FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES DANIEL SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHARTER 

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-35149

D.C. No.

1:18-cv-00069-SPW-TJC

ORDER CERTIFYING 

QUESTION TO THE 

SUPREME COURT OF 

MONTANA

Filed January 18, 2022

Before: Susan P. Graber and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit 

Judges, and Jennifer Choe-Groves,* Judge.

Order

* The Honorable Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge for the United States 

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
2 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

SUMMARY**

Montana Law

The panel certified to the Supreme Court of Montana the 

following question:

Whether, in an action for wrongful discharge 

pursuant to Montana Code Annotated section 

39-2-904, an employer may defend a 

termination solely for the reasons given in a 

discharge letter, as the court held in 

Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., 

890 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1995), or whether the 

1999 statutory amendments have superseded 

the Galbreath rule.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 3

ORDER

Defendant Charter Communications, Inc., fired one of its 

employees, Plaintiff Charles Daniel Smith, in early 2018. 

Plaintiff then brought this diversity action under Montana’s 

wrongful-discharge statute, alleging that Defendant lacked 

“good cause” to fire him. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-

904(1)(b).1 The district court granted summary judgment to 

Defendant, and Plaintiff timely appeals.

We conclude that the disposition of this appeal turns on 

a single question of Montana law: whether a defendant in a 

wrongful-discharge action may establish good cause for the 

dismissal on grounds that were not set forth in the 

employee’s termination letter. The Montana Supreme Court 

held in Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., 890 P.2d 

382 (Mont. 1995), that an employer could not rely on such 

additional grounds, but some courts have concluded that 

later statutory amendments superseded Galbreath’s rule. If 

Galbreath remains valid, then we will reverse the district 

court’s summary judgment, which relied on grounds not 

stated in Plaintiff’s discharge letter. But if Galbreath is no 

longer good law, and additional grounds may be considered, 

then we will affirm the district court’s summary judgment.

The outcome of this appeal turns, then, on the vitality of 

the Galbreath rule. That central question of state law is 

determinative of the instant appeal, and we find no 

controlling precedent in the decisions of the Montana 

Supreme Court. Mont. R. App. P. 15(3). Thus, we 

1 Montana amended its employment-related laws, effective in March 

2021. Those amendments do not affect the analysis of this case, but all 

citations are to the version of the statute that was in effect when 

Defendant fired Plaintiff in 2018.
4 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

respectfully certify this question of law to the Montana 

Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 15 of the Montana Rules of 

Appellate Procedure.

“We invoke the certification process only after careful 

consideration and do not do so lightly.” Murray v. BEJ 

Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2019) (en 

banc) (order) (quoting Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 

1037 (9th Cir. 2003)). Whether employers may defend a 

termination solely for the reasons given in a discharge letter 

in a wrongful-discharge action is a “substantial” question of 

“broad application,” and the issue has “important public 

policy ramifications.” See id. (listing factors relevant to 

invoking the certification process). Because Defendant asks 

us to recognize, as superseded by statute, a line of decisions 

by the Montana Supreme Court, “the spirit of comity and 

federalism” also weighs in favor of certification. Id.

(quoting Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1037–38). We hesitate to 

declare the relevant state-court decisions to be superseded by 

statute without first giving the Montana Supreme Court an 

opportunity to decide the issue. For all of those reasons, we 

exercise our discretion to certify the question to the Montana 

Supreme Court.

Pursuant to Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(6), 

we provide the following information for the consideration 

of the Montana Supreme Court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 2013, when 

Defendant acquired Plaintiff’s previous employer. In 2016, 

Plaintiff became a vice president of “Inside Plant” (“VP, 

ISP”) for the Mountain States management area, which 

encompassed Montana, Wyoming, and parts of Colorado. 

Plaintiff had responsibility for managing employees at about 
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 5

50 sites scattered in the region. Although the parties dispute 

the full extent of a travel requirement, it is clear that the job 

required Plaintiff to travel to each of those sites at least 

quarterly.

In April 2017, Plaintiff’s supervisor issued to Plaintiff a 

“corrective action report,” with a written warning selected as 

the chosen action. Plaintiff eventually resolved the issues 

without further disciplinary action.

In July 2017, Plaintiff took time off from work for a 

personal trip. Plaintiff was injured during that trip and spent 

more than three weeks in a hospital. He took approved 

medical leave until November 2017, when he returned to 

work.

During his recovery, in October 2017, Plaintiff posted a 

comment on Facebook from his personal account. Although 

Plaintiff maintains that his comment was taken out of 

context, many persons found the comment offensive, and it 

drew significant media attention. Plaintiff listed his 

employer on his Facebook page, and someone created a new 

post by copying Plaintiff’s employment information and 

placing that information next to Plaintiff’s controversial 

comment. At Defendant’s request, Plaintiff deleted his 

original post.

Plaintiff had been scheduled to return to work on 

November 6, 2017. But, as a result of the Facebook post, 

Defendant suspended him without pay and issued him a final 

warning in lieu of termination. Plaintiff returned to work on 

November 20, 2017.

On January 29, 2018, Defendant fired Plaintiff. The 

corrective action report listed two reasons for the 

termination. First, Plaintiff allowed an employee to work as 
6 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

an electrician, in violation of the company’s policy. Second, 

“[i]n December 2017,” Plaintiff “failed to fulfill the 

50% travel requirement to [his] management area.”

Plaintiff filed this action in state court, and Defendant 

removed it to federal court. Plaintiff alleges a single claim 

that Defendant fired him without good cause, in violation of 

Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-904(1)(b).2

After discovery, Defendant moved for summary 

judgment. A magistrate judge issued a recommendation, and 

a district judge independently reviewed the motion. With 

respect to the first reason, the magistrate judge ruled that 

genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Plaintiff 

allowed unauthorized electrical work, the district judge did 

not disturb that conclusion, and neither party challenges it on 

appeal.

The magistrate judge also recommended denying 

summary judgment as to the second reason, but the district 

judge disagreed. The district judge did not disagree with the 

magistrate judge’s conclusion that there was a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether a 50% travel requirement 

existed in 2017. But the district judge concluded that this 

dispute was “immaterial” because the undisputed evidence 

established that Plaintiff had “failed to meet even [the] 

quarterly travel requirement” that Plaintiff conceded was 

applicable. Although Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 

quarterly travel requirement was not expressly mentioned in 

Plaintiff’s termination letter, the district judge concluded 

2 Plaintiff initially brought a second claim, that Defendant violated 

its own written policies. But Plaintiff abandoned that claim, the district 

court granted summary judgment to Defendant on it, and Plaintiff does 

not raise that issue on appeal. Only the wrongful-discharge claim 

described in text remains.
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 7

that it nonetheless “substantiated” the reasons given in that 

letter. On that basis, the district judge held that the quarterly 

travel requirement could be considered, notwithstanding 

Galbreath, which the district judge stated was still good law.

Plaintiff timely appeals. We review de novo the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment. Wolfe v. BNSF Ry. Co., 

749 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

In determining Montana law, we are bound by the 

decisions of the Montana Supreme Court. Albano v. Shea 

Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2011). If the 

Montana Supreme Court has not decided an issue, we must 

predict how the court would resolve it. Id. Under Montana 

law, as relevant here, a “discharge is wrongful” if “the 

discharge was not for good cause.” Mont. Code Ann. § 39-

2-904(1)(b).

If we may consider Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 

quarterly travel requirement, then Defendant had good cause 

to terminate Plaintiff. Although the parties dispute the full 

extent of Plaintiff’s travel requirements, the parties agree 

that he was required to visit all his sites on at least a quarterly 

basis, and his travel schedule fell far short of that 

requirement. Plaintiff “traveled” to the Billings site, located 

across the parking lot from Plaintiff’s office, throughout 

2017. But he traveled elsewhere only sporadically, visiting 

only a few of the sites he oversaw during 2017. The record 

decisively establishes that Plaintiff failed to meet the specific 

travel requirement that he visit the sites quarterly. Defendant 

therefore had good cause for the termination. See Mont. 

Code Ann. § 39-2-903(5) (“‘Good cause’ means reasonable 

job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to 

satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the 
8 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

employer’s operation, or other legitimate business reason.”); 

Putnam v. Cent. Mont. Med. Ctr., 460 P.3d 419, 423 (Mont. 

2020) (“A legitimate business reason is one that is not false, 

whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious, and one that must have 

some logical relationship to the needs of the business.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (holding that courts 

generally defer to an employer’s business judgment 

especially where, as here, the employee holds a sensitive 

managerial position).3

A. Application of the Galbreath Rule

As noted, the Montana Supreme Court held, in 

Galbreath, 890 P.2d at 384–85, that an employer may defend 

its termination decision only for the reasons stated in a 

discharge letter. Defendant’s discharge letter did not list, as 

a reason for the termination, a failure to make quarterly site 

visits. Instead, Defendant stated that Plaintiff failed to meet 

a very specific requirement: that he travel 50% of the time 

in December 2017.

Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether 

Defendant had imposed a 50% travel requirement on 

Plaintiff during 2017. For example, Defendant’s written 

policy for 2017 contains no 50% travel requirement; by 

contrast, Defendant’s written policy for 2018 does contain a 

50% travel requirement. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was 

told, at some point during 2017, that he was subject to a 50% 

travel requirement. But Plaintiff denies ever receiving that 

message, and we conclude that Defendant’s evidence that 

3 For the reasons stated by the district court, we reject Plaintiff’s 

alternative argument that he presented sufficient evidence of pretext to 

rebut Defendant’s showing of good cause. See Putnam, 460 P.3d at 424 

(holding that, once an employer sets forth evidence of good cause, an 

employee bears the burden of presenting evidence of pretext).
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 9

Plaintiff was told of the new requirement does not mandate 

summary judgment. A reasonable juror could believe 

Plaintiff and disbelieve the contrary evidence.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, evidence of 

Plaintiff’s failure to meet the quarterly travel requirement 

does not substantiate the very specific reason given in the 

letter. Employers may introduce any evidence that 

“substantiates” a reason given in a discharge letter. See

McConkey v. Flathead Elec. Coop., 125 P.3d 1121, 1127 

(Mont. 2005) (evidence of the company’s finances 

admissible where the letter stated that the fired employee’s 

recommendations “negatively impacted [the employer] 

financially”); Jarvenpaa v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 

970 P.2d 84, 90–91 (Mont. 1998) (evidence of morale 

admissible where the letter cited low morale as a reason for 

discharge); McGillen v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 964 P.2d 

18, 24–25 (Mont. 1998) (evidence of motive as to the 

employee’s bad act admissible where the letter cited the bad 

act as the reason for discharge). But an employer may not 

introduce evidence unrelated to the reasons given in a 

discharge letter. Galbreath, 890 P.2d at 384–85 (evidence 

of staging of a workplace accident inadmissible where the 

letter cited only a failure to provide medical documentation); 

Bean v. Mont. Bd. of Labor Appeals, 965 P.2d 256, 261 

(Mont. 1998) (evidence of unrelated misconduct 

inadmissible where the letter cited only unprofessional 

conduct during a specific incident).

The factual issue at dispute here is whether Defendant 

required Plaintiff to travel 50% of the time in December 

2017. Evidence of Plaintiff’s failure to visit all the sites 

quarterly does not speak to that critical disputed issue, 

because it does not relate to whether Defendant had imposed 

a 50% travel requirement on him. If Plaintiff was not 
10 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

required to travel 50% of the time, then the discharge letter 

does not show good cause: he was unfairly faulted for 

failing to do something that he was not required to do. His 

failure to visit the sites at least quarterly thus does not 

“substantiate” the reason given in the discharge letter. In our 

view, this case is comparable to Bean, 965 P.2d at 261, 

where the discharge letter listed one specific incident of 

misconduct, and the court held that evidence of other

instances of misconduct was inadmissible. The cases cited 

by Defendant are not to the contrary because, in those cases, 

the evidence had a clear connection to a reason listed in the 

discharge letter. See, e.g., Jarvenpaa, 970 P.2d at 90–91 

(evidence of morale and operational performance admissible 

where the discharge letter stated that the employee had 

detrimentally affected morale and operations). The district 

court thus erred in granting summary judgment on the 

ground that Plaintiff’s travel schedule substantiated the 

reason in the letter.

In sum, if the sole question is whether Defendant had 

“good cause,” then the district court properly granted 

summary judgment to Defendant. But if the Galbreath rule 

remains good law, then genuine issues of material fact 

remain and, accordingly, the district court erred by granting 

summary judgment to Defendant.

B. The 1999 Statutory Amendments and the Galbreath Rule

We turn, then, to the key legal question in this case: 

whether the Galbreath rule remains good law following 

1999 statutory amendments. Because of the importance of 

the issue, we describe the jurisprudential and statutory 

history in some detail.

Before the 1999 amendments, Montana Code Annotated 

section 39-2-801 required an employer, upon an employee’s 
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 11

request, “to furnish him in writing a full, succinct, and 

complete statement of the reason of his discharge.” In 

Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hospital, 597 P.2d 702, 

706–07 (Mont. 1979), the Montana Supreme Court 

interpreted that passage as binding the employer, in a later 

wrongful-discharge action, to justify the firing only for those 

reasons stated in the letter that the employee had requested. 

The statutory provision, the court held, “becomes a part of 

any employment contract entered into by an employer and 

an employee in the State of Montana.” Id. at 706. “[I]t is 

our duty to interpret [the statute’s] requiring a ‘full, succinct 

and complete’ statement to mean exactly what it says. 

Therefore, in the case at bar, the only reason which could be 

considered by the District Court was the reason set forth in 

the [discharge] letter.” Id. at 706–07. Swanson expressly 

concerned a letter requested by the employee. Id. at 706.

Sixteen years later, the Montana Supreme Court decided 

Galbreath. The court held that the trial court had erred by 

admitting evidence of reasons other than the reason 

contained in the discharge letter. 890 P.2d at 384–85. The 

court reasoned as follows:

In Swanson, we concluded that in a 

wrongful discharge action the only reason for 

discharge the district court could consider 

was the reason set forth in the discharge 

letter. Reasons other than the reason stated in 

the discharge letter were irrelevant and 

excluded from evidence. Swanson, 597 P.2d 

at 704. By allowing the above testimony in 

the present case to go to the jury, the court, in 

effect, permitted the jury to decide whether 

the discharge was wrongful based on reasons 

other than, or in addition to, the sole reason 
12 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

stated in the discharge letter. Any collateral 

reasons suggested by the evidence, other than 

the sole reason stated in the discharge letter, 

were irrelevant, and therefore, inadmissible. 

Rule 402, M.R.Evid.; Swanson, 597 P.2d 

at 704.

We hold that the District Court erred in 

allowing [the employer] to offer evidence 

suggesting that [the employee] was 

discharged for reasons other than the reason 

set forth in his discharge letter.

Id. at 385 (one citation omitted). Two justices dissented on 

the ground that Swanson was distinguishable because, unlike 

the case at hand, the plaintiff in Swanson had requested a 

statement of reasons pursuant to section 39-2-801. Id.

at 385–86 (Weber, J., dissenting). The majority did not

respond expressly to the dissent’s view.

Three years later, in 1998, the Montana Supreme Court 

applied the Galbreath rule in three separate cases. 

Jarvenpaa, 970 P.2d at 90–91; Bean, 965 P.2d at 261; 

McGillen, 964 P.2d at 24–25.

The next year, in 1999, the Montana legislature amended 

section 39-2-801. The statute no longer requires “a full, 

succinct, and complete statement of the reason” for 

discharge (emphases added); it now requires only “a 

statement of reasons.” Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-801(1). 

Moreover, the statute now provides: “A response to the 

demand may be modified at any time and may not limit a 

person’s ability to present a full defense in any action 

brought by the discharged employee.” Id. § 39-2-801(3). 

The earlier version of the statute contained no similar 

provision.
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 13

The amended statute means that, at least for purposes of 

section 39-2-801, for those employees who receive a letter 

pursuant to that section, the employer is not bound in 

litigation by the reasons given in the letter. Defendant 

argues, further, that the amendments to the statute undermine 

the foundation for Galbreath’s rule. Galbreath relied on 

Swanson, and Swanson relied on section 39-2-801. 

Defendant contends that, because section 39-2-801 has been 

amended to require the opposite result, Swanson is no longer 

good law, and so too is Galbreath no longer good law.

Since the 1999 amendments, the Montana Supreme 

Court has discussed the Galbreath rule only once, in 

McConkey, 125 P.3d at 1127, in 2005. No party appears to 

have argued that the rule had been superseded by statute. 

The court held that the rule did not apply in that case, 

because the evidence substantiated the reason in the 

discharge letter. So McConkey sheds little light on the effect 

of the 1999 amendments.

At least two Montana trial courts have held that the 1999 

amendments superseded the Galbreath rule. In Bourdelais 

v. Semitool, Inc., No. DV 01-073(B), 2002 Mont. Dist. 

LEXIS 2244, at *31–32 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Sept. 13, 2002), 

aff’d, 77 P.3d 555 (Mont. 2003) (unpublished), the court 

stated, without elaboration:

[T]he 1999 legislature amended section 39-2-

801 to state that an employer is not limited to 

the reasons set forth in response to the 

employee’s request for a written statement of 

the reasons for discharge, and may modify its 

response at any time. Galbreath no longer 

applies.
14 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

(citation format altered). Another trial court held the same 

in 2007, after McConkey had been decided: “Swanson and 

Galbreath . . . were decided on the service letter rule (and 

thus have now been superseded by statute).” Stevenson v. 

Felco Indus., Inc., No. DV-06-298, 2007 WL 5528566, at *3 

(Dist. Ct. Mont. Apr. 16, 2007). The court agreed with a 

then-recent law review article on the topic. Id. (citing 

William L. Corbett, Resolving Employee Discharge 

Disputes Under the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act 

(MWDA), Discharge Claims Arising Apart from the MWDA, 

and Practice and Procedure Issues in the Context of a 

Discharge Case, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 329, 392–93 (2005)). We 

have found other Montana trial court decisions that have 

applied the Galbreath rule without comment.4 But we have 

not found any other Montana trial court decision that 

confronted the question concerning the statutory 

amendment. In sum, both Montana trial courts to have 

considered the issue have held that the statutory amendments 

superseded the Galbreath rule.

Decisions by the federal district court in Montana have 

split. One decision held, as the two state trial courts had 

held, that the statutory amendments superseded the 

Galbreath rule. Erdman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV05-202-M-DWM, 2007 WL 9710331, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 

13, 2007) (order) (unpublished). “The cases cited by [the 

employee] . . . rely on language in a prior version of 

Montana Code Annotated [section] 39-2-801 that required 

4 Wells v. River Design Grp., No. DV-15-2019-526-WS (D), 2020 

WL 8837385, at *3–5 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Dec. 9, 2020) (unpublished); 

Reinlasoder v. City of Colstrip, No. DV 14-0340, 2015 WL 4384625 

(Dist. Ct. Mont. Feb. 15, 2015) (unpublished); Swehla v. Montana, No. 

ADV-2009-926, 2012 WL 9510453 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Sept. 21, 2012) 

(unpublished); Winslow v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., No. CDV-1997-552, 

2003 WL 25656786 (Dist. Ct. Mont. May 14, 2003) (unpublished).
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 15

employers to provide a ‘full, succinct, and complete 

statement’ of the reason for discharge.” Id. “Because of 

the[] statutory amendments, reasons for [the employee’s] 

discharge other than those set forth in the exit interview form 

are relevant and admissible . . . .” Id. By contrast, one recent 

federal district court decision has rejected that reasoning and 

result. McCue v. Integra Imaging, P.S., No. CV 19-147-MDLC, 2021 WL 633416, at *4 (D. Mont. Feb. 18, 2021) 

(order).5

The legislative history, which mentions the Montana 

Supreme Court’s decisions, including Galbreath, may 

contain useful guidance. See Clarke v. Massey, 897 P.2d 

1085, 1088 (Mont. 1995) (discussing the role of legislative 

history in statutory interpretation); see, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 

271 Before the S. Comm. on Lab. & Emp. Rels., 56 Leg., 

Reg. Sess., Ex. 2 (Mont. 1999) (Letter from Law Offices of 

Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, P.C.) (listing three 

decisions by the Montana Supreme Court, including 

Galbreath); Letter from Gov. Racicot to the Legislature 

5 As is true with the state trial-court decisions, some federal district 

court decisions have applied Galbreath without comment. King v. 

Recreational Equip., Inc., No. CV 16-27-M-DLC, 2016 WL 8711290, 

at *2 (D. Mont. Dec. 8, 2016) (unpublished); Weinheimer v. Omniflight 

Helicopters, Inc., No. CV 09-06-M-DWM, 2010 WL 11606784, at *5 

(D. Mont. Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished); Schwartz v. Metro Aviation, 

Inc., No. CV 08-32-M-JCL, 2009 WL 352599, at *5 (D. Mont. Feb. 9, 

2009) (unpublished); Bleek v. Supervalu, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 

1124–25 (D. Mont. 2000). Because no party appears to have raised the 

question concerning the 1999 amendments, those cases bear little weight.
16 SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

Regarding Proposed Amendments (Apr. 16, 1999) (referring 

to “recent court cases”).6

CERTIFICATION

In light of the foregoing discussion, we certify the 

following question to the Montana Supreme Court:

Whether, in an action for wrongful discharge 

pursuant to Montana Code Annotated section 

39-2-904, an employer may defend a 

termination solely for the reasons given in a 

discharge letter, as the court held in 

Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., 

890 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1995), or whether the 

1999 statutory amendments have superseded 

the Galbreath rule.

We acknowledge that, as the receiving court, the Montana 

Supreme Court may reformulate the certified question. 

Mont. R. App. P. 15(6)(a)(iii).

The names and addresses of counsel for the parties, as 

required by Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 

15(6)(a)(iv), are as follows:

Eric Holm; Holm Law Firm, PLLC; 

12 North 35th Street, Billings, MT 59101 for 

Appellant Charles Daniel Smith

Joshua Becker Kirkpatrick, David C. 

Gartenberg; Littler Mendelson, PC; 1900 

6 The State Law Library of Montana provides a Compiled 

Legislative History of Montana State Senate Bill 271, which includes the 

summary minutes of committee hearings and meetings.
SMITH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 17

16th Street, Suite 800, Denver, CO 80202 for 

Appellee Charter Communications, Inc.

The Clerk shall forward a certified copy of this 

certification order, under official seal, to the Montana 

Supreme Court. The Clerk is also ordered to transmit a copy 

of the Excerpts of Record filed in this appeal to the Montana 

Supreme Court and, if requested by the Montana Supreme 

Court, provide all or part of the district court record not 

included in the Excerpts of Record. Mont. R. App. P. 15(5). 

The Clerk is further directed to forward a copy of the briefs 

filed by the parties.

Submission of this appeal for decision is vacated and 

deferred pending the Montana Supreme Court’s final 

response to this certification order. The Clerk is directed to 

close this docket administratively, pending further order. 

The parties shall notify the Clerk of this court within 

fourteen days of the Montana Supreme Court’s acceptance 

or rejection of certification, and again, if certification is 

accepted, within fourteen days of the Montana Supreme 

Court’s issuance of a decision.

QUESTION CERTIFIED; PROCEEDINGS 

STAYED.