58238 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 164 / Friday, August 25, 2023 / Notices 

1The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR 

parts 730–774 (2020), originally issued pursuant to 

the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601– 

4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘EAA’’), which lapsed on 

August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive 

Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 

Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive 

Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in 

effect under the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) 

(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President 

signed into law the John S. McCain National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 

which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 

2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While section 

1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA 

(except for three sections which are inapplicable 

here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent 

part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other 

forms of administrative action that were made or 

issued under the EAA, including as continued in 

effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of 

ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall 

continue in effect according to their terms until 

modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through 

action undertaken pursuant to the authority 

provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) 

of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary 

denial orders. 

2The TDO was published in the Federal Register 

on March 1, 2023 (88 FR 12912). 

Integration, shana.j.banks@census.gov, 

Department of Commerce, Census 

Bureau telephone 301–763–3815. For 

TTY callers, please use the Federal 

Relay Service at 1–800–877–8339. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Committee will review and provide 

feedback related to 2030 Census plans 

and execution to assist the Census 

Bureau to devise strategies to increase 

census awareness and participation, 

reduce barriers to response, and 

enhance the public’s trust and 

willingness to respond. 

The Census Bureau will benefit from 

the insight, perspectives, and expertise 

of the Committee through 

recommendations on planning and 

implementation of the 2030 Census to 

advise the Census Bureau in conducting 

an accurate decennial census. The 

Committee will provide the Director of 

the Census Bureau periodic updates on 

insights regarding various topics 

relating to preparation for the 2030 

Census. 

Robert L. Santos, Director, Census 

Bureau, approved the publication of this 

Notice in the Federal Register. 

Dated: August 21, 2023. 

Shannon Wink, 

Program Analyst, Policy Coordination Office, 

U.S. Census Bureau. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18339 Filed 8–24–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Foreign-Trade Zones Board 

[S–104–2023] 

Approval of Subzone Status; LL 

Flooring Services, LLC, Sandston, 

Virginia 

On June 23, 2023, the Executive 

Secretary of the Foreign-Trade Zones 

(FTZ) Board docketed an application 

submitted by the Virginia Port 

Authority, grantee of FTZ 20, requesting 

subzone status subject to the existing 

activation limit of FTZ 20, on behalf of 

LL Flooring Services, LLC, in Sandston, 

Virginia. 

The application was processed in 

accordance with the FTZ Act and 

Regulations, including notice in the 

Federal Register inviting public 

comment (88 FR 41884, June 28, 2023). 

The FTZ staff examiner reviewed the 

application and determined that it 

meets the criteria for approval. Pursuant 

to the authority delegated to the FTZ 

Board Executive Secretary (15 CFR 

400.36(f)), the application to establish 

Subzone 20G was approved on August 

22, 2023, subject to the FTZ Act and the 

Board’s regulations, including section 

400.13, and further subject to FTZ 20’s 

2,000-acre activation limit. 

Dated: August 22, 2023. 

Elizabeth Whiteman, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18388 Filed 8–24–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Ilya Balakaev, 

Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20–68, 

Moscow, Russian Federation; 

Radiotester OOO, 

a/k/a Radiotester LLC, 

Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 11, 

Building 1, 

Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation 

and 

Volgograd Prospect, House 2, 

Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation; 

Order Renewing Temporary Denial of 

Export Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations (the 

‘‘Regulations’’ or ‘‘EAR’’),1 I hereby 

grant the request of the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

to renew the temporary denial order 

(‘‘TDO’’) issued in this matter on 

February 24, 2023. I find that renewal of 

this order is necessary in the public 

interest to prevent an imminent 

violation of the Regulations. 

I. Procedural History 

On February 24, 2023, I signed an 

order denying the export privileges of 

Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/ 

a Radiotester LLC (collectively, ‘‘the 

Respondents’’) for a period of 180 days 

on the ground that issuance of the order 

was necessary in the public interest to 

prevent an imminent violation of the 

Regulations. The order was issued ex 

parte pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of 

the Regulations and was effective upon 

issuance.2

On July 31, 2023, BIS, through OEE, 

submitted a written request for renewal 

of the TDO that was issued on February 

24, 2023. The written request was made 

more than 20 days before the TDO’s 

scheduled expiration. A copy of the 

renewal request was sent to 

Respondents in accordance with 

Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the 

Regulations. No opposition to the 

renewal of the TDO has been received. 

II. Renewal of the TDO 

A. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 

766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be 

‘imminent’ either in time or degree of 

likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS 

may show ‘‘either that a violation is 

about to occur, or that the general 

circumstances of the matter under 

investigation or case under criminal or 

administrative charges demonstrate a 

likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As 

to the likelihood of future violations, 

BIS may show that the violation under 

investigation or charge ‘‘is significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or 

negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘[l]ack of information 

establishing the precise time a violation 

may occur does not preclude a finding 

that a violation is imminent, so long as 

there is sufficient reason to believe the 

likelihood of a violation.’’ Id. 

Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 

766.24, TDO may also be made 

applicable to other persons if BIS has 

reason to believe that they are related to 

a respondent and that applying the 

order to them is necessary to prevent its 

evasion. 15 CFR 766.23(a)–(b) and 

766.24(c). A ‘‘related person’’ is a 

person, either at the time of the TDO’s 

issuance or thereafter, who is related to 

a respondent ‘‘by ownership, control, 

position of responsibility, affiliation, or 

other connection in the conduct of trade 

or business.’’ 15 CFR 766.23(a). Related 

persons may be added to a TDO on an 


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3 ‘‘Item’’ means ‘‘commodities, software, and 

technology.’’ 15 CFR 772.1. Further, ‘‘technology’’ 

may be in any tangible or intangible form, such as 

written or oral communications, blueprints, 

drawings, photographs, plans, diagrams, models, 

formulae, tables, engineering designs and 

specifications, computer-aided design files, 

manuals or documentation, electronic media or 

information revealed through visual inspection. Id. 

4The Entity List (supplement no. 4 to part 744 of 

the EAR) identifies entities for which there is 

reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and 

articulable facts, that the entities have been 

involved, are involved, or pose a significant risk of 

being or becoming involved in activities contrary to 

the national security or foreign policy interests of 

the United States. 

5See 87 FR 34131 (Jun. 6, 2022). See also 

§§ 734.9(g), 746.8(a)(3), and 744.21(b) of the EAR. 

6 Id. 

7See 82 FR 722 (Jan. 4, 2017). See also 82 FR 

18219 (Apr. 18, 2017), 86 FR 37903 (Jul. 19, 2021), 

87 FR 12240 (Mar. 3, 2022), and 87 FR 34136 (Jun. 

6, 2022) for additional listings of FSB-related 

entities on the Entity List. 

8On March 2, 2021, the Department of State 

designated the FSB pursuant to Executive Order 

13382 for its contributions to the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. Thus, exports to the 

FSB were also prohibited under 15 CFR 744.8. 

9See 52 FR 3722 (Jan. 26, 2007). 

10Additionally, BIS implemented broad based 

controls for items and activities subject to the EAR 

in support of U.S. national security and foreign 

policy. 50 U.S.C. 481 l(l)–(2). These controls 

included restrictions on exports and reexports to 

the DPRK for United Nations (‘‘UN’’) and antiterrorism reasons. 15 CFR 746.4, 742.19. Consistent 

with ECRA and UN Security Council Resolutions, 

with limited exceptions, a license was required to 

export or reexport any item subject to the EAR to 

North Korea. 15 CFR 746.4. The DPRK was also 

subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo, and 

thus, militarily sensitive items were also restricted. 

15 CFR746.1(b)(2). Furthermore, the Secretary of 

State designated the DPRK a state sponsor of 

terrorism and implemented additional restrictions 

on it. 15 CFR 742.19(a)(2)–(3). For example, 

additional prohibitions applied to certain items 

destined for military, police, intelligence or other 

sensitive end users or if an item would make a 

significant contribution to the military potential of 

the DPRK. 15 CFR 742.19(a)(3); Supplement No. 2 

to part 742. 

ex-parte basis in accordance with 

Section 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 15 

CFR 766.23(b). 

B. The TDO and BIS’s Request for 

Renewal 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s) further invasion 

of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping 

series of stringent export controls that 

severely restrict Russia’s access to 

technologies and other items that it 

needs to sustain its aggressive military 

capabilities. These controls primarily 

target Russia’s defense, aerospace, and 

maritime sectors and are intended to cut 

off Russia’s access to vital technological 

inputs, atrophy key sectors of its 

industrial base, and undercut Russia’s 

strategic ambitions to exert influence on 

the world stage. 

As of February 24, 2022, any item 

classified under any Export 

Classification Control Number 

(‘‘ECCN’’) in Categories 3 through 9 of 

the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) 

required a license to be exported or 

reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 

(Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8, 2022, the 

license requirements for Russia were 

expanded to cover all items on the CCL. 

See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These 

rules were codified in Title 15 CFR 

746.8, which state, ‘‘a license is 

required, excluding deemed exports and 

deemed reexports, to export, reexport, 

or transfer (in-country) to or within 

Russia or Belarus any item subject to the 

EAR and specified in any Export 

Control Classification Number 

(‘‘ECCN’’) on the CCL.’’ 

OEE’s request for renewal is based 

upon the facts underlying the issuance 

of the initial TDO and the evidence 

developed over the course of this 

investigation, which demonstrate the 

existence of an illicit procurement 

network conspiring to violate U.S. 

export control laws by unlawfully 

procuring and shipping controlled 

counterintelligence items to Russia and 

North Korea. As detailed in its July 31, 

2023 request for renewal of the TDO, 

OEE’s investigation, which remains 

ongoing, has revealed evidence that this 

illicit network and its reach remain 

ongoing. As a result, the renewal of this 

order is necessary. 

1. The Basis for the Initial TDO 

As detailed in the initial TDO issued 

on February 24, 2023, Balakaev engaged 

in conduct prohibited by the 

Regulations by unlawfully procuring 

and exporting from the United States 

electronic devices subject to the EAR to 

the Federal Security Service of the 

Russian Federation (‘‘FSB’’), a BIS-listed 

entity located in the Russian Federation 

(‘‘Russia’’), and to the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (‘‘North 

Korea’’ or ‘‘DPRK’’) without the required 

U.S. government authorization. 

‘‘Export’’ is defined in the EAR as an 

‘‘actual shipment or transmission out of 

the United States, including the sending 

or taking of an item out of the United 

States, in any manner.’’ 15 CFR 

734.13(a)(1).3

The FSB is listed on the Commerce 

Department’s Entity List 4 with a policy 

of denial for all items subject to the EAR 

with certain exceptions for transactions 

authorized by the Department of the 

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (‘‘OFAC’’) pursuant to General 

License No. 1B of March 2, 2021.5 As a 

result of this listing, no item subject to 

the Regulations may be exported, 

reexported, or transferred (in-country) to 

the FSB without prior authorization 

from BIS, and BIS will review any 

license applications for the FSB 

pursuant to a policy of denial.6 The FSB 

was originally listed on the Entity List 

on January 4, 2017,7 with a license 

review policy of presumption of denial 

for all items subject to the EAR.8 As 

such, as of January 4, 2017, a license 

was required to export, reexport, or 

transfer (in-country) all items subject to 

the EAR to the FSB. 

As of January 26, 2007, a license is 

required for the export or reexport to 

North Korea of all items subject to the 

EAR other than food or medicine 

designated as EAR99.9 This rule was 

codified in Title 15 CFR 746.4, which 

states ‘‘consistent with United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 1718, a 

license is required to export or reexport 

any item subject to the EAR (see part 

734 of the EAR) to the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (North 

Korea), except food and medicines 

classified as EAR99 (definitions in part 

772 of the EAR).’’ 10

As referenced in the initial TDO, on 

February 21, 2023, Balakaev was 

indicted on multiple counts in the 

United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of New York. The 

charges included, but were not limited 

to, conspiring to violate U.S. export 

control laws in connection with the 

unlicensed export of electronic 

spectrum analyzers, signal generators, 

and gas detection equipment, among 

other items, to Balakaev’s company 

Radiotester, located in Moscow, Russia, 

for ultimate end use by officials of the 

FSB and the DPRK. As described in the 

indictment and initial TDO, Radiotester 

is owned or controlled by Balakaev. The 

company is described on its website as 

‘‘helping to quickly resolve issues of 

supply and repair of foreign-made 

measuring equipment’’ and as having 

‘‘experience of working with large 

federal, city-forming, manufacturing 

enterprises’’. 

As further detailed in the initial TDO, 

Balakaev heads an illicit procurement 

network consisting of an individual in 

the United States, referred to herein as 

‘‘Individual 3’’, who would assist 

Balakaev in purchasing the electronic 

equipment, as well as two members of 

the FSB in Russia, referred to as FSB CoConspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 

2, who worked in FSB Center 8’s 

Military Unit 43753 and who would 

publish a request for proposal (‘‘RFP’’) 

to repair a device on publicly available 

Russian websites (collectively, the 

‘‘Balakaev Network’’). In particular, 

Balakaev would purchase the electronic 

devices on the internet or directly 

through the United States-based 


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58240 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 164 / Friday, August 25, 2023 / Notices 

manufacturers and ship them to 

Individual 3’s home in Richmond, 

Virginia. Then, often traveling through 

the Eastern District of New York, 

Balakaev flew to the United States to 

pick up the devices and bring them back 

to Russia or had Individual 3 and others 

ship the electronic devices from the 

United States to Russia. On occasion, 

Balakaev directed others to travel with 

the electronic devices from the United 

States to Russia. Balakaev subsequently 

used parts from the electronic devices to 

repair FSB equipment or provided the 

equipment directly to a DPRK official. 

The electronic devices Balakaev 

purchased, repaired, and sold to the 

FSB and DPRK are subject to the EAR 

and are items commonly used as part of 

sensitive foreign counterintelligence 

and military operations, including the 

transmission of encrypted 

communications, the ability to scan a 

room to determine if it was bugged, and 

the detection of hazardous gases. 

As stated in the initial TDO, OEE has 

presented evidence indicating that 

Balakaev and the other above-captioned 

parties were engaged in unlawfully 

purchasing and shipping dual-use items 

from U.S. manufacturers to the FSB and 

DPRK. These items included advanced 

electronics and sophisticated testing 

equipment, some of which can be used 

in sensitive foreign counterintelligence 

and military operations. 

The February 2023 indictment 

charged Balakaev, owner of Radiotester, 

with conspiring to defraud, conspiring 

to violate IEEPA, conspiring to violate 

ECRA, and smuggling goods from the 

United States. The violations charged in 

the indictment cover conduct occurring 

between at least January 2017 through 

February 2022, and it alleges that 

Balakaev was not only aware of U.S. 

export control laws but also took active 

steps to evade U.S. export controls by 

illicitly procuring items subject to the 

EAR without the required BIS export 

licenses. 

i. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin 

Electronic Devices to the FSB in Russia 

As stated in the indictment and in the 

initial TDO issued on February 24, 

2023, Balakaev and his co-conspirators 

in the Balakaev Network unlawfully 

sourced, purchased, shipped and 

transported spectrum analyzers and 

signal generators from vendors and 

manufacturers in the United States for 

the benefit of the FSB in Russia. 

Spectrum analyzers are generally used 

to detect the frequency of radio signals 

to identify surveillance devices. The 

spectrum analyzers that were exported 

by Balakaev are classified under ECCN 

3A992.a and are controlled for AntiTerrorism (AT) reasons. Signal 

generators are generally used to securely 

transmit information, often as part of 

counterintelligence or other covert 

operations. The signal generators that 

were exported by Balakaev are classified 

under ECCN 3A992.a and are controlled 

for AT reasons. A license was required 

to export these items to the FSB in 

Russia. 

As described in the indictment and in 

the initial TDO, because many of the 

spectrum analyzers and signal 

generators used by the FSB were 

manufactured in the United States, it is 

difficult for the FSB to obtain parts to 

repair these items. Pursuant to the 

scheme involving the Balakaev 

Network, Balakaev conspired with FSB 

Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB CoConspirator 2, who worked in FSB 

Center 8’s Military Unit 43753. In 

particular, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and 

FSB Co-Conspirator 2 would publish a 

RFP to repair certain devices on 

publicly available Russian websites. 

Balakaev, FSB Co-Conspirator 1, and 

FSB Co-Conspirator 2 then negotiated a 

contract price to repair the devices 

before Balakaev submitted a bid in 

response to the RFP. To ensure that 

Balakaev won the bid, FSB CoConspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 

instructed Balakaev to submit two 

higher bids under fictious company 

names, in addition to the agreed-upon 

bid through Balakaev’s company, 

Radiotester. 

Once the FSB accepted Radiotester’s 

bid and the contract was signed, 

Balakaev traveled to FSB Center 8 in 

Russia to pick up the broken device(s). 

Either FSB Co-Conspirator 1 or FSB CoConspirator 2 would meet Balakaev 

outside the secure gate of FSB Center 8 

to provide Balakaev with the broken 

device(s). 

As described in the indictment and 

the initial TDO, Balakaev then sourced 

the necessary repair parts from the 

United States. Balakaev either 

purchased the devices over the internet 

or directly from the U.S. manufacturers, 

and had the devices shipped to 

Individual 3’s home in Richmond, 

Virginia. Once purchased, Balakaev 

brought or shipped the devices to Russia 

where he then mined the devices for 

component parts to use to repair the 

FSB devices. After Balakaev repaired 

the devices, he returned to FSB Center 

8, where he met with either FSB CoConspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2 

outside the FSB Center 8 gate to provide 

the repaired devices. The FSB Military 

Unit 43753 then wired payment to 

Balakaev’s Sberbank account. 

As also referenced in the indictment 

and initial TDO, in total, between 

approximately 2017 and February 2022, 

Balakaev entered into approximately ten 

(10) contracts with FSB Military Unit 

43753 to repair approximately forty (40) 

spectrum analyzers and signal 

generators. In furtherance of those 

contracts, Balakaev purchased 

approximately forty-three (43) devices 

in the United States. Balakaev 

frequently traveled between Russia and 

the United States during this time to 

obtain the devices, often through John F. 

Kennedy International Airport (‘‘JFK 

Airport’’) in the Eastern District of New 

York. In furtherance of the scheme to 

unlawfully export controlled items from 

the United States to the FSB, on or 

about and between February 2017 and 

March 2021, Balakaev traveled from 

Russia to the United States 

approximately fourteen (14) times, 

typically staying in the United States 

anywhere from two (2) to fourteen (14) 

days on each trip. Included below is one 

example of the multiple unlawful 

exports to the FSB which are described 

in further detail in the indictment. 

By way of example, on or about 

December 19, 2019, Balakaev, acting 

through Radiotester, entered into a 

contract with the FSB Military Unit 

43753. As described in the indictment, 

the contract was to repair an Agilent HP 

8562EC and two Agilent HP 8560EC 

spectrum analyzers. According to 

purchase records and shipment 

notifications, Balakaev purchased two 

Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers 

that were delivered to Individual 3’s 

home in Richmond, Virginia on or about 

January 14, 2020 and January 15, 2020. 

Approximately one month later, on or 

about February 10, 2020, Balakaev flew 

from Russia to the United States, where 

he stayed for approximately one week, 

in order to obtain the two Agilent HP 

8560E spectrum analyzers that he 

purchased. While in the United States, 

on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev 

emailed FSB Co-Conspirator 1 with the 

subject of the email ‘‘Repair Contracts 

43753’’ and attached a PDF about 

spectrum analyzers. The following 

month, in or about March 2020, 

Balakaev purchased an Agilent HP 

8562EC spectrum analyzer to fulfill the 

FSB contract. On or about March 21, 

2020, the device was delivered to 

Individual 3’s home in Richmond, 

Virginia. 

In addition to the example described 

above, between approximately April 16, 

2020 and March 6, 2021, Balakaev 

purchased approximately thirty (30) 

additional spectrum analyzers, 

spectrum analyzer parts, and other radio 

parts which were shipped to Individual 

3’s home in Richmond, Virginia. 

Balakaev also traveled to the United 


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11The Altair 4X gas detector would not fall 

within the exception set forth in § 746.4 as it is not 

EAR99 food or medicine. 

States twice in 2021 to obtain the 

devices and fulfill his FSB contracts. 

Further, in approximately January 2022, 

Balakaev, through Radiotester, entered 

into a new contract with FSB Military 

Unit 43753 to repair six spectrum 

analyzers and signal generators, 

including the following make and 

models: HP8648D; Agilent HP 8562E; 

Agilent HP 8562EC; Rohde & Schwarz 

FS300; and Rohde & Schwarz SM300. In 

approximately February 2022, Balakaev 

picked up the devices from FSB CoConspirator 1 at FSB Center 8 to begin 

the process of procuring spectrum 

analyzers for use in repairing the 

devices. 

ii. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin 

Gas Detection Equipment to the DPRK 

Between approximately 2019 and 

2020, Balakaev conspired with DPRK 

Government Official 1, the First 

Secretary of the Embassy of the DPRK to 

the Russian Federation, to provide the 

DPRK with U.S.-origin technology that 

can detect hazardous gases, in violation 

of United States laws. 

As described in the indictment and in 

the initial TDO, in approximately 2019, 

DPRK Government Official 1 contacted 

Balakaev to discuss business they could 

engage in together. DPRK Government 

Official 1 contacted Balakaev 

specifically due to connections that 

Balakaev had made while working at the 

Russian Ministry of Culture and in his 

travel to North Korea. Balakaev 

subsequently met DPRK Government 

Official 1 multiple times at the North 

Korean embassy in Moscow, Russia. On 

one of those occasions, DPRK 

Government Official 1 asked Balakaev to 

purchase an Altair 4X gas detector for 

the DPRK. The Altair 4X gas detector is 

a device manufactured by a company in 

the United States that can be used to 

detect deadly gases such as combustible 

gases, oxygen-deficient atmospheres, 

and toxic gases. The Altair 4X gas 

detector is subject to the EAR and 

designated as EAR99.11

On approximately December 28, 2019, 

Balakaev purchased the Altair 4X gas 

detector on the internet in the United 

States and had it shipped to Individual 

3’s home in Richmond, Virginia. On 

January 2, 2020, the shipment arrived at 

Individual 3’s home. Approximately 

two months later, on or about February 

9, 2020, DPRK Government Official 1 

sent Balakaev a photograph of a broken 

CD labeled ‘‘Altair 4XR Multigas 

Detector.’’ Balakaev responded, in sum 

and substance, that he would send a 

link for the gas detector software. As 

further described in the indictment and 

initial TDO, on or about February 10, 

2020, Balakaev traveled from Russia to 

the United States to obtain the gas 

detector that was previously shipped to 

Individual 3’s home. Approximately one 

week later, on or about February 17, 

2020, Balakaev returned to Russia with 

the gas detector. 

As the indictment and initial TDO 

further demonstrate, Balakaev was 

aware of the applicable U.S. export 

control laws which prohibited him from 

purchasing the electronic devices in the 

United States for ultimate end use by 

the FSB and DPRK. As described in the 

indictment, on or about November 5, 

2019, Individual 3 emailed Balakaev a 

hyperlink to a BIS document titled 

‘‘Don’t Let This Happen To You!: Actual 

Investigations of Export Control and 

Antiboycott Violations.’’ In the email, 

Individual 3 wrote to Balakaev to ‘‘Take 

a look just in case.’’ The BIS document 

provided ‘‘an introduction to the 

consequences of violating U.S. export 

control law.’’ In addition to explaining 

U.S. export control laws, the document 

noted specific examples of individuals 

who violated U.S. sanctions regulations 

by exporting items to Russia without a 

BIS license. Balakaev subsequently 

downloaded the document and saved 

the document to his computer. 

2. Basis for Renewal of TDO 

i. Recent Procurement Attempts 

As noted in OEE’s request for 

renewal, OEE’s investigation, which 

remains ongoing, has identified 

evidence of multiple transactions 

involving Balakaev and the Balakaev 

Network dating back to 2017. As 

described in the indictment, Balakaev 

has demonstrated a pattern of conduct 

involving the illicit procurement and 

unauthorized exports of EAR-controlled 

items for end use by the FSB and DPRK. 

Further, on October 18, 2022, Balakaev 

made statements to law enforcement 

that he intended to continue to procure 

EAR-controlled items through other 

means and is still obtaining contracts 

through the FSB. 

In addition, Balakaev informed agents 

that he had fulfilled FSB contracts he 

had obtained in January 2022 for the 

repair of six devices, and that he was 

currently negotiating with FSB CoConspirators for new contracts in 

January or February 2023. According to 

Balakaev, the new contracts were not 

public yet and the FSB Co-Conspirators 

would advise Balakaev to review the 

contracts. Accordingly, OEE has reason 

to believe that Balakaev and the other 

above-captioned parties continue to 

engage in unlawfully purchasing and 

shipping dual-use items from U.S. 

manufacturers to the FSB and DPRK. 

These items include advanced 

electronics and sophisticated testing 

equipment, some of which can be used 

in sensitive foreign counterintelligence 

and military operations. 

ii. Risk of Continued Evasion 

Since the issuance of the TDO on 

February 24, 2023, an arrest warrant has 

been issued for Ilya Balakaev. Ilya 

Balakaev is presently a fugitive from 

U.S. law enforcement and resides in the 

Russian Federation. Because he has not 

yet been apprehended, OEE has reason 

to believe that his illicit procurement 

efforts will remain ongoing, given the 

length and nature of the conduct 

identified to date. Moreover, because 

Balakaev is familiar with methods of 

concealment, he is likely to use 

increasingly sophisticated methods to 

avoid detection by law enforcement, 

absent the renewal of the TDO. 

III. Findings 

I find that the evidence presented by 

BIS demonstrates that a violation of the 

Regulations by the above-captioned 

parties is imminent in both time and 

degree of likelihood. As such, a TDO is 

needed to give notice to persons and 

companies in the United States and 

abroad that they should cease dealing 

with Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO 

a/k/a Radiotester LLC in export or 

reexport transactions involving items 

subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is 

consistent with the public interest to 

preclude future violations of the 

Regulations given the deliberate, covert, 

and determined nature of the 

misconduct and clear disregard for 

complying with U.S. export control 

laws. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 

It Is Therefore Ordered: 

First, that ILYA BALAKAEV, with an 

address at Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 

20–68 Moscow, Russian Federation; 

RADIOTESTER OOO A/K/A 

RADIOTESTER LLC, with an address at 

Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 11, Building 

1, Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation, 

and Volgograd Prospect, House 2, 

Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation; 

and when acting for or on their behalf, 

any successors or assigns, agents, or 

employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ and 

collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) may 

not, directly or indirectly, participate in 

any way in any transaction involving 

any commodity, software or technology 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
58242 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 164 / Friday, August 25, 2023 / Notices 

1See Initiation of Antidumping and 

Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 87 FR 

61278 (October 11, 2022). 

2See Memorandum, ‘‘Extension of Deadline for 

Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty 

Administrative Review,’’ dated March 29, 2023. 

3See Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain 

Steel Nails from the People’s Republic of China, 73 

FR 44961 (August 1, 2008) (Order). 

4For a complete description of the scope of the 

Order, see Memorandum, ‘‘Decision Memorandum 

for the Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty 

Administrative Review: Certain Steel Nails from the 

People’s Republic of China; 2021–2022,’’ dated 

concurrently with, and hereby adopted by, this 

notice (Preliminary Decision Memorandum). 

5The companies that we preliminarily determine 

had no shipments during the POR are: (1) Hebei 

Minmetals Co., Ltd.; (2) Nanjing Caiqing Hardware 

Co., Ltd.; (3) Nanjing Yuechang Hardware Co., Ltd.; 

(4) Shandong Qingyun Hongyi Hardware Products 

Co., Ltd.; (5) Shanxi Hairui Trade Co., Ltd.; (6) 

Suntec Industries Co., Ltd.; (7) Tianjin Jinchi Metal 

Products Co., Ltd.; and (8) Xi’an Metals & Minerals 

Import & Export Co., Ltd. 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States that is subject to the 

EAR, or in any other activity subject to 

the EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, License Exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR, or in any other 

activity subject to the EAR; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or in any 

other activity subject to the EAR. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of a Denied 

Person any item subject to the EAR; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

a Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States, 

including financing or other support 

activities related to a transaction 

whereby a Denied Person acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from a Denied Person of any 

item subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

EAR with knowledge or reason to know 

that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by a Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by a Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States. For 

purposes of this paragraph, servicing 

means installation, maintenance, repair, 

modification or testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Ilya Balakaev 

and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester 

LLC by affiliation, ownership, control, 

or position of responsibility in the 

conduct of trade or related services may 

also be made subject to the provisions 

of this Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

section 766.24(e) of the EAR, Ilya 

Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a 

Radiotester LLC may, at any time, 

appeal this Order by filing a full written 

statement in support of the appeal with 

the Office of the Administrative Law 

Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing 

Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 

Maryland 21202–4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. Respondents 

Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/ 

a Radiotester LLC may oppose a request 

to renew this Order by filing a written 

submission with the Assistant Secretary 

for Export Enforcement, which must be 

received not later than seven days 

before the expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be served 

on each denied person and shall be 

published in the Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18311 Filed 8–24–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

International Trade Administration 

[A–570–909] 

Certain Steel Nails From the People’s 

Republic of China: Preliminary Results 

of Antidumping Duty Administrative 

Review and Preliminary Determination 

of No Shipments; 2021–2022 

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, 

Department of Commerce. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Commerce (Commerce) preliminarily 

determines that Shanghai Yueda Nails 

Co., Ltd., a.k.a. Shanghai Yueda Nails 

Industry Co., Ltd. (Shanghai Yueda), an 

exporter of certain steel nails from the 

People’s Republic of China (China), sold 

subject merchandise in the United 

States at prices below normal value 

(NV) during the period of review (POR) 

August 1, 2021, through July 31, 2022. 

Interested parties are invited to 

comment on these preliminary results. 

DATES: Applicable August 25, 2023. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob 

Palmer or Bill Horn, AD/CVD 

Operations, Office VIII, Enforcement 

and Compliance, International Trade 

Administration, Department of 

Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue 

NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: 

(202) 482–9068 or (202) 482–4868, 

respectively. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

This administrative review is being 

conducted in accordance with section 

751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended (the Act). Commerce 

published the notice of initiation of this 

administrative review on October 11, 

2022.1 On March 28, 2023, Commerce 

extended the preliminary results 

deadline until August 18, 2023.2

Scope of the Order 3

The products covered by the Order 

are nails from China. A full description 

of the scope of the Order is contained 

in the Preliminary Decision 

Memorandum.4

Preliminary Determination of No 

Shipments 

Based on our analysis of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) 

information, and the no shipment 

certifications submitted by eight 

companies,5 Commerce preliminarily 

determines that these companies had no 

shipments of subject merchandise 

during the POR. 

Consistent with our practice in nonmarket economy (NME) cases, we are 

not rescinding this review but instead 

intend to complete the review with 

respect to these eight companies for 

which we have preliminarily found no 

shipments and issue appropriate 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1