IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 6, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CRAIG MICHAEL BARBEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Crockett County

No. 4326 Clayburn L. Peeples, Judge

No. W2014-00835-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 1, 2015

The defendant, Craig Michael Barbee, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, 

especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, employing a firearm 

during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault,

which were merged with the aggravated robbery convictions. He received an effective 

sentence of 106 years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not 

granting his motion for change of venue and in sentencing. Following our review, we 

affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN

and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

Tom W. Crider, District Public Defender; J. Daniel Rogers (on appeal) and Jamie 

Berkley (at trial), Assistant Public Defenders, for the Defendant-Appellant, Craig 

Michael Barbee.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel; 

Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General; and Hillary L. Parham, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

The defendant’s convictions resulted from his robbery of a Dollar General Store in 

Friendship, Tennessee, during which he shot and seriously wounded the chief of police.

Since the defendant is not contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, we will review it in 

a narrative fashion.
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During the evening of May 18, 2012, the defendant entered the store and asked a 

clerk, Shay Olonda Nicole Palmer, about head scarves. He left without making a 

purchase. She recognized him when later, wearing a mask, he returned and began yelling 

and cursing at her, wanting the key to the safe. She responded that only the manager had 

the key. Pointing a pistol at Ms. Palmer, he grabbed her arm and pushed her to the back 

of the store. On the way, they encountered Chief Bill Garrett, of the Friendship Police 

Department, who was in civilian clothes and shopping in the store with his wife at the 

time. Chief Garrett told his wife the store was being robbed and she should leave 

immediately. Also, he broadcast a call on his radio that the store was being robbed. The 

defendant repeatedly hit Chief Garrett in the back of the head as he forced the two 

hostages toward the rear of the store. As they entered the back storage room, they 

encountered Chief Garrett’s wife and Angela Lumley, the assistant manager, who were 

hiding behind some boxes. Unsuccessful in obtaining the key to the safe, the defendant 

took cell phones from Chief Garrett and his wife, stomping them after tossing them on 

the floor. He next took the money which they were carrying and demanded Chief 

Garrett’s wallet. As the defendant saw Chief Garrett’s badge in the wallet, Chief Garrett

grabbed for the defendant’s pistol and was shot in the stomach by the defendant. The 

defendant then took the remaining hostages to the front of the store, removed money 

from the cash register, and ran out the door. As he passed a black Suburban SUV, he 

threw his jewelry, gloves, and mask into it and fled. The defendant was chased and 

subdued by two officers, who recovered from him a .38 caliber revolver. The defendant 

waived his Miranda rights and made a written statement admitting that he had robbed the 

Dollar General Store and shot Chief Garrett. The defendant did not testify or otherwise 

present proof at the trial. 

ANALYSIS

We will review the issues presented on appeal by the defendant.

I. Change of Venue

The Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a trial court may grant a 

change of venue “when a fair trial is unlikely because of undue excitement against the 

defendant in the county where the offense was committed or for any other cause.” Tenn. 

R. Crim. P. 21(a). Whether to grant a motion for change of venue is left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and the court’s ruling will be reversed on appeal only upon a 
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clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 611-12 

(Tenn. 2003). The mere fact that jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity will not 

warrant a change of venue. State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 531-32 (Tenn. 1997). For 

this court to reverse a conviction based on a venue issue, the “defendant must 

demonstrate that the jurors who actually sat were biased or prejudiced against him.” 

State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 192 (Tenn. 1992).

The defendant’s motion for change of venue set out the following bases for the 

request:

1. The Defendant believes that it is unlikely that he can receive a 

fair trial in this county due to the undue excitement and media publicity 

commencing at the date of the alleged crime and continuing thereafter. The 

media outlets within this jurisdiction have carried multiple stories 

purporting to relate facts surrounding the various counts alleged in the 

Indictment. Said outlets have a general circulation which extends 

throughout the county and into the homes of most prospective jurors. Said 

publicity transcends the normal amount of newspaper comment concerning 

the Defendant and the charges pending against him.

2. The local television station, WBBJ, has broadcast multiple stories 

regarding this case since May of 2012 including but not limited to the 

injuries sustained by Friendship Police Chief Bill Garrett, quotes regarding 

the facts of the case, quotes from the Defendant’s statement to police, and 

quotes from Friendship Police Chief Bill Garrett regarding the desired 

punishment of Defendant.

3. Other media outlets, including WMCT out of Memphis, 

Tennessee; WREG out of Memphis, Tennessee; State Gazette out of 

Dyersburg, Tennessee; the Jackson Sun out of Jackson, Tennessee; and the 

Commercial Appeal in Memphis, Tennessee; have likewise carried news 

reports at various hours of the day and have sent stories concerning this 

Defendant into practically every home in this county.

4. Publicity in this case transcends the normal amount of newspaper 

comment concerning the Defendant and the charges pending against him 
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due to the fact that an officer, Friendship Police Chief Bill Garrett, was 

injured during the commission of the alleged crime. There has been 

tremendous community support and outreach to Friendship Police Chief 

Bill Garrett, which has also received media coverage.

5. Defendant submits that the area from which the venire is drawn is 

much smaller and more concentrated than other areas. Crockett County is, 

with regard to population, . . . one of the smallest counties in Tennessee. 

(Crockett County is approximately the 19th smallest county in Tennessee 

with regard to population.)

6. Due to the publicity in this case, Friendship Police Chief Bill 

Garrett being a well-known person in the Crockett County community, and 

the size of Crockett County, there is a strong likelihood that potential jurors 

from another venire would have much less knowledge of and much less 

exposure to the facts and publicity surrounding this case. 

Attached as exhibits to the motion were approximately thirty pages of various 

types of news reports and comments regarding the incident. Apparently, the defendant 

did not seek a pretrial hearing on this motion; and the record does not include an order of 

the court denying the motion. At the beginning of the trial, as prospective jurors had 

been seated, the court questioned them as a group and, then, individually, regarding their 

knowledge of the incident.2 To those who had some familiarity with the incident, the 

court then questioned each further regarding whether the prospective juror had formed an 

opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and, if so, whether the opinion could 

be set aside. As we understand the transcript of the voir dire examination of the jurors, of 

the twelve selected, three had heard nothing of the matter; another three had heard of it 

but recalled nothing of it; and another juror had heard of the matter but could recall little 

about it. All of those selected said they could be fair, and the trial proceeded. In his

motion for a new trial, the defendant listed as an issue the denial of his change of venue 

request. However, there was no elaboration of this assignment, and it was not raised in 

oral argument on the motion. 

 

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The prospective jurors were not questioned, either by the trial court or the defendant, as to their 

exposure to or knowledge of the specific articles which were the bases for the motion for change of 

venue.
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Based upon the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 

in not granting the motion for change of venue. The record does not show that the 

prospective jurors had knowledge of the particular news articles relied upon by the 

defendant’s motion, and there is no basis for our concluding that they could not do as 

they said, which was to set aside any knowledge of the matter and make their decision 

based upon the evidence at trial. Accordingly, this assignment is without merit.

II. Sentencing

The defendant also argues on appeal that the court erred in imposing the maximum 

sentences for each conviction and ordering that they be served consecutively. The State 

disagrees, as do we.

The trial court is granted broad discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within 

the applicable range, regardless of the presence or absence of enhancement or mitigating 

factors, and “sentences should be upheld so long as the statutory purposes and principles, 

along with any enhancement and mitigating factors, have been properly addressed.” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s

sentencing determinations under an abuse of discretion standard, “granting a presumption 

of reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of 

the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” Id. at 707. In State v. Caudle, our 

supreme court clarified that the “abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a 

presumption of reasonableness, applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision 

based upon the purposes and principles of sentencing, including the questions related to 

probation or any other alternative sentence.” 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012).

Sentences were imposed on the defendant for his convictions in Counts 1-5 of the 

indictment. His convictions and sentences were, as to Count 1, 20 years at 35% as a 

multiple offender for the attempted second degree murder of Bill Garrett; as to Count 2, 

40 years at 100% as a multiple violent offender for the especially aggravated robbery of 

Bill Garrett; as to Count 3, 20 years at 100% as a multiple offender for the aggravated 

robbery of Shay Palmer; as to Count 4, 20 years at 100% for the aggravated robbery of 

Daphne Garrett; and as to Count 5, 6 years at 100% as a career multiple offender for the 

employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. All of these 

sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The State is correct in pointing out 

that each sentence is within the range available for the defendant. As to the sentencing, 

the defendant argues that it was excessive because he was sentenced to serve, “for a 
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single episode of armed robbery which included a non-fatal shooting[] more than twice 

the sentence many defendants receive for a conviction of first-degree murder.” 

According to the presentence report, the defendant has a very lengthy record of 

arrests and convictions, his first as an adult being in 1992, at age 18, when he was 

sentenced to two years for the felony unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. This 

conviction was followed, over the next eighteen years, by what appear to be at least nine

felony convictions, including convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon in 1993, at 

age 19, and robbery without a deadly weapon in 1999, at age 26. It appears that the 

defendant has spent most of his adult life either in prison or awaiting disposition of 

charges for new crimes committed following his most recent release from custody. 

Possibly because the defendant had spent so much time imprisoned, he reported “no 

employment history.” 

In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court explained why the defendant 

was a professional criminal and a dangerous offender:

That brings up the question as to whether any or some or all of these 

charges should be run consecutively. It’s my understanding and I’m 

looking at the law as I speak, I have to find that the Defendant is a 

professional criminal who has knowingly devoted his life to criminal acts 

as a major source of livelihood. I do find that.

I find further that the Defendant is an offender whose record of 

criminal activity is extensive.

I find that the Defendant is a dangerous offender who has little 

hesitation about committing crime in which the risk to human life is high.

Therefore, I find that the need for public safety demands that he be 

sentenced as an offender with consecutive sentences. 

The trial court may order multiple sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a 

preponderance of evidence that one or more of the seven factors listed in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-35-115(b) apply, including that the defendant is a dangerous 

offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and no hesitation 

about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-115(b)(4). As to consecutive sentencing, our standard of review is abuse of discretion 

with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851 (Tenn. 2013). 
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This defendant’s record speaks for itself. His very lengthy record of prior 

convictions, including those for crimes of violence, coupled with the dangerous episode 

in this matter, compels us to agree with the trial court that the defendant is dangerous, 

does not hesitate to engage in violent behavior, and lengthy incarceration is necessary to 

protect the public.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial court 

are affirmed.

_________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE