In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2146

Suzanne Edwards,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar;

Richard J. Prendergast, in his official capacity

as President of the Illinois Bar; Character

and Fitness Committee of the Second Judicial

District; and L. Lee Perington, in his

official capacity as Chairman of the Committee on

Character and Fitness for the Second Judicial

District,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 6792--Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

Argued November 6, 2000--Decided August 22, 2001

 Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Kanne and Diane

P. Wood, Circuit Judges./*

 Kanne, Circuit Judge. Suzanne Edwards,

plaintiff-appellant, alleges that the

defendants-appellees violated Title II of

the Americans With Disabilities Act by

asking her to release all of her medical

records detailing her treatment for

depression as part of the process of

reviewing her application for admission

to the Illinois Bar. She also challenges

the defendants’ practice of making the

disclosure of all treatment by mental

health professionals a precondition to

certification to the Illinois Bar. We

affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Edwards’ complaint on the grounds that

review is barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. 

I. History

 Suzanne Edwards graduated from the

Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1998,

passed the Illinois Bar Exam, and applied

for admission to the Illinois Bar.

Illinois Bar admissions are overseen by

the Illinois Board of Admissions to the
Bar (the "Board"), an entity that is

appointed by and acts on behalf of the

Illinois Supreme Court. The Board is in

turn assisted by several committees that

review bar applications and conduct

character and fitness inquiries of bar

applicants. Edward’s application was

reviewed by the Committee on Character

and Fitness for the Second Judicial

District (the "Committee"). The President

of the Board is Richard J. Prendergast

and the Chairman of the Committee is L.

Lee Perington.

 Applicants for admission to the Illinois

Bar are required to explain the reasons

for leaving any prior employment, and

Edwards’ bar application disclosed that

she left her previous employment as an

air traffic control specialist because of

a medical disqualification to perform

duties. Edwards further disclosed, during

an August 1998 interview with a member of

the Committee, that she has received

treatment for "Major-DepressionRecurrent" from mental health

professionals since 1987. She was then

called to appear before an inquiry panel

of the Committee. At that time, Edwards

explained that the Federal Aviation

Administration had revoked her medical

certificate because she was receiving

treatment for depression, which included

the use of doctor prescribed antidepressant medication. The panel

requested that Edwards furnish the names

and addresses of each mental health

professional she had consulted for

treatment since 1987. Edwards declined to

do so, but she agreed to provide the name

of her current physician and consented to

a release of the records reflecting the

time under his care. 

 On September 25, 1998, the Committee

advised Edwards that it had declined to

certify her eligibility for admission to

the bar. She requested a formal hearing

before the Committee but was informed, by

way of a letter dated February 5, 1999,

that a hearing would not be scheduled

until she consented to the release of her

medical records. Included with the letter

was a form entitled "Consent to

Disclosure of Mental Health Records,"

which stated, in part, that failure to

execute the document might result in

Edwards’ inability to sustain her burden

to demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence that she possessed the requisite
character and fitness to practice law.

She refused to execute the consent form,

and a hearing was not scheduled.

 On October 15, 1999, Edwards filed a

complaint in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief against the Board, the

Committee, and Perington and Prendergast

in their official capacities

(collectively referred to as

"defendants"). Her two-count complaint

accused the defendants of violating the

Americans with Disabilities Act (the

"ADA") and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. She requested an

order:

 Declaring that Defendants’ demand for

the complete disclosure and consent to

release of all records of any mental

health treatment of Plaintiff and of

other applicants for admission to the

Illinois Bar, and Defendants’ refusal to

schedule a hearing absent said

disclosures and releases, violates the

Americans With Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. [and]

 Enjoining Defendants from making total

disclosure and complete release of all

treatment by mental health professionals

a precondition to certification to the

Illinois Bar and/or the opportunity for

hearing. 

 On December 23, 1999, the Committee

advised Edwards by letter that a formal

hearing would be scheduled for February

10, 2000. The letter also advised her,

however, that should she fail to produce

her medical records at least thirty days

prior to the hearing, the hearing would

not take place. After sending this

letter, the defendants filed a motion to

dismiss, claiming that, inter alia,

Edwards’ complaint was moot because a

hearing that was not dependant upon the

disclosure of the entirety of her medical

records had been scheduled. Defendants’

memorandum in support of this motion

asserted that Edwards would have the

opportunity to raise her constitutional

challenges in the state proceedings. 

 The Committee continued to seek access

to Edwards’ medical records and requested

advance copies of them in a letter dated

January 21, 2000. Three days later,
another letter withdrew this demand, and

stated that she need not produce any

records in advance of the hearing.

Edwards was reminded, however, that she

would have the burden to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that she had the

requisite character and fitness for

admission to the practice of law. See Ill.

Comp. Stat. Bar. Admis. Rule 4.1. 

 The hearing was conducted on February

15, 2000, and Edwards was allowed to

submit whatever records she felt were

appropriate. Edwards’ counsel was

prepared to raise Edwards’ constitutional

and federal claims at this hearing in

accord with the representations made by

defendants’ counsel in the district court

proceeding. When members of the Committee

objected to the relevancy of those

issues, however, Chairman Perington

sustained the objection and limited the

hearing to fact-finding.

 Following the hearing, but prior to the

Committee’s issuance of its decision, the

district court determined that it was

required to abstain from considering

Edwards’ claims under the doctrine

announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669

(1971) and thus dismissed Edwards’

complaint. See Edwards v. Ill. Bd. of Ad

missions to the Bar, No. 99 C 6792, 2000

WL 343333 (N.D. Ill. March 29, 2000).

 On April 28, 2000, the Committee issued

its findings and conclusions. It decided

that Edwards did not show by clear and

convincing evidence that she possessed

the requisite character and fitness for

admission to the practice of law. The

Committee stated that matters unrelated

to her mental health "were sufficiently

adverse to [Edwards’ application] to

warrant a denial of her certification,"

including her lack of candor during the

bar application process, her arrest

record, and her financial

irresponsibility. The findings and

conclusions state, however, that Edwards’

mental health condition was "nonetheless

a factor which the Hearing Panel has

taken into consideration." Edwards

alleges that her condition was taken into

consideration insofar as she did not

prove "by clear and convincing evidence

that [she] would be able to meet the

expectations and demands" of the

profession of law, and that her failure
to release all of her medical records

contributed to the Committee’s

determination that she was insufficiently

candid, honest, or trustworthy to be an

attorney in the State of Illinois. 

 Edwards filed a petition for review of

the Committee’s findings and conclusions,

as is permitted by Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 708(d). Her petition argued, inter

alia, that the ADA protected the

disclosure of her mental health records.

She also requested oral argument. The

Illinois Supreme Court denied Edwards’

Petition for Review in an order dated

September 11, 2000. 

 Plaintiff appeals the district court’s

dismissal of her complaint, requesting

this court to reverse and remand for

adjudication of her ADA claim.

II. Analysis

 The district court determined that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

Edwards’ claims under the abstention

doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 669

(1971). We review this determination de

novo. See Crenshaw v. Supreme Court of

Ind., 170 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1999).

Abstention is only appropriate "when

there is an ongoing state proceeding,"

Leaf v. Supreme Court of State of Wis.,

979 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1992), thus

"abstention is no longer appropriate"

here, Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d 301,

305 (7th Cir. 1992), because the Illinois

state proceedings relevant to this appeal

terminated when the Illinois Supreme

Court declined plaintiff’s petition for

review. See Leaf, 979 F.2d at 595. The

district court’s judgment may, however,

be affirmed on any ground supported by

the record. See Cushing v. City of Chi.,

3 F.3d 1156, 1167 (7th Cir. 1993). In

light of this, we will consider whether a

host of other doctrines--namely mootness,

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res

judicata, and Eleventh Amendment immunity

of state actors--prevent us from

adjudicating Edwards’ claims.

 On appeal, Edwards accuses defendants of

violating the ADA by 1) demanding

complete disclosure of mental health

treatment records of applicants for

admission to the Illinois Bar, including

herself, and 2) making total disclosure
of all treatment by mental health

professionals a precondition to

certification to the Illinois Bar.

Defendants allege that Edwards’ case is

now moot because they accorded Edwards a

hearing at which Edwards was not required

to produce all of her medical records. A

defendant carries a heavy burden when it

argues that a plaintiff’s claims are

moot, see Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d

592, 597 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation

omitted), and we are not convinced by

defendants’ arguments on this point. With

respect to the first alleged injury, it

is true that, once Edwards filed her

federal complaint, the Committee agreed

to hold a hearing without requiring

complete disclosure of Edwards’ mental

health records. We have long recognized,

however, that a defendant can not moot a

claim simply by voluntarily ceasing

behavior when it is free to resume that

behavior at any time. See Milwaukee

Police Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 747

(7th Cir. 1999); Sefick v. Gardner, 164

F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1998); Jones v.

Sullivan, 938 F.2d 801, 807 (7th Cir.

1991). Plaintiff has stated that she will

reapply for admission to the Illinois Bar

in 2002, and nothing would prevent

defendants from again requiring total

disclosure of her records at that time.

With respect to Edwards’ second alleged

injury, Edwards was not certified, so the

fact that she was accorded a hearing does

not moot her claim that the Committee

requires full disclosure of mental health

records as a precondition to

certification. We conclude, then, that

neither of Edwards’ claims are moot.

 We thus turn to the second doctrine on

our list: Rooker-Feldman. This doctrine

derives from two Supreme Court cases,

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1923),

and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d

206 (1983), and provides that lower

federal courts do not have subject matter

jurisdiction to review state court civil

decisions. See Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d

1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted). Plaintiffs must instead seek

review through the state court system

and, if necessary, petition the United

States Supreme Court for a writ of

certiorari. See id. Courts and

commentators have expended considerable

ink in an attempt to define the
parameters of this doctrine, and our

court is no exception. Despite all of the

doctrinal twists and turns, the point is

rather simple: to avoid federal review of

state court decisions. See, e.g., Manley

v. City of Chi., 236 F.3d 392, 396 (7th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus, our

overarching concern is "whether the

federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a

state court judgment or whether [she] is

. . . presenting an independent claim."

Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d

548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation omitted).

 It is "often difficult to distinguish"

between situations in which the plaintiff

is seeking to set aside a state court

judgment and ones in which the claim is

independent. Id. at 554. To assist in

this determination, we ask "whether the

injury alleged by the federal plaintiff

resulted from the state court judgment

itself or is distinct from that

judgment." Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362,

1365 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Manley,

236 F.3d at 397 (examining the source of

plaintiff’s injury). If it is the former,

then "the federal courts lack subject

matter jurisdiction, even if the state

court judgment was erroneous or

unconstitutional." Centres, Inc. v. Town

of Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699, 702

(7th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted). If

the injury alleged by the federal

plaintiff "is distinct from the state

court judgment and not inextricably

intertwined with it, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply." Id. at 702. The

key phrase in this previous sentence is,

of course, "inextricably intertwined"--

thus, if the injury alleged in the

federal case is intertwined in this

fashion, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does

apply. To determine whether the injury is

inextricably intertwined, we focus on

whether the federal court is being called

upon to review the state court decision.

See id. "[C]onstitutional claims that are

’inextricably intertwined’ with state

court judgments of necessity call upon

the district court to review the state

court decision and are thus beyond the

district court’s jurisdiction." Young, 90

F.3d at 1231 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S.

at 482 n.16). On the other hand, an

alleged injury will be independent if the

state court was acting in a non-judicial

capacity when it injured the plaintiff--

for example, if the state court was
"promulgating rules regulating the bar."

Leaf, 979 F.2d at 597 (citing Feldman,

460 U.S. at 485 ). Thus, "federal

district courts ’have subject-matter

jurisdiction over general challenges to

state bar rules . . . which do not

require review of a final state court

judgment in a particular case.’" Id.

(quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486). When

the litigant is challenging the

constitutionality of a rule that was

applied to him, but is not asking "to

correct or revise" the determination that

he violated the rule, Rooker-Feldman is

"no obstacle to the maintenance of [the]

suit." Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry

Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993). 

 The Committee’s decision declining to

certify Edwards constituted a judicial

determination, see Feldman, 460 U.S. at

479, that was appealed to the Illinois

Supreme Court. The court, upon

consideration of Edwards’ written submis

sions detailing her ADA claim, denied

Edwards’ petition for review. This order

constituted a final state court decision

and terminated the state proceedings.

What must now be decided is what effect

the state court judgments in this case

have on Edwards’ claims--specifically,

whether the district court may consider

Edwards’ ADA claims or whether her only

avenue for federal relief was through the

United States Supreme Court. 

 To determine whether Rooker-Feldman

precludes federal court review, we ask

whether Edwards’ injury resulted from the

state court judgment declining to certify

her for admission to the Illinois bar.

See Garry, 82 F.3d at 1365. We first

consider Edwards’ challenge to

defendants’ practice of requiring

disclosure of applicants’ mental health

records as a precondition to

certification. As an initial matter,

Edwards has presented no facts to support

the assertion that defendants have made

such disclosure a precondition to

certification for anyone other than

herself. Thus, this claim is most

accurately stated as alleging that

defendants violated her rights under the

ADA by making total disclosure of her

mental health treatment records a

precondition to her certification. The

question, then, is whether the injury

(precluding certification when records

are not disclosed) resulted from the
state court judgment (the refusal to

certify). The answer must be yes. The

state’s refusal to certify Edwards is the

act that potentially violates the

ADA,because if the state had certified

her, then the injury would not have

occurred. That is, if the facts were

exactly as they are here except that

Edwards was certified for admission to

the Illinois Bar, then she could not

claim that full disclosure of her mental

health treatment records was a

precondition to admission. This is

clearly the type of federal court action

that is barred by Rooker-Feldman.

 We now turn to the other injury alleged

by plaintiff--that defendants violated

her rights under the ADA by demanding

complete disclosure of her mental health

treatment records. This injury can not be

said to have resulted from the state

court judgment. Even if the state court

decision had come out differently, that

is, even if the state had certified her

to the bar, Edwards could still have

alleged that the Committee violated the

ADA by requiring her to release all her

records. It was not the state’s refusal

to certify her that allegedly violated

the ADA; rather, it was the procedure

followed by the Committee in reviewing

her candidacy. 

 This determination does not end our

inquiry, however. We must determine

whether plaintiff’s alleged injury is

inextricably intertwined with the state

court judgment denying her certification.

In other words, would the district court

be required to review the state court

decision in order to consider and decide

the federal claim? The Supreme Court has

made it clear that we are "without

subject matter jurisdiction to review a

final order of the state Supreme Court

denying a particular application for

admission to the state bar." Feldman, 460

U.S. at 485 (quotation and internal

alteration omitted). The lower federal

courts do, however, have subject matter

jurisdiction to consider a general

challenge to a bar rule. See id.; see

also Johnson v. Supreme Court of Ill.,

165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999)

(noting that rules may only be contested

"if they are separable from the decision

in an individual licensing or

disciplinary case"). 
 Edwards challenges the Committee’s

practice of requiring total disclosure

and complete release of applicants’

records of treatment by mental health

professionals. This is not a challenge to

the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, as the

Rules do not require this type of

disclosure; they simply require each

candidate to possess "good moral

character and general fitness to practice

law." See Ill. Comp. Stat. S. Ct. Rule 708.

Plaintiff’s challenge, then, is to the

manner in which the Committee treated her

application. She asserts that her

decision not to release her medical

records was held against her because it

led the Committee to determine that she

did not possess the requisite character

and fitness for admission to the practice

of law. She essentially asks us to find

that "the test of candor should not be

whether an applicant is willing to grant

unrestricted access to her private

psychiatric medical records." Edwards’

Pet. for Review at 9. This too is

precisely the type of claim that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the lower

federal courts from considering because

it requires review of a state court

decision in a particular case that arose

out of judicial proceedings. See Feldman,

460 U.S. at 486; see also Dale v. Moore,

121 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1997)

(holding that plaintiff’s ADA claim was

"inextricably intertwined with the

state’s judicial proceedings relating to

his bar admission"); Campbell v.

Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 1996)

(finding that Rooker-Feldman barred the

district court from reviewing whether the

New York state court violated the ADA

when it required the applicant to provide

medical information as a precondition to

renewal of his bar application). 

 Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that she is

not asking us to review the state court

determination because her complaint does

not ask us to grant her certification to

the bar. While she might not be asking us

to review the state court order declining

certification, granting the relief she

requests would have that effect: she is

asking for a remand so the district court

may determine whether the Committee

violated the ADA in treating her decision

not to release the records as it did. If

the Committee did violate the ADA, the

district court would be directing the

Committee to reconsider plaintiff’s case
for admission when it has already ruled

on it. This we can not do. 

 We thus conclude that the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

review plaintiff’s ADA claims and that

dismissal was appropriate. Because the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, we do

not need to address the res judicata

effects, if any, of the Illinois Supreme

Court’s order denying Edwards’ petition

for review. See Centres, Inc. v. Town of

Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.

1998). Nor do we need to decide whether

the Eleventh Amendment renders state

officials immune from suit under Title II

of the ADA. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of

Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960 n.1

(2001) (expressly declining to "decide

the constitutional issue whether Title

II, which has somewhat different remedial

provisions from Title I, is appropriate

legislation under sec. 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment"); see also Erickson

v. Bd. of Gov. of State Colls. & Univs.

for N.E. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952

(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "private

litigation to enforce [Title I of] the

ADA may not proceed in federal court"). 

III. Conclusion

 For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM

the district court’s dismissal of

Edwards’ complaint.

FOOTNOTE

/* Judge Ann Claire Williams recused herself after

oral argument and did not participate in the

decision of this case.