In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 17-2334

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARIO A. RODRIGUEZ-ESCALERA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 16-CR-30114-SMY — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 10, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 7, 2018

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and

BUCKLO, District Judge*. Defendant-appellee Mario RodriguezEscalera (“Rodriguez”) and his fiancée Blanca Moran were

arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, after police

discovered a large amount of methamphetamine and case in 

__________________

*Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 17-2334

Moran’s vehicle during a traffic stop. Before the district court,

Rodriguez and Moran each moved on Fourth Amendment

grounds to suppress the evidence obtained in the vehicle

search. Concluding that the evidence was derived from an

unlawfully extended traffic stop, the court granted both

motions. On appeal, the government challenges the grant of

Rodriguez’s motion to suppress. We affirm.

I.

On October 4, 2016, Illinois State Trooper Kenneth

Patterson observed a car abruptly switch lanes in front of a

truck without using a turn signal on Interstate 70 in southern

Illinois. Patterson decided to pull the car over for the traffic

infraction. See 625 ILCS §§ 5/11-703(a), 5/11-804. Equipped with

a dashboard video camera, Patterson’s vehicle recorded the

ensuing traffic stop. 

Once the car stopped, Patterson approached the passenger

side of the vehicle to find Rodriguez in the front passenger seat

and Moran in the driver’s seat. Patterson greeted them and

asked Moran to provide her license, registration, and proof of

insurance. Moran promptly complied. Her license indicated

that she was from Paramount, California, a city in Los Angeles

County. After gathering Moran’s documentation, Patterson

told Moran why he stopped her and explained that he intended to issue her a written warning for her traffic violation.

He asked her to accompany him in his squad car while he ran

her information and issued the warning. Moran agreed. 

Pattersonled Moran to the front passenger seat of his squad

car then returned to Moran’s vehicle to ask Rodriguez for his

identification. As Rodriguez retrieved his documentation,

Patterson inquired where he and Moran were headed. Rodri-
No. 17-2334 3

guez answered Pennsylvania. Then he handed Patterson his

Mexican identification card and his Mexican driver’s license.

Patterson kept the identification card and handed back the

driver’s license before returning to his squad car. 

Back in his vehicle, Patterson reviewed Moran’s and

Rodriguez’s documents and began to question Moran about

hertravel plans. Moran told Patterson that she and Rodriguez,

her fiancé, had come from Los Angeles and were heading to

New York City to visit the city for the first time while she was

on vacation from her job as a tax preparer and insurance

broker. Patterson asked where she and Rodriguez were

planning to go in New York. Moran replied that she wanted to

see Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Statue of Liberty. When

Patterson asked how long the trip would last, Moran told him

that she had two weeks off from work. She and Rodriguez did

not have lodging booked in New York yet, she told Patterson,

but they would look for a hotel when they arrived in the city. 

About eight minutes into the traffic stop, Patterson discovered that Moran’s California driver’s license was suspended.

He informed Moran, who was apparently surprised by the

news, and asked whether Rodriguez had a license so that he

could drive instead. Moran said that he had a Mexican license,

so Patterson returned to Moran’s vehicle to collect it from him.

Moran remained in the squad car. While Rodriguez retrieved

his license, Patterson probed for more information about the

couple’s apparently conflicting travel plans. He asked Rodriguez what city in Pennsylvania he and Moran were going to

visit. Rodriguez, who evidently had limited English skills,

indicated that he did not know. Patterson then asked how long

they were going to be gone; Rodriguez said one or two days.
4 No. 17-2334

Finally, Patterson asked if they were visiting friends or family

there. Rodriguez said no. 

After this brief exchange with Rodriguez, Patterson

returned to his squad car. About eleven minutes had passed

since he initiated the traffic stop, and Patterson now had all of

the information he needed from Moran and Rodriguez to issue

the traffic citations and send them on their way. But Patterson

had grown suspicious of the couple’s travel plans and decided

to have a narcotics-detection dog sniff Moran’s vehicle.

Patterson could see from his in-vehicle computer, however,

that his department’s K-9 unit was occupied with another

traffic stop. 

Patterson took nearly twenty-two minutes to issue Moran

three routine traffic citations—one ticket for driving with a

suspended license, one written warning for failing to signal

when changing lanes, and one written warning for improper

overtaking. Before he started writing the citations, Patterson

asked Moran for more details about the couple’s travel

itinerary. He inquired whether she and Rodriguez planned to

stop anywhere else on their way to New York. Moran said that

they did not. Troubled by the apparent conflict, Patterson then

asked if Rodriguez knew that they were going to New York.

Moran smiled and explained that she told Rodriguez that they

were going to Pennsylvania. When Patterson asked why,

Moran said she wanted the visit to New York City to be a

surprise. Upon further questioning, she explained that Rodriguez knew that they would be gone for two weeks. She also

told Patterson that Rodriguez was not currently employed but

that he would be looking for work in construction once they

returned to Los Angeles. 
No. 17-2334 5

Over the next several minutes, Patterson worked at his invehicle computer, occasionally chatting more with Moran, as

he listened to his police radio waiting for the K-9 unit to

become available. Patterson eventually heard on the radio that

the traffic stop holding up the K-9 unit had ended in an arrest.

Patterson messaged State Trooper John Baudino, the K-9 unit

officer, to see if he was available. Not until Baudino confirmed

that he was available and on his way did Patterson begin

writing Moran’s ticket for driving with a suspended license.

Baudino raced to Patterson’s location, arriving about ten or

eleven minutes afterPatterson’s request and nearly thirty-three

minutes into the traffic stop. As soon as he saw that Baudino’s

vehicle was behind him, Patterson handed Moran her traffic

ticket and written warnings, along with her license, registration, and proof of insurance. He then instructed Moran to stay

in the squad car while the K-9 unit sniffed her vehicle.

Patterson walked to Moran’s car and told Rodriguez to roll up

his window.

Baudino walked his narcotics-detection dog around

Moran’s cartwice. The dog did not alert him to the presence of

any contraband. Despite the negative dog sniff, Patterson

remained unconvinced. He returned to his squad car, where

Moran was still detained, and resumed questioning her. He

asked her whether there was anything illegal in her vehicle.

She said there was not. He explained that he just wanted to

make sure that she and Rodriguez were actually going to New

York. He inquired about Moran’s luggage and whether anyone

had given her any luggage to take along to New York. She said

she only had her luggage. Patterson’s questioning concluded

with the following exchange:
6 No. 17-2334

Patterson: Okay. You’re free to go and everything but I’m just concerned that there might be

something illegal inside the car. Usually, most

people don’t say, “Hey, let’s go on a trip.” And

then, they ... it’s a surprise, they go to New

York. It’s kind of out of the ordinary I should

say. I know that probably doesn’t make any

sense to you.

Moran: No.

Patterson: Does that not make any sense to you?

A strange trip?

Moran: No. I take my vacations.

Patterson: Yeah, but telling someone you are

actually going to Pennsylvania and then actually

you are going to New York, that’s kind of out of

the ordinary as far as a trip goes, itinerary wise.

Can I search that vehicle and its contents ...

Moran: Sure.

Patterson: ... to make sure there is nothing

illegal, is that all right?

Moran: (nods yes)

Patterson: I’ll just have you stay in the vehicle

and I’ll have [Rodriguez] step out.

Patterson and Baudino then conducted a search of Moran’s

vehicle. In her trunk, they uncovered approximately 7.5

pounds of methamphetamine hidden in two pieces of luggage.

In Moran’s purse, they discovered nearly $28,000 in cash.

Rodriguez claimed ownership of the drugs, Moran claimed
No. 17-2334 7

ownership of the money. The officers placed them both under

arrest. 

Moran and Rodriguez were each charged with one count of

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Both filed pretrial motions to suppress the

drug evidence seized from Moran’s vehicle, claiming that

Patterson unlawfully detainedthembeyondthe timenecessary

to complete the traffic stop and that Moran had not freely

given her consent to the search. 

The district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on

Moran’s motion to suppress, and, by agreement of the parties,

adopted its evidentiary findings in Rodriguez’s case in lieu of

an additional evidentiary hearing. At Moran’s suppression

hearing, Patterson testified about several factors that triggered

his suspicion during the traffic stop. He told the district court

that when he first approached Moran’s front passenger

window after making the stop, he smelled a “very pungent” of

an unlawful seizure. The government appeals from this

decision, arguing that neither the traffic stop nor the vehicle

search violated Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

II.

We employ “a mixed standard of review on motions to

suppress, reviewing the district court’s factual determinations

for clear error and de novo its ultimate determination about

whetherthe police had sufficient grounds to stop or search the

individual.” United States v. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 908 (7th

Cir. 2015) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699

(1996)).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free

from “unreasonable searches andseizures” bythe government.
8 No. 17-2334

This protection “extend[s] to brief investigatory stops of

persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). Thus, whenever a

police officer decides to stop a vehicle, the stop must meet the

reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). If a search or

seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, courts will exclude

evidence gained from that violation in judicial proceedings

against the person injured. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d at 910; see also

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“[E]vidence may not be

introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and

search which were not reasonably related in scope to the

justification for their initiation.”). 

The Fourth Amendment’sprotections are “personal rights”

that “may not be vicariously asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.

128, 133–34 (1978). To challenge evidence obtained in an

unlawful search, a person must show that he had a “legitimate

expectation of privacy” in the area searched. Id. at 143, 149.

Typically, apassenger quapassengerlacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched vehicle, unless he can show that

he has some possessory interest in it. See id. at 148–49;

Wilbourn, 799 F.3d at 908.

A passenger without standing to challenge a vehicle search

may nevertheless challenge the legality of a traffic stop. In

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), the Supreme Court

held that because a traffic stop seizes all vehicle occupants, a

vehicle passenger has standing to suppress evidence derived

from an unlawful traffic stop. Id. at 255–59; Wilbourn, 799 F.3d

at 908 (a passenger has standing to challenge evidence derived

from an illegal stop but not evidence derived from an illegal

search after a lawful stop). That includes evidence obtained in
No. 17-2334 9

a search resulting from an unlawful stop. See United States v.

Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the district court

concluded that Rodriguez did not have standing to challenge

the search itself because he lacked any property or possessory

interests in the vehicle. Rodriguez’s standing to challenge the

drug evidence uncovered in Moran’s vehicle thus depends on

whether the traffic stop was unlawful. 

To pull a car over for a brief investigatory stop, a police

officer must have “at least [an] articulable and reasonable

suspicion” that the particular person stopped is breaking the

law. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. Here, there is no dispute that, after

observing Moran abruptly change lanes without signaling,

Patterson had a lawful basis forinitiating the stop. See 625 ILCS

§§ 5/11–703(a), 5/11–804; United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720,

724 (7th Cir. 2005) (officer-observed traffic violation triggers

probable cause to stop). But a seizure that is “lawful at its

inception” can nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it

is “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” the initial mission of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.

405, 407 (2005) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124

(1984)). That is what the district court concluded happened

here.

The Supreme Court considered the reasonable duration of

traffic stops in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).

In that case, a police officer lawfully pulled a vehicle over for

a traffic violation, issued a written warning for that violation,

then continued to detain the vehicle and its driver while he

conducted a dog sniff. Id. at 1613. The Court held that the

officer’s prolonged detention of the vehicle, even if it was

slight, was unlawful, unless it was supported by a reasonable

suspicion of criminal activityindependently sufficient to justify
10 No. 17-2334

a seizure, an issue the Court left to the lower courts to evaluate

on remand. Id. at 1615–17. The authority to detain a vehicle and

its occupants for a police-observed traffic violation, the Court

reasoned, ends when the “tasks tied to the traffic infraction

are—orreasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 1614.

Absent reasonable suspicion, then, law enforcement may not

extend a traffic stop with measures like a dog sniff unrelated to

the mission of the stop. 

The government does not dispute that Patterson extended

the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to issue the traffic

citations but argues that Patterson had reasonable suspicion to

extend the stop. To meet the reasonable-suspicionrequirement,

an officer must have “a particularized and objective basis” for

suspecting the persons detained of breaking the law. Heien v.

North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014). Although reasonable

suspicion “embodies something less than probable cause,” it

requires more than a hunch or inchoate suspicion. Wilbourn,

799 F.3d at 909. Thus, to justify a “particularintrusion [a] police

officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts

which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,

reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 

When evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must

consider “the totality of the circumstances—the wholepicture.”

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). A “divide-andconquer analysis” that examines each factor supporting

reasonable suspicion in isolation is not permitted. District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018). Importantly,

however, the totality-of-the-circumstances test does not bar

courts from discussing factors separately. See, e.g., Wesby, 138

S. Ct. at 586–88 (discussing each factor supporting probable

cause separately before considering the combined effect of
No. 17-2334 11

those factors). It simply requires that courts consider the

reasonable inferences that a law enforcement officer could

draw from the objective facts in combination.

The government contends that the district court misapplied

the totality-of-the-circumstances test. It argues that the court

overlooked some of the factors supporting Patterson’s suspicion and improperly evaluated and rejected each of the other

factors in isolation. In the government’s view, the factors it

identified in the district court—(1) that Moran and Rodriguez

appeared nervous; (2) that the couple was traveling from a

“major narcotics distribution center,” i.e., Moran’s home of

greater Los Angeles; (3) that the two presented conflicting

travel plans; and (4) the presence of multiple air fresheners in

the car—viewed together through the lens of Patterson’s

personal training and experience, justified Patterson’s decision

to prolong the detention to conduct a dog sniff. We agree with

the district court, however, that taken together, these factors

did not establish reasonable suspicion.

First, while courts must consider the factors supporting an

officer’s suspicion cumulatively, they need not accept all of an

officer’s proffered justifications at face value. Reasonable

suspicion must be supported by objective and articulable facts,

and the district court as fact-finder is entitled to weigh the

evidence presented at a suppression hearing. “[B]ecause the

resolution of a motion to suppress is necessarily fact-specific,

we give special deference to the district court that heard the

testimony and observed the witnesses at the suppression

hearing.” United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir.

2004) (quoting United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 811 (7th

Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ornelas,

517 U.S. at 699 (“[A] reviewing court should take care both to
12 No. 17-2334

review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give

due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident

judges and local law enforcement officers.”). 

In this case, the district court reviewed the evidence and

found that Moran and Rodriguez did not act suspiciously

nervous. We see no clear error in the court’s conclusion. The

video of the traffic stop—the most reliable evidence of the

detainees’ demeanor—shows a relatively calm Moran answering all of Patterson’s questions while detained in Patterson’s

vehicle for nearly thirty minutes. And the audio footage of

Rodriguez’spre-searchinteractions with Patterson reveals that

Rodriguez answered all questions directly posed to him and

complied with all of Patterson’s requests, even if he initially

did not make eye contact. Cf. United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d

860, 863 (7th Cir. 1999) (weighing a driver’s “very nervous”

appearance and his failure to make eye contact during a traffic

stop for speeding, along with the smell of marijuana and FBI

surveillance of the car’s involvement in drug sales, as factors

supporting reasonable suspicion). While nervousness is

certainly a factor that can support reasonable suspicion, see

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the court was not

required to credit Patterson’s testimony that the couple

appeared nervous when the court’s own review of the traffic

stop footage led it to the opposite conclusion. 

The district court also gave little weight to several other

factors on which Patterson relied. For instance, Patterson told

the court that he found it “very significant” that Moran and

Rodriguez initially gave different answers when Patterson

asked them where they were going. But as the district court

noted,the informationMoran subsequentlyprovided—thatthe

trip to New York was a surprise, and that she had told Rodri-
No. 17-2334 13

guez they were going to Pennsylvania—corroborated Rodriguez’s answer, objectively diminishing the possible conflict.

While an officer does not need to rule out innocent explanations for conduct that appears suspicious at first blush, see

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, a court may consider how facts later

obtained mitigate or dispel suspicion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28

(considering whether any of the defendant’s conduct “gave

[the arresting officer] sufficient reason to negate [his] hypothesis” that criminal activity was afoot).Moreover, a couple taking

a spontaneous road trip to New York City is hardly implausible or surprising. The fact that one of the travelers was unaware of the ultimate destination may be unusual, but given

Moran’s explanation, we do not think the district erred by

giving little weight to this detail. 

The presence of clip-in airfresheners in the vehicle does not

change our analysis.1 The district court recognizedthat because

air fresheners are sometimes used to mask the scent of narcotics, an excessive air freshener presence in a vehicle can, in

combination with other indicators of drug trafficking or

concealment, justify extending a stop. See, e.g., United States v. 

Fuse, 391 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2004) (presence of airfreshener,

1

The parties agree here that the district court made an error in its written

order when it stated that Patterson only testified to observing two air

fresheners in the front cab of the vehicle and not an air freshener in the

back. Patterson testified to noticing all three during the stop. Nonetheless,

in its earlier oral findings, the court considered both the front seat and back

seat air fresheners, and determined that the number of air fresheners—the

district court said four, but we only see evidence of three—was not

“excessive or unusual ... to trigger suspicion, even along with the odor.”

The discrepancy about how many air fresheners Patterson observed in the

car is slight enough that it does not change the analysis.
14 No. 17-2334

a prior arrest record, the absence of the car’s owner, and the

driver’s unusual explanations for visiting Kansas City, among

other reasons, justified an extended stop). A non-excessive

presence of air fresheners, however, may show nothing more

than a car owner’s preference for the smell of air fresheners or

desire to cover up other, lawful odors. See United Stat es v.

Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). So while we agree

with the government that the presence of airfresheners should

be considered as part of the whole picture, we conclude that

the district court did just that and determined that the three or

four small sticks clipped into the car’s air vents were not

“excessive” to the point of suggesting unlawful activity. That

finding is not clearly erroneous. 

The government next asserts that the district court overlooked the significance of the fact that Moran and Rodriguez

were coming from Los Angeles. But the district court’s written

order acknowledged that Patterson considered Los Angeles’s

reputation as a “known drug distribution point,” and the court

explicitly considered the factor in its oral findings at Moran’s

suppression hearing. We do not think the court erred in

discounting the probative value of the fact that the couple

began their trip in greater Los Angeles, Moran’s home and the

country’s second most populous city. See Reid v. Georgia, 448

U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (concluding that circumstances that

“describe[d] a very large category of presumably innocent

travelers” did not support reasonable suspicion).

The government also contends that the district court did

not properly consider Patterson’s experience as a police officer

in its analysis. The totality-of-the-circumstances test “allows

officers to draw on their own experience and specialized

training to make inferences from and deductions about the
No. 17-2334 15

cumulative information available to them that might well

elude an untrained person.” Arvizu, 534U.S. at 273–74 (internal

quotation marks omitted). In other words, a court may give

more weight to a police officer’s assessment of certain circumstances due to his particular experience with such matters. See,

e.g., United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2007)

(crediting an officer’s specific observations of a suspected bank

robbery which were drawn from his experience investigating

bank robberies). The government argues that the district court

failed to consider how Patterson’s experience with highway

drug interdiction informed his view of the factors supporting

his suspicion. But, again, the district court did recognize that

Patterson’s suspicions were “based on his training and experience.” Moreover, because it considered how the other factors

Patterson observed—conflicting travel plans, air fresheners,

and perceived nervousness—can, with other facts, support

reasonable suspicion, the district court did account for the

importance that such details can hold for law enforcement.

That the court ultimately determined that the objective facts

fell short of reasonable suspicion in this case does not mean

that it overlooked how Patterson’s experience and training

may have caused him to evaluate air fresheners or undeveloped travel plans differently than others. 

In summary, at the time Patterson requested the dog sniff,

he knew that the couple was coming from the Los Angeles

area, where at least Moran resided; that Moran had a few air

fresheners in her car; that the couple did not have concrete

travel arrangements, but that Moran was using her two-week

vacation to surprise Rodriguez with a trip to New York; and

that Rodriguez did not initially look up at Patterson when the

officer approached the vehicle. At least two of these charac-
16 No. 17-2334

teristics—the presence of a few air fresheners and originating

from Los Angeles—could describe “a very large category of

presumably innocent travelers.” Reid, 448 U.S. at 441. And the

other two factors—the initially conflicting travel plans and

Rodriguez’s initial inattentiveness to Patterson’s presence—became considerably less probative by the time

Patterson called Baudino to the scene due to Rodriguez’s

subsequent responses to Patterson’s direct questioning and

Moran’s explanations of the couple’s travel plans. See Terry,

392 U.S. at 28. No criminal history, tips, or surveillance

supported Patterson’s suspicions. Cf. Sanford, 806 F.3d at 956

(history of drug arrests and gang affiliations supported officer’s reasonable suspicion); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275,

1282 (7th Cir. 1996) (criminal history check revealed two prior

drug convictions, which “strongly confirmed [the police

officer’s] initial suspicions”); Brown, 188 F.3d at 863 (FBI

surveillance of vehicle’s involvement in drug sales supported

reasonable suspicion). Considering these factors together, as

the district court did, we agree that the objective facts that

Patterson observed fell short of giving him a reasonable basis

for believing that criminal activity was afoot. It was therefore

unreasonable to detain the couple beyond the time needed to

complete the traffic stop’s mission just because the only onduty K-9 unit was tied up with another stop. Rodriguez’s right

to be free from unreasonable seizures does not yield to law

enforcement’s resource allocation strains. 

One last wrinkle remains. The government argues that

Rodriguez lacks standing under Brendlin even if the prolonged

detention was unlawful because the drug evidence was

derived from Moran’s consent to search rather than Rodriguez’s detention. We do not share this view. Moran’s consent
No. 17-2334 17

to search—which the district court deemed involuntary and

which the government does not challenge on

appeal—happened in the course of the prolonged detention.

The government asserts that the detention had ceased because

Patterson told Moran she was “free to go and everything.” But

in the same breath he continued to interrogate her. Neither

Moran nor Rodriguez, who was not a party to this post-sniff

conversation, could have reasonably believed that the police

encounter had terminated at this point. The drug evidence was

therefore derived from the unlawful seizure, and Rodriguez,

as a subject of that seizure, is entitled to have suppressed any

evidence which is the fruit of that violation.

III.

This is without a doubt a close case. But the record reflects

that the district court closely considered the evidence, weighed

the credibility of the arresting officer’s testimony, and considered the weight each factor merited to conclude that the

totality of the circumstances failed to support the officer’s

reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond its trafficrelated mission. Because we find no clear error in the district

court’s factual findings and otherwise agree with its analysis,

the decision below is AFFIRMED.