Filed 10/15/13 P. v. Galarza CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DAMIEN LEONARD GALARZA, Defendant and Appellant. G046827 (Super. Ct. No. 08CF0137)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Orange County, James A. Stotler, Judge. Affirmed. Sharon G. Wrubel, under appointm ent by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Genera l, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistan t Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and William M. Wood, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *2 I NTRODUCTION A jury convicted Damien Leonard Ga larza of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) 1 and one count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). In addition, the ju ry found true two special circ umstance allegations—lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) an d murder to further the activities of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22))—and found true th e allegations the murd er was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.2 2, subd. (b)(1)) and vicarious discharge by a gang member of a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced Galarza to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction with stayed or imposed concurrent terms for the street terrorism conviction and true findings on the enhancement allegations. Galarza argues the trial court erred in two ways. First, he argues the court erred by receiving in evidence statements he made during a police interrogation after he allegedly invoked his right to remain silent. Second, he argues the court erred by failing to instruct the jury to cons ider with caution any statement made by him tending to show his guilt, unless the statement wa s written or otherwise recorded. We conclude Galarza did not unambig uously assert his right to remain silent during police questioning and, therefore, the trial court did not err by receiving in evidence statements he made after he allegedly asserted that right. We also conclude any error in failing to give the cau tionary instruction was harmless . Accordingly, we affirm.

F ACTS We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and resolve all conflicts in its favor. ( People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.)

1 Further code references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 A. Juan Orejel Is Killed. In the evening of January 3, 2008, Eulis es Orejel (Eulises), his brother Juan Orejel (Juan), and three other men walked fro m the Orejel residence on Anahurst Place in Santa Ana to the Azteca Market, which was le ss than one block away on the corner of Saint Gertrude Place and Main Street. At that time, Eulis es was 16 years old and Juan was two years older. Eulises belonged to a tagging crew called F.T.L. (which stands for “Fuck The Law”). N.W.O. (which stands for “No Way Out”) was a rival tagging crew that operated not too far from the Orejel residence. Eulises, Juan, and the three others walked into the market’s rear parking lot from a driveway on Saint Gertrude Place. As they approached the rear entrance to the market, they passed a Chevrolet Suburban that was pa rked in the rear pa rking lot. Three men were inside the Suburban. Galarza was in the driver’s seat. Juan Calderon was in the front passenger seat, and R odrigo Sanchez was th e third person. A surveillance video showed that Calderon had been insi de the market at some point. Eulises recognized the Suburban. He had seen it earlier that afternoon and on the day before, January 2, 2008, when a heavyset man, who be longed to N.W.O., had driven the Suburban to the Orejel residence and “maddogged” (gave bad looks at) Eulises. Earlier in the afternoon of January 3, Eulises again saw the Suburban with the same heavyset man driving. Although the heavyset man was not in the Suburban in the evening of January 3, Eulises associated the Suburban with N.W.O. As Eulises walked toward the rear entrance of the market, he heard “a mumb le” from the Suburban. He turned and said some “bad words” to the oc cupants of the Suburban, prom pting an exchange of bad words and maddogging, and Eulis es “[f]lipp[ed] them off.” After this exchange, Eulises and the other four in his group walked into the market, and the Su burban drove away. Eulises thought the incident was “pretty much no thing” and did not “think much about4 it.” He was not concerned becau se he had had con frontations and fistfights in the past with N.W.O members, and he thought tagging crew members, unlike gang members, do not use weapons. Juan was angry with Eulises for causi ng trouble and told his group to leave the market through the front entrance to avoid confrontation in the rear parking lot. Juan and his group walked down Main Street and turned onto Sain t Gertrude Place. Eulises saw the Suburban parked at the corner of Saint Gertrude Place and Cypress Avenue. Eulises could not see inside the Suburban, as it was very dark in that area and the Suburban’s headlights were not on. To avoid a confrontation, Juan and his group crossed the street to avoid walking pa st the Suburban, turned left, and headed toward the home of a relation of Juan and Eulises. At that moment, the Suburban’s door s opened and all three occupants got out. They followed Juan and his group, and, drawing close, shouted for them to turn around. Nobody in Juan’s gro up responded. Eulises did not say anything out of respect for his brother’s wish to avoid confrontation. Hearing a noise “like a firework” or “a bottle rocket,” Eulises turned around and saw Juan on the gro und, shot in the head. The three assailants ran back to th e Suburban. Eulises did not kn ow which one fired the gun. Juan died from a gunsho t wound to the head.

B. Police Detectives In terrogate Galarza. On January 4, 2008, Galarza wa s interrogated by Santa Ana Police Corporal David Rondou and Detective Flynn at the police station. The interrogation was audio-recorded. The r ecording was played for the jury, a transcript of the recording was identified as exhibit 14-A, and copies of the tran script were published to the jurors to help them understand the recording. Rondou asked Galarza questions for a short time before reading him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 ( Miranda ). Galarza said he5 understood them. Rondou con tinued asking Galarza questions and pressed him to give his side of the story. At some point, Ga larza made statements, which, he contends, constituted an invocation of his right to rema in silent. These statements are explained fully in part I.A. of the Discu ssion section. The interrogation continued. At a later point in the interrogation, Galarza stated, “I’ll ta lk.” Ultimately, Ga larza told the police detectives he had driven the Suburban after leaving the Azteca Market, saw the shooting, and identified the shooter as a Delhi member. Galarza admitted he was there to provide backup and “fuck somebody up ” if there was a fight.

C. Expert Testimony 1. David Rondou Rondou testified as the prosecution’s gang expert. He testified that Delhi is a longtime traditional Hispanic street ga ng and had about 150 members in 2008. Through violence and intimidati on, Delhi maintained control over its claimed territory, and enhanced its re putation and the reputation of its memb ers. Juan was killed in an area claimed by Delhi as part of its territory. Delhi used the number “13” out of ho nor to the Mexican Mafia. Delhi members wear blue clothing and hats, includi ng a blue Detroit Tigers cap with a “D” on it. Rondou testified that guns are the “life line” of a criminal street gang and are “highly prized possession[s]” in the gang world. After speaking with thousands of gang members, Rondou has learned that “[w]hen one gangster has a gun, he’s more often than not going to share that with his buddies.” Gang members do not commit crimes with people whom they do not trust. Rondou testified that tagging crews put graffiti on walls and commit some crimes, but do not meet the legal definition of a criminal street gang. He explained that tagging crews might serve as a feeder or pa thway to a gang, just as a minor league baseball team serves as a farm team for a ma jor league team. Here , the N.W.O. tagging6 crew fed into Delhi, and the F.T.L. taggi ng crew fed into the Locotes gang, whose claimed territory borders that of Delhi. Th ere are rivalries between tagging crews, and sometimes they have confrontations, but they are not as likely as gangs to use weapons. In Rondou’s opinion, Galarza was a memb er of Delhi at the time Juan was killed. Rondou’s opinion wa s based on the following: 1. Galarza had been served with a California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (§ 186.20 et seq.) (STEP) notices twice in November 2007. 2. Once when Galarza was served with a STEP notice, he was in the heart of territory claimed by Delhi and was wearing a blue Detroit Tigers baseball cap with a “D” on it. 3. Galarza’s brother was a Delhi member. 4. Galarza had body tattoos which, t hough not associated specifically with Delhi, were common among gang members. 5. Galarza made statements in a fiel d interview regarding gang affiliation. 6. Galarza had been known to associate with Delhi members. 7. In this case, Galarza was a ssociating with Delhi members and participating in their response to a perceived form of disrespect. 8. Rondou had had “plenty of contacts ” with Galarza in the past and “knew he was Delhi.” Rondou testified Galarza was “a self-admitted Delhi gang member.”

2. Roland Andrade Detective Roland Andrade of the Santa Ana Police Department also testified as gang expert. He had had contact with Galarza seve ral times in th e year before Juan’s killing and had been present when a STEP notice had been served on him. Andrade believed Galarza was a Delhi memb er, based on “[t]he totality of the circumstances during my contacts with him, conversations I had with him, his own admissions to me regarding his affiliation and membership with the De lhi criminal street7 gang, other people I’ve talked to related to Mr. Galarza who have indicated he’s a Delhi gang member.”

D. Defense Evidence 1. Sanchez’s Testimony Sanchez testified as a defense witness. He had been charged as a codefendant and pleaded guilty to voluntary ma nslaughter on the factual basis of aiding and abetting Galarza and Calderon in killing Juan. Sanchez also admitted he committed the offense for the benefit of a nd in association with Delhi. Sanchez testified he was a member of the N.W.O. tagging crew. In 2007, N.W.O. and F.T.L. had been engaged in an ongoing battle over gr affiti that sometimes resulted in fistfights. Sanchez was not a me mber of Delhi, and, according to Sanchez, one could not be a member of both N.W.O. a nd Delhi. Sanchez had heard that Calderon was a member of Delhi and a former member of N.W.O. Sanchez knew that Galarza was a member of N.W.O. and was not a member of Delhi. In the evening of January 3, 2008, Sanchez was at a friend’s house when Galarza, driving a white Suburban, arrived. Calderon also was in the Suburban. Sanchez agreed to go with Galarza and Calderon to the Azteca Market to buy cigarette tobacco. Galarza drove to the rear parking lot of the Azteca Market. As Calderon got out of the car to go inside the market, he reached into his pants, pulled out a gun, and placed it on the backseat. Sanchez had not known Calderon to carry a gun and did not tell Galarza about it. Calderon returned from the market, and as he, Sanchez, and Galarza sat in the Suburban, a couple of guys walked through the parking lot. They looked at Sanchez, who asked if “they did graffiti.” In response , the guys said they were “graffiti artists” from F.T.L., and walked into the market. Sanchez interpreted their response as a challenge and said, “let’s get in a fight with these guys.” Calderon, who had returned8 from the market, Sanchez, and Galarza discu ssed the situation. Sanchez was angry. Calderon handed him the gun. Sanchez handed it back and said he “d idn’t want any part of this.” Galarza drove the Suburban out of the pa rking lot and parked just south of the intersection of Saint Gertr ude Place and Cypress Avenue. Calderon rolled marijuana. Sanchez told Galarza he wanted to wait for the guys from F.T.L. and fight them. About 10 minutes later, Sanchez saw the guys from F. T.L. walking down Saint Gertrude Place and starting to cross Cypress Avenue. Sanch ez and Galarza simultaneously got out of the Suburban. Galarza told Calderon to stay inside the Suburban. When Sanchez and Galarza were about 30 feet behind the F.T.L. guys, Sanchez asked them, “you guys write?” Sanc hez meant this as a challenge, and such a question is the typical way in which a confrontation betwee n tagging crews begins. The F.T.L. guys did not respond, which indicated they did not want to fight or have any problems, so Sanchez and Gala rza stopped pursuing them. Out of the corner of his eye, Sanch ez saw Calderon with his gun drawn. Sanchez heard a gunshot. Shocked and scar ed, Sanchez ran back to the Suburban. Galarza drove the Suburban to his friend’s ho use, and Sanchez eventually drove Galarza home. Sanchez was arrested abou t 3:00 a.m. on January 4, 2008.

2. Galarza’s Testimony Galarza testified in his own defense. He was 20 years old at the time of the shooting. He had grown up with in the area claimed by Delhi as part of its territory, and had known Delhi members, incl uding his older brother. Ga larza was not a member of Delhi, and his brother had told him not to join because it was not a lifestyle he would

want. Galarza, as Sanchez, was a member of the N.W.O. tagging crew, which Galarza nicely described as “a bunch of gentlemen that defa ce people’s property.”9 Galarza had been a member of N.W.O sinc e he was about 12 years old and was a member at the time of his arre st. F.T.L. was a rival tagging crew, and F.T.L. and N.W.O. would have fistfights when en countering each other. Neither Galarza nor other N.W.O. tagging crew members ever ca rried or used a weapon. At the time of the shooting, Gala rza had known Calderon only a few months and did not consider him a frie nd, although the two had smoked marijuana together. Calderon was a member of N.W.O. wh en Galarza first met him. Three to four weeks before Juan was killed, Cald eron became a Delhi member. Galarza’s version of the shooting was s ubstantially the same as Sanchez’s. Galarza testified that while pa rked in the Azteca Market pa rking lot, Eulises and Sanchez glared at each other, and Eulises told Sanche z, “fuck you.” When Sanchez asked where they were from, a few turned around and said, “F.T.L.” Befo re leaving the parking lot, Galarza saw Calderon hand Sanchez a gun a nd heard Sanchez say, “should I shoot these fools?” Calderon replied, “you don’ t have to if you don’t want to.” Galarza drove the Suburban out of the parking lot and parked near a stop sign at the intersection of Saint Gertrude Pl ace and Cypress Avenue so that Calderon could roll a blunt. When the F.T.L. guys were spotted, Galarza agreed to get out of the Suburban with Sanchez. Gala rza thought there would be a fi stfight and told Calderon to stay in the car. Galarza and Sanchez followe d the F.T.L. guys and told them to turn around. When none did so, Galarza and Sanc hez turned to go back to the Suburban. Galarza was surprised to see Calderon, who pu lled out his gun and aimed it at the F.T.L. guys. Galarza told him to “kick it,” meaning to stop, but Calderon fi red the gun once. Galarza, hearing a groan, ran back to the Suburban with Sanchez and Calderon. Galarza dropped off Calderon, and then Sanchez drove Galarza home. Galarza was interrogated the next da y by Santa Ana police detectives. Galarza testified he lied to the detectives throughout the interr ogation and told them different stories “to kind of wiggle my way out of the situation.” He lied because he was10 afraid of going to jail and be ing labeled a “rat,” but “reality” hit when Galarza realized the detectives knew he had been at the crime scene. He began to give “bits and pieces of the truth, but not the full truth” and, by th e end of the interrogation, he was telling a mixture of lies and truth. Galarza told the detectives he was a De lhi member, although that was a lie, because that was “what [they] wanted to hear at the same time” and he “wanted to make it seem like I was being honest.” Galarza testified he owned and wore a Detroit Tigers baseball cap with a “D” on it. He knew the letter “D” was a Delhi logo, but he wore that cap because his first name is Damien and a friend sold him the cap for half price. Galarza was not concerned about wearing a cap with a Delh i logo because he always wo re the cap backwards and did not wear it to signal gang membership.

D ISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Receiving in Evidence All of Galarza’s Statements Made During the Police Interrogation. A. Background Galarza argues the trial court erred by concluding he di d not invoke his right to remain silent during the police inte rrogation and by receiving in evidence all of his statements made during the interrogation. To address that argument, we start by reviewing relevant portions of the transcri pt of the police interrogation on January 4, 2008. Galarza was interrogated by Rondou a nd Flynn. Before being read his Miranda rights, Galarza was asked about his body tattoos. He answered questions about where he grew up and where he currently lived. Galarza said a police officer named Hernandez was “crooked” and had told him he was going to “put you and your brother11 away for as long as I can.” When Galarz a asked, “what’s going on,” Rondou replied, “[y]ou[r] name popped up in an incident we’re looking into.” At that point, Rondou read Galarza his rights under Miranda , and Galarza said he understood them. Rondou continued asking Galarza questions and pressed him to give his side of the story. Galarza ackno wledged he had been in the Suburban the previous day but said he did not want to be a rat. Rondou told Galarza, “I know who you were with. I know where you were. Ther e’s still some doubt on wh at you[r] role was here.” Galarza claimed he did not know what Rondou was talking about and said he “didn’t do nothing.” Galarza de nied he was a member of Delh i and denied he had been at the Azteca Market on the even ing of January 3, 2008. Rondou told Galarza, “I got the feeli ng you’re gonna to let these dudes put the case on you.” Galarza replied, “[h]ell no” and he did not want to feel like a “fucking rat.” Rondou continued to press Galarza to give his side of the story, and Galarza continued to maintain he did nothing, did no t know what happened, and “wasn’t there.” Rondou insisted Galarza had been at the crim e scene, and Galarza insisted he had been telling the truth. After these back-and-f orth exchanges, this colloquy occurred: “[Galarza]: I didn’t do a shit, homey. You tell him that, homey . . . . I didn’t do a shit, homey. I’ll te ll you, you know what, fucking to the bus stop, that’s all. I’m done, man. I’m done, man. I got nothing else to say. “RO[N]DOU: You won’t talk to us anymore? “[Galarza]: . . . I’m done. . . . I got not hing to say, homey. I’m—, that’s it. “RO[N]DOU: Okay. “[Galarza]: I’m tired, I’m sick, homey. I’m . . . “RO[N]DOU: You’re even more tir ed than me, man. [¶] . . . [¶] “[Galarza]: You guys are fucking down, man. “RO[N]DOU: No, we’re—, we’re good.12 “[Galarza]: You guys are down. . . . I mean, . . . I smoke the whole hours and go to sleep the same day. Well y eah, that’s it. I’m—, I’m done, . . . . “RO[N]DOU: You don’t want to talk to us anymore? “[Galarza]: No, I’m through, man. “RO[N]DOU: You don’t like us? “[Galarza]: Nuh, you guys are cool people. I knew, but . . . “RO[N]DOU: Then talk to us. “[Galarza]: Because . . . you guys ar e getting on my nerves, I mean . . . “RO[N]DOU: The feeli ng’s mutual, my friend. “[Galarza]: I tell you guys the tr uth, you guys don’t believe me. “RO[N]DOU: You told us the truth of what happen [ sic ] as you pulled out . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . but from where you went as soon as you pulled out, that’s—, that’s . . . [¶] . . . [¶] “[Galarza]: That’s—, that’s the truth, that’s all I got to say. Like I show you, I went down Orange, made a left . . . “RO[N]DOU: You don’t want to talk to us anymore, or do you wanna? “[Galarza]: I don’t want to, you know. “RO[N]DOU: Okay. “[Galarza]: I’m cool. I’m done. “RO[N]DOU: You’re done. “[Galarza]: I’m . . . .” At that point, Rondou told Galarza he was going to jail for murder and asked Galarza if he wanted to talk. The following discu ssion then occurred: “RO[N]DOU: You’re going to jail. Y ou’re going to jail for murder, man. Put your hand in there. “[Galarza]: Are you serious? “RO[N]DOU: Put your hand in there.13 “[Galarza]: Why big dog[?] “RO[N]DOU: You want to talk to me, I’ll spend all night talking . . . “[Galarza]: I’ll talk . . . “RO[N]DOU: You wan[t] to talk to us? “[Galarza]: Yeah, but I—, I—, homey, I don’t want to go to jail for murder dog.” Galarza again asserted he had told Ron dou the truth. Rondou said, “[n]o, it’s not. I told you we know what happened and I’m not playing games. You said you want to talk to us, I’ll sit and listen. I’ll listen to you all night and I know we shucked and jived and joke around but it’s no joke.” Rondou again asked Galarza to tell his side of the story, Galarza again insisted he di d not do anything, and Ro ndou again insisted Galarza had not told the truth. The interrogation continued. Galarza continued to claim he knew nothing about the shooting and had not been lying. He said he was tir ed and wanted to go home. Flynn stated, “[w]e got people, pointing the finger at you saying you were there and you did it . . . .” Galarza then said he was in the Suburba n in the evening of January 3, 2008, and was seated behind the driver, identified as “Gabriel.” The car stopped, Galarza got out because he did not want to “roll the blunts” with the others, and he walked toward the bus stop. As he passed a tire store on Main St reet, he heard a single gunshot. He then caught a bus to go home. Rond ou told Galarza he was “a te rrible liar” and told him to “stop from jerking around and tell the truth.” Galarza said he got out of the Suburban because the others in the Suburban wanted to “fuck these fools up” (referring to Eulises, Juan, and the three others in their group) and he wanted no part of it. Galarza claimed he wa s the only one who got out of the Suburban. At first he claimed he did not know why the others in the Suburban wanted to attack Eulises and Juan, but then said they had looked at somebody in the14 Suburban. Galarza stated, “som eone in the car shot him, that’s all I know” and claimed he did not know that anyone in the Suburban had a gun. Gala rza said he got out of the Suburban, walked to th e west side of Cypress Avenue, and smoked a cigarette. Galarza said two others (later identified as Calderon and Sanchez) got out of the Suburban and walked across the street, while Gabriel, the driver, stayed in side. Calderon and Sanchez approached two guys in the street. Galarza heard one gunshot. Calderon and Sanchez ran back to the Suburban and got inside. Galarza claimed he did not get back into the Suburban, but ran off. Galarza later admitted he saw the sh ooting and the shooter was a Delhi member. Galarza said he knew Calderon wa s a Delhi member but did not know whether Sanchez was. Galarza denied being a Delhi member, but stated he had “back[ed] it up” for about a year. Galarza later said he wa s “from” Delhi (“I’m fu cking DELHI, homey”) and was with Calderon and Sanchez to provid e backup and “fuck so mebody up” if there was a fight. At the end of the interrogation, Galarza stated that Gabriel had been in the Suburban at the Azteca Market, but was dr opped off before the shooting. Galarza admitted he was driving when th e Suburban left the market. He denied being the shooter but, after seeing the shooting, left the keys in the Suburban and “fucking bounce[d].”

B. Galarza’s Motion and the Trial Court’s Ruling At the outset of trial, Galarza brought a motion under Evidence Code sections 402 and 403 to exclude statements he made to law enforcement, including, and most importantly, statements he made duri ng the police interroga tion, on the ground those statements were made in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The motion asserted Galarza’s st atements before the Miranda warning was given were made in violation of Miranda and Galarza’s statements made after the Miranda warning was given should be suppressed as the product of coercion.15 In court, Galarza’s counsel submitted an audio recording and transcript of the entire police interrogation (exhibits 1 and 1-A). Redacted from those exhibits were passages from the interrogation that likely would have been excl uded under Evidence Code section 352. Galarza’s counsel also subm itted, as exhibit 2, an audio recording of the interrogation without redactions. A transcript of exhibit 2 was marked as exhibit 2-A. At the request of Galarza’s counsel, the court ag reed to listen to exhibit 2 up to the point when Galarza was read his rights under Miranda

. Two days later, the trial court announce d it had listened to exhibits 1 and 2 and had read exhibits 1-A a nd 2-A. Galarza’s counsel ar gued Galarza should have been given a Miranda warning at the outset of the in terrogation, before giving the Miranda warning, Rondou and Fl ynn had engaged in a deliberate tactic of getting Galarza to become comfortable and open up, and, therefore, the entire interrogation was unconstitutionally coercive. The prosecutor stated he “wouldn’t obj ect” to excluding the few minutes of the interrogation that preceded the Miranda warning. The trial court on its own initiativ e considered whether Galarza had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silen ce during the police interrogation. The court noted that Galarza did not raise the issue but, on the record, reviewed the portions of the interrogation in which Galarza stated he was “done,” was through, and had “nothing else to say.” The court construed these passage s as an expression of frustration with the detectives’ refusal to accept Galarza’s stor y. The court stated: “[R]eading these passages, because it appears that the defendan t’s mentality is he doesn’t want to rat on anybody else and that’s extremely important to him because he says in here in no uncertain terms that if he ra ts he could be killed or harm ed or however that language goes. [¶] There’s at least one other passage where the defendant says ‘I’m done’ or says maybe I don’t want to say anything else or some thing to that effect. So I looked at that in the totality of the circumstances, voluntarine ss and otherwise, and my interpretation of that was this is the defendant saying, if you’re not going to believe what I have to say,16 what else can I say? I have nothing else to sa y. I do not interpret th at to be an invocation of the right to remain silent.” The trial court found that Galarza’s statements—both before and after the Miranda warning—were made voluntarily. Out of “an abundance of caution,” the court excluded Galarza’s statem ents made before the Miranda warning. Galarza’s counsel then asked that, in light of the court’s ruling, th e court allow in all of Galarza’s statements made during the interrogation. The cour t agreed and stated, “your objection is preserved.” 2

C. No Forfeiture The Attorney General argues that Ga larza forfeited his claim that he invoked his right to remain silent during the police interr ogation by failing to raise that claim in the trial court. Although Galar za did not argue he ha d invoked his Fifth Amendment rights during the interrogation, we c onclude the issue may be raised directly on appeal. “To preserve an evidentiary issu e for appeal, the complaining party generally is required to make a timely and meaningful ob jection in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule ‘is to encourage a defenda nt to bring any errors to the trial court’s attention so the court may correct or avoid the errors and provide the defendant with a fair trial.’ [Citation.] Thus, an objection w ill be deemed sufficient so long as it ‘fairly apprises the trial court of the issue it is being called upon to decide. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The duty to object will be excu sed when an ‘objection or request for admonition would have been futile or would not have cured th e [alleged] harm . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 94, 101.) Here, the purpose of the rule requir ing an objection was fulfilled because the trial court addressed the issue whether Galarza invoked his Fifth Amendment rights

2 The court stated: “[Y]our ag reement is also in the record that in light of my ruling— and only in light of my ruling—are you requ esting that the first few pages go in.”17 and therefore could “‘correct or avoid’” any error and “‘provide [Galarza] with a fair trial.’” ( People v. Carrillo , supra , 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) The trial court listened to the audio recording, read the transcript of the police interrogation, reviewed the relevant passages on the record, and explained the reasons for its ruling. Thus, a formal objection likely would not have assisted the trial court or led it to alter its ruling.

D. Galarza Did Not Unambiguously Invo ke His Right to Remain Silent. 1. Relevant Law “The admission at trial of a defendant’ s statements made involuntarily to government officials violates the defendant’ s federal due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Citation.] Sim ilarly, a defendant must be advised of his or her Miranda rights, and must make a valid waiver of these rights, before questioning begins or any statements resulting from inte rrogation can be admitted. [Citations.]” ( People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 114, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) If the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives those rights, law enforcement officers may question, but if the defendant invokes his or her right to remain s ilent at any point in the inte rrogation, then questioning must cease. ( People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 947.) “Even if a defendant voluntarily has waived his or her Miranda rights to remain silent and to have counsel present, th e defendant later may revoke the waiver. In such a case, ‘once a defendant has indicated an in tent to assert his right to remain silent or to counsel, all further attemp ts at police interrogation should cease.’ [Citation.] ‘In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege afte r it has been waived, and in order to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect “must unambiguously ” assert his right to silence or counsel. [Citation.] It is not enough for a reasonable police officer to understand that the suspect might be invoking his rights. [Citation.] Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, law en forcement officers ar e not required under18 Miranda , supra , 384 U.S. 436, either to ask clarifyi ng questions or to cease questioning altogether. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A defe ndant has not invoked his or her right to silence when the defendant’s statements were merely expr essions of passing frustration or animosity toward the office rs, or amounted only to a re fusal to discuss a particular subject covered by the questioning. [Citations.]” ( People v. Rundle , supra , 43 Cal.4th at pp. 114-115. ) “On appeal, we review independently th e trial court’s legal determinations of whether a defendant’s statements were voluntary [citation], whether his Miranda waivers were knowingly, intelligently, and vo luntarily made [citation], and whether his later actions constituted an invocation of his ri ght to silence [citation] . We evaluate the trial court’s factual findings regarding th e circumstances surround ing the defendant’s statements and waiver s, and ‘“accept the trial court’s re solution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility , if supported by substantial evidence.”’ [Citations.]” ( People v. Rundle , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 115.)

2. Analysis Viewing Galarza’s statemen ts in context, we c onclude Galarza did not unambiguously assert his right to remain silent. Galarza initially waived his Miranda rights, and spoke with Rondou and Flynn. Galarza claimed he was not a Delhi member and was not at the crime scene. Rondou said he did not believe Ga larza and pressed him to tell his side of the story. After stati ng several times he had been telling the truth, Galarza declared, “I didn’t do a shit, homey,” and stated, “I’m done” and “I got nothing else to say.” Galarza said he did not want to talk because “you guys are getting on my nerves” and “I tell you guys the truth, you guys don’t believe me.” By stating he was done talking, a reasonable inference coul d be drawn that Galarza was expressing his frustration and anger over the detectives ’ refusal to buy into his story.19 The trial court, which listened to an audio recording of Galarza’s interrogation and read the transcript, could r easonably conclude, as it did, that Galarza was expressing frustration and anger with the de tectives for not believing him. “While we must review the record and make an in dependent determination of the question, we, like the United States Supreme Court, ma y ‘give great weight to the considered conclusions’ of a lower court that has prev iously reviewed the same evidence.” ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 963, 979 ( Jennings ).) We accept the trial court’s inference, reasonably drawn from the audio recording an d transcript of the interrogation, that Galarza’s statements that “I’m done” and “I got nothing else to say” were expressions of frustration and animosity, not unambiguous invo cations of the right to remain silent. An analogous case is Jennings , supra , 46 Cal.3d 963. In that case, the defendant made incriminating statements to police officers Cromwell, Maich, and Rose, in an interrogation following the discove ry of the murder victim’s body. ( Id. at pp. 974, 978.) The defendant claimed he invoked his right to remain silent during that interrogation, by stating to Officer Crom well: “‘I’ll tell you something right now. You’re scaring the living shit out of me. I’ m not going to talk. You have got the shit scared out of me,’ and, ‘I’m not saying shit to you no more, man. You, nothing personal man, but I don’t like you. You’re scaring the living shit out of me. . . . That’s it. I shut up.’” ( Id. at p. 977.) The California Supreme Court, upholding the trial court’s ruling, concluded the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent by making the above quoted remarks to Officer Cromwell. ( Jennings , supra , 46 Cal.3d at p. 978.) Assuming the defendant had been in custody during the in terrogation, the Supreme Court also agreed with the trial court that the defendant di d not intend to invoke his right against self-incrimination. ( Ibid. ) The court did not consider the defendant’s statements in isolation, but as part of the interrogation as a whole. ( Ibid. ) During the interrogation, Officer Cromwell questioned discrepancies in th e defendant’s story and was persistent in20 attempting to get the defendant to cl arify contradictory statements. ( Ibid. ) The defendant became angry and refused to say anything more. ( Ibid. ) The Supreme Court concluded: “Viewing the tape, observing defendant’s demeanor before, during, and after the statements, and considering th e context in which defendant made the statements on which he relies here, we conclude that the stat ements reflect only momentary frustration and animosity toward Cromwell.” ( Ibid. ) Other cases, though not as analogous as Jennings , lend support to our conclusion Galarza did not unambiguously invo ke his right to remain silent. (See People v. Martinez , supra , 47 Cal.4th at pp. 949-951 [the defendant did not invoke right to remain silent by stating “‘That’s all I can tell you’” and “‘I don’t want to talk anymore right now’”]; In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 516 [when suspect who had given exculpatory statements was em phatically accused of lying by interrogating officers, the response “‘That’s all I have to say’” was inte rpreted to mean “That’s my story, and I’ll stick with it,” rather than a request to terminate the in terview]; see also People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 433 [no unambi guous invocation where, near end of lengthy interview, suspect res ponded to police officer’s disbe lief of his denials by stating,

“‘ I don’t want to talk about it ’”]; People v. Vance (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1211 [no unambiguous invocation where suspect stated, “‘I don’t have a side of the story’” and “‘I don’t want to talk about it’”].) Further, Galarza reinitiated the conversa tion with Rondou and Flynn. After a suspect invokes a Fifth Amendment right, further questioning is forbidden unless the suspect personally initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations. ( People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384.) A suspect personally initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations when he or she speaks or engages in conduct that can be fairly said to represent a desire to open a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. ( Id. at pp. 384-385.) The prosecution has the burden of proving the suspect initiated further discu ssions with the police and the21 suspect knowingly and inte lligently waived the right previously invoked. ( Id. at p. 385.) The question whether the suspect or the police reinitiated communication, after the suspect’s invocation of Fifth Amendment righ ts, is predominately factual and therefore reviewed under the substan tial evidence standard. ( Ibid. ) After Galarza stated he was done talk ing, Rondou asked him, “[y]ou don’t want to talk to us anymore, or do you wann a?” Galarza replied, “I’m done.” At that moment, questioning ceased. Rondou placed Ga larza under arrest for murder. Rondou had made no prior threats to do so. When Galarza expressed surprise at being placed under arrest, Rondou stated, “[y]ou want to ta lk to me, I’ll spend all night talking.” Galarza then reinitiated the conversation by st ating, “I’ll talk.” Rondou confirmed, “[y]ou wanna . . . talk to us?” Galarza rep lied, “[y]eah, but I—, I—, homey, I don’t want to go to jail for murder dog.” Galarza argues that Rondou reinitia ted the conversation by asking if Galarza wanted to talk. Viewing all the st atements in context, we conclude Galarza reinitiated the conversation in response to be ing placed under arrest . Galarza’s reaction to being arrested (“[a]re you serious” and “[w]hy big dog”) and his unambiguous statement “I’ll talk” constituted words and conduc t that “‘“can be ‘fairly said to represent a desire’ on his part ‘to open up a more ge neralized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.’”’” ( People v. Gamache , supra , 48 Cal.4th at pp. 384-385.) The transcript of the interroga tion permits the fair inference that Galarza’s waiver of his right to remain silent and restarting of communicatio n were knowingly and intelligently made. II. Any Error in Failing to Gi ve the Cautionary Jury Instruction Was Harmless. Galarza argues the trial court erred by fa iling to instruct sua sponte that his unrecorded oral admissions should be view ed with caution. Such instruction was22 required, Galarza argues, because Rondou te stified Galarza was a “self-admitted” Delhi member and Andrade testifie d he believed Galarza was a Delhi member based on “his own admissions to me regarding his affiliati on and membership with the Delhi criminal street gang.” We conclude any error was harmless. CALCRIM No. 358 reads as follows: “You have heard evidence that the defendant made [an] oral or written statement[s] (before the trial/while the court was not in session). You must decide whether th e defendant made any (such/of these) statement[s], in whole or in part. If you decide that the defendant made such [a] statement[s], consider the stat ement[s], along with all the other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to decide how much importance to give to the statement[s]. [¶] [Consider with caution any statement ma de by (the/a) defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise recorded.]” Here, the trial court gave the first paragraph of CALCRIM No. 358 (with modifications), but did not give the second paragraph admonish ing the jury to consider with caution any unwritten or unrecorded statement made by the defendant. “When the evidence warrants, the court must instruct the jury sua sponte to view evidence of a defendant’s oral admiss ions or confession with suspicion.” ( People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905.) The trial court erred by not giving the cautionary instruction because ev idence was presented that Galarza orally admitted to Rondou and Galarza he was a Delhi member. The Atto rney General does not argue otherwise. “The standard of review for errone ous failure to give the cautionary instruction is . . . the normal standard of review for state law error: whether it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result mo re favorable to defendant had the instruction been given.” ( People v. Dickey , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 905.) Galarza argues the error in failing to give the cautionary instruction violated his federal constitutional rights and, therefore, the more stringent Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard should apply. The Califor nia Supreme Court has rejected this argument23 at least twice. ( People v. Dickey , supra , at p. 905; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393.) “‘“The purpose of the cautionary inst ruction is to assi st the jury in determining if the statement wa s in fact made.” [Citation. ]’ [Citation.] ‘Since the cautionary instruction is inte nded to help the jury to de termine whether the statement attributed to the defendant was in fact made , courts examining the prejudice in failing to give the instruction examine th e record to see if there was any conflict in the evidence about the exact words used, their meaning, or whethe r the admissions were repeated accurately. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Dickey , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 905; People v. Carpenter , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 393.) Thus, in assessing prejudice, we addre ss whether there was any conflict in the evidence about the exact words used in the purported admissions and whether the witnesses repeated the admissions accurately. The admissions were (1) Rondou testified Galarza was a “self-admitted” Delhi gang memb er and (2) Andrade testified he believed Galarza was a Delhi gang member based on “his own admissions to me regarding his affiliation and membership with the Delhi crimin al street gang.” There is no conflict in the evidence about what Gala rza said to Rondou and Andr ade. Although Galarza testified he was not a Delhi gang member, he never denied making those admissions to Rondou and Andrade. Galarza did not de ny being served with a STEP notice in Andrade’s presence. In sum, there was no pr ejudice because “[t]here was ‘no evidence that the statement was not made, was fabric ated, or was inaccurately remembered or reported.’” ( People v. Carpenter , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 393.) In addition, the trial court instructed the ju ry on judging th e credibility of witnesses. ( Ibid. ) Because the only error we have found was that in failing to give the cautionary instruction, th ere was no cumulative error.24 D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.