58260 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 164 / Friday, August 25, 2023 / Notices 

Applicants: AEP Texas Inc. 

Description: § 205(d) Rate Filing: 

AEPTX–SMT McAllen II Generation 

Interconnection Agreement to be 

effective 7/31/2023. 

Filed Date: 8/21/23. 

Accession Number: 20230821–5136. 

Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 9/11/23. 

Docket Numbers: ER23–2677–000. 

Applicants: PJM Interconnection, 

L.L.C. 

Description: § 205(d) Rate Filing: 

Amendment to ISA/CSA, Service 

Agreement Nos. 5852/5982; Queue No. 

AC2–079 to be effective 10/21/2023. 

Filed Date: 8/21/23. 

Accession Number: 20230821–5138. 

Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 9/11/23. 

Docket Numbers: ER23–2678–000. 

Applicants: PJM Interconnection, 

L.L.C. 

Description: § 205(d) Rate Filing: 

Original ISA, Service Agreement No. 

7041; Queue No. AE2–092 to be 

effective 7/20/2023. 

Filed Date: 8/21/23. 

Accession Number: 20230821–5150. 

Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 9/11/23. 

The filings are accessible in the 

Commission’s eLibrary system (https://

elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/

fercgensearch.asp) by querying the 

docket number. 

Any person desiring to intervene, to 

protest, or to answer a complaint in any 

of the above proceedings must file in 

accordance with Rules 211, 214, or 206 

of the Commission’s Regulations (18 

CFR 385.211, 385.214, or 385.206) on or 

before 5:00 p.m. Eastern time on the 

specified comment date. Protests may be 

considered, but intervention is 

necessary to become a party to the 

proceeding. 

eFiling is encouraged. More detailed 

information relating to filing 

requirements, interventions, protests, 

service, and qualifying facilities filings 

can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/ 

docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For 

other information, call (866) 208–3676 

(toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502–8659. 

The Commission’s Office of Public 

Participation (OPP) supports meaningful 

public engagement and participation in 

Commission proceedings. OPP can help 

members of the public, including 

landowners, environmental justice 

communities, Tribal members and 

others, access publicly available 

information and navigate Commission 

processes. 

For public inquiries and assistance 

with making filings such as 

interventions, comments, or requests for 

rehearing, the public is encouraged to 

contact OPP at (202) 502–6595 or OPP@

ferc.gov. 

Dated: August 21, 2023. 

Debbie-Anne A. Reese, 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18333 Filed 8–24–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Project No. 10489–020] 

City of River Falls Municipal Utilities; 

Notice of Availability of Environmental 

Assessment 

In accordance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and 

the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission’s (Commission) 

regulations, 18 CFR part 380, the Office 

of Energy Projects has reviewed the 

application for subsequent license to 

continue to operate and maintain the 

River Falls Hydroelectric Project 

(project). The project is located on the 

Kinnickinnic River, in the City of River 

Falls (City), Pierce County, Wisconsin. 

Commission staff has prepared an 

Environmental Assessment (EA) for the 

project. 

The EA contains the staff’s analysis of 

the potential environmental impacts of 

the project and concludes that licensing 

the project, with appropriate 

environmental protective measures, 

would not constitute a major federal 

action that would significantly affect the 

quality of the human environment. 

The Commission provides all 

interested persons with an opportunity 

to view and/or print the EA via the 

internet through the Commission’s 

Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov/), using 

the ‘‘eLibrary’’ link. Enter the docket 

number, excluding the last three digits 

in the docket number field, to access the 

document. For assistance, contact FERC 

Online Support at 

FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov, or tollfree at (866) 208–3676, or for TTY, (202) 

502–8659. 

You may also register online at 

https://ferconline.ferc.gov/FERCOnline.

aspx to be notified via email of new 

filings and issuances related to this or 

other pending projects. For assistance, 

contact FERC Online Support. 

Any comments should be filed within 

45 days from the date of this notice. 

The Commission strongly encourages 

electronic filing. Please file comments 

using the Commission’s eFiling system 

at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/ 

efiling.asp. Commenters can submit 

brief comments up to 6,000 characters, 

without prior registration, using the 

eComment system at http://

www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/ 

ecomment.asp. You must include your 

name and contact information at the end 

of your comments. For assistance, 

please contact FERC Online Support. In 

lieu of electronic filing, you may submit 

a paper copy. Submissions sent via the 

U.S. Postal Service must be addressed 

to: Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street NE, Room 1A, Washington, 

DC 20426. Submissions sent via any 

other carrier must be addressed to: 

Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 12225 

Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, Maryland 

20852. The first page of any filing 

should include docket number P– 

10489–020. 

For further information, contact 

Michael Davis at 202–502–8339 or 

michael.davis@ferc.gov. 

Dated: August 21, 2023. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18392 Filed 8–24–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. RD23–2–000] 

Physical Security Technical 

Conference; Notice Inviting PostTechnical Conference Comments 

On Thursday, August 10, 2023, the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(Commission) and the North American 

Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 

convened a Physical Security Technical 

Conference to discuss physical security 

of the Bulk-Power System, including the 

adequacy of existing physical security 

controls, challenges, and solutions. 

All interested persons are invited to 

file post-technical conference comments 

to address issues raised during the 

technical conference identified in the 

Final Notice of Joint Technical 

Conference issued on August 3, 2022. 

For reference, the questions included in 

the Final Notice are included below, 

and supplemental questions appear in 

italics. Commenters need not answer all 

of the questions but are encouraged to 

organize responses using the numbering 

and order in the below questions. 

Commenters are also invited to 

reference material previously filed in 

this docket but are encouraged to avoid 

repetition or replication of their 

previous comments. Comments must be 

submitted on or before 30 days from the 

date of this Notice. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 164 / Friday, August 25, 2023 / Notices 58261 

Comments, identified by docket 

number, may be filed electronically or 

paper-filed. Electronic filing through 

https://www.ferc.gov is preferred. 

Documents must be filed in acceptable 

native applications and print-to-PDF, 

but not in scanned or picture format. 

Instructions are available on the 

Commission’s website: http://

www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp. 

Although the Commission strongly 

encourages electronic filing, documents 

may also be paper-filed. To paper-file, 

submissions sent via the U.S. Postal 

Service must be addressed to: Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, Office 

of the Secretary, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426. Submissions 

sent via any other carrier must be 

addressed to: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, Office of the Secretary, 

12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. 

For more information about this 

Notice, please contact: 

Terrance Clingan (Technical 

Information), Office of Energy 

Reliability, (202) 502–8823, 

Terrance.Clingan@ferc.gov 

Leigh Anne Faugust (Legal Information), 

Office of General Counsel, (202) 502– 

6396, Leigh.Faugust@ferc.gov 

Dated: August 21, 2023. 

Debbie-Anne A. Reese, 

Deputy Secretary. 

Post Technical Conference Questions 

We are seeking comments on the 

topics discussed during the technical 

conference held on August 10, 2023, 

including responses to the questions 

listed in the Final Notice issued in this 

proceeding on August 3, 2023, as well 

as supplemental questions developed by 

Commission staff post-conference. The 

questions from the agenda and the 

supplemental questions are included 

below. 

Panel 1: Effectiveness of Reliability 

Standard CIP–014–3 

This panel explored the facilities 

subject to Reliability Standard CIP–014– 

3. While the NERC report filed with the 

Commission did not recommend 

revising the applicability section of the 

Standard at this time, the report 

determined that this could change based 

on additional information. Panelists 

discussed whether the applicability 

section of Reliability Standard CIP–014– 

3 identifies the appropriate facilities to 

mitigate physical security risks to better 

assure reliable operation of the BulkPower System. Panelists also discussed 

whether additional type(s) of substation 

configurations should be studied to 

determine risks and the possible need 

for required protections. 

Please address the following 

questions: 

1. Is the applicability section of CIP– 

014–3 properly determining 

transmission station/substations to be 

assessed for instability, uncontrolled 

separation or cascading within the 

Interconnection? Specifically, are the 

correct facilities being assessed and 

what topology or characteristics should 

the applicable facilities have to be 

subject to CIP–014–3? For example, are 

there criteria other than those in Section 

4.1.1 of CIP–014–3, such as connected 

to two vs. three other station/substations 

and exceeding the aggregated weighted 

value of 3,000, changing the weighting 

value of the table in the applicability 

section, or including lower transmission 

voltages? 

2. Given the changing threat 

landscape, are there specific 

transmission station/substation 

configurations that should be included 

in the applicability section of CIP–014– 

3, including combinations of stations/ 

substations to represent coordinated 

attacks on multiple facilities? What 

would they be and why? 

3. What other assessments (e.g., a 

TPL–001 planning assessment) may be 

used to identify an at-risk facility or 

group of facilities that should be 

considered for applicability under CIP– 

014–3? How stringent are those 

assessments? Describe any procedural 

differences between those other 

assessments and the CIP–014–3 R1 Risk 

Assessment. Should CIP–014–3 apply to 

entities other than those transmission 

owners to which 4.1.1 applies or 

transmission operators to which 4.1.2 

applies? 

4. Should potential load loss or 

generation loss be considered? If so, 

why, and how would potential impact 

be determined (e.g., how would 

potential load loss be determined in 

advance of running an assessment?)? 

5. Should facilities that perform 

physical security monitoring functions 

that are not currently subject to CIP– 

014–3 (e.g., security operation centers) 

be covered by CIP–014–3 as well? If so, 

what criteria should be used? 

6. Are there additional studies that 

could be performed—either by industry, 

the ERO Enterprise, the national labs, or 

others—that could be used to determine 

whether there are unidentified CIP–014 

‘‘critical’’ transmission stations and 

transmission substations? Are there 

additional studies that would help 

determine whether the applicability 

section of the standard requires 

expansion to identify those transmission 

substations/stations that if lost or 

rendered inoperable would result in 

instability, uncontrolled separation or 

cascading within an Interconnection. 

7. How should extreme conditions be 

considered when identifying ‘‘critical’’ 

transmission substations/stations such 

as extended extreme weather events or 

disasters such as wildfires that weaken 

the resiliency of the Bulk-Power System? 

Panel 2: Minimum Level of Physical 

Protection 

This panel discussed the reliability 

goal to be achieved and based on that 

goal, what, if any, mandatory minimum 

resiliency or security protections should 

be required against facility attacks, e.g., 

site hardening, ballistic protection, etc. 

This panel discussed the scope of 

reliability, resilience, and security 

measures that are inclusive of a robust, 

effective, and risk-informed approach to 

reducing physical security risks. The 

panel also considered whether any 

minimum protections should be tiered 

and discuss the appropriate criteria for 

a tiered approach. 

Please address the following 

questions: 

1. What is our reliability goal? What 

are we protecting against to ensure grid 

reliability beyond what is required in 

the current standards? 

a. What are the specific physical 

security threats (both current and 

emerging) to all stations/substations on 

the bulk electric system? 

b. As threats are continually evolving, 

how can we identify those specific 

threats? 

c. How do threats vary across all 

stations/substations on the bulk electric 

system? How would defenses against 

those threats vary? To what extent 

should simultaneous attacks at multiple 

sites be considered? 

2. Do we need mandatory minimum 

protections? If so, what should they be? 

a. Should there be flexible criteria or 

a bright line? 

b. Should minimum protections be 

tiered (i.e., stations/substations receive 

varying levels of protection according to 

their importance to the grid)? How 

should importance be quantified for 

these protections? 

c. Should minimum protections be 

based on preventing instability, 

uncontrolled separation, or cascading or 

preventing loss of service to customers 

(e.g., as in Moore County, NC)? If 

minimum protections were to be based 

on something other than the instability, 

uncontrolled separation, or cascading, 

what burden would that have on various 

registered entities? If the focus is on loss 

of service, is it necessary to have state 

and local jurisdictions involved to 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
58262 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 164 / Friday, August 25, 2023 / Notices 

implement a minimum set of 

protections? 

d. In what areas should any minimum 

protections be focused? 

i. Detection? 

ii. Assessment? 

iii. Response? 

3. To what extent would minimum 

protections help mitigate the likelihood 

and/or reliability impact of 

simultaneous, multi-site attacks? 

4. To what extent would the 

placement of basic security-related data 

recording devices and associated 

equipment at stations/substations 

(varying based on the criticality of the 

stations/substations as determined by 

the transmission owner) to allow for an 

assessment of damage and the 

collection of evidence in the event of an 

attack provide any security benefit? 

Such devices and equipment could 

possibly provide alarms in real time to 

operating centers or merely be reviewed 

on demand when a singular disturbance 

alarm is sent to an operating center. 

5. Are there basic levels of protection 

that all Bulk-Power System facilities 

use, such as fencing? Would minimum 

improvements to these protections, such 

as adding better security requirements 

to the present public safety 

requirements, better deter attacks? 

6. Given the increasing number and 

severity of physical security threats and 

perpetrated attacks: 

i. Should transmission owners 

annually evaluate evolving physical 

threats and implement corresponding 

security measures for CIP–014 critical 

facilities? 

ii. What criteria should be considered 

in evaluating the impact of evolving 

threats and appropriate protections 

(e.g., criticality of load, likely duration 

of outage, location of station/ 

substation)? 

iii. How should transmission owners 

prioritize security measures for facilities 

that are not CIP–014 critical facilities? 

For example, should transmission 

owners document and implement a 

tiered approach to protecting bulk 

electric system (i.e., 100 kV and above) 

stations and substations based on 

criteria characterizing the level of 

impact (high(i.e., CIP–014 critical), 

medium, or low), similar to CIP–002– 

5.1a? 

Panel 3: Best Practices and Operational 

Preparedness 

This panel discussed physical 

security best practices for prevention, 

protection, response, and recovery. The 

discussion included asset management 

strategies to prepare, incident training 

preparedness and response, and 

research and development needs. 

Please address the following 

questions: 

1. What is the physical security threat 

landscape for each of your companies? 

What best practices have been 

implemented to mitigate the risks and 

vulnerabilities of physical attacks on 

energy infrastructure? 

2. What asset management and 

preparedness best practices have your 

member companies implemented to 

prevent, protect against, respond to, and 

recover from physical attacks on their 

energy infrastructure? 

3. What research and development 

efforts are underway or needed for 

understanding and mitigating physical 

security risks to critical energy electrical 

infrastructure? 

4. What research and development 

efforts, including the development of 

tools, would you like to see the National 

Labs undertake to assist your companies 

in addressing physical threats to your 

critical electrical infrastructure? 

5. What do you need or would like to 

see from the energy industry to improve 

your ability and accuracy in addressing 

physical security risks to critical energy 

electrical infrastructure? 

6. What best practices are in place to 

accelerate electric utility situational 

awareness of an incident and to involve 

local jurisdiction responders? 

7. What can the federal and state 

regulators do to assist the energy 

industry in improving their physical 

security posture? 

8. What training improvements can 

NERC and the Regional Entities 

implement to system operators to aid in 

real-time identification and recovery 

procedures from physical attacks? 

9. What changes could be made to 

improve information sharing between 

the federal government and industry? 

10. How do these best practices 

comport with the objectives of CIP–014– 

3? 

Panel 4: Grid Planning To Respond to 

and Recover From Physical and Cyber 

Security Threats and Potential 

Obstacles 

This panel explored planning to 

respond to and recovery from physical 

and cyber security threats and potential 

obstacles to developing and 

implementing such plans. This 

discussion focused on how best to 

integrate cyber and physical security 

with engineering, particularly in the 

planning phase. The panel discussed 

whether critical stations could be 

reduced through best practices and how 

to determine whether to mitigate the 

risk of a critical station or protect it. 

Finally, the panel considered the 

implications of the changing resource 

mix on vulnerability of the grid and its 

resilience to disruptions. 

Please address the following 

questions: 

1. How can cyber and physical 

security be integrated with engineering, 

particularly planning? What aspects of 

cyber and physical security need to be 

incorporated into the transmission 

planning process? 

2. What modifications could be made 

to TPL–001 to bring in broader attack 

focus (e.g., coordinated attack)? What 

sensitivities or examined contingencies 

might help identify vulnerabilities to 

grid attacks? 

3. Currently, if a CIP–014–3 R1 

assessment deems a transmission 

station/substation as ‘‘critical’’ that 

station/substation must be physically 

protected. Are there best practices for 

reconfiguring facilities so as to reduce 

the criticality of stations/substations? 

4. When prioritizing resources, how 

should entities determine which 

‘‘critical’’ stations/substations to remove 

from the list and which to protect? If the 

project is extensive and may have a long 

lead time to construct, to what degree 

does the station/substation need to be 

protected during the interim period? 

5. How will the development of the 

grid to accommodate the 

interconnection of future renewable 

generation affect the resilience of the 

grid to attack? Will the presence of 

future additional renewable generation 

itself add to or detract from the 

resilience of the grid to physical attack? 

6. What are the obstacles to 

developing a more resilient grid? What 

strategies can be used to address these 

obstacles? 

a. Cost? 

b. Siting? 

c. Regulatory Barriers? 

d. Staffing/training? 

7. How can transmission owners 

better work with state commissions on 

physical security? For example, are 

there opportunities to better work 

together as part of approval processes 

for projects (e.g., applications for 

certificates of public convenience and 

necessity)? 

8. How can security protections be 

better integrated into the planning, 

engineering, and construction of 

projects that improve the security of the 

grid and overall performance and 

resilience, while keeping critical energy 

infrastructure information from being 

inappropriately released? 

[FR Doc. 2023–18336 Filed 8–24–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1