Circuit Judge: Appellant Misty

Kingsland appeals the dis trict court's grant of summ ary j udgm en t i n f

av or of D ef en dants -Appe lle es , ba se d onhe r § 19 83 c la im s of f al se ar re st and m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n. F or the r ea sons that f

oll ow , w e re ve rs e the 1 dis tr ic t c ourt' s j udgm en t and r em an d th is c as e fo r furthe r pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. I. BACKG ROUND A . F ac tua l B ac kgroun d A t a ppr oxi m at el y

8:0 0 p. m . on N ove m

be r 27, 199 5, Appe llant K ing sland w as inv olv ed

in anauto m obi le a cc ide nt w ithof f- duty O ff ic er Ram on D e A rm as of the Ci ty of Mi am i P oli ce D ep ar

tm en t. O ff

ic er D e A rm as r ep orte d th e ac ci de nt o n his po lice ra dio. K ingsl and, w ho was driving a y ellow Pe nske rental truck, had tw o pa sse nge rs w ithhe r. D e A rm as w as tr an spor tin g on e pa sse nge r in h is unm ar ke d po lic e ve hic le . K ing sland a sse rt s th at D e A rm as r anar ed

li ght and3

caused the accident, while D e A rm as avers that it w as Kingsland who ran the re d li gh t. A t the ti m e of

the a cc ide nt, K ing sland w as not und er the inf lue nc e of alcohol or drugs . As a result of the accident, Kingsland suffered head tra um a, cr ie d, w as diz zy , f

el t si ck , and h ad

blurr ed vis ion . F oll ow ing the c oll isi on, she cl im be d ou t of

the r en ta l tru ck

and s at down inapil e of

shatte re d gl as s a dj ac en t t o the tr uc k, c utt ing he r hand. S he w as dis or ie nte d and w as “ in and o ut o f it. ” N ot knowing Office r D e A rm as had been a participant in the collision , and ins tead be lie vin g hi m

to be an of

fi ce r w ho h ad

r es pond ed

to the sc en e, K ing sland scream ed to him , “ He j ust ran the red light and hi t m e!” A lth oughMi am i po lic e of fi ce rs pr om

ptl y r es pond ed

to the sc en e of

the accident, an officer

did no t approach Kingsland unt il approxim ately thirty m inutes ha d pa sse d. A t tha t t im e, K ing sland r em ai ne d se at ed in a pil e of

shatte re d gl as s an d w as una

ble to stand u

p. Whe n a ske d f

or he r lic en se and r eg istratio n, she attem pted to stand to retrieve it, but had to sit back down. O ne of her passengers ev en tua lly

obt ai ne d th e lic en se and r eg istratio n f ro m the tr uc k. K ing sland a lle ge s th at

she tol d th e of

fi ce rs that sh e w as diz zy

and c oul d no t stand u p. S he a lso m en tio ne d th at she ha d su sta ine d in

j ur ie s to he r he ad , andA post-ac cident phy sical exam conducte d by King sland’s doctor r evea led that 2 King sland bore two bla ck eyes; a bruise and a la rg e bump on her

head; br uising fr om her lef

t shoulder ac ross her c hest (pre sumably from her seatbe lt); and injuries to her lef t jaw, hip, and shoulder due to impac t with the inside of the truck. 4 re que ste d ic e fo r he r he ad , w hic h sh e did not r ec ei ve . C ontrary

to the a sse rt ion s 2 of the de fe ndants , K ing sland c ont en ds tha t sh e w as not tr eate d a t the sc en e by em ergency

m edical technicians. Of ficer De Ar m as and his passeng er, however, did r ec ei ve m ed ic al tr eatm en t. De spite the presence of about twenty police officer s at the scene, no officer as ke d K ing sland f

or astate m en t of

he r ve rs ionof

the e ve nts or

spo ke to an y w itn es se s onthe sc en e. H ow ev er , the of fi ce rs spe nt a

gr eat de al of

ti m e ta lki ng t o Offi cer De Arm as , who cla im edth atKin gs la nd was a t fa ul t. When Off

icer V alenzuela ar

rived at the scene, Of

ficer Balikes told Off

icer V al en zu el a that he not ic ed an od or of c annabis c om ing f

ro m K ing sland’ s ve hic le and person, and that he thou ght Kingsland wa s im paired. Of

ficer Va lenzuela then we nt to th e truck to corroborate O ffice r Ba likes’ s statem ents, and later testified that he a lso sm el le d a“ sli ght odo r” of c an nabis on K ing sland’ s pe rs on. Y et , non e of th es e in ve st ig at in g o ffi cers saw fi t t o c on du cta se arch of Ki ng sl an d’s v eh ic le . L ike w ise , no dru g- sni ff

ing dog s w er e sum

m one d to c or

ro bor at e the of

fi ce rs ’ be lie fs , and n o c an nabis w as e ve r fo und. K ing sland d en ie s th e ex ist en ce of anyIn contra st, Office r Va lenzuela testified that King sland did not say she wa s diz zy , and 3 th ats h e r e s p o n d e d

th ats h e w a s f

i n e w h e na s k e d

i f s h e w a s o k ay. 5 canna bis or c an nabis odo r on h er

pe rs on o r in the tr

uc k. I n he r co m

pla int , she al le ge s th at

the of fi ce rs f ab ri cate d th e sm el l of

c an nabis in ane ff

ort t o m anufacture probable ca

use. Offi cer Val en zu el a al so no ti cedth atKin gs la nd ’s ey es were b lo od sh ot . Kingsland explain s that if her ey es we re bloodsh ot, it w as because she had been cr y ing . O ff ic er V al en zu el a sawone of

K ing sland’ s pa sse nge rs be ing tr eate d by re sc ue pe rs onne l, but

did not a tte m pt t o ta lk t o hi m

or the oth er pa sse nge r to a sse ss whe th er ei th er o f th em

sm el le d o f can nabi s. O ff ic er Ba lik es and anothe r of

fi ce r as ke d O ff

ic er V al en zu el a, w ho i s a certifie d Driving Under the I nfluence (D UI ) technician w ith two y ears e xperience, to adm inister a field sobriety test on Kingsland . Kingsland inform ed the officer s that sh e w as f

ee lin g di zz y

and s ic k, and tha t sh e w an te d to go t o th e hosp ita l. T he 3 of fi ce rs did not ta lk t o r es cu e pe rs onne l a bout K ing sland’ s c ondi tio n. D ur ing the “ w al k and t

ur n” te st, K ing sland d id an a bout f ac e ins te ad

of doi ng the tur

n a s in str uc te d. S he a lso sw ay ed

w hil e ba lanc ing on o ne le g, did not properly place her finger to her nose, m issed the tip of her nose five tim es, f ailed to f oll owins tr

uc tio ns, ha d e y el id tre m or s, and f ai le d to ke ep he r ey es shu t duri ngKi ng sla nd ’s pa sse ng e rs we re le ft at th e sc e ne of

the a c c ide nt. 4 6 the Rhom berg balancing test. O ffice r V alenzuela concluded that Kingsland failed th e so br ie ty test s. The off icers then escorted K ingsl and into a police cr uiser, inform ing her that sh e w as be ing tr an spor te d to the hos pit al f

or tr eatm en t and m or e te sts . S he 4 wa s instead taken int o custod y and brough t to a DU I testing facility . At the police statio n, the de fe ndants and o the r of fi ce rs a cc use d he r of

r unni ng a r ed li ght and cau si ng th e acc id en t. A lth oughO ff

ic er V al en zu el a say s th at

he a lw ay s su spe ct ed

that K ing sland wa s under the influence of cannabis and later char ged her w ith that offense, K ing sland s ta te d th at

she w as c harg ed

w ithdr ivi ng unde r the inf lue nc e of a lc ohol upon arr iving at the station. K ingsl and asserts that the officer s told h er they knew she w as dr

unk an d ha d be endr ivi ng drunk. T he y pe rf orm ed be tw ee n tw o and f

our Br eatha ly ze r te sts , a ll of

w hic h c am e ba ck

ne ga tiv e–

w itha0. 000% a lc ohol co nte nt. Whe n th e Br eatha ly ze r re sul ts c am e ba ck , the of fi ce r w ho w as w ri tin g on a fo rm a ske d anothe r of

fi ce r w ha t he sho uld

the n w ri te . T he se co nd o ff ic er tol d the f ir st o ff ic er to w ri te that K ing sland h ad astr ong odor

of c an nabis e m itt ingThe a rre st affidavit, which was sig ned by Offic er B alikes, states that King sland “ra n the 5 re d li g ht . . . and

c oll ide d w itha

[sic ] unm ark e d p oli c e un it, ” and that sh e wa s “ ob se rv e d w ith bloodshot ey es, slurre d speec h, and a strongodor of c annabis e mitti ngfrom her breath.” Although the arr est aff

idavit was complete d afte r the B reathaly zer tests had bee n administered, the a ff ida vit c onta ins no me nti on

of the ne g ativ e B re atha ly

zer re su lts . Ins te a d, in t

he are a in which the of

fice r wa s to mark whethe r the a rre stee wa s under the inf

luence of alc ohol, a box was chec ked to indicate that the answe r wa s unknown. King sland denies that ther e wa s any odor of c annabis on he r per son or in the truck. Fur ther, she disputes without supportingevidenc e whe ther she ha d bloodshot ey es and slurr ed speec h, and cla ims that if she did in fact exhibit t hese c hara cter istics, they resulted f rom the trauma of the ac cident and he r subseque nt continual cry ing. Whil e inca

rce rate d, King sland’s eyes beg an dilatingand constric ting, a nd she beg an 6 vomiting. The pr ison nurse mentioned that she w as af raid King sland may

have suf fer ed a c on c us sio n, pla c e d K ing sla nd in i so latio n, and

c he c ke d o n h e r e ve ry

fi ft e e n to thi rt

y min ute s. 7 fr om he r br eath. A t tha t po int , the f ir st o ff ic er thr ewaw ay

the f orm he w as w ri tin g o n an ds t a rt e dw r i t i n g o n an e wf o rm. 5 A ft er she pa sse d th e Br eatha ly ze r te sts , K ing sland c ont inu ed te lli ng the officer s that she didnot do drugs and th at she felt sick. O ffice r V alenzuela then re que ste d th at

adr ug t es t be pe rf

orm ed on K ing sland. O ff

ic er Ro be rt Je nki ns o f the Mi am i B ea chP oli ce D ep ar tm en t r es pond ed

and p er fo rm ed

m or e te sts on Kingsland, includin g walking a straight line, touching her nose, and closin g her eyes wh i l e e x t en d i n g h erar m s . Of fi ce r J en k i n s d et er m i n ed th at Ki n g s l an d ’s no rm al faci li ti es were i m pa ire d a nd ob ta in eda ur in e sp eci m en fro m he r. K ing sland w as the n handc uf fe d, tr an spor

te d to the D ad e Co unty

j ai l, and ch ar ge d w ithD U I. H er

f athe r post ed

a$1, 000. 00 b ond the f

oll ow ing day , and s he 6 w as sub se que ntl y

arr ai gne d onc harg es of

c ar el es s dr ivi ng, r ec kle ss dri vin g, andBe cause Offic er Jenkins worked f or the Miami B eac h police, the City of Miami police 7 depar tment did not rece ive the test re sults, despite the fac t that the case arose in the City of Mia mi. 8 D U I. K ing sland m ad e tw o tr ips f ro m N ewJe rs ey

to Fl or ida

to ap pe ar in co urt on th es e ch arg es . T he de fe ndant o ff

ic er s a sse rt

that the y ne ve r re ce ive d th e la

bor at or y te st re sul ts, w hic h c am e ba ck ne ga tiv e fo r canna

bis . T he y c la im that, a cc or din g to pol ic e de partm en t po lic ie s, dr ug t es t r es ult s are de liv er ed to the pr ose cu tor

and the of fi ce r w ho s ubm its the sam ple f or ana ly sis –inthi s c as e, O ff ic er Je nki ns. 7 O n F eb ru ar

y 5, 199 6, the pr ose cu tor

pr ovi de d th e ne ga tiv e ur ine te st r es ult s to K ing sland’ s c ouns el . I n M ay 199 6, a ft er

tw o c ourt a

ppe ar an ce s th at

r es ult ed in co nt in ua nc es , Kin gs la nd fil eda m ot io n t o d is m is s i n l ig ht of t he dru g t es t re su lt s. The ch arg es were d ro pp edon Ju ne 6, 1 99 6. B . Proc ed

ural H istory K ing sland f

ile d su it unde r 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 a ga ins t O ff ic er s D e A rm as , Ba lik es , and V al en zu el a, and a ga ins t the Ci ty of Mi am i, a lle gin g f

al se arr es t and m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n. I n Ki ng sl an d v . Cit

y o f Mi ami , No. 9 9- 03 39 3- CV-AJ (S.D. Fl a. May 29, 200 3) , the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the de fe ndants , f

ind ing that the of

fi ce rs ha d pr oba

ble c au se to ar

re st K ing sland, and that the of

fi ce rs w er e en tit le d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty on b othc la im s.9

K ing sland a

ppe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t, arg uin g that the appe lle es vio la te d he r Fo urth A m en dm en t r igh ts and are not e nti tle d to qu a l i f i e di mm un i t y. II. ST AN DA RD OF RE VIEW W e re vie wadis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t de novo , appl y ing th e sa m e le ga l s ta nd ard s u se d b y th e d is tri ctco ur t. See O ’F errell v. United States , 253 F.3d 125 7, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001 ). Sum m ary j udgm ent is appropriate wher e

“ the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and . . . the m ovi ng p ar ty is entitled to a judgm ent as a m atter of law. ” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56( c) . W e vie wthe ev ide nc e an d a ll fa ct

ua l i nf er en ce s th er ef

ro m in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the non- m ovi ng p ar

ty , and r es olv e al l r ea sona ble doubts about

the f ac ts i n f av or of the no n- m ov an t. Se e B urt on v . Ci tyof B el le G lad e , 178 F. 3d 11 75, 1187 (11t h Cir. 1999 ) (c iti ng Cl em ons v. D ough er tyCo unt y , 684 F. 2d 13 65, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982 )). III. D ISCU SSION A . F als e A rrest A w ar rantl es s arr es t w ith out

pr oba ble c au se vio la te s th e Co nst itu tio n and pr ov id es a ba si s fo r a s ect io n 1 98 3 c la im . Marx v. Gum binn er , 905 F . 2d 1 503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990). T he e xis te nc e of pr oba ble c au se a t the ti m e of

arr es t,10

how ev er , c onst itu te s an a bsol ute bar to a

se ct ion198 3 a ct ionf

or f al se arr es t. Id . at 1505 -0 6. Be ca

use thi s c as e co m es to us o n su m m ar y j udgm en t, w e ne ed

onl y de ci de w he the r the de fe ndants c ar ri ed the ir bur de n of

de m onstratin g th at

pr oba ble cau se ex is te d t o a rres t Ki ng sl an d a s a m at te r of law. Pr oba ble c au se to ar

re st e xis ts whe n an arr es t i s ob j ec tiv el y r ea sona ble ba se d o n t he to ta li ty of th e ci rcu m st an ces . R ank in v . E va ns , 133 F . 3d 1 425, 143 5 (1 1thCi r. 199 8) . “ T his standard is m et w he n ‘ the f

ac ts and c ir cum stanc es w ith in the of fi ce r’ s kn ow le dge , of

w hic h he or

she ha s r ea sona

bly tr ustw orthy inform ation, w ouldcause a prudent person to believe, under the cir cum stances shown, that the suspect has com m itted, is com

m itting , or is about to com m it an offense. ’ ” Id

. ( quot ing W

ill iam son v. M

ill s , 65 F. 3d 15 5, 158 (11th Cir. 1995)). 1. T he Integrity of the Evidence If the off icers’ assessm ent that Kingsland’s ey es we re bloodsh ot, that her speech wa s slurred, and that either she or her truck sm elled of cannabis we re u n d i s p u t ed , we wo u l dh av e n o p ro b l em ag re ei n g wi t h th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s co nc lus ion s. T he r ec or d, how ev er , c ont ai ns e vid en ce that c ontra dic ts e ac h of the se fi ndi ngs, suf

fi ci en t t o ov er co m e sum

m ar y j udgm en t. Pr inc ipa lly , the de fe ndant o ff ic er s ba se d th ei r ar

re st i n part

on the ir allegation that th ey

detected an odor of cannabis em anating from either11

Kingsland’s bre ath, her

person, or her

vehicle. How ever, Kingsland claim s that she did not e nga ge in ill eg al dr

ug a ct ivi ty

on the day

of the a cc ide nt o r on any oth er day , and h en ce , that the of fi ce rs c oul d no t have de te ct ed any suc h od or

pr ior to h er arr es t. A t the out se t, the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in fa ili ng t o r ec ogni ze in K ing sland’ s c om

pla int the a sse rt ionthat the de fe ndants f ab ri cate d e vid en ce to su pp or t p ro babl e cau se . W e fi nd i t si gni fi cant tha t K ing sland i s a ble to supp ort he r as se rt ion s of fa br ic at ionw iththe f

oll ow ing f

ac ts: ( 1) de spi te de te ct ing an od or of c an nabis , the of fi ce rs c hose not

to co nduc t a

se ar chof K ing sland’ s ve hic le or

he r pa sse nge rs to co rr obor at e the ir

te sti m ony ; ( 2) the of

fi ce rs did not c al l i n dr ug- sni ff ing dog s to co nf irm the ir sus pic ion s of

dr ug u se ; ( 3) no dru gs w er e ev er f ound or pr oduc ed ; (4 ) K ing sland t es te d ne ga tiv e fo r canna bis ; ( 5) K ing sland’ s ve hic le w as not im poun de d a s e vid en ce , nor w as he r al le ge dly

odo ri fe ro us c lothin g r et ai ne d; ( 6) the de fe ndants state d inthe ir arr es t a ff idavit that K ing sland r anthe r ed li ght , al le ge dly w ith out takin g st at em en ts f

ro m a va ila ble w itn es se s or

f ro m K ing sland herself; and (7) the of

ficer s decided to charge K ingsl and with DU I-cannabis rather than DU I-alc ohol , and sim ultaneous ly

destroy an initial arrest a ffidavit, only afterIn contra st, we ar e mindful that a c ourt nee d not enterta in conclusory and 8 unsubstantiated alleg ations of fa brication of evidenc e. See, e .g., Cunningham v. Gates , 229 F.3d 1271, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissing pla intiffs’ conc lusory alleg ations of fa

brication where the plaintiffs produc ed “not a n iota of evide nce” to sugg est that the def endant of fice rs fa bricated evidenc e). 12 she pa sse d B re atha ly ze r te sts . I n su m , the de fe ndants appe ar to la ck any 8 corroborating evidence to sup port their testim ony that an odor of cannabis was present, whereas K ingsl and is able to sup port her assertions with circum stantial evidence. Inf ind ing both pr oba

ble c au se and r ea sona

ble sus pic ionto co nduc t a f ie ld sobr ie ty te st o n K ing sland, the dis tr ic t c ourt st at ed : O ff ic er s V al en zu el a an d B al ike s de te ct ed an od or of c an nabis em an at ing f

ro m [ K ing sland’ s] tr

uc k. Ms . K ing sland d en ie d th at she sm el le d of

c an nabis , but

she ha s no e vid en ce to co ntr ad ic t the te st im on y of Off ic ers Vale nz ue la an d B al ik es ab ou t t he tru ck ’s od or .

. . . . E ve n th oughMs . K ing sland d id n ot s m el l of c an nabis – I c re dit her version of events instead of Off icer V alenzuela’ s and Off icer Balikes’ – she has no evid ence to contradict the testim ony of O ffice rs V al en zu el a an d B al ike s th at the re w as an od or

of c an nabis f

ro m the tr uc k. Ki ngsland , N o. 99- 0339 3- CV -A J, sli p op . a t 6, 9. W e ha ve se ve ra l c onc er ns a bout th is reas on in g. Fi rs t, the r ec or d c ont ai ns c onf lic tin g a cc ount s r eg ar din g w he re the odo r of canna bis or igi na te d. O n th e ar re st a ff idavit , O ff

ic er Ba lik es state d th at

K ing sland13

“ wa s observed with . . . a strong odo r of cannib is [sic] em itting from her breath.” H ow ev er , the arr es t a ff

idavit m ak es no m en tio n of

ac an nabis odo r em an at ing fr om the tr uc k. Mo re ove r, O ff

ic er V al en zu el a, aD U I spe ci al ist , te sti fi ed that he ha s tr oubl e sm el lin g c an nabis on a pe rs on’ s br eath, and i nst ea d in dic at ed that he detected a “ sligh t odor” of cannabis on Kingslan d’ s person. T hus, there ar e ge nui ne iss ue s of

f ac t r eg ar din g ( 1) w he the r the re w as any odo r at a ll, and ( 2) if the re w as an od or , w he the r it ra diate d f ro m the tr uc k, f ro m K ing sland’ s pe rs on, or fro m Kin gs la nd ’s bre at h. Se co nd, w e not e that the pla int if f ha s pr of fe re d no le ss e vid en ce r eg ar din g the pr es en ce or

abse nc e of

ac an nabis odo r than th e de fe ndants have . T he pla int if f’ s w or d is m er el y

c ount er ed

by the de fe ndants ’ te sti m ony . G ive n th e s t an d ar do f r ev i ew at th e s u m m ary ju d g m en ts t ag e, we m u s t ac ce p tKi n g s l an d ’s version of the facts as true. Se e R ow e v. Ci tyof F ort L aude rdal e , 279 F . 3d 1 271, 1 2 7 9 n .9 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( s t at i n g th at a c o u rt m u s tac ce p tth e n o n -mov an t ’s version of disp uted facts as true f or purposes of summ ary

j udgm ent). Ther efore, the dis tr ic t c ourt i m

pr ope rl y a cc ep te d a s tr

ue the de fe ndants ’ a lle ga tio n th at the truck sm elled of cannabis, and erroneouslyused this fac t to sup port summ ary j udgm ent in the defendants’ favor. Whether an odor of cannabis was indeed14

em an at ing f

ro m the tr uc k is age nui ne iss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t su ita ble f or co ns id erat io n b y

a jury. T hir d, the dis tr ic t c ourt i nc or re ct ly c onc lud ed

that K ing sland h as no ev id en ce t o c on tra di ctth e o ffi cers ’ te st im on y reg ard in g t he tru ck ’s od or . As de ta ile d a bove , K ing sland has presented circum stantial evidence to sup port her as se rt ionthat the tr

uc k di d no t sm el l of

c an na bis . In addition , while laboratory tests have proven that Kingsland wa s drug-free at the tim e of her arre st, the defe ndants h ave proffe red no objec tive evidence that dr ugs w er e pr es en t, e ith er

on K ing sland’ s pe rs on o r in h er tr uc k. W e fi nd i t inc re dib le that the of

fi ce rs f ai le d to c ondu ct

ase ar chof

K ing sland’ s ve hic le or sum m on dru g- sni ff

ing dog s up on d et ec tin g th e “ str ong odor ” of anarc oti c, the m ere p os se ss io n o f whi ch is il le ga l. See, e. g., United States v. R eeh , 780 F . 2d 1541 , 1543 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986) (“ Af ter a m em ber of the [ Coast Guar d] detected the odor of m arij uana, a

searc h ensued du ring which the m arij uana wa s discovered.”). Pre sum ably , if cannabis wer e present, such evidence would justify a drug poss ession charge. Fi n al l y, it i s u n cl ea r w h y t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ch o s e t o cr ed i tKi n g s l an d ’s testim ony that she did no t sm ell of cannabis, and y et chose not to accept her as se rt ion s th at

the tr uc k li ke w ise did

not sm el l of c an nabis .We further note that this is a special c ase where in the investigating of fice rs wer e 9 respondingto a ca ll made by a fe llow office r on his police ra dio, to an acc ident involving that very office r. I f eve r there wer e a c ase in whic h we should re cog nize the potential exi stence of a motive for fa

brication, this is it. Cf. Stone v. City of Chi cago , 738 F.2d 896 ( 7th Cir. 1984) (f ind inge vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

jur y ve rd ic t in

fa vo r o f p la int if

fs on c on sp ir a c y

c la im under 42 U .S.C. § 1985 where plaintiffs w ere involved in collision wit h office rs). 15 W e cannot

a llo wapr oba

ble c au se de te rm inatio n to stand p ri nc ipa lly on the unsu pported statem ents of interested officer s, when thos e statem ents have been challenged and coun tered by objec tive evidence. 9 2. T he Suf fic ie nc y of t he I nv es tigati on Ne xt, w e consider whether the defendants’ investig ation was co nst itu tio na lly

de fi ci en t. Appe llant arg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr one ousl y c o n c l u d e da s amat t e r

o f l a wth a tth e o f

f i c e r s c o n du c t e dac o n s t i tu t i o n a l l ysuf fi ci en t i nve sti ga tio n, the re by r em ovi ng the inquir

y f ro m aj ur y . S he c ont en ds that, obj ec tiv el y , of

fi ce rs sho uld

not be pe rm itt ed

to tur n abli nd e y e to ex cu lpator

y inf orm at ionthat i s ava ila

ble to the m , and i nst ea d su ppor t the ir a ct ion s on selected facts they

chose to focus upo n. W e agre e. In Sevigny v. Dick

sey , 846 F . 2d 9 53 ( 4thCi r. 198 8) , the F ourth C ir cu it state d: [Aqua lif

ie d im m uni ty ana ly sis ] m

ust c harg e [the of

fi ce r] w ith poss ession o f all the inform ation reasonably discoverable by

an officer acting reasonably

under the circum stances. . . . “ [A ] police officer m ay not close his or her e y es to facts that w ouldhelp clarifyWe are awa re tha t office rs ar e not re quired to per form er ror- fre e investig ations or 10 independe ntly

investigate eve ry

proff ere d claim of innoce nce. See B aker v . McCollan , 4 43 U. S.

16 the circum stances of an ar rest. ” B eV

ie r v . H uc al , 806 F . 2d 1 23, 128 (7 th C ir . 198 6) ( of

fi ce r m ust be he ld t o kn ow le dge of r ea sona bly dis co ve ra ble inf orm at ionbe ar ing upo n pr oba ble c au se to ar

re st f or child neglect). Se vi gny , 846 F . 2d at 95 7 n. 5. B ec au se the of fi ce r in Se vi

gnym ad e anarr es t without heeding certain, ea sily obtained in form ation, the Fourth Circuit held that th e o ffi cer f

ai le d t o a ctreas on ab ly. Id . a t 95 7. T he c ourt art ic ulate d th at the of fi ce r “ sim ply did not bothe r to d o w ha t any

pol ic e of fi ce r ac tin g r ea sona

bly in the circum stances would have done to clarify the fac tual situatio n” and that

“ [t] here w as no exigency which prevented his doing so.” Id . a t 95 8. K ing sland asserts that the sam e situation p resents itself here. She m aintains that th e district co urt’ s c onc lus ionthat the inv es tig at ionw as suf fi ci en t t o f

orm aba sis f or pr oba ble cause im plies that “ no go od-faith investig ation whatsoever is required to satisfy thi s st an dard . ” I nit ia l B ri ef of Appe llant at 22 . The district court f

ocused on the rea sonablen ess of Kingsland’ s arre st given what the off

icers did inv es tig at e, ign or ing the f ac t tha t the y

m ay have sub j ec tiv el y failed to investig ate both sides o f the story . On the other hand, K ingsl and argues (and Se vi gnyim pli es ) that of

fi ce rs m ust inv es tig at e obj ec tiv el y

and c onsi de r al l inform ation available to them at the tim e. While the constitution al

10137, 145-46 (1979) . Howeve r, that is a sepa rate inquiry

than the nar

row que stion presented he re. He re , K ing sla

nd a lle g e s th at th e de fe nd ants tur ne d a bli nd e y e to i mme diate ly

ava ila ble exculpatory

information, improperly

choosingto gather infor

mation that would exonerate Of fice r De Ar mas in a biased ma

nner. 17 re as ona ble ne ss o f a pol ic e inv es tig at iondoe s no t de pe nd o n an of fi ce r’ s su bj ec tiv e in te nt or u lt eri orm ot iv e in co nd uc ti ng th e in ve st ig at io n, s ee, e. g., W hren v. U nited States , 517 U. S. 806, 812-13 (19 96), it does not follow that the officer m ay then inv es tig at e se le ct ive ly . T he F ourth C ir cu it’ s a ppr oa chis on p oin t i n th is c as e, and w oul d se rv e to d et er

dis hone st o ff

ic er s f ro m f ab ri catin g c harg es to co ve r up im pr ope r de te nti ons by

inc lud ing onl y

se le ct ive e vid en ce in the ir r ep orts. W e re co gni ze , how ev er , that a pol ic e of fi ce r “ is n ot r equir ed

to explo re and elim inate every

theoretically

plausibl e claim

of innocence before m aking an arre st.” R ic ci utiv . N. Y. C. T rans it A uth . , 12 4 F .3d12 3, 1 28 (2d Cir . 19 97 ). Ne vertheless, an officer

m ay not choo se to igno re inform ation that has been offer ed to him

or her, such as Kingsland’s a ssertions th at she wa s injured and that O ff ic er D e A rm as r anthe r ed

li ght . N or

m ay the of fi ce r co nduc t an in ve sti ga tio n in a biased fashion or elect not to ob tain easily discoverable facts, such as whether the re w as c an nabis in the tr uc k or w he the r w itn es se s w er e av ai la ble to atte st t o w ho w as a t f

au lt in the a cc ide nt.18

Th e l ac ko f c o rr o b o ra t i o n th ro u g h i n d ep en d en tp o l i ce wo rko f D e A rmas ’s al le gatio n th at

K ing sland w as a t f

au lt in the a cc ide nt i s no te w orthy in our pr oba ble cau se an al y si s. Cf

. O rte ga v . Ch ris tia n , 85 F . 3d 1 521, 152 5 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) (finding no probable cause w here arresting officer relied on unsub stantiated inf orm an t’ s ti p, f

ai le d to take any

ind ep en de nt s te ps t o in ve sti ga te the ti p, and d id not have any

evidence w hich would have corroborated the tip). Appe lle es r el y

on the S ev en th C ir cu it’ s de ci sio n in Q ian v . Ka utz , 168 F . 3d 949 (7 th C ir . 199 9) , to supp ort the ir a sse rt ionthat the y

pos se sse d pr oba

ble c au se fo r K ing sland’ s arr es t. I n Q ian , the c ourt he ld tha t a pol ic e of fi ce r ha d pr oba

ble ca use to m ak e a D U I ar

re st whe re ( 1) the of

fi ce r obse rv ed

that a dr ive r ha d lo st co ntr ol o f his c ar

and c ra she d, ( 2) the dr ive r w as slum pe d ov er and h ad dif fi cu lty w al kin g, ( 3) the ins ide of the c ar sho w ed no s ign s of

avio le nt i m

pa ct or that the dr ive r’ s bo dy

ha d hi t anythi ng d

ur ing the a cc ide nt, ( 4) the dr ive r de nie d be ing injured and sho we d no ph y sical signs o f inj ury , ( 5) the driver’ s speech seem ed slurr ed , and ( 6) the of

fi ce r did not kno wanythi ng a

bout the dr ive r’ s pr ee xis tin g he adin jury, whi ch cau se d h is im pa irment. Id . at 952-53 . The def endants assert that, a s in Q ian , they

rea sonablyrelied on their experience in concludi ng that Kin gs la nd ’s beh av io r m os t l ik el y res ul te d fr om

dru g i nt ox ic at io n. Ho wev er, Q ian is di st in gu is habl e in a nu m be r of si gn ifi can t re sp ect s. Fi rs t, Qi an cras he d h is own19

ve hic le w ith out

appare nt r ea son an d so w as c le ar ly a t f au lt, w he re as the que sti on of f au lt in K ing sland’ s c oll isi on i s un cl ear an d di sput ed . S ec ond, the r es pond ing of fi ce r in Q ian se ar ch ed

the ve hic le f

or sig ns o f inj ur

y and f or dr ugs or a lc ohol be fo re m ak ing an arr es t, w hil e the de fe ndant o ff ic er s di d ne ith er

be fo re arr es tin g K ing sland. T hir d, the of

fi ce r in Q ian asked the driver severa l tim es if he w as okay , and the driver denied any injury and showed no ou twar d sign s of injury . In contrast, K ingsl and alleges that, despite her pronouncem ents of injury and her visib le signs o f inj ury , the def endants deni ed her m edical attention and altog ether igno red her inj uries. Fourth, Q ian was not involv ed in a collision with a police of fi ce r, the re by

a ssu ag ing c onc er

ns o f co nc ea lm en t and i m pr opr ie ty . F if

th, unl ike Ki n g s l an d , Qi an d i dn o tm ak e a n y al l eg at i o n s o f f ab ri ca t i o n . La s t l y, th e p l ai n t i ff ’s inj ur ie s in Q ian w er e pr ee xis tin g and d id n ot a ppe ar to be c au se d by

the c ra sh, w he re as it

w as pur porte dly e vid en t tha t K ing sland’ s in j ur ie s w er e inc ur

re d duri ng th e acc id en t wi th Offic er De Arm as . It is cl ear that the de fe ndant i n Q ian m ade a good faith effort to discov er inf orm at ionthat w oul d he lp c lari fy the sit ua tio n he w as pr es en te d w ith . O n th e contrary , a

rea sonable jury

could find th at the appellees’ investig ation was deficient in that the officer s consciou sly did no t m ake an ef

fort to uncover re as ona bly dis co ve ra

ble , m at er ia l i nf

orm at ion . G ive n th at

apr oba ble c au se20

de te rm inatio n is ba se d onthe tot al ity of the c ir cum stanc es , the c ondi tio ns sur ro undi ng and l ea din g up to anarr es te e’ s ou tw ar d m an if es ta tio ns, and n ot those m an if es ta tio ns a lon e, f

ac tor int o th e de te rm inatio n. T hus, an of fi ce r m ay not ex cl usi ve ly

r el y on the outw ar d si gns that an in div idu al is ex hib iti ng, w ith out co ns id eri ng th em

in th e co nt ex t o f th ei r su rro un di ng cir cu m st an ces . Se e R ank in , 133 F. 3d at 14 35 ( statin g th at pr oba ble c au se is ex am ine d un de r the tot al ity of circum stances); c

f. D orm an v . F

lor ida , 492 S o. 2d 1 160, 116 2 ( Fl a. 198 6) ( fi ndi ng no p ro bable c au se to adm ini ste r a blo od a lc ohol te st whe re of fi ce r kne wthe defendant had been invo lved in a collisio n, observed that the defendant’ s ey es w er e re d and w at er

y and tha t the de fe ndant h ad be enc ry ing , and d id n ot s m el l alcohol on defendant’ s breath). W e do n ot d isp ute that, in ce rt ai n si tuatio ns, an of fi ce r m ay have pr oba

ble ca use to ar re st a pe rs on i f the pe rs on w as diz zy , pe rf orm ed poo rl y on f ie ld s obr ie ty te sts , and e xhi bit ed

blo odsh ot e y es and s lur

re d sp ee ch . H ow ev er , the pr es en ce of these charac teristics cannot be viewed in the absolute. For e xam ple, if an officer ha s no r ea son to b el ie ve that the ind ivi dua l ha s su ff er ed any tr aum a to c au se the se co nd it io ns , th en a fi nd in g o f pr ob ab le cau se forDUI wou ldno t b e dub io us . See ge ne ral lyQ ian , 168 F . 3d 9 49. I n c ontra st, if the inv es tig at ing of

fi ce rs are f

ull y aw are that the person who exhibi ts such character istics has, j ust m om ents before,We r e c a ll that pr ob a ble c a us e re qu ir e s th at “ ‘t

he fa c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s withi n the 11 officer’s knowledge , o f whic h h e or sh e ha s reasonably trustworthy infor mation , would cause a prudent person to believe , un de r th e c irc um sta nc es sh own , th at th e su sp e c t ha s c omm itt e d, is committing, or is about to commit an offe nse.’” Ra nk in , 133 F.3d at 1435 (citation omitted) (empha sis added). 21 been invol ved in a forcef ul autom obile collis ion and h as been cry ing, the presence or abse nc e of

pr oba ble c au se is m or e am

big uous . H er e, the of

fi ce rs f ound K ing sland s itt ing in a pil e of de br is f ro m the c oll isi on, and K ing sland a lle ge dly outri ght tol d th em

that sh e ha s su ff

er ed inj ur ie s, inc lud ing he ad

tr aum a. I n f

ac t, Of ficer Va lenzuela conceded that her behavior w as consistent with that of an acci de nt vi ct im . [D.E. 25- 1 a t 1 3]. Th e p ar t i es d i s p u t e t h e c o n du ct o f t h e d ef en d an t s l ea d i n g up t o Ki n g s l an d ’s arre st. U nder Kingsland’ s version of the events, the defendants did no t act in an objec tively

rea sonable m anner under the totality of the circ um stances. I t wa s within the officer s’ knowledge that Kingsland was involv ed in an accident, wa s cr y ing , and f

au lte d O ff

ic er D e A rm as . I t m ay

a lso have be enw ith in the of fi ce rs ’ knowledge that there we re no drugs in Kingsland ’ s truck and that Kingslandhad be eninj ur ed . Y et , the re is ev ide nc e he re that the y c hose to ei the r ign or e or m isr ep re se nt those f

ac ts, thu s m ak ing the inf

orm at ionon whic h th ey

ba se d th ei r arre st les s t ha n “ reas on ab ly trus two rth y .” 11Nor c an we conclude , as a matter of law , that probable cause exis ted on the basis of the 12 unchalleng ed evide nce. E ven if King sland failed multiple sobriety tests, was dizz y , and had blo od sh ot e y e s and

slurr e d s pe e c h, we c ann ot s ay that un de r th e c irc um sta nc es p re se nte d h e re , such evide nce is re asonably trustworthy

or suffic ient to leg ally

establish probable cause for a DUI arr est. As we ha

ve mentioned, King sland’s phy sical condition ca nnot be viewe d in a box. Aside fr om the odor of c annabis, a ll of the offic ers’ alleg ed obser vations are char acte ristic of a c ry inga c c ide nt v ic timwh o c la ims inj ur y . Und e r t

he re qu isi te “ tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s” approa ch, a r easona

ble jury could find that the de fenda nts did not have probable cause to believe that King sland was intoxi cate d. 22 Beca use we find that there are genuine iss ues of m aterial f act as to w hether the de fe ndants ( 1) m anuf ac tur ed pr oba ble c au se , and ( 2) f

ai le d to c ondu ct

a re as ona ble inv es tig at ion , vie w ing the e vid en ce in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the pla int if f, w e cannot

c onc lud e as am atte r of

lawthat pr oba

ble c au se e xis te d to ar re st K ing sland. T hus, sum m ar y j udgm en t i s in ap pr opr ia te on the m er its of the 12 f a l s e arr e s tc l a i m. B . M ali ci ous P ros ec uti on Pl ai nti ff K ing sland a lso a sse rt s a§ 19 83 c la im f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n based on th e defe ndants’ alleged f abrication of evidence against her, their alleged fa ilure to co nsi de r pot en tia lly e xc ulp at or

y inf orm at ion , and the ir

a lle ge d r ef

usa l t o investig ate im

partially . Kingsland m aintains that, due to the officers’ im proper ac tio ns, the pr ose cu tor

w as pr es en te d w ithf

al se and m isl ea din g in fo rm at ion . S he av er s th at c ri m ina l pr ose cu tio n w as ana tur al c onse que nc e of the de fe ndants ’ pur porte dly de ce pti ve a cc ount

of the a cc ide nt and i ts s ur

ro undi ng c ir cum stanc es .23

To establish a feder al m alicious prosecuti on claim under § 198 3, a plaintiff m ust pr ove ( 1) the e le m en ts o f the c om m on l awtor

t of m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n, and (2 ) a vio la tio n of

he r Fo urth A m en dm en t r igh t t o be f re e fr om unr ea sona

ble se iz ur es . W

ood v. Kesler , 32 3 F .3d87 2, 8 81 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct. 298 (200 3). 1. T he Co m m on L awE le m en ts o f M ali ci ous P ros ec uti on Under F lorida law, a plaintiff m ust establis h each of six elem ents to su pport a cl ai m of m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n: ( 1) an or igi na l j udi ci al pr oc ee din g a ga ins t the pr es en t pl ai nti ff

w as c om m en ce d or

c ont inu ed ; ( 2) the pr es en t de fe ndant w as the legal cause of the original proceeding; (3) the term ination of the original pr oc ee din g c onst itu te d abon a fi de te rm inatio n of that pr oc ee din g inf

av or of the present plaintiff; (4) there wa s an absence of probable cause f or the original pr oc ee din g; ( 5) the re w as m al ic e on the part of the pr es en t de fe ndant; and ( 6) the pl ai nt iff su ffer edda m ag es as a res ul t o f th e o rig in al pro ceed in g. D urk in v . D av is, 814 So . 2d 1 246, 124 8 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 200 2) ( ci tin g B urns v . G CC B ev erages, Inc. , 502 So. 2d 12 17 (Fla. 1986 )). O nly the f ourth and f

if th e le m en ts are a t i ssu e here: w hether there w as an absence of pr obable cause for the original crim inal pr oc ee din g, and whe the r the re w as m al ic e on the part of the de fe ndants .In Bo nn e r v . Ci ty of Pric ha rd, 661 F.2d 1206 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), w e adopte d as 13 binding pr ece dent all dec isions of the former Fifth Circuit re ndere d prior to Octobe r 12, 1981. 24 “ It is w el l se ttl ed

that i n an a ct ionto re co ve r da m ag es f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n w he re , a s he re , the e vid en ce is in d isp ute , the e xis te nc e or non- ex ist en ce of

m al ic e an d w an t of

pr oba ble c au se are que sti ons of f ac t f or the j ury .” G ood H

olding Co . v . B osw el l , 173 F. 2d 39 5, 399 (5th Cir. 1949). 13 Co nse que ntl y , be ca

use K ing sland c ha lle nge s th e le git im ac y of the r el ev an t ev ide nc e, c onc er

ns r eg ar din g th e fu lf

ill m en t of the f ourth and f

if th e le m en ts f

or t h e c o mm o n l a wt o rto f

mal i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n ar e r i g h t l y re s e rv e df o r th e ju ry. 2. F ourt h A m en dm en t Se izu re N ex t, K ing sland b ears the bur de n of pr ovi ng tha t sh e w as se iz ed in re la tio n to th e p ro se cu ti on , in vi ol at io n o f he r co ns ti tu ti on al rig ht s. In the case of a w ar rantl es s arr es t, the j udi ci al pr oc ee din g do es not be ginunt il the party

is arra ig ne d o r in di ct ed . Se e, e . g. , M ej ia v . Ci tyof Ne w Yo rk , 119 F . S upp. 2d 2 32, 254 (E. D. N. Y. 2000 ) (“ [T ] he existence, or lack, of probable cause is m easured as of the ti m e the j udi ci al pr oc ee din g is c om m en ce d ( e. g. , the ti m e of

the arra ignm ent), not th e tim e of the prec eding warr antless arrest. ”). Thu s, a pla int if f’ s arr es t c an not

se rv e as the pr ed ic at e de pr ivatio n of li be rty be ca use it oc curr ed pr ior to the ti m e of

arr ai gnm en t, and w as “ not one that aro se f

ro mRather than to vitiate a findingof seizure, discr epanc ies in the degree or seve rity of a 14 seizure would pre sumably be re flec ted in the amount of damag es aw arde d.

25 m alicious prosecuti on as opp osed to false arre st.” Id . a t 25 4 n. 26. H ow ev er , in ha vi ng to (1) pa y

a $1 ,00 0 b on d; (2) ap pe ar at he r arra ig nm en t; an d (3 ) m ak e two tr ips f ro m N ewJe rs ey

to Fl or ida

to de fe nd h er se lf

in co urt, pur suant t o th e au tho ri ty of the state , K ing sland w as sub j ec te d to a“ co nti nui ng s ei zure ” fo r Fo urth A m en dm en t purp ose s. See A lbrig ht v. O liver , 510 U . S. 266 , 276 -7 9 14 (1 994) ( plura lity

opi nio n) ( G ins bur g, J. , c onc ur ri ng) ( statin g th at

am al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c la im

c oul d be f

ound und er the F ourth A m en dm en t i n th at ade fe ndant re m ai ns s ei ze d f

or tr ia l so lon g a s he is obl igate d to appe ar in co urt and answ er

the state ’ s c harg es ); G all o v . Ci tyof Philade lph ia , 161 F . 3d 2 17, 222 ( 3d C ir . 199 8) (f ind ing se iz ur e w he re pla int if f (1 ) ha d to pos t $1 0, 000 bond ; ( 2) w as r equir ed to atte nd a ll co urt he ar ing s, inc lud ing his tr ia l and arr ai gnm en t; (3 ) w as obl igate d to co nta ct pr etri al se rv ic es w ee kly ; and ( 4) w as pr ohi bit ed f ro m tr av el ing out sid e N ewJe rs ey

and P en nsy lvania ); se e als o W hit ing v . T ray lor , 85 F . 3d 5 81, 584 (1 1thCi r. 199 6) ( de sc ri bin g m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n a s “ the kin d of c la im w he re the plaintiff, a s part of the com m encem ent of a cr im inal proceeding, has beenIn W hiting , th e pla int if

f h a d b e e n r e le a se d o n b on d a ft e r b e ingde ta ine d f or on e night, 15 but he had to re turn to court on twenty occa sions to answer the c harg es ag ainst him. See W hiting , 85 F.3d at 583. We declined to rule on the “continuingseizure” a rgument in W

hiting , holding th attw o o th e r

p o s s i b l e s e i z ur e s –

W h i t i n g ’ s ar

r e s tan d h i s s ur r e n d e r a f t e r h e l e ar n e d o f a n e w l yissued war

rant – “ wer e seizures that c ould be the basis of a section 1983 cla im.” Id. at 584-85. We later noted that Whi ting’ s arr est was pur suant to the filing of an information and was there fore part of a

prosec ution. Id. at 585 n.7. Fur thermore , the war

rant issued a g ainst Whi ting was ba sed on a pr eexisti ngchar g e of obstruc ting of fice rs, and since it was an initial step of a c ri min a l pr os e c uti on , it

lik e wi se fe ll und e r t

he tor t of ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on

rathe r t ha n f a lse arr est. Id. at 583, 585. In contra st, Kingsland’ s arr est may not constitute a seizure for purposes of a ma licious prosecution cla im because it was made be fore the commenc ement of a criminal proce eding . See id. at 585 n.5. Rather, he r beingsubject to a bond a nd beingrequire d to appea r in court to answe r the c harg es ag ainst her throughout the prosec ution constitut e a se izure for purposes of ma licious prosecution. Such seizure is virtually no differ ent or less seve re tha n the deg ree of state c ontrol upon which W hiting is b a se d –

name ly an a rr e st a nd a surr e nd e r. B oth here and in W

hiting , th e pla int if

f w a s r e qu ir e d to su

bmi t to the a

uth or ity of the state purs ua

nt t o leg al proc ess. Se e id . at 585. 26 unl aw fu lly

and f or ci bly r es tr ai ne d invio la tio n of the F ourth A m en dm en t and injuries, due to that seizure, f ollow as the prosecution g oes ahead”). 15 Co nse que ntl y , K ing sland m ay have ac ogni za

ble c la im f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n, and s he ha s su ppor te d he r co nte nti ons ad equa te ly to sur viv e a m oti on fo r sum m ar y j udgm en t onthe m er its . C. Qualified Imm unity 1. G eneral Principles If the def endant officers are e ntitled to qualified im m unity , w e m

ust affirm sum m ar y j udgm en t i n th ei r favor . “ Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty of fe rs c om ple te pr ote ct ion for governm ent officials sued in their indiv idual capacities if their conduct ‘ does not vio la te c le ar ly

e sta bli she d st at

uto ry or c onst itu tio na l r igh ts o f w hic h a27

reasonable person would have known.’ ” V iny ard v. W

ils on , 311 F . 3d 1 340, 134 6 (1 1thCi r. 200 2) ( quot ing H arl owv . F

itz ge rald , 45 7 U.S. 8 00 , 81 8 (1 98 2) ). Qualified im

m unityrepre sents a balance betw een the need for a re m edy to protect citizens’ rights and th e need for governm ent officials to perform their duties wit ho ut th e fea r of

co ns ta nt , bas el es s l it ig at io n. G JR I nv . , I nc . v . Co unt

y of E sc am bia , 132 F. 3d 13 59, 1366 (11t h Cir. 1998 ). T he e sse nc e of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty is the pub lic of

fi ci al ’ s ob j ec tiv e reas on ab le ne ss , reg ard le ss of h is un de rlyin g i nt en t o r m ot iv at io n. Se e H arl ow , 457 U . S. a t 81 9; Le e v. F errar o , 284 F. 3d 11 88, 1195 (11t h Cir. 2002 ). If re as ona ble pub lic of

fi ci al s c oul d di ff

er on the law fu lne ss o f the de fe ndants ’ act io ns , th e d efen da nt s ar e en ti tl edto imm un it y . Sto rc k v. Ci tyof Co ral Spr ing s , 354 F. 3d 1 307, 131 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . H ow ev er , “ [w ] he re an of fi ci al c oul d be expected to know that certain conduct would vio late statutory or constitut ional ri ght s, he sho uld

be m ad e to h es itate ; and a pe rs on who s uf

fe rs inj ur y c au se d by such cond uct m ay

have a ca use of action.” H

arl ow , 457 U. S. at 819. Q ualified im m uni ty “ giv es a m

ple r oom f or m ist ak enj udgm en ts” but doe s no t pr ote ct

“ the plainlyincom

petent or those who kno wingly violate the law. ” M

all eyv . B rig

gs , 475 U.S . 335, 343, 341 (1986).28

T o r ec ei ve qua lif

ie d im m uni ty , “ the pub lic of

fi ci al m ust f ir st p ro ve that he w as a ct ing w ith in the sc ope of his dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity w he n th e al le ge dly wr ongful acts occurred.” Lee , 284 F . 3d at 11 94 ( ci ta tio n and i nte rn al quo ta tio n m arks om itted). H ere, it is und isput ed that Of ficer s Vale nzuela and Balikes we re acting within the course and scope of their discretionary authority when they ar re ste d K ing sland. “ O nc e the de fe ndant e sta bli she s th at

he w as a ct ing w ith in h is discretionary

authority , the burden shifts to the plaint iff to show that qualified im m unityis not approp riate. ” Id . The Supr em e Co ur t h as he ldth atqu al ifi edimm un it y an al y si s i nv ol ve s t wo discrete queries. First, we m ust decide whether the f

acts alleged, assum ing th ey are t ru e, de m on st rat e th atth e d efen da nt s v io la te d a co ns ti tu ti on al rig ht . See Sauc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U. S. 194, 201 (200 1). If this is answer ed in the affir m ative, we proceed to the second query , which is to d eterm ine whether the right vio lated was cle arl y

est ab li sh ed . See id. A s a result of this analy sis, w e conclude that O ff ic er s B al ike s and V al en zu el a ar e not e nti tle d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty on e ith er of the f al se arr es t or

m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c la im s. 2. F als e A rrest

“ Pl ai nly , an arr es t w ith out pr oba ble c au se vio la te s th e ri ght to be f re e fr om an unreasonable search under the Fourth A m endm ent.” D urr uth y v. P ast or , 35129

F. 3d 1 080, 108 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( ci tin g R ed d v . Ci tyof E

nte rpr ise , 140 F . 3d 1378 , 1382 (11th Cir. 1998)). As discussed above, w e cannot conclude as a m atter of lawthat probable cause existed to arrest K ingsl and. O ffice rs w ho m ake an ar re st w ith out

pr oba ble c au se are ne ve rthe le ss e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty if th ere was arg uabl e p ro babl e cau se forth e arr es t. J ones v . Ca nnon , 174 F . 3d 1 271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999). Ac cordingly , w e m ust inq uire w hether “ reasonable office rs in the sam e ci rc um stanc es and p oss es sin g th e sa m e know le dge a s th e D ef en dants could have believed th at probable cause existed to arre st Plaintiff. . . . ” V on Ste in v. Brescher , 904 F. 2d 57 2, 579 (11th Cir. 1990). K ingsl and m ust dem onstrate that no r ea sona

ble of fi ce r co uld

have f ound pr oba ble c au se und er

the tot al ity

of the ci rcu m st an ces . See Storck , 354 F . 3d at 13 13. Ingr an tin g qu al if

ie d im m uni ty to the de fe ndants , the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound the fa ct s of thi s c as e to b e an al ogou s to tho se se t f orth i n P ost

v . Ci tyof F

ort La ude rdal e , 7 F . 3d 1 552 (1 1thCi r. 199 3) . I n P ost , w e gr an te d qu al if ie d im m uni ty wher e governm ent agents insp ecting a restaurant m ade an im proper arr est for a bu il di ng co de vi ol at io n. Id . a t 15 58. T he a ge nts in P ost claim ed that they

counted people in excess of the restaurant’ s m axim um capacity , but in eff

ect they er ro ne ousl y c ount ed e m plo y ee s w ho w er e not

to be c ount ed . W e he ld tha t a

“ m ist ak enbut

r ea sona ble c ount ” w as suf

fi ci en t f or the a ge nts to es ta

bli sh arg uable30

pr ob ab le cau se . Id . H ow ev er , the a ge nts in P ost sim ply m ad e a good

f ai th m ist ak e, w he re as , he re , the of fi ce rs ’ c ondu ct

c re at es f ac tua l i ssu es a s to the ir cr ed ibi lity . I t w as e rr or

f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o om it the pla int if f’ s a lle ga tio ns o f fa lsi fi catio n and know ing la ck of pr oba ble c au se f

ro m it s ana ly sis . I t i s r ea dil y ap pare nt tha t the c ondu ct in P ost is ch ar ac te ri sti c of

the ty pe of c ondu ct that the pol ic ie s of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty se ek to pr ote ct . I n P ost , the off icials m ade a re as ona ble m ist ak e in the le git im at e pe rf orm an ce of

the ir dut ie s, and the re w er e no co nc ern s re ga rd in g p ot en ti al ab us e o f au th or it y . Se e id. ; see also Hunter v. B ry ant , 502 U . S. 224 , 227 ( 1991 ) (o ff ic er s w ho r ea sona

bly but m ist ak en ly co nc lud e that pr oba

ble c au se e xis te d are e nti tle d to im m uni ty ); Cf . H arl ow , 457 U . S. a t 81 4 ( “ Insit

ua tio ns o f ab use of

of fi ce , an a ct ionf

or dam ag es m ay

of fe r the on ly reali st ic av en ue forvi nd ic at io n o f co ns ti tu ti on al gu aran te es .”). Inc ontra st, K ing sland c ont en ds tha t the de fe ndants m ad e de lib er at el y f al se state m en ts t o su

ppor t he r ar re st, in vio la tio n of

the law . S he c ite s Holm es v. Ku cy nda , 321 F. 3d 10 69 (11th Cir. 2003 ), in which w e held that qualified im m uni ty “ doe s no t of

fe r pr ote ct ionif

an of fi ci al kne wor

r ea sona bly sho uld have known th at

the a ct ionhe too k w ith in h is s phe re of of fi ci al r es pons ibi lity

w oul d violate the const itutio nal rights of the plain tiff. ” Id . at 1077 (citations and internal quot at ion s om itt ed ). I n Holm es , w e re ve rs ed the gr an t of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty and31

sum m ar y j udgm en t t o po lic e of

fi ce rs w he re the re e xis te d f ac tua l qu es tio ns re gard ing w he the r the of

fi ce rs f ile d ar ec kle ssl y

f al se appl ic at ionf

or an arr es t warra nt . Id . a t 10 83- 84. B as ed on the f ac ts o f the c as e, the pane l f ound that the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d no t c onc lus ive ly de te rmine that the of

fi ce r’ s a ff idavit w as not m ade in “ reckless disregard of the tr uth.” Id . at 1084. L ikewise, there are que sti ons of

f ac t i n th is c as e re gard ing the int eg ri ty of the e vid en ce w hic h is to fo rm th e b as is of a n a rg uabl e p ro babl e cau se de te rm in at io n. V ie w ed in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to K ing sland, the f ac ts s uppo rt

a co nc lus ionthat the arr es t a ff idavit inc lud ed r ec kle ssl y

or de lib er at el y

f al se state m en ts tha t are m at er ia l t o af ind ing of arg uable pr oba

ble c au se . I f the de fe ndants f

ab ri cate d or

unr ea sona

bly dis re gard ed

c er ta in p ie ce s of

e vid en ce to establish p robable cause, as alleged, rea sonable officers in the sam e circ um stances and poss essing th e sam e knowledge as the defe ndants cou ld not have believed that pr oba ble c au se e xis te d to arr es t the pla int if f. B ec au se aj ur

y que sti on e xis ts a s to wh et h erth e d ef

en d an t s co n s t ru ct ed ev i d en ce up o n wh i ch t o b as e K i n g s l an d ’s ar re st, the que sti on whe the r ar gua ble pr oba ble c au se f

or the arr es t e xis te d is a lso ap tly sui te d f or aj ur y . Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty pe rt ai nin g to the f

al se arr es t c la im

is th eref or e im pr op er. 3. M ali ci ous P ros ec uti onThe e x planation that follows will clarify that the offic ers did not re quire fa ir notice that 16 their conduc t constituted a thing c alled “ma licious prosecution,” in violation of § 1983. See Kingsland , N o. 99 -0 33 93 -C V- AJ, s lip op . at 14 . Rathe r, the y re qu ir e d f

a ir no tic e that th e ir 32 T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t the de fe ndants are e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty on the m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c la im , statin g: T he ne xt i ssu e is whe the r Ms . K ing sland’ s c onst itu tio na l r igh t t o be fr ee f ro m m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n w as c le ar ly e sta bli she d a s of Novem ber 27, 1995. I agree with O ffice rs V alenzuela and Balickes [s ic ] that su char igh t w as not r ec ogni ze d by

the E le ve nthCi rc uit

unt il it de ci de d W

hit ing [i n 1 9 9 6 ]. Ki ngsland , N o. 99-03393 -CV -A J, slip op. at 14. Alter natively , the district court stated that even if the constitu tional to rt of m alicious prosecuti on had been r e c o g n i z e dp r i o r

t o Ki n g s l a n d ’s arr e s t , b y Ke llyv . Cu rti s , 21 F. 3d 15 44 (11th Cir. 1994 ), the of

fi ce rs w er e en tit le d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty be ca use the re is no ev ide nc e sugg es tin g th at

the y de lay ed or w ith he ld e xc ulp at or

y dr ug t es t r es ult s or in si st edup on co nt in ui ng th e p ro se cu ti on in th e fac e o f th os e res ul ts . Ki ngsland , No . 9 9 -0 3 3 9 3 -C V- AJ , s l i p o p . a t1 4 -1 5 . We c o n cl u d e t h at th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s an al y sis on this iss ue is ina cc ur at e. S pe ci fi ca lly , the dis tr ic t c ourt m isa ppl ie d th e te st s et f orth i n Saucier . It failed to clearly delineate the precise constitu tional ri ght a lle ge dly vio la te d – h er e, the F ourth A m en dm en t r igh t a ga ins t un re as ona ble se iz ur es in co nne ct ionw ithapr ose cu tio n. F urthe r, it m isa ppl ie d th e “ cl earl y es ta bli she d” r equir em en t. 16conduct c onstitut ed a Fourth Amendme nt violation – one which r ender ed them in some wa y acc ountable for

the continuation of the pr osecution. 33 A s an in iti al m atte r, w e m ust c lari fy the le ga l pr inc ipl es w e ar e obl ige d to fo llo win m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c as es und er § 19 83. I n any

§ 19 83 a ct ion , inc lud ing an a ct ionf

or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n, apla int if f m ust “ ide nti fy the specific co nst itu tio nal

right allegedly

infringed.” A lbr igh t , 510 U . S. a t 27 1 (e m pha sis a dde d) . I n W

hit ing , w e sugg es te d th at “ anind ep en de nt, c la ssi c Fo urth A m en dm en t vi olatio n is c ri tic al to a se ct ion198 3 c la im c al le d m al ic iou s prosecution .” W

hit ing , 85 F . 3d at 58 4 n. 4. T hus, in § 19 83 c la im s f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n, the c onst itu tio na l r igh t a t i ssu e is n ot the “ ri ght to be f re e fr om m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n, ” but r athe r the und er ly ing F ourth A m en dm en t r igh t a ga ins t unr ea sona

ble se iz ur es . Se e id. (“ [W ] e think refer ring to a federa l ‘ right’ to be free from m alicious prosecuti on is actually a description of the right to be free f rom an unlawful seizure which is part of a prosecution.”). A ccordingly , w e m ust inq uire wh et h erth e f

ac t s al l eg ed d emo n s t ra t e t h at th e d ef en d an t s v i o l at ed Ki n g s l an d ’s ri ght to be f re e fr om an un law fu l se iz ur e, and i f so, w he the r the of fi ce rs ’ spe ci fi c vi ol at io n o f th e ri gh t was cle arl y est ab li sh edat t he ti m e o f Kin gs la nd ’s arres t. See Saucier , 533 U . S. a t 20 1; see generally Hope v. Pe lzer , 536 U. S. 730 (200 2).34

T o th e ex te nt tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt ba se d it s j udgm en t onthe f ac t tha t the

“ ri ght to be f re e fr om m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n” w as not c le ar ly e sta bli she d in199 5, that de ci sio n w as in er

ro r. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a

ppl ie d th e “ cl earl y

e sta bli she d” re qui re m en t i n an im

pr ope r co nte xt. A s m en tio ne d a bove , a§ 19 83 c la im

f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n is m er el y am eans b y

w hic h apla int if

f m ay se ek r edre ss f or a vio la tio n of

his or he r cl earl y

e sta bli she d F ourth A m en dm en t r igh ts. W e ha ve he ld tha t “ [l ] ab el ing . . . ase ct ion198 3 c la im a s on e fo r a ‘ m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n’ can be asho rthand w ay

of de sc ri bin g akin d of

le git im at e se ct ion198 3 c la im ; the kin d of c la im w he re the pla int if

f . . . ha s be enunl aw fu lly and f or ci bly r es tr ai ne d in vio la tio n of

the F ourth A m en dm en t and i nj ur ie s, due to that se iz ur e, f oll owa s th e prosecution goes ahead.” W hit ing , 85 F . 3d at 58 4. O ur f oc us i n am al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n a ct ionm

ust r em ai n onthe a lle ge dly

unc onst itu tio na l c ondu ct of the defendants, not on the label attached to the proceedings . Kingsland “ can avoid an o r d e r o f d i s mi s s a l i f

[ s h e ] b a s e d[ h e r ] c l a i m – w h a t e v e r [ s h e ] c a l l s i t–

o n s o me actual unlawf

ul, forc ible, re straint of [her] person.” Id . Any ref erence to the need fo r anind ep en de nt “ri ght a ga ins t m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n” sim ply dir ec ts atte nti on away fro m

th e fu nd am en ta l co ns ti tu ti on al in qu iry at h an d.In Stre ng th v . H ub e rt , 854 F.2d 421 ( 11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), overruled in part by 17 W hiting , 8 5 F .3 d at 58 4, we re lie d o n a F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt s ub sta

nti ve du e pr oc e ss t

he or y to support the conc ept of a

“fe dera lly

guara nteed r ight to be f

ree from malicious prose cution.” See id. at 42 6; see also W

hiting , 85 F.3d at 584 n.4. In 1994, the Supreme Court c oncluded that the substantive due proc ess component of the Four teenth Amendme nt did not provide the constitutional source of a rig ht to be fre e fr om malicious prosecution, but the Court left open the possibili ty

that the Four

th Amendment is the appropr iate sourc e of suc h a right. See A lbright v. Oliver , 5 10 U. S. 2 66 , 2 74 -7 5 ( 19 94 ) (plu ra lity op ini on ), 51 0 U .S. at 27 4- 75 ; W ood , 323 F.3d at 882 n.14. Finally , in W

hiting , w e he ld t

hat th e “ ri g ht” to b e fr e e fr om m a lic iou s p ro se c uti on is actua lly an expression of the F ourth Amendment right to be fre e fr om an unlawf ul seizure attributable to a pr osecution. See W hiting , 85 F.3d at 584 & n.4.

35 Whil e it is tru e that the c ourts h av e not his tor ic al ly

a dopt ed ac onsi ste nt posit ion on the constitu tional so urce of a m alicious prosecuti on claim , the fac t 17 that su chac la im

or igi na te s f

ro m the F ourth A m en dm en t i s no t the pur pose of the

“ cl earl y e sta bli she d” r equir em en t. O nly the c onst itu tio na l r igh t vi olate d, upo n w hic h th e m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c la im is ba se d – whe re ve r de ri ve d – m ust be clear ly established. T he “ right” against m alicious prosecuti on is no t itself a co nst itu tio nal

r igh t. “ [A ] se ct ion198 3 pl ai nti ff m ust a lw ay s ba se his c la im

on the vio la tio n of

aspe ci fi c fe de ra l r igh t. Whe re the r igh t sa id t o be vio la te d is the Fourth Am endm ent, the plaintiff m ust establis h a concrete violatio n of that right.” Id . a t 58 6. F or

e xa m ple , in G raha m v . Co nnor , 4 9 0 U . S . 3 8 6 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , th e S up r e me Co urt a ddr es se d th e co nst itu tio na l r oot s of a§ 19 83 e xc es siv e fo rc e cl ai m . T he Co urt st at ed

that, in ad dr es sin g su chac la im , “ an al y sis be gin s by ide nti fy ing the spe ci fi c co nst itu tio na l r igh t a lle ge dly inf ri nge d by the c ha lle nge d a

ppl ic at ionof36

force. ” Id

. at 394. T hus, the Court declined to recognize any abstract constitu tional right against excessive force, but rather explained that a separate , spe ci fi c co nst itu tio na l r igh t m ust be ide nti fi ed

on whic h to ba se a§ 19 83 e x c e s s i v e f

o r c e c l a i m: In de ed , m an y

c ourts h av e se em ed

to as sum e, a s di d th e co urts b el ow in this c as e, that the re is a ge ne ri c “ ri ght ” to b e fr ee f ro m e xc es siv e fo rc e, gr ound ed

not in an y part ic ular co nst itu tio na l pr ovi sio n bu t rat he r in “ ba si c p rin ci pl es of § 19 83 juri sp ru de nc e.” W e re j ec t this not ionthat a ll ex ce ssi ve f or ce c la im s br ough t un de r § 1 98 3 a re g ov ern edby a sin gl e g en eri c st an da rd . Id . a t 39 3 ( fo otn ote s om itt ed ) (r ej ec tin g su bst an tiv e due pr oc es s a s aba sis f or ex ce ssi ve f

or ce c la im s be ca

use suc h c la im s im

pli cate am or e spe ci fi c co nst itu tio na l r igh t – the F ourth A m en dm en t) . L ike w ise , w e fi nd tha t the re is no ge ne ri c “ ri ght

a ga ins t m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n. ” I nst ea d, the pla int if f m ust de m onstrate ac onc re te vio la tio n of the F ourth A m en dm en t tha t w as c le ar ly es tabl is he d i n No ve m

be r 19 95 . Fi na lly , w e not e that i t w oul d be inc onsi ste nt w ithour pr ec ed en t t o a dopt the de fe ndants ’ pos iti on tha t ( 1) ar igh t t o be f re e fr om m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n m ust be c le ar ly e sta bli she d be fo re apla int if

f m ay m ai nta in a

§ 19 83 c la im

to that e nd, an d ( 2) suc h ar igh t w as not c le ar ly e sta bli she d un til W

hit ing w as de ci de d in199 6.Even if we assume that King sland’s cla im may not stand unless a “r ight to be f ree from 18 m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n ” w a s c l e ar l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n1 9 9 5 , o ur

h o l d i n gw o u l d

r e m a i nun c h an g e d . It was re adily

appar ent in 1995 that, in the Eleventh Circuit, off icer s may be sued f or malicious prosec ution under § 1983. Se e, e .g., Nesm ith v . A lfo rd, 318 F.2d 110, 126 ( 5th Cir. 1963) (“ [T]he c omm e nc e me nt a nd pr os e c uti on

of un fo un de d c ri min a l pr os e c uti on might u nd e r c e rt a in circ umstances c onstitut e, not only malicious prosec ution under the state la w . . . but a violation of [Feder al] Ci vil Ri g hts as well.”) ; Stre ng th , 8 54 F .2 d at 42 5- 26 ; Ke lly , 21 F.3d at 1553-55. Given that, in Ke lly , an off

icer was de nied qualified immunity on a § 1983 cla im for malicious prosec ution based on the F ourth Amendment, we believe that the defe ndant offic ers ha d sufficie nt notice that they , too, could be held liable f or the tort of ma licious prosecution. 37 If w e w er e to s o ho ld, the va lid ity of our pr ec ed en tia l op ini on i n Ke llyw oul d ne ce ssari ly

be und er m ine d. I n Ke lly , w e he ld tha t a de te ct ive w ho o bta ine d a w ar rant o n th e ba sis of

f al se inf orm at ionw as not

e nti tle d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty fro m li ab il it y form al ic io us pro se cu ti on . Ke lly , 21 F . 3d at 15 55. I n or de r fo r the Ke llyc ourt t o have r ea ch ed suc h ac onc lus ion , it

f oll ow s th at

it m ust have im pli ci tly r ec ogni ze d th e via

bil ity of a§ 19 83 c la im

f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n in 1994 , the y ear Ke llyw as de ci de d. I f a m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c la im ba se d ona vio la tio n of

the F ourth A m en dm en t w as c ogni za ble a t l ea st a s of

199 4, the n it

is incontrov ertible that either ( 1) the right to be free from m alicious prosecuti on need not be c le ar ly

e sta bli she d a t a ll, or

( 2) suc h r igh t w as ind ee d c le ar ly e sta bli she d in 1995 , a t the ti m e of

K ing sland’ s a lle ge d in

j ur ie s. A ny

oth er r es ult w oul d r un 18 af oul of our j udgm en t i n Ke lly . Thu s, t he de fen da nt s’ ass ert io ns can no t b e uph el d.More spe cifica lly , in a § 1983 malicious prosec ution case, the rig ht at issue is the rig ht 19 to b e fr e e fr om a

n unr e a so na

ble se izur e that is in connec tion wi th a prosecution , as distinguished fr o ma s ei z ure th ati s p arto f a narre s to r o th er p ro ce ed i n g. 38 H av ing e xpl ai ne d th at

the f undam en ta l r igh t a t i ssu e is K ing sland’ s r igh t against unreasonabl e seizure, we now address w hether the defendants violated 19 t h at ri g h t , a n dwh et h erth e r i g h twa s cl ea rl y es t ab l i s h ed at th e t i m e o f K i n g s l an d ’s arre st . For a c onsti tutio nal right to be clearly established, the unlawfulness of an of fic ia l ac ti on m

us t b e ap pa ren t i n t he li gh t o f pr e-ex is ti ng law. H ope , 536 U. S. at 739. The purpos e of re quiring that a right be clear ly established is “ to ensure that be fo re the y

are sub j ec te d to sui t, of

fi ce rs are on n oti ce that the ir c ondu ct is unlawful.” Saucier , 533 U . S. a t 20 6; se e als o id . W e have previously described thi s pr inc ipl e as f

oll ow s: Be ca use f ai r an d c le ar

not ic e to g ove rn m en t of

fi ci al s is the co rn er sto ne of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty , c ourts m

ust dil ige ntl y

ana ly ze the pr ee xis tin g c as e lawto de te rm ine w he the r it re al ly did pr ovi de pla in notice to every

rea sonable go vernm ent official that the pe rti ne nt conduct , in the specific circumstances , w oul d c le ar ly vio la te pr eex is ti ng fed eral law. M ars h v . B utl er

Co unt y , 26 8 F .3d10 14 , 10 31 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ) (em ph as is ad de d) . T hus, the c en tr al que sti on tha t w e m ust a sk i s w he the r the state of the lawin 199539

gave the officer s fair w arning that their alleged treatm ent of Kingsland was un co ns ti tu ti on al . Se e H

ope , 53 6 U.S. at 74 1. Fa lsi fy ing f

ac ts t o e sta

bli sh p ro bable c au se is pa te ntl y unc onst itu tio na l and ha s b een so lo ng be fo re Ki ng sl an d’s arres t i n 1 99 5. Se e, e . g. , R ile y v. Ci tyof M ont gom er y , 104 F . 3d 1 247, 125 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( “ It w as w el l e sta

bli she d in 1989 that f

ab ri catin g in cr im inatin g e vid en ce vio la te d c onst itu tio na l r igh ts. ”) ; see als o H inc hm an v . M

oore , 312 F . 3d 1 98, 205 -0 6 ( 6thCi r. 200 2) ( ci tin g Hill v. M cI nty re , 884 F. 2d 27 1, 275 (6th Cir. 1989)). So, the defendants wer e on notice in 19 95 th atm an uf

act ur in g p ro babl e cau se is un co ns ti tu ti on al . A s af ina l po int , w e ad dr es s th e de fe ndants ’ a sse rt ionthat the pr ose cu tor an d th e state j udge w ho s et K ing sland’ s bo nd p ro vid ed ac au sa l br eak su ff

ic ie nt t o re lie ve the of

fi ce rs of li ab ili ty f or m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n. “ Inm an y c as es , ar re sti ng o ff

ic er s w ill not

be r es pons ibl e fo r the c ont inu at ionof the pr ose cu tio n because the prosecutor (or som e other fa ctor) w ill break the causal link between defendants’ conduct and pl aintiff’ s injury .” W hit ing , 85 F.3d at 5 86 n.1 0. H ow ev er , the sub se que nt a ct s of apr ose cu tor

or j udge do n ot b re ak

the c ha in o f causation in a m alicious prosecuti on case w here the prosecutor and j udge are act in g o n a ll eg ed ly fals e in fo rm at io n p ro vi de d b y th e d efen da nt off

ic ers . See Barts v. Joyner , 865 F . 2d 1 187, 119 5 ( 11th C ir . 198 9) ( “ T he int er ve nin g a ct s of40

the pr ose cu tor , gr an d j ur

y , j udge and j ur

y . . . e ac h br eak th e ch ai n of c au sa tio n unl es s pl ai nti ff

c ansho wthat the se int er ve nin g a ct s w er e the r es ult of de ce pti on o r undu e pr es sur e by

the de fe ndant p oli ce m en . ”) ; Cf . Eubanks v. G erwen , 40 F . 3d 1157 , 116 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ( “ [D ef en dants ] did

not m ak e the de ci sio n a s to w he the r or

not to pr ose cute E ubanks; nor did the y a ct in suc h aw ay

a s im pr ope rl y to in flu en ce t he de ci si on by the Sta te Att orne y in th atreg ard .”). Ass um in g, as we shou ld, that the re w as no o dor of c an nabis in the tr

uc k or on K ing sland’ s pe rs on, the defendants’ constitu tional vi olation s wer e not discrete, and instead cont inued thr oughan arr es t, an arr ai gnm en t, and a tr ia l ba se d onf

al se te sti m ony . I f the defendant officer s fabricated testim ony regar ding the odor of cannabis and further failed to corre ct the m isinform ation provi ded to the prosecuto r, as the plaintiff alleges, they

we re on notice that their actions clearly violated federal lawand are t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e dt o n o i mm

u n i t y. Qualified im

m unityis, as the te rm

im plies, qualified. It is not absol ute. I t co nt em pl at es in st an ces in whi ch a pu bl ic off ic ia l’s ac ti on s ar e n ot pro te ct ed . See M adi son v. G er

ste in , 440 F . 2d 3 38, 341 ( 5thCi r. 197 1) (“ A s alawe nf or ce m en t officer , def

endant . . . does not enj oy the cloak of im

m unityof the quasi-j udicial pr ose cu tin g a tto rn ey . ”) ; se e als o B utz v . Eco nom ou , 438 U . S. 478 , 506 -0 7 ( 1978 ) (“ [I ] t i s no t un fa ir

to hol d li ab le the of

fi ci al w ho know s or

sho uld kno whe is41

acting outs ide the law, and that insis ting o n an awareness of clearly established constitu tional lim its will not un dulyinterfer e w ith the exercise of off icial jud gm en t.”) . Viewedin th e li gh t m os t fa vo rab le to Kin gs la nd , th e ev id en ce s ho ws that the arr es tin g of

fi ce rs in thi s c as e be ha ve d inan ob j ec tiv el y unr ea sona

ble fa shi on and w er e the re fo re not e nti tle d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty . G ive n th e sig nif ic an ce of the dis put ed

iss ue s of f ac t he re , qua lif

ie d im m uni ty f ro m sui t i s ef fe ct ive ly unava ila ble , e ve n th ougha ft er

af ull tr ia l the of

fi ce rs m ay

y et pr ev ai l on the m er its . A cc or din gly , w e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t on both th e fa lse arr es t and the m al ic iou s pr ose cu tio n c la im s, and w e re m an d f or pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. REVERSED AND REMANDED.