IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1294

Filed June 7, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MADISON ELIZABETH MARY VIERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 

David P. Odekirk, Judge.

A defendant appeals the revocation of her deferred judgment. AFFIRMED.

Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
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BADDING, Judge.

Madison Viers pled guilty to trafficking in stolen weapons. Honoring the 

parties’ agreement, the court granted Viers a deferred judgment. The order 

deferring judgment placed Viers on probation for two years, required her to 

“immediately report” to the judicial district department of correctional services for 

probation supervision, and advised: “Upon violation of the terms of probation, the 

court will enter judgment of guilty and sentence defendant.”

Less than two months later, on May 17, 2022, the department filed a report 

of probation violations, alleging Viers failed to comply with the requirement that 

she “initiate and maintain specific contact with the probation officer.” The report 

claimed the officer had been unable to contact Viers since receiving the file on 

April 27, and Viers failed to appear or call in for scheduled appointments on May 2 

and 9. A warrant was issued for Viers’s arrest, and she was taken into custody in 

mid-June. 

At the revocation hearing in July, Viers stipulated to violating her probation 

as alleged. The State recommended revoking her deferred judgment and 

imposing a suspended sentence, with residence at a treatment facility as a 

condition of probation. Highlighting the “nature of the violations,” her acceptance 

of “responsibility for what happened,” and her time in jail since arrest, Viers argued 

for contempt with credit for time served and continued probation with the deferred 

judgment remaining in place. The court elicited information about Viers’s family 

and employment circumstances before questioning the probation officer about the 

ongoing viability of probation. The officer agreed with the State’s recommendation, 

explaining continued probation would not be “realistic” given Viers’s “stability 
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issues.” The officer then pointed out that “she was on pretrial before she came to 

me through intake, so she knows how the probation process works and made no 

contact” and “this went on for nearly six weeks where I called, emailed, every time, 

a number that I had and was not able to get in contact with her.”

The court decided to revoke Viers’s deferred judgment. After hearing her 

statement of allocution and the parties’ recommendations, the court imposed a 

suspended sentence with placement in a residential treatment facility for one year 

as a condition of probation. The court explained:

In pronouncing judgment and sentence today, the court has 

considered the factors set forth in the Iowa Code. I’ve considered 

the Defendant’s age, nature of this offense, the recommendations of 

counsel, as well as the Defendant’s own allocution, her family 

circumstances, her employment history. And in pronouncing 

judgment and sentence, I think the sentence most likely to protect 

the community and deter future conduct of like nature would be to 

place the Defendant in the Residential Facility—suspend her 

sentence and place her in the Residential Facility for one year or 

maximum benefits.

In its written order, the court “conclude[d] the defendant’s deferred judgment 

should be revoked and sentence imposed.” The court separately stated its 

“reasons for sentence,” which included some of the factors noted above. 

Viers now appeals, for which she has good cause. See State v. 

Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause to appeal following 

guilty plea where defendant was challenging “the order revoking her deferred

judgment and entering a judgment of conviction and sentence”). She simply claims

her “deferred judgment should not have been revoked” because the court “did not 

state a reason for the revocation.” 
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We will only overturn revocations upon an abuse of discretion, which 

“occurs when the court exercises its discretion on grounds of for reasons that are 

clearly untenable or unreasonable” or “based on an erroneous application of the 

law.” Id. at 4 (quoting State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019)). The 

supreme court has “observed that ‘revocation involves a serious loss of liberty’ and 

‘due process requires written findings by the court showing the factual basis for the 

revocation.’” Id. at 5 (quoting State v. Lillibridge, 519 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa 1994)). 

But “[t]hose findings can be made orally on the record or in the written order.” Id.

Despite this longstanding and clear authority allowing the court to state its 

revocation rationale orally on the record, Viers argues a “written statement [is] 

required in order to revoke probation.” Yet even the case she cites to support that 

proposition, Christenson v. State, says otherwise. See 325 N.W.2d 922, 923 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1982) (“‘[A]n oral statement of such findings by the factfinder, made in 

open court in the presence of the defendant and recorded by the reporter, is 

substantially equivalent to the written statement’ required by Morrisey v. Brewer, 

408 U.S. 471 (1972).” (quoting Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa 

1976)). And Viers does not argue that the court’s oral statements about its reasons 

for revocation were insufficient. Even if she did, such a challenge would be 

meritless. 

A revocation decision is a two-step inquiry: (1) “whether the person has 

acted in violation of one or more conditions of his or her probation” and (2) “whether 

the person should be committed to prison or whether the court should take other 

steps to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation.” Covel, 925 N.W.2d 

at 187. Viers stipulated to violating probation, so the only question before the court 
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was whether she should continue on probation or whether other steps should be 

taken for rehabilitation. Id. at 188. 

On that question, the State recommended a different effort at 

rehabilitation—imposition of a suspended sentence with one year at a residential 

treatment facility as a condition of probation. Viers recommended staying the 

course on probation, with a slight contempt detour. After questioning Viers about 

her family and employment circumstances, the court received information about 

why Viers’s stability issues would make staying the course an unrealistic option for 

rehabilitation. Later, the court explained that its decision to enter judgment on the 

conviction, and impose the sentence it did, was based in part on its consideration 

of Viers’s age, family, and employment circumstances; the recommendations of 

the parties; community protection; and deterrence.

Finding the court provided a sufficient factual basis for revocation orally on 

the record, which Viers does not dispute, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.