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98–564PS 2005

NASA’S FISCAL YEAR 2006

BUDGET PROPOSAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–5

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

JOHN J.H. ‘‘JOE’’ SCHWARZ, Michigan

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

VACANCY

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JIM MATHESON, Utah

JIM COSTA, California

AL GREEN, Texas

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

VACANCY

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C O N T E N T S

February 17, 2005

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 11

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16

Statement by Representative Ken Calvert, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space

and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ....... 18

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19

Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Minority Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 19

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20

Prepared Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 21

Prepared Statement by Representative J. Randy Forbes, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 21

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 22

Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 23

Prepared Statement by Representative Michael M. Honda, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 23

Prepared Statement by Representative Lincoln Davis, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 23

Prepared Statement by Representative Russ Carnahan, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 24

Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 24

Prepared Statement by Representative Jim Matheson, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 25

Witness:

Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA)

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 26

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28

Biography .......................................................................................................... 35

Discussion

ISS Research ........................................................................................................ 36

Remaining Shuttle Flights .................................................................................. 37

Project Prometheus .............................................................................................. 38

Crew Exploration Vehicle .................................................................................... 39

Page

IV

NASA’s Proposed Iran Nonproliferation Act Remedy ....................................... 39

Launch Vehicle for the Crew Exploration Vehicle ............................................ 40

Soyuz and the Iran Nonproliferation Act ........................................................... 41

NASA Workforce .................................................................................................. 42

Buyouts ................................................................................................................. 43

Space Shuttle Flight Manifest ............................................................................ 44

Alternatives for International Space Station Construction .............................. 45

Crew Exploration Vehicle Development ............................................................. 46

Future of NASA Workforce ................................................................................. 47

NASA Budget and Safety .................................................................................... 48

Space Shuttle and Crew Exploration Vehicle Safety Modifications ................ 49

Space Shuttle Return-to-Flight Safety Modifications ....................................... 51

Possibilities for a Shuttle Servicing Mission to Hubble .................................... 51

International Space Station Safe Haven Capability ......................................... 54

Risk Assessment and Safety ............................................................................... 56

Hubble and the Future of NASA Astronomy ..................................................... 57

Center Transformation and the NASA Workforce ............................................ 59

NASA Full Cost Accounting ................................................................................ 60

NASA Priorities and Roadmapping .................................................................... 61

Future of the International Space Station Without the Space Shuttle ........... 63

Cost Estimates for the Development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle ........... 64

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) ....................................................................................... 68

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

National Aeronautics and Space Administration President’s FY 2006 Budget

Request ................................................................................................................. 112

NASA FY 2006 Budget Request Summary ........................................................... 113

The New Age of Exploration: NASA’s Direction for 2005 and Beyond, February

2005, National Aeronautics and Space Administration .................................... 136

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NASA’S FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET PROPOSAL

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.

Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NASA’s Fiscal Year 2006

Budget Proposal

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2005

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

On Thursday, February 17th at 10:00 a.m., the Committee on Science will hold

a hearing on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Fiscal

Year (FY) 2006 budget proposal. The hearing will examine NASA’s plans and programs and the rationale for the funding levels proposed in the agency’s budget.

In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Space Exploration.

The President’s plan can be seen as having three distinct, but related aspects. The

first aspect concerns current human space flight programs. The President proposes

to complete construction of the International Space Station (ISS) by 2010 and to retire the Space Shuttle at that point. ISS research is to be reconfigured to focus on

questions related to the impact on human health of spending long periods in space.

Under the proposal, the U.S. participation in ISS is slated to end around 2016, although the Administration has said that that date may shift. NASA has also decided to cancel the Shuttle mission that was needed to keep the Hubble Space Telescope in operation past 2007. Completing construction of the Space Station by 2010,

enabling the Shuttle to be retired that year, is necessary to free up the funds needed to return to the Moon by 2020.

The second aspect of the Vision concerns new medium-term goals for human space

flight. The central goal is to return humans to the Moon between 2015 and 2020.

To do this, NASA will develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which will

be tested without carrying people by 2008 and will carry humans into space by

2014.

The third aspect of the Vision concerns long-range goals for the years past 2020.

The entire plan is geared toward preparing for this period, but what will happen

during these years is (perhaps necessarily) left entirely open-ended. The ultimate

goals are to send humans to Mars and ‘‘worlds beyond’’ and to increase the commercial exploitation of space. The timing of future exploration is left open and will depend on the pace of technology development and discovery and the availability of

funds.

Overarching Questions:

Questions about the budget proposal basically fall into three categories:

1. SHUTTLE AND STATION: How will NASA ensure that the Shuttle is retired by 2010? Will that require scaling back the Space Station? How will

the Space Station contribute to Space Exploration?

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXPLORATION VISION: When and how will

NASA determine the specific goals for the CEV? Will the development costs

of the CEV stay within budget projections?

3. OVERALL NASA BUDGET: To what extent should other portions of the

NASA budget (Earth Science, Space Science, Aeronautics) be cut to free up

funds for human space programs? What would the impact be of the proposed

cuts in these areas?

Witness:

Mr. Frederick D. Gregory is the NASA Deputy Administrator. He is expected to

be named Acting Administrator once the resignation of Sean O’Keefe is officially effective on Feb. 18.

4

Budget Highlights:

NASA’s budget request for FY06 is $16.5 billion, an increase of 2.4 percent over the $16.1 billion provided in FY05. (The FY05 level does not include the $126 million emergency supplemental provided to fix facilities damaged from last year’s hurricanes.) While this year’s increase for NASA is larger than that for most other

agencies, NASA’s overall the budget is $546 million less than the 4.7 percent by

which its budget was projected to grow in last year’s budget documents.

The Vision for Space Exploration continues to be the priority in NASA’s budget.

The Space Shuttle and Space Station continue to bulk large in the budget, together

accounting for 39 percent of the proposed NASA budget for FY06. Development of

the CEV would jump in the FY06 budget by more than 500 percent, from $140 million in FY05 to $753 million in FY06, as work on the vehicle gets underway in earnest to allow for an unmanned test in 2008. In general, no element of NASA’s budget related to exploration is proposed for a cut in FY06 for reasons of budget stringency, although a few areas are cut either because new cost estimates are lower

than previous ‘‘placeholder’’ numbers or because of problems with specific projects.

The primary example of the latter is the reduction in Project Prometheus, which is

working to develop nuclear propulsion techniques. NASA has decided not to move

ahead now with the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) as a first test of Project Prometheus technology because it was proving to be too complex and expensive. NASA

is reviewing options before deciding what mission to substitute for JIMO as a test.

Funding for research aboard the Space Station is proposed for a cut as NASA reorients the program toward research on human physiology.

The budget does propose cuts to programs that are not related to the Vision, including Earth Science, Aeronautics and some portions of Space Science. The proposed cuts in these areas along with a reassessment of NASA’s personnel needs for

exploration is leading NASA to consider reducing its workforce by as many as 2,000

people, through layoffs if necessary.

A Senate-requested study by the Congressional Budget Office last year determined that if costs for the Exploration Vision grew at the same pace as costs for

previous NASA projects, the Vision could cost as much as $32 billion to $61 billion

more than has been estimated by 2020. CBO did not assess the likelihood of such

an escalation occurring.

In FY05, as part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Congress provided NASA

with its full funding request, an increase of more than five percent from FY04, and

gave NASA flexibility in allocating the money. The Appropriations Act did seek to

limit spending on the Lunar Robotic Orbiter, scheduled to launch in 2008, but

NASA has chosen to provide full funding for the project. The Act also provided funding for a robotic servicing mission to the Hubble, which NASA is now canceling.

Congress has not yet had a specific vote or debate on the President’s Vision, and

the report accompanying the Appropriations Act asked for numerous reports to fill

in details about the Vision.

Issues:

When will the Space Shuttle return to flight? The Shuttle is currently slated

to return-to-flight in May or June of this year, after having been grounded for more

than two years since the Feb. 1, 2003 loss of the Columbia. NASA has been working

to implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

(CAIB) and its efforts are being reviewed by a NASA-appointed group, the StaffordCovey Task Force. The Task Force has determined that, so far, NASA has successfully completed work on six of the CAIB’s 15 recommendations for returning to

flight. NASA officials and the Task Force appear cautiously optimistic that NASA

will be able to stick to the May-June schedule even though NASA will probably not

have developed a repair capability for the Shuttle’s tiles by then. NASA officials and

Task Force members have expressed concern, however, that NASA could learn of

problems during a successful first flight that could complicate future launches. The

Shuttle will be under intense scrutiny during that flight, and since the Columbia

disaster NASA engineers have learned of more aspects of Shuttle flights that need

to be monitored (like the foam shedding that brought down the Columbia) because

they could imperil the vehicle. NASA estimates that returning the Shuttle to flight

will cost about $762 million more in FY05 than had been requested originally.

How many more Shuttle flights are needed to complete the Space Station?

NASA has flown 16 Shuttle missions to the ISS so far and currently estimates that

another 28 are needed to complete its construction. Doubts have been raised inside

and outside NASA that 28 flights could be competed in time to retire the Shuttle

by 2010. As a result, NASA is in the process of reviewing its options to reduce the

number of flights (see more below), including by scaling back the Space Station and

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by using other vehicles for logistic and crew missions for which the Shuttle is not

required. NASA officials have suggested that the number of flights could be reduced

to 23 and perhaps to as few as 16 with changes to the Space Station. Also, the Shuttle is required to ferry large replacement parts to the Station, such as gyroscopes,

as they wear out. If the Station is to remain in use until around 2016, the Shuttle

will have to launch and pre-position in space, large replacement parts before the

Shuttle is retired.

What is the future of the Space Station, and how will it contribute to the

program to go to the Moon and Mars? The President’s Vision called for research

on the Space Station to be reoriented from a range of biological and physical research projects to a narrower, more focused agenda researching matters necessary

to keep humans alive and healthy during long stays in space. NASA now expects

to have a review completed by the end of this month of how the Station could contribute to space exploration. The two greatest human health issues involve the effects of low gravity and the effects of radiation. Radiation research is better conducted on Earth than on the ISS, and NASA has a facility for that purpose at the

Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York. The question then is what kinds of

research can be done on the Station to learn how to mitigate the effects on the body

of low gravity and whether that research can be conducted only on the Station. A

related question is whether enough astronauts can serve on the ISS long enough

for statistically sound conclusions to be reached before the Station is retired. NASA

is seriously considering scaling back the Station to eliminate projects that may not

be required to understand how astronauts could spend long periods on the Moon.

NASA may cancel the centrifuge being built for the U.S. by the Japanese that was

to study the effects on animals of low gravity. While in the past, the centrifuge was

described as perhaps the most useful piece of scientific equipment designed for the

Station, NASA is now beginning to argue that it needs human rather than animal

research and that the centrifuge research is more relevant to a Mars mission than

to a lunar one. Once NASA determines how it will use the Station, it will then determine how many Shuttle flights will be needed to complete the Station and when

they will be needed. That review is expected to be completed late this spring.

Will Americans still be able to use the Space Station effectively after next

April when our agreement with the Russians expires? NASA faces a legal

hurdle next year that could prevent any effective utilization of the Space Station

after next April. The U.S. is dependent on the Russians for crew rescue capability,

which is provided by Russian Soyuz vehicles. The Shuttle is not capable of remaining docked at the Station for long enough stays to provide this service, and U.S.

regulations prevent astronauts from being aboard the Station if there is no rescue

capability. But under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), the U.S. is forbidden to

provide the Russians with cash or services under a new agreement unless the President certifies that the Russians are not proliferating nuclear technology from Iran—

a certification the President is highly unlikely to make. NASA has no known alternative plans for providing a crew rescue capability beyond buying such services from

the Russians. The matter is currently the subject of an interagency review, and the

Administration is expected to send up an amendment to the INA, perhaps as early

as next month. It is unclear how Congress would react to such a proposal with Iran

being such a focus of attention in foreign policy. The International Relations Committee, which shares jurisdiction with the Science Committee over the Act, has been

a strong proponent of the Act. If Congress fails to amend the INA, the U.S. would

not be able to use the Soyuz as a rescue vehicle or to use Russian Soyuz and

Progress vehicles to ferry astronauts and cargo, respectively, to and from the Station to limit the use of the Shuttle.

Will the Space Station program exceed the Congressional cost cap? Another

legal hurdle facing the ISS program is the $25 billion cost cap for ISS development

set by Congress. (The cap only applies to ISS development costs and does not include costs for operations, Shuttle, and research.) The original cost estimate for ISS

development in 1993 was $17.4 billion. In 1998, NASA announced an increase to

$21.3 billion. As a result, NASA asked an outside task force to evaluate the cost

and schedule credibility of the ISS program. The task force estimated the development cost of the ISS, given the configuration at the time, at $24.7 billion. Congress

then set a $25 billion cost cap on the ISS in the NASA Authorization Act of 2000

(P.L. 106–391). According to NASA’s FY06 budget request, the ISS will exceed the

Congressional cost cap in FY05. NASA is likely to request legislative relief from the

existing cost cap.

How is NASA proceeding with development of the CEV? NASA intends to

issue a Request for Proposals for companies interested in developing the CEV in

6

March. Then toward the end of FY05, NASA intends to select two teams to prepare

prototypes of a CEV. As a result, large-scale spending on the CEV is slated to begin

in FY06. NASA has described its budget request for CEV for FY06 as something

of a ‘‘placeholder’’ because no contract has yet been let. NASA has estimated total

development costs for the vehicle at about $15 billion. NASA is moving ahead with

contractor awards without settling many of the questions concerning the vehicle,

and, indeed, will leave some of these questions to two contractor teams that will design the vehicle. Among the key open questions are whether the CEV will be able

to dock with or service the Space Station and the number of crew members it will

be able to carry. Relatedly, NASA has not yet decided what astronauts will do once

they get to the Moon. Some of those decisions will have to await the data gathered

by the Lunar Robotic Orbiter, due to be launched in 2008, which will gather data

on potentially landing sites and the availability of resources on the Moon, including

water.

What launch vehicle will the CEV will require? NASA has also not yet decided

what vehicle to use to launch the CEV. It could choose to launch the CEV into space

on top of an expendable rocket like the Defense Department uses to launch satellites, although alterations might need to be made to such a rocket for it to be considered sufficiently safe for human launches. Or NASA may choose to develop a

launch vehicle based on the components of the Space Shuttle. Alternatively, it may

choose to develop an entirely new vehicle, although that would probably increase the

costs for the Vision beyond current estimates.

NASA must make a decision soon, especially if the agency chooses a Shuttle-derived design, because it must work to keep open production lines for Shuttle components beyond the point when they would otherwise be needed. The President’s recently released Space Transportation Policy directs that NASA’s decision be made

jointly with the Department of Defense. NASA anticipates that it will conclude its

study of launch vehicle options and submit its decision for interagency review sometime in the next few months.

How will the Vision affect NASA’s science and aeronautics programs? NASA

considers planetary science (such as robotic missions to Mars) as part of the exploration program. But other areas of Space Science, such as those more related to astrophysics, and all of Earth Science are not considered NASA priorities in the FY06

budget, although they continue to receive significant funding. The proposed changes

in these areas are highlighted in the budget details in the next section of this charter. The FY06 budget calls for a significant paring back of aeronautics research, refocusing the program, and reducing funding to $850 million, down $250 million from

FY04. NASA has requested adequate funding to preserve the launch date of 2011

for the James Webb Telescope, the successor to the Hubble Space Telescope.

What is the future of the Hubble Space Telescope? The budget request, in effect, allows the Hubble Space Telescope to die, as funding is included only to continue work on a de-orbiting mission; no funds are included for servicing. The Committee recently held a hearing to examine the options for the Hubble, of which there

are basically four, each of which arguably cost in the range of $2 billion:

• Do not service the telescope. The telescope will then cease to function as early

as 2007. NASA does have other space telescopes in orbit and others are

planned to be launched in 2011, but none has the same capabilities as

Hubble.

• Send the Shuttle to service the telescope. This is the recommendation of the

National Academy of Sciences. Like any Shuttle mission, this would put astronauts at risk. It would also delay completion of the ISS.

• Send a robotic mission to service the telescope. There is wide disagreement

as to whether this mission could be ready in time. The National Academy of

Science concluded it could not, but those involved in the robotic effort believe

it can be done in time.

• Launch a new ‘‘platform’’ with the equipment that was designed to be added

to the Hubble (this is sometimes called ‘‘rehosting’’) and perhaps include new

equipment as well. This would leave a gap in Hubble science, as the new platform would probably not be ready until after the Hubble stopped operating.

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Details of NASA’s FY06 Budget:

Space Operations

The primary programs within Space Operations are the ISS and the Space Shuttle, which together make up almost 40 percent of NASA’s budget. The FY06 budget

request for ISS and Space Shuttle totals $6.4 billion, up $169 from FY05 and $945

million from FY04.

Funding for the Shuttle would decline from nearly $5 billion in FY05 to $4.5 billion in FY06 as NASA finishes paying for the increased costs associated with returning the Shuttles to flight. NASA says that it will not know whether it will need to

make adjustments to its FY06 request for Shuttle until after the Shuttle returns

to flight and the agency can assess whether additional work must be done to ensure

the vehicles’ safety. Also, NASA has indicated that the funding levels proposed for

the years beyond FY06 (see attached table) are ballpark estimates and could rise

as NASA develops a better understanding of the costs associated with retiring the

Shuttle.

The large increases in the Shuttle program from FY04 to FY05 were due to the

escalating costs of returning the Shuttles to flight, expected this spring. The current

launch window for return-to-flight is May 12th through June 3rd.

Exploration Systems

Funding for Exploration Systems—which includes funding for the human Moon

mission, including the CEV, and for the development of nuclear reactors for use in

space and on other planets—would grow by nearly half a billion dollars from FY05

to $3.165 billion under the request. The CEV would grow from $140 million in FY05

to $753 million in FY06. Meanwhile Prometheus, NASA’s nuclear reactor program,

would be cut from $432 million in FY05 to $320 million in FY06.

The Administration has described its FY06 request for the CEV program as something of a ‘‘placeholder’’ while the program continues to be defined. The funding

level requested for Prometheus is a placeholder, as well, as NASA recently announced that it was scrapping its plan to send a nuclear-powered robotic mission

to Jupiter’s icy moons (an orbiter known as JIMO) and is instead conducting a complete review of its nuclear program. The agency says that the analysis will help it

to determine how Prometheus might fit into the Vision and what kind of mission

might provide the best opportunity to demonstrate its capabilities. In the meantime,

JIMO is on hold, sidelining a mission that included investigations of the Jovian

moon Europa, the number one priority among scientists, according to the latest National Academy of Sciences decadal survey of astronomy priorities.

8

The budget requests $34 million for NASA’s prize program, called Centennial

Challenges, up from $9.7 million appropriated for FY05. NASA needs authorization

from Congress to move forward with prizes greater than $250,000.

NASA proposes to shift into the Exploration Systems account what was previously

the Biological and Physical Research (BPR) program, now called Human Systems

Research and Technology. The program funds research aboard the ISS. The program

has been restructured numerous times over the past several years. The budget proposes a $198 million or 20 percent decrease from FY05 levels to $806 million as

NASA determines the future of the program.

Science

Funding for Earth and Space Science programs, which NASA proposes to combine

into a single Science account for FY06, is only slightly down from FY05, but several

hundred million below the level NASA projected last year that it would need. To

accommodate the addition last year of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) mission, which will orbit the Moon to gather data in advance of a human mission, a

number of Space Science and Earth science programs have been delayed or cut. As

the LRO mission ramps up the amount of funding required, it is expected to have

a larger effect on other space and Earth science missions unless the overall level

of funding for science grows accordingly.

Last year, NASA announced that it would delay the launch of the Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM), a mission NASA had planned to carry out together with the

Department of Energy to explore the nature of dark energy. Scientists believe that

understanding dark energy has the potential to fundamentally alter our understanding of the universe.

The following are changes NASA proposes to make in this year’s budget:

• Cut to Earth Science: The budget cuts the Earth Systematic Missions program by $118 million, or 40 percent below FY05. As a result, NASA proposes

essentially to cancel the Glory mission, which the Administration believes will

answer critical questions about climate change. While the budget continues

the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission, it is not clear whether

enough funds are provided in FY06 to allow for the planned 2010 launch.

Earth scientists have called GPM one of their top priorities for understanding

severe weather events such as hurricanes.

Also, a mission designed to ensure that weather instruments are properly

tested before they are launched on the Nation’s next generation of weather

satellites is running into problems and will be delayed if it does not receive

additional funding.

• Addition to Earth Science: The budget increases funds for Earth System

Science Pathfinder projects by $27 million, or 25 percent over FY05. However,

the budget documents NASA has provided do not contain sufficient detail to

determine which programs will benefit from the increase.

• Change to Space Science: The proposed budget provides $371 million for the

James Webb Space Telescope. NASA continues to hold to a launch date of the

Webb to 2011. The budget for Webb is an increase of $60 million over the

FY05 level, but a $23 million decrease from the level projected for FY06 last

year. It is unclear why NASA now believes the Webb Telescope needs less

than it had previously projected.

• Cut to Space Science: The budget proposes slipping the Space Interferometer

Mission (SIM) by two years with launch now scheduled for 2012. SIM will detect Earth-like planets.

• Cut to Space Science: The Future New Frontiers program is cut by $56 million from FY05. The budget cut will delay selection of the second New Frontiers mission. The first mission, called New Horizons, a mission to Pluto, is

scheduled to be launched next year.

Aeronautics Research

The budget request for Aeronautics is $852 million, a decrease of $54 million from

FY05 and $182 million below the FY04 level of $1.034 billion. The Aeronautics program has three main components, Aviation Safety and Security, Airspace Systems,

and Vehicle systems. NASA proposes to limit research within Vehicle Systems to activities related to noise and emissions reductions, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Vehicle Systems is a big user of wind tunnels, and maintaining these facilities puts

significant pressure on the budget. NASA is proposing to restructure its research

programs to focus on those that do not depend as heavily on wind tunnel tests.

9

Education Programs

NASA proposes $167 million for its education programs, $2 million less than

FY05, or a one percent cut. NASA’s FY06 budget run-out projects that education

will get cut again in FY07, bringing it down to $155 million where it will remain

at that level through 2010.

Other Issues:

Financial Management Issues at NASA

In three of the past four years, NASA has not been able to produce auditable financial statements; its financial auditors disclaimed opinions on NASA’s financial

statements for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2004. NASA’s new auditors for FY 2004,

Ernst & Young, reported that many financial management weaknesses continue to

persist, including the following:

• NASA has not been able to reconcile its Fund Balance with Treasury account

since FY 2003. Although NASA reportedly has resolved many of the errors

causing a difference of almost $2 billion as of September 30, 2003, Ernst &

Young identified unreconciled differences between NASA and Treasury of

$313 million as of September 30, 2004.

• NASA lacks adequate controls to ensure that its Property, Plant, and Equipment and Materials and Supplies are properly valued and accounted for. As

of the end of FY 2004, NASA reported the value of these assets as $37.6 billion.

• NASA lacks an integrated financial management system, as required by the

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.

In April 2000, NASA began development of its Integrated Financial Management

Program (IFMP), consisting of nine systems or modules to support a range of activities, including accounting, asset management, contract administration, and human

resource management. The Core Financial module, considered the backbone of

IFMP, was implemented in 2003. However, the Government Accountability Office

(GAO) reported that NASA did not follow disciplined processes in implementing this

module and as a result, NASA has been experiencing numerous data integrity problems with the system. Ernst & Young recently reported that the Core Financial

module is not integrated with certain subsidiary systems, does not facilitate the

preparation of financial statements, and does not contain sufficient controls to detect and correct invalid data in a timely fashion. According to NASA, problems with

the Core Financial module are the cause of $565 billion in adjustments needed to

complete its FY 2004 financial statements.

NASA plans to complete implementation of all nine IFMP modules by FY07.

While NASA has estimated the life cycle cost of IFMP to be almost $1 billion, GAO

found that this estimate does not include all costs.

Workforce

To support the Vision, NASA has said that it needs to ‘‘transform’’ its workforce

into a smaller force with a different set of skills than those possessed by its current

employees. Overall, the agency aims to reduce its total workforce from 19,227 fulltime employees in FY05 to 18,798 in FY06, a net reduction of 429 employees.

The total additions and reductions in staff are likely to be greater, however, as

NASA has determined that about 2,000 of its employees have skills that are not

well matched to the skills the agency now believes it needs. NASA believes that it

simply no longer needs the skills of about 1,000 of these employees, many of them

technicians that work in with aeronautics research facilities. NASA has offered voluntary buy-outs to these employees, but as of January 12, only 302 employees had

accepted them. As of February 7, NASA has given its center directors approval to

begin talking about the potential for positions to be eliminated and the news has

been covered widely in media reports, so the number of employees taking voluntary

buy-outs may increase.

NASA believes the other 1,000 employees might be able to compete for future

projects and thus retain their jobs, but that outcome is uncertain and it is possible

that the agency would eventually resort to mandatory Reductions In Force (RIFs)

to accomplish its workforce goals.

10

11

Chairman BOEHLERT. We have a crisis. Someone stole the Chairman’s gavel. As a strong advocate of clean water, I will gavel this.

This hearing will come to order.

I want to welcome everyone here this morning to this important

hearing on the NASA budget. I see this hearing as the first in a

series that will culminate in the introduction of a NASA authorization bill. Our goal is to get such a bill to the House Floor in time

to influence the appropriations process. I know that is Chairman

Calvert’s goal as well, and I want to welcome him to his important

responsibilities as Chairman of the Subcommittee. Last year, we

were deeply engaged in that process behind the scenes. Now, we

should be ready to go more public.

I want to do an authorization bill, because I think it is critical

that Congress have a full and open debate on the President’s Vision for Space Exploration and the future of NASA, before NASA

barrels ahead with the program. Congress has never endorsed, in

fact has never discussed the vision. What we did do, as part of a

huge omnibus bill, is provide the money to enable NASA to continue planning how it wants to go forward, but the truly critical

spending commitments start in fiscal year 2006, so this year is

when we must have the debate.

Here are some of my current thoughts on how I would like that

debate to come out. First, let me state clearly some things that I

am for.

I am for returning humans to the Moon by 2020. I am for moving

ahead prudently but swiftly with the development of a crew exploration vehicle for that purpose. I am for retiring the Space Shuttle

as soon as possible, but under absolutely no circumstances later

than December 31, 2010. That is, incidentally, compatible with the

Administration’s position. I am for a NASA that sees itself as a

science agency with all of space science, Earth science, and aeronautics receiving the attention and funding according to priority

areas. I am for a NASA that is open to outside ideas from academia

and the private sector.

So where does that leave me on the current budget proposal?

With the same mixed feelings I have had in the past. First, let me

be blunt. I don’t think NASA should be our top budget priority, either in this committee or in this Congress. That means in a budget

as excruciating tight as this one, NASA probably should not get as

much as the President has proposed. Moreover, even if NASA received every cent it has requested, it would still be trying to do too

much at once, the historic pattern for the agency, as the Gehman

Report noted. So something has to give, and this hearing will be

a first step in looking at what that might be.

There is one other problem we have reviewing this budget. There

are a lot of fundamental questions that NASA still isn’t ready to

answer. That is not a criticism of the agency. That is just a description of where they are in the planning process, and we have to

keep that in mind.

What are some examples? They can’t tell us what research will

be done aboard the Station. They can’t tell us how many more

Shuttle flights will be scheduled. They can’t tell us how they are

going to get around the Iran Non-Proliferation Act. They can’t tell

us how many people the CEV will carry or whether it will go to

12

the Space Station. They can’t tell us what we might do when we

go to the Moon. And they obviously can’t tell us whether the Shuttle will once again fly successfully.

Again, that is not because NASA hasn’t been forthcoming. Quite

the contrary. Top NASA officials have spent countless hours with

us, giving direct and candid answers to a wide range of questions.

But they can’t provide answers that they don’t yet have, and we

need to understand just how much is unknown, the extent, for example, the cost—that cost estimates for the CEV and Project Prometheus are still ‘‘placeholders.’’

So one thing I will be asking today is when some of our questions

might be answered.

I know some answers should be forthcoming soon. We understand, for example, that the Administration could send up in the

next month or so proposed to language to amend the Iran Non-Proliferation Act. That is a critical matter, because the current law

would bring the Station program to a halt by next April. Any proposal will be reviewed very carefully. The only thing I can say now,

and I think the Administration agrees with this, is the Station is

a lot less important than non-proliferation is. I am not interested

in having go into space because we’ve blown ourselves up.

Well, with so many questions, let me just stop there. We have

before us Fred Gregory, the Deputy Administrator of NASA, who

has been an integral part of all the decision-making that went into

the ’06 proposal. The agency will be in good hands as he becomes

Acting Administrator this weekend. But I am sure that he is as

eager as anyone in this town to see an end to the parlor game or

predicting who will be appointed when to succeed Sean O’Keefe.

But I am as helpless as he is in bringing that about.

Sean O’Keefe left the agency far stronger than he found it. Now,

we need to decide what the next step is in creating a strong and

productive NASA.

Mr. Gordon.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT

I want to welcome everyone here this morning to this important hearing on the

NASA budget. I see this hearing as the first in a series that will culminate in the

introduction of a NASA authorization bill. Our goal is to get such a bill to the House

Floor in time to influence the appropriations process. I know that is Chairman Calvert’s goal as well. Last year, we were deeply engaged in that process behind the

scenes; now we should be ready for a public role.

I want to do an authorization bill because I think it’s critical that Congress have

a full and open debate on the President’s Vision for Space Exploration and the future of NASA before NASA barrels ahead with the program. Congress has never endorsed—in fact, has never discussed—the Vision. What we did do, as part of a huge

Omnibus bill, is provide the money to enable NASA to continue planning how it

wants to go forward. But the truly critical spending commitments start in FY06, so

this year is when we must have the debate.

Here are some of my current thoughts about how I’d like that debate to come out.

First, let me state clearly some things that I am for.

I am for returning humans to the Moon by 2020. I am for moving ahead prudently

but swiftly with the development of a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) for that purpose. I am for retiring the Space Shuttle as soon as possible, but under absolutely

no circumstances later than December 31, 2010. I am for a NASA that sees itself

as a science agency, with all of Space Science, Earth Science and Aeronautics receiving the attention and funding accorded to priority areas. I am for a NASA that is

open to outside ideas from academia and the private sector.

13

So where does that leave me on the current budget proposal? With the same

mixed feelings I’ve had in the past. First, let me blunt, I don’t think NASA should

be our top budget priority either in this committee or the Congress. That means in

a budget as excruciatingly tight as this one, NASA probably should not get as much

as the President has proposed. Moreover, even if NASA received every cent it has

requested, it would still be trying to do too much at once—the historic pattern for

the Agency, as the Gehman Report noted. So something has to give, and this hearing will be a first step in looking at what that might be.

There’s one other problem we have reviewing this budget. There are a lot of fundamental questions that NASA still isn’t ready to answer. That’s not a criticism of

the Agency. That’s just a description of where they are in the planning process, and

we have to keep it in mind.

What are some examples? They can’t tell us what research will be done aboard

the Station. They can’t tell us how many more Shuttle flights will be scheduled.

They can’t tell us how they’re going to get around the Iran Non-Proliferation Act.

They can’t tell us how many people the CEV will carry or whether it will go to the

Space Station. They can’t tell us what we might do when we get to the Moon. They

obviously can’t tell us whether the Shuttle will once again fly successfully.

Again, this is not because NASA hasn’t been forthcoming. Quite the contrary. Top

NASA officials have spent countless hours with our staff, giving direct and candid

answers to a wide range of questions. But they can’t provide answers that they don’t

yet have. And we need to understand just how much is unknown—the extent, for

example, that cost estimates for the CEV and Project Prometheus are still (quote)

‘‘placeholders.’’

So, one thing I’ll be asking today is when some of our questions might be answered.

I know some answers should be forthcoming soon. We understand, for example,

that the Administration could send up in the next month or so proposed language

to amend the Iran Nonproliferation Act. That’s a critical matter because the current

law would bring the Station program to a halt by next April. Any proposal will be

reviewed carefully. The only thing I can say now—and I think the Administration

agrees with this—is that the Station is a lot less important than non-proliferation

is. I’m not interested in having go into space because we’ve blown ourselves up.

Well, with so many questions pending, let me stop there. We have before us Fred

Gregory, the deputy administrator of NASA, who has been an integral part of all

the decision-making that went into the FY06 proposal. The Agency will be in good

hands as he becomes acting Administrator this weekend. But I am sure that he is

as eager as anyone in this town to see and end to the parlor game of predicting

who will be appointed when to succeed Sean O’Keefe. But I’m as helpless as he is

in bringing that about.

Sean left the Agency far stronger than he found it. Now we need to decide what

the next steps in creating a strong and productive NASA should be.

Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join you

in welcoming Mr. Gregory to today’s hearing, and I want to sincerely thank him for his long service to our country and to NASA,

and to say I am very pleased that you are going to top this off by

not just being interim, but the Acting Director for NASA. I think

it is a position well deserved.

You know, I feel a little embarrassed that I continually agree

with the Chairman. The Committee—the Ranking Member is supposed to be raising some Cain here, but I think that our Chairman

very well has stated what I think is the right view of our position,

and looking at NASA now, I am very pleased that we are going to

go forward with additional hearings, and have an authorization. I

would have to say I disagree on the importance of NASA’s budget.

I would like to see that number not only stay where it is, but be

increased. But again, I want to concur with the very good statement of our Chairman.

I would also like to take a moment to acknowledge and welcome

all of the new members of the Committee on both sides of the aisle,

as well as to extend my good wishes to Representative Calvert and

14

Representative Udall, as they embark on their responsibilities as

chair and Ranking Member of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. In those capacities, they will be leading the NASA-related issues on a regular basis, and I have no doubt they will do

a good job.

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing is likely to be one of the most important that we hold this session. More than a year ago has now—

or more than a year has now passed since President Bush announced his Space Exploration Initiative. I for one support the

President’s proposal, but it needs to be paid for and sustainable.

However, since the time the initiative was first announced, there

has been little opportunity for Congressional scrutiny, and there

has been no opportunity to develop a consensus on what Congress

or the American people thinks of this initiative, which is very important if this Committee is to successfully convince our colleagues

to continue its funding for several years during tight budgets.

And while some have argued that the funding provided to NASA

in Fiscal year 2005 omnibus appropriations constituted a Congressional mandate for the President’s initiative, others would disagree.

In point of fact, Congress was being asked to vote up or down on

a $388 billion spending bill, funding a wide array of agencies and

activities, with no opportunity for amendments. NASA’s funding

accounted for only four percent of the total funding of that bill, and

despite the fact that NASA received close to its fiscal year 2005 request level, $1.5 billion of funds provided to NASA in the omnibus

are going to be needed to pay for things like the increase in the

Shuttle return-to-flight costs that weren’t in the original fiscal year

2005 request.

So it appears that we are entering this year with Congress’ position on the Exploration Initiative still unresolved. It also appears

that Congress is going to have to address some fundamental issues

as we assist the President—assess the President’s proposal, notably, what priority should the President’s Exploration Initiative

have, relative to NASA’s other important missions? Are we prepared to maintain the funding and the schedule of the President’s

initiative, even if it results in the loss of opportunities in space and

Earth science, and aeronautics research, and microgravity research

and applications, in research into low-cost and high reliability

launch capacities and technologies, or in other significant research

areas?

What role do we want NASA centers to play in the future? What

type of workforce do we envision for NASA? In that regard, are we

prepared to shed highly skilled scientists, engineers, and technicians from NASA’s workforce if they do not directly support the requirements of the President’s initiative? These are not idle questions. They go to the heart of what we want from our nation’s civil

space and aeronautics program. Moreover, I do not believe that

Congress has the luxury of deferring considerations of these questions any longer. One thing is clear from NASA’s fiscal year 2006

budget request and from recent actions taken by the agency. In the

absence of any clear Congressional direction, NASA is proceeding

to move out aggressively to implement the President’s initiative. As

a result, we are starting to get a clear picture of the Administration’s vision for NASA. For example, just one year after President

15

Bush launched his space initiative, the Administration has already

started backpedaling on multi-year funding profile it had proposed

for the agency. As a result, the Administration is planning to cut

a total of some $2.5 billion from the budget plan for fiscal year

2006 through fiscal year 2009 that had been proposed for NASA

just a year ago.

It is also instructive to see how NASA proposes to allocate the

cut. It allocates 75 percent of the required cuts to NASA’s science

and aeronautics program, with just 10 percent having to be absorbed by NASA’s exploration systems programs. What other clues

do NASA’s new priorities—are displayed in this year’s budget request? As we have all heard, NASA is eliminating the funding for

servicing the highly productive Hubble Space Telescope. NASA is

cutting funding it contributes to the National Interagency Initiatives in nanotechnology, networking, information technology, and

climate change science. NASA is eliminating funding for

hypersonics research. NASA is reducing Space Shuttle Operation

reserves in fiscal year 2006 and 2007, in order to support the funding requirements of the Exploration Initiative. NASA is cutting the

funding for its science mission operations account, an action that

will force the termination of some ongoing scientific spacecraft missions within the next year. I could cite other examples, but you get

the picture.

Contrary to the image it has fostered of a measured, go as you

pay approach for exploration, the fact is that NASA is protecting

the funding for its Exploration Initiative at the expense of other

programs. I think it is reasonable to assume that unless directed

otherwise, NASA will continue that approach in the future, as deficit concerns increasingly squeeze the agency’s budgetary bottom

line. And as I have previously stated, I am a strong supporter of

exploration. I think it is important for our nation’s human space

flight program to be—to have a challenging, long-term goal. And I

agree with the President that a step by step plan for exploration

makes the best sense. At the same time, I am very concerned that

the approach NASA is taking to exploration is not going to be sustainable.

I am speaking as one who has to convince other Members of Congress of the value of investing in NASA at a time when a host of

other national priorities are competing for the same dollars. It

doesn’t make my job any easier when Members see NASA cutting

its commitment to aeronautics research that could reduce aircraft

noise and emissions, and—or improve efficiency and safety of the

air traffic management system, or cutting its commitment to research that could help us better understand the impact of the sun

on weather and climate. Or eliminating research for the International Space Station that NASA has long asserted would benefit

the health and welfare of our citizens back here on Earth, especially if they suspect that NASA is making those cuts in order to

shift money to an Exploration Initiative whose budget doesn’t

match its goals.

It becomes even more difficult when these same Members look at

what NASA has been doing as part of its exploration initiative, and

start asking questions such as how could NASA first make the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter mission its showcase flight demonstration

16

of the initiative’s nuclear technology program, and then wind up

having to shelve it because of, and I quote ‘‘concerns over cost and

technical complexity.’’ Well, why did NASA make purchasing Russia’s Soyuz crew transfer and rescue services a basic elements of

its human space flight plan when the current law prohibits such

purchases? And now that NASA has done it, what is it going to do

next to make it work? Or finally, how does NASA justify its apparent willingness to spend U.S. tax dollars to support European aerospace companies as part of the Crew Exploration Vehicle program?

I don’t have good answers to these questions, and I hope that Mr.

Gregory will address them at today’s hearing.

Now, before I close, I would like to raise one final issue. NASA

is starting to make sweeping changes in its workforce and centers,

with the potential for several thousands of its employees to be let

go, numerous facilities to be consolidated or done away with, and

one or more of the centers to be privatized or even closed. Yet neither Congress nor NASA’s own employees are being given a clear

picture of what is planned. I don’t think it is right to treat the dedicated men and women of NASA’s workforce that way, and I don’t

think it is the appropriate way to deal with Congress.

Mr. Chairman, we have important issues in front of us that need

our attention. We can start to address them at today’s hearing, but

I hope that we will not stop with a single hearing. We need to devote whatever time and oversight effort is needed to chart a reasonable path for NASA, and it needs to be a path that is sustainable. I don’t want to see us on the Floor of the House in a couple

of years losing a vote to continue the program. I can still remember

when the Space Station program avoided a similar fate by only one

vote in 1993.

With that, I again want to welcome Mr. Gregory to today’s hearing, and I look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON

Good morning. I’d like to join the Chairman in welcoming Mr. Gregory to today’s

hearing.

I’d also like to take a moment to acknowledge and welcome all of the new Members of the Committee on both sides of the aisle, as well as extend my good wishes

to Rep. Calvert and Rep. Udall as they embark on their responsibilities as Chair

and Ranking Member of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. In those capacities they will be dealing with NASA-related issues on a regular basis, and I have

no doubt that they will do a good job.

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing is likely to be one of the most important ones we

hold this Session. More than a year has now passed since President Bush announced his space exploration initiative.

I for one support the President’s proposal if it is paid for and is sustainable. However, since the time the initiative was first announced, there has been little opportunity for Congressional scrutiny or debate of the proposal. And there has been no

opportunity to develop a consensus on what Congress thinks of the initiative, which

is very important if this committee is to successfully convince our colleagues to continue its funding for several years during tight budgets.

While some have argued that the funding provided to NASA in the Fiscal Year

2005 omnibus appropriation constituted a Congressional ‘‘mandate’’ for the President’s initiative, others would disagree. In point of fact, Congress was being asked

to vote up or down on a $388 billion spending bill funding a wide range of agencies

and activities—with no opportunity for amendments. NASA’s funding accounted for

only about four percent of the total funding in that bill. And despite the fact that

NASA received close to its FY05 request level, $1.5 billion of the funds provided to

17

NASA in the Omnibus are going to be needed to pay for things—like the increase

in Shuttle return-to-flight costs—that weren’t in the original FY05 request.

So, it appears that we are entering this year with Congress’s position on the exploration initiative still unresolved. It also appears that Congress is going to have

to address some fundamental issues as we assess the President’s proposal, notably:

• What priority should the President’s exploration initiative have relative to

NASA’s other important missions?

• Are we prepared to maintain the funding and schedule of the President’s initiative even if it results in the loss of opportunities in space and Earth

science, in aeronautics research, in microgravity research and applications, in

research into low cost/high reliability launch technologies, or in other significant research areas?

• What role do we want NASA’s Centers to play in the future?

• What type of workforce do we envision for NASA?

• In that regard, are we prepared to shed highly skilled scientists, engineers,

and technicians from NASA’s workforce if they do not directly support the requirements of the President’s initiative?

These are not idle questions—they go to the heart of what we want from our nation’s civil space and aeronautics program. Moreover, I do not believe that Congress

has the luxury of deferring consideration of these questions any longer.

One thing is clear from NASA’s FY06 budget request and from recent actions

taken by the agency: In the absence of any clear Congressional direction, NASA is

proceeding to move out aggressively to implement the President’s initiative.

As a result, we are starting to get a clearer picture of the Administration’s vision

for NASA. For example, just one year after President Bush launched his space exploration initiative, the Administration has already started back-pedaling on the

multi-year funding profile it had proposed for the agency. As a result, the Administration is planning to cut a total of some $2.5 billion from

the budget plan for FY06 through FY09 that it had proposed for NASA just a year

ago.

It is instructive to see how NASA proposes to allocate that cut—it would allocate

75 percent of the required cuts to NASA’s science and aeronautics programs with

just 10 percent having to be absorbed by NASA’s Exploration Systems programs.

What other clues to NASA’s new priorities are displayed in this year’s budget request?

• As we have all heard, NASA is eliminating the funding for servicing the highly productive Hubble Space Telescope.

• NASA is cutting the funding it contributes to the national interagency initiatives in Nanotechnology, Networking and Information Technology, and Climate Change Science.

• NASA is eliminating funding for hypersonics research.

• NASA is reducing Space Shuttle operations reserves in FY06 and FY07 in

order to support the funding requirements of the exploration initiative.

• NASA is cutting the funding for its science mission operations account-an action that will force the termination of some ongoing scientific spacecraft missions within the next year.

I could cite other examples, but you get the picture.

Contrary to the image it has fostered of a measured, ‘‘go as you pay’’ approach

to exploration, the fact is that NASA is protecting the funding for its exploration

initiative at the expense of its other programs.

I think it’s reasonable to assume that unless directed otherwise, NASA will continue that approach in the future as deficit concerns increasingly squeeze the agency’s budgetary bottom line.

As I have previously stated, I am a strong supporter of exploration. I think it’s

important for the Nation’s human space flight program to have challenging longterm goals. And I agree with the President that a step-by-step plan for exploration

makes the best sense.

At the same time, I’m very concerned that the approach NASA is taking to exploration is not going to be sustainable. I’m speaking as one who has to convince other

Members of Congress of the value of investing in NASA at a time when a host of

other national priorities are competing for those same dollars.

It doesn’t make my job any easier when Members see NASA cutting its commitment to aeronautics research that could reduce aircraft noise and emissions or improve the efficiency and safety of the air traffic management system, or cutting its

18

commitment to research that could help us better understand the impact of the Sun

on our weather and climate, or eliminating research on the International Space Station that NASA has long asserted would benefit the health and welfare of our citizens back here on Earth—especially if they suspect that NASA is making those cuts

in order to shift money to an exploration initiative whose budget doesn’t match its

goals.

It becomes even more difficult when those same Members look at what NASA’s

been doing as part of its exploration initiative and start asking questions:

• Such as, how could NASA first make the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO)

mission its showcase flight demonstration of the initiative’s nuclear technology program and then wind up having to shelve it because of ‘‘concerns

over costs and technical complexity. . .’’?

• Or, why did NASA make purchasing Russian Soyuz crew transfer and rescue

services a basic element of its human space flight plan when current law prohibits such purchases? And now that NASA’s done it, what’s it going to do

next to make it work?

• Or finally, how does NASA justify its apparent willingness to spend U.S. taxpayer dollars to support European aerospace companies as part of the Crew

Exploration Vehicle (CEV) program?

I don’t have good answers to those questions, and I hope that Mr. Gregory will

address them at today’s hearing.

Now before I close, I would like to raise one additional issue. NASA is starting

to make sweeping changes to its workforce and Centers, with the potential for several thousand of its employees to be let go, numerous facilities to be consolidated

or done away with, and one or more of its Centers to be privatized or even closed.

Yet neither Congress nor NASA’s own employees are being given a clear picture

of what is planned. I don’t think that’s the right way to treat the dedicated men

and women of NASA’s workforce. And I don’t think it is an appropriate way to deal

with Congress.

Mr. Chairman, we have important issues in front of us that need our attention.

We can start to address them at today’s hearing, but I hope that we will not stop

with a single hearing. We need to devote whatever time and oversight effort is needed to chart a responsible path forward for NASA. And it needs to be a path that

is sustainable.

I don’t want to see us on the Floor of the House in a couple of years losing a vote

to continue the program—I can still remember when the Space Station program

avoided a similar fate by only one vote in 1993.

With that, I again want to welcome Mr. Gregory to today’s hearing. I look forward

to your testimony.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon. The

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I—also looking forward to working with Mr. Udall, as I take on this—a new responsibility, and I would like to welcome Mr. Gregory for his—and his

colleagues today to this important hearing, a hearing that will set

the stage for the rest of the year. There are a lot of issues that we

are going to cover today, so I will keep my remarks very brief.

As we all know, this is a crucial time for NASA and the civil

space program. NASA has made progress toward returning the

Shuttle to flight, but some technical issues remain. We hope and

believe the Shuttle will return to flight when it is ready and continue the assembly of the International Space Station. But as you

said, no later than 2010, the Shuttle will be retired, so we can

move forward with the exciting and bold exploration vision laid out

by the President over a year ago, a vision that I strongly support.

Today, it is important that we get a better understanding of the

priorities reflected in NASA’s budget proposal and specifics of how

NASA intends to implement this vision. We also want to know how

NASA intends to refocus its programs on the exploration vision

19

while rebalancing its portfolio of science, aeronautics programs,

since these programs are also important to the Nation.

To help illuminate this issue, I plan to hold hearings focusing

specifically on NASA’s various roles, missions, and infrastructure.

Just as important, I want to ensure that we get to work early to

pass an authorization bill for NASA. We haven’t passed one since

2000. I think it is important we not turn our responsibilities over

to the appropriators as we enter a new era of space exploration.

Lastly, I also look forward to the hearing on how NASA plans to

expand, accelerate, and accommodate America’s growing commercial and entrepreneurial spacefaring community. NASA has a lot

on its plate. As this new Subcommittee Chairman, I look forward

to working with all my colleagues on this committee, the Administration, and NASA to make sure the space program a success, and

with that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE KEN CALVERT

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like to welcome Mr. Gregory and his colleagues

today to this important hearing, a hearing that will set the stage for the rest of the

year. There are a lot of issues we need to cover, so I will keep my remarks very

brief. As we all know, this is a critical time for NASA and the civil space program.

NASA has made solid progress toward returning the Shuttle to flight, but some

tough technical issues remain. We hope and believe that the Shuttle will return to

flight when it is ready and continue the assembly of the International Space Station. In 2010, the Shuttle will be retired, so we can move forward with the exciting

and bold exploration vision laid out by the President over a year ago.

Today, it is important that we get a better understanding of the priorities reflected in NASA’s budget proposal and the specifics of how NASA intends to implement the vision. We also want to know how NASA intends to refocus its programs

on the exploration vision while maintaining a balanced portfolio of science and aeronautics programs, since these programs are also vitally important to the Nation.

NASA has a lot on its plate and as the new Subcommittee Chairman I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Committee, the Administration, and

NASA to make sure our space program is a success.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Now, Mr. Udall, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on

Space and Aeronautics.

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Gregory. We look forward to hearing your testimony today.

As we all know, NASA is an important part of the Nation’s

science and technology infrastructure, and at their best, NASA’s activities advance knowledge, inspire our youth, and improve the

quality of life for our citizens. So it is important that Congress be

involved in decisions on NASA’s future, and along with my colleagues, I think this, and I know this hearing can be a good start

toward gaining the information that we will need to make sure

that those decisions are informed ones. In that regard, I look forward to working with Mr. Calvert in my new capacity as Ranking

Member on the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to carry out

additional oversight.

Mr. Chairman, as you do, I consider myself to be a champion of

space exploration in its broadest sense, which is the adventure of

pushing back the boundaries of our ignorance with both robotic and

human explorers, as well as with researchers in the laboratory and

20

the observatory. I confess that I am—as I think we all are here,

a bit troubled that the President’s Exploration Initiative seems to

be couched in terms of having to walk away from important research areas in science and aeronautics if we want to do exploration. One of those important research projects is, of course, the

Hubble Telescope, which we all intend to discuss further during

this hearing. But it is not the only one. Nevertheless, I think we

are being presented with a false choice. We should be able to do

both. It may require adjusting the pace of the President’s Exploration Initiative, or making a tough love prioritization of the proposed exploration programs, but I believe it can be done. To do otherwise is to risk losing the fruits of investments we have made over

the last 45 years to establish and maintain our current world class

capabilities for research at NASA and at our universities.

In addition, I think we should never forget that an important

component of those world class capabilities is in the NASA workforce. As you may know, I have several federal laboratories in my

district, and I have developed a keen appreciation for the intellectual capital that resides in those laboratories. And I have no doubt

that similarly impressive intellectual capital exists at the NASA

centers, though in contemplating changes to NASA’s workforce, we

should proceed very carefully. Change by itself is inherently neither good nor bad. It is just change. However, if we make precipitous changes to those centers without considering what the Nation

will want from NASA in the future, we risk losing valuable skills

and intellectual capital that we may never be able to recover.

Now, I know that some champions of the President’s vision want

to move quickly to realign NASA to conform to that vision. However, as Members of Congress, I think we need to step back and

take the broader view. We need to ask some hard questions, such

as what do we want NASA to be? What are we asking NASA to

contribute to our society and to our economy, and what steps do we

need to make to ensure that NASA will retain the capacity to make

those contributions for decades to come? It is not going to be easy

to answer these questions. Nevertheless, it is vital that Congress,

working with the Administration, try to answer them.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time,

and I welcome you again, Mr. Gregory, and look forward to your

testimony. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Udall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MARK UDALL

Good morning, and welcome Mr. Gregory—we look forward to hearing your testimony. As we all know, NASA is an important part of the Nation’s science and technology infrastructure. At their best, NASA’s activities advance knowledge, inspire

our youth, and improve the quality of life for our citizens. So it’s important that

Congress be involved in decisions on NASA’s future, and I think this hearing can

be a good start toward gaining the information we will need to make sure that those

decisions are informed ones. In that regard, I look forward to working with Mr. Calvert in my new capacity as Ranking Member on the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to carry out additional oversight.

Mr. Chairman, I consider myself to be a champion of space exploration in its

broadest sense—the adventure of pushing back the boundaries of our ignorance with

both robotic and human explorers, as well as with researchers in the laboratory and

the observatory. I confess that I am a bit troubled that the President’s exploration

initiative seems to be couched in terms of having to walk away from important research areas in science and aeronautics if we want to do exploration. One of those

21

important research projects is of course the Hubble Telescope, which I intend to discuss further during this hearing, but it’s not the only one.

Nevertheless, I think we’re being presented with a false choice. We should be able

to do both. It may require adjusting the pace of the President’s exploration initiative, or making a ‘‘tough love’’ prioritization of the proposed exploration programs. . .but I believe it can be done. To do otherwise is to risk losing the fruits

of investments we have made over the last 45 years or more to establish and maintain our current world-class capabilities for research at NASA and at our universities across a wide range of scientific and technological disciplines.

In addition, I think we should never forget that an important component of those

world-class capabilities is the NASA workforce. As you may know, I have several

federal laboratories in my district. I have developed a keen appreciation for the intellectual capital that resides in those laboratories. And I have no doubt that similarly impressive intellectual capital exists at the NASA Centers. When contemplating changes to NASA’s workforce, we should proceed very carefully. Change by

itself is inherently neither good nor bad—it’s just change. However, if we make precipitous changes to those Centers without considering what the Nation will want

from NASA in the future.. . . We risk losing valuable skills and intellectual capital

that we may never be able to recover.

I know that some champions of the President’s exploration vision want to move

quickly to realign NASA to conform to that vision. However, as Members of Congress, I think we need to step back and take the broader view. We need to ask some

hard questions.. . . What do we want NASA to be? What are we asking NASA to

contribute to our society? To our economy? And what steps do we need to take to

ensure that NASA will retain the capacity to make those contributions for decades

to come? It’s not going to be easy to answer these questions. Nevertheless, it’s vital

that Congress, working with the Administration, try to answer them.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Udall.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE VERNON J. EHLERS

I believe that NASA’s decision to abandon a Hubble telescope servicing mission

is unwise and shortsighted. Given Hubble’s tremendous history of scientific discovery and its continuing potential, there is no question as to the value of such a

mission. I understand that the reasoning that led to this decision for decommissioning instead of a servicing mission is the purported safety risks to astronauts.

While this is, of course, an important consideration, I believe the calculated risk

does not outweigh the potential benefits of such a mission.

Currently, there are 28 different missions planned by the Space Shuttle to the

International Space Station (ISS) before the vessel’s retirement in 2010. With a history of only two accidents in 113 Shuttle flights, for any single flight there is a 1.8

percent chance of failure. With 28 planned missions to the ISS, the cumulative risk

of a single accident over the course of those missions is substantially higher (almost

40 percent). Simple mathematics shows me that one mission to service the Hubble

telescope makes sense, given the minimal risk to the astronauts and the tremendous and proven scientific potential of the instrument. Coupled with the time that

will be lost before another telescope is launched, decommissioning this telescope is

clearly a questionable decision. In the case of Hubble, stewardship of our existing

telescope is the smartest investment of our federal dollars.

With a 1.8 percent risk to the astronauts of one Hubble mission, we get a tremendous amount of science accomplished, whereas, with the 28 missions to the ISS

there is uncertain scientific achievement coupled with a significantly higher risk. If

NASA’s goal is to conduct missions of the greatest scientific value and least amount

of risk to astronauts, then clearly, a single mission to fix Hubble is the right decision.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY FORBES

In only the last half century, space exploration and scientific discovery have

brought an unquantifiable richness to human life. America’s space program is a

symbol of our success as a scientifically and technologically advanced nation. I am

pleased that President Bush has devised a plan that seeks to advance human space

22

exploration, however I am concerned that the FY 2006 Budget proposes cuts to vital

programs that are not related to NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration.

In particular, I remain concerned that reduced federal funding for aviation and

aeronautics research and technology in FY 2006 will jeopardize the Nation’s leadership in providing the technologies needed to develop the next generation aircraft,

improve aviation safety and security, and attract the next generation of aerospace

scientists and engineers. We are in danger of falling behind our competitors in Europe who have announced that their goal is to dominate commercial aviation sales

by 2020.

In addition, cuts to the NASA Aeronautics budget will have a profound impact

on the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, which has a long and

proud history of aeronautics research. NASA Langley’s wind tunnels and laboratories, research aircraft and spacecraft and flight simulators have made significant

contributions to our nation’s advances in the aeronautics industry and have the

promise of yielding many more in the future.

Like the explorers of the past and the pioneers of flight in the last century, we

cannot identify today all that we will gain from aviation and aeronautics research;

however, we know from experience that the eventual return will be great. And the

greater the investments of today, the greater the rewards for generations to come.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good morning. I want to thank Honorable Frederick Gregory for appearing before

our committee to discuss the NASA’s FY06 budget proposal. Today’s hearing serves

as an opportunity for oversight of certain departmental programs. On January 14,

2004, the President announced his space exploration initiative which provides much

needed long-term goals for our nation’s human space flight program. The lack of

clear direction has hampered NASA’s effectiveness and has kept it from realizing

its full potential as the Nation’s space agency. During last fall’s FY05 Omnibus, the

appropriators gave NASA a great deal of latitude to determine how their money

would be allocated. The understanding was that the appropriations committees

would review the funding programs as part of the Operating Plan process. Months

later, it is unacceptable that NASA has only submitted an initial Operating Plan

that provides only partial information on how it intends to allocate its FY05 appropriation. I support the action of Ranking Member Gordon, who sent a letter to

NASA indicating that he did not concur with the Operating Plan submission because it was incomplete.

It is troubling that NASA continues to proceed on implementation of the President’s exploration initiative in the absence of any clear Congressional direction on

their priorities, their missions, and the future role of NASA Centers. In light of the

President’s new initiative, the budget for NASA leaves many significant questions

unanswered and Congress needs more specifics as we consider the FY06 budget request for NASA.

NASA continues to be our gateway to the universe. It is through NASA’s efforts

that we will understand our planet, our solar system and beyond. NASA’s budget

should reflect a strong commitment to, and emphasis on, continuing to build the

agency’s core foundation of aeronautics and aerospace research and development as

well as its missions of exploration and discovery to educate and inspire.

While the President’s initiative envisions human lunar landings by 2020 and

human missions to Mars at some point in the future, I am concerned that one year

later, the budget plan for NASA has worsened, and the majority of the funding

shortfall is to be absorbed by NASA’s non-exploration initiative-related programs.

Finally, I am concerned that many important and promising programs, such as

the education programs and space station research, would be eliminated or have

their funding cut, deferred, or flattened in order to fund the space exploration initiative. NASA’s track record on the credibility of its cost estimates over the last several

years is at best mixed. The President’s proposal will have a high price tag and it

should not come at the cost of our commitment to our children, our veterans, our

seniors, and our other important domestic priorities. The federal deficit for 2004 will

be a record $413 billion and the case is going to have to be made to this committee

and the American people why the space exploration initiative should be supported

in the face of that deficit.

I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

23

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

First of all, I would like to thank the Chairman for bringing us together for this

hearing today.

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the President’s proposed budget for the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for fiscal year 2006.

I have always been a strong supporter of the U.S. Space Program. I am a firm

believer that the United States should continue our space program that has accomplished so much in the areas of research and science.

While I am happy that the Administration’s budget request is an increase from

last year’s, there are still many questions that must be addressed. I am quite concerned that this budget is actually lower that what was stated for the President’s

Vision for Space Exploration. How does NASA plan on reaching these goals with

$2.5 million less than what was original stated?

It is imperative that we today discuss safety and our return-to-flight plans, since

space travel is inherently dangerous. Under no circumstances should we allow budget cuts to ever interfere with the responsibility of maintaining safety.

With that being said, I would like to again thank the Chair and Ranking Member

for holding this hearing and the witness for agreeing to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL M. HONDA

Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Gordon, thank you for holding this important hearing today. This is an essential first step in the oversight process it is

our committee’s responsibility to perform. I emphasize that this is a first step, however—we must be sure to pay close attention to NASA represented here, both to celebrate successes and to make sure the agency is doing the job we expect it to do

in the way we expect it to do that job.

The number one issue in my mind as we discuss this budget is the ‘‘Transformation’’ that NASA is executing in order to carry out the President’s Vision for

Space Exploration. I am very concerned about the lack of Congressional oversight

of this transformation and the fact that NASA has not provided us with timely information about changes that are taking place.

I know that our side of the aisle had serious concerns when NASA sought to

switch to the Full Cost Accounting system, and I think that our greatest fears have

come true. Full Cost Accounting has been combined with broad discretionary authority granted to the agency in the Fiscal Year 2005 Omnibus Appropriations bill

to create a situation in which the salaries of vast numbers of Civil Service R&D employees are being moved out of project accounts and into general operations, which

has created an artificial crisis at the centers and is being used as a reason to undertake large scale workforce reductions. To date, NASA has not provided us with a

detailed Operations Plan outlining how these changes are being made, and NASA

has not provided requested documentation outlining those ‘‘excess competencies’’

broken down by Center, so that it would be possible to see what areas NASA management considered to be no longer important to pursue. We must be kept informed,

but NASA is doing everything to prevent that—according to a Center director, a

page from NASA’s budget submission to Congress about Civil Service employment

numbers at the Centers should be ignored because it does not make any sense. How

is it that Congress is not being given accurate information?

A big question in all of this ‘‘transforming’’ is whether NASA will continue to

honor the obligations it has already made. There are many research contracts and

cooperative agreements between the agency and Centers and outside entities whose

status remains uncertain. Without a detailed Operations Plan, we can not know

what the future of these agreements is.

I have a large number of questions that I want answers to, a larger number than

I should have, because up to this point NASA has not been doing a good job of communicating with the Congress. I hope that I can start to get some answers to these

questions at today’s hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE LINCOLN DAVIS

Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.

As a member of the Congressional Blue Dog Coalition, I am a fiscal conservative.

As we consider the Administration’s aggressive proposal for a manned space mission

to the Moon, I think that we need to think about fiscal priorities.

24

The Administration has repeatedly asked for billions upon billions of dollars for

the Iraq conflict. An exit strategy has not been developed.

Our health care system is broken. More than 45 million people are uninsured. In

my own State, TennCare is in danger of collapse and will cause thousands more to

become uninsured.

And we are discussing an aggressive Space program? Mr. Chairman, my constituents and I understand the benefits of science and technology research, and we see

the benefits of space research. But our nation is leaving a multi-trillion dollar deficit

to its grandchildren, and as a Blue Dog, I want to express my disagreement with

the Administration’s aggressive space exploration agenda.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RUSS CARNAHAN

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this hearing, and

Mr. Gregory, thank you for joining us today to discuss the NASA proposed budget

request. I am very interested in hearing your testimony.

I, as many on this committee, will be paying particular attention to what NASA’s

budgetary decisions mean for the long-term direction of the agency. I hope that you

can elaborate on whether or not you believe it is possible for NASA to accomplish

the President’s space exploration agenda while simultaneously maintaining strong

programs in each of NASA’s mission areas.

Furthermore, I want to state that I am concerned about a few specific elements

of the budget. Specifically, I am troubled by both the decision to discontinue funding

for hypersonic work in both my home State of Missouri and in Tennessee as well

as the potential for halting development of the ISS centrifuge facility. Finally, I believe it is problematic that bidding on the Crew Exploration Vehicle may produce

an outcome in which non-U.S. companies are paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon,

I want to thank you for organizing this important hearing to discuss NASA’s

budget proposal for fiscal year 2006. I want to welcome Mr. Gregory, NASA’s Deputy Administrator and thank him for coming before this committee this morning.

NASA faces a watershed moment after having endured a tremendous tragedy in the

Columbia disaster and now trying to map its future with a return to the Moon and

manned exploration of Mars.

Unfortunately, while I wholeheartedly support the work of NASA, I am deeply

concerned that the President’s budget does not meet all the needs for future space

exploration as we move forward in this new century. As I have stated before, this

Administration has made many bad budgetary choices, which continue to push us

further into a huge deficits and mounting debt during the last four years. In addition, the President has proposed a highly questionable plan for Social Security along

with an uncertain military future in Iraq that in conjunction with proposed $1.6 trillion tax cuts will result in less funds being available for vital agencies such as

NASA.

I have been supportive of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration because

I firmly believe that the invest we make today in science and exploration will pay

large dividends in the future. Similarly, I do not want to put a cap on the frontiers

of our discovery, NASA should aim high and continue to push our nation at the forefront of space exploration. However, I find it to be more supportive of the President’s

plan, when I have no real specifics as to what this plan will entail. Large missions

of this sort require detailed planning and as a Members of Congress we deserve to

know how exactly the President’s plan proposes to accomplish its objectives so that

we can set out the proper resources and provide the necessary oversight. In addition, the President stated that the fundamental goal of his directive for the Nation’s

space exploration program is ‘‘. . .to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic

interests through a robust space exploration program.’’ I could not agree more with

that statement; unfortunately, this President’s own budget does not meet the demands of his ambitious agenda. One year after the Administration laid out a fiveyear funding plan for NASA that was intended to demonstrate the affordability and

sustainability of the exploration initiative, the Administration has submitted a

budget proposal for 2006 that would reduce that funding plan by $2.5 billion over

25

the next four years. For example, in 2006, the Administration is seeking $546 million less than it said would be needed for NASA in 2006 in the five-year funding

plan that accompanied last year’s request. In fact 75 percent of the $2.5 billion

shortfall will fall to NASA’s science and aeronautics programs. This kind of under

funding for vital programs is unacceptable. Again, it is even more alarming because

the President has not provided a detailed plan as to how he intends to accomplish

his space exploration agenda; certainly draining money from the budget will not

help that cause.

My greatest concern with this budget is that it may not allocate enough money

for ensuring the safety of all NASA astronauts and crew. After the Columbia disaster, safety must be our highest priority and it is worrisome that there is not a

noticeable increase in funding to address all safety concerns. Presently, NASA is

working towards a resumption of Space Shuttle flights, with return-to-flight currently scheduled for mid-May. However, once NASA returns the Shuttle to flight

status, it is then supposed to begin the task of figuring out how to retire the Space

Shuttle fleet in 2010 while continuing to fly the Shuttle safely up to the very last

flight. I am concerned that pressure to retire the Shuttle by a fixed date to free up

resources for other activities, coupled with the need to fly up to 28 Shuttle flights

to assemble the Space Station, could—if not handled properly—lead to the types of

schedule and budgetary pressures that were cited by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) as contributing to the Columbia accident. I hope this concern

is paramount at NASA as we move forward in the future.

While this NASA budget is supposed to move us forward toward exciting new discoveries, I was deeply disturbed to find that this budget if approved will mean the

end of the Hubble Space Telescope. The Hubble Space Telescope has been one of

the most productive and successful scientific facilities ever deployed. Hubble was

originally intended to be operated with periodic manned servicing missions using

the Space Shuttle. However, since the grounding of the Shuttle, NASA Administrator O’Keefe has canceled the final scheduled servicing mission to Hubble. Without this servicing mission, Hubble’s support systems (gyroscopes for maintaining orientation, batteries to power heaters) will fail causing irreversible damage to the

spacecraft. Three servicing options have been identified to deal with Hubble: 1) complete the scheduled manned servicing mission; 2) use a robotic spacecraft to service

Hubble; and 3) incorporate ground based replacement parts intended for Hubble in

a new telescope. At this time, none of those options have been exercised. Unfortunately, the only funds attached for Hubble in this budget will go towards de-orbiting

the telescope. I believe there is a better way to keep Hubble in service where it has

served our nation and in fact the world so well. Now is not the time to digress in

terms of our discovery, Hubble served an essential function in our space exploration

efforts. I hope that this Committee and Congress as a whole will work to save the

Hubble telescope before we lose a valuable asset.

As Members of this committee know, I have always been a strong advocate for

NASA. My criticism of the President’s budget is intended only to strengthen our efforts to move forward as we always have in the area of space exploration and discovery. NASA poses an exciting opportunity to charter a new path that can lead to

untold discoveries. As always I look forward to working with the good men and

women of NASA as we push the boundaries of our world once again.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JIM MATHESON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gordon. As a supporter of

science, I am well aware that space exploration benefits Americans by encouraging

innovation in defense, education, communications, scientific research, and commercial technology.

Today, I am concerned that the benefits of research are being curtailed by NASA’s

foolhardy decision to cancel a servicing missing to the Hubble Space Telescope.

Hubble is one of the crown jewels of America’s space science enterprise. Some of

the greatest scientific benefits from the Hubble Space Telescope have been the unexpected discoveries that have expanded our knowledge about our solar system. It has

also proven to be a powerful scientific and educational tool. I find it hard to believe

that NASA is so willing to abandon this incredible project.

Just a few weeks ago, this committee heard testimony from Dr. Louis Lanzerotti,

Chair of the National Research Council panel, who asked to examine the issues surrounding the cancellation of Hubble’s final servicing mission. His panel’s report concluded that NASA should commit to a Shuttle-based Hubble serving mission, allowing the telescope to continue its highly productive scientific mission.

26

Space industry workers in my home State of Utah and in other parts of our nation

have already dedicated years of service to the Shuttle. They stand ready to continue

that effort, so that Hubble can be serviced safely and efficiently. Finally, both the

general public and the scientific community are very opposed to the discontinuation

of Hubble and to the reckless postponement of needed servicing missions.

I hope that NASA reviews and reconsiders its decision to cancel what would have

been the fifth and final Hubble servicing mission. Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Our first and only witness today is the

Deputy Administrator, soon to be Acting Administrator of NASA,

the Honorable Fred Gregory. We are very familiar with your work,

Mr. Gregory. We thank you for your years of very distinguished

service to the Nation in a variety of capacities. And I understand

you will be accompanied by, and that is why we have the six

chairs, Mr. James Jennings, Associate Deputy Administrator, Institutions and Asset Management; Rear Admiral Craig Steidle, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems Mission Directorate; Mr.

William Readdy, Associate Administrator, Space Operations Mission Directorate; Mr. Alphonso Diaz, Associate Administrator,

Science Mission Directorate; Dr. Victor Lebacqz, Associate Administrator, Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate; and Mr. Steve

Isakowitz, Comptroller, Office of the Chief Financial Officer. And

Mr. Readdy, I am sorry for mispronouncing your name.

Gentleman, take your seats, behind a multi-hatted Mr. Gregory.

Mr. Gregory, you know the drill. And usually, we ask witnesses,

because we have many panels and many distinguished witnesses,

to summarize the statement. We are not going to waive that. We

would ask you to summarize your statement, but we are not going

to be so arbitrary as to only give you five minutes. But the shorter

your statement, the more opportunity we have for a dialogue,

which we have always found to be the most productive part of

these hearings.

So the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICK D. GREGORY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. GREGORY. Well, first of all, let me tell you what a privilege

it is to sit before such an august body. And Mr. Boehlert, thank you

very much for inviting Mr. O’Keefe to come, and then allowing me

to be, I hope, a worthy substitute. Ranking Member Gordon and

the Committee Members, thank you for this opportunity to discuss

this—NASA’s fiscal year 2006 budget request.

This October 1, on the day when the new fiscal year begins,

NASA will be entering our 48th year of serving the public interest,

inspiring—and inspiring the next generation of explorers. For 31

years, I have had the privilege to serve on the NASA team, first

as a test pilot, then as an astronaut, and more recently now as part

of Agency leadership. I have never been as proud of our work and

as hopeful about the space program’s future as I am today. The exciting science findings on our Mars and Saturn missions, the research we are conducting on the International Space Station, and

the assistance NASA satellites provided to Tsunami relief efforts

highlight NASA’s relevance in advancing America’s scientific and

technological leadership, and in providing people with tangible benefits.

27

These accomplishments in NASA’s steady progress towards safety, safely returning the Space Shuttle to flight, are the products of

a team that has strived very diligently since the Columbia accident

to operate all our missions safely and successfully. They also reflect

Sean O’Keefe’s outstanding leadership of the Agency these past

three years, and I certainly thank you for acknowledging Sean’s

work. To be certain, NASA’s successes also reflect a strong spirit

of cooperation between the Administration and Congress. We appreciate your role in helping us to set program priorities, and in

providing constructive oversight of NASA activities. We look forward to working with you to help advance the Nation’s Vision for

Space Exploration. Now well under way, the Vision promises to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust program of human and robotic space exploration.

Significantly, this budget will fully support the vision activities

underway here on Earth, in low-Earth orbit, and throughout the

solar system. It will also enable significant progress in other research priorities, such as aeronautics and Earth science. The budget as is—is, as promised, affordable, representing a 2.4 percent increase in a very tight fiscal environment. Finally, this budget is focused, as a result of NASA’s disciplined effort to set priorities and

align our workforce, organizational structures, facilities, and partnerships, with the unifying goals that many in Congress have long

called for. The budget will provide resources to support Shuttle’s

safe Return-to-Flight, the continued assembly and operations of the

International Space Station, progress on the Crew Exploration Vehicle, and the development of several transformative technologies.

The budget will enable a new series of lunar science missions, beginning in 2008, and the new Mars missions, targeted to begin in

2011. And yes, this budget continues NASA’s commitment to conducting world class astronomy. It will help us maintain our current

fleet of orbiting laboratories, the Chandra, which is an X-ray observatory, the Spitzer, an infrared space telescope, and the Hubble

Space Telescope, and develop impressive new tools, such as the

James Webb Telescope and the Kepler Planet-Finding Telescope.

Under this budget plan, we will strive to extend the scientific

lifetime of Hubble through at least 2007 and possibly further, as

well as support the analysis of past and current Hubble images.

The budget also builds on NASA’s long-standing effort to improve

life here, and better understand our home planet. It emphasizes

our aeronautics research to enhance aviation safety and security,

increases the efficiency of air traffic management, and invests in

barrier-breaking technologies. Also, we will continue to add to the

constellation of Earth-observing satellites, and develop new spacebased technologies, and link systems for Earth observation.

Finally, we will determine—we are determined to inspire and

motivate the next generation of explorers, through a variety of innovative programs, such as the NASA Explorer Schools and the

Scholarship for Service program. Significantly, the Scholarship for

Service program is one of the many elements of NASA’s strategy

to help ensure that we sustain the Vision over the long haul. Under

this strategy, we are also taking steps to reshape NASA’s workforce

so that our skillsets are properly aligned with our mission requirements. This obviously will cause some impact on the NASA workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
28

force, but positively, we know that the vast majority of our existing

skillset is directly applicable to this Vision. We also know that we

have a large number of people eligible for retirement. Through our

tools like the Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004, NASA plans to strategically build up our talent base for the future. To advance the Vision, we will also pursue innovative partnerships with academia,

aerospace firms, and entrepreneurial companies. And we will encourage NASA centers to compete for useful work on technologies

that can spin in to exploration agenda, and spin out into the economy at large.

Indeed, all of NASA’s strategic and transformational changes are

oriented to making the Agency an even more vital contributor to

the prosperity and well being of the 21st Century America. That

is what this budget is all about, investing in the great cause of exploration and discovery, and the development of revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future.

I thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before this

committee this morning, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregory follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK D. GREGORY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to

appear today to discuss NASA’s plans for the future as represented in the President’s FY 2006 budget request for NASA. I will outline the major budget highlights

and discuss NASA’s transformation progress and strategic direction, and describe

how exciting the Nation’s future will be in exploration and discovery.

As Members are aware, on January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration. The President’s directive gave NASA a

new and historic focus and clear objectives. The fundamental goal of this directive

for the Nation’s space exploration program is ‘‘. . .to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.’’ In issuing

this directive, the President committed the Nation to a journey of exploring the

solar system and beyond, returning humans to the Moon, and sending robots and

ultimately humans to Mars and other destinations. He challenged us to establish

new and innovative programs to enhance our understanding of the planets, to ask

new questions, and to answer questions as old as humankind. NASA enthusiastically embraced this directive and immediately began a long-term transformation

that will enable us to achieve this goal.

In June 2004, the President’s Commission on Implementation of the United States

Space Exploration Policy, led by E.C. ‘‘Pete’’ Aldridge, Jr. (the Aldridge Commission), reported its findings and recommendations to the President. The Aldridge

Commission emphasized the crucial role that technological innovation, national and

international partnerships, and organizational transformation must play if we are

to implement the President’s Vision for an affordable and sustainable space exploration program. NASA is committed to making the necessary transformation to ensure our success in achieving the Vision.

The President demonstrated his commitment to the Vision by making it a priority

in his FY 2005 budget request, and Congress responded positively by providing

funding for NASA at the level requested by the President. The President has reaffirmed his commitment to the Vision by also making it a priority in his FY 2006 budget request. The $16.46 billion requested for NASA is an increase of 2.4 percent

over FY 2005 in a very challenging budget environment.

Exploration Vision is Well Underway

Over the past year, NASA has made great strides in implementing the Vision:

• Returning to Flight—We are making final preparations for Shuttle return-toflight as early as May 2005 and Space Station is entering its fifth year of continuous presence on-orbit.

• Exploring Our Solar System and the Universe—The Mars twin rovers are exceeding all expectations and making unprecedented discoveries; the Cassini/

Huygens mission is providing stunning views of Saturn and Titan; the GenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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esis mission has returned primordial samples from space; new missions have

been launched to Mercury and comets; amazing discoveries continue with

Hubble, Chandra and Spitzer; and we have completed deployment of the

Earth Observing System.

• Laying the Groundwork for the Future—We have had overwhelming interest

in our exploration efforts with 5,000 letters of interest, 600 proposals submitted, and competitive awards of 118 contracts for exploration technologies.

Also, initial contracts have been awarded as we prepare for major milestones

in 2008 including an unprecedented mapping of the Moon with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, and a technology demonstration flight of the Crew Exploration Vehicle, and a planned ground-based nuclear reactor test for Project

Prometheus.

• Engaging the Public—All of these accomplishments have created even greater

excitement for space exploration since the President’s announcement of the

Vision. Indeed, the incredible 17 billion hits on NASA web site over the past

year is a testament to the intense public interest.

Funding Based on Long-Term Affordability

In his February 2nd State of the Union Address, the President underscored the

need to restrain spending in order to sustain our economic prosperity. As part of

this restraint, it is important that total discretionary and non-security spending be

held to levels proposed in the FY 2006 Budget. The budget savings and reforms in

the Budget are important components of achieving the President’s goal of cutting

the budget deficit in half by 2009 and we urge the Congress to support these reforms. The FY 2006 Budget includes more than 150 reductions, reforms, and terminations in non-defense discretionary programs, of which three affect NASA programs. The Agency wants to work with the Congress to achieve these savings.

To achieve the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is proceeding, as directed by

the President, to plan and implement a sustainable and affordable, integrated

robotic and human exploration program, structured with measurable milestones,

and executed on the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and technology readiness. NASA views human and robotic explorers as partners in achieving

the Vision. Last year, we provided a long-range roadmap through 2020 to address

how such human and robotic exploration would remain affordable:

• Human explorers would return to the Moon no later than 2020 based on innovative new designs that would be developed in ever increasing capabilities or

‘‘spirals.’’ Major development of these hardware elements would commence

later this decade, given the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010. These

exploration elements would include needed launch vehicles, in-space transfer

systems, lunar landers and habitation systems, and a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that would ferry humans from Earth to the Moon and beyond. To

prepare for development decisions of these elements, we would use the intervening years focusing on critical research and technology (R&T). Such R&T

would encourage new innovations, and ensure development decisions that

could deliver hardware at the promised cost and performance. Funding for the

R&T this decade was largely achieved by terminating legacy human space

flight projects, such as canceling the Space Launch Initiative in last year’s

budget, and focusing existing R&T investments on exploration requirements.

• Robotic explorers would continue the exploration of the solar system, traveling to places like Mars in anticipation of eventual human visits, and going

to destinations that are more challenging, like Mercury, Saturn, Pluto, and

comets. Observatories would be deployed to search for Earth-like planets and

habitable environments around distant stars, and to explore the universe to

understand its origin, structure, evolution, and destiny. Funding for these

areas would significantly increase over the coming years with Science investments growing from 33 percent to 38 percent of the Agency’s total budget.

These human and robotic explorers will enable our exploration and scientific

plans. A recent report released on February 3, 2005, by the National Research

Council entitled Science in NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration states, ‘‘Exploration

is a key step in the search for fundamental and systematic understanding of the

universe around us. Exploration done properly is a form of science. Both robotic

spacecraft and human space flight should be used to fulfill scientific roles in NASA’s

mission to explore.’’

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Guided by Our Priorities

Indeed, the President’s FY 2006 budget request for NASA reaffirms the funding

strategy outlined above. The FY 2006 budget identifies what is needed to proceed

with the transformation of America’s civil space program. It maintains resolute

focus on key priorities, milestones, and schedules for the Vision introduced in the

FY 2005 budget:

• First Step—Space Shuttle return-to-flight and completion of International

Space Station assembly;

• Flagship Program—Constellation Systems including the 2008 Crew Exploration Vehicle flight demonstration;

• Technology Base—Critical exploration technologies;

• Transforming Technologies—Prometheus Nuclear Systems and Technology,

including a planned flight demonstration in a decade;

• Robotic Precursors—Lunar missions beginning in 2008 and Mars missions

added in 2011;

• Shuttle Transition—Space Station cargo and crew services via near-term commercial services and Shuttle retirement in 2010;

• Scientific Breakthroughs—Exploration of the solar system and the universe,

such as the James Webb Space Telescope launch in 2011 and the search for

Earth-like planets.

The FY 2006 budget also supports critical national needs in other areas:

• Aeronautics—Protecting priorities in aviation safety, security and airspace

systems and focusing on high-payoff, ‘‘barrier-breaking’’ technology demonstration projects;

• Climate Change—Supporting investments in the Global Change Science and

Technology Program and the next generation Earth observing satellites;

• Education—Continuing to inspire the next generation of explorers with programs like Explorer schools and scholarship for service.

To support the Administration’s goal of reducing the deficit, NASA’s budget was reduced $0.5 billion in FY 2006 below the level planned last year for FY 2006. In

addition, returning the Shuttle safely to flight costs $0.4 billion more than previously estimated in FY 2006. To address these and other items the net result was

$0.4 billion (11 percent) less in Exploration Systems than previously planned for FY

2006, $0.3 billion (five percent) less in Science, $0.1 billion (11 percent) less in Aeronautics, and $0.2 billion (four percent) more in Space Operations. These changes

were not easy but, in the end, we made the tough decisions while protecting the

priorities outlined above.

On December 21, 2004, the President signed a new national policy directive that

establishes guidelines and implementation actions for United States space transportation programs and activities to ensure the Nation’s continued ability to access and

use space for national and homeland security, and civil, scientific, and commercial

purposes. NASA will play a significant role in implementing this directive, fostering

and enabling the development of space transportation capabilities for human space

exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, consistent with the goals of the Vision for Space

Exploration.

Building on Our Scientific Successes

The FY 2006 budget request of $5.5 billion for the Science Mission Directorate

will support 55 missions in orbit, 26 in development, and 34 in design phase. By

2010, the Science budget will increase by 23 percent over current levels.

The FY 2006 budget includes $858 million (a 17 percent increase) for Mars and

Lunar robotic exploration. The Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, are exceeding

all goals with their unprecedented discoveries and longevity. Last year, they found

definitive evidence of an ancient body of water on the Red Planet, and they continue

to gather data more than a year after their successful landing. We recently awarded

contracts for six instruments to be flown on the 2008 Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter

(LRO) that promises unprecedented mapping of the Moon’s surface. The 2008 LRO

should revolutionize our understanding of the Moon to the same extent that the

Mars rovers have transformed our understanding of Mars.

The budget also includes $218 million to maintain competitive efforts for the Explorer Program, $56 million (a 33 percent increase) for the Beyond Einstein program

to study the universe, $234 million for studying the Sun in the Living With a Star

program, and $136 million (a six percent increase) for competitive opportunities in

the Earth System Science Pathfinder program. With our international partners, we

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also continue to add to the constellation of Earth-observing satellites that monitor

our planet while extending our reach and presence further into the solar system.

We launched Aura to look back at Earth and give us a better picture of our atmosphere and changing climate, and the entire Earth Observing System continues to

return trillions of bytes of information about our dynamic Earth. In the future,

NASA plans to develop a ‘‘sensor-web’’ to provide timely, on-demand data and analysis to users who can enable practical benefits for scientific research, national policy-making, economic growth, natural hazard mitigation, and the exploration of

other planets in this solar system and beyond.

NASA will continue to expand our exploration reach with an armada of existing

and new space observatories operating in many different wavelengths and looking

at different parts of our exotic universe. The three ‘‘Great Observatories’’—Hubble,

Spitzer and Chandra—will continue to bring wondrous images to our eyes and exciting new scientific discoveries while we continue development of new tools for research like the James Webb Space Telescope and the Space Interferometry Mission

that will vastly expand our understanding of the origin and evolution of the universe. Missions such as Kepler will provide a new understanding and knowledge of

the planets orbiting stars far from our solar system, perhaps identifying new targets

for voyages of exploration by future generations of explorers. This budget also includes $372 million (a 19 percent increase) to maintain the Webb telescope on pace for a 2011 launch and $93 million in development funds for

the Hubble Space Telescope to extend its scientific productivity and initiate a robotic

mission to safely de-orbit it. This investment in the Hubble, together with the synergistic use of the other two Great Observatories and combined with the greatly increased capability of ground-based assets and the emergent science of optical

interferometry, will ensure many years of new scientific discoveries for the Nation.

NASA decided to discontinue the effort on robotic servicing of the Hubble Space

Telescope, and, based on analysis of the relative risks, not to proceed with a Shuttle

servicing mission. The Hubble will complete its originally planned 15-year mission

this year and, with careful stewardship, should continue to operate for 2–3 additional years until its gyroscopes and batteries wear out. As it ages, other items may

unexpectedly fail, such as the recent loss of one of the four scientific instruments,

the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS). NASA’s decision not to service

the Hubble was a very difficult one given the Hubble’s spectacular successes. Nonetheless, although the spacecraft may have limited lifetime, NASA is fully committed

to saving the associated science. NASA’s FY 2006 budget request is consistent with

redirecting the HST effort to:

(1) Operate Hubble as long as the spacecraft generates useful scientific data;

(2) Develop techniques to extend its life;

(3) Safely de-orbit the spacecraft after the end of Hubble’s useful life;

(4) Examine options for addressing some Hubble science such as re-hosting new

or modified Hubble instruments on new space platforms;

(5) Continue analysis of the archived data generated by Hubble; and

(6) Aggressively pursue development of the James Webb Space Telescope,

which promises an exciting future of continued discovery.

Even though the Columbia accident has compelled NASA to change its plans for

the Hubble Telescope, NASA remains committed to our world-class program of astronomy.

Preparing for Our Exploration Future

The FY 2006 budget request of $3.2 billion for the Exploration Systems Mission

Directorate includes $753 million for continuing development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle, America’s future spacecraft for safe and affordable human exploration, scheduled for a flight demonstration in 2008. The CEV promises safer travel

for astronauts into space and continuing U.S. human access soon after retirement

of the Shuttle. The CEV as well as launch vehicles for transport of the CEV and

cargo to low-Earth orbit, and any ground or in-space support infrastructure for communications and operations, is collectively known as the ‘‘System of Systems.’’ This

will be developed in a ‘‘spiral’’ approach, wherein early demonstrations and prototypes are used to demonstrate capabilities, validate technologies, and mitigate risk,

all along an evolutionary path toward a mature design. The first spiral development

planned will provide the capability to deliver humans to orbit in a CEV by 2014.

The second spiral will deliver humans to the lunar surface by 2020, followed by the

third spiral that will enable extended visits on the lunar surface. As spiral development evolves, System of Systems elements will grow to include in-space support systems, destination surface systems, and additional human support systems. NASA

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will be assessing design options for the Crew Exploration Vehicle, including the ability to dock with the International Space Station.

The FY 2006 budget request includes $919 million (a 27 percent increase) for Exploration Systems Research and Technology that will enable designs for sustainable

exploration, including $34 million for a revamped technology transfer program and

$34 million for the Centennial Challenges prize program. The Agency seeks the

Committee’s support in providing the authorization language to enable larger prize

awards. This budget also includes $320 million for Prometheus Nuclear Systems

and Technology to support a new flight demonstration that is less risky and more

affordable than the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter mission. In addition, the FY 2006

budget request provides $806 million for Human Systems Research and Technology

which has been restructured so its programs are now linked directly to exploration

requirements for human missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.

Enabling Breakthrough Aeronautics Research

The President’s FY 2006 Budget fully supports the Aeronautics program’s vital research especially in the areas of emissions and noise reduction, increasing the Aviation safety and security, and increasing the capacity and efficiency of the National

Airspace System. The budget request also supports the critical research activities

that have been identified by the Joint Program and Development Office. NASA’s FY

2006 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $852 million. The

President’s FY 2006 budget increases the Aeronautics program’s vital research in

Aviation Safety and Security by four percent and Airspace Systems by 32 percent.

These two priority programs are fully funded to ensure timely results critical to

meeting national goals, especially those efforts in support of the interagency Joint

Planning and Development Office (JPDO). This is a consortium of government agencies, of which NASA is a principal member, chartered to transform the U.S. air

transportation system by the year 2025.

Participants include Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, and

Transportation.

To ensure maximum benefit to the taxpayer, we are transforming part of our investment in Aeronautics Research in order to more sharply focus the investment on

breakthrough technologies. Toward this end, the NASA Aeronautics Vehicle Systems Program has been restructured from the current emphasis on numerous

projects aimed at incremental improvements. Instead, the program is moving towards a smaller and more focused set of four projects seeking to achieve near-term

flight demonstrations of revolutionary and barrier breaking technology: (1) reducing

the noise of conventional aircraft to within the airport boundary, (2) reducing the

supersonic boom allowing future supersonic aircraft to fly over land without the restrictions in place today, (3) developing electric propulsion systems for aircraft that

eliminate pollution entirely because they do not burn hydrocarbon fuels, and (4)

demonstrating high altitude, long endurance, remotely operated or autonomous aircraft to create opportunities for new applications including scientific platforms. The

$459 million program request for FY 2006 will fully fund these four projects. In concert with the Agency transformation, this program will be conducted using a higher

level of competitively awarded research. We believe that this new focus and new

way of performing the research will enhance the value of our vehicle research to

the taxpayer.

Meeting Our Obligations

The FY 2006 budget request of $6.8 billion for the Space Operations Mission Directorate reflects the first step in the Vision: returning the Space Shuttle safely to

flight and resuming flight operations. The budget includes $4.5 billion to return the

Shuttle safely to flight and maintain safe operations in support of five planned

flights. NASA will retire the Space Shuttle in 2010. The FY 2006 budget also provides $1.9 billion for the International Space Station. NASA currently is examining

configurations for the Space Station that meet the needs of the Vision for Space Exploration and our international partners and require as few Shuttle flights as possible to complete assembly. A key element in the future of the International Space

Station program is the purchase of alternate cargo and crew transportation services

to supplement the Shuttle when it is in service, and to replace it when it retires.

The budget provides $160 million for these services in 2006 and NASA intends to

solicit a Request for Proposal for commercial cargo transportation services to the

Station this summer.

We are making final preparations to return the Space Shuttle safely to flight in

2005. We have made more than 100 major maintenance modifications and upgrades

to Discovery and its supporting systems, including new cabling and wiring that will

support leading edge sensors, a digital camera, and a boom extension for the ShutVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tle’s robotic arm that will enable us to inspect nearly all the outside areas of the

orbiter’s Thermal Protection System during missions. Technicians installed the Forward Reaction Control System and the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Nose Cap, and 88

sensors are being installed on each wing; 66 will measure acceleration and impact

data, and 22 will take temperature data during Discovery’s journey. Overall, we are

making excellent progress on the milestones toward a launch. The return of the

Shuttle to flight is a key milestone and we are committed to keeping human space

flight as safe as possible.

As the United States implements the Vision for Space Exploration, the Administration recognizes the value of effective cooperation with Russia to further our space

exploration goals. At the same time, we have to appropriately reflect U.S. nonproliferation policy and objectives in our relationship with Russia. The Administration is thus interested in seeking a balanced approach that continues to protect our

nonproliferation goals while advancing potential U.S. cooperation with Russia on

the Vision for Space Exploration. Such a balanced approach must include the Iran

Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA), which currently complicates cooperation with

Russia on the International Space Station (ISS), and will also have an adverse impact on cooperation with Russia on our future space exploration efforts related to

human space flight. To that end, the Administration looks forward to working with

Congress to ensure that the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration is able to succeed

while remaining fully consistent with broader U.S. national security and nonproliferation goals.

This year, we began our fifth year of continuous astronaut presence on the Space

Station. Astronauts continued their international cooperation on-board the Station

through a variety of joint research activities. Just last month, agency leaders from

the U.S., Russia, Japan, Europe, and Canada met in Montreal, Canada to discuss

Station cooperative activities. At the meeting, the Station partnership unanimously

endorsed completion of this orbiting laboratory by the end of the decade.

Building the Pipeline for Future Careers

The FY 2006 budget request of $167 million for the Office of Education reflects

NASA’s continued commitment to developing the next generation of explorers by inspiring and motivating students and educators at all levels in the formal and informal education communities to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering,

and mathematics. We will achieve this goal by providing unique teaching and learning experiences, as only NASA can, through the Agency’s research and flight missions. Students and educators will be able to work with NASA and university scientists to use real data to study Earth, explore Mars, and conduct scientific investigations. They will work with NASA engineers to learn what it takes to develop

technological breakthroughs required to reach the farthest regions of the solar system and to live and work in space. To ensure diversity in NASA’s future workforce,

the education programs pay particular attention to under-represented groups. NASA

will continue to support the Nation’s universities to educate more students in

science and engineering by providing meaningful research and internship opportunities for qualified students, plus a roadmap for students seeking NASA careers. The

FY 2006 budget continues emphasis on priority initiatives: NASA Educator Astronaut, NASA Explorer Schools, NASA Explorer Institutes, and Science and Technology Scholarship Program. Exploration advances knowledge.

The Vision is Transforming NASA

To achieve the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is engaged in a major transformation—taking the extraordinary capabilities we have throughout the Agency

and restructuring them to achieve the goals of the 21st century. This is an enormous challenge, but in less than a year, we have begun to transform our entire organization to foster permanent change and making a positive, mission-driven culture. We are creating an environment of openness and free-flowing communication

by continuing to assess our leadership practices. We also are sure that the entire

NASA family is headed in the same direction.

The focus of the transformed NASA is on how best to achieve the Vision and other

national priorities assigned to our Agency. Guided by NASA’s core values of Safety,

the NASA Family, Excellence, and Integrity, the Agency’s transformation is:

• Embedding a Safety Culture—NASA is continuing to foster its safety culture

throughout the organization. The Agency has reduced workforce accident

rates to industrial world-class standards and implemented an Independent

Technical Authority (ITA) and NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)

to guide NASA’s continued safety improvements. NASA’s FY 2006 budget assumes $87 million in Center service pool budgets to support the ITA funcVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tions. The budget also includes $79 million for the NESC (a 21 percent increase).

• Embracing Competition—NASA is embracing competition as a way to elicit

the best from the NASA’s Centers, industry, and academia. The Agency is

using competitive processes to encourage more cost-effective, innovative solutions to the scientific and technical challenges presented by the Vision. Over

the past year, competitive selections in exploration have demonstrated increased collaboration between NASA’s Centers and industry and academia.

The budget provides well over $10 billion in new competitive opportunities

over the next five years.

• Enhancing Strategic Planning—In a new document released with our FY

2006 budget request, The New Age of Exploration: NASA’s Direction for 2005

and Beyond, we outline NASA’s commitment to change and to achieving the

Vision. This document establishes NASA’s long- and short-term objectives,

supports our re-mapped FY 2005 Performance Plan, and underpins the structure and strategy of our FY 2006 budget. NASA’s 2006 Strategic Plan—to be

released next February with the FY 2007 budget request—will be informed

by the strategic and capability roadmaps currently being developed by national teams of experts from academia, industry, other government agencies,

and NASA.

• Improving Decision-making—Our transformed headquarters organization includes a Strategic Planning Council and a supporting Advanced Planning and

Integration Office to enable better long-range planning, an Operations Council to integrate NASA’s tactical and operational decisions, and a transformed

NASA Advisory Council to integrate Agency activities. We have streamlined

our corporate structure by reducing the number of headquarters organizations

by half to four Mission Directorates and eight Mission Support Offices.

• Reinvigorating Field Centers—NASA has identified Core Competencies, involving human capital and physical assets, which must be sustained within

NASA in order for the Agency’s mission to be achieved. These specific Organizational Core Competencies are resident at one or more NASA Centers and

funded primarily through competitive means. Every three years, these Competencies will be assessed as a part of the Agency’s strategic planning process,

and may be changed in response to changing mission requirements, emerging

commercial capabilities, and/or competitive results. NASA’s Centers will build

long-term business plans based on the Vision for Space Exploration, strengthen institutional capabilities around Core Competencies, and remain at the

cutting edge through competitive opportunities. NASA Centers will also be examining alternative management structures to enhance organizational agility

and to foster new business opportunities.

• Transforming Human and Physical Capital —As NASA sets its sights on exciting worlds beyond, NASA will require a workforce and facilities with the

right mix of world-class capabilities. The Agency is actively engaged in a

multi-faceted approach to shape the workforce of the future, and to align it

physical assets in support of current and future mission needs. The need to

reshape workforce and align physical assets is not a new challenge for NASA,

but with the Vision we are now provided the necessary long-term direction

to guide the transformation. In response to all these challenges, NASA will

use 2005-2006 as a transition period for Centers to reshape and rebalance its

workforce and facilities. The Agency is undertaking a number of targeted

workforce activities to ensure the relevant skills are available to accomplish

the mission. Additionally, it is taking steps to identify underutilized infrastructure that could possibly be replaced with state-of-the-art facilities providing greater utility or a lower cost burden to the Centers. Before closing any

facilities, NASA will be coordinating with other users and government agencies to determine the demand for underutilized facilities. In the near future,

NASA will be proposing a set of legislative initiatives as part of the Agency’s

draft Authorization Bill that will enhance the Agency’s transformation in support of the Vision.

• Implementing Improved Program Management Procedures—The Agency is implementing improved cost estimating and earned value management procedures to ensure we meet our cost commitments. We are also establishing an

acquisition strategy approval process that will draw on the best processes

from the Department of Defense and prior NASA acquisition policies. This is

to ensure that before contract award, all acquisition programs and projects

will satisfy the requirements and that the acquisition strategies, if done as

35

planned, are executable, have exit and entrance criteria, contain clear approval milestones, and involve independent reviews.

• Improving Financial Management—For the past two years, NASA has received a disclaimer of audit opinion on its annual financial statements due

largely to two issues—financial system conversion, and accounting for property, plant and equipment, and materials and supplies. In FY 2003 NASA

converted the 10 separate NASA Center accounting systems and the associated 120 subsidiary systems, along with over 12 years of historical financial

data, into one single integrated agency-wide core accounting system. Problems associated with this conversion have been greater than expected and are

taking longer than expected to correct. Accounting for property and materials

and supplies valued at $37.6 billion (83 percent of NASA’s assets on the balance sheet) lacks the necessary internal controls and systems to support valuation for management and audit purposes. NASA understands the seriousness of these issues and has developed work plans to overcome these and

other material issues, however it will take time to implement all of the corrective actions. NASA anticipates that improved audit results could be achieved

on the FY 2006 financial statements with a reduction in the number of material weaknesses and reportable conditions.

The Nation’s Future in Exploration and Discovery

The torch is being passed from the pioneers, who first took us to the Moon and

beyond, to the new generation of explorers who will take us into deep space to stay.

A new era in space exploration begins with the return-to-flight of the Shuttle and

the completion of the International Space Station, as we begin a journey that will

take the next generation of Americans back to the Moon, to Mars, and beyond. We

will also be pursuing ever more aggressive plans with advanced robots and space

observatories that will require this nation’s most sophisticated technical capabilities.

This generation inherited great legacies from the exploratory voyages and discoveries of earlier centuries. It is our responsibility to ensure that future generations

inherit from our journey a similar legacy of achievement and inspiration. Implementing the Vision will provide this legacy. The FY 2006 NASA budget reaffirms

the President’s commitment and allows us to take the next step in implementing

the Vision.

As President George W. Bush said, ‘‘We choose to explore space because doing so

improves our lives and lifts our national spirit. So let us continue the journey.’’

BIOGRAPHY FOR FREDERICK D. GREGORY

Frederick D. Gregory is the Deputy Administrator of NASA. He assumed this position in August 2002. He serves as the Chief Operating Officer for the Agency and

reports directly to NASA’s Administrator. He is responsible for directing and managing many of the programs as well as the day-to-day operations and activities at

NASA.

Prior to becoming the Deputy Administrator, Mr. Gregory served as the Associate

Administrator for Space Flight and was responsible for overseeing the management

of the International Space Station; Space Shuttle operations; Space Access using Expendable Launch Vehicles for commercial launch services; Space Communications;

and Advanced Programs. He held that position from December 2001 to August 2002.

From June 1992 to December 2001, Mr. Gregory held the position of Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, at NASA Headquarters. As Associate Administrator, he was responsible for assuring the safety, reliability, quality,

and mission assurance of all NASA programs.

Mr. Gregory has extensive experience as an astronaut, test pilot, and manager of

flight safety programs and launch support operations. As a NASA astronaut, he

logged 455 hours in space: as pilot for the Orbiter Challenger (STS–51B) in 1985,

as spacecraft commander aboard Discovery (STS–33) in 1989, and as spacecraft commander aboard Atlantis (STS–44) in 1991. Mr. Gregory served in several key positions as an astronaut, including Astronaut Office Representative at the Kennedy

Space Center, for the first Space Shuttle flights (STS–1 and STS–2); lead Capsule

Communicator (CAPCOM); Chief, Operational Safety at NASA Headquarters; and

Chief, Astronaut Training. He also served on the Orbiter Configuration Control

Board and Space Shuttle Program Control Board.

Mr. Gregory retired as a Colonel in the United States Air Force in December 1993

after logging 7,000 hours in more than 50 types of aircraft, including 550 combat

missions in Vietnam. His 30-year Air Force career included serving as a helicopter

pilot and as a fighter pilot. He graduated from the United States Naval Test Pilot

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School and served as an engineering test pilot for the Air Force and for NASA. He

was selected as a pilot Astronaut in January 1978.

Mr. Gregory holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Air Force

Academy and a Master’s degree in Information Systems from George Washington

University. He is a member or past member of numerous societies, including the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, American Helicopter Society, Air Force Academy

Association of Graduates, the National Technical Association, the Tuskegee Airmen,

and the Order of the Daedalians, and the Association of Space Explorers. He has

been or currently is a board member with the following organizations: Maryland

Science Center; Young Astronaut Council; Kaiser-Permanente; the Photonics Laboratory at Fisk University, and the Engineering College at Howard University.

His honors include the Air Force and DOD, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Force

Commendation Medal, 16 Air Medals, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, Legion of

Merit, Defense Superior Service Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, National Intelligence Medal; NASA, three Space Flight Medals, two Outstanding Leadership Medals, Distinguished Service Medal; National Society of Black Engineers

Distinguished National Scientist Award; the George Washington University Distinguished Alumni Award; President’s Medal, Charles R. Drew University of Medicine

and Science; Honorary Doctor of Science Degrees from the College of Aeronautics

and the University of the District of Columbia. He was also awarded the Air Force

Association Ira Eaker Award as well as numerous civic and community honors.

He is married to the former Barbara Archer. They have two children and four

grandchildren.

DISCUSSION

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Gregory, and

let me tell you, this committee, on a bipartisan basis, was privileged and proud to work with you and all at NASA to get that

Workforce Flexibility Act in place, to give you the flexibility you

need to treat your staff the way it should be treated, as very able

professionals.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, there are a lot of questions NASA can’t answer yet. And I understand that. I am going

to go through a list of nine items, and for each of them, I would

like to know when NASA will be able to give Congress an answer

to the question. It would be helpful to know a month, but a season

will do. I will stop after each item.

ISS RESEARCH

First question. The research agenda for the Space Station.

Mr. GREGORY. I would say that the research agenda, at least the

first part of it, should be available at the end of this month, or

early in March, but if it is okay with you, let me ask Mr. Craig

Steidle, who is responsible for that, to give you——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Admiral.

Mr. GREGORY.—a more definitive answer.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Thank you.

We will complete the assessment that we have under way by the

28th of February, and I will give it to Bill Readdy, who—and then

together, we will put it together, and have a completion of that

study at the end of April.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Next question.

Whether the Space Station will be reconfigured once again, whether we will bring up the centrifuge.

Mr. GREGORY. The—about three weeks ago, we had the privilege

of meeting in Montreal with the heads of agency, that would be the

Sean O’Keefe equivalent in Japan, Canada, Europe, and Russia.

37

Chairman BOEHLERT. Or the Fred Gregory equivalent, come Sunday.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you, sir. I have had the privilege of

chairing something called the Multilateral Coordination Board,

which is the board just down from—the representatives just down

from the top. During that session, we looked at the, and agreed to,

the final configuration of the International Space Station. We made

a recommendation to the heads of agency, which they accepted.

As part of that configuration, we looked at the assembly sequence, and we looked at the number of flights that could accomplish that configuration. At the same time, however, with the

change in—with the identified focus that we have now, as part of

the Exploration Vision, we also held open the opportunity to reevaluate the components that we will have on the International

Space Station. This was very openly addressed with the international partners, and each has taken upon themselves, and given

themselves the opportunity re-look at what they are—what they

would have on the Space Station.

We, of course, are focused toward the Exploration Vision. It is a

requirement-driven activity that we have, as we assess each and

every piece and component, as it prepares us to take the next step.

Chairman BOEHLERT. So when will we be enlightened? A season,

at least?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, Admiral Steidle gave you that answer just

a moment ago. He said that they would report out at the end of

February, and that probably by the end of April, all of us will

know, sir.

REMAINING SHUTTLE FLIGHTS

Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay. The number of remaining Shuttle

flights planned.

Mr. GREGORY. The—at this moment, we are looking at a number

that is around 28. But as I said earlier, what we are looking at is

the fewest number of flights necessary to complete the International Space Station with its requirements by December 31,

2010, as you mentioned.

But let me have Bill Readdy give you his opinion.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Readdy.

Mr. READDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 28 flights is the baseline

manifest, as agreed to by the international partners, but as a result

of the Vision for Space Exploration, we are taking a very critical

look at that, and what components will be flown, and as Mr. Gregory and Admiral Steidle both said, by the end of April, we should

have a little bit more clarity in terms of perhaps some of the content for that.

We don’t want to use the Space Shuttle for any more flights than

we have to, where its unique capabilities to carry modules to the

International Space Station, to support spacewalks, to support

robotic operations, and crew transfer, and logistics. We don’t want

to use that for any more flights than we have to to complete our

obligations.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. So by the end of

April, we can expect something more definitive?

Mr. READDY. In terms of the centrifuge, that is correct, sir.

38

Chairman BOEHLERT. And what about the number of flights?

Mr. READDY. The number of flights will be an iterative process

with our international partners and ourselves, as we assess what

our exploration goals are, and as they assess what their exploration

goals are. So expect—that will be a continuing dialogue, but the

first step in the Vision for Space Exploration, of course, is returning the Space Shuttle safely to flight, and we are very focused on

doing that right now in late Spring.

Chairman BOEHLERT. So it is still an open question on the number of flights, as you point out.

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. I think it will be an open question, and it

will certainly be dependent on how we fare with return-to-flight,

and the remainder of the flights this year, and input that we get

from the international partners.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, let us go on down to the manifest for

the Shuttle flights. That is, which flight will conduct which mission? Has that been determined yet?

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. At least in the baseline manifest, each and

every one of those 28 flights has been laid out, with specific mission objectives, and that is how we pared it down initially, to meet

our international commitments. We are assessing each and every

one of those flights, and General Kostelnik and his Space Station

Deputy, Mark Uhran, and the Program Manager, Bill

Gerstenmaier, are looking at all of those flights to see which ones

are uniquely requiring the Space Shuttle as a launch capability.

As you know, we are also looking at commercial crew and cargo

to the International Space Station this fiscal year. We look for the

opportunity to be able to provide logistics with other than Shuttle,

certainly after it is retired at the end of this decade, but to that

end, this summer, we expect to have a request for proposal issued,

and then by the end of this calendar year, we expect to start

issuing contracts to that end.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Whether NASA will have to lay off employees this year or next. Mr. Gregory.

Mr. GREGORY. The answer to that is very clear, and that is between now—this year and next, there will be no employees laid off.

We have adequate budget to cover all salaries for the next year and

a half or so, or the next two years. During that time, we will be

assessing, in a very deliberate way, based on the Vision that we

have, the kind of requirements that we have, and the kind of resources that will be necessary, and that includes people and facilities and capabilities, sir.

PROJECT PROMETHEUS

Chairman BOEHLERT. What mission will be used as a test for

Project Prometheus?

Mr. GREGORY. Craig Steidle.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Admiral.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Did you say vehicles, sir, or——

Chairman BOEHLERT. What mission?

Admiral STEIDLE.—test mission? Which mission? We don’t know

exactly what the mission will be to demonstrate Prometheus, but

we are doing an analysis of alternatives to define exactly that.

39

On Prometheus in general, we looked at the risk and the scope

and the dollar value of the JIMO mission that was proposed. After

we signed the MOU with Naval Reactors through its Department

of Energy hat, we did an assessment of that particular mission,

found that we were pushing the state of the art for what we were

trying to achieve in the JIMO mission, so we looked at some earlier

spirals, earlier demonstrations of fuel capabilities, probably in ’08,

demonstration of a prototype in ’11, and hopefully, for a mission

by—within the—another decade. We haven’t defined exactly what

that mission will be, but it will be a demonstration of an in-space

nuclear electric capability, a joint exploration and science mission.

CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The basis parameters for the Crew Exploration Vehicle, including the crew size and

whether it could service the Space Station.

Mr. GREGORY. The RFP for that will go out, I believe, the first

week of March. We anticipate a response back, and a selection in

the August timeframe, and let me, again, give Mr.—Admiral

Steidle the opportunity to talk about that area.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Admiral.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, what we have done,

slightly different, is we have tried to leave the trade space open as

wide as we possibly could, first thing. And we tried to get as much

participation with industry as we could in the early design and

scope of the concepts.

Chairman BOEHLERT. That is to be applauded.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. So what we—thank you—what we did

is we led a Broad Agency Announcement, and we picked 11 teams.

They go from the traditional primes down to t/Space, and some of

the nontraditional players, and brought them into the fold, actually

working with us to define the requirements, and helping us write

the RFP. So we have kept that trade space open. The final version

of the RFP will go out by the 1st of March, with a selection, as Mr.

Gregory said, in August. We are going to keep that trade space

open through about the summer of ’06, when we will define with

more rigor such parameters and capabilities, such as the number

of crew, and the launch vehicles, and pieces of that nature.

NASA’S PROPOSED IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT REMEDY

Chairman BOEHLERT. NASA’s plan for dealing the Iran Nonproliferation Act.

Mr. GREGORY. I appreciate that question. As we all work to accomplish the President’s Vision for Space Exploration, we recognize

that this is a journey for all mankind, and as with endeavors such

as the International Space Station, the cooperation of international

partners will be welcome.

I can tell you from personal experience we have worked very,

very closely with the Russians, and I will tell you, it has really surprised me how close these two countries have come, and how they

have certainly exceeded our expectations. There have certainly

been challenges. There are always challenges in programs such as

this. But we recently accomplished something called a balance

40

agreement, which preceded the INA activity, or the INA Act. And

we are now very comfortable with the ability to maintain and sustain a human presence, both American and Russian, on the International Space Station through April 2006. It includes transfer,

crew transfer both ways, and Station crew rescue capabilities.

The Administration is interested in seeking a balanced approach

that continues to protect our non-proliferation goals while advancing potential U.S. cooperation with Russia on the Vision for U.S.

Space Exploration. Such a balanced approach must include the

Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which is the INA, which currently complicates the cooperation with Russian on the International Space Station, and we also have to address the impact on

cooperation with Russia on our future space explorations, efforts

related to human space flight. To that end, the Administration

looks forward to working with Congress to ensure that the Vision

for the U.S. Space Exploration is able to succeed while remaining

fully consistent with broader U.S. national security and non-proliferation goals.

Chairman BOEHLERT. So when will we know? We welcome their

cooperation in space exploration, and applaud that. I would like to

see that same cooperation——

Mr. GREGORY. It is——

Chairman BOEHLERT.—with nonproliferation.

Mr. GREGORY. This is a very critical decision, that has to be

made, and an agreement and understanding. I can’t tell you yet

what the form of it will be, but I do know that NASA, along with

the Administration and the Department of State, are working diligently to prepare, so that we can engage with the Congress to come

to an understanding. I would say that it would be sooner rather

than later, and if you will allow, when we get greater detail, we

will report back to you, sir.

LAUNCH VEHICLE FOR THE CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE

Chairman BOEHLERT. And finally, the launch vehicle for the

CEV.

Mr. GREGORY. Let me give—again—this to Admiral Steidle.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Admiral.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. What we have done, sir, is taken a

step back, and I will get to answer in just a second. But what we

have done is pulled out all of the trade studies that have been done

from launch vehicles. We worked together, Bill Readdy, myself, and

our Director of Mission Safety and Analysis, Brian O’Connor, to redefine the human ratings plan and human ratings document.

We have—are going to share that with the industry. We are

going to complete our trade studies, and present the capabilities to

industry right after we put the RFP out, and that will be in April,

so that is the capability that is going to be required for the Crew

Exploration Vehicle.

During the summertime, when we select the two teams that will

actually build the demonstration model and go forward, we will

share with them the human ratings document and plan, so that we

can integrate this as a total system. We will also go out with an

RFP for a launch vehicle to support the Crew Exploration Vehicle.

41

In the December timeframe, we should have the selection of the

Crew Exploration Vehicle launch vehicle.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. I have exercised the privilege

of the chair by going beyond my normal five minute question period, but these are questions that are on the minds of all of us on

this committee, on both sides of the center aisle. And from the answers, and some of those, understandably, were somewhat vague,

you can appreciate why we are having this hearing, and are determined to follow through and work cooperatively with you to ferret

out the answers, so that we can make some decisions based upon

fact, rather than just theory, or for that matter, emotion.

We all are excited by space exploration, and I was one who was

there when the President gave his January 14 speech last year. I

stood and applauded, because he inspired us all. He outlined a vision, and to his credit, he didn’t say we are going to do it tomorrow,

and Congress, write me a blank check. But he did indicate a determined effort to explore the great beyond, and that is something we

all are interested in.

Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was an important

line of questioning. Over the last few years, we have been given a

lot of wait and see type answers, and I think it is important that

we do set some deadlines, and I will try to be brief, to make up

for your lack of brevity here, because you served us all with those

questions.

SOYUZ AND THE IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT

Now, Mr. Gregory, the last Soyuz we have contracted for goes up

this year. And so in terms of timetables, next year, either we are

going to have—the President is going to have to certify compliance,

or there is going to have a repeal of the Non-Proliferation period—

Treaty. Is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, would you repeat the question——

Mr. GORDON. Yes.

Mr. GREGORY.—one more time?

Mr. GORDON. Since the last Soyuz is going to be going up this

year, that we have contracted for, they have agreed to do, and we

have no alternative method, then next year, and the Russians have

made it clear, over and over, that they are not going to do it at

their own expense, then so next year we are going to—the President either has to certify compliance or there is going to have to

be some type of repeal of the Iran Non-Proliferation Treaty. Is that

correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, you are correct that we have an agreement

with the Russians for them to carry out the crew transfer and the

rescue. As I had stated earlier, it is vital that an agreement be

reached on how we handle the INA. That is still being discussed

on the Administration’s side, and as soon as we are aware of the

medium with which we will approach Congress, we will come back.

From my point of view, it is essential, it is mandatory, and it will

set us up to continue the build and completion of the International

Space Station.

Mr. GORDON. Now, the Russians have made it clear, they have

said over and over, they are—that they are not going to do this on

42

their own. So if that is the case procedurally, then, if we have to—

and we have no alternative but to purchase additional Soyuzes

next year. Then the only alternative, is this correct, that either the

President has to certify compliance, or there has to be repeal or

modification of the Act? Is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Something will have to occur, yes.

Mr. GORDON. I know that. Right. But would it have to be one of

those—is it—is there anything other than one of those two alternatives?

Mr. GREGORY. At this moment, I am aware, perhaps a waiver or

an exception. Other than that, sir, I am—I don’t know what the

other vehicles would be.

Mr. GORDON. There is a waiver or something. Could you—then,

could you lay out—would you provide for the Committee, please,

what those alternatives would be?

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, if we would allow—we will provide that for

the record, as soon as——

Mr. GORDON. Right.

Mr. GREGORY. As soon as we learn.

Mr. GORDON. Well, you don’t know? I am not asking you what

the President is going to do. I am asking you what are the alternatives the President can do?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, those——

Mr. GORDON. Those should be known, shouldn’t they?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, those are the two that I can speak of at this

moment. But if you would allow, I will research and provide it for

the record.

NASA WORKFORCE

Mr. GORDON. Again, I am not—I know that you, you know, don’t

have ESP. You can’t know what the President is going to do, but

you—he, I assume he is going to ask you what are the alternatives,

and that is what we would like to know, what the alternatives and

what the timeframe would go with that. Let me ask you, also, approximately how many employees does NASA currently have? Just

approximately.

Mr. GREGORY. Jim Jennings, can you give us an answer?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes. We have approximately 18,000 employees in

NASA today.

Mr. GORDON. And what does your five year budget assume for

the workforce levels over the next five years?

Mr. JENNINGS. Our current budget, we are budgeted through ’07

for the 18,000 employees. Going into ’07, we are budgeted for about

2,000 less than that, and over the next two years, we are going to

work to understand our exploration program, and where that competition lies, and our assumption is we will remain close to the

18,000 during the—through the run-up.

Mr. GORDON. I thought you said there were going to be 2,000

less. And you can’t take 2,000 off, and then still have 18.

Mr. JENNINGS. Our current budget planning is 2,000 less beginning in ’07, but we have a lot of work that hasn’t been defined in

the exploration program. Our expectation is, over the—during this

budget process, that work will be defined, and then, we can assign

folks in the center to that fund.

43

Mr. GORDON. But you can’t put—you can’t really have an accurate five year budget without knowing what your workforce level

is going to be.

Mr. JENNINGS. The process we go through, we define the mission,

and then we look at and see what human resources is required to

carry out that mission.

Mr. GORDON. Well, that means you are going to be getting rid

of current employees that don’t meet your—the mission, and bring

in additional employees that will have the skills and talents.

Mr. JENNINGS. That will be part of the process, looking at our

skill mix issues, but to answer the question, as we put the budget

together, we didn’t have a lot of the exploration vision defined, so

we couldn’t assign those employees at centers to it. So as we define

those, we will assign the folks at the centers to that particular dollar lines.

BUYOUTS

Mr. GORDON. And you have advertised buyouts at a number of

the centers. Can you tell us how many employees you are hoping

to take the buyouts and how many actually took the buyouts?

Mr. JENNINGS. The current buyouts that we had planned, this

year, we had hoped to get about 425 employees to take those

buyouts. We got about 325. We are offering the buyout again across

the Agency, and we hope to get about the same number in this new

buyout.

Mr. GORDON. Let me compliment you for—its—we don’t often get

specific information here, and I thank you for helping us with that.

Mr. Gregory, the NASA briefing charts indicate that NASA has

a team looking at, and I quote ‘‘transformation to alternative organizations, such as Federally-Funded Research and Development

Centers, and further consolidations with additional facility closures.’’ In other words, privatizing the NASA centers or shutting

down some of the facilities. Could you give the Committee specifics

on what is being planned?

Mr. GREGORY. Certainly, sir. Well, first of all, as you look at

the—if you look at the exploration vision, the exploration vision is

probably the largest sustained activity that I am aware of, certainly nothing like this has ever occurred in the government, and

probably in industry. As you transform and prepare yourself to look

forward, and to sustain an activity like this, it requires changes.

It is absolutely mandatory that changes occur. As we have reorganized the headquarters to bring together the themes that we have

in order to support, it also requires that we look at the skill mix

that we have in the agency. It looks at how we get the best bang

for the buck. We are all taxpayers. We want that—the monies that

come to us to be spent in a very reasoned way.

It also requires that not only do we look at the skill mix, but it

also requires that we take a look at the facilities that we have, and

there are activities where we look not at closing down centers at

all. That is not part of it. But looking at those resources that we

have, assets that we have, to determine what is necessary, both in

the short term and the long-term, that we should either maintain,

upgrade, shut down, and rebuild. Another thing we are looking at

are management organizations. You mentioned the FFRDC, the

44

Federally-Funded Research and Development, but that is one of

many alternatives that we are looking at, a university affiliate, industry partnerships, government institutes of sorts. And so we

have actually asked each center director to evaluate what they do,

and determine what are those obstacles, or those hindrances, to do

even greater work.

And so each center is looking at them, and there was a team put

together that came up with several options, but I think it was very

clear, as the team worked together, that there was not a single solution, that it could be one of several, that it would not necessarily

replace, but might complement. And so all of those activities are

going on as the Agency transforms itself to support the exploration

vision.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Gregory. My time is running out.

But let me just say it was almost staggering, in terms of magnitude, that you described the changes that are getting ready to go

on. This is sort of the genie going out of the box here. That is why

we really would like to be partners with you in trying to determine

where NASA is going, because there is the potential to lose a tremendous amount of skill and employees, and institutional knowledge that can’t be replicated. And so we have got to be sure that

we are going the right direction, and a sustainable direction, because the magnitude that you pointed out, there is no turning back.

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir. And I certainly agree with you, and that

is why, as Mr. Jennings just mentioned, we have several years to

thoroughly assess and make a reasoned—or give you a reasoned

answer. No rash decisions at all, as far as I can tell, and I think

that you will be very satisfied and pleased with the way the Agency

responds to these very important questions.

Mr. GORDON. It sounded like two or three years was—I don’t

know whether that is several, but it was—there is going to be some

pretty big things happening in two or three years.

Mr. GREGORY. Until 2007, we have stability.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired, and I want to commend the gentleman from Tennessee, who

has proven that Democrats are as loquacious as Republicans, and

just as constructive and productive in the line of questioning.

Mr. Calvert.

SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT MANIFEST

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Gregory, for your testimony.

I guess this question is for both you and Mr.—and Admiral

Steidle. You mentioned that approximately 28 missions were necessary to finish the International Space Station, and as we all

know, when we look at the budget for NASA, the first thing that

strikes you, of course, is that the Shuttle and the Station itself take

up approximately 40 percent of the overall budget. So in order for

us to move on to the President’s vision, we need to stay on budget

and finish the Station as soon as possible.

Of the flights that are going to Station, how many are solely for

the assembly of the International Space Station, and how many are

purely supply missions?

45

Mr. GREGORY. As is usually the case, all Navy guys look the

same. It was actually Bill Readdy, also a Navy person, who would

be the appropriate person to answer that question.

Mr. CALVERT. All right.

Mr. READDY. Thank you, Mr. Calvert. The 28 flight manifest is

a mix of some modules going up and logistics, and so you can’t necessarily take one mission and say, okay, that is a logistics mission

solely, because each and every mission is going to carry some logistics. Not every mission is dedicated to a particular cargo element.

So there is some logistics and some assembly in most of those

flights.

I will get you the answer for the record, because we are assessing

the mission content from that 28 flights and working backwards,

based on our exploration vision.

ALTERNATIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

CONSTRUCTION

Mr. CALVERT. The reason I was asking that question, are there

alternatives—and some testimony that indicated that there was—

besides the Shuttle. Obviously, the Shuttle is an expensive infrastructure to maintain, but the sooner we get the Station done, the

sooner we could retire the Shuttle. Is there—have you looked into

other lifting components to—that would be able to lift these components and get this done sooner?

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir, we have. And just to set the stage here,

the International Space Station right now, that is on orbit right

now, circling the world every hour and a half, is about half-built.

It is about the size of a 747 jumbo jet. The solar arrays have got

about the same wingspan as a 747, about the same habitable volume. Most of the other components are at the Kennedy Space Center, and they have already been integrated into launch packages,

and they are ready to go, with the exception of the Columbus Laboratory that the Europeans are providing, which is over in Bremen,

Germany, and some other components. So——

Mr. CALVERT. Have you looked into if, in fact, basically, the components that are on the shop floor, and it is a matter of getting

these components up and constructing the Station to its—to completion, if in fact, we resolve our issues with Russia and the Iran

proliferation problem that we have to work out, could they be helpful in getting this done sooner by using some of their lift capability?

Mr. GREGORY. We have already looked at the ability to use other

launch vehicles, and because those launch packages, those modules

were designed to be launched on board the Space Shuttle, the

launch environments, the loads, the integration of those different

packages doesn’t allow you to repackage those for a different

launch vehicle, with different interfaces, without substantial redesign. So we don’t think that that is possible. It may be that by adjusting the manifest, there are some components of the International Space Station that, based on our new exploration vision,

and that of our partners, may no longer fit in the assembly sequence, though.

46

CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

Mr. CALVERT. Going back to the CEV for a second, Admiral, you

mentioned in your testimony in answering a question that determining at this point exactly how that vehicle is going to be comprised and moved forward, it seems me, I am new to this Chairmanship. I have been here two weeks, but I have been on the Committee 12 years, that we haven’t had a lot of great success in working out the—a new launch vehicle. Can you make us more comfortable up here, what new emerging technology we have, and

whether or not you are looking at new emerging technology, and

new commercial folks out there, that can provide us some hope that

we can actually get this completed?

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We have, as I alluded to, we

have done a lot of trade studies analysis. This is for the Crew Exploration Vehicle, not the Heavy Lift, which—we can segregate

those two pieces into different avenues. But on the Crew Exploration Vehicle, there is a lot of commercial pieces that are available. The—we are looking from the Shuttle-derived variations,

where we can take the reliability of pieces that have been used on

the Shuttle, to what is being used on the EELVs today, and doing

the trade studies on both of those pieces.

And that is the process that we are going through. You have to

look at the life cycle costs of those particular systems, the logistics

efforts of those, the infrastructure that is in place today, versus the

development costs that are needed later on, and then, the human

rating aspects of that, what it costs to actually put the Crew Exploration Vehicle on top of these particular pieces. That will be concluded in April, and then, Bill and I will work as—together to go

forward to define those capabilities that are going to be required

by the summertime for the teams that will actually build the demonstration, they need to have that information by the summer of

’06.

There is assets—there are assets out there that will meet our

needs. There are proposals from these 11 teams that we have been

working with for the last year right now, to put the Crew Exploration Vehicle on top of it. So I feel very confident that we are

going to move forward, and have a very good solution for it.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Admiral. I see my time has expired.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Ms.

Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to

the full Committee Chairman and Ranking Member, to the Subcommittee Chairman and Ranking Member. I think this committee

and the responsibility of oversight is, if you will, embracing of all

philosophies. We know the importance of NASA. We know the importance of science, and so we come to the hearing with the concept

of how we can do better.

And I thought I would just offer some observations that are

somewhat painful, but I think it is important to couch our debate

or our discussion in a very realistic perspective. First of all, the

budget that we are operating under, the proposed Administration’s

budget, and the constraints that we have to work on here in Congress, I think, can be appropriately named the pinch and pain fedVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
47

eral budget. It makes it very difficult for us to make the right

kinds of choices, and it forces on us priorities that eliminate some

very good options and opportunities.

I am concerned about that.

I also believe that NASA has gained, and I thank Ranking Member Gordon for his leadership in terms of the advocacy that he has

shown as it relates to the NASA human Space Shuttle in particular, because I am reminded of more than 10 years ago, when

it was a very, very tall mountain to climb in order to get across

the board support from all regions of the country to support NASA.

Frankly, I believe it is important for us to develop stakeholders,

more so than the reordering of an appropriations process to make

friends. You don’t make friends that way. You make friends by ensuring that the NASA program invests in many aspects of science,

including human Space Shuttle, which I happen to be a very strong

supporter of.

FUTURE OF NASA WORKFORCE

As I look at, if I may pose these questions dealing with employees and staffing, and I do so even in light of the fact that Kennedy

and Johnson, Johnson in Texas, may have some protection only because we are dealing with the human Space Shuttle for the next

couple of years, up to 2010. But I always am reminded of the fact

that if they come for you at night, they will come for me in the

morning. And so it is important to understand what we are doing

with our employees.

I am particularly concerned that if we have these rumors about

closing, one, you are losing outstanding research scientists. Two, all

of your future scientists now being trained in our institutions

around the Nation, our institutions of higher learning around the

Nation, and possibly international scientists, have no reason to

look toward NASA or look toward the science entities here in the

United States, because we are cutting individuals. Of course,

maybe your answer will be that you are cutting administrative, et

cetera. But that is not what is going out across the wires. So I

want that question again, and I know that it was probed earlier,

but this seems like a BRAC. We have no understanding, we—is

there a commission? What is your timetable, etc.?

My second question leads into my safety concern. The CEV vehicle that we are talking about, and I do want to acknowledge, mind

my manners, thank Sean O’Keefe, the Administrator, for his great

service, and I do want to say Administrator Gregory, which I will

call you, your service is to be appreciated by this nation and by this

committee. We thank you very much. But this vehicle that is proposed, there are proposals, but it is a draft request for proposal. It

contains no requirement for the CEV to ferry crews to and from the

International Space Station. One of the concerns I had with the

Gehman report, and I couch it in terms of concerns, is that it didn’t

go far enough to review the safety needs of the International Space

Station.

Over the months and years, we have heard of different deficiencies. Safety is a big issue. Safety is an issue for the astronauts.

Safety is an issue for those who are at Kennedy and Johnson. Safety is an issue for the ISS, and I would like specifically to ask what

48

is the safety budget? Where is that line item for the next five

years, and what is it for the last two years, so that we can compare? What is NASA’s commitment to safety? So I ask you to share

with me your ordering of this BRAC for NASA. How are we going

to protect these employees or reinvest in our employees, so that we

get the kind of talent we need, the CEV question, and of course,

the safety question.

I thank you, Mr. Gregory, very much.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you, ma’am. Very, very, very important

questions.

Let me address the awareness, and I think you have rightfully

pointed out an issue that we have really been working with. I

think, if you would really look at what has occurred in the last

year, we have always believed that if we make decisions at Headquarters, everybody knows exactly what it means, and there is no

misinterpretation. What we found out was, in fact, that doesn’t

happen. And many times, decisions are made, and they are misinterpreted, and what we end up with are a series of rumors and

people are very concerned about it, not only from their welfare, but

the integrity of the programs that they are working on. We have

taken a very active role in the last year to move to each center,

and in fact, we have done that, with a group of folks, where we talk

about those very specific areas and issues.

And we have also been—major—we have also encouraged the

center directors to go back and tell, as they should, exactly what

the plans are. Sometimes, we miss a person, or a group of people,

and we then very quickly try to go back and describe exactly what

the process is, how it works with the vision, and what the transformations that occur, and after we have been able to do that, we

have had, I think, very good agreement and understanding by our

people. But we really need to do more.

NASA BUDGET AND SAFETY

The second issue, on safety. You have at this table two people

who actually flew in the Space Shuttle, myself and Bill Readdy.

And so we are very aware of the issues that you are mentioning.

There has been a major re-look at the safety program in the agency. It has also looked at the independent assessments. It has also

looked at the way that the agency can determine whether choices

or decisions or waivers that have been granted are, in fact, valid.

And so this is a dialogue that we should we have where we fully

explain all of the pieces and parts that not only responds to the Accident Investigation Board, but we believe go way beyond that.

Your question of budget, we have Steve Isakowitz, the Comptroller, on the end, and Steve, can you handle that?

Mr. ISAKOWITZ. Yes, sir. You asked a question on budget with regard to the safety.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Sir.

Mr. ISAKOWITZ. Yeah. We actually don’t have specific budgets

just for safety. We have, in a number of areas, teams of folks that

are dedicated, such as the NASA Engineering and Safety Center,

that we had set up in this year’s budget, which is about $70 million

in the ’06 request. We also had set up an independent technical authority, which was one of the recommendations that came out of

49

the CAIB, and there, we had identified about $80 million in the ’06

budget for that purpose. But we also, in the dollars that we invest

in the Shuttle and Station program, we have people as part of their

job, safety is an important aspect for it. And so to that degree, we

don’t specifically break out those safety-related items, even though

it is integral to the overall safety strategy.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is

up. May I just pose this question to the Chairman? I would really

like them to provide me in writing those specific numbers on safety, and also, the answer regarding the number of employees they

are projecting to be cutting from around those centers. And I would

appreciate it very much. And I thank the Chairman for his indulgence.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, and all Members

will be given the opportunity to submit questions in writing to our

witnesses, and we will accumulate them, submit them to Mr. Gregory and his team, and ask for timely responses.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hall of Texas.

SPACE SHUTTLE AND CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE SAFETY

MODIFICATIONS

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Ms. Jackson Lee

hit on the thing that this country listens more for at this time in

conjunction with the space program than anything else, and that

is safety. And I would like more specific than we have been given.

I know it is difficult to design, because of weight problems, proper material, and designs, but two things that have kept us from

having a safety escape mechanism of some type for these men and

women, isn’t design and difficulty, but design and cost. I can’t accept the fact that you can put cost into that, because I don’t think

you can put a figure on the lives of the people that have—we have

already lost, and all of you know that two years ago, the Columbia

disaster underscored, I think, the sad reality that we have not done

enough to ensure crew safety.

I think you remember, or are aware of the fact, and I am sure

the Comptroller is, that I authorized an amendment that was included in last year’s NASA funding bill, that calls for $15 million

to be used to solicit the best concepts from the aerospace industry

and elsewhere to improve Shuttle crew survivability. You are

aware of that, are you not?

And I will go ahead and ask the second question. What safety

changes have you made for the first future flight, which I understand the window opens about May the 12th for this year?

Mr. GREGORY. Mr. Hall, why don’t I let Mr. Readdy answer that

question, but let me tell you something. Safety permeates NASA.

We have values, NASA values, number one is safety. Number two

is the NASA family. Number three is excellence. Number four is integrity. When you go to different centers, you talk to different people, they don’t have a variation of that. That is—those are the

NASA values that we have, that we work to every day. Bill Readdy

has been on top of the—of all of the safety enhancements, and I

think—Bill, can you, why don’t you summarize some of those for

Mr. Hall?

50

Mr. READDY. Mr. Hall, thank you for your support. Crew escape

is, I think, what you are talking about, and as you mentioned, the

inherent design of the Space Shuttle really makes it nigh on impossible to put that into the Space Shuttle design. That was one of the

things that influenced our thinking on making sure that we would

only fly those flights necessary through the end of the decade to

complete the International Space Station. And not fly to 2020, as

had been previously planned.

Admiral Steidle and his folks are ensuring that in the request for

proposals for the Crew Exploration Vehicle, that we build in crew

escape throughout all modes of that vehicle. And I think that represents the real commitment that we have in the future to providing a safer means of getting crew to and from space.

Very specifically, though, in the Space Shuttle world, as we all

know, the foam liberated off the tank caused the accident. But we

haven’t simply looked at insulation of that external tank as what

we must do to Return-to-Flight. Today, we are testing solid rocket

motors out in Utah. Today, the Stafford-Covey task group is down

in Florida reviewing our progress on Return-to-Flight implementation plan. We are looking across the Space Shuttle hardware, from

stem to stern, including all the ground operations that we do, and

the management operations, in order to make sure that we come

back not only much smarter as a result of the Columbia accident

investigation, but also with a much stronger and safer program.

Mr. HALL. I certainly don’t question anybody’s interest in safety,

nor would I even dare to question those of you who have undergone

the vicissitudes of flight, and the dangers, and know better than

any of us here the—really the fragility of that flight in the future,

and that one that we are going to launch later this year, and those

that follow.

What I want to know is, and I understand the difficulty involved

in attaching or installing an escape module in any of the three existing Shuttles, but I don’t really want to see us initiate any new

thrusts unless we are at least underway with incorporating safety

mechanisms and devices. I won’t say modules, because you may

have a module, and you can’t put a module in a module, but I use

the words safety mechanisms and devices. I think that is what this

country and this committee and this Congress, and this—and everyone interested in the space thrust is listening for, is safety that

you are underway with now. I would hate to have another tragedy,

and not have us underway with trying to solve the problems that

exist with the losses that we have had.

So I guess what I really would like to know is the $15 million,

how that has been spent, and has it been spent, and is it allocated

still toward that that it was set up for?

Mr. GREGORY. Admiral.

Admiral STEIDLE. Sir, we will have to get you the specifics on exactly where the $15 million went. I can tell you, as Bill said, our

top priority in the Crew Exploration Vehicle is safe escape throughout the entire envelope, and that is through mechanisms,

modularization, and designed by industry with us. But as——

Mr. HALL. What does that mean?

Admiral STEIDLE. That means working with industry, we have

established the capabilities, and we have stated that you—industry

51

and the design team has to have the capabilities for a safe crew

ejection and safe return throughout the entire envelope. You may

miss—we may lose a mission, but we will not lose the crew. That

is the design specifications. Now, how you do that has to be done

together with us and industry together in that. Specifically, where

that particular funding went, I will have to get back to you, because I don’t have that with me, sir.

SPACE SHUTTLE RETURN-TO-FLIGHT SAFETY

MODIFICATIONS

Mr. HALL. All right. All right. And the last thing I want to ask,

I think there was a question asked about the basic changes in

the—for the first launch. Was that your question, Mr. Chairman?

And the number of crew members, and I didn’t hear an answer to

the number of crew members.

Mr. READDY. With respect to Return-to-Flight.

Mr. HALL. Yes.

Mr. READDY. We have looked at those things that we must accomplish on that mission, and as you know, the first two flights are

going to be test flights. There are so many things that we have

done to improve the system, that even given the exotic laboratories

that we have here on Earth, the vacuum chambers, the wind tunnels, the computational fluid dynamics, and everything else, quite

simply, we won’t know until we actually go fly. So the first two

missions are test missions. They include a whole number of safety

changes, not only the ability to observe the Space Shuttle during

its ascent, all the way through the external tank separation, the

ability to inspect the vehicle with an orbiter boom sensing system,

and then, when we get to the Space Station, we will also be doing

developmental test objectives to look at reinforced carbon carbon,

or the wing leading edge material repair, as well as tile repair. All

of those things require seven people on Return-to-Flight missions,

sir.

Mr. HALL. So seven is the figure.

Mr. READDY. Seven is the figure for the Space Shuttle Returnto-Flight.

Mr. HALL. I thank you. I yield back my time.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. And that return-toflight will be commanded by Colonel Collins?

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. That is correct. Colonel Eileen Collins, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. A New Yorker, I might add. The Chair recognizes Mr. Udall.

Mr. GREGORY. Not only Elmira, but also Air Force——

Chairman BOEHLERT. And also a Syracuse University graduate.

Mr. GREGORY.—instructor at the Air Force Academy.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Udall.

POSSIBILITIES FOR A SHUTTLE SERVICING MISSION TO

HUBBLE

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will attempt to follow

in the footsteps of my good friend, Mr. Hall, in his loquacious brevity. The Hubble Telescope, of course, has been the center of a lot

of discussion recently. I want to focus my initial comments on the

52

telescope. And I have made no bones about my support for a servicing mission, and I am afraid the treatment of Hubble in your testimony doesn’t really address my objections to the Administration

decision to terminate funding for any Hubble servicing mission.

I know you have to support the Administration’s position on

Hubble, so I don’t expect you to change your testimony, but I would

like to review the bidding. NASA asked the National Academies to

review the options for extending the useful life of Hubble. A distinguished Committee did that, and their conclusion was unanimous

and unambiguous, and that was that a Shuttle servicing mission

is the best option for extending the life of Hubble, and for preparing it for eventual robotic de-orbit. They also concluded that a

robotic servicing mission was unlikely to succeed in the time available. In the wake of that report, what did NASA do? Well, NASA

eliminated the funding for the robotic servicing mission, but it

didn’t reinstate the SM–4 servicing mission, and I think I am not

alone when I say I don’t understand that.

The Academies Committee squarely addressed the issue of safety

risk, and concluded it was comparable to flying the Shuttle to the

Station, which NASA is already committed to doing. And I haven’t

heard any convincing rebuttal from NASA to the Academies safety

risk assessment since their report was issued late last year.

So in that context, let us look at the remaining issue of cost.

Your accomplished panel, Mr. Gregory, told the Chairman that it

would be about 28 flights give or take what will be needed to complete the International Space Station, but you also said this number isn’t solid, and could likely change, so it appears to me that the

potential impact of an extra Shuttle flight to service Hubble is

overwhelmed by the uncertainty in the estimates of how many

more times we will be flying the Shuttle before it is retired.

Isn’t that so?

Mr. GREGORY. Administrator O’Keefe made a very conscious and

deliberate and well-informed decision that the Shuttle would not

service the Hubble. We acknowledge and recognize and agree with

the Academy, when it says that the Hubble is a wonderful vehicle,

has provided excellent information. We have learned quite a lot

from it.

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Gregory——

Mr. GREGORY. But I can tell you that I agree with Mr. O’Keefe,

as a former Shuttle pilot, and so I have the—at least the credentials to talk to you about what it is that I would consider safe or

risky, and I will make that very strong recommendation to the next

Administrator, who—either he or she is.

Mr. UDALL. No, I am not questioning your service and your valor.

What I wanted to make the point is, is that in the context of 28

or 30 additional flights, because I am talking about cost now, not

the safety side, of the equation is that an additional flight fit into

that timeframe to me, doesn’t seem to be something that is—would

overwhelm what we are trying to do with the Space Station.

So if I can continue, just—my commentary. The National Academies, when Dr. Lanzerotti spoke before us two weeks ago, he

made a very important point. He said that when deciding whether

to allocate the costs of a Shuttle servicing mission to the agency’s

science program, it is important to remember that throughout the

53

life of the Hubble program, the costs of Shuttle missions to service

Hubble have never been charged to the science program, and the

costs of Shuttle missions to the ISS have never been charged to the

Station program. I believe those statements are both true.

Mr. GREGORY. Now, those were true, and they were certainly applicable before the Columbia accident.

Mr. UDALL. And so in that context, do you see any logical basis

for changing the commitment that Administrator O’Keefe made to

Congress, namely, that the Shuttle costs of SM–4, Shuttle servicing

mission, would not be charged to the science program? This statement from—answer to a question from Administrator O’Keefe was

in response to Mr. Gordon asking him about the Hubble servicing

mission, and it was in this statement, which I would like to enter

into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. No objection.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF MR. SEAN O’KEEFE

Below is the answer submitted by Mr. Sean O’Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in response to written questions submitted by Congressman Bart Gordon resulting from the February 27, 2002 Science

Committee hearing on NASA’s FY03 budget request:

Q2. According to the FY 2003 NASA budget request, the new policy is that the cost

of any Shuttle flight above the four per year allocated to the Space Station will

be borne by the customer for that flight. In your response to my question at the

February 27th hearing, you stated that ‘‘in the next Hubble servicing mission

two years out, you will see that cost incorporated in the space science costs.’’

Does the five-year budget runout for space science contained in the FY 2003

budget request include funds for the cost of the Shuttle flight for the next Hubble

servicing mission? If so, how much funding is allocated for that Shuttle mission,

and where is it included in the space science budget, by account and fiscal year?

A2. The next Hubble servicing mission is SM–4, which is scheduled to launch in

2004. This long-planned servicing mission is considered ‘‘grandfathered in’’ under

this policy, and the projected budget for the mission was included in the five-year

budget run-out under the Office of Space Flight. The Office of Space Science will

have to budget for the Hubble retrieval mission, currently scheduled for the 2010

timeframe.

Mr. UDALL. The servicing mission was considered grandfathered

in under this policy. So the point I am trying to make is that I

don’t think cost is the concern here, and I would like your comments.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you very much, Mr. Udall. Exactly right.

Cost is not an issue, as we evaluated whether—if there were extra

flights or so one of them could go to the Hubble. That was not an

issue at all. What we have done is to look at what we have done

in the past, and then, the—I think the Accident Investigation

Board was really an eye-opener, and there is a paragraph in the

Accident Investigation Board report that I would like to enter into

the record, that really says you know, you guys have just become

so can do that sometimes, you forget that this is an extremely risky

business, and we tend to minimize what is sane to do and what is

inappropriate.

As I looked at it from the commander’s point of view, and I have

had that privilege several times, I began to look at what are those

things that we would have to do to assure the absolute safety of

the crew, and then I began to look at the options that we had. One

54

of those that they mentioned in the Accident Investigation Board

was a safe haven.

A safe haven is a place where you can go without an issue of

whether you will sustain your life or not, and have the ability to

sit and think, not only on-board, but also, the people on the ground.

If you go to the Space Station, you have that opportunity. You have

a very large, as Mr. Readdy talked about, a volume in there, and

you can put all of the crew in there to sit and think.

When you go to the Hubble, you don’t have that opportunity at

all. The only life support activities, or the capabilities you have are

those things that are resident on the Shuttle. And I know the

Academy talked about 30 days. Well, let me tell you, that is not

a good date. That is something that says you have powered down

the orbiter to a point where you are maintaining the ability to

power up and come home. But it really doesn’t address the issue

of what the quality of life is on board, or whether, in fact, it can

sustain life. We do not have a Transatlantic abort site for a 28 degree launch. Now, let me tell you what that means. When you

launch, you always want to have an opportunity to land, and if you

lose a system or an engine, you would like to be able to proceed

straight ahead and land at a prepared site. We do not have any

sites for 28 degrees, which is a due east launch out of Kennedy.

The next thing is, we would have to hold a vehicle on the ground,

and that sounds simple, but to have a vehicle standing by to get

to the orbiter, that is—has a problem, within 15 days or less. The

agency has never demonstrated that capability before. So this is a

very high risk activity. And let us assume that we had it. We will

have never, ever practiced a rendezvous of two orbiters on orbit,

and this sounds simple, again, but I can tell you, and Bill Readdy

can tell you, this is something no one has ever done before. Probably, we could do it. Probably, I don’t know how that means. I don’t

know what that really means. But it also means that we are going

to have to rendezvous and get into an attitude, and connect these

two orbiters. We have never done that before. And so we have a

significant number of risks that I think that the Academy may

have brushed over. And of course, the first one is that we haven’t

launched it yet, and that is not occurring until May, and so there

were some assumptions—and there are many, many other areas

that we have looked at——

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION SAFE HAVEN CAPABILITY

Mr. UDALL. I see my time has expired. But I think if the Chairman will indulge me for a minute. I think this is an important line

of discussion. I understand what you are saying, Mr. Gregory, but

I also know that—at least, I am under the impression that NASA

is not planning for a safe haven on the Space Station after the first

two Shuttle return-to-flight flights. And the question then becomes

how long are you going to baseline safe havens, if it is not going

to be continued, then essentially, there is no difference between the

ISS and the Hubble Telescope missions, and many in the astronaut

corps have pointed that out, as the NAS study did as well.

And I respect you defending the position that NASA has taken,

but I do think that when you look at the relative dangers involved,

and the risks involved in these two types of mission, that there is

55

not a lot of difference between. And I know that there will be many

of us who will continue to advocate that if we are unwilling to take

the risks to go to Hubble, then what does that say about a Moon

and eventual Mars mission, that there are risks in space travel and

exploration, as my good friend Congressman Hall pointed out, but

there are also ways to balance those risks with the rewards, and

Hubble is such a tremendous asset, both public relations-wise, as

well as the science that has been developed, that there are many

of us that continue to believe there has to be a way here.

I made a speech on top of my questions, and I apologize, but if

you could briefly answer my questions about the baseline safe

haven concept that you are pursuing.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, let me give you an initial one sentence, and

then pass it over to Bill Readdy. A safe haven is always an opportunity on the International Space Station. It will always be there,

and whenever we dock, whether we have planned to have it as a

safe haven or not, it will always be there. It will always be there

as a contingency, even though we have not planned to use it as a

safe haven.

Bill.

Mr. READDY. To provide a little bit more detail, you are exactly

right. For the first two flights, we have insisted that we have a safe

haven available onboard the International Space Station, and we

are going to assess exactly how many days we have. As Mr. Gregory mentioned, what the Space Station offers is the ability to very

deliberately assess the situation before you commit to launching

another orbiter.

We could certainly have another orbiter stacked, ready to go on

another launch pad, but to commit to flying that orbiter to do a rescue mission, to do the high wire act that he talked about, a free

space transfer of crew members, suited, from one ship to another,

to commit to that ahead of time we don’t think is a prudent thing

to do, and we respectfully disagree with the National Academies

assessment of that as trivial. De minimis, I think, was the term

that they used.

In terms of Space Station having a safe haven capability, on the

28th of this month, when the Progress launches, we will have an

ability to assess what the safe haven capability is. Just for planning purposes, we have been looking at 33 days. That includes a

number of engineering analyses that we have done, and counts on

having failures as soon as you launch the Space Shuttle, of the oxygen generating equipment on board the Space Station. When the

Progress docks, we think planned right now for March 2, we will

have a much better assessment, and we would expect that the

number of safe haven days aboard International Space Station

would be 40 plus days at least. Some estimates are in the 50s of

days. That certainly gives you an awful lot of time to very soberly,

very deliberately assess the commit to launch of a rescue mission.

And finally, with the Space Station, you can effect a shirtsleeve

transfer just as part of our nominal operations, which we do routinely, with the Space Shuttle docked to International Space Station. So I think all of those things are not trivialities, as were kind

of stated by the National Academies.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

56

Mr. UDALL. I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. I think this

is a very important issue, and this discussion has been very helpful.

Chairman BOEHLERT. I agree on both counts. Dr. Ehlers.

RISK ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had planned to ask the

same questions. So I will simply continue the line of questioning.

The Hubble Telescope has been described as the greatest advance in astronomy since Galileo developed the first telescope, and

I think that is probably accurate.

The Hubble Telescope, in a week, would probably do better and

more science than we are likely to do during the lifetime of the

Space Station. I have yet to see any good description of any important, meaningful scientific research that we are planning to up

there, and I would be—I would love to be shown wrong on that.

But the Hubble is a real treasure. I believe Mr. O’Keefe’s decision

was wrong. I told him that the day after he made it. And what I

see before me now appears to me very much to be simply trying

to justify a decision that I believe was made in haste, and was not

an appropriate decision. When you talk about the cost as being $2 billion, that is certainly

an inflated figure, when you are able to fly, you are talking about

five flights for $4 billion, why is it $2 billion for the Hubble flight?

And Mr. Gregory, I have to respond to your question about absolute safety. If you are going to insist on absolute safety, you are

not going to fly again, and you are definitely not going to send anyone to Mars. Get rid of the term absolute safety. There is no such

thing.

There is risk involved in going into space. Every one of your astronauts understands that. I have talked to them personally. I have

asked a number of astronauts personally, would you be willing to

volunteer to go on a Hubble mission if you were given the opportunity. None of them I have talked to have said no.

The—I believe the commission that studied the Columbia disaster did an excellent job, but I am concerned about the lack of understanding of risk analysis among the public and many people involved with this. You cannot guarantee absolute safety. You try to

reduce the risk as much as possible, but all of you—those of you

who have been in space, those of you involved with this, recognize

there is risk associated with it. There is also risk associated with

me driving my car from my apartment to work, and a sizable risk,

and yet, I do it every day.

We live in a sea of risk, and we try to minimize the risk, and

I appreciate what you are trying to do, but I think—I am really

concerned, not just about the Hubble, but about the impact on

NASA itself if we get so overwhelmed with concerns about safety

and not—aren’t willing to recognize that there is a risk, and set tolerable risk limits, so that you can accomplish your missions. Otherwise, as I say, we are never going to go to Mars, if we continue to

insist on such low levels of risk. The costs will balloon out of sight,

and the country will not be willing to pay for it.

I—your analysis—I can understand why your analysis of risk

might differ from the NRC’s. At the same time, these are pretty

57

bright people, and they understand this issue. You said in your testimony, the mission was canceled based on analysis of relative risk.

I would like to see that analysis, if you would provide that to us,

and see what detail you went into, and in what ways you differ

from the National Academy of Sciences. I would very much like to

see you change your position, and dedicate a flight to saving the

Hubble. I believe the scientific merit of it deserves that chance, and

the risk is no greater than any of the more than 100 missions you

have already flown, and I think although the disasters you have

had are horrible, you have lost two flights out of roughly 100, and

that is greater than the risk you had anticipated when you began

flying the Shuttle. But it is—I don’t want to even say it is an acceptable risk, but I think you have got a pretty good record, and

I don’t think you should be ashamed of that. You have shown that

the Shuttle is a safe vehicle. Both of these disasters can be explained by anomalies that were not foreseen, and—which is what

most accidents are caused by. And you should not be ashamed of

your safety record. I think it is good. I think you have really done

a good job, and you have tried hard. And I don’t see that much of

a risk in going to the Hubble again, which you have already done

a couple of times, and I would love to see it happen.

I appreciate any comments you are willing to make in that regard. But if you are talking about 28 flights up to the Space Station, certainly one flight to Hubble is of lower risk than 28 flights

to the Space Station. You are much less likely to suffer a catastrophe on one flight to the Hubble than you are in the 28 to the

Space Station. And I think you have to look at the relative value

of those.

Mr. GREGORY. Dr. Ehlers, let us talk the science part of the relative value of the Hubble, how it works with the Chandra, with the

Spitzer, with the Swift, with the James Webb that is coming up.

Al Diaz would be the appropriate one to respond to the science aspect.

Mr. EHLERS. Okay.

HUBBLE AND THE FUTURE OF NASA ASTRONOMY

Mr. DIAZ. Well, I appreciate the opportunity to say a few words

here, because both Mr. Ehlers and Mr. Udall, I think, with their

comments, really have confirmed that the work that we have done

on Hubble has produced exactly what we intended to, which was

world class astronomy for the past 15 years. And having been there

in 1990, when Hubble was launched, and having been involved in

the development of it, I am humbled by the fact that it was really

the Space Shuttle and the Space Shuttle crews that made the difference between Hubble becoming space junk and it being exactly

as the Academy identified it, as the greatest advance since Galileo.

It has been difficult for the team to accept at times that—the nature of the decision that was made, but frankly, I think all of us

have accepted the fact that in the wake of the Columbia accident,

that it is impossible for the Agency to commit to doing another mission. In fact, as the director of the Goddard Space Flight Center

last year, I was the one that proposed to the Administrator that we

look at the robotic servicing of Hubble, which actually led to the

Academy evaluation, and I must say that, in the end, while I might

58

not agree with every one of the recommendations that the Academy

has made, their final conclusion, actually, with respect to the robotics, is consistent with four or five other independent reviews, that

being that the cost would be very high, and the $2 billion number

that you mentioned, that is associated with that robotic mission.

What we have been forced to conclude is that the discussion

about Hubble really needs to be a discussion about continuing that

world class astronomy program, and not about the telescope. And

I think that—I would suggest to you that the budget that we have

brought forward, and the strategy that it supports, is one that is

focused on continuing that world class astronomy program. It clearly recognizes the need to continue the Hubble Telescope activities

as long as possible. We believe that that could extend into 2008,

at least now, and hopefully, we will be able to manage some developments that might get it to 2009. The other part of our strategy

is to keep the development of the successor, or the follow-on telescopes, for the astronomy program, on their current schedules by

investing in maintaining those schedules, specifically with regard

to that—the James Webb Space Telescope, which promises to continue every bit of the discovery space that Hubble has.

In addition to that, we intend to continue to support the development of other capabilities that might extend the telescope’s life and

continue the support of the archive data. I think it is probably not

well-known, but 40 percent of the discoveries that are reported out

of Hubble are actually extracted from the archives that are at the

Space Telescope Science Institute. And so I think that we have

come forward with a plan in the 2006 budget that is, in fact, one

that promises to continue the world class astronomy program, despite the fact that we will no longer plan to service the telescope.

Mr. EHLERS. In the appropriations last year, Congress directed NASA to spend $291 million on a Hubble servicing mission. What

is happening to that money?

Mr. GREGORY. Craig, do you want to—Steve?

Mr. ISAKOWITZ. Sir, I will be happy to take that one. Congress

did identify $291 million for the purposes of robotic servicing. In

our first operating plan letter that we sent to the Congress that

laid out our plans for fiscal year 2005, we had identified $175 million specifically so we can do some of this early design work, looking at the servicing, and now focused on a de-orbit mission that we

think will take us through the March/April timeframe. Our current

plan now is to assess where we are at that time, and determine

what additional resources are needed in this fiscal year to take us

through, and so our plan is in our—as early as our next operating

plan, which could be at the end of February, early March, to indicate to the Congress our plans for how to go forward through the

rest of this fiscal year.

Chairman BOEHLERT. I thank the gentleman for his line of questioning.

Mr. EHLERS. Let me just make a final comment. I don’t think it

makes sense to try to use robotics to continue the Hubble. The

costs and the likelihood of success, I think, are too small.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, the timing, too, is also a factor.

Mr. EHLERS. Right. But I—yes, but I do strongly support a

manned or womanned mission to continue the Hubble. I think you

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get a lot of good out of it for a fairly small investment. I am fully

aware of the other advanced telescopes that are going up, but there

is a gap between—there will be a large gap between the Hubble,

end of the Hubble, and the beginning of the James Webb at this

point, and I would like to see that gap filled.

I am just concerned, as I said, that the decision was made—I

don’t think it was made on a sound basis, and now, I have seen

NASA ever since then try to defend that decision, and come up

with arguments of why that decision was right, rather than really

going back and honestly re-examining whether or not it was right.

And I would certainly appreciate an honest re-examination of that.

With 28 flights going up, as Mr. Udall said, it seems you could

spare one for the Hubble, and I don’t think that the risks are going

to be very much, if any greater, than any of the other 28 flights.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. I thank the gentleman, and I want to reinforce his request, Mr. Gregory. The Committee would formally request that you share with us the risk report.

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes Mr. Honda.

CENTER TRANSFORMATION AND THE NASA WORKFORCE

Mr. HONDA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and welcome, Administrator Gregory. Well, all this line of question has been very

interesting for me, because this is probably one of the first times

that we really had some detailed discussions, but I am still not

clear on a lot of areas. When I first visited NASA Ames through—

facility in Mountain View, some of the comments I heard while

walking around there was this terminology called, what is it, full

cost accounting and its impact on the way our skills and our folks

are being distributed or redistributed, and then, I am reading

about this term transformation.

I guess my question is, I would like to understand how you see

the impact of transformation on existing contracts, including the

research contracts and cooperative agreements, especially the kinds

that we have had developed at NASA Ames in Mountain View with

UC–Santa Cruz, or San Jose State, with Carnegie Mellon, and

those others. Will NASA be fully honoring its existing obligations,

and you know, and the reason I am asking is because I am concerned about the dissolution of that collaboration, relative to its impact on the kinds of science that we need to see, and relative to

the kind of education I want to see happen from that point down

into the public schools. And it just—I am not quite sure what all

the details of your plan is to achieve your vision, and it seems to

me that everything seems to be served, in my mind, disconnected

or haphazard.

And then, I have one more other question, that I will ask, so that

I won’t get stopped by the red light. In looking at the vision and

the mission of sending—going back to the Moon and to Mars, and

it has been about two years now, since we have had this activity

in front of us, has anybody done a plan, if you will, that would map

out, in a backward fashion, from achievement of the goal, working

it backwards and figuring out what the steps are, and developed

60

a PERT chart, program review evaluation technique, that they

have used in the development of the nuclear submarine, which

turned out to be a very good technique for moving a complex

project such as this. Do you have that? Is that something that we

can visit or see, or be shared with Members here, so that the complexity of the project can sort of be grasped by our minds, because

right now, there are so many parts of it, it appears to be—there

is costs, and there is personnel attached to it, and changing of techniques that—it seems to be very disorienting, I think, for a lot of

people. And that is my questions.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you, Mr. Honda. I think it would appropriate to have Al Diaz respond to the activities at Ames, and then,

we will have Craig Steidle address the second portion of your question.

Mr. DIAZ. First, let me say that in my visits to Ames recently,

I have recognized that the center has transformed itself dramatically over the course of the past five years of so when I previously

visited. It is a new addition to the science family, and the center

director and I have been having almost daily, if—well, weekly, anyhow, interactions about the transformation that is ongoing.

It—with regard to the agreements, I must say that I have not reviewed all of the agreements. Although the Center Director has not

indicated to me that there are any agreements that are in jeopardy

because of the current transformation, or full cost accounting. What

I would like to do is take the opportunity of your question to review

that with him, and get back to you with a full report.

NASA FULL COST ACCOUNTING

Mr. HONDA. Just a real quick question. In that full cost accounting, how does that allow NASA to attain its vision, say, in terms

of the arena of nanoscale activities, which to me seems to be very

essential in developing materials for space flight and things like

that, so you have a lighter vehicle, but stronger, and capable of

probably lifting greater payloads. So it seems like we are cutting

out certain arenas that will affect future needs.

Mr. DIAZ. Well, I may not be the right one to talk about full cost

accounting in general, and so if there is any further comment, that

might be appropriate to Steve Isakowitz. But I do come from a center that does a fair amount of research at the Goddard Space

Flight Center, and I have been associated with work that has been

done at JPL. Fundamentally, there is no inconsistency between full

cost accounting and research type activities. The issue is making

sure that we understand exactly what the cost is that is associated

with all of those activities, including the workforce cost. Typically,

that has been the cost that—the cost of the workforce, and the cost

of overhead, that hasn’t been properly accounted for. I think that

the transition to full cost has created some, if you will, some new

understanding of how high the cost actually is that is associated

with doing some of our research, when it is compared to other organizations that already do full cost accounting, like JPL or external

organizations.

And maybe Steve would want to comment on it.

Mr. HONDA. But not being argumentative, it appears that in that

full cost accounting, that you are forcing through budgetary acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tions, some elimination of necessary skills within our organization.

Even though there may be other organizations that operate under

full cost accounting, they are more of a privatized organization

versus NASA, which is more government-run, and more researchoriented, where you do a lot of research, and you know, that may

come up with some outcomes that would be necessary for space

flight. It is just—it just is an observation.

Mr. DIAZ. I understand what you are saying, and I think we are

trying to be careful about that, but let me turn it over to Steve at

this point.

Mr. ISAKOWITZ. I think Al Diaz had it exactly right. Full cost accounting is an accounting tool. It provides to managers the insight

on the full cost of what it takes to accomplish their specific program and project goals. With that information, managers are then

in a position to determine whether or not it makes sense to continue to make the investments inside the Agency or another. But

in and of itself, full cost doesn’t force us to take any specific action.

It does, for the first time, though, give us the insight as to what

the cost is for the skills we need and the facilities we need in order

to execute our programs.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s

time has expired.

Mr. HONDA. Just very quickly, Mr. Chairman. I would like to sit

down with you, and continue the debate, because you can have a

budget-driven organization and miss your target, because you are

on budget, and—but you are not going to be on target as far as

your mission is concerned.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. There

has been considerable discussion this morning about risk, and as

we all know, there is risk in everything, including being in this

room for a prolonged period of time. It is more conducive to a discussion of our polar program. In any event, nothing is ever simple

in Congress. We don’t have control over the thermostat. We have

checked with higher authorities, and have been advised by the Superintendent of Buildings that someone will be dispatched to turn

up the thermostat, and they will probably arrive just as we adjourn, so if you can bear with us a few more minutes, I would appreciate it.

Mr. Costa.

NASA PRIORITIES AND ROADMAPPING

Mr. COSTA. I will make one statement, though. Sir, you have already turned up the heat, and so I don’t think anyone at this table

is chilly.

I am sorry, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am new

to the Committee, and hopefully, we will keep the temperature just

about right.

But in listening carefully to the questions that have been asked

this morning, it seems to me what we really haven’t come to the

heart to, is what do we really want to make the basic mission of

NASA for the next five or ten year period, notwithstanding the pronouncements of the President’s with regards to the Moon exploration and Mars, it just seems to me that trying to get a handle,

and a consistent, clear view on our manned space program and all

62

that that entails, versus our other efforts with our exploratory astronomy, that we have yet to reach a consensus as to just exactly

what NASA’s mission needs to be over the course of the next ten

years.

I mean, the budget is what the budget is, and you know, it will

vary, based upon our other priorities, but once we have made a decision on that, you have got a set amount of dollars to deal with,

and it seems to me the underpinning of the basic hard question

that we seem to discuss around, and I am supportive of the Hubble

effort as well, but we need to complete the Space Station, I think.

And the problem, it seems to me, is we basically haven’t decided

what the primary mission or missions of NASA is going to be over

the course of the next ten years. And notwithstanding a lot of—

what a lot of people’s agenda or ideas are—and so I guess I would

like you to maybe try to indicate to us in terms of what steps you

are taking to attempt to prioritize, notwithstanding your funding,

where you think the manned program fits with the other priorities

that are there.

I mean, it just seems like a whole lot of things that have been

thrown against the wall at this point in time, and we are all very

proud of NASA and the accomplishments that you have achieved

over the decades, and obviously want to see that continue, but

without a clear and concise consensus, I am not so sure that we

are going to make much progress.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you. Thank you, sir, that was an excellent

question, and it is an area that we have not touched on. It is certainly one that we really need to inform all of us about.

A while ago, in pursuit of the answer, we—the senior leaders decided that what we needed to do would be to develop roadmaps,

and we—in fact, we have 13 of those. And each of the roadmap

teams has a person from outside of NASA, from academia, or industry. We have a center director, in general, and we also have

several of the members of this table as co-chairs, on each of these

roadmaps. And each of them is looking at the future to determine

what the future should be, and then, there is an—or a goal, as the

agency moves forward.

And then, there is an activity where we integrate all of these together, to come out with a single or several absolute goals that the

agency would be holding our feet to the fire on. That is an activity,

also, in work. And it is one of many activities in the agency that

we have to make—decisions that we have to make that, again,

gives us not 10 years, but probably 30 or 50 years in the future,

to talk about how the agency, this great agency of NASA, provides

a significant value to the population, not of the United States—not

only of the United States, but of the world. And it is an activity,

it is an ongoing activity. We have short-term goals and short-term

goals take us out to 2020, 2030. It follows on the question that Mr.

Honda just asked, about the goals in the future, and how you

work—how you come back from that to determine what we do on

the Space Station, what we have to learn from the Earth, what we

will learn from the Moon, as we progress to Mars.

And if you would, sir, the person who is responsible for that in

the agency is Craig Steidle, and if it is okay, I will ask him to give

you some further comments.

63

Mr. COSTA. I would specifically like to know what timeline you

are focused on, in terms of internally making these recommendations to the Committee and to the Congress, as to where you think

the priorities of NASA should be in the next 30 years, using your

timeline.

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. We formed the 13 roadmaps, as Mr.

Gregory pointed out, such as robotic and human exploration of the

lunar surface, robotic and human exploration of Mars, transportation systems, launch systems, in space systems, and then we are

going to integrate those particular roadmaps. We—each one of

those teams have been formulated. They are FACA, so they are

open to the public. We have had a meeting of each one of the roadmaps, the last one being the nuclear roadmap, which I chair as

well, yesterday. We will have a second meeting of those, and try

and complete those, by the middle of April. And then we will integrate those, and take them this summer to the National Academy

for review.

And that should set, in very, very high terms, our strategic direction for the future. And that is—those are going to be living documents which will be reviewed on a reoccurring basis. That will also

translate to technology investments and requirements below those

strategies, to support those in the future, which will lead to our investment strategies and our budgets of the future. So to answer

your question, they are coming together, the first blush will be

completed in the second in the second meetings, by around April,

mid-April timeframe, and then to the National Academy as soon as

we can get it scheduled, early summer.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION WITHOUT

THE SPACE SHUTTLE

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Gregory, I want to commend you for

the skillful manner you handled the newest Member of our committee. That is an excellent question you asked.

I have got a few brief questions here that don’t require long answers, and I would like to ask them now. Does NASA have a

backup plan for constructing the Space Station, if the Shuttle cannot remain in service?

Mr. GREGORY. And—you are referencing some time between now

and 2010, if we lose the——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Right.

Mr. GREGORY.—capability.

Chairman BOEHLERT. That is correct.

Mr. GREGORY. This is a—certainly a question that Bill Readdy

would, and can answer. I can tell you, though, that the resiliency

of the Agency and the industry that supports the Agency would answer, if we lose another Shuttle, that we would still be able to complete the International Space Station, with the two remaining.

Each time we have lost a Shuttle—each time we have preceded the

lost of a Shuttle, we had told ourselves that if we lose another one,

we can never proceed, or we can’t proceed. But in each case, we

have. Now, we have come out a stronger Agency each time. But

Bill, let me pass that to you, and see what your response would be.

64

Mr. READDY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I—if your question is the

unique capabilities of the Shuttle, not only to take these modules,

and provide the right launch environment for them, haul the cargo,

the crew, be the base for the robotics operation with the robot arm,

and conduct assembly spacewalks, really, there is no alternative to

that. In testimony before the Senate here some months ago, the

same question was raised, and our estimate are that in order to

provide an alternative launch capability, we are talking about on

the order of $1 billion to repackage those elements to launch in another capacity, and that doesn’t include replicating the robotics capability, or hosting the spacewalks required.

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Let me ask you then, do you

have a backup plan for servicing the Space Station if changes are

not made to the INA?

Mr. READDY. Well, clearly, we have worked together as a partnership, and the strength of the partnership, I think, is something

that we are all extremely proud of, over these last four years, or

these last two years since the accident, and we are now entering

our fifth year of permanent presence on board the International

Space Station. Clearly, we didn’t anticipate losing the Shuttle. We

didn’t anticipate having to rely exclusively on the Progress resupply vehicle, and that has stretched our logistic supply line very

thin. Fortunately, the Ariane 5 launched successfully on Saturday,

this past Saturday. That is the launcher for the Autonomous

Transfer Vehicle that the Europeans are providing. That will provide us an additional leg of redundancy, and resilience in our ability to resupply the Space Station. The Japanese HTV, their launch

vehicle right now is planned for Return-to-Flight here on the 24th

of this month, and so we have several legs of redundancy, in terms

of being able to provide resupply for the International Space Station. And then finally, what we intend to issue, in terms of a request for proposal this summer, and complete a contract by the end

of this calendar year, is commercial ISS crew and cargo services,

which would, of course, be open to our industry.

COST ESTIMATES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREW

EXPLORATION VEHICLE

Chairman BOEHLERT. Last year, NASA set its rough estimate for the total cost of developing the CEV was $15 billion. Is that still

a good number?

Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. It is in the realm of putting the Crew

Exploration Vehicle forward and with the demonstrations in 14,

and the crewed version of that 15 to 16 is what we have been logging in our books, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. And when would you think would be a

good time for Congress to assess the progress in building the CEV,

so we could pull the plug if, and I hope this would not be the case,

if it does not appear to be moving ahead successfully at a reasonable cost?

Admiral STEIDLE. I think the most appropriate time would be a

major design review that we hold in the summer of ’06. At that

particular time, we will have the two contractor teams that will

enough specificity in their proposals, and we will hold a design review in the summer of ’06 for a total review of the program.

65

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. soon-to-be Acting Administrator, thank

you and your team very much for an outstanding hearing and exchange. This hearing is adjourned.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(67)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

68

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA)

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert

Q1. Last year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) completed a budgetary analysis of NASA’s proposed new vision for space exploration, which concluded that

the potential cost growth through 2020, based on NASA’s history, is between $32

billion and $61 billion. What specific steps are being implemented to ensure that

NASA’s cost estimates for space exploration are as accurate as possible? What

specific steps are being implemented to identify cost growth risks and manage

those risks?

A1. NASA appreciates the analyses performed by the Congressional Budget Office

(CBO) in their report A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration (CBO, September, 2004), which ‘‘are intended to illustrate potential upper

bounds’’ to NASA’s budget projections for the Vision for Space Exploration. CBO assumes a 45 percent cost-growth risk factor, and applies that factor to the costs of

human lunar exploration activities and robotic support missions. CBO’s derivation

of this factor is based on 72 historical NASA programs. The results of the CBO report could represent a ‘‘potential upper bound’’ for cost growth, but CBO does not

address what may be the expected levels of cost growth. NASA believes that the expected cost growth will be much less than the ‘upper bound’ estimated by CBO, and

will be manageable while still achieving the goal in the Vision for Space Exploration

of returning humans to the Moon by 2020. The CBO states in their report, ‘‘It is

certainly not a foregone conclusion that technical programs such as those involved

in NASA’s exploration initiative will experience serious cost-growth problems. The

Apollo project is a case in point. . .exceeding the budget laid out in 1961 by only

about seven percent.’’ NASA disagrees with some of the assumptions used by CBO

to arrive at their ‘upper bound,’ and already has strategies in place to ensure that

costs are managed and that actual costs will be no where near the upper bound of

potential cost growth estimated by CBO.

The cost of any complex undertaking is highly dependent upon the underlying

technical and programmatic architecture. With respect to NASA’s new initiatives in

human exploration, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD), in partnership with industry through the Concept Exploration & Refinement contracts, has

been evaluating various alternative architectures with regards to sustainability,

cost, reliability, safety, etc. In order to ensure that cost estimates are credible

ESMD is embarking on a three-pronged strategy. First, the Directorate is developing a cost analysis career plan (in partnership with the NASA Cost Analysis Division of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer) that will delineate the knowledge,

training, and job experiences that cost estimators should have in order to adequately perform their function. Second, ESMD is funding the development of new

and improved cost tools that expand our capability to generate estimates and understand the underlying cost drivers. Third, ESMD is establishing a policy that requires independent cost estimates, both from within and from outside NASA at key

decision milestones. This policy also institutionalizes cost estimating as a necessary

part of effective program management.

NASA has taken a number of steps to address independent technical and cost assessments at the agency level in addition to the steps identified above. First, the

Agency is adding new tools, procedures, and personnel to the Independent Program

Assessment Office (IPAO) to independently review projects at critical milestones.

The IPAO reports to the Chief Engineer and Chief Financial Officer, both of whom

are adding personnel in this area. Second, NASA has revised and released its program management handbook (NPR 7120.5C) which includes clear decision milestones to determine if projects will proceed to the next phases of development. These

milestones are supported by independent technical and cost reviews. Third, the

Agency strengthened its safety and mission assurance organization by creating an

Independent Technical Authority (ITA) at all NASA field Centers and establishing

the NASA Engineering and Safety Center to enhance independent safety and engineering oversight. Fourth, NASA has benchmarked its cost estimating practices

against other organizations, including Department of Defense, and will be introducing improved earned value management requirements later this summer. NASA

has established a policy requiring independent cost estimates at Pre-Non Advocate

Review and Non Advocate Review milestones, has implemented Continuous CostRisk Management, which requires project estimates to be developed during formulaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tion. This estimate can be referred to during project management reviews and updated at critical milestones.

Q2. In your written testimony you are very cautious in stating that the Shuttle return-to-flight date could occur ‘‘as early as May 2005.’’ How certain are you at

this point that you can meet that date? Many inside and outside NASA have

said that they are less worried about the success of the first flight than they are

that something could be learned on that flight that presages future problems.

Could you comment on that?

A2. On February 18, 2005, the NASA Space Flight Leadership Council reviewed the

progress being made to ensure a safe Return-to-Flight and approved a launch date

of May 15, 2005 for STS–114. All major flight hardware is at the Kennedy Space

Center in Florida and being processed through a normal pre-launch flow. Meanwhile, the independent Return-to-Flight Task Group (RTFTG) continues to assess

NASA’s efforts to meet the fifteen Return-to-Flight recommendations made by the

Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The RTFTG met in a plenary session on March 29–31, 2005, to consider the remaining open CAIB Return-to-Flight

activities. In the words of RTFTG co-chair Richard Covey, ‘‘Right now, we don’t see

anything that stands in front of the agency that can’t be accomplished in order to

make the May–June [2005] launch window.’’

NASA is committed to making the last flight of the Space Shuttle system at least

as safe as the Return-to-Flight mission. All flights will be driven by safety milestones. If there is any indication that additional work needs to be done to meet

those milestones, then the Space Shuttle program will take whatever measures are

appropriate to ensure that those milestones are met—up to and including delaying

launches, if necessary.

Q3. You were clear in your testimony today that the Shuttle will be retired by the

end of 2010. But in comments to the press, other top NASA officials have been

much less firm. Is NASA’s position that it will retire the Space Shuttle in 2010?

Are there any circumstances under which NASA would fly the Shuttle after December 31, 2010?

A3. The President stated on January 14, 2004: ‘‘In 2010, the Space Shuttle—after

nearly 30 years of duty—will be retired from service.’’ To enable the 2010 retirement

date, NASA is examining configurations for the Space Station that meet the needs

of both the Space Exploration Vision and our international partners using as few

Shuttle flights as possible.

Q4. You say in your testimony that the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) ‘‘promises

safer travel.’’ Safer than what? How will you measure that? Will a risk level be

specified in the requirements for the CEV?

A4. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s Level 1 Crew Transportation

System Requirements (Rev D) establishes thresholds and objectives for the safety

performance of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and its associated human rated

launch system. These preliminary requirements establish the failure tolerance design criteria for the system against the loss of successful mission completion, nonlife-threatening injuries, or significant damage to the system. The key measure in

terms of safety is crew survivability. The preliminary requirements include a requirement that the predicted analytical crew survivability during ascent be 99,9325

percent with a 50 percent confidence level.

The CEV safety thresholds have been established such that the vehicle will be

safer than current systems including the Space Shuttle.

Q5. Does NASA intend to close any wind tunnels this year, in FY 2006 or in FY

2007?

A5. NASA will not close any wind tunnels in FY 2005 as directed by Congress in

the Conference Report accompanying the FY 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act

(H. Rpt. 108–792). However, beginning in FY 2006, NASA cannot sustain the existing suite of NASA ground test facilities and wind tunnels with the FY 2006 aeronautics budget as submitted. Hence, on January 28, 2005, the Aeronautics Research

Mission Directorate instituted a corporate management model for its wind tunnel

facilities to enable an Agency-wide assessment of these needs. From the existing

suite of facilities, the FY 2006 Vehicle Systems Program requires the use of only

a few facilities for ground and test flight assets necessary to support aircraft and

engine noise reduction, remotely operated aircraft design, development, and operations, and the development of electric (fuel cell) based power systems for an allelectric aircraft.

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There are up to 20 ground test facilities and capabilities that may no longer be

necessary to support the aeronautics research program, including most of NASA’s

large wind tunnels and engine test cells. Changes in operational status of these 20

facilities are needed by the start of FY 2006.

Numerous other capabilities/facilities are to be retained and invested in as appropriate. These are the capabilities required to support research activities in Airspace

Systems and Aviation Safety and Security Programs and are primarily information

technology based infrastructure, such as simulators, communication systems and

human factors laboratory capability.

Q6. Your testimony says that the Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble was canceled

‘‘based on analysis of the relative risks’’? As requested during the hearing by

Congressman Ehlers, please provide a copy of this analysis. Can you describe

how it differs from the analysis by the National Academy of Sciences in its report on the Hubble?

A6. Please refer to the letter from NASA to Chairman Boehlert dated March 14,

2005, for additional information related to this topic.

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The decision not to pursue a Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble was based

on a relative risk analysis and operational complexity. The National Academy of

Sciences (NAS) report recommended a Shuttle-based servicing mission for Hubble,

and concluded that a Shuttle flight to Hubble was not significantly more risky than

a Shuttle flight to the International Space Station (ISS). Yet while all space flight

is inherently risky, there are both on-orbit and ground processing requirements that

would be notably unique to a Hubble servicing mission. While similar issues (thermal protection system inspection and repair, contingency Shuttle crew support, and

potentially rescue) exist for missions to the ISS, they can be mitigated more easily,

in part due to the increased time available for understanding and responding to an

emergency situation at the Station. For a Hubble servicing mission, the options and

available time for dealing with an on-orbit emergency are greatly reduced, posing

additional risk to the mission.

NASA has developed a five-point flight rationale (addressing safety requirements)

for Space Shuttle RTF, which is grounded in the recommendations of the CAIB and

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predicated on primary hazard control, warning devices and special procedures. The

first two elements of that flight rationale (Elimination of Critical Debris and Impact

Detection During Ascent) rely upon Space Shuttle hardware, infrastructure, and procedural improvements that broadly apply to all missions, including those to destinations other than the International Space Station (ISS). However, the efforts of the

Space Shuttle program to meet the three remaining elements of the RTF flight rationale (On-Orbit Debris Impact/Damage Detection; On-Orbit Thermal Protection

System Repair; and, Crew Rescue) assume access to the resources of the ISS. Developing the additional capabilities necessary to meet these three elements of the flight

rationale for a Hubble servicing mission would entail additional risks above and beyond those inherent in a mission to the ISS.

The ISS provides Space Shuttle managers with three critical capabilities not

found in autonomous missions. First, the ISS serves as an independent observing

platform for assessing the integrity of the Space Shuttle’s Thermal Protection System (TPS). Second, the ISS can operate as an independent working platform from

which Space Shuttle crews can conduct repairs to the TPS if necessary. Finally, the

ISS provides redundancy as a safe haven platform capable of sustaining a stranded

Space Shuttle crew for a significantly longer period of time than the Shuttle alone

can.

To apply this same flight rationale to a Hubble servicing mission, NASA would

have to develop new capabilities that are analogous to those provided by the ISS.

The Orbiter Boom Sensor System would have to be extensively modified, or an alternative capability would need to be created. Specifically, there would have to be new

hardware and procedures to provide space-walking astronauts a platform from

which to effect repairs to a damaged TPS, without increasing the risk of further

damaging the Orbiter. Additionally, a way would need to be found to sustain the

crew of a hopelessly crippled Orbiter with limited life-support capabilities long

enough for a second Shuttle to be launched on a rescue mission. That rescue mission, in turn, would need to be processed at the same time as the Hubble servicing

mission itself, a situation which would be highly complex, would require double the

normal workload on ground launch and processing teams, and would put an unprecedented strain on the overall Shuttle system. Finally, a rescue mission would require many unproven techniques, such as emergency free-space crew transfer in

space suits while performing Space Shuttle to Space Shuttle station-keeping. Being

based at the ISS offers the advantages of multiple hatches, airlocks, and established

docking and evacuation procedures, which would afford a shirt-sleeve, nominal

transfer of crew from the ISS to the rescue Orbiter.

New capabilities would need to be built, tested, and validated before Hubble had

degraded to the point where any reasonable repair effort would be impossible. Seeking to develop and validate these new capabilities in time for Hubble servicing, as

well as process a second launch, is contrary to the milestone-driven approach NASA

has adopted in response to the CAIB recommendations.

Based on analysis of the relative risks, operational complexity and implicit schedule pressure, in February 2004, NASA decided not to proceed with a Shuttle servicing mission of Hubble. The new NASA Administrator has stated his intention to

revisit this earlier decision in light of what NASA learns after the Shuttle returns

to flight.

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Q7. How does NASA intend to use the money proposed for crew and cargo services

for the Station? When does NASA expect the first commercial cargo mission to

launch? What is NASA specifically doing to develop additional service providers

beyond the Russians?

A7. A portion of the money in the ISS Cargo/Crew services line will likely be used

to procure Soyuz crew transportation services, if Congress agrees to a legislative solution to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA). Over the last several months,

NASA has been participating in an interagency coordination process related to INA,

which seeks to protect our nonproliferation objectives while advancing potential U.S.

cooperation with Russia on the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. The results of this

interagency coordination process will be presented to Congress shortly.

The balance will be used to acquire commercial cargo transportation services.

NASA is developing a Request for Proposal (RFP) to be released in 2005. The RFP

will seek to develop an initial operating capability for commercial services for cargo

transportation to the ISS before Space Shuttle retirement. NASA will also utilize

partner capabilities for cargo transportation. The European Automated Transfer vehicle will make its first visit to the ISS in 2006. The Japanese H2A Transfer Vehicle

is also in development.

Q8. NASA has discussed the possibility of launching the James Webb Space Telescope on a foreign rocket, the Ariane. It is my understanding that the Europeans

have offered to provide the Ariane launcher as well as an infrared instrument

in exchange for 15 percent of the tasking time on Webb. Is this accurate? Please

provide the terms and conditions for this arrangement. The President’s Space

Transportation Policy requires that use of a foreign launcher be coordinated

through an interagency process. Has the interagency coordination process been

initiated? When does NASA need to know which launcher it will use if it is to

deliver Webb on schedule and within cost?

A8. The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is envisioned to be an international

mission involving significant contributions from the European Space Agency (ESA)

and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA). This is consistent with the Vision for Space

Exploration, announced by the President on January 14, 2004, which directs the

pursuit of opportunities for international participation to support U.S. space exploration goals. NASA pursues foreign cooperation on science missions for mutual scientific benefit on a no-exchange-of-funds basis, and considers scientific merit, engineering practicality, industrial capability and export control feasibility and compliance in assessing the potential contributions of foreign partners.

ESA proposes to contribute significantly to the JWST mission. On JWST, foreign

scientists are likely to receive significant amounts of science (measured in terms of

observing time on the telescope). Case in point is the Hubble Space Telescope, where

European scientists have won slightly more than 15 percent of the total observing

time according to scientific merit through the competitive time allocation process.

Therefore, it is fair and logical that NASA exact tangible contributions to JWST

from foreign space agencies in proportion to the amount of science that the foreign

scientists they sponsor and represent are likely to receive. Hence, NASA seeks about

a 15 percent contribution from ESA.

Discussions regarding possible ESA contributions have explored many possibilities. ESA proposes to contribute a near-infrared spectrometer (NIRSpec), an optical

bench assembly for a mid-infrared instrument (MIRI), an Ariane 5 ECA launch vehicle and launch services with a launch from Kourou, French Guiana, and a small

number of support staff in residence at the JWST science operations and control

center. The Ariane presents a small number of simple interfaces, and thus is an attractive option from a technical viewpoint that reduces mission risk. It is also worth

substantial value by itself such that the total value of ESA’s proposed contribution

package is approximately 15 percent of the total mission cost.

Launch of any U.S. government payload on a foreign-supplied launch vehicle is

subject to interagency review, in accordance with NSPD 40, National Space Transportation Policy, dated December 21, 2004. This interagency review has been completed, clearing the way for what is known as the C–175 process by which the Department of State grants authority to NASA to negotiate with ESA the terms of cooperation on JWST.

JWST is approaching mission preliminary design review (PDR) in 2006. Many

subsystem design details depend on knowing the launch vehicle envelope and environment. Therefore, the designation of the launch vehicle for JWST is needed now

to preserve the launch schedule.

Q9. NASA was provided $15 million in the FY 2004 Appropriations Act for crew

safety and survivability by Congressman Hall. Please provide a report on how

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this money was spent and how the results will improve safety and survivability

of human space flight.

A9. The Shuttle program reviewed a wide range of options for addressing crew survivability, including major hardware modification of the vehicles. The evaluation

process was revised in light of the Vision for Space Exploration, which calls for

Shuttle retirement after assembly of the ISS is complete, planned for the end of this

decade.

Crew survivability options encompass a range of means that could be implemented to ensure crew safety and survivability and test new technologies as we

move forward with the Vision for Space. The Program identified a series of options

that can be accomplished and are being pursued.

The following investment areas are being implemented. Items with an asterisk

(‘‘*’’) denote potential applicability to exploration initiatives.

Improved Individual Tracking Device—will significantly increase the location

accuracy and acquisition time for any contingency crew rescue operations including

unconscious crew members. This effort is currently being reviewed and modified by

the Department of Defense (DOD) for completeness and accuracy.

* Portable Radio Communication Device with GPS—will enable quick identification and location of conscious crew members during rescue operations. This device will transmit crew member identification and location data to multiple DOD

Search and Rescue operation entities.

* Improve ISS Rendezvous Radar—place an active radar transponder on ISS to

aid in Orbiter dock/undock operations. This effort provides one clean, uninterrupted

sensor source for all phases of rendezvous. Hardware changes would be on the ISS

side only. The current system becomes noisy due to radar wandering over the large

surface of ISS. A transponder on ISS would eliminate that noise, providing for pristine relative navigation data for the manual phase and docking, thereby increasing

the range at which the Orbiter could acquire a radar lock. It also improves navigation performance during the manual phase. A study of this proposal was completed

and has been incorporated into a larger autonomous rendezvous and docking effort.

Continuation of the CAIB Directed Crew Survivability Working Group—

performing analysis and reconstruction of STS–107 post break-up crew cabin dynamics and forensics. To be included is an analysis/reconstruction of the STS–51L

crew compartment dynamics and forensics. This actual flight reconstructed data will

be utilized by flight operations in future procedure development and possible crew

compartment structural/thermal hardening for future vehicle design.

Egress Procedure Development—Develop crew operational procedures to support

crew egress in the event of a catastrophic vehicle break-up where the crew cabin

has separated intact. Testing the new procedures entails changes to the program requirements documentation and facility modifications to the Crew Compartment

Trainer (CCT). Activity is in work and procedures will be made available in FY

2005.

Q10. In your testimony, you state that improved audit results ‘‘could be achieved on

the FY 2006 financial statements.’’ How likely is that? What progress toward

a clean audit opinion do you hope to make this year? What specific actions is

NASA taking to ensure that its financial information is reliable in the future?

Please describe the actions planned for the next six months and any longerterm plans to improve the accuracy of financial information.

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A10. NASA has developed and implemented a work plan aimed at correcting the

material weaknesses and reportable conditions published in the FY 2004 Financial

Statement Audit report; however, it will take time to fully implement all of the identified corrective actions. Nevertheless, NASA is aiming at gradually and consistently

improving its audit performance, which includes a reduction in the number of identified material weaknesses and reportable conditions. Subsequently, NASA’s objective is to receive increasingly positive audit results in each of the following years,

possibly starting with a ‘‘qualified’’ opinion and ultimately ending with a sustainable

‘‘unqualified’’ opinion.

The objective for this current year is to begin the reduction of material weaknesses and reportable conditions.

One of our near-term goals is to eliminate the material weakness on the reconciliation of Fund Balance with Treasury in the FY 2005 audit report.

Q11. Last year, NASA provided two different draft versions of a Financial Management Improvement Plan to this committee. We understand that a third version

is being developed. What is the status of this plan and when do you expect it

to be finished?

A11. NASA is in the process of coordinating its overall plan to improve financial

management with NASA’s Office of Inspector General and the Office of Management

and Budget. NASA wants each of those offices to have the opportunity to review

and comment on the plan. Once all of their suggested comments are incorporated

into the revised document, NASA will deliver the financial management improvement plan to the Committees later this year.

Q12. Has the budget for NASA’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) been reduced for FY

2005? If so, by how much was it reduced and what ramifications does this reduction have on NASA’s efforts to improve its financial management? Does the

FY 2006 budget increase or decrease the CFO’s budget request?

A12. Agency-wide reductions across all Corporate G&A activities were imposed for

FY 2005 and FY 2006 to help accommodate costs associated with the Space Shuttle

Return-to-Flight activities. As a result, the staffing plan in the Office of Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) and the Center’s Financial Offices was impacted. Additionally, the Agency’s Integrated Financial Management Program was reduced by 37

percent or $41.5 million in FY 2005, and $7.8 million in FY 2006. This cut impacted

the scope and schedule of the Asset Management activity. A revised scope and

schedule reflecting the new funding profile is still in development.

Q13. What effect will NASA’s Earth Science cut in FY 2005 and its proposed cut for

FY 2006 have on the overall climate change research program? To what extent

did the other agencies involved in climate change research participate in the

decisions to make these cuts? What criteria did you use to determine that the

cuts did not adversely affect anything ‘‘essential’’? Which missions does NASA

plan on scaling back, delaying or canceling as part of this reduction in funding? Are there any new Earth Science missions planned for the future that were

not already part of the FY 2005 budget submission?

A13. The reductions to NASA’s Earth Science programs in FY 2005 and FY 2006

should not greatly affect the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP); NASA’s role

in research and the generation of synthesis reports (the principal near term product

of the CCSP) will continue as before. NASA engaged the other CCSP agencies in

discussions of the changes to NASA’s budgets as they were being developed. The

principal criterion employed was to do the least harm to current commitments and

satellite programs currently under development. In the FY 2005 budget, the Ocean

Vector Winds mission was canceled, and the Global Precipitation Measurement mission was delayed two years. In the FY 2006 budget request, the Glory mission is

re-scoped to instrument development only with an expectation that it will fly on the

NPOESS system, and the Landsat Data Continuity Mission now reflects the provision of two-advanced land imaging instruments for flight on the NPOESS system.

Funding for technology development and future mission concepts was reduced. No

new missions have been identified that were not part of the FY 2005 budget submission. NASA eagerly awaits the decadal survey report of the National Research

Council, as well as recommendations from our own strategic roadmapping team for

guidance on identification of potential future missions.

Q14. Your FY 2006 budget justification (page EC 2–6) refers to NASA’s ‘‘reassessment of the ISS final configuration.’’ Not quite a month ago (January 26,

2005), NASA and other ISS partners announced that all of you endorsed the

‘‘Multilateral Coordination Board approved ISS configuration.’’ Is that the conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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figuration you are now reassessing? When will the final configuration of the

space station be agreed upon? What changes to that configuration are being

considered by NASA? In particular, are you reconsidering whether to launch

the centrifuge? How important is the centrifuge to research planned by NASA

and its partners?

A14. The International Partnership Heads of Agency (HOA) met January 26, 2005,

to review the status of ongoing ISS operations and NASA’s plans for Shuttle returnto-flight. The HOA endorsed the Multilateral Coordination Board-approved ISS configuration. The partners reaffirmed their agencies’ commitment to meet their ISS

obligations; to complete Station assembly by the end of the decade; and to use and

further evolve the ISS in a manner that meets their research and exploration objectives.

NASA is now examining configurations for the Space Station that meet the goals

of the Vision for Space Exploration and the needs of our international partners

using as few Shuttle flights as possible. The timeline for completion for these studies will be determined by the new NASA Administrator.

The Centrifuge remains on schedule for completion and delivery to Kennedy Space

Center on time for a 2009 launch. NASA requirements for the Centrifuge are derived from the Human Systems Research and Technology (HSR&T) theme within

the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD). ESMD recently conducted a

Zero-Based Review of the entire HSR&T portfolio in order to ensure that future efforts will be focused on research that directly supports the future safety of the astronauts.

Q15. Does NASA have any back-up plan for providing rescue capability for the

Space Station if changes are not made to the Iran Nonproliferation Act?

A15. With the exception of the Space Shuttle, the Soyuz is the only other proven

spacecraft capable of performing crew transportation and rescue operations for the

ISS. If the Soyuz were to become unavailable to NASA, the operation of the Space

Station would be limited to those periods of time when the Shuttle could be docked

to the ISS.

Q16. How confident are you of the accuracy of the proposed CEV budget for FY 2006,

which officials have described as a ‘‘placeholder’’? What is the range of possible

costs for the CEV in FY 2006?

A16. NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, in partnership with industry through the Concept Exploration & Refinement (CE&R) contracts, has been

evaluating various alternative CEV concepts with regard to safety, sustainability,

cost, reliability, etc. The culmination of this evaluation process will be the Constellation Mission Systems Spiral 1 Milestone–A Review. At this review, Exploration Systems will present to the NASA Program Management Council a range of cost estimates for CEV. This range of possible costs will be the result of industry inputs

through the CE&R contracts and internal NASA studies, validated by an independent cost assessment conducted by the NASA Cost Analysis Division with assistance from the Independent Program Assessment Office. Currently, the Spiral 1

Milestone–A Review is planned for July 2005.

In addition, Exploration Systems is in the process of procuring a minimum of two

contractors to complete preliminary design and perform a risk reduction demonstration in 2008. These contracts will be signed in September 2005. At this time, all

information and analyses indicate that Exploration Systems will be able to perform

preliminary design activities and initiate development of risk reduction demonstrations in FY 2006 within the proposed budget.

Q17. As Admiral Steidle has described, NASA is using an unusual procedure for the

CEV—going out with initial contracts before many parameters of the vehicle

are nailed down. What are the risks and advantages to that approach?

A17. The capabilities and technologies developed to extend, in an affordable and

sustainable manner, human presence beyond low-Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars,

and beyond will require NASA to respond flexibly to new scientific discoveries and

incorporate new technologies, while minimizing risk and avoiding costly redesign. In

order for ESMD to execute the Vision for Space Exploration effectively and

affordably, its governing acquisition policies draw on the best processes from the

DOD, Naval Sea Systems (NSS), and NASA acquisition models. Additionally,

ESMD’s use of the evolutionary acquisition concept of spiral development allows this

flexibility. In spiral development, the overall program is broken up into a series of

intermediate goals, each addressed by a spiral. Because it is not realistic to define

all variables precisely now, NASA’s plan is to separate the acquisition strategy for

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Moon and Mars exploration into a number of smaller acquisition programs called

spirals. Each intermediate spiral will usher in a set of major new capabilities in

support of the Vision for Space Exploration. These spirals will be structured based

on specific requirements, well-defined goals and end points, then-current technologies, management risks, executable budgets, and knowledge gained from prior

in-space activities. The spiral development approach builds on experience gained in

early spirals to provide end points for the subsequent spirals. It also allows flexibility in responding to scientific discoveries and program direction and the ability

to incorporate newly developed technologies into subsequent spirals through a preplanned integration strategy.

The acquisition strategy for a Spiral 1 CEV is using a phased approach. The criteria for entering the next phase will be based on approval of the CEV Acquisition

Strategy and an Independent Cost Assessment. By the end of FY 2005, NASA expects to award two contracts for Phase I that will direct industry to:

• Conduct a flight demonstration program to validate industry’s capability to

perform on cost, on schedule and on performance. Additionally, the demonstration will be part of the overall CEV risk mitigation strategy.

• Evaluate NASA’s Exploration Systems Research and Technology, Human System Research and Technology, and Prometheus Nuclear Systems Technology

themes for potential CEV program integration as part of a concerted effort

to improve system effectiveness and affordability.

• Conduct a series of trade analyses on critical performance drivers for the purposes of identifying threshold and objectives for Phase 2 of the CEV contract.

Affordability, sustainability, and extensibility to future spirals will be the

focus of the analyses.

• Participate in a NASA-led System Readiness Review and Preliminary Design

Review for the human-rated CEV.

• Provide an iterative analysis of cost, risk and performance based on realistic

timelines and estimates of cost.

• Provide a risk management plan, which will mitigate program uncertainties

by establishing priorities, options, adequate margins of safety, and ‘‘offramps.’’

CEV Phase 1 actually began with a draft Request for Proposals (RFP) released

in January 2005 seeking industry, academia and NASA Center inputs. A final RFP

was released March 1, 2005, with planned contract award in September 2005. CEV

Phase 1 ends with a planned down select to a single prime contractor in late 2008.

Phase 2 of the CEV acquisition calls for a single contractor to complete the development, test, and deployment of a human-rated CEV. After completion of Phase 2, the

contractor shall provide as government options, sustaining engineering services and

production capability to support additional flights and additional CEV spacecraft.

The government may elect to perform a down select at any time or not to select either contractor after 2008. ESMD has developed a Single Acquisition Management

Plan documenting ESMD’s Overarching Acquisition Strategy for Constellation Systems.

The benefit of this phased approach is that Milestone A activities, specifically

trade studies in major areas affecting affordability, risk, schedule, and performance,

will enable ESMD to determine more achievable requirements for the next Phase

of development. This approach also helps to anticipate and mitigate risk.

Q18. NASA’s FY 2006 budget basically cancels the Glory mission while allowing

work to continue on the instrument. Our understanding, though, is that the

contract for the satellite will actually be canceled this month. Is that right?

How likely is it that NASA will find another satellite on which to launch

Glory?

A18. In FY 2005, NASA is continuing development of the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM) instruments and continuing the contract effort to refurbish the Vegetation Canopy Lidar bus as a dedicated spacecraft

for Glory. NASA is currently assessing launch options for both dedicated and comanifested launch vehicle configurations.

Q19. If the Shuttle’s failure rate in the past (two failures in 113 flights) is taken to

be the best estimate of its future rate of failure, a simple calculation shows that

the probability that we will lose another Shuttle in 28 flights is more than 41

percent. Does this seem accurate to you? What is NASA’s estimate of the probability that another Shuttle will be lost over the next 28 flights? Over the next

20 flights?

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A19. Through implementation of NASA’s Return-to-Flight activities, the Agency has

made substantial organizational and technical improvements that we believe will reduce the failure rate of the Shuttle below the historical level. This includes redesigns to address the cause of the Columbia accident and improvements in our

knowledge of the state of the vehicle during various mission phases. We have also

improved our ability to address the inherent risk of human space flight with a thorough review of individual and integrated risks. However, even after we have returned the Shuttle to flight and examined the data from the initial missions, it will

still be difficult to estimate the actual risk that a given future mission will be lost.

Q20. At the hearing, Mr. Jennings made the following statement regarding the budget and the number of employees the agency projects it will need. ‘‘Going into

’07, we are budgeted for about 2,000 less than that [18,000 employees], and

over the next two years, we are going to work to understand our exploration

program, and where that competition lies, and our assumption is we will remain close to the 18,000 during the—through the run-up.’’ Please clarify this

statement. Specifically, how many employees does the agency assume for each

year of the five-year budget projection?

A20. The President’s FY 2006 Budget contains only workforce currently known to

be funded. It does not include the estimated impact of future Exploration Systems

competitive decisions or of other Transformation or reimbursable activities that may

affect the size of the funded workforce. The FTE in the FY 2006 Budget are:

FY 2005: 19,227 (funded by programs and G&A)

FY 2006: 18,798 (funded by programs and G&A)

FY 2007: 16,738 (funded by programs)

FY 2008: 16,715 (funded by programs)

FY 2009: 16,586 (funded by programs)

FY 2010: 16,415 (funded by programs)

As to the need for workforce in addition to that currently funded by programs,

we can only estimate the results of the ongoing activities that will define such

needs. These include competitions for major elements of work associated with the

Exploration program and all other Transformation activities underway. Within

those bounds of uncertainty, we estimate that the NASA workforce funded by programs as we move into FY 2007 could be as much as 2,000 lower than it is today.

Beyond that point, as the Exploration program ramps up, and as Centers transform

themselves to facilitate bringing in non-NASA work aligned with their capabilities,

it is possible that the NASA workforce may grow back to where it is today or higher.

However, the skill mix and distribution of that workforce will almost certainly be

different.

There is still a significant amount of FY 2007 programmatic money not yet assigned. This relatively high level of uncertainty was caused by major changes to the

workforce. Planning assumptions between the FY 2005 and FY 2006 budgets:

1. The Vision for Space Exploration

2. Requirements for the safe return-to-flight of the Space Shuttle

3. Reprioritization within the major program areas (Mission Directorates)

4. An increased emphasis on competition to identify the optimum mix of civil

servants, contractors and university employees performing NASA work

5. An effort to maximize the resources available for direct mission objectives vs.

indirect support functions

There are ongoing efforts to match needed skills with funded work. In addition,

there will be billions of dollars of work available for competition as the Exploration

program proceeds with its overall program definition, as well as its systems engineering and integration effort and Crew Exploration Vehicle activity. There will also

be work available in various competitive science areas, such as the Discovery and

Mars programs.

NASA’s ongoing health assessment of its core competencies may result in the application of additional program resources to sustain critical workforce. It is anticipated centers will pursue reimbursable work for non-NASA customers in their areas

of special competence. Centers may also consider alternative management structures for more flexibility to pursue reimbursable tasks.

As a result of these efforts, many of the FTEs not yet supported will likely be

matched with funded requirements. It is also true that a significant number may

not be, at least by the start of FY 2007. The best we can do is to offer an estimate

based on what we know now and our judgment about how and when the various

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issues in the planning process will be resolved. We are working to reduce the uncertainty as quickly as possible.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What was the rationale for the policy decision to accept a multi-year gap after

the Shuttle is retired during which time the United States will have no currently

identified U.S. means of getting its astronauts into space and to and from the

International Space Station?

Q1a. Was it budgetary?

Q1b. If not, what was the rationale?

A1a,b. It is important to note that the President’s Vision for Space Exploration

called for the Crew Exploration Vehicle to be ready no later than 2014. Administrator Griffin has stated his determination to endeavor to have the Crew Exploration Vehicle ready earlier than 2014, thus reducing any potential ‘‘gap.’’

The decision to not guarantee a U.S. means of getting astronauts into space immediately following Space Shuttle retirement was informed by budgetary, technical

and programmatic factors. These included:

• continuing concerns about Shuttle safety and the need to recertify the Shuttle

if it flew after 2010,

• assessments of how long the Shuttle was needed to assemble the Space Station,

• the Space Shuttle’s $4 billion to $5 billion annual operating costs,

• the cost and time required to develop a new U.S. capability to launch astronauts, and

• the disadvantages of having no guaranteed alternative U.S. access to space

immediately following Shuttle retirement.

Q1c. What alternatives to a gap were considered, and why were they rejected?

A1c. Alternatives were assessed, including not retiring the Shuttle, retiring the

Shuttle immediately without returning to flight, and mandating the CEV be ready

by the time the Shuttle retired. These alternatives were rejected due to such factors

as excessive cost, inability to meet international commitments, and technical risk.

Q1d. If during the multi-year ‘‘gap’’ period, the Soyuz spacecraft becomes unavailable for either geopolitical or technical reasons, what is your backup plan for

providing U.S. astronaut access to space/ISS?

A1d. Possible alternatives to the Soyuz include potential commercially developed

U.S. services that NASA has procured through its ISS cargo and crew program.

NASA intends to issue its first RFP under this program in the summer of 2005. If

the Soyuz were unavailable to NASA and no commercial services were available, the

operation of the Space Station would be limited to those periods of time when the

Shuttle could be docked to the ISS.

Q2. Given the existence of the Iran Nonproliferation Act as public law since 2000,

what was the rationale for continuing to baseline the Russian Soyuz as the only

means of crew rescue for the International Space Station (ISS) for the duration

of the ISS program?

A2. Over the last several months, NASA has been participating in an interagency

coordination process related to INA, which seeks to protect our nonproliferation objectives while advancing potential U.S. cooperation with Russia on the Vision for

U.S. Space Exploration. The results of this interagency coordination process will be

presented to Congress shortly.

The utilization of the Soyuz spacecraft as the baseline crew rescue vehicle of the

ISS is a result of an evolution of capabilities, partner commitments, costs challenges, the Columbia tragedy and changes in national priorities. As one of the ISS

partners, the Russians have always been committed to providing a crew rescue capability for the initial years of ISS operation. The Soyuz is a tested, reliable and

available capability. We believe our resources are better spent utilizing a proven capability, rather than spending time and money to develop a new one.

In order to facilitate the continued use of the Soyuz crew rescue capability, the

Addendum to the 1996 Balance Agreement, which covers necessary Russian services

through 2005, was negotiated last year and completed interagency concurrence on

January 26, 2005. The agreement covers ‘‘habitation’’ through December 2005 and

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crew rescue through April 2006. Currently, there is on-going interagency coordination on negotiation of a comprehensive re-balance. This coordination includes the development of an approach that would allow NASA to procure certain space goods

and services from Roskosmos while maintaining a strong stance on nonproliferation

issues.

Q2a. What is your backup plan in case the Soyuz becomes unavailable?

A2a. The Soyuz spacecraft and Soyuz rocket booster have demonstrated a remarkable reliability record over their lifetime of operations. With the exception of the

Space Shuttle, the Soyuz is the only other proven spacecraft capable of performing

crew transportation and rescue operations for the ISS. Possible future alternatives

to the Soyuz may include commercially developed U.S. services that NASA has procured through its ISS cargo and crew program. NASA intends to issue its first RFP

under this program in 2005. If the Soyuz were unavailable to NASA and no commercial services were available, the operation of the Space Station would be limited

to those periods of time when the Shuttle could be docked to the ISS. There are

no plans for this mode of operation at this time.

Q3. What are the specific options under consideration by the interagency team examining alternatives for dealing with the Iran Nonproliferation Act’s impact on the

International Space Station?

A3. As the United States implements the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration, the Administration recognizes the necessity for effective cooperation with Russia to further

our space exploration goals. At the same time, it is imperative that we maintain

appropriate U.S. nonproliferation policy and objectives in our relationship with Russia. Over the last several months, NASA has been participating in an interagency

coordination process related to INA, which seeks to protect our nonproliferation objectives while advancing potential U.S. cooperation with Russia on the Vision for

U.S. Space Exploration. The results of this interagency coordination process will be

presented to Congress shortly.

Q4. NASA has encouraged contractors bidding on the Crew Exploration Vehicle

(CEV) project to include international participants on their industry teams.

However, it appears that NASA is not seeking or expecting cost sharing by the

governments of the non-U.S. companies. Instead, NASA apparently plans to pay

the non-U.S. companies with U.S. taxpayer dollars.

Q4a. Is that accurate—will American taxpayer dollars be used to pay non-U.S. companies for their participation in the CEV project?

Q4b. If so, what is the rationale?

A4a,b. One of the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration is to promote commercial and international participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security,

and economic interests. Exploration Systems is committed to fulfilling the Vision in

an expeditious and cost-effective manner. The scope of international participation in

the Vision is still being defined. In the areas of advanced concepts and technologies,

Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) has pursued ways of procuring

foreign capabilities and expertise in areas where domestic sources are either

unobtainable or the foreign sources reduce risks to the development of ESMD systems. As such, ESMD has been open to teaming arrangements between domestic

and foreign vendors who, by linking their capabilities, are able to provide a better

product for the American taxpayer than separate efforts would otherwise yield.

Additionally, ESMD has been open to teaming arrangements between U.S. and

foreign companies on the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Request for Proposal

where U.S. capabilities are optimized by the foreign capability. NASA has not

sought cost-sharing arrangements at this time for such potential teaming arrangements in order to ensure an even competitive environment for U.S. industry.

NASA has not excluded the possibility of seeking cost-sharing arrangements in

the future, so long as such arrangements do not introduce undo complications to the

industry-to-industry relationship, result in an unfair competitive advantage to one

industry team, or place foreign government support on the critical path for the CEV.

Q5. When John Young, the highly decorated astronaut, finally retired from NASA

at the end of the year, he gave an interview on December 17th in which he was

asked about whether NASA’s safety culture had changed in the two years since

the Columbia accident. He said, ‘‘I was in the astronaut office the other day and

I asked them how many people thought NASA had changed its culture and nobody raised their hand. There were about a hundred people there, so that’s how

they feel now.’’

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Q5a. That is a very troubling assessment from people inside the agency who are in

a position to know. Would you care to comment?

A5a. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report indicated that positive change to the NASA safety culture would be difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, in the year and a half since the CAIB released its Final Report, NASA has

significantly strengthened its safety organizations and culture. Following the CAIB’s

recommendations, we have established an Independent Technical Authority that operates as the warrant holder for all Space Shuttle waivers, deviations, and exceptions and acts as an independent check on engineering issues. We have created a

NASA Engineering and Safety Center to act as a source of engineering expertise

that is not tied to any one particular program and can be called upon to provide

in-depth and independent analysis of complex technical issues. We have enlisted the

services of Behavioral Science Technology, Inc. (BST), an industry leader in behavior-based performance improvement, to identify specific cultural and communications issue throughout the Agency and help develop mitigation strategies to resolve

those issues. We are in the process of an Agency-wide organizational transformation

that has as one of its goals the elimination of communication barriers that can pose

risks to safety.

All of these changes are designed to enhance the ability of individuals to voice

their opinions without fear of retribution or marginalization. The results of recent

BST cultural surveys across NASA suggest that we have made some significant

progress, in a very short period of time, in opening up communications between line

operators and managers. Such improvements will have a positive impact on NASA’s

overall safety culture. The job is never done, and changes to culture tend to take

a long period of time, but we feel that we have made a very positive start.

Q5b. How confident are you that the safety culture will be strong enough at the time

the Shuttle is scheduled to return-to-flight? On what do you base that conclusion?

A5b. The ultimate strength of a safety culture is evidenced in the ability of individuals working throughout the organization to elevate concerns to the appropriate

level of management and be confident that those concerns will be thoroughly vetted.

We believe that there is ample evidence of such a strong safety culture in the Space

Shuttle program supporting Return-to-Flight. For example, we have pushed back

the Return-to-Flight date on several occasions so as to give ample time to fully meet

all of the CAIB recommendations and Space Shuttle program-initiated activities.

The Space Shuttle program is sharing our lessons learned, issues, options and ultimate decisions on how to proceed with implementation of Return-to-Flight activities

by fully documenting them in the Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Returnto-Flight and Beyond, which is now in its ninth revision. A key aspect of preparing

for the upcoming mission has been a series of simulations where the Mission Management Team is presented with a variety of problems that could arise during a

mission, and must investigate the problem and determine how to proceed. This is

one example of opportunities for our Space Shuttle team to practice the types of behaviors we are stressing in our culture change activities, including understanding

and assessing minority opinions. The Mission Management Team simulations have

included external observers who provide feedback to the team. The Return-to-Flight

Task Group, an advisory committee co-chaired by Richard Covey and Thomas Stafford, provides an independent check on—and an unprecedented level of external

scrutiny of—NASA’s implementation of the CAIB recommendations. There are multiple, independent avenues for safety concerns to be elevated to senior program

managers, and all of those avenues have been fully exercised over the past two

years. We are confident that our safety culture is significantly stronger than it once

was and that, while space flight can never be without risk, the safety culture is fully

ready to support the Shuttle’s return-to-flight.

Q6. NASA has canceled funding for a Hubble servicing mission in the FY 2006

budget.

Q6a. What will happen to the civil servant and contractor workforce involved with

Hubble servicing, and when?

A6a. The Administrator plans to review the possibility of conducting a Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble once the Shuttle has returned to flight. Any final determination regarding the fate of the civil and contractor workforce associated with

Hubble servicing must await the conclusion of that review.

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Q6b. If Congress or a new NASA Administrator decides to reinstate a Shuttle servicing mission to Hubble, what civil service and contractor workforce will be required to complete the mission within the required timetable?

A6b. On the Hubble program side, the workforce involved with ongoing operations,

life extension, and de-orbit activity is essentially the same workforce that would be

required to support a Shuttle servicing mission. Space Shuttle workforce requirements are relatively insensitive to the mission.

Q6c. Does NASA have that workforce in place now?

A6c. Yes, NASA has that workforce in place now.

Q6d. What additional funding would be required in FY05 and FY06 to cover the

non-Shuttle-related costs of a Shuttle servicing mission to Hubble?

A6d. The Administrator plans to review the possibility of conducting a Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble once the Shuttle has returned to flight. Any final determination regarding funding for Hubble servicing must await the conclusion of that

review.

Q7. Your testimony indicates that you have established ‘‘core competencies’’ at each

of the NASA Centers that ‘‘must be maintained in order for the Agency’s mission

to be achieved.’’ You also say that these competencies will be funded through

competition for work. What specifically are you going to do to retain the core

competencies in a particular area at any given Center over those periods when

there is insufficient project funding to cover the workforce and facility costs?

A7. We are currently engaged in a process to assess the health of all NASA Core

Competencies, a process that will be repeated on an annual basis in conjunction

with the budget development. As part of this assessment, we may use peer reviews,

external awards, patents, and benchmarking to validate that NASA’s core competencies remain competitive. Our core competencies sustainment strategy focuses

on competition as the preferred approach for bringing to a Center the necessary

level of work to sustain a core competency. However, this strategy further provides

for alternative sustainment approaches when, for example, a gap in competition opportunities puts a core competency at risk. The Centers will be responsible for identifying where they are unable to sustain the critical level from the resources available to them. Mission Directorates will then be responsible for providing needed resources through direct work assignments to the Center if necessary. If that is not

feasible, the Mission Directorates are then responsible for bringing the issue forward to the Agency leadership where a tailored investment strategy will be developed.

Q8. Please provide both the actual civil service and the actual contractor workforce

levels broken down by Center (including HQ) for the years FY 2004 and 2005,

and also the projected civil service and contractor workforce levels broken down

by Center (including HQ) that are assumed in the FY 2006 budget request for

each of the years FY 2006 through FY 2010.

Q8a. How many of the current civil service employees does the FY 2006 budget request assume will no longer work at NASA by FY 2007?

A8a. The chart below shows the NASA workforce requirements as identified by the

existing Agency programs. These numbers do not reflect additional workforce that

will be required as Centers are awarded additional projects currently identified in

the budget for future competitions. As shown in the chart, NASA’s budgeted workforce decreases by 2060 FTE from FY 2006 to FY 2007 as part of the transformation

of the agency to fulfill the new Vision. There are ongoing efforts to match needed

skills with funded work both at the Centers currently showing reductions and at

other Centers that continue to hire. There is still a significant amount of FY 2007

programmatic money not yet assigned. There will be work available for competition

as the Exploration program proceeds with its overall program definition, as well as

its systems engineering and integration effort and Crew Exploration Vehicle activity. There will be work available in various competitive science areas, such as the

Discovery and Mars programs. NASA’s ongoing health assessment of its core competencies may result in the application of additional program resources to sustain

critical workforce. It is also anticipated that Centers will pursue reimbursable work

for non-NASA customers in their areas of special competence. Because of these ongoing activities, FTEs currently not supported may yet be matched with funded requirements.

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NASA’s performance based procurements are not managed or budgeted by contractor head count, so accurate projections of the contractor workforce are not possible.

Q9. Please provide a breakdown by specialty and by Center of the number of civil

servants that have been identified as ‘‘excess competencies.’’ What were the criteria used to determine who falls into the ‘‘excess competency’’ category?

A9. NASA has identified those positions that do not support a funded program or

project and, therefore, must be funded through Center overhead funds. These are

referred to as ‘‘unfunded capacity.’’ Some of these ‘‘unfunded capacity’’ positions include competencies that we know will not be needed in their current quantity to

support the Agency’s new Vision and those are the competencies that are currently

part of our buyout activities.

NASA will maintain the workforce necessary to assure the health of the core competencies the Mission Directorates rely on. We are currently engaged in a process

to assess the health of all NASA’s core competencies, a process that will be repeated

on an annual basis in conjunction with budget development. Our core competencies

sustainment strategy focuses on competition as the preferred approach for bringing

to a Center the necessary level of work to sustain a core competency. However, this

strategy further provides for alternative sustainment approaches when, for example,

a gap in competition opportunities puts a core competency at risk. The Centers will

be responsible for identifying where they are unable to sustain the critical level

from the resources available to them. Mission Directorates will be responsible for

providing needed resources, or if that is not feasible, bringing the issue forward to

the Agency leadership where a tailored investment strategy will be developed.

It is anticipated that Centers will pursue reimbursable work for non-NASA customers in their areas of special competence. Centers may also consider alternative

management structures for more flexibility to pursue reimbursable tasks. Once this

analysis is completed, NASA will be in a position to more precisely identify its excess workforce competencies.

Q10. Administrator O’Keefe testified to our Committee in February of 2004 that

NASA would know whether development of a new heavy-lift rocket would be

necessary to fulfill exploration mission requirements ‘‘within this next six

months to a year.’’ A year has now passed, and NASA has still not said whether it will need to develop a heavy-lift vehicle.

Q10a. Why did NASA miss the milestone stated by the Administrator for reaching

a decision?

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A10a. Because the question of heavy lift is so central to the overall execution of the

Vision for Space Exploration, NASA has moved very carefully to ensure that all potential technical, budgetary, and policy issues are fully considered and vetted. Since

Administrator O’Keefe testified before the Committee in February, 2004, there have

been a number of significant developments, including the release of the Final Report

of the President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, the release of a new U.S. Space Transportation Policy, and the development of an Agency-wide strategic roadmapping process. All of these developments

must be carefully considered by NASA in the decision process on the need for a

heavy-lift vehicle.

NASA has made significant progress in coming to an informed decision on the potential role of heavy lift within a mixed launch vehicle fleet. Among the issues and

trades that NASA is considering are the technologies from which a heavy lift vehicle

might evolve (Shuttle, expendable launch vehicle, or hybrid), the needs of the International Space Station in the post-Shuttle environment, potential synergy between

the needs of the ISS and future exploration requirements, and overall cost and

schedule impacts. Assessments and recommendations from this ongoing evaluation

are also being coordinated with other Federal Government partners, including the

Department of Defense, as directed by the new transportation policy.

Q10b. When will NASA know?

A10b. We expect to have initial results from our roadmapping activity complete in

May of this year.

Q10c. What are the specific criteria that will be used in making the decision?

A10c. The criteria in making the decision of whether to pursue, and if so how best

to pursue, an evolved heavy lift option will include overall best value to NASA

across all present and future missions, total life cycle costs, the availability of technology options and the cost/risk associated with these options (including the unique

consideration of human rated/high value payloads), and the potential availability of

an evolved heavy lift option against our need date.

Q10d. Is there funding reserved for such a launch vehicle in the five-year runout of

the FY06 budget and if so, how much and in what account?

A10d. No, although long-range budget planning for Constellation systems does include some provisions for a heavy lift option. However, these plans do not include

heavy lift funding as a separate line item in the current five-year runout.

Q11. In 2001, NASA and the Department of Defense entered into a collaborative National Aerospace Initiative (NAI). Hypersonics research to enable both nearterm and longer-term advances in air-breathing hypersonics vehicles was considered to be an essential element of that Initiative. However, NASA’s FY 2006

budget request contains no funding for hypersonics research. What is the reason for not providing funding—is it budgetary or is there a policy rationale for

the elimination of the funding? If the latter, what is that rationale?

A11. Through a Congressional special interest item, NASA is currently funded to

work on the X–43C concept in FY 2005. At present, there is no plan to continue

funding hypersonics beyond the present year. In FY 2006 and the near-term, NASA

will refocus its resources for the Vehicle Systems Program on a limited number of

demonstrations. The current four programmatic priorities are supersonic low-boom

demonstration, a demonstration of a zero-emissions vehicle, a demonstration of high

altitude long-endurance aircraft, and a demonstration of integrated subsonic noise

reduction. Hypersonics demonstrations may re-emerge as a high priority in the out

years.

Q12. When the White House directed NASA to cut its four-year budget plan (FY

2006–09) by $2.5 billion relative to the budget plan that accompanied the FY05

NASA budget request, the aeronautics program had to absorb almost a third

of that total cut.

Q12a. What was the rationale for allocating that fraction of the cut to aeronautics?

Q12b. Who proposed that allocation of the cut—NASA or OMB?

A12a,b. NASA budget formulation was guided by the Exploration Vision and other

national priorities. Accordingly, resource decisions resulted in reductions between

the FY 2005 and FY 2006 budget requests, which required all Directorates to contribute to deficit reduction. Throughout this process, NASA priorities and key milestones were retained.

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NASA is transforming its Aeronautics program in the FY 2006 Budget request.

NASA is simultaneously transforming its Aeronautics Research investment to more

sharply focus on revolutionary, high-risk, ‘‘barrier breaking’’ technologies. Toward

this end, the NASA Aeronautics Vehicle Systems Program (VSP) has been refocused

away from evolutionary research and technology development of the past and toward more revolutionary, ‘‘barrier-breaking’’ technology demonstration projects that

address critical public needs related to reduction of aircraft noise and emissions, and

enable new science missions. The revolutionary technologies developed by NASA

within the next decade will form the basis for a new generation of environmentally

friendly aircraft and will enhance U.S. competitiveness 20 years from now. This

budget supports NASA’s emphasis to address basic aeronautical barriers confronting

our national aviation system and supports research to pioneer and validate highvalue technologies that enable new exploration and discovery, and improve the quality of life though practical applications. The President’s FY 2006 Budget fully supports the Aeronautics program’s vital research in Aviation Safety and Security and

Airspace Systems.

Q13. Although the NASA Administrator, among others, had showcased the Jupiter

Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) mission as the first flight demonstration of the exploration initiative’s Project Prometheus nuclear technology program, NASA has

now indefinitely deferred the JIMO mission due to ‘‘concerns over costs and

technical complexity.. . .’’ What were the specific cost and technical issues, and

when did they emerge?

A13. During the course of conceptual design and trade studies, it was determined

that the mission requirements directly related to JIMO (such as mission lifetime to

reach Jupiter) were too complex for a first mission to use space nuclear electric

power and propulsion. These nuclear electric power and propulsion technologies will

include a new capability to enter into orbit around multiple moons of the outer planets for long duration exploration and reconnaissance. Electric propulsion technology

developed and flown in the past, and terrestrial nuclear power system development

efforts both provide firm foundations upon which to build; but in both cases a flight

system would require substantial technology maturation including life testing. Although NASA never prepared a formal cost estimate, a CBO estimate prepared in

September 2004 indicated a cost of roughly $10 billion.

In addition, the JIMO mission concept was developed before the announcement

of the President’s Vision for Space Exploration. As a result of NASA’s new direction,

the needs for and uses of nuclear power and propulsion have to be reassessed.

NASA is currently reviewing an Analysis of Alternatives as well as undertaking a

strategic roadmapping process to better integrate nuclear technology development

with the Vision and determine a more suitable and affordable, first flight demonstration mission.

Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall

Q1. Please provide the risk assessment of the SM–4 Shuttle servicing mission that

was prepared for Administrator O’Keefe, as well as any other safety analyses

used by the Administrator in making his determination to cancel the SM–4 servicing mission.

A1. Attached is a letter provided to Chairman Sherwood Boehlert on March 14,

2005, that responds to your question. [See p. 71.]

The decision not to pursue a Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble was based

on a relative risk analysis and operational complexity. The National Academy of

Sciences (NAS) report recommended a Shuttle-based servicing mission for Hubble,

and concluded that a Shuttle flight to Hubble was not significantly more risky than

a Shuttle flight to the International Space Station (ISS). Yet while all space flight

is inherently risky, there are both on-orbit and ground processing requirements that

would be notably unique to a Hubble servicing mission. While similar issues (thermal protection system inspection and repair, contingency Shuttle crew support, and

potentially rescue) exist for missions to the ISS, they can be mitigated more easily,

in part due to the increased time available for understanding and responding to an

emergency situation at the Station. For a Hubble servicing mission, the options and

available time for dealing with an on-orbit emergency are greatly reduced, posing

additional risk to the mission.

NASA has developed a five-point flight rationale (addressing safety requirements)

for Space Shuttle RTF, which is grounded in the recommendations of the CAIB and

predicated on primary hazard control, warning devices and special procedures. The

first two elements of that flight rationale (Elimination of Critical Debris and Impact

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Detection During Ascent) rely upon Space Shuttle hardware, infrastructure, and procedural improvements that broadly apply to all missions, including those to destinations other than the International Space Station (ISS). However, the efforts of the

Space Shuttle program to meet the three remaining elements of the RTF flight rationale (On-Orbit Debris Impact/Damage Detection; On-Orbit Thermal Protection

System Repair; and, Crew Rescue) assume access to the resources of the ISS. Developing the additional capabilities necessary to meet these three elements of the flight

rationale for a Hubble servicing mission would entail additional risks above and beyond those inherent in a mission to the ISS.

The ISS provides Space Shuttle managers with three critical capabilities not

found in autonomous missions. First, the ISS serves as an independent observing

platform for assessing the integrity of the Space Shuttle’s Thermal Protection System (TPS). Second, the ISS can operate as an independent working platform from

which Space Shuttle crews can conduct repairs to the TPS if necessary. Finally, the

ISS provides redundancy as a safe haven platform capable of sustaining a stranded

Space Shuttle crew for a significantly longer period of time than the Shuttle alone

can.

To apply this same flight rationale to a Hubble servicing mission, NASA would

have to develop new capabilities that are analogous to those provided by the ISS.

The Orbiter Boom Sensor System would have to be extensively modified, or an alternative capability would need to be created. Specifically, there would have to be new

hardware and procedures to provide space-walking astronauts a platform from

which to effect repairs to a damaged TIPS, without increasing the risk of further

damaging the Orbiter. Additionally, a way would need to be found to sustain the

crew of a hopelessly crippled Orbiter with limited life-support capabilities long

enough for a second Shuttle to be launched on a rescue mission. That rescue mission, in turn, would need to be processed at the same time as the Hubble servicing

mission itself, a situation which would be highly complex, would require double the

normal workload on ground launch and processing teams, and would put an unprecedented strain on the overall Shuttle system. Finally, a rescue mission would require many unproven techniques, such as emergency free-space crew transfer in

space suits while performing Space Shuttle to Space Shuttle station-keeping. Being

based at the ISS offers the advantages of multiple hatches, airlocks, and established

docking and evacuation procedures, which would afford a shirt-sleeve, nominal

transfer of crew from the ISS to the rescue Orbiter.

New capabilities would need to be built, tested, and validated before Hubble had

degraded to the point where any reasonable repair effort would be impossible. Seeking to develop and validate these new capabilities in time for Hubble servicing, as

well as process a second launch, is contrary to the milestone-driven approach NASA

has adopted in response to the CAIB recommendations.

Based on analysis of the relative risks, operational complexity and implicit schedule pressure, in February 2004, NASA decided not to proceed with a Shuttle servicing mission of Hubble. The new NASA Administrator has stated his intention to

revisit this earlier decision in light of what NASA learns after the Shuttle returns

to flight.

Q2. Please provide NASA’s cost estimate for the SM– 4 Shuttle servicing mission to

Hubble, including a breakdown of it by cost category and the specific assumptions included in the cost estimate.

A2. NASA estimates the cost of $1.7 billion–$2.4 billion for SM– 4 —a Space Shuttle

servicing mission to Hubble. This estimate was provided to Aerospace Corporation

to assist them in their development of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for the

Hubble Space Telescope. For Space Shuttle missions, the general assumption of five

years of operations was made. The AOA report provided by Aerospace Corporation

adjusted that estimate slightly by reducing two years of operations for the SM– 4

mission. Aerospace made this adjustment based on their own assessments of operations costs, therefore reducing the Space Shuttle numbers by two years of operations (worth about $200 million) in order to provide a baseline for comparison. The

estimates provided are considered preliminary only. Additional assumptions included three years of Hubble operations after servicing is completed.

These costs assume completion of required Return-To-Flight (RTF) actions for the

Space Shuttle fleet and missions to ISS, but RTF costs are not included in the $2.4

billion estimate.

The $2.4 billion includes a small portion of the cost to cover the de-orbit.

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Q3a. NASA has not committed to providing a ‘‘safe haven’’ capability for the Space

Shuttle at the International Space Station (ISS) beyond the first two Shuttle

flights after Return-to-Flight. Does NASA intend to baseline such a requirement for the duration of the ISS assembly phase (running through 2010)? If

not, why not?

A3a. NASA has not specifically ruled out the requirement to have a safe haven capability for an extended period. We are using safe haven as a last resort in the unlikely event that return-to-flight modifications are in error and there is a need to

safely bring the crew home on another vehicle or vehicles.

Q3b. What specifically would be required to enable a ‘‘safe haven’’ on the ISS for a

combined crew of 9–13 Shuttle/ISS astronauts for 30–90 days for the duration

of the Space Station assembly phase? What changes to NASA’s current ISS assembly and operations plans would be required?

A3b. By far, the greatest issue with maintaining a safe haven capability through

2010 is the adverse impact it would have on logistics needs and the upmass impact

to the ISS to maintain the capability to support the larger crew. The Space Shuttle

and International Space Station programs are currently assessing the logistics requirements needed to support the safe haven capability beyond the first two Returnto-Flight missions.

Q3c. If NASA decides not to baseline a ‘‘safe haven’’ capability on the ISS for the

duration of the ISS assembly phase, will NASA baseline a requirement for a

backup Shuttle on the launch pad for all remaining ISS assembly flights?

A3c. The current safe haven approach does not require a backup Shuttle to be on

the launch pad at the time of launch. For STS–114, the launch-on-need vehicle will

not have rolled out of the Orbiter Processing Facility, given that we launch at the

opening of the window on May 15, 2005. The requirement is to have a backup Shuttle in position to launch in sufficient time to meet the defined safe haven support

window that the ISS offers the combined Shuttle/ISS crew. The requirement and

timetable for the launch-on-need vehicle in support of STS–121 is similar to that

for STS–114. The Space Shuttle program is currently assessing the launch-on-need

requirement for missions after STS–121.

Q4. NASA is significantly reducing its participation in a number of national interagency R&D initiatives in its FY06 budget request, most notably the

Nanotechnology, Networking and Information Technology, and Climate Change

Science initiatives. What are the specific reasons for each of the funding reductions?

A4. To pursue the Vision for Space Exploration in FY 2006, NASA must assemble

a much broader portfolio of research than in past years. Nanotechnology and National Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) were previously

primary focus areas. NASA’s transformation to the Vision has a much more focused

research agenda than in previous years. At the same time, the funding available to

support this broader research portfolio remains roughly unchanged. As a result,

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fewer projects in Nanotechnology and NITRD are competitively selected than in previous years.

In 2006, NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration and mission needs for Return-toFlight will affect its participation in the National Information Technology Research

and Development (NITRD) Program. NASA will continue operating the 52-teraflop

Columbia computer acquired in 2004 and 2005 for science and engineering simulation, including providing access to this world-class resource for the scientific community. Funding for Grand Challenge Applications will be reduced, and High-End

Computing (HEC) technology research will be completed, reducing its HEC I&A (Infrastructure and Applications) participation and ending NASA’s HEC R&D participation. NASA will continue interagency coordination activities in architectures,

testbeds, and system performance assessment. Funding for research in intelligent

systems and grid computing has been redirected to more directly address time-critical agency mission needs related to Return-to-Flight and the Vision for Space Exploration, reducing NASA participation in Human Computer Interface and Information Management (HCI&IM) and Large Scale Networking [including Next Generation Internet] (LSN). NASA investments in autonomous systems and robotics are no

longer counted as part of Software Design and Productivity (SDP), and NASA funding similarly is no longer counted as part of Social, Economic, and Workforce Implications of IT (SEW). As a result of these reductions and redirections, NASA overall

funding for NITRD activities changes from $162.9 million in FY 2005 to $74.3 million in FY 2006.

NASA continues its contribution of over $1 billion annually to improving our understanding of our Earth’s climate. NASA’s constellation of over 28 Earth-Sun observing satellites provides a host of on-going data sources to improve our understanding of Earth’s climate. NASA is helping to protect this scientific resource by

providing funding for extended operations of many satellites beyond their initial design life. Additional funding is provided in FY 2006 to complete several key missions

in development, including Calipso, Cloudsat, NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP),

and Ocean Surface Topography Mission (OSTM). Additional missions in the formulation stage, if they are approved to proceed to development, will provide new ways

to assess the Earth’s climate. The percent reduction in CCSP elements of the FY

2006 budget reflects a decrease in mission operations funding due to several missions reaching the end of their operational life and decreased ground network expenditures, along with a planned ramp-down in spending on NPP, which is nearing

launch. The FY06 request also assumes the Glory mission will be an instrumentonly build.

NASA continues to make a strong investment in nanotechnology, and will invite

proposals for nanotechnology development in future responses to Broad Agency Announcements. In addition, NASA has had discussions with the National Science

Foundation concerning strategic partnership in various areas of research and technology, including nanotechnology.

Q5. Jupiter’s moon Europa ranked very high on the National Academies’ solar system decadal survey priority list. Since the FY06 budget effectively cancels—‘‘indefinitely defers’’ to use OMB’s language—the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO)

project,

Q5a. Are there any plans for an alternative mission to Europa within the next decade?

Q5b. If so, where will the funding for it come from?

A5a,b. NASA is studying alternative ways to get to Europa. In addition, we have

opened a dialogue with our international partners, particularly the Europeans, regarding this issue. No funding source has yet been identified for such alternatives.

Q6. NASA has for years touted the Space Station’s research program as benefiting

the health and welfare of citizens back here on Earth. Now as part of the restructuring of the ISS research program, NASA has indicated that it will only

focus on exploration-related R&D and will largely abandon any research directed at terrestrial applications.

Q6a. What is the reason for eliminating essentially all non-exploration-related research on the Station? Why can’t it co-exist with the exploration-related research program?

A6a. NASA is in the process of realigning its research initiatives in order to support

the Vision for Space Exploration. Efforts will be focused on research that directly

supports the future safety and effectiveness of Expedition crews. NASA’s efforts in

the biomedical area are focused on research that will result in a significant reducVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tion of risk to exploration crews. A curtailment of alternate research within our

portfolio is necessary due to space-based resource limitations.

The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) recently conducted a Zero

Base Review of the entire Human Systems Research and Technology (HSRT) portfolio which consists of the programs and projects of the former Biological and Physical Research Enterprise. This review has identified the following research priorities

for successful implementation of the Vision: space radiation health and shielding,

advanced environment control and monitoring, advanced EVA, human health and

countermeasures, advanced life support, exploration medical care, and space human

factors and behavioral health. One of the conclusions reached during the Zero-Base

Review suggested that NASA’s research programs should prioritize medical research

on human subjects over basic animal, cell, and tissue models. The redirection of the

program in this way was based on an internal programmatic review and assessment, input from NASA’s Medical Policy Board Subcommittee on the Centrifuge Accommodation Module and Centrifuge, and recommendations from the National

Academies/Space Studies Board (NA/SSB) report: ‘‘Assessment of the Directions in

Microgravity and Physical Sciences Research at NASA.’’

The HSRT Zero Base Review has been completed and results are being reviewed

and integrated.

Concurrent to the Zero Base Review activity, NASA is conducting an ISS utilization effort to identify the best means by which to use the unique ISS platform.

Based on the results of the Strategy-to-Task-to-Technology (STT) prioritization process currently in work, such utilization opportunities may include flight experiments

to test and validate technologies like in-space assembly, cryo fluid management, advanced propulsion, and space power systems. NASA is also investigating how efficiencies can be gained in the area of payload planning, integration of research hardware into the launch vehicle and the ISS, crew training, and real-time operations

support.

Additionally, NASA continues to expand its contribution to Earth applications of

our research technology development investments through the Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP). IPP is taking deliberate actions to improve the quality of life

on Earth from these investments, through its current projects, technology transfer,

Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfer

(STTR), Industry-led partnerships and University-Led partnerships, all fostering the

creation of benefits throughout all NASA research and technology development programs. University-led partnerships include the Research Partnerships Centers

(RPCs), an established network of dual-use research centers located at universities

around the U.S., and the University Research Engineering Technology Institutes

(URETI), a consortia of universities pursuing basic research in nano-technology.

Highly leveraged partnerships such as the RPCs make it possible to meet NASA’s

exploration needs while at the same time fostering the creation and delivery of

Earth benefits through the industrial partners. The leveraging of these partnerships

helps to make the exploration vision affordable, while the benefits help to make it

sustainable.

Q6b. What are you telling all of the researchers who based their career plans on

NASA’s commitment to support such fundamental and applied microgravity research?

A6b. NASA is moving to the next step to implement the knowledge gathered by the

research community on gravity-driven phenomena in biological and physical systems, and we will need the research community’s further participation in solving

more focused, but no less challenging problems. The scope of NASA’s support to

science and technology may need to increase as our efforts in space exploration become more substantial in the coming years. New areas of emphasis will provide opportunities for participants in the previous fundamental and applied microgravity

research program to contribute to solving problems and advancing technologies in

areas like in-situ resource utilization for life support and spacecraft propellants, inspace multi-phase fluid processes for propulsion and power generation, low-gravity

processes for fabrication and repair, innovative technologies for medical and environmental monitoring sensors and integrated control systems, and a variety of advanced materials solutions needed for radiation protection. The opportunities for

contribution from this community have not decreased—they have become more focused on space exploration.

Q7. The last round of Discovery proposals (11) yielded only a ‘‘Mission of Opportunity’’ (the Moon Mineralogy Mapper instrument for the Indian Chandrayaan

1 mission) and not a full mission. What will happen to the remaining funds?

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Will they be maintained within the Discovery program such that there may be

funding for two missions in the next round (12)?

A7. The remaining funds will stay within the Discovery Program. The surplus early

year funding will primarily be used to solve funding problems with Deep Impact,

Stardust, and Kepler. Funding from about FY 2007 onward will go toward a potential second selection in the next AO. A second mission will only be selected if it is

qualified, and if the proposed funding can be phased such that it is affordable within the current (combined Discovery-11 and -12) budget profile. It is anticipated that

this will indeed be the case. In the interim, NASA has assembled a review team

to assess our recent decisions on the Discovery Program. NASA expects the results

of this review in the coming weeks.

Q8a. The Deep Space Network (DSN) is receiving a slight decrease from last year’s

budget. Your budget materials acknowledge that the DSN infrastructure is

starting to show its age and repairs and upgrades are going to be needed. Will

you have the resources you need for the approximately 35 missions the DSN

will support this year and to prepare for the increasing data needs in future

years?

A8a. The DSN will continue to support all current missions. The FY 2006 budget

request and the FY 2005 budget are adequate to support continued operation of the

DSN. Additional investments will be required in the future to support new missions,

and to renew aging infrastructure. The strategy for making these investments is

currently under development.

Q8b. What repairs and upgrades planned for the DSN to prepare it for the increasing data needs expected in future years will be deferred, delayed, or otherwise

negatively impacted as a result of the FY 2006 budget and its five-year runout?

A8b. The Science Mission Directorate is working with the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate to develop and validate requirements and capabilities for future

needs. We recognize that the DSN will need significant upgrades to satisfy these

future needs and are assessing infrastructure and performing failure analyses to

help determine how to focus the effort. The specific plan will be refined as part of

the FY 2007 budget process.

Q8c. Please provide the seven-year (FY 2004–2010) budget plan for the Deep Space

Network, broken down by category of expenditure.

A8c. The FY 2006 budget request for the Deep Space Network is shown below, by

major categories.

Q9. What are the specific ‘‘schedule issues’’ that have caused Kepler’s launch to be

delayed apparently indefinitely?

A9. Funding issues within the Discovery Program necessitated a reduction in the

FY 2005 funding profile for Kepler. The total impact of this reduction is still in

work, but it is expected to result in a six to eight months slip in the Kepler launch

date. This means that Kepler would launch between June and August 2008.

Q10. GLAST is having schedule delays in part due to ‘‘withdrawal of international

partners’’—who are these partners, what were they responsible for and why

have they withdrawn? Besides schedule, what else will this withdrawal impact?

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A10. GLAST entered development at the end of 2003. The Large Area Telescope

(LAT) is the primary instrument on this mission, and is being developed under a

NASA contract with the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, which is operated by

Stanford University for the U.S. Government Department of Energy. The LAT Principal Investigator assembled a consortium that includes the U.S. Department of Energy and institutions in France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Sweden to develop and

build this instrument.

During project formulation, the Italian Space Agency, ASI, and the French Space

Agency, CNES, went through budgetary reprioritizations and withdrew from some

of their GLAST LAT activities; ASI withdrew funding for the Malindi ground station

in Africa, and CNES determined they could no longer provide their input to the

LAT. The Italians, however, have continued to provide the remainder of their

planned contribution (a portion of the LAT silicon strip detectors, the majority of

the LAT tracker production costs, and science support). The French (CNRS/IN2P3

and CEA/DSM) are providing science support, as well, and CNRS/IN2P3 continues

to supply the calorimeter structures.

Prior to the aforementioned changes, GLAST had a working launch target of September 2006. At the time of Confirmation Review (December 2003), the baseline

schedule launch of May 2007 and the life cycle cost of $739.5 million (as reported

in the FY 2005 NASA budget request), reflected the impact of these two changes

in international participation.

Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda

Q1. There has been a reorganization at NASA HQ in order to better address the Exploration requirements. What is the impact of this on existing contracts, including research contracts and cooperative agreements? Will NASA fully honor its

existing commitments to the University of California and San Jose State University?

A1. In 2004, NASA merged the former Space and Earth Science Enterprises into

a single Science Mission Directorate with three themes: The Universe, Solar System

Exploration, and Earth-Sun Systems. The science transformation also brought together similar needs/processes for engaging the external scientific community in

planning/sponsoring scientific research, mission solicitation/selection/management,

advanced technology development, and business management.

The research and technology development activities of the former Exploration Systems Enterprise and former Biological and Physical Research Enterprise have been

merged and are now both managed in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

(ESMD). Organized in this way, ESMD will be able to fully integrate the critical

human system element with the broad engineering systems infrastructure required

for the human exploration of the Solar System. This full integration enables the

early insertion of critical human support requirements to implement safety, sustainability, and exploration crew effectiveness.

The Science Mission Directorate does not plan to terminate any research investigations as a result of reorganization at NASA Headquarters—on the contrary, the

resulting efficiency improvements and science coordination will most likely allow

SMD to provide additional science opportunities. In particular, all current commitments from the Science, Exploration Systems, and Education Mission Directorates

to the University of California and San Jose State University will be honored.

Q2. With mission complexity and duration increasing, the challenges of autonomy

and software dependability appear to be more important than before. What is

NASA doing to address these technical challenges where it has such aggressive

requirements?

A2. NASA has been proactive in addressing software related issues for increased

mission complexity and duration. The Agency is taking a multi-faceted approach to

assure software-supporting NASA missions will meet the technical challenges associated with an aggressive set of requirements. Highlights of the Agency’s approach

include:

a) In the final quarter of 2004, NASA issued a new set of procedural requirements (NPR 7150.2, Software Engineering Requirements) and significantly

updated two NASA standards (NASA–STD–8739.8, NASA Software Assurance Standard, and NASA–STD–8719.13, Software Safety Standard).

b) The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility is the

Agency’s agent for the development and application of independent

verification and validation processes and technology to improve reliability

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and reduce risk in software systems. The NASA IV&V Facility, located in

Fairmont, West Virginia, has been performing verification and validation on

mission critical software across the Agency’s missions and projects for over

10 years.

c) In January 2005, the NASA Chief Engineer issued a Technical Warrant for

the discipline of software engineering. The goal of the NASA Technical Warrant system is to establish and execute a standard, formal process for delegating technical authority from the Chief Engineer to competent experienced

individuals conducting and overseeing high-risk technical work in order to

assure safe and reliable operations and missions.

d) NASA has funded research to improve the dependability of software intensive systems. Two of these programs of note are the High-Dependability

Computing Program (HDCP) and the Software Assurance Research Program

(SARP).

e) NASA has an ongoing commitment to the NASA Software Engineering Initiative Implementation Plan established in January 2002. This initiative defines a NASA-wide comprehensive approach for improving software engineering to a quantifiable maturity level commensurate with mission criticality in

order to meet the software challenges of missions and projects. This initiative

employs the common frameworks of the Software-Capability Maturity Model

(SW–CMM) and the CMM Integrated (CMMI) developed under the auspices

of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University.

f) The NASA Engineering Training program provides Agency-wide training to

advance software engineering skills and assure critical personnel are properly trained in this discipline.

g) The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) at Langley Research Center maintains a Software Super Problem Resolution Team to coordinate and

conduct robust, independent engineering and safety assessments across the

Agency.

Q3. The Vision for Space Exploration is clearly a long-term goal. To accomplish such

a long-term goal will take long-term stability and excellence within the Agency’s

technical infrastructure. Yet management is diverting much of its funds to meet

short-term goals while sacrificing critical in-house core competencies and

science. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board warned that excessive

downsizing of the in-house technical competence contributed to the Columbia

disaster, but NASA is accelerating this process rather than reversing it. How is

NASA incorporating this lesson-learned from the Shuttle loss into its workforce

plan?

A3. NASA is taking a deliberate, thoughtful and targeted approach to realigning its

workforce to meet the Exploration Vision. This means that the competencies needed

to accomplish its current and expected future work are being identified through an

analysis of NASA’s core organizational and workforce competencies. NASA’s workforce will be realigned in a manner that ensures retention of needed competencies

and avoids any skill gaps that may impact the success and safety of future missions.

NASA’s field centers are fully engaged in this review of the Agency’s competency

needs. Their assessments are a critical part of the decision process and key to the

short- and long-term stability of the Agency.

Q4. I would like to draw your attention to a table on page SD 5–1 of the budget materials your agency supplied to Congress. This table shows Civil Service Distribution of Full Time Equivalent employees at the Centers. I will focus on Ames

Research Center in particular, since it is adjacent to my district. The table

shows what can best be described as simple attrition-type decreases in FTEs.

However, on February 7th, Ames’ Center director announced to his entire staff

that the FY 2006 budget would require, among other things, a reduction of

about 400 Civil Service employees and an equal number of on-site contractors

over the next year and a half. Similar draconian announcements have been

made by Glenn and Langley’s Center directors. Please tell me where do the numbers come from in your glossy notebook? And why is NASA telling Congress

something so vastly different from what the employees at the Centers are being

told?

A4. The FTE levels on page SD 5–1 represent the NASA workforce only through

FY 2006 and do not show the workforce currently budgeted for funded programs

from FY 2007 to FY 2010. The chart below shows the complete workforce runout

through 2010 and shows the 400 FTE reduction in the level of the workforce currently budgeted for funded programs through FY 2010 at Ames Research Center.

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Similar situations exist at Glenn and Langley Research Centers. To a degree, these

lower budgeted workforce levels reflect the fact that we are still engaged in an assessment of the workforce required to fulfill the Vision for Space Exploration.

We are matching needed skills with funded work both at the Centers currently

showing reductions and at other Centers that continue to hire. There is a lot of programmatic funding in the budget runout that is not yet assigned to a particular center, contractor, or research institution. Billions of dollars of work will be available

for competition as the Exploration program proceeds with its overall program definition, as well as its systems engineering and integration effort and Crew Exploration

Vehicle activity. There will be work available in various competitive science areas,

such as the Discovery and Mars programs.

We are currently assessing the health of NASA’s core competencies required to

support the Vision, a process that will be repeated on an annual basis in conjunction

with the budget development. Our core competency sustaining strategy focuses on

competition as the preferred approach for bringing to a Center the necessary level

of work to sustain a core competency. However, this strategy further provides for

alternative sustaining approaches when, for example, a gap in competition opportunities puts a core competency at risk. The Centers will be responsible for identifying

where they are unable to sustain the critical level from the resources available to

them. Mission Directorates will be responsible for providing needed resources, or if

that is not feasible, bringing the issue forward to the Agency leadership where a

tailored investment strategy will be developed.

In addition to work associated with the Vision, it is anticipated that Centers will

pursue reimbursable work for non-NASA customers in their areas of special competence. In this regard, Centers may consider alternative management structures

for more flexibility to pursue reimbursable tasks.

As a result of these activities, the workforce levels in the budget runout will increase to the extent additional FTE are needed to support identified and funded program requirements.

Q5. I have got some questions about the way in which you are introducing a competitive paradigm to the NASA. It appears that in-house Civil Service employees

are marginalized or excluded by chaotic, rushed, and unprofessional proposal

and review processes and by outsourcing quotas. Can you comment on the procedures that have been used for both intramural and extramural calls for proposals by ESMD, on the shorter timelines provided for intramural proposers,

and on the pre-determined allocation of greater funds for external calls for proposals than internal calls?

A5. New space technology developments are critical to the success of the Vision for

Space Exploration. However, to have an impact, these new developments must be

properly focused on the most important technical challenges that face NASA in realizing a long-term program of exploration that is sustainable and affordable.

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Because several of NASA’s technology development efforts must be effectively and

efficiently focused on exploration, a year long, multi-step process was used during

FY 2004 and early FY 2005 to reformulate and refocus ongoing NASA space technology R&D programs. This reformulation process began in February 2004 with a

‘zero base review’ of ongoing technology projects in the former Mission and Science

Measurement Technology Program, which were transferred to the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) from the Office of Aerospace Technology. At the

same time, various studies within NASA and ESMD better defined initial objectives,

schedules, requirements, and a spiral development approach for exploration in the

context of the Vision for Space Exploration. On the basis of the Vision and the

emerging requirements set, NASA established a new Exploration Systems Research

and Technology theme (ESR&T) to develop the critical technologies needed for future exploration missions. The ESR&T theme includes the Advanced Space Technology Program, the Technology Maturation Program, the Innovative Partnerships

Program, and the Centennial Challenges Program.

Following the creation of the ESR&T theme, a NASA-wide team was established

(involving every Center and over 100 individuals) to implement program-level planning efforts. This team developed content for an ESR&T Formulation Plan, which

was issued in March, 2004. The ESR&T Formulation Plan outlined the major elements of each program, identified the technical areas that would be addressed to

meet exploration mission needs, and established the processes for selecting new

technology development activities.

The selection process for new projects involved two separate competitions: an Intramural Call for Proposals (ICP) issued in May 2004 to select projects led by NASA

Centers, and a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) issued in July 2004 to select

projects led by external organizations. Both solicitations were based on the critical

technology needs identified in the ESR&T Formulation Plan. This two-part selection

process was designed to encourage partnerships between the NASA Centers and external organizations, to insure that the best ideas from all organizations would be

proposed without concern for intellectual property infringement, and that technology

development activities would be focused on practical applications and successfully

infused into NASA missions. In the ICP projects, the majority of the work is performed by NASA researchers, with participating team members from industry, universities, and other government agencies. In the BAA projects, the majority of the

work is performed by external researchers, with NASA personnel participating as

collaborators.

Although both ICP and BAA processes were conducted on an aggressive schedule

(about 100 days in duration from release of a solicitation to announcement of

awards), both efforts provided approximately two weeks for proposers to develop

their one-page, non-binding Notices of Intent (NOIs), and 30 days to develop their

full proposals.

Both solicitations were highly competitive. Over 1300 NOIs were submitted to the

ICP, and these were evaluated for their relevance to exploration mission needs by

the ESR&T management team at NASA Headquarters. Based on the relevance evaluations, 147 NASA investigators were invited to submit full proposals. The full proposals were then reviewed for technical merit, management approach, and cost by

an external peer review panel, and 48 intramural projects were selected based on

the peer review panel recommendations. The ICP resulted in $573 million in new

project awards.

For the BAA, over 3,700 Notices of Intent were submitted. A team of reviewers

from the NASA Centers evaluated the relevance of the NOIs, and 498 full proposals

were invited. The full proposals were evaluated by peer review panels consisting of

over 100 non-conflicted NASA and university reviewers, and 70 extramural projects

were selected. The BAA resulted in an additional $1.1 billion in new project awards.

Guidelines were established for the approximate scope of work to be led by either

NASA or non-NASA investigators. However, there was no ‘quota’ that set fixed limits on the funding that could go to intramural versus extramural projects. The actual selections were based on the competitive evaluations and the availability of

funds. The NASA Centers received approximately 50 percent of available program

funding, both as principal investigators on the intramural projects and as collaborators on the extramural projects. The two-part competitive selection approach using

the ICP and the BAA resulted in over 250 collaborations among NASA and nonNASA investigators, which was the original intent.

The Exploration Mission Directorate is committed to enhancing all of our processes, as we evolve. Thus, based on lessons learned from the initial ICP and BAA

competitions, we will be adapting our processes for future ICP and BAA competitions to ensure that we obtain the best value for the government, from all sources,

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including NASA field centers, industry, and universities. Specific suggestions for improvement are always welcome.

Q6. What is going to happen if you realize in the future that some of the expert scientists and engineers that you have identified today as ‘‘excess competencies’’ and

are eliminating (or planning to) through buy-outs and other means are actually

required to accomplish the Vision and you want to hire those employees back?

From what I hear about the brutal way employees and contractors are being

treated right now, they are not likely to want to go to work for NASA in the

future and you are likely creating future recruiting problems for the Agency

among those best and brightest scientists and engineers who can expect much

better treatment from academia and industry even in times of economy hardship. If it is necessary to execute Reductions in Force (RIFs), will you commit

to doing this in a reasonable manner and at a responsible pace after consulting

with Congress through the annual workforce plan review process? Why not require direct funding of R&D Civil Service salaries at the centers at maybe half

of the current level in FY06, and ramping this down over the following couple

of years to allow for an orderly and fair transition to a more competitive environment? This phase out would allow for a smooth and rational transition to

Full-Cost Management, in which 1) in-house proposers can transition off of their

current tasks and compete for future funding opportunities and 2) Centers can

properly shed institutional burdens to reset overhead. It would seem that demanding immediate change of both proposers and Centers is unrealistic and is

driving the unnecessary loss of in-house capabilities and expertise.

A6. NASA is taking a deliberate and thoughtful approach to realigning its workforce to meet the Exploration Vision. This means that the competencies needed to

accomplish its current and expected future work are being identified through an

analysis of NASA’s core organizational and workforce competencies. NASA’s workforce will be realigned in a manner that ensures retention of needed competencies

and avoids any skill gaps that may impact the success and safety of future missions.

The process for assessing and revisiting the health of our core competencies is addressed in the answer to Question 4. All civil service staff is funded through FY

2006 to allow us to conduct this realignment using a strategic, deliberate approach,

with a reduction in force as a last resort effort that will only be considered if all

of our voluntary efforts (job fairs, buy-outs) are not successful. For competitive opportunities, Centers are permitted to use overhead rates for FY 2005 and FY 2006

that exclude the additional cost burden of uncovered capacity, so the overhead rate

is ‘‘reset.’’

Q7. How many managers and non-clerical administrative employees does NASA employ? How has this workforce sector been changing over the last four years? My

reading of the numbers is that the ratio has bloated to a level of almost one administrative non-clerical employee for every two R&D employees (I believe at

Ames there are about 400 non-clerical administrative employees for about 800

scientists and engineers). How do you justify that ratio for an agency with such

ambitious technical goals? Any private R&D/engineering company with numbers like that would be ‘‘transforming’’ itself by getting rid of mid-level managers. Why isn’t NASA planning a focused reduction in its management workforce?

A7. During the last four years NASA’s civil servant science and engineering positions have increased from 10,957 positions to 11, 287 positions while non-clerical administrative civil servant positions have increased from 4,454 positions to 5,181 positions. The size of NASA’s non-clerical administrative workforce needs to be viewed

in the context of NASA’s overall science and engineering workforce, which includes

the contractor workforce. For example, in addition to the civil servant population,

NASA employs over 25,000 on-site contractor staff and another 5,000 employees at

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. These employees are predominately involved in

science and engineering work.

NASA’s civil service professional/administrative workforce serve in important

business management functions, such as procurement, contract administration, and

financial management, that are necessary to ensure prudent stewardship of resources entrusted to the Agency.

Q8a. How much of NASA’s current workforce turmoil and financial uncertainty are

due to the Agency’s adoption of SAP financial management software?

A8a. The current workforce turmoil and financial uncertainty are due to Transformational realignment activities, and not SAP software. In FY 2003, the Integrated Financial Management Program consolidated ten Center-based accounting

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systems and approximately 200 independent sub-systems and transitioned to a single, Agency-wide accounting system. This exposed many problems with the integrity

of historical data and weaknesses in financial practices and internal controls.

Through the IFM Program and the Office of the CFO, NASA is in fact working to

provide greater certainty and confidence in the financial data and management information it presents to its managers.

Q8b. Management policies are often changed to fit the software, rather the product

fitting the agency’s needs. And while this software system is something NASA

brags about in its budget, because adopting it got NASA a green light, rumor

has it that it has ‘‘transformed’’ the process of getting a purchase order from

something that used to take an hour to something that can now take months.

How is this helping run the Agency?

A8b. Best practice—and in fact federal guidance—for implementing Commercial Off

The Shelf (COTS) information technology systems dictate changing organizational

structures and business processes to fit the software, and not the reverse.

NASA is currently not rated at ‘‘green’’ for financial management. Nevertheless,

we are proud of our achievements, especially given that the industry standard

shows that less than a third of similar programs succeed.

The SAP solution requires the fiscal discipline of understanding basic finance,

knowing relevant procurement information, and more importantly, having the availability of funding before obligating taxpayer dollars. Should an organization or user

possess this fiscal discipline and have funding available, transaction times are minimal. This level of internal control and fiscal discipline is imperative if NASA is to

be struck from the GAO’s High Risk List.

Q8c. Why was SAP (a German software product) selected as opposed to Oracle (a

U.S. product)?

A8c. The software selected by NASA was made in accordance with a competitive

procurement process in line with Federal Acquisition Regulations. These regulations

require that all federal agencies procure from approved suppliers on the U.S. General Services Administration’s (GSA’s) Financial Management Supply Schedule, and

that any financial systems also be certified by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP.) Neither the GSA nor the JFMIP have excluded nonU.S. suppliers.

Q8d. Why is JPL not using SAP?

A8d. The Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) operated under contract by California Institute of Technology

(CaITech) CaITech, in this instance, is like any other federal contractor, and is at

liberty to operate the business software of its choice. Lockheed Martin and Northrop

Grumman, two significant NASA contractors, have chosen SAP.

Q9. What is the value of fully completing the ISS if most of its scientific capabilities

are being abandoned? What exactly is NASA expecting to accomplish either technically or scientifically with ISS and how does this justify the continued investment of billions of dollars and 28 risky Shuttle flights? How specifically does

ISS contribute to the Exploration Vision given its severely limited capabilities?

Would reprogramming some ISS, funds (by reducing the number Shuttle flights

and limiting some ISS goals) over to CEV1 development allow for an earlier delivery of CEV and associated independence from Soyuz (along with the reduced

exposure to Shuttle failure)?

A9. NASA is in the process of focusing and prioritizing its research and technology

development efforts for the International Space Station (ISS) on areas that best contribute to the Vision for Space Exploration. ISS provides a unique environment in

which the astronaut crew can carry out scientific research, investigating the effects

of the space environment both on human physiology as well as on spacecraft systems. NASA has identified 22 areas of research and technology that can be carried

out on the International Space Station to reduce the risk associated with future

human exploration missions. The ISS can specifically contribute to the Vision for

Space Exploration in areas such as: testing and validating performance of closed

loop life support systems; testing and validating both pharmaceuticals and new exercise systems to maintain astronaut health, and; demonstrating technologies necessary for future space systems such as thermal control, power generation, and

management of cryogenic fuels in space.

In response to the question of whether the CEV could be ready sooner, currently

CEV development is paced by existing technology maturation timelines and the development and demonstration of a reliable human-rated launch system, all of which

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are constrained by available resources. While preliminary indications are that the

CEV development could be accelerated, impacts relative to additional costs, performance, program risks, and what actual schedule acceleration can be achieved are yet

to be determined. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) is initiating

a six-month study to determine potential CEV schedule acceleration and the concurrent impact on performance, cost, and risk. It is unlikely that CEV deployment

could occur as early as 2010, when the Shuttle will be retired.

Questions submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee

Q1a. Members of the Committee were told during the NASA budget hearing that

money for safety activities was not put in its own separate budget function but

spread throughout the NASA budget.

What is the combined total amount of funding in the NASA budget for safety?

A1a. Safety is one of NASA’s core values and is embedded in all we do throughout

the Agency. There are certain safety related activities that can be explicitly identified in our budget, and total over $400 million in the FY 2006 request. They include

items in Corporate G&A such as the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC),

Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA), and Independent Verification & Validation

(IV&V); Center G&A for S&MA; and, Service Pools for S&MA and Independent

Technical Authority (ITA). However, this approximate $400 million does not include

the amounts expended routinely within programs and projects that contribute to the

safety posture of programs and projects outside these specific budget categories, nor

does it include safety funding embedded in the work of NASA’s contractors.

Q1b. How do the total safety budget projections for the next five years compare with

the last two years?

A1b. For the next five years, FY 2006 to FY 2010, the identified safety related budget of over approximately $400 million annually (see (a) above) is increasing at

approximately the rate of inflation. There have been some recent changes to elements of the overall safety and related budgets that make it difficult to compare

the last two years. These changes include the creation of service pools for ITA and

S&MA, which did not exist previously. However, over the past two years, there have

been specific increases in the Corporate G&A portion of the identified safety and

related funding, for both NESC (an expected ramp-up as that organization has been

established) and S&MA. The total funding for these activities increased more than

40 percent from FY 2004 to FY 2005 and then 16 percent from FY 2005 to FY 2006,

after which they level off to roughly inflationary increases.

Q2. How many NASA employees will be laid off due to the proposed plan for restructuring? How does NASA project this proposed restructuring to affect recruitment,

since rumors of layoffs or closings may dissuade those who may have wanted

to join NASA?

A2. NASA is taking a deliberate and thoughtful approach to realigning its workforce to meet the requirements of the Vision for Space Exploration. Any reduction

in force (RIF) that may be needed has always been considered an activity of ‘‘last

resort.’’ Rather, NASA is currently engaged in Agency-wide initiatives to avoid RIF.

These include offering a second round of voluntary separation incentives (‘‘buyouts’’)

and early retirement opportunities at most Centers in April 2005. An earlier round

of buyouts was offered in December 2004. Also, the Agency just concluded a series

of internal job fairs at Langley Research Center, Glenn Research Center, Ames Research Center and Dryden Flight Research Center designed to realign employees.

Hiring managers are currently in the process of selecting from among the job fair

applicants. In addition, the Langley Research Center conducted a very successful job

fair of private sector employers that they hope will provide job opportunities for

their employees. NASA is hopeful that these and similar future RIF avoidance activities will obviate the need for a reduction in force as a result of restructuring.

In addition, there are ongoing efforts to match needed skills with funded work.

There will be additional work available for competition as the Exploration program

proceeds with its overall program definition, as well as its Crew Exploration Vehicle

activity. Work will also be available in various competitive science areas, such as

the Discovery and Mars programs.

NASA’s ongoing health assessment of its core competencies may result in the application of additional program resources to sustain critical workforce. It is anticipated Centers will pursue reimbursable work for non-NASA customers in their

areas of special competence. Centers may also consider alternative management

structures for more flexibility to pursue reimbursable tasks. As a result of these efVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:07 Sep 19, 2005 Jkt 098564 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\021705\98564 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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forts, many of the FTEs not yet supported will likely be matched with funded requirements.

NASA will continue to conduct outreach and recruitment activities. The Agency

needs to be positioned to attract candidates with the competencies required to support the Exploration Vision. Additionally, we must continue to focus on maintaining

a pipeline of recent graduates, particularly in the science and engineering fields,

and will use tools such as the NASA Science & Technology Scholarship Program

(STSP). This program will award scholarships to individuals to prepare them for careers at NASA. In exchange for tuition scholarships and stipends, STSP award recipients must agree to fulfill a service obligation following graduation. The service

obligation equates to serving a two-year appointment with NASA for each academic

year under the scholarship, up to a maximum of four required years of service. As

always, NASA will also continue to hire students through the Student Education

and Employment Program. Our ongoing outreach and recruitment efforts will ensure that the Agency has the appropriate competencies necessary to continue to support NASA’s mission.

Questions submitted by Representative Jim Matheson

Q1. How does NASA actually set its budget priorities?

A1. NASA’s budget priorities are guided by the President’s direction, as outlined in

his Vision for Space Exploration announced in January 2004. His Vision provides

a historic opportunity to focus NASA for the long-term. The Vision was defined in

a policy document called ‘‘A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for

U.S. Space Exploration.’’ NASA has outlined new objectives in ‘‘The New Age of Exploration,’’ which lays out the new approach to space exploration. The FY 2006

Budget Request maintains resolute focus on exploration priorities and critical milestones defined by the President’s direction, and informed by our science priorities.

Consistent with the Vision, the FY 2006 Budget Request supports critical National

needs and revolutionary technologies in other priority areas, including Aeronautics,

Earth Science and Education.

Q2. Why do you think that sacrificing NASA’s science and aeronautics programs to

fund the exploration initiative will be compelling to the Congress, in terms of

securing Congressional support? It seems to me that the manned missions to the

Moon and Mars are being paid for at the expense of science missions.

A2. While there were reductions in science and aeronautics programs made in the

FY 2006 Budget Request relative to earlier plans, those reductions were not made

to fund the Vision for Space Exploration. In the FY 2006 budget request, reductions

were required in all four Mission Directorates as part of a government-wide effort

to reduce the deficit, and the need to adequately fund the Space Shuttle return-toflight activities. The net reductions relative to FY 2006 plans in the FY 2005 budget

request were: Science -$274 million; Aeronautics -$105 million; and Exploration Systems -$406 million. Note that the largest reduction was in Exploration Systems.

NASA continues to support important National priorities in Earth Science, Space

Science and Aeronautics. Science remains a key driver in the Vision for Space Exploration. Funding levels in Science are increasing in the FY06 budget request, with

an increase of 23 percent over current levels by 2010. Furthermore, the overall percentage of NASA’s budget going to the Science Mission Directorate increases from

33 percent in 2006 to 38 percent by 2010. NASA continues to build the next generation of space telescopes, prepare for robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, and develop new technologies to study our own planet. In Aeronautics Research, the FY

2006 Budget Request fully supports vital research in Aviation Safety and Security

and Airspace Systems programs in close cooperation with FAA. In Vehicle Systems,

the program’s focus has changed from evolutionary to revolutionary, high-risk, ‘‘barrier breaking’’ technologies.

Q3. Why did NASA decide to cancel funding for the Hubble servicing mission, given

its popularity with American citizens and its significant contributions to science?

A3. The decision not to pursue a Space Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble was

based on a relative risk analysis and operational complexity. While all space flight

is inherently risky, there are both on-orbit and ground processing requirements that

would be notably unique to a Hubble servicing mission. For a Hubble servicing mission, the options and available time for dealing with an on-orbit emergency are

greatly reduced, posing additional risk to the mission.

NASA has developed a five-point flight rationale (addressing safety requirements)

for Space Shuttle RTF, which is grounded in the recommendations of the CAIB and

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predicated on primary hazard control, warning devices and special procedures. The

first two elements of that flight rationale (Elimination of Critical Debris and Impact

Detection During Ascent) rely upon Space Shuttle hardware, infrastructure, and procedural improvements that broadly apply to all missions, including those to destinations other than the International Space Station (ISS). However, the efforts of the

Space Shuttle program to meet the three remaining elements of the RTF flight rationale (On-Orbit Debris Impact/Damage Detection; On-Orbit Thermal Protection

System Repair; and, Crew Rescue) assume access to the resources of the ISS. Developing the additional capabilities necessary to meet these three elements of the flight

rationale for a Hubble servicing mission would entail additional risks above and beyond those inherent in a mission to the ISS.

To apply this same flight rationale to a Hubble servicing mission, NASA would

have to develop new capabilities that are analogous to those provided by the ISS.

The Orbiter Boom Sensor System would have to be extensively modified, or an alternative capability would need to be created. Additionally, a way would need to be

found to sustain the crew of a hopelessly crippled Orbiter with limited life-support

capabilities long enough for a second Shuttle to be launched on a rescue mission.

That rescue mission, in turn, would need to be processed at the same time as the

Hubble servicing mission itself, a situation that would be highly complex, would require double the normal workload on ground launch and processing teams, and

would put an unprecedented strain on the overall Shuttle system. Finally, a rescue

mission would require many unproven techniques, such as emergency free-space

crew transfer in space suits while performing Space Shuttle to Space Shuttle station-keeping. Being based at the ISS offers the advantages of multiple hatches, airlocks, and established docking and evacuation procedures, which would afford a

shirt-sleeve, nominal transfer of crew from the ISS to the rescue Orbiter.

Based on analysis of the relative risks, operational complexity and implicit schedule pressure, NASA has decided not to proceed with a Shuttle servicing mission of

Hubble.

In terms of a robotic servicing mission, the Hubble program office estimated a cost of $1.3 billion over 39 months, with launch in December 2007. Independent reviews

have concluded costs could approach $2 billion and development schedule could extend past 5 years. Starting in 2006, Hubble could begin to lose some pointing control. More importantly, batteries are degrading and could become inadequate to protect Hubble in the 2008–2009 timeframe, after which point Hubble would be

unsalvageable. Hubble’s orbit will not decay to re-entry until the middle of the next

decade.

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report released in December 2004 concluded that the likelihood of successful Hubble robotic servicing was highly improbable. The Report strongly recommended termination of robotic servicing in favor of

a de-orbit only mission:

—‘‘[A] robotic mission should be pursued solely to de-orbit Hubble.’’ (emphasis

added)

Based on the unambiguous and very strong NAS recommendation, NASA can no

longer defend continued effort in support of Hubble robotic servicing. NASA is developing a plan to refocus the program to a de-orbit mission. The PDR occurred, but

was focused on inventorying work done to date and on identifying the best approach

to the de-orbit only mission. The new NASA Administrator has stated his intention

to revisit the earlier decision to not service Hubble with Shuttle in light of what

NASA learns after the Shuttle returns to flight.

Q4. In what ways could the preservation and extension of the Hubble Space Telescope help our understanding of dark energy and provide useful insights for future dark energy missions?

A4. Astronomers use measurements of distant supernovae (explosions of aged stars)

in other galaxies to determine how fast the universe was expanding at the time of

the explosion that began the life of our Universe. The Hubble Space Telescope, along

with ground-based telescopes, has been used to trace this ‘‘expansion history’’ of the

universe, and has contributed to the recent surprise conclusion that the expansion

of the universe is currently accelerating (after initially slowing down due to gravity).

The physical phenomenon behind this acceleration is not yet understood and is often

termed ‘‘dark energy.’’ Observations of more supernovae allow the refinement of

knowledge of the amount of cosmic deceleration and acceleration over the history

of the universe and better determination of numerical parameters that define the

‘‘dark energy.’’ Over the next few years, the Advanced Camera for Surveys on

Hubble will continue to be used as a search engine to find many more supernovae.

Future telescopes may be designed with much larger fields-of-view than available

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on Hubble in order to more efficiently detect many supernova explosions in a shorter period.

Questions submitted by Representative Brad Miller

Q1. Please provide a breakdown of the budget for NASA’s commercial technology

and technology transfer programs for the years FY 2004–2010.

A1. The outyear estimates used to construct the 2006 President’s Budget are reflected in the chart below.

Q2. In what specific ways have you modified NASA’s technology transfer programs

in response to the National Academy of Public Administration’s review of those

programs?

A2. The goals of the newly organized Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP) are to:

1) make the Vision for Space Exploration affordable through partnerships; and,

2) make it sustainable by creating benefits to the public.

The Innovative Partnerships Program includes the following elements

• Technology Transfer

• Small Business Innovative Research—SBIR

• Small Business Technology Transfer—STTR

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• Industry-Led Partnerships

• University-Led Partnerships

Æ The Research Partnership Centers (RPCs)

Æ University Research Engineering Technology Institutes (URETIs)

Responses to National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recommendations are as follows (numbering corresponds to NAPA Report):

1. Demonstrated Leadership Commitment: NASA has committed to an improved

technology transfer effort by committing new funds in the FY 2006 President’s Budget request. The nominee for NASA Administrator has played a

leadership role in technology transfer issues throughout his career, including

his membership on the NAPA panel, which reviewed the technology transfer

programs at NASA.

2. Relocation: The Agency elected to place the Technology Transfer program in

the IPP Office within the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD).

The rationale for this move was to make Technology Transfer an integral

part of the technology maturation process, engaging the private sector on a

broader level in the Exploration Vision. The Technology Transfer efforts

along with the SBIR and STTR programs will continue to support the entire

Agency’s needs.

3. Mission Directorates Responsible for Spin-In: Upon receipt of the NAPA report, ESMD transmitted it to the other Mission Directorates, indicating that

in the coming year, there would be a series of dialogues between the IPP office and Mission Directorate staffs. The purpose of these dialogues would be

to determine the proper approach in meeting the recommendation. Spin-in,

or Technology Infusion, is an integral part of the ESMD mission; it also is

for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, which has established its

own partnerships function for spin-in. We expect similar results with the

other Mission Directorates during the coming months.

4. Center Directors Responsible for Spin-Out: Upon receipt of the NAPA report,

ESMD transmitted it to the NASA Field Center Directors, calling attention

in particular to four of the eight recommendations that would require Center

attention and asking the Centers to address those recommendations. The

IPP office will be working with its Center counter-parts in addressing these

recommendations. As part of this, the IPP instituted formal work package

agreements with each of the Centers which established performance goals

and standards for the IPP program elements.

5. Restructure External Network: NASA’s Technology Transfer Element is

streamlining its External Network competitively awarding this function to a

single contractor managed from Headquarters. A draft Statement of Work

has been completed. A contract should be awarded by late summer.

6. Web Sites & Information Systems: A new contract for the National Technology Transfer System (TechTracS) has just been selected; working in collaboration with the ESMD and Agency Information Technology personnel

and Strategic Communications Office, the web sites will be consistent with

agency policies and directives as well as satisfying the recommendation made

by NAPA. Other improvements to the information system are also underway,

also consistent with the NAPA recommendation.

7. Intellectual Property Processing: This recommendation is being worked jointly between the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and IPP; the competitive selection of a central external network contractor (item #5) will also address

this recommendation. OGC and IPP are in general agreement, and it is recognized that a number of processes will be affected and improved when the

new contract is completed.

8. Rigorous Management: Program plans are being finalized, task agreements

are in place with all Centers, and regular quarterly program reviews are

being conducted, the budget and program planning are more fully coordinated, and stronger centralized management controls are being put in place.

The role of the IPP leadership team has been strengthened and has become

more focused on strategic planning, long-range goals, and annual objectives

with targets and measurable results.

Q3. Please provide the funding profile for NASA’s Space Grant fellowship program

for the years FY 2004–2010. What is the reason for the reduction in funding for

the Space Grant program after FY 2006?

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A3.

The budget for NASA’s Office of Education beyond FY 2006 decreases slightly,

consistent with the government-wide effort to reduce the deficit. During the last few

years, NASA’s Office of Education conducted formal assessments of its education

programs, eliminating or restructuring those programs determined to be less efficient and effective. To accommodate the new lower planning level for FY 2007 and

beyond, and having already eliminated many less effective programs, it was necessary to reduce the planning amounts for remaining Education programs and

projects, including Space Grant. During the FY 2007 budget cycle, we expect to reassess all program budgets, including the Space Grant budget, to better identify resource needs. The FY 2007 budget request will reflect the results of this reassessment.

Questions submitted by Representative Michael T. McCaul

Q1. I am happy to see that NASA is making headway in meeting the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, and aims to return the

Shuttle to flight as early as May or June of this year. Do you see any specific

reason that NASA would not reach its goal of May–June for a return flight to

space?

A1. All major Space Shuttle flight hardware is at the Kennedy Space Center in

Florida and is being processed through a normal pre-launch flow. Meanwhile, the

independent Return-to-Flight Task Group (RTFTG) continues to assess NASA’s efforts to meet the fifteen Return-to-Flight recommendations made by the Columbia

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The RTFTG met in plenary session on March

29–31, 2005 to consider the remaining open CAIB Return-to-Flight activities. In the

words of RTFTG co-chair Richard Covey, ‘‘Right now, we don’t see anything that

stands in front of the Agency that can’t be accomplished in order to make the May–

June [2005] launch window.’’

Nevertheless, this and all future flights will be driven by safety milestones. If

there is any indication that additional work needs to be done to meet those milestones, then the Space Shuttle program will take whatever measures are appropriate to ensure that those milestones are met—up to and including delaying

launches, if necessary.

Q2. The phase-out date of the Space Shuttle, corresponding with the completion of

the International Space Station, is slated for sometime in 2010, and the Crew

Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is not expected to carry humans into space until

2014. Will there be no manned flights by NASA between 2010 and 2014, and

is there a possibility that the CEV could be ready sooner?

A2. It is important to note that the President’s Vision for Space Exploration called

for the Crew Exploration Vehicle to be ready no later than 2014. Administrator Griffin has stated his determination to endeavor to have the Crew Exploration Vehicle

ready earlier than 2014, thus reducing any potential ‘‘gap.’’

The current schedule for CEV calls for risk reduction demonstrations in 2008, followed by uncrewed full up vehicle tests commencing in 2011. It is anticipated that

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Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s (ESMD) current acquisition plan will result in the first crewed flight of the CEV in 2014. In the interim between Shuttle

retirement in 2010 and the first crewed flight of the CEV, NASA Astronauts will

continue to conduct human research activity on the International Space Station

with transportation provided by the Soyuz, and potentially other vehicles.

In response to the question of whether the CEV could be ready sooner, currently

CEV development is paced by the maturity of technology and the demonstration of

a reliable human rated launch system, both of which are constrained by available

resources. ESMD is initiating a six-month study to determine potential CEV schedule acceleration and the concurrent impact in performance, cost and risk. While preliminary indications are that the CEV development could be accelerated, impacts

relative to additional costs, performance, program risks, and what actual schedule

acceleration can be achieved will have to be determined—particularly with respect

to the human rated launch system requirement. It is unlikely that CEV deployment

could occur as early as 2010, when the Shuttle will be retired.

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