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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No . 0 4- 08 -0 05 03 -C V I N T H E MA T T E R O F E . A. P. F ro m th e 38 6th

Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, B e xar County , T e xas Trial Court No. 2008-JUV-00203 Honora ble L aura Parker , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Marc h 11, 2009 AFF I RMED I n the under ly ing juve nile proce eding , appellant was char g ed with three counts of ag g ravated assault, ag ainst three dif

fer ent complainants. B ased on appellant’ s plea of true, J udg e L aura Parker
e nte re d a n o rd e r o f a dju dic a tio n a nd se t th e c a se fo r a

dis po sit ion hear in g. De sp ite a juv e nil e probation off

icer ’s re commendation of a lesser se ntence , J udg e Parke r committed appe llant to the TYC for a

fiftee n y ear deter

minate sentenc e. Appr ox imately one month afte r the sente ncing , the court g rante d a substitut ion of counsel, and the new attorney for a ppellant filed thre e motions: (1) motion for new tria l, ( 2) motion to di squalify the B exar County

Criminal District Attorney , and (3)
m o t i o n t o re cu s e J u d ge P ark er . J u d ge P at P ri es t h ea rd an d l at er d en i edt h e m o t i o nt o re cu s e J u d ge Parker . There afte r, Judge Par ker de nied the motion for new trial and the moti on to rec use the B exar0 4
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- 2- County Criminal District At t o rn ey . On appe al, appe llant asserts Judge Par ker should have been
rec used, the B exar County Criminal District Attorne y (“D A”) should have be en disqualified, a nd the de te rm inate se nte nc e sh ou ld b e se t a sid e . We a ff ir m. DISQUALIFICA TION OF DA I n h is f ir st a nd se c on d issu e s, a

pp e lla nt a sse rt s th e DA ’s pr os e c uti on of its c a se a g a ins t hi m resulted in a violation of his due proce ss r ights beca use the DA should have been disqua lified on the g rounds that one of

the three complainants wa s the son of a B exar County Assistant District Attorney (“A DA”) (Melisa Skinner) , althoug h he wa s not the son of the prose cuting ADA ( Khristina Fie lder). To the extent appellant asse rt s t h e DA ’s Off ice should have sua sponte re cused itself, w e disag ree . There are two circ umstances under which a DA is statutorily disqualified, neither

of which
a pp ly he re . A dis tr ic t atto rn e y may no t re pr e se nt the State “ in ca se s w he re he ha s b e e n, be fo re his elec tion, employ ed adversely .” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P. ANN . art. 2.01 (V ernon 2005) . And, a district attorney “shall not be of counsel adver sely to the S tate in any case , in any court, nor sha ll they , afte r they cea se to be such of

fice rs, be of

counsel a dverse ly t o t h e S tate in any case in which they

have been of counsel for the S tate.” Id. a t art . 2. 08
. B e c a us e ne ith e r t

he DAno r t

he AD A’ s in

thi s c a se
we re statut or ily

dis qu a lif ie d, we c on c lud e the DA ’s Of fi c e wa s und e r n o o bli g a tio n t o s ua sp on te
rec use itself. To the ex tent appellant asserts J udg e P arke r erred in denying his motion to rec use t he DA,
we c onclude that c omplaint was waive d. At the hea ring on the motion to rec use Judge Par ker, appellan t ’s t ri al counse l admitted he knew, a bout one month before the adjudication hearing , that one of th e c o mp la in an ts w a s th e s o n o f an A D A
. A c r im in a l d e f e n d an t ma

y w a iv e any

err or including c onstitut ional err o r by failure to object or re quest proper relief
. See Mu niz

v . S tate ,0 4
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- 3- 85 1 S. W.2 d 2 38 , 2 55 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); L i t t l e v . Sta te , 75 8 S .W .2 d 5 51 , 5 64 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ); Ha ll v . S

tate , 1 24 S.W. 3d

24 6, 24 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 20 03 , pe t. re f’ d)
. B e c a us e trial counsel did not ra ise his complaint a bout the DA bef

ore Judge Parker

proce eded w ith either the adjudication or disposition hearing s, it is waived. RE CU SAL OF JU DG E P ARKER I n h is thir d, fo ur

th, and fi ft h is su e s, a pp e lla nt r a ise s th e fo llo wi ngc o mpl a int s: h is d ue pr oc e ss rig hts were violated bec ause Judge Parker did not recuse herse lf sua sponte, J udg e Priest erre d by denying his motion to recuse J udg e Parke r, and Judge Parker ’s active participation during the motion to rec use hea

ring require d her r ecusa l. Th e Te xas C od e of

Judic ia l Co nd

uc t r e qu ir e s ju dg e s to a vo id t he a pp e ara nc e of imp ro pr ie ty in all of the judg e’s a ctivities and “c omply with the law and . . . act at a ll tim es in a manne r that promotes public conf

idence in the integ rity

and impartiality

of the judiciar

y .” T EX . C ODE J UD . C O N D U CT , Canon 2A, re

pr inte d in T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN ., tit. 2, subt it. G app. B (Ve rnon 2005). The Tex as Rules of C ivil Procedur e require a judge to rec use her self in any proce eding in which her “impartiality

might re asonably

be questioned” or she “has a persona l bias or pre

judice conc erning the subject matter

or a pa rty , or persona l knowledg e of disputed e videntiary fac ts conce rning the proce eding .” T EX . R. C IV . P. 18b(2). At the re cusal he aring , J udg e P arke r t estified that prior to taking the bench, she had worked in the Be x ar County

Criminal District Attorney ’s Off ice a s an ADA . She ad m i tted to being acqua inted with Melisa S kinner, although she had neve r met Ms. Skinner’s husband or children. She and Ms. Skinner had n ever been a ssigne d to the same c ourt during the time they both worked a s ADAs a nd had never worked together in any capa city . J udg e Parke r said she attended some of the0 4
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- 4- same po li ti c a l e v e n ts a s M s . Sk inn e r an d th e y b o th to o k th e s a me g r o u

p tr ip to L a s V e g a s f

o r the purp os e of

a tte nd ingano the r A DA’s b ir thd ay pa rt y . A s to the un de rl yingpr oc e e din g a g a ins t appellant, Judge Parker

said ADA K

hristina Fielde r ca

me to her of

fice to tell her she did not think
a tr ia l w ou ld b e ne c e ssa

ry be c a us e the c a se “ wa s bei ng wo rk e d o ut” and Ms. F ie lde r w ante d h e r t o kn owthat on e of

the thr e e c omplainants wa s Ms . Sk inn e r’ s so n. Judg e Park e r s a id s he tol d M s. F ie lde r s he ha d n o p ro ble m “w ith it, ” bu t she ins tr uc te d Ms. F ie lde r t o in fo rm de fe ns e c ouns e l “ in
case he had a

problem with it.” Finally , J udg e Parke r testified he r sentenc ing de cision in appellant’s
case had nothing to do with her ac quaintance with Ms. Ski nner. I n addition to J udg e Parke r’s testimony , J udg e Priest also hea rd testimony

from appe llant’s trial attorney . Counsel ag ree d that he neve r questioned Judge Parker ’s ability to be fair and impartial duri ngthe a dju dic a tio n a

nd dis po sit ion

he ari ng , “ e xce pt whe n s he pr on ounc e d s e nte nc e . [I ]t wa s a l o tm o re t h an wh at It h o u gh t t h at [ ap p el l an t ] wa s go i n g t o get . ” C o u n s el s ai d h e d i d n o tkn o w J u d ge Parker had bee n an ADAduring the same time pe riod as Ms. Skinner. W e co n cl ude appe llant did not establish bias on J udg e Parke r’s pa rt; theref ore, he did not
es t ab l i s h t h at h i s d

u e p ro ce s s ri gh t s we re v i o l at ed
. Ac co rd i n gl y , o n t h i s re co rd , we co n cl u d e J u d ge Parker did not err by not sua sponte re cusing herse lf, and Judge Prie st did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to recuse Judge Parker
. Finally , appellant c oncede s J udg e Parke r’s testimony a t t h e r e c u s a l h e a

r in g w a s not improper, but h e as s er t s her “ active pa rticipation throug h counsel [at the re cusal he aring ] . . . raises the p r o b l e m . ” J u d g e P ar

k e r w a s s u b p o e n a e d a n d

c a l l e d t o t h e w i t n e s s s t an d

b y a p p e l l an t ’ s a t t o r

n e y. There fore , she did not voluntarily inject her self i n t o the re cusal proc eeding . As to appellant’s contention that she improper ly secur ed the assistance of an attorney to r epre sent her at the re cusal0 4
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- 5- hear ing, w e ca

nnot conclude, ba sed on this rec ord, that Judge Par ker a cted imprope rly

by seeking leg al counse l. See I

n re Union Pacific Re

sources Co. , 969 S.W .2d 427, 429 (Tex. 1998) (He cht, J ., concur ring ) (“ But the r elationship betwee n judge and lawyer is of le ss conce rn, it seems to me, whe n it involves no more than the lawyer’ s repr esentation of t h e j u dg e as a responde nt in a mandamus pr oc e e din g .” ); see also Rapp v . Van Dusen , 350 F.2d 803, 813 (3rd Cir. 1965) (en ba nc) ( when the g rounds for r ecusa l are extrinsi c to the mer its of a judicial ac t and ar e in s t ea d direc ted ag ainst the judge himself, the judge as the responde nt in a mandamus proc eeding“may , without being r equire d to do so, file an answ er a n d contest the pe tition and where appropr iate, interve ntion by interested parties will be a llowed.”)
. SENTE NCE I nh i s f i n a l i s s u e, ap p el l an tas s er t s J u d ge P ark er ab u s edh er

d i s cr et i o nb y

i mp o s i n g a deter minate sentence o f fi ft een year s. A juvenile cour t possesses broad disc retion to deter mine a
su ita ble dis po sit ion

fo r a c hil d wh o ha s be e n a dju dic a te d a s havin g e ng a g e d in de lin qu e nt c on du c t. In r e K
. J.N., 1 0 3 S
. W
. 3 d 4 6 5 , 4 6 5 ( T e x. A p p . — S an A n t o n i o 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t . )
. A c o u rt a b u s e s it s discretion whe n it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner , or wit hout refe renc e to any g uiding rules or pr inciples. Id. at 466. Appellant pled true to the alleg ations that he eng ag ed in delinquent conduc t by committing the offe nse of a g g rav at ed ro b bery ag ainst three dif

fer ent complainants in a sing le incident. One violation of one pena l law listed in Texas Fam i l y C o d e s ection 53.045(a ) is sufficie nt for the imposit ion of a de terminate se ntence . In re J .H. , 150 S.W .3d 477, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) . Ag g ravated robbe ry is one of the of

fense s listed in Family Code section 53.045. See T EX . F AM . C ODE . ANN .§ 53.045(a) (7) ( Ver non 2008).0 4
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- 6- At t h e time of his disposit ion hear ing, a ppellant was f

ourtee n y ear s old. At the h ea ri n g, appellant a dmit t ed h e was wrongto rob the three complainants at knife point, but he said he
c omm itt e d th e of

fe ns e be c a

us e he ha d b e e n s mok ing mari jua na . L and on

Cr os s, a pp e lla nt’ s juve nil e pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r, te sti fi e d a

pp e lla nt w a s q uie t, r e sp e c tf

ul, a lw ay s d id what he wa s a sk e d to do wh ile in detention, and his office had no problems with appellant while appe llant wore a n ankle monitor. L andon said he discovere d no g ang aff iliation on appellant’ s part, and based on what he knew a bout appellant, he rec ommended the c ourt place appellant on pr obation, inclu d i n g u p to six ty hours of
c omm un ity se rv ic e . H ow e ve r, te sti mony a t th e he ari ng a lso re ve a le d a pp e lla nt ha d be e n f

ound in possession of a knife while at school in D ece mber 2006 and that he possessed and sold marijuana while at school in 2007. Following the 2007 incident, appellant was expelled from school a nd sent to drug counseling . Appellant’s mother works full-time, does not ge t home until 6:00 p.m ., does not know wher e her son g ets the knives or marijuana , and wa s unawa re a ppellant continued to smoke marijuana wee kly
. Ba sed on this rec ord, we conclude J udg e Parke r did not abuse he r discre tion in sentencing
a pp e lla nt t o a de te rm inate se nte nc e of

fi ft e e n y e ars . CO NC LU SION We o ve rr ule a pp e lla nt’ s is su e s o n a

pp e a l and a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice