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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,240

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

LISA MICHELLE STOTTS,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Montgomery District Court; F. WILLIAM CULLINS, judge. Opinion filed December 

10, 2021. Appeal dismissed.

Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for 

appellee. 

Before GARDNER, P.J., SCHROEDER and CLINE, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Lisa Michelle Stotts appeals the district court's decision to revoke 

her probation and impose her original sentence after finding that Stotts had absconded 

from supervision. Among other issues, the State responds that Stotts' appeal is moot 

because Stotts is no longer incarcerated on this case. Agreeing with the State, we dismiss 

the appeal as moot.
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Factual and Procedural Background

Although the facts are unimportant to our disposition of this case, we include them 

as background.

In May 2018, Lisa Michelle Stotts tried to take one of her neighbor's children who 

was playing across the street in front of their home, believing the child to be her daughter. 

Stotts' neighbor told law enforcement that Stotts had twice come to the home where her 

children played in the front yard to try to take a child. An unidentified person who 

witnessed the incident informed police officers that, at one point, Stotts held a child by 

the legs and refused to let go. 

When officers responded to the incident, Stotts claimed she had a daughter and 

that her neighbors would not let her have her child back. But when asked about her 

daughter's name, Stotts could not provide it. Police officers followed Stotts into the 

apartment as she backed away from the front door until she started to walk toward the 

hallway. When officers told her to stop walking and moved closer to Stotts, she ran into 

the back bedroom. There, she sat on a mattress on the floor, pointed to a pile of blankets 

on the mattress, and repeatedly told officers: "My baby is in here." Afraid that a child 

may be in danger, the officers ordered Stotts to stand. Stotts became combative but the 

police officers eventually subdued her and placed her in handcuffs. The officers did not 

find a child or anyone else in the apartment. Then the officers searched Stotts for 

contraband or weapons and found a "clear glass pipe with white residue on the inside" in 

her front sweatshirt pocket. 

The State charged Stotts with (1) kidnapping in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 

21-5408(a)(3), (2) possession of methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-

5706, (3) interference with a law enforcement officer in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 
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21-5904, and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-

5709(b)(2). 

In September 2018, Stotts pleaded no contest to one count each of 

methamphetamine, a severity level 5 drug felony, and endangering a child, a class A 

nonperson misdemeanor. The district court ordered Stotts to go to Four County Mental 

Health and to follow their recommendations. Soon after, Stotts posted bond to await 

sentencing. Her bond conditions required her to report to her Court Services officer

(CSO), to submit to urine or breath testing for alcohol or drugs, to refrain from violating 

the law, and to refrain from drinking alcohol. Yet Stotts missed three appointments with 

CSO John Kirk, missing her opportunity to begin the Senate Bill 123 evaluation process. 

As a result, Kirk requested Stotts be detained until Court Services could get the necessary 

information from her. The district court issued an arrest warrant that law enforcement 

served about two weeks later. 

Upon being released in December 2018, Stotts failed to contact Court Services, 

although Kirk had reminded her to do so. A week later, CSO Alexis Dunsing called the 

last phone number Stotts had provided. Stotts' mother answered and stated she would 

pass on the message to report to Court Services if she had any contact with Stotts. The 

district court issued an arrest warrant that law enforcement served 20 days later. This 

arrest was close to the date Stotts committed a new offense of possession of 

methamphetamine in January 2019, which led to a felony charge. 

Stotts did not appear for her hearing in January 2019. Kirk told the district court he 

had not had contact with her. In March 2019, based on Stotts' criminal history score of I, 

the district court sentenced Stotts to 11 months' incarceration for possession of 

methamphetamine, and 12 months' postrelease supervision. The district court suspended 

that sentence and ordered Stotts to serve 18 months' probation. For the charge of 

endangering a child, the district court ordered Stotts to serve a 90-day jail sentence to run 
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concurrent with the 11-month sentence. The district court ordered Stotts to complete 

mandatory S.B. 123 drug treatment as a condition of her probation. See K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 21-6824.

Stotts completed one inpatient drug treatment program but did not complete 

outpatient counseling or the program's recommendations. While on probation, Stotts had 

an argument with her boyfriend and went to Oklahoma where she was arrested on a 

warrant for her arrest. Stotts had not asked her Intensive Supervision Officer (ISO) for 

permission to leave Kansas. 

Stotts' ISO, Amber Harkey, submitted a statement to the district court 

recommending the court revoke Stotts' probation based on Stotts' (1) failure to timely 

attend S.B. 123 treatment as required, (2) subsequent unsuccessful discharge from S.B. 

123 mental health treatment, (3) multiple failures to follow recommendations by ISO and 

providers for mental health treatment, (4) continued use of methamphetamine, (5) failure 

to use resources available to secure a stable living situation, (6) failure to attempt to 

obtain valid employment, (7) failure to report to ISO as directed for roughly six months; 

(8) two methamphetamine positive urinalysis tests, (9) failure to comply with increased 

reporting and a demonstrated unwillingness to comply with supervision, and (10) failure 

to remain in the area her ISO specified by traveling to, and being incarcerated in, 

Oklahoma. 

At the probation revocation hearing, Harkey testified about the probation 

violations listed above. Harkey also stated that in 2019 Stotts only sporadically attended 

scheduled meetings, refused to allow Harkey to apply for suitable housing, and failed to 

respond or show after Harkey sent a reporting instructions letter to Stotts' last-known 

address. Based on Harkey's policy and being unable to reach or find Stotts for six months, 

she considered Stotts an "absconder." 
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Stotts testified that she suffered from drug addiction and acknowledged Harkey's 

attempt to work with her to abide by her probation conditions. She asked the district court 

to let her attend another inpatient treatment program on a reservation in Oklahoma. Stotts' 

attorney asked the district court to either place Stotts in an inpatient treatment program 

followed by ankle monitoring or impose a 180-day intermediate sanction. 

The district court instead revoked Stotts' probation and ordered her to serve her 

underlying sentence, finding Stotts was an absconder. The district court revoked Stotts' 

probation in this case and in her 2019 felony case and ordered her 11-month sentence to 

run concurrent with her 32-month sentence in the 2019 case. As of June 23, 2020, the 

date of revocation, Stotts had served roughly 328 days of her 11-month sentence.

Stotts appeals, arguing the district court relied on an incorrect legal standard when 

it found her to be an absconder. She asks us to remand with orders to reconsider the 

disposition of her probation violations. Although she did not timely file her appeal, we 

consider her appeal timely under Kansas Supreme Court Administrative Order 2020-PR016, effective March 18, 2020, which suspended filing deadlines because of the COVID19 global pandemic. 

Is This Appeal Moot?

The State argues the appeal is moot because Stotts has already completed her 

sentence and cannot be reinstated to probation. On July 30, 2021, the State filed a Notice 

of Change in Custodial Status for Stotts, showing she is no longer serving her sentence in 

this case and that any statutorily required postrelease supervision would begin once she 

served the rest of her 2019 felony sentence. 

Generally, this court reviews only actual controversies and will not issue advisory 

opinions on moot claims. State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581, 590, 466 P.3d 439 (2020). An 
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issue is moot when "'it is clearly and convincingly shown the actual controversy has 

ended, the only judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and 

it would not impact the parties' rights.'" 311 Kan. at 584 (quoting State v. Montgomery, 

295 Kan. 837, 840-41, 286 P.3d 866 [2012]). This doctrine is a judicial policy applied to 

best serve the interests of judicial economy. 

The party claiming mootness must prove a prima facie case by showing the 

defendant "has fully completed the terms and conditions of his or her sentence." Roat, 

311 Kan. at 593. Once the claimant meets its burden, the opposing party must show that 

dismissal would impair the defendant's substantial interests or that an exception prevents 

dismissal. 311 Kan. at 592-93. 

In compliance with Supreme Court Rule 2.042 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 18), on July 

30, 2021, the State filed a Notice of Change in Custodial Status asserting that Stotts had 

completed her sentence in this case. In support, the State attached a letter from the 

Manager of the Kansas Department of Corrections' Sentence Computation Unit, 

confirming that Stotts had served the prison portion of her sentence, although she 

remained imprisoned for her sentence on another case.

Although this letter may not be as reliable as the certification provided in State v. 

Castle, 59 Kan. App. 2d 39, 477 P.3d 266 (2020), it is still

"reliable enough to meet the State's prima facie case and to shift to the defendant the 

burden to show that despite the letter he has not fully completed the terms of his 

sentence, that his substantial interest would be impaired by dismissal, or that an exception 

to the mootness doctrine applies." State v. Harmon, No. 122,153, 2021 WL 936070, at *3 

(Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion). 
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See State v. Griffin, No. 123,055, 2021 WL 4127829, at *4 (Kan. App. 2021) 

(unpublished opinion). Thus, the State has made a prima facie case of mootness and the 

burden shifts to Stotts. 

Stotts chose not to reply to the State's argument that her appeal is moot. Yet it is 

the defendant's burden to show "the existence of a meaningful interest that would be 

impaired by dismissal." Roat, 311 Kan. at 593. See also State v. Mayes, 311 Kan. 615, 

617, 465 P.3d 1141 (2020) ("Without a challenge from Mayes, the panel has nothing to 

consider.").

True, Stotts is still "'under a sentence'" in this case because she has not yet served 

her postrelease supervision. State v. Lehman, 308 Kan. 1089, 1098, 427 P.3d 840 (2018).

But the fact that Stotts must serve postrelease supervision does not keep her appeal of her 

probation revocation from being moot because whether a defendant is on probation or 

imprisoned does not affect the mandatory term of postrelease supervision. Cf. Castle, 59 

Kan. App. 2d at 48 (making same analysis about criminal history score).

And this court cannot grant Stotts any meaningful relief. Even if this court found 

error, this court cannot remand with instructions to impose an intermediate sanction 

because the district court cannot reinstate her probation or order Stotts to serve any more 

time on this case. See State v. Kinder, 307 Kan. 237, 243-44, 408 P.3d 114 (2018) (once 

the defendant serves his or her sentence, the district court cannot later sentence the 

defendant to probation). The district court no longer has any authority to punish her in 

this case. See Montgomery, 295 Kan. at 844.

Because Stotts has completed her sentence and does not argue that an exception to 

the mootness doctrine preserves her claim for appellate review or that dismissal would 

impair her substantial interest, we dismiss her appeal as moot.
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Appeal dismissed.