IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0550

Filed May 26, 2021

TROY LEE MURE, JR.,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

Troy Lee Mure Jr. appeals the denial of his application for postconviction 

relief. AFFIRMED.

Gregory F. Greiner, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

Troy Lee Mure Jr. drove his girlfriend down a residential Des Moines street

at a speed of ninety miles an hour. The car crashed, and his girlfriend died. Before 

Mure turned onto the residential street, a Cadillac began following him, and

someone in the vehicle displayed a gun. 

The State charged Mure with homicide by vehicle as an habitual offender. 

See Iowa Code §§ 707.6A(2)(a), 902.8 (2015). Mure raised a defense based on 

the role of the Cadillac. The district court rejected the defense and found him guilty 

following a bench trial. The court of appeals affirmed his judgment and sentence.

See State v. Mure, No. 16-1169, 2017 WL 1735886, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 3, 

2017). 

Mure filed a postconviction-relief application. The district court held an 

evidentiary hearing, then denied the application. On appeal, Mure contends his 

trial attorney was ineffective in failing to “use an accident reconstruction expert to 

assist with his defense,” and his postconviction attorney was similarly ineffective 

in failing to “use an accident reconstruction expert to assist with his application.”

He also contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to “investigate and 

present possible exculpatory evidence.” Mure must show (1) counsel breached 

an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

I. Failure to Call Accident Reconstruction Expert

Mure contends “[t]he most important aspect of [his] defense is whether his 

car was rammed by the Cadillac, and whether that intervening act was the 

proximate cause of the accident and death of his girlfriend.” In his view, an 
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accident reconstruction expert could have refuted the State’s expert testimony on 

this issue. 

Mure faces a significant hurdle in the form of our opinion on direct appeal. 

We determined there was substantial evidentiary support for the district court’s 

finding Mure was not “hit, tapped, or rammed by the Cadillac.” Mure, 2017 WL 

1735886, at *4. We cited an officer’s testimony that “any contact between the 

Cadillac and [the] vehicle [Mure was driving] would most likely have left markings, 

paint transfer, or denting on the bumper of [the] vehicle—none of which were 

present.” Id. at *5. We noted the officer “ruled out contact with another vehicle as 

a cause for the accident and [the woman’s] death.” Id. Based on those findings, 

we stated, “[T]he trial court did not err in concluding Mure’s reckless driving was 

the proximate cause of [the woman’s] death.” Id.

Mure’s claim that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to call a 

reconstruction expert is a repackaged challenge to the proximate cause 

determination conclusively decided against him on direct appeal. Mure is 

foreclosed from re-litigating the issue. See Holmes v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733, 735 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“The first three issues identified above . . . are in effect direct 

attacks on this court’s holding on direct appeal. . . . Our decision on direct appeal 

is thus final as to all issues decided therein, and is binding upon both the 

postconviction court and this court in subsequent appeals.”); see also Iowa Code 

§ 822.8 (2018) (“Any ground finally adjudicated . . . may not be the basis for a 

subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which 

for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 

supplemental, or amended application.”). 
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Even if Mure’s claim did not implicate an issue that was raised and decided, 

it fails on the merits. Mure’s trial attorney testified that he predicated his defense 

on the chase by the Cadillac rather than a rear bump by the Cadillac: 

I believe that it was my thought and argument to the court that it really 

didn’t matter whether or not the Cadillac touched [Mure]’s car or not. 

The Cadillac was chasing [Mure], and [Mure] felt his only avenue of 

escape and protection was to speed towards that grocery store. So 

whether it touched or not, the Cadillac and the people in it or the 

operator of it caused this accident, touching or not.

Because counsel’s strategy did not turn on whether the Cadillac hit the car Mure 

was driving, a reconstruction expert was unnecessary. 

On our de novo review, we conclude Mure’s trial attorney did not breach an 

essential duty in failing to call a reconstruction expert. See State v. Polly, 657 

N.W.2d 462, 468 (Iowa 2003) (“Generally, the decision not to call a particular 

witness or the defendant to testify implicates a reasonable tactical decision. 

‘Improvident trial strategy or miscalculated tactics’ typically do not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation omitted)); Heaton v. State, 420 N.W.2d 

429, 432 (Iowa 1988) (“We believe that the question of whether or not to call an 

expert witness is a matter of trial strategy.”). It follows that postconviction counsel 

did not breach an essential duty in failing to call a reconstruction expert to support 

the application.

II. Failure to Investigate Possible Exculpatory Evidence

Mure contends “[his] defense depended on the condition of the Cadillac, 

whether there was evidence to support an intervening event, and whether it was 

reasonable for him to drive extremely fast to escape a life-threatening situation.

All of that evidence was ripe for development, but simply was not developed.” In 
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his view, counsel should have investigated (1) a convenience store surveillance 

video purporting to show extensive damage to the Cadillac; (2) threatening 

messages against Mure’s life; and (3) the owner of the Cadillac.

Our discussion above concerning the role of the Cadillac is dispositive of 

the first contention. To reiterate, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s 

finding that the Cadillac did not hit the vehicle Mure was driving. Mure’s claim that 

counsel should have looked into surveillance video showing damage to the 

Cadillac is an impermissible attempt to re-litigate the determination. But, even if 

Mure could pursue this ineffective-assistance claim, his attorney testified the 

defense theory did not depend “on the condition of the Cadillac.” In light of his 

defense theory, there was no need for counsel to investigate surveillance video 

capturing the condition of the Cadillac.

The court of appeals also addressed threats to Mure, the second topic Mure 

contends his attorney should have investigated: 

The harm in this case was initially present, imminent, impending, and 

of such a nature as to induce well-grounded apprehension of death 

or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. However, once Mure 

turned onto [the residential] street, that harm dissipated. The 

Cadillac was no longer pulling up next to him, it was now behind him. 

No shots were fired. It was simply not necessary to drive recklessly 

to avoid the harm.

Mure, 2017 WL 1735886, at *3. As Mure concedes, the court gave credence to 

his belief that he was threatened by someone in the Cadillac. But the court decided 

the threats did not provide grounds to drive recklessly. Again, the question of 

threats was litigated, and there was no basis for re-litigating the question.

That said, Mure’s attorney delved into the threatening messages at trial. 

Counsel asked Mure’s mother whether she heard about threats to her son. The 
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mother responded that she saw social network postings and, specifically, 

“Facebook-type things”, including pictures of guns. She said rumors were 

circulating “through like Facebook messages.”

The State did not dispute the existence of threats. Indeed, the prosecutor

confirmed the threats with Mure and suggested Mure could have contacted police 

in lieu of driving recklessly. Because the existence of the threats was not an issue, 

Mure’s attorney had no reason to offer the underlying social media posts. We 

conclude counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to “retrieve[] the 

threatening messages.”

We are left with Mure’s contention that his trial attorney should have 

interviewed the owner of the Cadillac. In fact, counsel was aware of the owner’s 

importance. He listed her as a trial witness and resisted the State’s motion to bar 

her from testifying. Ultimately, the owner did not testify, but not for lack of effort on 

counsel’s part. In any event, the role of the Cadillac and its occupants was 

thoroughly vetted without her testimony. Mure points to nothing more counsel 

would have gleaned by “us[ing] an investigator to interview” her. We conclude 

Mure’s trial attorney did not breach an essential duty in failing to follow up with the 

Cadillac’s owner. 

We affirm the district court’s denial of Mure’s ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims and his postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.