Union Calendar No. 269

107TH CONGRESS REPORT " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 2d Session 107–454

JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON

WHITE HOUSE

MAY 14, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of

the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. BURTON, from the Committee on Government Reform

submitted the following

SECOND REPORT

On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ‘‘Justice Undone: Clemency

Decisions in the Clinton White House.’’ The chairman was directed

to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

CHAPTER THREE

HUGH RODHAM’S ROLE IN LOBBYING FOR

GRANTS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

HUGH RODHAM’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIGNALI COMMUTATION

Vignali’s clemency petition was false and misleading.

• Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First, he continued

to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming evidence of his

involvement in selling a substantial amount of cocaine across

state lines and a specific finding by the sentencing judge that

he lied at trial about his involvement in a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that he was a first-time

offender, despite the fact that he had a prior criminal record. By

not accepting responsibility for his crime and lying about his

1262

background, he should not have been eligible for executive clemency.

Vignali’s supporters provided letters of support that were

false and misleading.

• A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and his father

Horacio, was a series of letters on Carlos’ behalf from prominent

Los Angeles politicians. A number of these letters contained misleading statements calculated to create the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The officials who submitted letters included Representative Xavier Becerra, Representative Esteban

Torres, State Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg, State Assembly Member Antonio Villaraigosa, State Senator Richard

Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, and Cardinal Roger

Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles.

Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support for the Vignali commutation that was inappropriate,

given his position.

• Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio Vignali that

was based on Vignali’s political and financial support for Baca.

Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since 1991, and Vignali

has been a key political supporter of Baca, giving him at least

$11,000 in contributions and raising between $60,000-$70,000

more.

• Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support of the

Vignali commutation. In January 2001, Baca received a telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that

he would get a call from the White House about Horacio

Vignali. Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White

House staff and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on

Baca’s statements in this telephone call, White House staff

clearly and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation of Carlos Vignali’s sentence.

• Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis, that he did

not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation and did nothing

that could have been interpreted as support for the commutation. However, Sheriff Baca’s supposed opposition to the Vignali

commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he drafted

a letter that he believed Horacio Vignali would use in the clemency effort and (2) when he was asked squarely by the White

House if the President should commute Vignali’s prison sentence, he stated that it was ‘‘the President’s decision to make,’’

rather than express his opposition. These facts, and others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca wanted to support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of creating a

paper record that would clearly indicate his support.

1263

• Sheriff Baca’s efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are even more inappropriate given that there were extensive allegations that

Horacio Vignali, Carlos’ father, was also involved in illegal drug

trafficking. It is inappropriate enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale drug dealer like Carlos Vignali. However,

when coupled with credible allegations indicating that Horacio

Vignali was a drug dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine

supply for his son, Baca’s support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali

is even more inappropriate.

U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support

for the Vignali commutation that was inappropriate, given

his position.

• U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White House in

support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top federal

prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali to call

the White House in support of his son’s clemency petition.

Mayorkas then called the White House about the Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed support for

the Vignali commutation.

• Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed clemency. Before he

called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken twice with Todd

Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the Vignali case. Jones

told Mayorkas that Vignali was a ‘‘major player’’ in drug trafficking, that he was ‘‘bad news’’ and that Mayorkas should not

‘‘go there’’ when it came to Vignali. Despite these warnings from

a prosecutor who was intimately familiar with the Vignali case,

Mayorkas still called the White House in support of the Vignali

commutation.

• Mayorkas’ support for the Vignali commutation was inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case. What he did

know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an unrepentant, largescale criminal. These facts alone make his support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor, totally inappropriate.

There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and

Carlos Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking.

• There are allegations that, in addition to his son, Horacio

Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking, and that Carlos

Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond the conduct

that led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA reports documenting these allegations include the following statements:

‘‘[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell a

machine gun and stated to them that he had also smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing automobiles.’’

1264

‘‘[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos Vignali

Jr. of Los Angeles . . . Vignali’s father Carlos Vignali aka

‘pops’ owns a body shop, at 1260 Figueroa and is the

source of supply for his son.’’

‘‘Carlos Horatio Vignali’s role in [George Torres’ drug dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this time. It is

believed that Vignali functions as a financial partner in

the organization.’’

• These DEA reports are corroborated by law enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received information indicating

that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali were involved in largescale drug trafficking. These charges have never been formally

made in court or substantiated by physical evidence. However,

the mere existence of such allegations should have precluded

senior law enforcement and political officials from supporting a

commutation for Carlos Vignali on the strength of his father’s

reputation. Nonetheless, it appears that no one checked with

the DEA prior to granting the commutation.

Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to

the White House in support of the Vignali commutation.

• Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the Vignali

commutation. It appears that, in return for this money, he

worked part-time for two months gathering materials in support

of Vignali’s case and making telephone calls to White House

staff. It appears that Rodham’s payment in the Vignali matter

was contingent upon his success, as he received the $200,000

payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton granted

clemency to Vignali.

• Rodham repeatedly provided false information during his communications with the White House. First, and most importantly,

Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was completely

false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was a first-time

offender when, in fact, he had two prior convictions and two

other arrests. Rodham also told Lindsey that Vignali ‘‘did not

play a major role in the offense’’ when, in fact, Vignali was a

major source of cocaine for the Minnesota drug-dealing ring at

issue in his case.

Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary

Rodham Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that

the Vignali commutation was ‘‘very important’’ to her.

• Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali commutation was ‘‘very important to him and the First Lady as well as

others.’’ This statement is confirmed by the independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke to Rodham as well

as the note that she took contemporaneously. Rodham’s statement raises two possibilities: first, that the First Lady was

aware of and approved of Hugh Rodham’s lobbying efforts; or,

1265

second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to White House staff regarding the First Lady’s knowledge of his efforts.

The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors or judge who understood the Vignali case.

• White House staff engaged in telephone conversations with a

number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali case—Hugh

Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of whom

knew very much about the Vignali case. It appears that key

White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by

Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little

about the case and had mixed motives.

• White House staff failed to reach out to the prosecutors who had

convicted Vignali or the judge who sentenced him. White House

staff justified their failure to take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the prosecutors and judge would object,

so there was no need to speak to them. However, if the White

House had spoken to Todd Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne,

or Judge David Doty, they would have learned that Carlos

Vignali: (1) was not a small-time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal activity; and (3) never cooperated with

law enforcement by telling them who supplied him cocaine.

The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the

Vignali commutation that were lodged by the Pardon Attorney.

• The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a report

that contained his recommendation against granting the Vignali

commutation. This report contained a number of powerful arguments against the commutation, which were apparently ignored

by the White House. The existence of the Pardon Attorney’s report means that the White House cannot claim that it was totally unaware that Vignali’s arguments were completely false.

The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition had

no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway. President Clinton’s decision raises questions about why the Vignali

commutation was granted.

Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning

to the Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the

clemency and ignored former President and Senator Clinton’s request that he do so.

• On February 21, 2001, at the request of former President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham promised to

return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he received in connection with the Vignali clemency. But, as of June 2001, Rodham

had apparently returned only about $50,000 of the money that

Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham’s attorney has confirmed to

Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any additional

amounts and has no plans to return the remaining $154,000.

1266

HUGH RODHAM’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BRASWELL

PARDON

Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal

agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon was granted.

• Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead consumers.

After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax evasion in

1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers about the

benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to facing numerous

lawsuits, Braswell’s companies have been investigated by the

Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission, Food and

Drug Administration, and Better Business Bureau.

• Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion and

money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell’s

petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had

conducted a background investigation instead of the White

House, Braswell’s petition would have been rejected quickly.

Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining the pardon.

• Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition for

$230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a letter

of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel’s Office and

made a follow-up inquiry. According to Rodham, these two actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell pardon.

Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing widespread criticism from the media and members of both political

parties.

HUGH RODHAM’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR

THE LUMS

Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors

and fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit

contributions and tax offenses.

• In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 in illegal

conduit contributions to the DNC. They were sentenced to home

detention, confinement in a halfway house and a $30,000 fine.

In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax fraud for filing

tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in false deductions

and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through

Hugh Rodham.

• Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the Lums’ efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency. In December

2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband’s criminal attorneys

1267

1Superceding Indictment, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 1993) (Exhibit 1). See also Drug

Ring Case Wrapped up with 2 Convicted, 1 Acquitted, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec.

13, 1994, at 2B.

and asked him to send various documents to Hugh Rodham at

the White House. He did so. In early January 2001, Rodham

called Gene Lum’s attorney again and asked him to resend

those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an

associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters.

Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits of the Lums’ pardon request. Cabe then told White House

Counsel Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce

Lindsey about her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that

the Lums were not going to receive clemency.

The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate

with the Committee’s investigation.

• Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation. The Lums’ daughter, Nicole (with whom

Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the Committee.

Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the Committee’s request for an interview. Therefore, the Committee is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums’ efforts to obtain

executive clemency and Rodham’s role in those efforts.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham was highly successful in

leveraging his relationship with the President and First Lady into

lucrative work lobbying for grants of clemency. The Committee is

aware of three cases in which Hugh Rodham lobbied the White

House for grants of executive clemency: Carlos Vignali, Glenn

Braswell, and Gene and Nora Lum. Rodham was successful in two

of these cases and was paid over $430,000 for his work.

Simply put, Rodham inappropriately used his access to the White

House to lobby for grants of clemency, which were not deserved

and would not have been granted but for his intervention. Carlos

Vignali was a supplier of cocaine to a major drug-dealing ring in

Minnesota who never admitted his guilt or cooperated with law enforcement. Yet, because of Hugh Rodham’s efforts, he had his sentence cut from 15 to 5 years. Glenn Braswell was a highly successful con artist who had his earlier fraud conviction erased despite

that he was under active investigation for tax fraud at the time of

the pardon. The fact that Vignali and Braswell received clemency

from President Clinton through the efforts of Hugh Rodham undermines public confidence in the President’s exercise of the clemency

power and in the equality of our laws.

I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION

A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali

On December 20, 1993, a federal grand jury in Minnesota issued

a 34-count indictment against 30 defendants. The indictment resulted from the largest drug investigation in Minnesota history.1

1268

2 Id; Superceding Indictment, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 1993) (Exhibit 1). 3 Id.

4Drug Ring Case Wrapped up with 2 Convicted, 1 Acquitted, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.

Paul), Dec. 13, 1994, at 2B. 5Telephone Interview with Tony Adams, Officer, Minneapolis Police Department, 4th Precinct, Narcotics Division (Mar. 27, 2001). 6 Id.

7Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 33 (Exhibit 2) (incorporated into Judgment in a Criminal Case as finding of fact). 8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id. at para. 31. 11 Id. at para. 30, 31, 42, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 68, 71. See also Telephone Interview

with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2,

1001) (describing evidence supporting finding of Vignali’s broad level of involvement in conspiracy). Before leaving the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Jones obtained, as the lead AUSA in the Vignali

investigation, the court orders for the wiretaps; represented the Government at suppression

hearings; and presented the case to the grand jury. In 1998, Jones returned as the U.S. Attorney

for the U.S. District of Minnesota. 12Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 68 (Exhibit 2) (incorporated into Judgment in a Criminal Case as finding of fact). 13 Id. at para. 42. 14 Id. at para. 85, 87.

According to the indictment, Carlos Vignali and his co-defendants

sent large quantities of cocaine to Minnesota by mail from California, converted it to crack, and distributed it quickly on the street.2

Vignali was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine; two counts of using facilities in interstate commerce with the

intent to promote a business enterprise involving narcotics; and

one count of illegally using a communication facility to facilitate

the distribution of cocaine.3 According to the government, Vignali

and his associates sold a kilogram of crack a day as late as November 1993.4

The investigation that resulted in Vignali’s conviction began locally with a probe of Gerald and Shirley Williams, who were suspected of distributing cocaine.5 As the scope of the investigation expanded, Minneapolis narcotics authorities obtained the assistance

of federal law enforcement agencies.6 Based on information obtained from confidential informants and other sources, authorities

initiated a court-ordered wiretap of several residential and cellular

telephones to monitor calls to and from Gerald Williams regarding

cocaine distribution.7 Many of the intercepted conversations to and

from Williams’ residential and cellular telephones involved coded

language and had to be interpreted by investigating officers.8

In the course of its wiretap surveillance, authorities intercepted

telephone conversations between Vignali and others during which

cocaine shipments to Minnesota were discussed.9 Authorities ultimately learned that Williams’ original supplier of cocaine in California was Dale Evans, who in turn obtained his supply from Jonathan Gray and, later, Carlos Vignali.10 The evidence obtained in

the investigation indicated a broad level of involvement by Vignali

in a multi-state conspiracy to distribute cocaine.11 In that context,

authorities discovered that, in October 1993, Vignali sold a substantial quantity of cocaine to Todd Hopson in Los Angeles for distribution in the Minnesota area 12 and supplied an additional six

kilograms of cocaine to Minnesota-area distributors through use of

the mails and the telephone.13

On November 9, 1993, Minnesota law enforcement executed warrants on several individuals involved in the drug conspiracy, including Dale Evans.14 Within Evans’ home and vehicles, law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1269

15 Id. at para. 87. 16 Id. at para. 85–101. See also Telephone Interview with Tony Adams, Officer, Minneapolis

Police Department, 4th Precinct, Narcotics Division (Mar. 27, 2001). 17 Evans immediately cooperated with law enforcement. Id. He told DEA that he worked for

Vignali, a.k.a., ‘‘C-Low’’ and identified him with a still-shot photograph of Vignali’s appearance

in a rap video. 18Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 102 (Exhibit 2). When

he was arrested, Vignali stated that he knew Gray but had not seen him for about a year; that

Gray introduced him to Evans, who was interested in possibly buying his townhouse; and that

no one had ever referred to him as ‘‘C-Low.’’ 19Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 1994) at 113–14.

forcement found an AK-47 assault rifle and ammunition, a Desert

Eagle pistol and ammunition, a Smith and Wesson 9 millimeter

pistol and loaded magazine, a bag containing marijuana, pagers,

addresses of other co-conspirators, pictures of him and some of the

other co-conspirators target-shooting in California, and various

other items.15 Searches and arrests of other co-conspirators likewise revealed large amounts of cash, cocaine and other contraband,

drug paraphernalia, guns, and ammunition.16 As a result of these

searches and arrests and with the assistance of Los Angeles law

enforcement, Carlos Vignali was arrested in Los Angeles on May

6, 1994,17 and extradited to Minnesota for trial.18

Vignali’s trial began on October 27, 1994. In his opening statement to the jury, Vignali’s defense attorney, Danny Davis, repeatedly characterized the alleged drug conspiracy as ‘‘a black drug network’’:

[T]he indictment that His Honor read for you—it is a sensitive suggestion about the evidence in this case—and I do

it with complete deference to what the court suggested earlier about drugs, and our sensitivities, about race, and our

sensitivities—but this conspiracy, the evidence will show,

really comes down to a black drug dealing network. One

by one those drug dealers, that the prosecution has found

it necessary to come in and put on as witnesses, will make

clear this is a nationwide black drug-dealing network. You

can’t get around it. Disabuse yourself that I am prejudiced

when I say that. It is a fact. My client is not [black].19

Counsel for the co-defendants thereupon moved for a mistrial:

Mr. FENSTER [Counsel for Melvin Campbell]: [I]t is offensive, what he is doing, and I think that just because he is

a defense counsel doesn’t excuse him from this kind of offensive behavior, and I think the court—I don’t know

about a mistrial, maybe that is not appropriate—I am not

quite sure what to do, but I think I will move for a mistrial. I think that kind of presentation to the jury is so offensive to the fabric of our law that it is impossible for the

jury to now be able to have a fair trial when he’s painted

the other defendants in a black drug-dealing network. Certainly the prosecution would have a mistrial if they did

that.

Mr. CASCARANO [Counsel for Todd Hopson]: I join in that

motion.

Mr. GRAY [Counsel for Claude Oliver Phillips]: I join in

that motion and, if the court doesn’t grant it, I move to

1270

20 Id. at 115–16. 21On appeal, co-defendant Todd Hopson argued that those comments made by Vignali’s attorney were so prejudicial that he was entitled to a new trial. U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 244

(8th Cir. 1996). However, the appellate court found that Hopson failed to show prejudice. In particular, the court observed that the jury’s verdict indicated that it declined any invitation to use

race as a proxy for guilt. In support of that view, the court cited the jury’s acquittal of co-defendant Claude Phillips, an African-American, and its conviction of Vignali, a Hispanic, on three of

four counts. 22Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 16, 1994) at 86. 23 Id. at 100. 24 Id. at 101. 25 Id. at 119. 26 Id. at 120–21. 27 Id. at 137–43. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 10–12 (Evans

testifying that he planned with Ronald Nunn to pick up Hopson and collect a parcel mailed by

Vignali at the residence of Hopson’s relative in Egan, Minnesota).

strike every word that Mr. Davis has said about a black

drug network around the nation. And, if he says it again,

I ask he be jailed. It is the worst conduct I have seen by

a defense lawyer in twenty-four years.

Mr. CASCARANO: Your Honor, [what] Mr. Davis has done

is paint not only the three black defendants as not clothed

with the presumption of innocence, but what he has done

is he has painted them guilty by virtue of their skin

color.20

The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. However, it

did caution the jury that the defendants’ race should play no role

in its determination of their guilt or innocence.21 Even though the

court did not grant a mistrial, Vignali’s crude effort to play the race

card against his codefendants is highly troubling. Vignali’s conduct,

through his counsel, is even more troubling when considered in

light of the fact that one of his supporters later claimed, without

any factual support, that Vignali was the victim of racial prejudice

at trial.

At Vignali’s trial, the government presented compelling evidence

showing that he conspired to traffic cocaine, aided and abetted the

mailing of at least two packages of cocaine from California to Minnesota, and used the telephone to facilitate the sale of cocaine.

That evidence included the testimony of various co-conspirators, including Dale Evans, Gerald Williams, and Ronald Nunn. Evans testified that, beginning in March 1993, he bought cocaine from Jonathan Gray and typically mailed that cocaine to Gerald Williams in

Minnesota for distribution.22 Evans also testified that Gray informed him in 1993 that he was obtaining his cocaine from

Vignali.23 Evans first met Vignali sometime during the summer of

1993 when they discussed distributing cocaine and agreed on

prices.24

Evans also testified that Todd Hopson, one of the Minneapolisbased cocaine distributors, flew to Los Angeles around October 20,

1993, and met with Evans and Vignali, and Vignali agreed to sell

Hopson cocaine.25 Hopson, Evans, and a friend of Evans then followed Vignali to an East Los Angeles apartment where Hopson

bought between $36,000 and $70,000 of cocaine from Vignali.26

Evans testified that prior to leaving Los Angeles for Minnesota, he

made arrangements with Carlos Vignali and Jonathan Gray to

have an additional six kilograms of cocaine sent to the residence

of Todd Hopson’s relative in Minnesota.27

1271

28Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 1994) at 184–86 (testimony of Officer

Tony Adams). 29 Id. 30Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 16 (testimony of Dale

Evans). 31 Id. 32 Id. at 14 (Evans testifying that Nunn detected undercover police surveillance). 33Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 51 (testimony of Dale

Evans); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 204 (Vignali testifying

that Evans paged him ‘‘911’’). 34Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 51. 35 Id. at 51, 56 (testifying that he later described to Vignali, ‘‘They were following us, riding

and shining’’). 36Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 276. 37Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 51. 38 Id. at 52. 39 Id. 40 Id. at 53. 41 Id. at 54. 42Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 204.

On October 21, 1993, officers conducted surveillance on Evans,

Ronald Nunn, and Todd Hopson.28 In the course of that surveillance, officers observed Ronald Nunn picking up Evans at Gerald

Williams’ apartment in Minneapolis.29 Nunn and Evans then drove

to Hopson’s home in Apple Valley, Minnesota, picked him up, and

went to the drop-off location in Eagan, Minnesota.30 They picked

up a large parcel and returned with it to the Apple Valley residence.31 Evans, Nunn, and Hopson detected police surveillance

while driving and attempted evasive maneuvers.32 After Evans noticed that he was being tailed by undercover surveillance, he paged

Vignali and Gray in Los Angeles from his cell phone with the emergency code ‘‘911.’’ After he had managed to shake off his pursuers,

Evans spoke with Gray and Vignali. They did not realize that their

conversation was being monitored by the police. Evans told Vignali

that ‘‘[t]hey followed us all around.’’ 33 He further stated that ‘‘[w]e

had to shake them, get them off, one in front, back one came,

parked down the street, waiting for us, dog, undercrizzovers.’’ 34

Evans testified that by ‘‘undercrizzovers’’ he was referring to undercover police and was conveying that he was being chased by the

police.35 Evans also told Vignali that he had to start ‘‘busting uturns’’ to evade the police.36 In response to Evans’ report, Vignali

asked, ‘‘Is that right? So everything’s cool, though?’’ 37 Vignali later

asked Evans, ‘‘How long ago was this?’’ 38 As Evans was continuing

to talk to Vignali about the ‘‘undercrizzovers,’’ Vignali asked, ‘‘Hey,

but, you, you, you, um, you made everything straight, right?’’ 39

Vignali also asked, ‘‘Don’t you think you should be careful before

you bust a move?’’ 40 Evans responded, ‘‘that’s what I’m doing.’’ 41

Vignali later paged Evans to determine whether Evans was arrested.

At trial, Vignali contended that, during his conversation with

Evans, he did not know what Evans meant by ‘‘undercrizzovers’’

and that he was disoriented because Evans’ call had woken him.42

Vignali testified that he inferred only that ‘‘something was wrong’’

with a $20,000 ‘‘business loan’’ that he supplied to Jonathan

1272

43 Vignali claimed that Gray had told him that he needed $20,000 for a short-term business

deal involving Stacy Augmon and several other professional basketball players. Transcript of

Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 248–49 (cross examination of Carlos Vignali);

Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 1994) at 39–40 (direct examination by

Horacio Vignali); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 232 (closing argument of Carlos Vignali). According to Vignali, Gray assured him that he would get $25,000 back in a matter of days

and that, if the deal fell through, Gray would sell his Porsche to cover Vignali’s losses. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 192–93. Vignali claimed that he had $20,000 in cash to loan Gray because he had saved his allowance since he was a young child

and that the resulting stack of $100 bills, which he had ironed and carefully stacked in his closet, represented his ‘‘life savings.’’ See Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 1994)

at 40–43. According to Vignali, Gray returned to him the $20,000 and an additional $5,000. See

Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 188. Also, according to Vignali,

a second ‘‘business loan’’ was made when Vignali ‘‘loaned’’ Gray $25,000, which, with $5,000 in- terest, resulted in the $30,000 referred to on the tapes. Id. at 192–95, 273–75. 44 Id. at 173, 204, 259; Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 232. 45Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 269–70. 46 Id. at 273.

Gray 43 and that Evans either lost or someone stole that money.44

At trial, prosecutors pointed out that Vignali’s defense made no

sense. Though he claimed to be confused and ‘‘freshly woken up,’’ Vignali cautioned his friend to ‘‘be careful’’ and asked if ‘‘everything

was cool.’’ The trial transcript makes it clear that Vignali’s defense

was implausible:

DUNNE. I thought that you said, on direct examination,

that you didn’t understand what he meant by under

crizzovers because you had just gotten up?

VIGNALI. Yes, he, he had just woken me up with the page,

sir.

DUNNE. Okay. And you will agree with me, will you not,

that the time on this transcript [is 12:09 p.m.], Minneapolis time? 45

***

DUNNE. You say, when Dale gives you the explanation

about the under crizzovers . . . ‘‘Is that right?’’

VIGNALI. Yes.

DUNNE. Do you say—you don’t say to him, ‘‘Dale what are

you talking about?’’

VIGNALI. No.

DUNNE. Okay. And you don’t say, ‘‘I don’t understand

this?’’

VIGNALI. No, sir. Bear in mind that I, I had just freshly

woken up.46

***

DUNNE. Now you just said that the reason you called . . .

[was] that you were concerned about your money?

VIGNALI. Yes sir.

DUNNE. Concerned enough to say Don’t you think you

should be careful before you bust a move?

1273

47Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1994) at 10–11. 48 Id. at 12–13. 49 Id. at 13. 50Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 56. 51 Id. at 56. 52Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 1994) at 189, 193 (Officer Tony

Adams); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 56–58 (Evans testifying

that he received money he mailed to himself in California and took about $80,000 or $90,000

to Vignali and Gray at Vignali’s house).

VIGNALI. Yes sir.

DUNNE. But you don’t ask him what the problem is?

VIGNALI. I, I have a little understanding that something

wrong is going on, but I’m not exactly sure, he didn’t make

it clear to me.47

***

DUNNE. What do you mean, something is going wrong?

VIGNALI. I have no idea. I wasn’t there.

DUNNE. What did you think was going wrong with your

25,000 dollars?

VIGNALI. I have no idea.

DUNNE. You have no idea?

VIGNALI. No, sir. I thought maybe, when he told me that

it was smashing, maybe something was following him trying—maybe trying to carjack him or something, I don’t

know—and then he was going to try to tell me, Well I lost

your money, or something. I was just concerned about, in

that aspect.48

***

DUNNE. Now let me ask you, during this phone conversation where you are concerned about Dale’s busting a move

with your 25,000 dollars because someone might carjack

him. Do you ever tell Dale: Dale, maybe you should call

the police if someone is trying to carjack you?

VIGNALI. I, I didn’t, again I will tell you I didn’t know exactly what was going on.

DUNNE. But you thought somebody was trying to carjack

him?

VIGNALI. It was, it was the morning. I’m—my head—I had

just woken up, I wasn’t—it—nothing was clear to me, it

never was clear to me.49

Evans testified that he returned to California the day after he escaped the undercover surveillance.50 But, before returning to California, he mailed himself the money he obtained for the cocaine.51

Evans told Vignali and Jonathan Gray in intercepted telephone

conversations that he would meet with them to give them the

money.52

1274

53Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali, (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 70 (Evans); Transcript of

Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 59–60, 64–66 (Evans testifying to conversation). See also Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 57–58 (Exhibit

2).54 Id. at para. 65. 55Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 69. ‘‘Love’’ was the code word

used by the conspirators to refer to cocaine. 56Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 164. See also Transcript of

Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 66–68. 57Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 164. 58Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 70–71. 59Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 68. 60 Id. at 75–76. 61 Id. at 76. 62 Id. 63 Id. at 76–77. That transaction appears not to have been consummated.

On October 26, 1993, agents tapped into a phone conversation

between Dale Evans and Gerald Williams regarding a new shipment of cocaine, six kilograms sent from Los Angeles to Ronald

Nunn’s Minnesota home.53 That shipment was intercepted by postal inspectors on or about October 28, 1993.54 On October 31, 1993,

agents overheard a call between Williams, Evans, and Carlos

Vignali regarding the October 26th shipment. Evans asked, ‘‘Love

[the cocaine shipment] never got there?’’ 55 Williams replied, ‘‘no.’’ 56

Evans stated that they had called the post office to see if the package had arrived.57 At that point, Vignali, who was apparently with

Evans, got on the telephone, said ‘‘[t]his is the other end,’’ and told

Williams to send somebody into the post office to find out about the

package.58 Vignali then said, ‘‘We sent that right down that day’’

and told Williams to get on ‘‘good horns [a public telephone].’’ 59

During that conversation, a prospective 15-kilogram deal was

discussed.60 The parties conferred about whether the quantity

should be broken up into one or two kilogram shipments or shipped

all at once.61 They also discussed the prospect that the buyers

might not want to pay for the shipment up front before obtaining

all of their cocaine.62 They further discussed having someone either

drive the shipment from California to Minnesota or having someone come down from Minnesota to California.63

In attempting to explain away these conversations, Vignali argued that the money referred to ‘‘life savings’’ he accumulated as

a child from his father and ultimately ‘‘lent’’ to Jonathan Gray.

Vignali supposedly lent Gray, who had been recently released from

jail for a crime Vignali knew nothing about, a $20,000 ‘‘business

loan’’ for a project which Vignali also knew nothing about. This

part of Vignali’s story met with skepticism from prosecutors:

DUNNE. Now when you gave Jonathon [Gray] this 20,000

dollars for this loan . . . for this business proposition or

whatever, did he show you any kind of contract?

VIGNALI. No, he didn’t.

DUNNE. Did he show you any kind of paperwork about this

business proposition?

VIGNALI. No, he did not.

DUNNE. Did he have you sign anything to validate that

you were giving him 20,000 dollars in cash?

VIGNALI. No, sir.

1275

64Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 240, 243. 65 Id. at 247–48. 66Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 232. 67 Judgment in a Criminal Case, U.S. v. Vignali (D.Minn. July 17, 1995) (Exhibit 3).

***

DUNNE. And do you recall how much money was in your

checking account at the time you had 20,000 dollars in a

safe in your house?

VIGNALI. No, I never, I never kept much money . . . in the

bank, I’m sorry.

DUNNE. Well, when you have money in a bank you earn

interest. Right?

VIGNALI. If it is in your savings account, yes.

DUNNE. Are you earning any interest on 20,000 dollars in

a safe in your house?

VIGNALI. No, but it is in my possession.64

***

DUNNE. In 1992 you file an income tax return where you

declared your income was thirteen thousand nine hundred

nine dollars? . . . Now the 20,000 dollars that you had in

the closet at home, was that part of the thirteen thousand

dollars that you made in 1992?

VIGNALI. That was part of the money that I had accumulated over my lifetime.

DUNNE. Over your lifetime?

VIGNALI. Absolutely.

DUNNE. Okay. And so all of your life savings you put in

. . . the closet in the townhome.65

Rather than refute the facts prosecutors had marshaled against

him, Vignali argued that the co-conspirators who cooperated with

law enforcement made ‘‘sweetheart’’ deals for leniency. In particular, Vignali charged that Dale Evans had falsely identified Vignali

as his source of cocaine in California because he wanted to conceal

the involvement of his family members and close associates in

criminal activity.66 Nonetheless, the testimony of the cooperating

co-conspirators and law enforcement officers and the corroborating

physical evidence was overwhelming. The combination of evidence

admitted at trial showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Vignali

supplied significant quantities of cocaine from California for distribution in Minnesota.

On December 12, 1994, Vignali was convicted of all the crimes

for which he was indicted, except one count of using facilities in

interstate commerce for the promotion of his drug operation.67 All

but one of the original thirty defendants in the drug conspiracy eiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1276

68 Id. Claude Phillips, 50, of Memphis, Tennessee, was acquitted of conspiring to distribute

cocaine—the sole count against him in the superceding indictment. Also convicted was Todd

Hopson, 23, of Apple Valley, Minnesota. 69 Id. 70 Id. Judge Doty also found that, in late October, co-defendant Todd Hopson traveled to California and co-defendant Dale Evans arranged for Hopson to buy additional quantities of cocaine

from Vignali. 71 Id. Judge Doty did so by referring to the testimony of co-defendant Dale Evans. According

to Evans, Vignali may have been the source of two packages of cocaine sent to Minnesota—one on October 21, 1993, and the other on October 28, 1993. Judge Doty noted that the second package was, in fact, seized by law enforcement authorities and found to have contained six kilograms of cocaine, and Evans testified at trial that the first package contained four kilograms

of cocaine. However, Judge Doty found Evans’ testimony regarding the sale of additional quantities of cocaine by Vignali unpersuasive. 72 Id. 73 Horacio Vignali, who immigrated to the United States in 1962, has owned several businesses, including parking lots, body shops, and real estate. See Richard Serrano and Stephen

Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES (L.A. TIMES MAG.) Apr. 29, 2001, at 10. Ap- parently, Horacio Vignali has been financially successful and owns a $9 million home in Pacific

Palisades that apparently once belonged to Sylvester Stallone. Id. 74For example, Horacio Vignali has hosted several political fundraisers, including outdoor barbecue fundraisers (for which he became locally well known), and provided food for various political events. Id. 75 Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin’s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar,

L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1.

ther pleaded guilty or were convicted.68 At sentencing, the probation office for the federal district of Minnesota submitted to Judge

David S. Doty a pre-sentence report. This report recommended an

imprisonment range of 151 to 188 months for Vignali.69 In determining the proper sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines, Judge Doty found that Vignali was, in fact, a willing participant in the shipment of cocaine to Minnesota on October 20,

1993.70 Judge Doty also found that Vignali was accountable for distributing between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine, rather than

the fifteen to fifty kilograms suggested in the pre-sentence report.71

Vignali was sentenced to imprisonment for 175 months, about 15

years, on July 17, 1995.72 On January 20, 2001, President Clinton

commuted Vignali’s sentence to time served.

B. Vignali’s Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency

As described below, 55-year old Horacio Carlos Vignali, a successful Los Angeles-area businessman,73 apparently used every tool

at his disposal to see that his son would not fully serve out his

prison sentence. When attempts to have his son released before

sentencing and on appeal failed, Horacio, who cultivated political

contacts over time through substantial campaign donations, fundraising activity,74 and civic involvement, directed his considerable

resources to a concerted effort to lobby President Clinton for an

eleventh hour pardon of his son.

1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali’s Sentence

a. Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota

Efforts to reduce Carlos Vignali’s sentence apparently started

soon after Vignali was convicted. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew Dunne, who prosecuted Vignali in Minneapolis,

Vignali’s political associates exerted ‘‘a lot of influence’’ in Vignali’s

sentencing.75 Dunne explained that he and the other prosecutors

working on the case received periodic calls from state representatives in California on behalf of Carlos Vignali after the sentencVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1277

76 Id. 77 Id. 78Telephone Interview with the Honorable Denise Reilly, Juvenile Court Judge, 4th Judicial

District of Minnesota (Hennepin County) (May 11, 2001). 79 Id. 80 Id. 81 Id. 82 U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 1996). 83 Id. at 246. 84 NARA Document Production at 2 (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr. (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 4). 85 Id. 86There is no position of ‘‘Pardon Secretary’’ at the White House. It is not clear who received

and reviewed these letters when they were sent to the White House in 1996. However, the letters were ultimately made part of the Vignali clemency file at the White House Counsel’s Office

years later in 2000. 87 NARA Document Production (Letter from Antonio R. Villaraigosa, Assembly Member, FortyFifth District, California Legislative Assembly, to Pardon Secretary, the White House (May 24,

1996)) (Exhibit 5).

ing.76 Characterizing some of the calls as ‘‘perhaps improper influence,’’ Dunne recalled that ‘‘they wanted to know: Is there anything

that could be done to help reduce the sentence?’’ 77 Denise Reilly,

the lead government prosecutor in the Vignali case, likewise confirmed that they ‘‘would get calls from different people—politically

placed’’ throughout the course of the case.78 She characterized the

input of those who called ‘‘odd,’’ stating ‘‘I don’t know how they do

things in the rest of the country, but that isn’t what we do in Minnesota.’’ 79 Judge Reilly described the incoming calls as inquiring, ‘‘are you sure you know what you’re doing?’’ and ‘‘are you sure that

you have the right person?’’ 80 Judge Reilly believed that the calls

came from political officials in Los Angeles.81

b. Vignali’s Appeal

Carlos Vignali appealed his conviction immediately after the verdict. Vignali appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,

claiming juror misconduct, witness perjury, improper jury instruction, failure to grant a severance, and improper exclusion of defense evidence. A unanimous appellate court upheld Vignali’s conviction, dismissing Vignali’s arguments with minimal discussion.82

In affirming the district court’s ruling, the appellate court agreed

that ‘‘there was considerable evidence of Vignali’s guilt.’’ 83 Vignali

subsequently sought habeas relief, asserting ineffectiveness of

counsel.84 This claim was also denied.85

c. Letters to the White House and Justice

Department

Horacio Vignali was hard at work gathering political support for

his son’s cause even before filing his son’s clemency petition.

Vignali had a number of prominent California politicians write letters to the White House in 1996, requesting a ‘‘review’’ of Carlos

Vignali’s case. At least five similarly phrased letters were sent to

the White House ‘‘Pardon Secretary’’ requesting an examination of

the case.86

The first letter, dated May 24, 1996, from California Assembly

Member Antonio Villaraigosa, stated, ‘‘After reviewing Mr.

Vignali’s case, I am convinced that he has been falsely linked to a

drug ring in Minneapolis, MN, and that his conviction is a product

of ‘guilt by association,’ among other factors.’’ 87 Villaraigosa noted

that Carlos Vignali had no prior record and that Vignali’s ‘‘military

1278

88 Id. 89Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 130 (Exhibit 2). 90Mateo Gold, Vignali Case Casts Shadow over Mayor’s Race, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at

B1 (‘‘I wrote that letter without talking to prosecutors on the other end.’’). 91 John Antczak, L.A. Heads Retract Support for Pardon, AP ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2001; See also

Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency:

Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf of a

Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22. 92Matea Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf

of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22. It is widely

believed that Villaraigosa’s involvement in the Vignali matter cost him his election as mayor

of Los Angeles to Robert Hahn. See, e.g., Beth Barrett, Villaraigosa’s Refusal to Hit Back Cost

Him—Rival’s Attack Went Unanswered, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., June 7, 2001, at N9. 93 NARA Document Production (Letter from Richard Alatorre, Councilman, Fourteenth District, L.A. City Council, to Pardon Secretary, the White House (May 28, 1996)) (Exhibit 6). 94Department of Justice Press Release No. 01–062, Former Los Angeles City Councilman

Richard Alatorre Charged with Tax Evasion for Failing to Report Bribes; Defendant Agrees to

Plead Guilty to Felony Offense, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, Apr.

3, 2001. As a result of Alatorre’s failing to report bribes, he evaded the payment of at least $12,970 in federal income tax. In addition to pleading guilty, Alatorre has agreed to file an

amended 1996 federal income tax return and to pay any penalties and interest assessed by the

Internal Revenue Service.

Less than a year after being elected to the Los Angeles City Council, Alatorre agreed to pay a record fine of more than $140,000 for improperly financing his campaign for City Council with

money he raised as a state lawmaker. Rich Connell and Robert J. Lopez, Alatorre’s Fall Belies

Early Promise, Achievements, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, at Al. In 1988, Alatorre was fined for

attempting to steer a $722,000 contract to The East Los Angeles Community Union

(‘‘TELACU’’), a firm that was headed by a longtime friend. Earlier, TELACU had flown Alatorre to a meeting at Lake Tahoe and paid him a $1,000 speaking fee.

When Alatorre was on the board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (‘‘MTA’’), which

administers Los Angeles’ multibillion-dollar subway and light rail system, Alatorre reportedly solicited contributions of more than $500,000 from organizations with interests before the MTA

and the City Council for the benefit of a children’s charity he helped create. Rich Connell and

Robert J. Lopez, Alatorre’s Fall Belies Early Promise, Achievements, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999,

at Al; Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre, L.A.

academy schooling adds to his superior resume ́.’’ 88 Villaraigosa was

apparently unaware that Vignali both had a prior criminal record

and had dropped out of military school.89 Under those circumstances, Villaraigosa’s characterization of Vignali’s resume ́ as ‘‘superior’’ was, at best, hyperbole and, at worst, misleading.

Villaraigosa has since admitted that he did not independently investigate the details of Carlos Vignali’s case and regretted not having done so.90 Villaraigosa stated, ‘‘I was convinced at the time . . .

that his son was not a major player in this drug ring. I made a

mistake in not investigating.’’ 91 Villaraigosa stated that he was

moved by Horacio Vignali’s emotional plea: ‘‘It was a conversation

between fathers as much as anything. . . . He was very distraught.’’ 92

On May 28, 1996, Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre

wrote in support of Vignali:

It is difficult for me to understand why Mr. Vignali received such an exorbitant sentence. It has been pointed out

that this may have been due to the fact that his case was

grouped together with a much larger case involving the

sale of drugs. Others contend that it may have been because of his Latino background, which I hope is not the

case.93

However, Alatorre was not fit to provide a character reference for

Vignali or anyone else. Throughout his extensive career in Los Angeles politics, Alatorre was the subject of various public corruption

investigations, recently pleaded guilty to federal tax evasion

charges, and is himself a proven cocaine user.94

1279

TIMES, July 7, 1997, at Al. That charity exclusively hired Eventually Yours, an event-planning

firm founded by Alatorre’s third wife, Angie, paying the firm tens of thousands of dollars in fees. Ultimately, Alatorre was fined $8,000 by state and local watchdog agencies for improperly intervening on behalf of the firm before a city licensing agency. That was the maximum fine allowed

under state and local laws. Also, in the custody dispute described below, Alatorre conceded to

receiving a $13,200 loan (without a repayment plan) from TELACU. At that time, Alatorre was

also supporting a TELACU team for a $65 million MTA subway contract and a TELACU partnership for a $2 million city development for a shopping center in his district.

The investigation of Eventually Yours broadened an earlier probe of how another firm that

was ranked last in competing for a lucrative subway contract, but which Alatorre backed, came

to be recommended for that contract. Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities

Promoted by Alatorre, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1997, at Al. That controversy resulted in the resignation of MTA’s executive director, who selected the team after it made a $20,000 donation to a

golf tournament benefiting a charity of which Alatorre was an honorary chairman.

Eventually Yours was also investigated by the California Attorney General’s Office for failing

to account for hundreds of thousands of dollars in charitable donations it helped raise. Robert

J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre, L.A. TIMES, July 7,

1997, at Al. After repeated press inquiries for information regarding the firm’s five-year failure

to account for certain contributions, the firm’s attorney stated that the firm’s forte was in staging ‘‘spectacular’’ events—not in faithfully tending to administrative matters. In the course of

its investigation, the State Attorney General’s Office received an inquiry from State Senator

Richard Polanco, generally well known to be an Alatorre ally. According to a State Justice Department official, Polanco stated that he was concerned about the pressure being brought to

bear on the firm. The official recounted that Polanco said he knew the people associated with

Eventually Yours to be upstanding and asked why they were targeted. In response, Polanco was

told that, because the investigation was pending, he could be given no information about the

matter. Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre, L.A.

TIMES, July 7, 1997, at Al.

In the course of a child custody dispute regarding his niece in which Alatorre’s competency

to care for the girl was in controversy, Superior Court Judge Henry W. Shatford found that

‘‘Richard Alatorre’s credibility has been totally shredded as to his profound declaration [that]

he has been clean from the use of cocaine.’’ Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, Judge Says Test

Shows Alatorre Is Using Cocaine, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at Al. Judge Shatford arrived at

that finding after Alatorre failed a surprise courthouse drug test. The judge ordered the test

after Alatorre repeatedly denied using cocaine with an individual on whose behalf he aggressively helped obtain government business. That individual was a waste hauler and demolition

specialist who pleaded guilty to possessing and intending to distribute heroin. That individual

has publicly stated that Alatorre has written him letters of reference for public contracts, ‘‘attesting to my character.’’ Alatorre publicly explained that the white powder his former executive

secretary testified to having seen on his nostrils and clothes upon his return from business

meetings might have been dandruff, denture powder, or Doritos. Alatorre’s former secretary also

testified that, following Alatorre’s divorce from his second wife when Alatorre was facing finan- cial problems, he began mysteriously producing wads of $100 bills. The secretary claimed that

some of the money came after meetings with businessmen and other supporters. After reviewing

financial records involving associates of Alatorre with government business interests, Judge

Shatford noted that Alatorre had ‘‘questionable conflict of interest financial dealings as a city

councilman.’’ Id. Ultimately, Judge Shatford stripped Alatorre of guardianship of his niece and

barred him from visiting with her until he successfully completed a drug detoxification program. 95 NARA Document Production (Letter from Richard Polanco, State Senator, Twenty-Second

District, California Legislature, to Pardon Secretary, the White House (July 22, 1996)) (Exhibit

7).96 NARA Document Production (Letter from Archbishop Roger Mahony, Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, to Pardon Secretary, the White House (July 26, 1996)) (Exhibit 8). 97 NARA Document Production (Letter from Esteban E. Torres, Member of Congress, U.S.

House of Representatives, to Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Department of Justice (July

3, 1996)) (Exhibit 9). Congressman Torres also wrote to the warden of Vignali’s prison in Colorado, asking that Vignali be transferred to a prison closer to his family in California. Stephen

Braun, et. al, L.A. Politicians Urged Pardon of Cocaine Dealer, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2001, at

A1.

On July 22, 1996, State Senator Richard Polanco requested that

the White House ‘‘carefully review’’ the Vignali case and stated

that Vignali had ‘‘no prior criminal record.’’ 95 On July 26, 1996,

Archbishop Roger Mahony, Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, wrote to ‘‘add [his] voice recommending that all of the process, the law, and the facts in this case be reviewed fully to determine if justice has been achieved[.]’’ 96 Finally, Congressman

Esteban Torres wrote to Attorney General Reno complaining that

Vignali was not ‘‘individually tried before a jury of his peers’’ and

asking that the Attorney General ‘‘carefully review’’ Vignali’s

case.97

1280

98Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 117, 118 (Exhibit 2). 99 U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1996). 100 Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin’s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar,

L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001. 101 Id. 102 Id.

Even these initial stages of lobbying for Carlos Vignali involved

a significant amount of misinformation. For example, Villaraigosa,

Alatorre, Polanco, and Torres all claimed in their letters that Carlos Vignali had no prior criminal record. In fact, Vignali had two

prior criminal convictions for fighting in a public place and vandalism and two prior arrests for reckless driving and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant.98 It is unclear whether the political

figures writing on Vignali’s behalf were aware of Vignali’s criminal

history and chose to disregard it or were misinformed by those lobbying on Vignali’s behalf.

Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre’s claims of racial

prejudice were similarly baseless. Alatorre claimed that ‘‘others

contend’’ Vignali’s sentence was the result of racial prejudice. However, the Committee is unaware of any allegations, other than

Alatorre’s own letter, that Vignali received unfair treatment because of his ethnic background. In fact, Vignali’s attorney argued

at trial that Vignali was innocent because he was Hispanic and,

therefore, could not have been part of the ‘‘black drug dealing network’’ of his codefendants. Indeed, Vignali’s black codefendants appealed their convictions on the basis of the potentially prejudicial

statements by Vignali’s lawyer.99

2. Vignali’s Clemency Petition

After Carlos Vignali’s appeal failed, the Vignali family began to

pursue a grant of executive clemency to get him out of prison.

Horacio Vignali initially reached out to Danny Davis, Carlos’ criminal defense lawyer, to assist with efforts to obtain presidential

clemency for him.100 However, Davis, who represented Carlos

Vignali at trial in Minnesota, declined because he calculated the

probability of obtaining clemency for Carlos as ‘‘a snowball in

Hades.’’ 101 Sometime thereafter, Horacio Vignali himself embarked

on a campaign to obtain a presidential grant of clemency for his

son.102

Carlos Vignali’s clemency petition was filed with the Justice Department on August 24, 1998. Vignali’s brief petition laid out his

reasons for seeking a commutation:

Vignali loaned $25,000 to a friend, which were [sic] interpreted through slang taped telephone conversations to involve the purchase of drugs. No drugs were seized from

Vignali, and he was convicted solely on the testimony of a

codefendant who received leniency. The taped conversations did not mention either drugs or money but were interpreted to have those subjects. Vignali was tried in Minnesota where he had never been or had any significant

contacts with.

1281

103 NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation of Sentence ) (Exhibit 10). 104 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr.) at 4 (Exhibit 4) (handwritten note on last page of Report).

***

The sentence of 175 months for a 21 year old, first time,

nonviolent offender with no significant prior record is unwarranted. Based solely on a $25,000 loan to a friend,

falsely interpreted telephone recordings, and a codefendant’s highly rewarded testimony, the punishment does not

fit the crime as proved. The concept of holding minor players responsible for any and all drugs of a conspiracy, irregardless of whether that minor play [sic] had any knowledge or nexus with those drugs, undermines the concept of

fairness. No drugs were introduced at trial as to Vignali,

who never visited Minneapolis where the case was tried,

yet he was held responsible for the drugs involved in a 30

defendant conspiracy, when he knew, at best, two people.

By the end of 1998, Vignali will have served, with good

time, almost five years, which is the mandatory minimum

for the drugs which could have been bought with his

loan.103

The Vignali clemency petition was a poorly drafted rehash of issues

that had been thoroughly addressed at trial and on appeal. Unlike

most successful clemency petitions, Vignali’s petition continued to

maintain actual innocence. Yet, it failed to present any new facts

suggesting Vignali was indeed innocent. These flaws were easily

recognized when the petition was reviewed by individuals familiar

with the Vignali case. In short, the pardon petition made a number

of misleading statements, including the following:

‘‘Vignali loaned $25,000 to a friend, which were [sic] interpreted

through slang taped [sic] telephone conversations to involve the purchase of drugs.’’ Vignali’s claim that he was simply engaged in a

business deal—not a drug deal—was thoroughly disproved at trial.

As described above, literally dozens of pieces of evidence pointed to

Vignali’s involvement in a drug deal, including the testimony of his

co-conspirators, wiretap evidence, and the actual proceeds of the

drug deal. In the course of reviewing Vignali’s clemency application, the White House was apparently not persuaded by Vignali’s

explanation at trial. On the last page of a copy of the report from

the Justice Department’s Pardon Attorney to President Clinton declining to recommend Vignali’s application for clemency, a handwritten note by a White House staffer reads ‘‘Need to XC for Bruce

[Lindsey]. Definitely isn’t simply making a loan[.]’’ 104

‘‘[Vignali] was convicted solely on the testimony of a codefendant

who received leniency.’’ As described above, the testimony of several

witnesses proved Vignali’s role in the conspiracy. The testimony of

those witnesses was consistent with and independently corroborated by wiretap interceptions of communications among the coconspirators, search warrant evidence obtained from lawful

searches of the co-defendant’s homes and drug stash houses, and

visual police surveillance. Thus, as the Eighth Circuit noted on diVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1282

105 U.S. v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998); U.S. v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2001). 106See Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 229–30. 107Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 117, 118 (Exhibit 2). 108 Id. at para. 117–18. 109 Id.

rect appeal, Vignali’s conviction was supported by considerable evidence.

Agreements with defendants for cooperation in exchange for leniency at sentencing are a widely-used tool used by prosecutors to obtain evidence in criminal cases. Such agreements are contemplated

by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a basis for downward departure from the applicable guideline imprisonment range. Moreover, Vignali’s sentence was commuted to a term shorter than even

those of defendants who actually cooperated with the Government.

This makes the clemency decision particularly egregious.

‘‘Vignali was tried in Minnesota where he had never been or had

any significant contacts with.’’ This is a red herring. Physical presence within the district where a criminal defendant is to be tried

has never been held to be a requirement in determining venue. It

is well-settled that the appropriate focus for determining venue is

the place of the crime and that the inquiry into the place of the

crime may yield more than one appropriate venue or even a venue

in which the defendant has never set foot.105 In this case, Vignali

was charged with, among other things, aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine using facilities in interstate commerce and conspiring to distribute cocaine. As described above, the evidence that

Vignali facilitated the interstate sale of cocaine and conspired in

Los Angeles to distribute cocaine in Minnesota included testimony

of cooperating co-defendants (which was corroborated by wiretapped communications among the co-conspirators), search warrant

evidence, and visual police surveillance. That evidence amply

showed an interdependence between Vignali and the Minnesotaarea distributors. Therefore, under prevailing case law, venue in

the U.S. District of Minnesota was clearly proper.

‘‘The sentence of 175 months for a 21-year old, first time, nonviolent offender with no prior record is unwarranted.’’ First, Vignali

was not a ‘‘first time, nonviolent offender.’’ Vignali’s counsel, Danny

Davis, similarly misrepresented Vignali’s criminal record when he

told the jury in closing argument that Vignali had ‘‘[n]o prior criminal record’’ and cited ‘‘his unblemished past.’’ 106 Hugh Rodham,

who was retained to lobby the White House on Vignali’s behalf,

likewise misrepresented Vignali’s criminal record to the White

House Counsel’s Office. In fact, Vignali had two prior convictions

and arrests. He was convicted in 1989 for fighting in a public place

and received a $183 fine. He was also convicted of vandalism to

which he pleaded no contest and received 12 months probation and

was ordered to pay restitution and complete 82 hours of community

service work. In the course of his arrest for vandalism, Vignali stated that he was associated with ‘‘The 87th Street West Side Boys’’

in Los Angeles.107 According to police records, Vignali also admitted that he was a member of the West Covina Mob.108 In 1988,

Vignali was arrested for reckless driving.109 Finally, Vignali was

arrested in 1990 for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant, but that case was dismissed. Second, Vignali’s sentence reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1283

flected the gravity of his participation in a large-scale conspiracy

in which he served as the source of cocaine. It also reflected both

Vignali’s obstruction of justice in lying about his actual role in the

conspiracy before a judicial tribunal and his obdurate refusal to accept any responsibility for his crimes.

‘‘No drugs were introduced at trial as to Vignali[.]’’ Although this

assertion appears to be true from the trial record, the implication

that Vignali’s verdict is therefore unsupported by sufficient evidence is misleading. In fact, the appellate court noted that Vignali’s

verdict was well-supported by the evidence admitted at trial. In

sentencing Vignali under the federal sentencing guidelines, the

trial judge determined how much cocaine was attributable to

Vignali. Because the parcels of cocaine attributable to Vignali had

long since been distributed or consumed, the judge looked to the

testimony of co-defendant Dale Evans. According to Evans, Vignali

was the source of two packages of cocaine sent to Minnesota, one

on October 21, 1993, and the other on or about October 28, 1993.

The judge found that Evans’ testimony as to the amount of cocaine

in the second package was corroborated by the postal inspector’s

seizure of the parcel and finding that it contained six kilograms of

cocaine. In contrast, the judge found that Evans’ uncorroborated

testimony as to additional quantities of cocaine was not reliable.

Nonetheless, he found that Evans’ testimony was credible so as to

establish that Vignali knowingly participated in distributing cocaine on more than one occasion. Given the strength of the available evidence, the judge’s determination that between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine were attributable to Vignali did not require the physical presence of those parcels in court.

‘‘[Vignali] was held responsible for the drugs involved in a 30 defendant [sic] conspiracy, when he knew, at best, two people.’’ The

evidence admitted at trial against Vignali showed that he was a

member of a large-scale drug conspiracy and facilitated the distribution of cocaine in Minnesota by supplying Dale Evans, Gerald

Williams, and Todd Hopson with significant quantities of cocaine

from Los Angeles. As such, Evans’ association with the other members of the conspiracy was irrelevant to any issue material to the

government’s case.

The facts prove that every substantive assertion in Vignali’s commutation petition was false and misleading. The petition could

have been easily refuted by anyone with a basic familiarity with

Vignali’s underlying conviction. The question then is how the White

House came to believe that Carlos Vignali deserved an executive

grant of clemency.

3. Supporters of Vignali’s Clemency Petition

In 2000, a number of prominent California politicians wrote to

the White House in support of Vignali’s release. Some were the

same individuals who wrote to the White House on Vignali’s behalf

four years earlier. In addition, a number of prominent Californians

called the White House and the Justice Department to further

press their arguments. The distortions of fact in the Vignali clemency petition were repeated throughout the campaign to win

Vignali’s release.

1284

110Did Politics Sway Clinton to Free Drug Dealer, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A8. 111Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf

of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at 22; Rob Morse,

Still Have Bill to Kick Around, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2001, at A2; Dominic Berbeo, Hertzberg

Had Part in Pardon Flap, DAILY NEWS OF L.A. (Valley Edition) Feb. 16, 2001, at N1. 112Ted Rohrlich and Robert Lopez, Convict’s Father a Wealthy, Well-Liked Mediator on the

L.A. Political Scene; Profile: Horacio Carlos Vignali Has Donated Thousands Across Party Lines.

He Puts Emphasis on Strengthening the Latino Community, Aides Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,

2001, at A23. 113 Id. 114Dominic Berbeo, Hertzberg Had Part in Pardon Flap, DAILY NEWS OF L.A. (Valley Edition)

Feb. 16, 2001, at N1. 115 Id. 116 Id. Dominic Berbeo, Hertzberg Had Part in Pardon Flap, DAILY NEWS OF L.A. (Valley Edition) Feb. 16, 2001, at N1.

a. Letters of Support from Prominent California

Politicians

It appears that from the earliest stages of his efforts to obtain

a commutation for his son, Horacio Vignali attempted to enlist the

support of various state and federal politicians and other prominent Californians. By the time that the White House reviewed

Vignali’s clemency petition in January 2001, seven different political figures had drafted letters to the White House or Justice Department in support of Carlos Vignali’s petition. Horacio Vignali

apparently used a number of different tactics to convince these individuals to sign onto his cause.

Perhaps most significantly, Horacio Vignali became a major political contributor to top federal, state, and local officeholders after

his son was convicted in 1994.110 This made him a well-known figure in the Los Angeles political community. Horacio Vignali contributed reportedly more than $160,000 to state and federal office

holders after his son was incarcerated.111 He reportedly gave

$25,000 to former Governor Pete Wilson in 1994 and held a fundraiser for Governor Gray Davis in 2000 that raised $75,000, including $25,900 from himself.112 Horacio Vignali also reportedly gave

$23,500 to Davis before he became Governor 113 and $35,000 to the

Democratic Party.114 In addition, he made large contributions to a

number of Los Angeles city and county officials and held fundraisers and other political events at his Los Angeles estate. While

these contributions clearly gave Vignali the access he needed to

make his case to key political figures, it is less clear why his case

was received so positively. Most of the politicians who endorsed

Carlos Vignali’s clemency petition now admit that their actions

were a mistake and claim that they took the positions they did out

of a misplaced sympathy for a father who was deeply hurt by his

son’s imprisonment.

i. Congressman Xavier Becerra

Congressman Becerra conceded that the Vignalis were not members of his constituency but that Horacio had been a friend and

contributor of his for five years.115 The Vignalis have donated at

least $11,000 to Becerra’s political action committee, Leadership of

Today and Tomorrow, between 1998 and 2001,116 $2,475 to

1285

117 Id. Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer;

Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at 22. 118 Id. 119 Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. 120 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,

2001, at A1. 121 Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).

Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency:

Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf of a

Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22. 122 Justice Department Document Production Mayorkas 00029–30 (Letter from Roger Adams,

Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to Xavier Becerra, Member of Congress, U.S. House

of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 11). 123 NARA Document Production (Letter from Xavier Becerra, Member of Congress, U.S. House

of Representatives, to President William J. Clinton (Nov. 21, 2000)) (Exhibit 12).

Becerra’s congressional campaigns, and $3,500 to Becerra for the

mayor’s race.117

Congressman Becerra has explained to the press that he was initially approached by Horacio Vignali and Congressman Esteban

Torres, who wanted to see if Becerra could assist the Vignali family.118 After Horacio Vignali asked for Becerra’s help, Becerra

called the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California,

Alejandro Mayorkas.119 Becerra asked Mayorkas about the case

and whether a commutation could be granted. Becerra recalls that

Mayorkas looked into the case and called him back a few days

later, telling him that the conviction was justified but that the sentence was too harsh.120

Becerra also called Pardon Attorney Roger Adams about the

Vignali case.121 Becerra apparently called Adams on October 13,

1998, asking about the procedures followed by the Office of the

Pardon Attorney. On October 14, 1998, Adams sent Becerra a

lengthy letter explaining the conditions under which the Office of

the Pardon Attorney considered cases for commutation. Adams

noted that ‘‘commutation of sentence is usually recommended only

in exceptional circumstances, such as unwarranted disparity or severity of sentence, the rendering of an important service to the government not taken into account at sentencing, or terminal illness.

. . . Since President Clinton has been in office, he has granted

clemency only in three commutation cases.’’ 122

Becerra then drafted a letter to the White House in support of

Vignali. On November 21, 2000, Becerra wrote the following to

President Clinton:

[I write to] add my voice to those recommending a full

evaluation of this case to determine if justice has been

achieved in the case of Mr. Vignali. . . . In the interest of

redeeming the life of a young man, I respectfully urge you

to weigh a few factors in Mr. Vignali’s favor. Prior to Mr.

Vignali’s conviction, he had no criminal record whatsoever.

Although convicted of drug possession and the illegal sale

of drug narcotics, his parents remain highly disturbed by

a variety of factors in play at Carlos’ trial and believe that

when Carlos loaned money to a friend he unwittingly became connected with the convicted narcotics ring. It is my

understanding that neither drugs nor drug money was

found in his possession.123

1286

124Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf

of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22. 125 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the System, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at

A1.126 Id. Congressman Becerra’s position should be contrasted with that of former Associate

White House Counsel Meredith Cabe, who characterized the congressman’s involvement as ‘‘advocacy.’’ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White

House (Mar. 16, 2001). 127 NARA Document Production (Letter from Esteban E. Torres, Member of Congress, U.S.

House of Representatives, to President William J. Clinton (Aug. 4, 1998)) (Exhibit 13). 128 Antonio Olivo and Tina Daunt, Speculation Swirls over Polanco Exit from Race, L.A.

TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at B1.

After the commutation, Becerra explained his actions as follows:

‘‘Knowing that justice is not yet blind to color in America and with

time running out for the review of the Vignali case, I added my

voice to that of other community leaders . . . asking for a review

of the case.’’ 124

Unlike others, Becerra has not apologized for his role in the

Vignali case. Rather, he has steadfastly maintained that he did

nothing wrong and did not even explicitly support Vignali’s clemency grant. Becerra stated that he wrote the letters to urge the

White House to make sure that justice had been served in the

Vignali case.125 He has said that he never specifically asked President Clinton to commute Carlos Vignali’s sentence, despite the fact

that he wrote about the case and even called the White House on

January 19, 2001, to see where the case stood.126

ii. Congressman Esteban Torres

In addition to his 1996 letters to the Justice Department and the

warden of Vignali’s prison, Congressman Torres wrote to the White

House in support of Vignali’s clemency request. In an August 4,

1998, letter, Torres requested President Clinton’s ‘‘careful review

and immediate consideration of approval of his petition.’’ 127 It is

unclear why Torres wrote on Vignali’s behalf.

Congressman Torres’ son-in-law, James Casso, apparently became aware of the Vignali case while working as Congressman

Torres’ district director. More importantly, after Congressman

Torres’ retirement in 1999, Casso went into private practice as an

attorney and apparently maintained his contacts with the Vignalis.

In that capacity, Casso apparently played a significant role in introducing the Vignalis to Hugh Rodham. Unfortunately, Casso has

declined to be interviewed by the Committee about this matter.

iii. State Senator Richard Polanco

State Senator Richard Polanco, who wrote to the White House

‘‘Pardon Secretary’’ in 1996, wrote to the President once again in

2000, specifically requesting a presidential grant of clemency for

Vignali. Polanco, who received $20,000 in political contributions

from Horacio Vignali throughout his career,128 sent his letter to the

White House on December 6, 2000. At the time, Polanco was the

Chair of the Latino Legislative Caucus and purported to write on

behalf of the Caucus:

The Caucus respectfully requests you commute Mr.

Vignali’s sentence and that he be released immediately.

We believe that Mr. Vignali was convicted despite the fact

1287

129 NARA Document Production (Letter from Senator Richard G. Polanco, Senate Majority

Leader, California State Senate, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 16). 130Ted Rohrlich, et. al, Molina, Hertzberg Wrote Letters for Convict’s Pardon, L.A. TIMES, Feb.

16, 2001, at B1. 131 Id.

that the criminal investigation did not reveal any guns,

drugs, or illegal money in Mr. Vignali’s possession. Mr.

Vignali was a 22-year-old investor and did not have any

contacts demonstrating his involvement in the sale or purchase of drugs.

***

Given the facts of the case and Mr. Vignali’s conduct during incarceration, the Caucus has investigated the impact

of Mr. Vignali’s release. We are convinced that Mr. Vignali

will return to his family in southern California. Mr.

Vignali’s family is a loving, embracing family and is committed to supporting him.129

It is not clear whether Polanco obtained the approval of all 23

members of the California Latino Legislative Caucus before he

wrote the President on their behalf. However, it is clear that Senator Polanco spread misleading information about Carlos Vignali in

his letter. Rather than being an investor in a legitimate business

enterprise, as suggested by Polanco, Vignali was convicted by a

jury of providing large amounts of cocaine for distribution. His conviction was upheld by an appellate court. As for the lack of contacts

demonstrating his involvement in the sale of drugs, as claimed by

Polanco, Vignali’s own words, captured on government wiretaps,

show that he was part of a cocaine distribution conspiracy. Also of

interest is Senator Polanco’s claim that the Latino caucus had ‘‘investigated’’ the impact of Vignali’s release. Polanco has not made

it clear what steps he took to investigate the impact of the commutation. Given the inaccuracies in Polanco’s letter, the Caucus’

investigation appears to have been incomplete or, more likely, nonexistent.

iv. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria

Molina

Unlike many other individuals who supported Vignali’s bid for

clemency, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina did not receive political contributions from Horacio Vignali. Rather, she came

to know Horacio Vignali through her husband, Ron Martinez, a Los

Angeles affirmative action consultant.130 After receiving a ‘‘constant barrage of requests’’ from Horacio to support his son’s bid for

clemency, Molina agreed to write such a letter.131 In her December

20, 2000, letter, Molina stated the following:

While I usually do not write letters in support of individuals I do not know personally, I am making this request

because I do know Mr. Vignali’s family and have reviewed

his case carefully. What I have learned is that Mr. Vignali

is a young man who made a mistake in his life and is imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1288

132 NARA Document Production (Letter from Gloria Molina, Supervisor, 1st District, Board of

Supervisors, County of Los Angeles, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 20, 2001)) (Exhibit

18) (cover sheet reflecting transmission from Rodham to Lindsey, attached). 133 Id. 134 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Clinton Brother-in-Law Was Paid $400,000 to Help

Win Clemencies, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1. 135Ted Rohrlich, et. al, Molina, Hertzberg Wrote Letters for Convict’s Pardon, L.A. TIMES, Feb.

16, 2001, at B1. 136 NARA Document Production (Fax Cover Sheet, Dec. 21, 2000) (Exhibit 18) (all capitalization omitted). 137 Rene Sanchez, Powerful Supporters Retreat on Pardon, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2001, at A6. 138 NARA Document Production (Letter from Michael Hernandez, Councilman, First Council

District, City of Los Angeles, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 17). 139 Id. 140 Id.

mensely remorseful and has demonstrated a genuine interest to re-join the community.’’ 132

Molina also noted Vignali’s good record in prison, where he excelled

in his work details and received a GED.133 It is unclear how

Molina came to the understanding that Carlos Vignali was ‘‘immensely remorseful’’ for his actions. To the contrary, Carlos and

Horacio Vignali have steadily maintained Carlos’ innocence ever

since his arrest in 1994, and Carlos, to date, has never cooperated

with authorities by revealing the identities of his narcotics sources.

Molina’s ignorance of the most basic aspect of the Vignali case—

whether Vignali claimed to be innocent or guilty of the charges—

seriously undermines her claim to have ‘‘reviewed his case carefully.’’ It has also been reported that Molina shared her draft letter

of support with Horacio Vignali before it was provided to the White

House.134 Therefore, Horacio Vignali was aware of the inaccuracies

in the letter and still allowed it to be presented to the White

House. While Molina told Horacio Vignali that her letter ‘‘probably

would do no good,’’ 135 it was provided to Bruce Lindsey the day

after it was written. Hugh Rodham faxed the Molina letter to

Dawn Woollen, Bruce Lindsey’s assistant, on December 21, 2000,

with a notation stating, ‘‘Dawn, enclosed please find a copy of the

letter we discussed.’’ 136

Molina has not explicitly renounced her representations in the

Vignali case. She has, however, said that she will not write any

more letters like her Vignali letter because prosecutors and judges

know the facts better than political figures like herself.137

v. Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike

Hernandez

Horacio Vignali cultivated a close relationship with Los Angeles

City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, beginning with Hernandez’s

1993 campaign, to which Vignali contributed $2,500. Vignali also

hosted a day-long retreat at his estate for Hernandez and his staff.

On December 4, 2000, Hernandez wrote to the President, asking

him to ‘‘strongly consider commuting the sentence of Carlos A.

Vignali[,] Jr.’’ 138 Hernandez argued, ‘‘Although convicted, you will

hopefully note, that no evidence was presented that Mr. Vignali

had any involvement with illegal narcotics prior to the last three

months leading up to his arrest.’’ 139 Hernandez also noted

Vignali’s accomplishments in prison, including receiving his GED

and being named the prison’s ‘‘Student of the Year.’’ 140

1289

141See infra, section 4.a, California Law Enforcement and Political Officials Supported

Vignali’s Clemency Petition Despite Serious Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali— There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug Trafficking Against Horacio Vignali and Carlos

Vignali. 142 Beth Shuster, Back from the Bottom, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 6, 2000, at 10. 143Michael Fleeman, He Just Said Yes—An Interview with L.A. City Councilman Mike Hernandez, L.A. TIMES MAG., Jan. 1998. 144 Id. 145 NARA Document Production (Letter from Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 11, 2000)) (Exhibit 19). 146 Id. 147Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn’t Have Written on Behalf

of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22.

Hernandez’s arguments were completely irrelevant as to

Vignali’s suitability for a commutation. Even assuming Hernandez

was correct that Vignali was a large-scale drug dealer for only

three months, that hardly seems to be a powerful argument in

favor of executive clemency. Moreover, Carlos Vignali was suspected by law enforcement authorities of trafficking narcotics well

before he was actually arrested.141

The extent to which the White House relied on Hernandez’s letter is unclear. It is certain, though, that Hernandez was a questionable source for any kind of character reference, especially one

involving drug charges. In August 21, 1997, Hernandez was arrested and charged with one felony count of cocaine possession.142

He subsequently posted $10,000 bond and checked himself into a

drug-treatment hospital.143 Hernandez ultimately pleaded guilty

and entered a drug diversionary program, which allowed him to

complete his rehabilitation and, upon successful completion, avoid

the felony conviction.144

vi. Cardinal Roger Mahony

Cardinal Roger Mahony, the Archbishop of Los Angeles, also

wrote in support of Vignali. Given that the Cardinal was not a political figure, his letter may have carried particular weight with the

White House. However, Cardinal Mahony’s December 11, 2000, letter, like those of the political figures who supported the Vignali

clemency, was misleading. Mahony stated that ‘‘prior to [Vignali’s]

conviction, he had no criminal record or arrests.’’ 145 As described

above, this claim was false. Cardinal Mahony also stated that there

were ‘‘mitigating factors’’ in the Vignali case, such as the fact that ‘‘neither drugs nor drug money was found in Carlos Vignali Jr.’s

possession.’’ 146 Cardinal Mahony’s recitation of these irrelevant

facts gives the impression that there was no evidence linking

Vignali to narcotics trafficking. To the contrary, Vignali’s fellow

drug dealers testified against him, and his voice was captured on

intercepted telephone conversations, discussing the shipment of cocaine to Minnesota.

The Cardinal has issued a statement accepting some responsibility for his actions in the Vignali case. In particular, he claimed,

‘‘The purpose of the letter was to seek a further review of the facts,

the law and the processes used in his case. I made it clear that I

was incapable of making a judgment about his guilt or innocence.’’ 147 However, the Cardinal’s letter did no such thing and

even concluded that ‘‘the granting of clemency to Carlos Vignali, Jr.

is worthy of your consideration. His relatives, a very respected, acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1290

148 Id. 149 Beth Shuster, Baca Admits Call, Not Advocacy on Felon’s Clemency, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23,

2001, at A1; Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22,

2001). 150Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001). 151 Id. 152 Id. 153 Id. 154 Id. As described below, the C&H Body Shop was the location of a heroin trafficking arrest

and was alleged to be a location where cars were altered to facilitate the transportation of narcotics and drug proceeds. 155 Id.

tive and well-known Latino family, are committed to assist Carlos,

Jr. to again become a contributing member of society.’’ After the

public learned of Cardinal Mahony’s role in the Vignali case, the

Cardinal conceded, ‘‘Regardless of the merits of the case, I made a

serious mistake in writing to the president and I broke my decades-long practice of never sending a letter on behalf of any person

whom I did not know personally. I apologize for not following my

own principles in this matter.’’ 148

b. Support from Los Angeles County Sheriff

Lee Baca

The White House has cited the support of Los Angeles County

Sheriff Lee Baca, along with the support of U.S. Attorney Alejandro

Mayorkas, as being instrumental to the President’s decision to

grant clemency to Carlos Vignali. However, Baca has publicly

claimed that he did not support the grant of clemency for Vignali

but, rather, believed that he should serve out his sentence.149 Yet,

when Baca’s actions in the Vignali case are carefully examined, it

is clear that he was close to Horacio Vignali and took a number of

actions that could be seen by the White House as supporting a

grant of clemency for Carlos Vignali. In light of these facts, it is

troubling that Baca has refused to acknowledge the effect of his actions in the Vignali matter.

i. Sheriff Baca’s Relationship with the

Vignalis

Sheriff Baca met Horacio Vignali in 1991 through ‘‘Latinos for

Riordan,’’ a group which supported the election of Richard Riordan

as Mayor of Los Angeles.150 Beginning in 1993, Baca and Horacio

Vignali began having one-on-one contacts, including lunches and

other social meetings.151 Over the course of the years that followed,

Baca became friends with Horacio Vignali and his wife, Luz, and

even visited the Vignali home on five or six occasions.152 Vignali

became a major supporter of Baca. Vignali contributed $11,000 to

Baca’s campaigns for Sheriff between 1994 and 2001.153 Vignali

also hosted three fundraisers for Baca at the C&H Body Shop, each

of which raised, according to Baca, between $60,000 and $70,000

for his campaign.154

Baca first learned of Carlos Vignali’s trouble with the law

through his own deputies. In 1994, detectives from his narcotics

bureau went to the C&H Body Shop to arrest Carlos Vignali.155

Vignali had already been indicted in Minnesota, and detectives had

just been able to identify the person previously known as ‘‘C-Low’’ on surveillance tapes as Carlos Vignali. When the detectives went

1291

156 Id. 157 Id. 158 Baca was elected Sheriff in November 1998, shortly after the death of his predecessor,

Sherman Block. Id. 159 Id. 160 Id. 161 Id. 162 Id. 163 Id. 164 Id. 165 Justice Department Document Production Mayorkas 00014 (Letter from Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles, to Joan L. White, U.S. Probation Officer (Nov. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 20).

to the C&H Body Shop, Horacio told them that Carlos Vignali was

not there.156 After the detectives left, Horacio called Baca to ask

why the detectives had been there and why they were looking for

his son.157 Baca, who at the time was Chief of Field Operations for

Region II of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office,158 told Horacio

that he would look into the matter.159 Baca called the detective

who had been by the body shop and asked him why he was looking

for Carlos Vignali.160 The detective explained the matter to Baca,

and Baca called Horacio back and explained that he should have

his son meet with detectives at the body shop. Baca made a point

of not informing Horacio Vignali why investigators were looking for

Carlos and simply told Horacio that he should have his son show

up at the body shop to speak to investigators.161 Shortly thereafter,

Carlos did show up at the body shop, and he was arrested.

After Carlos Vignali’s arrest, Baca’s information about the

Vignali case came from Horacio Vignali. Baca learned of Carlos’ conviction, and Horacio often mentioned his son’s plight to Baca

when they spoke.162 Horacio Vignali told Baca that he believed his

son was innocent and that he was spending significant sums in

legal fees to appeal the conviction. Baca claims that he consistently

believed that Carlos Vignali was guilty of the charges against him.

He even claims to have had a heated discussion with Horacio

Vignali where he told him that he believed that Carlos was guilty

and responsible for his own predicament.163

Despite Sheriff Baca’s apparent lack of sympathy for Carlos’ situation, Horacio Vignali continued to mention Carlos to Baca. In

1996, Horacio informed Baca that, because he was afraid of flying,

he was having difficulty visiting his son in prison in Colorado.164

He asked for Baca’s help in having Carlos moved to a prison closer

to the Vignali’s home in Los Angeles. On November 1, 1996, Baca

wrote a letter to Vignali’s probation officer. In that letter, Baca argued that more frequent contact between the Vignali family and

Carlos would help the family and Carlos deal with his imprisonment. Baca also referred to Horacio Vignali’s ‘‘cooperation’’ with the

Sheriff’s Department:

Mr. Vignali, a highly respected businessman, cooperated

with the initial investigation that enabled Sheriff’s Department investigators to arrest his son for the offenses he was

convicted of. This level of cooperation is rare and it reflects

very highly on Mr. Vignali’s integrity. That is why I am

writing this letter.165

However, Baca’s glowing reference to Horacio’s role in Carlos’ arrest is misleading. First, Baca seems to ignore the fact that

Horacio’s first response after being contacted by Sheriff’s DepartVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1292

166Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001). 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 Id. 171 Id. 172 Id. 173 Id. 174 NARA Document Production (Letter from Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles, to

President William J. Clinton (Dec. 8, 2000)) (Exhibit 21). 175Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001).

ment investigators who wanted to speak to his son was to call his

friend who was a chief in the Sheriff’s Department. If Horacio

Vignali was truly trying to cooperate with law enforcement, he

would have told his son to meet with investigators rather than contact his politically powerful friend at the Sheriff’s Department.

More importantly, Baca intentionally did not tell Horacio Vignali

that the Sheriff’s Department intended to arrest Carlos. Rather, he

told him only that they wanted to speak to him. In this instance,

it appears that Sheriff Baca behaved professionally and appropriately. However, to the extent that Baca’s letter portrays a father

who knowingly participated in arrangements to have his son arrested, it is misleading.

ii. Sheriff Baca’s Involvement in the Vignali

Clemency Effort

In late 2000, Horacio Vignali again approached Sheriff Baca, this

time asking for his help in obtaining a grant of clemency for Carlos. Horacio asked Baca to write a letter to the President in support of the grant of clemency.166 Baca recalls that Horacio showed

him other letters of support he had obtained, including one from

Representative Becerra.167 Horacio also mentioned that Hugh

Rodham was helping him obtain a grant of clemency.168 However,

Baca declined to write any letter in support of Carlos Vignali’s request for a commutation.169 Baca informed Committee staff that he

told Horacio that his son was guilty and would not receive the commutation that he wanted.170 Baca believes that Horacio was upset

by his refusal to write a letter regarding the commutation request.171 After Baca had spoken with Horacio Vignali, he began to

reconsider his refusal to write a letter and decided that he could

write a general letter in support of Horacio Vignali.172 He drafted

such a letter, signed it, and gave the original to Horacio Vignali.173

The letter drafted by Baca did make a number of strong statements

in support of Horacio Vignali, but it did not mention Carlos at all:

This letter will confirm my support for Mr. Carlos Vignali,

Sr., as a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness.

I have known Mr. Vignali for many years and have witnessed his consistent support of law enforcement and especially the policing effort of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. . . . I am confident that Mr. Vignali will

fulfill any commitment he makes regarding any matter entrusted to him.174

After Horacio read the letter, he told Baca he did not believe he

could use the letter because it did not help his son.175 Indeed, Baca

1293

176 Id. 177 Id. 178 Id. 179 Id. 180 Id. 181 Id. 182 Id. 183 Id. 184 Id. 185 Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to Deputy White House Counsel

Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25, 2001). 186Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001). 187 Id. 188 Id. 189 Id. 190 Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to Deputy White House Counsel

Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25, 2001). 191 Id.

believes his letter was never forwarded to the White House by

Vignali.176

After giving his letter to Horacio Vignali, Sheriff Baca did not

have any further involvement with the Vignali matter until he received a phone call from Hugh Rodham in early January 2001.177

Baca received a message from Rodham and called the number

Rodham left, which turned out to be the number for the White

House switchboard.178 Baca was then connected with Rodham.179

Rodham told Baca that he was working for Horacio Vignali and

that Baca would be receiving a telephone call from the White

House Counsel’s Office regarding ‘‘Vignali, Sr.’’ 180 Baca claims he

told Rodham he had nothing to say about Carlos Vignali and believed Carlos deserved whatever he got.181 But, Baca indicated he

would discuss Horacio Vignali with the Counsel’s Office.182

Several days after Rodham’s telephone call, Baca received a message from someone else at the White House.183 Baca returned the

call to the man who had left the message, but, when he asked for

that person, he was transferred to a woman who identified herself

as an assistant of the man whom Baca sought.184 It appears this

woman was Dawn Woollen, assistant to Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey.185 Woollen asked Baca what he could tell her

about Horacio Vignali.186 Baca told Woollen ‘‘nice things’’ about

Horacio Vignali, particularly, that he was deeply devoted to his

family and very disturbed by his son’s imprisonment.187 Woollen

then asked Baca whether President Clinton should commute Carlos

Vignali’s prison sentence.188 According to Baca, he answered that

he was not familiar with the facts of the case and that it was the

President’s decision to make.189 Woollen’s recollection of the call is

significantly different. She remembers that Baca ‘‘expressed support for the Vignali commutation’’ but that he was uncomfortable

writing a letter in support of Vignali.190 According to Baca, he had

no further involvement in the Vignali case after his conversation

with Woollen.191

iii. Conclusion

Sheriff Baca has maintained that he never supported a grant of

clemency for Carlos Vignali. Rather, Baca claims that he was opposed to the commutation. After the pardon was granted, he even

made a public statement that ‘‘I maintain and espouse a policy that

those persons convicted of a crime should serve their full and comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1294

192 Beth Shuster, Baca Admits Call, Not Advocacy on Felon’s Clemency, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23,

2001 at A1. 193Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001). 194 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 387, 426 (Mar. 1, 2001). 195 NARA Document Production (Note from Dawn Woollen, Secretary to Deputy White House

Counsel Bruce Lindsey, the White House, to Bruce Lindsey, Deputy White House Counsel, the

White House) (Exhibit 22) (NARA cover sheet, reflecting that document came from Lindsey’s

file, attached).

plete sentence.’’ 192 Moreover, Sheriff Baca has taken the position

that it was not reasonable for the White House to interpret his call

as conveying support for the commutation of Carlos Vignali’s sentence.193 However, if the account of Dawn Woollen, the assistant to

Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, is accurate, Sheriff

Baca’s position is disingenuous. In addition, Sheriff Baca took a

number of discrete actions that assisted the effort to get Carlos

Vignali out of prison. As such, the White House was justified in believing that Baca supported a grant of clemency for Vignali.

Baca knew or should have known that his actions would assist

the effort to get Carlos Vignali out of prison. When Baca wrote a

letter to President Clinton vouching for Horacio Vignali’s character,

he knew that he was providing Vignali with a letter that would be

used to get Carlos Vignali out of prison. When he agreed to speak

with White House staff about Horacio Vignali, he knew the only

reason the White House wanted to know about Horacio Vignali was

that they were considering a grant of clemency for Carlos Vignali.

It is difficult to conceive what Sheriff Baca thought he was doing

if not assisting in the effort to get Carlos Vignali out of prison. Indeed, the White House interpreted Baca’s call as supporting a

grant of clemency to Carlos Vignali. It appears that Sheriff Baca’s

support for Vignali, together with that of U.S. Attorney Alejandro

Mayorkas (as described below), was instrumental to the White

House decision to grant clemency. At a Committee hearing, Deputy

White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey stated that ‘‘the Los Angeles

sheriff indicated he supported a commutation.’’ Lindsey also stated

that:

I originally was probably negative. After the call from the

. . . sheriff of Los Angeles and our office reached out to

the U.S. attorney in Central District of California and Los

Angeles, I decided that given the community support and

their position that into the county in which he would go

to live, that they would be aware of the crime situation, if

you will, in their community, and if they were not concerned about him coming back to their community, that I

thought it was an appropriate commutation.194

Sheriff Baca has been careful to point out that in none of his

calls or letters did he expressly advocate support for a grant of

clemency for Carlos Vignali. Nonetheless, it is likely that the careful language in the Sheriff’s letters resulted from his own desire to

avoid creating evidence that he supported the commutation rather

than from any lack of desire to help the Vignali family. Indeed, an

internal White House note confirms this view. The note indicates

that Hugh Rodham told Dawn Woollen that ‘‘Sheriff Baca from LA

is more than happy to speak with you about [Vignali] but is uncomfortable writing a letter offering his full support.’’ 195 This note supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1295

196 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 426 (Mar. 1, 2001).

ports the conclusion that Sheriff Baca’s actions had the effect of assisting Horacio Vignali’s effort to get his son out of prison but did

not want to create a paper trail showing that he helped a convicted

cocaine dealer get out of prison.

The most troubling aspect of Sheriff Baca’s involvement is his

continued claims that he was opposed to the Vignali commutation.

In his public statements since the commutation and his interview

with Committee staff, Baca maintained that Vignali was guilty and

should not have had his sentence commuted. Moreover, Sheriff

Baca believes there was nothing inappropriate about his role in the

Vignali matter. However, when Sheriff Baca was asked squarely by

the White House Counsel’s Office whether the President should

commute Vignali’s sentence, he said he was not familiar with the

facts of the case and it was a decision that only the President could

make. If Baca believed Vignali was guilty, as he claims to have,

and was opposed to a commutation, he should have shared his

views with the White House. It is troubling that Sheriff Baca

would make self-serving statements to the Committee and the

press that he was opposed to the commutation yet refused to express meaningful opposition when given the opportunity.

Sheriff Baca’s actions, which are troubling enough when viewed

in isolation, are even more troubling when considered in light of

two additional facts. First, Horacio Vignali was a major financial

supporter of Baca’s campaign, contributing $11,000 and raising

tens of thousands of dollars more. Second, as discussed below, law

enforcement knew of numerous allegations that Horacio Vignali

himself was involved in trafficking cocaine. Thus, the top law enforcement officer in Los Angeles County supported a grant of clemency for a cocaine trafficker, the son of a major financial supporter

and alleged narcotics trafficker. Sheriff Baca’s involvement in the

Vignali matter was inexcusable, especially for a law enforcement

officer.

c. Support from U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas

As described below, the government attorneys who actually convicted Vignali vehemently opposed the Vignali commutation. In the

face of this opposition, the intervention of Los Angeles-area U.S.

Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas is particularly troubling. According

to President Clinton’s Deputy Counsel, Bruce Lindsey, the White

House Counsel’s Office ‘‘reached out’’ to Mayorkas regarding

Vignali’s clemency petition.196 Why the White House reached out

to Mayorkas—who had no role in prosecuting Vignali in Minneapolis—rather than to the federal prosecutors who convicted Vignali is

far from clear. Equally unclear and of greater concern is why the

White House gave greater weight to Mayorkas’ position than it did

to the strenuous objections of the U.S. Attorney’s Office that actually convicted Vignali and the Pardon Attorney’s negative recommendation.

1296

197Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001). 198 Id. 199 Id. Mayorkas did not read the brief. After he received it, he put it in a file. 200 Id. 201 Id. 202 Id. 203 Id. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Power of Words from High Places, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001,

at B10; Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.

TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. Jones believed that Mayorkas received inquiries from Horacio

Vignali and was reaching out to Jones to look into Vignali’s case. Telephone Interview with Todd

Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001). Specifically, Jones opined, ‘‘Why [was Mayorkas calling him]? Because the old man was calling him.

Horacio was contacting [Mayorkas] and his U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking support for a commutation.’’ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.

TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. 204 Id. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Power of Words from High Places, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001,

at B10; Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.

TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001 at A1. 205Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001); Telephone Interview with Todd Jones,

U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001) (Jones noting

that December 2, 1999, is the likely date); Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney

Pursued Clemency Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001 at A1. 206Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2000). 207 Id. In an Interview with Committee staff, Mayorkas denies having been told this. Also,

Jones recalls that, during their discussion, Mayorkas referred to Horacio Vignali as a ‘‘player

in the community in Los Angeles, a pillar in the community.’’ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen

Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. See also Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of

Justice (May 2, 2001) (describing that Mayorkas also told Jones that Horacio Vignali was ‘‘a big guy in the community’’). Mayorkas sternly denies ever having told Jones that Horacio

Vignali was a pillar—or player—in the community. Telephone Interview with Alejandro

Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice

(June 15, 2001). According to Mayorkas, he just does not talk like that. 208Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001). Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001) (Mayorkas stati. Mayorkas’ Initial Exposure to the Vignali

Matter

Sometime in the first quarter of 1999, Mayorkas received a call

from Representative Xavier Becerra.197 During that conversation,

Becerra informed Mayorkas that he had received information regarding an appeal of Carlos Vignali’s conviction.198 Becerra sent

Mayorkas a copy of the brief and asked him to look into the matter.199 Becerra attached to the brief a few letters submitted by various community leaders in support of Carlos Vignali’s case.200 Because some of those letters were addressed to a ‘‘Pardon Secretary,’’ Mayorkas believes he assumed Carlos Vignali was seeking clemency.201

According to Mayorkas, he treated Congressman Becerra’s call as

he did other inquiries from congressmen, which he received frequently.202 In this case, he consulted Minnesota U.S. Attorney

Todd Jones, whose office tried the original case against Vignali.203

In fact, Mayorkas called Jones twice.204 In the first call, which occurred shortly after the inquiry from Representative Becerra,

Mayorkas called Jones to obtain information on the status of Carlos Vignali’s case.205 In response, Jones told Mayorkas that Carlos

Vignali was ‘‘a major player’’ in drug trafficking.206 Jones told

Mayorkas, ‘‘don’t go there,’’ when it came to Vignali—he was ‘‘bad

news.’’ 207 Jones also told Mayorkas he should call Assistant U.S.

Attorney Andrew Dunne for further details regarding the case.208

1297

ing that he recalls having been referred to a line attorney as well as the general fact of their

conversation but cannot specifically recall what was discussed). 209 Id. 210 Id. 211 Id. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001) (Jones noting that he referred Mayorkas to Dunne ‘‘for the

gory details’’). 212Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001). 213 Id. 214 Id. 215 Id. 216 Id. 217 Id. 218 Id.

Mayorkas noted that he might have asked Jones during the call if

his office was interested in receiving Carlos Vignali’s cooperation,

but he does not specifically recall.209 Mayorkas relayed what he

learned back to Congressman Becerra.210

Jones also referred Mayorkas to a line attorney who handled the

case for specifics regarding Carlos Vignali’s conviction.211 As described below, that line attorney was probably Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew Dunne, who tried the government’s case with former

Assistant U.S. Attorney Denise Reilly. Jones believes that

Mayorkas may have followed up with Dunne. Mayorkas cannot recall whether he spoke with Dunne but believed that such a conversation may have taken place. Unfortunately, the Committee was

unable to interview Dunne to confirm the conversation because of

objections from the Department of Justice. However, if such a conversation took place, Mayorkas would have likely gained even more

specific information regarding the scope of Vignali’s criminal activity.

After looking into the Vignali case for Representative Becerra,

Mayorkas actually met Horacio Vignali for the first time. Over the

next two years, Mayorkas would see Horacio Vignali at various

community events and at several one-on-one meetings with Vignali.

When Mayorkas saw Horacio Vignali, Vignali would usually mention his son’s case and tell Mayorkas how much anguish he was

suffering as a result of his son’s imprisonment. Sometime early in

1999, Horacio Vignali spoke to Mayorkas about executive clemency.212 Mayorkas told Horacio the only way he knew that Carlos’

sentence could be reduced was for him to cooperate with law enforcement and receive a reduction of his sentence under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.213 Mayorkas does not recall Horacio

Vignali’s response to that comment.214

ii. Mayorkas Calls the White House

In early January of 2001, Horacio Vignali called Mayorkas and,

noting that a petition for the commutation of his son’s sentence

was pending, asked Mayorkas if he would call the White House.215

During that conversation, Horacio Vignali stated that other individuals, including Sheriff Baca and Archbishop Mahoney, had

made similar communications.216 After Horacio Vignali’s call,

Mayorkas called the Justice Department to see if it was proper for

him to contact the White House regarding a clemency matter in

which he did not have a prosecutorial role.217 The Justice Department referred Mayorkas to the Office of the Pardon Attorney.218

1298

219 Id. 220 Id. 221 Id. 222 Id. 223 Id. 224Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001). See also Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney

Pursued Clemency Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. 225Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001). 226Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued

Clemency Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. 227Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001). 228 Id. 229 Id. 230 Id. 231 Id. See also Telephone Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the

President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001) (corroborating that she and Angel spoke with

Mayorkas); Interview with Eric Angel, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001) (corroborating that he and Cabe spoke with Mayorkas). 232Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001). 233 Id.

Mayorkas spoke to an unidentified female lawyer at the Pardon Attorney’s Office and asked if it was permissible for him to make a

call to the White House regarding clemency.219 Mayorkas recalls

telling the attorney that: (1) the case he intended to weigh in on

was not in his jurisdiction; (2) he did not know the defendant but

knew the parents; and (3) he intended only to speak to the integrity of the parents.220 According to Mayorkas, the Office of the Pardon Attorney permitted him to call the White House.221 Mayorkas

noted that the attorney with whom he spoke did not express the

slightest reservation about his intention to call the White House.222

Before calling the White House, Mayorkas called Minnesota U.S.

Attorney Todd Jones and informed him of his intention to weigh in

with the White House.223 Indeed, Jones also recalls that Mayorkas

initiated a second contact with him regarding the Carlos Vignali

matter and specifically asked him how he came out on Vignali’s

clemency request.224 Jones told Mayorkas that he opposed commutation of Vignali’s sentence.225 He did not recall whether

Mayorkas indicated an intent to weigh in with the White House

but noted that the conversation was very brief.226 Jones was troubled by Mayorkas’ inquiries about the Vignali case and his subsequent lobbying on behalf of Vignali, believing that only the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the case should have been involved in recommending a grant of clemency and that, if a prosecutor was not

so involved, he should ‘‘stay the hell away from it.’’ 227 Jones remarked that if the roles were reversed, he would never have

weighed in on the Vignali case.228

Mayorkas then called Deputy White House Counsel Bruce

Lindsey.229 Mayorkas believes that Horacio Vignali suggested he

call Lindsey and provided him Lindsey’s contact information.230

Mayorkas’ call was returned by Associate White House Counsels

Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel.231 Mayorkas indicated that Horacio

Vignali had asked him to make the call.232 Also, according to

Mayorkas, he told Cabe and Angel that he was not familiar with

the facts of the case and did not know the defendant but knew the

parents to be good people.233 In that conversation, he also noted

1299

234 Id. 235 Id. 236 Id. 237 Richard Serrano, L.A. Leaders’ Support Cited in Decision to Free Vignali, L.A. TIMES, Feb.

19, 2001, at A1. 238 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 387 (Mar. 1, 2001). 239 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the

White House (Mar. 28, 2001). 240 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the

White House (Mar. 28, 2001). Mayorkas strenuously denies having said this. Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001). According to Mayorkas, he was never in a position to opine

about the appropriateness of Vignali’s sentence. And, if he was asked whether he holds that position now, the answer would be ‘‘no.’’ And, if one were to ask whether he espoused that position

then, his answer would be ‘‘no.’’ According to Mayorkas, ‘‘Some sentences are too lenient. Others

are too harsh.’’ But, regarding the term ‘‘disproportionate’’ as relating to Vignali’s sentence,

Mayorkas stated that he ‘‘never talked like that.’’

that the federal prosecutors in Minnesota who convicted Vignali opposed commutation of Vignali’s sentence.234 Mayorkas does not recall having expressed support for Vignali’s clemency request during

that call.235 But, he observed that the fact of his call conveyed support for the commutation, noting, ‘‘By virtue of the fact of the

phone call, there’s no question that I conveyed support for the commutation.’’ 236

Mayorkas’ belief, in hindsight, that his call to the White House

conveyed support for Vignali’s clemency request was correct. Statements of various staff members at the White House involved in the

clemency process indicated that they thought that Mayorkas supported the commutation. Chief of Staff John Podesta plainly believed that Mayorkas actually supported commutation of Vignali’s

sentence.237 Also, in testimony before the Committee, Deputy

White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey stated that Mayorkas, ‘‘while

saying he didn’t know much about the facts, felt like that the family was a good environment for which [sic] Mr. Vignali would get

the proper supervision.’’ 238 Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe likewise confirmed that Mayorkas supported Vignali’s

petition, said he thought well of the Vignali family, and believed

that the family would support Vignali after his release.239 According to Cabe, Mayorkas explained his views in the Vignali case by

asserting that most drug sentences were disproportionate.240

iii. Conclusion

Alejandro Mayorkas acted inappropriately in supporting the commutation of Carlos Vignali’s sentence. Mayorkas made three major

mistakes in the Vignali matter. First, Mayorkas should have realized that by calling the White House regarding Horacio Vignali, he

was conveying support for the commutation of Carlos Vignali’s sentence. Mayorkas now understands that his call had such an effect,

but there is no reason that Mayorkas should not have understood

this simple fact when he called. Mayorkas understood that the

White House was considering the commutation of Vignali’s sentence. He knew that the only reason the White House wanted to

hear from him was so that it could evaluate whether to grant the

commutation. Therefore, when he provided a positive character reference for Horacio Vignali, he should have known it would have a

positive effect on Carlos Vignali’s commutation petition.

1300

241 U.S. Attorney Apologizes for Role in Vignali Pardon, CITY NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 23, 2001.

Second, just as Mayorkas should have known the effect of his actions, he should have known he was weighing in on a matter about

which he knew very little. Mayorkas was aware that the prosecutor

responsible for the Vignali case, Todd Jones, was against the commutation. In fact, he pointed this fact out to White House staff during his conversation with them. However, Mayorkas should have

also known that, as a U.S. Attorney, he was providing confusing

signals to the White House. He should have realized he was abusing his office by providing a character reference in a clemency case

in which his office had no involvement.

Finally, Mayorkas did not know Horacio Vignali well enough to

offer a character reference. Mayorkas’ relationship with Horacio

Vignali consisted of seeing Vignali at various community events

and only two or three one-on-one meetings for dinner or drinks.

Mayorkas now concedes that he did not know Vignali well enough

to call the White House and provide a character reference. But,

Mayorkas’ concession raises questions as to why he made the call

at all. Three possibilities are apparent: first, that Mayorkas is simply an overly compassionate person who provided help when he

should not have; second, that he wanted to help a well-connected,

wealthy, and politically powerful businessman; and third, that he

felt pressure to help Vignali because so many other Los Angeles political figures were helping him. Most likely, Mayorkas assisted

Vignali out of a combination of all three of these factors.

However, of all of the people who were involved in helping Carlos

Vignali, Mayorkas appears to have most clearly accepted responsibility and apologized for his actions. After his involvement in the

Vignali matter came to light, Mayorkas explained to his staff:

I called the White House counsel’s office and informed the

office that I was not familiar with the facts of the case,

that the prosecuting U.S. attorney was against the commutation, and that I was calling because I knew the parents to be upstanding people. I understand that my telephone call conveyed support for the commutation. In hindsight, it was a mistake for me to place that call [to the

White House] and I am sorry that I did so. I allowed my

compassion for the parents to interfere with my judgment.’’ 241

In addition, the responsibility for the Vignali commutation cannot be pinned entirely on Mayorkas, as some White House staff

have attempted to do. In various settings, White House staff have

pointed to the involvement of Mayorkas, along with Sheriff Baca,

as being central to the President’s decisionmaking. Deputy White

House Counsel Bruce Lindsey testified that he changed his mind

regarding the Vignali matter after the White House heard from

Baca and Mayorkas. Associate White House Counsel Meredith

Cabe stated that Mayorkas’ opinion was ‘‘significant’’ because ‘‘very

few prosecutors advocate clemency in any form.’’ But, the White

House was not justified in relying on the support offered by Baca

or Mayorkas to any determinative extent. While they both made

statements that amounted to support for Horacio Vignali, and as

1301

242Telephone Interview with the Honorable Denise Reilly, Juvenile Court Judge, 4th Judicial

District of Minnesota (Hennepin County) (May 11, 2001); Telephone Interview with Todd Jones,

U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2000). 243 In the course of its inquiry, the Committee has learned that while the White House was

reviewing Carlos Vignali’s clemency petition, Horacio Vignali and associates of Vignali were part

of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (‘‘OCDETF’’) investigation in the Los AnContinued

such, support for the commutation, they both also made it clear

that they knew little about the case against Carlos Vignali. It appears that the White House was looking for reasons justifying commutation and as such used the support of Mayorkas and Baca as

a fig leaf to rationalize its decision.

4. California Law Enforcement and Political Officials

Supported Vignali’s Clemency Petition Despite Serious Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos

Vignali

a. There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug

Trafficking Against Both Horacio and Carlos

Vignali

The Committee has learned of numerous allegations made to law

enforcement as long as twenty-five years ago that Horacio Vignali

was involved in cocaine trafficking and other illegal activity. The

Committee has also discovered other allegations that Carlos

Vignali was involved in drug sales even more extensive than those

for which he was prosecuted in Minnesota. Although the information the Committee obtained consists solely of allegations against

Horacio and Carlos Vignali, it is extremely significant. These reports allege long-term criminal activity on the part of Horacio

Vignali, in particular, that Horacio Vignali was involved in the cocaine trade and was the source of supply for his son. Despite the

availability of these reports to Sheriff Baca and U.S. Attorney

Mayorkas, both chose not to exercise any due diligence before supporting Vignali’s clemency plea. Although the White House and the

Justice Department also had access to these reports, it apparently

did not consider them. Even though these serious allegations have

not been proven, the mere fact of their existence—without additional information—should have ruled out the possibility of executive clemency for Carlos Vignali. Instead, these reports were never

considered.

While the extensive DEA reports regarding Horacio and Carlos

Vignali are being made public only now, it appears that suspicions

about Horacio Vignali’s role in drug trafficking were widespread

and well-known to law enforcement. In interviews with Committee

staff, Todd Jones and Denise Reilly, who were responsible for the

investigation and prosecution of Carlos Vignali in Minnesota, both

indicated they believed that Carlos Vignali was not the ‘‘end of the

line’’ and were aware of the widespread belief among investigators

that Horacio Vignali was involved in drug trafficking with his

son.242 Law enforcement officers in California had even more detailed knowledge regarding allegations against Horacio and Carlos

Vignali. According to a number of investigators working for local

law enforcement in Southern California, both Horacio and Carlos

Vignali had been the subjects of major drug investigations.243 As

1302

geles area. Various federal and California law enforcement agencies were investigating Carlos

and Horacio Vignali’s involvement in supplying narcotics before Carlos’ conviction in Minneapolis and Horacio Vignali’s personal and business relationship with alleged California drug figure

George Torres. In this case, the OCDETF investigation was being conducted by the federal government in cooperation with various agencies of the California State Department of Justice. 244The DEA report refers to ‘‘Carlos Vignali,’’ but it clearly means Horacio Vignali, or ‘‘Carlos

Vignali, Sr.,’’ as he is known to many of his associates. The date of birth listed for Vignali, as

well as other personal information, appears to correspond to that of Horacio Vignali. 245DEA Document Production V–DEA–00009 (DEA–6–Internal Investigative Report (Feb. 18,

1976)) (Exhibit 23). 246DEA Document Production V–DEA–00012 (DEA–6–Internal Investigative Report (Dec. 1,

1976)) (Exhibit 24). 247This information casts the following testimony from Horacio Vignali at Carlos’ trial in a

new light: ‘‘I treated him like my best friend, my partner. Anything he needed, I would always

the following reports indicate, a number of law enforcement agencies apparently received credible information indicating that Carlos

and Horacio Vignali were personally involved in large-scale drug

dealing. These same agencies also received allegations indicating

that the Vignalis were part of a large organized drug-dealing ring

headed by George Torres.

The first series of reports indicates that there were allegations

of drug dealing against Horacio Vignali dating back to 1976.

Among those reports is a DEA–6, an internal investigative report,

which notes:

[Horacio] Carlos VIGNALI 244—Co-owner of the C & H

Auto Body Shop. His drug relationship with the [redacted]

Organization is also unknown. VIGNALI however is a

close personal friend of [redacted]. In November, 1975, he

negotiated with ATF Agents to sell a machine gun and

stated to them that he had also smuggled heroin into the

United States utilizing automobiles. Since current intelligence indicates that the remainder of the [redacted] Family in Los Angeles, [redacted] are still dealing in multi-kilogram quantities of heroin, it is recommended that a grand

jury probe be initiated with the object of eliminating the

remaining [redacted] Organization in Los Angeles by obtaining indictments on [redacted] possibly other members

of their organization such as [redacted] [Horacio] Carlos

VIGNALI, [redacted].245

A December 1, 1976, DEA report contains similar information:

[Horacio] Carlos VIGNAL [sic]—the [redacted]s used his

body shop in Los Angeles to take heroin out of the drive

shafts of vehicles brought into the United States from

Mexico.246

A more recent set of DEA reports contains additional allegations

that Horacio Vignali was involved in drug trafficking. They also

show that the DEA received information indicating Horacio was involved in the drug trade with his son Carlos. A March 19, 1993,

report states:

The ‘‘traps’’, (hidden compartments) were built into the

truck through Carlos VIGNALI Jr. for $5,000.00. [Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos VIGNALI

Jr. of Los Angeles. . . . VIGNALI’s father Carlos VIGNALI

aka ‘‘pops’’ owns a body shop, at 1260 Figueroa and is the

source of supply for his son.247 . . . An associate of

1303

provide for him. Always. It doesn’t matter. I always provided for him.’’ See Transcript of Trial,

U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 1994) at 297. 248DEA Document Production (DEA–6–Internal Investigative Report (Mar. 19, 1993)) (Exhibit

25). 249See DEA Document Production V–DEA–00028–29 (DEA–6–Internal Investigative Report

(Apr. 26, 1993)) (Exhibit 26). The Committee has reviewed an unredacted copy of this report

but is not releasing it for the reason described above. 250 At trial, Carlos Vignali conceded that Torres was a friend of the family and, in particular,

of his father. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 227. Carlos appears

to have used a variation of George Torres’ name—‘‘Charles Torres’’—when he subscribed for his

pager. Because Carlos used that pager to communicate with his coconspirators in trafficking cocaine, he used ‘‘Charles Torres’’ to conceal his true identity. 251DEA Document Production V–DEA–00110 (DEA Case Initiation Report (Sept. 25, 1997))

(Exhibit 27).

VIGNALI, Jorge TORRES aka ‘‘G’’ owns [NUMBERO

UNO] Market on Jefferson St. in Los Angeles. Across the

street from the Market, TORRES maintains a warehouse

full of luxury vehicles and tractor trailers used to transport cocaine. The warehouse also has a penthouse complete with a casino where TORRES and VIGNALI gamble.

. . . Cocaine purchased from VIGNALI Jr. went to [redacted] of Shreveport, La.248

The Committee has received additional information from a DEA

report that it is not releasing because it could identify confidential

informants.249 In this report, an informant alleges, based on his direct knowledge, that Carlos Vignali sold hundreds of kilograms of

cocaine. Additionally, Vignali is alleged to have stated that he had

ties to the relative of a prominent South American cocaine dealer.

Like the other information in the DEA reports, these allegations

are unproven.

In addition to the reports listed above, two recent reports indicate that the DEA received information linking Horacio Vignali to

a large-scale drug dealing organization headed by George

Torres.250 A September 25, 1997, DEA Case Initiation Report describes the Torres organization:

[Torres’ organization] has been in existence since the middle 1980’s when it was closely associated with the [redacted] family in their drug trafficking. By the early 1990’s

this group were [sic] transporting approximately 1,800

kilograms of cocaine into the Los Angels [sic] area from

Mexico. At that time they were smuggling the cocaine

using the [redacted] TORRES’s tractor-trailer trucks, concealing the drugs inside laundry detergent and jalapeno

chilli [sic] cans. [Redacted.] Since that time TORRES has

continued to be involved in drug trafficking and information shows that his organization supply [sic] various drug

trafficking organizations throughout the United States.

TORRES’ organization has used illicit profits derived from

drug trafficking to buy legitimate businesses and properties throughout Los Angels [sic] and southern California.

. . . Investigators believe that the organization uses these

businesses to laundry [sic] its drug proceeds.251

A September 16, 1998, DEA report about Torres reported the following:

1304

252DEA Document Production (Case Initiation Report on the George Torres Cocaine Trafficking Organization, Sept. 16, 1998) (Exhibit 28). 253 Id.

To date, the investigation shows that the TORRES organization is involved in the importation and distribution of

drugs throughout the United States. Latest intelligence reveals that this group is distributing approximately one

hundred (100) kilograms of cocaine per month. [Redacted.]

George TORRES is the head of this organization.

TORRES’ direct associates include [redacted] Carlos

Vignali. [Redacted] Carlos Horatio [sic] VIGNALI’s role in

the organization is relatively unknown at this time. It is

believed that VIGNALI functions as a financial partner in

the organization. VIGNALI has been involved in organizing meetings between TORRES and individuals with extensive criminal backgrounds.252

The report goes on to describe the scope of Torres’ activities:

The TORRES organization has used its profits from drug

trafficking to purchase legitimate businesses and properties throughout the Southern California area—The grocery and wholesale business are cash intensive thus making it easy to launder illicit funds through them. In 1996,

TORRES’ businesses had sales of approximately $50,000,000. Investigators believe that TORRES uses

these businesses, properties and vehicles to launder his

drug profits. Members of the TORRES organization have

been involved in various acts of violence. In 1996,

TORRES was arrested for being a felon in possession of a

firearm. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has

named TORRES a suspect in two murders. One involved

a disgruntled employee and the other involved the owner

of a property adjacent to one of TORRES’ businesses.

TORRES has been known to intimidate and threaten others and in so doing likes to portray himself as a Mafia

member. He often uses his associates to carry out these

acts of intimidation.253

This troubling report regarding Horacio Vignali and George Torres

was received just one month after Carlos Vignali applied for executive clemency.

b. The Extensive Allegations Against Horacio

and Carlos Vignali Were Never Considered by

Sheriff Baca, U.S. Attorney Mayorkas, or the

Clinton White House

The allegations made against Horacio Vignali, Carlos Vignali,

and George Torres are serious. However, with respect to the decision to commute the sentence of Carlos Vignali, the key fact is that

these allegations existed, and none of the individuals involved in

the clemency process conducted sufficient due diligence to find

these reports. Both Sheriff Lee Baca and U.S. Attorney Alejandro

Mayorkas, who made supportive calls to the White House on the

Vignalis’ behalf, had access to this information. In addition, the

White House should have been provided with this information as

1305

254Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001). 255 Id. 256 Id. 257 According to a November 10, 1992, DEA report, the gang enforcement unit at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department discovered that a vehicle used by Carlos Vignali was registered to a company that owned cars ‘‘associated with various gangs.’’ DEA Document Production V–DEA–00024 (DEA–6, Report of Investigation, ‘‘Carlos Anibal Vignali,’’ (Nov. 10, 1992))

(Exhibit 29). 258Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001). 259 Id. 260 Id. 261 Id. 262 Id.

part of the clemency process. However, it appears that Baca,

Mayorkas, and the White House were all unaware of the extensive

allegations against the Vignalis.

Committee staff asked Sheriff Baca whether he was aware of any

allegations that Horacio Vignali was involved in drug trafficking.

Baca replied that he was not aware of any such allegations.254

Baca readily admitted that he would be the person to know if there

were any such allegations against Vignali.255 Sheriff Baca was also

asked if he was familiar with George Torres. He stated that he

knew Torres and ‘‘know[s] him to be a legitimate businessman.’’ 256

As he himself conceded, Sheriff Baca, the top law enforcement officer in Los Angeles County, should have known if a businessman of

Horacio Vignali’s or George Torres’ caliber was alleged to have

been involved in drug dealing.257 Therefore, it is troubling that

Baca is completely unaware of the allegations against Vignali and

Torres. It appears that rather than investigate these allegations

against Horacio Vignali and close down what might have been a

major conduit for drugs into the Los Angeles area, Sheriff Baca

maintained a warm relationship with Vignali and vouched for him

as a ‘‘man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness.’’ Indeed,

Baca held three fundraisers at Vignali’s C&H Body Shop, which

itself was alleged to be a locus for unloading drugs and outfitting

vehicles for smuggling drugs.

Committee staff also asked Alejandro Mayorkas whether he was

aware of allegations that Horacio Vignali was involved in drug trafficking.258 Mayorkas expressed great surprise that Horacio Vignali

was the subject of these kinds of allegations.259 When informed of

the allegations, Mayorkas immediately stated that if he had been

aware of the allegations, he would have ruled out any possibility

of involvement in Carlos Vignali’s clemency petition. Mayorkas also

confirmed that it would not have mattered to him that the allegations against Horacio Vignali were not proven. Mayorkas stated

that ‘‘an allegation is enough—the world consists of the caught and

the uncaught. Allegations alone would have eliminated the possibility [of my involvement].’’ 260

Mayorkas conceded that he did not exercise any due diligence regarding the Vignalis prior to his weighing in on the clemency proceedings with the White House.261 In other words, he did not consult his criminal chief or the head of his narcotics division at the

Los Angeles-area U.S. Attorney’s Office to determine whether his

own office had an investigative or prosecutorial interest in the

Vignalis, which might have conflicted with his assistance to the

Vignalis.262 Mayorkas explained that his failure to conduct due

1306

263 Id. 264 NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation of Sentence) (Exhibit 10).

diligence resulted from his belief that he was not supporting Carlos

Vignali’s clemency petition. Since he did not view himself as providing support for the grant of clemency, Mayorkas did not believe

that he needed to investigate Vignali’s background. However given

what he knows in hindsight about the Vignalis and about how his

call to the White House was interpreted by White House staff,

Mayorkas conceded it was perhaps an error for him to have taken

his involvement in the clemency proceedings so lightly.263

While Mayorkas’ acceptance of responsibility is commendable, his

actions in this matter remain less than commendable, especially for

the top federal prosecutor in Los Angeles. Mayorkas has explained

that his actions in this matter were motivated by his sympathy and

compassion for a father who appeared to be distraught by the imprisonment of his son. Because he failed to conduct due diligence

and look into Horacio Vignali’s background before contacting the

White House, Mayorkas ended up providing assistance to a man

who was alleged to be a drug dealer and the source of cocaine for

his son. Like Sheriff Baca, Mayorkas was a senior law enforcement

official charged with protecting his communities. By becoming involved in the Vignali matter without being fully aware of the facts,

both did the public a profound disservice to the rule of law.

There is no indication that the White House was ever made

aware of the additional allegations against Horacio and Carlos

Vignali. Unlike many other last-minute pardons and

commutations, the Vignali commutation was filed with and processed by the Justice Department. Although the Vignali petition

was filed with the Justice Department in August 1998,264 there is

no indication that the Justice Department discovered these allegations against Horacio and Carlos Vignali during its background

check. The memorandum prepared by the Pardon Attorney, Roger

Adams, for President Clinton makes no mention of these allegations. There is also no indication that they were provided to the

White House in any other form. However, it is possible that the

White House would have learned about these allegations if it had

reached out to the prosecutor who had tried Vignali’s case or the

judge who sentenced him. Rather, they reached out to Horacio

Vignali’s friends and associates in Los Angeles who knew little

about the Vignali case but were ready to provide a favorable reference.

Therefore, the failure of the White House to receive this information appears to be the result of the skewed, ad hoc system set up

by President Clinton to churn out pardons and commutations in

the waning days of his presidency. This was a system that necessarily catered to the wealthy and the well-connected. If White

House staff had approached the Vignali matter in a deliberate

manner and had spoken to the individuals who knew the most

about Carlos Vignali’s conviction, they likely would have learned

this information. While it is not certain that this information regarding the drug dealing allegations against Horacio and Carlos

Vignali would have changed President Clinton’s mind, it clearly

should have been considered.

1307

265 Valenzuela is a Los Angeles-area real estate executive and a member of the Congressional

Hispanic Caucus Institute. 266Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI Capital Commercial Real

Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001). Presently, Casso, who served as Congressman Torres’ district

director until Torres’ retirement in 1999 and unsuccessfully ran for Congress, is an attorney

with the Los Angeles firm of Alavarez-Glasman & Colvin.

C. The White House’s Review of Vignali’s Clemency Request

Carlos Vignali’s clemency petition was first filed with the Justice

Department in August 1998, but it first came under serious consideration much later, in December 2000, when Hugh Rodham was

hired by the Vignali family and approached the White House about

a grant of clemency for Carlos Vignali. Rodham’s contacts with the

White House started a process culminating in the January 20,

2001, commutation of Vignali’s sentence. The process by which the

White House considered the Vignali petition was remarkable and

disturbing for a number of reasons:

• Hugh Rodham made a number of misrepresentations to the

White House regarding the Vignali matter. Nevertheless, the

White House continued to rely on his word and granted the

commutation he so desperately sought.

• The White House sought input from a number of Vignali’s supporters yet never contacted the prosecutors who tried the

Vignali case or the judge who sentenced him.

• The White House ignored the strenuous objections lodged by the

Pardon Attorney who had considered the position of the prosecutors who tried the Vignali case.

• The White House apparently relied heavily on letters and statements of support by California politicians and law enforcement

figures despite the fact that they either misstated the Vignali

case or were completely unaware of the facts of the case.

• The White House has subsequently misstated the facts of

Vignali’s case in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable.

1. Hugh Rodham’s Hiring

In connection with its investigation, the Committee requested

that Hugh Rodham produce records to the Committee and participate in an interview with Committee staff. Rodham refused both

requests, citing attorney-client privilege. Rodham made a blanket

invocation of the privilege even though the privilege does not apply

to the vast majority of Rodham’s activities. For example, Rodham’s

contacts with third parties, like White House staff, are not covered

by the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, by using the attorneyclient privilege to avoid any inquiry from the Committee, Rodham

is simply seeking to avoid questions about his activities rather than

to protect any legitimately privileged information. Despite

Rodham’s unreasonable invocation of privilege, the Committee was

able to piece together a number of Rodham’s activities.

It appears that the Vignalis hired Rodham late in 2000. According to Luis Valenzuela, a close friend of Horacio Vignali,265 James

Casso, the son-in-law and former district director of former Congressman Esteban Torres, introduced Horacio Vignali to Rodham

sometime around October 2000.266 At that time, Valenzuela atVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1308

267 Id. According to Valenzuela, Nora Lum, her sister, Kathy Nojima, and her daughter,

Nickie, attended the dinner. Because Gene Lum was then in prison for a tax evasion conviction,

he was apparently unable to attend the dinner. According to Valenzuela, Casso might have represented the Lums on various real estate matters. Gene and Nora Lum, who operated an Oklahoma natural-gas pipeline company, received 10-month sentences after pleading guilty in October 1997 to funneling $50,000 in illegal contributions to the 1994 re-election campaign of Senator Edward Kennedy and to an unsuccessful congressional campaign in Oklahoma. Federal

Document Clearing House, Department of Justice, New Jersey Attorney Sentenced in Campaign

Finance Case, Oct. 12, 2000 (summarizing Campaign Task Force prosecutions). They admitted

making the donations through ‘‘straw donors,’’ including their daughter and Michael Brown, son

of the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. The fundraisers gave Michael Brown thousands of

dollars in shareholder fees and corporate perks, and Brown then gave the money to friends to

give to Kennedy’s re-election campaign. 268Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI Capital Commercial Real

Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001). 269 Id. 270 Id. 271 Id. See also City National Bank Document Production (Check from Horacio C. and Luz C. Vignali to Rodham & Fine, P.A. for $4,200.00 (Nov. 22, 2000)) (Exhibit 30). 272Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI Capital Commercial Real

Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001). 273See Turnberry Bank Document Production (Check from Horacio C. and Luz C. Vignali to Rodham & Fine for $200,000 (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 31); City National Bank Document Production (Application for Cashier’s Check (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 32); First Union Document

Production (Deposit Slip and Cashier’s Check for $200,000 (Jan. 26, 2001)) (Exhibit 33). 274See City National Bank Document Production (Application for Cashier’s Check (Jan. 23,

2001)) (Exhibit 31); City National Bank Document Production (Morvis Corvis Business Account

Agreement (Mar. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 34) (describing Maria Cisneros as ‘‘office manager’’). 275First Union Document Production (Deposit Slip and Cashier’s Check for $200,000 (Jan. 26,

2001)) (Exhibit 33). In several contexts, Valenzuela appears to have been involved in funding

Horacio Vignali’s payment to Rodham. On January 12, 2001, Horacio Vignali wrote a check for $200,000 to City National Bank. On the memo of that check, Vignali noted ‘‘CC: Luis

Valenzuela.’’ See City National Bank Document Production (Exhibit 35). In a separate transtended a dinner at Barrangas restaurant in Los Angeles where he

met with Horacio Vignali, Casso, Rodham, and three members of

the Lum family.267 The Lums were seeking presidential pardons

through Hugh Rodham at that time, and it is possible Rodham introduced the Lums to Horacio Vignali as a way of marketing his

services. After dinner, the Lums left the restaurant, and Horacio

Vignali discussed his son’s clemency matter with Rodham.268 At

that point, Horacio Vignali explained the background of his son’s

underlying conviction and provided Rodham with a binder of materials regarding his son.269 Rodham indicated that he would review

the matter, ‘‘make some calls,’’ and get back to Horacio Vignali.270

For that initial consultation, Rodham charged Horacio Vignali

$4,200.271 Valenzuela was not privy to any further meetings or discussions between Rodham and Vignali.272

Due to the refusal of Horacio Vignali, Hugh Rodham, and James

Casso to cooperate with the Committee, little is known about the

agreement that was reached between Rodham and Vignali after the

Barrangas dinner. What is clear is that Rodham agreed to help

Carlos Vignali obtain a commutation from President Clinton, and

that Horacio Vignali agreed to pay $200,000 to Rodham, contingent

on Rodham’s success in getting Carlos Vignali out of prison.

Horacio Vignali paid Rodham on January 23, 2001, three days

after Carlos Vignali received his commutation. Vignali’s bank

records make it appear that Vignali originally wrote a check for

$200,000 to Rodham & Fine, Rodham’s law firm, but then converted those funds into a cashier’s check.273 That cashier’s check

was purchased by Maria Cisneros, the office manager for Horacio

Vignali’s Morvis Corvis Corporation.274 It is unknown whether

Vignali altered his payment method at Rodham’s request. Hugh

Rodham deposited the funds on January 24, 2001.275

1309

action, on January 26, 2001, a cashier’s check for $200,000 was purchased, apparently on

Horacio Vignali’s behalf, and made payable to Luis Valenzuela. See City National Bank Document Production (Exhibit 36). It appears that the check was later endorsed by Cisneros and ultimately deposited into Horacio’s personal account. Accordingly, it appears that Vignali contemplated paying Valenzuela but changed his mind. See City National Bank Document Produc- tion (Deposit Slip for $200,000 (Jan. 26, 2001)) (Exhibit 37). In an interview with Committee

staff, Valenzuela did not know that his name had been put on the checks until after it was done

and, in any case, never came into possession of any of the money. Telephone Interview with

Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI Capital Commercial Real Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001).

But, Valenzuela speculated that his name appeared on both instruments because Vignali probably intended for him to act as an escrow agent for the money if/when Carlos Vignali was released. According to Valenzuela, this was probably done ‘‘so the representation could be made

to [Hugh Rodham] that the money was in escrow.’’ Valenzuela believes that such a representation was made only because ‘‘[Horacio] is a very cautious guy.’’ Valenzuela believes that he was

designated as an escrow agent without having been notified only because he and Horacio are

‘‘like brothers.’’ 276 NARA Document Production (Letter from Horacio Vignali to Hugh Rodham (Dec. 9, 2000))

(Exhibit 14). 277 Id. 278 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 412 (Mar. 1, 2001).

By December 2000, Hugh Rodham was apparently actively working on Carlos Vignali’s clemency petition. This is evidenced by a

December 9, 2000, letter to Rodham wherein Horacio Vignali forwarded a number of letters of support for Carlos Vignali.276 The

letter begins, ‘‘[p]ursuant to your conversation with Jaime Casso,

I am enclosing the testimonial letters I have been able to secure

as of today.’’ 277

2. Hugh Rodham’s Initial Approach to the White

House

In mid-December 2000, Rodham first approached Bruce Lindsey

regarding the Vignali case. It appears that Lindsey was Rodham’s

main White House contact. Chief of Staff John Podesta testified

that he did not know Hugh Rodham was advocating Carlos

Vignali’s petition. White House Counsel Beth Nolan equivocated

about her knowledge of Hugh Rodham’s involvement. Specifically,

Nolan answered, ‘‘I don’t think I knew that, but I may have known

that.’’ 278 Lindsey explained his interactions with Rodham in the

Committee’s March 1, 2001, hearing:

Mr. Rodham called to ask me to take a look at a commutation application for Carlos Vignali, indicated that he was

a first-time offender, that his application was supported by

the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, that it was supported

by the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles.

***

[H]e also told me it was supported by the trial attorney

who actually tried the case in Minnesota. That turned out

probably not to be correct.

***

[He] [t]old me it was supported by the U.S. Attorney in

Los Angeles, by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, by the

Cardinal Archbishop Diocese and Archdiocese in Los Angeles, Cardinal Mahoney, by several Congressmen, former

1310

279 Id. at 361–62. 280There are only three possible prosecutors Rodham could have been referring to: Todd

Jones, Andrew Dunne, or Denise Reilly. Committee staff interviewed Jones and Reilly, and they

were strongly opposed to the commutation. Committee staff were not able to interview Dunne,

but Jones informed Committee staff that Dunne helped him prepare the Minnesota U.S. Attorney Office’s formal opposition to the Vignali commutation. Therefore, it is certain that he opposed the commutation as well. It is clear now that no attorney involved in prosecuting Vignali

supported the commutation, and it was just as clear when Hugh Rodham made his misrepresentation to the White House. 281 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 282 NARA Document Production (chart of former Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel)

at 6 (Exhibit 38). 283 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 284 Id.

Congressmen, city council people. . . . I indicated to him

that it was—that he had served six years approximately.

I indicated to Mr. Rodham that that was the kind of application the President actually was interested in looking at.

He was interested in looking at first-time drug offenders

who did not play major roles in the crime and that we

would take a look at it.279

Based on Bruce Lindsey’s testimony, in his initial presentation to

Lindsey, Rodham made a number of serious misrepresentations.

First, he claimed that Vignali was a first-time offender. As described above, this is plainly false because Vignali had two prior

convictions and two other arrests. In addition, Vignali was an admitted gang member. Second, when Rodham told Lindsey that

Vignali was a ‘‘first-time drug offender who did not play a major

role in the crime,’’ Rodham misstated the case against Vignali. As

explained above, Vignali was a major source of cocaine and was

sentenced accordingly. Third, Rodham informed Lindsey that the

Vignali petition was ‘‘supported by the trial attorney who actually

tried the case in Minnesota.’’ While Lindsey could bring himself

only to concede that Rodham’s statement was ‘‘probably not correct,’’ it is, in fact, utterly false.280 The only question is whether

Rodham’s lie was his own creation, calculated to mislead the White

House or whether he was fed the lie by the Vignalis or others

working on their behalf. Rodham’s lie regarding the position of the

Minnesota U.S. Attorney’s office was no small matter. It was apparently passed on by Lindsey to Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel,

the White House lawyers working on the pardon. Both noted they

had originally believed that the prosecutors supported the commutation and then learned that their information was not accurate.281 Rodham’s misinformation also found its way into White

House documents analyzing the Vignali matter. In a chart dated

January 9, 2001, a White House staffer stated that ‘‘acc. to representatives, U.S. Atty in Minneapolis (who prosecuted him) supports [clemency.]’’ 282

After Lindsey spoke to Rodham, Lindsey referred the Vignali

matter to Meredith Cabe, the Associate White House Counsel responsible for clemency issues. Cabe conducted a brief review of the

two-page clemency petition but did not read any of the appendices

submitted with the petition.283 Cabe also stated that she frequently

received materials from Lindsey regarding the Vignali case.284 PreVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1311

285 Interview with Deborah Smolover, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 12, 2001). 286 Id. 287 Id. 288 Id. 289 Id.

sumably, Lindsey received these materials from Hugh Rodham and

other outsiders interested in the Vignali case.

Despite Hugh Rodham’s efforts to mislead, the White House was

able to obtain accurate information about Carlos Vignali. Thanks

to the Pardon Attorney, the White House learned that Carlos

Vignali had prior convictions and that the U.S. Attorney in Minnesota opposed his commutation. However, it is surprising that

having caught Hugh Rodham providing patently false information,

the White House staff would go ahead and recommend that

Rodham’s client receive a commutation anyway.

3. The Justice Department’s Input on the Vignali Case

Long before the Vignali case was brought to the White House’s

attention by Hugh Rodham, staff in the Justice Department Pardon Attorney’s office had been considering the Vignali petition. The

petition was initially filed with the Department in August 1998.

Some point after that date, the Pardon Attorney’s office conducted

a background investigation of Vignali. Such a report would typically involve contacts with the prosecutors and FBI, a review of a

report from the Bureau of Prisons, the presentence report, and the

judgment and commitment order.285 In the fall of 2000, the Pardon

Attorney forwarded a draft report to the Deputy Attorney General

recommending the denial of Vignali’s clemency petition. A staff

member of the Deputy Attorney General would typically review the

Pardon Attorney’s recommendation and provide the Pardon Attorney’s recommendation and her own comments to the Deputy Attorney General for his review. The Deputy Attorney General could

then sign off on the Pardon Attorney’s recommendation and provide

it to the President for his consideration.

However, the usual Justice Department process was not followed

in the Vignali case. In November 2000, the White House instructed

the Deputy Attorney General’s office to stop sending recommendations for clemency denials to the President.286 The White House

told the Deputy Attorney General’s office that it was interested in

favorable clemency recommendations, specifically favorable pardon

recommendations, and to place a priority on forwarding such favorable recommendations to the White House.287 As a result of this directive, the Deputy Attorney General stopped forwarding to the

White House negative clemency recommendations prepared by the

Pardon Attorney.288

This was almost the fate of the Pardon Attorney’s report regarding Carlos Vignali. At some point in the fall of 2000, the Pardon

Attorney prepared a report that strongly recommended against the

Vignali commutation.289 The report was forwarded to the Deputy

Attorney General’s office, where it was reviewed by Deborah

Smolover, the Associate Deputy Attorney General responsible for

supervision of the Office of the Pardon Attorney. Smolover stated

that the Vignali report was not signed off on by the Deputy Attorney General or forwarded to the White House because it fell into

1312

290 Id. 291 Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). 292 Id. 293 Interview with Deborah Smolover, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 12, 2001). 294 Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). 295 Interview with Deborah Smolover, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 12, 2001). 296 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr. (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 4). Adams noted that ‘‘Petition- er’s defense counsel used th[e] fact [that he was the sole Hispanic charged] to argue his client’s innocence to the jury, characterizing the case as involving a ‘black drug dealing network,’ and

emphasizing that petitioner was not black.’’

the category of reports that the White House staff had earlier said

it did not want to receive—negative clemency recommendations.290

However, after an inquiry from the Pardon Attorney, Roger Adams,

Smolover sent the Vignali report back to Adams and told him that

he could sign off on the memo and send it to the White House.291

Adams believed it was important for the Justice Department to be

on the record as opposed to the Vignali commutation, so he signed

the memo and sent it to the White House on January 12, 2001.292

The failure of the Deputy Attorney General to sign off on the recommendation against the Vignali commutation is disturbing. Deborah Smolover could not recall any cases other than Vignali’s where

the Pardon Attorney, rather than the Deputy Attorney General,

signed off on a recommendation memorandum.293 Moreover, she

did not ascribe any significance to the fact that Pardon Attorney

Roger Adams, rather than Eric Holder, signed it. However, Roger

Adams stated that Holder refused to sign two or three denial recommendations because he ‘‘didn’t want to sign any more denials.’’ 294 But, Smolover stated that Holder would not have allowed

Adams to send any recommendation with which he did not agree

to the White House.295 In addition, Smolover could not offer any

reasonable explanation why Holder refused to sign the denial recommendation at issue but allowed Adams to send it to the White

House under Adams’ own signature. In the Marc Rich case, Holder’s actions made it clear that he was attempting to please his superiors in the White House while trying to maintain some credibility as a prosecutor serious about law and order. He failed miserably in the Rich case, first by failing to warn prosecutors that the

Rich case was being considered and then by taking the position

that he was ‘‘neutral, leaning towards favorable’’ on the pardon if

it helped the Middle East peace process. It appears that Holder

took a similarly irresolute position in the Vignali case—allowing

his subordinate to oppose the Vignali commutation while refusing

to go on the record against a commutation the President apparently wanted to grant and the President’s own brother-in-law supported.

The report recommending against the Vignali commutation was

an important one. For the first time, it made the White House

aware of a number of key facts in the Vignali case,296 including

Vignali’s role in the offense and the basis for his sentencing.

Adams pointed out that Vignali had two prior convictions and two

prior arrests and that he had not disclosed the arrests on his petition, as was required. Adams included in his report the opposition

of the Minnesota U.S. Attorney’s Office:

1313

297 Id. 298 Id. 299 Id.

United States Attorney B. Todd Jones strongly opposes

clemency for petitioner, noting that petitioner’s persistent

claims of innocence are undermined by [the] strength of

the evidence presented against him:

Th[e] testimony [of the cooperating coconspirators]

was consistent and independently corroborated by

Title III wiretap interceptions, search warrant evidence and police surveillance. The evidence clearly

established that Carlos Vignali, Jr., was a member of the charged drug conspiracy and facilitated

the distribution of narcotics in the Twin Cities by

supplying Evans, Williams and Hopson with substantial quantities of cocaine from Los Angeles,

California.

Mr. Jones noted that the two main cooperating coconspirators, Williams and Evans, received sentences of 180

months and 95 months respectively. He concluded by stating:

The sentence imposed by Judge Doty reflects the

seriousness of the defendant’s role in a large scale

narcotics conspiracy as the California source of cocaine to Evans, Williams, and Hopson. To my

knowledge Vignali has refused to accept personal

responsibility for his criminal activities and has

never expressed sincere remorse for his conduct.

In light of the exacting standards generally applicable in pardon cases, this case does not warrant

such a commutation.297

After quoting the Minnesota U.S. Attorney, Roger Adams offered

his position on the Vignali commutation:

In applying for clemency, petitioner has to a large degree

merely recycled arguments already rejected by the jury

and courts. He continues to deny his guilt, and his petition

contains misleading statements and misstatements of fact.

As for his allegation that he has no connection to Minnesota, the jury convicted him of the offense of supplying

large quantities of cocaine to distributors in that state.

Moreover, his contention that his sentence is excessive

fails in light of the sentencing record, which establishes

that the district court accorded him leniency in refusing to

adopt two enhancements recommended by the presentence

report. For all these reasons, I recommend that you deny

his petition.298

It appears that the Pardon Attorney’s report had an impact on

the White House staff. Next to the portion of the report discussing

Judge Doty’s sentence of Vignali, a White House staffer wrote a

note reading, ‘‘He recommended other cases—was he contacted?’’ 299

Apparently, members of the White House staff were aware that

1314

300 Id. 301 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 302 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,

2001, at A1. 303 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 304 Id. 305 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001).

Judge Doty recommended commutations for Serena Nunn and Kim

Willis, making his opposition to the Vignali commutation even

more significant. Despite this inquiry from a White House staffer,

Judge Doty was never contacted. More importantly, at the end of

Roger Adams’ report, a White House staffer wrote, ‘‘Need to XC for

Bruce. Definitely isn’t simply making a loan—& do we believe the

gang thing? USA is actually against—maybe we shd call & ck the

recs we’ve been told of?’’ 300 Apparently, the report dispelled any

beliefs the White House might have had regarding Carlos Vignali’s

story that the $25,000 he had been paid was simply payback on a

loan he had made to friends. The notation ‘‘USA is actually

against—maybe we shd call & ck the recs we’ve been told of’’ indicates that the Adams report was the first clear enunciation received by the White House that the Minnesota U.S. Attorney was

actually opposed to the commutation. It also indicates that learning

of this fact cast some doubt on other information that had been

shared with the White House, likely by Hugh Rodham. Despite the

clear doubts expressed by the White House staffer’s notes on the

Adams memo, apparently little was done to follow up on those

doubts. The White House staff never followed up with either the

prosecutors or the judge in the Vignali case.

4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation

a. Contacts Between the White House and

Interested Parties

In addition to reviewing the Pardon Attorney’s comments on the

Vignali commutation petition, White House staff contacted a number of individuals regarding Vignali. First, Meredith Cabe recalls

that Representative Xavier Becerra was advocating for the Vignali

commutation. 301 According to other White House staff, Representative Becerra ‘‘peppered’’ the White House with calls on Vignali’s

behalf.302 Together with her colleague Eric Angel, Cabe also spoke

to U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas. According to Cabe, Mayorkas

said he supported the petition but admitted he was not familiar

with the details of the case.303 Cabe also recalls that Mayorkas

stated that most drug sentences were disproportionate and that

this one likely was as well.304 Eric Angel recalls that Mayorkas expressed support for the Vignali family and opined that Carlos

Vignali would have a strong support network if he were released.

Angel also recalled that Mayorkas made general comments about

the length of Vignali’s sentence and a statement to the effect that

‘‘a lot of these sentences are too long and this one was long too.’’ 305

In an interview with Committee staff, Dawn Woollen, Deputy

White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey’s administrative assistant,

conceded that she wrote a note to Lindsey that indicated, among

1315

306 Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to Deputy White House Counsel

Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25, 2001). NARA Document Production (Handwritten

Note from Woollen to Lindsey) (Exhibit 22). 307 Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to Deputy White House Counsel

Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25, 2001). 308 Id. This conversation with Sheriff Baca was the witness’ only conversation with Sheriff

Baca about the Vignali clemency matter. 309 Id. 310 Id. With Committee staff, Woollen was unequivocal about her understanding about Baca’s

support for the petition. When asked by Committee staff what the specific basis was for her

understanding as to Baca’s position, Woollen replied, ‘‘Sheriff Baca said that he supported [the

commutation].’’ Woollen further stated that ‘‘it was clear that Sheriff Baca was supporting the

commutation.’’ 311 Id. 312 Id. 313 Id. 314 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001).

other things, that ‘‘Sheriff Baca from LA is more than happy to

speak with you about him but is uncomfortable writing a letter offering his full support.’’ 306 According to Woollen, her note reflected

a telephone conversation with Hugh Rodham around early January

2001.307 Within a week of having spoken with Hugh Rodham,

Woollen ‘‘very briefly’’ spoke to Sheriff Baca about the Vignali matter.308 Originally, Sheriff Baca left a telephone message for

Lindsey, but, as per Lindsey’s request, Woollen returned Baca’s

call.309 During that conversation, according to Woollen, Sheriff

Baca ‘‘expressed his support for the Vignali commutation.’’ 310 According to Woollen, Baca also told her he was uncomfortable writing a letter offering his full support for the petition but did not say

why.311

Contrary to statements Baca has made to this Committee, according to Woollen, at no point during his conversation with her

did he say that he was unfamiliar with the facts associated with

Vignali’s clemency petition or cite any unfamiliarity with the underlying conviction as a basis for not commenting on Vignali’s

clemency petition.312 Finally, according to Woollen, Sheriff Baca

did not express any support for Carlos Vignali’s father or even

mention the name ‘‘Horacio.’’ 313 The degree to which Baca and

Woolen disagree about the nature of their conversation gives rise

to serious concern.

Despite the general nature of the White House’s discussions with

Mayorkas and Baca, their support has been described as being important in the decision to grant clemency to Vignali. Cabe understood the qualifications offered by Mayorkas but still viewed his

support as ‘‘significant’’ because ‘‘few prosecutors advocate clemency in any form.’’ 314 Similarly, Bruce Lindsey stated:

I originally was probably negative. . . . But after I received a call from the sheriff of Los Angeles and our office

reached out to the U.S. Attorney in the central district of

California and Los Angeles, I decided that given the community support and their position that into the county in

which he would go to live, that they would be aware of the

crime situation, if you will, in their community, and if they

were not concerned about him coming back to their comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1316

315 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 426 (Mar. 1, 2001). 316Los Angeles Cardinal Regrets Role in Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A26. 317Drug Kingpin’s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1. 318 Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced Dealer in Minnesota Questions Clemency, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb. 15, 2001, at A1. 319 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Vignali Case Built on Informants, Wiretaps, L.A.

TIMES, Feb. 15, 20001, at A1. 320 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin’s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar,

L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1. 321 Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Tale of a Prodigal Father, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,

MN) Feb. 18, 2001, at A1; Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced Dealer

in Minnesota Questions Clemency, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb. 15, 2001, at A1. Judge

Doty wrote in support of grants of clemency for Serena Nunn and Kim Allen Willis, two smalltime drug offenders who had been sentenced to 15 year terms in prison. Judge Doty as well

as prosecutors and investigators involved in the Nunn and Willis cases agreed that they were

truly low-level drug offenders who had been caught up in a larger conspiracy and were suitable

candidates for clemency.

munity, that I thought it was an appropriate commutation.315

The White House’s reliance on the support for the commutation

voiced by Baca and Mayorkas should be juxtaposed against the fact

that the White House made no attempt to speak to the prosecutors

or judge involved in the Vignali case. Judge David Doty, who sentenced Vignali, has stated that he was surprised by the commutation 316 and that, if the White House had contacted him, he would

have argued against a commutation for Vignali.317 Judge Doty believes Vignali was an unsuitable candidate for clemency first because his sentence was appropriate: ‘‘Carlos deserved what he got

. . . I hit him in the middle, not in the low end. . . . And I didn’t

max him out.’’ 318 Judge Doty also noted that Vignali was not a

small-time offender: ‘‘[He] provided funds to the conspiracy, provided places and was involved in the direct transfers. He was a big

player. He was one of the top two or three defendants.’’ 319 Judge

Doty also pointed out that Carlos Vignali had never admitted his

crime, noting that Vignali ‘‘was non-repentant.’’ Even after I sentenced him, he claimed he had been railroaded.’’ 320 Judge Doty’s

strong position against the Vignali commutation is even more significant given his longstanding opposition to mandatory minimum

sentences for drug offenses and his support for clemency for two

other drug offenders he had sentenced.321

Similarly, the White House never consulted the lawyers who

prosecuted Vignali. Meredith Cabe stated that she did not consult

with the prosecutors because the Justice Department had already

been in contact with them and their position on the commutation

was already clear. However, Cabe’s explanation is less than satisfactory. Just because the White House knew that the prosecuting

office opposed a grant of clemency for Vignali did not eliminate the

need to actually speak to the prosecutors who had tried the case.

If the White House staff had discussed the grant of clemency with

the U.S. Attorney or his staff, it is possible that the prosecutors

could have explained the scope of Vignali’s drug-dealing activities,

his utter lack of remorse, or the suspicions regarding his other

drug-dealing activities or those suspected of his father.

1317

322Letter from Nancy Luque, Counsel for Hugh Rodham, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan

Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001) at 2 (within Appendix I). 323 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 324 Id. 325 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 412 (Mar. 1, 2001).

b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh

Rodham

In the final days of the Clinton Administration, it appears that

Hugh Rodham had several contacts with White House staff about

the Vignali matter. Rodham spoke to Bruce Lindsey twice more

about Vignali after his initial conversation in December 2000 and

Meredith Cabe once about Vignali. Rodham’s counsel described the

two subsequent contacts with Bruce Lindsey as follows: ‘‘he subsequently submitted and discussed letters of recommendation, and he

made a final follow up inquiry.’’ 322 Meredith Cabe stated that

Rodham called her about the Lums, for whom Rodham had been

requesting executive clemency, and brought up Vignali.323 Cabe recalled that Rodham was concerned that the White House was getting bad information about Vignali and believed that someone had

accused Vignali of being in a gang.324

No one on the White House staff has made it clear how Rodham’s

lobbying was viewed by the President or his staff. In their defense,

White House staff have claimed that they never figured out that

Rodham represented Vignali or was receiving a large fee from

Vignali for his work. When questioned in a Committee hearing,

Lindsey was vague about whether the President was informed

about Rodham’s role in the Vignali matter:

Mr. LATOURETTE. I am interested in what took place in

front of the President, and the meeting that you remember, Ms. Nolan, whether these guys were there or weren’t

there, was the fact that Hugh Rodham was advocating this

position, or was advocating that Mr. Vignali receive a pardon [or] commutation, was that discussed in your presence? Was Hugh Rodham’s name invoked to the President

of the United States in this meeting?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Lindsey?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t recall. I don’t have a specific memory

of mentioning it. I wouldn’t have hesitated to mention it.

I just don’t recall.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You don’t remember. How about you,

Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. With the caveat that I gave earlier, in the

meeting I was in where Vignali was discussed, Mr.

Rodham’s name did not come up.325

The hazy recollection of senior White House staff therefore makes

it impossible to know whether Rodham’s name was invoked in the

discussions that White House staff had with the President.

1318

326 NARA Document Production (Handwritten Note from Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff Bruce Lindsey, the White House, to Bruce Lindsey, Deputy

Chief of Staff, the White House) (Exhibit 22). 327 Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff Bruce

Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25, 2001). All of those conversations took place over the phone.

Id.328 Id. 329 Id. 330 Id. 331Sumana Chatterjee, Hillary Clinton Addresses Pardons Involving Brother, Campaign Aide, KNIGHT RIDDER (Washington Bureau) Feb. 23, 2001. 332 James V. Grimaldi and Peter Slevin, Hillary Clinton’s Brother Was Paid for Role in 2 Pardons, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1. 333 Jackie Judd, Senator Hillary Clinton Answers Questions About Her Brother’s Involvement

in Two Presidential Pardons, ABC World News Tonight, Feb. 22, 2001. 334Sumana Chatterjee, Hillary Clinton Addresses Pardons Involving Brother, Campaign Aide,

KNIGHT RIDDER (Washington Bureau) Feb. 23, 2001.

c. Hugh Rodham’s Invocation of First Lady

Hillary Clinton

One critically important document makes it clear that, at a minimum, Hugh Rodham invoked the First Lady’s name in lobbying for

Vignali’s commutation. That document, a note handwritten by

Dawn Woollen, the administrative assistant of Deputy White

House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, states, ‘‘Hugh says this is very important to him and the First Lady as well as others. Sheriff Baca

from LA is more than happy to speak with you about him but is

uncomfortable writing a letter offering his full support.’’ 326

In an interview with Committee staff, Woollen recalled having

spoken with Hugh Rodham about the Vignali matter on at least

five occasions.327 After one such conversation, around early January 2001, Woollen wrote the previously described note to

Lindsey.328 When presented with that note during her interview

with Committee staff, Woollen confirmed that the note was accurate.329 But, independent of what she wrote on the note, Woollen

could not recall what Rodham said about the First Lady’s knowledge of the Vignali issue.330

At the very least, Woollen’s note reflects attempts by Hugh

Rodham to capitalize financially on his association with the First

Family by invoking his sister’s support for the Vignali petition

without her knowledge. After Hugh Rodham’s role in clemency proceedings pending before President Clinton was publicly disclosed,

Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton asserted that she ‘‘knew nothing

about [her] brother’s involvement in these pardons’’ and that she ‘‘did not have any involvement in the pardons that were granted

or not granted.’’ 331 In fact, when Senator Clinton was asked by the

media about pardons President Clinton granted in the final hours

of his administration, she replied, ‘‘I was very disturbed to learn

that my brother, Hugh Rodham, received fees in connection with

two clemency applications. . . . Hugh did not speak with me about

these applications.’’ 332 When asked about President Clinton’s lastminute pardons generally, she stated, ‘‘you’ll have to talk with people who were involved in making them, and that leaves me out.’’ 333

Indeed, according to Senator Clinton, her involvement in pardon

matters pending before the President was limited to passing on

‘‘envelopes’’ that were given to her.334 The Woollen note leaves only

two possibilities: (1) that Hugh Rodham indeed told Hillary Clinton

about his efforts on behalf of Carlos Vignali and that Hillary Clinton was not being candid when she stated that Hugh did not speak

1319

335 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 336 NARA Document Production (chart of ‘‘Disparate Sentencing Commutation Cases’’) at 21

(Exhibit 39). 337 NARA Document Production (alternate chart of ‘‘Disparate Sentencing Commutation

Cases’’ at 11 (Exhibit 40). 338 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 339 Id. 340 NARA Document Production (Exhibit 39). 341 Id.

to her about Vignali; or (2) Hugh Rodham was lying when he told

Woollen that the Vignali case was ‘‘very important’’ to the First

Lady. The first possibility raises serious questions about the conduct of the former First Lady, and the second possibility raises serious questions about the conduct of Hugh Rodham.

d. The President’s Decision to Grant the

Commutation

White House staff have been vague in describing the process the

Vignali commutation went through. Cabe indicated that staff had

a mixed opinion regarding the Vignali case until the end of the

process, when they were all in agreement to recommend Vignali for

a commutation.335 White House documents seem to confirm vacillation in the White House’s position on the matter. One document

about the Vignali case states, ‘‘Lean no,’’ 336 and another states, ‘‘STAFF: mixed(?)’’ 337 Cabe also indicated that Vignali was considered together with a number of other drug cases in which the defendant had been ‘‘oversentenced.’’ 338 Cabe recalls that others in

this group were Lau Ching Chin, Derek Curry, Peter Ninemire,

and Loretta De-Ann Kaufman.339 These parts of Cabe’s recollection

are confirmed by documents. A chart of potential pardons and

commutations maintained by Associate White House Counsel Eric

Angel with the heading ‘‘Disparate Sentencing Commutation

Cases’’ includes Vignali’s name with the notations:

Arg is he is not guilty—loaned $25K to a friend, which he

args was falsely interpreted to be part of drug conspiracy;

aged 24 at time of offense, with no significant criminal

record; args he had minor role; DOJ states that petitioner

was supplier for major cocaine distribution organization

and has two 1989 convictions for fighting in public place

and vandalism; 1990 arrest for corporal injury to spouse or

cohabitant, dismissed. DOJ says U.S. Attorney strongly opposes. DOJ recommends denial.340

A separate column of Angel’s chart discusses who supported the

Vignali commutation:

Reps. Becerra, Torres ask for ‘‘every consideration’’ because parents are friends; Council of CA State Legislators

also ask for consideration; Archbishop of LA supports; acc.

To representatives, U.S. Atty in Minnesota (who prosecuted him) supports; LA Sheriff Lee Baca and LA US

Atty Alejandro Mayorkas support; Maria E[chaveste] has

inquired.341

Given President Clinton’s silence regarding his pardons and

commutations, it is impossible to know which factors led to his deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1320

342 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 362 (Mar. 1, 2001). 343 Judgment in a Criminal Case, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. July 17, 1995) (Exhibit 3).

cision to commute Vignali’s sentence. Clearly, there were a number

of outside factors contributing to the President’s decision: a White

House staff generally supportive of the decision; pressure, including

misleading statements, from Hugh Rodham; and pressure from

California political figures. On January 20, 2001, President Clinton

commuted Carlos Vignali’s sentence to time served, reducing his

15-year sentence to only about 5 years.

5. The White House Has No Justification for the

Vignali Commutation

The process by which the President actually reached the decision

to grant the Vignali commutation is still a mystery. Apparently,

the President did not reach his decision to grant the commutation

until January 19, after a meeting with his staff. Since the President has never answered questions about the Vignali matter, the

Committee has not been able to determine which facts influenced

his decisionmaking. The President’s failure to speak out on the

Vignali matter leaves a number of key questions unanswered:

• To what extent did Hugh Rodham’s representation of Carlos

Vignali play a role in the President’s decision to grant

Vignali’s commutation?

• Did First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton support the effort

to obtain the Vignali commutation?

• Did the President or the First Lady know that Rodham was

being paid $200,000 for obtaining the Vignali commutation?

• When did the President make the decision to commute

Vignali’s sentence and why?

In the absence of answers to these questions, the Committee must

examine the arguments offered by the White House to justify the

Vignali commutation. These arguments, set forth below, are all

spurious.

‘‘Vignali was a minor participant in a large drug conspiracy.’’ It

appears that the White House based its decision on the belief that

Vignali was only a minor participant in the Minnesota-area drug

dealing scheme. As Lindsey testified before the Committee:

I actually believe the judge made a specific finding that

[Carlos Vignali] was responsible for five to 15 kilos, which

is I think 11 to 33 pounds. I think the total amount of

money he was involved with was $2,500—$25,000 excuse

me. So I don’t think it is correct that he was responsible

for $800,000; and in fact, I believe there was a specific

finding that he was not. There was also I believe a specific

finding that he was not an organizer, leader of the conspiracy.342

In applying the federal sentencing guidelines to Vignali’s case,

Judge Doty indeed attributed five to fifteen kilograms of cocaine to

Vignali, rather than the fifteen to fifty kilograms suggested in the

pre-sentence report.343 Judge Doty nevertheless enhanced Vignali’s

1321

344 Id. 345 Id. 346 Id. 347 Judge Doty was never contacted by the White House about Vignali’s clemency application.

L.A. Cardinal Regrets Role in Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A26; Richard A. Serrano

and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin’s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,

2001 at A1. Referring to the Vignali commutation, Judge Doty stated ‘‘I have no idea why it

happened, but we are all aghast.’’ Los Angeles Cardinal Regrets Role in Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001 at A26. According to Judge Doty, Carlos Vignali never acknowledged responsibility

or showed remorse for his crime, ‘‘He was non-repentant. . . . Even after I sentenced him, he

claimed he had been railroaded.’’ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin’s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001 at A1. 348Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, Partner, Greene Espel (May 2, 2001).

offense level because he found that Vignali committed perjury by

denying that he was involved in the distribution of cocaine.344 The

judge also concluded that Vignali’s role as a supplier of cocaine

tended to make him more culpable than other co-defendants.345

These conclusions led the judge to give Vignali a sentence on the

upper end of the guideline range.346 Therefore, Bruce Lindsey’s

heavy reliance on Judge Doty’s finding that Vignali was responsible

for only five to fifteen kilograms of cocaine appears highly disingenuous. Indeed, Judge Doty sentenced Vignali to 175 months imprisonment despite his belief that the evidence adduced at trial supported a finding that Vignali supplied between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine. Lindsey completely ignored the judge’s finding

that Vignali perjured himself when he denied any involvement in

supplying narcotics. For Lindsey to accept that Vignali was responsible for supplying between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine

would have required that Lindsey accept that Vignali perjured

himself at trial and refused to accept responsibility for what he had

done. It is difficult to believe that Lindsey would recommend that

such a person be granted executive clemency.347

The White House’s reliance on Judge Doty’s findings regarding

the amount of cocaine Vignali supplied was irresponsible and misleading for another reason. The judge’s finding was a highly technical decision relating to the offense level computed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Under those guidelines, a different

base offense level is applied if the offender supplies between 5 and

15 kilograms of cocaine than if he deals between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine. When deciding whether to grant Vignali’s clemency request, one would think the White House would be more interested in an evaluation of who Vignali was and what he was

doing in a generalized sense than in trying to defeat a technical application of the sentencing guidelines. If the White House had

wanted such an evaluation, it could have turned either to the Pardon Attorney’s recommendation or the submission of the U.S. Attorney in Minnesota. In his submission, U.S. Attorney Todd Jones

explained that Vignali was involved in a far larger network of drug

dealing than that which was alleged in the case against Vignali in

Minnesota. As former U.S. Attorney Todd Jones noted in an interview with the Committee, ‘‘the fact the Vignali was convicted as a

Category 1 dope dealer doesn’t mean that he’s innocent, just that

he was smart.’’ 348

‘‘Vignali’s sentence was disproportionate in comparison to his coconspirators.’’ In testimony before the Committee and in various

public statements, the White House has argued that the leniency

granted to similarly situated codefendants provided a basis for the

1322

President’s grant of clemency to Carlos Vignali. This position is

wholly without merit. A number of Carlos Vignali’s co-conspirators

received leniency because they, unlike Vignali, cooperated with law

enforcement. Vignali, on the other hand, took his chances with the

jury and lost, receiving 175 months in prison. A brief review of the

sentences given to other major defendants in the Vignali case demonstrates that Vignali’s sentence was fair and proportionate.

• Gerald Williams: Williams was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. Judge Doty found that he was the main distributor, organizer, and leader of the drug conspiracy. The government recommended an imprisonment term of 360 months to

life, but Williams received a sentence of 120 months. Judge

Doty departed from guideline range because of ‘‘substantial and

valuable assistance’’ Williams provided to law enforcement in

breaking up the distribution ring.

• Dale Evans: Evans was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. Evans was a California source to distributors in Minnesota. At trial, Evans testified that he was sending an average

of one to two kilos of cocaine to Minnesota per week during

1993. Evans obtained that cocaine from Jonathan Gray and

Vignali. The government recommended an imprisonment term

of 135–168 months, but Evans received a sentence of 95 months.

Judge Doty departed from the guideline range because Evans

provided law enforcement with ‘‘substantial and valuable’’ assistance in breaking up the ring.

• Shirley Williams: Williams was convicted of conspiring to distribute between 15 and 50 kilos of cocaine for finding buyers of

cocaine for her son, Gerald. The government recommended a

151–188 month term of imprisonment, but Judge Doty sentenced Williams to 75 months in jail. Judge Doty ordered a

downward departure because of the substantial assistance Williams provided law enforcement.

• Melvin Campbell: Melvin Campbell was convicted of using a

telephone to conspire in selling cocaine. Campbell was another

California source to distributors in Minnesota. He distributed

large amounts of cocaine and cocaine paste with Shirley and

Gerald Williams and cooked crack for distribution. The government recommended imprisonment for 12–18 months, but Judge

Doty sentenced Campbell to 48 months. He ordered an upward

departure because of Campbell’s significant involvement in the

conspiracy, the substantial amount of drugs he distributed, and

his criminal history.

• Jonathan Gray: Jonathan Gray was convicted of conspiring to

distribute more than 5 kilos of cocaine. In 1993, Gray and

Vignali supplied cocaine from California to Dale Evans in Minnesota. The government recommended 151–188 months in jail,

and Judge Doty sentenced Gray to 170 months. Gray was the

defendant most similarly situated to Vignali as he was a California source of cocaine for the Minnesota distribution network

and refused to cooperate with law enforcement. Gray’s sentence

was almost identical to Vignali’s.

1323

349 Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced Dealer in Minnesota Questions Clemency; Clinton Commuted Cocaine Supplier Carlos Vignali’s Sentence, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb. 15, 2001. 350 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 351 Id

• Tony Speank: Tony Speank was convicted of conspiring to manufacture and distribute between 1.5 and 5 kilos of cocaine and

cocaine base. The government recommended a sentence of 210–

262 months, but Judge Doty sentenced Speank to 58 months.

Judge Doty granted a downward departure because of the ‘‘substantial and valuable’’ assistance Speank provided law enforcement.

• Todd Hopson: Todd Hopson was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine; using facilities in interstate commerce to promote a drug enterprise; possession with intent to distribute and

distribution of more than 5 kilos of cocaine; and use of telephone

for promotion of drug enterprise. The government recommended

235–293 months in jail. Judge Doty sentenced Hopson to 235

months imprisonment. Judge Doty found that the low end of the

range adequately reflected the nature and circumstances of

Hopson’s offense and his past criminal conduct.

As shown above, in those cases where Judge Doty exercised leniency in sentencing codefendants who were at least as culpable as

was Vignali, Judge Doty specifically found that each of those codefendants provided ‘‘substantial and valuable’’ assistance to law

enforcement. By contrast, Carlos Vignali and Todd Hopson, both of

whom were charged with conspiring to distribute substantial

amounts of cocaine and various other federal narcotics offenses,

chose not to cooperate. Furthermore, they failed to express the

least remorse about or assume responsibility for their roles in the

distribution ring. As such, there could have been no reasonable expectation of leniency from the sentencing judge. Accordingly, the

White House’s position that Vignali’s sentence was overly harsh or

disproportionate as compared with his codefendants is wholly without merit. Having thoroughly considered the available evidence,

Judge Doty sentenced Vignali under the applicable standards set

forth under the law.

‘‘Vignali’s sentence was an unfair and overly harsh result of mandatory minimum sentencing laws.’’ Although the rationale for President Clinton’s commutation of Carlos Vignali’s sentence remains

unclear, the former president has said he believes mandatory sentences ‘‘in many cases are too long for nonviolent offenders.’’ 349

Documents and statements obtained by the Committee indicate

that the White House considered Vignali’s petition together with a

number of other drug cases in which the defendant had been ‘‘oversentenced.’’ 350 Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe, who

was responsible for clemency matters for the White House Counsel’s Office, recalled that others in that group were Lau Ching

Chin, Derek Curry, Peter Ninemire, and Loretta DeAnn Kaufman.351 Cabe’s appreciation that Vignali’s petition was considered

as a ‘‘mandatory minimum’’ case is borne out by a chart of potential pardons and commutations maintained by Associate White

1324

352See, e.g., NARA Document Production (chart of ‘‘Disparate Sentencing Commutation

Cases’’) (Exhibit 39). 353 Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced Dealer in Minnesota Questions Clemency; Clinton Commuted Cocaine Supplier Carlos Vignali’s Sentence, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb. 15, 2001. 354 Id. 355 Id. 356 Id. 357 Id. 358 Id. 359 James V. Grimaldi and Peter Slevin, Hillary Clinton’s Brother Was Paid for Role in 2 Pardons, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2001) at A1. 360 Id. 361Statement by Nancy Luque, Counsel for Hugh Rodham, Reed Smith (Feb. 21, 2001).

House Counsel Eric Angel, who worked with Cabe on clemency

matters.352

U.S. District Judge David Doty, who sentenced Vignali, has long

been a critic of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines for drug

offenses.353 In Judge Doty’s view, ‘‘most drug sentences are exceedingly long and onerous.’’ 354 But, in Vignali’s case, Judge Doty felt

that ‘‘Carlos deserved what he got.’’ 355 In explaining the sentence

he imposed on Vignali, Judge Doty stated, ‘‘I based the sentence on

his criminal history score—he didn’t have much. And I kicked it up

because of the amount of drugs involved.’’ 356 According to Doty, the

sentence he imposed was slightly more than the midpoint of the

guideline range.357 Doty observed, ‘‘I hit him in the middle, not in

the low end. And I didn’t max him out.’’ 358

D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation

1. The Response from Hugh Rodham

The Vignali commutation proved to be almost as controversial as

the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. News of Hugh Rodham’s

involvement in the Vignali matter first surfaced around February

21, 2001. Former President Clinton issued a statement indicating

that he and former First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton were unaware that Hugh Rodham had been paid for his work on the

Vignali and Braswell matters: ‘‘Neither Hillary nor I had any

knowledge of such payments . . . We are deeply disturbed by these

reports and have insisted that Hugh return any monies received.’’ 359 Hillary Clinton added, ‘‘I was very disturbed to learn

that my brother, Hugh Rodham, received fees in connection with

two clemency applications[.] Hugh did not speak with me about

these applications.’’ 360 Rodham responded to the statement from

the former President and Senator Clinton with a statement from

his own attorney, Nancy Luque:

My client, Hugh Rodham, today acceded to his family’s request that he return legal fees earned in connection with

pardon requests. My client did not advise President or

Senator Clinton of his involvement in these requests. He

believes they were unaware until this week of his work on

his client’s behalf. Hugh Rodham has done absolutely

nothing wrong. He has returned these fees solely because

his family asked that he do so. Their request, presumably

made because of the appearance of impropriety, is one he

cannot ignore. There was, however, no impropriety in

these matters.361

1325

362David Johnston, Hollywood Friend Had Clinton’s Ear for 2 Late Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb.

24, 2001) at A8. 363 Id. 364First Union Document Production (Check numbers 1321 and 1322 from Rodham & Fine, P.A. IOTA [sic] to Coale, Cooley Liets, McInerny & Broadus, for $230,000.00 and $50,000, respectively) (Feb. 28, 2001)) (Exhibit 41) (in globo). John P. Coale, a name partner in Coale

Cooley, is a well-known personal injury lawyer with strong ties to the Clinton Administration. 365 Reed Smith Document Production (Check from Reed Smith to Glenn Braswell for $230,000

(Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 42). 366 Reed Smith Document Production (Check from Reed Smith to Morvis Corvis Corporation for $50,000 (Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 43). 367Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to Carlos Vignali, Morris [sic] Corvis Corp.

(Feb. 21, 2001) (Exhibit 44). 368 In her discussions with Committee staff, Luque indicated that she advised against refunding any of the money and that Rodham did so against her advice. It is also interesting to note

that Roger Clinton believes that Hugh Rodham should not have been forced to return the

money:

Anyway, Huey [Rodham] has been sort of hung out to dry, and I want to make that

clear. He is a great man. I love him. He didn’t do anything wrong. But he was just

tired of the crap. And tired of the hounding, and he did what he thought it was going

to take to get rid of it. You know what? He is a lawyer, he was entitled to do what

he wanted to do.

Larry King Live, CNN, June 21, 2001.

Roger Clinton has an interesting point insofar as Hugh Rodham was asked to return $434,000

he earned lobbying for executive clemency when Roger was not asked to return any of the

money he earned in connection with the Gambino matter and Jack Quinn was not asked to return fees he earned in connection with the Marc Rich matter.

Luque’s initial statement suggested that Rodham returned all of

the fees he was paid for obtaining the Braswell pardon and the

Vignali commutation. She soon backtracked, and conceded to the

press that he had returned only $300,000 of the fees.362 The press still reported that Rodham had agreed to refund all $434,000 he

was paid by Braswell and Vignali.363

However, the Committee’s review of Rodham’s bank records

shows that as of June 2001 Rodham had returned only $280,000

of the $434,000 he was paid for his work on the Vignali and

Braswell matters. On February 21, 2001, Rodham wrote checks for

$230,000 and $50,000 to the Coale, Cooley, Leitz, McInerny law

firm.364 It appears that the funds were then forwarded by the

Coale, Cooley firm to Reed Smith, Nancy Luque’s law firm. Then,

on February 23, 2001, Reed Smith issued a check for $230,000 to

Glenn Braswell 365 and a check for $50,000 to Morvis Corvis Corporation, one of Horacio Vignali’s companies.366 When Luque for- warded the $50,000 to Vignali, she stated that ‘‘a check for the balance will be forwarded directly.’’ 367 Communications between Committee staff and Rodham’s attorney have confirmed that Rodham

has not to date returned any additional amounts and has no plans

to return the remaining $154,000 to Vignali.368

Therefore, it appears that Rodham misled the public when he

suggested he returned all of the fees when he, in fact, ignored the

request from former President Clinton and Senator Clinton that he

do so. The lack of any further demands from former President Clinton and Senator Clinton that Rodham return the fees suggests that

their initial demand was motivated by media pressure, rather than

a genuine sentiment that Hugh Rodham should return the funds.

2. The Florida Bar’s ‘‘Investigation’’ of Hugh Rodham

Shortly after news of Rodham’s role in the Vignali and Braswell

grants of clemency came to light, a complaint was filed against

Rodham with the Florida Bar Association. The Florida Bar rules,

1326

369 Rule 4–1.5(a)(1), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. 370 Rule 4–1.5(f)(3)(B), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. 371 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (No. M11–189 (DC)) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001). 372Letter from Barry W. Rigby, Chief Branch Disciplinary Counsel, The Florida Bar, to J.

Christian Adams, Counsel, Adams Law Firm (July 16, 2001) (Exhibit 45). 373 Id.

like those of most other states, prohibit excessive fees and the receipt of contingent fees in criminal cases. Rule 4–1.5(a)(1) states

that ‘‘[a]n attorney shall not enter into an agreement for, charge,

or collect an illegal, prohibited or clearly excessive fee.’’ 369 Rule 4– 1.5(f)(3)(B) states that a ‘‘lawyer shall not enter into an agreement

for, charge, or collect . . . a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.’’ 370

The facts of the Rodham case not being in dispute, it seems that

the one issue examined by the Florida Bar was whether Rodham’s

work constituted ‘‘representing a defendant in a criminal case.’’ Indeed, there is mixed opinion regarding how Rodham’s work on the

pardons should be characterized. Jack Quinn took the position that

his lobbying for Marc Rich’s pardon did constitute representation

in a criminal case and that is why he met the exemption in Executive Order 12834, which otherwise would have prohibited him from

lobbying his former colleagues in the White House Counsel’s Office.

If Quinn’s reasoning were to prevail in the Rodham case, it seems

clear that Rodham would have violated the Florida Bar Rules

against receiving contingent fees in a criminal case. On the other

hand, Federal District Court Judge Denny Chin rejected the claims

of Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers that their work

lobbying for the pardons of Rich and Pincus Green were protected

by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protection. Judge Chin ruled that their work lobbying for a pardon could

not be considered legal work entitled to the attorney-client privilege or work product protection.371 If Judge Chin’s ruling were to

be followed by the Florida Bar, it is less likely that Rodham could

be sanctioned for violating the Florida Bar rules. However, it is

still possible that he could be punished for charging an excessive

fee in relation to the amount of work he performed on the pardons.

Rather than conducting a serious inquiry into the facts or the

law, it appears that the Florida Bar has declined to look into the

Rodham matter at all. On July 16, 2001, the Florida Bar grievance

committee voted unanimously to close the Rodham case. In its letter closing the case, the Florida Bar described its investigation and

reasons for closing the case. It appears that the investigation consisted solely of reading press accounts of Rodham’s involvement in

lobbying for pardons and requesting a written response to the allegations from Rodham’s counsel.

The Florida Bar considered first whether Rodham’s fees were improper and ruled that they were not for two main reasons. First,

it determined that the clemency process was not a judicial proceeding. Contingent fees are prohibited in criminal cases, largely because the ‘‘right to competent counsel should not be tied to the

compensation paid to the attorney.’’ 372 However, the Florida Bar

concluded that ‘‘clemency is different from other post-conviction

avenues of appeal. It cannot be said that, based on existing rules

and ethics opinions, accepting a contingency fee for assistance in a

clemency proceeding is improper per se.’’ 373 Second, it determined

1327

374 Id. 375 Id. 376 Id.

that Rodham’s fees could not be characterized as ‘‘excessive,’’ despite the fact that he was paid $434,000 for minimal work. The Bar

Committee concluded that ‘‘it would be highly unusual for The

Florida Bar to become involved in a determination of reasonableness of attorney’s fees in the absence of a complaint of an interested party, one who actually suffered harm directly. We may consider doing so when a compelling public interest arises . . . [We]

did not find a compelling public interest in the matters involved.’’ 374

Second, the Florida Bar considered whether Rodham engaged in

dishonest conduct in his efforts to obtain the Vignali and Braswell

grants of clemency. The Florida Bar concluded:

There has been no evidence presented or made available to

The Florida Bar: 1) that Mr. Rodham violated rules or procedures relating to the pardons in question; 2) that monies

were intended as improper payment to persons involved in

the pardon process; or 3) that there was any other deceit

or dishonesty on his part.375

The Bar then noted that it had attempted to obtain information

about Rodham from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern

District of New York but was declined.376 At no time did the Florida Bar approach this Committee seeking information about

Rodham, which would have been shared readily with the Bar.

As this report has made clear, Hugh Rodham engaged in dishonest conduct on a number of occasions with respect to his work on

the Vignali commutation. Rodham passed on misleading information to the White House, he made misleading arguments to White

House staff about Vignali’s case for clemency, and he told outright

lies to White House staff, for example, that the attorney who prosecuted Vignali supported his commutation. The Florida Bar should

review this report and take appropriate action against Rodham.

3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation

The Vignali commutation will have two practical consequences.

First, Carlos Vignali has been released from prison approximately

nine years ahead of schedule. There is no evidence that Vignali is

reformed or that he has in any way changed his life since being

convicted. He has never admitted his guilt, he has never cooperated

with law enforcement, and he has never admitted that he did anything wrong.

However, the Vignali commutation has a significance beyond the

early release from prison of an unrepentant cocaine dealer. With

his commutation, President Clinton sent a message that there is a

double standard of justice between the rich and the poor. Twentyeight other people were convicted along with Vignali for participating in the cocaine distribution ring. Carlos Vignali was the only

person in that distribution ring to receive executive clemency. Yet,

other participants in the conspiracy received stiffer prison sentences, despite the fact that they served more minor roles in the

conspiracy than Vignali. For example, Todd Hopson was sentenced

1328

377Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Feb. 27, 2001). 378 Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES, Apr.

29, 2001, at L.A. TIMES MAG. 10. 379The danger of Adams’ work is underscored by the fact that on April 20, 2001, he was shot

at by a suspect. Adams was unharmed. David Chanen, Man Fires at Officer, But Nobody is

Hurt, STAR TRIB., Apr. 20, 2001, at 9B. 380 Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES, Apr.

29, 2001, at L.A. TIMES MAG. 10. 381Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Feb. 27, 2001). 382 ABC World News Now (Feb. 23, 2001). See also Duncan DeVille Document Production (Letter from Duncan DeVille, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice, to Alejandro Mayorkas, U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice (Mar. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 46) (citing Mayorkas’ assistance in the Vignali matter as the basis for resignation). 383Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Feb. 23, 2001). 384Douglas Pasternak, Another Dubious Pardon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 2001, at

26.

to over 19 years in prison and is still in prison today. While Hopson

was clearly guilty, police have stated that his sentence was excessive.377 After Vignali received his commutation, Hopson observed, ‘‘I didn’t pay anybody, I didn’t have anybody walk my application

up to the White House and put it in front of the President. I didn’t

have those connections.’’ 378 Even Todd Hopson, a convicted cocaine

dealer, can understand the message sent by President Clinton: if

you can afford to hire the right person—especially a relative of the

President—you can get out of prison, even if you are clearly guilty

of a serious crime.

The Vignali commutation also sent a message to the nation’s law

enforcement officers. Many law enforcement officers risk their lives

on a daily basis to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our neighborhoods. Indeed, Carlos Vignali and his 28 co-conspirators were apprehended only after a painstaking investigation that included

wiretaps and undercover surveillance. When one of the ringleaders

of a cocaine distribution ring receives executive clemency solely because he hired the president’s brother-in-law to represent him, it

mocks the efforts of law enforcement and indicates a dangerously

lax attitude towards fighting the war on drugs. Tony Adams, the

Minneapolis narcotics detective who played a key role in apprehending Vignali and who has risked his life in the line of duty,379

understood the significance of President Clinton’s actions. Adams

observed that ‘‘it’s like, basically, you’ve just been told that this

kid, he’s untouchable.’’ 380 Adams stated that the Vignali commutation ‘‘more or less tells us that America’s system has been bought

if you have money.’’ 381 The bitterness of Adams, and presumably

a number of other law enforcement officers, is clear in Adams’

statement that ‘‘politicians always get in front of this camera and

say ‘‘We’re trying to take dope off the streets. We’re trying to put

dope dealers in jail.’’ Well, you just let one out, a big one.’’ 382

Adams suggested that ‘‘the politicians in L.A. or Washington, D.C.,

should finish the nine years that he has left on his time, and I’m

standing right by that.’’ 383

II. THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL

Another of the recipients of President Clinton’s misplaced mercy

on his final days in the White House was Almon Glenn Braswell.

Braswell was convicted in 1983 of mail fraud, perjury, and tax evasion in connection with selling herbal remedies purporting to encourage hair growth, remove cellulite, and increase breast size.384

1329

385 Id. 386Peter Slevin, Another Pardon Stirs Controversy; Herbal Marketer Faces U.S. Tax Evasion

Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3. 387See Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001) (within Appendix I). 388Kurt Eichenwald and Michael Moss, Pardon for Subject of Inquiry Worries Prosecutors,

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at A1. 389 NARA Document Production (Almon Glenn Braswell’s Petition for Pardon (Jan. 12, 2001))

(Exhibit 47). 390 Id. 391 Id. The House Select Committee on Aging held a hearing in 1984 examining the fraudulent

claims of dietary supplement marketers such as Braswell. ‘‘In Quackery: A $10 Billion Scandal,’’

Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Aging, Subcommittee on Health and Long-term

Care, 98th Cong. (May 31, 1984). Regarding Braswell’s companies in particular, a Postal Service

official testified, ‘‘one hundred and thirty-eight false representation complaints were filed

against 50 different medical-cosmetic products marketed by Braswell, Inc.’’ Id. at 137. The cases

were concluded through 32 false representation orders and 15 consent agreements. 392 Id. at 138. 393 Richard A. Serrano, Man’s Pardon for ‘‘83 Crime Can’t Aid Him in L.A. Probe, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at A4. 394Douglas Pasternak, Another Dubious Pardon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 2001, at

26.395 ‘‘Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope Marketing Anti-Aging

Products to Seniors,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 27

(prepared statement of E. Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn). Glenn

represented several clients in a defamation lawsuit against Braswell.

More alarmingly, Braswell was under investigation by the Food

and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and several state attorneys general when

his pardon was granted.385 In addition, as the President was granting Braswell a pardon, federal investigators in Los Angeles were

examining a massive tax evasion and money-laundering scheme allegedly conducted by Braswell.386 How such an unmeritorious application received President Clinton’s attention may be explained

by a $230,000 payment from Braswell to Hugh Rodham, the President’s brother-in-law. 387

A. Braswell’s History of Misconduct

In the decades prior to Hugh Rodham’s involvement, Braswell

created a dietary supplement empire by intentionally misleading

consumers with false claims of health benefits.388 These fabricated

claims led to Braswell’s conviction in 1983 on perjury, tax evasion,

and mail fraud charges.389 According to his pardon petition,

Braswell was convicted of tax evasion for creating a system in

which he would intentionally overpay for corporate services and, in

return, receive cash payments that were not reported as income to

the IRS.390 With respect to the mail fraud conviction, Braswell devised a scheme to defraud consumers by placing false and misleading advertisements in magazines throughout the United States.391

These advertisements depicted phony ‘‘before and after’’ photographs purportedly revealing how Braswell’s products promoted

hair growth and breast enlargement.392 Mr. Braswell was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and five years’ probation for

these crimes,393 but he received parole after serving only seven

months in prison.394

Braswell’s conviction was just the beginning of his legal troubles.

Braswell pled no contest to grand theft after being arrested for burglary at the home of a former employee.395 He was sentenced to

two years’ probation to run concurrently with his federal senVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1330

396 Id. 397Federal Trade Commission Press Release, Braswell Prohibited Permanently from Advertising Baldness ‘‘Cures’’ Without FDA Approval of Product, Under Federal Trade Commission Consent Judgment, Sept. 16, 1983. 398 Id. 399Michael Isikoff, The Bush Clan’s Donor Problem, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 2000, at 2000 WL

33208288. 400 Id. 401See Food and Drug Administration Import Alert #66–41, Unapproved New Drugs Promoted

in the U.S., Sept. 28, 2000. 402Michael Isikoff, The Bush Clan’s Donor Problem, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 2000, at 2000 WL

33208288. 403 Id. (quoting Gero Vita Advertisement) 404 Id. 405 Joan McKinney, New ‘‘Snake-Oil’’ Industry Roasted, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 11, 2001,

at 1A. 406Lucy Morgan, Bush Brothers Pop Up in Potion Peddler’s Magazine, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1. 407 ‘‘Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope Marketing Anti-Aging

Products to Seniors,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 26

(prepared statement of E. Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn). 408 Id.

tence.396 Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission brought

charges against Braswell in 1983. The FTC contended that his

companies lacked adequate scientific evidence supporting the

claims of their hair-loss products and that the companies declined

to pay refunds promised to customers.397 Braswell’s companies set- tled FTC charges by paying $610,000 in civil penalties, and the

FTC permanently barred them from making performance claims

for any product without reliable scientific evidence.398

For over a decade, the herbal remedy dealer managed to evade

the attention of federal regulators. In 1995, the Food and Drug Administration issued an import alert on products manufactured by

Gero Vita International, Braswell’s principal mail-order marketer

of natural medicines.399 The FDA determined that Gero Vita was

promoting certain products as ‘‘drugs’’ that could cure various ailments without first receiving FDA approval.400 The alert enabled

FDA to seize Gero Vita products imported into the United States.

It was in effect at the time President Clinton pardoned Braswell

on January 20, 2001, and it was still in effect as of January

2002.401 Also in 1995, the National Advertising Division of the

Council of Better Business Bureaus concluded that Gero Vita could

not substantiate claims for one of its products claiming to be an

‘‘Anti-Aging Pill.’’ 402 The company advertisement declared that the

pill ‘‘improves memory . . . Sex Drive! And reduces chance of

Heart Attack by 83%!’’ 403 The Better Business Bureau warned consumers that these proclamations were ‘‘exaggerated and overstated’’ and ‘‘misleading.’’ 404

Three sports celebrities were also victims of Glenn Braswell’s

fraudulent practices. Race-car driver Richard Petty, Hall of Fame

quarterback Len Dawson, and baseball Hall of Famer Stan Musial

filed suit against Braswell in 1997 for falsely portraying these celebrities as endorsing a Braswell product that purportedly treats

prostate cancer.405 In peddling Prostata, Braswell inappropriately

and inaccurately warned that the sports figures ‘‘waited too long

and are suffering’’ from prostate problems.406 He then mailed brochures featuring the celebrities’ photographs with their bogus endorsement to over 17 million addresses.407 As a result, subsequent sales of Prostata associated with those brochures totaled over $5

million.408 The lawsuit accused Braswell of defamation, invasion of

1331

409Lucy Morgan, Bush Brothers Pop Up in Potion Peddler’s Magazine, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

Sept. 29, 2000, at A1. 410 Isabel Vincent, The Canadian Connection to Clinton Pardon, NAT’L POST, Mar. 3, 2001, at

B1.411 Id. 412 Consumer Reports, quoted in Peter Slevin, Another Pardon Stirs Controversy; Herbal Marketer Faces U.S. Tax Evasion Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3. 413 Id. 414 ‘‘Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope Marketing Anti-Aging

Products to Seniors,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 28– 29 (prepared statement of E. Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn). 415Kim Martineau, Doctor Sues Firms Over Claims in Ad, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY) Sept.

2, 2000, at B4. 416 Id. 417 ‘‘Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope Marketing Anti-Aging

Products to Seniors,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 28– 29 (prepared statement of E. Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn). 418 Id. 419 Id. at 29. 420Peter Slevin, Another Pardon Stirs Controversy; Herbal Marketer Faces U.S. Tax Evasion

Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3. 421 Id.

privacy, unfair trade practices, and intentionally inflicting emotional distress.409 In his two-hour deposition, Braswell invoked his

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 196 times.410

According to the sports stars’ attorney, the lawsuit was eventually

settled out of court for ‘‘significant money.’’ 411

Undeterred by the settlement, the FDA’s import alert, and the

Better Business Bureau’s consumer warning, Gero Vita continued

to publish deceiving advertisements. In 1998, the editors of Consumer Reports wrote, ‘‘We see a lot of misleading marketing, but

what spews out of Gero Vita Industries rivals the worst.’’ 412 Continuing its censure, Consumer Reports described Gero Vita’s unsolicited booklet mailings as ‘‘masquerading as science. The booklets

cite actual studies, but twist the findings to support the company’s

own unsubstantiated claims.’’ 413

Despite drawing the attention of law enforcement agencies, various federal regulators, consumer advocate groups, and plaintiffs’

attorneys, Braswell has continued to use misleading advertising to

promote his products. Since the Prostata lawsuit, Braswell has

been sued twice more for misrepresenting the results of medical research.414 Arthritis specialist Dr. Joel Kremer filed suit against

two Braswell companies for creating the appearance in an advertisement that Dr. Kremer’s research supported the effectiveness of

a Braswell arthritis product.415 According to the lawsuit, the advertisement also falsely portrayed Dr. Kremer as endorsing an antiarthritis elixir,416 an allegation similar to the one Braswell settled

in the Prostata lawsuit. In a similar lawsuit, Braswell allegedly

misused another doctor’s research once again for an anti-arthritis

product.417 This lawsuit asserts that Gero Vita distorted Dr. John

Prudden’s research to support the claim that the Gero Vita product

supposedly rebuilt joints and stopped arthritis.418 These suits were

still pending as of September 2001.419

Braswell was under criminal investigation by federal prosecutors

in Los Angeles for tax evasion when President Clinton pardoned

him in January 2001.420 The federal inquiry focused on whether

Braswell transferred millions of dollars offshore through a shell

company to evade IRS detection.421 Federal investigators described

Braswell’s actions as ‘‘a massive tax evasion and money-laundering

1332

422 Id. 423Michael Isikoff, The Bush Clan’s Donor Problem, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 2000, at 2000 WL

33208288. 424 Id. 425Michael Moss, Officials Say Investigation Will Go On Despite Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,

2001, at A24. A former White House spokesman said that the President did not intend for the

pardon to cover anything other than the felonies Braswell committed in 1983. Richard A.

Serrano, Man’s Pardon for ‘‘83 Crime Can’t Aid Him in L.A. Probe, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001,

at A4. The Justice Department also concluded that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles

could continue its investigation of Braswell’s potential felonies involving his offshore corporations and accounts. 426Michael Moss, Officials Say Investigation Will Go on Despite Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,

2001, at A24. 427Kurt Eichenwald and Michael Moss, Pardon for Subject of Inquiry Worries Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at A1. 428 Id. 429 Id. 430Tim Nickens, Pardon of Man Under Investigation Questioned, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.

8, 2001, at 6B. 431Leon Bruneau, Clinton Aides Testify Before Congress on Pardon Controversy, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 2001 WL 2352895. 432Peter Slevin, Clinton Termed Unaware of Braswell Probe; Spokesman Says Pardon Covered

Only ’83 Case, Not Possible New Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2001, at A20. 433Leon Bruneau, Clinton Aides Testify Before Congress on Pardon Controversy, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 2001 WL 2352895.

scheme.’’ 422 Court documents also allege that Braswell and his employees attempted to conceal documents from the government.423

These allegations are based on documents and company computers

seized from Braswell’s principal holding company, G.B. Data Systems, after IRS agents raided the office in 1999.424 Should any

charges be brought based on these allegations, federal prosecutors

anticipate that Braswell will argue that his pardon included the

pending tax evasion investigation.425 Moreover, if Braswell were

convicted on tax evasion charges, the pardon could lessen his sentence by neutralizing past felonies.426 In either scenario, the legal

consequences of the pardon could potentially reward Braswell with

unjustified leniency.

B. Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton

White House

The active criminal investigation into Braswell might have disqualified him if normal pardon procedures were followed.427 Yet,

Braswell’s petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice Department and went directly to the White House.428 Legal experts agree that had the FBI conducted the background investigation instead of the White House, Braswell’s application would have

been rejected quickly.429 A former pardon attorney at the Justice

Department during the Carter Administration said, ‘‘If it had gone

through normal channels, it never would have gotten through. Nobody ever gets a pardon when they are under active investigation

for other offenses—ever.’’ 430 Margaret Colgate Love, the Justice

Department’s pardon attorney from 1990 to 1997,431 concurred that

evidence of an ongoing investigation should stop a president from

issuing a pardon because the ‘‘law-abidingness’’ of the individual is

a critical threshold in determining whether a petitioner is deserving.432 Love described the final Clinton pardons as ‘‘an accident

waiting to happen.’’ 433

How such an undeserving petitioner received the President’s ultimate grant of forgiveness can be explained by Braswell’s powerful

and high-priced connections. Braswell was represented in his parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1333

434 Coffey’s tenure as U.S. Attorney ended under an ethical cloud. After losing a major drug

trafficking trial in February 1996, Coffey visited the Lipstik Adult Entertainment Club, charged

a $900 magnum of Dom Perignon champagne to his American Express card, and retired to the

club’s private champagne room with one of the dancers. David Adams, Top Lawman Quits After

Topless Bar Tale, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 1A. Reports indicate that, after the

dancer rebuffed Coffey’s advances towards her, Coffey grabbed the dancer, pulled her towards

him, and bit her left upper arm. The bite broke the dancer’s skin and drew blood, according

to the dancer’s husband. After meeting with then-Attorney General Janet Reno about the incident, Coffey resigned as U.S. Attorney. Federal Attorney Resigns, TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 18,

1996, at 1. 435Tim Nickens, Pardon of Man Under Investigation Questioned, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.

8, 2001, at 6B. 436Kendall Coffey Document Production 0003 (Memorandum from Kendall Coffey, Attorney,

to Hugh Rodham, Attorney (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 48). Along with this note, Coffey attached

a copy of Braswell’s pardon petition. 437 Id. 438See Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001) (within Appendix I). News reports indicated that

Rodham received $200,000 for his work on Braswell’s pardon, but, according to Rodham’s attorney, Braswell made one payment of $30,000 and then transferred $200,000 by wire to Rodham’s

law firm. Based on this information and Coffey’s note to Rodham, the $30,000 payment likely

was for a ‘‘best efforts submission’’ by Rodham that he would receive regardless of outcome. The

$200,000 wire transfer likely was received as a ‘‘success payment.’’ 439Kendall Coffey Document Production 0004–07 (Fax from Kendall Coffey, Attorney, Kendall

Coffey, P.A., to Hugh Rodham (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 49). 440See id. 441 Id. 442 Id.

don bid by Kendall Coffey, a former U.S. Attorney appointed by

President Clinton 434 and an attorney for former Vice President Al

Gore during the Florida vote recount.435 However, it is unclear

whether Coffey called on his own influence with the Clinton Administration to obtain the Braswell pardon. Rather, it appears that

Coffey’s main contribution to the pardon effort was to hire Hugh

Rodham.

On January 12, 2001, Coffey sent a note to Rodham requesting

his assistance. The note suggested that Rodham could earn a very

large sum of money for his work.436 In his note regarding Braswell,

Coffey wrote:

The client proposes $20,000 for a best efforts submission

and an $80,000 success payment. Both numbers are negotiable, especially the latter. The initial payment can be

wired Tuesday a.m. if the representation is accepted.437

Rodham accepted the representation but not before negotiating a

fee of $230,000 for his work if successful.438 On January 17, 2001,

two days before the pardon was issued, Coffey sent Rodham a fax

at the White House.439 The fax included a three-page letter written

by Coffey to the President expounding on the merits of the

Braswell case.440 With Braswell’s crime-ridden background in

mind, in addition to the current investigation for tax fraud, excerpts from Coffey’s letter would be laughable if not for the gravity

of the situation. In the letter, Coffey describes Braswell as a ‘‘visionary’’ with an ‘‘exemplary record of business accomplishments’’

who is ‘‘truly deserving of the extraordinary measure of mercy embodied in a Presidential pardon.’’ 441 Coffey also opined that

‘‘[g]ranting a pardon to bring justice and healing to a man’s life

would further the extraordinary legacies that have defined your

Presidency.’’ 442

1334

443Kendall Coffey Document Production 0001–02 (Record of Professional Services Rendered

Regarding Braswell Clemency Application (Feb. 4, 2001)) (Exhibit 50). 444Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001) (within Appendix I). 445 Id. 446 Id. 447 Id. 448 Christopher Marquis and Michael Moss, A Clinton In-law Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon

Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1. 449 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 450 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 451 Id. 452 Id. 453 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 413 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 454 Id. at 382. 455 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 456 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 457 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001).

At this point, Coffey’s work pushing the Braswell pardon was finished,443 and Braswell’s fate was placed in Rodham’s hands. In the

final days of the Clinton Administration, Rodham contacted Meredith Cabe of the White House Counsel’s Office at least twice.444 He

forwarded Coffey’s letter of support for Braswell to Cabe, and he

made a follow-up inquiry.445 According to Rodham’s attorney, these

two actions were the extent of Rodham’s role in the Braswell pardon, a role for which he received $230,000.446 Despite the huge reward for success, his close relationship with the President, and his

living in the White House, Rodham claims he never discussed either Braswell or Vignali with President Clinton or Hillary Clinton.447 However, the small circle of aides advising the former President admit that Clinton and Rodham may have had private discussions to which staffers were not privy.448

Among the staffers assisting the President with the pardon petitions were members of the White House Counsel’s Office. Meredith

Cabe recalls discussing the Braswell pardon with Rodham.449 In

fact, another associate counsel at the White House, Eric Angel, was

also aware that Rodham was involved with the Braswell case.450

When asked how he knew of Rodham’s advocacy, Angel responded,

‘‘I think his name was on an envelope or Meredith mentioned

it.’’ 451 Based on the pardon petition and the White House’s cursory

investigation, Angel did not oppose the Braswell pardon and remembers no other staff member opposing the Rodham-backed pardon either.452

One of the President’s closest advisors, White House Counsel

Beth Nolan, was also aware that Rodham was advocating

Braswell’s petition.453 Ms. Nolan knew that Mr. Rodham circumvented the Justice Department and filed the Braswell petition

directly with the White House.454 In fact, Nolan brought the

Braswell pardon to Cabe’s attention.455 Ms. Nolan personally handed the Braswell file to Cabe and Angel.456 Nolan then requested

that Cabe inspect the petition because Nolan believed it was the

type of case in which the President was interested.457 Finally, both

Cabe and Nolan recall discussing the Braswell petition in a meetVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1335

458 Id. ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 413 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 459 Id. 460 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 461 Id. 462 Id. 463 Jerry Seper, Hillary’s Brother Returns Cash for Pardon Work, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001,

at A1. 464 Id. 465Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to Glenn Braswell (Feb. 23, 2001) (Exhibit

42).

466 Reports detailing Rodham’s receipt of over $200,000 from Braswell appeared on the front

page of The NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST, WASHINGTON TIMES, WALL STREET JOURNAL, LOS ANGELES TIMES, and USA TODAY. 467 Christopher Marquis and Michael Moss, A Clinton In-law Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon

Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1. 468 Jerry Seper, Hillary’s Brother Returns Cash for Pardon Work, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001,

at A1. 469 Id. 470 Christopher Marquis and Michael Moss, A Clinton In-law Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon

Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1. 471 Id.

ing with the President.458 Despite Rodham’s oddly intense interest

in an obscure herbal remedy dealer from South Florida, Nolan

claims that she was unaware Rodham was receiving a fee for his

advocacy.459 Cabe explained that the President had a ‘‘general articulation’’ of types of cases he wanted to consider.460 She recalled

that President Clinton believed that felons convicted a long time

ago, but who now abided by the law, deserved to have their civil

rights restored.461 Based on general agreement among White

House staff, Braswell fell into this category and deserved clemency.462

In a carefully worded statement, President Clinton issued a similar claim.463 The former President said he had no knowledge that

Rodham received a contingency fee for his work on the Braswell

application and insisted that Rodham return any monies received.464 The President’s careful use of the phrase ‘‘contingency

fee’’ leaves open the possibility that he was aware Braswell was

paying Rodham, but not the details of their arrangement.

Rodham’s attorney Nancy Luque mailed a $230,000 check to

Braswell on February 23, 2001,465 after Rodham’s conduct was

widely reported and criticized in the press.466

In the face of widespread criticism from Republicans and Democrats alike, Luque somehow maintained that ‘‘Hugh Rodham has

done absolutely nothing wrong.’’ 467 Most disagreed with Luque’s

viewpoint. President Clinton declared that he and Hillary were

‘‘deeply disturbed’’ by news reports of Rodham’s actions.468 In a

separate statement, Hillary Clinton stated her belief that ‘‘the payments should be returned immediately.’’ 469 Other critics more

forcefully condemned Rodham. Terry McAuliffe, Chairman of the

Democratic National Committee, declared, ‘‘What he did was absolutely wrong.’’ 470 The DNC Chairman called on Rodham to ‘‘fully

account for his actions.’’ 471

As for Braswell, he has been unable to steer clear of allegations

of misconduct. In addition to the federal tax evasion inquiry ongoing in Los Angeles, Braswell was subpoenaed to testify before a

Senate Committee investigating health scams in September

1336

472William M. Welch, Senate Probes ‘‘Anti-Aging’’ Claims, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 2001, at A7. 473 ‘‘Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope Marketing Anti-Aging

Products to Seniors,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 8 (testimony of Mike O’Neal, former Chief Executive Officer, GB Data Systems) 474 Id. at 11. 475See id. at 8–9. 476 Id. at 9. 477Dennis Camire, President of Dietary Supplement Firm Takes Fifth in Senate Questioning, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2001, at 2001 WL 5112568. 478Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Henry F.

Schuelke, III, Partner, Janis, Schuelke and Wechsler (February 26, 2002) (within Appendix I). 479 Jerry Seper, Brown Son Gets Probation and Fine; Illegal Donations Made in ’94 Races, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A2; John Solomon, Couple to Plead Guilty to Illegal $50,000

Donation, ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERVICE, May 22, 1997, at 1997 WL 2527905. 480 Jerry Seper, Couple Jailed for Gifts to Democrats, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997, at A10. 481Press Release 01–182, Thai Businesswomen Sentenced On Campaign Financing Charges,

Department of Justice, Apr. 20, 2001. In particular, the Lums pleaded to using Dynamic Resources to funnel $50,000 in illegal contributions to the 1994 re-election campaign of Senator

Edward Kennedy and to Stuart Price’s unsuccessful congressional campaign in Oklahoma.

2001.472 At the hearing, the former chief executive officer of a

Braswell company testified that its products are ‘‘laden with lies

and deception’’ 473 and that Braswell continues to ‘‘prey on the elderly and infirmed.’’ 474 Due in part to advertisements containing ‘‘outright false statements,’’ Braswell’s companies generate annual revenues of approximately $200 million.475 The companies are organized to create the appearance of foreign ownership in ghost locations so any individual or agency seeking to locate the company

will be delayed.476 In response to these weighty allegations,

Braswell invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions posed by the Committee.477

Braswell similarly refused a request for an interview by Committee

staff.478

III. HUGH RODHAM’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY

FOR THE LUMS

A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum

Gene and Nora Lum were prominent Democratic contributors and fundraisers who gave more than $90,000 to the Democratic

Party and raised at least $250,000 more.479 The Lums were especially close to former DNC Chair and Commerce Secretary Ron

Brown. In 1992, at the request of Ron Brown, the Lums established

the Asian Pacific Advisory Council to organize the Asian-Pacific

American community and raise funds for the Democratic National

Committee. In 1993, the Lums purchased an oil and gas company

in Oklahoma and named it Dynamic Energy Resources. They hired

Secretary Brown’s son, Michael, to work at Dynamic Energy Resources. Although he did little work for the Lums, he was given

$500,000 in company stock and a country club membership worth

$60,000.480

Many of the Lums’ political contributions were illegal, and in 1997 the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 in illegal conduit

contributions to the DNC and the campaigns of Senator Edward

Kennedy and Stuart Price. Their daughter, Trisha Lum, and Michael Brown also pled guilty to misdemeanor charges of making

conduit contributions. As part of their plea agreement, Gene and

Nora Lum were sentenced to 5 months in home detention and 5

months in a halfway house and were ordered to pay a $30,000

fine.481 In August 1998, Gene Lum also pleaded guilty to tax fraud

1337

James Rowley, The Justice Department Opposes Giving Convicted . . ., ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERVICE, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1997 WL 2555487; Federal Document Clearing House, Department of Justice, ‘‘New Jersey Attorney Sentenced in Campaign Finance Case,’’ Oct. 12, 2000

(summarizing Campaign Task Force prosecutions). The Lums admitted making the donations

through ‘‘straw donors,’’ including their daughter, Trisha, and Michael Brown. James Rowley,

‘‘The Justice Department Opposes Giving Convicted . . .,’’ ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERVICE, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1997 WL 2555487. The Lums also admitted to having given Brown thousands of dollars in shareholder and consulting fees, which were given to friends to forward to

Kennedy’s re-election campaign. Id. 482 Id. 483Press Release 01–182, Thai Businesswomen Sentenced On Campaign Financing Charges,’’

Department of Justice, Apr. 20, 2001. 484 Notes of Conversation Between Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, and

Nicole Lum (Aug. 28, 2001). 485See First Union Document Production (Check number 1314 from Rodham & Fine, P.A.

IOTA Account to ‘‘Ms. Nikki Lum’’ for $20,420 (Jan. 26, 2001)) (Exhibit 51). 486Telephone Interview with Joel Wohlgemuth, Partner, Norman, Wohlgemuth, Chandler &

Dowell (Jan. 17, 2002). 487 Id. 488 Id. The Federal Express package addressed to Hugh Rodham at the White House that contained the documents was reportedly dated December 28, 2000, at 11:11 a.m. The Lawyer’s Column, Lobbyist? Who’s a Lobbyist? When It Comes to Clemency, They Are Most Likely Advocates,

WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at E8. Because Rodham needed the documents immediately at that

point, Wohlgemuth sent the documents directly to him through the Usher’s Office so that it

would not be subject to, and therefore delayed by, onerous security measures that might have

Continued

for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in false deductions.482 In June 1999, Gene Lum was sentenced to two years

in prison.483

B. Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the

Possibility of a Pardon for the Lums

The Committee has attempted to interview Gene Lum, Nora

Lum, and their daughter Nicole Lum. All three have refused to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation. Hugh Rodham also refused to cooperate with the Committee’s request for an interview.

Therefore, it is difficult to obtain a full understanding of the Lums’

efforts to obtain executive clemency. However, sufficient evidence

exists to conclude that the Lums did attempt to obtain executive

clemency and that Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part

of that effort. It is not clear why Rodham lobbied on behalf of the

Lums or why their request was rejected.

It appears that the Lums had a relationship with Hugh Rodham

predating their efforts to obtain executive clemency. The Lums’

daughter Nicole described Hugh Rodham was a ‘‘business associate

and a friend.’’ 484 This relationship is supported by the fact that, on

January 26, 2001, Hugh Rodham paid Nicole Lum $20,420.485

However, Nicole Lum refused to elaborate on the nature of the relationship between Hugh Rodham and her family or the purpose of

the payment made by Rodham.

In late 2000, the Lums apparently began their efforts to obtain

executive clemency. In December 2000, Nora Lum called Joel

Wohlgemuth, the attorney who represented her husband in his tax

case, and asked him to compile a variety of documents related to

their criminal cases and send them to Hugh Rodham at the White

House.486 Wohlgemuth then compiled a packet of documents relating to both the tax case against Gene Lum and the campaign fundraising case against Gene and Nora Lum.487 Wohlgemuth sent the

documents to Rodham at the White House in late December

2000.488 In early January 2001, Rodham called Wohlgemuth and

1338

had the package rerouted through an offsite location for screening. Telephone Interview with

Joel Wohlgemuth, Partner, Norman, Wohlgemuth, Chandler & Dowell (Jan. 17, 2002). 489 Id. 490Telephone Interview with Cono Namorato and Scott Michel, Partners, Caplin & Drysdale

(Jan. 17, 2002). This was the extent of Namorato and Michel’s involvement in the Lums’ clemency matter. Id. At no time did they speak to Hugh Rodham about that, or any other, matter.

Id.491 Id.; NARA Document Production (Cover Letter and Presentence Investigation Report from

Scott Michel, Partner, Caplin & Drysdale, to Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the

President, the White House (July 16, 1997)) (Exhibit 52). 492 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001); James V. Grimaldi & Lois Romano, Two Others Rodham Helped Didn’t Win

Pardons; Clinton Relative Called White House on Behalf of Former Fundraisers, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1. According to one unnamed source, during that conversation, ‘‘[Rodham]

was expressing some interest in the prospects of the Lums [sic] getting a pardon. He wanted

to know where it stood, what the likelihood of a pardon might be.’’ Stephen Braun and Richard

Serrano, More Clemency Lobbying by Rodham Alleged; Commutations; Former President Clin- ton’s Brother-In-Law Called a White House Lawyer About a Pardon For a Couple Convicted of

Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1. 493 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 494Stephen Braun and Richard Serrano, More Clemency Lobbying by Rodham Alleged;

Commutations; Former President Clinton’s Brother-In-Law Called a White House Lawyer About

a Pardon For a Couple Convicted of Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001,

at A1. 495Stephen Braun and Richard Serrano, More Clemency Lobbying by Rodham Alleged;

Commutations; Former President Clinton’s Brother-In-Law Called a White House Lawyer About

a Pardon For a Couple Convicted of Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001,

at A1.

said that the Justice Department did not have the documents

Wohlgemuth had sent to the White House and asked him to resend

them directly to Meredith Cabe, the associate White House Counsel

responsible for vetting clemency applications, and one other person

whose name Wohlgemuth could not recall.489 Wohlgemuth also

asked the Lums’ criminal attorneys in their campaign finance-related case to forward the Lums’ presentence report directly to

Cabe.490 On January 18, 2001, Cabe received the Lums’ presentence report from Caplin & Drysdale.491

In January 2001, Hugh Rodham telephoned Meredith Cabe and

spoke to her about the prospects of obtaining pardons for Gene and

Nora Lum.492 Cabe found the case Rodham presented in support

of the Lums unimpressive, so she ‘‘just heard him out.’’ 493 Cabe relayed the substance of her discussion with Rodham about the Lums

to Beth Nolan and Bruce Lindsey. Cabe also recalls that later,

shortly before the end of the Clinton Administration, she again

raised the issue of the Lum pardons with Nolan and Lindsey, and

they made it clear to Cabe that the Lums were not going to receive

pardons. While Cabe did not know why the Lum pardons were not

seriously considered, one anonymous White House source told the

press that ‘‘senior White House aides had spread the word that

clemencies would not be available for those who had been convicted

in the past of campaign finance irregularities involving the Democratic Party.’’ 494

Hugh Rodham has refused to participate in an interview with

Committee staff regarding his pardon efforts. However, Rodham’s

attorney has publicly stated that Rodham ‘‘did not represent the

Lums. He was asked to represent them. He declined.’’ 495 Luque

also publicly noted that Rodham ‘‘did not represent [the Lums] in

any way, shape or form in connection with any pardon request’’ and that Rodham ‘‘did not advocate on [the Lums’] behalf.’’ Luque’s

statement is in direct conflict with Meredith Cabe’s clear recollection that Hugh Rodham called her about the Lum pardons and lobVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1339

496David Johnston and Don Van Natta, Jr., White House Logs Said To Show Pre-pardon Visits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at A20. 497Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Hugh

Rodham (Feb. 21, 2001) (within Appendix I). 498Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001) (within Appendix I). 499Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 7, 2001) (within Appendix I). 500Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Nancy

Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (Mar. 13, 2001) (within Appendix I). 501Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Hugh

Rodham c/o Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (July 30, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from

the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Hugh Rodham c/o Nancy

Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (Sept. 21, 2001) (within Appendix I).

bied her on behalf of the Lums. Ultimately, Luque modified her

earlier public statement when she noted that Rodham in fact

played ‘‘a negligible role’’ in pursuing executive clemency for the

Lums.496

It remains unclear what, if any, amount of money was paid by

Rodham to the Lums. Also unclear is whether there was any arrangement for a success fee in the event that Rodham was successful. The refusal of Rodham and the Lums to cooperate with the

Committee only heightens the suspicion that some sort of financial

arrangement, similar to Rodham’s payment arrangement with

Horacio Vignali and Glenn Braswell, existed in this case.

IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE

HUGH RODHAM INVESTIGATION

A. Hugh Rodham

Hugh Rodham was a central figure in both the Vignali and

Braswell matters. However, he extended only partial cooperation to

the Committee. On February 21, 2001, Chairman Burton sent

Hugh Rodham a letter posing a number of questions regarding his

work lobbying for pardons and commutations for various individuals.497 This letter also requested Rodham to produce records to

the Committee regarding his lobbying efforts. On February 28,

2001, Nancy Luque, counsel for Rodham, provided brief answers on

behalf of Rodham.498 On March 7, 2001, Luque provided to the

Committee records regarding Rodham’s efforts to obtain a pardon

for Glenn Braswell.499 However, Luque did not provide any records

regarding Rodham’s efforts to obtain a commutation for Vignali,

claiming they were all protected by the attorney-client privilege.

Shortly thereafter, Chairman Burton requested that Rodham participate in an interview with Committee staff.500 Rodham refused

to participate in an interview but continued to offer to respond to

written questions. Therefore, the Committee did send Rodham two

letters asking questions regarding his role in the Vignali matter.501

Rodham did provide extremely brief responses to these questions.

However, he refused to provide to the Committee any documents

relating to his work on the Vignali matter. Rodham’s refusal to provide records relating to the Vignali matter was not justified by the

attorney-client privilege, and it appears that Rodham’s invocation

of the privilege was overbroad and made to hinder the Committee’s

investigation.

1340

502Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Edward A.

Rucker, Esquire (Mar. 9, 2001) (within Appendix I). 503Letter from Edward A. Rucker, Esquire, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm.

on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) (within Appendix I). 504Subpoena of Comm. on Govt. Reform to Horacio C. Vignali c/o Edward A. Rucker, Esquire

(Mar. 21, 2001) (within Appendix II); Subpoena of Comm. on Govt. Reform to Carlos A. Vignali

c/o Edward A. Rucker, Esquire (Mar. 21, 2001) (within Appendix II). 505Letter from Edward A. Rucker, Esquire, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm.

on Govt. Reform (Mar. 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). See also Letter from the Honorable Dan

Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Edward A. Rucker, Esquire (Apr. 4, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from Edward A. Rucker, Esquire, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 6, 2001) (within Appendix I). 506Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to James M.

Casso, Partner, Alvarez-Glasman & Colvin (July 25, 2001) (within Appendix I). 507Letter from Mark E. Overland, Partner, Shapiro, Borenstein & Dupont, to the Honorable

Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).

B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali

On March 9, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Edward

Rucker, counsel for Horacio and Carlos Vignali, posing a number

of questions regarding the effort to win a commutation for Carlos

Vignali.502 On March 15, 2001, Rucker responded, stating that, in

light of the criminal investigation into the Vignali matter, it would

be ‘‘inadvisable’’ to respond to the questions or produce documents

to the Committee.503 On March 21, 2001, Chairman Burton issued

subpoenas to the Vignali’s, requiring them to produce records to

the Committee regarding the effort to obtain a commutation.504 On

March 22, 2001, Rucker sent a letter to the Committee stating that

his clients invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and, therefore, would not respond to the subpoena.505

C. James Casso

During the Committee’s investigation of the Vignali matter,

James Casso emerged as a significant figure in the effort to win a

commutation for Carlos Vignali. Beginning in July 2001, Committee staff began efforts to interview Mr. Casso. Mr. Casso spoke

with staff but initially declined to answer any questions about his

involvement in the Vignali matter. Casso explained that he wanted

to see if other individuals involved in the investigation were cooperating before he decided whether to cooperate. In late July, Casso

informed Committee staff that he would not answer questions in

an interview but would like to receive questions in writing from the

Committee. Accordingly, on July 25, 2001, Chairman Burton posed

a number of written questions to Casso.506 However, Casso failed

to respond to this letter, necessitating a number of telephone calls

from Committee staff. Eventually, Casso hired a lawyer and refused to cooperate with the Committee. On August 27, 2001, Mark

Overland, Casso’s attorney, wrote to the Chairman and stated that

Casso was ‘‘unable to provide’’ the requested information.507 Overland later explained that Casso could not provide the information

because he had an attorney-client relationship with the Vignalis

that prohibited him from discussing his work for the Vignalis. This

representation was in direct conflict with earlier assurances given

by Casso to Committee staff, namely that he never represented the

Vignalis. It appears that Casso, like Hugh Rodham, invoked the attorney-client privilege in an overbroad and unjustified manner to

avoid answering questions about his involvement in the Vignali

matter.

1341

508Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Henry F.

Schuelke, III, Partner, Janis, Schuelke & Wechsler (February 26, 2002) (within Appendix I)

(confirmation letter). 509Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform Committee, to

Jon A. Sale, Partner, Sale & Kuehne (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix I). 510Letter from Jon A. Sale, Partner, Sale & Kuehne, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform Committee (July 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). 511Subpoena Duces Tecum from the Comm. on Govt. Reform to Gene K.H. Lum (Sept. 24,

2002) (within Appendix II); Subpoena Duces Tecum from the Comm. on Govt. Reform to Nora

Lum (Sept. 24, 2002) (within Appendix II). 512Letter from Gene K.H. Lum to Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Nov.

14, 2001) (within Appendix I). Despite indications of Rodham’s involvement in seeking executive

clemency for the Lums and suggestions of some sort of ‘‘business relationship’’ between the

Lums and Rodham, the Lums claimed that they did not have any records whatsoever relating

to Rodham. Id. 513Letter from Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Gene K.H. Lum

(Feb. 20, 2002) (within Appendix I) (memorializing request for prosecutorial immunity). 514Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Nora Lum

(Feb. 20, 2001) (within Appendix I).

D. Glenn Braswell

The Committee contacted Glenn Braswell’s attorney, Henry F.

Schuelke, and requested that Braswell participate in an interview

on February 26, 2002. Through his attorney, Braswell declined to

be interviewed 508 and provided no documentation regarding his relationship with Kendall Coffey and Hugh Rodham.

E. Kendall Coffey

Kendall Coffey represented Glenn Braswell in his efforts to obtain clemency. On February 16, 2001, the Committee requested all

records relating to Coffey’s work on the Braswell pardon. Coffey’s

attorney provided records relevant to the Committee’s request.

These records raised a number of questions, and the Committee requested an interview with Coffey to resolve several issues regarding his role in the Braswell matter in an April 10, 2001, letter.

After not receiving a response from Coffey or his attorney, the

Committee again requested that Coffey participate in an interview

in a letter dated June 12, 2001.509 On July 27, 2001, Coffey’s attorney finally responded to the Committee by claiming that Coffey

was ‘‘unable to participate in an interview’’ due to attorney-client

privilege.510 Without Coffey’s full cooperation, the Committee has

been unable to resolve questions about the relationship between

Braswell, Coffey, and Rodham.

F. Gene and Nora Lum

The Lums likewise refused to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation. On September 26, 2001, the Committee had Gene and

Nora Lum served with a subpoena duces tecum.511 For almost two

months, both avoided repeated requests by the Committee for compliance with its subpoena. After numerous delays, the Lums finally

replied to the Committee’s subpoena by claiming that they had no

responsive documents.512 On February 12, 2002, Gene Lum declined to be interviewed by Committee staff unless he was granted

immunity from prosecution.513 Nora Lum likewise declined to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation.514

G. Nicole Lum

On August 28, 2001, Committee staff briefly spoke to Nicole

Lum. During that conversation, Nicole Lum described Hugh

1342

515Letter from Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Nicole M. Lum

(Feb. 20, 2002) (within Appendix I) (requesting interview and noting telephone calls made on

February 12, 2002, and February 15, 2002).

Rodham as ‘‘a friend’’ and ‘‘a business associate.’’ Committee staff

then attempted to probe into Nicole Lum’s (and her family’s) relationship with Rodham and Rodham’s efforts to obtain a presidential pardon for Gene and Nora Lum. Nicole Lum indicated that

she was unwilling to submit to an interview without her attorney

present. However, Nicole Lum ultimately declined to retain an attorney for purposes of the Committee’s investigation. On February

12, 2002, February 15, 2002, and February 20, 2002, Committee

staff attempted to interview Nicole Lum.515 Nicole Lum has not responded to the Committee’s repeated requests.

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

1370

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

1412

1413

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

1455

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

1497

1498

1499

1500

1501

1502

1503

1504

1505

1506

1507

1508

1509

1510

1511

1512

1513

1514

1515

1516

1517

1518

1519

1520

1521

1522

1523

1524

1525

1526

1527

1528

1529

1530

1531

1532

1533

1534

1535

1536

1537

1538

1539

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

1581

1582

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

(1589)

CHAPTER FOUR

TONY RODHAM’S ROLE IN LOBBYING FOR

GRANTS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Tony Rodham’s Role in the Case of Edgar and Vonna Jo

Gregory

• Tony Rodham lobbied President Clinton to grant pardons to

Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory while he was receiving substantial

sums of money from the Gregorys. Rodham received $244,769 in

salary from the Gregorys over two and a half years and also received another $79,000 in loans from the Gregorys. The Gregorys claim that they paid Rodham this large sum of money for

various consulting services that Rodham provided to the Gregorys. However, the Gregorys do not have any documentation reflecting work performed for them by Rodham.

• Given the fact that the Gregorys do not have any documentary

evidence reflecting the $244,769 of work performed for them by

Rodham, substantial questions are raised as to what Rodham

actually did for the Gregorys that was so valuable. The most valuable thing that Rodham did for the Gregorys was to obtain

presidential pardons. Therefore, there is a substantial question

as to whether the Gregorys paid Rodham for his efforts to obtain presidential pardons for them.

• If Rodham was paid to obtain presidential pardons for the Gregorys, it creates the strong appearance of impropriety. The prospect of financial benefit for Rodham would taint Rodham’s actions in lobbying for the pardon. Also, if President Clinton knew

about Rodham’s financial arrangement, it would taint his actions in granting the pardons.

• Compounding the appearance of impropriety in the Gregorys

case is the fact that the pardons were opposed by the Justice Department, the prosecutors responsible for the case, and the Gregorys’ sentencing judge. Apparently, the only people in the Clinton Administration who felt that the Gregorys deserved pardons

were President Clinton and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce

Lindsey, both of whom knew of Tony Rodham’s involvement in

the matter.

1590

Tony Rodham’s Role in the Case of Fernando Fuentes Coba

• Tony Rodham offered to help Vivian Mannerud obtain a pardon

for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba, in exchange for $50,000.

When Rodham learned in late 2000 that Mannerud was seeking

a pardon for her elderly father, he met with Mannerud and told

her that he could help obtain the pardon if she paid him a

$50,000 consulting fee. Rodham told Mannerud that he had successfully obtained pardons before and showed her the Gregorys’ pardon petition to support his claim.

• Rodham attempted to convince Mannerud to hire him by making

a number of false representations to her. Rodham told Mannerud

that he was close personal friends with the Pardon Attorney,

Roger Adams. Rodham also told Mannerud that he would use

the $50,000 to hire a law firm to handle her case, and that

Roger Adams’ wife worked at the law firm, which would help

her case be treated favorably. All of these representations were

completely false and were apparently made to mislead

Mannerud as to the purpose of the payment to Rodham.

• Mannerud rejected Rodham’s offer. Mannerud was concerned

that Rodham could not guarantee that he could obtain a pardon

in exchange for the $50,000. She was also concerned about becoming embroiled in a scandal. Therefore, she rejected Rodham’s

offer.

• After Mannerud rejected Rodham’s offer, an associate of Rodham

came back to Mannerud with another offer. According to

Mannerud, a month after she rejected Tony Rodham’s proposal,

Marilyn Parker, a mutual friend of Rodham’s and Mannerud’s

who attended the initial meeting between them, came back to

Mannerud and told her that Rodham now wanted only $30,000

to help her obtain a pardon for her father. Mannerud was still

concerned about the nature of Rodham’s proposal and rejected

it.

• The actions taken by Rodham and Parker may have been illegal.

It appears that Rodham, and maybe Parker, tried to defraud

Mannerud. While this effort was unsuccessful, it may have constituted criminal conduct. The Committee recommends that the

Justice Department investigate these allegations.

INTRODUCTION

Like his brother, Hugh Rodham, and his brother-in-law, Roger

Clinton, Tony Rodham tried to sell his access to the White House.

The Committee has investigated at least two instances in which

Tony Rodham was involved in discussions regarding lobbying the

White House for presidential pardons. In one case, dealing with

Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, Tony Rodham was successful and obtained pardons on March 15, 2000. Rodham’s efforts on behalf of

the Gregorys are troubling given several facts: (1) the Gregorys do

not appear to be suitable candidates for presidential pardons; (2)

Tony Rodham used his access to the President to lobby for the pardons; and (3) Tony Rodham had an extremely lucrative financial

1591

1Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001,

at A9. A news report aired by ‘‘Dateline NBC’’ several years ago alleged that ‘‘games of skill

and chance’’ were rigged in United Shows fairways. At that time, Edgar Gregory said he thought

such games were legal but would investigate the allegations. See Gregory Document Production

00004–08 (‘‘Florida State Fair’s Midway—United Shows of America, Inc.: Showmanship, Entertainment, Food, Family, Fun, Memories,’’ 1998 Fla. State Fair Mag.) (Exhibit 1). 2See Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek Pardons, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A. 3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.; Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain

Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1.

relationship with the Gregorys in which he apparently did very little work other than lobby for the presidential pardons.

In the other case, it appears that Tony Rodham attempted to

convince Vivian Mannerud, a prominent Democratic donor who was

seeking a pardon for her father, that she should hire him to help

obtain the pardon. In the course of attempting to convince

Mannerud to hire him, it appears that Rodham seriously misled

Mannerud about his influence with the Justice Department.

Rodham was seeking as much as $50,000 for his work on this matter. While Mannerud did not accept Rodham’s offer, Rodham’s efforts to obtain money from Mannerud might have been criminal.

Although the investigation of Tony Rodham’s involvement in

clemency proceedings produced important new evidence, the investigation was hampered by Tony Rodham’s refusal to cooperate fully

with the Committee. Though Rodham produced documents in response to a Committee subpoena, he refused to be interviewed by

Committee staff. Rodham’s refusal to answer questions regarding

his involvement in the Gregory and Fuentes matters limited the

ability of the Committee to reach definitive conclusions about certain aspects of those cases. Given Rodham’s position that he did

nothing improper, it is unclear why he did not want to answer

questions from the Committee regarding his actions.

I. EDGAR AND VONNA JO GREGORY

A. Background

Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., and his wife, Vonna Jo, live outside

Nashville and own United Shows of America, a carnival company

which puts on the Florida State Fair and more than 30 other carnivals a year.1 The Gregorys have felony convictions dating from

1986 relating to their ownership of several banks in the 1970s.

From November 1975 to April 1977, the Gregorys owned controlling interests in five Alabama banks.2 The Gregorys’ banking practices came under fire from regulators, who accused the Gregorys of

making unsound loans to other companies they owned and to various associates.3 Alabama’s banking superintendent closed one of

the Gregorys’ banks in March 1978.4 In a separate matter in January 1978, regulators seized another of the Gregorys’ banks, the

First Bank of Macon County in Notasulga, Alabama, citing ‘‘unsafe

and unsound banking practices.’’ 5

In 1982, the Gregorys were indicted on charges that they stole

$800,000 in connection with their banking activities in the 1970s,

sending the bank into bankruptcy.6 Subsequently, they were convicted of conspiring to misapply bank funds, making false stateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00331 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1592

7Tony Rodham Document Production 000029 (Petition for Pardon After Completion of Sentence for Vonna Jo Gregory, Nov. 10, 1998) (Exhibit 2); Gregory Document Production (Petition

for Pardon After Completion of Sentence for Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., Nov. 10, 1998) (Exhibit

3). See also Florida Officials Investigating Couples State Fair Contract Extension, ASSOCIATED

PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 8, 2001. 8 Id.

9 U.S. v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 706 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Florida Officials Investigating

Couples State Fair Contract Extension, AP STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 8, 2001. 10Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek Pardons, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A. 11Tony Rodham Document Production 000029 (Petition for Pardon After Completion of Sentence for Vonna Jo Gregory, Nov. 10. 1998) (Exhibit 2); Gregory Document Production (Petition

for Pardon After Completion of Sentence for Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., Nov. 10, 1998) (Exhibit

3). See also Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek Pardons, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A. 12 According to the Center on Responsive Politics, United Shows, the Gregorys’ company, has

ranked among the top 6 entertainment industry companies contributing to federal candidates

and committees in the last three two-year campaign cycles. According to campaign finance disclosure records, United Shows contributed $50,000 to the DCCC in 2000, $25,000 to the DNC

in 1998, and $10,000 to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee in 1998. According to

financial disclosure records, the Gregorys also contributed a total of $4,500 to Senator Hillary

Rodham Clinton in 1999 and 2000, $11,000 to the New York Senate 2000 Committee, $1,000

to President Clinton in 1995, $4,000 to Vice President Gore, $8,000 to the Tennessee Democratic

Party, and $5,000 to the Democratic National Committee in 1992. During 1999 and 2000, the

Gregorys, their children, and their company and its employees reportedly contributed a total of

$294,000. Although the Gregorys contributed to Republican political interests during that period, eighty-nine percent of the Gregorys’ contributions in that interim reportedly went to Democrats. 13Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). See also Gregory

Document Production (Invitation to birthday party for Hillary Rodham Clinton, Oct. 27, 1997)

(Exhibit 4); Gregory Document Production (Facsimile driving instructions from Daniela CastroQuijada, Tony Rodham & Associates, to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to birthday party for Hillary Rodham Clinton (Oct. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 5). The Gregorys declined that invitation. See Letter from Deborah L. McGee, Secretary to Howard Vine, Greenberg Traurig, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 7, 2001) (within Appendix I). 14Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). 15 Id. 16 In a televised interview, Rodham described himself as a ‘‘general consultant’’ and someone

‘‘who solves problems for people.’’ Interview by Larry King, CNN, with Tony Rodham (Mar. 3,

2001) (‘‘I just bring different peoples together. I help them negotiate deals.’’).

ments to banks, misapplication of bank funds, and wire fraud.7 At

that time, Edgar Gregory was sentenced to two years imprisonment

and his wife to three years probation.8 The Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals affirmed the conviction in part but also vacated in part.9

In 1986, the case was concluded when the Gregorys pleaded guilty

to conspiracy and misapplication of bank funds.10 On October 1,

1986, Edgar Gregory and his wife were sentenced to 5 years and

3 years probation respectively.11

B. Tony Rodham’s Relationship with the Gregorys

The Gregorys had a relationship with President Clinton predating their relationship with Tony Rodham. The Gregorys made substantial contributions to Bill Clinton when he was running for

President in 1992 and continued their contributions throughout

President Clinton’s two terms in office.12 By making large and frequent contributions to President Clinton’s campaign, the Gregorys

were able to meet with President Clinton a number of times. In

total, the Gregorys met with President Clinton at least ten times

while he was in office.13

The Gregorys first met Tony Rodham while President Clinton

was campaigning for his second term.14 They met Rodham at a

small private fundraiser in Washington, D.C.15 Rodham apparently

used such fundraisers as a venue to solicit business opportunities

for his consulting firm 16 and develop a network of associates from

which he could generate cash not only for political purposes but

1593

17Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). See Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9. 18Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). 19 Id. 20 Id. This paragraph was added by the Gregorys to the draft Rodham originally submitted

to them. 21 Id.; Gregory Document Production (Consulting Services Agreement between Tony Rodham

& Associates and Anthony D. Rodham and United Shows of America, et al. (June 6, 1998)) (Exhibit 6). 22Tony Rodham Document Production (Draft of Consulting Services Agreement between Tony

Rodham & Associates and United Shows of America (Aug. 1, 1997)) (Exhibit 7). 23 Id. 24 Id. 25Gregory Document Production (Consulting Services Agreement between Tony Rodham &

Associates and Anthony D. Rodham and United Shows of America, et al. (June 6, 1998)) (Exhibit

6).26 Id. 27 Id. See also Letter from Deborah L. McGee, Secretary to Howard Vine, Greenberg Traurig,

to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 7, 2001); Gregory Document Production (Certificate of Vehicle Registration Renewal, Dec. 5, 2000) (Exhibit 8); Gregory

Document Production (Vehicle inspection report, Dec. 5, 2000) (Exhibit 9); Gregory Document

Production (Insurance Enrollment Form submitted by Tony Rodham for life and health insurance to be provided by United Shows of America, Mar. 29, 1999) (Exhibit 10). 28Gregory Document Production (1998 IRS 1099 for Tony Rodham by United Shows of America) (Exhibit 11). 29Gregory Document Production (1999 IRS 1099 for Tony Rodham by United Shows of America) (Exhibit 12). 30Gregory Document Production (2000 IRS 1099 for Tony Rodham by United Shows of America) (Exhibit 13). 31Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001).

also for his personal use. At the fundraiser, Rodham introduced

himself to the Gregorys as he was making the rounds in the

room.17 The Gregorys cannot recall how many times or in what

contexts they subsequently met Rodham.18 But, in the period that

followed, a substantial business relationship between the Gregorys

and Rodham developed. Around August 1997, Rodham approached

the Gregorys and asked them to hire him as a consultant for their

carnival and music businesses.19 Rodham told the Gregorys that he

could be helpful to them in securing contracts or other opportunities for their businesses.20 Rodham also suggested that he had contacts in the real estate and music businesses.21

In August 1997, Rodham provided the Gregorys with a proposed

consulting services agreement.22 Under Rodham’s proposal, he

would be retained to provide ‘‘general consulting services’’ to

United Shows of America.23 Rodham proposed that he be paid a re- tainer of $200,000 in addition to $2,500 per month for his labors.24

The Gregorys substantially revised Rodham’s proposed agreement

before signing it in June 1998. The main change made by the Gregorys was eliminating the $200,000 retainer. With their changes,

Rodham received $2,500 per month from the Gregorys as well as

a $25,000 ‘‘signing bonus.’’ 25 In addition, the Gregorys agreed to

pay at their discretion additional bonuses to Rodham for specific

services provided by Rodham.26 Rodham also received health benefits and the use of a 1995 Chevrolet Suburban.27

Over the course of his relationship with the Gregorys and United

Shows, Tony Rodham received a substantial sum of money.

Rodham received a total of $62,985 in 1998,28 $85,806.27 in 1999,29

$93,978.66 in 2000,30 and at least $2,000 in 2001.31 In addition to

the $244,769 he received in salary from the Gregorys, Rodham also

received a substantial sum in personal loans. Rodham apparently

had significant expenses resulting from his divorce, and, therefore,

he asked the Gregorys to loan him money for expenses ranging

1594

32 Id. 33Tony Rodham Document Production 000003–04 (Promissory Note from Tony Rodham to

United Shows of America (Dec. 12, 2000)) (Exhibit 14). 34Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). 35 Id. 36Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, and

David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix

I). See also Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Kevin Sack,

Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9. 37Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). According to the

Gregorys, Tony Rodham told them that Hillary Rodham Clinton asked him to contact them

about having an ‘‘old-time’’ carnival at the White House. Id. 38 Id. 39Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001,

at A9. 40Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, and

David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix

I). See also Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Kevin Sack,

Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9. The latter deal involved growing and exporting hazelnuts from the former Soviet Republic of Georgia.

Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, and David

Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix I). See

also Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9; John F.

Harris, Hazelnut Flap Is Building; White House Disavows Clinton In-Law’s Foreign Dealings, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 2000, at A6; Viveca Novak and Jay Branegan, Are Hillary’s Brothers Driving

Off Course—Hugh and Tony Rodham Are Bill Clinton’s In-laws, a Connection That’s Brought

Them Pain and Gain, TIME, Nov. 1, 1999, at 46. In that deal, the Rodhams entered into a partnership with the political rival of President Eduard A. Shevardnadze whose government, then

only tenuously in power, enjoyed the support of the Clinton Administration. See Sack, supra

(and other cited authority). After the State Department complained that the deal was causing

diplomatic tension, the deal was abandoned. Id. Rodham’s other international business ventures

from lawyer’s fees to school tuition for his son. The Gregorys started loaning Rodham money in early 2000.32 In total, the Gregorys

made more than ten separate loans to Rodham, all of which were

consolidated into one promissory note for $72,000 payable in December 2001 at eight percent interest.33 According to the Gregorys,

Rodham said that ‘‘he was working on a deal and expected a large

payment before the note [was] due.’’ 34 In 2001, the Gregorys loaned Rodham an additional $7,000.35 Despite that the loan was

due in December 2001, there is no evidence that Rodham has repaid this loan, and the Gregorys’ attorney informed Committee

staff that he believes that Rodham has not repaid the loan. From 1998 to 2001, Tony Rodham received a total of $323,769 in

salary and loans from the Gregorys. A central question is whether

he was paid by the Gregorys to help obtain their pardon or whether

Rodham was paid for legitimate business services.

The Gregorys have referred to several efforts Rodham made to

obtain business for them and their company, United Shows. For example, Edgar Gregory indicated that Rodham had contacts with officials in the United Arab Emirates as part of an unsuccessful effort to bring an ‘‘American-style’’ carnival to Dubai.36 With the

input of his sister, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham did

help the Gregorys obtain a contract to put on an ‘‘old style’’ carnival at the White House in 1998 and 2000.37 Rodham also obtained information from the State Department for the Gregorys

about doing business overseas and reportedly did some unspecified

‘‘public relations’’ for the Gregorys.38 In an interesting twist, the

Gregorys also indicated that Rodham’s work for them also included

bringing them investment possibilities.39 The Gregorys said that

Rodham asked them to invest in an overseas telecommunications

project and a $118 million hazelnut scheme conceived by Tony and

Hugh Rodham.40 In essence, the Gregorys make the claim that

1595

were equally unimpressive. For example, in 1998, Rodham and Stephen Graham, a business

partner, met with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia in that country in search of new business opportunities. Lisa Getter, Family Ties Put Rodham Brothers In Spotlight, L.A. TIMES,

Mar. 4, 2001, at A1; Robin McDowell, Brother of U.S. First Lady Meets Cambodia Strongman

on Business Trip, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 14, 1998. As with Rodham’s initiative in the Republic

of Georgia, the State Department, which had difficulty with Cambodia’s human rights record,

expressed concern about Rodham’s dealings in that country. See Getter, supra (and other cited

authority). Rodham was equally oblivious to the policy implications of his ‘‘business trips’’ when

he went to Taiwan and met with Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu. See Getter, supra; Deborah Kuo, ROC Vice President Meets US First Lady’s Brothers, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Taipei),

June 23, 2000. Taiwanese government officials who attended the meeting ‘‘considered [the meeting] very hush-hush.’’ See Getter, supra. According to one such official, ‘‘Nobody wanted to talk

about [the meeting] because [Rodham’s] brother-in-law was the president—because if China

knew about the trip, they might raise issues.’’ Id. Not surprisingly, as was the case with

Rodham’s other attempts to develop international business opportunities, no deal emerged from

Rodham’s trip to Taiwan. Id. 41Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm.

on Govt. Reform (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix I). 42Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001).

they paid Rodham to ask them to invest in other schemes in which

he was involved. There is no evidence that Tony Rodham’s investment advice was in such demand that the Gregorys had to pay to

be solicited by Rodham.

Critically, the Gregorys did not provide the Committee with a

single document reflecting work performed for them by Tony

Rodham. Given the fact that the Gregorys were subpoenaed to provide the Committee with ‘‘[a]ll records reflecting work performed

for you or your company by Tony Rodham,’’ such records should

have been produced to the Committee if they existed. Therefore, it

is safe to conclude that the Gregorys do not have a single document

reflecting substantive work performed for them by Tony Rodham

despite the fact that they paid him $244,769 in salaries and loaned

him another $79,000. Such a lack of documentation supports the

conclusion that Tony Rodham performed little or no substantive

valuable work for the Gregorys apart from the failed effort to stage

a carnival in Dubai and the effort to stage carnivals at the White

House. The Gregorys attempted to explain the lack of documentation in a letter to Chairman Burton:

[We] certainly do not deny he has either sent or brought

to us a great deal of information over the years, of which

a lot of Tony’s ideas were over the telephone and not in

writing, that he thought we may be interested in investing

in, as a management partner, and/or that he thought we

might be interested in taking a financial position in.41

However, since the Gregorys did not produce to the Committee any

documentation of the work performed for them by Rodham, it is

possible that the large sum of money paid to Tony Rodham by the

Gregorys was compensation for Rodham’s efforts to obtain pardons

for the Gregorys.

C. Tony Rodham’s Efforts to Help the Gregorys Obtain Pardons

In 1998, the Gregorys became interested in seeking presidential

pardons, primarily because their convictions undermined their ability to obtain carnival contracts.42 In cases where bid applications

specifically requested criminal history, the Gregorys were someVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00335 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1596

43Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Marc Lacey and Don

Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,

2001, at A1; Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

10, 2001, at A9; Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek Pardons, THE

TENNESSEAN, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A. 44Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). 45 Id. 46 Id. See also Gregory Document Production 000144 (Letter from Vonna Jo Gregory to Roger

Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Nov. 16, 1998)) (Exhibit 15); Marc Lacey and

Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

1, 2001, at A1. 47Tony Rodham Document Production 000028 (Letter from Vonna Jo Gregory to President

William J. Clinton (Nov. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 16). 48Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). 49 Id. See also Gregory Document Production (Letter from Bob Crawford, Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Jan. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 17) (urging Pardon Attorney to consider Gregorys’ clemency application expeditiously because of impending contract negotiations regarding Florida

State Fair). 50 Id. 52Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). See also Marc Lacey

and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES,

times barred from bidding for contract business.43 In some cases,

according to the Gregorys, their competitors sent fair officials information regarding their criminal history.44 One of the largest problems faced by the Gregorys during this time period related to their

role as the primary contractor for the Florida State Fair. The Gregorys took over as primary contractor for the Fair in 1998 and soon

found that their criminal convictions were posing a problem for

Florida state officials.

Faced with the possible loss of significant business relating to

state fairs, the Gregorys decided to file for pardons. They consulted

with their son, David Gregory, a lawyer, as well as Greenberg

Traurig, a prominent Florida law firm.45 The Gregorys prepared

the relevant paperwork and filed their pardon petition with the

Justice Department on November 14, 1998.46 It appears that, on

that same day, the Gregorys also sent copies of their pardon petitions directly to the White House and requested that President

Clinton ‘‘[p]lease personally review the application and exhibits enclosed herein.’’ 47

After the pardon petition was filed, the Gregorys and their

Greenberg Traurig lawyers remained in contact with the Justice

Department. Mark Schnapp, one of the Gregorys’ lawyers at Greenberg Traurig, met with Pardon Attorney Roger Adams and Helen

Bollwerk, another staff attorney in the Pardon Attorney’s office, to

discuss the petition.48 Specifically, Schnapp informed them that the

Gregorys’ convictions were adversely impacting their business in

relation to the Florida State Fair.49 He also told them that the

Gregorys needed the pardons by February 2000 if they were to help

with the contracting process in Florida.50 Justice Department staff

asked the Gregorys or their representatives on several occasions for

additional information with respect to the pardon petitions.

Throughout their contacts with the Justice Department, the Gregorys and their attorneys believed that the Justice Department was

‘‘understanding,’’ and they never developed a sense that the Department viewed their petition negatively.

Nevertheless, by late 1999 the Gregorys had not received their

pardons, and they were growing impatient. The Gregorys approached Tony Rodham for his assistance with the pardon at a

party in late 1999 or early 2000.51 At this point, Rodham had been

1597

Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. Vonna Jo Gregory believes that Rodham first became aware of their convictions in connection with their bid for the Florida State Fair, but it was in December 1999 that

the Gregorys expressed to Rodham disappointment about not having been pardoned and asked

him for help. Id. 51 Id. See also Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped

to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. 53Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. 54Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001). 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Id.

on the Gregorys’ payroll for a year and a half. Edgar Gregory described his request to Tony Rodham as follows: ‘‘Tony, we’ve applied for a pardon, and if you can help us in any way, we’d really

appreciate it.’’ 52 Gregory recalls that Rodham initially replied, ‘‘I

don’t really get involved in that’’ and suggested that pardons were

handled at the Justice Department.53 According to Edgar Gregory,

Rodham gave them the impression that he could not help much

with their pardon petition but that ‘‘if he could do anything, he

would.’’ 54 Edgar Gregory stated that he saw Tony Rodham occasionally between late 1999 and March 2000 when he and Vonna Jo

Gregory received their pardons. Edgar Gregory occasionally raised

the pardon effort with Rodham, even once telling him that the Justice Department was ‘‘putting them through the wringer’’ with respect to their pardon applications.55 But Rodham said little to encourage them and did not tell them that he had raised the pardons

with his brother-in-law or sister.56

In their interview with Committee staff, the Gregorys and their

attorneys attempted to minimize the role of Tony Rodham in obtaining the pardons. They discounted the importance of Rodham’s

role in obtaining pardons. They claimed that the Justice Department had the predominant role in processing the Gregorys’ petition, and since Tony Rodham did not have any influence at the

Justice Department, Rodham was not ‘‘necessary’’ to the process.57

However, common sense and the evidence in this case suggest that

the Gregorys’ basic story—that they believed that Rodham was not

important to the pardon process—is not true. Rather, Tony

Rodham had a significant role in obtaining the pardons, and the

Gregorys attached some importance to Rodham’s efforts.

First, the suggestion by the Gregorys and their lawyers that

Rodham’s participation was not significant because he did not have

influence at the Justice Department is absurd. Obviously, when

seeking Presidential pardons, it is far more important to have influence and access to the President of the United States than the

Pardon Attorney or any other Justice Department staffer. Tony

Rodham had this access and used it to lobby for the Gregorys’ pardons.

Second, Edgar Gregory did more than merely mention his pardon

effort to Tony Rodham in an off-hand manner. Gregory provided

Rodham with a copy of his pardon petition as well. When Committee staff initially asked Gregory why he provided Rodham with a

copy of the petition, he was initially unable to provide an explanation. Then, he suggested that he gave Rodham a copy of the petition just so that Rodham would not be ‘‘blindsided’’ by the fact that

1598

58 Id. 59 Id. 60Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 Id. 64See Interview by Larry King, CNN, with Tony Rodham (Mar. 3, 2001). 65 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 254 (Mar. 1, 2001). 66 Id. Howard Vine, one of the Greenberg Traurig attorneys representing the Gregorys, also

called Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey and White House Counsel Beth Nolan. Vine

describes those calls as ‘‘largely procedural.’’ 69Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001,

at A9. 67Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. See also Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel

to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). However, due to the Bush Administration’s

refusal to produce to the Committee records relating to the consideration of pardon petitions

they had applied for a pardon.58 Gregory vehemently denied that

he had given Rodham a copy of the petition so that Rodham could

hand-carry it to the White House or otherwise influence the pardon

process.59 If Gregory did provide Rodham with a copy of the pardon

petition so that he could hand-carry it to the President or so that

Rodham could make a more impressive pitch to the President, it

would undermine the Gregorys’ claim that they did not place any

significance on Rodham’s efforts.

Despite the Gregorys’ protestations, it appears that Rodham did

have a significant role in the pardon process. Rodham would not

agree to an interview with Committee staff regarding his role in

the Gregory pardons. Nevertheless, he did describe some of his activities to the press. According to these reports, Rodham asked

President Clinton to pardon the Gregorys.60 Specifically, he stated, ‘‘I didn’t push. I told the President about Ed Gregory and that he

had applied for a pardon. He’s what the pardon process is all

about.’’ 61 Rodham has recalled publicly that he told President Clinton that the Gregorys’ pardon petition had been filed through the

Justice Department and argued to the President that pardons for

the couple ‘‘made good sense.’’ 62 He told the President that ‘‘[Edgar

Gregory] is repentant for what he did’’ and ‘‘[the offenses for which

the Gregorys were convicted were] white-collar crime[s] involving

banking irregularities. He’s paid his taxes. He’s run a respectful

business for 40 years. He’s a good guy.’’ 63 It also appears that

Rodham claimed that the Gregorys were deeply involved in charitable activities in Tennessee and throughout the country.64

Rodham also called Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey

about the Gregory pardons. Lindsey stated that Rodham’s call to

him was ‘‘mostly concerned about the fact that the application had

been pending over in the Justice Department[,] and [he] asked me

whether I could try to move it along.’’ 65 Either at that point or subsequently, Lindsey became aware that Rodham had spoken to the

President.66

D. Deliberations by the Administration

According to press reports, the Justice Department opposed the

Gregory pardons because the Gregorys did not ‘‘accept the criminality of their actions.’’ 67 The United States Attorney who prosecuted

the case as well as the judge responsible for sentencing the Gregorys also opposed the pardons.68 According to federal prosecutors,

1599

by the Justice Department and Clinton White House, the Committee has not obtained any

records from the Justice Department regarding the consideration of the Gregory pardon. Therefore, the Committee does not know the specific reasons the Justice Department opposed the

Gregorys’ petition. 68 Id. 70 Id. Federal prosecutors have noted that the Gregorys also used the Wilcox County Bank

in Camden, Alabama, to buy goods from their other companies. For example, that bank ordered

10,000 job application forms from a company owned by the Gregorys for another bank with 20

employees in a town of 2,000 people. 71 Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar.

16, 2001). 72Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. 73 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 255 (Mar. 1, 2001). 74 Id. 75 Id.

the Gregorys’ activities as owners of several small Alabama banks

were blatantly fraudulent; such activities included arranging unsecured loans to themselves, their friends, and other companies they

owned.69 Ginny S. Grande, the assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the Gregorys, noted, ‘‘[The Gregorys] drained the banks that

they were majority shareholders in and just ran them into the

ground for this interconnecting web of companies they owned. They

ran those banks with an iron fist.’’ 70 The question then is why

were these recommendations ignored.

There is evidence indicating that the President, not White House

staff, was the driving force behind the Gregory pardons. Associate

White House Counsel Meredith Cabe, the primary White House

lawyer responsible for processing clemency petitions, recalls that

Bruce Lindsey and Beth Nolan told her that someone had raised

the Gregory case with the President because the President had

been asking them about the case.71 Former Clinton aides have publicly conceded that President Clinton expressed a strong desire to

Justice Department officials to have the Gregorys pardoned.72 In

speaking to Deputy White House Counsel, Bruce Lindsey, President Clinton ‘‘indicated . . . that he understood that the Gregorys

were unable to do business in certain states, and that competitors

of the Gregorys were raising their conviction some 17, 18 years ago

as a basis as to why various states shouldn’t do business with

them.’’ 73 According to Lindsey, President Clinton ‘‘thought that

was not fair.’’ 74 In testimony before the Committee, Lindsey elaborated as follows:

The President’s belief on pardons is that if a person makes

a mistake, does something illegal, wrong, if they have paid

the price for that, if they have gone to jail or they go on

probation and then they live a good life from that point on

forward, that they should not be denied the restoration of

their rights because of that. He certainly would believe

that a person 17 years afterwards shouldn’t have a conviction be used to keep them from making a living. And,

therefore, believed that if, in fact, they had lived a good

life, if they had not been in additional trouble from that

point[.] 75

Because Lindsey believed that the Gregorys ‘‘were being financially hurt because of a conviction 17, 18 years ago and that they

had done nothing subsequent to be in trouble with the law, that

1600

76 Id.; Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). To the extent that the Gregorys believed that a presidential pardon would require that they no longer disclose their convictions when applying for state carnival contracts,

it appears that they were wrong. According to Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, a pardon ‘‘does

not erase or expunge the record of conviction and does not indicate innocence.’’ Letter from

Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to Mark Schnapp, Counsel to Edgar and

Vonna Jo Gregory, Greenberg Traurig (Mar. 15, 2000) (Exhibit 18). As Adams indicated to the

Gregorys, ‘‘On any application or other document which requires the information, a pardon recipient should disclose the fact of his or her conviction.’’ Id. 77See Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 78 Id. 79See Gregory Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department

of Justice, to Mark P. Schnapp, Counsel to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, Greenberg Traurig

(Mar. 15, 2001)) (Exhibit 18) (describing President Clinton’s grant of clemency); Gregory Document Production (Warrant of Executive Grant of Clemency for Vonna Jo Gregory, Mar. 15, 2000,

and Acknowledgement Form, Mar. 17, 2000) (Exhibit 19); Gregory Document Production (Warrant of Executive Grant of Clemency for Edgar Allen Gregory, Mar. 15, 2000, and Acknowledgement Form, Mar. 17, 2000) (Exhibit 20). See also Gregory Document Production (Letter from

Edgar Allen and Vonna Jo Gregory to President William J. Clinton (Mar. 16, 2000)) (Exhibit

21) (thanking President for grant of clemency).

they were deserving of a pardon,’’ he recommended that President

Clinton consider the petition.76 Meredith Cabe did not find the

merits of the Gregorys’ petition particularly compelling.77 For her

part, White House Counsel Beth Nolan does not recall her position

on the Gregory case. Cabe recalls that Nolan was not opposed to

the pardons and recommended that the President review the

case.78 On March 15, 2000, President Clinton pardoned the Gregorys of their convictions.79

E. Conclusion

There are several troubling facts regarding Tony Rodham’s lobbying efforts on behalf of the Gregorys:

• Tony Rodham was provided with $323,769 by the Gregorys for

work for which there is little documentary evidence.

• Rodham lobbied his brother-in-law, President Clinton, and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey in support of the Gregorys’ pardons.

• President Clinton granted the Gregorys’ pardons despite the fact

that the Justice Department, relevant prosecutors, and the sentencing judge all objected to the pardon. The Gregorys’ only

qualification for the pardons was that they had a lucrative business which was being adversely impacted by their criminal

record and that they had hired the President’s brother-in-law.

• A full understanding of these facts has been further complicated

by the refusal of Tony Rodham to cooperate with the Committee

and the refusal of the Bush Administration to provide the Committee with all records relating to the consideration of the Gregory pardons.

The Committee is able to conclude that Rodham was paid a significant amount of money by the Gregorys and apparently did little

for them other than lobby for their pardons. However, there is not

sufficient evidence to conclude definitively that the Gregorys hired

Rodham for the express purpose of using him to lobby for Presidential pardons. However, the time period during which the GregVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00340 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1601

80 Interview by Larry King, CNN, with Tony Rodham (Mar. 3, 2001). 81 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 256 (Mar. 1, 2001).

orys were seeking presidential pardons and during which they were

paying Rodham overlapped substantially; therefore, it is probable

that Rodham was paid for his efforts to obtain pardons for the

Gregorys. This conclusion is also bolstered by Tony Rodham’s subsequent attempted to use his success in the Gregorys’ case to obtain payments to help others obtain pardons, described below.

It is clear that Rodham had a significant role in obtaining pardons for the Gregorys. Reportedly, those individuals who were familiar with the Gregory case—the Pardon Attorney, federal prosecutors and the sentencing judge—did not believe that they should

be pardoned. However, those people who were lobbied by Tony

Rodham—President Clinton and Bruce Lindsey—did believe that

they should be pardoned. As in the case of many other questionable

grants of clemency issued by President Clinton, the impetus for the

Gregory pardons came from the President himself. It appears that

the President was interested in the Gregory pardons solely because

of his contacts with Tony Rodham. It is fair to conclude that, but

for Tony Rodham’s lobbying efforts, the Gregory pardons would not

have been granted.

One of the factors supporting the conclusion that Rodham was

indispensable to the Gregorys’ pardon effort is the Gregorys’ unsuitability for presidential pardons. The Gregorys committed a

serious crime, defrauding banks they owned out of substantial

funds for their personal benefit. Tony Rodham himself was unable

to provide much of a justification for the Gregory pardons:

TONY RODHAM. The Gregorys are the kind of people that

the pardon system is made for.

LARRY KING. Because?

TONY RODHAM. They are people—well, they’re tax-paying

citizens. They’ve been involved in different charitable organizations. They do a tremendous amount of help in their

community in Nashville and throughout the rest of the

country. Florida, where they do the Florida State Fair

every year, they do a tremendous amount of money every

year. They do a tremendous amount of money that has

gone into the Florida state government’s coffers.80

It appears that the primary motivation for the pardons was the

fact that the Gregorys were finding that their criminal histories

were an impediment to receiving state contracts. Of course, such

difficulties are the natural and fair result of criminal convictions,

not by themselves a justification for pardons.

However, there are also unanswered questions about the Gregory

case. The most significant question is whether the President or

First Lady knew of the financial relationship between Tony

Rodham and the Gregorys when Rodham was lobbying the President for the pardons. In his testimony before the Committee, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey stated that this financial

relationship ‘‘was unknown to me until I read it in paper [this]

morning [of the hearing].’’ 81 Lindsey testified that he did not know

1602

82 Id. 83 Hillary Clinton Defends Brother Tony, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 1,

2001. 84Tony Rodham Document Production 000020 (Attachment B to Pardon Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 24).

if the President knew of Rodham’s financial relationship with the

Gregorys.82 In a statement to the press, Hillary Clinton stated that

‘‘[t]hese are people he has known for some time . . . he has a personal relationship with them. He was not paid. I think there’s a

distinction between someone whom you’ve known for a number of

years . . . and taking money on behalf of people he didn’t know

and had no personal relationship with.’’ 83 At the time Senator

Clinton made her statement about the Gregory case, it had already

been publicly disclosed that Tony Rodham was working as a paid

consultant. Therefore, her statement that Tony Rodham ‘‘was not

paid’’ is not accurate. However, her statement does not make it

clear whether she knew of Tony Rodham’s lucrative financial relationship with the Gregorys at the time he was lobbying the White

House for their pardons.

If the President or First Lady did know that Tony Rodham was

receiving substantial sums of money from the Gregorys at the time

he was lobbying the White House for their pardons, it would cast

substantial doubt on the motivations of the President for issuing

the pardons. It would appear that the President was not motivated

by any genuine belief in the merits of the Gregorys’ case, particularly given the fact that such merits did not exist. Rather, it would

appear that he was motivated by the desire to help his brother-inlaw cash in. Such a case would be a quintessential conflict of interest. However, given the failure of the President to address the details of his decisionmaking in the Gregorys case and other controversial grants of clemency, the public will likely never know his

true motivations.

II. FERNANDO FUENTES COBA

In the course of its investigation, the Committee discovered that

Tony Rodham attempted to become involved in lobbying for a presidential pardon for another individual, Fernando Fuentes Coba. In

this case, Rodham solicited a large payment from Fuentes’ daughter, Vivian Mannerud, in return for the promise to lobby for

Fuentes’ pardon. It appears that Rodham and an associate of

Rodham’s made misleading statements to Mannerud in an attempt

to get her to pay Rodham to work on the case. The Fuentes case

combines the unsavory aspects of Rodham’s work on the Gregory

matter—a blatant attempt by Rodham to sell his influence—with

a potentially illegal attempt to defraud Vivian Mannerud.

A. Background on Fernando Fuentes Coba

In the late 1970s, Fernando Fuentes Coba started an airline

charter business called American Airways Charters, Inc. (‘‘AAC’’).

AAC took advantage of changes in U.S. law permitting charter

flights to Cuba and, over the next several years, built a successful

business based on flights between the U.S. and Cuba.84 After the

Mariel boatlift, Fuentes, AAC, and a number of other companies

and individuals were investigated for having violated U.S. law in

1603

85 8 People, 4 Companies indicted in Cuba Sealift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1982, at A14. 86Tony Rodham Document Production 000017 (Attachment A to Pardon Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 23). 87 Id. 88 Id. 89Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). Fuentes was sentenced to a

term of one year in prison but, according to Mannerud, was ‘‘fearful for his life’’ because ‘‘there

were drug dealers there’’ and he ‘‘would have been lumped in as a communist.’’ According to

Mannerud, Fuentes ‘‘decided not to go’’ to jail for that reason. See also Mark Hosenball, Periscope, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 2002 (noting Fuentes’ death). 90Tony Rodham Document Production 000021 (Attachment C to Pardon Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 25). 91Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 92For example, Mannerud was instrumental in arranging for Elian Gonzalez’s Cuban grandparents to visit the United States. See Carol Rosenberg, Longtime Air Charter Operator Set to

Retire, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 6, 2000, at 1B. She also provided the charter for U.S. celebrities

to attend the 1999 game between the Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban national team. 93See Carol Rosenberg, Donor Gets Angry at Democrats, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 2000, at 1B.

When her money was returned by the Clinton campaign, Mannerud stated, ‘‘I think . . . they

have to stop calling me for money, begging me for money, haunting me for money’’ and recommended that the Democratic Party return to her the ‘‘several hundred thousand dollars’’ she

had given in the preceding years. Id. 94Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 95 Id.

connection with having facilitated the Mariel Boatlift. In 1982,

Fuentes, seven other individuals, and four corporations were indicted for what U.S. customs officials described as a ‘‘big, gigantic

conspiracy by the Cuban Government to obtain U.S. currency’’ in

connection with the Mariel Boatlift.85 In late 1982, Fuentes was

convicted of conspiring to trade with the enemy and violating the

Cuban Assets Control Act in connection with the shipment of goods

to Cuba.86 Fuentes was sentenced to a term of one-year imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.87 After having his appeals rejected, in

1985, Fuentes was ordered to report to prison.88 Rather than report, Fuentes fled to Mexico where he remained a fugitive until his

death.89

While a fugitive, Fuentes apparently became very ill, suffering

from heart disease, stroke, two aortic aneurysms, emphysema, and

diabetes.90 In 2000, Fuentes apparently decided that he wanted to

return to the U.S. to receive medical treatment and be close to his

family without serving his prison sentence.91 Helping Fuentes

achieve this goal was his daughter, Vivian Mannerud. Mannerud,

a prominent Democratic contributor who has raised or contributed

hundreds of thousands of dollars, is also involved in the charter

airline business and has arranged a number of high-profile flights

between the U.S. and Cuba.92 Mannerud was herself embroiled in

controversy when she solicited convicted cocaine dealer Jorge

Cabrera to contribute to the DNC and arranged for Cabrera to be

photographed with President Clinton. Mannerud also had $22,000

in contributions returned by the Senate campaign of Hillary Clinton when the press reported on Mannerud’s role in the Cabrera

matter.93

Mannerud initially attempted to resolve her father’s case by contacting the U.S. Attorney’s office.94 Mannerud attempted to negotiate her father’s return to the United States, claiming he could

stay in a hospital in lieu of incarceration.95 When Mannerud concluded that the U.S. Attorney’s Office could not give her any guarVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00343 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1604

96 Id. Mannerud did so through the assistance of her attorney in Washington, Lonnie Pera,

an aviation attorney. See Tony Rodham Document Production 000005 (Fernando Fuentes Coba

Pardon Petition) (Exhibit 22). 97 Id. In an interview with Committee staff, Mannerud could not recall exactly when she sent

the petition to the Pardon Attorney’s Office. She believed that she probably did so about a

month before the date on a White House document which states that Fuentes ‘‘just applied’’ for

a pardon. That document is dated November 27, 2000. Mannerud’s recollection that she sent

the petition late in 2000 accords with her memory that, whenever she submitted the petition,

someone told her that it was ‘‘kind of late’’ to apply because there was not enough time for the

FBI to conduct its background check. 98Tony Rodham Document Production 000025 (Attachment C to Pardon Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 25). 99Tony Rodham Document Production 000023 (Attachment C to Pardon Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 25). 100Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 101 Vivian Mannerud Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to Lonnie Anne Pera, Counsel to Vivian Mannerud, Zuckert Scoutt &

Rasenberger (Nov. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 28).

antees, she and her attorney, Lonnie Anne Pera, prepared a pardon

petition on her father’s behalf.96

B. The Pardon Attorney Refuses to Process Fuentes’ Clemency Petition

Around late October 2000, Mannerud sent her father’s pardon

petition to the Office of the Pardon Attorney at the Department of

Justice.97 In the petition, Fuentes did not indicate any remorse for

his crimes. Rather, he maintained his innocence and claimed selective prosecution and ineffective assistance of counsel.98 Fuentes

also did not express regret for having fled the United States after

his conviction. Rather, he claimed that he fled the country because

he ‘‘feared that anti-Castro groups would seriously injure, maim, or

kill me in prison.’’ 99

On November 7, 2000, Pardon Attorney Roger Adams sent a letter to Mannerud’s attorney stating that the Justice Department

would not process Fuentes’ petition because he was a fugitive.100

Adams explained that:

Mr. Coba is ineligible to apply for a presidential pardon.

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 . . . ‘‘[n]o petition for pardon

should be filed until the expiration of a waiting period of

at least five years after the date of the release of the petitioner from confinement ....’’ Because Mr. Coba has

served none of his prison sentence, he fails to meet this

most basic eligibility requirement for pardon consideration.

Moreover, the Department of Justice has consistently declined to accept pardon petitions from individuals, such as

Mr. Coba, who are fugitives, since the pardon process assumes the Government’s ability to implement either of the

President’s possible decisions regarding a petition—that is,

a denial of clemency as well as a grant of clemency. Put

another way, it is not reasonable to allow a person to ask

that the President grant him a pardon which, if granted,

would have the effect of eliminating the term of imprisonment to which he has been sentenced, while at the same

time insulating himself from having to serve the sentence

if the pardon is denied.101

The Justice Department’s application of the foregoing policy,

whereby it does not even consider pardon petitions from fugitives,

stands in marked contrast to how the policy was applied in the

1605

102Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 103 Id. 104 Id. In connection with its investigation of Roger Clinton, the Committee learned that Clinton was in business with Perez and a number of other individuals in Los Angeles who were

in the business of arranging travel to Cuba. 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 Id. 108 Id. But see NARA Document Production (Draft of document entitled ‘‘Pending Clemency

Matters’’ by Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Dec. 10,

2000)) (Exhibit 29) This document, which was retrieved from the work file of Deputy White

House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, indicates that ‘‘Velazquez spoke to POTUS re: case.’’ Id. at 3. 109Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 110 Id.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green case. Clearly, the policy expressed by

Roger Adams in the Fuentes case should have applied equally in

the Marc Rich case. In the Rich case, of course, the White House

considered and granted the Rich and Green pardons contrary to

Justice Department policy. Moreover, the Deputy Attorney General,

Eric Holder, expressed his support for the pardons despite the express contrary policy of his own Department. The fact that Fuentes’

petition was summarily rejected confirms that Jack Quinn was

right in thinking that he needed to circumvent the Justice Department in order to obtain pardons for Marc Rich and Pincus Green.

Fuentes’ summary rejection by the Justice Department also leads

one to speculate that Fernando Fuentes Coba and Vivian

Mannerud might have been more successful if they had hired Tony

Rodham to lobby for the pardon.

Despite the fact that the Justice Department declined to process

her father’s pardon petition, Mannerud gave the pardon petition to

‘‘a lot of people—anyone who could help make sure that the application wasn’t just put on a pile.’’ 102 Among the people to whom

Mannerud gave copies of the petition was Joe Perez, a friend of

Mannerud’s in California, who, according to Mannerud, owns J.

Perez & Associates, a travel services company.103 Mannerud believed that Perez knew ‘‘one of the Clinton brothers—probably

Roger Clinton, because he is in California too.’’ 104 Ultimately,

Mannerud understood that Perez was going to speak to ‘‘his contact’’ about her father’s pardon petition.105 But, in hindsight,

Mannerud does not know whether Perez did so.106 Mannerud also

gave a copy of the petition to a friend named Joe Velazquez who,

according to Mannerud, ran a Hispanic outreach program and had

worked at the Clinton White House.107 Mannerud does not know

what, if anything, Velazquez did in support of her father’s petition.108

C. Tony Rodham’s Attempt to Become Involved in the

Fuentes Clemency Effort

Tony Rodham became involved in the Fuentes matter in November 2000.109 Mannerud was introduced to Rodham at the

Mayflower Hotel by their mutual friend, Marilyn J. Parker.110

Parker, like Mannerud, was a prominent Democratic contributor.

Parker also was involved in business with Tony Rodham. Rodham

invested in a Florida company called Environmental Energy Fuels,

which has developed a reportedly environmentally-sensitive gasoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00345 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1606

111Lisa Getter, Family Ties Put Rodham Brothers In Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at

A1.112 Id. 113 Joseph Tanfani, Case Could Bring More Prosecutions, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 4, 2001, at 20A. 114Telephone Interview with Marilyn J. Parker (Dec. 18, 2001). 115 Id. 116 Id 117 Id. 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Id. 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Id. 124 Id. 125Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 126 Id. 127 Id. Neither Parker nor Mannerud was able to specifically recall the names of the individuals mentioned by Rodham, although Mannerud did remember that they were ‘‘carnival people.’’

This reference strongly suggests that Rodham mentioned the Gregorys’ case to Mannerud. The

petition that Rodham showed to Mannerud was so thick that Mannerud ultimately redrafted

her father’s petition. 128 Id. 129 Id.

line additive.111 Well before the meeting at the Mayflower Hotel,

Parker had offered Rodham, and Rodham accepted, an opportunity

to obtain shares in that company.112 In August 2001, Parker plead- ed guilty to five felonies in connection with $145,000 she paid in

bribes to Miami airport officials in return for $1.5 million in no-bid

work at the airport.113

According to Parker, Mannerud initially spoke to her about her

father’s pardon matter during a trip in New York.114 During that

trip, which, according to Parker, occurred around September 2000,

Mannerud talked about her father’s age and deteriorating physical

condition as well as his desire to return to the United States.115

Parker offered to write a letter in support of his petition.116 According to Parker, the gist of her letter was simply that she knew that

Fuentes was aged and in ill health.117 Parker had no opinion as

to why Mannerud thought that, given her limited knowledge about

the matter, her support would have been meaningful.118 Parker initially characterized her role as being limited to drafting the letter.119 However, she later conceded that she had also arranged and

participated in a meeting between Tony Rodham and Vivian

Mannerud.120

After discussing the pardon effort with Mannerud in New York,

Parker decided that Tony Rodham might be able to assist

Mannerud.121 Therefore, she called Rodham, and he suggested that

Parker and Mannerud meet him for a drink that afternoon in the

Mayflower Hotel.122 At the hotel, Rodham and Mannerud talked

about her father’s pardon petition.123 According to Parker, the

meeting lasted no more than an hour.124 Mannerud and Rodham

discussed why she was seeking a pardon for her father and what

avenues Mannerud had pursued to date.125 Rodham then told

Mannerud that he could help her obtain the pardon for her father.126 Rodham told Mannerud that he had previously helped two

individuals obtain pardons and even brought a copy of their clemency petition with him to the meeting.127 Rodham then told

Mannerud that he would help her if she paid him.128

Mannerud asked Rodham what exactly he would do to help get

the pardon.129 Rodham explained that ‘‘it costs money,’’ specifically

1607

130 Id. 131 Id. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 Id. 136 Id. 137 Id. 138Telephone Interview with Marilyn J. Parker (Dec. 18, 2001). 139 Id. 140 Id. 141 Id. 142 Id. 143Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001). 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id.

$50,000, which would be paid to Rodham and then ‘‘go to an attorney’’ to work on the matter.130 When Mannerud pressed Rodham

for more details of how exactly he would help get the pardon,

Rodham explained that he knew the Pardon Attorney, Roger

Adams.131 He stated that Adams was from Arkansas and that he

had ‘‘known Adams forever.’’ 132 Rodham then told Mannerud that ‘‘after the Administration, we’re all out of jobs.’’ 133 Mannerud understood that Rodham was referring to himself and Adams.134

Rodham then told Mannerud he would hire a law firm to prepare

her father’s pardon petition and Roger Adams’ wife was associated

with this law firm.135 When Mannerud asked if he could guarantee

that her father would be pardoned, Rodham demurred.136

Mannerud then told Rodham that she had had ‘‘her share of scandals’’ and wanted no part of Rodham’s proposal.137

Mannerud’s account of the Mayflower meeting with Rodham is

corroborated in large part by Marilyn Parker. Parker does not recall a number of details of the meeting and attributes her poor

memory to the fact that Rodham and Mannerud did most of the

talking at the meeting.138 However, she confirms that Rodham explored with Mannerud ‘‘whether there was any way they could

work together’’ on the pardon matter.139 She also confirms that

Rodham mentioned his previous work on a pardon matter.140

Parker also confirms that Rodham mentioned he knew a person

handling the pardons, a law firm that worked with DOJ on pardons, and that a wife of a Justice Department official worked at the

law firm.141 Parker also believes that it was possible that Rodham ‘‘expressed his desire to be paid’’ for his work on the Fuentes matter but could not recall whether Rodham specifically sought

$50,000.142

According to Mannerud, in December 2000, about a month after

the first meeting, Marilyn Parker called her about the possibility

of Rodham helping her with the effort to obtain a pardon for

Fuentes.143 Parker told Mannerud that Rodham had lowered his

asking price and wanted only $30,000.144 Mannerud asked once

again if there were any guarantees, to which Parker responded

that there were not.145 Parker asked Mannerud to consider the

offer, emphasizing her father’s poor health.146 Ultimately,

Mannerud told Parker in strong terms that she did not want to be

involved in such an arrangement with Rodham.147 After that discussion, Mannerud had no further discussions about the clemency

1608

148 Id. 149 Id. 150 Id. 151 Id. 152Telephone Interview with Roger Adams (Sept. 4, 2001). 153 Id. 154 Id. 155 Id. 156Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).

matter with either Parker or Rodham.148 Mannerud continued her

efforts to obtain a pardon for her father but was unsuccessful.

Parker denies Mannerud’s account of this subsequent telephone

call. According to Parker, Rodham simply asked her whether she

had spoken to Mannerud ‘‘about her father.’’ 149 As for a subsequent conversation with Mannerud, Parker remembered only having asked Mannerud how the pardon effort was going and that

Mannerud became upset.150 Parker flatly denied having approached Mannerud on Rodham’s behalf with a reduced offer of

$30,000 for services relating to Fuentes’ pardon proceedings.151

D. Tony Rodham’s Representations to Mannerud Were

Fraudulent

Tony Rodham’s activities in the Fuentes case go beyond an at- tempt by Rodham to sell his political access for $50,000. Rather,

Rodham’s actions were a potentially criminal attempt to defraud Vivian Mannerud of $50,000 by making serious misrepresentations

to her about the actions he would take to help her. Almost all of

the statements made by Rodham to Mannerud in the course of his

efforts to be hired by Mannerud were false. Tony Rodham does not

know Roger Adams or his wife.152 In fact, Adams has never met

Tony or Hugh Rodham. Adams is not from Arkansas and has been

to Arkansas only once in his life, in the 1970s.153 Adams’ wife does

not work for a law firm at all, let alone one that handles pardon

matters.154 In fact, Adams’ wife is not even an attorney.155 When

Committee staff informed Mannerud that Rodham in fact had no

relationship with Adams, she stated that she was ‘‘shocked’’ because Rodham left no doubt that he was close with Adams and that

he intended to use that relationship to obtain the pardon for

Fuentes.156

There are several questions about Tony Rodham’s actions in this

case. First, what is Rodham’s response to Mannerud’s charges? Second, what was Rodham’s motivation for making these false representations to Mannerud? Third, were the actions taken by

Rodham and Marilyn Parker criminal?

Due to Rodham’s refusal to participate in an interview, the Committee has not been able to determine Rodham’s response to these

charges. However, in the absence of Rodham’s cooperation, it still

appears that there is substantial corroboration for Mannerud’s account. First, Marilyn Parker recalls a number of key details from

the first meeting at the Mayflower Hotel. Second, Tony Rodham

had in his possession a copy of Fernando Fuentes Coba’s pardon

petition. Third, Mannerud has provided the Committee with a detailed and credible account.

It is difficult to divine Tony Rodham’s motivation for making

these false representations to Vivian Mannerud. It is possible that

Rodham was concerned about the appearance of impropriety if he

1609

157 Based on the information currently available to the Committee, it appears that Tony

Rodham and Marilyn J. Parker might be criminally liable for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371

or 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud). Liability as to Rodham and Parker under those statutes turns

on the extent to which Rodham and Parker devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud

Mannerud and whether the telephone call by Parker to Mannerud was made interstate and in

furtherance of the underlying scheme. If Parker did not conspire with Rodham to defraud

Mannerud, it appears that liability as to Parker turns on whether she knowingly and willingly

participated in Rodham’s fraud scheme. See, e.g., U.S. v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028 (C.A.D.C.

1990).

asked for $50,000 to lobby his sister or brother-in-law for a pardon,

especially considering the fact that he was not an attorney. To address this concern, Rodham may have concocted a cover story that

he needed the $50,000 to hire a law firm which was close to Roger

Adams when in reality no such firm existed and Rodham was going

to keep the $50,000 for himself.

The final, and most important, question is whether the actions

taken by Tony Rodham or Marilyn Parker were criminal. It is certainly possible that Rodham and Parker engaged in a conspiracy to

defraud Mannerud. Clearly, Mannerud ended up rejecting the overtures from Rodham and Parker and was never defrauded of any

funds. However, the actions by Rodham and Parker may have

amounted to a criminal conspiracy.157 The Committee does not

have sufficient evidence at this point to conclude that criminal conduct took place but strongly recommends that the Department of

Justice examine this case and obtain sworn testimony from all of

the relevant actors.

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

1624

1625

1626

1627

1628

1629

1630

1631

1632

1633

1634

1635

1636

1637

1638

1639

1640

1641

1642

1643

1644

1645

1646

1647

1648

1649

1650

1651

1652

1653

1654

1655

1656

1657

1658

1659

1660

1661

1662

1663

1664

1665

1666

1667

1668

1669

1670

1671

1672

1673

1674

1675

1676

1677

1678

1679

1680

1681

1682

1683

1684

1685

1686

1687

1688

1689

1690

1691

1692

1693

1694

1695

1696

1697

1698

1699

1700

1701

1702

1703

1704

1705

1706

1707

(1709)

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO DRUG MONEY

LAUNDERER HARVEY WEINIG

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Weinig was properly imprisoned for conspiring to launder

millions of dollars in drug money and concealing and furthering an extortion-by-kidnapping scheme.

• Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, conspired to launder

about $19 million dollars in drug proceeds through a Swiss

bank for the Cali cartel. Members of the money laundering organization, of which Weinig was a part, boasted that they successfully laundered more than $70 million for the cartel. In addition

to conducting banking transactions for the organization, Weinig

consulted with co-conspirators in furtherance of the organization’s activities and stored the drug proceeds in his New York

City apartment.

• Weinig and other co-conspirators at his law firm stole from the

Cali cartel about $2.5 million they were supposed to have

laundered. This theft exposed Weinig’s family to a risk of being

harmed by those drug dealers. In the course of investigating the

organization’s money laundering activities, authorities intervened when they learned that the drug dealers sent a hit man

to kill one of Weinig’s co-conspirators.

• Weinig learned that one of his co-conspirators kidnapped an individual as part of a scheme to extort money from the victim’s

family. Rather than report the kidnapping, Weinig made his office available as a meeting place where the ransom could be delivered and directed his associates at the firm to execute transfer agreements.

Weinig’s lawyer, a prominent Washington attorney with

close connections to the Clinton Administration, lobbied the

White House in support of Weinig’s clemency petition.

• Weinig’s wife, Alice Morey, retained Reid Weingarten, who was

close to the Clinton White House, to lobby for the commutation.

In April 2000, Weingarten filed a clemency petition on Weinig’s

behalf with the Justice Department and the White House.

Knowing that the Justice Department would advise the President to reject the Weinig commutation petition, Weingarten lobbied the White House directly, approaching White House CounVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00449 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1710

sel Beth Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey,

and Chief of Staff John Podesta.

• Weingarten chose not to familiarize himself with the facts of

Weinig’s underlying conviction. Accordingly, he was unable to

convey to those he lobbied a full, accurate, factual basis of the

merits of Weinig’s petition.

Two former Clinton Administration officials, David Dreyer

and Harold Ickes, lobbied the White House on Weinig’s behalf.

• Alice Morey enlisted the assistance of her cousin, former White

House Deputy Communications Director David Dreyer. Dreyer

repeatedly raised the Weinig commutation with John Podesta.

Ultimately, Podesta recommended that the President grant the

Weinig commutation. Dreyer has invoked his Fifth Amendment

rights rather than cooperate with the Committee’s investigation.

• Morey also obtained support for Weinig’s commutation from

former Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, whose children attended the same school as did her sons. Ickes discussed the

Weinig case with President Clinton twice and recommended the

commutation of Weinig’s sentence.

The Justice Department repeatedly and adamantly recommended against the commutation of Weinig’s sentence.

• On several occasions, U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, whose office

convicted Weinig, objected to any reduction of Weinig’s sentence.

Ultimately, in a report to President Clinton, the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder voiced their

strong opposition to a commutation of Weinig’s sentence.

• Pardon Attorney Roger Adams submitted a report to the President advising against the Weinig commutation. Adams pointed

out that Weinig ‘‘was a well-respected lawyer who used his professional skills to assist in laundering millions of dollars that he

knew constituted the proceeds of a huge narcotics trafficking enterprise. He was involved in this activity for an extended period

of time, and he admits that he engaged in it purely out of

greed.’’ Adams also informed the President that Weinig ‘‘aided

and abetted the extortion of money from an individual he knew

had been kidnapped at the direction of a co-defendant in order

to coerce the production of a ransom.’’

After an apparently cursory review, the White House set

aside the Justice Department’s negative recommendation

and granted Weinig clemency.

• Support for Weinig’s petition from John Podesta and Beth Nolan

appears to have been critical. The Associate White House counsels responsible for clemency matters did not support the petition. However, setting aside the negative recommendations of

not only the Justice Department but also staff at the White

House Counsel’s Office, Nolan and Lindsey, who were lobbied by

1711

Weingarten, recommended Weinig’s clemency to President Clinton. John Podesta, who was lobbied by Weingarten and Dreyer,

also recommended to the President that Weinig’s sentence be

commuted.

The White House was unjustified in commuting Weinig’s

sentence.

• None of the arguments made by Weinig entitle him to executive

clemency. In his petition, Weinig stated three main reasons why

his sentence should have been commuted: (1) his sentence was

disproportionate and excessive; (2) his contributions to society

justified his early release from prison; and (3) one of his children was suffering emotional difficulties as a result of his imprisonment and needed him to return home. The first reason is

simply not true. Weinig’s sentence was comparable to those received by other co-conspirators who were directly responsible for

laundering large amounts of drug money and declined to cooperate with authorities. Weinig’s sentence was also comparable to

those received by co-defendants who participated in the extortion-by-kidnapping scheme, which Weinig concealed and facilitated. The other two reasons fail to distinguish Weinig from the

vast number of other similarly situated felons, who were properly sentenced but whose families have suffered because of their

imprisonment.

President Clinton’s commutation of Weinig’s sentence has

sent out the wrong message about the United States’ commitment to fighting drug trafficking.

• President Clinton’s decision conveyed an appearance of granting

special consideration to wealthy, politically well-connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger Adams foresaw

the message sent by the Weinig commutation, warning President Clinton that ‘‘[t]o commute [Weinig’s] prison term to the

five years he proposes would denigrate the seriousness of his

criminal misconduct, undermine the government’s legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and could give the appearance of

granting special consideration to economically advantaged,

white-collar offenders.’’

• The Weinig commutation undermines the nation’s efforts to fight

the illegal drug trade. Complaints are frequently made that U.S.

drug laws punish low-level drug criminals too severely yet do

not punish high-level drug distributors enough. When a largescale drug money launderer like Harvey Weinig receives executive clemency after serving five years of an eleven-year sentence, it sends the message that the U.S. is not serious about

prosecuting the high-level criminals who make the drug trade

possible.

• The Weinig commutation has eroded the United States’ moral

authority to press other countries to fight the drug trade within

their own borders. The Weinig commutation could harm the efVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00451 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1712

1See U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 14 (Exhibit 1); NARA Document Production

(Letter from Mark P. Goodman, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice,

to John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges (Sept. 20, 1995)) (Exhibit 2). 2See U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29 (Exhibit 1). 3 Id. at 17. 4 Id. at 22. 5 Id.

6See id. at 19 (describing co-defendants Miguel Omar Garrabito Botero, Amparo Hurtado Valencia, Juliana (last name unknown), and Carlos Lopez as associated with Cali cocaine cartel). 7 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 2 (Exhibit 3). 8See id.

9See id.

forts of the U.S. government to extradite drug traffickers and

money launderers from Latin America. Newspapers in Latin

American countries have accused the U.S. of hypocrisy in the

Weinig case. For example, in Colombia’s leading daily, former

Colombian attorney general Gustavo De Greiff, in an op-ed entitled ‘‘The Morality of the Strongest,’’ labeled President Clinton’s

clemency decision ‘‘monstrous.’’

I. BACKGROUND

Harvey Weinig was among the 36 prisoners whose sentences

were commuted on President Clinton’s last day in office. Weinig, a

former Manhattan attorney, was centrally involved in conspiring to

launder about $19 million in drug proceeds through a Swiss bank

for the Cali cocaine cartel.1 Weinig also actively participated in a

kidnapping and extortion plot.2

The efforts that led to Weinig’s conviction began in February

1994 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the New York City Police Department

jointly investigated a large international money laundering organization.3 Ultimately, the organization was found to have laundered

tens of millions of dollars in narcotics proceeds generated in the

U.S., Puerto Rico, and other locations.4 In connection with that investigation, law enforcement authorities seized almost $5 million in

drug proceeds from members of the organization.5

A. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators

As members of the money laundering organization, Weinig and

his law partner, Robert Hirsch, used their firm, Hirsch Weinig, to

launder drug proceeds for the benefit of their clients, including

members of the Cali cocaine cartel in Colombia.6 After Weinig and

Hirsch formed their partnership in October 1993, they helped a

German resident named Tohmes Peter retrieve large sums of

money that had been seized by law enforcement due to a suspicion

that the money was related to drug sales.7 To assist in the effort,

Weinig recruited Richard Spence, a client and former New York

City fireman who became a leader of the money laundering organization.8 Weinig and Hirsch incorporated Transglobal Import Export

Trading Co., Inc., so that Spence could open a corporate bank account through which he could operate his end of the money laundering scheme.9

Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence divided responsibilities in the money

laundering operation. Weinig conducted banking transactions for

1713

10 U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 18 (Exhibit 1). 11 Id. 12 Id. at 19. Ocampo was previously convicted in New York of selling narcotics, for which he

was sentenced to 5 years to life imprisonment and released on parole in or about May 1987.

Id. In September 1994, Ocampo was re-arrested in Colombia. Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 19–21. See also Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million DrugMoney Laundry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1; John J. Goldman, ‘‘White-Collar’’ Money Laundry Is Smashed Crime: Lawyers, Rabbis, a Police Officer and an L.A. Diplomat are Among 23

Charged. Ring Handled Tens of Millions of Dollars in Drug Proceeds, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at A7. On July 21, 1994, Salerno was arrested by NYPD for extortion involving

physical injury and attempted grand larceny; and, on November 16, 1994, he was arrested for

conspiracy to traffick in firearms, a federal offense. U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document

Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 20

(Exhibit 1). A contemporaneous search of Salerno’s residence uncovered a ‘‘hitman’s kit’’ containing a garrotte (a device used to strangle and sever the vocal chords of the intended victim), three

pairs of handcuffs, a handgun, two rifles, ammunition, a law enforcement badge bearing the

name of another, and a bugging device. Id. 16Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001). During the federal investigation of Weinig’s money laundering activities,

Levin was with the New York field division of the DEA and was the primary case agent in the

investigation. See also U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22 (Exhibit 1). After Peter and

Ocampo began contacting Hirsch directly in the U.S., Hirsch contacted Spence, who would arrange for the cash to be picked up and retrieved back to him in New York. Id. Hirsch’s increased

involvement in the conspiracy was corroborated by his attendance at meetings in Switzerland

with, among others, Weinmann and Peter from January 31, 1994, through February 1, 1994.

Id. At that meeting, during which the network’s laundering activities were discussed, the

Continued

the organization and consulted with co-conspirators Hirsch and

Richard Spence about the organization’s activities.10 Weinig also

stored the proceeds from the money laundering operation in his

New York City apartment.11 Hirsch coordinated laundering activities with Spence in New York, Tohmes Peter and Juan Guillermo

Ocampo in Germany, and Leon Shulum Weinmann and his wife,

Rachel, in Switzerland.12 As part of the money laundering conspiracy, the Weinmanns received money transfers in Switzerland and

remitted them to bank accounts designated by their principals.13

Spence was responsible for organizing pickups of the drug money,

depositing the money into bank accounts without raising suspicion,

and wire-transferring the money to various other accounts with the

intent of concealing its nature and source.14

Other co-conspirators included Michael Kalanz, a police officer at

the 48th Precinct in the Bronx, who counted, stored (sometimes in

his locker at the Precinct), and transported hundreds of thousands

of dollars in drug proceeds; Charles Bruno, a New York City fireman who acted as a courier; Alexander Schwartz, a rabbi who

picked up drug proceeds throughout the U.S. and returned them to

New York City; Latchezar Christov, reportedly a Bulgarian diplomat who received drug proceeds in California and shipped them

via overnight courier to New York City; and Gary Salerno, an enforcer of the money laundering organization who intimidated and

collected money from various individuals.15

B. The Money Laundering Operation

The money laundering conspiracy typically operated as follows. A

narcotics trafficker or his representative (for example, Juan Guillermo Ocampo) would contact a member of the money laundering

network (for example, Spence and later Hirsch) to pick up a parcel

of cash on the street or in a hotel in a particular city.16 The cash

1714

Weinmanns reportedly stated that they, with Peter’s assistance, laundered about $72 million.

Id.17Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22 (Exhibit 1). 18See Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001). See also U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Presentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22–23 (Exhibit 1). 19Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22–23 (Exhibit 1). Joseph B.

Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money Laundry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994,

at B1. 20Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); Timothy O’Brien, Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers

to Launder Drug Fortunes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A1. 21Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); Timothy O’Brien, Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers

to Launder Drug Fortunes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A1. 22Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 23 (Exhibit 1). See also Joseph

B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money Laundry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,

1994, at B1. 23Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22–23 (Exhibit 1). When the coconspirators of the money laundering ring discussed their activities over the phone, they often

used coded language to conceal the actual nature of their conversations. For example, they referred to money as ‘‘paper’’ and units of $1 million as ‘‘containers.’’ Id. at 18. See also Timothy

O’Brien, Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers to Launder Drug Fortunes, ASIAN

WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A1. 24 U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 23 (Exhibit 1).

in those parcels was generated from street sales of cocaine and totaled anywhere from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands

of dollars.17 A member of the network, sometimes a courier, would

then retrieve the parcel at the given location and deliver it to a

leader in the network (for example, Spence) who would count and

deposit the money into bank accounts controlled by Weinig, Hirsch,

or Spence.18 From such accounts, Weinig, Hirsch, or Spence would

then transfer the money by wire or other means to the Weinmanns

in Switzerland or elsewhere.19 Through a foreign money exchange,

the drug proceeds would then be auctioned to ‘‘brokers’’ who typically bid about 85 cents on the dollar for $10 million to $20 million

bundles.20 The brokers would then generally have to return 85 percent of the cash to the Weinmanns within a fixed period.21 With

the proceeds safely laundered, the Weinmanns would send the cash

to bank accounts designated by their principals in Colombia.22

Members of the organization would ultimately be compensated for

their services by receiving about 7 percent of the amount

laundered, which between 1993 and 1994 equaled between $70 million and $100 million.23

C. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators Run Afoul of the Colombian Cocaine Cartel

The organization lost money throughout 1993 and 1994, when

law enforcement arrested some of its couriers in San Juan, Puerto

Rico, and Houston, Texas, and seized drug proceeds they carried.24

In response to those seizures, Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence filed

fraudulent claims of ownership with the DEA, typically asserting

that the money seized from their couriers represented the proceeds

1715

25 Id. at 25. On November 4, 1993, the Hirsch Weinig law firm filed a complaint in federal court alleging that a hotel allowed someone to take a suitcase containing $260,000, which was

left by Rabbi Alexander Schwartz, one of their couriers. Id. at 24–25. The firm subsequently

filed, on February 14, 1994, a claim of ownership with the DEA for entitlement to those proceeds. Id. at 25. The law firm also filed three false claims on July 13, 1994, for $1,053,200 (with

respect to a seizure from another courier, Charles Bruno), $1,010, and $802,893. The law firm

filed another false claim on March 24, 1994, for $676,392 (with respect to proceeds seized from

Gary Salerno). Id. at 25–26. Weinig contended that, despite being aware of the filing of those

documents, he was not personally involved in their preparation or filing. Id. 26 Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money Laundry, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1. 27 Id. at 23–24. Weinig asserts that the indictment was created by Hirsch alone. Id. at 24.

A member of the organization who was conducting activities from Germany reportedly lost so

much money that he began speculating in commodities to recoup the losses but then lost even

larger sums on poorly placed market gambles. Timothy O’Brien, Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers to Launder Drug Fortunes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A1. 28See U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for

the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court

Continued

of payment ‘‘for a sale of precious stones [by Spence] . . . acquired

and sold overseas.’’ 25

The organization also lost money when some of its members, including Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence, stole from Colombian drug

dealers about $2.5 million they were supposed to have laundered.26

To conceal their theft from the Colombians, Weinig, Hirsch, and

Spence drafted a bogus indictment and notice of seizure to induce

their principals in Colombia into believing that their money was

seized by law enforcement when Spence was ‘‘arrested.’’ 27 In October 1994, law enforcement intercepted Weinig’s explanation to

Hirsch of his theft from the organization:

WEINIG. And all of the sudden, someone says to me, I can

put a million in cash in your . . .

HIRSCH. Oh, God. I’m sick.

WEINIG. In your, in your attic. I do a quick analysis, and

understand that if everything else goes wrong in the world

for the rest of my life, a million in cash takes care of everything I’ll ever need.

HIRSCH. That’s true.

WEINIG. And so I said, I’m dealing with people, and I remember this was, this was my approach. We’re dealing

with people who are total a**holes, who are out of control,

who are scumbag, lying, cheats. And I am gonna be in this

for the long haul? F**k ’em! F**k ’em! I’m taking a million

dollars and let’s, let’s see you get it from me. That was my

approach.

HIRSCH. But remember the other . . .

WEINIG. A million f**king dollars.

HIRSCH. A million dollars, but where, you know . . .

WEINIG. This is not . . .

HIRSCH. How much you would have had today?

WEINIG. This is not, this is dealing with normal Americans. This is dealing with guys I wouldn’t take a telephone

call from.28

1716

Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 3–4 (Exhibit 4) (transcription of conversation between Harvey Weinig

and Robert Hirsch recorded in October 1994). 29 Id. 30 U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 24 (Exhibit 1). Botero and Valencia similarly threatened Tohmes Peter and Juan Ocampo, both of whom conducted money laundering activities for

the organization from Mulheim, Germany. Id. Ocampo’s brother was apparently kidnapped in

Colombia. Id. There is no doubt that Weinig was aware of the risk of harm his theft from the

cartel created. On September 30, 1994, Hirsch told Weinig that Botero was the principal ‘‘of everyone’’ in Colombia and explained to him the financial difficulties that arose from the debt

owed to Botero. Id. at 27. Weinig acknowledged the problem and said, ‘‘[L]isten, let’s not talk

about this on the phone.’’ Id. In response to Hirsch’s request for the telephone number for his

private line at the office, Weinig noted that he did not think that his private line was any more

secure than the line on which they were speaking. Id. Hirsch also told Weinig that, in a previous

conversation with Botero, Botero implied that Ocampo might be dead. Weinig replied, ‘‘[L]et’s not talk about it.’’ Id. See Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million DrugMoney Laundry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1 31 U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 27 (Exhibit 1) (describing that Hirsch, Weinig, and

Spence pooled together some of the money they had stolen and sent it to their clients in Colombia). 32Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); Timothy O’Brien, Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers

to Launder Drug Fortunes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A1. 33 Id. 34Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 35Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 23 (Exhibit 1). 36 Id.

As the foregoing indicates, Weinig believed that because his clients

were unsavory he was justified in stealing their drug proceeds. To

account for the millions in drug proceeds they stole from their Colombian principals, Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence planned to divide

it among themselves and allow Spence to disappear, letting their

principals believe that Spence was arrested and imprisoned.29

Plainly, Weinig’s decision to steal from the Colombian drug traffickers exposed him, his co-conspirators, all of their families, and

various innocent bystanders to a considerable risk of harm.

The theft of the drug money by Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence ultimately led to the unraveling of the money laundering conspiracy

and to Weinig’s imprisonment. In late 1994, leaders in the Cali cartel apparently decided that Hirsch had stolen money from them

and sent two individuals, Miguel Omar Garrabito Botero and

Amparo Hurtado Valencia, to ‘‘convince’’ him to return the

money.30 Hirsch indicated that he would attempt to get the money

together.31 Unknown to Hirsch and the Colombians, law enforcement was monitoring these discussions and approached Hirsch to

obtain his cooperation.32 Law enforcement also informed Hirsch

that the Colombians had decided to kill him and had, in fact, dispatched a hitman to New York.33 Once provided with this information, Hirsch began cooperating with the investigation of the money

laundering network.34 Over the next several months, the money

laundering network had meetings to address the actual and the fictitious seizures.35 With Hirsch’s cooperation, many of those meetings were observed or recorded by law enforcement.36

As money owed to the cartel became more of a problem, Weinig

decided to extend his criminal activities beyond money laundering.

On November 15, 1994, Spence told Weinig that he had kidnapped

an individual named James Clooney, who had swindled him out of

1717

37 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 3–5 (Exhibit 3); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29 (Exhibit 1); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for

the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court

Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 6 (Exhibit 4). 38 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 3–5 (Exhibit 3); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29 (Exhibit 1); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for

the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court

Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 6 (Exhibit 4). 39Lev Dassin Document Production at 11 (Letter from John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal

& Manges, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Feb. 28,

1997)) (Exhibit 5). See also U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev

L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable

Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Mar. 19, 1996)) (Exhibit 6) (transcript of conversation between Harvey Weinig and Robert Hirsch recorded on November 15, 1994). 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 5–6. 43 Id. at 6. 44 Id. 45 Id. at 25. 46 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 4 (Exhibit 3).

$237,000 by tricking him into investing in an insolvent company.37

Although Clooney had assets that would have enabled Spence to

recover part of his loss, Clooney would not return Spence’s

money.38 While Weinig was abroad between November 9 and 13,

1994, Spence had Clooney kidnapped to ‘‘compel him to return the

money that he had wrongfully taken.’’ 39 On November 15, 1994,

Weinig told Hirsch that Spence ‘‘seized a person.’’ 40 After Hirsch

joked with him that Spence ‘‘learned it from the Colombians,’’

Weinig continued, ‘‘[Clooney] will be released as soon as his family

produces money[.]’’ 41 Hirsch responded, ‘‘Wait a minute. Hold it,

hold it. Dick Spence is holding someone hostage and you’re sitting

here? . . . He’s holding a person and you really don’t see any problem with that?’’ 42 Hirsch observed that Clooney might notify the

authorities, but Weinig replied, ‘‘Well, he’s not in a position to call

the police at this point, right?’’ 43 Weinig rationalized Clooney’s abduction by noting, ‘‘You know [Spence is] kidnapping someone who

owes him money here.’’ 44 He continued, ‘‘It’s not drug money, it’s

money. He’s lost some good money.’’ 45 Weinig apparently felt that

his role as a lawyer might conflict with his participation in a kidnapping. He therefore attempted to justify his involvement to

Hirsch:

We didn’t do it. I don’t know anything about it. If he tells

me a crime is going to be committed, then I have an obligation, I have to disclose it or go to the authorities. . . .

But he didn’t do that. He just talked to me a few times

about ‘‘I couldn’t just sit around and wait so I had some

goons go talk to the guy and they’re gonna make sure the

money comes this week.’’ 46

Clooney was released the following day on the condition that he

surrender his artwork and a home mortgage to settle his debt to

1718

47 U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant

U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court

Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 7–8 (Exhibit 4). 48 Id. at 8. Specifically, Weinig instructed two attorneys at the firm to receive the ransom from

Clooney. Id. 49 Id. 50Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special

Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 2 (Exhibit 4). See Telephone Interview

with Mark Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001). 51 U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29 (Exhibit 1). See also NARA Document Production

(Criminal Complaint, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1994)) (Exhibit 7); NARA Document Production (Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Drubner, In Re Application for Arrest and Search

Warrant (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1994)) (Exhibit 8). The best recollection of those involved in Weinig’s arrest is that he was taken into custody at his home, without incident, and outside the view

of his children. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lev Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney

for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 52 U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29 (Exhibit 1). 53 U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Indictment, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y.

Dec. 22, 1994)) (Exhibit 9); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Indictment,

U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1995)) (Exhibit 10); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document

Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 4

(Exhibit 1). 54 U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Indictment, U.S. v. Weinig, S2 95 CR–

167 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 1995)); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production

(Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 13 (Exhibit 1). 55 Id. at 14. See also NARA Document Production (Letter from Mark P. Goodman, Assistant

U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal

& Manges (Sept. 20, 1995)) (Exhibit 2) (plea agreement).

Spence.47 Weinig offered his office as a meeting place where

Clooney could convey the ransom and instructed two of his associates to execute transfer agreements when Clooney and his

girlfriend arrived at the office.48 However, he left before they arrived.49

D. Weinig’s Prosecution and Sentencing

Robert Hirsch was arrested in September 1994 and, with Spence,

subsequently cooperated with authorities in their investigation of

the remaining members of the money laundering organization.50

On November 30, 1994, Weinig and the remaining members of the

organization, including Tohmes Peter, were arrested.51 Weinig was

subsequently released on bail.52 Weinig was indicted on December

22, 1994, and April 20, 1995, with several co-defendants in the

Southern District of New York for conspiring to launder drug proceeds, 15 counts of money laundering, two counts of interstate

transportation of stolen money, wire fraud, three counts of making

false statements to federal authorities, and criminal forfeiture.53

On September 21, 1995, Weinig was charged under a separate indictment with interfering with commerce by extortion arising from

his participation in Spence’s abduction of Clooney.54

Shortly before Weinig was to go to trial on money laundering

charges, he pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder drug money for

the Cali cocaine cartel and to owning or controlling property that

was involved in and traceable to the money laundering conspiracy.55 Weinig’s plea to those charges resulted in his forfeiture of

various personal and business assets, including his summer home,

proceeds traceable to his money laundering activities, and personal

1719

56 Id. at 16–17. 57 Id. at 14. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) of the federal criminal code, this offense is referred

to as ‘‘misprision of a felony.’’ 58Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 59 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 6 (Exhibit 3) (quoting transcript of allocution). 60 Id. 61 Id. at 6 n.14. 62 U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant

U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., for Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 1 (Exhibit 4). 63 Id. 64 Id. at 1–9. 65Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman, Special

Continued

and business bank accounts.56 Weinig also pleaded guilty to knowingly concealing from law enforcement authorities Spence’s abduction of Clooney for the purpose of extorting the payment of ransom.57 Because he waited until the eve of trial to plead guilty and

did not cooperate with law enforcement, Weinig did not receive any

credit for cooperation in the plea agreement.58

The documents relating to Weinig’s plea show that he failed not

only to cooperate with law enforcement but also to accept responsibility for his actions. In his allocution before Judge Kevin T.

Duffy, Weinig stated that he originally believed representations

made by Hirsch that Tohmes Peter was involved in the ‘‘worldwide

distribution of parallel market or greige market goods, including

electronic equipment, computer equipment, health and beauty aids,

and other commodities[,]’’ not money laundering.59 But, Weinig

conceded that ‘‘[f]rom the very start . . . [he] had misgivings about

the highly unconventional nature of the activity in which [Peter]

was engaged’’ and ‘‘[a]s time went on, [he] deliberately ignored obvious indications that these monies were, in fact, the proceeds of

illicit drug transactions, and eventually [he] was fully aware of this

fact.’’ 60 Weinig admitted that he ignored the following indicators:

DEA statements that the proceeds at issue were drug-related; the

‘‘highly unconventional locations, . . . [h]otel rooms, street corners

and empty cars in parking lots where the money was transferred’’;

that ‘‘[his law] office never saw documents that would ordinarily

underlie a commercial transaction’’; and that he received ‘‘what [he]

perceived to be an unreasonably large amount of money in relation

to the business being conducted.’’ 61 However, Weinig argued that,

with respect to the money laundering operation, he was less involved than were Hirsch and Spence in the operation’s day-to-day

operations.62 Regarding his role in the kidnapping scheme, Weinig

maintained that he was not told about the extortion-by-kidnapping

scheme until after Clooney was abducted.63

In reply to Weinig’s claims, the Government argued that Weinig

was in fact centrally involved in the money laundering organization

with Hirsch and Spence from its inception and played an important

role in the kidnapping.64 In support of its position, the Government

cited private statements and proffers made by Hirsch and Spence,

both of whom cooperated with the Government from the date of

their arrest.65 In particular, the Government noted that both

1720

Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 2 (Exhibit 4). 66 Id. at 3. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. at 6. 70 Id. 71 U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, U.S.

v. Weinig, et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996)) at 14 (Exhibit 11). 72 Id. at 2–3. 73 Id. at 5. 74 Id. 75 Id. at 7. 76 Id. 77 Id. at 9. 78 Id. at 9–11.

Hirsch and Spence had consistently stated that Weinig was generally aware of the organization’s day-to-day activities and had spoken to them about those activities frequently.66 The Government

also cited various wiretapped conversations, which clearly and consistently inculpated Weinig.67 The Government also argued that

the level of Hirsch’s and Spence’s involvement in the organization

was irrelevant to Weinig’s sentencing.68 According to the Government, Weinig’s conduct was ‘‘extremely serious and reprehensible’’ and was motivated by ‘‘unmitigated, unrelenting greed and arrogance.’’ 69 With regard to Weinig’s role in the extortion scheme, the

Government argued that, for sentencing purposes, Weinig’s activities should be considered independent of those of the other criminals involved and characterized his conduct, particularly inasmuch

as Weinig was a lawyer, as ‘‘chilling.’’ 70

Judge Duffy agreed. On March 22, 1996, he sentenced Weinig to

the maximum sentence under federal guidelines—11 years and

three months.71 Before he did so, John Wing, Weinig’s attorney,

asked for leniency:

Your Honor, when my kids were young, I was familiar

with that Sesame Street character Big Bird and a song he

used to sing about how everybody makes mistakes, big

people, small people, as a matter of fact, law people. It’s

probably a different version of the doctrine of original sin,

but Harvey Weinig made some business mistakes[.] 72

Wing continued by noting that his client ‘‘did not sit down and

make a conscious, knowing decision to initiate and enter into a

business of laundering drug proceeds.’’ 73 Rather, according to

Wing, Weinig was misled by his law partner, Robert Hirsch, ‘‘a

man he liked, respected, trusted, someone he thought was smart,’’

into believing that they were handling ‘‘gray market’’ forfeiture

cases unrelated to narcotics trafficking.74 However, Wing conceded

that after Weinig learned about the true nature of the business,

‘‘[he] stayed in. [He] made money. He liked having the security.’’ 75

Wing then discussed Weinig’s role in the extortion by kidnapping

scheme, which he characterized as ‘‘also somewhat bizarre.’’ 76

Wing conceded that, with full knowledge of the abduction scheme,

Weinig ‘‘basically let it happen. He didn’t stop it.’’ 77 In an attempt

to offset the seriousness of Weinig’s criminal conduct, Wing mentioned Weinig’s character, the harm his behavior visited on his

family, and the legal assistance Weinig occasionally made available

to various friends without charge.78

1721

79 Id. at 11. 80 Id. at 12–14. 81 Id. at 14. 82 Id. 83 U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Judgment and Commitment Order,

U.S. v. Weinig, et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1996)) (Exhibit 12). See 11-Year Sentence for Lawyers

in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at A25.

Speaking for himself at sentencing, Weinig conveyed to Judge

Duffy, among other things, that ‘‘today marks yet another milestone in the nightmare from which I am unable to awake.’’ 79 But

Judge Duffy observed the following with regard to Weinig’s involvement in the kidnapping scheme:

You know, you talk about a nightmare. Nightmares come

from the unconscious, the subconscious. What you are facing is something that you were conscious or you got yourself into. . . . The suggestion has been made that you are

a very altruistic person, that you are a great guy . . . . I

don’t know . . . . What would you have done, Mr. Weinig,

if your son Jacob had been kidnapped and some lawyer

knew about it . . . and didn’t do anything? . . . I insisted

on getting the tape and listening to your conversation with

Hirsch when you talk about it, very flip, matter of fact.

You couldn’t care less, but if it had been your son, you

would have cared more. . . . You apparently were able to

divide yourself in two, outside the office and inside. Even

when Clooney came in, your attorney says you let it happen. Sure you let it happen, because you went, and you

stuck two young associates with the job of cleaning it up.80

With regard to Weinig’s involvement in the money laundering operation, Judge Duffy noted the following:

The suggestion is made that you are not smart or sophisticated. I can’t believe that. You thought that the money

laundering was coming in gray market goods. But even

you admit that you knew where it was coming from, at

least at the end.

What are we talking about? Well the figures vary, from 72

million dollars, that the Swiss bankers claimed to have

laundered, to nineteen, which I understand you are accused of. Nineteen million dollars in drugs is a lot of

money. That much drugs is a lot of pain. If [your sons]

Samuel or Jacob were the ones who were using the drugs,

you would be singing a different story, an entirely different

song.81

Judge Duffy thereupon noted that ‘‘if [this case] had been in the

old days, I would have given [Weinig] the statutory maximum.’’ 82

On March 22, 1996, Judge Duffy sentenced Weinig to 135 months

(11 years and three months) plus three years supervised release

and a $100 special assessment.83 Even with credit for good behavior, Harvey Weinig would not get out of prison until 2005.

After his conviction in federal court, Weinig filed for resignation

from the New York Bar with the Appellate Division of the State

of New York. That court accepted Weinig’s resignation, observing

that ‘‘[its] review of the record in this matter reveals that respondVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00461 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1722

84 In re Weinig, 642 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 85 Id. See also Disciplinary Proceedings; Appellate Division; First Department, N.Y. LAW J.,

May 20, 1996, at 5; Today’s News Update, N.Y. LAW J., May 20, 1996, at 1. 86See generally Lev Dassin Document Production (Letter from John R. Wing, Member, Weil,

Gotshal & Manges, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice

(Feb. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit 5); Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to Clemency, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1. 87Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001); Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to

Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1. 88 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. See also NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation of Sentence, Apr. 6,

2000) (Exhibit 13) (letters attached to petition not attached).

ent engaged in a course of conduct that can only be described as

shocking and reprehensible for anyone, let alone a member of the

bar.’’ 84 The court also emphasized that if Weinig had not voluntarily resigned from the bar, a ‘‘serious crimes’’ hearing would have

commenced with disbarment being ‘‘the only appropriate sanction.’’ 85

II. WEINIG’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Soon after Weinig was imprisoned, John Wing, Weinig’s criminal

defense counsel, wrote a 34-page letter to the U.S. Attorney for the

Southern District of New York, Mary Jo White, in which he sought

a reduction in his sentence, citing the difference between Weinig’s

sentence and those of his co-conspirators.86 The U.S. Attorney rejected Wing’s request.87 After that effort, Weinig focused his efforts

on obtaining executive clemency.

A. Weinig Hires Reid Weingarten to Lobby for Clemency

After Weinig was sent to prison, his wife, City University of New

York law professor Alice Morey, explored ways of getting Weinig

out of prison. Perhaps Morey’s most important move was to hire

Reid Weingarten, a prominent Washington attorney with close connections to the Clinton White House. Weingarten had represented

a number of key figures in Clinton-era scandals, including Yah Lin

‘‘Charlie’’ Trie, Ron Brown, Mike Espy, and Pauline Kanchanalak.

In representing these individuals, Weingarten had frequent contact

with senior Clinton White House officials and their attorneys.

Weingarten was also well-connected in the Justice Department,

having served as a trial attorney in the Public Integrity Section.

A friend told Weingarten about the Weinig case in 1998 and

asked him to meet with Weinig’s wife.88 Weingarten met with

Morey, who was at her ‘‘wits end’’ because of Weinig’s imprisonment and the harm his imprisonment had caused to her children.89

Weingarten ultimately took the case because ‘‘the general sentiment was that the sentence was ‘grossly disproportionate.’ ’’ 90 Accordingly, Weingarten prepared a clemency petition packet on

Weinig’s behalf and attached letters submitted while Weinig was

awaiting sentencing and written in support of the clemency petition itself.91 In the petition, Weinig set forth his offenses as follows:

As to the first count, I assisted various individuals in laundering money, after realizing that the funds were proceeds

of illegal drug sales. As to the second count, I became

1723

92 Id. 93 Id. (attachment). 94 NARA Document Production (Harvey Weinig’s Memorandum in Support of His Petition for

Commutation of Sentence, Apr. 6, 2000) at 6 (Exhibit 14) (originally attached to petition). 95 NARA Document Production (Letter from Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to

Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Apr. 3, 2000)) (Exhibit 15); Interview

with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 96 NARA Document Production (Letter from Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to

Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House (Apr. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 16); Interview

with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). See also NARA Document

Production (Letter from Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to Roger Adams, Pardon

Attorney, Department of Justice (Apr. 3, 2000)) (Exhibit 17) (indicating, in note by Podesta to

Nolan, ‘‘I need to discuss this one with you. Can you give me a call[?]’’); NARA Document Production (Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President, the White House, to Reid

Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (May 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 18) (drafts of letter attached). 97 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 98 Id. 99 Id. 100 Id. 101 Id. 102 Id.

aware, after the fact, that a client of mine had detained an

individual who had defrauded my client and owed my client money. I subsequently instructed associates in my law

firm to prepare documentation that gave my client a security interest in some of the individual’s assets. I did not report to the authorities that my client had previously detained the individual.92

Weinig also observed that ‘‘[a]s to my client’s abduction of an individual, I did not learn of the kidnapping until after the individual

had been released.’’ 93 As bases for the commutation of his sentence, Weinig argued that: (1) his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the sentences given to more culpable co-defendants and

to money laundering sentences nationwide; (2) he had made and

will continue to make contributions to society; and (3) his family

and, in particular, his youngest son needed him to return home.94

Weingarten filed a copy of the petition with the Pardon Attorney’s Office at the Justice Department on April 3, 2000,95 and with

the White House Counsel’s Office on April 7, 2000.96 Weingarten

knew that the support of the prosecuting U.S. Attorney’s Office was

critical because he had previously represented two clients in clemency proceedings (and prevailed in one of them).97 Accordingly, he

spoke with Deputy U.S. Attorney Shirah Neiman and Assistant

U.S. Attorney Alan Kaufman in the Southern District of New

York.98 Weingarten knew that the prosecutors office had to be on

board or the application was not going anywhere.99 In Weingarten’s ‘‘spirited’’ conversation with Neiman and Kaufman, the prosecutors

indicated that they would not recommend commutation of Weinig’s

sentence.100 Therefore, sometime in the fall of 2000, Weingarten

turned to Pardon Attorney Roger Adams.101 Rather than persuade

Adams to support commutation of Weinig’s sentence, which he was

confident he would not do, Weingarten intended only to have

Adams ‘‘soften’’ his recommendation against granting Weinig clemency.102 Weingarten failed, as is apparent from the Justice Department’s report to President Clinton regarding Weinig’s clemency petition, which is discussed below.

Weingarten then turned his attention to the White House. When

Weingarten’s practice occasionally required trips to the White

House, he typically met with White House Counsel Beth Nolan,

1724

103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. Weinig’s trial attorney, John R. Wing, also argued this point in a letter to U.S. Attorney

Mary Jo White after Weinig’s sentencing. In that letter, Wing argued that Weinig’s belief that

Clooney was not in danger was shared by law enforcement and that, in fact, ‘‘[i]t was later

learned that Clooney was provided with steaks and prostitutes during his ‘detention.’ ’’ Lev

Dassin Document Production (Letter from John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, to

Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Feb. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit

5).110Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 111There are additional elements of the crime of which Weingarten was apparently unaware

when he spoke with Committee staff. First, as Clooney was being abducted, he was plainly fearDeputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, or Chief of Staff John

Podesta.103 Though Weingarten has no specific recollection of meetings he had with any of them regarding the Weinig matter, he is

confident that he brought the matter up with them.104 Weingarten

implored those staff members to review the Weinig clemency petition, telling them ‘‘please read it, it sings.’’ 105 He also communicated that Weinig was a ‘‘small fry in terms of culpability’’ and

that the Weinig family believed that their youngest son’s life was

in jeopardy if Harvey Weinig was not released from prison.106

However, it appears that Weingarten was not well situated to

lobby the White House on the Weinig case because he was ignorant

of many basic details of the Weinig case. For example, when discussing the Weinig case with Committee staff, Weingarten attempted to characterize Weinig as a low-level white collar criminal.107 However, he readily admitted that he ‘‘never, ever, ever got

into the facts of the case because I felt that I didn’t need to.’’ 108

Regarding the kidnapping-related charge, Weingarten said, ‘‘That

could hardly be called a kidnapping. If it was, it was the mildest

kidnapping ever. First of all, the facts are in dispute. And, the alleged victim was fed steaks and whores.’’ 109

Every aspect of Weingarten’s response is troubling. First,

Weingarten was apparently trusted and respected by White House

staff. It is difficult to imagine how, in lobbying the Administration,

Weingarten could have accurately conveyed a factual basis for his

belief in the merits of Weinig’s clemency petition when he ‘‘never,

ever, ever’’ felt the need to ‘‘[get] into the facts’’ of Weinig’s underlying conviction. Second, contrary to Weingarten’s assertion, the

facts most relevant to Weinig’s active involvement in the extortionby-kidnapping scheme were not in dispute. In fact, Weinig admitted most of them in court. Those facts established that Weinig was

aware of the scheme to kidnap Clooney and facilitated Clooney’s

extortion through that scheme. Finally, Weingarten’s contention

that Clooney’s kidnapping was the ‘‘the mildest . . . ever’’ because

his kidnappers provided him with ‘‘steaks and whores’’ fails to reflect the true facts of the crime. As Lev Dassin, the assistant U.S.

Attorney who prosecuted the case indicated to Committee staff,

‘‘[H]aving your abductors have sex with prostitutes while you’re

cowering by the bed on the floor can, in no way, be construed as

pleasant.’’ 110 Weingarten failed to appreciate the actual dynamics

of Clooney’s abduction. The kidnappers, rather than Clooney, apparently partook of the steaks and prostitutes at issue.111 This disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00464 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1725

ful for his life. He cried. See Appellate Brief, U.S. v. Messina, Docket No. 96–1789 (2d Cir. 1997)

at 9 (citing to record). When Spence told co-conspirator Richard Messina on the telephone that

Clooney cried while being abducted, Messina responded that he wished he could have been there

to have seen Clooney cry. Id. Also, at various times during Clooney’s ordeal, a co-conspirator

brandished a butterfly knife. Id. Additionally, Clooney noticed that two other co-conspirators

had a gun. Id. Finally, Clooney’s kidnappers told him several times that he would be harmed

if he tried to escape. Id. Had Weingarten bothered to ‘‘get into the facts,’’ one hopes that he

would have refrained from characterizing Clooney’s abduction as ‘‘the mildest ever.’’ 112 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 113 NARA Document Production (Letter from Alice Morey to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney,

Department of Justice (Feb. 24, 2000)) (Exhibit 19). 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Id.

tinction appears to have been lost on Weingarten. Nonetheless, assuming only for the sake of argument that Weingarten’s representation that Clooney was treated favorably while abducted is accurate, there is an obvious problem with Weingarten’s citing it here.

It is simply bizarre for a lawyer, particularly one with

Weingarten’s background, to suggest that the offense is mitigated

by supplying a kidnapping victim with ‘‘steaks and whores.’’

B. Weinig’s Wife Seeks Support for His Clemency Petition

While Weingarten was meeting with the White House about the

Weinig matter, Alice Morey called several public officials and

prominent rabbis regarding her husband.112 Morey sought these individuals’ help in obtaining a commutation of Weinig’s prison sentence. Morey’s statements to these individuals can be inferred from

her February 24, 2000, letter to the Pardon Attorney. In that letter, Morey characterized Weinig’s role in the conspiracy as ‘‘exceedingly limited.’’ 113 She also asserted that ‘‘if [Weinig] has to serve

the full remainder of his sentence . . . our family will not be able

to survive.’’ 114 Morey further observed that ‘‘[w]ith the exception of

[Weinig], all of the twenty or so co-defendants in this case received

relatively light sentences and most have been out of jail for some

time.’’ 115 She continued, ‘‘[I]t is cruelly inequitable that Hirsch and

the other major players received sentences so far lighter than that

which [Weinig] received, despite [Weinig’s] less significant role.’’ 116

Morey’s letter to the Pardon Attorney contained many of the

same arguments made in Weinig’s clemency petition. However,

Morey’s letter also contained arguments not asserted by others. For

example, Morey attempted to distance Weinig from the conspiracy

by noting that Tohmes Peter was Hirsch’s client, not Weinig’s.117

However, she conceded that Weinig acted on behalf of Peter ‘‘in a

few instances when Hirsch was not available [and] accepted the

cash payments that [Peter] made to the firm[.]’’ 118 Nonetheless,

Morey maintained that ‘‘[i]nterestingly enough, prior to Hirsch’s arrest and subsequent cooperation, the government had little or no

evidence that [Weinig] was connected in any way other than as

Hirsch’s law partner.’’ 119 Morey also argued that the Government

had essentially entrapped Weinig, claiming that ‘‘once Hirsch

began cooperating with the federal government, he began involving

Harvey in his dealings with Peter Tohmes.’’ 120 Morey further arVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00465 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1726

121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Id. 124Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 125 Id. 126 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 127 Id. 128 Id.

gued that the original indictment ‘‘barely mentions’’ Weinig, ‘‘perhaps because he had little to do with the illegal activities.’’ 121

Morey’s position as to Weinig’s activities is totally misleading.

Weinig’s extensive involvement in the money laundering conspiracy

was supported by statements of co-conspirators and corroborated by

Weinig’s own admissions captured by a wiretap. Contrary to

Morey’s representation that Weinig’s involvement was barely mentioned in the indictment, counts one, five, eleven through seventeen, nineteen, twenty-six through twenty-nine, and thirty through

thirty-eight of the April 20, 1995, indictment clearly indicate

Weinig’s deep involvement in the money laundering conspiracy well

beyond his mere partnership in the law firm. Indeed, Morey’s characterization of Weinig’s business transactions as having been conducted ‘‘in a few instances’’ is charitable and, to the extent that it

ignores the $19 million Weinig admitted to having laundered for

members of the Colombian cartel and Weinig’s role in the extortion-by-kidnapping scheme, irrelevant.

Regarding Weinig’s guilty plea and sentencing, Morey asserted

that Weinig pleaded ‘‘[f]or a host of reasons, mostly emotional and

financial.’’ 122 Morey also suggested that ‘‘[a]lthough [Weinig’s] lawyer had been hopeful that the court would depart downward in sentencing, Judge Duffy sentenced [Weinig] to the top of the guidelines

without articulating his reasons.’’ 123 Morey’s assertion of why

Weinig pleaded guilty seems to confirm that Weinig never fully accepted responsibility for his actions—one of the requirements for

receiving a commutation. Indeed, there was never a legitimate expectation of downward departure at sentencing. Weinig provided no

meaningful assistance to authorities until immediately before trial,

and, as described below, the information he ultimately provided

was useless.124 Accordingly, Weinig’s plea agreement did not contemplate a downward adjustment for substantial assistance to authorities.125

C. Weinig’s Wife Obtains Support From Individuals With

Ties to the Administration

Alice Morey obtained the assistance of a number of individuals

to press her husband’s clemency case with the White House. A key

individual who helped Morey was her cousin, David Dreyer, who

served as a deputy communications director with the Clinton White

House and senior advisor to Clinton Administration Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. Dreyer used his White House contacts to

lobby White House Chief of Staff John Podesta.126 When asked

about Dreyer’s role in lobbying for the commutation, Weingarten

confirmed that Dreyer ‘‘bugged’’ Podesta about the Weinig matter

but does not know how many times Dreyer contacted the White

House.127 Weingarten noted that, because Dreyer was a ‘‘noodge,’’ it might have been as many as 20 times.128

1727

129 Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001,

at A1. 130 Id. 131 Id. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 136Dreyer’s letter refers to ‘‘papers filed with your office [seeking] a clemency . . . for Harvey

Weinig,’’ yet the petition was actually filed with the Justice Department (and the White House

Counsel’s Office) months later in April 2000. 137 NARA Document Production (Letter from David Dreyer, Principal, TSD, Inc., to Roger

Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 20). 138 Id. 139 Id.

Dreyer has publicly noted his fondness for his cousin Alice and

that he occasionally saw Weinig at various family functions.129 He

also observed that his friendship with Podesta, with whom he occasionally jogged in Rock Creek Park, remained strong even after he

left the White House.130 According to Dreyer, sometime in July

2000 during a visit to Podesta’s office, he gave Podesta the cover

memorandum from Weinig’s clemency petition and ‘‘asked him to

take a look at it and explained to him the relationship, and why

this mattered[.]’’ 131 Dreyer confirmed that Podesta made no promises but was ‘‘certainly willing to look into it as an act of

friendship[.]’’ 132 Dreyer asked Podesta about the matter again during the Fall of 2000 as they were jogging.133 Podesta responded by

telling Dreyer not to expect any action for several months.134 According to Weingarten, Podesta felt that the Weinig clemency matter was a ‘‘good story’’ and that a decision could be made ‘‘on the

merits.’’ 135

Some insight as to what Dreyer specifically told Podesta, and

possibly others in the Administration, about the Weinig matter can

be gleaned from a letter that Dreyer submitted to the Pardon Attorney’s Office in support of Weinig’s petition.136 Dreyer noted in

the letter that ‘‘[n]o conceivable societal interest is being served by

forcing Harvey [Weinig] to remain in prison for the entire length

of his maximum sentence.’’ 137 Dreyer cited as bases for clemency:

(1) the ‘‘disproportion’’ between Weinig’s sentence and those of codefendants ‘‘all more deeply involved [in the money laundering conspiracy and misprision] than he’’; (2) the fact that ‘‘Harvey’s wife

and sons are bearing the brunt of his punishment with enormous

force’’; and (3) the fact that Weinig was ‘‘a good and decent father’’

and ‘‘a contributing member of the community.’’ 138 Apparently content with only a superficial appreciation of the facts, Dreyer noted

that the apparent disproportion between Weinig’s sentence and

those of his co-defendants ‘‘[o]n its face . . . is not fair.’’ 139 As described above, these arguments are based on an incomplete understanding of the underlying case. Perhaps more importantly, characterizing Weinig as a ‘‘contributing member of society’’ does not help

those unfamiliar with the facts of the case understand that his

most significant ‘‘contribution’’ was to assist the Cali cartel in flooding the United States with cocaine.

In light of the specious arguments Dreyer set forth in his letter

to the Pardon Attorney and also likely communicated to senior Administration officials, Chairman Burton asked Dreyer to participate

in an interview with Committee staff and subpoenaed documents

1728

140Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to David

Dreyer, Principal, TSD, Inc. (Mar. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I) (invitation letter); Subpoena

from Comm. on Govt. Reform to David Dreyer, Principal, TSD, Inc. (Apr. 4, 2001) (within Appendix II). 141 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 142 Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001,

at A1. 143 Id. 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). 148 Id. 149 Id.

from Dreyer.140 Dreyer declined the Committee’s invitation and asserted his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination rather than produce records. Dreyer’s role in lobbying senior Clinton

Administration officials for the Weinig commutation was obviously

critical. Therefore, it is disappointing that Dreyer would not cooperate with the Committee’s investigation. Moreover, it is troubling

that Dreyer believed that something about his involvement in the

Weinig matter might be incriminating. Nevertheless, the Committee must take his representation at face value and conclude that

Dreyer at least believes that he might have incurred criminal liability during the course of his activities.

Weinig’s wife, Alice Morey, also directly lobbied Harold Ickes, the

President’s former Deputy Chief of Staff, whose children attended

her sons’ school.141 Ickes and Podesta have publicly stated that,

like Dreyer, they were persuaded to support Weinig’s petition by

the merits of the argument that Weinig’s sentence was disproportionate to other sentences imposed in the case.142 Ickes, in particular, said, ‘‘I think what really drove it home to me was the disparity in the sentences.’’ 143 They have also stated that they believed

that Weinig’s sons were suffering considerably from their father’s

incarceration.144 That appears to be the position that Ickes conveyed to President Clinton when the President approached him

about the Weinig petition.145 Ickes recalled, ‘‘[The President] asked

me about it a couple of times. I don’t think he was aware of all the

nuances, so I told him my view of it. It was the sentencing issue.

I said, ‘Look, this guy was sentenced. He pled guilty. And nobody

is claiming that he’s a saint.’ ’’ 146 However, it is not entirely clear

why the sentencing disparity—not whether Weinig’s crimes merited the sentence Judge Duffy imposed—was the primary focus. It

appears in hindsight that the disparity argument was manufactured to compensate for the fact that there were actually no intellectually defensible grounds for the argument that Weinig’s sentence should be commuted.

Reid Weingarten also enlisted Alma Brown, the widow of former

Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, in the clemency campaign.

Weingarten had represented Ron Brown in various investigations

prior to his death and remained friendly with Alma Brown. Knowing that Alma Brown remained close to the White House,

Weingarten asked her to write a letter ‘‘putting in a good word’’ for

Weinig.147 Brown initially resisted but eventually did so.148

Weingarten believes that Brown also might have spoken to President Clinton about the Weinig matter.149

1729

150 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 11 (Exhibit 3). 151 Id. 152 Id. 153 Id. at 11. 154 Id. at 12. 155 Id. 156 Id.

III. THE WHITE HOUSE’S REVIEW OF WEINIG’S COMMUTATION REQUEST

A. The Justice Department’s Input in the Weinig Clemency

Matter

The Justice Department repeatedly, clearly, and adamantly recommended against any reduction of Weinig’s sentence, not only at

and after sentencing but also during the clemency proceedings.

Some time after sentencing, Weinig’s defense counsel sent a 34-

page letter to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White seeking a reduction of

Weinig’s sentence. In response, White rejected the request out of

hand. Also, when Weinig sought a commutation of his sentence

from the White House, the Justice Department, through Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, voiced its opposition.

1. The U.S. Attorney Strongly Objected to Commuting

Weinig’s Sentence

U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White expressed her opinion on the

Weinig commutation in her official comments to the Pardon Attorney. White’s position was then communicated by the Pardon Attorney to President Clinton. White disputed Weinig’s description of his

role in the money laundering conspiracy.150 Citing Weinig’s admissions at the sentencing hearing and in the recorded conversations

with Hirsch, White argued that ‘‘the evidence amply demonstrates

both Weinig’s knowledge of and enthusiasm to participate in this

scheme.’’ 151 White also argued that Weinig ‘‘misstates his role in

the extortion scheme,’’ and she challenged his argument that ‘‘he

should be exonerated on [the misprision] count because his ethical

duties as a lawyer prevented him from disclosing confidential information.’’ 152

White explained that ‘‘the extortion charge . . . stemmed not

from Weinig’s failure to interfere with the kidnapping, but rather

from his affirmative efforts to conceal and further his client’s extortion of Clooney.’’ 153 White also noted that ‘‘the tapes of Weinig’s

conversations with Hirsch regarding the kidnapping provide perhaps the greatest example of Weinig’s shocking lack of morality or

care for the rule of law.’’ 154 White described Weinig’s ‘‘suggestion

that New York [S]tate’s ethics rules either compelled, or at least

justified, his conduct’’ as ‘‘perverse.’’ 155 In particular, she noted

that, although Spence was Weinig’s client, he plainly did not inform Weinig of the kidnapping because he was seeking legal advice.156 White maintained that, to the contrary, Spence sought

Weinig’s assistance in obtaining ransom from Clooney. She observed that ‘‘[n]othing in the ethics rules governing attorney conduct in New York State (or any other state for that matter) sanctions one’s affirmative participation in a crime, let alone the collection of ransom from a kidnap victim, which is exactly what Weinig

1730

157 Id. 158 Id. 159 Id. at 12. 160 Id. 161 Id. 162 Id. 163 Id. 164 Id. at 13. 165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Id.

directed his law firm’s associates to do.’’ 157 White also noted that

the Appellate Division of the State of New York, which accepted

Weinig’s resignation from the bar, took grave exception to his interpretation of the state’s ethics rules.158

White also challenged Weinig’s claim of entitlement to commutation because he received a longer sentence than did his co-conspirators.159 White noted that several co-conspirators, including Gary

Salerno and Tohmes Peter, received significant, comparable jail

sentences for their crimes.160 White observed that Weinig was not

similar to other co-conspirators in that he was a successful attorney and, therefore, had no reason to engage in illegal activity other

than ‘‘sheer greed.’’ 161 White further noted that, contrary to co-conspirators Hirsch and Spence, Weinig repeatedly declined to cooperate with the Government and admit his guilt until immediately before trial.162 White explained that any disparity existing between

Weinig’s sentence and those of his money laundering co-conspirators is explained by Weinig’s active participation in the kidnapping

scheme.163 Finally, White argued that Weinig’s family situation did

not justify commutation of his sentence.164 White apparently notified Judge Duffy, the judge who sentenced Weinig, of Weinig’s ongoing effort to obtain presidential clemency. Judge Duffy did not

comment on the petition ‘‘other than to point out that Mr. Weinig

was sentenced within the Guidelines’’ range and that the Commutation Application contains no facts not known to the prosecution and the sentencing court at the time of conviction.’’ 165

2. The Pardon Attorney Objected to Commuting

Weinig’s Sentence

Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney, also opposed the Weinig

commutation. In his report to the President, Adams pointed out

that the length of Weinig’s sentence was directly attributable to the

following aggravating factors: the extremely large amount of money

Weinig helped to launder, Weinig’s actual knowledge that the

money he laundered was narcotics trafficking proceeds, and

Weinig’s use of his special skills as an attorney to ensure that the

offense would succeed.166 The report further stated that, but for

those aggravating factors, Weinig’s sentence would have been much

lower.167 The report also noted that Weinig’s argument that his

sentence was too severe under the sentencing guidelines was

meritless because his offense (of assisting in the laundering of millions of dollars that he knew were the proceeds of drug sales) falls

comfortably within the category of drug-related financial crimes

that Congress sought to punish severely through the money laundering statute and its sentencing guidelines.168

1731

169 Id. 170 Id. at 14. 171 Id. 172 Id. See NARA Document Production (Letter from Mark P. Goodman, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., for Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice,

to John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges (Sept. 20, 1995)) (Exhibit 2) (plea agreement). 173See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 14 (Exhibit 3). 174 Id. at 14–15.

The report refuted Weinig’s claim that he learned of Spence’s

kidnapping of Clooney only after Clooney was released. Weinig’s

claim is flatly disproved by his contemporaneously recorded telephone conversations with Robert Hirsch. Given that Weinig’s claim

indicates his unwillingness to accept full responsibility for his role

in the extortion scheme, according to the report, Judge Duffy was

fully entitled under the sentencing guidelines to consider this fact

when determining Weinig’s proper sentence.169

Regarding Weinig’s argument that his sentence was unfair in

comparison to his co-conspirators, the report notes that, inasmuch

as Weinig plainly sought to downplay his involvement in the extortion scheme, he also sought to significantly minimize his role in the

money laundering conspiracy, calling himself ‘‘a belated and minor

participant.’’ 170 The report correctly notes that this characterization is contrary to the evidence. Although the report concedes that

Weinig was less frequently involved in the day-to-day operations of

the money laundering scheme, it notes that Weinig participated in

the planning and oversight of the operation, wired money when

needed, assisted in recovering seized funds, and participated fully

in the profits of the enterprise.171 The report also noted that, unlike his co-conspirators, Weinig rejected repeated requests from the

government for assistance and did not enter into a plea agreement

until the eve of trial—nearly 10 months after his arrest and long

after his co-conspirators pled guilty.172 Accordingly, the report observes that:

[Weinig] thus has no one but himself to blame for the fact

that, unlike his co-defendants, he was not the beneficiary

of a government motion for a downward departure at sentencing, since his own choices precluded him from providing the kind of assistance that would have warranted such

a request.173

Critically, the report notes that, under those circumstances, commuting Weinig’s sentence as he proposed would ‘‘significantly undermine’’ the government’s ‘‘legitimate and important policy interests in encouraging early and complete cooperation by criminal defendants.’’ 174

Finally, the report maintains that Weinig’s remaining arguments

for clemency, those relating to a history of and potential for continued community service as well as those relating to family hardship,

simply fail to distinguish Weinig from other convicted felons. The

report helpfully notes that many felons have enjoyed fewer advantages than has Weinig, have served longer portions of their lengthy

sentences, and have had their clemency requests denied by President Clinton. Given the foregoing and the vehement opposition of

1732

175 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 176 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 177 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 178 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 179 Id. 180 Id.

the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, the report recommended denial of

Weinig’s petition.

The Committee finds the Justice Department’s positions, as articulated by both U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White and Main Justice,

powerfully persuasive. Their positions reflect a reasoned, thoughtful deliberation of the merits of Weinig’s clemency application

against criteria traditionally considered when vetting clemency petitions. They also reflect a thorough understanding of Weinig’s underlying conviction and the extant record. To accept Weinig’s argument requires a willingness to overlook the facts of the underlying

conviction and the record. Such willful blindness gives rise to the

inference that the ultimate decision to commute Weinig’s sentence

was motivated by a factor other than the merits of Weinig’s petition.

B. The White House’s Deliberations

By late 2000, Weinig’s clemency matter was brought before

President Clinton for consideration. Despite the Justice Department’s opposition to the commutation and the lack of any strong

arguments in favor of the commutation, key White House staff supported the commutation. The Weinig commutation, like many of

President Clinton’s other final clemency grants, is remarkable for

the lack of analysis that the case received at the White House. The

White House seems to have ignored the strong recommendations of

the Pardon Attorney and the Justice Department prosecutors and

granted the commutation after only cursory consideration.

Support from John Podesta and Beth Nolan appears to have been

critical to the decision to grant the Weinig commutation. Podesta

had been lobbied by his former staffer, David Dreyer, and Nolan

had been lobbied by Reid Weingarten. Eric Angel, an Associate

White House Counsel who was working on clemency matters, recalls that Podesta ‘‘asserted himself’’ in favor of Weinig at a meeting with the President regarding the Weinig matter.175 White

House Counsel Beth Nolan also supported the Weinig commutation.176 The lower-level staff in the Counsel’s Office, Meredith Cabe

and Angel, were not as supportive. Angel claims that he was

strongly opposed to the commutation because of the seriousness of

Weinig’s crimes.177 Cabe put her opposition in more gentle terms,

stating simply that she was ‘‘not a big fan’’ of the Weinig case.178

According to Cabe, Podesta and Nolan supported the Weinig commutation for two main reasons. First, they believed that Weinig’s

sentence was disproportionately long, apparently accepting the argument that Weinig was treated unfairly because his co-conspirators received lighter sentences than he did.179 Second, one of

Weinig’s children was suffering from severe emotional distress as

a result of his father’s incarceration.180

1733

181 NARA Document Production (Draft Memorandum to the President by Beth Nolan, Bruce

Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe (Dec. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 21). 182 NARA Document Production (Draft Memorandum to the President by Beth Nolan, Bruce

Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe (Dec. 20, 2000)) (Exhibit 22). 183 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 184 NARA Document Production (Draft Memorandum from Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and

Meredith Cabe to President William J. Clinton entitled ‘‘Pending Clemency Matters’’) (Exhibit

23) (entry for Weinig only). 185 NARA Document Production (Summary of Harvey Weinig’s Petition for Commutation) (Exhibit 24) (note attached). 186 Id.

By late December 2000, the White House Counsel’s Office was

prepared to recommend that Weinig’s sentence be commuted. In a

December 17, 2000, draft memorandum to the President, Beth

Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe recommended clemency

but noted opposition by the office of the prosecuting U.S. Attorney.181 A December 20, 2000, draft memorandum noted opposition

by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder and recommended that

Weinig’s sentence be commuted to 108 months ‘‘[s]ince [Weinig]

agreed in guilty plea range should be 108–135 months[.]’’ 182 As the

‘‘rationale’’ for the recommendation, Nolan, Lindsey, and Cabe observed that ‘‘[m]ore culpable co-defendants, including the law partner who directed the kidnapping, received shorter sentences and

have been released.’’ 183 No mention is made of the substantial assistance provided by the ‘‘more culpable defendants’’ to investigating authorities or that a similarly situated defendant (who actively

participated in the extortion by kidnapping scheme) received a sentence comparable to Weinig’s. Presumably, both of these facts, as

well as a correction to the misstatement that Weinig’s ‘‘law partner

. . . directed the kidnapping,’’ were made in the final draft of the

memorandum or orally when advising the President. It is also unclear when or why the decision was made to commute Weinig’s sentence from 108 months to time served. But, drafts of ‘‘Pending

Clemency Matters’’ noted that ‘‘Rep. By Reid Weingarten; through

JDP; Harold Ickes.’’ 184

The only indication of the President’s reasoning in the Weinig

matter comes from a copy of the summary of Weinig’s argument for

a commutation. On a note attached to that document, President

Clinton wrote, ‘‘M. Cabe—This looks meritorious[.] Advise[.]—

BC.’’ 185 At the top of the memorandum itself, President Clinton

wrote, ‘‘Reduce to time served.’’ 186 On January 20, 2001, President

Clinton commuted Harvey Weinig’s 11-year prison term to time

served, which reduced Weinig’s sentence by 66 months.

C. The White House Had No Justification for the Weinig

Commutation

Weinig articulated three main reasons why he was entitled to

presidential clemency: (1) that his sentence was disproportionate

and excessive; (2) that his contributions to society justified his

early release from prison; and (3) that one of his sons was suffering

severe emotional difficulties as a result of his imprisonment. The

first reason simply was not true. The other two did not justify any

reduction in his sentence, much less his release from prison.

Weinig’s main argument in favor of the commutation was that

his sentence was disproportionate and excessive. In support of his

1734

187Weinig has argued on occasion that he attempted to cooperate with the government but

was rebuffed. A close examination of Weinig’s claims shows them to be hollow. Between the time

when Weinig entered his guilty plea and his sentencing hearing, Weinig apparently attempted

to cooperate with the Government. See Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe &

Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001); NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 6–7 (Exhibit 3). Specifically, he submitted

himself for debriefing regarding the money laundering operation in November 1995. At that

time, he told authorities that Robert Hirsch had violated his own cooperation agreement with

the government by resuming his money laundering activities. Id. But this fact was already well

known to the federal government. Months earlier, in May 1995, and well before his guilty plea,

the government already knew about Hirsch’s activities and moved for revocation of Hirsch’s bail.

Id. at 7; see Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). Ultimately, the federal government did reach

an agreement with Hirsch whereby Hirsch agreed to plead guilty to money laundering, bank

fraud, and making false statements to federal law enforcement authorities and to cooperate with

law enforcement. See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial

of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 7 (Exhibit 3). Under this agreement, Hirsch received a sentence of three years imprisonment under the federal sentencing guidelines. The

prosecutors made this deal with Hirsch primarily because they needed his cooperation to prosecute Weinig. See Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for

the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). As the U.S. Attorney informed the Pardon

Attorney, ‘‘The predominant reason the Government resigned Hirsch as a cooperator was to assist in prosecuting [Weinig’s] trial. If [Weinig] had admitted his guilt earlier, Hirsch would not

have been resigned as a cooperating witness.’’ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 7 (Exhibit 3). 188Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 189Peter received 97 months in prison, and Salerno received 108 months in prison. Leon and

Rachel Weinmann were indicted for, among other things, money laundering and, under separate

indictment, causing a $20,000 fully endorsed third-party check to be sent from New York City

to Switzerland without filing a particular customs report. On May 19, 1995, they pleaded guilty

to only the customs violation. U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 12 (Exhibit 1). But, prior

to their sentencing, it was stipulated that (1) the Weinmanns were charged with money laundering in Switzerland; (2) the case against the Weinmanns represented the second largest money

laundering prosecution in Swiss history; and (3) the Weinmanns should be extradited as soon

as possible to Switzerland for prosecution there. Id. at 13. Accordingly, the Weinmanns waived

the preparation of a presentence report; the Government declined to take a position regarding

the Weinmann’s sentencing; and, for the crime to which they pled guilty, the Weinmanns were sentenced by Judge Kevin T. Duffy to 1 year unsupervised probation, a $1,000 fine each, and

a $50 special assessment. Id. The Weinmanns were then escorted to a flight to Switzerland for

prosecution. Id. See Swiss Couple to Be Extradited from United States, Official Says, ASSOCI- ATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, May 16, 1995. However, Marc Ziegler, who was then the District

Attorney for the Canton of Zurich, noted substantial difficulty with his prosecution of the

Weinmanns. The prosecution was intended as a test case of Switzerland’s money laundering

law, which was introduced in 1990. Apparently, the case against the Weinmanns in Switzerland

arose out of the same facts that gave rise to the Weinmann’s indictment for money laundering

in the U.S. Nonetheless, as described below, many of Weinnman’s co-conspirators entered into

plea agreements, which precluded evidence that could have been used against the Weinmanns

in their prosecution in Switzerland. Ziegler attributes his difficulties in prosecuting the

Weinmanns to that factor, ambiguities in the Swiss money laundering statute, and the differences between Swiss and American evidentiary law. The current status of the Swiss case

against the Weinmanns is unknown. Richard Messina, one of Weinig’s co-conspirators in the

scheme to extort James Clooney by kidnapping, was sentenced to 151 months incarceration and

three years supervised release—a sentence comparable to Weinig’s sentence. Judge Duffy sentenced both Weinig and Messina to the upper end of a recommended sentencing range of 121

to 151 months imprisonment. Judge Duffy’s rationale for Messina’s sentence was very similar

to his rationale for sentencing Weinig, an attorney, to 135 months. He found, among other

things, that Messina knowingly played a role in the extortion of Clooney and engaged in serious

criminal conduct after having been disbarred. See Telephone Interview with Lev Dassin, former

Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001); Appellate Brief,

U.S. v. Messina, Docket No. 96–1789 (2d Cir. 1997) at 20 (citing to record for judge’s reasons).

claim, Weinig pointed to his main two co-defendants, Richard

Spence and Robert Hirsch, both of whom received lighter sentences

than he did and who arguably were more involved in money laundering activities. However, Weinig’s sentence was stiffer than those

received by Spence and Hirsch because they, unlike Weinig, cooperated with law enforcement.187 Judge Duffy adjusted their sentences

downward because they provided substantial assistance to investigative authorities.188 Co-conspirators truly ‘‘equally culpable,’’ including Tohmes Peter and Gary Salerno, received sentences comparable to Weinig’s 135-month imprisonment term.189

1735

190Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,

Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). 191 Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001,

at A1.

Indeed, in many criminal cases involving multiple co-defendants,

the Government obtains cooperation from some defendants to help

develop its case against others. Generally, and understandably,

there arrives a point in the investigation in which the Government

becomes unwilling to make available any more deals with other codefendants. In such cases, those co-defendants choose to take their

chances with the judge and the jury rather than cooperate with the

Government. Until the eve of trial, this was Weinig’s decision.190

Accordingly, Weinig’s citing the resulting ‘‘disproportion’’ between

reduced sentences given to co-defendants who substantially assisted the Government and the sentences of those who decide not

to is flawed because it renders his case indistinguishable from all

similar cases where cooperation agreements were used to obtain

evidence. In other words, Weinig cannot argue that the methods by

which law enforcement gathered evidence to convict him is inherently unfair without requiring that all those cases where convictions were obtained by those same means also be reversed. Such

a position is obviously untenable.

The second main argument used by Weinig as a justification for

his commutation is that his humanitarian actions justified his

early release from prison. The basic thrust of this argument was

that, apart from his activities laundering money for the Cali cartel

and participating in a kidnapping scheme, Weinig was actually a

very nice person. There are several obvious flaws with this argument. First, it should not have been relevant to the President’s

analysis. Second, there is little evidence that Weinig was a humanitarian in any significant sense. Rather, the letters of support for

Weinig in his clemency petition basically show that Weinig, like

most people, had friends who liked him. While he may have been

nice to his children and friends, it is difficult to ignore that he was

laundering millions of dollars in drug money for the Cali cartel.

The fact that Harvey Weinig consciously decided to assist and profit from the Cali cartel’s efforts to distribute massive amounts of cocaine in the United States should have been both the starting and

finishing point in determining his suitability for Presidential clemency. Doubtless, many families around the United States could provide tragic stories supporting the theory that a money launderer

for one of the most powerful Colombian drug cartels is not the kind

of person that should be described as humanitarian.

The final argument used by Weinig to support his clemency effort was that one of his children was suffering emotional difficulties

as a result of his imprisonment. It appears that this argument,

more than any other, had a great impact upon the President’s decision to grant the commutation. John Podesta obliquely referred to

this in one of his public comments about the Weinig case: ‘‘I think

that people were aware of what he had done, but that ultimately,

I think that based on the length of time he had served and based

on a humanitarian plea, while a difficult case, it seemed like the

right decision.’’ 191

1736

192 NARA Document Production (Letter from Cynthia A. Hayes to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Dec. 18, 1995)) (Exhibit 25).

However, the ‘‘humanitarian plea’’ made by Weinig did not justify the commutation of his sentence. Thousands of criminals have

families adversely impacted by the stigma of criminal conviction or

the fact of incarceration. Yet, this fact should serve as a deterrent

to crime, not as a reason to let criminals out of prison long before

their sentences are completed. One of the letters in support of Harvey Weinig noted, ‘‘Harvey’s love for his children has always been

a dominant factor in his life, shaping his ideas of how he wants to

spend his time, his money and his life.’’ 192 If this were true, Harvey Weinig would have decided not to join a conspiracy to launder

millions of dollars of drug money for, or tried to steal millions of

dollars from, the Cali cartel. Weinig knew that his money laundering activity was illegal and that it, as well as his attempted theft

of the cartel’s drug money, exposed his family to considerable danger. He also knew that, if he was caught by authorities laundering

drug money or the cartel stealing its money, he would go to prison

or be harmed by the Colombian drug traffickers themselves. However, because of what U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White described as

‘‘sheer greed,’’ Weinig participated in substantial criminal conduct

that ended up harming his family immeasurably. Given that it was

Harvey Weinig who harmed his family, it is unclear why that same

harm should then be used to justify freeing Weinig from prison.

Weinig’s plea is reminiscent of the man who kills his parents and

then asks for leniency because he is an orphan. Weinig’s ‘‘humanitarian plea’’ also ignores entirely his role in bringing into the

United States large volumes of drugs that harmed innumerable

families.

Moreover, as Weinig’s situation was no different from that of

thousands of other inmates, it is hard to see why President Clinton

chose to grant clemency to Weinig, rather than one of the other

thousands of inmates whose families were suffering because of

their incarceration. In short, the only answer is that President

Clinton chose Weinig because he was the person who had the access, through his wife’s cousin, David Dreyer, and his lawyer, Reid

Weingarten, to make his case to the President and the White

House staff.

D. Aftermath of the Weinig Commutation

President Clinton’s grant of clemency to Harvey Weinig has

trivialized the seriousness of Weinig’s criminal misconduct. Having

interviewed law enforcement personnel, it is also clear that the

clemency decision has eroded morale among law enforcement personnel who put their lives on the line and work tirelessly to enforce

the drug laws on a federal, state, and local level. As a policy matter, the grant of clemency has also undermined the government’s

legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty pleas and truthful

cooperation from criminal defendants.

Domestically, President Clinton’s action conveyed an appearance

of granting special consideration to wealthy, politically well-connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger Adams

1737

193 NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 15 (Exhibit 3). 194Former Colombian Drug Agent Blasts Clinton’s Pardon of Trafficker, AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, Mar. 4, 2001. 195 Colombian General Hits Clinton Commutation, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at A13. 196 Russell Crandall, The Americas: In the War on Drugs, Colombians Die, Americans Are Pardoned, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at A15. 197 Id. 198 Id.

foresaw the message sent by the Weinig commutation, warning

President Clinton that:

To commute [Weinig’s] prison term to the five years he

proposes would denigrate the seriousness of his criminal

misconduct, undermine the government’s legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and could give the appearance of granting special consideration to economically

advantaged, white-collar offenders.193

It is difficult to disagree with Adams’ conclusion. Clearly, many

prison inmates have families that have been adversely impacted by

their criminal activity. Yet, of all those people, Harvey Weinig received a commutation of sentence. Weinig’s commutation did not

come as a result of having committed some minor crime—he was

a money launderer for the Cali cartel. Rather, Weinig received a

commutation because he was wealthy and privileged, could hire a

lawyer like Reid Weingarten, and had relatives and friends who

knew the President.

On an international level, President Clinton’s commutation decision has unfortunately sent the message to the world that the

United States’ commitment to eradicating narcotics trafficking is,

to some extent, disingenuous. Former Colombian National Police

Chief Rosso Serrano noted that President Clinton ‘‘sent the wrong

message to the anti-drug struggle, because it negates the suffering

of all the families of those who died to fight trafficking.’’ 194 According to Serrano, ‘‘[The Weinig clemency decision is] very frustrating.

[The drug traffickers] must be laughing at us. It’s a terrible precedent for those of us who have openly fought this scourge.’’ 195 In an

op-ed entitled ‘‘The Morality of the Strongest’’ in El Tiempo, Colombia’s leading daily, Gustavo De Greiff, a former Colombian attorney

general, labeled President Clinton’s clemency decision ‘‘monstrous.’’ 196 Likewise, former Colombian president Ernesto Samper,

who saw his country decertified and facing sanctions for his apparent lack of cooperation with the United States, described the clemency as ‘‘repugnant.’’ 197 He rhetorically asked, ‘‘What would have

happened if, with just a few days left in my presidency, I had set

free several drug traffickers arrested in Bogota, and if those same

people were found to be helping people in my government?’’ 198

Indeed, President Clinton’s eleventh-hour commutation of

Weinig’s sentence prompted government officials and the media in

Colombia to accuse the U.S. government of hypocrisy. During the

mid-1990s, the Clinton administration openly condemned the Colombian government’s ‘‘surrender policy’’ toward the Cali cartel.

Pursuant to the ‘‘surrender policy,’’ the Colombian government allowed reduced prison sentences for drug kingpins who agreed to

surrender. And, currently, an important element of the U.S. antiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00477 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78815.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
1738

drug approach is the $1.3 billion U.S. commitment to Plan Colombia—President Andres Pastrana’s program to recover control of the

country from guerilla factions brutally dominating the Colombian

countryside in furtherance of their cocaine production enterprises.

But, there can be no doubt that, to the extent that eradicating narcotics trafficking is indeed important to the United States, such a

commitment should be reflected in the activities of those charged

with the public trust at the highest levels of elected office.

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

1739

1740

1741

1742

1743

1744

1745

1746

1747

1748

1749

1750

1751

1752

1753

1754

1755

1756

1757

1758

1759

1760

1761

1762

1763

1764

1765

1766

1767

1768

1769

1770

1771

1772

1773

1774

1775

1776

1777

1778

1779

1780

1781

1782

1783

1784

1785

1786

1787

1788

1789

1790

1791

1792

1793

1794

1795

1796

1797

1798

1799

1800

1801

1802

1803

1804

1805

1806

1807

1808

1809

1810

1811

1812

1813

1814

1815

1816

1817

1818

1819

1820

1821

1822

1823

1824

1825

1826

1827

1828

1829

1830

1831

1832

1833

1834

1835

1836

1837

1838

1839

1840

1841

1842

1843

1844

1845

1846

1847

1848

1849

1850

1851

1852

1853

1854

1855

1856

1857

1858

1859

1860

1861

1862

1863

1864

1865

1866

1867

1868

1869

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

1891

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

1901

1902

1903

1904

1905

1906

1907

1908

1909

1910

1911

1912

1913

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

1919

1920

1921

1922

1923

1924

1925

1926

1927

1928

1929

1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

2031

2032

2033

2034

2035

2036

2037

2038

2039

2040

2041

2042

2043

2044

2045

2046

2047

2048

2049

2050

2051

2052

2053

2054

2055

2056

2057

2058

2059

2060

2061

2062

2063

2064

2065

2066

2067

2068

2069

2070

2071

2072

2073

2074

2075

2076

2077

2078