[Cite as State v. Robison, 2020-Ohio-2980.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

MATTHEW ROBISON 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 18CA0064-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 18CR0234 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: May 18, 2020 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Matthew Robison appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of 

Common Pleas, denying his motion to suppress. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} A grand jury indicted Mr. Robison on one count of aggravated trafficking in 

methamphetamine, and one count of aggravated possession of methamphetamine. The charges 

stemmed from a search of a vehicle driven by Jennifer Alexander, in which he was a passenger. 

In Ms. Alexander’s appeal, this Court set forth the relevant factual background as follows: 

At approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer James Allenby responded to a nearby gas 

station based on a tip that two males appeared to be either under the influence of 

narcotics or involved in drug activity. The informant indicated that the two males 

were leaving the gas station in a blue Dodge four-door vehicle, and Officer Allenby 

spotted a matching vehicle as he approached the parking lot. Because the vehicle 

was leaving the lot, Officer Allenby followed behind it and executed a traffic stop 

shortly thereafter. 

The vehicle contained three occupants: (1) Alexander, who was the driver, (2) her 

boyfriend [Mr. Robison], who was the front seat passenger; and (3) an 
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acquaintance, who was the backseat passenger. Officer Allenby spoke with each 

occupant in turn and continued to investigate, as he found their circumstances 

suspicious and it was clear to him that the backseat passenger was under the 

influence of narcotics. Approximately 38 minutes into the traffic stop, he and 

another officer spotted an item of concern in the back of Alexander’s vehicle and 

asked her for consent to retrieve the item and open it. Alexander assented, so they 

removed the item and identified it as a scale coated with drug residue. After 

locating that item, they searched the remainder of the vehicle and discovered 

narcotics. A second search of the vehicle, conducted several days later, also 

revealed narcotics that had been concealed inside a pillow in the trunk. 

State v. Alexander, 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0066-M, 2019-Ohio-3310, ¶ 2-3. The police 

arrested Ms. Alexander and the backseat passenger at the scene, but did not arrest Mr. Robison. A 

few days later, after the second search of the vehicle, the police arrested Mr. Robison. 

{¶3} Mr. Robison and Ms. Alexander filed motions to suppress in their respective 

criminal cases. Upon motion of Mr. Robison, the trial court held a consolidated suppression 

hearing. The trial court subsequently denied both motions, and Mr. Robison pleaded no contest to 

the indicted charges. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to three years of 

imprisonment. He now appeals, raising two assignments of error for this Court’s review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT[’]S MOTION TO SUPPRESS[.] 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF APPELLANT[’]S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

OR BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 

{¶4} Mr. Robison has set forth two assignments of error that challenge the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress, but has not argued each assignment of error separately in his 

merit brief. While this Court can disregard his assignments of error on that basis, we exercise our 
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discretion to consider the merits of Mr. Robison’s combined assignments of error. See Loc.R. 

7(B)(7) of the Ninth District Court of Appeals (“Each assignment of error shall be separately 

discussed * * *.”); App.R. 12(A)(2) (“The court may disregard an assignment of error presented 

for review if the party raising it fails to * * * argue the assignment separately in the brief[.]”). 

{¶5} In his assignments of error, Mr. Robison argues that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress. Specifically, he argues that the officers violated his constitutional rights 

because they lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. Alexander’s vehicle, and because they lacked 

reasonable suspicion to prolong the length of the stop to investigate potential drug activity. He 

argues that the officers had no reliable information that he – or any of the other occupants of the 

vehicle – possessed drugs, or had used them. He also argues that, even if the officers did have 

reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop, the continued detention became illegal when Ms. 

Alexander refused to consent to a search of the vehicle. Mr. Robison further argues that any 

evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search was fruit of the poisonous tree, and that the 

inevitable-discovery exception does not apply. Lastly, in a footnote, he argues that the officers 

conducted an illegal pat down of him. For the reasons that follow, this Court disagrees. 

{¶6} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, 

the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual 

questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 

366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. “Accepting these facts as true, the 

appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial 
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court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 

Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997). 1

{¶7} This Court set forth the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in Ms. 

Alexander’s appeal, which are identical to the findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court 

made in this case,2 as follows: 

The trial court found that, at about 1:30 a.m., Officer James Allenby received a 

dispatch regarding suspicious individuals at a nearby gas station. The dispatcher 

received his or her information from the gas station clerk, who reported that the 

suspicious individuals had been “involved in drug activity” in the restroom and 

were leaving in a blue four door vehicle. The court found that Officer Allenby 

knew the gas station clerk who had called, dealt with her on a daily basis, and felt 

that she was a reliable source given that the employees of the 24-hour gas station 

were “used to people doing drugs in their bathroom.” Only after he completed the 

stop did Officer Allenby learn that the clerk had not personally observed the 

suspicious activity she relayed to the dispatcher. Instead, a customer had reported 

the suspicious activity to her, and she, in turn, had reported it to the dispatcher. 

The trial court found that, as Officer Allenby approached the gas station in his 

cruiser, he saw a blue four door vehicle. Noting that it matched the vehicle 

description he had received from dispatch and that it had a burned-out license plate 

light, Officer Allenby stopped the vehicle to investigate. Upon his approach, he 

discovered that the vehicle had three occupants. Alexander was the driver, her 

boyfriend was the front seat passenger, and an acquaintance of theirs was the 

backseat passenger. Officer Allenby began his investigation by collecting their 

information and identifying each person. As he was doing so, he noticed the 

backseat passenger had “heavy or droopy eyelids” indicative of drug use. The court 

found that Officer Allenby had undergone Drug Recognition Training and was 

“able to recognize the physical signs of when a person is under the influence of 

seven different types of drugs including amphetamines.” Consequently, the court 

found him to be a Drug Recognition Expert, qualified to determine that the backseat 

passenger was under the influence of narcotics. 

 

1

 The caption of Mr. Robison’s second assignment of error challenges the trial court’s decision as 

not being supported by sufficient evidence, and as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress based upon the standard 

set forth herein, which “presupposes evidentiary weighing by an appellate court[.]” Eastley v. 

Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 15. 

2

 The trial court substituted “Robison” for “Alexander” where appropriate. 
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The trial court found that Officer Allenby spoke with each of the vehicle’s three 

occupants in turn, separating them one at a time by making use of his cruiser and 

the cruiser of a second officer who had arrived to assist. While speaking with 

Alexander, Officer Allenby learned that she and her boyfriend were from an area 

near Sandusky. Alexander told the officer that she and her boyfriend had driven to 

Akron to pick up the backseat passenger because he was drunk and had called for 

a ride. Officer Allenby found it strange that Alexander and her boyfriend would 

drive that far in the middle of the night just to give the backseat passenger a ride. 

He then informed Alexander that someone at the gas station had seen two men 

engaged in suspicious activity in the bathroom, and she confirmed that her 

boyfriend and the backseat passenger had gone into the bathroom. Following his 

initial conversation with Alexander, Officer Allenby spoke with the backseat 

passenger. 

The trial court found that, as Officer Allenby spoke with the backseat passenger, he 

confirmed his initial suspicion that the man was under the influence of narcotics. 

The officer observed that the backseat passenger’s pupils were constricted in spite 

of the dark surroundings, his speech was slurred, and his eyelids continued to be 

droopy. The backseat passenger admitted that he had been in the gas station 

bathroom and had used drugs in the past, but denied any recent use. As Officer 

Allenby continued to speak with him, however, he began crying and admitted that 

he had used heroin earlier that day. The backseat passenger acknowledged that 

Alexander and her boyfriend had picked him up in Akron, but did not say how he 

knew them. 

The trial court found that, after speaking with the backseat passenger, Officer 

Allenby spoke with the boyfriend. Much like Alexander, the boyfriend initially 

maintained that the backseat passenger was drunk. After Officer Allenby informed 

him that the backseat passenger was actually under the influence of heroin, 

however, the boyfriend then offered that he had only known the backseat passenger 

for a few days. That statement also aroused Officer Allenby’s suspicions given the 

considerable distance that Alexander and her boyfriend had driven in the middle of 

the night to pick up the backseat passenger. Moreover, while speaking with the 

boyfriend, the officers noticed track marks on his neck. When Officer Allenby 

asked about the track marks, the boyfriend admitted that he sometimes injected 

drugs, but claimed he had not done so for several days. He indicated that he took 

prescription Percocet each day for pain and would use heroin when his pills ran out. 

The trial court found that, following his conversations with each of the three 

occupants, Officer Allenby and his fellow officer walked around Alexander’s 

vehicle and looked through the windows. They noticed a black object in the 

backseat, and the second officer relayed that she had seen Alexander’s boyfriend 

attempt to throw a blanket over the object while still inside the car. Officer Allenby 

asked Alexander about the object, but she claimed not to know what it was. He then 

asked her for permission to remove the object and open it, and she agreed he could 
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do so. Upon opening the object, Officer Allenby discovered it was a scale coated 

with crystals that resembled methamphetamine residue. 

The trial court concluded that Officer Allenby possessed reasonable suspicion to 

stop Alexander’s vehicle based on the information he received from dispatch. It 

found that the tip the dispatcher received from the gas station clerk and relayed to 

Officer Allenby possessed sufficient indicia of reliability because the officer was 

very familiar with the clerk and knew her to be a reliable source. Though it was 

actually a customer who had observed the suspicious activity and not the clerk 

herself, the court noted that Officer Allenby was unaware of that fact until later. 

Based on the information available to him at the time of the stop, the court 

concluded that Officer Allenby had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigatory stop to determine whether Alexander or her passengers “were in 

possession of illegal drugs and paraphernalia to use or sell * * *.” 

The trial court also concluded that, once Officer Allenby began his investigation, 

he continued to develop “more ‘specific and articulable facts’ [to] support[ ] his 

initial suspicions that the occupants were involved in drug activity.” Those facts 

included the backseat passenger’s appearance and behavior, Alexander and her 

boyfriend’s claim that the backseat passenger was only intoxicated, their further 

claim that they had driven a considerable distance to pick up someone they barely 

knew at such a late hour, the track marks on the boyfriend’s neck, and the backseat 

passenger and boyfriend’s admissions that they were heroin users. The court found 

that Officer Allenby was justified in continuing to detain Alexander until he spotted 

the black case in her car and, as a result of opening it, developed probable cause to 

search the remainder of her car. 

Alexander at ¶ 10-17. 

{¶8} Like Ms. Alexander, Mr. Robison’s arguments on appeal sound entirely in law; he 

has not challenged the trial court’s factual findings. Id. at ¶ 19. In her appeal, Ms. Alexander 

argued that Officer Allenby lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle because “the State 

failed to prove that the tip the officer received from dispatch possessed sufficient indicia of 

reliability[,]” and that he lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the length of the stop to 

investigate potential drug activity. Id. at ¶ 18, 21. This Court rejected those arguments. Id. at ¶ 

20, 22. In doing so, this Court stated that “we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it 

determined that the tip Officer Allenby received from dispatch provided him with reasonable 

suspicion to stop Alexander’s car and investigate its occupants for possible drug activity[,]” and 
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that “the record contains competent, credible evidence in support of the trial court’s determination 

that Officer Allenby legally detained Alexander for the duration of the traffic stop.” Id. at ¶ 20, 

22. Regarding the latter, this Court indicated that: 

[a]pproximately 38 minutes elapsed between the point in time that Officer Allenby 

executed the stop and the point in time that he discovered the residue-coated scale 

inside the vehicle. During that period of time, Officer Allenby was actively 

confirming the identities of the three occupants, speaking separately with each 

occupant, conferring with the second officer on scene, inspecting Alexander’s 

vehicle, and performing other tasks in the pursuit of his investigation. The record 

does not support the conclusion that he purposely delayed matters or otherwise 

failed to diligently conduct his investigation. * * *. 

The trial court determined that, as the stop progressed, Officer Allenby continued 

to develop “more ‘specific and articulable facts’ [to] support[ ] his initial suspicions 

that the occupants were involved in drug activity.” The record supports that 

determination given the backseat passenger’s appearance and behavior, Alexander 

and her boyfriend’s claim that he was only intoxicated, their further claim that they 

had driven a considerable distance to pick up someone they barely knew at such a 

late hour, the track marks on the boyfriend’s neck, and the backseat passenger and 

boyfriend’s admissions that they were heroin users. Based upon the totality of the 

circumstances, Officer Allenby possessed reasonable suspicion to extend 

Alexander’s detention as he continued to investigate the suspicious activity that he 

observed. 

Id. at ¶ 22-23. Nothing in Mr. Robison’s merit brief, which presents substantially similar 

arguments relative to the legality of the stop, the occupants’ continued detention, and the search 

of the vehicle, compels this Court to reach a different conclusion than our decision in Alexander. 

We, therefore, reject Mr. Robison’s arguments. Based upon this conclusion, we likewise reject 

Mr. Robison’s arguments that any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search was fruit of 

the poisonous tree, and that the inevitable-discovery exception does not apply, both of which 

presuppose that an illegal search and seizure occurred. To the extent that Mr. Robison has 

challenged the pat-down search, he has not argued – and there is no indication in the record – that 

he suffered any prejudice, even assuming without deciding that the pat down was illegal. See State 
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v. Franchi, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22474, 2005-Ohio-5105, ¶ 7. Accordingly, Mr. Robison’s 

assignments of error are overruled. 

III. 

{¶9} Mr. Robison’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 

CALLAHAN, P. J. 

CARR, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

RUSSELL A. BUZZELLI, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.