NEEDED NOW: 

THE “85% QUICK FIX” IN BIO-DEFENSE 

by 

Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 23 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Needed Now: 

The “85% Quick Fix” In Bio-Defense 

Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett 

September 2004 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 23 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 23 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii

The Authors ............................................................................................... iii

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. Defining the BW/BT Threat ...............................................................4 

III. Mitigating U.S./Allied Vulnerability Against Bio-Weapons .............8 

IV. Conclusions.......................................................................................23 

Notes..........................................................................................................25 
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

ii 
The Authors 

Colonel Jim A. Davis is the Deputy Director of the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center. Previously, Colonel Davis was the Deputy 

Chair to the Department of Future Conflict Studies at Air War College and 

the AF Surgeon General’s Chair to Air University. He also served as the 

Commander, 48th Aerospace Medicine Squadron at RAF Lakenheath, UK 

where he was responsible for the largest Aerospace Medicine Squadron in 

USAFE, which oversees flight medicine, optometry, preventive medicine, 

health promotion, public health, industrial hygiene, and bioenvironmental 

engineering. He provided support to USAFE fighters, European Tanker 

Task Force, and MOOTW in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. He 

also served as UK Medical Intelligence Officer and USAFE Consultant for 

Public Health. Colonel Davis served 4 years in the U.S. Army Veterinary 

Corps, 6 years in private veterinary medicine, and has been in the Air 

Force since 1987. His areas of special interest include CBW, bioterrorism, 

and occupational epidemiology. Colonel Davis has several academic 

degrees including a Doctorate of Veterinary Medicine from Texas A&M 

and a Doctorate of Public Health from the University of Texas. He is 

board certified with the American College of Veterinary Medicine and 

through his experience at Plum Island, New York, has become a Foreign 

Animal Disease Diagnostician. 

Dr. Bruce W. Bennett is the research leader for strategy, force planning, 

and counterproliferation within RAND’s International Security and 

Defense Policy Center. His work focuses on the future of warfare and 

military analysis, especially in light of new technologies, operational 

concepts, and threats. He is examining the operational and strategic

implications of possible chemical, biological, and nuclear threats that 

could be posed in Korea and the Persian Gulf, and the character of the 

U.S. strategy required in response, with a focus on deterrence. He 

facilitated the Coral Breeze seminars on CBW for CINC Combined Forces

Command (Korea), the Desert Breeze seminars on CBW for

USCENTCOM, and parts of USCENTCOM’s Eagle Resolve exercises 

with the Gulf States. He has worked on defenses against chemical and 

biological weapons in the CASPOD ACTD (Contamination Avoidance at 

Sea Ports of Debarkation), the RestOps ACTD (Restoration of Operations 

iii 
at airfields after CBW attack), and the subsequent USPACOM CounterBW research effort. He has also worked on deterrence-based strategy, 

future force planning procedures, peacetime force requirements, and future 

threats and the military forces required to counter them. 

Dr. Bennett received a Ph.D. in policy analysis from the RAND Graduate 

School and a B.S. in economics from the California Institute of 

Technology. He has served as an Adjunct Professor at the U.S. National 

War College, as an Adjunct Lecturer in the School of Public Health at the 

University of California at Los Angeles, and is a Professor of Policy 

Analysis in the RAND Graduate School. 

iv 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 1

Needed Now: 

The “85% Quick Fix” in Bio-Defense 

Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett 

I. Introduction 

Some new proposals are presented to provide an 

“85% Quick Fix,” including implementation of a 

Bio-Threatcon level, building preparation, providing off 

the shelf 1/2 mask respirators and more. 

The search for the “best solution” for bio-defense is proving to be an 

obstacle to finding the more immediate “good solution.” In the day when 

Americans have grown used to fast food, instant access to the Internet, and 

minimal United States’ casualties during war, many have come to expect a 

“silver bullet solution” for almost any problem. The military, like the rest

of America, is often in quest for the 100% solution to its challenges. For 

example, the military, now awakened to the biological warfare/biological

terrorism (BW/BT) threat, is in search of the perfect solution to the 

problem posed by biological weapons. The pursuit of the 100% solution 

often diverts efforts from potential quick (though incomplete) fixes for 

such tough problems that could provide valuable protection. Some new 

proposals are presented to provide an “85% Quick Fix,”1

 including 

implementation of a Bio-Threatcon level, building preparation, providing 

off the shelf 1/2 mask respirators and more. While the technical 

information in this paper needs further study, it is hoped this chapter will 

provoke discussion and stimulate the development of new ideas for

immediate solutions (albeit partial solutions) rather than waiting on the

100% solution. 

In April 1990, two U.S. naval bases, Yokosuka and Yokohama, 

were attacked with botulinum toxin, and although they failed, the 

scenario could have turned out much different. A home-grown Japanese 

terrorist organization, Aum Shinrikyo, had amassed over a billion dollars
2 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

in net worth and had developed a clandestine biological warfare 

program. This group became famous for its nerve agent attack in the 

Tokyo subways in March 1995 that killed 12 and injured 5,500. 

Fortunately, in 1990, technology and scientific know-how were not as 

accessible as they are today, and as a result, the Aum Shinrikyo cult had 

not perfected its program.2

 To our knowledge, no U.S. forces became ill 

from this attack. But if this attack occurred today when technological 

capabilities and the proliferation of information are rampant, it seems far 

more likely they would have been successful, leading to thousands of 

U.S. forces casualties. 

Likewise, consider the Gulf War in 1991 when the U.S. had 320,000 

military personnel massed in a 50 by 150 mile rectangular area southeast

of Iraq. The Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated if an anthrax 

attack had occurred on our troops, 76,300 individuals would have died if 

they were not vaccinated. On the other hand, if all were vaccinated, it was 

estimated that only 122 would have died. Conversely, what if the attack 

had been tularemia, Q-fever, or a host of other biological agents for which 

we do not have a vaccine? Thousands would have died or become ill 

because we did not have even a partial protection from such agents. Yet, 

if an “85% Quick Fix” was put into place, hundreds or possibly thousands 

of lives could be saved, allowing the military mission to continue. 

Since there is no mechanism in place today to provide even partial 

protection from a biological warfare attack at most military installations,

both the Aum Shinrikyo and the Gulf War scenarios have grave 

implications. U.S. military forces could suffer death tolls higher than the 

tragic events of September 11, 2001, unless some interim efforts for 

partial protection occur prior to finding the 100% solution. With the 

“85% Quick Fix,” it is hypothesized 85% of the affected soldiers would

be protected. 

Indeed, there is an obligation to protect our forces completely from 

threats when practical. We owe that protection to U.S. military personnel, 

to their families, and to our nation. Yet, the complexities of this threat

make it difficult to field comprehensive defensive measures in the nearterm — and BW/BT threats exist today. The weapons of this threat are 

bacteria, viruses, other microorganisms, and toxins. Unlike TNT, 

chemicals, and radioactive material, biological organisms are alive and 

can adapt to new challenges in the quest for survival. These invisible 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 3

weapons are much different from other threats. They can be released to 

travel difficult terrain silently and effortlessly over long distances, creating 

sickness and death in their wake. 

Sometime in the 21st century we may be able to provide 100% 

protection against all the dozens of pathogens that might be used as 

weapons. However, unless we adopt a group of partial fixes now, our

military forces will be left grossly vulnerable to the BW/BT threat while

we search for a more comprehensive breakthrough in vaccines, sensors, 

and other counters. We have much ground to make up in biodefense. 

Until very recently, senior DoD leaders were unable to grasp the urgency 

in protecting military forces and were unwilling to obligate large

investments necessary to counter an unlikely event. Hopefully that has 

changed. 

The anthrax attacks in the United States during the Fall of 2001 have 

helped convert many such doubters, but further complicating a solution is 

the fact that some within DoD have seen this problem as “too hard to do.” 

Not knowing just what to do and not sure the threat was real, they did 

little. Also, one of the difficulties in preparing for this threat is the 

military’s fixation on technological answers more than procedural 

solutions. That finally may be changing, because a few in the military are 

beginning to ask, “Is there an inexpensive, quick fix that can provide 

partial protection for our forces while we look for the 100% solution?”3

Our frustrating quest for such items like the “detect to protect”4

technology provided by biological detectors or highly reliable vaccines for

a myriad of pathogens has led many to despair. Others have realized that 

for immediate protection, new technology innovations may not be the

major portion of the immediate solution. 

Today, more than a dozen countries are suspected of having some

level of a biological warfare program. It is also true that terrorist 

organizations such as Al-Qaeda have shown a keen interest in obtaining 

these weapons. Since Al-Qaeda says it is their God-ordained 

responsibility to kill Americans and most of the countries with BW/BT 

programs are not our best of friends, it is important we get to the 

immediate business of what might be termed the “85% Quick Fix”–some

simple, effective, and immediate counters to today’s biological weapons 

threat. Effective interim and partial protection might be accomplished 
4 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

with several simple procedural changes and by minor applications of 

current technology at modest expense. 

The quest for the perfect answer can be the enemy of the “good

solution,” and no one would credibly argue that 100% of personnel left

unprotected in the near term is better than protecting 85% of personnel 

immediately through quick-fix procedures.

II. Defining the BW/BT Threat 

The biological threat can be quantified by integrating three distinct 

variables:5

• An adversary’s intent to use biological weapons 

• An adversary’s capability to use biological weapons 

• Our own vulnerability to biological weapons 

Enemy Intent + Enemy Capability + U.S./Allied Vulnerability = Threat

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to thoroughly analyze the

possible intent of various rogue states/adversaries or to fully describe the

myriad of biological weapon agents that may be used in an attack.

Likewise, it is important to understand that to appropriately defeat 

BW/BT a full range of activities should be pursued, including: arms

control, export controls, diplomatic and economic sanctions, deterrence, 

counterforce, active defense, passive defense and consequence 

management. However, this analysis will look at how a few simple and 

immediate steps can be taken to mitigate the hazards from biological

weapons in the areas of passive defense, intelligence and warning, 

consequence management, and active defense/offensive options.

Understanding BW Agents 

Threats like biological warfare/biological terrorism can be serious

when the United States and/or its allies are vulnerable, and this is generally 

the case for every BW agent. This vulnerability is in turn a function of the 

characteristics of the BW agents and their various delivery systems. 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 5

Nevertheless, the details of U.S. vulnerability are critical to determining the 

potential impacts of a BW attack. 

Many sources suggest that BW threats can be overwhelming. The

actual area in which people would be affected by BW would vary

depending upon the means of delivery (aerosol delivery is generally 

expected to be the most serious),6

 the quantity and positioning of the BW

source, time of day, weather conditions, where people are located, what they 

are doing when exposed, and various other factors. For example, the

Congressional Office of Technology Assessment indicated that 100 

kilograms of anthrax could cover 46 to 300 square kilometers with lethal

effects, depending upon weather conditions,7

 while other sources suggest

potentially larger areas.8

 Another source suggests that spray from “... a

single airplane could be expected to infect a high percentage of individuals

within an area of at least 10,000 km2

” with equine encephalitis (VEE, EEE, 

or WEE).9

 These large areas suggest that even Special Forces carrying a 

kilogram or so of BW, could affect large parts of a city, airfield, port, 

ground force base, or command/control or logistics facility. An aircraft or 

missile carrying tens of kilograms of BW agents could thoroughly 

overwhelm most military targets and cover much of the surrounding areas. 

There are a significant number of biological agents that have different 

characteristics, as shown in Table 1. These weapons vary in their potency

(ECt50),10 their lethality, their survivability in air and other media, their 

period of incubation and duration of effects, whether they are contagious 

between people, the degree to which they can be prevented (e.g., by 

vaccines) or treated (e.g., by antibiotics), and their potential resistance to

various forms of treatment (e.g., in antibiotic resistance). For example, a 

toxin like Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B (SEB) could rapidly affect a 

military population (starting within 2 hours or so), would have serious 

effects for perhaps a day or so, have residual effects for as long as weeks,

should cause few fatalities, and could be treated only by supportive 

treatment. Alternatively, some bacterial weapons like anthrax and plague

take longer to incubate, are highly lethal, but can generally be countered by 

certain antibiotics if these are taken in a timely manner and the BW agent 

has not been engineered to resist the antibiotic.
6 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

Table 1

Characteristics of Some BW Agents 

Agent 

ECt50* 

(μg)-min/m3

Nighttime 

Decay

(%/min) 

Untreated

Mortality(%)

Incubation 

(Days) Contagious Treatment Vacc. 

Bacteria

 Anthrax 0.01 0-0.1 100 1-6 No Antibiotic Yes 

 Plague 0.01 10 100 2-3 Yes Antibiotic No** 

 Tularemia 0.0001 5 5-60 2-10 No Antibiotic IND 

 Q Fever 0.00002 0-0.1 0-1 10-40 Rare Antibiotic IND 

Toxins

 Bot Tox 0.1 5 5 1-5 No Antitoxin* IND 

 Ricin 200* ? High* 18-24 hr* No* Support* No* 

 SEB 0.03* 1 1 3-12 hr No Support* No 

Viruses

 VEE ? ? Low* 2-6* Low* Support* IND* 

 Ebola ? ? 50-90* 4-21* Moderate* Support* No* 

 Smallpox 0.1 0.5 15-40 7-17 Yes Support* Yes 

* ECt50 - Exposure Concentration Time 50%; Vacc. – Vaccine; SEB-Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B; 

VEE - Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis; IND – Investigational New Drug 

Source: Brian G. Chow, et. al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological 

Environment, RAND, DB-189/1-AF. 1998, 29. Values with a “*” come from USAMRIID, 

Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, February 2001, 64 and

Appendices C, D, and I. The vaccine for plague “**” (actually for bubonic as opposed to

pneumonic plague) is no longer being produced per Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., “Plague as

a Biological Weapon,” JAMA, May 3, 2000, 2285.

11

The impact of the different potency and decay rate values is 

illustrated in Figure 1, based on a series of biological weapons exposure 

curves produced by the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability

(HPAC) model for a one-kilogram BW agent release of one-kilometer 

width. The model also assumes a temperature inversion and a wind speed 

of approximately 10 mph. Even in daylight (8:00 a.m.), the model shows 

that the concentration of viable anthrax stays above the median infective 

dose for an hour or so after the release (reflecting its relative resistance to 

UV degradation). This is enough time to cover most fixed military targets 

as long as there is a temperature inversion, the wind was properly forecast, 

and the original release was sufficiently wide. At night (8:00 p.m.), the 

anthrax concentration stays above the median infective dose for several 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 7

hours, sufficient to cover large military assembly areas with a favorable 

breeze. In contrast, the greater potency (determined by the reduced 

number of microorganisms required to induce infection) of tularemia starts 

with far higher infective dose levels, but the infective dose declines much

more rapidly because of the decay rate of tularemia in air. Still, the 

dosage for tularemia is well above the median infective dose for almost 

two hours, giving reasonable time to cover most fixed targets. Indeed, 

even modest amounts (a kilogram or so) of both anthrax and tularemia 

should carry well beyond an intended military target and could affect large 

civilian areas under ideal conditions. With anthrax, doses well less than 

the median infective dose may still cause some lethal exposures many 

hours after the release, well downwind of the target.12 Maximum Infective Dos

e

s Receiv

ed 

BW Agent – Release Times 

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Tularemia - 8:00 p.m.

Anthrax - 8:00 p.m.

Anthrax - 8:00 a.m.

Hours After Release 

Figure 1 - Maximum Infective Dose Received at the Front of a BW Cloud traveling 

at approximately 10 mph.

(Decreased dose over time is primarily due to degradation from ultraviolet light and 

dispersion of the agent in the air. This figure is based on a one kilogram released

over a distance of one kilometer.)13 

Antibiotics against bacterial weapons can often be effective, whether 

used for treatment14 or for post-exposure prophylaxis.15 Nevertheless, use 

of antibiotics could still lead to some debilitating side effects16 that could 

impact both civilian and military operations. While antibiotics fight 
8 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

bacteria, many toxins and viruses lack a direct means of treatment (as

shown in Table 1), meaning that victims will be sick and many will be

incapacitated for some period of time. 

The Soviets, recognizing the potential for antibiotics to defeat many 

biological agents, developed genetic variations of BW agents (such as 

plague, anthrax, and tularemia), that were resistant to various antibiotics. 

One of the Soviets’ former leading bio-weaponeers stated: 

“There was a task force to develop a new strain of weapon with a 

resistance to ten antibiotics. These antibiotics were first released in

the United States and some European countries just to treat 

infections. In 1989 it was very difficult to have strains of plague 

resistant to antibiotics. But one of our facilities developed a new

approach. They developed two different strains resistant to five

antibiotics each. And they cultivated them together and they have a 

mutual relationship, one with another. That was about ten, twelve, 

fifteen years ago. Recently, Russian scientists have proclaimed 

success in developing a Bacillus anthracis strain resistant to most 

antibiotics.”17

III. Mitigating U.S./Allied Vulnerability Against Bio-Weapons 

The U.S. military has studied the BW threat and concluded that the

military’s goal of full-dimensional protection, enshrined in Joint Vision 

2020,

18 cannot be achieved against BW today (no 100% solution). Each 

element of a potential response to BW use is limited in its ability to 

resolve the threat. Therefore, no individual element can mitigate the BW 

threat. Yet, the “85% Quick Fix” could be realized if the following four 

areas are addressed: passive defense, intelligence and warning,

consequence management, and active defense/offensive options. 

Passive Defense Quick Fixes 

Passive defenses seek to prevent the infection of people by a BW 

attack. Passive defenses include several elements: 

Vaccines - A vaccine is an antigen that is introduced into the body to 

stimulate the immune system to build defenses against that antigen. An 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 9

effective vaccine will neutralize a specific virus, bacteria, toxin, or 

rickettsiae - the four categories of BW agents. In the future it is hoped one

vaccine will be developed that boosts the immune system against all or 

many diseases. But for now, vaccines are disease-specific. Relatively few 

vaccines are FDA approved for use against BW agents, and all of those, 

specifically the anthrax and smallpox vaccines, are controversial.

Nevertheless, vaccines are one of the most effective ways to reduce BW 

vulnerability, especially against the most serious BW agents like anthrax 

and smallpox. This is probably the greatest payoff area for protecting 

military forces long term and DoD should fund this at much higher levels.

Individual protective equipment (IPE) - includes various kinds of 

masks and suits; it keeps BW agents away from people and thereby

prevents infection. The quandary with IPE is that its use reduces

operational effectiveness, and in many weather conditions, it can only be 

used for a limited period of time (it causes heat casualties and other effects 

after a period of minutes to hours). The most devastating BW threats 

come from aerosol delivery; a commercial half mask respirator will 

significantly reduce biological agent inhalation providing protection 

factors of 50 to 500 or more against BW stimulants—a level of protection 

often adequate to prevent infection, without the operational degradation 

and heat burden of traditional chemical masks.19

Collective protection systems (CPS) - are facilities that provide a 

BW-free area by filtering incoming air. These are places where people 

can eat and sleep, change clothes, and perform other operations without 

being vulnerable to BW agents or having to wear the hot and cumbersome

protective boots, gloves, masks and over garments. Many facilities could 

provide much protection from BW agents, albeit not 100% protection, 

with minimal upgrades as outlined later. 

Biological decontamination - includes solutions and delivery devices 

to neutralize BW agents in the air, ground, water, or on people or their 

clothing. Advances are being made technologically in this field and will

help us move toward the 100% solution. 

Avoidance and Operations - With chemical weapons, rapid

detection of an attack allows commanders to direct personnel to avoid 

exposure, for example by moving in-doors and turning off heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems that would otherwise 

draw the agent into the building. Because biological weapon detection is 
10 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

so slow, such procedures generally will not be implemented quickly 

enough after detection to help; indeed, by the time BW detection occurs, 

the air outside will likely be clear of contamination while the air inside

buildings may be contaminated because of HVAC operations.

20 

Therefore, if the HVAC was shut off shortly after an attack the levels of

BW agent might linger in a building long after the outside air has cleared. 

Dissimilarly, the sensitivity and rapid response of chemical 

detectors allows users to fairly quickly identify the area of contamination 

and mark it so that people can be directed to stay out. But with BW,

most detectors, due to sensitivity and specificity shortfalls, may not 

identify some contaminated areas and may not be sufficiently sensitive to 

identify some potentially infectious dosages. As a result, an extremely 

conservative view is often taken whereby detection of any BW agent 

usually becomes the basis for complete isolation of that and surrounding 

areas; this will probably help people to avoid contamination but often

restricts the use of more areas than necessary, while missing some areas 

that may be contaminated. 

One concept of military operations when potentially facing chemical 

or biological weapon threats is similar to the concept when facing nuclear 

threats: forces should disperse to operate at low density to reduce the 

damage that can be done by any given attack. Currently most concepts of 

operations are designed to build tent cities that force all the personnel in a

small area. It is not clear, however, that military units are prepared to 

execute dispersion of personnel on a base. While this would be beneficial

for a point release close to the base, this concept would not be as helpful 

for a line source release that would disperse BW agent over a large area.

Nevertheless, an effort to disperse people on a base if there is a potential

BW attack might lessen the likelihood of some individuals being exposed 

once an attack occurs. 

Operational procedures can also help when combined with knowledge 

of the limits of various biological weapons. Most biological agents degrade

rapidly with ultraviolet (UV) light. For instance, Francisella tularensis dies

at a rate of 50% every 20 minutes on a bright sunny day. There are only 

two biological agents that are generally considered “UV resistant” and those

are Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Coxiella burnetii (Q Fever). Even 

though their degradation is refractory to UV light, they still decay at a rate

of approximately or less than 0.1% per minute in sunlight.21 Based on this
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 11

understanding, it is far more productive and, therefore, likely for an

adversary who wants mass casualties to launch a BW/BT attack when there 

is no sunlight, since such an attack has a much greater potential for

delivering higher concentrations of virulent organisms. 

Although biological agents can be delivered by several mechanisms, 

biological agents that are aerosolized would be dependent on the wind to 

move them. If it is a day with less than 3 mph of wind and an attacker is

outside the fence of a military installation spraying a biological agent, the 

germ cloud will not move very far and probably will not pose a major 

threat to personnel on base. Conversely, if the wind is too strong, perhaps 

at speeds greater than 23 to 25 mph, the cloud of agent is thought to 

become so unstable and diffuse so rapidly that it is unlikely to deliver 

enough concentration to infect many individuals and cause a mass casualty 

event. Of course, distance from the point of dissemination is also 

important here. If an individual or group was very close to the release

point, whether there was slow or fast wind speeds, concentrations may still 

be high enough to infect large numbers of people.22

In order for a biological weapons attack to be optimally successful, 

the wind needs to be blowing at certain velocities and no UV light should 

be present. Additionally, biological agents will not infect anyone unless 

they are close to the ground in the human breathing zone, 3 to 7 feet above 

the surface. This means a temperature inversion would be necessary to 

keep large concentrations of the BW agent close to the ground. 

Temperature inversions, where cold air overlays and pins warmer air 

against the ground, may occur at various times of the day but usually 

occur at dawn, dusk, or night. Also, certain seasons of the year are more 

likely to have temperature inversions than others, helping forecasters to 

predict their occurrence. Additionally, it may seem counterintuitive, but

Bill Patrick, an expert in offensive biological warfare, has stated that light 

to moderate rain or snow will not appreciably affect the delivery of

aerosolized BW agents. In other words, light to moderate rainstorms do 

not wash the skies clean of BW particles.23

Building Preparation Before the Attack - All buildings, including 

homes, where persons might be present during dawn, dusk or night should 

be inspected and made as airtight as possible. Simple efforts such as 

caulking, painting, taping, or sealing around doors or windows might 

greatly reduce the airflow through a building.24
12 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

Inexpensive small particle air filters are now available at hardware

stores that can be installed in most existing air conditioning or heating 

units. This is not as good as creating positive pressure throughout a 

building to keep air flowing into it, nor does it provide as good a filtration 

as provided by a High Efficiency Particulate (HEPA) filter, but it is 

something that can be done now with minimal expense. 

Although there are many manufacturers of these types of filters, here 

are two examples of filters that can be purchased at local hardware stores.

Web Products from Kansas City, Kansas has a filter called The Web Plus

that is marketed as “trapping 91% of the pollen, dust, and dander sized 

particles from 0.245 to 85 microns” and the fourteen by twenty inch 

version was priced at $8.40 per filter. 

3M Construction and Home Improvement Markets Division from St. 

Paul, Minnesota has a filter called Filtrete: Ultra Allergen filter that is 

marketed as “90% effective at capturing large allergens like mold spores

and pet dander ... captures bacteria and particles that can carry viruses” 

and in calling their toll free number, one of the authors was told that it is 

“90% efficient at removing particles from 0.1 to 10 microns.” The 3M

filter was $15.97 per filter for the sixteen by twenty inch size. The idea of

using these higher efficiency filters is to get a quick improvement in 

filtering BW/BT agents without requiring new blowers or other expensive, 

time consuming modifications to be made to existing ventilation systems. 

Since buildings with larger concentrations of people might elevate the

risk of mass casualties if they became contaminated, some extra precautions

might be reasonable for them. Buildings that would likely house over, 

perhaps, 50 people at dawn, dusk, or night could be equipped with counterbactericidal UV lights in the ventilation systems. Rather than turning them 

on during higher Bio-Threatcon levels, it would probably be easiest to have 

them lit whenever the ventilation system is running. The lights would need

to be arranged in ventilation ducts to provide maximum contact with BW

agents. Although these may not affect Bacillus anthracis, Coxiella burnetii, 

or smallpox appreciably, the lights, if properly arranged, would likely have

significant effect on many other bacterial agents. 

Stand-alone room filtering devices are now available as commercial 

off-the-shelf items. These small freestanding units re-circulate the air in 

rooms through the unit’s filter thereby trapping particles. If biological 

agents get into the building, these devices might greatly reduce the level of 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 13

concentrations that people would breathe. This would be effective as long

as the filter captured particle sizes in the 1 to 10 micron diameter range, 

the size that tends to lodge in the lungs of those exposed. A side benefit 

filters like this might offer is that if a BW attack did occur they could be

sent to a diagnostic lab for confirmation of the particular agent that had 

been in the air. 

Intelligence and Warning 

The greatest problem in defending against BW attacks is the limited 

amount of intelligence and warning we will likely have. In contrast to 

chemical weapon attacks, where there are a multitude of detectors that can 

provide tactical warning of attacks, there are BW detectors at very few

bases today (though the number of bases is expanding), and in general, 

they take too long to provide adequate attack warning. 

For example, the Portal Shield system deployed at a number of U.S. 

military bases takes roughly half an hour to process an air sample and 

determine that it potentially contains a BW threat. By that time, an 

aerosolized BW cloud has usually passed through a military base being

attacked, exposing almost everyone before protection can be applied in 

response to warning. This type of warning is usually referred to as “detect 

to treat” rather than “detect to protect,” the preferred approach. Detect to 

treat allows the base to promptly begin treatment for BW exposure, which 

could significantly reduce or eliminate casualties in the case of most 

bacterial and some other biological weapons. 

A preferred solution for warning would involve rapid standoff 

detection: the ability to see BW agents in an approaching cloud and 

quickly identify them. If this can be achieved, then personnel would have 

time to don protective clothing or move into protected buildings before 

arrival of a BW cloud, and thereby, not be infected. Work is ongoing to 

develop such detectors, but they appear to be still several years away from 

production and deployment. 

In places where there are no BW detectors or as a back-up to BW 

detectors, discovery of a BW attack can be achieved by disease 

surveillance at hospitals and other medical facilities. Recognition of a BW 

attack may not happen until symptoms develop, which, according to the

incubation periods in Table 1, will normally be days after the attack. Still, 
14 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

aggressive disease surveillance is an important part of the “85% Quick 

Fix” and should receive major attention and resourcing at installations. 

However, when the initial detection of a BW attack has happened, it

is then necessary to confirm that the suspected biological agent is indeed

what it appears to be, and also to determine if it has been mixed with 

other biological agents (especially contagious ones) which have not yet 

been detected. This process is pursued through advanced medical 

laboratory capabilities. Once such a confirmation is accomplished, 

medical officers have a stronger basis for taking actions to treat for the 

identified BW agent. 

While the military has labs capable of such confirmation in a few 

locations overseas, it needs to deploy more labs and enhance the

capabilities of these facilities (giving them the ability to identify more 

types of BW agents)—an important part of the “85% Quick Fix.” 

Although each year technology greatly improves the ability to detect and 

identify particular BW agents, appropriate resourcing with today’s 

technology would provide a large and immediate improvement. The

ongoing cost will be that the Department of Defense will need to be

willing to switch out old systems as new technologies for bio-detection are

developed, much like it does as it continually updates its computer and 

software systems. 

Bio-Threatcon Levels - To reduce U.S. forces, Allied Forces, and 

civilian vulnerability to BW/BT attacks, military installations should 

develop and issue warnings of the daily Bio-Threat condition 

(Bio-Threatcon) level, reflecting the likelihood of a successful aerosol BW 

attack that could inflict massive numbers of casualties. Then decision 

guidelines can be established to help commanders make reasonable and 

logical force protection decisions. 

The Bio-Threatcon level would be determined by two pieces of 

information – the first, “BW/BT Intel Threat (BIT)” levels, is designed to 

help predict the likelihood of a BW attack. The intelligence officer at each

installation could fuse at least four and perhaps more types of information 

to assign a BIT level: (1) the current overall force protection level (alpha, 

bravo, charlie, delta), (2) current intelligence assessments of the BW/BT 

capability of an adversary, (3) assessments of the predicted intent of the 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 15

adversary, and (4) assessments of adversary movement of SOF or activity 

with other potential BW delivery systems. 

This data, some objective and some subjective, would be 

amalgamated to come up with a BIT level (ranging from 1 to 4). “One” 

would indicate that an adversary is very unlikely to use BW on the given 

military installation, whereas, “Four” would indicate a BW attack was 

very likely. Two and three would be interim ranges between one and four. 

The BIT level would be integrated with another variable, the 

“Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness” (BACE) level, which would be 

made up of meteorological factors such as wind speed, ultraviolet light

levels, and the probability of a temperature inversion. A meteorological 

computer model could be developed without great difficulty to integrate

these three variables, as a minimum, giving current and projected BACE 

levels that would predict the likelihood of specific meteorological

conditions for successfully delivering enough biological agents to cover an 

airfield or other military facility to cause mass causalities. Note, though, 

that depending upon the size of the target to be affected and other factors, 

a successful BW attack might still be carried out in conditions that are not

climatologically ideal. 

The BACE levels would be assigned so that BACE-1 means the 

climatogical conditions are extremely adverse toward a successful 

biological attack, whereas a BACE-4 rating would indicate the existence 

of optimal climatic conditions for a successful enemy biological attack. 

For BIT level 2 and above (heightened likelihood of an attack), the 

BACE computer model should be run continuously. At these heightened 

threat levels the “Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness” levels should be 

available instantly to the Intelligence Officer and the Command Staff 

because BACE is meaningless unless it is combined with the “BW/BT 

Intelligence Threat” level. At the BIT level 1, “Bio-Attack Climatology 

Effectiveness” levels would only be calculated intermittently to indicate 

the conditions that would be climatologically ideal for a mass casualty 

attack using a BW agent. 

After the “BW/BT Intel Threat”(BIT) level and “Bio-Attack

Climatology Effectiveness”(BACE) levels are determined, it would be 

easy for a commander to see where their axes intersect and determine an 

overall Bio-Threatcon level (BIT + BACE = Bio-Threatcon Level). This 

intersection would be assigned a designator of alpha, bravo, charlie, or 
16 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

delta. Similar to other threatcon levels that the military are accustomed to, 

the alpha is the lower threat level while the delta is the highest threat level. 

The model (Table 2) shows alpha where the threat is so low that a 

commander would not need to implement protection procedures. But a

delta would mean the highest level of threat for a successful biological 

attack that might cause mass casualties has been achieved, and all 

personnel on the installation are at great risk. Obviously, bravo and 

charlie are in between areas where there is a heightened threat of exposure 

but are less likely than delta. 

A notification system for base personnel at military facilities also 

would need to be designed. Some options available are the installation

“Giant Voice,” audio and visual alarms, individually carried beepers, 

and/or television broadcast warnings. Base personnel should exercise

these notification procedures during dawn/dusk hours or the times a given 

base is most likely to be vulnerable. The entire base populace, even 

civilians and dependents, will need to become familiar with these

procedures because any large number of people that become casualties

would affect the mission regardless of who they are. 

Currently, most installation meteorologists, bioenvironmental 

engineers, epidemiologists and intelligence officers at the installation level 

do not have adequate training in biological warfare issues. To properly 

manage the Bio-Threatcon levels and be a valuable consultant to the 

commander, these individuals would require scientific training dealing 

with aerodynamics of BW agents, signatures of BW facilities, etc. 

The idea of including a biological warfare threatcon level into the

more well known “Force Protection Condition Level” (FPCON) is 

attractive to help simplify the number of indices a commander would have 

to keep track of to protect his forces, but it would undermine the 

awareness needed. Just as there is an “Information Threat Condition 

Level” (INFOCON) that is distinct from FPCON, Bio-Threatcon levels 

should also be distinct.25

Several unique aspects of BW/BT make it appropriate that the 

Bio-Threatcon level be separate from FPCON. Some examples of these 

unique aspects include: (1) silent weapons that can be delivered many 

miles from the base, (2) some adversaries are known to already possess 

BW/BT capability, (3) some adversaries are thought to be very unlikely to 

use BW/BT, (4) the intent of certain adversaries may be clearly toward 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 17

civilian rather than military targets, (5) detection of an ongoing attack is 

not very likely because of the level of sophistication of today’s detection 

systems, or, (6) unlike conventional weapons, aerosol delivered biological 

weapons can be greatly affected by meteorology. 

Table 2 

Commander’s Decision Matrix to Avoid Mass BW/BT Casualties

Bio-Threatcon Levels26

BIT-4 Bravo Charlie Delta Delta

BIT-3 Alpha Bravo Charlie Charlie

BIT-2 Alpha Bravo Bravo Bravo

 (BIT-4: Attack most 

likely)

(BIT-1: Attack least likely)

BIT-1 Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha

BACE-1 BACE-2 BACE-3 BACE-4

(Low effectiveness) (High effectiveness)

Bio-Attack Climatology Effectiveness(BACE)

(UV light, Wind Speed, 

Probability of Temperature Inversion)

BW/BT Intel Threat

(BIT) level

(BIT level is derived from at 

least four components of 

information)

1. FPCON level 

2. Capability of adversary 

3. Intent of adversary

4. Adversary’s movement of 

BW/BT delivery systems

Alpha = Minimal Threat Charlie = Partially Effective BW/BT 

Bio-Threa attack possible with elevated risk tcon

Levels: Bravo = Partially Effective BW/BT 

 attack is possible 

Delta = Effective BW/BT attack 

 is likely

Below are some thoughts on how a commander could respond at the 

different Bio-Threatcon Levels: 

1. A (Alpha) - No precautions needed. 

2. B (Bravo) - 

• All outside personnel on duty must wear lightweight half 

mask27 respirators that cover nose and mouth, which can be 
18 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

purchased inexpensively using commercial off the shelf (COTS)

technology. 

• All other personnel are encouraged to stay indoors or, if they 

must go outside, to wear the half mask respirator. 

• Outside personnel are educated to stand with their back to the 

wind as much as is possible when outside as long as it does not 

affect completion of the mission.28

• Building ventilation systems should be turned off unless 

special filters are installed. (Discussed in section titled “Building

preparation before the attack.”) 

• Keep all windows and doors shut. 

• Assigned installation personnel should increase air-sampling 

procedures. 

• The medical staffs in hospitals/clinics are notified of the BioThreatcon level to give a heightened awareness of a biological 

threat and exhibit greater vigilance in disease surveillance. 

• Inside buildings and shelters, personnel must turn on room 

airflow filter units (Discussed in section titled “Building 

preparation before the attack.”) 

3. C (Charlie) - 

• All outside personnel on duty must wear lightweight half mask 

respirators that cover nose and mouth, which can be purchased 

inexpensively using commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology. 

• Only in an emergency situation should dependents or other 

personnel exit a building. In that case they should wear their half 

face respirator. 

• Outside personnel are educated to stand with their back to the

wind as much as is possible when outside as long as it does not 

affect completion of the mission. 

• Building ventilation systems should be turned off unless 

special filters are installed. (Discussed in section titled “Building 

preparation before the attack.”) 

• Keep all windows and doors shut. 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 19

• Assigned installation personnel would increase air-sampling 

procedures. 

• The medical staffs in hospitals/clinics are notified of the

Bio-Threatcon level to give a heightened awareness of a 

biological threat and exhibit greater vigilance in disease 

surveillance.

• Inside buildings and shelters, personnel must turn on room 

airflow filter units (Discussed in section titled “Building 

preparation before the attack.”) 

• Personnel must have sleeves rolled down. 

• Upon detection of BW agents in the area, prophylaxis must

begin immediately. 

4. D (Delta)- 

• All outside personnel on duty should wear a full-face military

protective mask and hood. 

• Only in an emergency situation should dependents or other 

personnel exit a building. In that case, they should wear their 

half face respirator. 

• Turn off ventilation units unless unbearable temperature 

demands they run; even then, let operate only if they have a 

special filter installed. (Discussed in section titled “Building 

preparation before the attack.”) 

• Keep all windows and doors shut. 

• Assigned installation personnel would increase air-sampling 

procedures. 

• The medical staffs in hospitals/clinics are notified of the

Bio-Threatcon level to give a heightened awareness of a 

biological threat and exhibit greater vigilance in disease

surveillance.

• Inside buildings and shelters, personnel must turn on room 

airflow filter units (Discussed in section titled “Building 

preparation before the attack.”) 

• Personnel must have sleeves rolled down. 
20 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

• Upon detection of BW agents in the area, prophylaxis must

begin immediately. 

Consequence Management Suggestions 

Once a BW attack has occurred, military efforts can be organized to

manage the consequences of those attacks. A major aspect of 

consequence management involves medical treatment with antibiotics, 

serums, and other appropriate therapies designed to prevent, mitigate, and 

cure various diseases caused by BW agents. Sufficient medical care 

personnel will be required to handle casualties, and plans should be made 

for how to handle mass casualties. Likewise sufficient medications and 

supplies can be stockpiled in advance in specified locations. 

Greater care needs to be taken after a contagious biological weapons

attack to prevent further spread of the disease. Quarantine procedures 

need to be put in place to handle such situations, and police and other

security personnel will need to be mobilized to enforce such quarantines.

Unfortunately, it is often impossible to know whether a person is 

infected with a contagious disease until they show symptoms. Therefore, 

once it appears that a biological weapon has been used, it may be 

necessary to impose a local quarantine until medical authorities can 

explicitly rule out the possibility that contagious diseases were not 

included in the attack. 

Note that this may impair the most likely approach to handling mass 

casualties: moving casualties to other medical facilities. It will often be 

necessary to solve the mass casualty problem in the area of the initial 

outbreak until the incubation period has passed for potential contagious

diseases (as long as a couple of weeks) or until other actions can be taken 

to prevent the disease in those not yet symptomatic. This approach will be

a serious problem for the U.S. military, which normally plans to stabilize

and then evacuate all casualties. Instead, they may be forced to bring in 

medical care personnel, supplies, and equipment, and thereby potentially 

disrupt the force flow into a combat region. By resolving these 

quarantine, manpower, and supply issues in advance, the “85% Quick Fix” 

will help enhance protection immediately at other locations. 

It may also be necessary to impose some travel restrictions after a

biological warfare attack, even when it was clearly not contagious. For 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 21

example, if a military service member were exposed in Country A, but 

was transported to Country B and then developed symptoms there, the 

military may not be able to prove whether this person was exposed in

Country A or in Country B, potentially causing hysteria to spread to 

Country B unnecessarily. All travel should likely be restricted from the 

area where a BW attack occurred until enough time has passed to 

definitively diagnose the disease as non-contagious. Note that whether 

quarantine or travel restrictions are imposed, these will likely disrupt

noncombatant evacuation and even conventional casualty evacuation from 

the area attacked. 

With BW attacks, it will not be uncommon for psychological 

reactions to occur in greater numbers than actual BW/BT casualties. 

Masses of people, including many with little chance of having been in

the infected area, will insist upon receiving medical treatment, 

potentially exhausting medical supplies in that area. Some will even

develop psychosomatic symptoms, making them difficult to differentiate 

from actual casualties until laboratory work can be accomplished (and 

thus heightening the laboratory workload.) Many will also try to flee the 

area of infection, potentially seeking to break quarantine or travel 

restrictions. 

Every effort needs to be made to prevent and then later treat 

psychological reactions. Efforts to understand the “panic phenomena” 

and the “worried well” in a BW event should be a priority but often

remain under-funded. Aggressive efforts in planning and executing 

public relations and public information before an attack will probably be 

one of the commander’s most valuable investments to ensure mission 

completion and prevent chaos. This will usually be best done with an 

active public information campaign to explain to people what has 

happened and what they should do about it. The public information 

effort can be vastly aided if authorities can accurately determine the time 

and area of the attack, thereby excluding many people from fear. But the 

capabilities to do so today are inadequate, and efforts to make such 

projections may only undermine the effectiveness of the public 

information as mistakes are made. 

Every military facility should have public information packages for 

various BW agents and various scenarios detailing the types of 
22 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

information that should be released to the public or military forces and 

when they should be released. The Israeli Home Front Command has had 

hands on experience with many threats to their population over the last 

decade. As a result, they have a comprehensive system of communicating 

with the entire country through television, radio, faxes to key personnel, 

etc. Additionally, they have prepared thousands of information messages

ready to be disseminated depending on the type of event. Their 

appreciation for minimizing panic and minimizing the numbers of 

“worried well” has helped them to come up with these valuable mitigation

procedures.29

Active Defense and Offensive Options 

Some BW threats may be best countered using active defenses or 

offensive options. Active defenses seek to intercept and destroy the means 

of WMD delivery before they reach the target area. U.S. and allied forces

are normally very effective in intercepting opposing aircraft threats, 

though they would likely be less effective at intercepting ballistic and 

cruise missiles or terrorists/special forces. Since SOF-delivered BW is

perhaps the largest BW threat, active defenses need to be augmented in the 

form of a more robust security system that is capable of patrolling and 

monitoring upwind of an installation. 

Another way to defeat biological weapons use is to destroy BW 

through attack operations (counterforce) before the BW can be used. To 

do so, one must be able to locate the biological weapons storage and 

production sites and have the proper agent defeat type munitions available 

to destroy the BW in these sites. As noted earlier, it is difficult at best to

locate these sites using current methods. These actions need to be taken 

before the adversary can disperse its BW agents. 

Perhaps one of the strongest defenses against biological weapons use 

is the ability to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on countries that use 

such weapons. Such a retaliatory capability may deter BW attacks if the 

U.S. leadership possesses both the tools and the will to strike back. 

Nevertheless, even if he fears capture, a terrorist may not be deterred by 

retaliatory threats because the terrorist may lack a home location or some

other valued item that he would not want damaged by retaliation. 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 23

IV. Conclusions 

The quest for the “perfect” long-term protection against biological

warfare or terrorist attacks must not become the enemy of the “good” 

solution today. Partial measures can provide significant levels of protection 

against biological threats at U.S. and allied military bases and facilities. 

First, a new Bio-Threat condition alerting system needs to be created,

and personnel need to be trained in its use. 

Second, each military base must make upgrades to its facilities and

acquire commercial off-the-shelf technologies to provide protection to 

building occupants. 

Third, inexpensive masks must be purchased and personnel, including 

civilians and dependents, should be trained in their use. 

In addition, we must deploy biological agent detectors more broadly, 

enhance disease surveillance systems, enhance stocks of medical supplies 

needed to treat casualties of biological attacks, design realistic plans to 

handle mass bio-casualties, develop procedures for quarantine and travel 

restrictions, and prepare to manage the psychological effects that are 

expected in the wake of biological weapons attacks. 

These are some of the effective quick fixes available to United States

now to counter mass casualty bio-events. We need to bolster protection 

today via the “85% Quick Fix” while working on longer-term, more 

perfect countermeasures to protect against emerging biological warfare 

and terrorist threats. 
24 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 25

Notes 

1. The 85% number here is notional. We believe that a large percentage of potential

BW casualties can be averted through a series of quick fixes, but the actual percentage

will vary by type of BW and other issues. We cannot say with precision what the actual 

improvement will be with detailed scientific studies. Nevertheless, the basis for the 85% 

number is derived from a scientific understanding of Biological Warfare.

2. David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New

York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 92, 251, 294.

3. An example of one effort is the U.S. Air Force’s Biological Defense Task Force, 

which was a 120-day project in the summer and fall of 2002. This was an effort directed by 

the Chief of Staff of the USAF through HQ USAF/XONP to assist in developing a concept

of operations for military installations in the event it was faced with biological warfare. 

4. “Detect to protect” means that a biological attack can be detected before people

are infected, giving them time to protect themselves from infection before it arrives. 

5. Lt Col Don Noah, USAF, “Medical Intelligence with a Weapon Focus on 

Biological Warfare.” Presentation was at the USAF Counterproliferation Center,

Maxwell AFB, on 11 Jan 2000 to an Air War College elective class. He stated that U.S. 

national threat assessments often uses the formula of: intent + capability + vulnerability =

threat. Lt Col Noah was the primary author of the National Medical Intelligence Threat

Assessment for the United States, published in January 2000. 

6. “Biological weapons can be deployed in three [primary] ways: by contaminating 

food or water supplies; releasing infected vectors, such as mosquitoes or fleas; or creating 

an aerosol cloud to be inhaled by the victims. By far, the most effective mode for 

applying biological weapons [to produce mass casualties] is an aerosol cloud. Such a 

cloud is made up of microscopic particles and is therefore invisible.” Ken Alibek,

Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on Terrorism, May 

23, 2000. 

7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, U.S.

Congress Office of Technology Assessment, August 1993, 53-54.

8. See Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction,”

International Security, Summer 1991. Computer models like Hazard Predication and

Assessment Capability (HPAC) show areas where varying fractions of those present will

become anthrax fatalities. Dr. Bruce Bennett did four HPAC runs assuming the use of

five kilograms of anthrax, the results of which provide a useful comparison. For an

untreated and non-vaccinated population the 90 and 50 percent lethality areas range from 

2 to 26 square kilometers (90 percent lethality) and from 31 to 2,600 square kilometers 
26 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

(50 percent lethality). The 20 percent lethality areas run from 500 to 15,000 square 

kilometers, and the 2 percent fatality areas run from 6,000 to 32,000 square kilometers. 

9. Jonathan F. Smith, et. al., “Viral Encephalitides,” in Medical Aspects of Chemical

and Biological Warfare, eds. Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz,

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1997). (VEE is 

Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis; EEE is Eastern Equine Encephalitis; and WEE is

Western Equine Encephalitis. 

10. ECt50 is Effect Concentration Time 50%. The ECt50 is a measure of the dose at

which 50 percent of the population experiences the agent’s primary effect. “For a vapour 

cloud or aerosol presenting a respiratory hazard, the exposure can be conveniently 

expressed as the product of the agent concentration (C) and the exposure time (t), which 

is known as the ‘Haber Product’, or ‘Ct’ exposure, with units of milligrams minutes per 

metres cubed (mg.min.m-3). (33) Since the susceptibility to CW agents varies from 

human to human, it is not possible to specify an exact minimum effective dosage or lethal

dose for each agent. As a result, scientists can only define the dosage that has a specified 

probability of producing a particular effect. It is possible to define the term ‘Effect Ct50’ 

(ECt50) which indicates the Ct exposure that has a 50% probability of producing some

kind of an effect.” Found at British Ministry of Defence site:

http://www.mod.uk/issues/gulfwar/info/ukchemical/annexa.htm on 17 January 2003;

Also see Brian G. Chow, et. al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological

Environment, RAND, DB-189/1-AF. 1998, 29. 

11. This table is a modification of the unclassified table at: Brian G. Chow, et. al., 

Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment, RAND, DB-189/1-AF. 

1998, 29. On-line. Internet, 9 September 2002. Available from http://www.rand.org/

publications/DB/DB189.1/DB189.1.pdf/DB189.1.sec2.pdf. Values with a “*” come

from USAMRIID, Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, February

2001, 64 and Appendices C, D, and I. The vaccine for plague “**” (actually for bubonic as 

opposed to pneumonic plague) is no longer being produced per Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., 

“Plague as a Biological Weapon,” JAMA, May 3, 2000, 2285. 

12. In the aftermath of the anthrax letters, the threshold dose required for some level

of anthrax lethality was widely debated. A recent article indicated that even a few spores

(about 0.0003 median lethal dose) might cause lethality in a small percent of those exposed, 

well below the 0.01 levels shown in this chart. See C.J. Peters and D.M. Hartley, “Anthrax

Inhalation and Lethal Human Infection,” The Lancet, February 23, 2002, 710. 

13. Dr. Bruce Bennett employed a series of eight HPAC forecasts to estimate these

curves; the results showed some variability for other factors, with these curves reflecting

roughly median values. 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 27

14. For example, 6 of the 11 victims of inhalation anthrax from the 2001 anthrax

letters survived based upon antibiotic treatment that started after the development of

symptoms. Indeed, in all cases where antibiotic treatment was started during the initial

phase of the illness (post-symptoms), the victims survived. See John A. Jernigan, et. al., 

“Bioterrorism-Related Inhalation Anthrax: The First Ten Cases Reported in the United

States,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, November-December, 2001, 933-944. 

15. After potential anthrax exposure, antibiotic use (referred to as prophylaxis) can

prevent the disease from developing. See Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., “Anthrax as a 

Biological Weapon, 2002,” Journal of the American Medical Association, May 1, 2002, 

2244-2248. 

16. See CDC, “Update: Adverse Events Associated with Anthrax Prophylaxis

Among Postal Employees – New Jersey, New York City, and the District of Columbia

Metropolitan Area, 2001,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, November 30, 2001, 

1051-1054. 

17. Alibek Interview, Op. cit. 

18. Joint Vision 2020 is the vision document from the Chairman of the Joint Chief

of Staff. 

19. “Protection Factor (PF) and Saturation Testing of Commercial Negative

Pressure Half-Mask Respirators,” Edgewood Chemical & Biological Center (ECBC) 

Interim Technical Memorandum; Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (AMSSBREN), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, November 9, 2001. 

20. “Once the outdoor concentration has diminished to safe levels (as determined by

emergency response teams), evacuate the building and flush it with outdoor air. After the 

contaminated plume passes, the concentration of contamination will actually be higher

inside the building than outside, because the building will tend to retain contamination 

that managed to enter” Phillip N Price, Michael D Sohn, Ashok J Gadgil, et.al.,

Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or 

during a release., LBNL/PUB-5195. (Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkeley National 

Laboratory, January 10, 2003), 11. 

21. Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “The United States Offensive 

Biological Program (1940-1972).” Presentation was at the USAF Counterproliferation

Center, Maxwell AFB, on 19 Feb 1999 to an Air War College elective class. 

22. Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “Fundamentals of Biological

Warfare.” Presentation was for the USAF Counterproliferation Center at USAMRIID, Ft 

Detrick, Maryland, on 13 Sept 2002 to an Air War College elective class. 
28 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”

23. This can be understood by realizing that only a small portion of each cubic foot of

air will have water passing through it during a light or moderate rain or snow. This allows 

most BW agents to escape being washed to the ground by the water particles passing

through it. Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare Consultant, “The United States Offensive 

Biological Program (1940-1972).” Presentation was at the USAF Counterproliferation

Center, Maxwell AFB, on 19 Feb 1999 to an Air War College elective class. 

24. Phillip N Price, Michael D Sohn, Ashok J Gadgil, et. al., Protecting Buildings 

From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a release,

LBNL/PUB-5195. (Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,

January 10, 2003), page 30; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Guidance for 

Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological

Attacks, ” May 2002, 19; and on-line, Internet, 10 November 2002, available from

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/2002-139.html. 

25. There may be some who will complain that BIT, BACE, INFOCON, FPCON

and the nation’s new homeland security threat levels are all a bit too much for 

commanders to remember. Yet, the high consequence of an effective BW/BT attack 

necessitate it receive a separate threat condition from the FPCON. By commingling it

with the existing FPCON, this will reinforce in commander’s minds that BW/BT is like

the chemical threat or other threats. Over time, this will ultimately diminish the 

commander’s understanding of this threat and hence, decrease the proper emphasis that

should be placed against this potentially catastrophic and unique danger. 

26. The complex nature of command requires commanders to make assessment of

risk and deal with those risks while completing the military mission. Dr. Jim Davis 

developed this table as one concept that could be used to help commanders make simple, 

yet critically important decisions. A table like this could be applied across the spectrum

of all military installations. For instance, an installation in the continental U.S. would 

hopefully never reach a BIT-2 and would therefore never reach a Bio-Threatcon level of

Bravo. Likewise, an installation located in South Korea might frequently be at BIT-2

necessitating its Bio-Threatcon level to change with as climatology (BACE) changes.

27. Two inexpensive respirators were bought randomly from a local hardware to

show the accessibility of protective gear. Mine Safety Appliances (MSA) Company had 

two respirators priced reasonably: Dust Respirator with odor filter for Harmful Dust

($4.93) and Dust Respirator with exhalation valve for Harmful Dust ($6.97). Both

respirators were rated N95. According to a manufacturer representative this means the

filters in these masks can filter 95% of the particles down to 0.3 microns. The main

concern for human infectivity of BW/BT agents is the 1 to 10 micron range. 

28. Bill Patrick related through personal anecdotal experience that by having his 

back to the wind with even crude respiratory protection reduced the concentration of 

deposited BW agent simulate around his face. Bill Patrick, Biological Warfare 
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 29

Consultant, “Fundamentals of Biological Warfare.” Presentation was for the USAF

Counterproliferation Center at USAMRIID, Ft Detrick, Maryland, on 13 Sept 2002 to an 

Air War College elective class.

29. Col Gilad Shenhar, Head of Doctrine & Development Dept., Israeli Defense

Force Home Front Command, “Home Front Command Overview with Emphasis on

Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues. ” Presentation was given at Home Front

Command Headquarters, Israel on 30 Oct 2002 to a delegation of USAF officers (one of

the authors was part of the delegation) supporting the Office of the Secretary of

Defense’s Bilateral Counterproliferation Working Group. 
30 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”
The “85% Quick Fix”. . . 31

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538)
32 . . . The “85% Quick Fix”