ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT			ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William E. Daily				Jeffrey A. Modisett

Danville, Indiana				Attorney General of Indiana

							Jon B. Laramore

							Priscilla J. Fossum

							Deputy Attorneys General

							Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

KATHLEEN REGESTER, R.N.,			)

							)

	Appellant (Petitioner Below),	) 06S04-9807-CV-389

							) in the Supreme Court

		v.					)  

							) 06A04-9704-CV-150

INDIANA STATE BOARD OF NURSING,	) in the Court of Appeals

							)

	Appellee (Respondent Below).	)

APPEAL FROM THE BOONE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Ora A. Kincaid, III, Judge

Cause No. 06D01-9610-CP-219

December 16, 1998

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

	The Indiana State Board of Nursing suspended the nursing license of appellant Kathleen Regester, R.N.  Regester sought judicial review of the suspension.  The trial court denied

Regester's petition and "affirmed" the Board's decision.  The Court

of Appeals reversed, Regester v. Indiana State Bd. of Nursing, 689 N.E.2d 477, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), and the Board petitioned this

Court for transfer, which was granted.  We affirm the trial court.

	Regester raised four issues on appeal, which we consolidate

into these three: 

	1.	Whether the Indiana State Board of Nursing had jurisdiction to hear the case against her; 

	2.	Whether the orders issued in her case complied with proper statutory procedure; and

	3.	Whether these was substantial evidence to support the suspension of her license.

Factual Background and Procedural History

	According to the Board, the agency proceedings began with a

citizen's complaint alleging that Regester had written

prescriptions without a prescriptive license.  The Board claims --

and Regester does not appear to contest -- that this informal

complaint was first filed with the Board, and then forwarded to the

director of the Division of Consumer Protection. 

	On September 4, 1996, the Board found that Regester, a

registered nurse without a prescriptive license, wrote

prescriptions for family members and for herself, signing various

doctors' names without their permission.  When confronted by her employer, she admitted that she was addicted to a pain killer that

she had prescribed for herself, and she voluntarily entered

treatment for chemical dependency.  The Board found that her

conduct was fraudulent or materially deceptive, that she rendered

services beyond her training or experience, and that she continued

to practice although unfit due to addiction to or abuse of drugs;

it suspended her license indefinitely.  The suspension order

provided that Regester could apply for reinstatement after six

months had passed.  

	Regester filed a verified petition for judicial review on

October 7, 1996.  Although the trial court characterized the

Board's suspension of Regester's license as a "close call,"  it

denied the request for relief and affirmed that decision.  (R. at

60-61.)  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board

lacked jurisdiction over Regester's case because the record did not

contain proof that the citizen's complaint had been filed with the

Board.  Regester, 689 N.E.2d at 479.  

Standard of Review

	In her brief, Regester correctly notes that the scope of

judicial review of an agency action is "severely limited."  When

reviewing an administrative agency action, a court shall grant

relief only if the person seeking such relief has been prejudiced by an agency action that is:

(1)	arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(2)	contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(3)	in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;

(4)	without observance of procedure required by law; or

(5)	unsupported by substantial evidence.

Ind. Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (West 1991).  Regester argues that

the Board's action violated subsection (d) in three ways:  that it

was in excess of its jurisdiction, without observance of proper

procedure, and unsupported by substantial evidence.

I.  Jurisdiction

	In support of her argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction

in her case, Regester cites two provisions of the Indiana Code

chapter on the investigation and prosecution of complaints

concerning regulated occupations, Ind. Code § 25-1-7-4 and Ind.

Code § 25-1-7-5.1  She claims a jurisdictional defect because there is no evidence that a citizen's complaint was (1) filed with the

director of the consumer protection division, (2) investigated by

the director, and (3) then submitted to the Board by the director. 

	The Board asserts that in this case, instead of filing first

with the director, who then should forward the complaint to the

Board, "the citizen initially contacted the Nursing Board, [and]

the Board provided the complaint to the Director . . . ."  (Board's

Pet. for Reh'g at 2; Board's Br. in Opp'n to Petitioner's Pet. for

Jud. Rev., R. at 52.)2  Rather than arguing that the complaint did not in fact reach both the director and the Board, Regester instead

relies on the sequence in which the complaint was passed through

the system to support her jurisdictional argument.

	The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of an agency action

is on the party asserting the invalidity.  Natural Resources Comm'n v. AMAX Coal Co., 638 N.E.2d 418 (Ind. 1994).  While Regester has drawn our attention to statutory language indicating that a citizen

should file a complaint first with the Division of Consumer

Protection, which may then submit it to the  Board, we are not

persuaded that paper flowing in the opposite direction creates a

jurisdictional defect.  Regester has neither provided any evidence

that the relevant authorities did not receive the complaint, nor

has she articulated any reason to oust the Board because a citizen

thought first to complain to the licensing board.  While the

absence of the citizen's complaint in the administrative record

could be an indication that no such complaint was filed, Regester has not made that argument here.3  For all that appears, the director and the Board had the complaint.  Regester did not meet

her burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the Board's

jurisdiction. 

II.  Proper Procedure

	Regester makes three arguments that the Board's orders do not

comply with proper procedure:  (1) the executive director issued

orders rather than simply executing them at the request of the

Board; (2) the Board's order does not rely upon specific findings

of fact; and (3) the reviewing court's order does not rely on

specific findings of fact.

	Regester contends that the executive director of the Health

Professions Bureau acted outside the scope of her duties by issuing

all the orders in the course of the agency proceeding, including

the final order suspending Regester's license.  While an "executive

director may execute orders" on behalf of the Board when requested to do so, Ind. Code Ann. § 25-1-5-5(g) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added), Regester argues that the executive director here issued orders.  We disagree.  On their face, the orders indicate that the

executive director was acting under the direction of the Board. 

(See R. at 77, 80, 91, 130 (orders contain an indication that they were issued by the Indiana State Board of Nursing); R. at 78, 81,

93, 130 (orders signed "INDIANA STATE BOARD OF NURSING BY:  Laura

Langford").  As such, the Board, not the executive director,

disciplined Regester.  The orders were properly issued. 

	Regester also challenges the Board's final order suspending

her license, claiming that the findings that accompany the order

are not specific enough to satisfy the procedural requirements of

Indiana Code section 4-21.5-3-27(b).  She argues that the findings

fail "to inform the parties of the evidentiary bases upon which the

ultimate findings rest, and to allow for meaningful review by the

courts."   (Appellant's Br. at 12.)  Again, we disagree.

	Indiana Code section 4-21.5-3-27(b) states:  "The order must

include, separately stated, findings of fact for all aspects of the

order . . . . Findings of ultimate fact must be accompanied by a

concise statement of the underlying basic facts of record to

support the findings."  While this Court has never specified a

particular method for determining the adequacy of findings under

this section, we find merit in the Court of Appeals' observation

that the findings must inform the parties of the evidentiary bases

upon which the ultimate findings rest and must allow for meaningful judicial review.  Glaser v. Indiana State Dep't of Public Welfare, 512 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).  In this case, the

Board made certain particular findings of fact ("The prescriptions

that Regester wrote for herself were for controlled substances that

she admitted abusing,"  R. at 127-28), several broader findings

("Regester did not have authorization for these prescriptions,"  R.

at 127-28), and the ultimate finding (that Regester should be

suspended, R. at 130).  These were adequate.

	Finally, Regester challenges the reviewing court's order

denying judicial review on the basis that the "court failed in

[its] statutory obligation to provide specific findings of fact." 

(Appellant's Br. at 13.)  The judge's order stated:

It is apparent from the Court's review of the transcript

that the decision made by the Indiana State Board of

Nursing was what may be characterized as a 'close call.' 

The Board certainly did not act precipitously and, as

evidenced by the record, gave considered judgment to its

decision.  The hearing was fair.  Due process was

observed.  But in the final analysis this Court concludes

that the Board had jurisdiction to make its decision,

that all procedural requirements were adhered to, and

that the resulting decision was in all regards legally

entered.

(R. at 60-61.)  

	The Indiana Code gives courts slightly differing instructions

when it comes to findings.  On the one hand, the Code says that

judicial review is largely confined to the agency record and that

the court "may not try the cause de novo or substitute its judgment

for that of the agency."  Ind. Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-11 (West 1991).  This seems consistent with the directive that relief may be granted

only under fairly serious circumstances, such as arbitrary and

capricious action or the absence of substantial evidence.  Ind.

Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (West 1991).  Given these constraints,

the command that a court makes "findings of fact on every material

issue", Ind. Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-14(c) (West 1991), cannot be

understood to require the same sort of findings of fact and

conclusions of law that a trial court might enter to decide the

merits of a matter on the civil plenary docket.  Rather, judicial

review findings must be adequate to demonstrate that the court has

undertaken to assess the claims for judicial relief that are before

it.  The trial court's findings in this case are unusually brief,

but they satisfy us, in light of the underlying record, that the

court considered and ruled on the chief questions before it.  

III.  Substantial Evidence

	Regester claims that the Board's findings and order are not

supported by substantial evidence.  

	In our review of the administrative record, we neither

substitute our judgment on factual matters for that of the Board,

nor do we reweigh the evidence.  John Malone Enterprises v. Schaeffer, 674 N.E.2d 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Medical Licensing Bd. v. Robertson, 563 N.E.2d 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).  Instead we read the record in the light most favorable to the administrative

proceedings, and we do not disturb the Board's conclusion so long

as there is substantial evidence to support that determination. 

John Malone Enterprises, 674 N.E.2d at 605  "Under [the substantial evidence] standard, the reviewing court may vacate a board's

decision only if the evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates

that the conclusions reached by the board are clearly erroneous." 

City of Indianapolis v. Hargis, 588 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind. 1992).  

	The evidence in this case provides substantial support for the

Board's decision.  Regester's testimony alone establishes the basis

for the Board's suspension of her license.  She admitted that she

wrote prescriptions for herself and for members of her family

without a prescriptive license, signing the names of doctors who

had neither examined the patients nor given permission for the

prescriptions.  She also admitted that her use of the pain

medication she prescribed for herself resulted in a drug abuse

problem for which she entered a drug treatment program.  Regester's

license suspension was supported by substantial evidence.  

Conclusion

	We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dickson, Sullivan, Selby, and Boehm, JJ., concur.