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23–744 PDF 2005

THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

OF THE POST-9/11 COAST GUARD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 

SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 8, 2005

Serial No. 109–18

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Vice Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND

CYBERSECURITY

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Security, 

Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity ..................................... 3

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5

The Honorable Donna Christensen, a Representative in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Oregon ..................................................................................................... 28

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 25

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 31

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia .............................................................................................................. 26

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 29 

The Honorable Don Young, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alaska 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4

WITNESS 

Admiral Thomas Collins, Commandant, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10

APPENDIX 

Questions Submitted for the Record ...................................................................... 45

Rear Adm. Patrick M. Stillman, USCG, Oversight ad Management of the 

U.S. Coast Guard’s, Integrated Deepwater System .......................................... 46

(1)

THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS OF THE 

POST-9/11 COAST GUARD 

Wednesday, June 8, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in Room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lungren, Linder, Rogers, Pearce, Cox 

(Ex Officio), Sanchez, Dicks, DeFazio, Pascrell, Langevin, and 

Thompson (Ex Officio). 

Also Present: Representative Christensen. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 

Cybersecurity will come to order. 

The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony on the 

post-9/11 security missions of the United States Coast Guard. 

Today we have the pleasure for hearing from Admiral Collins, the 

Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, as we explore the 

Homeland Security missions of the post-9/11 Coast Guard. I want 

to start by thanking the commandant for his testimony and appearance before us today, which I understand is the first before the 

Homeland Security Committee. 

I expect that we will be working together on many issues in the 

years ahead as the committee vigorously exercised jurisdiction over 

border and port security activities in which the Coast Guard plays 

a fundamental and critical role. 

Our hearing today will review how the implementation of the 

Coast Guard’s integrated Deepwater system is considered to enhance our Nation’s port judge minority capabilities. We will also 

exam how this long-term complex and costly project, which was 

begun before the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and as of 9/11, 

has been revised by the Coast Guard to appropriately account for 

such events and expanded Homeland Security missions in this 

unique agency. 

As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast 

Guard has the awesome task of protecting our waterways and securing our Nation’s ports. For over 200 years the Coast Guard has 

patrolled and protected our coastlines, which total over the 95,000 

miles. The Coast Guard also plays a key role in pushing our borders out to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from arriving 
2

at our shores. The committee will be particularly interested in the 

details as to how the Coast Guard manages both these blue and 

brown-water missions. 

The Coast Guard implements its acquisition strategy—or as the 

Coast Guard implements its acquisition strategy for the Deepwater 

program, this committee will pay close attention to how well these 

acquisitions enhance the maritime and port security capabilities of 

the Coast Guard and support the overall mission of the Department of Homeland Security. 

It is equally important that the Coast Guard’s acquisition strategy take into account the availability and capabilities of the other 

DHS, Federal, State and local air and marine assets operating in 

the port and coastal security environment, as well as the need for 

greater interoperability and coordination between those assets and 

those of the Coast Guard. I am also interested in the flow of information. 

How does the Coast Guard receive, analyze and act on intelligence? How does the Coast Guard work with State and local law 

enforcement in the maritime sector who are both users and major 

collectors of valuable information? 

I look forward to the insights that Admiral Collins will provide 

on these topics today.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Today, the Subcommittee will hear from Admiral Collins, the Commandant of the 

United States Coast Guard, as we explore the homeland security missions of the 

post-9/11 Coast Guard. I want to start by thanking the Commandant for his testimony and appearance before us today, which I understand is your first before the 

Homeland Security Committee. I expect that we will be working together on many 

issues in the years ahead, as the Committee vigorously exercises its jurisdiction over 

border and port security—activities in which the Coast Guard plays a fundamental 

and critical role. 

Our hearing today will review how the implementation of the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System can serve to enhance our Nation’s port and maritime security capabilities. We also will examine how this long-term, complex, and costly 

project—which was begun before the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and of 9/11—

has been revised by the Coast Guard to appropriately account for such events, and 

the new and expanded homeland security missions of this unique agency. 

As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard has the awesome task of protecting our waterways and securing our Nation’s ports. For over 200 

years, the Coast Guard has patrolled and protected our coastlines, which total over 

95,000 miles. The Coast Guard also plays a key role in pushing our borders out to 

prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from arriving at U.S. shores. The Committee will be particularly interested in the details as to how the Coast Guard manages both these blue—and brown-water missions. 

As the Coast Guard implements its acquisition strategy for the Deepwater program, this Committee will pay close attention to how well these acquisitions enhance the maritime and port security capabilities of the Coast Guard, and support 

the overall mission of the Department of Homeland Security. 

It also is critically important that the Coast Guard’s acquisition strategy take into 

account the availability and capabilities of other DHS, Federal, state, and local air 

and marine assets operating in the port and coastal security environment, as well 

as the need for greater interoperability and coordination between these assets and 

those of the Coast Guard. 

I am also very interested in the flow of information. How does the Coast Guard 

receive, analyze, and act on intelligence? How does the Coast Guard work with state 

and local law enforcement in the maritime sector, who are both users and major 

collectors of valuable information? 

I look forward to the insight that Admiral Collins will provide on these topics 

today. 

I will now recognize the Ranking Member for any opening statement she may 

wish to make at this time.
3

I would now recognize the ranking member from California for 

any opening statement she may wish to make at this time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for being before us. I have to tell you that after having been 

on this committee and the Select Committee—really, since we set 

this up—I have been very critical of the Department of Homeland 

Security and many of the measures that haven’t been taken, that 

haven’t been done and implemented with respect to the security of 

America and Americans. But I have to say that one of the areas 

where I am pretty happy is all the work that the Coast Guard has 

done. 

Admiral COLLINS. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So I want to commend you really for much of the 

work. There is a lot more to be done. I want to let you know what 

pieces I would like to hear from you today. But every time that I 

go to the Port of L.A. or the Port of Long Beach or the San Francisco ports, I am just amazed at how thoughtful the Coast Guard 

is with respect to what has to be done and what it has been able 

to do. 

I think its incredibly important that we protect the ports. As you 

know, 95 percent of everything of the trade that moves from 

nonNorth America comes through our port system. I think more 

than anything, the Coast Guard understands what an attack would 

look like and the result of loss of life, and, more importantly, as 

we saw on the shutdown we had a couple of years ago in the Long 

Beach, Los Angeles area, the economic loss that this country would 

suffer. So I commend you for many of the things that you have 

done. 

There are some items that I think are critical items that still 

need to be completed, and I hope that you will discuss them with 

us today. A national maritime security strategy, the long—and 

short-range vessel tracking system, a comprehensive maritime intelligence plan and the response plan for a maritime security incident. 

I understand that the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

13 is supposed to address some of these requirements. So I would 

like to hear from you when these items will be completed, especially with respect to the vessel tracking requirement. 

I am also concerned about the Deepwater program. Many of us 

have advocated acceleration of Deepwater. We are concerned with 

the two GAO reports issued within the last year that state the 

management challenges—because this really is a big job—associated with that program. 

Most of all, we want the men and women of the Coast Guard to 

have the best equipment available to do their jobs, but we also 

have to insure that Deepwater is being properly managed so that 

those resources can reach the field in a timely and cost efficient 

manner. I would love to get some assurances to you as to how that 

all is moving along. 

Again, I welcome you and thank you for being before us today. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady. Before I recognize the 

chairman of the full committee and the ranking member of the full 

committee, I would like to ask unanimous consent to permit the 
4

chairman of Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, who is 

also a member of this panel, to make a brief opening statement. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It will be brief. I will, for 

the record, submit my written statement and again welcome you, 

Commandant. I have worked with the Coast Guard, I know longer 

than anybody on this committee. It has been my prime objective, 

ever since the Merchant Marine Committee was existing and then 

we lost control of that and we went to the Transportation Committee. 

I want to thank you. One of the reasons I am now chairman of 

that committee is because of the Coast Guard. You have played a 

very vital role. I have watched all the missions we have charged 

the Coast Guard with, prior to 9/11, the oil pollution, drug interdiction, immigration problems, all new charges that we didn’t fund. 

Happily, the President is beginning to fund the program and this 

Congress will do also. 

My main interest from you, Commandant, is, of course, the Deepwater program. Again, you know my interest in that. I have read 

your testimony already, and I see that you are addressing that. 

The second interest is one that means a great deal to me, and 

I think you recognize, as I mention all along, there was a mass 

hysteria to try to have security within our ports, and I argued all 

along you cannot secure a port. You have to secure the port of origin of what comes into our ports to make sure it is safe. That is 

the way we make our ports safe, and I see you have addressed that 

internationally. 

We have some fine agreements. I hope you pursue that with the 

international maritime group so we can affect our commerce. We 

have to keep our commerce flowing and yes, have security, but the 

way you gain that is to make sure that those countries that import 

to us, as we accept those imports, everything that comes into the 

ports is secured. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the Commandant’s testimony 

and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The information follows:]

THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DON YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA

I am pleased to see the Commandant again this morning. 

As the other members of the committee know, I have worked with the Coast 

Guard to improve the safety and security of Maritime Commerce and the boating 

public as the chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which 

continues to have jurisdiction over the service. 

As you know, I am a strong supporter of the Coast Guard. 

The service is a multi-mission agency that is responsible for many important missions including search and rescue, marine safety, the licensing and documentation 

of mariners, maritime law enforcement, and oil pollution prevention and response. 

In addition to these many traditional missions, the Coast Guard has been designated as the lead federal agency for protecting Maritime Homeland Security. 

I look forward to hearing the Commandant explain how the homeland security 

mission is being carried out in concert with the service’s other important historic 

missions. 

Over the years that I have been in Congress several Coast Guard missions have 

generated widespread public interest. Oil pollution response, migrant interdiction, 

and drug interdiction have all at one time or the other captured the public’s attention. 

Fortunately, those of us who work frequently with the Coast Guard have continued to support all of the service’s many missions. 
5

It is the breadth of coast guardsmen’s training, and the multi-mission capabilities 

of the service’s personnel, ship and planes that give the United States a remarkably 

safe and economically productive maritime domain. 

I commend the chairman for holding this hearing today, and I look forward to the 

Commandant’s testimony.

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from 

Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for any statement that he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Admiral 

Collins, welcome to the committee. 

Admiral COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I am sure you will be very positive while you are 

here. I would like to thank Ms. Sanchez also and join her in supporting the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard. As a ranking 

member of the House Homeland Security Committee, I believe this 

committee must provide the Coast Guard with the support it needs 

to keep America’s port and coast lines safe and secure. 

Our homeland security strategy depends on the security of our 

ports and waterways as our ports are dependent on securing a 

Coast Guard that is robust, dynamic and fully capable of performing a diverse set of missions. 

Since the tragic events of September 11th, the men and women 

of the U.S. Coast Guard have been on the front lines of the war 

against terror. As the Department of Homeland Security’s principal 

agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard continues to play a 

lead role in securing the Nation’s 95,000 miles of coastline and 361 

ports. This includes boarding high-interest vessels and assessing 

security at our ports. 

One of my primary concerns is whether the Coast Guard has the 

resources it needs to perform its many, many missions. I asked the 

same question at a field hearing we held recently in Vicksburg, 

Mississippi about these Coast Guard resources. 

At that time, I was told by Admiral Duncan that resources were 

sufficient. But I have had a hard time completely believing, when 

I see the activities put on the Coast Guard since 9/11, and would 

love to hear your position from that, Admiral. I have had concerns 

about the Deepwater program. Make no mistake, I am a strong 

supporter of the program. I supported the authorization of the $1.1 

billion for Deepwater last year as a conferee on the 2004 Coast 

Guard authorization bill. 

But the management challenges raised by GAO are considerable, 

and I hope that your testimony will address some of these problems. We simply cannot allow poor management to result in squandered resources and delays in the implementation of important 

Homeland Security projects such as Deepwater. 

Finally, I would like to hear the steps taken by the Coast Guard 

to protect our inland waterways. As you know, the Mississippi 

River borders the entire western half of my district, and obviously 

it is absolutely a priority for a lot of us. While the inland ports do 

not receive attention the coastal ports do, they are just as vulnerable and a terrorist attack will cause significant loss of life and economic damage. 

As you know, the Coast Guard is considered a very valuable 

piece of the Homeland Security proposal. In fact, some might even 

call the Coast Guard their king. Given the important work you 
6

folks do, we certainly understand why. Admiral Collins, welcome. 

I look forward to your testimony. 

Admiral COLLINS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full 

committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox for any statement he may have. 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much, Chairman Lungren, Ranking 

Member Sanchez, for putting this hearing together today, and especially, Admiral Collins, thank you very much for appearing here 

today. As you know this committee is strongly supportive of the 

Coast Guard and its mission. It has been our observation over the 

last several years, both as the Permanent Committee and as the 

Select Committee, that the Coast Guard, among the elements that 

were contributed to this new cabinet department at the Department of Homeland Security, is really the crown jewel, and your 

mission, even before September 11th, even before the creation of 

the Department of Homeland Security, lined up very nicely with 

what became the mission, the national security mission, of what is 

now the third largest cabinet department. 

To put today’s hearing in proper context to understand the 

daunting challenges of Homeland Security when it comes to such 

issues as container shipping, it is important to note at the outset 

that America is connected to the rest of the world, to the global 

economy, primarily through the maritime sector. 

More than 95 percent of our overseas trade arrives in the United 

States by ship. That is about 8,000 ships carrying multinational 

crews and cargo from around the globe, making more than 51,000 

U.S. port calls every year. More than 7 million containers are coming into this country every year. 

This maritime environment is amazingly complex, and the government regulatory structure that has gone grown up to deal with 

it is likewise amazingly complex, even excluding State and local 

regulations. The number of Federal regulatory agencies responsible 

for dealing with various aspects of our maritime security is 

daunting. 

There are separate regulatory systems to monitor discrete aspects of maritime activity from tracking and targeting high-risk 

vessels and crews, to screening the cargo on board those vessels 

and to vetting passengers aboard the vessel. There is often reasonable justification for this kind of division of responsibilities. 

But these divisions can also provide opportunities for our enemies. We know from experience that terrorists seeking to harm 

America study our systems and seek to exploit gaps in those systems. It is for this reason that the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security brought under one roof for the first time, the 

major elements of our maritime security system. The Coast Guard 

has been given lead responsibility to insure the seamless execution 

of this critical mission. 

What is required is a level of coordination and information sharing that simply didn’t exist prior to September 11, 2001. We now 

know that our national ability to detect potential threats from the 

maritime arena request be significantly improved through effective 

sharing of information. With such advance information on inbound 

ships, and on cargo, crews and passengers, border control agencies 
7

will be better able to identify those that require more thorough security screening, exploiting available information to discern threats 

and concentrating resources to stop them, is at the heart of the 

maritime domain awareness concept, and it is the key to effective 

risk management. 

In May of last year, the Select Committee on Homeland Security 

held a hearing examining the coordination of maritime security responsibilities and operations among DHS agencies. This included a 

look at the various air and maritime acquisition plans within the 

Department. 

One year later, this hearing today will provide a status update 

on the level of improved coordination. In particular, we will exam 

how various initiatives, such as the C4ISR program, joint harbor 

operation centers and other similar activities are working to bridge 

the interoperability gap between the various maritime and port security agencies within DHS and between these agencies and State 

and local law enforcement and port authorities across the country. 

We will also examine the cornerstone of the Coast Guard’s longterm strategy for carrying out both its Homeland Security and nonHomeland Security security missions, the integrated Deepwater 

system. 

This quarter-century long acquisition project with costs esti- mated to range from $19 billion to $24 billion will provide a complete modernization of Coast Guard assets. Deepwater, which was 

developed in the late 1990s, had to be revised to accommodate the 

Coast Guard’s new and enhanced Homeland Security responsibilities post-9/11. The revised plan was delivered to Congress at the 

end of last month. This hearing will kick off the committee’s oversight of whether these revisions to Deepwater adequately account 

and provide for the Coast Guard’s Homeland Security requirements. 

In 2003, the Journal of Homeland Security published an interview with Admiral Collins in which he stressed that the Coast 

Guard accomplishes its various missions through capacity, capability and partnerships. Today’s hearing will provide us with an opportunity to explore each of these areas as part of our broader examination of the Coast Guard’s authorization needs in its Homeland Security mission areas. 

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. I look 

forward to the Commandant’s testimony and an opportunity to further explore these issues. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX

Thank you, Chairman Lungren, and welcome, Admiral Collins. To put today’s 

hearing in the proper context, it is important to note, at the outset, that America 

is connected to the global economy primarily through the maritime sector. More 

than 95 percent of overseas foreign trade (and 100 percent of certain commodities, 

such as foreign oil) arrives in the U.S. by ship. Approximately 8,000 ships carrying 

multinational crews and cargo from around the globe make more than 51,000 U.S. 

port calls each year. More than 7 million containers enter the country annually. 

This complex maritime environment has had similarly complex governmental regulation. Even excluding state and local government involvement, there are several 

different Federal agencies utilizing separate systems to monitor discrete aspects of 

maritime activity—from tracking and targeting high-risk vessels and crews, to 

screening the cargo on board those vessels, to vetting passengers aboard such vessels. 
8

While there is often reasonable justification for division of responsibility, such divisions can also provide opportunities for our enemies—whom we know from experience study our systems and seek to exploit the gaps in such systems. The creation 

of the Department of Homeland Security brought under one roof, for the first time, 

the major elements of our maritime security system, and the Coast Guard has been 

given lead responsibility to ensure the seamless execution of this critical mission. 

Such execution requires a level of coordination and information sharing that simply did not exist prior to September 11, 2001. We now know that our national ability to detect potential threats from the maritime arena can be significantly improved 

through effective sharing and use of information. With sufficient advance information on inbound ships, cargo, crews, and passengers, border control agencies will be 

better able to identify those that require more thorough security screening. Exploiting available information to discern threats and concentrate resources to stop them 

is at the heart of the maritime domain awareness concept, and the key to effective 

risk management. 

In May of last year, the Select Committee held a hearing examining the coordination of maritime security responsibilities and operations among DHS agencies, including the various air and marine acquisition plans within the Department. One 

year later, this hearing will provide a status update on the level of improved coordination. In particular, we will examine how various initiatives such as the C4ISR 

program (which stands for Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), joint harbor operations centers, and 

other similar activities are working to bridge the interoperability gap between the 

various maritime and port security agencies within DHS, and between such agencies and state and local law enforcement and port authorities across the country. 

We also will examine the cornerstone of the Coast Guard’s long-term strategy for 

carrying out both its homeland and non-homeland security missions—the Integrated 

Deepwater System. This 20–25 year acquisition project with costs ranging from $19 

billion to $24 billion will provide a complete modernization of Coast Guard assets. 

Deepwater, which was developed in the late 1990s, had to be revised to accommodate the Coast Guard’s new and enhanced homeland security responsibilities post9/11. The revised plan was delivered to Congress at the end of last month, and this 

hearing will kick off the Committee’s oversight of whether these revisions to Deepwater adequately account and provide for the Coast Guard’s homeland security requirements. 

In 2003, the Journal of Homeland Security published an interview with Admiral 

Collins in which he stressed that the Coast Guard ‘‘accomplishes its various missions through capacity, capability and partnerships.’’ Today’s hearing will provide 

us with an opportunity to explore each of these areas, as part of our broader examination of the Coast Guard’s authorization needs in its homeland security mission 

areas. 

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. I look forward to the 

Commandant’s testimony and an opportunity to further explore these issues.

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman for his statement. Other 

members of the committee are reminded that opening statements 

may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished witness as our only witness before us today on this important topic. It is my pleasure as the Chair to recognize Admiral 

Thomas Collins, the Commandant of the United States Coast 

Guard to testify. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS, COMMANDANT, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral COLLINS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

good afternoon to you and to distinguished members of this committee. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here with you to discuss 

how the Coast Guard is contributing to maritime security of the 

United States. 

Quite simply, Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is America, the 

maritime sector is safer today than it was in 2001. We still have 
9

a ways to go. But we have made incredible progress, from my perspective, to enhance the maritime security posture implementing 

programs and practices that are already paying substantial dividends in the way of risk mitigation, risk mitigation. 

Our approach has been to draw upon and enhance Coast Guard 

strength first as an armed force; second as a law enforcement agency, as a first responder and a regulator. When you add up those 

things, that makes us a unique agency in this government. 

The other important ingredient is we pursue risk mitigation, to 

partner aggressively, both domestically and internationally so it 

mitigates security risk on this global system, as Congressman 

Young alluded to. 

It is a heavy dose of preemption that characterizes our approach, 

being preemptive and not static in our approach the maritime. We 

developed a strategy that has four parts. One, as you have already 

referred to, to enhance the concept we call maritime domain awareness, a very, very important part of this strategy. The second to 

create and oversee a maritime security regime, one that did not 

exist prior to 9/11. 

Third, to increase our operation presence, to be persistent for deterrence and response and then overall, improve our response posture in the event an incident does occur. There are a number of 

very comprehensive initiatives that we have taken in each one of 

these four buckets, four categories. Many are detailed in my written statement. If you will permit me, I will highlight just a select 

few to give you a flavor for our areas of emphasis. 

Since 9/11, the central element of our strategy requires increasing knowledge of our vulnerabilities, our threats and targets of interest. It depends on timely information sharing, partnering with 

others, both at home and abroad, building on current international 

cooperative security events and preparing to respond quickly to future events. 

For example, since 9/11 we have made changes to improve our 

operational intelligence by building out our intelligence program, 

by increasing our advance notice of arrival from 24 hours to a minimum of 96 hours for all foreign vessels and expanded the type and 

the amount of information required. This information and the vetting of this information is critical to assess inbound risk. 

We have built a robust maritime security regime predicated on 

the maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the International Ship and Port Security Code or ISPSC code that was 

pushed through the International Maritime Organization. We have 

reviewed and approved thousands of vessel facility security plans 

an, insured compliance through literally thousands of boarding and 

inspections of foreign vessels. We have set up 13 new deployable 

maritime security teams, and we are full partners in the foreign intelligence community and have operationalized this in 30 field intelligence port units around the country. 

We are realigning and integrating our field structure—that is 

where security gets delivered—into single multimission commands 

called sectors across the country and are moving ahead on critical 

command and control technologies like Rescue 21 and Command 

2010 to improve our operational effectiveness. 
10

Overall, we have made, I think, considerable progress in implementing our maritime Homeland Security strategy in the four 

main areas that I talked about. We will continue efforts to close 

perceived security gaps by increasing our capabilities and our capacity to deal with those gaps. 

In a response to HSPD 13, the Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 13 and a counterpart, National Security Directive 41 are 

the same document, cosponsored by those two White House bodies. 

We are very enthused as a maritime organization, very enthused 

about our current efforts, interagency efforts to develop a comprehensive, national interagency strategy covering a broad range of 

maritime security issues and functions. Hopefully you will see the 

results of those labors this summer. 

I should note that the Coast Guard’s inventory of capabilities and 

capacities to address the full range of our missions is critical to 

mitigating security risks now and into the future. 

As already mentioned by committee members, Deepwater is the 

enduring solution to that capacity and capability issue to mitigate 

risk. It is the key for us to develop the proper level of readiness 

and to meet our missions across the board. They are essential to 

providing the necessary capabilities to secure our borders, to fight 

the war on terror and meet the full range of the missions of search 

and rescue and beyond. 

The President’s fiscal year 2006 budget presses forward each element of our maritime security strategy. It does move the ball along 

in maritime domain awareness, it furthers our efforts to tighten security, develop and to tighten the security regime. It increases our 

operational presence and improves our response posture. 

So I think with this budget, in support of this budget, we will 

continue to push ahead aggressively across this challenging area. 

I thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you 

today. I will be happy to take any questions that you may have, 

Mr. Chairman, and your committee members. 

[The statement of Admiral Collins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It 

is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role in homeland security, and specifically maritime homeland security. 

The Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service. It is those core 

elements of the service’s character coupled with its broad statutory authorities, 

membership in the Intelligence Community, command and control structure, and extensive experience conducting maritime operations that uniquely equip the Coast 

Guard to conduct maritime homeland security missions. For homeland security, the 

Coast Guard serves as (1) the lead Federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security; 

(2) the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator in U.S. ports as designated by the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002; and (3) as a supporting or 

supported commander for military operations conducted under Title 10. These and 

other critical roles have imparted a tremendous challenge on Coast Guard men and 

women and I would be remiss without remarking on their many accomplishments 

since September 11, 2001. For example: 

• Before 9/11 we had no mandatory ship-tracking requirement; now we have 

forged an international agreement to accelerate the requirement for Automatic 

Identification System (AIS) capability. It went into effect in December 2004. Simultaneously, we have initiated a major acquisition project for AIS. It has allowed us to deploy immediate capability including AIS shore stations in VTS 

ports, outfitting NOAA buoys offshore, and testing AIS receiving capability from 

a low-flying satellite. 
11

• Before 9/11 we had no formal international or domestic maritime security regime for ports, port facilities, and ships—with the exception of cruise ships. 

Partnering with domestic and international stakeholders, we now have both a 

comprehensive domestic security regime and an international security convention in place. Both have been in force since July 1, 2004. 

• Before 9/11 we were shorthanded and could not have met mission requirements without our Reserves and Auxiliary. While our Reserve and Auxiliary 

forces continue to make vital contributions, since 9/11 we have: 

o Established 13 new Maritime Safety and Security Teams, 

o Deployed over 80 new small boats (RB–S) and boat crews, 

o Provided radiation detection capabilities to our boarding teams, 

o Deployed field intelligence support teams to better collect and disseminate maritime threat information, 

o Acquired fifteen 87-foot Coastal Patrol boats four 179-foot coastal patrol 

craft to increase operational presence in our ports. 

• Before 9/11 our prevention, protection, and response activities were coordinated by multiple commands in a single geographic location. Since 9/11, we 

have begun establishing Sector commands to streamline our command-and-control structure, provide unity of command, and offer one-stop shopping for port 

stakeholders. It is an organization re-alignment that will have long term positive impacts on our response and recovery posture. 

Looking at their accomplishments, it is clear that Coast Guard men and women 

continue rising to the challenge and delivering tangible and important results across 

all Coast Guard mission-programs. No amount of new technology or capability enhances security more than the daily dedication of our personnel. They are the indispensable link in any strategy and I am continually impressed by their ingenuity, 

courage, and dedication. 

The Coast Guard has responded to a broad and substantial level of maritime risk 

with a comprehensive maritime security strategy that guides our operational and 

resource planning. We have made tremendous progress in a short period of time. 

Much of our success to date is a direct result of the strong support we have enjoyed 

from Congress. Through the passage of MTSA and subsequent laws providing for 

the resources to implement this new law, Congress enabled the Coast Guard to successfully institute a maritime security regime that now serves as a global model for 

maritime security. But there is clearly more to do and I echo the consensus of most 

on this topic; we are safer but not yet safe. In the years ahead, Coast Guard readiness will continue to be the key challenge to our ability to deliver results to the 

American people.

Maritime Security Risks 

The maritime domain is of unparalleled strategic importance. In terms of threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence, there are few more valuable and vulnerable targets 

than the global maritime transportation system. I stress the words global and system here because it is critical to understand the broad and diverse nature of the 

maritime domain in order to adequately confront the threats. Increasingly, the maritime security of the United States depends as much on international cooperation 

and partnerships as it does on our ability to effect security enhancements within 

areas of exclusive U.S. jurisdiction; areas which by comparison make up only a 

small fraction of this global system. 

• Threat: While the 9/11 Commission notes the continuing threat against our 

aviation system, it also states that ?opportunities to do harm are as great, or 

greater, in maritime or surface transportation.? From smuggling to piracy, suicide attacks to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the threats are many 

and varied. 

• Vulnerability: The maritime transportation system annually accommodates 

6.5 million cruise ship passengers, 51,000 port calls by over 7,500 foreign ships, 

at more than 360 commercial ports spread out over 95,000 miles of coastline. 

The vastness of this system and its widespread and diverse critical infrastructure leave the nation vulnerable to terrorist acts within our ports, waterways, 

and coastal zones, as well as exploitation of maritime commerce as a means of 

transporting terrorists and their weapons. 

• Consequence: Contributing nearly $750 billion to the U.S. gross domestic 

product annually and handling 95% of all overseas trade each year—the value 

of the U.S. maritime domain and the consequence of any significant attack cannot be overstated. Independent analysis has estimated the economic impact of 

a forced closure of U.S. ports for a period of only eight days to have been in 

excess of $58 billion to the U.S. economy. 
12

The only way to effectively address and mitigate these risks is through a layered 

approach to security. The targets are too many and infrastructure too diverse to rely 

solely on efforts within the geographic confines of U.S. ports. It requires a layered 

defense comprising the full range of maritime security operations and measures, 

starting overseas and extending to U.S. shores, ports, and internal waterways. This 

defense-in-depth will enable the Coast Guard to address both external and internal 

threats across the full geographic spectrum and at multiple points in an attack 

event chain. Simply put, U.S. port security cannot start nor end within our own 

ports.

Maritime Security Objectives and Strategy 

The Coast Guard’s overarching maritime security objectives are to prevent attacks 

in the U.S. maritime domain, protect maritime related critical infrastructure and 

key assets, and ensure we’re prepared to respond to, and can expedite recovery 

from, an attack. These primary objectives—Prevent, Protect, and Response/Recovery—guide our operational and resource planning. Underlying each is the need for 

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), enabled by our ability to collect, fuse, analyze 

and disseminate large amounts of maritime data, information and intelligence in a 

way that facilitates effective decision making at every level of command. Preventing 

terrorist attacks increasingly depends on ensuring we get the right information, to 

the right people, at the right time, and in the right form so that optimal decisions 

can be made. 

The Coast Guard’s Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security is in direct alignment with the Department of Homeland Security’s strategic goals of Awareness, 

Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery, and is encapsulated in the below 

four pillars: 

(1) Enhance MDA. We seek to increase our awareness and knowledge of what is 

happening in the maritime arena, not just here in American waters, but globally. 

We need to know which vessels are in operation, the names of the crews and passengers, and the ship’s cargo, especially those inbound for U.S. ports. MDA is critical to separate the law-abiding sailor from the anomalous threat. The core of our 

MDA efforts revolve around the development and employment of accurate information, intelligence, and targeting of vessels, cargo, crews and passengers—and extending this well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries. All DHS components 

are working to provide a layered defense through collaborative efforts with our 

international partners to counter and manage security risks long before they reach 

a U.S. port. 

(2) Create and oversee an effective maritime security regime. To help prevent terrorist attacks we have developed and continue to improve an effective maritime security regime—both domestically and internationally. This element of our strategy 

focuses on both domestic and international efforts and includes initiatives related 

to MTSA implementation, International Maritime Organization regulations such as 

the International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as well as improving 

supply chain security and identity security processes. 

(3) Increase Operational Presence. We seek to better protect critical maritime infrastructure and improve our ability to respond to suspect activities by increasing 

our operational presence in ports, coastal zones and beyond . . . to implement a layered security posture, a ‘‘defense-in-depth’’. Our collective efforts to increase operational presence in ports and coastal zones focus not only on adding more people, 

boats and ships to force structures but making the employment of those resources 

more effective through the application of technology, information sharing and intelligence support. 

(4) Improve Response and Recovery posture. Finally, we are improving our ability 

to respond and aid in recovery if there were an actual terrorist attack. Understanding the challenge of defending 26,000 miles of navigable waterways and 361 

ports against every conceivable threat at every possible time, we are also aggressively working to improve our response capabilities and preparedness. 

The Coast Guard continues to guide its efforts by implementing policies, seeking 

resources, and deploying capabilities through the lens of the above maritime security strategy. However, continued risk reduction is contingent upon Coast Guard 

readiness and capacity. Without these basic building blocks, the implementation of 

maritime security strategies will not be sustainable. It is no surprise then that readiness and capacity are the focus of my most pressing concerns in fulfilling maritime 

security missions.

Maritime Security Challenges 

Coast Guard readiness is a product of its authorities, capabilities, competencies 

and partnerships. Each provides a tool for action and no where has this been more 

important than in the Coast Guard’s response to the current security environment. 
13

While each is critical to success, I will focus today on the authorities and capabilities the Coast Guard seeks to equip itself with to ensure it is ready to meet the 

mission demands of today and tomorrow.

Authorities 

The Coast Guard greatly appreciates the tradition of the Administration supporting and Congress passing a Coast Guard Authorization Act each year, as has 

been the case for three consecutive years. These annual Acts help us keep critical 

authorities at the cutting edge, enabling us to respond quickly and effectively to the 

new challenges our service faces daily. 

On April 12th, we transmitted to the Congress the Administration’s proposed 

Coast Guard Authorization Act for 2005. The bill contains sixteen provisions that 

provide the Coast Guard with important new authorities, as well as expansions and 

clarifications of existing authorities. I ask that you adopt these provisions and would 

like to highlight a few of them here today.

Merchant Mariner Credentials 

The awful events of September 11th 2001 made clear that our country must take 

more care in controlling who is able to secure and use government-issued forms of 

identification. The 9/11 Commission report, noted that the September 11th hijackers 

obtained and used government-issued identification cards such as driver’s licenses. 

The Commission recommended that forms of identification be made more secure. 

Congress mandated the development of a biometric transportation security card in 

MTSA. The Coast Guard is assisting the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) with the implementation of this requirement. The card is known as the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). 

Concurrently, the Coast Guard has proposed revisions to the existing merchant 

marine document (MMD) requirements. These documents are, by statute, identification documents, yet they contain virtually no security features. This, among other 

reasons, is why, with the support of the President and Secretary, I have submitted 

a complete update of the merchant mariner credentialing statutes. We cannot, and 

must not, continue with business as usual in the area of mariner credentialing. Not 

when, as this committee is well aware, our ports and harbors are still vulnerable 

to terrorist attack. The specter of a terrorist obtaining and using a merchant mariner credential to access and attack vital areas of a strategic port is one that is very 

real. The changes we have proposed will enable the Department to heighten the security of all merchant mariner credentials in partnership with the mariners themselves and the maritime industry. Additionally, the Coast Guard will work with TSA 

to ensure the regulations for obtaining the MMDs are consistent with TWIC to minimize future impacts on mariners and to ensure mariners undergo appropriate security threat assessments in accordance with MTSA. 

Our proposal enhances the Coast Guard’s ability to be flexible and agile in establishing appropriate criteria and processes for obtaining merchant mariner credentials and in recovering them from unqualified holders. Our proposal also updates 

the mariner credentialing statutes. The existing merchant mariner credentialing 

statutes have developed piecemeal over the last 50 years and have not been comprehensively updated since 1983, over twenty years ago in a very different world. 

As a result, they are unclear, self contradictory and in some cases obsolete. This 

proposal would update, clarify, and simplify the statutes allowing the Coast Guard 

to better administer the mariner credentialing program as well as addressing the 

many changes in the domestic and international maritime communities, and especially, as I mentioned above, security concerns post September 11th.

Critical issues the Administration’s proposal addresses include: • Authority to conduct background checks to evaluate mariners for both maritime security and maritime safety purposes, 

• Authority to issue a single merchant mariner credential, including allowing 

for the merger with the TWIC, 

• Authority to issue cadet credentials (including to foreign cadets) for training 

and educational purposes, 

• Authority to refuse to issue a merchant mariner credential to a mariner who 

is a maritime safety or security risk, and 

• Authority to refuse to issue a merchant mariner credential for one year to a 

mariner who lies on application. 

The suspension and revocation chapter allows for immediate temporary suspension of a merchant mariner credential where the mariner is involved in an accident 

involving death or serious injury or where a mariner is determined to be a threat 

to security or safety. Because we are very concerned with fairness and the rights 

of merchant mariners, it also requires a hearing on any temporary suspension within 30 days of the suspension. The proposal also enhances compliance with the law 
14

by adding significant new civil and criminal penalties for making, using, or presenting fraudulent credentials.

Other Authorization Priorities 

Our proposed bill also includes some seemingly small but critically important provisions that would enhance our authorities in maritime homeland security and drug 

interdiction. These are Extension of Coast Guard Vessel Anchorage and Movement 

Authority, which would extend to 12 miles the Coast Guard’s authority to enact 

maritime protection zones around naval vessels; Enhanced Civil Penalties for Violations of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), which would make each 

day of a continuing violation of MTSA maritime security regulations a separate offense; and Certification of Vessel Nationality in Drug Smuggling Cases, which 

would allow the certification of the nationality, or lack thereof, of interdicted drug 

smuggling vessels without the presence in a U.S. court of foreign officials. 

The Administration’s bill includes other important provisions that would improve 

our management of the officer corps, streamline and lower costs of small procurements and clarify and update the tonnage laws administered by the Coast Guard. 

In addition, it includes several provisions to improve the Coast Guard’s ability to 

carry out non-homeland security missions as well. Most notably, the Administration’s proposal would authorize the Secretary to establish a pilot program to conduct 

mandatory dockside crew survivability examinations on uninspected U.S. commercial fishing vessels in two geographic areas over the next five (5) years. The purpose 

of the pilot program would be to examine fishing vessels and their crews to ensure 

the required safety equipment is on board and that the crew is trained and exercised in its proper use. Currently, the Secretary does not have the authority to conduct mandatory dockside exams. We estimate that only 6 percent of the owners or 

operators of the approximately 90,000 uninspected commercial fishing vessels operating in the U.S. today make their vessels and crew available to the Coast Guard 

for a voluntary dockside examination. Since 1991, when the Coast Guard first began 

offering voluntary examinations, history has demonstrated that the crews of fishing 

vessels examined under such a program have a much higher survivability rate during an accident or loss of the vessel. I ask for your support in enacting the President’s proposed bill.

Capabilities 

The President’s 2006 Budget requests funding to continue the urgently needed recapitalization of our cutters, boats, aircraft and support infrastructure to reverse declining readiness trends and enhance operational capabilities to meet today’s maritime safety and security threats. As detailed in the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, this restoration of Coast Guard capability is a critical need in protecting 

the homeland. 

Many of the Coast Guard’s operational assets will reach the end of their anticipated service lives by 2008, resulting in rising operating and maintenance costs, reduced mission effectiveness, unnecessary risks, and excessive wear and tear on our 

people. Listed below are some specific examples highlighting alarming system failure rates, increased maintenance requirements, and the subsequent impact on mission effectiveness: 

• HH–65 helicopter in-flight engine power losses occurred at a rate of 329 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours in FY 2004. This is up from a FY 2003 rate of 

63 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. The comparable Federal Aviation Administration acceptable standard for a mishap of this severity is approximately 1 per 

100,000 flight hours. The engine loss rate has resulted in flight and operational 

restrictions and high levels of risk to our aircrews. Re-engining the HH–65 will 

remain the Coast Guard’s highest legacy asset priority until every HH–65 aircrew is flying safely with a fully capable aircraft. (The 2006 Budget addresses 

this issue.) 

• The 110-foot Patrol Boat fleet has experienced 23 hull breaches requiring 

emergency dry docks. The resultant loss in operational days is unsustainable, 

and risks to our personnel are unacceptable. (The Deepwater fast response cutter initiative helps eliminate this issue.) 

• Our high and medium endurance cutters are experiencing sub-system failures 

due to old and unserviceable systems. The 378-foot WHEC fleet averages one 

main space casualty, with potential to escalate to main space fire, on every patrol. Three out of a total class of twelve ships have recently missed operations 

due to unscheduled maintenance required to repair failing sub-systems. The 

total number of unscheduled maintenance days for the major cutter and the 

110’ Patrol Boat fleet has risen from 267 days in FY 1999 to 742 days in FY 

2004 (175 percent increase over FY 1999). This loss of operational cutter days 

in 2004 equates to losing four cutters, or 10% of our major fleet for an entire 
15

year. (The FY 2006 budget addresses this issue through increased investment 

in out legacy systems.) 

The contributions of Deepwater legacy assets to maritime safety and security are 

not theoretical, evidenced by the below accomplishments in 2004 alone: • Operation ABLE SENTRY blanketed the coastline of Haiti with Coast Guard 

Deepwater assets, which interdicted over 1,000 illegal migrants during this operation and deterred many thousand more from taking to sea in unsafe boats. 

• The 378-foot Coast Guard Cutter GALLATIN, and its Airborne Use of Force 

(AUF) capable helicopter seized more than 24,000 pounds of cocaine worth an 

estimated $768 million and detained 27 suspected smugglers in the span of 

seven weeks. 

• The Coast Guard’s Deepwater cutters and aircraft patrolled over 28,000 hours 

in direct support of maritime homeland security missions. 110-foot patrol boats 

alone patrolled 13,000 hours supporting port and coastal security missions including, cruise ship escorts, critical infrastructure protection, and countless security boardings. 

• Working in conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service during the national political conventions, 270-foot Medium Endurance cutters and 110-foot patrol boats 

provided maritime security, enforced security zones, and served as command 

and control platforms coordinating maritime traffic. Deepwater aircraft, 

equipped with the AUF package, provided air security and conducted maritime 

security patrols. 

Despite spending increasing amounts maintaining operational assets, the Coast 

Guard is experiencing a continuing decline in fleet readiness. Legacy cutters are 

now operating free of major equipment casualties (equipment failures that significantly impact mission performance) less than 50 percent of the time, despite the investment per operational day increasing by over 50 percent over the last six years. 

The resulting ‘‘readiness gap’’ negatively impacts both the quantity and quality of 

Coast Guard ‘‘presence’’—opening an unacceptable hole in our layered defense. If declining readiness trends continue, Coast Guard capability and capacity will continue 

to be reduced exactly when the nation needs it most. 

The Integrated Deepwater System is the enduring solution to both the Coast 

Guard’s declining legacy asset readiness concerns and the need to implement enhanced maritime security capabilities to reduce maritime risk in the post-9/11 

world. Aggressive implementation of the Deepwater program will recapitalize the 

Coast Guard fleet and introduce much needed surveillance, detection/clarification, 

intercept, interdiction and command and control capabilities. 

The original Deepwater contract baseline sought to replace Coast Guard assets 

operating at their 1998 performance levels. The post-9/11 national strategic security 

environment demanded that the original Deepwater solution be revised to defeat 

terrorist threats, address contemporary mission demands, and satisfy current and 

emergent operational priorities. In early July 2003, I directed an internal Coast 

Guard study to analyze operational capability and capacity gaps and the impact 

these gaps have on mission performance. This process, known as the Integrated 

Deepwater System Performance Gap Analysis (PGA), identified significant capability and capacity gaps in the existing Deepwater system implementation plan designed to meet the 1998 performance baseline. 

Based on the results of the PGA, the Coast Guard, working with the Department, 

updated Deepwater capability and capacity requirements through development of a 

revised Mission Needs Statement (MNS). The revised MNS, approved by the Department of Homeland Security on January 24, 2005, calls for additional systemwide capabilities to extend the borders of our ports and reduce maritime homeland 

security risk. Based on the revised MNS, the Coast Guard developed a revised Deepwater Implementation Plan to reflect new post-9/11 system requirements. 

The revised plan addresses the Coast Guard’s dual challenges of legacy-asset deterioration and performance gaps by (1) enhancing the performance of selected Deepwater assets through added capabilities and conversions, including C4ISR systems; 

(2) adjusting the implementation schedule and mix of individual assets over the life 

of the program; (3) providing necessary balance over the life of the program based 

on the Department of Homeland Security’s strategic goals, current and emerging 

mission requirements, and the need to provide for a high-quality workplace for 

Coast Guard men and women. 

In addition to delivering more capable operating assets for the Coast Guard’s post9/11 transformation to support DHS strategic goals and to reduce maritime security 

risk, the revised plan will enable the Deepwater Program to make more significant 

contributions to improved information sharing, collaboration, and interoperability in 

the maritime domain—essential capabilities to implement the Maritime Strategy for 

Homeland Security, and in particular enhance MDA. 
16

The Revised Implementation Plan ensures Deepwater cutters and aircraft will be 

equipped with the right systems and capabilities (summarized below) to operate successfully in the post-9/11 threat environment. These changes are critical to ensuring 

the maritime security of America and its $750 billion maritime transportation system, including: 

• An innovative, integrated network-centric C4ISR system to harness the power 

of an interoperable network to enhance performance in all mission areas, improve MDA, and provide a common operational picture—key to Coast Guard 

leading the inter-agency effort to know and respond to maritime conditions, 

anomalies, vulnerabilities, and threats. Improvements to C4ISR enable earlier 

awareness of events through the more effective gathering and fusing of terrorism-related information, analysis, coordination, response—all critical to detecting, deterring, and defeating terrorist attacks. Upgrades to Deepwater surface assets, for example, contribute directly to improved intelligence collection 

and fusion through a sophisticated Shipboard Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facility (S/SCIF), sensors, and increased data-exchange bandwidth; 

• Improved maritime-security capabilities such as increased speed and integrated weapons systems on selected Deepwater cutters essential to higher levels 

of maritime homeland security during a terrorist attack, opposed boardings, and 

other high-risk operations; 

• Airborne use of force and vertical insertion and delivery capabilities to allow 

helicopters to provide warning and/or disabling fire, and to deploy, deliver, and 

recover boarding teams safely and more effectively; 

• Improved fixed-wing long-range surveillance aircraft to increase MDA and reduce maritime patrol aircraft shortfalls in operating hours; organic Coast Guard 

air transport capability will enable deployment of Maritime Safety and Security 

Teams and National Strike Force teams for faster, more effective response. 

• Improved capabilities for anti-terrorist/force protection on select Deepwater 

assets with all-weather self-defense and the ability to protect high-value assets; 

assets will have the capability to engage terrorists with higher assurance of survivability and continued mission capability; and 

• Improved asset capabilities for detection and defense for chemical-biologicalradiological (CBR) threats—essential to survival and continued operations during a CBR attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. 

The Deepwater system’s performance-based acquisition strategy will allow the 

Coast Guard to respond to changing conditions and threats, and provides a vehicle 

for capability and schedule adjustments over the life of the program—maximizing 

value and performance through technology refreshment and innovation. The flexibility inherent in Deepwater’s acquisition will enable the Coast Guard to adjust the 

final mix of selected platforms as overall system-of-systems capability improvements 

are generated by, for example, significant improvements to the program’s system for 

C4ISR or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology. 

Our plan to incorporate improved post-9/11 operational capabilities on all major 

surface and aviation platforms will reap significant system-wide performance improvements that will have a bearing on capacity requirements. In the world of 

C4ISR, for example, we have already seen how command-and-control upgrades to 

our legacy cutters serve as a force multiplier to generate impressive dividends in 

operational effectiveness and efficiency. Armed with earlier, more accurate, and continuously streamed intelligence and operational data to maintain a common operating picture, commanders can employ their assets far more effectively than in the 

past. Our modeling and simulation studies predict a robust return on investment 

by revising the Deepwater plan to meet post-9/11 requirements. 

With the continued strong support of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), the Administration, and Congress we are positioned to play an even greater 

role in reducing the future risk of a terrorist event against the homeland. During 

the past two years, we have modernized select legacy assets to operate more effectively until replaced by Deepwater assets. Now we have established requirements 

for improved capabilities on converted or newer Deepwater platforms that are necessary for the Coast Guard to perform its full range of post-9/11 missions.

Conclusion 

On 9/10/01, our primary maritime focus was on the safe and efficient use of America’s waterways. Since 9/11, we have made great progress in securing America’s waterways, while continuing to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of commerce. There 

is no doubt that work remains, but there is also no doubt that we continue to improve maritime homeland security each and every day—thanks in large part to the 

continued strong support of the Administration and Congress. 
17

The Coast Guard’s 2006 Budget continues that support, proposing budget authority of $8.15 billion, an eleven percent increase over 2005 comparable discretionary 

funding. The budget provides the resources necessary to continue recapitalizing the 

Coast Guard’s aging cutters, boats, aircraft, and supporting infrastructure, while 

building out maritime safety and security capabilities essential to meeting present 

and future mission demands. In addition, the Administration’s proposed Coast 

Guard Authorization Act for 2005 contains provisions that provide the Coast Guard 

with important new authorities, as well as expansions and clarifications of existing 

authorities. 

Our country faces many challenges in today’s dangerous world. In the maritime 

arena the Coast Guard strives every day to be the Shield of Freedom, to protect our 

homeland and to continue to perform our traditional missions in the outstanding 

manner that the men and women of the Coast Guard have performed all of their 

many missions for over 200 years. 

By supporting enactment of President’s proposed budget levels and legislative 

changes, the Committee will better equip today’s Coast Guard to meet our current 

and future maritime safety and security challenges. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Admiral. We will be recognizing members for 5 minutes each for questions, and I will start 

that off by, first, reflecting on the fact that the Coast Guard personnel numbers were down prior to 9/11, you folks suffered as 

much of a cutback as anybody in the Federal establishment. They 

are back up now, almost the numbers, to where they were prior to 

that cutback. 

Your budget has been significantly increased since the mid 1990s 

to the present time, I guess 3.05 billion in 1995 to 6.52 billion in 

2005. I would assume that much of that reflects the increased commitment or the new compliment to Homeland Security. Can you 

tell me what percentage or what portion of those budget increases 

have been divided between Homeland Security and nonHomeland 

Security missions of the Coast Guard? 

Admiral COLLINS. If you look at our budget presentation, I think 

that breaks out about 45 to 46 percent of our total budget base is 

officially described as Homeland Security missions, as defined in 

the Homeland Security Act. Of course, most of the growth that you 

refer to, Mr. Chairman, has been allocated to capability and capacity issues within those Homeland Security missions. 

Several examples, we built up, as I mentioned, 13 maritime safety and security teams that are placed around the country, 75-person team is augmented with reservists up to 100. They are sort of 

our special ops team that can provide enhanced security in and 

around a port environment. That is a considerable—ate up a considerable portion of that increase. 

We have added 15 coastal patrol boats to our fleet, is another example in the direct Homeland Security and maritime security assets. Just two examples of where that money has been allocated. 

I should note that we have also not neglected our other traditional missions as well. We have invested in those multimission 

systems, both in people and in systems that will enhance our systems across the board. Case in point. If you look from 2000, 2001 

to the present, we have added almost 1,000 people to our search 

and rescue structure in our Coast Guard between our command 

centers and our stations to deal with increased operational tempo. 

And the Rescue 21, which is a VH/FM command and control distress and calling system, digital-based that we are building around 

a country is largely focused on our search and rescue mission but 
18

is multimission mission. It is a blue force tracker. It is a command 

and control system that is under the distress calling system. This 

will service our missions across the board. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Last week I had a chance to go out and visit the 

Pacific Command in the 11th District in California and had the opportunity to look at some of the intelligence operations you have 

out there. 

My question is this: We have looked at, in other committees, the 

difficulty, for instance, the FBI is having in transforming itself and 

both attracting proper intelligence but more importantly analyzing 

proper intelligence. Your people presented to me the argument, you 

presented the argument that you do a far better job on intelligence 

than you did before, that there is more coordination. 

How do we judge that other than the fact that we are spending 

more money at it? At least in my observation, the FBI has been—

they are certainly not doing a very good job in terms of analyzing 

things. They have got sort of a disrespect for analysts, because they 

are not agents, and so forth. 

What kind of significance do you put to the intelligence operations you have? What benchmarks would you suggest we would 

look at to see that you are actually doing a better job, not just have 

more money, and now tell us that you are talking to the other elements within DHS and DOD and local law enforcement, for instance? 

Admiral COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, that is a wonderful question. It 

is a very difficult question. The metrics are hard, it is like asking 

what the deterrence impact is of a patrolling police officer on the 

street and trying to quantify those benefits. So it is absolutely the 

right question. The answer to it is exceedingly difficult. 

You are right. We have added, almost doubled our intel establishment. We have changed it organizationally. It is a direct report 

to me. It is not buried down in our operational directorate. We 

have added a three-tier structure. We have added these field intelligence support teams, area fusion centers east and west, Pacific 

and Atlantic, and then co-located with the Navy at Suitland, we 

have a Navy intelligence center located with ONI, which is a terrific partnership for us. 

We are in the process of building out structured competency in 

this area. I can give you a classified briefing on a couple of real 

high connect-the-dots payoff, connect-the-dot things that our analysts have done that no one else saw. I would be glad to give you 

a classified briefing on that. Really some terrific, terrific, analytical 

work. We did it right because we have a systems view of the maritime. We know the safety part, maritime, environmental part, domestic part, and we are able to tie the dots together. That is one 

measure, analytical success. 

The second is, not only have information developed, flowing from 

the bottom up and feeding into the total intel picture, but just as 

important from my perspective, it is giving tactical information to 

our operational commanders every day. That is the real payoff, the 

real payoffs of the FITs, the field intelligence teams. 

Every day, they are assimilating information, the vessel arrival 

of information that comes in, vetting that information, up through 

ONI and Suitland and back, and taking that information, fusing it 
19

and giving the operational commander information on which he can 

say, well, where do I put my boarding team today. What vessels 

do I escort today, where do I put my inspection resources. It is all 

based on risk. 

But it has to be done on the fusion of information, the best information you have to allow you to make those kinds of decisions. 

That is the real payoff, I think, that is the real payoff. One of the 

elements of success is that they are joint multiagency entities, as 

these field intelligence support teams, other agencies that are coming, State and local, willingly and eagerly to participate in this, because they see a value proposition in the information that is 

brought together within those structures. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Admiral. My time is up. The 

gentlelady from California. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, thank you, Admiral. The GAO issued a report in 2004 on the automatic identification system, which, as you know, is the short-range tracking 

system, and stated that currently the Coast Guard could only monitor vessels in 10 ports with the existing Vessel Traffic Services, or 

the VTS. 

It would appear to me that if you are going to be doing this, you 

would have to have more ability to monitor ships than just in 10 

ports. I understand that expanding the AIS coverage is not an easy 

task, and the GAO estimated that it would—a national ATS system 

would be around $150 million. 

Have you thought of how you are going to enlarge that capacity? 

And in particular, because, in having gone to the Port of Los Angeles–Long Beach, they have the automatic secure Vessel Tracking 

System. It would seem to me like maybe you could work with them 

and get some more coverage than if it wasn’t an AIS type of coverage, but something close to it. 

Admiral COLLINS. Sure. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So my question is, how do you plan to expand the 

AIS coverage to all the other ports and major ports and would you 

consider something like that system in partnership? 

Admiral COLLINS. Great. Terrific question. If I could just start 

from a broad perspective, you are talking about maritime domain 

awareness. How do you get visibility, transparency of people, cargo 

and vessels and activity in the maritime, so you can intervene and 

prevent. You need many systems and subsystems to do that. AIS 

is a great system and it has great potential. It is one system. 

There is, if you add them all, and you get a fused, fused multiple 

systems that will give you this kind of picture, it sensors its reporting requirements, its procedures. It is all intelligence and bringing 

all that together to give you that kind of transparency. So, low 

light level TV in a port is a great maritime domain awareness sensor. 

AIS is a very important sensor. I would submit our Deepwater 

system that we are building is really an MDA sensor system. So 

it is how do you bring all of these systems together, fuse it and 

have a good common picture that you can share. 

AIS is an important part of that. We have it started off in 

phases, the first phase was to implement all our vessel tracking 
20

systems with AIS. We have done that. We have done the nine systems. 

Now we are building out. We have a multiyear plan to build out 

nationally to have coverage around entire coastal areas. We are 

looking at efficient ways to do it. Partnering as mentioned, as suggested, is one of those, to give you an example of the partnering. 

Instead of building additional structures to hang the AIS transponders off, for instance, along our coast, we have partnered with 

NOAA in putting them on—in installing them on NOAA weather 

buoys as a source. In the Gulf, we are partnering with the petroleum industries to hang them off oil platforms that cover our entire 

gulf. There are 3400 oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. 

So we are looking—and we don’t want to build separate dedicated towers and things like that to AIS, so we are hanging some 

of these off our Rescue 21 tower infrastructure that is going on. We 

are looking at satellite-based AIS systems. 

So many, many different ways to track and sensor, putting those 

all together, and that will be included in our plan to hit the streets 

this summer, knock on wood, on a national plan to achieve maritime domain awareness. That is an interagency effort, a national 

effort that we have locked the whole team up for 6 months, shoved 

pizzas under the door, and they have been working real hard, 7 

days a week to develop this plan. It is interagency in scope, and 

they will lay out how all these things intersect to give us the kind 

of transparency of the maritime we need. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The MTSA requires a long-range Vessel Tracking 

System. How long do you think before really how that plan is in 

place? 

Admiral COLLINS. That is one of the things, we have been activists, I would describe ourselves, in the International Maritime Organization, driving security standards through the word, literally, 

through that body, I think, with a great deal of success. Our next 

step, and we got short-range AIS requirement is the function of the 

Solis amendments and ISBS code that we moved through IMO several years ago. 

The next step is long-range identification and tracking. We have 

an effort underway right now at IMO to develop international 

standards for carriage requirements for long-range tracking out to 

2,000 miles, both to the flag State, the coastal State and the port 

State that would monitor this system. It is working through that 

body as we speak. We have been successful at getting two special 

intercessional work groups sponsored by the Secretary General of 

IMO. I have his personal commitment for the long-range identification tracking. 

They are paying for and sponsoring special intercessional working groups to move this along. We hopefully will get those standards codified, documented, and agreed to by the key countries so 

that there will be a stamp of approval next spring. That is the 

next—the Marine Safety Committee is the committee in IMO that 

is dealing with this. So we are working very hard to deliver the 

bacon when it comes to long-range innovation and tracking, and I 

think we have made progress. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 
21

The gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to exchange 

my place in the order of questioning, with the gentleman from 

Alaska. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank the chairman—both the chairmen for that 

courtesy. My question will be very short. You mentioned about the 

original mission. That is my dear dream about the Coast Guard. 

Do you have another subcommander or commandant that handles 

that mission, oil spill pollution, navigational purposes, search and 

rescue, or—I am worried, Commandant, more than anything else? 

I listen to your testimony, you are doing very well, but it seems to 

be focused only on security. I have another role, that original mission. 

Who decides the personnel count, the ships, everything that is 

needed, and I am being very parochial, I have more coastline in all 

the United States together and half the world and great involvement. I don’t want to see the mission diminished. Who is handling 

that for you? 

Admiral COLLINS. Sir, we have, of course, our operation, we have 

an operation directorate and a marine safety directorate. Two separate flag officers in our headquarters. The marine safety directorate deals with port security port and coastal security issues, carrier security, large-capacity cruise ship security and the like, and 

oversees the compliance associated with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

The Office of Operations, the admiral in charge of that office 

oversees, all our ships, and patrol boats and the utilization of them, 

the allocation of them and the policy associated with them, the 

counterdrug operation and the like. 

Mr. YOUNG. Do you have any plans in the future that you know 

of that would drop personnel or ships in Alaska? 

Admiral COLLINS. Of stopping? 

Mr. YOUNG. No, dropping or diminishing. 

Admiral COLLINS. Absolutely not, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. I wanted that on the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secondly, I have one interest, and I am going to make, I hope, 

a constructive suggestion, again parochial. I am a mariner, I am 

a licensed mariner, although you say I am now honorary, but I am 

still licensed. And one of your recommendations is the proposed revision of Merchant Marine documentation. 

I would suggest respectfully that whoever is helping you write 

that communicate with me very closely. Because what concerns me 

the most is that in the last paragraph it says the proposals, the 

preparedness, it says that there shall be an ability to appeal any 

type of decision made by the Coast Guard. Who would you appeal 

to? The Coast Guard? 

Admiral COLLINS. We have hearing offices. 

Mr. YOUNG. With the Coast Guard? 

Admiral COLLINS. That judges—. 

Mr. YOUNG. My point is I want to suggest, and hopefully I will 

do with this my other committee, because I am protecting the exist-
22

ing Mariners that are documented, that are making their living out 

of the Coast Guard, I say blessing, on Merchant Marine ships that 

are Jones Act in our Nation. Now to have them come under scrutiny other than security. This is about security, and have you not 

allow them and the ability to appeal to me is unfair. So I want to 

make sure that you understand that. 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, we will work closely with you, sir, to 

make sure that that is addressed. 

Mr. YOUNG. I want to make sure I get my license back. Go 

ahead. 

Admiral COLLINS. That whole issue of credentialing and documentation does need an overhaul. That is the point. We need to 

make it more effective, more efficient, more customer-oriented for 

the mariner. That whole realignment of that is to that end. We will 

make sure that the appeals process and the hearing process is fair 

and addresses your concerns. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

your time. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and Mr. Admiral. I appreciate your testimony. 

We are about 4,000 men short, based upon reports that I read 

from a manpower standpoint. Do you agree with that? Are those 

numbers just—. 

Admiral COLLINS. I haven’t heard that. I haven’t seen that report. I don’t know which report you are referring to, sir. We have 

grown by 12.5 percent since 2001. That is pretty significant in the 

history of our service, in terms of growth over that similar period 

of time. I think it has been measured growth. I think it would be 

difficult to grow faster during that timeframe. I mean, you can 

grow good or you can grow not so good. That is not being able to 

absorb and acculturate that workforce and bring them up to speed 

and so forth. 

So I think at the right pace we are on that has been reflected 

in the budget since 2001. I am pleased with the support that we 

have gotten through the administration and Congress on building 

up that 12.5 percent. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, just for the record, GAO more or less indicated that you were 4,000 short. Obviously they had produced the 

numbers based on their analysis of, I guess, Coast Guard material. 

So maybe we need to go back to them and suggest that their numbers might be a little off. 

But nonetheless, is it your testimony today that we are at a 

number that you are comfortable with that we don’t need to increase our numbers with the Guard or anything like that? 

Admiral COLLINS. I think there is, you know, I probably deal 

with that budget 1 year at a time. You look at the merits of the 

initiatives in the budget, and every budget gets configured based 

upon the, you know, the puts and the takes and the priorities in 

a given budget year, as you know very well, sir. I think the—. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, let me put it another way. If you had your 

druthers, would you like to have some more people? 
23

Admiral COLLINS. Well, let me maybe answer it this way. The 

first year—we had the opportunity this year to submit an unfunded 

priorities list as directed by Congress in the 2005 Act. We submitted that list. What that list is, both dollars and people. It said 

if I had the next person or the next dollar, this is where I would 

put them. 

So that document is on the record, on the Hill. It shows you 

where we think the next dollar or the next person would be placed 

if I had it at my disposal, and I think they are very significant 

item, let me leave it that way. I think they are important items 

that have to do with inland rivers. That deal with security. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, that is my next question. 

Admiral COLLINS. That item is on the unfunded priority list. It 

has to do with the inland river vessel movement center. It tracks 

dangerous cargos that move in our inland rivers. They are very 

hazardous, very dangerous. If a terrorist did something bad to 

those in a high-density area, and we have defined about 20 highdensity areas along the river we have to worry about, we need to 

track those. Right now, we are doing it by hook or by crook with 

a reserve force that we cobbled together. 

We need to make that more permanent, and we are a little more 

sophisticated in terms of technology. That is why that line item is 

there. So I think that is the best way to answer your question, sir, 

that we do have a list of unfunded priorities that are meaningful, 

or substantial, could add value. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think, for the sake of the committee, if you 

could just provide each member of that committee, of the committee, that information. It would be helpful to us again. 

You talked about the inland waterway security in the center. So 

you are also saying that if we chose to give you the money, it would 

be an additional asset that you think the Coast Guard could do a 

better job in monitoring the inland waterways? 

Admiral COLLINS. Absolutely. That particular item, as I said, is 

made up of reservists that we brought on. Their service ends the 

end of this fiscal year. We are going to have to hunt down other 

reservists if they want to keep that going. Our game plan would 

be to put active duty permit people there along with some contracted people, and given the proper information technology systems to track those barges and river traffic efficiently. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The time 

of the gentleman from California who, I guess, wants to reclaim his 

time now. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COX. Admiral, on May 31st, the Coast Guard submitted your 

revised Deepwater implementation plan to the Congress. I want to 

read from it. Because if I didn’t identify the source, this would 

sound like a pretty trenchant criticism of the Coast Guard. Today’s 

Coast Guard outfitted with assets defined for the threat environment of 30 to 40 years ago lacks the maritime security and network centric capabilities essential for operational effectiveness. 

That is really an indictment of where we stand. I would like to 

know how the new capabilities that you are seeking to achieve ad-
24

dress the need for interoperability, because that is one of the things 

that is referenced in our opening statement. 

It is also one of the things as I mentioned in my opening statement. Last year we held a hearing to examine the maritime operations of the Department, and we were focused on whether Coast 

Guard, aircraft and vessels are yet capable to engage in secure 

communication with other DHS assets, such as border patrol boats. 

Does this plan address that? And what is the answer to that question? Can we do that today? 

Admiral COLLINS. The current preDeepwater systems are really 

independent systems, they are not network based. What I mean by 

that tied together with real data; real-time data capability, exchanged between the component parts. 

To steal a term out of the Department of Defense, what we are 

building is a network centric system with Deepwater with advanced communication systems, advanced census systems, advanced command and control systems that tie the network together. What it does is leverages your capability to have maritime 

domain awareness to understand your environment and act on it 

and have real-time information through what is—the buzz word is 

common operating picture. 

Everyone has the fused operational picture that is moved instantaneously that leverages each asset and increasing the productivity 

of the asset. That is what we are building with Deepwater. It is 

a system of ships, fixed wing, helicopters and boats tied together 

in a robust way that has transparency of its operating area. It allows you to push the borders out and transparency along the threat 

axis and act on it. It will not only help Homeland Security issues 

in the courts in the like, but migrant interdiction, counterdrug 

interdiction, search and rescue mission reinforcement. So it is all 

mission system that will enhance our ability to act in the maritime. 

[Insert for the Record. See page 46.] 

Mr. COX. I love the term ‘‘network centric,’’ and I completely 

agree that it is an object much to be desired that we have a common operational picture. My question remains, do we have it yet 

at least to the extent that we can communicate with a border patrol boat. 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, we do. We have it. 

Mr. COX. By communicate, can we communicate securely, because intelligence sharing is a big piece of this. Do we have interoperable secure communications now between those Coast Guard 

aircraft and border patrol boats? 

Admiral COLLINS. We have partial capability in that regard. Part 

of the Deepwater program was building replacement assets for the 

current assets over a period of time and enhancing existing legacy 

systems while we transition. 

So, for instance, if you look at our medium endurance cutters, 

our high endurance cutters, part of the investment of Deepwater 

has been to secure communications on those platforms, they all 

have secure communications now. Even the legacy system. So we 

have enhanced the current system and all that will be in the new 

system. We are working very, very hard to insure—and that is part 

of the rebase lining of Deepwater—is to insure that they are all 

post-9/11 interoperable systems, that our Rescue 21 systems are 
25

interoperable with our Deepwater system, that is interoperable 

with the AIS system that can talk to the border patrol that can 

talk to the local police. That is all embedded in the requirements 

definition that we have baselined. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Admiral. Obviously, the sooner the better 

on that. I am delighted we are heading in that direction. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. 

Dicks, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Thank you, Commandant. We are glad to 

have you here. Another maritime State, Washington State, where 

the Coast Guard plays a great role out there. We appreciate it. The 

Maritime Transportation Security Act requires that security plans 

be developed for the Nation’s port facilities in U.S. flag vessels. 

According to the Coast Guard, 3,000 facilities and 9,000 vessels 

subject to the regulations have approved plans in place. What does 

the approval process entail? 

Admiral COLLINS. They have submitted, of course. This played 

out over the last year, 2 years, they submitted their plan to us. We 

evaluated the plan that it had certain prescribed things that it had 

to address. Access control, perimeter security and the like, so there 

are some basic ingredients as we bake the cake, so to speak. 

Mr. DICKS. So it includes physical verification and review of the 

security plan by the captain of the port? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Good. Now that the plans have been approved, how 

is the Coast Guard going to insure that facilities and vessels are 

in compliance with their plans and maintain their compliance? 

Admiral COLLINS. That we will inspect those facilities annually 

and—also, as part of MTSA, as you know, sir, that as is required 

is an exercise regime, it is also required not to exceed 18 months. 

So there is exercise of regimes that have to take place to exercise 

the plan. That is a wonderful way to have visibility into how prepared they are. 

In addition, we are starting with this 40-tabletop-exercises plan 

starting this summer, across the key ports and areas that exercise 

these plans. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, isn’t it true that there still is a question about 

the financing of port security? That the ports themselves have said 

that the Federal Government should be financing this and the Federal Government has been saying well, no, it should be the shippers and the ports doing it privately. But isn’t that still a problem? 

Admiral COLLINS. It is still an issue, I think it may be debated 

forever, but it is a key issue. There are costs to building out the 

security plans. Now, the important part is that you have a standard set of regulations that are applicable to everyone, so there is 

not an unlevel playing field. It would be really bad if we had one 

State that had one set of standards and another place with another 

set of standards and so forth, and that would be an unequal playing field. One of the national standards is a level playing field of 

standards. 

Mr. DICKS. Wasn’t it true that the Coast Guard said to fully implement the plan to do all the port security this would cost billions 

of dollars, which we have not appropriated, and the money hasn’t 
26

been raised at the local level. There has got to be a huge gap in 

the effectiveness of these plans that have been put down on a piece 

of paper. That doesn’t mean they have been implemented and the 

work done to secure these ports; isn’t that correct? 

Admiral COLLINS. There has been, of course, I think five rounds 

of grants to date; $560 million have been distributed around the 

country. There is another round this year. I think it closes out, the 

applications close out the end of this month or early July for another 150 million, that pushes it close to $700 million through 

2005. 

Mr. DICKS. You had some numbers that you presented to the 

Congress, as I recall, that were in the billions of dollars that were 

needed to implement port security, and we are nowhere near that. 

In many of these cases, Congress had to add the money to the 

budget. It wasn’t even in the President’s budget; isn’t that correct? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. There was in the cost/benefit analysis 

that is required as part of the regulatory effort, there was an estimate of several billions of dollars. 

Mr. DICKS. As I understand, 5.4 billion over 10 years for port facilities? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. We are at $700 million. And most of that has been 

put in by the Congress. So I still worry about this. I mean I am 

a big supporter of the Coast Guard, but I worry whether we have 

done enough on port security. And it seems to me that with a gap 

of—in this case, would be $4.7 billion that hasn’t—work that hasn’t 

been done. We still have a lot to do here in this area, don’t you 

agree with that? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. I think it is going to be built out over 

time. And there are alternative security techniques and provisions 

that can be included into the plan to have equivalent levels of security while the final solution is built up. That is built into the plan 

review and the system as we go forward. It boils down to, sir, how 

do you distribute between what public expense—a private expense 

and the public expense, whether it is State, local, and Federal, and 

how that gets distributed. There is no magic formula that has been 

adjudicated that sets those boundary conditions. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Linder is recognized. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, welcome. How 

many personnel do you have? 

Admiral COLLINS. If you count the civilian personnel, which you 

should, they are a great part of our work force, around 47,000 individuals. 

Mr. LINDER. How many reservists are on duty? 

Admiral COLLINS. We have a selective Reserve of 8,100. We currently have about between—voluntarily recalled and involuntarily 

recalled—around 1,500 as we sit here today on duty. 

Mr. LINDER. How many reservists do you have entirely, including 

those that are not on full-time duty? 

Admiral COLLINS. Eighty-one hundred selective Reserve. 

Mr. LINDER. All of your personnel trained in all of your various 

missions? 
27

Admiral COLLINS. Not everyone knows every mission. We have 

multi-mission ships and multi-mission planes. A ship could be 

doing a search and rescue mission in the morning and could be 

interdicting drugs in the afternoon, which is frequently the case, by 

the way. The competencies necessary to do a variety of missions 

that are built into that platform in the amount of people—. 

Mr. LINDER. Platform-related essentially, yes? 

Where do you fit in the intelligence loop? Quite a bit of discussion about intelligence and the substantial ability to change it. 

Where do you fit in that loop? 

Admiral COLLINS. We are, of course, we are a member of the foreign intel community. That was an act of Congress right after 9/

11 that saw that need and made us a part of that community. We 

are—we have intel analysts. We are a form of collectors in the foreign intel community. Throughout our department, we obviously 

have a relationship with the IAIP, Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection under the Secretariat. 

We are co-located—and obviously responsible to the Secretary 

through them. We are co-located with the Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland, a national intelligence entity. And as the current—the HSPD 13 work that I referenced earlier is a family of 

plans. There is an over—umbrella, national maritime security plan 

and then eight subordinate plans, one of which is integrated maritime intelligence. 

In that plan that is evolving, it defines the role and the organizational positioning particularly with the new entity. And how we see 

it is we have become the maritime plug-in up the chain in terms 

of focus integrated maritime intelligence. 

Mr. LINDER. How much of that intelligence comes from civilian 

both commercial and pleasure boats? I suspect there are a million 

of them. 

Admiral COLLINS. Every one is sensor is our approach. We have 

HUMINT teams. We have these 30 field intelligence support teams 

that I mentioned earlier. We have started a program called America’s Waterway Watch, which is drawing upon marinas and boatmen around the country, orchestrated and promoted by our Coast 

Guard Auxillary, which is our volunteer arm of 45,000 people that 

help us in this neighborhood watch of the waterway basically, and 

it is very, very effective. It is another maritime domain awareness 

sensor, if you will, to give us information so we can put this all together. So—. 

Mr. LINDER. Is it your sense that people are paying more attention since 9/11? 

Admiral COLLINS. Absolutely. We get the call, the report that 

there is a perceived increased—someone surveilling or taking a picture of this ferry, and looks strange, and we are worried about him 

or her. So you get that kind of input all the time. You run those 

things through the ground and collect the information and do the 

field intelligence report and all those things. There is a consciousness around our ports and waterways that these are precious 

things, these ports and waterways, and people want to protect 

them. The best way is to have people, local folks that know what 

is supposed to happen in a waterway and what is not—what is an 

aberration and what is not, and they can see that aberration and 
28

report in. Some things like America’s Waterway Watch is an important initiative in that regard. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman from Oregon is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Foreign port security 

assessments, I am disturbed to see—and I am certain this is a personnel or funding issue—but only 26 of your planned 135 assessments have been done at this point in time? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. I think it is pretty good, sir, from my 

perspective. We have, of course, had to stand up that whole program. We had to staff that whole program and get an inspection 

protocol accomplished. We got adopted by, approved by, and embraced by IMO. So that same standard approach will be used by 

others around the world. And we have done 26 already and we are 

on tap to do a whole bunch this summer. So I think as I recall the 

mandate, sir, if I got it right, it was 3 years to have it all done. 

And I think we are going to meet that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Of those 26 that have been completed, have you 

identified problems? 

Admiral COLLINS. There were two countries, small African countries that were determined to be noncompliant. There were five 

countries—and don’t ask me to name them because I don’t remember them off the top of my head—I will get you the information. 

There are five countries that have not reported compliance. Under 

the ISPS code, flag states have to report compliance and that they 

have met the port standards. There are five countries that have not 

reported compliant. And two we found on inspection.

INSERTED FOR THE RECORD

Currently five countries have not reported compliance as required by the ISPS 

Code. (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and 

Nauru). Conditions of Entry have been imposed on vessels arriving from those countries. These Conditions of Entry require vessels to take additional security precautions while in ports in the foreign countries and when in the U.S. In addition 

these vessels receive intense scrutiny when they arrive in the U.S. The Coast Guard 

consulted with our interagency partners to insure all other agency and foreign policy 

considerations are taken into account.

What we do with that, we can deny entry for those vessels. And 

what we have chosen to do with the five that have not reported 

compliant is impose additional restrictions on any vessel coming 

from those ports to our country. They have had to maintain a higher security posture while they were in that country and other documentation in order—and there are mandatory offshore inspections 

before they come into our country. We have ratcheted the security 

net up based upon the status of the security in that foreign port. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So for ports that are noncompliant, and any ships 

that have transited those ports, before coming to the U.S., you are 

doing mandatory inspections? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. The issue of vessel ownership, I know we have 

talked about this before, I am just curious where we are in terms 

of transparency, penetrating the veil of ownership. Osama bin 

Laden may well personally own vessels that are transiting the 

United States. Where are we at on that? 
29

Admiral COLLINS. Part of the ISPS code in the Solis amendments 

that went through IMO was a requirement for a synopsis record on 

the bridge that required a full history of that vessel, ownership. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Only down to the agent level or the law firm or 

whatever. It does not get to actual ownership; is that correct? We 

don’t have anything that requires that we know what individuals 

or corporations or entities own it? 

Admiral COLLINS. I can give you a classified brief on this. There 

are a number of intelligence avenues to get that information. And 

in many regards we do have that information. There was a motor 

vessel voyager that we tracked I think very successfully over the 

last—about a month ago—that had ownership issues, flag state 

issues, and a whole bunch of other risk factors that we vetted with 

ONI at Suitland and with our foreign partners and identified it, located it, tracked it with national assets, boarded it 800 miles off 

shore. 

So we are active from all sources to get the information we need 

to assess risk. And we err on the side of being conservative. And 

if there is an element of risk we are going to be all over that vessel. 

I think there are some good examples. And that was an interagency coordinated effort, by the way. And this committee is interested in interagency coordination. I think it is getting better and 

better and better in the sharing of information. Customs has a 

tracking targeting center. We have Coast Guard people with permanent liaisons there. They have folks in our National Maritime 

Intelligence Center and Vessel Tracking Center that we have at 

Suitland, and we are sharing all the information back and forth all 

the time. 

So I am pretty pleased—not there yet, we have a way to go—but 

I am pretty pleased where we are. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Then on the questions raised by the Ranking Member and I believe by the Chairman, if I could quickly, Mr. Chairman, on the long-range tracking, aren’t there a number of maritime 

cargo companies that actually have installed on their vessels commercial systems so they know where that ship is real-time all the 

time? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. And we have a couple of pilot programs going. One in Alaska. With ORBCOMM, we have a satellite 

project going. We are looking at various techniques and lining them 

up to see what we could use and how we can derive that as a solid 

long-range identification tracking system. That is part of our 

project is to look at the options and do demonstration projects, kick 

the tires, see them in action, and then pick the best solution. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You mentioned Alaska and the gentleman from 

Alaska was not even here. I am sure he will hear about that. 

Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral a few questions that go into general policy and strategy, 

I am really shocked by the record of the HH–65 helicopter. You 

brought that to our attention in your testimony in terms of the 

amount of incidents and the amount of mishaps; 500,000 flight 

hours, 329 mishaps. That is up from 63 mishaps. And as you know, 
30

the FAA says what is acceptable. The standard is 1 in 100,000. 

Now that is not close; that is bordering on tragic. 

Could you respond to that, please? 

Admiral COLLINS. I couldn’t agree with you more, sir. That is 

why we have such a priority and such an urgency with our reengineering effort. In the meantime, we are managing the risk 

through operational restrictions on the aircraft commensurate with 

the current condition and reliability; and we are building out, replacing that engine absolutely as fast as we possibly can do it. We 

have got 12 already installed, another batch in the making. And we 

are putting them in as fast as the manufacturer can build them 

and spending over 350 million doing it. So this is a huge priority. 

It is a mainstream asset for us. And we have—it is not only the 

engine, it is the engine we are replacing, the fuel control system 

and the gear box, all three in that aircraft. 

If you go to the air stations where that aircraft has now been 

reengined, there are a lot of aviators walking around with their 

smiley faces on, because it is a much more capable aircraft. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Some of those things we are addressing in the 

2006 budget. But this is something that needs immediate attention 

by all of us. This is totally unacceptable. I think you would agree 

with that. 

Admiral COLLINS. Absolutely. 

Mr. PASCRELL. My second question is this: New York Harbor. We 

were up there just the other day, Homeland Security Committee. 

And I want you to give me a brief assessment of the New York 

Harbor in terms of security and protection of this huge, huge harbor. 

Admiral COLLINS. It is a very complex harbor and a very valuable harbor. It has significant traffic in and out and, of course, a 

lot of it is bulk liquid traffic. It comes in to Bayonne and Arthur 

Kill area. There are vulnerable assets there in terms of bridges and 

structures of national significance. 

Mr. PASCRELL. How many people are assigned there? 

Admiral COLLINS. I have to get you that for the record. We have 

the biggest Coast Guard station and our service is located there, 

the most boats and the most people.

INSERTED FOR THE RECORD

There are 58 members assigned to Coast Guard Station New York.

Mr. PASCRELL. That is functioning totally? That facility is functioning? 

Admiral COLLINS. It is on Staten Island and has the most boats 

and most people of any station in the Coast Guard. We have a 

major capital port function there, office in charge of reinspection 

there, sector—sector New York, and we have the capacity to augment. For example, obviously, New York is the center of every orange condition. If you have an orange alert or a national convention that is there, Republican in this case, if you have the national 

convention there, then the security goes up and we roll assets in 

and augment that. And we did that at the national convention. We 

did that for the other security conditions. So it is a dynamic process. We allocate resources. We have the basic core level of re-
31

sources there and we increase based on risk. We have a maritime 

safety and security team there. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I want to make one other point, Mr. Chairman 

and that is when we started our first hearings a few years ago and 

we looked at the Coast Guard, we were very concerned that the 

process of interdiction of drugs would take a back seat. I know that 

you are dealing with priorities. When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. But I believe the members on both sides of the 

aisle feel very strongly about the interdiction process continuing 

and being successful. 

We have a homeland security problem with the infiltration of 

drugs in our country. And let us not kid ourselves. The terror on 

our streets is something that is not written about too much lately. 

The Coast Guard—we have to rely on the Coast Guard primarily 

to continue. This is homeland security and it may not be somebody 

bringing in a bomb. To me, there is no difference in that bomb and 

the drugs that are killing adults as well as kids. And I am glad 

and I know you are trying to make that effort more substantial. 

And I appreciate it and I salute your entire Coast Guard. 

But I want you to know, we feel very, very serious about that 

issue. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can look into that specifically down the road. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman. I might say when I was 

out there for my briefing with Pacific Command, I got no suggestion that there has been any slacking on the interdiction efforts 

with respect to drugs. 

Admiral COLLINS. Sir, in fact, I agree there is nothing more 

homeland ‘‘security-ish’’ than counterdrugs, and we have continued 

to put great effort into that. Last year, we had an all-time record 

interdiction year. We seized 241,000 pounds of cocaine at sea. 

Broke the previous record by 100,000 pounds. And this year we are 

ahead of that record-breaking pace. We are putting attention to it 

and I think we are getting great results. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And I would suspect that your increased emphasis 

on intelligence helps in that regard. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for 

being here today and for your testimony. As you know, Rhode Island has a long and proud maritime history and we have always 

enjoyed strong ties with the Coast Guard and we appreciate your 

service and everything that the Coast Guard does to keep our waterways safe. I am glad to hear today in your testimony you were 

talking about maritime awareness and your focus and your concern 

about that, and I share that concern. 

I have had several opportunities to receive a demonstration of a 

very impressive maritime security system known as Project Athena 

that is located at Raytheon in Portsmouth, Rhode Island. Project 

Athena architecture is the same as that used by NORAD for the 

national air picture; Raytheon solipsys data fusion software, which 

fuses data from multiple sensors over vast areas to monitor airborne and surface platforms and has the potential to integrate undersea targets of interest as well. I have been a strong supporter 
32

of Athena’s work and its capabilities continue to grow and improve 

each time I have had the opportunity to visit the site. 

In addition to the obvious regional interest in protecting Narragansett Bay and Port of Providence, I really now see its a great potential for national homeland defense application as well. I believe 

that two gentlemen from the Coast Guard, Mr. Jeff High and Rear 

Admiral Joe Nimick recently had a chance to see Athena’s potential 

firsthand. I am curious whether you were briefed about their visit 

and what their assessment was and whether the Coast Guard has 

any plans to integrate Project Athena’s technology and plans to integrate the technology into any current or future operation. I know 

Raytheon is eager to contribute to maritime security in any way 

that is possible, and I believe that Athena could be a critical tool 

for our country. 

Admiral COLLINS. I asked them to visit based on the correspondence that you sent me. I have yet to get a downbrief from them on 

their experience and am looking forward to that soon and we will 

crank it into the equation. We are in the formative stages of our 

maritime domain awareness effort and our national plan to achieve 

maritime domain awareness and looking at various procedures, 

systems, and doctrine to attain it. And this will be part of the mosaic and some of the options we can look at. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. It is an impressive capability. And I hope you 

have the opportunity to go see it for yourself. I know Dr. McQueary 

has been out there and Secretary McHale from homeland defense 

has had the opportunity to personally visit the site and it would 

be an eye opener. 

Another area I want to turn to is basically the ability to do the 

job right now with current resources. One of my primary concerns 

is whether the Coast Guard has the resources to adequately perform its new homeland security responsibilities. And I know we 

have been talking about that here today, and one area of particular 

interest to me is the movement of LNG tankers through New England ports and waterways and the possibility of a proposed expansion of an LNG facility in Providence. The Coast Guard officials in 

my region that I have had the opportunity to meet with have indicated to me that their staff and vessels are already stretched very 

thin, particularly for LNG traffic, and it would be a great challenge 

to ensure security of additional LNG traffic in the area. I know 

that LNG tankers are only a small part of the Coast Guard’s homeland security responsibilities, but this anecdote really does seem to 

point to a larger concern about the ability of the Coast Guard to 

perform its security functions with existing resources. 

So my question, Admiral, would be whether you feel the Coast 

Guard has sufficient resources to reliably perform the requirements 

that you have been charged with; and, if not, whether the authorization levels in H.R. 889 will provide the necessary boost or 

whether more still has to be done to adequately enhance the Coast 

Guard’s capability. 

Admiral COLLINS. The short answer is no. I have talked to the 

commanding officer stationed at Castle Hill on this issue, who incidentally just received the National Award for Leadership, and one 

of our very best, and to look at what the proper configuration is. 

In the 2006 budget, there is a line item for more people and dollars 
33

for boat crews specifically for LNG. And so that is the next increment and I hope that will get supported with Congress. With that, 

we will have additional boat crews and additional staff to oversee 

the security associated with LNG. That is step number one and 

that is a good step. If that can get supported, we are able to beef 

up places like Narragansett Bay. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair 

would ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady from the Virgin 

Islands, Ms. Christensen, who is a member of the committee but 

not the subcommittee, be allowed to ask questions for 5 minutes. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

welcome you, Admiral and thank you for the team that you have 

in Puerto Rico that assists us and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Of 

course they are very stretched. And I noticed that the Coast Guard 

released a report on its current interagency operational centers and 

its plans to create 40 additional centers. And I was wondering what 

plans might we anticipate to have either Puerto Rico expanded to 

be able to reach over to the U.S. Virgin Islands where we have almost 200 miles of open borders, while they are now mostly in the 

Mona Passage, or have our own center. 

Admiral COLLINS. Just one point in clarification. These are not 

new centers. We are taking existing centers and converting them. 

So in reshaping them and enhancing them, those are existing centers that were part of our creation of sectors around the Coast 

Guard. We are integrating our field structure, and along with that, 

enhancing the existing command and control operation centers 

within those entities. And we are doing that around the country. 

It is called our 2010 project. Sector Puerto Rico will be included in 

that. And exactly what its reach will be in terms of sensors and so 

forth, I don’t have at my disposal. But there is a project in the 

Miami area called Project Hawkeye that ties together Fort Lauderdale, Miami, and Key West with AIS and radar sensors into this 

new command and control center. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I hope that in the plans we could get a permanent cutter in the Virgin Islands. We don’t have one as yet. 

In your statement, you talk about a layered defense in starting 

overseas to extend, you know, the defense layer. And I was wondering about the operations in the Caribbean in general and what 

your operations are there and how much are the island nations in 

the Caribbean able to support your efforts, because we hear from 

them all of the time that they are really strapped and unable—. 

Admiral COLLINS. Take the Caribbean Basin as a whole, I get an 

operations brief every morning. I look at the force structure every 

morning. If you look at that, you will see an international force 

structure. We have French, British, Dutch, the United States, 

United States Navy, and Coast Guard working together in a team 

in a coordinated way through Joint Interagency Task Force south 

out of Key West. I think it is a terrific team and gets wonderful 

results and it is international in scope. And we have Coast Guard 

law enforcement detachments on British ships. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I have been on one of the Dutch ships as they 

come into the Virgin Islands. What about the readiness of their 

ports? Have they met the criteria to be approved? Because we have 
34

a lot of small cargo in between the islands and we have had a lot 

of difficulty either getting those boats in or out. 

Admiral COLLINS. I will get back to you on the record and the 

detail, but my recollection is that they all have reported compliant. 

And with the 26—and I don’t know if Caribbean countries are a 

number among the 26 visits. We have already made international 

visits. But if they have, none have been identified as deficient, as 

not meeting the basic intent of those standards.

INSERTED FOR THE RECORD

Twelve Caribbean Island nations trade with the U.S. and are on the IPS Program 

country list: Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 

Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and Trinidad. All twelve countries reported their compliance with the ISPS Code. This report is made to the 

International Maritime Organization (IMO) for SOLAS signatory countries and U.S. 

Coast Guard for non-SOLAS signatory countries. The Coast Guard has visited the 

Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad as part of our IPS Program. 

Based upon our visits, all four countries have substantially implemented the ISPS 

Code. The remaining countries will be visited within the next two years.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I see my time is almost up. I want to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague from New Jersey 

about the drug interdiction. I notice that you say you have done 

better on search and rescue, which is another area that I was very 

concerned about, because I lost a young man from my district with 

whom I had been very close, who had been in the water for 36 

hours before he was lost, and his companion made it. And I am 

hoping you will continue your efforts in that regard. 

Admiral COLLINS. That is our bread-and-butter mission for us. 

Anything that is associated with saving a life, whether a security 

issue or safety issue, that is our number one priority. We are maintaining our standards and our readiness posture for search and rescue. And we will not back off of that one inch. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Admiral, I have a few more questions and I want 

to start another round for those who are here remaining. I would 

like to ask you about the maritime safety and security teams. I 

know you are very proud of them. I know recently you have established an enhanced maritime safety and security team with the express purpose of providing greater prevention and response capabilities for WMD events. It is my understanding the Coast Guard 

has asked the Congress for some clarification in legislation to ensure that they can be deployed internationally if needed, since current legislation appears to restrict MMSTs to domestic operations. 

What is the essential difference between the enhanced maritime 

safety and security teams from the original ones? How do they 

strengthen the maritime security mission? Is there additional legislative authority you believe you need in order to do your job? And 

why would you need it with respect to international activities as 

opposed to domestic activity? 

Admiral COLLINS. Let me start with the difference. The enhanced 

MMST is an MMST on steroids. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I am from California, so I understand what you 

are talking about. 

Admiral COLLINS. It is night vision goggles, automatic weapons, 

vertical insertion, carrying detection devices. In the Department of 

Defense parlance, special operations framework, national structure 
35

for special operations. It is Tier 2 capability. Tier 1 is that capability that can go and detect and render safe a weapon of mass destruction. Tier 2 doesn’t have the render-safe capability, but has 

about everything else. These are folks that can jump out of the sky 

in the middle of the night and see things with infrared. It is training. It is high, high-end offensive capability. 

The MMST is more defensive capability and not the high end. 

The MMST has canine explosive teams and underwater capability 

and the like. We are outfitting three of the MMSTs with nuke-type 

detection devices. We will have one on each coast. Enhanced—we 

just have one. The enhanced MMST in Chesapeake will have it. 

New Orleans will have it and San Diego will have it. So we will 

cover gulf, west and east coasts with that. The enhanced MMST is 

a schedule deployer only. It is not 7 by 24 capable. It is capable—

and this has to do with resourcing. It can do a schedule of events. 

It was mobilized for the national conventions. Mobilized for the G–

8 summit, et cetera. It has dedicated helicopters. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Why international rather than just domestic? 

Admiral COLLINS. My lawyers say I have all the authority I need 

to deploy currently. It would be nice to have additional clarification. That is what my lawyers are thinking. 

Mr. LUNGREN. What training do you give your analysts? Because 

I am concerned about the quality of analysts. You talked about 

anecdotally and you have given me a classified briefing on several 

instances. 

Admiral COLLINS. We leverage like crazy at the Department of 

Defense on a lot of things. We train our pilots at Pensacola, the 

Naval Training Station. Wherever we can leverage off the United 

States Navy, the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense for this 

training, that is what we do. A lot of our folks get trained through 

Department of Defense intel structure and it pays huge dividends 

for us. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Last question, and this is a general question but 

I think it is important for informing the public. Some would suggest if they look at your deepwater proposals and look about the 

whole idea of advancing our borders or putting our borders further 

out for national security and homeland defense purposes that that 

should be the job of the Navy and not the Coast Guard, and are 

we creating a second Navy. What would you say to the public so 

they would understand why you believe deepwater is not only important for your original mission, but, more importantly, for this 

homeland security mission? And how do you make sure you are not 

duplicating the Navy or getting in the Navy’s way and they are not 

getting in your way? 

Admiral COLLINS. Deepwater is a little bit of a misnomer. If you 

look at the entire system, it is out from port and out in. It is all 

of our helicopters. It is a prime asset for our port and coastal surveillance and protection and the like. And it is delivering, as I testified before, it is delivering network-centric surveillance information to the entire system. So it is indispensable to our homeland 

security work. 

There are also—every deepwater asset is a multi-mission asset, 

so it is doing everything from fisheries enforcement to search and 

rescue to drug interdiction to migrant interdiction and the like. 
36

And the difference between the Navy and the Coast Guard, they 

are higher end, high-threat platforms with high-end weapons systems. You could plot the spectrum of threat and higher end, the 

Navy owns. The lower end, we are predominant. And in the middle, 

there is a slight overlap, which is good for international interest. 

We have carefully discussed that relationship and that division 

of labor with the Navy collaboratively for the past 4, 5, years. We 

have developed the document that both Vern Clark and I have 

signed, have called the National Fleet Policy Statement. And it is 

a document that pledges our respective organizations to plan together our respective fleet so they are complementary, nonredundant systems. And that is exactly what we have done in planning 

out our two fleets. They are synergistic and complementary and not 

redundant. We have joint teams that determine the requirements 

and the performance dimensions of each system so they are in sync 

with that relationship. It is a powerful relationship. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Admiral. Gentlelady from California. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I really only have one question that I want to ask you and it 

comes back from this GAO report that was done in June of 2004. 

And it said that the Coast Guard was relying on reservists to conduct vessel and facility inspections. And as you can imagine, many 

of the reservists are reaching their Active day service limit. And I 

think that means you need to find other replacements to do those 

inspections. 

So my questions are how are you going to do that? Does the current budget you are proposing reflect that? Are you going to hire 

more full duty inspectors? Is the $114 million that you have in the 

budget sufficient to carry out that responsibility? 

Admiral COLLINS. The use of reservists through 2004 and into 

2005 was—the best way to describe it was a bridging strategy. 

Through the budget, we got over 500 additional billets last year, 

positions, so that we could ensure compliance and oversee and implement the regulation. But it takes a while to attract, train, promote or whatever you have to do to fill those positions. So use of 

Reserves was a great way to bridge, because the work couldn’t be 

put off, and it was a ‘‘now’’ type of a thing. We mobilized our Reserve. That is what they are there for, to provide for surge capability, and they performed incredibly well. They have helped us 

bridge, and well on the way of getting all those things filled out. 

So now we are in the tail end of transitioning from that Reservedominated force to a total Active Duty force and we are doing well. 

And the money is sufficient to do that. The annualization of that 

500-plus billet—in other words, we had partial funding in 2004 

until we brought them all on. The annualization of that is in the 

2006 budget. I am pleased where we are, and I am very appreciative of the support and I think we are in good shape. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have one last question and several of the gentlemen alluded to it in one way or the other. This is the Homeland 

Security Committee and we care about homeland security and we 

understand that our ports are much of the front line. You are the 

first responders in the sense here, but we are cognizant of the fact 

that many of us who live near ports in the State of Washington or 

California, that you have other responsibilities: water safety, drug 
37

interdiction, search and rescue, et cetera. Do you have resources? 

Are you really cannibalizing—. 

Admiral COLLINS. It is nice to have another dollar and another 

person. Someone would always say that would be nice to have. I 

think that given the budget is a relative thing, you submit it as 

part of the Department. Competing requirements and competing 

needs, and the President has to put together a complicated Federal 

budget and he has to balance. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We understand that, and we balance it here in the 

Congress. I guess the question is, do you feel comfortable that the 

original pieces of what the Coast Guard does and did and is supposed to do for us are getting done and not falling between the 

cracks because of this whole new layer of security that we are requiring of you? 

Admiral COLLINS. The answer is yes. I am comfortable. And the 

performance of our Coast Guard men and women has been extraordinary, number one. You could look at it several ways. You could 

look at what are the number of boat hours or aircraft hours that 

you apply to these different missions and how do they compare to 

point X in time: What is the performance you have achieved in 

each of these areas? And I would submit if you look at mission area 

by mission area by mission area, our mission performance has been 

extraordinary and it hasn’t taken a back seat anywhere. 

If you look at our counterdrugs, we shattered previous performance records for drug interdiction. Last year, we interdicted the 

highest amount of migrants we interdicted in the last 10 years. 

Our SAR, we have exceeded our performance standards for search 

and rescue. If you look at every performance dimension, I think we 

are answering the mail, and men and women doing some extraordinary things. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman from Washington. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let us go back to deepwater. I serve on the Appropriations Committee and I was concerned when the subcommittee, Mr. Rogers’ 

subcommittee, cut 466 million out of the budget for deepwater. 

Now, as I understood it, and the Chairman told us in our full committee markup, was that there had been certain reports that had 

not been submitted and that that is why they were taking this 

large cut. 

What comments—are we going to get the reports? I assume the 

Chairman is going to get the reports that he wants over the time 

frame that he wants. 

Admiral COLLINS. This is probably the most frustrating 3 or 4 

months since I have been in Washington, and I have been in and 

out of Washington 15 years. The issue was the Appropriations 

Committee wanted the full new rebaseline implementation plan for 

2006 and outyears. And that was in the 2005 appropriations bill; 

that was the stated requirements submitted along with the 2006 

request when it came up this February. We weren’t able to deliver 

on that direction. We couldn’t get the consensus within the administration to get the information up here. And so we were late on 

the initial submittal. The initial submittal came up. It wasn’t seen 

as responsive by the chairman and his staff. And thankfully, at the 
38

end of last month, I think we have answered the mail. We have 

got the full package of information through the administration and 

into the committee. And my feedback is they are basically pleased 

with the package we have given them and we will have meetings 

with them to follow up. So the information is there. 

Mr. DICKS. Now GAO has also stated that deepwater has serious 

management challenges that have to be addressed; contractual 

deadlines are going to be met if costs are to remain within the 

budget. What do you have to say about that? 

Admiral COLLINS. I say this is the ongoing partnership with 

GAO. They have been our—we have been thrilled—they have been 

part of the deepwater program for the last 7 years. In the formation of the strategy, they are always poking a critical finger at it, 

which we have welcomed and we have taken every bit of advice 

from them and we have tweaked and we have molded and improved the structure. There are 11 areas that they pointed out that 

have to be attended to. We are well on our way of attending to 

them. A good number of them have been checked off. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me give you a couple of these for the record. The 

GAO reported last year that the primary contract management 

teams are understaffed, insufficiently trained and lack decisionmaking authority. Has that been reversed? 

Admiral COLLINS. In large measure, it has. And we have worked 

with the project staff, brought both contracted and ours; enhanced 

the training, enhanced the partnering construct, increased the 

training. I would be glad to give you a blow-by-blow point/counterpoint with here are the 11 GAO issues and this is where we are 

in meeting all of those. I would be glad to provide that to you and 

for the record. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think this would be a good subject 

for another hearing, because this is a big part of our—. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Could we request it in writing and take a look at 

it? 

Admiral COLLINS. I would be glad to provide this for the record 

and take a look at it. 

[The information follows:] 
39

INSERTED FOR THE RECORD

UPDATE AS OF: 10 May 2005, GAO RECOMMENDATIONS COAST GUARD (CG) INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM (IDS) ACQUISITION SCHEDULE AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AUDITS 

Note: Items in BOLD reflect brief description of Coast Guard’s comment to GAO’s response to action taken. 

Coast Guard IDS Program has also provided five briefings, four update letters and responded to frequent 

requests for conference calls and deliverables in the past year. The IDS Program embraces GAO’s recommendations and will continue to communication with them and provide periodic updates to the status 

of recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATION ACTION TAKEN CG COMMENT 

ACQUISITION 

SCHEDULE AUDIT:

Update the original 2002 

Deepwater acquisition 

schedule in time to support 

the fiscal year 2006 

Deepwater budget submission 

to DHS and Congress and at 

least once a year thereafter 

to support each budget 

submission.

The Deepwater program updated 

its Integrated Master Schedule 

(IMS) in time to support the 2006 

budget submission and will continue to do so every 6 months. 

CG will continue to update its Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) 

every 6 months and provide GAO 

additional clarity regarding its 

use and capability as needed.

CONTRACT 

MANAGEMENT 

AUDIT: Increase 

Integrated Product Team (IPT) 

effectiveness by training IPTs 

in a timely manner, 

chartering sub-IPTs, and 

making improvements in 

electronic information-sharing 

system.

Training programs and processes 

improved and fully automated. 

Metrics updated on monthly basis. 

IPT Measures of Success (MOS) 

have improved and charters for 

IPTs updated. Domain Management 

Teams (DMT) were established to 

manage product IPTs, as a result 

of continued emphasis on improvement. 

All IPTs are now chartered and 

an improvement to 80% of members have received IPPD entry 

level training; CG will continue to 

manage these processes in a 

timely manner, define IPT team 

roles and responsibilities and improve IPT effectiveness and information systems.

Require notification to the 

Coast Guard, including ‘‘buy’’ 

alternatives considered, for 

‘‘make’’ decisions on 

subcontracts valued at over 

$5M.

Integrated Coast Guard Systems 

(ICGS) will notify the Coast Guard 

one week prior to implementation 

of a decision if the amount is 

greater than $10M, which comports with the respective Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Policy 

was adopted in July 2004. 

Coast Guard will ensure compliance.
40

UPDATE AS OF: 10 May 2005, GAO RECOMMENDATIONS COAST GUARD (CG) INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM (IDS) ACQUISITION SCHEDULE AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AUDITS—Continued

Note: Items in BOLD reflect brief description of Coast Guard’s comment to GAO’s response to action taken. 

Coast Guard IDS Program has also provided five briefings, four update letters and responded to frequent 

requests for conference calls and deliverables in the past year. The IDS Program embraces GAO’s recommendations and will continue to communication with them and provide periodic updates to the status 

of recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATION ACTION TAKEN CG COMMENT 

Human Capital Plan (HCP) 

policy implementation to 

ensure adequate staffing and 

proactively address personnel 

turnover.

The HCP provides the overarching 

guidance and the implementation 

of a Deepwater Human Capital Solutions Database provides for the 

execution. Workforce planning and 

coordination is addressed in the 

HCP. The program is adhering to 

requirements to ensure that the 

workforce is aligned with the program needs at every phase of the 

acquisition. These defined processes focus on key components of 

workforce effectiveness including 

training, leadership, knowledge 

management, recruiting, retention 

and culture development. Turnover 

risk mitigation steps taken, additional billets assigned and certified program management support contracted to bridge gaps. 

Coast Guard is taking steps as 

indicated and will strive to 

achieve HCP and GAO objectives, 

while improving results.

Timely communication of 

asset transition information 

to field units.

Transition team pursuing aggressive outreach plan that continues 

to expand with program execution. 

Over 100 field visits have been 

completed since July 2004. Maintenance and support systems, databases and documentation have 

improved based on actual application and user feedback. Additional 

training sessions, hot washes and 

conferences conducted to ensure 

continued support and that operational commanders remain knowledgeable. Field personnel also 

serve on IPTs and as liaison for 

related training and maintenance 

activities. ICGS has placed site 

representatives at key field locations in anticipation of asset deployment. Internal outreach plan 

implemented by Deepwater Communications Management Team. 

Input and feedback obtained, Survey Implementation Plan developed, and Survey System executed. 

Coast Guard will continue to take 

steps as indicated to achieve objectives and improve results, 

while closely monitoring transition requirements for critical internal communications.

Development and adherence 

to measurable award fee 

criteria.

Coast Guard has incorporated 

measurable award fee criteria and 

will use this criteria in the future. 

CG will continue to use measurable award fee criteria.
41

UPDATE AS OF: 10 May 2005, GAO RECOMMENDATIONS COAST GUARD (CG) INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM (IDS) ACQUISITION SCHEDULE AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AUDITS—Continued

Note: Items in BOLD reflect brief description of Coast Guard’s comment to GAO’s response to action taken. 

Coast Guard IDS Program has also provided five briefings, four update letters and responded to frequent 

requests for conference calls and deliverables in the past year. The IDS Program embraces GAO’s recommendations and will continue to communication with them and provide periodic updates to the status 

of recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATION ACTION TAKEN CG COMMENT 

Consideration of award fee 

assessment input from the 

Contracting Officer Technical 

Representative (COTR).

Coast Guard has standardized the 

method to compile Performance 

Monitor input and subsequent revisions. 

CG will continue to consider 

COTR input through a standardized methodology and ensure 

performance monitors’ input is 

included as part of the award fee 

determination.

ICGS accountability for 

improved IPT effectiveness 

included in future award fee 

determinations.

Award fee criteria have been revised to incorporate specific IPT 

metrics during the current award 

fee evaluation, including Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) administration, 

management commitment, collaboration, and IPPD training. 

CG will continue to evaluate ICGS 

accountability for improved IPT 

effectiveness.

Develop a comprehensive 

plan to evaluate ICGS 

accountability for ensuring 

out-year competition among 

second-tier suppliers.

The Coast Guard and ICGS agree 

with the emphasis on competition 

as a method of achieving cost 

control. Prices originally contained 

in Section B of the contract represent fair and reasonable pricing 

obtained as a result of competition. In Award Term evaluations, 

the Coast Guard will specifically 

examine ICGS’ ability to control 

cost throughout the evaluation period by assessing the degree to 

which ICGS fosters competition at 

the major subcontract level; ICGS’ 

project management structure and 

processes to control costs, market 

surveys, or similar assets and 

major subsystems. 

CG will continue to incorporate 

an assessment of the steps the 

system integrator is taking to 

foster competition at the major 

subcontractor level.
42

UPDATE AS OF: 10 May 2005, GAO RECOMMENDATIONS COAST GUARD (CG) INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM (IDS) ACQUISITION SCHEDULE AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AUDITS—Continued

Note: Items in BOLD reflect brief description of Coast Guard’s comment to GAO’s response to action taken. 

Coast Guard IDS Program has also provided five briefings, four update letters and responded to frequent 

requests for conference calls and deliverables in the past year. The IDS Program embraces GAO’s recommendations and will continue to communication with them and provide periodic updates to the status 

of recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATION ACTION TAKEN CG COMMENT 

Establish a time frame, 

based on the current asset 

delivery schedule, for 

measuring the contractor’s 

performance toward 

improving Operational 

Effectiveness with the 

appropriate degree of fidelity.

The program has a comprehensive 

framework and methodologies for 

measuring performance. The program uses the Balanced Scorecard 

(BSC) framework and developed a 

‘‘Strategy Map’’, an industry bestpractice, in order to develop program objective and measures that 

not only support the BSC perspectives but also identify linkages to 

the Department of Homeland Security Goals, USCG Programs and 

Deepwater goals. The Earned Value 

Management System (EVMS) compares actual cost and schedule results with planned cost and 

schedule using an enterprise-wide 

EVMS. The Deepwater Performance 

Measurement System (DPMS) was 

implemented as a web-based tool 

for every member of the program 

to view overall program status and 

current metrics at any given time. 

The Deepwater program, with its 

defined performance standards 

and performance-measurement 

plan determines operational effectiveness, total ownership cost, and 

customer satisfaction. 

CG will continue to execute and 

improve its comprehensive 

framework and methodologies for 

measuring performance as assets 

are delivered. The Integrated 

Master Schedule (IMS) has been 

updated starting with the FY06 

budget request and will be updated every 6 months based on 

GAO’s recommendation to update 

the schedule annually in its audit 

report, ‘‘Acquisition Schedule Update Needed’’.

Refine Total Ownership Cost 

(TOC) baseline that compares 

the IDS acquisition approach 

to the cost of a traditional 

acquisition.

The program established a TOC 

baseline for the entire program at 

$78.0B in FY02 dollars, which is 

lower than the traditional business 

as usual acquisition approach, 

projected at $83.76B in FY02 dollars, by the Logistics Management 

Institute (LMI). The TOC baseline 

has been refined to enable comparison of the IDS acquisition approach to the cost of traditional 

acquisitions. 

CG provided explanation to GAO. 

GAO was given a copy of the MNS 

by DHS and has a copy of the 

Implementation Plan. CG will continue to work with GAO to provide 

further clarity as the program 

progresses.

Establish criteria for 

adjusting the TOC baseline 

and ensure that the reasons 

for such changes are 

documented.

The Program adjusts the contract 

baseline based on approved Program Decision Memorandums from 

the Agency Acquisition Executive 

(AAE). The Performance Measurement Team established a database 

system that tracks the impact of 

contract changes to the TOC of the 

program and changes approved by 

the AAE. 

CG provided explanation to GAO 

and took action to establish criteria for adjusting the TOC baseline. CG will continue to work 

with GAO to provide further clarity as the program progresses. 
43

Mr. DICKS. In addition, the GAO stated that the Coast Guard did 

not hold the system integrator accountable for its performance and 

the Coast Guard has not developed the comprehensive schedule to 

measure progress. According to GAO testimony in April 2005, the 

Coast Guard has had mixed results in addressing the management 

challenges associated with deepwater, specifically about holding the 

system integrator accountable. Is that being done? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. And we have answered the mail on 

the master schedule and it has already been delivered to GAO and 

it meets their requirements. A lot of this stuff we have already 

marched through and answered. And we would be glad to give you 

a blow-by-blow. 

Mr. DICKS. I assume that a $466 million cut in your deepwater 

program would be devastating. It would require complete restructuring? 

Admiral COLLINS. That is obviously separate from the GAO report, related but separate. Absolutely, sir. If we are not able to reverse this 466, it would absolutely destroy the current acquisition 

strategy. We would have to totally restructure the program and it 

would stretch it out forever. We would go back to a replacement 

in kind, one-for-one replacement approach, which is absolutely the 

wrong approach. 

This systems approach we have is truly, I think, ground-breaking 

in terms of acquisition strategy. It is the right approach. It allows 

the necessary tradeoffs between the component parts and the two 

basic metrics for this whole system of systems, gives us the total 

performance of the overall system at the lowest total cost of ownership. That is good stewardship and a good acquisition strategy. I 

would hate for that perspective alone to reverse this. And if we 

don’t turn this around, it will implode. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman. And thank you, Admiral 

Collins, for your valuable testimony. The members of the committee may have some additional questions for you, sir, and we will 

ask you to respond to those in writing in addition to what we just 

talked about with the gentleman from Washington. 

The hearing record will be open for 10 days and the committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to the following questions have not been received. 

1. As required by the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (P.L. 

108–293), the Coast Guard recently released a report on its current interagency 

operational centers and its plans to create up to 40 additional centers in the future. 

The report did not address whether future centers will be solely Coast Guard centers or if they will be run and staffed by multiple agencies and serve multiple purposes. An April 2005 GAO report has shown that centers constructed on the interagency model have improved the effectiveness of coordinating operations and information sharing. 

• When will you provide the Homeland Security Committee with a copy 

of this report? 

• What plans, if any does the Coast Guard have to create additional 

operational centers that are interagency in nature, as opposed to centers constructed on the single-agency, single-purpose model? 

• When will these centers be operational? 

• Where will the Coast Guard centers be located?

2. I understand that the MTSA was an important first step in improving our port 

security. 

• Admiral Collins—Could you tell me what further actions are needed 

beyond meeting MTSA requirements to improve security at our nation’s 

ports?

3. Clearly, Deepwater is a crucial program since the Coast Guard needs to replace 

its outdated cutters, aircraft used to patrol our ports and the communications systems used on these assets. Many of us have supported accelerating the program to 

ensure that the men and women of the Coast Guard have the equipment they need 

to protect our ports. The GAO issued a report last year that stated that the Deepwater program is plagued with management problems. For example, the report stated that the Coast Guard has not held the contractor accountable, that the Deepwater program is understaffed, and that there is no acquisition schedule in order 

to measure progress. The GAO testified in April 2005, that the Coast Guard has 

taken some but NOT all of the GAO recommended steps. 

• Admiral, when will the Coast Guard fully implement the GAO recommendations for this critical program?

4. Currently helicopters and small airplanes are performing touch and go’s and 

aerobatics on the bridge to Terminal Island at the Port of Los Angeles—not only 

do these ‘‘tricks’’ contribute to noise issues, but more importantly, there appears to 

be a strong margin for error where these touch and go’s are concerned. It is my understanding that the FAA currently controls the air space over the Port and that 

the USCG has no jurisdiction over this air space. 

• As we are moving towards collaboration and cooperation in this post 

9–11 environment, and working to secure our ports and borders, what 

types of protocol are in place and has there been communication with 

the FAA on this issue? 

• If not, is there a way that Congress may help?

5. The Coast Guard and TSA are responsible for developing the Transportation 

Worker Identification Card or TWIC. The MTSA required the development of the 

TWIC card. The program is way behind schedule. The delay is a problem for transportation security, but it is an especially big security challenge at our ports.
46

• When will DHS begin issuing TWIC cards and what is the revised 

schedule for completion of the initial issuance?

INSERTED FOR THE RECORD

OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD’S

INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM

REAR ADM. PATRICK M. STILLMAN, USCG, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTE- GRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM, U.S. COAST GUARD HEADQUEARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C., 

24 APRIL 2005

Introduction 

During congressional testimony in March and April 2005, Margaret Wrightson, 

Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO), discussed the constructive nature of GAO’s relationship with the Integrated 

Deepwater System (IDS) Program. This testimony incorporated GAO’s ongoing analysis of the Coast Guard, and actions taken on GAO recommendations from reports 

issued in 2004 on the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). 

GAO’s 2004 recommendations focused on four main areas of improvement, the 

Deepwater acquisition schedule, program management, contractor accountability, 

and cost controls. In conjunction with these GAO recommendations, the Program 

has made significant advancements to strengthen business operations and managerial practices—leading to noteworthy improvements in the acquisition. 

As Ms. Wrightson stated, ‘‘I compliment the Coast Guard on their very nimble approach to responding to GAO’s findings and recommendations even while we’re conducting our work. . . . When GAO goes out and finds a problem, before I can get 

the report written, the Coast Guard is actively engaging with us in a way to fix it.’’

Deepwater Acquisition Schedule 

Deepwater’s acquisition schedule, or Integrated Management System (IMS), is intended to enable the Coast Guard and its industry partner, Integrated Coast Guard 

Systems (ICGS), to track the cost, schedule, and performance of every contract in 

the Deepwater Program. GAO cited concerns in 2004 about the IMS’s reliability, 

and further stated a need to update the schedule annually. 

At that time, ICGS had initiated a third-party independent review of the IMS 

that during the ensuing months overhauled the entire system. Additionally, the 

Coast Guard will have ICGS update the implementation plan twice each year, which 

exceeds the GAO recommendation for annual updates. 

This work resulted in a greatly enhanced acquisition schedule that allows monitoring of contractual successes and areas in need of attention. As Ms. Wrightson testified, this IMS now provides the Coast Guard and ICGS with ‘‘a much better visibility into where they are with each particular part of the acquisition.’’

Program Management 

Deepwater Program Management improvements began with the restructuring of 

IDS Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Recognizing the notable success of IPTs in 

improving cost, schedule, and performance in industry and certain government product—development programs, the Coast Guard and ICGS instituted IPTs at the program’s inception. GAO offered guidance that proved very helpful in enabling the 

IDS-ICGS team to resource, train, and empower Deepwater IPTs to meet their responsibilities more effectively. 

IPT Measures of Success, which track training, member empowerment, application of project management processes, and communication and collaboration both 

within the IPT and with the IPT customer, have improved 69 percent since ICGS 

introduced them in August 2003. Deepwater also upgraded a computer-based information-sharing system to facilitate better document management, program oversight, and timely exchanges of information. 

GAO also identified aspects of Deepwater human capital management as a risk 

to the program. In response, Deepwater helped stabilize turnover rates by converting certain military positions (subject to normal rotations) to civilian billets. Additionally, the Coast Guard sought to retain institutional knowledge and insulate 

the program against inevitable personnel changes by hiring experienced program 

managers as support contractors and better preparing military officers with advanced training before they report to the program. Human capital management remains a long term challenge. 
47

GAO faulted the Coast Guard and ICGS a year ago for not communicating more 

effectively to the field about the status of the program and the assets that fleet operators would be receiving. Team Deepwater consequently conducted more than 100 

outreach visits to key ‘‘Operations and Support’’ units since March 2004, invited 

Coast Guard field personnel to serve on Integrated Product Teams and as local contacts for training and maintenance issues, and assigned ICGS site representatives 

at key field locations. 

The Deepwater team also increased the quality and quantity of communication 

products targeting the Coast Guard’s internal audience. Improved documentation 

now allows field operators to better understand the equipment they have or will receive, and enhanced maintenance system databases facilitate faster repairs when 

necessary. In the Program Executive Office, the Deepwater Communications Team 

surveyed the Coast Guard internal audience and established benchmarking data to 

track information-sharing effectiveness to guide its efforts to ensure that Coast 

Guard information needs outside of Headquarters are met appropriately.

Contractor Accountability 

The Program’s main source of contractor performance is an increasingly comprehensive ‘‘Strategy Map’’ (also an industry best practice) that identifies program 

objectives, measures, and accomplishments. The Strategy Map links the Department 

of Homeland Security goals to specific I DS goals. This strategy map relies upon 

several assessments of contractor accountability: 

• Earned Value Management compares actual contractor cost and schedule to 

projected amounts. 

• Integrated Product Team (IPT) Performance evaluates the effectiveness of joint 

Coast Guard/contractor development efforts. 

• Risk Mitigation identifies factors threatening cost, schedule, and performance. 

• Contract Deliverables provide insight into timely delivery of key contractor outputs. 

• Technical Performance Measures indicate whether actual technical specifics of 

assets/system meet the projected technical specifications. 

• Customer Satisfaction assesses the Coast Guard’s impression of contractor performance in delivering the system. 

• Operational Test & Evaluation demonstrates how the delivered system performs under actual operating conditions. 

• Operational Performance Measures reveal actual year-end performance results 

and modeled performance projections using the Coast Guard’s model. 

• Readiness Measures link to the Coast Guard Readiness Measurement System 

to capture information deepwater asset availability, casualties, mission capabilities, 

and human capital status. 

The Coast Guard also conducts formal, periodic assessments of ICGS intended to 

both incentivize ICGS to improve program execution with potential award fees and 

discourage low performance by establishing a body of records in preparation for the 

Coast Guard’s decision whether or not ICGS has earned a subsequent award term. 

In accordance with GAO recommendations, the Coast Guard has refined the process 

through which program managers provide assessments, and increased the objectivity of the criteria used to assess ICGS performance. 

GAO also focused on Deepwater Total Ownership Cost measurement as a means 

of ensuring contractor accountability. The Coast Guard understands that Total 

Ownership Costs (TOC) is a key performance factor. We have developed criteria for 

managing the TOC baseline to ensure that reasons for changes are well justified 

and documented. Any changes to Deepwater’s baseline are accompanied by a TOC 

analysis. In addition, the Coast Guard continually examines innovative ways to reduce Deepwater TOC.

Cost Control through Competition 

The Deepwater contract was competed over several years, and the Coast Guard 

analyzed multiple industry solutions before selecting ICGS. GAO, among other independent parties, previously endorsed the results of that competition. Additionally, 

Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman’s respective procurement systems are 

validated by Department of Defense audit agencies on a periodic basis. 

However, the Deepwater Program spans more than two decades and represents 

an extraordinarily wide scope composed of a multitude of subsystems. GAD seeks 

to ensure that competition within the IDS did not end with the selection of ICGS, 

and the Coast Guard has bolstered its assessment of ICGS subcontractor competition. More specifically, the Coast Guard examines ICGS ability to control cost during periodic award-term evaluations. It will base future IDS award terms, in part, 

on the degree to which ICGS makes competitive lower-tier awards. A third party 
48

independent assessment of competition employment by ICGS and it’s prime subcontractors is ongoing. 

ICGS has agreed to notify the Coast Guard prior to deviating from the accepted 

contract proposal if it decides to execute work in-house above $10 million that was 

proposed to be subcontracted by a company other than the ICGS prime contractor.

Conclusion 

As evidenced by these significant improvements in the last year, the Coast Guard 

and ICGS have embraced the GAD’s observations and continue to reinforce the 

Deepwater Program’s foundation and execution as it matures. Throughout that 

time, the Deepwater Team has maintained a working dialogue with the GAD, first 

by proactively issuing periodic update letters throughout the year, and recently 

hosting a series of meetings and providing written responses to significant data requests as the GAD prepares for testimony in 2005. As Ms. Wrightson testified to 

Congress in April, GAD is ‘‘working with the Coast Guard to put the internal controls and other management that we asked for into place. And once that’s done, one 

will still need to monitor that program because of its complexities.’’

The Deepwater Program, a performance-based acquisition that unites air, surface, 

logistics, and C4ISR domains, is an unprecedented endeavor. Deepwater’s mission, 

to properly equip the Coast Guard charged with preserving our maritime security 

and safety at an affordable cost to the American taxpayer, mandates continuous introspective improvements as well as external oversight.

Æ