" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 109TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

109–396

Union Calendar No. 216

A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT

ANNEX

BY THE

SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/

index.html

MARCH 16, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on

the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

26–487 PDF

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 109TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

2006

109–396

Union Calendar No. 216

A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT

ANNEX

BY THE

SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/

index.html

MARCH 16, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on

the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

(II)

SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION

FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

TOM DAVIS, (VA) Chairman

HAROLD ROGERS (KY)

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (CT)

HENRY BONILLA (TX)

STEVE BUYER (IN)

SUE MYRICK (NC)

MAC THORNBERRY (TX)

KAY GRANGER (TX)

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING (MS)

BILL SHUSTER (PA)

JEFF MILLER (FL)

Members who participated at the invitation of the Select Committee

CHARLIE MELANCON (LA)

GENE TAYLOR (MS)

WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON (LA)

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY (GA)

SHELIA JACKSON-LEE (TX)

Staff Designations

David L. Marin, Staff Director

J. Keith Ausbrook, Special Counsel

Lawrence J. Halloran, Deputy Special

Counsel

Robert Borden, Senior Associate Special

Counsel

Daniel Matthews, Senior Professional Staff

Arthur Wu, Senior Professional Staff

Thomas E. Hawley, Senior Professional Staff

Grace A. Washbourne, Senior Professional

Staff

Kim Kotlar, Senior Professional Staff

Anne Marie Turner, Associate Special

Counsel

Charles M. Phillips, Associate Special Counsel

Steve Castor, Assistant Special Counsel

Brooke Bennett, Assistant Special Counsel

Kim Baronof, Professional Staff

Risa Salsburg, Professional Staff

Susie Schulte, Professional Staff

Shalley Kim, Professional Staff

Wimberly Fair, Professional Staff

Chuck Turner, Special Investigator

Robert White, Press Secretary

Drew Crockett, Art Editor

Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk

Amy Laudeman, Deputy Clerk

Robin Butler, Administrative Officer/Financial

Administrator

Michael Sazonov, Staff Assistant

Pat DeQuattro, Coast Guard Fellow

Jay O’Callahan, Research Assistant

Michael Arkush, Editorial Assistant

Margaret Peterlin, Speaker’s Designee

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington, DC, March 16, 2006.

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT,

Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, I submit herewith the committee’s supplementary report and document annex to the 109th Congress.

TOM DAVIS,

Chairman.

(III)

(V)

C O N T E N T S

Page

FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN’S COMMUNICATIONS

WITH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL

RESPONSE PLAN ............................................................................................... 1

I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1

II. Brown Deliberately Ignored the National Response Plan .......................... 2

ADDITIONAL VIEWS SUBMITTED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

BEHALF OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE MELANCON AND REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM JEFFERSON .......................................................... 7

DOCUMENT ANNEX ............................................................................................. 11

Union Calendar No. 216

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 109–396

A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

MARCH 16, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State

of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. TOM DAVIS, from the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,

submitted the following

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT

ANNEX

On March 16, 2006, the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina approved and adopted a report entitled, ‘‘A Failure of Initiative Supplementary Report and Document Annex.’’ The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN’S COMMUNICATIONS WITH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING

THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

The Select Committee’s efforts to obtain documents and other information from the White House are well-documented in the Select

Committee’s original report. While the Select Committee received

more than 22,000 pages from the Executive Office of the President

and the Office of the Vice President, the White House refused to

produce communications among senior White House staff and

would not permit witnesses to testify or be interviewed regarding

communications with senior White House officials and the President.

Before the Select Committee on September 27, 2005, Former Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Michael D. Brown told the Select CommitVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:20 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26487.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
2

1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before House Katrina Select Comm., 109th Cong. 79 (Sept. 27, 2005) (statement of Michael Brown,

former Dir., Federal Emergency Management Agency) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm.

Hearing]. 2 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of U.S. Dept of Homeland Security and FEMA

Leadership Before Sen. Homeland Sec. and Gov’tl Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 25–26 (Feb. 10,

2006) (statement of Michael Brown) [hereinafter Feb. 10, 2006 Sen. Homeland Sec. Hearing]. 3Subpeona served on Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm. Staff in Wash., D.C.

(Feb. 10, 2006). 4See Deposition of Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm. Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb.

11, 2006) [hereinafter Brown Dep.]. 5Dep’t of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan (Dec. 2004) at i [hereinafter NRP].

tee he would not respond to certain questions regarding his communications with senior White House officials, including the President. Brown told the Select Committee, ‘‘I’m being advised by counsel that I can’t discuss with you my conversations with the President’s Chief of Staff and the President.’’ 1

On February 10, 2006, however, Brown appeared before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, declaring that, as a private citizen, he no longer felt bound by the

same restrictions that applied to his previous testimony.2 In that

appearance, he testified about specific conversations with, among

others, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of

Staff Joseph Hagin, and the President.

Deprived previously of this information, the Select Committee

served a subpoena on Brown that same day, compelling him to appear on Monday, February 13, 2006.3 In lieu of his appearance on

that date, the Select Committee took testimony from him in a

sworn deposition on Saturday, February 11, 2006. In that testimony, he discussed his conversations with President Bush and

Chief of Staff Card, among others.4

Brown’s communications with the White House generally confirm

the Select Committee report’s findings. They confirm the Select

Committee’s conclusions regarding the use of the National Response Plan’s (NRP) protocols and procedures and the potential for

better response if the President had been involved in the details of

the response at an earlier date.

But Brown’s communications with the White House also raise serious questions about when and how the White House becomes involved in disaster response under the NRP. Brown testified he regularly communicated with senior White House officials and asked

for their assistance in the response. It is well-documented that the

response at all levels of government was inadequate. The record establishes that Brown deliberately ignored the procedures, responsibilities, and mechanisms of the NRP and called directly on the

White House for assistance instead.

II. BROWN DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN

Brown’s communications with the White House and his sworn

statements to the Select Committee and others reflect his deliberate decision to ignore the NRP. The NRP was required to be promulgated under the Homeland Security Act and was established at

the direction of the President under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 ‘‘to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards

approach to domestic incident management.’’ 5 It was designed to

3

6 Id.

7 Id. at v–viii. 8 Id. at ix–x. 9 Id. at 15. 10 Brown Dep. at 16. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 8. 13Feb. 10, 2005 Sen. Homeland Sec. Hearing at 44.

‘‘serve[] to unify and enhance the incident management capabilities

and resources of individual agencies and organizations acting

under their own authorities in response to a wide array of potential

threats and hazards.’’ 6 Thirty-two Departments and Agencies of

the federal government adopted it.7

The NRP was completed in 2004 and provided new tools for dealing with disasters, including catastrophic disasters. These tools include the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and its

constituent entity the National Response Coordinating Center, the

Regional Response Coordinating Center, the Interagency Incident

Management Group (IIMG), the Catastrophic Incident Annex,8 and

the designation of the Secretary of Homeland Security as the person responsible for execution of ‘‘overall coordination of federal incident management activities’’ 9 in a disaster.

Brown’s own testimony establishes that he ignored or circumvented the procedures under the NRP for managing the disaster. Brown’s testimony demonstrates that he deliberately chose to

disregard key provisions of the plan, communicating with White

House officials to secure resources. His circumvention of the NRP

contributed to depriving the nation of an opportunity to determine

whether the NRP worked. While it is clear that the federal, state,

and local response was inadequate, it is not clear that the NRP

itself would not have worked, or worked better, if it had been executed by those responsible for doing so, including Brown.

Brown chose to operate as he had in previous disasters—prior to

the adoption of the NRP. Responding to questions from Select Committee Chairman Tom Davis, Brown testified that he relied on his

‘‘previous experience with lots of disasters’’ to ‘‘relay [his needs] to

Hagin or Card, and it would get done. . . .’’ 10 He reported that if

he ‘‘needed, for example, DOD to do something in particular, then

either [Deputy Secretary] Gordon England, or Secretary [Donald]

Rumsfeld or Assistant Secretary Paul McHale would call me and

confirm that, yeah, we just got a call from Andy, and . . . we are

going to get that done for you.’’ 11 He testified that he had ‘‘literally

dozens’’ of conversations or e-mails with senior White House staff,

including the President, the Vice President, Card, Hagin, National

Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Karl Rove.12

Brown virtually boasted that he deliberately avoided communicating with the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff.

When asked in the Senate by Senator Lieberman whether he had

talked to Chertoff on Monday, August 29, and why he ‘‘would . . .

not have if that was the chain of command,’’ he responded: ‘‘Because I’m still operating that I need to get things done, and the

way I get things done is I request them from the White House

. . . .’’ 13

4

14 Id. at 65–66. 15 Id. at 69. 16 Id. at 66. 17 E-mail from Michael Brown to Brooks Altschuler, Dep. Chief of Staff, FEMA (Sept. 1, 2005,

21:31). 18 Brown Dep. at 17. 19See Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 114, 115–117 (statements of Michael Brown);

Brown Dep. at 41, 43, 85. See also Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 77, 99, 114, 139–

140 (statements of Michael Brown). 20Brown Dep. at 17. 21 Id. at 94. 22 Id. 23 Brown Dep. at 48–49.

He further testified in the Senate that calling Chertoff for support ‘‘would have wasted my time. . . .’’ 14 Brown claimed that

‘‘DHS was an additional bureaucracy that was going to slow me

down even more. And the way I got around that was dealing directly with the White House.’’ 15 Senator Bennett observed, ‘‘[I]f I

were Secretary Chertoff and I had a Deputy Secretary who would

prefer to call the White House rather than talk to me, I would find

that very disturbing.’’ 16

At the same time as he was eager to call the White House for

assistance, Brown tried to cut off communications with the Secretary. He told another FEMA official: ‘‘I did tell [Secretary

Chertoff] privately that the phone calls were killing me, and he

said he understood. He assures me he is not trying to interfere, but

they are literally driving me crazy.’’ 17

He also admitted that Card directed him to use the proper procedures. He testified that Card responded to a request:

Mike, we are going to have to follow the protocol. We are

going to have to follow the chain of command on this one.

And I took that to mean that the way we have played ball

for the past couple of years, we are not going to play ball

that way, and now we are going to play ball by ‘‘if you

really need something, you need to go to Chertoff or back

though HSOC or whatever you are going to do and do

those requests that way.’’ 18

Brown operated under the old procedures, despite his own recognition of changes to the NRP and at FEMA. In both his September 27, 2005 appearance before the Select Committee and his February 11, 2006 deposition, he complained about FEMA budget cuts

and reorganization at DHS.19 In response to Chairman Davis’s

question about whether the NRP had changed since the 2004 hurricane season in Florida, Brown replied: ‘‘It had. It had.’’ 20 Brown

was also asked: ‘‘[It] looks [as if] you may have spent a couple of

years fighting a system that you didn’t like, and then when the disaster came, it came [time] to use that system you chose not to use

it. How would you address that?’’ 21 He responded:

I would say that is generally true because the system that

is in place works, whether it is catastrophic or not. The

system that is in place worked.22

But that was emphatically not the system in place for Hurricane

Katrina, and Brown deliberately ignored it. He admitted that he

never advised the Secretary to designate Hurricane Katrina as an

Incident of National Significance 23 and never even discussed with

5

24 Id. at 93. 25 Id. at 95. 26 Id. at 48. 27 Id. at 49. 28 Id. 29 Id. at 94–95. 30 Id. 31 Id. at 92. Even when Brown had the opportunity to seek assistance from the White House,

he did not. When Andy Card asked Brown directly on Monday, August 29—the evening following landfall—if there were ‘‘[a]nything you want me to do?’’ Brown did not ask for anything,

saying only that ‘‘[h]ousing, transportation and environment could be long term issues.’’ (E-mail

from Michael Brown to Andy Card, Chief of Staff, White House (Aug. 29. 2005; 22:00) in response to E-mail from Andy Card to Michael Brown (Aug. 29, 2005; 21:51:07).) Moreover, in the

August 28 video teleconference in which the President appeared, Brown did not request anything. (Daily Video Teleconference [‘‘VTC’’] amongst key officials dated Aug. 28, 2005, Transcript

at 14–15). Later in the same conference call, Brown asked Louisiana State Coordinating Officer

Jeff Smith if he had ‘‘any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you need

. . .;’’ Smith replied simply ‘‘Mike, no.’’ (Id. at 18.) 32 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Sec. Dept’s Preparation and Response Before

Sen. Homeland Sec. and Gov’tl Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 24 (Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Sec., Dept Homeland Sec.). 33 Id. at 24–25.

Chertoff activating the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex.24 He

testified that he would have ‘‘fought the activation of the IIMG as

hard as [he] could.’’ 25 He testified that, if he had gone through the

HSOC or the Secretary, it would have ‘‘added two new phone calls

and two new layers to get things done.’’ 26 Similarly, he objected to

the designation of the Principal Federal Official for an Incident of

National Significance because ‘‘it adds an additional layer of bureaucracy.’’ 27 He testified: ‘‘[T]hat’s why I am such an opponent of

the PFO designation . . . .’’ 28

Yet when asked if these were the ‘‘mechanisms’’ for managing

disasters under the NRP and for pushing resources into the field,

he responded: ‘‘Right.’’ 29 When confronted with that fact that he

‘‘choose [sic] not to use them,’’ again, his unambiguous response

was ‘‘Right.’’ 30

At the same time, while he plainly perceived the structures of

the NRP to be bureaucratic, he admitted that he had no reason to

think that those structures could not and would not respond to his

needs. When asked if he had ‘‘any reason to think that you couldn’t

get [the logistics mission] assignment accomplished through regular channels,’’ he testified: ‘‘No. I really didn’t.’’ 31 Thus, there did

not appear to be any need to communicate with the White House

to obtain the assistance that he sought.

Finally, Brown also appears to have represented to Secretary

Chertoff that he could live with the changes at FEMA, when in fact

he could not. According to Secretary Chertoff’s testimony, Chertoff

and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson met with Brown and specifically asked him if he was ‘‘going to have a problem functioning

as the head of FEMA’’ with the changes at FEMA that Brown had

opposed.32 Chertoff testified that they told Brown it was ‘‘perfectly

creditable to say, I can’t go along with this. I want to leave. If you

are going to stay, though, we need to have your full commitment.

He told us he had felt he had gotten a fair hearing and would give

this his full commitment.’’ 33 Brown’s refusal to follow the NRP

seems contrary to that representation.

It is not clear that following the NRP’s procedures would have

dramatically altered the government’s response to Hurricane

Katrina. It is clear, however, that it was Brown’s responsibility to

use those procedures. It is equally clear, by his own admission,

6

Brown failed to follow them. He thought he could just ignore the

NRP and do it the way he did it in Florida in 2004. That way involved direct communication with the White House to get resources, circumventing the Secretary of Homeland Security and the

interagency processes and mechanisms designed to speed relief to

disaster victims.

The nation will never know whether its response would have

been better if the NRP had been followed. We only know the actual

response, where the NRP was not followed, was woefully inadequate.

(7)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS SUBMITTED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE

MELANCON AND REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM JEFFERSON

Michael Brown appeared before the Select Committee on February 11, 2006. His testimony, while self-serving, provided a window into how he, Secretary Chertoff, and the White House responded to Hurricane Katrina. His testimony raises questions

about the competence of the response at the highest levels of government.

The majority supplemental views emphasize Mr. Brown’s insubordination and failure to follow the National Response Plan. We

agree that Mr. Brown’s testimony demonstrates serious deficiencies

in his job performance. But his testimony also raises questions

about the roles of Secretary Chertoff and White House officials that

remain unanswered to this day.

Mr. Brown testified that he recognized that FEMA was overwhelmed and needed assistance from other departments, especially

DOD. He said he tried to get this assistance by working the process

from the bottom up, by sending requests through the FEMA mission assignment process, and from the top down, by requesting

White House assistance. Neither seemed to work.

In previous disasters, Mr. Brown had been able to rely on the

White House to break through red tape. But this time, operating

with a new Secretary of Homeland Security and under the newly

created National Response Plan, he said that the White House was

less responsive to his requests. Mr. Brown appeared to have no

clear method for getting what he needed from other agencies. Mr.

Brown said that when he informed White House officials of the

problems he was having, nobody at the White House took any initiative to break through bureaucratic obstacles.

Even after the publication of lengthy reports by this Committee

and by the White House, we still know very little about what top

White House officials knew and what actions they took to respond

to Hurricane Katrina.

MR. BROWN’S TESTIMONY ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. Brown testified that he had ‘‘innumerable’’ conversations

with White House officials, including the President, the Vice President, Andrew Card, Joe Hagin, National Security Adviser Steven

Hadley, Lee Ann McBride, Karl Rove, and Domestic Policy Adviser

Claude Allen. He said that he had probably spoken to Homeland

Security Adviser Fran Townsend, but that he did not have regular

contact with her.

Mr. Brown stated that he did not know how many conversations

he had with the President. He said that the President would occasionally join in on his calls with Joe Hagin. Mr. Brown stated:

8

‘‘From my point of view, at that time, the President was clearly engaged.’’

Mr. Brown stated that although FEMA did not have Cabinetlevel status under this Administration, he had been able to work

well with the White House in previous disasters. In previous disasters, ‘‘if I needed anything specific, I would relay that to Hagin or

Card and it would get done.’’

Things worked differently during this Hurricane Katrina. This

time, the White House became ‘‘bureaucratic’’ and provided less assistance. During one phone call, Andrew Card told him that requests need to go through the ‘‘chain of command.’’ He understood

Mr. Card to be telling him, ‘‘if you really need something, you need

to go to Chertoff or back through HSOC or whatever you are going

to do and do those requests that way.’’

Informed that White House Deputy Homeland Security Adviser

Ken Rapuano had told the Committee that when he left the White

House at 10 p.m. on Monday, August 29, conflicting reports were

still coming in about the severity of the impact on New Orleans,

Mr. Brown testified that these statements were ‘‘disingenuous.’’

He argued that the White House should have had clear information about the severity by that time and should have known that

the levees had breached. He noted specifically that White House

Homeland Security Council staff, including Ken Rapuano, Bethany

Nichols, and Joel Bagnal, were on the regular video teleconferences

that provided situational information.

He pointed to a teleconference held the evening of August 29 to

discuss Marty Bahamonde’s report on the grim condition of New

Orleans, and noted: ‘‘So either they all went home or they were all

asleep during the SVTS, but there was a conference call that

evening to discuss exactly what Marty had reported.’’

Mr. Brown would not respond to a question about whether he

thought it was irresponsible for Mr. Rapuano, the most senior official in the White House at the time, to go home at 10 p.m. without

clear situational awareness, but noted that he would have acted

differently.

MR. BROWN’S TESTIMONY ABOUT SECRETARY CHERTOFF

Mr. Brown told the Committee that Secretary Chertoff was not

involved in the response immediately. Once he became involved

however, Mr. Chertoff called frequently regarding ‘‘the most minute

details of operation.’’ According to Mr. Brown, ‘‘the micromanagement was amazing,’’ to the point where Mr. Brown stated that he

‘‘couldn’t get my job done.’’ He also said that Mr. Chertoff’s involvement ‘‘exacerbated’’ problems.

Mr. Brown expressed dismay at the ‘‘whole leadership issue,’’

stating that ‘‘the problem I had was, I wasn’t perceived as the leader down there because I was undermined. Who was the face of

Katrina?’’ He continued:

In Florida, who’s in charge of Florida? By God, I’m in

charge. Now, in Louisiana and Mississippi, we’ve got this

whole dance going around. Is Chertoff in charge? Is Mr.

Brown in charge? The President? Who’s in charge here?

9

Well, in my opinion, the President’s always in charge, and

when it comes these disasters whatever the cause of the

disasters is, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security,

the Director of FEMA, he’s in charge. But you can’t be the

leader and you can’t do that when you’re being undermined and micromanaged.

Mr. Brown told the Committee that he was ‘‘specifically constrained by Secretary Chertoff and told to stay in Baton Rouge.’’

On Wednesday, August 31, as he was on a plane flying back from

Biloxi and a meeting with Governor Barbour, ‘‘I received a phone

call in which I got my rear end chewed out by Michael Chertoff for

having been in Mississippi.’’ He said that in that call, ‘‘I was instructed not to leave Baton Rouge.’’ He also said: ‘‘I knew that this

FEMA Director could not operate under those conditions because

you can’t run a disaster sitting in an office. . . . I can’t sit in a stupid office and try to run a disaster that covers 90,000 square miles

and run it like a blasted bureaucrat.’’ Mr. Brown stated that this

call was the ‘‘tipping point because I knew, okay, this is a different

game.’’

CONCLUSION

The Committee’s meeting with Mr. Brown was a valuable addition to the investigative record. His failure to work within the system did not reflect well on Mr. Brown, as the majority views note.

But his statements also raise serious questions about the performance of the White House and Secretary Chertoff that should be further examined.

(11)

DOCUMENT ANNEX

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Æ