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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMAAL COLTHERST

(SC 20401)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-91g), when sentencing a child whose case has been

transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal

docket of the Superior Court and the child has been convicted of a class

A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, the sentencing court is required

to consider certain factors, including the defendant’s age at the time of

the offense and the hallmark features of adolescence.

Pursuant further to statute (§ 54-125a (f) (1)), a person convicted of a crime

or crimes committed while such person was under the age of eighteen

years of age and serving a sentence for that crime or crimes of more

than fifty years of imprisonment shall be eligible for parole after serving

thirty years.

The defendant, who had been convicted of numerous crimes, including

capital felony, murder and felony murder, in connection with the shooting death of the victim, appealed to the Appellate Court, challenging

the sentence imposed by the trial court following its granting of his

motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant, who was seventeen

years old at the time of the shooting and, pursuant to then applicable

law, was charged and tried as an adult, originally had been sentenced

to life imprisonment without the possibility of release followed by seventy-one years of imprisonment. In light of the enactment of legislation

(P.A. 15-84), which, pursuant to certain of its provisions, retroactively

afforded certain juvenile offenders, including the defendant, parole eligibility and rendered the defendant’s capital felony conviction invalid, the

defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in which he

sought to have his conviction of capital felony vacated and argued that

§ 54-91g required the trial court, in resentencing him, to consider the

relevant factors set forth therein. The trial court granted the defendant’s

motion and, following a hearing, dismissed the capital felony and felony

murder counts, and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence

of eighty years of imprisonment to run consecutively to a sentence of

eighty-five years of imprisonment that he was serving in connection

with his conviction of unrelated crimes. In resentencing the defendant,

the trial court, pursuant to § 54-91g, considered youth related mitigating

factors, as well as other relevant factors, and noted that the defendant

would be eligible for parole. On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the

trial’s court sentence, rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court,

in imposing that sentence, failed to account adequately for his youth at

the time he committed the underlying crimes, as required by § 54-91g.

On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court,

claiming that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial

court had followed the statutory requirements of § 54-91g in resentencing

him. Held:

1. The defendant, who was serving two definite sentences of 85 and 80 years

imprisonment that were to run consecutively, will be eligible for parole

after serving 30 years of the 165 year aggregate term of the two definite

sentences; on the basis of its interpretation of § 54-125a (f) (1) and the

statute (§ 53a-38 (b) (2)) governing the calculation of the aggregate term

of multiple, definite sentences that run consecutively, and in light of

the legislative history underlying 54-125a (f) (1), this court concluded

that, when a defendant, such as the defendant in the present case, is

serving more than one definite sentence, his parole eligibility date for

purposes of § 54-125a (f) (1) is calculated on the basis of the aggregate

term of the definite sentences.

2. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, § 54-91g did not apply to the defendant,

as neither of the two conditions that would make that statute applicable

to him and trigger its required sentencing considerations was met: the

plain language of § 54-91g restricts its application to a child whose case

has been transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal
docket and who has been convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant

to that transfer, and, because the defendant, who was not a child under

the applicable law ((Rev. to 1999) § 46b-120 (1)) when he committed

his crimes, was charged as an adult and prosecuted under the regular

criminal docket, his case was not transferred from the juvenile docket

to the regular criminal docket, and he was not convicted pursuant to

any such transfer; moreover, consistent with this court’s decision in

State v. Delgado (323 Conn. 801) and the plain language of § 54-91g,

that statute does not apply retroactively to defendants, like the defendant

in the present case, who, although under the age of eighteen when they

committed their offenses, were initially charged and tried as adults;

accordingly, although the trial court incorrectly applied § 54-91g in considering adolescent related mitigating factors in resentencing the defendant, the defendant received more consideration than that to which he

was statutorily entitled, resulting in a much reduced sentence with the

possibility of parole after he serves thirty years, and, therefore, the

Appellate Court’s judgment upholding the defendant’s sentence was

affirmed.

Argued March 30—officially released October 13, 2021*

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of capital felony, murder, felony murder,

kidnapping in the first degree, conspiracy to commit

kidnapping in the first degree, robbery in the first

degree, robbery in the second degree, larceny in the

first degree and larceny in the fourth degree, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford

and tried to the jury before Mulcahy, J.; verdict and

judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed

to this court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment;

thereafter, the court, Dewey, J., granted the defendant’s

motion to correct an illegal sentence, dismissed the

charges of capital felony and felony murder, and resentenced the defendant, and the defendant appealed to

the Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and

Lavery, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment,

and the defendant, on the granting of certification,

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Michael W. Brown, for the appellant (defendant).

Jennifer F. Miller, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s

attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. In this certified appeal,1the defendant,

Jamaal Coltherst, appeals from the judgment of the

Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial

court, which resentenced him for crimes he committed

in 1999, when he was seventeen years old. In his original

brief to this court, the defendant claimed that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court

followed the statutory requirements of General Statutes

§ 54-91g in resentencing him to eighty years of incarceration.2 He argued that the statute created a presumption

against the imposition of an effective life sentence,

which can be overcome only upon the court’s finding

that the defendant is incorrigible. Because we conclude,

as we explain in this opinion, that § 54-91g does not

apply to the defendant, we do not reach the issue of

whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that

the trial court followed the statutory requirements of

§ 54-91g in resentencing the defendant to a term of

eighty years of incarceration.

Following oral argument, this court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing two issues:

First, ‘‘[d]oes [§] 54-91g apply in cases where, as here,

the defendant was not charged as a child and transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to

[General Statutes §] 46b-127 but, rather, [was] charged

as an adult under the regular criminal docket of the

Superior Court?’’ Second, ‘‘[i]s the defendant eligible

for parole when he received two distinct total effective

sentences of 85 years and 80 years, respectively, to run

consecutively, and, if so, when is he eligible for parole

on each case?’’ As to the second issue, we conclude,

consistent with an affidavit submitted by Richard Sparaco, the executive director of the Connecticut Board

of Pardons and Paroles (board), that the defendant will

be eligible for parole after serving 30 years of the 165

year aggregate term of the two distinct total effective

sentences that he is currently serving. As to the first

issue, we conclude that § 54-91g does not apply to the

defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural background are

relevant to the resolution of this appeal. This case arose

from the October 15, 1999 carjacking, kidnapping, and

murder of the victim, Kyle Holden, by the defendant

and Carl Johnson. See State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn.

478, 485–86, 820 A.2d 1024 (2003). On the day that the

defendant was released from juvenile detention, where

he had been incarcerated for violating probation after

having been convicted on charges of assault in the third

degree, the defendant and Johnson planned to commit

a carjacking. Id., 483–84. They scouted out various locations and potential targets before settling on the victim,

whose car was parked outside an exotic dance club in
East Hartford. Id., 484–85. When the victim exited the

club, Johnson held a gun to his head, and Johnson and

the defendant forced the victim into his car. Id., 485.

Johnson then drove the car to an automated teller

machine (ATM), while the defendant, who held the gun,

sat with the victim in the backseat. Id. They used the

victim’s bank card to withdraw money from the ATM

and then brought the victim to a nearby entrance ramp

to Interstate 84, where Johnson shot the victim in the

head, killing him almost instantly. Id., 485–86. Over the

next eight days, the defendant and Johnson continued

to use the victim’s car and made withdrawals from his

bank account using his bank card. Id., 486. Thereafter,

they were arrested by the police, who had been on the

lookout for the victim’s car after the victim was reported

missing. See id., 486–87.

Because the defendant was seventeen years old at

the time he committed these crimes, he was tried as

an adult under the then applicable law. See General

Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 46b-120 (1) (limiting, as general

rule, for purposes of delinquency, definition of ‘‘child’’

to persons under sixteen years of age at time of offense).

‘‘After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of capital felony, murder, felony murder, kidnapping in the

first degree, robbery in the first degree, robbery in the

second degree, larceny in the first degree, conspiracy

to commit kidnapping in the first degree, and larceny

in the fourth degree. The trial court merged the convictions of capital felony, murder, felony murder and kidnapping in the first degree and imposed a sentence of

life imprisonment without the possibility of release on

the capital felony count, twenty years imprisonment

on the count of robbery in the first degree, ten years

imprisonment on the count of robbery in the second

degree, twenty years imprisonment on the count of

larceny in the first degree, twenty years imprisonment

on the count of conspiracy to commit kidnapping in

the first degree, and one year imprisonment on the

count of larceny in the fourth degree, all to be served

consecutively to the sentence of life imprisonment, for

a total effective sentence of life imprisonment without

the possibility of release followed by seventy-one years

[of] imprisonment.’’ State v. Coltherst, supra, 263 Conn.

487–88.

Subsequent to the defendant’s original sentencing,

significant changes in juvenile sentencing law prompted

the resentencing proceedings that are the subject of

this appeal. We recently summarized the effect of those

changes: ‘‘Under the federal constitution’s prohibition

[against] cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile

offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for

life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility

of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455,

183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); Casiano v. Commissioner of
Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015),

cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 577 U.S. 1202,

136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016); State v. Riley,

315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied,

577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016).’’

State v. Williams-Bey, 333 Conn. 468, 470, 215 A.3d 711

(2019). The United States Supreme Court has held that

Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral

review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206,

136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). The court

clarified, however, that ‘‘[g]iving Miller retroactive

effect . . . does not require [s]tates to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case [in which]

a juvenile offender received mandatory life without

parole. A [s]tate may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered

for parole, rather than by resentencing them.’’ Id., 212.

To comply with the decision of the United States

Supreme Court in Miller, as well as this court’s decisions in Riley and Casiano, the legislature enacted No.

15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84). Section 1 of

P.A. 15-84, codified at General Statutes § 54-125a (f)

(1), ensures parole eligibility for all persons convicted

of crimes committed when they were under eighteen

years of age who received a sentence of ten years or

more.3 Section 2 of P.A. 15-84, codified at § 54-91g,

requires a sentencing court to consider, inter alia, the

‘‘the hallmark features of adolescence’’ and the differences between the brain development of a child and

an adult when sentencing a child who has been convicted of a class A or B felony following transfer of the

child’s case from the docket for juvenile matters to the

regular criminal docket of the Superior Court.

The defendant became eligible for resentencing pursuant to § 6 of P.A. 15-84, which repealed General Statutes § 53a-46a, the capital felony provision, pursuant to

which the defendant had been sentenced. The substitute provision, codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2016)

§ 53a-46a, made persons who committed a capital felony when they were under eighteen years of age ineligible for the death penalty.4 The passage of P.A. 15-84,

therefore, rendered the defendant’s capital felony conviction invalid.5 Relying on that change in the law, the

defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

He sought to have his conviction of capital felony

vacated and argued that, upon resentencing, § 54-91g

(a) (1) required the trial court to consider his age at

the time of the offense, the hallmark features of adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evidence

showing the developmental differences between child

and adult brains. He also argued that § 54-91g (a) (2)

required the court, if it proposed to sentence him to a

lengthy sentence under which he would be likely to die

while incarcerated, to consider how the factors listed

in subsection (a) (1) counseled against such a sentence.
At the hearing on the defendant’s motion, neither

the state nor the trial court questioned the defendant’s

reliance on § 54-91g. In resentencing the defendant, the

court considered the mitigating factors of youth but

also took into account the horrific nature of the crimes,

the defendant’s level of involvement in them, his criminal history, his attempts to deflect blame for his crimes,

and his disciplinary record in prison. The court dismissed the counts of capital felony and felony murder,

and sentenced him to a total effective sentence of eighty

years of imprisonment on the remaining counts.6 The

court further ordered the defendant’s total effective

sentence in the present case to run consecutively to

the sentence of eighty-five years of imprisonment the

defendant is serving for a conviction involving his shooting of another victim four days after he and Johnson

killed the victim in the present case. See State v. Coltherst, 87 Conn. App. 93, 95–98, 864 A.2d 869, cert.

denied, 273 Conn. 919, 871 A.2d 371 (2005). The court

noted that the defendant would be eligible for parole.

In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant

claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly failed,

pursuant to § 54-91g, ‘‘to account adequately for the

defendant’s youth at the time he committed the underlying crimes . . . .’’7 State v. Coltherst, 192 Conn. App.

738, 740, 218 A.3d 696 (2019). The Appellate Court

rejected the defendant’s argument that § 54-91g creates

a presumption against the imposition of an effective

sentence of life imprisonment—in the present case,

eighty years—for defendants who were minors at the

time they committed their crimes. Id., 752–53. The court

grounded its decision on the plain and unambiguous

language of the statute; see id., 751; which requires that

the sentencing court ‘‘[c]onsider’’ how the scientific and

psychological evidence showing the differences between

a child’s brain development and an adult’s brain development counsels against the imposition of a lengthy

sentence under which it is likely that the child will die

while incarcerated. General Statutes § 54-91g (a) (1)

and (2); see also State v. Riley, 190 Conn. App. 1, 26–28,

209 A.3d 646 (rejecting, on basis of plain language of

§ 54-91g, defendant’s argument that language and legislative history of P.A. 15-84 created ‘‘a presumption against

the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile defendant,8 and such exceedingly rare sentences can only be

imposed after a specific finding that the juvenile being

sentenced is permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt, or irretrievably depraved’’ (footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 333 Conn.

923, 217 A.3d 993 (2019).9 This certified appeal followed.

I

We first address the question of whether and when

the defendant, who has received two distinct total effective sentences of eighty-five years of imprisonment and

eighty years of imprisonment, respectively, to run con-
secutively, will be eligible for parole. On the basis of

the parties’ submissions, we conclude that the defendant will be eligible for parole after serving thirty years

of the aggregate term of the two definite sentences of

imprisonment that he is currently serving.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this issue. Four days after the defendant

and Johnson killed the victim in the present case, they,

along with a third person, Rashad Smith, accosted

Michael Clark in the parking lot of an insurance firm

in Wethersfield where Clark worked. State v. Coltherst,

supra, 87 Conn. App. 96. They took Clark’s laptop and

credit card, and were in the process of forcing him into

his car when he broke free and ran, but Johnson tackled

him. Id., 97. The defendant and Clark then struggled,

and the defendant shot Clark in the head. Id. Grievously

injured, Clark nonetheless survived the shooting. See

id., 98. In connection with this incident, the defendant

was convicted of numerous offenses (Wethersfield

assault conviction) and received a total effective sentence of eighty-five years of imprisonment. Id., 95. In

the present case, when the trial court resentenced the

defendant, it ordered the total effective sentence of

eighty years in the present case to run consecutively

to the total effective sentence of eighty-five years that

the defendant received as a result of the Wethersfield

assault conviction.

Under the facts of these two cases, the defendant’s

parole eligibility is governed by General Statutes § 53a38 (b) (2), read in conjunction with § 54-125a (f) (1).

The question of how the defendant’s parole eligibility

date is calculated under those two statutes presents a

question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary

review. See, e.g., Commissioner of Emergency Services & Public Protection v. Freedom of Information

Commission, 330 Conn. 372, 380, 194 A.3d 759 (2018);

Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 792, 849 A.2d

839 (2004). In construing the relevant statutes, ‘‘[o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291,

308, 943 A.2d 1075 (2008).

We begin with the language of the statutes. Section

53a-38 (b) provides: ‘‘A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the

custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is

under more than one definite sentence, the sentences

shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run

concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by

discharge of the term which has the longest term to

run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms

are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied

by discharge of such aggregate term.’’

Pursuant to § 53a-38 (b) (2), therefore, the defendant’s aggregate term is 165 years and the two consecu-
tive, definite sentences are satisfied by the discharge

of the 165 year aggregate term. Section 54-125a (f) (1),

which is set forth in full in footnote 3 of this opinion,

does not expressly provide that the aggregate term is

used for purposes of calculating eligibility for parole

when an incarcerated person is serving more than one

definite sentence. It refers only to a ‘‘definite sentence’’

and provides that, if a person who falls within the ambit

of the statute ‘‘is serving a sentence of more than fifty

years, such person shall be eligible for parole after

serving thirty years.’’ General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1)

(B). The plain language of §§ 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a

(f) (1), accordingly, does not resolve whether the parole

eligibility date of a prisoner serving more than one

definite sentence should be calculated on the basis of

the aggregate term or each definite sentence.

Interpreting §§ 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1) to

require that parole eligibility be calculated on the basis

of the defendant’s definite sentences rather than the

aggregate term, however, would be contrary to the legislative intent underlying § 54-125a (f) (1). As we have

explained in this opinion, the legislative intent behind

the parole eligibility guarantee in § 54-125a (f) (1) is to

comply with the constitutional standards enunciated in

the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in

Miller and Montgomery, as well as in this court’s decisions in Riley and Casiano. See Miller v. Alabama,

supra, 567 U.S. 479 (holding that ‘‘the [e]ighth [a]mendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life

in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile

offenders’’); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra,

577 U.S. 212 (holding that ‘‘[a] [s]tate may remedy a

Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them’’); Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 54, 69 (holding that Miller

announced watershed rule of criminal procedure, applicable retroactively); State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn.

659–61 (applying Miller to state’s sentencing scheme

and holding that defendant’s 100 year sentence violated

Miller because sentencing court did not consider mitigating factors of youth in sentencing defendant, who

was under eighteen years of age at time of offense, to

functional equivalent of life).

Treating each definite sentence separately for purposes of parole eligibility would yield the result that

the defendant’s only opportunity for parole would be

30 years after he began serving the 80 year sentence in

the present case, 115 years after he began serving the

sentence for the Wethersfield assault conviction. He

would die long before becoming eligible for parole,

rendering the intended remedy of parole eligibility

meaningless—his sentence would effectively be one

without the opportunity for parole. That interpretation

would flout every recent juvenile sentencing decision

of both this court and the United States Supreme Court
and, therefore, would also be inconsistent with the

intent of the legislature in § 54-125a (f) (1). Accordingly,

consistent with the legislative intent underlying § 54-

125a (f) (1), we conclude that, when a defendant is

serving more than one definite sentence, his parole

eligibility date for purposes of § 54-125a (f) (1) is calculated on the basis of the aggregate term of the definite

sentences.

Our conclusion is consistent with the board’s interpretation of and current practice in applying §§ 53a-38

(b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1). In an affidavit procured by

the state in response to the second issue in this court’s

order for supplemental briefing regarding the defendant’s parole eligibility, Sparaco, the executive director

of the board, stated that, in circumstances such as those

in the defendant’s case, pursuant to §§ 53a-38 (b) (2)

and 54-125a (f) (1), the board uses the aggregate term to

calculate a parole eligibility date. Accordingly, Sparaco

stated that, because the defendant’s 165 year aggregate

sentence is more than 50 years, he will be eligible for

parole after serving 30 years. On the basis of our interpretation of §§ 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1), we

agree with Sparaco’s conclusion that the defendant will

be eligible for parole after serving 30 years of the 165

year aggregate term of the two definite sentences.

II

We next address the question of whether § 54-91g

applies to the defendant. The defendant, whose case

was not transferred from the docket for juvenile matters

to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court

but, rather, was charged under the then applicable law

as an adult under the regular criminal docket; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 46b-120; claims that the

provisions of § 54-91g nonetheless apply to him. We

conclude that the plain language of the statute, which

restricts its application to children whose cases are

transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the

regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, makes

clear that the statute does not apply to the defendant.

The applicability of § 54-91g to the defendant presents a question of statutory interpretation, subject to

plenary review. See State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, 336 Conn.

219, 232, 244 A.3d 908 (2020). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In

other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied

to the facts of [the] case, including the question of

whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual
evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trinity Christian School v. Commission on Human

Rights & Opportunities, 329 Conn. 684, 694, 189 A.3d

79 (2018).

We begin with the language of the statute. Section

54-91g (a) provides: ‘‘If the case of a child, as defined

in section 46b-120, is transferred to the regular criminal

docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b127 and the child is convicted of a class A or B felony

pursuant to such transfer, at the time of sentencing,

the court shall: (1) Consider, in addition to any other

information relevant to sentencing, the defendant’s age

at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of

adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evidence showing the differences between a child’s brain

development and an adult’s brain development; and (2)

Consider, if the court proposes to sentence the child

to a lengthy sentence under which it is likely that the

child will die while incarcerated, how the scientific and

psychological evidence described in subdivision (1) of

this subsection counsels against such a sentence.’’

Subsection (a) of § 54-91g sets forth two conditions

that trigger the required sentencing considerations in

subdivisions (1) and (2) of that subsection. First, the

case of a child, as defined in General Statutes § 46b120, must be transferred from the docket for juvenile

matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior

Court pursuant to § 46b-127. Second, the child must be

convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to the

transfer. Under the facts of the present case, neither

of these two conditions has been met. Because the

defendant was over the age of sixteen at the time that

he committed his crimes, he was not a ‘‘child’’ under

the then applicable law. See General Statutes (Rev. to

1999) § 46b-120 (1).

In 1999, when the defendant committed his crimes,

General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 46b-120 (1) defined a

delinquent ‘‘child’’10 as ‘‘any person (A) under sixteen

years of age . . . .’’11 The defendant, who was seventeen at the time he committed the crimes, was treated

as an adult criminal. Accordingly, the defendant’s case

was never initiated as a juvenile matter in the docket

of the Superior Court for juvenile matters. Instead, the

defendant was charged as an adult, and the state’s case

against him was filed in the regular criminal docket.

See General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 46b-127 (a). Of

course, because the defendant’s case was not transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket, the defendant was not convicted

pursuant to any such transfer. See General Statutes

§ 54-91g (a). Thus, neither of the two conditions that

would make § 54-91g (a) applicable was met.

This court’s previous interpretation of § 54-91g confirms that the legislature did not intend the statute to
apply retroactively to defendants who, although under

the age of eighteen when they committed their offenses,

were initially charged and tried as adults. Specifically,

in State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345 (2016),

although the defendant did not expressly claim that

§ 54-91g applied to him retroactively, we considered

and rejected that interpretation of the statute as part

of our analysis of his claim that he was entitled to be

resentenced. See id., 814. We explained: ‘‘There are ten

sections in P.A. 15-84, four of which specify that they

are ‘[e]ffective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any

person convicted prior to, on or after said date.’ . . .

P.A. 15-84, §§ 6 through 9. In contrast, P.A. 15-84, § 2,

provides [that] it is ‘[e]ffective October 1, 2015,’ indicating that the legislature did not intend for this section

to apply retroactively. Moreover, there is nothing in the

text of . . . § 54-91g or the legislative history of P.A.

15-84 to suggest that the legislature intended that all

[persons] convicted of a class A or B felony [committed

when they were under the age of eighteen] who were

sentenced without consideration of the age related mitigating factors identified in Miller would be resentenced.

In sum, even if the defendant had alleged that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the

trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of [§ 54-

91g], he would not be able to demonstrate that that

[statute] applies to him.’’ State v. Delgado, supra, 814.

We added: ‘‘Although the text of [§ 54-91g] seems clear

insofar as the retroactivity issue is concerned, to the

extent that there is any ambiguity in the applicable

statutory language, the pertinent legislative history clarifies that the legislature did not intend for this [statute]

to apply retroactively. The limited discussion on this

topic occurred before the Judiciary Committee. Attorney Robert Farr, a member of the working group of

the Connecticut Sentencing Commission, which helped

craft the proposed legislative language, discussed how

the legislation would affect previously sentenced individuals. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,

Judiciary, Pt. 2, 2015 Sess., pp. 949, 955–56. He first

mentioned this court’s decision in Riley, in which the

defendant in that case had been sentenced to 100 years

in prison and then resentenced, and noted that, under

the proposed legislation, ‘instead of having to worry

about resentencing what would have happened is in 30

years, 21 years from now there will be a parole hearing

and then that parole hearing would decide whether [the

defendant in Riley] was going to be—get another parole

hearing . . . . So it gave some resolution to this which

was consistent we believe with the federal—with the

[United States] Supreme Court cases.’ Id., p. 956,

remarks of Attorney Farr.’’ State v. Delgado, supra,

814 n.9.12

Relying on both the statutory language and its legislative history, we concluded in Delgado that, even if the

defendant in that case had claimed that the trial court
had failed to adhere to the requirements of § 54-91g,

his claim would fail because the statute’s provisions

did not apply to him. Id., 814. Our conclusion in Delgado

that § 54-91g does not apply retroactively is consistent

with the plain language of the statute, which, as we

have explained, limits its application, effective October

1, 2015, to children convicted of a class A or B felony

following transfer from the docket for juvenile matters

to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, and

supports our conclusion that § 54-91g does not apply

to the defendant.13 Accordingly, because the trial court

incorrectly applied § 54-91g in considering adolescent

mitigating factors in resentencing the defendant, he

received more consideration than was required, resulting

in a much reduced sentence with the possibility of parole

after he serves thirty years. The state recognizes that

the defendant received more consideration than that

to which he was statutorily entitled but does not request

that the defendant’s case be remanded for resentencing

and requests that this court affirm the Appellate Court’s

judgment.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* October 13, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 This court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal,

limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude

that the trial court had followed the statutory requirements under General

Statutes § 54-91g in resentencing the defendant to eighty years of incarceration?’’ State v. Coltherst, 333 Conn. 946, 219 A.3d 377 (2019).

2 General Statutes § 54-91g provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If the case of a

child, as defined in section 46b-120, is transferred to the regular criminal

docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b-127 and the child is

convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, at the time of

sentencing, the court shall:

‘‘(1) Consider, in addition to any other information relevant to sentencing,

the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of

adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evidence showing the

differences between a child’s brain development and an adult’s brain development; and

‘‘(2) Consider, if the court proposes to sentence the child to a lengthy

sentence under which it is likely that the child will die while incarcerated,

how the scientific and psychological evidence described in subdivision (1)

of this subsection counsels against such a sentence.

* * *

‘‘(c) Whenever a child is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) of this

section, the court shall indicate the maximum period of incarceration that

may apply to the child and whether the child may be eligible to apply for

release on parole pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (f) of section

54-125a. . . .’’

3 General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1) provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) to (e), inclusive, of this section, a person convicted

of one or more crimes committed while such person was under eighteen

years of age, who is incarcerated on or after October 1, 2015, and who

received a definite sentence or total effective sentence of more than ten

years for such crime or crimes prior to, on or after October 1, 2015, may

be allowed to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the

Board of Pardons and Paroles for the institution in which such person is

confined, provided (A) if such person is serving a sentence of fifty years

or less, such person shall be eligible for parole after serving sixty per cent

of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater, or (B) if such person

is serving a sentence of more than fifty years, such person shall be eligible

for parole after serving thirty years. Nothing in this subsection shall limit

a person’s eligibility for parole release under the provisions of subsections
(a) to (e), inclusive, of this section if such person would be eligible for

parole release at an earlier date under any of such provisions.’’

4 This court has since held that, regardless of a defendant’s age at the

time of the commission of a crime, the death penalty violates article first,

§§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. See State v. Santiago, 318 Conn.

1, 119, 122 A.3d 1 (2015).

5 Because the passage of § 6 of P.A. 15-84 rendered § 53a-46a, the provision

under which the defendant had been sentenced, invalid, this case is distinguishable from State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019), and

State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345 (2016). In each of those cases,

this court concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. See State v.

McCleese, supra, 387; State v. Delgado, supra, 813. In those cases, the sole

defect relied on by the defendants in seeking resentencing was the failure

of the trial court, in the original sentencing, to consider the mitigating factors

of youth in sentencing each of them to a sentence without eligibility for

parole. See State v. McCleese, supra, 385; State v. Delgado, supra, 803–804.

Because the passage of §1 of P.A. 15-84, codified at § 54-125a, made those

defendants eligible for parole, we explained, their sentences were no longer

invalid. See State v. McCleese, supra, 387; State v. Delgado, supra, 812.

By contrast, in the present case, although the defendant is now eligible

for parole, it is indisputable that his capitol felony conviction and sentence

were rendered invalid by the passage of § 6 of P.A. 15-84. Thus, not only

did the trial court retain jurisdiction to modify his sentence, but, because

the sentence had been rendered invalid, the court was required to resentence

him. See Practice Book § 43-22 (‘‘[t]he judicial authority may at any time

correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a

sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an

illegal manner’’).

6 The court sentenced the defendant as follows: on count two, for murder

in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-54a (a), forty years; on

count four, for kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-8 and 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), twenty years; on count five, for robbery in

the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), ten years;

on count six, for robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes

(Rev. to 1999) § 53a-135 (a) (1), five years; on count seven, for larceny in

the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) §§ 53a-8 and

53a-122 (a) (3), ten years; on count eight, for conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a92 (a) (2) (B), ten years; and, on count nine, for larceny in the fourth degree

in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-125 (a), one year. Counts

two, four, five, and eight run consecutively. Counts six, seven, and nine run

concurrently to counts two, four, five, and eight.

7 The defendant also claimed that the trial court improperly allowed him

to provide additional remarks to the court at the time of resentencing, in

violation of his rights to counsel, due process, and allocution. State v.

Coltherst, 192 Conn. App. 738, 740–41, 218 A.3d 696 (2019). The Appellate

Court’s rejection of that claim is not before us in this appeal.

8 Although the defendant in the present case often refers to himself as a

‘‘juvenile’’ because he was a minor when he committed the crimes, we

emphasize that, in 1999, the law did not afford him juvenile status for

purposes of delinquency proceedings. Seventeen year olds were not afforded

juvenile status until 2012. See generally Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2007,

No. 07-4, §§ 73 through 78; Public Acts, Spec. Sess., September, 2009, No.

09-7, §§ 69 through 89.

9 The United States Supreme Court recently held that Miller does not

require a sentencing court, prior to imposing a discretionary sentence of

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on defendants convicted

of a homicide committed when they were under the age of eighteen, to

make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility. See Jones v.

Mississippi, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318–19, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021).

10 By contrast, under the current statute, a delinquent ‘‘child’’ includes

‘‘any person . . . who is . . . under eighteen years of age and has not been

legally emancipated . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-120 (1) (A) (i) (I).

11 General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 46b-120 (1) (B) provides that the term

‘‘child’’ applies to a person over sixteen years of age only if that person,

‘‘prior to attaining sixteen years of age, has violated any federal or state

law or municipal or local ordinance, other than an ordinance regulating

behavior of a child in a family with service needs, and, subsequent to attaining

sixteen years of age, violates any order of the Superior Court or any condition
of probation ordered by the Superior Court with respect to such delinquency

proceeding . . . .’’ A child under sixteen years old charged as a delinquent

in 1999 and made subject to a court order in that delinquency proceeding

by the Superior Court for juvenile matters could, at any time after he turned

sixteen or older, be subject to a juvenile prosecution for violating the

court’s order.

12 Neither of the parties addressed in their supplemental briefs the import

of our conclusion in Delgado that § 54-91g does not apply retroactively. We

observe, however, that, in light of that conclusion, even if the defendant

had been transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular

criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to § 46b-127, § 54-91g would

not apply to him.

13 We disagree with the defendant’s conclusory statement in his supplemental brief that this construction renders § 54-91g unconstitutional because

it violates his right to equal protection. Even if we agreed with the defendant’s

statement that he is similarly situated to a child sentenced after October 1,

2015, who is convicted of a class A or B felony following transfer to the

regular criminal docket—which we do not—the differing treatment survives

rational basis review. That is, the legislature rationally could provide one

remedy for persons in the defendant’s class and a different remedy to persons

who meet the conditions under which the provisions of § 54-91g apply. This

is the sole constitutional argument that the defendant raises in this appeal.