IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

___________________ 

No. 13-11411

Summary Calendar

___________________ 

SEALED APPELLEE,

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SEALED APPELLANT,

 Defendant - Appellant

_______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

_______________________ 

Before SMITH, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant-Appellant appeals from the United States Magistrate Judge’s 

order committing her to the custody of the Attorney General. Defendant 

challenges the magistrate judge’s authority to enter this order because it does 

not comply with the procedural requirements set forth in the Magistrate’s Act. 

Although both parties agree that the magistrate judge’s order does not comply 

with the Magistrate’s Act, Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 25, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 13-11411

subject matter jurisdiction. Because the order is not a final judgment and we 

lack jurisdiction, we GRANT Appellee’s motion to dismiss.

The district court referred this case to the magistrate judge for pretrial 

management pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). When a district court refers a 

case to a magistrate judge under § 636(b), the magistrate judge is permitted 

“to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearing, and to submit to a judge 

of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations.” § 636(b)(1)(B). 

Once the magistrate judge files proposed findings and recommendations, 

parties have “fourteen days . . . [to] file written objections to such proposed 

findings and recommendations” to the district court. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

The magistrate judge in this case conducted an evidentiary hearing and 

entered an order granting the petition and committed Defendant to the custody 

of the United States Attorney General. The parties do not dispute that the 

magistrate judge did not submit proposed findings and recommendations to 

the district court, in violation of § 636(b)(1)(B). A magistrate judge is only able 

to enter judgment if both parties consent. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)(C). The district 

court did not refer this case to the magistrate judge pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(C) 

and it is undisputed that neither party consented to the magistrate at any time 

thereafter.

Under our precedent, “it is well established that a magistrate judge’s 

order is not ‘final’ within the meaning of § 1291 and may not be appealed to 

this court directly.” Donaldson v. Ducote, 373 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2004); 

see also Barber v. Shinseki, 660 F.3d 877, 878–79 (5th Cir. 2011). However, 

“Congress has created a limited exception to this rule”: § 636(c), under which 

a district court, with the consent of the parties, may authorize a magistrate 

judge to enter final judgment in a case and such judgment is appealable to the 

circuit court directly. Id. “Because this process requires the parties to waive 

2
No. 13-11411

their constitutional rights to an Article III judge, we have held that a case does 

not fall within the jurisdictional ambit of § 636(c) unless the parties’ consent 

to proceed before a magistrate judge is clear and unambiguous.” Id. As stated 

above, it is undisputed that the parties did not consent to magistrate 

jurisdiction. Therefore, this case does not fall under § 636(c) and the 

magistrate judge’s order is not a final judgment that can be appealed to this 

court. The district court is the proper court with which to file objections. See 

§ 636(b)(1)(C).

Because we lack jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss the appeal is 

GRANTED. Appellee’s alternative motion for extension of time to file a brief 

is DENIED as unnecessary. 

3