GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2000 CHEMICAL 

WEAPONS DISPOSAL

Improvements Needed 

in Program 

Accountability and 

Financial Management

GAO/NSIAD-00-80

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Contents

Letter 5

Executive Summary 8

Chapter 1

Introduction

20

Elements of the Chemical Demilitarization Program 20

Management Structure of the Chemical Demilitarization Program 30

International Efforts to Eliminate Chemical Agents and Weapons 31

Our Prior Concerns With the Chemical Demilitarization Program 32

Chapter 2

Most Chemical 

Weapons and Materiel 

Could Be Destroyed 

Before the 

Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

33

Ninety Percent of the Chemical Stockpile Could Be Destroyed Before

the Convention’s 2007 Deadline 34

Significant Obstacles Could Prevent the Nonstockpile Product From 

Meeting the Convention’s 2007 Deadline 41

Program Costs Will Likely Exceed $14.9 Billion Estimate 45

Conclusions 49

Chapter 3

The Army Has Not 

Adequately Managed 

the Liquidation of 

Program Funds

50

Prior Reviews Report Weaknesses in the Management of Program 

Funds 51

About 16.1 Percent of Prior Years’ Obligations Were Unliquidated 52

Assessment Indicates That Most Unliquidated Obligations Were

Accounted For 54

Reasons for Some Unliquidated Obligations 56

Recent Factors Reducing Unliquidated Obligations 60

Financial Improvements Have Not Been Consistently and

Systematically Implemented Across All Program Elements 62

Conclusions 62

Recommendations 63

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 63
Contents

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Chapter 4

Program Management 

Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and 

Ineffective 

Coordination

65

Complex Management Structure 65

Unclear Accountability for Program Results and Inadequate 

Coordination and Communication 70

Conclusions 73

Recommendations 73

Agency Comments 73

Appendixes Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 74

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 79

Appendix III: Comments From the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 82

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 85

Related GAO Products 86

Tables Table 1: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel 24

Table 2: Status of the Army’s Efforts to Destroy Its Nonstockpile 

Chemical Materiel 42

Table 3: Nonstockpile Transportable Treatment Systems 43

Table 4: Working Life Cycle Cost Estimates and Appropriated Funds

for the Chemical Demilitarization Program 47

Table 5: Reported Budget Authority and Unobligated, Obligated, and 

Unliquidated Obligations for the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program for Fiscal Years 1993-98 53

Table 6: Unliquidated Obligations for 428 Military Interdepartmental 

Purchase Requests for Fiscal Years 1993-98 55

Figures Figure 1: Original Stockpile of Chemical Agents and Munitions

(prior to the start of disposal operations at Johnston Atoll

in June 1990) 21

Figure 2: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel 25

Figure 3: Status of the Army’s Efforts to Destroy Its Chemical

Stockpile 36

Figure 4: Schedules for Disposal Operations at the Nine Chemical 

Stockpile Sites 38
Contents

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Figure 5: Organization Structure for the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program 67

Abbreviations

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DOD Department of Defense

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

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National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-284698 Letr

May 8, 2000

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) program to destroy chemical agents and munitions has been 

controversial from its inception and has experienced delays, cost increases, and management 

weaknesses. Recently, concerns over the financial management of the program surfaced following a 

review by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), which suggested that 

significant portions of prior years’ appropriations remained unliquidated.

This report responds to mandates contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2000 and the House Report No. 106-244 on DOD’s Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and to 

a request from the Chairmen of the Subcommittees on Defense and Foreign Operations, Senate 

Committee on Appropriations, to report on the management of the program. Accordingly, this report 

discusses whether (1) the program will meet the Chemical Weapons Convention’s time frames within 

the costs projected, (2) obligations and liquidations of funds appropriated for the program have been 

adequately managed, and (3) the management structure of the program allows for coordinated 

accountability of the program.

We are sending copies of this report to Senators Pete V. Domenici, Frank R. Lautenberg, Joseph I. 

Lieberman, Fred Thompson, and Charles S. Robb and to Representatives John R. Kasich and John M. 

Spratt, Jr., in their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of cognizant Senate and House 

Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. 

Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable William J. Lynn, Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller); the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable James Lee Witt, 

Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

GAO contacts and key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues
B-284698

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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner, Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Chairman

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence, Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young, Chairman

The Honorable David R. Obey

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
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Executive Summary

Purpose In 1985, the Congress required the Department of Defense to carry out the 

destruction of the U.S. stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and 

establish an organization within the Army to manage the disposal program. 

Over time, the Congress also directed the Department of Defense to 

dispose of chemical warfare materiel not included in the stockpile and to 

research and develop technological alternatives for disposing of chemical 

agents and munitions. Under the United Nations-sponsored Chemical 

Weapons Convention ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1997, the Department of 

Defense agreed to dispose of its 31,496-ton stockpile of chemical weapons 

stored throughout the United States and its territories. The convention 

requires that the chemical stockpile and chemical warfare materiel, such as 

recovered chemical weapons and training sets, be destroyed by April 29, 

2007. The Department of Defense has spent approximately $6.2 billion and 

estimates that it will spend another $8.7 billion on its disposal efforts under 

the Chemical Demilitarization Program.

In response to recent congressional concerns about the financial 

management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program, GAO assessed 

whether (1) the program will meet the convention’s time frames within the 

costs projected, (2) obligations and liquidations of funds appropriated for 

the program have been adequately managed, and (3) the management 

structure of the program allows for coordinated accountability of the 

program.

Background In section 1412 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1986 (P.L. 99-145),1

 the Congress directed the Department of Defense 

to destroy the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions that 

existed on the date of the legislation’s enactment. The stockpile consisted 

of nerve and mustard agents contained in rockets, bombs, projectiles, 

spray tanks, and bulk containers. These items are stored at eight sites in the 

continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. Since 

then, disposal activities have evolved into the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program, which comprises the following five elements:

1

 50 U.S.C. 1521.
Executive Summary

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Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project. This project was set up in 1988 to 

destroy the stockpile of unitary chemical weapons2

 stored at eight sites in 

the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. 

The method chosen for destruction was incineration.

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project. This project was set 

up in 1988 to help communities in 10 states near the chemical stockpile 

storage sites and the associated Army installations enhance existing 

emergency management and response capabilities in the unlikely event of a 

chemical stockpile accident.

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product. This project was set up in 1993 to 

identify, locate, and destroy binary chemical weapons,3

 miscellaneous 

chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, and 

former production facilities and identify and locate buried chemical 

warfare materiel.

Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project. This project was set up 

in 1994 to develop and support testing of two technologies for neutralizing 

chemical agents at two sites that store only large containers holding one 

type of agent.

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. This program was 

established under congressional direction in 1997 to identify and test two 

or more technologies (other than incineration) for destroying assembled 

chemical weapons. Such weapons include fuzes, explosives, propellants, 

chemical agents, shipping and firing tubes, and packaging materials.

Several different offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of the Army share management roles and responsibilities 

for the five elements of the Chemical Demilitarization Program. The 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 

oversees the chemical stockpile, nonstockpile, and alternative technologies 

projects. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and 

Environment) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency oversee 

2

 A unitary chemical weapon is a munition containing a single lethal chemical agent.

3

 Binary weapons are formed from two nonlethal elements through a chemical reaction after 

the munitions are fired or launched. The weapons are manufactured, stored, and 

transported with only one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The second element is to 

be loaded into the weapon at the battlefield.
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

the emergency preparedness project. The Agency manages the emergency 

preparedness activities in the civilian communities, and the U.S. Army 

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command manages similar activities on 

the Army installations. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 

Technology) oversees the assembled chemical weapons program.

On April 24, 1997, the Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, 

committing the United States to dispose of its unitary chemical weapons 

stockpile, binary chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare 

materiel, and former chemical weapons production facilities by April 29, 

2007. If a country is unable to meet the convention’s deadline, the 

convention’s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may 

grant an extension of up to 5 years.

Results in Brief The Army had destroyed approximately 17.7 percent of the chemical 

weapons stockpile as of January 31, 2000, and could destroy about 

90 percent of the stockpile by the convention’s 2007 deadline, given its 

recent progress and projected plans. However, the Army may not meet the 

deadline for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile because the 

incineration method of destruction has not been acceptable to two of the 

states where the chemical stockpile is located. Additionally, some of the 

nonstockpile materiel may not be destroyed before the deadline because 

the proposed method of destruction has not been proven safe and effective 

and accepted by state and local communities. The Army’s $14.9 billion 

estimate for program costs will likely increase due to (1) the additional 

time required to develop and select disposal methods for the remaining 

10 percent of the stockpile and for some of the nonstockpile chemical 

materiel and (2) possible delays in demolition of a former chemical 

weapons production facility.
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Army has experienced significant problems in recent years in 

effectively managing the use of funds appropriated for the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program. The Army reported that as of September 30, 

1999, $498 million (16.1 percent) of the $3.1 billion appropriated for the 

program in fiscal years 1993-98 was unliquidated.4

 During the review, GAO 

examined the transactions for which most of these obligations were 

recorded, a type of interagency order known as a military 

interdepartmental purchase request.5

 In an assessment of these interagency 

orders that account for $495.1 million (99.4 percent) of the unliquidated 

obligations, GAO found that $63.1 million (12.7 percent) had been 

liquidated but was not recorded in accounting records or included in 

financial reports prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. 

Of the remaining $432 million, most was for work completed but not yet 

billed by the contractor or verified by the Defense Contract Audit Agency 

or for work in progress but not yet completed. In addition, program 

officials could not explain why $10.4 million of the $432 million had not 

been liquidated. Some obligations remain unliquidated due to a lack of 

attention to and a fragmented structure for managing program activities 

and tracking liquidations, failure to liquidate obligations on completed 

contracts and deobligate excess funds, and program delays. The Army has 

begun to improve its management of funds appropriated for the program. 

4

 Federal agencies must have budget authority prior to incurring obligations of appropriated 

funds. Obligations are the amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, 

and similar transactions during a given period that will require disbursements (payments) 

during the same or future period. As services are rendered or goods delivered, an agency 

makes the required disbursements to liquidate the obligation. Appropriation laws usually 

make budget authority available for one or more fiscal years but do not require agencies to 

liquidate obligations during the specific years the budget authority is available. The 

liquidation can occur after the appropriation has expired but must occur prior to closing the 

account—5 years after the appropriation has expired.

5

 These interagency orders are used by the program offices (ordering agency) to obtain 

goods and services from another agency (the servicing agency), such as the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers or the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, that has 

the capability or expertise necessary to perform the needed work. The servicing agency in 

turn typically awards contracts to third parties, uses its existing contracts, or uses its own 

resources to fill the order. The orders are made on either a reimbursable order basis or by 

advancing funds of the ordering agency. For reimbursable orders, the ordering agency 

obligates funds upon acceptance of the order by the servicing agency. These obligations are 

liquidated as the servicing agency bills the ordering agency for the work performed under 

the contract or as the servicing agency completes the work itself and payments are made. 

For direct orders, once the servicing agency accepts the order, funds from the ordering 

agency are obligated and advanced for the resulting contract or for the work done by the 

servicing agency. The obligation is liquidated as payments are made to the contractor or the 

servicing agency as work is performed.
Executive Summary

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

However, it has not consistently implemented improvements across the 

program, and it is too soon to assess the effect of these improvements.

Effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been 

hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective 

coordination among program offices and with state and local officials. In 

addition, coordination and communication among officials responsible for 

elements of the program have been inadequate, thus causing confusion 

about what actions would be taken at certain sites. Further, officials of the 

Departments of Defense and the Army have not agreed on whether or when 

management roles, responsibilities, and accountability should be 

consolidated for destruction of the chemical stockpiles in Kentucky and 

Colorado. Consequently, state and local officials have expressed concern 

that no single office is accountable for achieving the desired results of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program’s activities.

GAO is making recommendations to address problems noted involving 

financial and program management and coordination and accountability.

Most of the Chemical 

Stockpile and 

Nonstockpile Materiel 

Could Be Destroyed by 

the Convention’s 

Deadline

Despite early delays in the destruction program, the Army could destroy 

about 90 percent of its stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and 

most of its nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel6

 before the Chemical 

Weapons Convention’s 2007 deadline. The convention contains provisions 

that, if granted, could extend the deadline by as much as 5 years to 2012.

6

 Because nonstockpile chemical materiel includes a large variety of items, such as 

recovered chemical weapons and materiel and former production facilities, the Army is 

unable to assign percentages to the total amount of nonstockpile materiel destroyed.
Executive Summary

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Army has made progress toward establishing the capabilities needed to 

destroy the stockpile and, absent unanticipated delays, could destroy about 

90 percent of the chemical stockpile before the convention’s 2007 deadline. 

It now has two operational destruction sites, at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, 

Utah, that have incinerated about 17.7 percent of the original chemical 

stockpile. These two sites accounted for 49.7 percent of the original 

stockpile. The Army has also begun constructing chemical disposal 

facilities at five other sites—Aberdeen, Maryland; Anniston, Alabama; 

Newport, Indiana; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Umatilla, Oregon.7

 These sites 

account for approximately 40.4 percent of the stockpile. The Army has 

selected incineration as the method of destruction of the chemical 

stockpile in Alabama, Arkansas, and Oregon, and state and local 

governments have agreed to this method. In Maryland and Indiana, the 

states have agreed to test neutralization technologies as an alternative to 

incineration and have granted permits for the construction of full-scale 

pilot facilities. Because of the testing, these sites may experience some 

initial delays in their destruction of chemical weapons, but the Army still 

expects to meet the 2007 deadline.

Two sites—Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado—are unlikely to 

meet the 2007 deadline. These two sites account for about 10 percent of the 

original stockpile. Recent program schedules show that operations using 

alternative technologies at the two sites would not begin until after the 

2007 deadline because of the time needed to validate, certify, and obtain 

approval of the technologies. Even if it decided to use incineration as the 

method of destruction, the Army would have difficulty obtaining the 

environmental permits from the states in time to meet the 2007 deadline.

The Army has destroyed a large portion of its nonstockpile chemical 

warfare materiel. However, it may not meet the 2007 deadline for 

destroying some recovered chemical warfare materiel. The methods 

developed by the Army for destroying this materiel have not been proven 

safe and effective and have not been approved by state and local 

communities. In addition, the Army may not meet the deadline for 

demolition of part of a former chemical weapons production facility 

because it must destroy the chemical weapons stockpiled there first. Any 

delay in the stockpile disposal may push demolition operations past the 

deadline.

7

 The proposed disposal facilities in Maryland and Indiana will pilot test alternative 

technologies selected under the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project.
Executive Summary

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Costs for the Chemical Demilitarization Program are likely to exceed the 

Army’s estimate of $14.9 billion. This estimate does not include the costs 

associated with likely delays in destruction of the stockpile in Kentucky 

and Colorado and delays in destroying nonstockpile materiel. Also, the 

Army has not developed a reliable baseline to estimate costs to clean and 

close chemical stockpile disposal facilities and adjacent areas. In response 

to congressional direction, the Army has implemented cost-reduction 

initiatives to reduce contract costs and reduce costs associated with 

extended state and local processes for obtaining environmental permits.

The Army Has Not 

Adequately Managed 

the Liquidation of 

Program Funds

The Army has not adequately managed program activities and tracked 

disbursements to ensure the timely liquidation of funds appropriated for 

the Chemical Demilitarization Program. This has occurred because of a 

lack of attention to and a fragmented organizational structure for managing 

program activities and tracking liquidations, delays in recording financial 

transactions and untimely liquidation of obligations under completed 

contracts, and delays in program schedules. The Army reported that as of 

September 30, 1999, $498 million (16.1 percent) of the $3.1 billion 

appropriated for the program in fiscal years 1993-98 was unliquidated. In an 

assessment of obligation documents that accounted for $495.1 million, or 

99.4 percent of the unliquidated balance, GAO found that $63.1 million 

(12.7 percent) had been liquidated but was not recorded in accounting 

records or included in financial reports prepared by the Defense Finance 

and Accounting Service. Of the remaining $432 million, most was for work 

completed but not yet billed by the contractor or verified by the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency or for work being done but not yet completed. In 

addition, program officials could not explain why $10.4 million of the 

$432 million had not been liquidated.

Program officials have historically placed a priority on the timely obligation 

of appropriations and paid much less attention to tracking liquidations of 

obligations. During GAO’s review, program officials could not readily 

determine whether unliquidated obligations were for completed or ongoing 

efforts and admittedly gave little priority to deobligating excess funds 

under completed or closed contracts. In addition, several different entities 

were responsible for managing program activities and tracking the 

dispersal of funds. In some cases, this has caused confusion as to who was 

accountable for liquidating obligations and deobligating excess funds.

Delays in reporting transactions in the defense accounting records and 

financial reports have contributed to the magnitude of unliquidated 
Executive Summary

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

obligations. Such delays were generally due to the time contractors took to 

validate and process liquidations and the time the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service took to record them. Other unliquidated obligations 

were due to the amount of time contractors took to submit their final bills 

after completing work or the time the Defense Contract Audit Agency took 

to review and approve costs associated with completed contracts. Finally, 

delays in program schedules have resulted in unliquidated obligations. 

Program officials have underestimated the time it would take to obtain 

states’ approvals for permits to construct destruction facilities. For 

example, permits to construct disposal facilities in Oregon, Alabama, and 

Arkansas took longer than anticipated to obtain, and the program office 

could not liquidate construction and procurement obligations for these 

sites until it obtained the approvals to start construction. In addition, 

obligations could not be liquidated due to technical and contractual delays.

The Army could liquidate some of its obligations soon, as it has recently 

obtained permits to construct destruction facilities at five of the stockpile 

sites. Additionally, actions by the Congress and the Office of the Under 

Secretary of the Defense (Comptroller) to reduce the funding requested for 

the program have decreased the amount of funds available for obligation 

and better aligned funding with the program’s execution. This will decrease 

the likelihood that these funds will be obligated far in advance of when they 

are needed.

The Army has begun to improve its management of obligations and 

liquidations of appropriated funds for the destruction program. For 

example, the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization recently 

required the managers for stockpile, nonstockpile, and alternative 

technology projects to report monthly on obligations, disbursements, and 

planned and actual cost information. However, at the time of GAO’s review, 

these improvements have not been consistently and systematically 

implemented across all program elements, and program officials could not 

explain why $10.4 million had not been liquidated.

Complex Structure and 

Ineffective 

Coordination Hinder 

Program Effectiveness

Effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been 

hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective 

coordination among program offices and with state and local officials. 

Several changes in the organization and structure of the program during 

1997-99, including some changes to implement legislative requirements, 

divided the management roles, responsibilities, and accountability among 

offices at several different levels within the Departments of Defense and 
Executive Summary

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

the Army. In addition, coordination and communication among managers 

of the various elements of the program have been inadequate. Further, 

officials of the Departments of Defense and the Army have not agreed on 

whether or when management roles, responsibilities, and accountability 

should be consolidated for destruction of the chemical stockpiles in 

Kentucky and Colorado. Consequently, state and local officials have 

expressed concern that no single office is accountable for achieving the 

desired results of the Chemical Demilitarization Program’s activities. The 

Congress has also expressed concern about the management of the 

program.

Some state and local officials have expressed concern because they have 

received conflicting information about the program and because no single 

office is clearly accountable for the execution of the program. For example, 

according to state and local officials, spokespersons for the Chemical 

Stockpile Disposal Project and the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program have made conflicting and inconsistent statements 

about the possible disposal methods for the chemical stockpile stored in 

Kentucky and Colorado. Consequently, the perception is that the program 

lacks a single vision for accomplishing its objectives effectively. To 

complicate matters, Department of Defense and Army officials have not 

decided on whether or when management roles, responsibilities, and 

accountability should be consolidated for destruction of the chemical 

stockpiles in Kentucky and Colorado. Whatever the decision is, closer 

cooperation will be needed between the two program elements.

GAO also found instances where coordination and communication among 

project managers for the program was inadequate. For example, as 

previously discussed, the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization’s 

efforts to improve the office’s management of program funds have not been 

consistently and systematically implemented across all program elements. 

In another case, officials of the stockpile and nonstockpile projects in 

Arkansas were not coordinating their efforts to obtain environmental 

permits and approvals for their disposal operations.
Executive Summary

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Congress has expressed concern over the management of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program. In the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000,8

 the Congress directed the 

Secretary of Defense to report on the management of the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program, including an assessment of the Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. Some in the Congress have also 

expressed concern that, in recent budget submissions, the Department of 

Defense included the budget for the Chemical Demilitarization Program as 

part of the Army’s budget. In its report for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,9

 the House Armed Services 

Committee reaffirmed its belief that, as required by the original statute 

establishing the program, chemical demilitarization funds should be set 

forth in a Defense Department-wide budget account to emphasize that 

destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile is a national issue that 

affects the entire Department.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense monitor the Army’s 

actions to

• develop a systematic approach for ensuring the timely, effective 

expenditure of funds appropriated for all elements of the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program and

• direct program officials to account for the $10.4 million in unliquidated 

obligations that they could not give an explanation for, or explain why 

the obligations have not been liquidated.

In addition, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Army to clarify the management roles and responsibilities 

of program participants, assign accountability for achieving program goals 

and results, and establish procedures to improve coordination among the 

program’s various elements and with state and local officials.

8

 Public Law 106-79 section 8159.

9

 House Report No. 106-162, page 63.
Executive Summary

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Agency Comments and 

GAO’s Evaluation

The Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency provided separate, written comments on a draft of this report. Both 

agencies generally agreed with the report’s findings and recommendations.

In its comments on the draft report, the Department of Defense agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations to develop a systematic approach for ensuring the 

timely, effective expenditure of funds appropriated for all elements of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program and direct program officials to account 

for the $10.4 million in unliquidated obligations that they could not explain. 

However, the Department disagreed that the Secretary of Defense should 

direct the Secretary of the Army to implement the recommendations 

because the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization had 

already initiated implementation actions. Given these actions and the 

long-standing nature of the concerns raised in the draft report, GAO 

modified the recommendations to call for the Secretary of the Defense to 

monitor the actions to ensure that the Army completes them fully and in a 

timely way and that appropriate results are obtained. The Department of 

Defense concurred with the last recommendation in the draft report, which 

called for more management accountability.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency concurred with the 

recommended principle of a systematic approach for ensuring the timely, 

effective expenditure of funds and elaborated on its actions to implement 

the principle behind the recommendation. Because the recommendation to 

account for the $10.4 million in unliquidated obligations pertains to the 

Army, the Agency had no comment on that recommendation. To the extent 

that the Chemical Demilitarization Program management impacts state and 

local emergency preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency concurred with last the recommendation, which called for more 

management accountability.

The comments of the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency are presented in their entirety in appendixes II and III, 

respectively. The two agencies also provided technical clarifications, and 

where appropriate, GAO incorporated them in the report.
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte1r

Since World War I, the United States has maintained a stockpile of chemical 

agents and munitions to deter the use of chemical weapons against its 

troops. From 1917 through the 1960s, obsolete or unserviceable chemical 

agents and munitions were disposed of by fire in an open pit, burial, and 

dumping in the ocean. However, because of public concern about the 

potential effects of these methods of disposal on public health and the 

environment, they were discontinued during the 1970s. In 1985, the 

Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD) to carry out the 

destruction of the U.S. stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and 

establish an organization within the Army to be responsible for the disposal 

program. Over time, the Congress also directed DOD to dispose of 

chemical warfare materiel not included in the stockpile and to research and 

develop technological alternatives for disposing of chemical agents and 

munitions. In April 1997, the U.S. Senate ratified the U.N.-sponsored 

Chemical Weapons Convention, effectively agreeing to dispose of the 

chemical stockpile weapons and chemical warfare materiel by April 29, 

2007. If a country is unable to maintain the convention’s disposal schedule, 

the convention’s management organization may grant an extension of up to 

5 years.

Elements of the 

Chemical 

Demilitarization 

Program

Since the 1980s, DOD’s chemical weapons disposal activities have evolved 

into the current program, known as the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program. It now consists of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project, the 

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project, the Nonstockpile 

Chemical Materiel Product, the Alternative Technologies and Approaches 

Project, and the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program.

Chemical Stockpile 

Disposal Project

In section 1412 of the Fiscal Year 1986 Department of Defense 

Authorization Act (P.L. 99-145),1

 the Congress directed DOD to destroy the 

U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions that existed on the 

date of the legislation’s enactment. The original stockpile consisted of 

31,496 tons of nerve and mustard agents contained in rockets, bombs, 

projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk containers. Some munitions contained 

nerve agents, which can disrupt the nervous system and lead to loss of 

muscular control and death. Others contained a series of mustard agents 

that blister the skin and can be lethal in large amounts. The stockpile is 

1

 50 U.S.C. 1521.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

stored at eight sites in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll 

in the Pacific Ocean, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Original Stockpile of Chemical Agents and Munitions (prior to the start of disposal operations at Johnston Atoll in 

June 1990)

Note: Program officials consider the original stockpile to be those chemical agents and munitions that 

existed before the start of disposal operations at Johnston Atoll in June 1990.

Source: Program office for chemical demilitarization.

Umatilla Chemical Depot,

Oregon

Number of items: 220,599

Tons of agent: 3,717







Johnston Atoll,

Pacific Ocean

Number of items: 412,652

 Tons of agent: 2,031

Deseret Chemical Depot,

Utah

Number of items: 1,115,995

 Tons of agent: 13,616

Pueblo Chemical Depot,

Colorado

Number of items: 780,078

 Tons of agent: 2,611

Hawaii

Blue Grass Army Depot,

Kentucky

 Number of items: 101,764

Tons of agent: 523

Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas

Number of items: 123,093

 Tons of agent: 3,850

Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama

Number of items: 661,529

 Tons of agent: 2,254

Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Number of items: 1,818

 Tons of agent: 1,625

Newport Chemical Activity,

Indiana

Number of items: 1,690

 Tons of agent: 1,269
Chapter 1

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Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

In 1988, the Army formally announced its Chemical Stockpile Disposal 

Project and stated that incineration on site at each of the existing stockpile 

locations was the preferred disposal method. The objectives of the 

program are to (1) destroy the stockpile of chemical weapons and 

(2) provide maximum protection to the environment, the public, and 

personnel involved in the storage, handling, and disposal of the stockpile. 

To destroy the weapons, the Army uses a “reverse-assembly” procedure 

that drains the chemical agent from the weapons and takes apart the 

weapons in the reverse order of assembly. Once disassembled, the 

chemical agents and weapons are incinerated in separate furnaces.

As of January 30, 2000, the Army had incineration-based disposal 

operations under way at two sites, had destroyed approximately 

17.7 percent of the original chemical stockpile, and had started 

construction of disposal facilities for future disposal operations at five 

other sites. The two operational disposal facilities are at the following 

locations:

• Johnston Atoll is located in the Pacific Ocean about 825 miles southwest 

of Hawaii. The Army completed construction of its baseline incineration 

disposal facility in July 1988 and started incineration operations in June 

1990. It is the world’s first full-scale facility designed specifically for the 

disposal of chemical weapons and is the prototype plant for the 

destruction program. The stockpile at Johnston Atoll originally 

contained 2,031 tons of nerve and mustard agents and represented 

6.4 percent of the original stockpile.

• Deseret Chemical Depot is located about 22 miles south of Tooele, Utah. 

The Army completed construction of the disposal facility in August 1993 

and started incineration operations in August 1996. The Army considers 

this disposal facility to be a first generation incineration facility, and as 

at the Johnston Atoll facility, it expects to apply lessons learned from its 

operations to other disposal sites. The Deseret stockpile originally 

contained 13,616 tons of nerve and mustard agents, representing 

43.2 percent of the original stockpile.

Three other baseline incineration disposal facilities are under construction. 

In June 1997, the Army started construction of both the Umatilla facility, 

located about 7 miles from Hermiston, Oregon, and the Anniston facility, 

located about 50 miles east of Birmingham, Alabama. The Umatilla 

stockpile contains 3,717 tons of nerve and mustard agents, or 11.8 percent 

of the original stockpile. The Anniston stockpile contains 2,254 tons of 

nerve and mustard agents, or 7.2 percent of the original stockpile. These 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

facilities are scheduled to begin destroying agents in late 2001 or early 

2002. Construction of the Pine Bluff facility, located about 35 miles 

southeast of Little Rock, Arkansas, started in 1999. The Pine Bluff stockpile 

contains 3,850 tons of agents, or 12.2 percent of the original stockpile. The 

Army plans to begin destroying chemical agents at the Pine Bluff facility in 

late 2003.

Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness 

Project

In 1988, DOD established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness 

Project to help communities in 10 states near the stockpile storage sites 

enhance their emergency management and response capabilities in the 

unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident. The project, a companion 

to the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project, is necessary to help protect the 

civilian population, workers, and the environment until disposal of the 

chemical stockpile is complete. Since 1988, the Army and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have assisted the civilian 

communities in the vicinity of the eight chemical stockpile storage 

locations and the storage installations in enhancing their emergency 

response capabilities. In 1997, the Army and FEMA implemented a 

management structure under which FEMA assumed responsibility for 

off-post (civilian community) program activities, while the Army continued 

to manage on-post chemical emergency preparedness and to provide 

technical support for both on- and off-post activities. FEMA, with its 

long-standing knowledge and experience in preparing for and dealing with 

emergencies of all kinds, provides its expertise, guidance, training, and 

other support to the civilian community. The Agency also administers the 

grant funds provided to the states and counties where stockpile facilities 

are located in order to carry out the program’s off-post activities.

Nonstockpile Chemical 

Materiel Product

Recognizing that the stockpile program did not include all chemical 

warfare materiel, the Congress directed DOD to plan for the disposal of 

materiel not included in the stockpile.2

 Consequently, DOD implemented 

the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product to identify the locations, 

types, and quantities of chemical materiel not included in the stockpile; 

develop and implement disposal and transportation methods and 

procedures; and develop plans, schedules, and cost estimates to implement 

the program. This materiel, some of which dates as far back as World War I, 

2

 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484, sec. 176).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

consists of binary chemical warfare materiel, miscellaneous chemical 

warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, former production 

facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. These items are described 

in table 1.

Table 1: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel

Source: Program office for nonstockpile chemical materiel.

The locations of the nonstockpile chemical materiel, as of January 31, 2000, 

are shown in figure 2.

Category Description

Binary chemical warfare materiel Binary chemical weapons form lethal chemical agents from two less toxic elements through a 

chemical reaction during flight to a target. Binary weapons were manufactured, stored, and 

transported with only one chemical element in the weapon. The second chemical element was to be 

loaded into the weapon at the battlefield.

Miscellaneous chemical warfare 

materiel

• Unfilled munitions, devices, and equipment specifically designed for use in the deployment of 

chemical weapons.

• Empty ton containers formerly used to store chemical agents.

• Chemical samples such as agents transferred from a research project or from leaking munitions into 

glass vials, metal cylinders, steel bottles, and ton containers to ensure safe storage of agent.

Recovered chemical warfare 

materiel

Items that were recovered from range-clearing operations, chemical burial sites, and research and 

development test areas. The handling and disposal of recovered chemical weapons are difficult 

because the weapons are more likely to have deteriorated than other nonstockpile materiel, and the 

identity of the agent is unknown in some of the items. Most recoveries involve very small quantities of 

materiel and include chemical containers such as training sets, glass bottles, metal containers, 

artillery projectiles, mortar cartridges, and bombs.

Former chemical weapons 

production facilities 

Prior to 1968, these facilities produced chemical agents, their precursors, and components for 

chemical weapons or were used for loading and filling chemical munitions.

Buried chemical warfare materiel Until the late 1950s, disposal by burial was an accepted and approved practice. In most cases, the 

materiel was burned or chemically neutralized before burial. Although the actual amount, agent, and 

types of materiel are unknown, the Army estimates that there are 100 known or suspected burial 

locations in 38 states and 2 U.S. territories. Some locations have multiple burial sites; the Army has 

identified approximately 227 known or suspected sites.
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Introduction

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Figure 2: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel (as of Jan. 31, 2000)

Note: No disposal operations are being conducted at the recovered chemical materiel sites.

Source: Program office for nonstockpile chemical materiel.

Umatilla Chemical Depot,

Oregon

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Johnston Atoll,

Pacific Ocean

Recovered chemical materiel

Deseret Chemical Depot,

Utah

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical materiel

Pueblo Chemical Depot,

Colorado

Miscellaneous chemical materiel Hawaii

Blue Grass Army Depot,

Kentucky

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas

Binary chemical weapons

Former production facilities

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical materiel

Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Binary chemical weapons

Former production facilities

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Recovered chemical materiel

Newport Chemical Activity,

Indiana

Former production facilities

Dugway Proving Ground,

Utah

Recovered chemical materiel

Miscellaneous chemical materiel

Redstone Arsenal,

Alabama

Recovered chemical materiel

Camp Bullis,

Texas

Recovered chemical materiel

Fort Richardson,

Alaska

Recovered chemical materiel
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Since the early 1990s, the Army has undertaken research and development 

on several transportable systems that are designed to identify, access, and 

treat chemical agents in nonstockpile munitions and decontaminate the 

containers and munitions. All disposal methods are to comply with federal 

and the affected state’s environmental and safety regulations. Until 

recently, the Army emphasized the use of transportable treatment systems 

because of the relatively small quantities and the characteristics of 

nonstockpile chemical weapon materiel located at a potentially large 

number of sites through the country.

Alternative Technologies 

and Approaches Project

In November 1991, because of public concern about the safety of 

incineration, the Army requested the National Research Council to evaluate 

potential technological alternatives to the baseline incineration process. In 

the 1993 Defense Authorization Act (sec. 173), the Congress directed the 

Army to use the Council’s evaluation and report on potential technological 

alternatives to incineration. The Congress also directed the Army to 

consider safety, environmental protection, and cost-effectiveness when 

evaluating alternative technologies. Consequently, in August 1994, the 

Army initiated the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project, a 

more aggressive research and development program, to investigate, 

develop, and support the testing of two technologies based on chemical 

neutralization of chemical agents at the bulk-only stockpile sites—

Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. The project focused on these 

two sites because they have only one type of chemical agent stored in large 

steel bulk containers. The Army is conducting this project in conjunction 

with the baseline incineration program.

In 1997, the project proceeded with full-scale pilot testing of the 

neutralization technologies at the following two stockpile sites:
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

• Edgewood Chemical Activity is located at the Edgewood Area of the 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, north of Baltimore, Maryland. The Aberdeen 

stockpile consists of 1,625 tons (or 5.2 percent of the original stockpile) 

of mustard agent stored in 1,818 ton containers. These containers are 

designed for safe storage of bulk chemical agents and do not have fuzes, 

warheads, or other explosive devices. The disposal technology being 

tested at Aberdeen is neutralization followed by the biodegradation 

process.3

 The environmental permit was obtained from the state in 

February 1999, enabling the start of site preparation activities and 

construction.

3

 The neutralization process involves mixing mustard agent with hot water; the process 

results in the destruction of the agent and the generation of a byproduct comprised 

primarily of thiodiglycol. This byproduct is readily biodegradable and results in an effluent 

of salts and bacteria waste products.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

• Newport Chemical Depot is located 2 miles south of Newport and 

32 miles north of Terre Haute in western Indiana. The Newport stockpile 

consists of 1,269 tons (or 4 percent of the original stockpile) of nerve 

agent stored in 1,690 ton containers. The technology being tested at 

Newport was neutralization followed by a supercritical water oxidation 

process.4

 The environmental permit was obtained from the state in 

December 1999, enabling the start of construction activities.

Assembled Chemical 

Weapons Assessment 

Program

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,5 the 

Congress directed DOD to assess alternative technologies to the baseline 

incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions.6

 In 

addition, section 8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 

1997, provided $40 million to conduct the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program, a pilot program to identify and demonstrate two or 

more alternatives to the incineration process for the destruction of 

assembled chemical munitions.7

 The appropriations act required the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology to designate a 

program manager who was not, nor had been, in direct or immediate 

control of the baseline incineration program to carry out the pilot program. 

The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for constructing 

incineration facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado, until 

180 days after the Secretary of Defense reports on alternative disposal 

methods for assembled chemical weapons. The Strom Thurmond National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 19998

 requires that if a 

technology other than incineration is selected for these sites, the Under 

Secretary of Defense must certify in writing to the Congress that the 

alternative is (1) as safe and cost-effective for disposing of assembled 

chemical munitions as is incineration, (2) capable of completing the 

4

 Mixing nerve agent with water and sodium hydroxide solution destroys it. The resultant 

byproduct mainly comprises water and phosphorous- and sulfur-containing compounds. 

Supercritical water oxidation is used to convert the neutralization byproduct to carbon 

dioxide, water, and inorganic salts.

5

 Public Law 104-201 section 142.

6

 Assembled chemical weapons represent the part of the chemical weapons stockpile that is 

configured with fuzes, explosives, propellants, chemical agents, shipping and firing tubes, 

and packaging materials.

7

 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208).

8

 Pubic Law 105-261 section 142.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

destruction of such munitions on or before the later date of either when the 

destruction would be completed if incineration were used or the 

convention’s deadline, and (3) capable of satisfying federal and state 

environmental and safety laws.

Because of the legislative prohibition on obligating any funds for 

constructing incineration facilities and the states’ unwillingness to accept 

incineration as a disposal method, the Army tentatively chose the Blue 

Grass and Pueblo depots to test alternative technologies for destroying the 

assembled chemical weapons.

• The Blue Grass Army Depot, located in central Kentucky, has a stockpile 

of weapons containing 523 tons of nerve and mustard agents, or 

1.7 percent of the original stockpile.

• The Pueblo Chemical Depot, located about 14 miles east of Pueblo, 

Colorado, has a stockpile of weapons containing about 2,611 tons of 

mustard agent, or 8.3 percent of the original stockpile.

The program involves a three-phased approach that includes the 

development of technology evaluation criteria, technology assessment, and 

demonstration of not less than two technologies. The public has thus far 

participated in all phases of the program. During criteria development in 

mid-1997, the program office developed three sets of criteria to select 

proposals of technologies worthy of further evaluation, demonstration, and 

implementation. From September 1997 through June 1998, the program 

office selected six technologies as worthy of demonstration from 

12 proposals. However, because of funding constraints, the program office 

selected only three of the six technologies for further testing. This selection 

was based on the program office’s evaluation of the demonstration plans 

and determination of each technology’s value to the government. In May 

1998, the program office determined that neutralization followed by 

supercritical water oxidation was a viable solution for destroying 

assembled chemical weapons containing either nerve or mustard agents. It 

determined that neutralization followed by biodegradation was a viable 

solution for destroying assembled weapons containing mustard agents.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The conference report for the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2000 stated that the conferees had been advised that DOD 

intended to conduct evaluations of the three technologies previously 

selected for the demonstration program, but which had not been tested 

because of funding constraints.9

 In addition, the conference report noted 

that DOD had decided to spend $40 million for this purpose. In the 

conference report for the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 

Fiscal Year 2000, the conferees directed DOD to make available $40 million 

to conduct demonstration testing of the three additional alternative 

technologies.10 Program officials are now using these funds to demonstrate 

these technologies. As of February 28, 2000, no decision had been made on 

which of the alternative technologies or the baseline incineration process 

would be used to destroy the chemical stockpile in Kentucky or Colorado.

To increase public awareness and acceptance, the program office 

established, with the assistance of the Keystone Center,11 the Dialogue on 

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment. The Dialogue includes 

representatives of the affected communities, national citizens’ groups, state 

regulatory agencies, Native American tribes, the Environmental Protection 

Agency, and the Departments of Defense and the Army and participates in 

the Army’s decision-making process for the program.

Management Structure 

of the Chemical 

Demilitarization 

Program

DOD and Army managers at several different levels share management 

roles and responsibilities for elements of the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program.

• The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology) oversees the chemical stockpile, nonstockpile, and 

alternative technologies and approaches projects. The Program 

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization manages the daily operations of 

these projects. The office of the program manager is organized into 

distinct project areas: the Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile 

9

 Public Law 106-65 (House Conference Report No. 106-301, page 590).

10 Public Law 106-79 (House Conference Report No. 106-371, page 257).

11 The Keystone Center is a nonprofit, public policy and educational organization and is 

headquartered in Keystone, Colorado. The Center identifies issues of public importance that 

it can constructively address through its process of education and consensus building.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Disposal, the Product Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel, and 

the Project Manager for Alternative Technologies and Approaches.

• The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) 

and FEMA share management responsibilities for the Chemical 

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project. The U.S. Army Soldier and 

Biological Chemical Command manages on-post Army activities for the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army, while FEMA manages the off-post 

portion of the program in the civilian communities.

• The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) oversees 

the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. The Program 

Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment manages daily 

operations.

The management structure for the program is discussed in more detail in 

chapter 4.

International Efforts to 

Eliminate Chemical 

Agents and Weapons

In 1993, the United States, Russia, and more than 150 nations signed the 

U.N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 

Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the Chemical Weapons 

Convention, making the convention effective on April 29, 1997.12 On 

April 24, 1997, the Senate ratified the convention, committing the United 

States to dispose of its unitary chemical weapons,13 binary chemical 

warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, and former 

chemical weapons production facilities by April 29, 2007. The Army 

classifies unitary chemical weapons as chemical stockpile weapons and 

classifies binary chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare 

materiel, former chemical weapons production facilities, and 

miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel as nonstockpile chemical 

materiel.14 If a country is unable to meet the convention’s disposal 

schedule, the convention’s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 

12 The Chemical Weapons Convention became effective 180 days after the 65th nation 

ratified the convention.

13 A unitary chemical weapon is a munition containing a single lethal chemical agent.

14 Chemical warfare materiel buried before January 1, 1977, is excluded from treaty 

requirements as long as it remains buried. Once the materiel is unearthed, intentionally or 

accidentally, it must be destroyed under treaty requirements.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Weapons may grant an extension, although in no case may the deadline be 

extended past April 29, 2012.

Our Prior Concerns 

With the Chemical 

Demilitarization 

Program

Since its beginning, the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been beset 

by controversy over disposal methods, delays of 2 to 3 years more than the 

Army anticipated in obtaining needed federal and state environmental 

permits and other approvals, and increasing costs. In prior reports, we 

expressed concern about the Army’s lack of progress and the rising cost of 

the program. For example, in 1991 we reported that continued problems in 

the program indicated that increased costs and additional time to destroy 

the chemical stockpile should be expected and recommended that the 

Army determine whether faster and less costly technologies were available 

to destroy the stockpile.15 In a 1994 report on the nonstockpile program, we 

concluded that the Army’s plans for disposing of nonstockpile chemical 

warfare materiel were not final and that its costs were likely to change.16 In 

1997, we reported that the program cost and schedule were largely driven 

by the degree to which DOD and the affected states and communities 

agreed with the proposed method to dispose of the chemical weapons and 

materiel.17 In July 1999, we reported that, although sizable unliquidated 

obligations were reported for the program from prior years, program funds 

did not appear to be available for other uses.18 In addition, we reported that 

these unliquidated obligations were caused by a number of factors, such as 

delays in obtaining environmental permits and technical delays. See related 

GAO products at the end of this report.

Our objectives, scope, and methodology are described in appendix I.

15 Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages Are Likely 

to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).

16 Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel Can Be 

Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).

17 Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule

(GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).

18 Chemical Demilitarization: Funding Status of the Chemical Demilitarization Program

(GAO/NSIAD-99-232R, July 29, 1999).
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline Chapte2r

The Army has destroyed approximately 17.7 percent of the original 

chemical weapons stockpile and could destroy 90 percent of its stockpile 

of chemical agents and munitions and most of its nonstockpile chemical 

warfare materiel1

 before the Chemical Weapons Convention’s 2007 

deadline, given its recent progress and projected plans. The Army has 

disposal operations under way at two stockpile sites and has started 

construction of disposal facilities for future destruction operations at five 

other sites—these seven sites store 90 percent of the chemical stockpile. 

However, because of the additional time required to develop and select 

disposal methods that are acceptable to the state regulatory agencies and 

local communities in Kentucky and Colorado, which store the remaining 

10 percent of the original stockpile, the Army will not meet the 2007 

deadline at these sites. In addition, the disposal of some nonstockpile items 

may exceed the 2007 deadline because of delays in the testing of and 

obtaining permits for key disposal systems for recovered chemical warfare 

materiel and because of possible delays in the demolition of a former 

chemical weapons production facility. Given past program experience, 

these types of delays are likely to occur and will add to program costs. The 

Army estimates that the program will cost $14.9 billion; it has spent 

approximately $6.2 billion and estimates that the program will cost another 

$8.7 billion. To identify opportunities to reduce the cost of the program, 

officials have developed and implemented several cost-reduction initiatives 

associated with contracting for the stockpile disposal facilities and 

increasing the public awareness and acceptance of the program.

1

 Because nonstockpile chemical materiel includes a large variety of items, such as 

recovered weapons and former production facilities, the Army is unable to assign 

percentages to the total amount of nonstockpile materiel destroyed.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Ninety Percent of the 

Chemical Stockpile 

Could Be Destroyed 

Before the 

Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

In prior reports, we have expressed concern about the Army’s lack of 

progress in destroying the stockpile of chemical agents and munitions. 

Despite these early delays, the Army is now making progress toward 

establishing the capabilities needed to destroy the stockpile. Absent 

unanticipated delays, the Army could destroy about 90 percent of the 

stockpile before the convention’s 2007 deadline.2

 However, because of the 

additional time required to research, develop, test, and verify new disposal 

methods that may be environmentally acceptable to the state regulatory 

agencies and local communities in Kentucky and Colorado, destruction 

activities at these locations, which store the remaining 10 percent of the 

stockpile, are not likely to start before the 2007 deadline.

2

 There are ongoing legal challenges in Utah, Alabama, Oregon, and Arkansas that have the 

potential to stop operations and construction activities in those states. However, litigation 

has not forced delays to the program. The Army has successfully defended these civil 

actions and is confident that it will continue to rebut legal challenges to the program.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Army Has Made 

Progress in the Destruction 

of the Chemical Stockpile

Since the Army formally announced its stockpile disposal project in 1988, it 

has disposal operations under way at two sites and has started 

construction of disposal facilities for future operations at five other sites. It 

is now operating stockpile disposal facilities at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, 

Utah, which together stored 49.7 percent of the total original stockpile.3

 Of 

this amount, 5,572 tons (17.7 percent of the original stockpile) of chemical 

agents have been destroyed, and another 10,075 tons (32 percent of the 

original stockpile) are scheduled for disposal at the two sites.4

 In addition, 

the Army has started to build chemical weapons disposal facilities at 

Aberdeen, Maryland; Anniston, Alabama; Newport, Indiana; Pine Bluff, 

Arkansas; and Umatilla, Oregon.5

 As shown in figure 3, these sites stored 

40.4 percent of the total original stockpile.

3

 Recently, a former contractor employee of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, 

Utah, came forward as a prospective witness in an ongoing administrative challenge to the 

facility’s environmental permit. In press releases, he made numerous allegations concerning 

the information provided in the permit application and the role of the Army, its contractors, 

and state officials in the permit approval process. However, at the time of this report, these 

concerns were still under review by DOD and the state of Utah. The petitioners in the 

ongoing challenge in Utah have removed the former contractor employee from the witness 

list, so he will not testify any further in the proceeding. Although this proceeding has the 

potential to stop operations at Tooele, program officials have expressed confidence that the 

concerns will be proven false.

4

 As the Army destroys chemical agents stored at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, Utah, these 

percentages will change.

5

 The proposed disposal facilities in Maryland and Indiana will pilot test alternative 

technologies selected under the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Figure 3: Status of the Army’s Efforts to Destroy Its Chemical Stockpile

(as of Jan. 31, 2000) 

Note: Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.

Source: Program office for chemical demilitarization.

Significant actions in the implementation of disposal operations for

90 percent of the stockpile have been completed. Such actions include the 

selection of a disposal method and the granting of environmental permits 

by state and local governments. The disposal method for the remaining 

10 percent of the stockpile stored in Kentucky and Colorado has not yet 

been selected because the 1997 Defense Appropriations Act requires an 

examination of alternative disposal methods under the Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment Program.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Disposal Operations at 

Seven of Nine Stockpile 

Sites Could Be Completed 

Before the 2007 Deadline

The Army’s most recent schedule shows that disposal operations are 

expected to be completed at seven of the nine stockpile sites with at least 

5 months to spare, most sites have at least 18 months to spare, before the 

2007 deadline. However, the schedules for completion at the Maryland and 

Indiana sites, which are pilot testing alternative disposal technologies, are 

more uncertain because of the need to further test the alternatives 

proposed for these locations. For the remaining two sites in Kentucky and 

Colorado, disposal methods have not yet been selected because the 1997 

Defense Appropriations Act requires an examination of alternative disposal 

methods under the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. 

Figure 4 depicts the Army’s current disposal schedules for these sites.6

6

 Although program officials are revising the estimated completion dates shown in figure 4, 

the revisions were not completed at the time of our review.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Figure 4: Schedules for Disposal Operations at the Nine Chemical Stockpile Sites (as of May 11, 1999)

a

Schedule execution is on hold because the 1997 Defense Appropriations Act requires an examination 

of alternative disposal methods under the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program.

Source: Chemical Stockpile Disposal Schedule, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,

May 11, 1999.

As part of the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project, Aberdeen, 

Maryland, and Newport, Indiana, have pilot projects to investigate, 

develop, and support the testing of disposal technologies based on 

chemical neutralization processes. The Army has started site preparation 

and construction activities for the full-scale pilot facilities at both 

locations, but the schedules for testing the technologies at these sites are 

based primarily on research, modeling, and input from engineers and 

scientists and not on full-scale operations. It is premature to assume that 

operations at these sites will successfully demonstrate the technologies 

Storage site (percent of stockpile)

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

 (5.2 percent)

Blue Grass Army Depot, KY

 (1.7 percent)

Chemical Weapons

Convention deadline

April 29, 2007

Possible

5-year extension 

April 29, 2012

Anniston Army Depot, AL

 (7.2 percent)

Johnston Atoll, Pacific Ocean

 (6.4 percent)

Newport Chemical Activity, IN

 (4.0 percent)

Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR

 (12.2 percent)

Pueblo Chemical Depot, CO

 (8.3 percent)

Deseret Chemical Depot, UT

 (43.2 percent) 

Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR

 (11.8 percent)

a

a

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

without some initial delays associated with the design and operation of the 

pilot plant. Until the pilot tests are completed, the schedules for these sites 

remain uncertain, and the sites may not have as long a period before the 

2007 deadline as shown in figure 4.

On February 2, 2000, officials from the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program provided schedules showing that disposal operations 

at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado, will not start until after the 

2007 deadline because of the time required to validate and certify the 

alternative technologies and obtain environmental permits. However, 

program officials are optimistic that operations could be completed within 

the possible 5-year extension to the deadline. Two other reviews of the 

program also concluded that the two sites would not meet the 2007 

deadline. In August 1999, a National Research Council brief by the 

Chairman of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Committee concluded that 

disposal operations using an alternative technology in Kentucky and 

Colorado would not be completed by December 2007. In September 1999, 

an Arthur Andersen, Limited Liability Partnership, consulting report 

prepared for the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Chemical Demilitarization concluded that the estimated completion dates 

for these sites ranged between May 2011 and December 2015, well beyond 

the 2007 deadline.7

The protocol for selecting an alternative technology for the destruction of 

assembled chemical munitions stored in Kentucky or Colorado has not yet 

been determined and remains under study. If a technology other than 

incineration is selected for these sites, the 1999 Defense Authorization Act 

requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology to 

certify in writing to the Congress that the alternative is (1) as safe and 

cost-effective for disposing of assembled chemical munitions as 

incineration, (2) capable of the destruction of such munitions on or before 

the later date of the completion of destruction if incineration were used or 

the convention’s deadline, and (3) capable of satisfying federal and state 

environmental and safety laws. DOD and Army officials were assessing 

these three conditions and identifying the criteria for making the 

certification. At the same time, the Congress directed that DOD make 

available, and DOD actually committed, funds in fiscal year 2000 to award 

7 Schedule and Cost Risk Assessment of the Alternative Technologies in the Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment, Arthur Andersen, Limited Liability Partnership (Sept. 17, 

1999).
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

contracts to evaluate and demonstrate three additional technologies for the 

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. Program officials 

were also determining whether the Under Secretary of Defense could issue 

the required certification before demonstrating the three additional 

technologies.

It is unlikely that an alternative technology can be validated, certified, and 

implemented in Colorado and Kentucky in time to meet the convention’s 

2007 deadline. In addition, insufficient time remains for the Departments of 

Defense and the Army to meet the 2007 deadline at these two sites using 

the baseline incineration process. According to the Army’s 1998 annual 

report on the program, to meet the destruction schedule required by the 

convention, authority to proceed with the baseline incineration process in 

Colorado and Kentucky was required before June 30, 1999.8

 Even so, DOD 

and Army officials were discussing whether to grant such authority for 

both Colorado and Kentucky. These officials were preparing two notices of 

intent announcing the preparation of separate environmental impact 

statements for the disposal of the stockpile in Colorado. One 

environmental impact statement will focus on whether to pilot test 

alternative technologies in Colorado or at two other sites. The other 

environmental impact statement is to be specific to Colorado and will focus 

on which disposal method—the baseline incineration process, a modified 

incineration process, or an alternative technology—should be used in 

Colorado. Some program officials believe it may still be possible to meet 

the 2007 deadline by using a modified incineration process to destroy the 

stockpile in Colorado. However, according to state officials, the Army 

would have great difficulty in obtaining environmental permits for any type 

of chemical agent incineration in Colorado or Kentucky. Each state has 

requirements for obtaining environmental permits that could prevent or 

slow the implementation of incineration in the two states.

8

 Annual Status Report on the Disposal of Chemical Weapons and Materiel for Fiscal

Year 1998, Department of the Army (Sept. 30, 1998).
Chapter 2

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Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Significant Obstacles 

Could Prevent the 

Nonstockpile Product 

From Meeting the 

Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

The Army has made progress in destroying most caterories of its 

nonstockpile chemical materiel as required by the Chemical Weapons 

Convention.9

 However, the disposal operations for some recovered 

chemical warfare materiel may exceed the convention’s 2007 deadline 

because the Army needs more time to develop and prove the proposed 

disposal methods will be safe and effective and will be accepted by state 

and local communities. Further, the demolition of a section of a former 

chemical weapons production facility in Indiana may exceed the 2007 

deadline because the chemical stockpile stored there must be destroyed 

before demolition of the facility can begin. Any slippage in the stockpile 

disposal schedule, which is considered optimistic by some involved in the 

program, will cause demolition operations of the facility to extend past the 

deadline.

The Army Has Made 

Progress in the Disposal of 

Nonstockpile Chemical 

Materiel

The Army has destroyed a large portion of its nonstockpile chemical 

warfare materiel. Table 2 summarizes the status of the Army’s efforts to 

destroy binary chemical warfare materiel, miscellaneous chemical warfare 

materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, and former chemical 

weapons production facilities.

9

 The Chemical Weapons Convention does not require the disposal of chemical warfare 

material buried before January 1, 1977, as long as it remains buried.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

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Deadline

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Table 2: Status of the Army’s Efforts to Destroy Its Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel (as of Feb. 23, 2000)

a

Former production facilities managed by the Product Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel.

Source: Product office for nonstockpile chemical materiel.

Category Location Inventory Percent destroyed

Binary chemical warfare materiel

Aberdeen, MD 1 metric ton 94

Pine Bluff, AR 161 metric tons 0

Tooele, UT 427 metric tons 100

Umatilla, OR 30 metric tons 100

Miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel

Aberdeen, MD 1,765 ton containers 98

Blue Grass, KY 25 items 100

Pine Bluff, AR 477 items 86

4,375 ton containers 0

Tooele, UT 1,895 items 85

944 ton containers 100

Umatilla, OR 9,744 items 100

Various locations (eight) 6 metric tons of samples 0

Recovered chemical warfare materiel

Aberdeen, MD 11 munitions 0

Camp Bullis, TX 8 bottles 0

Dugway, UT 41 munitions 0

Fort Richardson, AK 7 containers with chemical training items 0

Johnson Atoll 75 containers with chemical training items 39

Pine Bluff, AR 1,250 munitions 0

5,299 chemical training set components 0

Redstone, AL 1 container with training items and 1 bottle 0

Tooele, UT 575 bottles and 578 vials 0

Former chemical weapons production facilitiesa

Aberdeen, MD Former pilot plant 100

Newport, IN Nerve agent facility 8

Pine Bluff, AR Chemical facility 100

Binary weapons facility 0
Chapter 2

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Deadline

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Change in the Proposed 

Disposal Method Could 

Delay Disposal of Some 

Recovered Chemical 

Warfare Materiel

The disposal of some recovered chemical warfare materiel could exceed 

the convention’s 2007 deadline because of technical issues and cost 

increases associated with key disposal methods. In addition, the Army has 

experienced delays in obtaining state permits and approvals to test and 

implement these methods. Because of these factors, program officials are 

considering alternative disposal methods to replace the problematic 

systems.

Until recently, the Army was developing four types of integrated 

transportable destruction systems for nonstockpile materiel. These 

systems and their status are briefly described in table 3. Each system was 

expected to use a neutralization process, through which the chemical agent 

would be mixed with chemicals that would convert the agent into waste 

compounds. This waste would be much less hazardous than the chemical 

agent and would be sent to commercial treatment, storage, and disposal 

facilities that specialize in the treatment of hazardous industrial waste.

Table 3: Nonstockpile Transportable Treatment Systems

Source: Product office for nonstockpile chemical materiel.

Nonstockpile officials stated that the research and development of the four 

treatment systems described in table 3 have reached the point where the 

System Description Status

Rapid Response System System is designed to safely destroy nonexplosively configured 

chemical warfare materiel, primarily chemical training sets, by 

accessing the agent and neutralizing it in a sealed environment.

Full-scale prototype designed, 

assembled, and scheduled to be 

operational in fiscal year 2001.

Munitions Management 

Device-Version 1

System provides the capability to receive, contain, access, monitor, 

and treat range-recovered or buried, nonexplosively configured 

chemical warfare materiel weighing up to 500 pounds.

Full-scale prototype designed and 

assembled but on hold pending 

program decision on alternative 

disposal methods.

Munitions Management 

Device-Version 2

System provides the capability to safely destroy explosively 

configured chemical warfare materiel by accessing the agent and 

neutralizing it in a sealed environment. It is designed to process 

nonexplosively configured munitions and bulk items and to fully 

contain any potential explosion resulting from operations.

Full-scale system in design and 

explosive containment chamber 

tested but on hold pending program 

decision on alternative disposal 

methods.

Explosive Destruction 

System

System is designed to destroy explosively configured chemical 

warfare munitions that are unsafe for transport. Materiel is placed in 

the system and detonated, and the chemical agent is neutralized. 

The first phase system is expected to safely contain up to 1 pound 

dynamite-equivalent explosion. The second phase system is 

expected to contain up to 31 pounds of explosive materiel.

First phase system in testing and 

scheduled to be operational in fiscal 

year 2002.

Second phase system in design and 

the operational date not yet 

determined.
Chapter 2

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Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Army must decide whether it wants to complete development and make the 

systems available for deployment in the field. In the case of the two 

munitions management devices, the Army has experienced technical 

problems and cost overruns. In addition, it experienced delays in obtaining 

state permits and approvals to test the prototype for the munitions 

management device (version 1). The required permits to test the system 

had not been approved as of February 2, 2000.

Because of the problems and delays, nonstockpile product officials were 

considering alternative disposal methods to replace the two munitions 

management devices. For example, they were deliberating over the 

possibility of destroying recovered chemical warfare materiel stored in 

Oregon and Colorado in stockpile disposal facilities10 and disposing of the 

recovered materiel stored in Maryland and Arkansas in

neutralization-based disposal facilities specially designed for nonstockpile 

materiel. However, officials still need more time to prove that the 

alternatives will safely and effectively destroy recovered chemical materiel. 

Environmental issues similar to those affecting the testing of the prototype 

munitions management devices are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to 

obtain the environmental approvals and permits for the alternatives. 

Consequently, until the alternatives for disposing of the recovered chemical 

warfare materiel are proven and accepted by the state and local 

communities, this portion of the nonstockpile product is at risk of 

exceeding the 2007 deadline.

Destruction of Former 

Production Facility in 

Indiana May Not Meet the 

Convention’s 2007 Deadline

A portion of a former production facility at Newport, Indiana, classified as 

a nonstockpile requirement, may not be destroyed before the convention’s 

2007 deadline because the chemical stockpile agent stored there must be 

destroyed before destruction of the facility can begin. The weapons were 

scheduled to be destroyed by December 2004. Although nonstockpile 

program officials were confident that their schedule provides sufficient 

time to complete demolition of the facility before the 2007 deadline, 

10 The legislation originally authorizing the program, codified at 50 U.S.C. 1521, provided 

that the chemical stockpile disposal facilities may not be used for a purpose other than the 

destruction of the stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions that existed on 

November 8, 1985. The 2000 Defense Authorization Act (sec. 141) acknowledged this 

prohibition but further provided that this prohibition does not apply to items designated by 

the Secretary of Defense as lethal chemical agents, munitions, or related materials after 

November 8, 1985, if the state in which a disposal facility is located issues the appropriate 

permit or permits for the destruction of such items.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

slippages in the disposal of the chemical stockpile could extend 

nonstockpile operations past the deadline. As previously discussed, the 

Newport, Indiana, stockpile schedule is at risk because the Army needs 

more time to demonstrate whether the proposed alternative technology—

developed by the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project but not 

yet proven in full-scale operations—will safely and effectively destroy the 

stockpile. In addition, state officials believe the disposal schedule is too 

ambitious because it is based on processing 600 containers filed with nerve 

agent during pilot testing, more than they believe is realistic in the time 

allowed. State officials said the Army’s schedule for the pilot test phase 

might not allow sufficient time for program participants to fully evaluate 

the new technology before full-scale operations are scheduled to start.

Program Costs Will 

Likely Exceed

$14.9 Billion Estimate

The Chemical Demilitarization Program has a long-standing history of 

experiencing significant cost growth. The Army estimates that the program 

will cost $14.9 billion;11 it has spent approximately $6.2 billion. However, 

the $14.9 billion cost estimate does not include the costs associated with 

the schedule slippages likely in Kentucky and Colorado and in the 

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product. Army officials said that they 

were revising their cost estimates. However, the Army will likely need more 

time to develop a reliable baseline to estimate the cost for the closure and 

remediation of the chemical stockpile disposal facilities, adjacent areas, 

and miscellaneous materiel contaminated during disposal operations.12 At 

the same time, program officials have initiated some actions to contain 

costs.

11 An additional $8.6 billion that is estimated to be needed to recover buried chemical 

warfare materiel is no longer included in the life cycle cost estimate for this program 

because the Army believes it is possible but not probable that it will incur the cost to 

dispose of this buried materiel. In addition, the responsibility for managing, processing, and 

treating this buried materiel is divided among several defense organizations. For example, 

military commands and installation commanders are responsible for managing burial sites 

on DOD installations, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for managing 

burial sites no longer owned by DOD. The office for the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel 

Product is responsible for processing and destroying the materiel after it is recovered from a 

burial site or test range.

12 Remediation of chemical stockpile disposal facilities is not required by the Chemical 

Weapons Convention.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Army Estimates the 

Program Will Cost 

$14.9 Billion

As shown in table 4, the Army estimates that the program will cost 

$14.9 billion;13 the Congress has appropriated nearly $6.2 billion through 

fiscal year 1999. Since 1985, the Army’s cost estimate for the Chemical 

Stockpile Disposal Project, the largest portion of the program, has 

increased significantly from the initial $1.7 billion estimate to nearly 

$10 billion. The major reasons for the cost increases in the stockpile 

project include (1) overly optimistic program assumptions and estimates 

by program officials, (2) enhancements to respond to concerns for 

maximizing the safety of the public and environment, (3) technical 

problems resulting in lower than expected disposal rates, and (4) 

additional legislative and program requirements. In 1997, we reported that 

until the disposal methods for nonstockpile materiel were developed and 

proven and accepted by state and local communities, the Army would not 

be able to predict the cost of the nonstockpile product with any degree of 

accuracy.14

13 Program officials are revising this cost estimate; however, the revisions were not complete 

at the time of our review.

14 Chemical Weapons and Materiel (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Table 4: Working Life Cycle Cost Estimates and Appropriated Funds for the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program

a

Estimated program costs as of May 11, 1999.

b

Appropriations during fiscal years 1988-99.

c

The estimated cost of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project includes the cost of constructing and 

operating baseline incineration facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado.

Source: Our analysis of data provided by the program offices for chemical demilitarization and 

assembled chemical weapons assessment.

The working life cycle cost estimate for the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program shown in table 4 does not include the costs associated with 

schedule slippages likely in the disposal of the chemical stockpile stored in 

Kentucky and Colorado and the nonstockpile materiel. The cost estimates 

are based on the assumption that the disposal of the chemical stockpile and 

nonstockpile materiel would be completed before the 2007 deadline, which 

we believe is unlikely. Historically, schedule delays increase direct costs 

such as labor, emergency preparedness, and management of the program. 

In addition, until disposal methods for the stockpile stored in Kentucky and 

Colorado have been selected, proven to be safe and cost-effective, and 

accepted by the affected states and localities, the Army will be unable to 

accurately estimate disposal costs for these sites. Similarly, the cost of 

destroying recovered chemical warfare materiel will be uncertain until the 

product manager has demonstrated disposal methods for nonstockpile 

items and the methods have received permits and have been accepted by 

the affected states and localities. The cost estimate shown in table 4 for the 

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product does not included possible costs 

after the 2007 deadline.

Dollars in millions

Program element

Estimated

costa

Appropriated

fundsb

Program Office for Chemical Demilitarization $851.2 $189.8

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Projectc 9,984.4 4,734.9

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project 1,237.3 645.3

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product 1,383.6 309.1

Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project 1,122.8 235.1

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program 370.3 76.7

Total $14,949.6 $6,190.9
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 

Deadline

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Army also needs additional time to develop a reliable baseline to 

estimate the costs for the closure and remediation of the chemical 

stockpile disposal facilities, adjacent areas, and miscellaneous materiel 

contaminated during disposal operations.15 According to program officials, 

these costs may increase because of uncertainties regarding remediation 

requirements and standards for these facilities and other materiel, such as 

personal protection suits worn by the workers and miscellaneous 

equipment, contaminated during disposal operations. Individual states will 

establish the environmental requirements for remediating these facilities 

and nearby areas. Consequently, the environmental requirements and 

standards to use in estimating the cost to remediate these facilities have 

not yet been fully determined. Furthermore, because no stockpile disposal 

facility has yet to be remediated, the Army lacks real time experience on 

which to estimate these costs.

The Army Has Management 

Initiatives Under Way to 

Control Cost Growth

In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 

the program office for chemical demilitarization has developed and 

implemented several cost-reduction initiatives.16 Because the majority of 

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project costs are in the contracts for the 

construction and operation of the disposal facilities, the program office 

implemented a management approach that includes in-depth reviews of the 

contracts. According to program officials, these reviews may provide the 

office with a better understanding of the contractor’s approach to planning, 

enhance performance analyses and forecasting, and produce cost savings 

during negotiations with contractors. Additionally, the chemical 

demilitarization office expects cost savings to accrue through 

implementation of programmatic lessons learned, where opportunities to 

reduce costs are routinely investigated and applied as the program moves 

forward.

15 The closure and remediation of the chemical stockpile disposal facilities are not required 

by the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, 50 U.S.C. 1521 requires that when disposal 

facilities are no longer needed for the purposes for which they were constructed that they 

be disposed of in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and mutual agreements 

between the Secretary of the Army and the governor of the state in which the facility is 

located. In addition, the environmental permits issued for the individual sites require 

closure of the facilities in accordance with permit-specific requirements.

16 Public Law 104-106 (sec. 152) required the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment 

of the Chemical Demilitarization Program and of measures that could be taken to reduce 

significantly the total cost of the program.
Chapter 2

Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could 

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Deadline

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

To increase public awareness and trust, the program office for chemical 

demilitarization has hosted periodic environmental forums on the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program. These forums have allowed the public 

to exchange information with officials from various organizations 

associated with the program and were intended to increase public 

awareness and gain acceptance of the program and thereby reduce costs 

associated with extended environmental permit schedules and litigation 

actions. Similarly, to increase public awareness and acceptance, the 

program office for assembled chemical weapons assessment has convened, 

with the assistance of the Keystone Center, the Dialogue on Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment. The Dialogue includes representatives of 

the affected communities, national citizens groups, state regulatory 

agencies, Native American tribes, the Environmental Protection Agency, 

and the Departments of the Defense and the Army and has participated in 

the Army’s decision-making process for the program.

Conclusions The Army could destroy 90 percent of its stockpile of chemical agents and 

munitions and most of its nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel before 

the Chemical Weapons Convention’s 2007 deadline, given its recent 

progress and projected plans. However, because of the additional time 

required to develop and select disposal methods that are acceptable to the 

state regulatory agencies and local communities in Kentucky and Colorado, 

the Army will not meet the 2007 deadline at these sites. These sites store

10 percent of the original stockpile. In addition, the disposal of some 

nonstockpile items may exceed the 2007 deadline because of technical 

problems with key disposal systems for recovered chemical warfare 

materiel and because of possible delays in demolition of a former chemical 

weapons production facility in Indiana. Given past program experience, 

these types of delays are likely to occur and will add to program costs.
Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Chapter 3

The Army Has Not Adequately Managed the 

Liquidation of Program Funds Chapte3r

The Army has experienced problems in recent years in managing its 

liquidations of program funds. Concerns over the financial management of 

the Chemical Demilitarization Program surfaced following a February 1999 

review by the Office of the Under Secretary of the Defense (Comptroller), 

which suggested that significant portions of prior years’ obligations 

remained unliquidated and could be used for other purposes. In July 1999, 

we reported that sizable unliquidated obligations existed for the program 

from prior years. During this review, we examined the transactions for 

which most of these obligations were recorded, a type of interagency order 

known as a military interdepartmental purchase request.1

 We found that the 

program had more than $3.1 billion in budget authority from fiscal 

years 1993-98 appropriations as of September 30, 1999, of which a reported

$498 million (16.1 percent) was unliquidated.2

 Some unliquidated 

obligations exist because of the lack of management attention and 

fragmented structure for tracking and managing liquidations; procedural 

delays in reporting liquidation transactions in the defense financial system, 

auditing and liquidating obligated funds on completed contracts, and 

deobligating excess funds; and delays in executing the program schedule.

Several recent factors have affected and will continue to affect the 

reduction of the unliquidated obligations. The Army can liquidate some of 

1

 These interagency orders are used by the program offices (ordering agency) to obtain 

goods and services from another agency (the servicing agency), such as the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers or the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological and Chemical Command, that 

has the capability or expertise necessary to perform the needed work. The servicing agency 

in turn typically awards contracts to third parties, uses its existing contracts, or uses its own 

resources to fill the order. The orders are made on either a reimbursable order basis or by 

advancing funds of the ordering agency. For reimbursable orders, the ordering agency 

obligates funds upon acceptance of the order by the servicing agency. These obligations are 

liquidated as the servicing agency bills the ordering agency for the work performed under 

the contract or as the servicing agency completes the work itself and payments are made. 

For direct orders, once the servicing agency accepts the order, funds from the ordering 

agency are obligated and advanced for the resulting contract or for the work done by the 

servicing agency. The obligation is liquidated as payments are made to the contractor or the 

servicing agency as work is performed.

2

 Federal agencies must have budget authority prior to incurring obligations. Obligations are 

the amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar 

transactions during a given period that will require disbursements (payments) during the 

same or future period. As services are rendered or goods delivered, an agency makes the 

required disbursements to liquidate the obligation. Appropriation laws usually make budget 

authority available for one or more fiscal years but do not require agencies to liquidate 

obligations during the specific years the budget authority is available. The liquidation can 

occur after the appropriation has expired, but must occur prior to closing the account—

5 years after the appropriation has expired.
Chapter 3

The Army Has Not Adequately Managed the 

Liquidation of Program Funds

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

its obligations as soon as construction and procurement are under way at 

the chemical stockpile sites that recently obtained environmental permits. 

In addition, congressional reductions in the administration’s budget 

requests for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 will likely reduce the future buildup 

of unliquidated obligations. At the time of our review, the Army had begun 

to improve its management of appropriated funds and liquidations of 

obligations for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, but these 

improvements have not been consistently and systematically implemented 

across all program elements, and it is too early to tell their effect.

Prior Reviews Report 

Weaknesses in the 

Management of 

Program Funds

Concerns over the financial management of the program surfaced 

following a review by the Office of the Under Secretary of the Defense 

(Comptroller), which suggested that significant portions of prior years’ 

obligations remained unliquidated and could be used for other purposes. In 

July 1999, we reported that there were sizable unliquidated obligations 

reported for the program from prior years.

The financial management issue of the program surfaced in February 1999, 

following a quick program review summarized in internal memorandums 

prepared by an official in the Office of the Under Secretary of the Defense 

(Comptroller). The memorandums suggested that significant portions of 

prior years’ obligations remained unliquidated and could be reprogrammed 

to other uses. On July 26, 1999, the office issued a more comprehensive 

report,3

 stating that 26 percent of the Chemical Demilitarization Program’s 

appropriations were unexpended. The report also notes that delays in 

executing the program resulted in the accumulation of funds that were out 

of phase with the specific time when the contracted work was actually 

performed, resulting in the accumulation of unliquidated obligations. 

Consequently, the funds were not available for other immediate defense 

priorities and programs. The report also identified procedural delays in 

reporting financial transactions in the defense financial system and 

programmatic delays in executing the program schedule because of permit, 

technical, and contractual issues that contributed to the program’s 

unliquidated obligations.

3 Chemical Demilitarization Program, Program Funding Execution Assessment, Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (July 26, 1999).
Chapter 3

The Army Has Not Adequately Managed the 

Liquidation of Program Funds

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

In July 1999, we reported that sizable unliquidated obligations existed for 

the Chemical Demilitarization Program from prior years, but the unused 

funds did not appear to be available for other uses.4

 Our review of

$382.1 million (62.6 percent) of the reported $610.5 million in unliquidated 

obligations for fiscal years 1992-98 showed that $150.6 million (39.4 percent 

of our sample) had already been spent but was not recorded in accounting 

records or included in financial reports prepared by the Defense Finance 

and Accounting Service (DFAS). Further, the remaining $231.5 million in 

unliquidated obligations in our sample was scheduled to be liquidated by 

November 2000. In addition, we reported that these obligations were 

unliquidated because of several factors, such as delays in obtaining 

environmental permits and technical delays. At the same time, we 

identified a number of factors, including states’ approvals of environmental 

permits to start construction of chemical stockpile disposal facilities and 

congressional deferments in the administration’s budget request for the 

program, that have affected or will affect the reduction of unliquidated 

obligations.

About 16.1 Percent of 

Prior Years’ 

Obligations Were 

Unliquidated

As of September 30, 1999, the Chemical Demilitarization Program had more 

than $3.1 billion in budget authority from fiscal years 1993-98, of which 

$38.9 million was no longer obligated for specific program areas. (See

table 5.) Nearly this entire amount was obligated previously for program 

requirements that were completed for less cost than initially estimated and 

was deobligated and reclassified as program reserve. Most of these 

unobligated funds are no longer available because their authorized periods 

for obligation expired.5

 At the same time, the program office had a reported 

$498 million (16.1 percent) in unliquidated obligations from fiscal 

years 1993-98.

4 Chemical Demilitarization (GAO/NSIAD-99-232R, July 29, 1999).

5

 Under the chemical demilitarization appropriations, operations and maintenance funds are 

available for obligation for 1 year, research and development funds are available for 

obligation for 2 years, and procurement funds are available for obligation for 3 years. 

Military construction appropriations associated with the program are available for 

obligation for 5 years.
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Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Table 5: Reported Budget Authority and Unobligated, Obligated, and Unliquidated Obligations for the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program for Fiscal Years 1993-98 (as of Sept. 30, 1999)

Note: Numbers may not total due to rounding and are not intended to total horizontally.

a

The budget authority for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 operations and maintenance funds and fiscal year 

1993 research and development funds are not included in the table because these accounts have 

been closed.

Source: Our analysis of detailed transaction data provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

FEMA and DFAS data provided by the program offices for the chemical demilitarization and assembled 

chemical weapons assessment.

In addition, the program office reported that it had $804 million in budget 

authority in fiscal year 1999 funds. Of this amount, $70.7 million was 

unobligated and $381.3 million in obligations was unliquidated. However, it 

is important to note that the budget authority for fiscal year 1999 is 

relatively recent and that some of the funds are still available for obligation 

and liquidation and may continue to be available for several years 

depending on the type of fund. The budget authority for 1999 research and 

development funds under the chemical demilitarization appropriation is 

available for obligation during fiscal year 2000, 1999 procurement funds are 

available for obligation for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and 1999 military 

construction funds are available for obligation for fiscal years 2000 through 

2003. The obligations incurred under each of these chemical 

demilitarization appropriation subdivisions may be liquidated up to 5 years 

following the end of the funds’ periods of availability for obligation before 

the fund account is closed.

Dollars in millions

Summary by funding category Budget authority Unobligated Obligated

Unliquidated

obligations

Operations and maintenancea $1,560.8 $6.7 $1,554.1 $65.0

Procurement 968.3 1.9 966.4 339.6

Research and developmenta 266.2 0.2 265.9 20.1

Military construction 334.9 30.1 304.9 73.3

Total $3,130.2 $38.9 $3,091.3 $498.0
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Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Assessment Indicates 

That Most Unliquidated 

Obligations Were 

Accounted For

During this review, we focused our analysis on the unliquidated obligations 

for fiscal years 1993-98. On the basis of our analysis of 428 military 

interdepartmental purchase requests with $495.1 million in unliquidated 

obligations (or 99.4 percent of the total reported unliquidated obligations), 

we determined that $63.1 million (12.7 percent) in payments had been 

made but was not recorded in the accounting records or financial reports 

prepared by DFAS.6

 (See table 6.) Of the remaining $432 million in 

unliquidated obligations, most was for work completed but not yet billed 

by the contractor or verified by the Defense Contract Audit Agency 

(DCAA), or for work being done but not yet completed. Included in this 

amount is $10.4 million that program officials could not explain the reasons 

for the unliquidated balances.

6

 The $63.1 million includes a negative $1.1 million in corrections to the funding data and 

represents 12.7 percent of the total reported $498 million in unliquidated obligations for 

fiscal years 1993-98.
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Table 6: Unliquidated Obligations for 428 Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests for Fiscal Years 1993-98 (as of Sept. 30, 

1999)

Note: Numbers may not total due to rounding and are not intended to total horizontally.

a

Reported by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, DFAS, and FEMA.

b

Includes a negative $1.1 million in corrections to the funding data.

c

Military construction appropriations are provided directly to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which 

distributes funds through funding authorization documents for specific projects. The Corps of 

Engineers provided obligation and liquidation data for construction projects during fiscal years 1993-

98. 

Source: Our analysis of detailed transaction data provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

FEMA, and DFAS data provided by the program offices for the chemical demilitarization and 

assembled chemical weapons assessment.

As shown in table 6, 240 purchase requests included a reported

$62.6 million in unliquidated operations and maintenance obligations. Of 

this amount, $5.3 million had been liquidated, according to documents 

provided by the program office and its contractors, but not yet recorded as 

liquidated in DFAS accounting data and financial reports. Of the remaining 

$57.2 million in unliquidated obligations, program officials identified

$32.3 million for work that had been completed, but they were awaiting 

other actions such as final billing by the contractor or audit by DCAA. 

Another $18.6 million of the $57.2 million is obligated for ongoing purchase 

requests, for which most of the obligations are scheduled to be liquidated 

between now and January 2001. Program officials were unable to explain 

the reasons for $6.3 million of the unliquidated obligations.

In addition, 97 purchase requests included a reported $339.5 million in 

unliquidated procurement obligations. Of this amount, $52.6 million had 

been liquidated, according to documents provided by the program office 

Dollars in millions

Unrecorded liquidated 

obligationsb

Adjusted unliquidated 

obligations

Summary by funding category

Number of

purchase

requests reviewed

Reported

unliquidated

obligationsa Amount Percent Amount Percent

Operations and maintenance 240 $62.6 $5.3 8.5 $57.2 91.5

Procurement 97 339.5 52.6 15.5 286.9 84.5

Research and development 76 19.7 5.2 26.4 14.5 73.6

Military constructionc 15 73.3 73.3 100.0

Total 428 $495.1 $63.1 12.7 $432.0 87.3
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Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

and its contractors, but not recorded as liquidated in DFAS financial data. 

Of the remaining $286.9 million in unliquidated obligations, program 

officials identified $2.7 million for work that had been completed, but they 

were awaiting other actions such as final billing by the contractor or audit 

by the DCAA. Another $283.5 million is obligated for ongoing purchase 

requests, for which most of the obligations are scheduled to be liquidated 

between now and the end of 2001. Program officials were unable to explain 

the reasons for almost $700,000 in unliquidated obligations.

Further, 76 purchase requests included a reported $19.7 million in 

unliquidated research and development obligations. Of this amount, 

$5.2 million had been liquidated, according to documents provided by the 

program office and its contractors, but not recorded as liquidated in DFAS 

financial data. Of the remaining $14.5 million in unliquidated obligations, 

program officials identified $1.3 million for work that had been completed, 

but they were awaiting other actions such as final billing or audit. Another 

$9.7 million of the $14.5 million was obligated for ongoing purchase 

requests, for which most of the obligations are scheduled to be liquidated 

before June 2000. Program officials were unable to explain the reasons for 

$3.5 million of the unliquidated obligations.

Last, we found $73.3 million in unliquidated military construction 

obligations managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of 

Engineers uses integrated financial systems to manage and account for 

obligations and liquidations. Unlike the separately located, nonintegrated 

financial systems used by the program offices for chemical demilitarization 

and assembled chemical weapons assessment, the Corps of Engineers 

system contains real-time obligation and liquidation data. The $73.3 million 

in obligations will be liquidated as specialized government-furnished 

equipment is delivered and installed and the ongoing construction efforts 

are completed. The construction of the disposal facilities in Alabama and 

Oregon is scheduled to be completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, 

and the disposal facility in Arkansas is expected to be completed in the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2002.

Reasons for Some 

Unliquidated 

Obligations

Some unliquidated obligations are due to the lack of management attention 

and the decentralized organizational structure for managing program 

activities and tracking liquidations; procedural delays in reporting 

liquidation transactions in DFAS accounting data and financial reports; 

procedural delays in auditing and liquidating obligated balances on 
Chapter 3

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Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

completed contracts; and delays in executing the program schedule 

because of permit, technical, and contractual issues.

Management Delays Contributing to unliquidated balances have been delays due to the lack of 

management attention and decentralized organizational structure for 

managing program activities and tracking liquidations.

Lack of Management Attention The lack of attention to tracking and managing liquidations has contributed 

to the accumulation of unliquidated obligations. According to DOD and 

Army officials, the program office for chemical demilitarization has 

historically prioritized the management and timely obligation of 

appropriations and given much less attention to tracking and managing 

liquidations and deobligating excess funds. Despite beginning to track and 

liquidate obligations more aggressively, program officials still could not 

readily provide us the obligation and liquidation status for some purchase 

requests or determine whether the unliquidated obligations were for 

completed or ongoing efforts. Instead, program officials generally had to 

obtain liquidation data from performing entities, such as other government 

agencies and outside contractors, and in many cases testimonial data was 

the best data they could provide. Some officials said they did not 

systematically receive financial reports with liquidation data. Additionally, 

they gave little priority to deobligating unliquidated balances associated 

with completed or closed contracts. This lack of attention is partially 

reflected in the inability of program officials to explain the status of $10.4 

million in unliquidated obligations across all funding categories except for 

military construction.

Decentralized Organizational 

Structure

Different organizations are responsible for various elements of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers is responsible for managing military construction funds and 

most of the program’s procurement funds. FEMA and the U.S. Army Soldier 

and Biological Chemical Command share responsibility for managing funds 

appropriated for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project.7

FEMA is responsible for off-post emergency preparedness activities and 

the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is responsible for on-post 

activities. In addition, the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical 

7

 In our July 1999 report on the program, we found that FEMA had not reported its 

liquidation transactions in a timely manner to the Army. However, the agency had corrected 

this reporting deficiency by the time of this review.
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Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Weapons Assessment manages the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program funding, and the Program Manager for Chemical 

Demilitarization manages the execution of funds appropriated for the 

chemical stockpile, nonstockpile, and alternative technologies and 

approaches projects. Within the program office for chemical 

demilitarization, project managers are responsible for the execution of 

funds provided to their respective projects. Within this decentralized 

organizational structure, these program elements manage their obligations 

and liquidations as separate operating entities, and in some cases, there 

was confusion as to which program element or organization was 

accountable for tracking and managing the unliquidated obligations.

Procedural Delays Procedural delays have accounted for the accumulation of some of the 

unliquidated obligations. Some liquidation transactions were not reported 

in accounting records and financial reports prepared by DFAS in a timely 

way, and program officials have been reluctant to deobligate unliquidated 

excess funds on completed contracts until DCAA validates labor rates and 

other contract costs.
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Liquidation of Program Funds

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Accounting and Procedural 

Delays

According to program officials, processing and reporting liquidation data 

have taken 90 to 120 days before the data were included in accounting 

records and financial reports prepared by DFAS. For example, contractors 

have taken several weeks to validate and process liquidations by their 

subcontractors and report them to the program office, which has its own 

processes and procedures to complete before reporting to DFAS. 

Furthermore, DFAS requires time to input and report its liquidation data to 

its financial system. We recently reported that DOD’s payment and 

accounting processes are complex, generally involving separate functions 

carried out by individual offices using different systems.8

 These processes 

can contribute significantly to delays in reporting the liquidation of 

obligations to responsible program officials.

Contract Closure Delays According to Army officials, DCAA has taken several months to review and 

approve costs associated with completed contracts. Program officials have 

generally waited until DCAA validated labor rates and other contract costs. 

These audits may adjust labor rates or other costs, requiring additional 

payments from the remaining obligated funds.

Program Delays Contributing to the unliquidated balances have been delays in executing 

the program schedule because of environmental permit, technical, and 

contractual issues.

Environmental Permit Delays Program officials found that the time required to actually gain 

environmental permit approvals, particularly in Oregon, Alabama, and 

Arkansas, exceeded estimates. The additional time was mainly attributable 

to a variety of both internally and externally driven requirements. For 

example, satisfying safety and environmental design changes resulting 

from programmatic lessons learned, new state and federal regulatory 

requirements, and new interpretations of existing regulatory requirements 

in some cases significantly extended the projected schedules. Although 

funds were obligated to support the three sites based on initial permit 

issuance projections, the program office could not liquidate some 

obligations until after construction began, which was contingent on the 

issuance of the environmental permits.

8 Financial Management: Differences in Army and Air Force Disbursing and Accounting 

Records (GAO/AIMD-00-20, Mar. 7, 2000).
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Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Technical Delays According to program officials, lessons learned from ongoing disposal 

operations at Johnston Atoll and Utah resulted in technical and design 

changes for future facilities that required additional time and resources. 

While these changes were being incorporated, liquidation of obligated 

funds proved to be slower than program officials expected.

Contractual Delays According to program officials, the award of several construction and 

procurement contracts has been delayed due to protests by losing bidders. 

For example, the award of the construction contract for the disposal 

facility in Arkansas was delayed a year due in part to a bid protest. 

Accordingly, obligations for this contract could not be liquidated until 

resolution of the protest.

Recent Factors 

Reducing Unliquidated 

Obligations

Recently, approvals of environmental permits by state regulatory agencies 

at five chemical stockpile disposal sites resulted in initiation of 

construction activities and procurement actions and greater disbursement 

of obligated funds. Additionally, actions by the Congress and the Office of 

the Under Secretary of the Defense (Comptroller) to reduce the funding 

requested for the program decreased the amount of funds available for 

obligation and better aligned funding with the program’s execution. This 

action decreases the likelihood that these funds will be obligated far in 

advance of when they are needed.

The Army’s recent receipt of the required environmental permits and 

approvals by the state regulatory agencies at five chemical stockpile 

disposal sites has resulted in initiation of construction activities and 

procurement actions and greater pay-out of obligated funds. The 

environmental permits for the construction of the disposal facilities in 

Oregon and Alabama were approved in 1997. The execution of these 

construction projects has allowed and will continue to allow the program 

office to liquidate construction and procurement obligations for these 

locations. In addition, the environmental permits were approved in 1999 for 

the construction of disposal facilities in Arkansas, Indiana, and Maryland, 

which should allow the program office to liquidate construction and 

procurement obligations for these locations.

Congressional actions to reduce the funding requested for the program 

have decreased and are expected to continue to decrease the program’s 

unliquidated balances. In the DOD and military construction 

appropriations acts for fiscal year 1999, the Congress appropriated 
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Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

$78 million less than the administration requested for operations and 

maintenance, procurement, and research and development activities and 

appropriated $50.5 million less than requested for military construction 

projects. Similarly, in the fiscal year 2000 DOD and military construction 

appropriations acts, the Congress appropriated $140 million less than the 

administration requested for operations and maintenance, procurement, 

and research and development activities and appropriated $93 million less 

than requested for military construction projects. These actions reduced 

the amount of funds available for obligation and better aligned funding with 

the program’s execution, decreasing the likelihood that these funds will be 

obligated far in advance of when they are needed.

In their review of the Army’s fiscal year 2001 budget request for the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program, the Office of the Under Secretary of 

the Defense (Comptroller) recommended, and the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense approved, reductions to the Army’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2001 to better align funding in the year it would be executed.9

 For 

example, because of the delays in the Alternative Technologies and 

Approaches Project, DOD reduced the Army’s budget request for 

construction funds by $25 million for the Maryland site. It concluded that 

the contractor would be unable to execute construction work scheduled 

for fiscal year 2001. Similarly, DOD reduced fiscal year 2001 funding for 

equipment installation at Newport, Indiana, by $7.2 million because of the 

delays in the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project. Further, 

DOD reduced the Army’s request for the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program by $42 million because of expected delays in 

executing the program during fiscal year 2001.10

9 Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller), (PBD 204, Dec. 6, 1999).

10 We did not have sufficient time to examine the administration’s fiscal year 2001 budget 

request for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, which was issued on February 7, 2000, 

and assess the potential impacts of DOD’s reductions in the Army’s budget request for the 

program.
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Liquidation of Program Funds

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Financial 

Improvements Have 

Not Been Consistently 

and Systematically 

Implemented Across 

All Program Elements

Although the Army has started to improve its management of obligations 

and liquidations of obligated funds for the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program, these improvements have not been consistently and 

systematically implemented across all program elements. These 

inconsistencies are due in part to the decentralized financial management 

structure of the program.

In July 1999, the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization mandated 

monthly reporting of obligations, disbursements, and planned and actual 

cost information by the managers for chemical stockpile, nonstockpile, and 

the alternative technologies and approaches projects. The manager also 

reminded all project managers of the importance of effective funds 

management, including the management of cost as well as schedule and 

technical performance. Consequently, officials started examining the 

unliquidated obligations and deobligating those determined as no longer 

needed. In addition, they started working with their contractors and other 

defense agencies to expedite the reporting of financial transactions and 

developing methods for capturing and reporting obligations, liquidations, 

and accrual data.

While these are positive steps, the program office has not fully 

implemented these improvements for the timely capturing and reporting of 

obligations, liquidations, and accruals and could not explain $10.4 million 

in unliquidated obligations. The program office did not have an 

independent, integrated system to track obligations, liquidations, and 

accrual data and has relied mostly upon data in accounting records or 

financial reports prepared by DFAS. For example, the Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Project and the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program were not included in the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program Manager’s monthly reporting requirement because the U.S. Army 

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command manages the funds for the two 

programs. Further, the managers for the chemical stockpile, nonstockpile, 

and alternative technologies and approaches projects have implemented 

different systems to comply with the program manager’s mandate for a 

monthly reporting of obligations, liquidations, and planned and actual cost 

information.

Conclusions Although program officials have acted and are acting to improve the 

financial management of the program, problems remain. No systematic 

approach exists across all program elements to help ensure the consistent, 
Chapter 3

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Liquidation of Program Funds

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

effective execution and expenditure of funds appropriated for the program, 

and a relatively small amount of unliquidated obligations remain 

unexplained. Some unliquidated obligations exist because of the lack of 

management attention and decentralized structure for tracking 

liquidations. Other unliquidated obligations exist because of procedural 

delays in reporting financial transactions in the defense financial system, in 

auditing and liquidating obligated balances on completed contracts, and in 

deobligating excess funds, and delays in executing the program schedule. 

Several recent factors, including the recently approved environmental 

permits and congressional actions to reduce funding for the program, have 

decreased and will likely reduce the future buildup of unliquidated 

obligations. However, because the improvements in its financial 

management have not been consistently and systematically implemented, 

the Army cannot ensure that its unliquidated obligations will receive 

consistent attention to bring about a better alignment of funds with the 

execution of the program on an ongoing basis. In response to a draft of this 

report, the Army has recently initiated actions to address our concerns 

over the financial management of the program. Given the long-standing 

nature of these concerns, management oversight is essential to the 

effective implementation of the Army’s actions.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense monitor the Army’s actions to

• develop a systematic approach for ensuring the timely, effective 

expenditure of funds appropriated for all elements of the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program and

• direct program officials to account for the $10.4 million in unliquidated 

obligations that officials could not give an explanation for, or explain 

why the funds had not been liquidated.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In its written comments on our draft report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendations to develop a systematic approach for ensuring the 

timely, effective expenditure of funds appropriated for all elements of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program and direct program officials to account 

for the $10.4 million in unliquidated obligations that they could not explain. 

However, DOD disagreed that the Secretary of Defense should direct the 

Secretary of the Army to implement the recommendations because the 

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization had already initiated 

implementation actions. We are encouraged by the Program Manager’s 
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actions, which once completed should address the concerns raised in our 

draft report. Given these actions and the long-standing nature of our 

concerns, we modified our recommendations to call for the Secretary of 

the Defense to monitor the Army’s actions to ensure that it completes them 

fully and in a timely way and that appropriate results are obtained.

FEMA concurred with the recommended principle of a systematic 

approach for ensuring the timely, effective expenditure of funds and 

elaborated on its actions implementing the principle behind the 

recommendation. Because the recommendation to explain the 

$10.4 million in unliquidated obligations pertains to the Army, FEMA had 

no comment on that recommendation.
Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination Chapte4r

Effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been 

hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective 

coordination among program offices and with state and local officials. 

Several changes in the organization and structure of the program during 

1997-99, including some changes to implement legislative requirements, 

divided the management roles, responsibilities, and accountability among 

several different levels within the Departments of Defense and the Army. In 

addition, accountability for program performance has been unclear, and 

coordination and communication among certain program elements and 

state and local officials have been inadequate. Further, officials of the 

Departments of Defense and the Army have not agreed on whether or when 

management roles, responsibilities, and accountability should be 

consolidated for destruction of the chemical stockpiles at Blue Grass, 

Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. Consequently, state and local officials 

have raised concerns that no single office is accountable for achieving the 

desired results of the program’s various elements. In addition, the Congress 

has expressed concern about the management of the program.

Complex Management 

Structure

As the program has been expanded beyond its original single purpose of 

destroying the stockpile to encompass a broader range of missions, to 

include compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 

organization and structure of the Chemical Demilitarization Program have 

changed and become increasingly complex. At times, these changes have 

resulted in the fragmentation of the responsibilities for management and 

oversight of the program. For example, several different levels within the 

Departments of Defense and the Army now share oversight and 

management responsibilities.

Evolution of the 

Management Structure

As provided for in the original legislation establishing the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program, the Army, as executive agent for the program, 

established a Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization who was 

responsible for management of the destruction of the stockpile. This 

Program Manager reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Installations and Environment). Once the estimated cost of the program 

reached a certain dollar amount, as required by statute,1

 the Army formally 

designated it to be a major defense acquisition program subject to 

1

 10 U.S.C. 2430.
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

congressional reporting requirements and Office of the Secretary of 

Defense review and approval of various milestones. So that this major 

defense acquisition program could be managed in the acquisition chain in 

accordance with the DOD Directive 5000 series, program responsibility 

was transferred to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology) from the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Installations and Environment). To support the enhanced oversight role of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, an office was established in the 

office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological Defense Programs) to provide oversight responsibility for the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program regarding policy guidance, budget 

authority, and annual reporting requirements. The Program Manager 

continued to report directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) in his capacity as the Army 

Acquisition Executive and the Program Manager remained responsible for 

executing the existing elements of the program, except for the Chemical 

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project. Under a memorandum of 

understanding, the responsibility for the latter project resides with the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) in 

conjunction with FEMA.

Current Structure Has Three 

Separate Lines of Authority

There are three different lines of authority within the Departments of 

Defense and the Army for elements of the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program (see fig. 5). This structure resulted from congressional and DOD 

actions affecting various elements of the program. For example, the 

Congress wanted greater emphasis on the management of efforts to 

research and develop alternative technologies for destroying assembled 

chemical weapons. To achieve that goal, it directed that these research and 

development efforts be conducted separately from the baseline 

incineration activities. DOD, as part of its downsizing theOffice of the 

Secretary of Defense, devolved management responsibilities to the Army. 

In addition, to improve the management of the Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Project, the Army and FEMA changed the 

management structure for the project.
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Figure 5: Organization Structure for the Chemical Demilitarization Program

Source: Our analysis of data provided by the program offices for chemical demilitarization and 

assembled chemical weapons assessment.

Product Manager 

for Nonstockpile

 Chemical Materiel

Product Manager 

for Nonstockpile

 Chemical Materiel

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Army

Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition and

Technology

Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition and

Technology

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Acquisition, Logistics

and Technology)

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Acquisition, Logistics

and Technology)

Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization 

Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization 

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Installations and Environment)

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Installations and Environment)

Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness

Project (On-post)

Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness

Project (On-post)

Program Manager for

Assembled Chemical

Weapons Assessment

Program Manager for

Assembled Chemical

Weapons Assessment

Deputy Assistant

 Secretary of the Army

(Chemical Demilitarization)

Deputy Assistant

 Secretary of the Army

(Chemical Demilitarization)

Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness

 Project (Off-post)

Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness

 Project (Off-post)

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

U.S. Army Soldier

and Biological

Chemical Command

U.S. Army Soldier

and Biological

Chemical Command

Project Manager

for Chemical

Stockpile

Disposal

Project Manager

for Alternative

Technologies

and Approaches
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

The current organization has created a complex management structure and 

separated responsibilities. For example:

• In the 1997 Defense Appropriations Act (sec. 8065),2

 the Congress 

required the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) 

to designate a program manager who was not, nor had been, in direct or 

immediate control of the baseline reverse assembly incineration 

demilitarization program to carry out a new pilot program. In response 

to the act, DOD established the office of the Program Manager for 

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment, independent of the Program 

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, to implement the pilot program. 

The purpose of this legislation was to separate this pilot program from 

the baseline incineration activities. Achievement of that goal also meant 

that two program offices would share responsibilities associated with 

disposal activities in Kentucky and Colorado. As discussed later, 

ineffective coordination between these offices has hindered the 

program management.

• A 1998 Defense Reform Initiative downsized the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and resulted in the devolvement of the DOD office 

overseeing the Chemical Demilitarization Program from DOD to the 

Army. Consequently, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Chemical Demilitarization) was formed in February 1998 from a 

consolidation of the existing DOD oversight office and the Army staff 

office that assisted the Army Assistant Secretary in performing his 

chemical weapons demilitarization functions. While this devolvement 

resulted in a consolidation of staff offices in the Army Secretariat, it still 

did not clear up the existing ambiguity in responsibilities, lines of 

authority, and accountability. For example, the responsibility of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Chemical Demilitarization) is 

limited to oversight of the stockpile, nonstockpile, and alternative 

technologies and approaches projects. While this office reports directly 

to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology), it has no direct management control of the Program 

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, who also reports directly to the 

Assistant Secretary. During our review, we received conflicting 

descriptions and inconsistent organizational charts concerning the 

relationship and responsibilities of the offices of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Chemical Demilitarization) and the Program 

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization. This indicates some amount of 

2

 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208).
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

confusion among those involved in the program regarding who is 

accountable.

DOD, as part of the devolvement, planned to consolidate within the 

Army Secretariat management responsibility for the Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. For example, as noted in the 

transition plan for the reform initiative, program oversight for the 

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program was to be 

delegated to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics 

and Technology) and the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical 

Weapons Assessment was to report directly to the Assistant Secretary. 

The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) was to 

evaluate and certify the effectiveness of the alternative technologies as 

required by legislation. However, in the Conference Report 

accompanying the 1999 Defense Authorization Act,3

 the conferees 

agreed that the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment should continue to report directly to the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition and Technology) rather than the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology).

• In 1997, the Secretary of the Army and the Director of FEMA entered 

into a memorandum of agreement that revised the management 

structure of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project in 

an effort to streamline and improve the management of the program. 

Under the agreement, FEMA assumed full responsibility and authority 

for off-post project activities, and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological 

Chemical Command assumed responsibility for the on-post portion of 

the project. As a result of the agreement, the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Installations and Environment) assumed oversight 

responsibilities for the project. In addition, the Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Project was removed from the offices of the 

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization and the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology).

3

 House Conference Report No. 105-736, page 481.
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Unclear Accountability 

for Program Results 

and Inadequate 

Coordination and 

Communication

The Chemical Demilitarization Program has a complex structure that 

separates management roles, responsibilities, and accountability for 

achieving program results. In addition, effective management of the 

program has been hindered further by ineffective coordination among 

program offices and with state and local officials. Consequently, 

accountability for program performance is unclear, and state and local 

officials have expressed concern about conflicting information and the lack 

of a single office to be clearly accountable for the execution of the 

program. We also found instances where coordination and communication 

among project managers for the program were inadequate. In addition, the 

Congress has expressed concern about the management of the program.

State and Local Concerns 

Over Conflicting 

Information

In order to comply with congressional direction, program managers for 

chemical demilitarization and assembled chemical weapons assessment 

currently share responsibilities associated with disposal of the chemical 

stockpile at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. For example, the 

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is responsible for the 

destruction of the chemical stockpile, and at the same time, the Program 

Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment is responsible for 

developing and testing alternative technologies for disposing of the 

assembled chemical weapons at these sites. However, the activities of 

these offices have not always been effectively coordinated. This has led to 

difficulties in presenting a clear, coordinated message to affected state and 

local officials regarding the overall program goals for these sites. 

According to several state and local officials, spokespersons for these two 

programs have made conflicting and inconsistent statements about the 

possible disposal methods for the chemical stockpile stored in Kentucky 

and Colorado. Consequently, this confusion has created the public 

perception of the program at these two sites that DOD lacks a single vision 

for destroying the chemical stockpile in a judicious manner.

The lack of coordination will pose even greater problems in the future in 

implementing the decisions selecting the most appropriate disposal 

method to use in Kentucky and Colorado. Specifically, if an alternative 

technology is selected for use at these sites, views differ on which program 

office should manage the disposal operations after the pilot project starts. 

Specifically:

• Some program officials believe that the Program Manager for Chemical 

Demilitarization should assume responsibility for disposal operations 
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

after the method of destruction is selected for use in Kentucky and 

Colorado. As provided for in the original legislation establishing the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program, the Army established the office of 

the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization and made it 

responsible for management of the destruction of the stockpile. Officials 

believed that this office would be more skilled at managing the 

construction and operation of these disposal facilities based on its 

experience at other stockpile sites. Also, it would match the 

management structure being employed in Aberdeen, Maryland, and 

Newport, Indiana, where the Program Manager for Chemical 

Demilitarization has overall responsibility for implementing the pilot 

projects to test alternative technologies for disposing of chemical agents 

in bulk containers.

• Other program officials believe that the Program Manager for 

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment should continue to manage 

the program through the completion of the pilot-scale testing of 

alternative technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical 

weapons stored in Kentucky and Colorado. In section 142 of the 1999 

Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed that the Program 

Manager continue to manage the development and testing, including the 

demonstration and pilot-scale testing, of alternative technologies for the 

destruction of assembled chemical weapons. The Congress further 

directed the Program Manager to act independently of the Program 

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization. Program officials believed this 

could continue the enhanced communications the program office 

achieved with these states and local communities through the Dialogue 

initiative discussed previously and retain the expertise the office 

obtained on alternative technologies for destroying assembled chemical 

weapons.

DOD and the Army have not resolved issues related to future management 

roles and responsibilities should a full-scale pilot project start for 

demonstrating an alternative technology at Kentucky and Colorado be 

implemented. In any case, closer cooperation will be required between 

these program offices in the future. The adoption of any alternative 

disposal method for pilot-scale testing will depend on a certification to the 

Congress that the alternative is as safe and cost-effective as the baseline 

incineration process for disposing of assembled chemical weapons and will 

meet the destruction deadline.
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Inadequate Coordination 

and Communication Among 

Project Managers

In some instances, coordination and communication among project 

managers for the program were inadequate. For example, as previously 

discussed, the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization’s efforts to 

improve the office’s management of funds had not been consistently and 

systematically implemented across all program elements. In another case, 

officials of the stockpile and nonstockpile projects in Arkansas had not 

coordinated their efforts to obtain environmental permits and approvals for 

their disposal operations. This could have a significant effect on the start of 

one or both disposal operations because the state of Arkansas has limited 

resources to review and approve permit changes that will be needed to 

begin operations. Although concerned that nonstockpile activities could 

delay the state’s approval of permit changes, stockpile officials at the site 

did not know the status or schedule for nonstockpile activities. 

Additionally, some public outreach offices for the program did not have 

information related to emergency preparedness activities, such as 

information booklets and evacuation routes maps. According to outreach 

officials, they did not routinely provide emergency preparedness 

information to the public because those activities were managed by the 

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and FEMA, not by 

the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Congressional Concern 

About the Management of 

the Program

The Congress has expressed concern about the management of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program. For example, in the 2000 Defense 

Appropriations Act, section 8159,4

 the Congress directed the Secretary of 

Defense to report on the management of the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program, including an assessment of the Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Assessment Program. Some in the Congress have also expressed concern 

that, in recent budget submissions, DOD included the budget for the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program as part of the Army’s budget. In its 

report on the 2000 Defense Authorization Act,5

 the House Armed Services 

Committee reaffirmed its belief that, as required by the original statute 

establishing the program, chemical demilitarization funds should be set 

forth in a DOD-wide budget account, not in the budget accounts for any 

military department. This was to emphasize that destruction of the 

chemical stockpile is a national issue that affects all of DOD, not just a 

single military service. It stated that the Committee intended to keep 

4

 Public Law 106-79.

5

 House Report No. 106-162, page 63.
Chapter 4

Program Management Has Been Hindered by 

Complex Structure and Ineffective 

Coordination

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

chemical demilitarization funding separate to prevent these funds from 

being subject to internal service budget priorities and to avoid artificially 

inflating the budgets of any military department.

Conclusions Effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been 

hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective 

coordination among program offices and with state and local officials. This 

has been the case particularly at the Kentucky and Colorado sites, which 

were not expected to meet the convention’s 2007 deadline for destruction 

of their stockpiles. As the program’s mission has been expanded, some 

fragmentation in the management roles, responsibilities, and accountability 

among various program participants has resulted. While the Department of 

the Army is now responsible for most elements of the mission to destroy 

the stockpile, in accordance with congressional direction, responsibility for 

the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program remains with a 

separate program manager that reports directly to the office of the 

Secretary of Defense. Regarding the future management of this program, 

officials of the Departments of Defense and the Army have not agreed on 

the most appropriate management structure for accomplishing the 

destruction of the chemical stockpile stored in Kentucky and Colorado. 

Without resolution, these issues leave the effectiveness of the program at 

risk.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to clarify the management roles and responsibilities of program 

participants, assign accountability for achieving program goals and results, 

and establish procedures to improve coordination among the program’s 

various elements and with state and local officials.

Agency Comments Both DOD and FEMA concurred with the recommendation.
Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxiI

The program to destroy chemical weapons has been controversial from its 

inception and has experienced delays, cost increases, and management 

weaknesses. Recently, concerns over the financial management of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program surfaced following a review by the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) which suggested 

that significant portions of prior years’ appropriations remained 

unliquidated. Consequently, the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 20001

 provided that we review and assess the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program which was established by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical agents and 

munitions. We were required by the act to report the results of our 

assessment to the congressional defense committees no later than March 1, 

2000. Our assessment was to include a review of the program execution 

and financial management of all elements of the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program.2

 At the same time, the House Report 106-244 on DOD’s 

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and a request from the Chairmen of 

the Subcommittees on Defense and Foreign Operations, Senate Committee 

on Appropriations, asked us to report on the management of the program. 

Accordingly, we assessed whether (1) the program will meet the Chemical 

Weapons Convention’s time frames within the costs projected, 

(2) obligations and liquidations of funds appropriated for the program have 

been adequately managed, and (3) the management structure of the 

program allows for coordinated accountability of the program.

During our review, we interviewed officials and obtained data from DOD, 

including the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Biological and Chemical 

Defense. Within the Department of the Army, we interviewed and obtained 

data from officials in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Chemical Demilitarization; and the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Installations and Environment. In addition, we met with and 

obtained data from representatives of the Program Manager for the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program, the Program Manager for Assembled 

1

 Public Law 106-65 section 141.

2

 The act specified that the elements of the Chemical Demilitarization Program include the 

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness 

Project, the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product, the Alternative Technologies and 

Approaches Project, and the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Chemical Weapons Assessment, and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological 

Chemical Command. We also met with officials of the Department of State, 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Army Audit 

Agency. Further, we conducted site visits and interviewed program officials 

at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Edgewood Chemical Activity, Maryland; 

Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; Blue Grass Chemical Activity, 

Kentucky; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; 

Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon, and 

we interviewed the site manager for Johnston Atoll. We also met with 

officials of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Anniston, Alabama; 

Newport, Indiana; Umatilla, Oregon; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Huntsville, 

Alabama; and Washington, D.C. We visited county and city officials in 

Colorado and Kentucky; Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment 

Program’s Dialogue Group members in Colorado and Kentucky; state 

Citizens Advisory Commission members in Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, 

and Maryland; and representatives of private sector environmental groups 

with interest in these issues. We also met with state environmental officials 

in Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, and Utah to discuss and 

collect data on environmental and legal issues related to the disposal 

programs.

To determine whether the Chemical Demilitarization Program will meet the 

Chemical Weapons Convention’s time frames within the costs projected, 

we reviewed and analyzed program cost and schedule data related to the 

program and its elements: the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project, the 

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project, the Nonstockpile 

Chemical Materiel Product, the Alternative Technologies and Approaches 

Project, and the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. We 

reviewed the Chemical Weapons Convention to determine disposal 

requirements and time frames. Further, we examined implementation plans 

and schedules, status reports, disposal rates and data, cost and schedule 

risk assessments, cost containment studies, and inventory data on the 

stockpile of chemical agents and munitions, binary chemical weapons, 

miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, 

former production facilities, and suspected chemical burial sites. We 

compared the data to what the Army reported as destroyed and expected to 

be destroyed by the 2007 deadline.

To assess the risk of schedule slippages and cost increases, we interviewed 

program officials to (1) determine the reasons for differences between the 

Army’s official schedules and cost positions, (2) identify potential problems 

that may affect current cost and schedule estimates, (3) assess the causes 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

of previous schedule slippages and cost increases, and (4) determine how 

state laws may impact the disposal schedule and cost. To assess the factors 

that have affected or may affect the program schedule and costs in the 

future, we reviewed (1) disposal rate data and lessons learned at Johnston 

Atoll and Tooele, Utah; (2) reasons for the public concerns about 

incineration of chemical agents; (3) the Army’s efforts to obtain 

environmental permits; (4) the views of officials on current issues affecting 

the program; (5) obstacles in the environmental compliance and permit 

approval process; (6) the status of environmental permits; and (7) state 

environmental laws and regulations. We interviewed program officials, 

state environmental officials, citizen advisory commission members, and 

DOD and Army acquisition officials concerning the potential factors that 

may affect the Army’s ability to meet the 2007 deadline and cost estimates. 

We did not assess the validity of individual cost estimates included in the 

Army’s $14.9 billion life cycle cost estimate.

To determine whether obligations and liquidations of funds appropriated 

for the Chemical Demilitarization Program have been adequately managed, 

we reviewed the program’s funding records and analyzed the budget 

authority, obligated and unobligated balances, and the unliquidated 

obligations for fiscal years 1993-99. These records and documents included 

all categories of funds for the program: operations and maintenance, 

procurement, research and development, and military construction. We 

focused our analysis on the status of unliquidated obligations for fiscal 

years 1993-98. We did not analyze prior-year appropriations no longer 

available for new obligations and that had been closed, and we did not 

focus on fiscal years 1999-2000 appropriations because insufficient time 

had elapsed for these funds to be obligated and liquidated.

Due to the large number of purchase requests during this period, we limited 

our review to a sample of purchase requests for which there were no 

disbursements, a negative balance, or an unliquidated obligation of $20,000 

or more as of September 30, 1999. Our review included 428 military 

interdepartmental purchase requests with $495.1 million in unliquidated 

obligations, or 99.4 percent of the total reported $498 million in 

unliquidated obligations, for fiscal years 1993-98. To determine the 

requirements for these funds, primary causes for the unliquidated 

obligations, and actions that have affected or will reduce reported 

unliquidated balances, we conducted extensive interviews with program 

and site officials and contractor personnel and reviewed documents, status 

reports, and spending plans. We asked them to verify the amounts reported 

in the financial records and to provide supporting documents showing how 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

much had actually been spent if different from the reported amount. In 

some instances they could not provide us with documents to support the 

status of unliquidated obligations because the program does not have a 

systematic approach for monitoring and reporting funding. We established 

February 2, 2000, as a cutoff date for receiving further input from the Army 

on the status of unliquidated obligation balances.

To assess whether the management structure of the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program allows for coordinated accountability of the 

program, we assessed the organizational structure and lines of authority of 

the program. Specifically, we analyzed DOD and Army organization charts 

for the program, mission statements, roles and responsibilities guidance, 

and program objectives and reviewed contractor-prepared assessments, 

annual status reports, and other Army and DOD reports that addressed the 

organization and management of the program. Three different offices in the 

chain of command gave us three different organization charts for our 

review. Further, we analyzed the organization and evolution of the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program, with emphasis on the Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment Program, since its inception to determine 

which office or offices were accountable for the programs during various 

time frames. Because we reported on the effectiveness of the Chemical 

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project in 1999 and 1996,3

 we did not 

assess the management structure and lines of authority of the project 

during this review.

To identify congressional direction and concerns regarding the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program, we reviewed pertinent legislation and legislative 

history on the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project, the Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Project, the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel 

Product, the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project, and the 

Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program.

To identify management alternatives for effective program organization 

and alignment, we reviewed literature on best business practices, 

government performance standards, and results-based management 

techniques. In addition, we interviewed DOD and Army officials to discuss 

3 Chemical and Biological Defense: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 

for Oregon and Washington (GAO/NSIAD-00-13, Oct. 26, 1999) and Chemical Weapons 

Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses 

(GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

issues and concerns about the program’s evolution and management and 

the organizational challenges the Army has experienced in the past and 

may continue to experience in the future. We also evaluated DOD and Army 

initiatives to improve program management. We interviewed state and local 

officials associated with the program to determine their understanding of 

management roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the program 

and their opinions on ways to improve or streamline the management 

structure and assign accountability for performance.

In performing this review, we used the same accounting records and 

financial reports DOD and the Army use to manage and monitor the 

Chemical Demilitarization Program. We did not independently determine 

the reliability of the reported financial information. However, our recent 

audit of the federal government’s financial statements, including DOD’s and 

the Army’s statements, questioned the reliability of reported financial 

information because not all obligations and expenditures are recorded to 

specific financial accounts.

We performed our review from September 1999 through March 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Now on p. 17.

Now on p. 17.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Now on p. 17.
Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Appendix III

Comments From the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments From the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal
Appendix III

Comments From the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal
Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Appendix IV

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contacts David Warren (202) 512-8412

Donald Snyder (202) 512-7204

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Mark Little, Claudia Dickey, Dennis

De Hart, James Ohl, Bonita Oden, Lee Cooper, Gary Kunkle, John Brosnan, 

Adam Vodraska, Stephanie May, and Nancy Ragsdale made key 

contributions to this report.
Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Related GAO Products

Financial Management: Differences in Army and Air Force Disbursing and 

Accounting Records (GAO/AIMD-00-20, Mar. 7, 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Chemical Stockpile Emergency 

Preparedness Program for Oregon and Washington (GAO/NSIAD-00-13, 

Oct. 26, 1999).

Chemical Demilitarization: Funding Status of the Chemical 

Demilitarization Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-232R, July 29, 1999).

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost 

More, Achieve Less Than Planned (GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 13, 1999).

Financial Management: Problems in Accounting for Navy Transactions 

Impair Funds Control and Financial Reporting (GAO/AIMD-99-19, Jan. 19, 

1999).

Financial Management: Improved Reporting Needed for DOD Problem 

Disbursements (GAO/AIMD-97-59, May 1, 1997).

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and 

Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is 

Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 

1996).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995).

Chemical Weapons: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program Has 

Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar. 15, 1995).

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, 

Jan. 12, 1995).

Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, 

Dec. 22, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare 

Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).
Related GAO Products

Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-00-80 Chemical Weapons Disposal

Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr. 26, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of 

Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994).

Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical 

Weapons Convention (GAO/NSIAD-94-136, Mar. 15, 1994).

Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program 

Has Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb. 22, 1994).

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