alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Strafford,

Dec., 1899.

#### Snow, *Adm'r, v.*First Freewill Baptist Society of Somersworth & *a.*

Where a will directs au executor to invest a legacy and apply the income thereof to the use of the legatee, the principal of the fund is to be held by him as trustee.

Bill in Equity, praying for the construction of the fourth and fifth clauses of Lois Merrill’s will, which are as follows :

“ 4th. I give and bequeath to the First Freewill Baptist Society, where I attend church, the proceeds of the note I have against it, also the sum of five hundred dollars, and direct my executor to. safely invest said sums, and the income thereof to be annually applied to the uses of said society in the village of Great Falls, in said Somersworth.

“ 5th. I give and bequeath to the Congregational Society at Ossipee Center the sum of five hundred dollars, to be safely invested by my executor, and the income annually applied to the uses of said society. ”

The defendants are the beneficiaries named in these clauses and claim that the legacies should be paid to them.

*Worcester, Qafney £ Snow,*for the'plaintiff.

*William F. Russell,*for the defendants.

Young, J.

The provisions of the will that the executor invest tliese legacies, apply the income from them to the defendants’ use, and collect the note which forms a part of the legacy given in the fourth clause, are all the evidence there is as to whether the testa*49trix intended that these legacies should be paid to the defendants, or held in trust for them. Giving the language used in these provisions its ordinary meaning, it is the duty of the executor to keep these legacies invested, collect their income, and apply it to the defendants’ use, and he could not conveniently perform these duties unless he retained possession of the legacies; and it is very improbable that she would have directed him to collect the note .if she intended that the legacy of which it forms a part should be paid to the legatees, for that would be directing him to collect this note from the legatees and return its proceeds to them as soon as collected. These provisions show she intended that her executor should hold these legacies in trust for the defendants, and his-duties in respect to them are those of a trustee. *Ward*v. *Ward,*105 N. Y. 68, 74.

*Case discharged.*

All concurred.
Seperation Agreement and Release Dated July 31, 2003



 Exhibit 10.11 
  
 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 Sally Chapman 
 V. 
 Hytek Microsystems 
  
 The undersigned agree that the above referenced litigation, and all claims which were and could have been raised therein, is settled upon the following
terms: 
  

	 	1.	Chapman shall resign from the Company effective no later than 5 months from this date, or at any earlier date as determined by the Company in its sole discretion. Chapman shall
assist with a transition to any replacement. Chapman will be permitted to seek other employment, so long as she is adequately performing her duties with the Company. 

  

	 	2.	Upon the effective date of resignation, Chapman will receive severance payment of $85,000, payable over a 12-month period in equal installments, plus Company provided health
insurance for such period. 

  

	 	3.	Chapman shall receive payment of the sum of $40,000 upon full execution of a release as provided herein. 

  

	 	4.	Chapman shall receive an additional payment of $45,000 upon the effective date of her resignation as provided in Paragraph 1. 

  

	 	5.	Hytek shall execute a letter of reference for Chapman as set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto. 

  

	 	6.	Chapman shall execute a Release of All Claims and Covenant Not to Sue releasing the Company from any claims which have been or could have been raised in the litigation and/or
arising from Chapman’s employment with Hytek. 

  
 Dated this
31st day of July, 2003. 
  

									
	 	 	 	 	 Hytek Microsystems, Inc.

			
	 /s/ Sally Chapman

	 	 	 	 /s/ John F. Cole


	 by Sally Chapman
	 	 	 	 by John Cole

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Its CEO/President









 APPENDIX A 
  
 To Whom it May Concern: 
  
 Hytek employed Sally Chapman as Accounting Manger, Controller and Chief Financial Officer. She worked for the Company for over five (5) years, and in
these capacities directed the Company’s financial division commendably. She also worked with the Company through a transition to her replacement once she announced her intent to resign. We consider her a competent and loyal financial
professional.
Sullivan,

June, 1900.

#### Brown *v.*Fowler *& a.*

Assumpsit. Trial by jury and verdict for the plaintiff.

*Ira Colby & Son,*for the plaintiff.

*Brown & Dana,*for the defendants.

Young, J.

The defendants excepted to the court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the consideration of a promise to pay the debt of another must be expressed in -writing. This is not an open question, for it has been held for more than a quarter of a century that if need not be so expressed. *Britton*v. *Angier,*48 N. H. 420; *Lang*v. *Henry,*54 N. H. 57, 59; *Goodnow*v. *Bond,*59 N. H. 150; *McDonald*v. *Fernald,*68 N. H. 171.

*Exception overruled.*

Parsons, J., did not sit: the others concurred.
#### § 392.14 Hazardous conditions; extreme caution.

Extreme caution in the operation of a commercial motor vehicle shall be exercised when hazardous conditions, such as those caused by snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, or smoke, adversely affect visibility or traction. Speed shall be reduced when such conditions exist. If conditions become sufficiently dangerous, the operation of the commercial motor vehicle shall be discontinued and shall not be resumed until the commercial motor vehicle can be safely operated. Whenever compliance with the foregoing provisions of this rule increases hazard to passengers, the commercial motor vehicle may be operated to the nearest point at which the safety of passengers is assured.

[33 FR 19732, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 60 FR 38747, July 28, 1995]
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, James W. Stewart, Chief Financial Officer of Colonial Commercial Corp.,
certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Colonial Commercial
Corp.(the "Registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The Registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures, to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this Annual Report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this Annual Report any change in the Registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's fourth
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the Registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Date: April 14, 2004


                                        /S/ JAMES W. STEWART
                                        --------------------------------------
                                        James W. Stewart
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        Executive Vice President and Treasurer
###### Editorial Note on Part 381

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 381 appear at 66 FR 49872, Oct. 1, 2001.

#### § 381.320 How long will it take the agency to respond to my application for an exemption?

The agency will attempt to issue a final decision within 180 days of the date it receives your application. However, if you leave out important details or other information necessary for the FMCSA to prepare a meaningful request for public comments, the agency will attempt to issue a final decision within 180 days of the date it receives the additional information.
[Civ. No. 13088.

Second Dist, Div. Two.

June 27, 1941.]

#### THOMAS C. LITTLE, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER & POWER OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Appellants.

Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader, Assistant City Attorney, and George William Adams, and Louis A. Babior, Deputies City Attorney, for Appellants.

Joseph Scott, J. Howard Ziemann and Cuthbert J. Scott for Respondent.

McCOMB, J.

From a judgment in favor of plaintiff after trial before the court without a jury in a declaratory relief action by which plaintiff sought to have it declared that he was blanketed into the civil service of respondent city as a “motor truck driver”, because of the provisions of section 121 of the charter of respondent city adopted July 1, 1925 (Stats. 1925, p. 1069), defendants appeal.

The essential stipulated facts are:

January 28, 1924, plaintiff went to work as a laborer and later became a motor truck driver for defendant city and continuously performed services for such city until on or about March 25, 1938. This position had been duly created by the Board of Public Service Commissioners and included in the classified civil service of defendant city for more than six months prior to July 1, 1925, the effective date of the present charter of defendant city, which contains section 121, hereinafter set forth *in haec verba.*

Plaintiff from April 1, 1924, at the request and with the full knowledge and consent of his superiors in the Department of Public Service, and later its successor in interest, the De*809partment of Water and Power, performed in a capable and satisfactory manner the duties of motor truck driver.

Section 121 of the present city charter of defendant city, so far as material here, reads as follows:

> “Sec. 121. All officers and employees who, at the time of taking effect of this article, would be included in the classified civil service, and who shall have been continuously in the service of the city for a period of six months prior to the adoption of this article, shall be deemed to have the necessary qualifications required by the provisions hereof, and shall retain their respective positions until removed for cause, as provided herein ...”

This is the sole question for us to determine:

*Was plaintiff blanketed into the classified civil service of defendant city under and pursuant to the provisions of section 121,*supra, *of the present charter of the city of Los Angeles f*This question must be answered in the affirmative, for the reasons stated in *Bente*v. *Department of Water and Power,*No. 13087, *ante,*p. 589 [114 Pac. (2d) 699], which we have this day decided.

On the authority of the case just mentioned, the judgment is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.

Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 25, 1941. Shenk, J., voted for a hearing.
Editorial Note on Part 450
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 450 appear at 74 FR 49241, Sept. 25, 2009, and at 77 FR 59790, Oct. 1, 2012.

§ 450.5 General requirements and applicability. ( a ) Every owner of a new or existing container used or offered for movement in international transport shall have the container approved in accordance with the procedures established by the Administration of any contracting party to the convention, except that existing containers need not be approved until September 6, 1982.
( b ) Every owner of an approved container used or offered for movement in international transport who: ( 1 ) Is domiciled in the United States and has the head office in the United States, or
( 2 ) Is domiciled in a country which is not a contracting party to the convention but has the principal office in the United States, shall have the container periodically examined in accordance with part 452 of this subchapter.
( c ) Every owner of an approved container used or offered for movement in international transport who: ( 1 ) Is domiciled in the United States but has the principal office in the jurisdiction of another contracting party to the convention, or
( 2 ) Is domiciled in the jurisdiction of another contracting party to the convention but has the principal office in the United States, but elects to have the container examined in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the United States, shall conform to part 452 of this subchapter.
( d ) Every owner of an approved container used or offered for movement in international transport who is neither domiciled in nor has the principal office in the jurisdiction of a contracting party to the convention, but elects to have the container examined in accordance with procedures prescribed by the United States, shall conform to part 452 of this subchapter.
[45 FR 37213, June 2, 1980]
§ 374.303 Definitions. ( a ) *Carrier* means a motor passenger carrier.
( b ) *Bus* means a passenger-carrying vehicle, regardless of design or seating capacity, used in a carrier's authorized operations.
( c ) *Facility* means any structure provided by or for a carrier at or near which buses pick up or discharge passengers.
( d ) *Terminal* means a facility operated or used by a carrier chiefly to furnish passengers transportation services and accommodations.
( e ) *Station* means a facility, other than a terminal, operated by or for a carrier to accommodate passengers.
( f ) *Service* means passenger transportation by bus over regular routes.
( g ) *Commuter service,* means passenger transportation wholly between points not more than 100 airline miles apart and not involving through-bus, connecting, or interline services to or from points beyond 100 airline miles. The usual characteristics of commuter service include reduced fare, multiple-ride, and commutation tickets, and peak morning and evening operations.
( h ) *Baggage* means property a passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience.
( i ) *Restroom* means a room in a bus or terminal equipped with a toilet, washbowl, soap or a reasonable alternative, mirror, wastebasket, and toilet paper.
[55 FR 11199, Mar. 27, 1990, as amended at 66 FR 49871, Oct. 1, 2001; 68 FR 56198, Sept. 30, 2003; 74 FR 2901, Jan. 16, 2009; 81 FR 68345, Oct. 4, 2016]
#### § 575.5 Separability.

If any section established in this part or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the part and the application of that section to other persons or circumstances is not affected thereby.
#### Williams, Appellant, *v.*Universal Life, Health and Accident Insurance Company.

*Practice, C. P.*— Affidavit *of defense-^Appeal from order discharging rule for judgment*— Doubtful *case*— Equally *divided court.*

An order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will not be reversed in a doubtful case, and if the six judges who hear the case are equally divided in opinion upon it, the appeal will be dismissed without the appellate court discussing the questions involved.

Argued April 26, 1915.

Appeal, No. 169, April T., 1915, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1914, No. 2,248, discharging rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in case of John A. Williams v. Universal Life, Health and Accident Insurance Company.

Before Rice, P. J., Orlady, Head, Henderson, Kephart and Trexler, JJ.

Appeal dismissed.

Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

*Error assigned*was order discharging rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

*E. C. Irwin,*with him *Watson & Freeman,*for appellant.

*C. B. Melará,*of *Mehard, Scully & Mehardj*for appellee.

*621May 14, 1915:

Per Curiam,

This is an appeal by plaintiff from the court’s refusal of judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. The difficult question in the case arises upon the construction of the contract sued on, and particularly clause (d), which is quoted in the opinion of Judge Way, of the county court. The question is whether the plaintiff was entitled to a minimum salary of $1,500 after the expiration of the fourth year. We refrain from discussing the questions because the six judges who heard the case are equally divided in opinion upon it, therefore the case must go to a jury trial, where all the facts which legitimately can aid in the construction may be fully developed. See Griffith v. Sitgreaves, 81* Pa. 378; Kidder Elevator Co. v. Muckle, 198 Pa. 388; Palen v. International Lumber, etc., Co., 56 Pa. Superior Ct. 334.

The appeal is dismissed at the cost of the appellant, but without prejudice, etc.
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```

[109th Congress Public Law 127]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ127.109]

[[Page 119 STAT. 2548]]

Public Law 109-127
109th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To revoke a Public Land Order with respect to certain lands erroneously 
            included in the Cibola National Wildlife Refuge, 
           California. <<NOTE: Dec. 7, 2005 -  [H.R. 1101]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. <<NOTE: 16 USC 668dd note.>> REVOCATION OF PUBLIC LAND ORDER 
            WITH RESPECT TO LANDS ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN CIBOLA 
            NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, CALIFORNIA.

    Public Land Order 3442, dated August 21, 1964, is revoked insofar as 
it applies to the following described lands: San Bernardino Meridian, 
T11S, R22E, sec. 6, all of lots 1, 16, and 17, and SE\1/4\ of SW\1/4\ in 
Imperial County, California, aggregating approximately 140.32 acres.

SEC. 2. <<NOTE: Deadline. 16 USC 668dd note.>> RESURVEY AND NOTICE OF 
            MODIFIED BOUNDARIES.

    The Secretary of the Interior shall, by not later than 6 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act--
            (1) resurvey the boundaries of the Cibola National Wildlife 
        Refuge, as modified by the revocation under section 1;
            (2) publish notice of, and post conspicuous signs marking, 
        the boundaries of the refuge determined in such resurvey; and
            (3) prepare and publish a map showing the boundaries of the 
        refuge.

    Approved December 7, 2005.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 1101:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SENATE REPORTS: No. 109-172 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 151 (2005):
            May 23, considered and passed House.
            Nov. 16, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
----

(2004/C 84 E/0249)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0376/04

by Luciana Sbarbati (ELDR) to the Commission

(6 February 2004)

Subject:   Crisis in the steel sector in Terni

Given that:

Can the Commission say, in view of the above, whether and how it intends to intervene to prevent the closure of AST's electrical steel department in Terni, Italy, which would entail the loss of 900 jobs in the area, as well as having adverse repercussions on the region, and whether it has a precise strategy for tackling the negative impact of industrial restructuring measures?

----
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Heritage Worldwide,
Inc. (the "Company") for the quarter ended December 31,2007, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of
the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date: February X, 2007                             /s/ Jean Claude Mas
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                   Jean Claude Mas
                                                   Chairman of the Board and
                                                   Chief Executive Officer
                                                   (Principal Executive Officer)
#### § 601.20 Applicability.

This part prescribes rulemaking procedures that apply to the issuance, amendment and revocation of rules under an Act.
#### Mary J. Coombs, Appellant, v. Benjamin F. Bowen, as Administrator, etc., and others, Respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. Opinion by

Haight, J.
§ 604.45 Waiver of procedures. ( a ) The PO shall waive such procedural steps as all parties to the hearing agree to waive before issuance of an initial decision.
( b ) Consent to a waiver of any procedural step bars the raising of this issue on appeal.
( c ) The parties may not by consent waive the obligation of the PO to enter a recommended decision on the record.