In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-18-00002-CV 

THE STATE OF TEXAS AND JERRY PATTERSON AS COMMISSIONER 

OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

AND COMMISSIONER GEORGE P. BUSH, APPELLANTS 

 

V. 

 

JIMMY GLEN RIEMER, RICHARD COON, JR., JUNE MEETZE COON 

TRUST, HAP JOHNSON REALTY CO., LLC, AND W.R. EDWARDS, JR. 

 D/B/A W.R. EDWARDS, JR. OIL AND GAS, ET AL., APPELLEES 

 

On Appeal from the 84th District Court 

Hutchinson County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 30,441-B, Honorable Curt Brancheau, Presiding 

 

February 15, 2019 

 

ORDER 

 

Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

In this interlocutory appeal, appellants the State of Texas, the General Land Office 

of the State of Texas, George P. Bush, Commissioner, and former commissioner Jerry 

Patterson (hereinafter collectively “GLO”) challenge the trial court’s order denying their 

plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.& REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 

2018) (permitting the interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying a governmental 
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unit’s plea to the jurisdiction). The dispute in the underlying lawsuit primarily concerns 

the boundary between the State-owned riverbed of the Canadian River in Hutchinson 

County and the riparian surface and mineral interests of appellees Jimmy Glen Riemer, 

et al. Because of the pendency of the interlocutory appeal all proceedings in the trial 

court are stayed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (interlocutory appeal 

under subsection 51.014(a)(8) stays commencement of trial and “all other proceedings in 

the trial court”).

Appellees have filed a motion asking us to modify the stay of proceedings in the 

trial court so they may seek that court’s appointment of a receiver to manage the disputed 

property and oppose the Texas Railroad Commission’s effort to plug abandoned oil and 

gas wells on the property. The GLO responded in opposition to appellees’ motion, 

pointing out the Railroad Commission is not a party to the underlying suit, and contending 

resolution of the riverbed-ownership dispute has no bearing on the Railroad 

Commission’s legal obligation to plug inactive or abandoned wells; appellees’ motion to 

modify the stay is an improper collateral attack on a Railroad Commission order; and a 

challenge of the Railroad Commission’s plugging operations must be pursued according 

to rules and statutes governing plugging. In their reply to the GLO’s response, appellees 

emphasize their request for appointment of a receiver to “operate the wells and thereby 

remove them from the inactive status that triggered the intended plugging.” They deny 

their motion is a collateral attack on a Railroad Commission order but even were that 

correct, they continue, the trial court should have the opportunity to appoint a receiver to 

operate the wells. Appellees further assert that by joining the Railroad Commission, if 
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necessary, all issues can be addressed jointly and it is in the best interest of the GLO and 

appellees to avoid expending public funds for plugging the wells.

The statutory stay of section 51.014(c) arises automatically and is absolute. 

Superior HealthPlan, Inc. v. Badawo, No. 03-18-00691-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10797 

(Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 21, 2018, per curiam order). A trial court has no discretion to 

ignore its effect. In re Texas Educ. Agency, 441 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2014, orig. proceeding). Appellate Rule 29.3 grants an appellate court discretion to make 

temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties’ rights until disposition of the appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3; see also City of Sealy v. Town Park Ctr., No. 01-17-00127-CV, 

2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 8106, at *2 n.1, *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2017, 

no pet.). And in one instance we exercised our discretion to modify the stay for the limited 

purpose of allowing the continued operation of a temporary order of the trial court 

authorizing a court-appointed master to review bills and submit them to the trial court for 

final approval and payment. State v. Signal Drilling, LLC, No. 07-17-00412-CV, 2018 

Tex. App. LEXIS 727 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 23, 2018, per curiam order); compare

Bishop v. City of Austin, No. 03-16-00580-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13920, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Austin Sep. 20, 2016, per curiam order) (modifying the stay on a joint motion for 

the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to sign confidentiality orders) with Badawo, 

2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10797 (refusing to modify the stay so that appellee could pursue 

motions to sanction appellants and their counsel; dismiss their notice of appeal; and 

compel discovery responses). The modification of the stay appellees seek here 

dramatically exceeds that we authorized in Signal Drilling, where we merely lifted the stay 

to permit continued compliance with a trial court order made prior to the interlocutory 
4

appeal. Signal Drilling, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 727, at *2. Appellees seek to expand the 

litigation in the trial court by pursuing appointment of a receiver, and by seeking relief that 

would require joining the Railroad Commission as a party to oppose its proposed plugging 

operations. Accordingly, in light of the facts and law discussed, we deny appellees’ 

motion to modify the stay.

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam