SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4241-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SALIK HINTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Argued January 6, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 16-

01-0179.

Cody Tyler Mason, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Cody Tyler Mason, of 

counsel and on the briefs). 

Carey J. Huff, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Christopher J. Gramiccioni, 

Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Carey J. 

Huff, of counsel and on the brief). 

January 31, 2020
A- 4241-17T1 2

PER CURIAM

Tried by a jury, defendant Salik Hinton was convicted of second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count two); a seconddegree "certain persons" not to possession weapons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

7(b)(1) (count three); and third-degree possession of controlled dangerous 

substances ("CDS"), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one). The trial court 

sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of an eight-year custodial term 

with a five-year disqualifier on count three, an eight-year custodial term with a 

forty-two-month parole disqualifier on count two, and a four-year custodial 

term on count one.

Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentence on various grounds. 

We affirm.

 I.

 A.

The events precipitating this case occurred on August 18, 2015 in 

Asbury Park. Sergeant Lorenzo Pettway, an officer of the local police 

department, was patrolling the Asbury Park Garden Apartment Complex.

Sergeant Pettway testified at a pretrial suppression hearing that he was a 

member of the police department's street crimes unit, "a small proactive unit 

set up . . . to investigate and arrest individuals engaging in various criminal 
A- 4241-17T1 3

activities, including drug distribution, shootings, and gang activities" in 

Asbury Park. Part of the sergeant's role entailed "community policing," or 

establishing relationships with community residents so "they feel comfortable 

approaching us."

At the hearing, Pettway described the apartment complex location as a 

"high crime area," specifically noting there had been "numerous" arrests for 

shootings and drug distribution in the area and street gangs were in "control 

[of] different areas of the apartment complexes." There was an increased 

police patrol presence in the area on the night of August 18 because of a recent 

shooting. Defendant was not a suspect or otherwise implicated in that earlier 

shooting.

While on patrol, Pettway received information from a confidential 

source. The source apparently "flagged down" Pettway and, unsolicited, told 

him that "an individual only known by Salik was in the apartment complex, 

[and] was in possession of a handgun." Pettway stated he had a "history" with 

the confidential source and that he had provided Pettway with information that 

had proven "reliable in the past."1 The source also provided a physical 

1 The source was a not a confidential "informant," meaning there was no 

formal cooperation agreement between the informant and the prosecutor's 

office or police department. A tip by a civilian source is generally considered 

more reliable than that of a confidential informant, and normally the veracity 
A- 4241-17T1 4

description of "Salik:" a black male in his twenties, with a "heavy build," 

braids, and wearing a white t-shirt and orange shorts.

After receiving this information, Pettway immediately began to canvas 

the area seeking to corroborate it. The time was about midnight. Pettway 

drove in his patrol car to the corner of Jefferson Avenue and Atkins Avenue 

and saw three people, including defendant, standing in a grassy area on the 

corner. The sergeant recognized defendant as matching the physical 

description provided by the source.

Pettway was wearing a badge around his neck, jeans, and a "police shirt 

that says police across the front and Asbury Park Street Crimes Unit on the 

back." Although his car was unmarked, Pettway testified that "everyone 

knows it" and "it might as well be a marked police vehicle."

According to Pettway, he stopped his vehicle and "decided to approach"

the persons. Defendant had his back turned to Pettway as he approached. The 

two other persons told defendant that a police officer was approaching, and 

defendant turned around to face Pettway. Pettway then recognized defendant

from previous encounters in the complex.

____________________

of the source is assumed. State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super. 51, 79 (App. Div. 

2010); see also State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 362 (2002).
A- 4241-17T1 5

Pettway addressed defendant, initially saying, "Come here. Can I talk to 

you for a second?" According to Pettway, defendant began to walk away 

before he finished talking. "[A]s [defendant] was walking away, he started to 

reach towards his pockets."

Pettway followed defendant and addressed him a second time. The 

sergeant said, "Salik, come here. I just need to talk to you for a second." 

According to Pettway, defendant gave a "mumbled" response, and continued to 

walk away as Pettway followed. Then defendant began to run. Pettway 

estimated the entire encounter from his approach until defendant began to run 

lasted "a few seconds."

Pettway pursued defendant as he ran. The sergeant "believed 

[defendant] possibly had a gun" based on defendant's flight and his observed 

motion of reaching into his pockets as he ran.

As Pettway ran, he repeatedly yelled for defendant to "stop" and "stop 

running." The sergeant also radioed his location, a description of defendant, 

and the direction of pursuit to nearby officers.

After a chase estimated by Pettway to consume about two to three 

minutes, defendant tripped over a curb and fell to the ground in a parking lot. 

When he fell, Pettway saw objects fall out of defendant's right front pants 

pocket. There was "low lighting" in the area but it was not dark. Pettway 
A- 4241-17T1 6

stated he could clearly see objects fall out of defendant's pocket from about 

twenty feet away. The sergeant did not immediately recognize the items when 

they fell out of defendant's pockets.

Sergeant Alistair Sweeney, another Asbury Park police officer, 

approached defendant from another direction. The two officers grabbed and 

handcuffed defendant. The officers then recovered a bag containing seven 

pills later identified as Percocet, a small semi-automatic handgun with five 

bullets in the magazine, and marijuana. Pettway testified the items were on the 

ground "not even a foot" away from where they detained defendant.

Defendant testified in his own defense at the suppression hearing. 

According to defendant, on the night of August 18, he was standing in the Vita 

Gardens area of the apartment complex with his cousins. He had been 

standing there for about "three or four minutes" when he saw Pettway get out 

of his car and approach. Defendant initially suggested he did not know the car 

or its driver, but then testified that he recognized Pettway as he approached the 

group.

Defendant asserted he did not want to talk with Pettway because the 

sergeant knew him and allegedly "always harassed [him] since he was a 

juvenile." Defendant later clarified that on previous occasions Pettway had 

stopped and arrested him.
A- 4241-17T1 7

Defendant stated that he ran because Pettway "kept coming behind" him

as he walked away. He claimed that the gun that the police recovered had not 

fallen out of his pockets and did not belong to him. Rather, he contended it 

was already lying on the ground nearby.

B.

Following the pretrial hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion 

to suppress the gun and CDS obtained by the police as a result of this 

warrantless encounter. The court issued a nine-page written opinion detailing 

its factual findings and legal conclusions concerning the motion.

The court found Sergeant Pettway's account of the events to be more 

credible than defendant's version. Specifically, the court described Pettway's 

testimony as "clear, candid and convincing." By contrast, the court found 

defendant's testimony "confusing, self-serving, and contradictory at times." 

Moreover, the court noted that defendant's testimony largely corroborated

Pettway's, particularly as to the seizure itself.

In its legal analysis, the court rejected the State's initial argument that 

Pettway was working in a "community caretaking" capacity when he 

approached defendant and could not rely on that exception to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirements. However, the court found other grounds to 

justify the warrantless stop and search.
A- 4241-17T1 8

In particular, the court found Pettway had received information from a 

reliable source, and subsequently corroborated that information when he found 

defendant in the complex and matching the source's description. The court 

particularly noted defendant's observed demeanor, his initial presence in a 

high-crime area, and his flight from the scene. The court concluded the officer

had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based on his corroboration of the 

confidential source's testimony, and that additional facts also justified the stop.

C.

Pettway was a principal witness for the State at the ensuing trial, along 

with a ballistics expert and a laboratory analyst who tested the seized drugs. 

Defendant elected not to testify before the jury, and he presented no witnesses.

The jury found defendant guilty of the unlawful gun possession and CDS 

possession counts. In a second phase of the trial, which immediately followed 

with no additional testimony, the jury found defendant guilty of the "certain 

persons" count. Defendant stipulated to his previous commission of a 

predicate offense subjecting him to the certain-persons statute.

As we have already noted, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate 

eight-year term. This appeal followed.

II.

Defendant raises the following points in his brief on appeal:
A- 4241-17T1 9

Point I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE 

DEFENDANT WAS UNLAWFULLY SEIZED 

WHEN THE OFFICER ORDERED HIM TO "COME 

HERE" AND PURSUED HIM BASED ON A 

CONCLUSORY AND LARGELY 

UNCORROBORATED TIP FROM A 

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE.

A. Defendant was seized when the officer approached 

him, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered 

him to "come here."

B. The detention was unlawful and suppression of the 

evidence is required because the confidential source 

was not demonstrably reliable and the other factors 

cited by the trial court could not establish reasonable 

suspicion before the detention occurred.

Point II

REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL 

WAS TAINTED BY IMPROPER BAD-ACT 

EVIDENCE WHEN THE OFFICER IMPLIED THAT 

DEFENDANT WAS A GANG MEMBER, 

INFORMED THE JURY THAT THE GUN WAS 

LOADED, AND TESTIFIED THAT DEFENDANT 

WAS IN A "HIGH-CRIME" AREA, AND BECAUSE 

NO LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROVIDED 

ABOUT THAT EVIDENCE (not raised below).

A. The trial court erred in permitting testimony 

implying defendant was a gang member, that the gun 

was loaded, and that defendant was in a "high-crime" 

area.

B. Reversal is required because the evidence 

suggested defendant is a dangerous criminal and the 
A- 4241-17T1 10

court gave no limiting charges to prevent a conviction 

on that basis.

POINT III

THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE COURT 

DOUBLE-COUNTED THE PREDICATE 

CONVICTION FOR DEFENDANT'S CERTAIN 

PERSONS OFFENSE, IMPROPERLY 

CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S PENDING 

OFFENSES, AND WRONGLY REJECTED 

MITIGATING FACTORS ONE AND TWO 

WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE GUN'S 

INOPERABILITY.

Defendant's reply brief largely restates these points, but he also raises 

the following argument responding to the State's argument of attenuation:

I.B. THE SEIZURE OF THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT

ATTENUATED DUE TO DEFENDANT'S FLIGHT.

Having considered these arguments in light of the record and the 

applicable law, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

A.

The only issue calling for our detailed examination is defendant's 

primary argument that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. 

He contends that none of the exceptions to the constitutional warrant 

requirements invoked by the State—either at the trial level or in this appeal—

justify this warrantless stop and the seizure of the gun and CDS that fell out of 

defendant's pocket in the course of the police chase.
A- 4241-17T1 11

The State counters that the police action was constitutional. In 

particular, the State argues Sergeant Pettway had reasonable suspicion to stop 

defendant based upon the information from the civilian source, and also based 

on the circumstances of the encounter, including defendant's conduct when the 

officer approached him.

Alternatively, the State argues the record developed at the suppression 

hearing objectively shows that defendant was obstructing the police 

investigation by running away for two to three minutes after being commanded 

to stop, and reaching into his pockets.2 We choose to rely on this alternative 

ground, which the State acknowledges was not raised below, in upholding the 

suppression ruling. In doing so, we reject defendant's procedural argument 

that we should decline to reach the obstruction issue, as we are satisfied the 

existing record is amply developed on the subject. See State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 

469, 480 (2017) (noting appellate courts may entertain arguments not raised 

below if the record is sufficiently developed to enable such review).

In reviewing this search-and-seizure issue, we must afford substantial 

deference to the motion judge's determination that the sergeant's testimony 

about the encounter was more credible than defendant's version. State v. 

Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015); State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). 

2 The State does not rely on appeal upon the community caretaking exception.
A- 4241-17T1 12

Among other things, we rely upon the factual findings of the judge with regard 

to the officer's observations and defendant's behavior at the scene. That

including the nature and duration of defendant's flight and defendant's action 

of putting his hands into his pockets while he ran.

To perform our analysis, we need not resolve the parties' dispute as to

whether the sergeant had sufficient reasonable suspicion to twice order 

defendant to "come here." Nor do we resolve whether there is a sufficient 

basis for Pettway to rely upon the source's assertion that defendant was present

in the apartment complex carrying a handgun. In bypassing these discrete 

issues, we do note that defendant does not argue the sergeant engaged in 

discriminatory racial profiling in approaching him at the apartment complex 

and demanding him to "Come here." We also do not reach the issue of 

whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave once the sergeant 

made those imperative commands, notwithstanding defendant's testimony at 

the suppression hearing that he subjectively felt he could leave.

1.

The crux of our analysis involves principles of obstruction and 

attenuation that have been well established in New Jersey case law. As a 

general matter, if a civilian's flight from a police officer independently 

supplies probable cause that he or she is obstructing the police, the claimed 
A- 4241-17T1 13

unconstitutionality of the officer's underlying stop of that person can be 

inconsequential, so long as the flight is sufficiently attenuated from the stop. 

In such instances of obstruction, evidence derived from the post-flight seizure 

of contraband does not have to be suppressed.

The case law from the Supreme Court on these attenuation issues is 

instructive. In State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 451-52 (2006), our Supreme 

Court held that "when a police officer is acting in good faith and under color 

of his authority, a person must obey the officer's order to stop and may not 

take flight without violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29–1."3 That statute embodies the 

3 The obstruction statute reads:

Obstructing Administration of Law or Other 

Governmental Function. a. A person commits an 

offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts 

the administration of law or other governmental 

function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public 

servant from lawfully performing an official function 

by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or 

physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any 

independently unlawful act. This section does not 

apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an 

official duty, or any other means of avoiding 

compliance with law without affirmative interference 

with governmental functions.

b. An offense under this section is a crime of the 

fourth degree if the actor obstructs the detection or 

investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person 
A- 4241-17T1 14

strong public policy that "a person involved in a police encounter should [not] 

have an incentive to flee or resist, thus endangering himself, the police, and the 

innocent public.” Id. at 451.

The Supreme Court in Crawley upheld the defendant's conviction for 

obstruction and declined to consider the constitutionality of the underlying 

stop. The Court reasoned that, whether the initial stop was in "good faith" and 

under the color of law (and therefore a predicate to an obstruction charge) was 

not critical to the ultimate issue of constitutionality. Id. at 444. Even if a stop 

is unconstitutional, "[a] person has no constitutional right to use an improper 

stop as justification to commit the new and distinct offense of resisting arrest, 

eluding, escape, or obstruction, thus precipitating a dangerous chase that could 

have deadly consequences." Id. at 459.

The following year, the Court further explained the relationship between 

obstruction and suppression of evidence in State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1

(2007). In Williams, two police officers approached the defendant late at night 

in an area known to be "rampant with weapons and drug-dealing offenses" 

based on a station dispatch that a black man wearing a black jacket was 

____________________

for a crime, otherwise it is a disorderly persons 

offense.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. (emphasis added)].
A- 4241-17T1 15

dealing drugs at that location. Id. at 4-5. The officers stopped the defendant 

and asked him to put his hands on his head so they could search him. Id. at 5. 

When the officers approached, the defendant pushed one of them and fled. 

Ibid. Following a short chase, the officers detained the defendant and found a 

handgun in his waistband. Ibid. The defendant sought to suppress the 

handgun.

The Court in Williams presumed that the underlying stop was 

unconstitutional, but nonetheless declined to suppress the evidence. Id. at 10. 

The Court reiterated that a person must submit to a lawful investigatory stop, 

"regardless of its constitutionality." Id. at 10. The Court further clarified that 

whether an officer acts in good faith is a lenient standard. So long as an 

officer making an investigative stop reasonably relies on information provided 

to him or her, and does not "without any basis detain[] a person on the street," 

the officer is presumed to be acting in good faith. Id. at 13. (quoting Crawley, 

187 N.J. at 461 n.8).

The Court in Williams expressly considered whether the defendant's 

obstructive behavior was sufficiently attenuated from the allegedly 

unconstitutional stop. In doing so, the Court applied the traditional standard 

for attenuation for a constitutional violation, examining: "'(1) the temporal 

proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the 
A- 4241-17T1 16

presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of 

the police misconduct.'" Id. at 15 (quoting State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 653 

(1990)).

The "determinative" factor in Williams was the presence of intervening 

circumstances: i.e., the defendant's "resistance to the pat down and flight from 

the police in this case." Id. at 18. The Court found that such resistance was 

"an intervening act—the crime of obstruction—that completely purged the 

taint from the unconstitutional investigatory stop." Id. at 18. Examining prior 

cases where defendants had similarly evaded law enforcement officials, the 

Court concluded in Williams that "the law should deter and give no incentive 

to suspects who would endanger the police and themselves by not submitting 

to official authority." Id. at 17. Since the defendant's obstruction in Williams

was sufficiently attenuated from the underlying constitutional violation, the 

Court held suppression of the evidence was not required.

2.

A straightforward application of these Supreme Court precedents to this 

case demonstrates the seized gun and CDS should not be suppressed. The 

State maintains that Pettway acted in good faith when he approached defendant

based on a tip from a confidential source. Pettway testified that he was 
A- 4241-17T1 17

making an investigative stop when he approached defendant and told him to 

"come here."

Defendant was obligated to obey the officer's command, even if it was 

arguably unconstitutional. Williams, 192 N.J. at 10. We agree with the State 

that, when defendant fled, "there was probable cause to believe [he] violated 

the obstruction statute. . . [and] [t]hat flight was an intervening act that purged 

the taint from any unconstitutional stop." Evidence obtained following his 

flight accordingly should not have been suppressed.

Defendant argues his flight was not attenuated. He contends that the 

first attenuating factor of "close temporal proximity" particularly weighs

against suppression. We are unpersuaded the estimated two or three minute 

flight had such close proximity in time. In any event, as the Supreme Court 

expressed in Williams, the "determinative" focus is on the second attenuation 

factor, i.e., whether the obstruction was an intervening circumstance. 

Williams, 192 N.J. at 16.

With regard to this second factor, defendant relies upon this court's 

opinion in State v. Williams, 410 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2009), certif. 
A- 4241-17T1 18

denied, 201 N.J. 440 (2010) ("Williams II")4, to argue the seizure and his flight 

were not sufficiently attenuated because, in contrast to the defendant in the 

Supreme Court's Williams decision, he did not physically resist a lawful 

seizure.

Physical resistance is not required to establish attenuation. Although 

physical resistance would clearly be an example of obstruction of justice, the 

statute clearly refers to "force" or "flight" as independent means of obstructing 

a lawful investigation. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. As the Court in Crawley observed, 

"any flight from police detention is fraught with the potential for violence 

because flight will incite a pursuit, which in turn will endanger the suspect, the 

police, and innocent bystanders." Crawley, 187 N.J. at 460 n.7.

Defendant also argues that, unlike in Crawley or the earlier Williams

decision, in this case he was not actually charged with obstruction. He argues 

the State consequently should not be able to assert attenuation. We disagree.

The State's decision not to charge obstruction is not controlling. That 

decision is discretionary. Prosecutors frequently do not charge less serious 

offenses when other, more serious charges arising out of the same incident are 

lodged against a defendant.

4 Despite the common surname, the Williams II case in this court involved a 

different defendant and prosecution than the Supreme Court's earlier opinion in 

Williams.
A- 4241-17T1 19

The plain language of the obstruction statute prohibits "prevent[ing] . . . 

a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means 

of flight . . . " N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (emphasis added). Both Williams and 

Crawley hold that an investigative stop is such an "official function."

Here, defendant fled the scene when Pettway attempted to make an 

investigative stop. Regardless of whether the State believed there was 

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to charge him for the crime, at the very 

least there was probable cause to pursue him when he fled and disobeyed the 

officer's command to stop.

Furthermore, defendant's uncontroverted movement of his hands into his 

pockets strengthens the State's position. Such a movement reasonably 

indicates defendant could be armed and reaching for a weapon, thereby 

threatening the officer's safety.

Lastly, as to the third factor, defendant has not shown that the "flagrancy 

and purpose" of the alleged police misconduct weighs against attenuation. To 

the contrary, Pettway and his fellow officers acted sensibly in chasing 

defendant—who appeared as if he could have been armed—when he ignored 

Pettway's directives and fled. Even if, for the sake of argument, Pettway 

initially lacked what a court might conclude was reasonable suspicion to 
A- 4241-17T1 20

conduct an investigatory stop, the officer's initial actions in stopping defendant 

were not "flagrantly" unconstitutional.

In sum, the pertinent factors, on balance, support the State's argument of 

attenuation. Suppression of the seized evidence was not required.

We therefore affirm the denial of the suppression motion, albeit for 

different legal reasons than those stated by the trial court in its decision. ElSioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 169 (App. Div. 2005) 

(recognizing our function as an appellate court is to review orders and 

decisions, not opinions, and that we can affirm those decisions without 

adopting the trial court's legal reasoning). See also Scott, 229 N.J. at 479.

B.

The remaining issues raised by defendant concerning—the alleged 

improper admission of prejudicial character evidence against him at trial, and 

alleged sentencing errors—lack sufficient merit to warrant much discussion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We only add the following brief comments.

Defendant maintains the trial court should not have admitted evidence:

(1) impliedly suggesting he was a gang member; (2) revealing that the 

recovered gun was loaded; and (3) stating that the events took place in a "highcrime" area. He further contends the trial court, sua sponte, should have issued 

a limiting instruction about these items. We discern no plain error stemming 
A- 4241-17T1 21

from these matters that were not raised below. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 326, 

336 (1971). Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion as to these 

evidential items. State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012).

None of the three items transgress the prior "bad acts" limitations of the 

character rules and N.J.R.E. 404(b). The State's witnesses did not state that 

defendant was a member of a gang. Unlike his testimony at the suppression 

hearing, Pettway's trial testimony that he was in the area as a member of the 

Street Crimes Unit and responding to a recent "incident" at the complex did 

not necessarily suggest to the jury it was a "high-crime area." Moreover, the 

sergeant made clear to the jury that defendant was not a suspect in the earlier 

incident.

As to the State's proof that the seized gun was loaded, we conclude such 

evidence was "intrinsic" to the charged firearm possession crimes, regardless 

of the gun's actual operability. State v. Gantt, 101 N.J. 573, 584 (1986) 

(holding that an inoperable gun constitutes a "firearm" if it was originally 

designed to fire bullets); see also State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 161-62 (2011) 

(holding that relevant evidence "intrinsic" to an offense does not have to 

satisfy Rule 404(b)'s admissibility standards). In short, no reversible 

evidential error occurred, and there was no need for any special limiting 

instructions to the jury.
A- 4241-17T1 22

We likewise reject as unmeritorious defendant's challenges to his eightyear prison sentence. The trial court appropriately found aggravating 

sentencing factors three, six, and nine applicable. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), 

(6), and (9). Among other things, the court recognized defendant's two 

previous indictable convictions and the substantial need for deterrence. No 

mitigating factors demonstrably apply. There was no impermissible double 

counting. The trial court's reference to pending charges against defendant, 

although improvident, does not undermine the overall fairness or integrity of 

the sentence.

The sentence does not shock the judicial conscience or represent an 

abuse of the trial court's wide discretion over sentencing. See State v. Case, 

220 N.J. 49, 54 (2014); State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 607-08 (2010). We 

therefore uphold it, as well as defendant's conviction.

Affirmed.