GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

May 2000 WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION

DOD’s Actions to 

Combat Weapons Use 

Should Be More 

Integrated and 

Focused

GAO/NSIAD-00-97

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Chronology of Major Counterproliferation Milestones 30

Appendix II: Our Recent Unclassified Reports on

Counterproliferation and Related Subjects 32

Appendix III: Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation 34

Appendix IV: DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies 46

Appendix V: Organizations and Offices Contacted 58

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense 61

Appendix VII: Comments From the Department of Energy 70

Tables Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken by DOD to Institutionalize 

Counterproliferation 34

Table 2: Comparison of Counterproliferation-Related Areas of

the 1996 and 1999 Defense Planning Guidance 36

Table 3: Examples of Joint and Combined Exercises With 

Counterproliferation Elements 42

Table 4: DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies 56

Figures Figure 1: Counterproliferation Areas, Organizational Elements, and 

Functions 15

Figure 2: Organizations and Functions of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense 48

Figure 3: Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff 49

Figure 4: Organization of the Military Services 50

Figure 5: Organization and Functions of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency 53

Figure 6: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Personnel Levels 54

Figure 7: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding Profile for the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency 55

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-284722 Letr

May 26, 2000

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In December 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced the Defense 

Counterproliferation Initiative in response to the growing threat posed by 

the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, often 

referred to as weapons of mass destruction.1

 The Initiative calls for the 

development of offensive and defensive capabilities—to include equipping, 

training, and preparing U.S. forces, in coalition with the forces of friends 

and allies—to prevail over an adversary that threatens or uses such 

weapons in peacetime and during all phases of conflicts. The Secretary of 

Defense has described the threat and the potential use of these weapons 

against U.S. and allied forces as the greatest and most complex challenge 

facing the Department of Defense (DOD). The Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, in testimony to the Congress in February 2000, 

underscored the presence and seriousness of the threat.

Since the Initiative was announced, the Congress has increased funding for 

counterproliferation while there have been congressional committee 

concerns expressed about the direction and DOD’s management of the 

counterproliferation program. At your request, we reviewed DOD’s 

implementation of the Initiative. This report describes DOD actions to 

1

Counterproliferation is the activities of DOD to combat the spread of NBC capabilities and 

the means to deliver them. The offensive component of counterproliferation (referred to as 

“counterforce”) includes actions taken to defeat NBC targets, such as mobile missile 

launchers, and NBC weapons production and storage facilities. The defensive component 

includes “active defense,” which are actions taken to destroy enemy NBC weapons and 

delivery vehicles while en route to their targets; “passive defense,” which are measures 

taken to help U.S. forces survive and operate in an NBC environment, such as biological and 

chemical agent detectors and protective clothing and masks; and “consequence 

management,” which refers to efforts to mitigate the consequences resulting from the use of 

an NBC weapon, such as the decontamination of weapon systems and equipment and 

casualty evacuation. Consequence management measures are often included in passive 

defense.
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make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine 

consideration within its organization, activities, and functions and 

identifies other actions the Department can take to improve 

implementation of the Initiative. It also examines the actions of the 

interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to 

coordinate the research and development programs of DOD, the 

Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence community2

 to identify and 

eliminate unnecessary duplication.

Background The U. S. National Military Strategy states that the continued proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological 

weapons, has made their use by an adversary increasingly likely in both a 

major theater war and smaller scale contingencies. These weapons are 

capable of causing mass casualties, and their threat or use can disrupt the 

planning and conduct of military operations. DOD believes effective 

deterrence against the use of these weapons depends on a range of nuclear 

and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive 

defenses and supporting command, control, communications, and 

intelligence. DOD estimates that for fiscal year 2001 it will invest over

$7.3 billion on the research, development, and acquisition of such 

conventional response capabilities, with about $5.3 billion of that 

investment on missile defense. Although an unclassified estimate is 

unavailable, additional funding is spent to provide intelligence support for 

counterproliferation.

To help ensure that DOD’s counterproliferation policy objectives are met 

and that implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated 

and focused, the Secretary of Defense, in 1996, established the 

Counterproliferation Council composed of senior DOD civilian and military 

2

The U.S. intelligence community is a group of 13 government agencies and organizations 

that carry out the intelligence activities of the U.S. government. Members include the 

Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 

the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 

intelligence organizations of the military services.
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officials.3 The Council is to monitor departmental progress on developing 

the strategy, doctrine, and force planning necessary to effectively execute 

its counterproliferation objectives. In 1997, DOD’s Quadrennial Defense 

Review report4

 stated that a key challenge the Department must meet to 

ensure it is prepared for the NBC threat is to institutionalize—integrate or 

make permanent—counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every 

facet of military activity. A chronology of major events surrounding DOD’s 

Counterproliferation Initiative is included in appendix I.

To review activities and programs related to countering proliferation 

threats within the Departments of Defense and Energy and the U.S. 

intelligence community, in 1993 the Congress established the 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee.5

 The Committee’s 

charter includes addressing shortfalls in existing and programmed 

capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC weapons of mass 

destruction and their delivery systems; identifying and eliminating 

undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts; and establishing 

priorities for programs and funding. Since 1995, the Committee has 

submitted an annual report to the Congress detailing its findings and 

recommendations.

We have extensively reviewed U.S. government efforts to both prevent and 

combat the proliferation of NBC weapons. A summary of our recent 

unclassified reports on combating the use of such weapons is provided in 

appendix II.

3

The Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is to continue until the 

end of fiscal year 2001, by which time counterproliferation is expected to be established as a 

mainstream DOD mission area. Its tenure can be extended by the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense.

4

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, May 1997. The 

congressionally mandated review was designed to be a fundamental and comprehensive 

examination of U.S. defense needs from 1997 to 2015: potential threats, strategy, force 

structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and 

other elements of the defense program. (Sections 921-926 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-201.) Another review is to be 

conducted in 2001 to revisit defense needs and make recommendations to the new 

President, as mandated by section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65).

5

Section 1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160).
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Results in Brief DOD is taking steps to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a 

matter of routine consideration within its activities and functions, such as 

training and field exercises and the acquisition of weapon systems and 

equipment. Since the 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was 

announced, DOD has given greater emphasis to this threat in policy and 

planning documents, and the Joint Staff6

 has made considerable effort to 

determine and prioritize the counterproliferation requirements of the 

unified commands.7

 The services, particularly the Air Force, have increased 

the importance placed on counterproliferation requirements in their 

acquisition programs, training, and doctrine. Regional unified commands 

have incorporated counterproliferation concepts, equipment, and tasks 

into their planning and military exercises.

While DOD has taken positive steps, it can do more to integrate and focus 

its response to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons. DOD does not have an overarching joint 

counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of 

how DOD should respond in a nuclear, biological, and chemical 

environment across the spectrum of military operations. Such a document, 

which was recently approved for development, will help ensure that 

counterproliferation is being satisfactorily integrated in the entire body of 

joint doctrine. DOD also has not taken sufficient action to provide 

reasonable assurance that its weapon systems and equipment can survive 

and operate in a biological and chemical environment. Additionally, studies 

by DOD and a congressionally mandated commission indicate that DOD’s 

organization structure may be too diffused to effectively manage and 

integrate the Department’s counterproliferation mission.

DOD has not developed key strategy documents and management plans to 

aid in directing and managing its counterproliferation initiatives. Internal 

DOD reviews have identified the need for a comprehensive strategy for 

countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a military 

6

The staff that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in executing the Chairman’s 

responsibilities.

7

Regional unified commands are composed of components of two or more military 

departments and have a broad continuing mission under a single commander that has 

geographic responsibilities. The regional commands are the Joint Forces, Central, 

European, Pacific, and Southern Commands. Four other unified commands—the Space, 

Special Operations, Strategic, and Transportation Commands—have functional 

responsibilities.
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strategy for integrating offensive and defensive capabilities. There is also 

no management plan to guide, oversee, and integrate departmentwide 

initiatives, which would include a reporting and evaluation process with 

performance measures to allow for a continual assessment of the 

Department’s progress in achieving goals and objectives.

DOD primarily coordinates its counterproliferation activities with the 

Department of Energy and the intelligence community through the 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. DOD, Energy, and 

intelligence agency officials generally expressed satisfaction with the 

exchange of information that the Committee had provided about ongoing 

programs among the agencies. However, the Committee has taken little 

action to identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies among research 

and development programs, one of the primary reasons the Congress 

established it. The Committee does not have a process to facilitate such 

determinations and provide a basis to make decisions on eliminating 

undesired redundancies.

This report includes recommendations that the Secretary of Defense 

(1) develop strategies, a management plan, and performance measures to 

help guide and manage the implementation of DOD’s counterproliferation 

actions; (2) include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an 

examination of the Department’s organization for counterproliferation; 

(3) take steps to help ensure that the nuclear, biological, and chemical 

threat is being given sufficient attention in military doctrine and in the 

design and development of weapon systems and equipment; and (4) devise 

and implement a mechanism to help identify and eliminate undesirable 

redundancies among counterproliferation programs. DOD generally agreed 

with our recommendations and indicated that many corrective actions that 

are responsive to them have already been started. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The 

Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed a draft 

of the report but did not comment on our findings and recommendations.

DOD Has Taken 

Actions to Integrate 

Counterproliferation

DOD has taken actions to integrate the threat of NBC weapons into its 

organization, activities, and functions. Actions include incorporating 

counterproliferation guidance into major department planning and policy 

documents; establishing offices and other organizational elements that 

focus on counterproliferation issues; increasing NBC warfare emphasis in 

training, exercises, and education; and improving intelligence support of 

counterproliferation initiatives. DOD officials believe these actions have 
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improved the Department’s ability to develop and field the capabilities 

required by U.S. forces to respond to an enemy’s use or threatened use of 

NBC weapons.

Since 1993 DOD has been giving greater emphasis to the NBC threat in its 

planning and policy documents. For instance, the defense planning 

guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense to DOD components has 

placed increased emphasis on the NBC threat, particularly the biological 

and chemical threat, and the importance of preparing for it. The 1998 and 

1999 planning guidance state that countering the NBC threat will be given a 

high priority in defense planning. These documents discuss factors, such as 

intelligence and logistics support and the active and passive defense and 

counterforce capabilities, that are required to fight and win in an NBC 

environment in greater detail than the 1996 guidance. The documents 

require that major joint8

 exercises routinely include activities to assess and 

enhance preparations for sustained operations in chemical and biological 

warfare environments. The military services and the unified commands are 

to ensure that routine individual, unit, joint, and combined9

 training 

exercises incorporate realistic chemical and biological threats.

To better manage its counterproliferation efforts, DOD has taken steps to 

improve its organizational structure. For example, the Air Force has 

established a central headquarters office for counterproliferation, which is 

the focal point for all Air Force counterproliferation activities, including 

doctrine, strategy, policy, and requirements. This office has developed a 

master plan to provide the overarching guidance to enable the Air Force to 

meet its counterproliferation goals and a long-term plan to guide the 

development and acquisition of improved counterproliferation capabilities. 

The office has also initiated studies of subjects such as the implications of 

the NBC threat for strategic airlift operations and the metrics used to 

assess the readiness of Air Force units to respond to the threat. These two 

studies are to be used to identify solutions to current airlift problems and to 

develop meaningful criteria for measuring and reporting force readiness.

In training and exercises, the unified commands and the military services 

have incorporated counterproliferation tasks into service training, large8

“Joint” refers to two or more of the military services operating in coordinated action, such 

as a joint exercise involving units from the Army and the Navy.

9

“Combined” is used when two or more of two or more allies operate with U.S. forces.
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scale exercises, computer-assisted exercises, seminars, and operations. In 

intelligence support, the Defense Intelligence Agency—DOD’s focal point 

for integrating intelligence information on foreign NBC warfare programs 

in support of counterproliferation—has established a counterproliferation 

support office and is increasing the size of the office’s staff. It has created a 

center to provide improved intelligence analysis on underground facilities. 

Potential adversaries may use such facilities to protect and conceal their 

NBC weapons programs. The Agency has also developed a computerized 

system to provide current, substantive intelligence information and 

support to policy makers, force planners, and unified combatant 

commanders. Appendix III discusses other institutionalization actions.

Limitations Remain in 

DOD’s Integration of 

Counterproliferation

Integration shortcomings require DOD’s attention to better ensure that its 

counterproliferation efforts are integrated and focused. We identified the 

following four:

• An overarching joint doctrine document has not been developed to 

provide a comprehensive, integrated picture of how DOD should 

respond and operate in an NBC environment across the spectrum of 

military operations.

• A systematic approach does not exist to provide reasonable assurance 

that NBC survivability features are incorporated in weapon system 

designs.

• DOD’s organizational structure may be too diffused to facilitate efficient 

and effective management and integration of the Department’s 

counterproliferation efforts.

• Key strategy documents and management plans have not been 

developed to help guide, oversee, and integrate the multiple 

departmentwide counterproliferation initiatives.

Lack of a Comprehensive, 

Integrated Joint Doctrine

Adapting military doctrine to deal with operations in an NBC environment 

is critical because doctrine provides the fundamental principles that guide 

the employment of military forces. Unified commands build plans and 

conduct exercises on established doctrine. Because the offensive, 

defensive, and intelligence elements of counterproliferation cover so many 

aspects of military operations, those elements can be found in numerous 

joint and service doctrine publications. There is no one overarching joint 

counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of 

how DOD should respond in an NBC environment across the spectrum of 
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military operations and help ensure that counterproliferation is being 

satisfactorily integrated in the entire body of joint doctrine.

Several publications are either under revision to correct deficiencies or are 

being developed to fill voids in the body of joint doctrine. For example, the 

principal joint doctrine for NBC defense (Joint Publication 3-11),10 which 

deals particularly with the passive defense area of counterproliferation, has 

been extensively revised. DOD officials expect the new version to be 

published in spring 2000. Among the deficiencies being addressed in the 

new version is the lack of a thorough discussion of biological warfare and 

service responsibilities for chemical and biological defense and 

decontamination in joint operating areas, such as ports and airfields.11 Joint 

doctrine for active defense against the NBC threat is contained in air and 

missile defense doctrine publications that provide the fundamental 

principles for responding to all air and missile threats.12 This doctrine, 

which was completed in 1999, also contains some discussion of the 

offensive, or counterforce, elements of counterproliferation. Two new joint 

doctrine publications in development—one on attack operations against an 

adversary’s high value targets and one on joint targeting of an adversary’s 

forces and related capabilities—are expected to provide additional 

principles for counterforce operations. The targeting doctrine, for example, 

will provide guidance for the targeting of critical mobile targets, such as 

missile launchers. Joint assessments identified the need for such doctrine. 

With regard to conventional responses to NBC weapons and their 

associated infrastructure, counterforce operations are not discussed 

exclusively in any joint or service doctrine publication. However, the joint 

doctrine publications for nuclear operations include counterforce issues 

for the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

While there are over 100 joint doctrine publications, no single joint 

publication synthesizes counterproliferation doctrine. The Air Force, 

recognizing the value of such a document, is preparing a doctrine 

publication that will discuss all areas of counterproliferation in Air Force 

10Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, 

Draft, Joint Publication 3-11, Jan. 7. 2000.

11We are currently reviewing the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct NBC defense 

operations. This review includes an examination of the important policy issues for 

successful implementation of Joint Publication 3-11. A report on the results of this work will 

be issued later this year.

12Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, Joint Publication 3-01, Oct. 19, 1999.
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operations. Air Force officials believe this “capping” publication will 

provide a clearer centralized picture of how the Air Force is to respond in 

an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations. The other 

services do not have a similar publication, though the Navy is considering 

one. In April 2000, while our report was at DOD for review, a joint doctrine 

committee approved a Joint Staff proposal for an overarching 

counterproliferation doctrine publication for joint operations. The 

document will be developed, with final publication expected in winter 

2001. Such a capping document would complement, not replace, existing 

doctrine publications in providing a centralized picture of 

counterproliferation doctrine.

The Joint Staff has taken steps to examine counterproliferation guidance 

and correct deficiencies in several joint doctrine areas, but it has not 

systematically reviewed all joint doctrine to help ensure that 

counterproliferation is satisfactorily integrated. Additionally, Joint Staff 

officials told us that a number of supporting publications that would 

provide further practical guidance for implementing doctrine on NBC 

issues, such as for consequence management, had not been developed. 

Counterproliferation-related tasks span many missions, functions, and 

types of military operations, including intelligence support to operations, 

rear area operations, joint special operations, space operations, base 

defense, airlift support, nuclear operations, amphibious operations, 

operations other than war, and antiterrorism. While deficiencies in doctrine 

can be identified and changes made to improve doctrine through lessons 

learned from joint training and exercises, a review has not been made to 

assist in ensuring that the entire body of doctrine satisfactorily addresses 

the NBC threat. Development and maintenance of an overarching joint 

counterproliferation doctrine publication should help satisfy this need.

Absence of Systematic 

Approach to Ensure NBC 

Survivability

DOD major acquisition program regulations require that systems essential 

to the accomplishment of missions be able to survive at the NBC 

contamination levels anticipated in their operating environment.13

However, DOD does not have a systematic approach that identifies weapon 

systems that should be capable of operating in a biological and chemical 

contaminated environment and that provides sufficient management 

13Section 4.4.1 of DOD Regulation 5000.2R, setting forth the mandatory procedures for major 

defense acquisition programs.
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controls to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate survivability 

features are incorporated in the design of these systems.

DOD has stated that the ability of U.S. systems and equipment to survive 

and operate in an NBC environment is a major concern. However, DOD’s 

regulations for acquiring major weapon systems only state that 

survivability needs to be addressed during the acquisition process—key 

provisions that would promote the consideration of survivability are 

lacking. For example, survivability is not a condition of the process’ 

milestone exit criteria.14 In a January 1999 report,15 a DOD team reviewing 

the status of the Department’s chemical and biological defense program 

found that weapons survivability in a chemical and biological environment 

was a concern across the Department. The team’s findings corroborated 

and updated a 1995 DOD Inspector General report.16 The team noted a lack 

of uniform standards among the services to ensure survivability in systems 

and equipment they are acquiring. In their acquisition processes, the 

services treat survivability differently. For example, the Army uses criteria 

for evaluating survivability, but if the criterion is not met, the program 

manager can waive it. The other services do not use specific criteria and, 

therefore, have no waiver process. In the acquisition of chemical and 

biological defense systems and equipment, the team found that design and 

test measures to ensure that survivability requirements are sufficiently 

considered in weapon system acquisitions are largely absent from the 

process.

Recognizing the potential seriousness of the survivability problem, the 

DOD study team developed a plan for immediate application to all DOD 

acquisition programs. The plan included implementing interim measures to 

immediately strengthen the survivability provisions in DOD’s major 

acquisition program regulations and studying how NBC contamination 

survivability criteria developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

and adopted by the Army could be cost-effectively utilized for all DOD 

acquisition programs. It has been over a year since the report was issued, 

14Exit criteria serve as gates that, when successfully passed, demonstrate that a program is 

on track to achieve its goals and should be allowed to continue. 

15Chemical/Biological Defense Program Overarching Integrated Product Team Report, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Jan. 24, 1999.

16Chemical and Biological Defense Management of Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 

Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 95-202, May 24, 1995.
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and no action has been taken on the plan nor has an implementation 

timetable been established. According to the DOD official responsible for 

implementing the proposed measures, action has not been taken because 

of the investment required and the issue is not considered a top priority.

While several DOD officials concurred with the study team’s report, they 

noted that survivability is only one of several criteria to be considered in 

the design and development of weapons and equipment. Others, such as 

cost and combat effectiveness, could take priority. Survivability design 

features could include filtered overpressurized ventilation systems to 

minimize the effects of chemical and biological weapons on combat 

vehicles, ships, and aircraft or hardening against electromagnetic radiation 

for command, control, communications, and intelligence systems.

Other factors may further reduce the likelihood that acquisition programs 

will incorporate survivability features in system design. For example, DOD 

is required to purchase commercial items to the maximum extent 

practicable.17 According to one DOD official, this can reduce the likelihood 

that systems and equipment being acquired will be designed to operate in 

an NBC contaminated environment. Also, DOD program and acquisition 

decision-making bodies generally do not include representatives with 

responsibilities for NBC survivability requirements. The study team’s 

January 1999 report recommended that such a representative be appointed 

to attend reviews for acquisitions that involve compliance with NBC 

contamination survivability requirements. At completion of our review, 

action had not been taken on this recommendation.

Questions Raised About 

DOD’s Organization 

Structure for Managing 

Counterproliferation

While DOD has taken steps to improve its organizational structure to better 

manage its counterproliferation efforts, its counterproliferation 

organization for establishing policy and guidance and developing offensive 

and defense capabilities, including intelligence support, still consists of 

diverse constituencies and involves numerous organizations and 

committees that are loosely connected. Questions have been raised by the 

Congress, a key congressionally mandated commission, recent DOD 

studies, and officials we interviewed about DOD’s organizational changes 

17The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, P.L. 103-355, section 8104, codified at 

10 U.S.C. 2377, establishes a preference for the acquisition of commercial items to the 

maximum extent practicable.
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and the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s organization structure for 

managing counterproliferation.

As shown in figure 1, the counterproliferation mission involves many 

diverse DOD organizational elements and numerous functions and 

activities that present management challenges for DOD in integrating its 

counterproliferation initiatives. Each of the organizations, such as the Joint 

Staff, must ensure that issues related to the four areas of 

counterproliferation—counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and 

consequence management—are fully considered in its planning, policies, 

doctrine, acquisition, and other functions. In turn, the actions of each 

organization must be coordinated to ensure consistency in application and 

direction throughout DOD. As noted in a comprehensive congressional 

staff report on DOD’s organization and decision-making procedures, 

inefficient mission integration can lead to gaps in capabilities, wasted 

resources through undesirable duplication, interoperability problems, 

unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint training, and 

ineffective fighting forces.18

18Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, Oct. 16, 1985. Study was conducted in support of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
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Figure 1: Counterproliferation Areas, Organizational Elements, and Functions

Source: DOD.

To promulgate policy and provide oversight, DOD established an office for 

counterproliferation policy and a senior-level counterproliferation council. 

The Office of Counterproliferation Policy reports to an Assistant Secretary 

who also oversees nearly a dozen other offices that are involved in various 

policy and strategy issues, three of which concentrate on preventing the 

proliferation of NBC weapons. The Counterproliferation Council is 

responsible for ensuring that the implementation of DOD’s 

counterproliferation efforts is integrated and focused. While it provides a 

venue for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to discuss DOD’s 

counterproliferation efforts, the Council has largely functioned as an 

information gathering body.

DOD’s efforts to develop and acquire active and passive defense and 

counterforce capabilities for counter-NBC operations involve many DOD 

Policy, Planning, and Requirements

Doctrine

Acquisition

Training, Exercises, and Education

Intelligence Support

 Counterforce Active Defense Passive Defense Consequence Management

Office of the

Secretary of Defense

Joint Staff

Military Services

Defense Agencies

Unified Commands

Functions

Counterproliferation areas

Organizations
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organizations. The Ballistic Missile Defense and Joint Theater Air and 

Missile Defense Organizations work with the unified commands, services, 

and other DOD agencies to develop active defense systems to counter an 

adversary’s use of ballistic and cruise missiles. Passive defense capabilities 

are being developed by the services with oversight responsibility assigned 

to an office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Two joint service 

groups are responsible for joint NBC defense requirements, priorities, 

training, and doctrine and for coordinating and integrating NBC defense 

research, development, and acquisition efforts. Counterforce capabilities 

are being developed by each of the military services and the Special 

Operations Forces, but there is no central organization or management 

structure similar to those for active and passive defense. Appendix IV 

provides additional information on DOD’s counterproliferation 

organization.

Several organization changes were included in the Secretary of Defense’s 

1997 Defense Reform Initiative19 that were intended to raise the priority of 

DOD proliferation-related activities and improve the Department’s overall 

performance. The Initiative was the impetus for creating the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, which brings under one director the missionoriented capabilities of DOD to reduce the threats from weapons of mass 

destruction. It also assigned responsibility for all proliferation policy under 

a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. 

DOD proposed to abolish the position of the Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Affairs, which was created by 

the Congress (10 U.S.C. 142). This proposal was unsuccessful because of 

strong congressional opposition.20 In opposing this change, the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services believed the position was necessary for 

fulfilling specific congressionally mandated responsibilities and for 

ensuring appropriate senior-level oversight and implementation of DOD 

guidance.

19Defense Reform Initiative, Secretary of Defense, Nov. 1997. The initiative is designed to 

streamline DOD’s organizational structure and business practices.

20 Senate Report 106-50 (1999).
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In July 1999, a congressionally mandated commission reported on the 

results of its assessment of the federal government’s organization for 

combating weapons of mass destruction proliferation.21 The Commission 

noted the diffusion of counterproliferation responsibilities throughout 

DOD’s organization and the lack of a focal point responsible for integrating 

the organization and its efforts. It recommended establishing (1) a senior 

position for all proliferation-related issues in the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy and (2) an Assistant Secretary of Defense 

position for technology acquisition programs bearing on combating 

proliferation. These recommendations were never adopted by DOD. Some 

officials we interviewed agreed with the Commission’s conclusions and 

recommendations, believing the suggested organizational changes would 

increase the Department’s focus on counterproliferation issues and 

improve DOD’s ability to make difficult decisions on the best allocation of 

limited resources across the counterproliferation areas and agencies. 

Others disagreed, believing that the current organization provides the 

necessary attention and management tools for managing the 

counterproliferation mission. Although DOD prepared comments to the 

Commission’s report and recommendations, we were unable to review or 

be briefed on them because a governmentwide response to the report had 

not been released.

The results of two recent DOD studies tend to support the need for some 

reexamination of the DOD organization structure to determine if 

adjustments can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in 

the management and integration of the Department’s initiatives. A major 

conclusion of a November 1999 Joint Staff study22 was that the 1999 

Commission was right—the integration function required for DOD’s NBC 

defense program is too diffused. The study found that the integration that 

needs to take place is not always occurring. An October 1999 DOD report23

on the defense intelligence community support of joint 

21Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the Commission to 

Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction, July 14, 1999. The report was required by section 712 (c) of the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-293, and the Omnibus 

Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, P.L. 105-277.

22Chemical and Biological Warfare Study of Studies, Deterrence and Counterproliferation 

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Team, Joint Staff, Nov. 1999.

23Report Number 00-0IR-01, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Oct. 15, 

1999.
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counterproliferation operations cited the need for improvements in 

policies, processes, and mechanisms to manage and oversee intelligence 

support of the counterproliferation mission. Similar problems were 

identified 3 years earlier by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board.

DOD Counterproliferation 

Initiatives Lack Overarching 

Strategies and a 

Management Plan

Important management tools, including (1) a comprehensive Department 

strategy for countering the NBC threat; (2) an integrated military strategy 

that describes how the offensive and defense capabilities of U.S. forces will 

function together to achieve maximum capability against the threat; (3) a 

management plan that can be used to guide, oversee, and integrate DOD’s 

multiple departmentwide counterproliferation initiatives; and (4) a 

reporting and evaluation process with qualitative and quantitative 

performance measures for assessing departmentwide progress toward 

achieving counterproliferation strategic goals and objectives, have not 

been developed. The absence of such tools makes it very difficult to 

ascertain the strategic direction and status of DOD’s Counterproliferation 

Initiative, particularly how the Department plans to effectively integrate 

the organizations, plans, policies, requirements, and programs of the 

diverse, but complementary, counterproliferation areas.

In 1996, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the unified commands 

conducted a 6-month review of the strategic environment expected for the 

year 2010. An important element of that review was the NBC threat. The 

resulting report24 cited the need for a comprehensive Department strategy 

for countering this threat because of the threat’s gravity for deployed U.S. 

forces and for the U.S. homeland. This strategy was never developed.

The Secretary of Defense’s May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report 

stated that to advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation 

concepts, the Joint Staff and the unified commands would develop an 

operational strategy for integrating the offensive and defensive elements of 

U.S. counterproliferation capabilities. Because the capabilities necessary 

to deal with NBC weapons and conditions cover such a broad range of joint 

and service operations, there is a tendency to assume that the sum of the 

deterrence, active, passive, counterforce, and consequence management 

capabilities will be sufficient to meet the requirement to fight and win in an 

NBC environment. The kind of operational strategy discussed above would 

24Joint Strategy Review, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan. 1997.
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more effectively integrate the broad range of existing and developing U.S. 

capabilities into a mode of operations and indicate areas where further 

progress is needed. It would also describe the means by which a broader 

DOD-level counterproliferation strategy would be executed. The Joint Staff 

is preparing a strategy document, but its development has languished 

because of staff shortages and higher priorities. As described to us by the 

Joint Staff, the document might not provide the integrated strategy sought. 

It would be more of a collection of current guidance contained in numerous 

publications, rather than a strategy for bringing together the offensive and 

defensive capabilities for countering NBC weapons. The Joint Staff plans to 

issue this document in June 2000.

In addition to the absence of documented counterproliferation strategies, 

DOD has not created a single, integrated master, or management, plan to 

guide, oversee, and integrate its departmentwide counterproliferation 

efforts. Such a plan would establish specific responsibilities, goals, 

objectives, timetables, and a process for reporting and evaluating the 

progress toward achieving goals and objectives. It would also serve as a 

tool to guide execution of counterproliferation strategy.

Some organizations involved in counterproliferation have created or are 

considering developing master plans. For example, the Air Force published 

a comprehensive master plan for counterproliferation in 1997 that detailed 

its approach for developing and providing capabilities, requirements to 

support the unified commands, and shortfalls and deficiencies and 

measures to correct them. An Air Force official told us the plan helps the 

Air Force to integrate all the various counterproliferation efforts that were 

once separate functions and encourages working relationships among the 

efforts. Counterproliferation officials in Navy and Marine Corps 

headquarters stated that their services saw value in having such plans and 

are considering creating similar master plans. These officials also saw a 

benefit in having a DOD-wide counterproliferation master plan to provide a 

better focus for executing their individual service efforts.

A senior policy official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that 

his office considered developing a comprehensive departmentwide master 

plan but decided against it. The official said ensuring that 

counterproliferation is addressed in major department policy and planning 

documents, such as the Defense Planning Guidance, is a better approach 

than a master plan. He also added that creating such a plan would take 

quite a bit of resources and time.
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DOD also has not established a reporting and evaluation process for 

assessing departmentwide progress toward achieving counterproliferation 

strategic goals and objectives. Such a process is important to implement 

the strategy, to assess its effectiveness, provide information on what needs 

to be done to refine policy and program directions, and assist with program 

budget management. The qualitative and quantitative performance 

measures developed under this process could allow for a constant 

assessment of progress toward a strategy’s goals and objectives in order to 

gauge success or failure and to adjust the strategy accordingly. Such goals 

and performance measures would be consistent with the principles of the 

Government Performance and Results Act, which the Congress anticipated 

would be institutionalized and practiced at all organizational levels of the 

federal government.25

Interagency 

Coordinating 

Committee Lacks a 

Process for Identifying 

and Eliminating 

Undesirable 

Redundancies

DOD coordinates its programs that are strongly related to 

counterproliferation with the Department of Energy and key intelligence 

agencies primarily through the Counterproliferation Program Review 

Committee (see app. IV). The Committee’s coordination of ongoing 

research and development programs is necessary to ensure that funding is 

optimally used and that undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts 

are eliminated. While the Committee has enhanced the exchange of 

information among these agencies, it has not taken determined steps to 

identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts 

throughout counterproliferation programs.

Committee Has 

Strengthened Information 

Exchange

DOD, Department of Energy, and intelligence agency officials generally 

expressed satisfaction with the exchange of information that the 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee provides. They believe 

the Committee has led to good interaction at the working level as a result of 

representatives from the agencies preparing the Committee’s annual report. 

The officials also cited instances where coordination had enabled the 

agencies to leverage work being done by each other. A typical example is 

where the agencies participate in each other’s tests to develop needed test 

data. Senior-level meetings, while less frequent than working group 

meetings, also have reportedly improved communication among the 

25The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62) requires federal 

agencies to clearly define their missions, set goals, link activities and resources to goals, 

prepare annual performance plans, measure performance, and report on accomplishments. 
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agencies. The Committee has also helped to focus the efforts within DOD, 

the Department of Energy, and the intelligence community in support of 

counterproliferation policy and has reported to congressional defense 

committees annually on these activities.

Committee Has Not 

Established a System to 

Identify and Eliminate 

Undesirable Redundancies 

and Uncoordinated Efforts

The Committee has not taken concerted actions to identify and eliminate 

undesirable redundancies, one of the primary reasons the Congress 

established it.26 While several Committee participants believe duplication 

had been reduced, they were able to provide few examples. Central 

Intelligence Agency officials cited, for example, an instance where two 

similar projects being conducted by two Department of Energy 

laboratories were merged. This duplication was identified when a review 

was made of a list of research and development projects with potential 

intelligence implications. While duplication can be identified through 

normal coordination actions, a process has not been established to focus 

on identifying and eliminating duplication. As far back as 1994, the 

Committee itself recognized the need for a system to identify overlaps.

Overlap and duplication within and among the agencies could be 

widespread, as evidenced by a 1999 U.S. Joint Forces Command 

assessment of organizations and projects developing capabilities to attack 

critical mobile targets, particularly ballistic and cruise missiles with NBC 

warheads. The Command initially identified and obtained information on 

525 projects related to joint experiments it was planning. These projects 

included experiments, demonstrations, studies, simulations, exercises, and 

war games.27 In its assessment, the Command used an integration database 

tool to assess each project for relevance to the mobile target experiment 

and identified 113 associated projects that it deemed applicable. 

Representatives from each of these projects met to share information and 

identify opportunities to pool their efforts. While some of the project teams 

had established strong relationships, many had not. The Command also 

found some duplication among the projects, but it believes the type of 

cooperation demonstrated by their efforts will reduce that redundancy. The 

Command has continued to expand its database and identify additional 

26Section 1605 (b) (2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 

(P.L. 103-160), as amended.

27A war game is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or 

more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or 

assumed real life situation.
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projects, beyond the initial 113, associated with attacking mobile targets. 

Although these projects have counterproliferation implications, we found 

no evidence that the Committee had reviewed these projects to determine 

whether they overlapped or were redundant.

In its 1996 report, the Committee recommended development of an 

integrated chemical and biological defense research and development plan 

for DOD, Energy, and the intelligence community. In May 1999, the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, seeing no action on this recommendation, 

directed the Committee to submit the integrated plan to congressional 

defense committees by March 1, 2000.28 In July 1999, the Committee tasked 

development of the integrated plan to a newly established joint chemical 

and biological defense research and development focus group. DOD 

officials believe the coordination and collaboration involved in developing 

such a plan could result in identifying and eliminating duplicative programs 

and uncoordinated efforts in passive defense. DOD said that similar plans 

may be developed to optimize integration of joint research and 

development activities in the other areas of counterproliferation. The 

Central Intelligence Agency, recognizing the difficulties faced in eliminating 

unnecessary duplication among programs, sees the focus group as a limited 

but positive step. Difficulties have been encountered in developing the plan 

and the March 1, 2000, deadline was not met. In explaining the delay, DOD 

officials cited difficulties in merging the research and development 

programs of two independent agencies.

Conclusions While DOD has taken actions to integrate considerations of the NBC threat 

into its organization, activities, and functions, it is very difficult to gauge 

the progress or context of the Department’s counterproliferation actions 

relative to stated goals and objectives. Development of mechanisms such 

as a comprehensive strategy, a military strategy, and a management plan 

complemented by a reporting and evaluation process would provide an 

integrated long-range vision and comprehensive guidance to better focus 

and direct DOD’s counterproliferation efforts and tools to guide and 

oversee progress toward achievement of goals and objectives. Without 

such mechanisms, it is difficult for senior leaders, the Congress, and others 

to determine the progress and success of DOD’s efforts and make optimal 

28Senate Report 106-50 (1999).
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decisions on the effective use of resources to develop the capabilities 

required for the counterproliferation mission.

While DOD has taken steps to strengthen its counterproliferation 

organization, studies indicate that the links between policy and programs, 

as well as among the major counterproliferation areas—counterforce, 

active defense, passive defense, and consequence management—could be 

strengthened. A strong organizational focus is necessary to ensure efficient 

integration and management of the wide range of counterproliferation 

initiatives being carried out by many diverse and loosely connected DOD 

organizational elements. Inefficient integration of these initiatives can lead 

to gaps in capabilities, wasted resources through undesirable duplication, 

interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, 

inadequate joint training, and ineffective fighting forces.

DOD has not developed an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine 

document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in 

an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations. 

Developing and maintaining a comprehensive overarching doctrine for 

counterproliferation could identify and eliminate gaps in addressing 

counterproliferation-related tasks in the body of doctrine. Gaps in doctrine 

can result in weaknesses in the ability of joint forces to effectively train, 

respond, and operate in an NBC environment. Joint training policy, for 

example, requires that the joint tasks, such as the decontamination of NBC 

contaminated equipment, used in joint training be supported by doctrine.

DOD’s acquisition processes, including those of the military services, are 

not providing effective oversight to guard against developing and deploying 

systems and equipment that cannot perform effectively in an NBC 

contaminated environment. Failure to field NBC survivable systems and 

equipment would significantly affect the ability of U.S. forces to sustain 

operations in such an environment.

Although interagency coordination among DOD, Department of Energy, 

and the intelligence community is reported as good, the full potential 

benefit of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee is not 

being realized. While tasked by the Congress to identify and eliminate 

unnecessarily redundant programs or uncoordinated efforts, the 

Committee does not have a procedural mechanism to facilitate such 

determinations and decisions within and across the counterproliferation 

areas. The results of the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s assessment of 

organizations and projects developing capabilities to attack critical mobile 
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targets suggest that there are opportunities to improve coordination and 

identify potential undesirable redundancies and uncoordinated efforts in 

counterproliferation. Identifying and eliminating unneeded redundancies 

and uncoordinated efforts is necessary to ensure that the resources 

available for counterproliferation efforts are optimized.

Recommendations To more clearly determine DOD’s progress in implementing its 

Counterproliferation Initiative, provide additional tools to guide and 

oversee its efforts, and ensure greater accountability to the Congress, we 

recommend the Secretary of Defense take actions to develop (1) a 

departmentwide strategy that takes a long-term, comprehensive view of the 

nuclear, biological, and chemical threat and links ends, ways, and means to 

better integrate DOD’s policies and programs for counterproliferation and 

(2) a military strategy for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive 

capabilities. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop 

(1) a management plan that clearly delineates responsibilities, explicit and 

outcome-oriented goals, a process for reporting, evaluating, and validating 

its progress, and a resource strategy for ensuring funding of its efforts and 

(2) quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to 

assess progress toward goal achievement.

Additionally, the Secretary of Defense should include in the next 

Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department’s 

organization for counterproliferation to determine if adjustments can be 

made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and 

integration of the Department’s initiatives.

To provide assurance that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is 

being given sufficient attention in the body of military doctrine, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense have the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine 

publication that encompasses all elements of counterproliferation.

To improve the attention given to nuclear, biological, and chemical 

survivability in DOD and service acquisition processes, we recommend that 

the Secretary devise and implement a systematic approach that identifies 

the systems and equipment that need to be capable of operating in a 

nuclear, biological, and chemical environment and provides reasonable 

assurance that appropriate features are incorporated into the designs of 

these systems.
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To strengthen the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program 

Review Committee in identifying and eliminating any unnecessary 

redundant programs, the Secretary of Defense, as Committee Chairman, 

should direct the Committee to devise and implement a procedural 

mechanism that establishes clear criteria, procedures, and a process for 

making such decisions.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We received written comments from the Departments of Defense and 

Energy on a draft of this report, which are included in their entirety as 

appendixes VI and VII, respectively. DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendations and indicated that many corrective actions that are 

responsive to them have already been started as a part of the continuing 

implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative. DOD also provided 

technical comments to the draft that were incorporated in the report where 

appropriate. The Department of Energy did not have any comments on our 

findings or recommendations. We obtained oral comments from the 

Central Intelligence Agency on specific sections of the report and have 

made changes in the report where appropriate.

While DOD acknowledges that there is merit to our recommendations, it is 

noncommittal on most of them. We examined many of the initiatives DOD 

cites in its comments and have discussed them in this report. We believe 

the Department’s corrective actions are limited, and that the long-term 

challenge posed by the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 

requires a more concerted, focused, and integrated effort by DOD. 

Therefore, we continue to believe that the Department should implement 

our recommendations. DOD’s comments and a more detailed discussion of 

them are included in appendix VI.

Scope and 

Methodology

To identify actions DOD has taken and opportunities for further action to 

institutionalize counterproliferation throughout DOD’s organization, 

activities, and functions, we obtained information, documents, and 

perspectives from officials at all levels of the Department, including the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, relevant defense 

agencies, the four military services, and the four unified commands that we 

visited, including their service component commands. We also obtained 

perspectives from former defense officials, military experts, and 

academicians, and defense support contractor staff. Appendix V lists the 

principal organizations where we performed work.
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We reviewed an extensive array of policy, planning, and guidance 

documents, joint and service doctrine, acquisition program documents, 

military plans, intelligence documents, posture statements and speeches, 

congressional hearings and testimonies, relevant legislation, statutory 

reports, open literature, and studies and assessments. In particular, we 

examined several Defense Planning Guidance documents to understand 

how counterproliferation guidance has evolved. We examined the 

Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s counterproliferation concept plan 

and corresponding plans prepared by the regional unified commands. We 

also reviewed the extent that counterproliferation tasks had been 

incorporated into the theater operation and concepts military plans of the 

regional unified commands. To ascertain the extent that 

counterproliferation tasks have been incorporated into joint and service 

field exercises, we asked the Joint Staff to prepare a summary of the 

relevant exercises and to include tasks, conducted by the unified 

commands and the services over the past 3 years. We surveyed and 

obtained documents from the service and joint intermediate and seniorlevel professional military education schools to determine how 

counterproliferation concepts had been incorporated into their curricula. 

To determine the rationale for recommendations made in the 1999 Report 

of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government 

to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we reviewed 

the report and discussed the findings and observations with Commission 

staff.

To provide a context within which to review DOD’s actions and determine 

the pervasiveness and extent of institutionalization within the Department, 

we used criteria DOD had established for implementing its 

institutionalization efforts. DOD plans to institutionalize 

counterproliferation by (1) embedding counterproliferation in all aspects 

of its planning and programming process, (2) adapting military doctrine 

and operational plans to deal with NBC weapons in regional contingencies, 

(3) maturing acquisition programs to ensure that U.S. forces will be 

adequately trained and equipped to operate effectively in contingencies 

involving NBC threats, and (4) reallocating intelligence resources to 

provide better information about adversary NBC capabilities and how they 

are likely to be used. We also used these criteria to examine actions aimed 

at institutionalization at all levels of DOD’s organization, in the functional 

areas of planning, programming, and budgeting, and across the four areas 

of counterproliferation capability efforts (counterforce, active defense, 

passive defense, and consequence management). We did not evaluate the 
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impact or effectiveness of the actions because it was beyond the scope of 

our work.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review 

Committee, we discussed the level of interagency coordination and 

collaboration with DOD, Department of Energy, and Central Intelligence 

Agency officials and staff. We also discussed with these officials and 

obtained information on the development of the Committee’s annual report 

to the Congress, the structure of the Committee and its network of 

supporting committees, and the implementation of key Committee 

recommendations. We reviewed the legislative history and legislation 

establishing and defining the Committee’s authority and responsibilities 

and compared each of the Committee’s annual reports from 1994 to 1999. 

To determine the Committee’s actions to identify and eliminate 

unnecessary redundancy or uncoordinated efforts among agency 

programs, we asked senior officials and action officers to cite specific 

examples and provide documentation.

Our review was conducted from April 1999 through February 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees; 

the Honorable William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; the Honorable 

Bill Richardson, the Secretary of Energy; the Honorable Louis Caldera, the 

Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the 

Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, the Secretary of the Air Force; 

General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 

Honorable George J. Tenet, the Director, Central Intelligence Agency; 

Dr. Jay Davis, the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and the 

Honorable Jacob J. Lew, the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3610 or Marvin Casterline at (202) 512-9076. 
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Key contributors to this assignment were Mark Wielgoszynski, 

Joseph Kirschbaum, and Sally Newman.

Norman J. Rabkin

Director, National Security

Preparedness Issues
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Appendix I

Chronology of Major Counterproliferation 

Milestones ApendxiI

Date Event Description

1991 January Department of Defense (DOD) annual 

report issued.

Stated that countering weapons of mass destruction is a high 

priority.

September The Central Intelligence Agency 

established the Nonproliferation Center.

Established as the focal point for all Intelligence Community 

activities related to proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 

chemical (NBC) weapons.

1992 April DOD issued Conduct of the Persian Gulf 

War report.

Report noted deficiencies in combating weapons of mass 

destruction.

1993 September White House issued Presidential Decision 

Directive 13.

Guidance defined U.S. policy objectives in the prevention of 

proliferation.

November National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160) enacted.

Established the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. 

Funding for the program was centralized and overall management 

responsibility placed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

December Secretary of Defense announced the 

Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.

Identified need to recognize new mission of protection in addition 

to proliferation prevention.

Deputy Secretary of Defense issued 

memorandum, “DOD Role in 

Counterproliferation.”

Assigned responsibility within DOD for developing policies, 

acquisition strategy, a statement of military roles and missions, 

and intelligence support for Counterproliferation Initiative.

1994 May Interagency group issued Report on 

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation 

Activities and Programs.

First of annual Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 

report series. (“Nonproliferation” was dropped from title the 

following year).

June Secretary of Defense issued 

memorandum, “DOD Counterproliferation 

Policy” is issued.

Memorandum’s purpose was to focus DOD expertise to enhance 

effectiveness of nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities. 

Emphasized development of plans to conduct counterproliferation 

operations.

August Counterproliferation Support Program 

established by Deputy Secretary of 

Defense.

Program’s goal is to “address key shortfalls in counterproliferation 

capabilities.”

November Executive Order 12938, “Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” is issued.

Order declared a national emergency to deal with “proliferation of 

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of 

delivering such weapons.”

1995 February White House issued A National Security 

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.

This version of the National Security Strategy stated “. . .a key part 

of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of [weapons of 

mass destruction and missiles] and to develop an effective 

capability to deal with these threats.” The 1996 update repeated 

this phrase.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff issued 

revised National Military Strategy.

Emphasized deterrence and improved capability to operate in 

contaminated environments.

May Secretary of Defense approved Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterproliferation 

Missions and Functions Study Report.

Report concluded that improvements were needed in regional 

unified command planning processes and that the unified 

commands should be responsible for implementing 

counterproliferation policy in their geographic areas of 

responsibility.

Continued
Appendix I

Chronology of Major Counterproliferation 

Milestones

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Date Event Description

President signed revised Unified Command 

Plan.

The regional unified commands were assigned 

counterproliferation responsibilities.

1996 April DOD issued first version of Proliferation: 

Threat and Response.

Document provided information on the nature of global 

proliferation and DOD policies and programs for countering the 

threat. It was updated in November 1997.

May Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved 

“Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction” concept plan (CONPLAN 

0400-96).

Plan directed the five regional unified commands to develop 

regionally specific counterproliferation plans. (All of the plans were 

approved by August 1999.)

July DOD Directive 2060.2, “DOD 

Counterproliferation Implementation,” 

issued.

Created senior-level Counterproliferation Council to provide 

oversight of DOD’s implementation of the Counterproliferation 

Initiative.

September Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued 

Instruction 5113.02, “Counterproliferation 

Charter,” issued.

Instruction provided policy and guidance for the employment of 

U.S. forces for counterproliferation.

1997 May White House issued A National Security 

Strategy for a New Century.

The new National Security Strategy states that the United States 

must plan and prepare to fight major theater wars “under 

conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means,” 

including weapons of mass destruction.

DOD issued Report of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review.

Assessment viewed chemical and/or biological attack as a “likely 

condition of future warfare” and directed a $1-billion 

counterproliferation funding increase.

September Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued new 

National Military Strategy.

The strategy stated that employment of weapons of mass 

destruction in both major theater war and smaller-scale 

contingencies is increasingly likely and U.S. forces must have a 

balanced counterproliferation capability.

November Defense Reform Initiative Report issued. DOD panel report called for creation of Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency to consolidate nonproliferation and counterproliferation 

efforts.

December Air Force issued counterproliferation 

master plan.

Described the Air Force’s strategy and objectives for confronting 

weapons of mass destruction capable adversaries.

1998 April Defense Planning Guidance 2000-2005 

issued.

Called the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons a 

likely condition of future warfare and provided increased guidance 

to DOD’s components for responding to the threat.

October DOD established the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency.

Merged the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency, the Defense Technology Security Agency, and 

selected program management functions in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense.

1999 April North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative 

announced.

Committed NATO members to share weapons of mass destruction 

information, broaden planning, coordinate on nonproliferation 

measures and on civilian protection, and establish a NATO 

weapons of mass destruction center.

November Counterproliferation Mission Support 

Senior Oversight Council established.

Group created to enhance cooperation on counterproliferation 

among regional unified and functional unified commands.

Continued from Previous Page
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix II

Our Recent Unclassified Reports on 

Counterproliferation and Related Subjects ApendxiI

Title Message

Medical Readiness: DOD Faces 

Challenges in Implementing Its Anthrax 

Vaccine Immunization Program

(GAO/NSIAD-00-36, Oct. 22, 1999)

Testing problems have slowed release of the anthrax vaccine. The manufacturer has yet to get 

Food and Drug Administration permission to release lots produced after restarting operations 

following renovation shutdown. DOD’s plans for maintaining an adequate supply assume 

approval of tested lots in less time than in past. It has no contingency plan and is not meeting 

its requirement to consistently record vaccination data. It has not informed personnel how to 

provide necessary data for its monitoring system. Thus, it may not be able to monitor vaccine 

safety.

Chemical and Biological Defense: 

Observations on Actions Taken to Protect 

Military Forces (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49, 

Oct. 20, 1999)

Testimony summarizing the message in our previous reports and testimonies on DOD’s 

efforts to resolve problems identified in the Gulf War.

Chemical and Biological Defense: 

Coordination of Non-Medical Chemical 

and Biological R&D Program

(GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999)

Four federal programs fund research and development of nonmedical chemical and biological 

defense technologies (two of them for warfighting applications). The framework to coordinate 

these programs has limited information on user needs and on how programs relate research 

and development projects to needs. More information about user needs and how user needs 

relate to projects would allow coordination mechanisms to better identify overlaps, gaps, and 

collaboration opportunities.

Chemical and Biological Defense: 

Program Planning and Evaluation Should 

Follow Results Act Framework

(GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999)

DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program, in general, and its research, development, 

test, and evaluation activities in particular, have not satisfactorily incorporated key Results Act 

principles. Program goals are vague and unmeasureable, inconsistently applied, and do not 

articulate specific desired impacts. Performance measures emphasize activities rather than 

impacts.

Medical Readiness: Issues Concerning 

the Anthrax Vaccine

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-226, July 21, 1999)

Studies have not been done to determine optimum number of doses of anthrax vaccine. The 

DOD system to collect data on adverse events relies on vaccine recipients or their health care 

providers to report adverse events. Studies show that adverse events are reported 

significantly less then they would be under an active surveillance system.

Missile Defense: THAAD Restructure 

Addresses Problems but Limits Early 

Capability (GAO/NSIAD-99-142, June 30, 

1999)

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense system’s flight-test schedule did not allow for 

adequate ground testing. Interceptors for tests were not equipped with sufficient instruments 

to provide optimum test data. Flight-test failures have been caused primarily by manufacturing 

defects rather than problems with advanced technology. These failures have prevented the 

Army from demonstrating that it can reliably employ the “hit-to-kill” technology critical to the 

system’s success.

Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common 

Systems and Components Could Result 

in Cost Savings (GAO/NSIAD-99-101, 

May 21, 1999)

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has achieved commonality primarily at lower levels 

of assembly, such as components. Officials report limited success in designing common 

systems or major subsystems mostly because of differences in system requirements and 

operating environments and difficulties in incorporating new technologies into mature 

systems. DOD needs to establish a structured effort with appropriate funding to identify and 

evaluate common systems and components.

Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made 

but Significant Challenges Remain

(GAO/NSIAD-99-68, Mar. 31, 1999)

The organization for coordinating cruise missile defense across the services consists of the 

Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization for operational requirements and the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization for acquisition. They are to work closely together to 

develop and refine a theater air and missile defense master plan. The military services are 

primarily responsible for funding and developing cruise missile defense capabilities.
Appendix II

Our Recent Unclassified Reports on 

Counterproliferation and Related Subjects

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Efforts to 

Develop Laser Weapons for Theater 

Defense (GAO/NSIAD-99-50, Mar. 31, 

1999)

DOD is developing two laser weapons—the Airborne Laser and the Space-based Laser—to 

destroy enemy ballistic missiles. Additionally, in a joint effort with Israel, DOD is developing a 

ground-based laser weapon, the Tactical High Energy Laser, which Israel will use to defend 

against short-range rockets. They are in various stages of development. The airborne laser is 

scheduled for full operational capability in 2009. Laser experts agree all three systems face 

significant technical challenges.

Force Structure: Opportunities for the 

Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the 

Military Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-99-47, 

Mar. 15, 1999)

The Army’s risk in implementing the National Security Strategy increased since its 1996 

review. The Army’s risk may be even higher. The 1998 force structure review was based on 

several “best case” assumptions, including limited enemy use of chemical weapons and 

immediate access to ports/airfields. The Army’s overall chemical support requirement is 

significantly under resourced, with only about 12,300 of 23,600 required positions allocated 

end strength during Total Army Analysis 2005.

Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have 

a Strategy to Address Low-Level 

Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, 

Sept. 23, 1998)

DOD does not have a strategy to address low-level chemical weapons exposures. It has not 

stated a policy or developed a doctrine on protection of troops from low-level battlefield 

chemical exposures. Research indicates low-level exposures to some chemical agents may 

result in adverse short-term performance and long-term health effects.

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD’s 

Evaluation of Improved Garment 

Materials (GAO/NSIAD-98-214, Aug. 18, 

1998)

Because the Marine Corps Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology Program and the Army’s 

exploratory development efforts were research and development activities, they were not 

subject to the same procedures as acquisition programs. DOD provided industry adequate 

opportunity to participate. The basic requirement for a lightweight, launderable, chemical 

protective garment did not change, but certain mission-specific requirements were added.

Chemical and Biological Defense: 

Observations on DOD’s Plans to Protect 

U.S. Forces (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-83, 

Mar. 17, 1998)

While many Gulf War deficiencies remain, DOD has increasingly accepted the urgency of 

developing a capability to deal with the chemical and biological threat. Its actions have 

resulted in increased funding and fielding of more and better defense equipment. DOD, 

however, still needs to decide major policy and doctrine issues, improve agent detection 

capabilities, provide forces with better and sufficient numbers of individual protective 

equipment, and deal with collective protection and decontamination problems. Doctrine and 

policy are inadequate regarding responsibility for defense of overseas airfields and ports 

against chemical or biological attacks. Questions remain regarding the force structure and 

equipment needed to protect these facilities. Unresolved doctrinal, policy, and equipment 

questions persist regarding return of chemical or biological contaminated aircraft and ships 

and protection of essential and nonessential civilians in high-threat areas. Servicemembers in 

high-threat areas normally lack biological agent detection capability. Collective protection 

facilities and equipment and agent detection systems are generally insufficient to protect the 

force.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Improvements 

Needed in Navy Area Acquisition 

Planning (GAO/NSIAD-98-34, Nov. 14, 

1997)

The area air defense system is a sea-based weapon system being developed by the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization and the Navy to defeat theater ballistic missiles. The Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization and the Congress consider it a high-priority theater missile 

defense program to protect deployed forces, population centers, and industrial facilities from 

theater missile attacks. The system has experienced schedule delays; additional slips are 

possible. The Navy plans to begin production before conducting operational tests.

Title Message
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation ApendxiI

The underlying objective of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is to 

make counterproliferation one of the matters routinely given consideration 

within DOD activities. DOD has taken actions since 1993, some of which 

are identified in table 1, to integrate the threat of NBC weapons and their 

means of delivery into its organization, activities, and functions.

Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken by DOD to Institutionalize Counterproliferation

While DOD continues to institutionalize counterproliferation, it recognizes 

that there are areas where further efforts are clearly warranted. For 

example, DOD has agreed to take action in response to DOD Inspector 

General reports that have identified deficiencies in service training and 

intelligence support. Much also remains to be done to understand the 

biological threat and to develop the doctrine, training, and equipment to 

counter it. This appendix provides additional discussion of DOD’s actions 

to institutionalize counterproliferation in its functional areas.

Area Action

Policy and planning • DOD incorporated counterproliferation guidance into major department planning and policy 

documents.

• The Joint Staff and the regional commands developed an overarching concept plan for 

counterproliferation operations.

• Regional unified commands incorporated counterproliferation tasks and guidance into military plans.

• The Army developed a planning/strategy document for NBC defense.

• The Navy is developing a counterproliferation master plan.

Requirements determination • The Joint Staff established a warfighting assessment team to assess joint counterproliferation 

requirements and capabilities.

Acquisition • DOD created the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program to manage joint research, 

development, and acquisition programs.

• The Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations Command created long-range acquisition plans (road 

maps).

Training and exercises • DOD components increased NBC emphasis in service-level training and major joint exercises.

• The Air Force reviewed chemical and biological weapons defense training and readiness deficiencies.

Professional military education • Joint and service colleges have incorporated coverage of the counterproliferation areas into their 

curricula.

Intelligence support • Defense Intelligence Agency set up a counterproliferation office and continues to increase the size of 

its staff.

• Defense Intelligence Agency created an NBC threat intelligence database that is widely accessed to 

support operations and planning.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Policy and Planning One of the objectives of the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative is to 

integrate proliferation concerns into the existing planning process. Major 

policy and planning guidance and the strategy for military actions to 

counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated 

delivery systems are contained in numerous key documents such as the 

National Security Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, a June 1994 

DOD counterproliferation policy memorandum, DOD’s 

counterproliferation directive, and the National Military Strategy. However, 

while presidential decision directives have been issued on preventing 

proliferation and counterterrorism, none have been issued specifically to 

address the military measures to combat the threat of NBC weapon use.1

Two DOD planning documents that provide detailed guidance—the 

Defense Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan2

—

have significantly increased emphasis on the NBC threat. A comparison of 

the Defense Planning Guidance of 1996 and 1999 shows a marked increase 

in emphasis on the NBC threat. Table 2 provides examples of the 

differences between the 1996 and 1999 documents.

1

A presidential decision directive is used to promulgate presidential decisions on national 

security matters.

2

The Defense Planning Guidance provides Secretary of Defense guidance to the military 

departments for development of their budgets. It includes major planning issues and 

decisions, strategy, and policy. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the 

commanders in chief of the unified commands and chiefs of the military services for 

accomplishing tasks and missions based on current capabilities. It also assigns tasks and 

resources to the unified commands for preparing their theater plans.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 2: Comparison of Counterproliferation-Related Areas of the 1996 and 1999 Defense Planning Guidance

At the recommendation of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995 

study,3 the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was revised to explain 

counterproliferation policy objectives and identify the missions and assign 

counterproliferation tasks to the unified combatant commanders. We 

reviewed portions of the 1996 and 1998 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans 

that included regional taskings for the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. 

Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern Command, as well as the general 

guidance on counterproliferation and NBC-related issues. Generic planning 

guidance regarding defense against weapons of mass destruction when 

confronted by such a threat is provided to all unified commands. This 

guidance was essentially identical in the 1996 and 1998 Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plans with the 1998 version providing more specific weapons 

of mass destruction taskings for two of the unified commands.

Requirements 

Determination

There are several means for identifying the counterproliferation 

requirements and capabilities of the unified commands. Formally, each 

command annually submits a list of integrated priorities to the Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, that identifies its highest requirements across all 

mission areas. Some commands have included counterproliferation-related 

1996 Defense Planning Guidance 1999 Defense Planning Guidance

Hostile states may be capable of using weapons of mass 

destruction in a major theater war.

Threat or use of chemical and biological weapons is a likely 

condition in a future major theater war.

NBC warfare is not mentioned in discussing the phases of a major 

theater war.

Need for active and passive defenses during three phases of major 

theater war is discussed.

NBC weapons or warfare is not mentioned in discussing 

contingency operations.

Counterforce operations against NBC facilities are cited as a 

potential contingency operation.

Planning section discusses NBC weapons. Most of the discussion 

is on proliferation prevention with a limited discussion of capabilities 

to counter the use of NBC weapons.

Planning section contains a detailed discussion of defensive 

measures; intelligence requirements; logistics; counterforce and 

active and passive defense capabilities; and doctrine, exercises, 

and training. Nuclear survivability is briefly discussed.

Programming guidance briefly discusses development of 

capabilities to defeat buried and hardened targets and active and 

passive defenses against the NBC threat.

Modernization guidance includes more specifics on intelligence 

support, counterforce, and active and passive defense capabilities 

against the NBC threat.

3

Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study Report, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

May 18, 1995.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

elements among their highest priorities. Additionally, each regional 

command and Special Operations Command have prepared a 

counterproliferation concept plan for its region that identifies capabilities 

to carry out missions. Also, as part of its Joint Warfighting Capability 

Assessment process, the Joint Staff established an assessment team for 

deterrence and counterproliferation when the process was established in 

1994.4

 This team annually assesses the requirements of the regional unified 

commands to accomplish their counterproliferation mission as assigned by 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The final assessments of the team are used to influence programming and 

budget guidance and to develop recommendations on allocating resources 

for joint requirements. The Chairman uses the information to develop two 

key documents—the Chairman’s Program Recommendations, which 

contain his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for consideration 

in developing the Defense Planning Guidance, and the Chairman’s Program 

Assessment, which contains alternative program recommendations and 

budget proposals for the Secretary’s consideration in refining DOD’s 

programs and budget. The team has made several important contributions 

to these documents, such as helping secure funds for an increase in 

biological agent detection units.

Since 1995, the deterrence and counterproliferation assessment team has 

conducted an annual assessment of requirements and capabilities through 

a series of workshops at the unified commands. The 1998 assessment 

identified and prioritized 19 requirements and 72 capabilities to meet those 

requirements. For example, a high priority identified by the commands was 

to provide individual protection to forces and assist allies and coalition 

partners with relief from the effect of NBC use. Capabilities necessary to 

meet that requirement included individual protective equipment, medical 

treatments, specified training, movable NBC detection and characterization 

devices, and immediate decontamination. The assessment team 

determined the sufficiency of then current capabilities.

Officials at the unified commands we visited were satisfied with the team’s 

review of the issues and determination of requirements and capabilities. A 

4

The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff’s conduit for obtaining a systematic view of future warfighting capabilities. Teams 

comprised of warfighting and functional area experts examine key relationships and 

interactions between joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities to improve 

warfighting effectiveness.
Appendix III

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U.S. Central Command official noted that the assessment was a useful 

process to raise concerns of the regional commands to the Joint Staff. Joint 

Staff officials who support the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 

which oversees the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process, said 

the team has done a good job of balancing risk, fiscal constraints, and 

requirements and effectively communicating the results of its work.

The regional unified commands have responsibility for implementing DOD 

counterproliferation policy within their respective geographic areas of 

responsibility. Each of the commands has approved concept plans, based 

on the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept Plan 0400, to meet its 

counterproliferation mission based upon theater-unique situations and 

circumstances. They have incorporated elements of their 

counterproliferation concept plans into other theater plans, particularly 

their plans for major theater wars.

Acquisition The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative identified “changing what we 

buy” as a key step in acquiring the right capabilities necessary to respond to 

NBC threats. DOD has taken several steps to respond to the Initiative’s 

direction and to institutionalize counterproliferation into defense 

acquisition processes. The Report on Nonproliferation and 

Counterproliferation Activities and Programs, issued in 1994 by an 

interagency group in accordance with provisions of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, discussed key shortfalls in 

counterproliferation capabilities. The report also prompted the 

establishment of the Counterproliferation Support Program, whose goals 

are to leverage ongoing research and development and acquisition 

programs to meet the counterproliferation priorities of the unified 

commands and to accelerate the deployment of enhanced capabilities to 

the field. It provides partial start-up funding for efforts that the services 

might not otherwise undertake. Projects that received such funds included 

the Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor and Joint Biological Remote Early 

Warning System.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 also 

established the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program.5

 The 

program’s mandate is to coordinate and integrate all DOD chemical and 

5

Title XVII of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-160.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

biological defense research and development and acquisition efforts. 

Oversight comes from the NBC Defense Steering Committee, which is 

composed of the Director for Defense Research and Engineering, the 

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary for Chemical and Biological Defense, the 

Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Director of the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Chemical and Biological Defense 

directorate. The military services provide day-to-day management of the 

program.

Chemical and biological defense has figured prominently in recent research 

and development planning documents. Since 1996, chapters on chemical 

and biological defense and countering weapons of mass destruction have 

appeared in the annual DOD-wide Joint Warfighting Science and 

Technology Plan. This document identifies joint objectives critical to future 

forces and is designed to ensure that DOD’s Science and Technology 

Program supports warfighting requirements. Each chapter defines needed 

and available capabilities and lays out a road map for redressing 

technological deficiencies. A chapter on hard and deeply buried target 

defeat was added in the February 2000 plan. In addition, the Joint Service 

Materiel Group, which is responsible for research, development, 

acquisition, planning, and technical oversight for the DOD Chemical and 

Biological Defense Program, issued a comprehensive plan of action in April 

1998 to guide research and development and acquisition funding.

To expedite the deployment of needed counterproliferation capabilities, 

DOD uses its Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration Program. 

While the normal acquisition process can take many years for a new system 

to begin production and be deployed, the advanced capability technology 

demonstration process focuses on deploying prototypes of promising 

technologies to determine their operational feasibility and application. One 

example is Portal Shield, a biological agent detection system that provides 

a capability to detect, warn, and identify a biological weapons attack on a 

fixed location, such as an air base or seaport. DOD considers the Portal 

Shield project a success. The number of Portal Shield systems to be 

acquired was increased in 1999 in response to the large demand by several 

regional unified commands for additional systems. Counterforce weapon 

capabilities developed under another counterproliferation demonstration 

project were used against hardened targets in Kosovo during Operation 

Allied Force in 1999.

The technology demonstration program is not designed for full-scale 

procurement. To procure larger quantities and provide the operations and 
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation

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maintenance support for a demonstration item, a military service must 

agree to sponsor and provide the necessary funding. These demonstration 

items must compete for resources with other major systems being acquired 

through the normal acquisition process.

Training and Exercises Numerous military tasks and operations support counterproliferation. The 

military operations conducted by the unified commands are based on joint 

doctrine, trained to unified command and service standards, described in 

detail within military theater plans, and exercised and trained to the 

standards during unified command, service, and joint training events. While 

the unified commands and the services are not required to develop specific 

exercises to train associated forces on counterproliferation tasks, they 

have incorporated coverage of these tasks into various training events, 

such as service training, large-scale exercises, computer-assisted exercises, 

seminars, and operations.

Counterproliferation-related elements are found in the joint task lists, 

which are the basis for joint training. The requirements for the joint tasks 

derive from the Defense Planning Guidance, the National Security Strategy, 

the National Military Strategy, and the military theater plans of the regional 

unified commands. Each of the services also has a list of essential tasks, 

including NBC and counterproliferation issues, that must be performed to 

accomplish that service’s mission. For example, one Navy task is to “defend 

against, detect, monitor, and reduce NBC threats.” This task includes 

warning and reporting of NBC threats and involves both threat reduction 

and implementation of readiness measures. Such essential tasks are the 

basis for subsequent training to support readiness.

Each of the services has taken steps to increase the NBC training it 

provides as well as enhance its NBC readiness. For example, the Marine 

Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force provides NBC training to 

deploying Marine Expeditionary Units. In addition, the Marine Corps has 

added an organic NBC capability, smaller but similar to the Chemical and 

Biological Incident Response Force, to each deploying unit. Similarly, the 

Army has developed a series of NBC-related training packages for various 

command levels and a plan to further incorporate NBC issues into such 

areas as training simulations, models, and the curricula of intermediate and 

senior Army service schools. The Army also includes the NBC-related items 

in its regular tests of Army Common Tasks for individual soldiers and for 

units.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

Institutionalize Counterproliferation

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

A July 1998 report by the DOD Inspector General described numerous 

shortfalls in the execution of chemical and biological defense training 

among the services.6

 The report concluded that except for Navy surface 

ships, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating chemical and 

biological defense into unit training. The Inspector General found that such 

training was not adequately incorporated into traditional readiness 

reporting mechanisms and recommended that the services revise their 

training plans and readiness reporting to better reflect the importance of 

this training. The services generally agreed with this recommendation. For 

example, as a result of a recently completed counterproliferation-readiness 

review, the Air Force plans to increase not only unit and individual NBC 

training but also the importance of NBC issues in measures of readiness. 

The Inspector General also noted the disparity between the relatively good 

Navy training of shipboard personnel and the more limited training of Navy 

air squadron personnel. The Navy is addressing the issue, especially in the 

context of joint operations. A number of major Navy exercises have 

included NBC elements for Navy and multiservice NBC-related training. 

However, the training and readiness shortfalls identified in the report have 

led the Counterproliferation Council to meet with the DOD Senior 

Requirements Council to discuss means of further integrating NBC issues 

into its measures of readiness. As the DOD Inspector General report 

suggests, this would provide further impetus for the services to more 

thoroughly conduct a broader range of NBC training.

In addition to the routine service and joint training and scheduled exercises 

conducted at the unified and component command levels, 

counterproliferation training can be achieved in incidental ways during 

events such as humanitarian relief operations, contingency deployments, 

and military operations other than war. For example, Pacific Command 

officials told us that U.S. forces received valuable practical training during 

the summer 1999 evacuation and re-occupation of Johnston Atoll in the 

Pacific Ocean. An approaching hurricane prompted a major consequence 

management operation on the island, which has a facility for destroying 

chemical weapons and agents. Pacific Command officials considered the 

operation a good test of the Command’s NBC-related capabilities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues guidance that directs joint 

commanders to concentrate training on specific areas the Chairman finds 

6

Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training, Department of Defense, Office 

of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-174, July 17, 1998.
Appendix III

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deficient. For example, weapons of mass destruction and NBC defense are 

among the list of issues recommended by the Chairman for immediate 

action. Included in the list of items for ongoing training concentration are 

theater missile defense, which has a direct counterproliferation role, and 

areas such as information superiority, interagency operations, and 

interface between commands, which have only a relation to 

counterproliferation operations.

All elements of counterproliferation are included in major joint and 

combined exercises. Table 3 provides examples of joint and combined 

exercises that have had counterproliferation elements over the last 4 years.

Table 3: Examples of Joint and Combined Exercises With Counterproliferation Elements

Source: Report to GAO: Embedding Counterproliferation Joint Mission Essential Tasks in CINC and 

Service Training and Exercise Programs, The Joint Staff, Jan. 14, 2000.

Exercise name Participants Counterproliferation element

NATO Crises Management Exercise 

2000

NATO forces Scenario used in exercise included dealing with an adversary 

armed with chemical/biological weapons and medium-range 

ballistic missiles.

Eligible Receiver DOD and interagency staff Scenarios used in exercises have included disaster relief and 

weapons of mass destruction terrorism.

Theater Missile Defense Exercise United States and Russia Conducted with Russian officers to exercise coordinated theater 

ballistic missile defense of a fictional third world country.

Brave Knight U.S. European Command Focused on consequence management operations and included 

NBC defense emphasis.

Tempest Express U.S. Pacific Command Trained joint task force and joint task force augmentation cell 

staff on crisis action procedures for consequence management 

operations.

Coral Breeze U.S. Pacific Command NBC war game, analyses, and seminars to examine the effects 

of chemical and biological agent employment on U.S. operations 

on the Korean peninsula.

Matador U.S. European Command Includes planning, intelligence, and operational tasks that are 

not counterproliferation-specific but relate to NBC defense.

Ellipse Series U.S. Special Operations 

Command

Exercises include counterforce and support to consequence 

management operations.

Turbo Challenge 2000 U.S. Transportation 

Command

Passive defense training incorporated into the tasks for the 

exercise.

Eagle Resolve U.S. Central Command Focuses on theater ballistic missiles and other NBC threats.

United Endeavor 98-1 U.S. Joint Forces Command Exercise provided training for joint task force staff on NBC 

protection in theater.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to 

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Professional Military 

Education

DOD officials consider professional military education to be vital to 

increasing awareness in officers and leaders of the seriousness of the NBC 

threat in military operations. DOD intermediate- and senior-level military 

schools have incorporated counterproliferation-related topics into their 

curricula, though the extent and emphasis of coverage vary among the 

schools.

The war colleges provide general coverage of counterproliferation-related 

topics in their core programs related to national security decision-making 

and operations. For example, 1 of the 14 instructional periods for the Air 

War College’s Department of Future Conflict is dedicated solely to weapons 

of mass destruction. Counterproliferation and NBC issues are also offered 

as additional courses at each of the war colleges. For example, a weapons 

of mass destruction elective course at the Army War College uses experts 

in the NBC field for lectures and provides an opportunity for a detailed 

study of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. Such courses generally 

include aspects of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The colleges 

also regularly conduct conferences, war games, and exercises that address 

counterproliferation issues. For instance, counterproliferation issues are 

included in an annual war game attended by all of the war colleges at 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

The National Defense University and the Air Force have established 

academic centers to improve counterproliferation education and research 

at their respective schools and to support other DOD components. These 

centers provide instructional support to the professional military education 

schools and participate in seminars and war games.

In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that 

weapons of mass destruction be considered by the military schools as one 

of several special areas of emphasis to incorporate into their curricula. The 

1998 list included the areas of consequence management support to foreign 

governments and force protection for U.S. forces operating overseas. 

Based on input from throughout DOD, this annual list highlights areas that 

are considered important for keeping professional military education on 

the leading edge of joint warfighting. However, such guidance contains no 

specific direction on the degree to which these topics should be 

emphasized or where in the overall curricula they belong. The schools have 

discretion on how these areas are incorporated into their curricula. The Air 

Command and Staff College noted that some guidance is also provided 

indirectly through DOD and joint agencies. They cited an example where 
Appendix III

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the Defense Threat Reduction Agency provides experts to a major 

counterproliferation war game at the school.

Intelligence Support Effective intelligence support is critical to all aspects of DOD’s 

counterproliferation mission. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which is 

the DOD focal point for integrating intelligence information in support of 

counterproliferation, established a counterproliferation support office in 

1995 to provide focus for its efforts. This office had an authorized 

personnel level of about 135 in fiscal year 1999. Approval has been given for 

the addition of 35 analysts between fiscal year 2000 and 2004. Ten of those 

were on board as of January 2000. Expenditures by the support office 

increased from about $6 million in fiscal year 1995 to about $20 million in 

fiscal year 1999.

Initiatives have been undertaken to enhance intelligence support of 

counterproliferation initiatives and further integrate intelligence into 

DOD’s counterproliferation efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency’s 

counterproliferation office is now producing a worldwide and four regional 

threat assessments every 2 years in support of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff’s weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation concept 

plan. An intelligence requirements office was established at the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency to facilitate the flow of intelligence requirements 

and products between the operational and intelligence communities. In 

1998 the Defense Intelligence Agency established a computerized system to 

provide current substantive intelligence information and related support to 

policymakers, force planners, and combatant commanders. By December 

1999, this classified system had 21 U.S. government agencies and 

organizations posting data to it. The Agency’s data indicate wide use of the 

system. Another key initiative was the 1997 establishment of a center to 

provide improved intelligence support on underground facilities. 

Adversaries can use such facilities to protect and conceal their weapons of 

mass destruction programs. Additional initiatives are outlined in the 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee’s annual report to the 

Congress.

Two recent DOD assessments of counterproliferation intelligence 

support—one by the DOD Inspector General and the other by the Joint 

Staff—identified weaknesses in the level of support. Problems cited by the 
Appendix III

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Inspector General in a classified October 1999 report7 were similar to 

deficiencies cited in a 1996 study of biological and chemical weapons 

intelligence by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The 

Inspector General made numerous recommendations, concurred by DOD 

officials, that included establishment of policies, processes, and 

mechanisms to manage and oversee intelligence support to the 

counterproliferation mission. The December 1999 Joint Staff report8

concluded that there are inadequate resources to support intelligence 

collection and analysis of the NBC threat. The report, signed by the 

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

recommended more flexible allocation of resources to support 

counterproliferation missions and improvements in DOD’s intelligence 

production program to facilitate analyst collaboration to support 

counterproliferation missions.

7

Report Number 00-OIR-01, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Oct. 15, 

1999.

8

Combat Agency Review Team Assessment of Defense Intelligence Agency, The Joint Staff, 

Dec. 21, 1999.
Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies ApendxiIV

Various organizations, offices, and coordinating bodies throughout DOD 

are assigned responsibilities for executing the 1993 Defense 

Counterproliferation Initiative. A 1996 DOD directive1

 establishes the 

policy, assigns responsibilities, and formalizes relationships among DOD 

organizations for implementing counterproliferation activities and 

programs. This appendix (1) describes the organizational structures and 

major missions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the 

military services, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for 

counterproliferation; (2) presents information on current personnel levels 

and funding for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and (3) provides 

information on key DOD and interagency coordinating bodies.

Office of the Secretary 

of Defense

Several organizations under the Office of the Secretary of Defense have 

counterproliferation-related responsibilities. The Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,2

 is assigned general 

responsibilities for, among other things, (1) coordinating DOD research, 

development, and acquisition programs to ensure that they adequately 

support counterproliferation efforts and U.S. forces’ ability to conduct 

operations successfully in an NBC environment and (2) providing 

management oversight to the advanced concept technology demonstration 

program and to the directors of the defense agencies who report to the 

Under Secretary.3

 The Assistant to the Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological Defense provides oversight of the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program.4

 The Under Secretary for Policy is to “develop, 

1

DOD Directive, No. 2060.2, “Department of Defense Counterproliferation Implementation,” 

July 9, 1996.

2

Logistics was added to the Under Secretary’s title at the beginning of fiscal year 2000.

3

Two of these agencies, On-Site Inspection Agency and Defense Special Weapons Agency, 

were disestablished on October 1, 1998, and subsumed into the newly created Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency. The Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 

continues to report to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who is 

charged with ensuring that the director includes counterproliferation as an integral element 

within the developmental framework for defense against ballistic missiles. The Director of 

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency reports to the Director, Defense Research 

and Engineering.

4

With the announcement of the Defense Reform Initiative in November 1997, DOD sought 

congressional approval to abolish this position and rename the Director for Defense 

Research and Engineering as the “Director, Defense Technology and Counterproliferation.” 

The Congress did not approve the proposal, and the position has since been vacant.
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

coordinate, and oversee” policy implementation throughout DOD and 

coordinate efforts with other U.S. government agencies and foreign allies 

and to oversee the Defense Technology Security Administration. Although 

not specifically assigned responsibilities for counterproliferation, the 

Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, also plays a key role in the 

process of planning, programming, and budgeting. The Defense 

Intelligence Agency is a combat support agency. As such, it operates under 

the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence, but submits intelligence estimates and 

other substantive products directly to the Secretary and the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, and, as appropriate, to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director, 

Defense Research and Engineering, is charged with assisting the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) in the 

day-to-day oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The major 

counterproliferation-related organizations within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense are shown in figure 2.
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 2: Organizations and Functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Source: DOD.

Assistant Secretary

Command, Control,

Communication and

Intelligence

Director,

Defense Intelligence

Agency

Defense Threat

Reduction Agency

Balistic Missile

Defense Organization

Program Analysis

and Evaluation

Manage programs to

reduce the threat

of NBC, conventional 

and special weapons

Manage, direct, and

execute the Ballistic Missile

Defense Program

Assistant Secretary

Strategy and Threat

Reduction

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Requirements, Plans,

and 

Counterproliferation 

Policy

Under Secretary

Acquisition Technology

and Logistics

USD (AT&L)

Director, Defense

Research and

Engineering

Under Secretary

Comptroller

Under Secretary

Policy

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary

Analyze and evaluate 

plans, programs, 

and budget

Director

Counterproliferation

Policy

Develop, coordinate,

and oversee

implementation of

counterproliferation

policy throughout DOD

Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency

Assistant to the Secretary

of Defense Nuclear,

Chemical, and Biological 

Defense Programs

Deputy Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense

Counterproliferation and

Chemical/Biological Defense

Conduct biological

weapons defense

research

Provide oversight of the

DOD Chemical and

Biological Defense

Program

Defense agencies
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s overall responsibilities for 

counterproliferation include (1) preparing guidance for the commanders of 

the regional unified commands and integrating the capabilities of the 

functional unified commands, such as the U.S. Special Operations 

Command; (2) preparing and reviewing plans; (3) making 

recommendations to the National Command Authorities5

 for operational 

employment of U.S. forces in counterproliferation operations; and 

(4) developing joint counterproliferation doctrine. Figure 3 shows the Joint 

Staff organization and functions for counterproliferation activities.

Figure 3: Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff

Note: 

TAMD--Theater Air and Missile Defense

WMD--weapons of mass destruction

Source: DOD data.

5

National Command Authorities are the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly 

deputized alternates or successors.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

J-2

Intelligence Support

J-3

Operations

J-5

Strategic

Plans and Policy

J-7

Operational Plans

and Interoperability

J-8

Force Structure, 

Resource

and Assessment

Counterproliferation

Division

Counterproliferation 

and Deterrence

Section

Doctrine Conventional

War Plans

Joint 

Requirements

Oversight 

Council

support

Joint Theater

Air and Missile

Defense

Organization

Warfighting

Analysis

Division

Oversee 

Concept of 

Operation plans

Lead Joint 

Warfighting

Capabilities

Assessment 

team

Coordinate

Joint Doctrine

drafting and

updating

process

Prepare

Joint Strategic

Capabilities

Plan and

other major

plans

Develop and

collate input

to Chairman's

Program 

Assessment

and 

Recommendation

Define joint

operational

requirements

and concepts

to ensure

TAMD

interoperability

Assess

impact of

WMD on

warfighting

via simulations

and other

studies
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Military Service 

Headquarters

The military services’ counterproliferation responsibilities include 

developing doctrine; conducting research, development, and acquisition 

efforts; and organizing, training, and equipping their respective forces to 

address NBC threats. The Air Force has established a single headquarters 

staff office to serve as a focal point for overseeing all aspects of Air Force 

counterproliferation policy to a greater degree than the staff organizations 

of the other services. The office’s responsibilities include doctrine, strategy, 

policy, and requirements, such as developing and coordinating 

implementation of the Air Force’s counterproliferation master plan and 

capabilities roadmap. Like the other services, the Air Force staff has 

organizations that perform specific counterproliferation-related tasks. For 

example, Air Force civil engineers are responsible for coordinating and 

conducting NBC defense at Air Force installations. The other military 

services have established different staff offices within their headquarters to 

address counterproliferation issues (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Organization of the Military Services

Note: CNO--Chief of Naval Operations.

Source: DOD.

Army

Chief of Staff

Deputy 

Chief of Staff

Operations 

and Plans

Strategy, Plans 

and Policy 

Directorate

Force 

Development

 Directorate

National 

Security

Policy 

Division

Chemical 

and NBC

Defense 

Division

Air and 

Missile

Defense 

Division

Nuclear 

Affairs

and Arms

Control 

Negotiations

Branch

Safety and

Survivability 

Branch Joint 

Chemical 

and

Biological 

Defense

Strategy

and Policy

Surface 

Warfare

Division

Chief of Naval

Operations

Deputy CNO

Plans, Policy 

and

Operations

Deputy CNO

Resources, 

Warfare,

Assessments,

and 

Requirements

Deputy 

Chief of Staff

Plans, Policy

and Operations

Marine Corps

Systems

Command

Deputy 

Chief of Staff

Air and Space

Operations

Deputy 

Chief of Staff

Installations and

Logistics

Plans

Division

National 

Security

Policy Division

Directorate of

Nuclear Issues 

and

Counterproliferation

Office of 

the Civil 

Engineering

Commandant of the

Marine Corps

Air Force

Chief of Staff
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The planning and execution of the individual elements of Army 

counterproliferation-related activities are performed in a number of 

separate offices throughout its headquarters. The National Security Policy 

Division, which is part of the Army’s Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate, 

coordinates arms control and proliferation-related policy issues and is the 

point of entry for most Army counterproliferation matters. A separate 

Army NBC Defense Division oversees all aspects of Army NBC defense and 

serves as the Army focal point for the DOD Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program. The Army also serves as DOD’s executive agent for 

several counterproliferation-related functions such as DOD support to civil 

authorities for consequence management and for developing medical, 

biological, and chemical weapons countermeasures. The Army is currently 

conducting an internal assessment to determine how it should be organized 

to better address counterproliferation issues.

The Navy also has a number of staff offices that deal with 

counterproliferation issues. The Surface Warfare Division is responsible for 

coordinating the Navy’s NBC Defense issues as well as serving as the 

Navy’s focal point for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. 

An office under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and 

Operations deals with arms control and counterproliferation policy issues.

An officer in the Marine Corps headquarters staff addresses 

counterproliferation policy and other issues, such as arms control 

agreements and the anthrax vaccine. Personnel at the Marine Corps 

Systems Command are responsible for many of the programs and 

equipment-related issues of counterproliferation. The Marine Corps and 

the Navy have proposed forming a council for the two services, composed 

of senior officers, to address specific counterproliferation issues, such as 

amphibious operations in an NBC environment.

Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was established on October 1, 1998, 

to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction and to support 

operational forces and develop and field systems for counterproliferation. 

The Agency comprises six functional directorates, support elements such 

as general counsel and business management, senior advisers representing 

the Departments of State and Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

and an advisory panel called the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee.

Three of the Agency’s six directorates focus on nonproliferation issues. The 

Technology Security directorate is responsible for monitoring export 
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

license applications and U.S. satellite launches to minimize the transfer of 

weapons of mass destruction-related technology. The Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Directorate is to assist former Soviet Union countries in 

reducing their weapons of mass destruction infrastructure and provide 

verifiable safeguards against further proliferation. The On-Site Inspection 

directorate supports on-site control inspection, escort and monitoring 

activities, and arms control confidence building activities and develops 

treaty verification monitoring technologies.

The Agency’s other three directorates support various areas of the 

counterproliferation mission. The Chemical and Biological Defense 

Directorate implements the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program. The Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate 

conducts technology development and provides support to the unified 

commands in the areas of counterforce, weapons effects, and force 

protection. This directorate also runs the Knowledge Preservation 

program, which is to protect the U.S. capability to sustain the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent in the absence of underground testing. The Nuclear Support and 

Operations Directorate works on technical aspects of maintaining the U.S. 

nuclear deterrent.

Although the Agency does not directly support DOD’s active defense 

efforts, its staff participates in DOD-wide working groups on related issues, 

such as weapon effects modeling. Figure 5 shows the organization and 

functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 5: Organization and Functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Note: 

CTR--Cooperative Threat Reduction

DARPA--Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DOE--Department of Energy

WMD--weapons of mass destruction.

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

The Agency had a staff of 1,872, or approximately 93 percent of the fiscal 

year 2000 authorized personnel total of 2,002, as of February 2000. Slightly 

more than 500 of the staff were assigned to the Counterproliferation 

Support and Operations, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear 

Support and Operations Directorates—the directorates largely involved in 

the Agency’s support of counterproliferation programs and activities.

(See fig. 6.)

Threat Reduction

Advisory Committee

Director

Deputy Director

Advanced Systems 

and

Concepts Office

Senior Advisors

Business

Management

Special Staff

Technology

Security

Cooperative 

Threat Reduction

On-Site

Inspection

Chemical and

Biological

Defense

Counterproliferation

Support and

Operations

Nuclear Support

and Operations

Participates in

export licensing 

process

Executes CTR

program to aid

in former Soviet

Union WMD 

dismantlement

Executes U.S.

rights under

Arms Control

Treaties

Help sustain

nuclear deterrent

Provides direction 

to procure systems

against chem-bio 

attack 

Works with DOE and 

DARPA on civilian

protection needs

Develops systems

to characterize and

strike WMD sites

Develops force

protection technologies

and assessments

Develops software

for targeting, 

assessments, and

consequence management
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 6: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Personnel Levels

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

The Agency’s fiscal year 2000 budget was $1.93 billion. The portion for the 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program, $791 million, is, by law, 

protected from use for other purposes and controlled directly by the DOD 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program, which is managed in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program 

portion, $458 million, is also protected in the Agency’s budget. Figure 7 

shows the allocation of fiscal year 2000 funding for the six directorates and 

support functions.

18

51

229

605

581

263

125

Chemical and biological defense

Nuclear support

On-site inspection

Technology security

Counterproliferation support and 

operations

Other

Cooperative threat reduction

Counterproliferation Directorates. Chemical and biological defense directorate excludes non-Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency personnel, such as military personnel who work on the Chemical and 

Biological Defense Program.
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 7: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding Profile for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

DOD and Interagency 

Coordinating Bodies

DOD has established two major coordinating bodies for 

counterproliferation—the Counterproliferation Council and the NBC 

Defense Steering Committee—and leads the interagency 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. The 

Counterproliferation Council is designed to bring all major components 

together on a regular basis, while the NBC Defense Steering Committee 

comprises senior officials with responsibility for the research, 

development, and acquisition activities of the DOD Chemical and 

Biological Defense Program. The Counterproliferation Program Review 

Committee is to coordinate research, development, and acquisition across 

DOD, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence community. Table 4 

describes the purposes, composition, and authorities of these bodies.

$5

$108 $109

$230

$458

$227

$791

Technology security

Nuclear support

On-site inspection

Counterproliferation support

and operations

Other

Cooperative threat reduction

Chemical and biological

defense

Counterproliferation Directorates

Dollars in millions
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4: DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies

Counterproliferation Council NBC Defense Steering Committee

Counterproliferation Program 

Review Committee 

Purpose • Advise Secretary of Defense on 

counter-proliferation matters.

• Make policy recommendations for 

the implementation of DOD 

counterproliferation activities and 

programs.

• Oversee implementation of DOD 

counterproliferation activities and 

programs.

• Make recommendations on elements 

of defense policy that deal with 

counterproliferation issues.

To strengthen the linkage between the 

Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering, the Deputy Assistant to 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Chemical, and Biological Defense 

Programs [DATSD/CBD], and DTRA.

• Optimize funding for, and ensure 

development and deployment of 

(1) highly effective technologies and 

capabilities for detection, monitoring, 

collection, processing, analysis, and 

dissemination of information in 

support of U.S. counterproliferation 

policy and (2) disabling technologies 

in support of such policy.

• Identify and eliminate undesirable 

redundancies or uncoordinated 

efforts in development and 

deployment of such technologies 

and capabilities.

• Establish priorities for programs and 

funding; facilitate interagency and 

interdepartmental funding of 

programs to ensure necessary levels 

of funding to develop, operate, and 

field highly capable systems.

• Ensure that Energy programs are 

integrated with the operational needs 

of other government departments 

and agencies of government.

• Ensure that DOD national security 

programs include technology 

demonstrations and prototype 

development of equipment.

Authority DOD Directive 2060.2 Public Law 103-160 Public Law 103-160

When formed July 1996 November 1998 1993

Chair Deputy Secretary of Defense Reports to Under Secretary of 

Defense (AT&L)

Secretary of Defense (or designee), 

Chairman; Secretary of Energy (or 

designee), Vice Chairman 

Membership Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L); 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

under secretaries of military 

departments; vice chiefs of the military 

services; ASD(ISP) (who serves as 

Executive Secretary)a

; ATSD(NCB); 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence; Director, Joint Staff, 

Strategic Plans, and Policy (J-5)

DDR&E; Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Chemical 

and Biological Defense Programs; 

DTRA director; and the head of 

DTRA’s Chemical and Biological 

Defense Directorate 

Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 

Executive Secretary; Special Assistant 

to the Director for Central Intelligence 

for Nonproliferation; Deputy Director 

for Strategy and Policy, Joint Staff (J-5) 

Continued
Appendix IV

DOD Counterproliferation Organization and 

Coordinating Bodies

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

a

The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy was eliminated as a 

result of the Defense Reform Initiative of November 1997. The functions of the position were merged 

with those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources to create the office of 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction.

Note:

AT&L-- Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

ATSD/NCB--Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense 

Programs

DDR&E--Director, Defense Research and Engineering

DOE--Department of Energy

DTRA--Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Sources: DOD Directive 2060.2; annual reports of the Counterproliferation Program Review 

Committee, Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Defense Annual Report to Congress, 1999; published 

overviews of the Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program; GAO interviews.

Frequency of 

meetings

“Upon call of Deputy Secretary of 

Defense or designee”; in practice, 

approximately quarterly.

Meets twice each year and upon call 

of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(AT&L).

Principals’ Committee has met twice 

since March 1995. Standing 

Committee consists of Principals’ 

Committee members or their deputies 

and meets at least annually. Working 

groups, meet regularly to prepare 

annual report.

Products and 

reporting

Briefings by DOD organizations are 

presented to the Council.

DOD Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program Management Plan 

(which specifies relationships and 

responsibilities among coordinating 

agencies and provides fiscal and 

programming guidance to the Joint 

NBC Defense Board to develop the 

Program Objective Memorandum).

Issues annual report, Report on 

Activities and Programs for Countering 

Proliferation and NBC Terrorism.

Counterproliferation Council NBC Defense Steering Committee

Counterproliferation Program 

Review Committee 

Continued from Previous Page
Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix V

Organizations and Offices Contacted ApendxiV

Washington, D.C., Area Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat 

Reduction

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Finance 

Officer), Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

The Joint Staff

Headquarters, Department of the Army

• National Security Policy Division

• Chemical and NBC Defense Division

Headquarters, Department of the Navy

• Strategy and Policy Division 

• Surface Warfare Division

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force

• Counterproliferation and Nuclear Policy Office

Headquarters, Marine Corps 

• Office for Plans, Policies and Operations

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

• Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate

• Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate

• Nuclear Support Directorate

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Army Soldier, Biological and Chemical Command, Aberdeen, Maryland
Appendix V

Organizations and Offices Contacted

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Defense Intelligence Agency

National Defense University, Counterproliferation Center

Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security

Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to 

Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Institute for Defense Analysis

Science Applications International Corporation

Battelle Memorial Institute

Norfolk, Virginia, Area U.S. Joint Forces Command

• Air Force Air Combat Command

• Headquarters, Marine Forces, Atlantic

• Headquarters, Atlantic Fleet

Tampa, Florida, Area U.S. Central Command

U.S. Special Operations Command

Honolulu, Hawaii, Area U.S. Pacific Command

• Headquarters, Army Pacific

• Headquarters, Pacific Fleet

• Headquarters, Pacific Air Force

• Headquarters, Marine Forces, Pacific

• Special Operations Command, Pacific
Appendix V

Organizations and Offices Contacted

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Ramstein, Germany, 

Area

Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces, Europe

Montgomery, Alabama, 

Area

Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base

• Air Force Counterproliferation Center

Los Angeles, 

California, Area

RAND Corporation

Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, Area

Defense Nuclear Weapons School

Letr
Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiVI

Note: GAO Comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the 

end of this appendix.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

 Now on p. 24.

See comment 1.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Now on p. 24.

 See comment 2.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Now on p. 24.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 24.

See comment 3.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

.

Now on p. 25.

See comment 5.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter, dated April 20, 2000.

GAO Comments 1. While DOD has taken actions that benefit the Department’s integration 

efforts, these actions, even taken collectively, do not provide the integrated 

long-range vision and comprehensive guidance needed to focus and direct 

its overall counterproliferation efforts, nor do they provide the tools to help 

guide and oversee progress. The breadth and complexity of 

counterproliferation permeate through DOD organizations, functions, and 

activities. The potential use of NBC weapons against U.S. and allied forces 

requires a more comprehensive integrated approach by DOD. Such an 

approach would encompass the entire spectrum of counterproliferation 

programs and activities and provide greater assurance that all commands, 

military services, and department level structures are working together in 

the most effective manner. A DOD-wide management plan would establish 

performance measures that could be used to clearly measure the 

effectiveness of integration efforts while indicating where further progress 

is needed.

In regard to an integrated military strategy, if the one being coordinated by 

the Joint Staff embodies the elements and scope envisioned by the 1997 

Quadrennial Defense Review, rather than be a collection of current 

guidance, it would satisfy the intent of our recommendation.

2. We believe that a recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to 

include DOD’s organization for counterproliferation in the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review would be of significant value to the next 

administration and to those currently preparing to undertake the Review. 

Including such an examination in the Review would provide an early 

opportunity for the next administration to consider organizational 

alternatives for the efficient and effective departmentwide management of 

future counterproliferation efforts in light of its assessment of overall 

defense needs. The planned initiatives noted by DOD to improve its 

understanding of how the counterproliferation mission can be better 

satisfied by organizational changes should complement an examination by 

the Quadrennial Defense Review.

3. Subsequent to receiving DOD’s comments, a proposal by the Joint Staff 

to develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine publication was 

approved. We reviewed the proposal and found it to be consistent with our 

recommendation. The new doctrine is planned for publication in winter 

2001.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

4. DOD agrees that NBC survivability measures must be incorporated into 

all military equipment, but indicates that it believes current acquisition 

regulations and investments in basic science and technology sufficiently 

address NBC survivability. We disagree. As discussed in our report, a DOD 

study team concluded in January 1999 that current survivability provisions 

in acquisition regulations need to be strengthened and that there is a lack of 

uniform standards among the services to ensure survivability in systems 

and equipment being acquired. It developed a plan to address these 

weaknesses, which after a year, has not been implemented. The thrust of 

our recommendation is to take actions consistent with the study team’s 

recommendations that provide reasonable assurance that appropriate 

survivability features are incorporated into systems and equipment being 

acquired by the Department.

5. In discussing its response with us, DOD agreed that there may be 

opportunities for the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to 

do more to identify and eliminate any unnecessary redundant programs. 

However, DOD indicated that the Committee has not decided whether the 

mechanism we recommend is necessary at this time. We recognize that 

existing mechanisms can help eliminate redundancies and uncoordinated 

efforts, but we were provided few examples of that occurring. Given the 

scope of counterproliferation, including the number of organizational 

elements involved, we believe the establishment of a more structured, 

comprehensive approach within and across the counterproliferation areas 

would provide greater assurance and consistency in evaluating and 

strengthening the decision process for eliminating programs that may 

unnecessarily overlap or be redundant.
Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-00-97 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Energy ApendxiVI

(701160) Letr
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