a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Government Reform, and Chairman, 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats and International 

Relations, House of Representatives

October 2005 RESERVE FORCES

Plans Needed to 

Improve Army 

National Guard 

Equipment Readiness 

and Better Integrate 

Guard into Army 

Force Transformation 

Initiatives

GAO-06-111
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent, 202-512-4402, stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-111, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Government 

Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives 

October 2005

RESERVE FORCES

Plans Needed to Improve Army National 

Guard Equipment Readiness and Better 

Integrate Guard into Army Force 

Transformation Initiatives 

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the 

equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment 

inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and threatens the Guard’s ability 

to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed 

Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have 

been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they 

could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and (2) current 

operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, 

such as armored vehicles. To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, 

the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of 

equipment from its nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had 

exhausted the Guard’s inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment 

items, such as night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as 

equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the 

Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying 

units need until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the 

Guard to transfer needed equipment quickly. 

To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing 

operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave 

behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for 

only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace 

them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track 

equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement plans, but 

they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates that since 2003

it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas 

to support operations. Without a completed and implemented plan to 

replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will likely face 

growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for 

future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the 

Army has an effective strategy for addressing the Guard’s equipping needs. 

Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new 

designs within the Army’s modular force by 2008, they are not expected to 

be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not 

developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment 

requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing 

operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about 

$15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, but this estimate did not 

include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed 

information to support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing 

deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect 

the availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the 

Army fully identifies the Guard’s equipment requirements and costs for both 

the near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to 

weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army’s plans.

Recent military operations have 

required that the Army rely 

extensively on Army National 

Guard forces, which currently 

comprise over 30 percent of the 

ground forces in Iraq. Heavy 

deployments of Army National 

Guard forces and their equipment, 

much of which has been left 

overseas for follow-on forces, have 

raised questions about whether the 

Army National Guard has the types 

and quantities of equipment it will 

need to continue supporting 

ongoing operations and future 

missions. 

GAO was asked to assess the 

extent to which (1) the Army 

National Guard has the equipment 

needed to support ongoing 

operations and (2) the Army can 

account for Army National Guard 

equipment left overseas. GAO also 

assessed the Army’s plans, cost 

estimates, and funding strategy for 

equipping Guard units under its 

modular and rotational force 

initiatives. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Army to develop 

and submit to Congress plans and 

funding strategies to address the 

Army National Guard’s equipment 

shortfalls, accurately track and 

replace equipment its forces left 

overseas, and complete planning to 

integrate the Army National Guard 

into its modular and rotational 

force initiatives. DOD agreed with 

the recommendations. 
Page i GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6 

Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall 

Equipment Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard 

Units 9 

Army’s Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army 

National Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the 

Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units 17 

Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will 

Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces 19 

Conclusions 25 

Recommendations 26 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33 

Table 

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages 

among Nondeployed Army National Guard Units 13 

Figures 

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity 

under Federal Command and Control 8 

Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units 

Meeting Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy 12 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

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Page 1 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

October 4, 2005 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 

subsequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National 

Guard has been called upon to play a significant role in supporting active 

Army forces overseas while, at the same time, taking on new homeland 

defense missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure—all of which 

require that the Army National Guard have sufficient quantities and types 

of equipment items. In addition, the Army National Guard must use its 

allotted equipment to perform other domestic responsibilities, including 

responding to natural emergencies or incidents of civil unrest. Historically, 

the Army National Guard has been structured as a follow-on force that 

supports the active Army in overseas conflicts, and as such, Guard units 

have not been resourced with all of the equipment and personnel they 

require for their missions. Instead, it was assumed that there would be 

sufficient time for units to obtain the remainder of their resources prior to 

deployment. However, Army National Guard members now comprise 31 

percent of the ground forces in Iraq. While Army officials anticipate Guard 

involvement to decline somewhat in 2006, the tempo of operations over 

the long term remains uncertain. The post-September 11 increase in the 

Army National Guard’s responsibilities, particularly its increased 

involvement in overseas operations, raises concerns about whether the 

Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to continue to support 

operations in the future. 

The Army recognizes that it needs to transform its forces, including the 

National Guard, to better meet the emerging threats of the 21st century 

and is undertaking two initiatives designed to enhance the capability of 

active and reserve forces. One of the Army’s key initiatives—called the 

modular force initiative—is a multibillion dollar effort to restructure the 

entire Army. It involves increasing the flexibility and responsiveness of the 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

force by converting from a division-based structure to smaller brigade 

combat teams and increasing the pool of units available for deployment. In 

addition, the Army is in the process of developing a rotational force model 

in which active and reserve forces would progress through a cycle of 

increasing readiness, culminating in the availability of a specified number 

of units for deployment if needed. The Army also hopes the model will 

increase deployment predictability for Army National Guard soldiers, who 

have been heavily involved in recent operations and must balance their 

military duties with civilian careers. 

The challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in managing its 

reserve forces and allocating its resources across services and programs 

are some of the many issues that we have highlighted to Congress as the 

nation entered the 21st century.1

 We have previously reported on how the 

Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been used in recent 

operations.2

 In 2004, we reported on the effect of the continuing high use 

of National Guard forces and challenges to prepare the Guard for future 

overseas and domestic missions.3

 In addition, we recently testified on the 

Army’s plans to convert to a modular force.4

 And, in August 2003 and 

September 2004, we reported on several reserve mobilization issues, 

including the limited use of the individual ready reserve and long-term 

availability issues.5

In response to your request that we examine Army National Guard 

equipment issues, the objectives of this report are to assess the extent to 

which (1) the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of 

equipment needed to support the Global War on Terrorism and (2) the 

 1

 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).

2

 GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel 

and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005).

3

 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future 

Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).

4

 GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and 

Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005). 

5

 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of 

Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and 

Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and 

Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

15, 2004).
Page 3 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Army can account for Army National Guard equipment that has been 

transferred to the active component in theater and its plans for replacing 

this equipment. We also examined the Army’s plans for converting the 

Army National Guard to a modular force and implementing a rotational 

force model to determine how Army National Guard units will be equipped 

for future missions and the estimated costs of the conversion. 

To address these objectives, we analyzed data on the types and quantities 

of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in support of the 

Global War on Terrorism and the equipment status of nondeployed units; 

the extent to which Army National Guard equipment has been retained 

overseas in the theater of operations; and the Army’s plans to create a 

modular force and its new rotational force model. We interviewed officials 

in the DOD, the Department of the Army, and the National Guard Bureau 

to obtain information on how equipment needs have evolved, the extent to 

which equipment has been transferred to the active component and the 

Army’s plans for replacing it, and the Army’s plans to include the Army 

National Guard in the modular force initiative and the rotational force 

model. We supplemented this information with visits to Army commands 

and conducted a case study of unit equipment experiences by visiting two 

units, the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in 

February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which 

deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they allowed us to 

evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed with 

subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We conducted our 

review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards between December 2004 and August 2005 and determined that 

the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and 

methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix 

I. 

While Army National Guard units have deployed overseas with most of the 

equipment they have needed to support current operations, the Guard is 

experiencing growing equipment shortages which are decreasing the 

ability of its nondeployed forces to be ready for future operations at home 

and overseas. Equipment shortages have developed for two primary 

reasons. First, the Army National Guard has been equipped at less than 

war-time readiness levels under the assumption that there would be 

sufficient time for its forces to obtain additional equipment prior to 

deployment; in peacetime, units generally had only about 65 to 75 percent 

of the equipment they needed for their wartime missions. For recent 

operations, theater commanders have generally required Army National 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment that is 

needed for their missions and, in some cases, to obtain different 

equipment, such as more modern communications systems, than Army 

National Guard units are authorized in peacetime. Thus, to fully equip its 

deploying units, as of July 2005 the Army National Guard had transferred 

more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeployed units to prepare 

deploying units; an increase of 189 percent from the 35,000 equipment 

items that were transferred as of June 2004.6

 Providing this equipment has 

depleted its inventories of more than 220 critical items and reduced 

inventories of other mission-essential items7 to only 61 percent of 

requirements by May 2005. Second, demand for some types of equipment, 

such as armored humvees and night vision equipment, has increased 

across the Army, and equipment requirements continue to evolve. This has 

made it very difficult for the Army to communicate to deploying units what 

equipment is needed in theater and further challenges the Army National 

Guard to identify and transfer the right equipment. The continuing strategy 

of transferring equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of 

nondeployed forces to train for future missions. The Army has developed 

processes to ensure that deploying active and reserve forces are provided 

the equipment they need for their deployments through transferring 

equipment between units and concentrating high-demand equipment in 

theater. However, growing equipment shortages resulting from these 

processes among the Army National Guard nondeployed force make it 

unclear whether the Guard will be able to maintain acceptable levels of 

equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home. 

Compounding the problem of equipment transfers within the Guard, Army 

National Guard units that have returned from overseas deployments have 

left behind many equipment items for use by follow-on forces by 

transferring equipment to active Army units. However, the Army does not 

have a complete accounting of these items or a plan to replace the 

equipment, as DOD policy requires. DOD Directive 1225.6, which 

implements this policy, requires the services to develop a replacement 

plan for equipment transferred from the reserve component to the active 

component for more than 90 days. The Army National Guard estimates 

that since 2003, it has transferred more than 64,000 pieces of equipment, 

 6

GAO-05-21. 

7

Mission-essential items are those items that are critical for accomplishing missions, 

including principal weapon/mission systems and equipment and critical mission support 

items. 
Page 5 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

valued at more than $1.2 billion, to the Army to support Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. However, the Army is only centrally tracking the portion of the 

Guard’s equipment that it expects will remain in the theater for the 

duration of current operations such as those items purchased specifically 

for units deploying to the theater or certain high-demand items in short 

supply. Items that units transfer to other units may also remain in theater 

for up to 3 years, but the Army does not have a complete accounting of 

these items because they are not tracked centrally. The Army expects that 

the items transferred from unit to unit will eventually be returned to the 

Guard, although the Guard does not know whether or when the items will 

be returned. Army officials told us they did not track and develop plans to 

replace Guard equipment because there were many other priorities in the 

early phases of the war, and the strategy of having units leave some 

equipment was expected to be a short-term measure. Yet, as operations 

continue, the amount of Guard equipment overseas has increased and, 

without a centralized process to account for all items that have been 

retained in theater, it is not clear how the Army will be able to develop the 

replacement plans required by the DOD directive. In May 2005, DOD 

expressed its concerns about the magnitude of equipment Guard units 

have left overseas and directed the Army to submit replacement plans for 

Guard equipment. Until these plans are completed and replacement 

equipment provided, Army National Guard units will face continuing 

equipment shortages while challenged to train and prepare for future 

missions. 

Although Army National Guard units are converting to new designs within 

the Army’s modular force by 2008 and entering the Army’s new rotational 

cycle, some units are not expected to be equipped for the new designs 

until 2011. Further, the Army has not developed detailed equipping plans 

that specify the Guard’s equipment requirements for each phase of the 

rotational cycle. One of the Army’s chief goals of its modular force 

initiative is to create standardized unit designs in the active and reserve 

forces with similar structures and equipment that are as effective as 

current brigades. Under this initiative, the Army National Guard’s new 

units will need different types and quantities of equipment for wartime 

missions and training. However, the Army is modifying the preferred 

designs to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to have based 

on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard units will 

continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern equipment 

to fill gaps until at least 2011, and not be comparably equipped with their 

active duty counterparts. Our analysis of other DOD initiatives has shown 

that detailed plans which outline the major implementation tasks and 

identify realistic funding requirements are needed to facilitate success and 
Page 6 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

avoid unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key 

leaders in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance. 

The Army has not completed detailed plans or cost estimates for these 

initiatives because it is moving quickly to implement them to better 

support continuing operations. Until the Army fully identifies the 

requirements and associated costs of these two initiatives and makes key 

implementation decisions, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound 

position to weigh their affordability and effectiveness, and the Army 

National Guard will face uncertainty as it prepares to implement the 

restructuring efforts. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 

of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy 

that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and a plan 

for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational 

force model and modular force initiatives. DOD agreed with our 

recommendations and cited actions the Army is taking to posture the 

Army National Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational 

force and developing a resource priority plan for all Army units. DOD 

stated that the details raised in our recommendations need to be 

addressed in the Army’s strategy for equipping Army National Guard units 

to prepare for future state emergency response, homeland defense, and 

federal missions. DOD also stated that the Army is taking steps to 

implement stricter accountability over Guard equipment currently left in 

theater and is working to develop replacement plans for these items. 

The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard 

of the United States are two components of the armed forces Selected 

Reserve.8

 The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity responsible for 

the administration of both the Army National Guard and the Air National 

Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers, 

makes up more than one-half of the Army’s ground combat forces and onethird of its support forces (e.g., military police, transportation units). Army 

National Guard units are located at more than 3,000 armories and bases in 

 8

The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National Guard of the 

United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air 

National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. 

The Selected Reserve consists of military members assigned to organized reserve units and 

reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year and 

serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each year.

Background 
Page 7 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard 

members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend 

per month and 2 weeks per year. However, after September 11, 2001, the 

President authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years. As of July 

2005, more than 70,000 Army National Guard personnel were activated 

under this authority to support ongoing operations. The Guard also 

employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in 

administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. 

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under 

three general statutory frameworks: Title 10 or 32 of the United States 

Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 

status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under 

federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being 

ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or under appropriate 

circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status 

are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which 

National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal 

mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and 

under state command and control. Under state law, the governor may 

order National Guard personnel to perform state active duty to respond to 

emergencies, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by state 

law. 

While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions, 

the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, and 

these take priority over state missions. The Global War on Terrorism, a 

federal mission, is a comprehensive effort to defeat terrorism and protect 

and defend the homeland and includes military operations such as 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

As we reported in our November 2004 report on the National Guard, the 

Army National Guard’s involvement in federal operations has increased 

substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and Army National 

Guard members have participated in overseas warfighting operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and 

homeland missions, such as guarding Air Force bases. Figure 1 shows that 

while the number of activated Army National Guard personnel has 

declined since its peak in December 2004 and January 2005, it continues to 

provide a substantial number of personnel to support current operations. 

As of July 2005, about 35,500 of the 113,000 soldiers, or nearly one-third of 

the soldiers serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were Army National 

Guard members. In a June 30, 2005, testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee the Army’s Chief of Staff said that the Army National 
Page 8 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Guard’s participation in overseas operations is expected to decrease 

somewhat in the near future. Although the Army National Guard is 

expected to continue its participation in ongoing operations, decisions as 

to the level of participation have not been made. 

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under Federal Command and Control 

The Department of the Army is responsible for equipping the Army 

National Guard. DOD policy requires that equipment be provided to units 

according to their planned wartime mission, regardless of their 

component. However, based on the Army’s funding priorities, the most 

modern equipment is usually provided to units that would deploy first. 

Later deploying units, such as most Army National Guard units, are 

equipped with older items from the Army’s inventory as active forces 

receive newer and more modern equipment. Army National Guard units 

are responsible for conducting some maintenance of their equipment. 

Number of activated guardsmen

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Oct.

Month and year

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

4,291

71,076

Source: Army National Guard data.

July

June
Page 9 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting 

the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the 

equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and equipment 

shortages threaten the Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future 

deployments. Among nondeployed National Guard units, the amount of 

essential warfighting equipment on hand has continued to decrease since 

we last reported on the Army National Guard in 2004. Equipment 

shortages have developed because most Army National Guard units are 

still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy. 

To ready deploying units for overseas missions, the Guard has had to 

transfer large numbers of equipment items from nondeployed units—a 

practice that has left nondeployed units with increasing shortages of 

equipment and made it difficult to prepare units for future missions and 

maintain readiness for any unplanned contingencies. Moreover, the 

equipment requirements for deploying Army National Guard units have 

evolved as the nature of current operations has changed. This has meant 

that in some cases, the Army National Guard has had little time to identify 

sources of equipment and transfer needed items to deploying units. The 

Army is adapting some of its processes to help units address the evolving 

equipment requirements. 

Most Army National Guard units mobilized9

 for recent overseas operations 

had equipment shortages that had to be filled so that the unit could meet 

the combatant commander’s equipment requirements for their mission. 

These shortages exist because the Army, following DOD planning 

guidance, has historically equipped all Army units, including the Army 

National Guard, according to a tiered resourcing strategy. Under tiered 

resourcing, those units expected to deploy overseas early in a conflict 

receive first priority for equipment, and most Army National Guard units 

were expected to deploy after the active component units to serve as 

follow-on forces. The Army therefore accepted some operational risks by 

providing lower priority Army National Guard units with less equipment 

than they would need for their mission under the assumption that there 

would be time to provide additional equipment to these units before they 

would be deployed. For example, Army National Guard enhanced separate 

 9

Mobilization involves assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel for 

active military service. Deployment is defined as the relocation of forces, personnel or 

equipment from home station to meet operational requirements. 

Critical Equipment 

Shortages Have 

Degraded the Overall 

Equipment Readiness 

of Nondeployed Army 

National Guard Units 

The Army National Guard’s 

Initial Equipment 

Shortages and the 

Continuing Need for Fully 

Equipped Forces for 

Current Operations Have 

Resulted in Critical 

Equipment Shortages 
Page 10 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

brigades10 are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment 

they require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which 

comprise the majority of the Guard’s combat forces, are supplied with 

about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army 

National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern 

equipment, so much of the Guard’s equipment is older and less modern 

than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more 

modern items. 

However, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required 

Army National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the 

equipment they are expected to need and with equipment that is 

compatible with active Army units. As an increasing number of Army 

National Guard forces have been needed to support current operations, 

the Army National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units 

need to meet combatant commander requirements by transferring 

equipment from within the Army National Guard. The Army National 

Guard first tries to identify the needed equipment within the same state as 

the deploying unit. If the equipment cannot be found within the state, the 

National Guard Bureau requests the equipment from Army National Guard 

units across the United States. If the equipment is not available in the 

Army National Guard, the Army National Guard notifies the Army that the 

equipment is not available, and the Army takes over the task of providing 

the equipment to the mobilized unit. 

For example, although the 30th Brigade Combat Team needed about 8,810 

night vision goggles to deploy, it only had about 40 percent of its 

requirement on hand when it was alerted to prepare to deploy, so the 

Army National Guard had to identify and transfer about 5,272 pairs of 

goggles to fully equip the unit. In another case, the Army tasked the 

National Guard to convert 40 nonmilitary police units, including field 

artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected 

military police missions in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. While a military 

police company typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field artillery 

companies have only about 3 humvees that are suitable for this new 

 10Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers and are the Army 

National Guard’s highest priority combat units. These 15 brigades received specialized 

training and higher priority than other National Guard units for personnel and resources 

during peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to deploy 

overseas within 90 days. In October 2004, the Army stopped using the enhanced separate 

brigade designation and now refers to these units as brigade combat teams. 
Page 11 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

mission. Therefore, the converted units had to obtain armored humvees 

from other units already in Iraq because the Army National Guard had 

depleted its inventory of armored humvees. 

As current operations have continued, the pool of equipment from which 

the Army National Guard can draw has been reduced because so many 

items have been transferred to deploying units or left overseas. Shortages 

of some equipment items have forced the Army National Guard to take 

measures that have further exacerbated existing shortages in nondeployed 

units to provide training equipment for deploying units. For example, 

because the Army National Guard’s supply of armored humvees was 

depleted, the Army directed the Army National Guard to transfer more 

than 500 humvees from nondeployed Guard units to create training sets 

for units to use when preparing for deployment. 

Significant numbers of equipment transfers have persisted as operations 

overseas have continued. We previously reported that as of June 2004 the 

Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of 

equipment to ready units for recent operations.11 By July 2005, the number 

of equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units had 

grown to more than 101,000. As a result of these transfers, the equipment 

readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard units has declined. As 

figure 2 shows, the percentage of nondeployed units that reported having 

the minimum amount of equipment they would need to deploy12 dropped 

from 87 percent in October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, this 

estimate includes units that have older, less modern equipment referred to 

as substitute equipment. While these substitute items are useful for 

training purposes, commanders may not allow these items in the theater of 

operations because they may not be compatible with the equipment other 

units are using and cannot be sustained logistically in theater. In addition, 

this estimate includes units that have equipment that is undergoing 

maintenance after returning from deployment or was left overseas, so 

these items are not readily available for deployment. The National Guard 

Bureau estimates that when substitute items, equipment undergoing 

maintenance, and equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are 

subtracted, its nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of 

essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005. 

 11GAO-05-21. 

12 To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at least 80 percent of 

its mission-essential equipment items on hand. 
Page 12 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy 

Note: Units must have at least 80 percent of their mission-essential equipment to meet minimum 

deployment criteria. Because data were not available for all months between October 2002 and July 

2004, some chart points in this period were estimated based on trends. 

With respect to some equipment items, transfers of equipment to 

deploying units have depleted the inventories of many key items in 

nondeployed units. Table 1 shows selected items needed for current 

mobilization for which inventory levels in nondeployed Guard units have 

fallen below 20 percent of authorized levels. 

Percent of units meeting minimum equipment criteria to deploy

50

60

70

80

90

100

Oct 

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Month and year

Source: Army National Guard data.

2002 2003 2004 2005
Page 13 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among 

Nondeployed Army National Guard Units 

Number 

of items 

authorized 

Number of 

items on hand

Percentage of 

authorized in 

inventory 

Equipment for handling truck containers 25 4 16

Machine guns 1,088 150 14

Chemical decontamination equipment 514 73 14

Armament carrier humvees 2,240 220 10

Truck flatbed semitrailers 2,287 180 8

Lightweight rifles 16,839 788 5

Individual night vision goggles 127,000 1,000 1

Weapon night vision sights 11,400 0 0

Up-armored scout humvees 3,922 0 0

Chemical agent monitoring equipment 7,200 0 0

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2005. 

As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment 

transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 5 

percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. Among 

these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios. 

While the Army can supply deploying forces with additional equipment 

after they are mobilized, nondeployed units will be challenged to maintain 

readiness for future missions because they do not have the equipment to 

train with or to use for other contingencies. The effect of equipment 

shortages on nondeployed units’ ability to perform homeland defense 

missions is not known because, as we reported in 2004, DOD has not 

developed requirements or preparedness standards and measures for the 

homeland missions in which the Army National Guard is expected to 

participate. However, as previously reported, some of these items such as 

humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective suits are useful for 

the Guard’s domestic missions, such as responding to potential terrorist 

threats. 
Page 14 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

As current military operations have evolved, equipment requirements for 

the Global War on Terrorism have continued to change. This has 

challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment 

requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to 

their deployment dates. Equipment that was not considered essential for 

some units’ expected missions has become important for ongoing 

operations, and units have been required to have equipment that is newer 

than or different from that on which they have been trained. For example, 

the 30th Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina, which deployed in 

the spring of 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team from Georgia, 

which deployed in 2005, were directed to deploy as motorized brigade 

combat teams with humvees instead of the heavy-tracked equipment, such 

as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks, with which they had trained for 

their expected missions. Overall, the combatant commander required that 

the 30th Brigade deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom with more than 35 

types of items that were previously not authorized for the unit, including 

different radios and weapons. 

Due to changing conditions in theater and a desire to tailor a unit’s 

equipment as closely as possible to its expected mission, the Army has 

continued to modify equipment requirements after units are alerted. These 

changes have resulted in requirements not being communicated to some 

Army National Guard units in a timely manner so that the units could be 

equipped as efficiently as possible for current operations or be provided 

ample time for training. In some instances, Army National Guard units 

have not known exactly what equipment they would require to deploy and 

what they could expect to receive in theater until close to their 

deployment dates, which has made it more difficult for Army National 

Guard officials to gather the equipment deploying units need to fill 

equipment shortages. For example, the 48th Brigade Combat Team, which 

was preparing for deployment in May 2005, had still not received a 

complete list of all of the equipment it would need at the time of our visit 

in April 2005. Because officials did not know exactly what they would 

need to take with them overseas, the brigade packed and transported 180 

different vehicles to be shipped to theater. When officials learned that this 

equipment was already available in theater, these vehicles had to be 

shipped back to the brigade’s mobilization station at Fort Stewart, 

Georgia. 

In some cases, delays caused by the changing equipment requirements 

reduced the amount of time units had to train with their new equipment. 

For example, the 30th Brigade did not have a chemical agent identification 

set to train with until its final exercise before deploying, and it did not 

Evolving Equipment 

Requirements Challenge 

Efforts to Equip Units for 

the Global War on 

Terrorism 
Page 15 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

have access to a Blue Force Tracker, a digital communications system that 

allows commanders to track friendly forces across the battlefield in real 

time, for training until the unit was in theater. In some cases, the 30th 

Brigade did not receive some items until they could be transferred from 

nondeployed units or they were provided in theater. For example, the unit 

received the 4,000 ceramic body armor inserts needed to protect soldiers 

from small arms fire upon arrival in Kuwait. According to Army officials, 

in such instances units may undergo training upon arrival in the theater of 

operations to acquaint them with new equipment. However, we did not 

evaluate the adequacy of the training units received in the theater of 

operations. 

To address critical equipment shortages and the evolving equipment 

requirements for current operations, the Army has adapted its equipping 

process in two ways. First, rather than having units bring all their 

equipment to the theater of operations and take it back to their home 

stations when they return home, the Army now requires units, in both the 

active and reserve components, to leave certain essential equipment that is 

in short supply in theater for follow-on units to use.13 This is intended to 

reduce the amount of equipment that has to be transported from the 

United States to theater, to better enable units to meet their deployment 

dates, and to maintain stocks of essential equipment in theater where it is 

most needed. While this equipping approach has helped meet current 

operational needs, it has continued the cycle of reducing the pool of 

equipment available to nondeployed forces for unplanned contingencies 

and for training. 

Second, the Army has instituted a process, known as a predeployment site 

survey, to allow large14 units preparing to deploy to send a team to the 

mission area to determine equipment needs. The team generates a list of 

equipment, known as an operational needs statement, which the unit will 

need in theater but was not previously authorized and will need to obtain 

before deployment. Once the Army has approved the items, the unit can 

 13 The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key items currently in short supply 

such as armored vehicles, improvised explosive device jammers, long-range surveillance 

systems, and generator sets, remain in theater for the duration of operations. 

14 Units that are smaller than a brigade complete a virtual pre-deployment site survey by 

communicating with units already in theater to determine the equipment they need to 

request. 

Army Has Adapted Its 

Equipping Process to 

Better Address Critical 

Equipment Shortages and 

Evolving Equipment 

Requirements for Ongoing 

Operations 
Page 16 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

obtain them through transfers from other units or procurement. Over the 

course of current operations, the Army has improved the operational 

needs statement process by pre-approving packages of equipment that are 

in high-demand for current operations so that deploying units do not have 

to request these items separately. For example, more than 160 items, such 

as interceptor body armor; Javelin, a medium antitank weapon system; 

kits to add armor to humvees; and night vision goggles, among other items, 

are pre-approved. For example, in 2003, the 30th Brigade Combat Team 

prepared about 35 lists of additional equipment it would need to deploy in 

January 2004. By the time the 48th Brigade was preparing for deployment 

in 2005, changes to the process resulted in the unit preparing only one 

operational needs statement. 

In addition, an existing Army program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, has 

provided individual equipment to soldiers, including those in the Army 

National Guard, more quickly than the standard acquisition process by 

fielding commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The Army provides 49 items 

such as body armor, helmets, hydration systems, goggles, kneepads, and 

elbow pads through this initiative to units preparing to deploy at their 

home stations and in theater. 

Filling shortages in deploying units has left nondeployed forces with 

worsening equipment shortages and hampers their ability to train for 

future missions. Growing shortages make it unclear whether the Guard 

will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for 

missions overseas or at home. 
Page 17 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more than 

64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support 

continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of this 

equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required under DOD 

policy. As a result, the Guard is challenged in its ability to prepare and 

train for future missions. The policy reflected in DOD Directive 1225.6, 

Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005, requires a replacement plan 

for reserve component equipment transferred to the active component for 

more than 90 days.15 According to Army officials, the Army did not initially 

track the Guard’s equipment or prepare replacement plans in the early 

phases of the war because the practice was intended to be a short-term 

measure and there were other priorities. In addition, the Army did not 

have a centralized process to develop plans to replace the equipment Army 

National Guard units left overseas and transfers of equipment between 

units were only documented at the unit level in unit property records. 

However, as operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment 

retained in theater has increased, which has further exacerbated the 

shortages in nondeployed Army National Guard units. For example, when 

the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its 

deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of its predeployment inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use. Similarly, 

according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army National 

Guard units were required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, 

in Iraq when they returned from deployment. As a result, the units could 

not conduct training to maintain the proficiency they acquired while 

overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National Guard reports that 14 

military police companies left over 600 humvees and other armored trucks 

which are expected to remain in theater for the duration of operations. 

While the Army has now instituted processes to account for certain highdemand equipment items that are being left in theater for the duration of 

the conflict and expects replacement plans for this equipment to be 

developed by August 2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans 

will account for all items transferred to the active component because the 

Army has not been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a 

centralized manner. 

 15Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required for transfers in 

support of force restructuring adopted as result of the planning, programming, budgeting, 

and execution process decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

Army’s Lack of 

Accountability and 

Plans to Replace All 

Army National Guard 

Equipment Retained 

in Theater Hinder the 

Guard’s Ability to 

Prepare and Train 

Units 
Page 18 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

In June 2004, six months after the first Army National Guard units left 

equipment overseas when they returned from deployment, the Army 

tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained 

in theater. However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the 

Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain highdemand equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored 

humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for the duration 

of the conflict. However, Guard units have also left behind equipment that 

was not designated to stay for the duration of the conflict, but which may 

remain in theater for up to three years, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain 

fork lifts, and palletized load trucks, which the Army Materiel Command 

does not plan to track. Of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army 

National Guard estimates Guard units have left behind, the National Guard 

Bureau estimates that as of July 2005, the Army Material Command was 

only tracking about 45 percent of those items. Given the lack of tracking of 

all Guard equipment left in theater, it is not clear how the Army will 

develop replacement plans for these items as required by DOD policy. 

In May 2005 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

requested that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National 

Guard equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. The Assistant 

Secretary noted that while the exact amount of equipment transferred 

between the reserve and active components is unknown, overall the 

magnitude of these transfers has been significant and was an area of 

concern. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

subsequently extended the date replacement plans were due to August 15, 

2005. According to Army officials, the equipment tracked by individual 

units may eventually be returned to the Guard. However, Army and Army 

National Guard officials said that even if it is eventually returned, 

equipment condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use during current 

operations and some of it will likely need to be replaced. The National 

Guard estimates it will cost at least $1.2 billion to replace the equipment it 

has left in Iraq, if it is not returned or is not useable. Until the Army 

develops plans to replace the equipment, including identifying timetables 

and funding sources, the National Guard will continue to face critical 

equipment shortages which reduce readiness for future missions. 
Page 19 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within 

the Army’s modular force by 2008, but they are expected to convert with 

the equipment they have on hand and will lack some equipment for these 

designs until at least 2011. However, the Army is modifying the designs it 

tested and found to be as effective as current brigades to include the 

equipment it can reasonably expect to have based on current funding 

plans. As a result, Army National Guard units will continue to lack 

equipment items and have to use less modern equipment to fill gaps until 

at least 2011 and will not be comparably equipped with their active duty 

counterparts. While the Army estimated in June 2005 that it would cost 

about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, this estimate did 

not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide 

detailed information to support the estimate. Further, it has not developed 

detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment requirements 

as it progresses through the new rotation cycle used to provide ready 

forces for ongoing operations. The Army is quickly implementing its 

initiatives to transform its forces into modular units and a rotational cycle 

of deployment without detailed plans and cost estimates because it views 

these initiatives as critical to sustaining current operations. In the short 

term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for 

equipment, which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed 

for modular conversions. In 2004 and 2005, the Army published and 

subsequently updated the Army Campaign Plan,16 to establish the broad 

goals, assumptions, and time frames for converting to the modular force 

and implementing the rotational force model. However, the plan does not 

include detailed equipping plans, cost estimates, or resources needed for 

implementing the modular and rotational deployment initiatives. Our 

analysis of best practices in strategic planning has shown that detailed 

plans, which describe how the objectives will be achieved and identify 

resources, facilitate success and avoid unintended consequences, such as 

differing assumptions among key leaders in DOD and Congress about 

priorities or program performance. Until equipping requirements for 

implementing the modular designs and the rotational model are specified, 

costs are better defined, and funding is identified, the Guard faces risks as 

it prepares to implement the Army’s restructuring while supporting the 

high pace of operations at home and overseas. 

 16 The Army updated the plan in October 2004 and June 2005. 

Army National Guard 

Units Are Changing to 

New Designs, but Will 

Continue to Lack 

Equipment 

Comparable to Active 

Forces 
Page 20 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and 

capable of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in 2004, the 

Army began to reorganize its forces from a structure organized around 

divisions to one based on standardized, modular brigades that can be 

tailored to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. The 

Army is in the process of developing and approving detailed designs,17

including equipment requirements, for active18 and reserve combat units, 

support units, and warfighting headquarters so that the first Guard units 

can begin their scheduled conversions in September 2005. Among the 

goals of the new structure are to maximize the flexibility and 

responsiveness of the force by standardizing designs and equipment 

requirements for both active and reserve units and maintaining reserve 

units at a higher level of readiness than in the past. However, under 

current plans, Guard units will continue to be equipped with items that 

may be older than their active counterparts and less capable than the new 

modular unit designs require. The Army’s initial estimate for converting 

Guard units to modular designs is about $15.6 billion through 2011, but 

this estimate is incomplete because it does not include the costs for 

converting all units to the new structure or the full costs of equipping them 

for the design the Army tested and determined was as effective as current 

brigades. Moreover, the Army has not developed plans to equip Guard 

units to the tested modular unit design and instead plans to equip them for 

a less modern design. Without a detailed equipping plan that identifies 

funding priorities over time, the Army National Guard is likely to continue 

to face challenges in its ability to train and maintain ready forces in the 

future. 

The Army expects that the new modular brigades, which will include 

about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel,19 will be as capable as the current brigades 

of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel through the use of enhanced military 

intelligence capability, introduction of key technology enablers, such as 

weapons and communications systems, and by having support capabilities 

 17Unit designs prescribe the unit’s wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, 

and mission-essential personnel and equipment requirements. 

18The Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions by the end of fiscal year 2006, 

expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular, standardized brigade combat teams and 

creating new types of command headquarters. 

19 The Army’s plan calls for three variants of the modularized brigade combat team. The 

infantry variant will have about 3,300 personnel, the armored variant 3,700 personnel, and 

the Stryker variant 4,000 personnel. 

Army National Guard Units 

Will Continue to Face 

Equipment Shortfalls That 

May Delay Transformation 

to Modular Designs and 

Hinder Comparability with 

Active Forces 
Page 21 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

contained in the brigade itself instead of at a higher echelon of command. 

The Army tested the new modular brigade designs and found that they 

were as effective as current brigades. However, the Army has modified the 

tested designs based on the equipment it can reasonably expect to provide 

to units undergoing conversion based on its current inventory of 

equipment, planned procurement pipelines, and other factors, such as 

expected funding. At the time of this report, the Army had not tested the 

modified designs to determine whether they are as capable as the current 

brigades or the tested design. The Army plans to equip modular Guard 

units for the modified design by 2011. In the meantime, modular Guard 

units are expected to continue the practice of using approved substitute 

equipment and will initially lack some of the key enablers, such as 

communications systems, which are the basis for the improved 

effectiveness of modular units. 

As of June 2005, the Army had approved modified designs for the 25 Army 

National Guard brigade combat teams and 25 support brigades scheduled 

to convert to the modular structure between 2005 and 2007, and all eight 

warfighting headquarters converting between 2005 and 2008. Under 

current plans, all the Army National Guard units will be converted to the 

modular organizational structure by 2008 with the exception of 3 support 

brigades which will be converted in 2011. The Army expects to complete 

modular designs for the remaining 9 brigade combat teams and 15 support 

brigades by September 2005. The Army had originally planned to convert 

Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the Army 

National Guard, accelerated the plan so that Guard units would share the 

new standardized organizational designs with the active component at 

least two years earlier, avoid training soldiers for the previous skill mix, 

and better facilitate recruiting and retention efforts. 

However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will 

exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls. There are significant shortfalls 

in the Army’s ability to equip Guard units for the modified design in the 

short term for three key reasons. First, according to current plans, the 

units are expected to convert to their new designs with the equipment they 

have on hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large 

number of equipment items that deployed units left in Iraq or that need 

repair or replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment 

needed to reach even the modified design. For example, converted Guard 

units expect initially to be without some equipment items, such as 

unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and airborne radio 

systems, and Javelin antitank missiles that provide the basis for the 

improved capability of the new brigades. Second, the Army has not 
Page 22 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

planned funding to provide equipment to the additional Guard units 

converting to the modular structure on the accelerated schedule. Although 

most Guard units are scheduled to be reorganized by 2008, they are 

expected to receive equipment for their new designs on a slower schedule, 

and in some cases are not expected to receive their equipment until 2 to 3 

years after they reorganize. The lack of detailed plans for equipping Army 

National Guard units makes it difficult to determine how the Army intends 

to transition Guard units from the old to the new organizational structure 

effectively. 

Finally, the Army’s cost estimates for converting Guard units to the 

modular structure are incomplete and likely to grow. The Army’s current 

cost estimate for converting all its active and reserve units to the modular 

force is $48 billion, a 71 percent increase from its initial rough order of 

magnitude estimate of $28 billion made in 2004. Of the $48 billion, the 

Army estimated in June 2005 that Army National Guard modular 

conversions would cost about $15.6 billion. This estimate included costs to 

convert all eight of the Guard’s warfighting headquarters and 33 of the 

Guard’s 34 combat units between 2005 and 2011. It also includes 

procurement of some high-demand equipment such as tactical unmanned 

aerial vehicles, humvees, and antitank guided-missile systems. During our 

work, we obtained summary information on the types of cost and key 

assumptions reflected in the Army’s estimates; however, we were unable 

to fully evaluate the estimate because the Army did not have detailed 

supporting information. 

Our work highlighted several limitations to the Army’s cost estimate for 

Army National Guard modular force conversions. First, the estimate was 

based on a less modern design than both the modified design that the 

Army plans to use in the near term and the tested design it intends to 

evolve to over time. The estimate assumes that Guard units will continue 

to use substitute equipment items that may be older and less capable than 

that of active units and does not include costs for all the technology 

enablers that are expected to provide additional capability for modular 

units. As a result, the estimate does not include costs for all the equipment 

Guard units would require to reach the capabilities of the tested modular 

brigade design. Second, the estimate does not include costs for 10 of the 

Guard’s support units, nor does it include military construction costs 

associated with the Guard’s 40 support units. According to the Army 

National Guard, military construction costs for converted support units 

are expected to near the $1.4 billion in military construction costs already 

included for the Guard’s warfighting headquarters and combat units. 

Furthermore, current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment 
Page 23 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular conversions. 

However, this may not be a reasonable assumption because, as discussed 

previously, Army National Guard units have left large amounts of 

equipment overseas – some of which will be retained indefinitely and the 

Army has not provided plans for its replacement. 

Further, the Army has currently identified funding sources for only about 

25 percent ($3.9 billion) of the current estimate— $3.1 billion programmed 

in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program and $.8 billion 

expected from fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding. Approval for funding 

the remaining $11.7 billion is pending within DOD. However, equipping 

priorities and the amount designated for equipment have not been 

decided. 

In the long term, according to the Army, the intent is to equip all active and 

reserve component units to the tested design over time. However, it will 

take until at least 2011 under current plans for the Army National Guard 

units to receive the equipment they will need for the modified designs 

which are still less modern than the one the Army tested and found as 

effective as current brigades, and the pace of operations may further delay 

equipping Guard units. Moreover, the Army does not have detailed plans 

or cost estimates that identify the funding required for equipping Guard 

units for the tested design. Without detailed plans for when Guard units 

will get the equipment they need for the tested design, it is unclear when 

the Army National Guard will achieve the enhanced capabilities the Army 

needs to support ongoing operations. Further, without more complete 

equipment requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will 

not have all the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the 

Army National Guard’s transition to the modular force. 

The Army’s initiative to transform into a rotational force, which is 

intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing readiness 

for potential mobilization once every 6 years, involves a major change in 

the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and has implications 

for the amount and types of equipment that Army National Guard units 

will need over time. Historically, Army National Guard units have been 

provided only a portion of the equipment they needed to train for their 

wartime missions because they were generally expected to deploy after 

active units. However, current military operations have called for the Army 

National Guard to supply forces to meet a continuing demand for fully 

equipped units, a demand the Army National Guard met through transfers 

of equipment to deploying units and which undermined the readiness of 

Army Plans for Equipping 

Army National Guard Units 

Under Its Rotational Force 

Model Are Not Complete 
Page 24 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

nondeployed units. Under the rotational force concept, the Army would 

provide increasing amounts of equipment to units as they move through 

training phases and near readiness for potential deployment so they would 

be ready to respond quickly with fully equipped forces if needed. However, 

the Army has not yet finalized equipping requirements for Army National 

Guard units as they progress through the rotational cycle. In addition, it is 

not clear how the equipment needed to support units in the new rotational 

cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available for modular 

conversions and affect the pace of the Army National Guard’s 

transformation. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the 

new modular structure and rotational force model and a plan that 

integrates requirements, the Army and Army National Guard are not in the 

best position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine whether 

the modular and rotational initiatives are working together to reach the 

goal of improving Army National Guard readiness. 

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according 

to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model, 

it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each 

phase. Under this proposal the Army National Guard will have three types 

of equipment sets: a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The 

baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the 

equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount 

called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least the 

equipment Guard units need for domestic missions. Training sets would 

include more of the equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, 

but units would share the equipment that would be located at training sites 

throughout the country, so the equipment would not be readily available 

for units’ state or homeland missions. The deployment set would include 

all equipment needed for deployment including theater specific equipment, 

items provided through operational needs statements, and equipment from 

Army prepositioned stock. At the time of this report, the Army was still 

developing the proposals for what would be included in the three 

equipment sets and planned to publish the final requirements in December 

2005. 

Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in operations 

or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular conversions. As a 

result, the requirements of ongoing operations will continue to drain the 

Army National Guard’s equipment resources and affect the pace at which 

equipment will be available for nondeployed units to transform to their 

new design. At the present time, it is not clear how the equipment 

requirements associated with supporting deployment under the new 
Page 25 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

rotational readiness cycle will affect the types and quantities of equipment 

available to convert the Army National Guard to a modular force. Until the 

near-term requirements for the rotational force and long-term 

requirements for a modular force are fully defined, the Army and Army 

National Guard will not be in a position to prioritize funding to achieve 

readiness goals in the near and long term. Further, although Army leaders 

have made it a priority to ensure that Army National Guard units have the 

equipment they need to continue to perform their domestic missions, it is 

not possible to assess whether units will have the equipment they need 

until unit designs and training set configurations are finalized and 

homeland defense equipment requirements are known. 

Evolving equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have 

challenged the Army National Guard in equipping its units for deployment 

while trying to maintain the readiness of its nondeployed force for training 

and future missions. While strategies such as transferring needed 

equipment from nondeploying units to ready deploying units, completing 

operational needs statements, and leaving equipment overseas when 

Guard units return home have helped to equip deploying units, these 

strategies may not be sustainable in the long term, especially as the 

Guard’s equipment inventories continue to diminish. In the meantime, as 

the Army National Guard’s equipment stocks are depleted, risks to its 

ability to perform future overseas and domestic missions increase. 

The Army’s lack of accountability over the Guard’s equipment stocks 

retained in theater has created a situation in which deploying Guard units 

face considerable uncertainty about what equipment they need to bring 

overseas and what equipment they will have for training when they return 

from deployment. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires a plan to replace reserve 

component equipment that is transferred to the active component, but the 

Army has not prepared these plans. Without a replacement plan, the Army 

National Guard faces depleted stocks of some key equipment items 

needed to maintain readiness and is unable to plan for how it will equip 

the force for future missions. 

Supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National 

Guard equipment inventories, which will likely delay the pace of its 

transformation to a modular force. Further, current modular plans for the 

Guard’s conversion will not provide for equipping Guard units to the less 

modern modified design and there are no plans to equip the Guard for the 

design the Army found as capable as current brigades. As a result, Guard 

units will continue to face equipment shortages and have to use older 

Conclusions 
Page 26 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

equipment than their active counterparts. If units are not comparable, the 

Army National Guard will have to continue its current practice of 

transferring equipment to fill the shortfalls in deploying units, thereby 

undermining the readiness of nondeployed forces. With lower readiness of 

Guard forces, the nation faces increased risk to future overseas 

operations, unplanned contingencies, and the homeland missions the 

Guard may be called upon to support. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that 

addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global 

War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from shortterm equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan 

should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with 

existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment 

readiness and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from 

equipment transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan for 

equipping the force for future missions. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 

of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective 

integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and 

modular force initiatives. This plan should include: 

• the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding strategy 

for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the 

extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of equipment and 

equipment levels as the active modular units, 

• an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard’s units will need for 

their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and 

• how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full 

funding is not provided on the expected timeline. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 

comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with our 

recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan and 

funding strategy to Congress that addresses the equipment needs of the 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 27 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism, specifically 

addressing how the Army will transition from its short-term equipping 

measures to long-term equipping solutions. In its comments, DOD said 

that the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be 

equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense 

requirements as well as federal missions and include these requirements in 

its resource priorities. DOD also said that the Army is working to 

implement stricter accountability over equipment currently left in theater 

and to comply with DOD guidelines which require replacement plans for 

these items. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan 

to Congress that details the effective integration of the Army National 

Guard into the Army’s rotational force model and modular force 

initiatives. DOD said that the Army plans to develop resourcing 

alternatives to mitigate potential risks should full funding for 

transformation initiatives not be realized. DOD also agreed that readiness 

goals for the Army National Guard in the 6-year rotational model need to 

be established and that the Army’s equipping strategy for the Army 

National Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to 

carry out both their federal and state missions. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days 

from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of 

Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and 

the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available 

at no charge on the GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed 

documentation and interviewed officials from the Army National Guard, 

the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, and the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We supplemented 

this information with visits to the United States Army Forces Command, 

the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of 

the United States. We also developed case studies of two units: the 30th 

Brigade Combat Team located in North Carolina and the 48th Brigade 

Combat Team in Georgia. These states were chosen to provide 

representative examples of how Army National Guard units were prepared 

for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of the Global War 

on Terrorism. The 30th Brigade Combat Team was one of the first National 

Guard units to deploy for Operation Iraqi Freedom and had just returned 

from deployment when we visited in March 2005. The 48th Brigade 

Combat Team was preparing for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom 

at the time of our visit in April 2005. In both states we met with unit 

logistics staff who had visibility over how the unit prepared for 

deployment. 

To examine the extent to which Army National Guard units have the 

equipment needed for the Global War on Terrorism, we obtained and 

analyzed data on critical shortages and the types and quantities of 

equipment transferred from nondeployed units to deploying units from the 

National Guard Bureau and our two case study states. Additionally, we 

supplemented these data with interviews, briefings, and documentation 

from officials at the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the 

U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command, and the First Army of the United States. We did not examine 

whether shortages of particular items were the result of industrial base 

issues. To understand the processes the Army adapted to equip units as 

equipment requirements evolved for the Global War on Terrorism, we 

interviewed officials from and analyzed data provided by the 30th Brigade 

Combat Team in North Carolina, the 48th Brigade Combat Team in 

Georgia, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, the U.S. 

Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, 

and the First Army of the United States. 

To assess the Army National Guard equipment retained in theater, we 

analyzed Army National Guard data and the Guard’s estimate of the cost to 

replace the equipment if it is not returned. Additionally, we interviewed 

officials and reviewed documentation and data from the Army National 

Guard, Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 29 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Army Forces Command, and the 

Coalition Forces Land Component Command about the lack of reliable 

data and whether any plans exist to replace the Guard’s equipment. We 

supplemented data on how much of the Army National Guard’s equipment 

has been left in theater with briefings and reviewed internal Army 

messages regarding the accountability and visibility of this equipment. 

To evaluate how the Army National Guard has been integrated into the 

Army’s plans for a modular structure and force generation model, we 

interviewed officials at the Army National Guard, the Department of the 

Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command. We reviewed documents such as 

the Army Campaign Plan, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army’s 

force generation model, and numerous briefings on the Army’s plans for a 

modular force and the new force generation model. Additionally, we 

interviewed Guard officials from both of our case study states about the 

units’ plans to convert to modular force given Army time frames and cost 

estimates. 

To assess the reliability of data used during the course of this engagement, 

we interviewed data sources about how they ensured the accuracy of their 

data and reviewed their data collection methods, standard operating 

procedures, and other internal control measures. In addition, we reviewed 

available data for inconsistencies, and, when applicable, performed 

computer testing to assess data reliability. We determined that the data 

were sufficient to answer each of our objectives. 

We conducted our review between December 2004 and August 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Agency comments were 

made on GAO-05-954. 

This report number was 

subsequently changed to 

GAO-06-111. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 33 GAO-06-111 Reserve Forces 

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant 

Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina 

Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne 

Wren also made major contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350607) 
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