COUNTER-WMD 

CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS AT 

U.S. AND ALLIED AIR BASES 

by 

Charles R. Heflebower 

Laura J. Le Gallo 

John P. Lawrence 

Bert A. Cline 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 27 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations at 

U.S. and Allied Air Bases 

Charles R. Heflebower 

Laura J. Le Gallo 

John P. Lawrence 

Bert A. Cline 

May 2005 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 27 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 27 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer ................................................................................................... ii 

The Authors................................................................................................iii 

I. Introduction........................................................................................ 1 

II. USAF’s Understanding of the Chemical Threat................................ 3 

III. Background: History of the Air Force Counter Chemical-Warfare 

Readiness Initiative............................................................................ 7 

IV. The USAF C-CW CONOPS.............................................................. 9 

V. Understanding and “Operationalizing” the Science......................... 13 

VI. The Chemical Threat and Current Air Force C-CW CONOPS 

Implementation Initiatives ............................................................... 15 

VII. Areas Still Being Addressed in the C-CW CONOPS...................... 23 

VIII. The Biological Threat and Current Initiatives ................................. 27 

IX. Nuclear and Radiological Threat and Current Initiatives ................ 35 

X. Summary and Way Ahead ............................................................... 39 

Notes ......................................................................................................... 41 
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

ii 
The Authors 

Lt. Gen. Charles R. Heflebower retired from the Air Force in 2002 

and currently serves as one of five Air Force Senior Mentors. While on 

active duty, his assignments in the Air Force included command and staff 

at every level in the United States, Asia and Europe. He holds a Bachelor 

of Science Degree from the United States Air Force Academy in

Aeronautical Engineering and a Master’s Degree in International Relations 

from the University of Arkansas. Other education accomplishments

include the National War College, the Program for Senior Executives in 

National and International Security, Harvard University, the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 

and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama. When he retired from active duty, he was a command pilot with 

nearly 4000 hours of flying time, mostly in fighter aircraft. He also has 

over 200 combat missions in Southeast Asia, Bosnia and Iraq. As an Air

Force Senior Mentor, he has participated in numerous warfighting 

exercises and mission rehearsals in the Pacific, Europe and the United 

States. He also instructs at the Air University. While stationed in the 

Republic of Korea, he was responsible for the initial implementation of 

what would become the joint Air Force and Marine Corps Counter 

Chemical Concept of Operations. 

Laura J. Le Gallo has over 5 years of experience as an Operations

Research Analyst focusing on the effects of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), specifically chemical and biological warfare weapons, on 

operations at key military sites (both homeland/ domestic and international 

sites to include the Pacific, European and Southwest Asian theaters) and 

analyzing the implications of those hazards for current and future theater 

operational planning, acquisition and force structure. These analyses have

been conducted in support of a number of DoD customers including the 

Air Force Directorate for Nuclear and Counterproliferation HQ 

USAF/XON (now XOS), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 

MARFORPAC, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and 7th Air Force (& AF).

This work has been paramount in revealing the complexities that 

adversaries face with regards to delivering sustainable chemical or 

biological hazards to fixed sites and has directly influenced CINC 

iii 
OPLANS, Service CONOPS and TTPs and several related ACTDs. She 

holds a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of Virginia in Biology and 

is completing a Master’s Degree in Systems Engineering from George 

Washington University. Additionally, Ms. Le Gallo has analyzed passive

and active defense postures currently used by the U.S. and its allies, and 

the impact of attack operations on strategic sealift and airlift operations, 

intra-theater airlift, and tactical air and port operations. Both the integrated 

methodology and the associated tools Ms. Le Gallo used to perform the

aforementioned analyses are broadly recognized as unique in the level of 

site-specific operational detail and fidelity that they address and their

ability to quantify the interdependencies between passive defense, active 

defense and attack operations / counterforce. 

Mr. John P. Lawrence is the chief scientist and manager of the

Operational Planning and Assessments Department of Science Applications 

International Corporation. Mr. Lawrence has a history of hands-on, highly

responsive technical support involving WMD proliferation issues and CBW 

proliferation for OSD, DNA, CIA, DOE, ACDA, and the National

Laboratories. Mr. Lawrence participated in the SHAPE analyses that

formed the basis for the SHAPE post-Cold War CP triad, SHAPE TMD 

MOR, and NATO TMD concepts. Since joining SAIC in 1988, Mr. 

Lawrence has led the analysis efforts of a series of operational impact

analyses conducted for the Air Staff, the Joint Staff, and CINCUNC Korea, 

which quantifies the impact of CB WMD attacks on operations at key

APODs, SPODs, and fighter bases. This work has been central to 

uncovering “new” science with respect to the difficulties adversaries face 

with delivering a sustainable hazard environment at these fixed sites. The 

methodology is broadly recognized as unique, both in the level of 

operational detail it addresses and the ability to directly measure the 

interdependencies between passive defense, active defense, and 

counterforce. It has been the basis for both direct changes to CINC 

OPLANs, Service CONOPs, and operational procedures. Mr. Lawrence

graduated from the United States Military Academy with a Bachelors of 

Science in Nuclear Engineering. He spent 9 years in the United States 

Army, with 4 years serving as a Nuclear Weapons Development Staff 

Officer. 

iv 
Mr. Bert A. Cline is a Senior Analyst at Science Applications 

International Corporation and has over 26 years of experience in the U.S. 

Air Force. Mr. Cline contributed to the development of a methodology for

the USAF assessment of Pacific Air Forces Concept of Operations and

authored the PACAF Chemical Warfare CONOPS that was implemented 

AF wide. Further, he was a major participant in the successful development 

and implementation of the Restoration of Operations Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstration that provided validation of the counter-chemical 

warfare CONOPS. While in the Air Force, he held numerous Disaster

Preparedness positions, an Inspector General position, and served as a 

Theater Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Advisor, 

Superintendent of the Readiness School, and was a Major Command 

Readiness Manager. Additionally, he authored the Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm NBC Defense portion of the War Plan, the NBC portion of current

U.S. Air Forces in Europe and PACAF War Plans, and the USAFE

Component Response for Nuclear Weapons Accident Response. Mr. Cline

has contributed to numerous SAIC studies and analyses and developed the

seven-day Civil Engineering Readiness C-CW CONOPS MAJCOM/Wing 

orientation session, which included lesson plans, tabletop exercises, and 

progress checks.

v 

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 1

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations at 

U.S. and Allied Air Bases 

Charles R. Heflebower 

Laura J. Le Gallo 

John P. Lawrence 

Bert A. Cline 

I. Introduction 

In the face of U.S. military superiority, potential adversaries have 

begun to turn to asymmetrical means as a way to counter that capability. 

Our adversaries understand that U.S.-led coalitions will dominate the 

battlespace, if given the opportunity to flow their forces. Likewise, 

adversaries may try to inflict casualties on U.S. and allied forces early in the 

conflict in an attempt to make the coalition lose its “will” to fight. Such 

attacks are likely to include one or more elements of chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) warfare. 

Recent events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 

subsequent dispersal of anthrax-contaminated letter threats, North Korea’s

October 2002 declaration of the reactivation of their nuclear facilities and 

missile testing programs, and the threat, fortunately unrealized, of Iraqi 

use of chemical and biological weapons against coalition forces in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, highlighted the specter of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) use and brought it to the forefront of our national 

security challenge as well as our national interest. Of equal concern is the 

availability of an extensive range of advanced weapons and technologies, 

dual-use production and storage facilities, and scientific/technical knowhow that has accelerated the proliferation of WMD capabilities. 

The number of likely adversaries pursuing these weapons is growing, 

and the potential for increased production and sales of weapons of mass

destruction between both state and non-state actors, such as terrorist 

groups, is of serious concern. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld addressed 

this increasing capability of our adversaries in June 2001. 
2 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

We do know that countries that do not wish us well have an

enormous appetite for weapons of mass destruction and the 

ability to deliver them. We know North Korea does, and we 

know they’ve launched a two-stage [missile] with a kick 

motor for the third. With an ounce of luck, it could have

been in orbit and would have inter-continental ballistic 

missile range. Everyone said they couldn’t do it; how could 

those people who were starving, how could they possibly 

develop the kinds of system integration capabilities that 

would enable them to do that? They did it.1

Since the end of the Cold War, the threats and challenges faced by

U.S. and allied forces changed dramatically. Many of the assumptions 

that had long dominated U.S. defense strategy, policy, doctrine, and force 

requirements no longer apply in today’s new security environment, 

characterized by the rise of well-armed regional aggressors as well as

smaller, non-state actors with the demonstrated desire and intent to acquire

or develop WMD along with suitable delivery means. While a new focus 

has emerged regarding the homeland threat, the U.S. still faces serious 

threats to its military forces overseas. Potential regional adversaries are 

very likely to turn to WMD, particularly chemical weapons, as a way to

blunt superior U.S. military strength during the course of hostilities. This 

monograph will explore, in depth, the improvements that have been made 

to operate in the chemical threat, and just as importantly but in less detail, 

the biological and radiological weapons threat. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 3

II. USAF’s New Understanding of the Chemical Threat 

Since U.S. Air Force (USAF) units traditionally deploy to strategic

forward operating locations early in a conflict, they are extremely 

vulnerable targets to chemical warfare (CW) attacks. This is particularly

significant given the U.S. Air Force need to freely operate and sustain high 

sortie generation operational tempo (OPTEMPO) from these fixed sites, 

and is crucial to deterring and defeating the adversary. However, until 

recently, the ability to resume flying operations in the wake of a chemical 

attack has been hampered by assumptions of a “worst case” scenario in all 

cases, which required personnel to don their protective equipment and 

remain in mission-oriented protective posture level four (MOPP 4)2

 for 

extended periods of time.3

A central feature of the prevailing “worst case” approach was the 

familiar “slimed base” environment. The underlying assumption was that 

enemy missile, air, and special operations forces (SOF) attacks could

strike with enough frequency and intensity to create chemical hazards that 

were highly lethal, pervasive, and persistent. Consequently, the base 

populace was forced to spend extended periods in MOPP 4, until chemical

reconnaissance efforts either (a) determined that a chemical agent had not

been used; or, more typically, (b) remediated the hazard, generally through 

a lengthy and resource-intensive decontamination process.4

 Regardless, it 

was anticipated that personnel would likely spend hours to days operating 

and living in MOPP 4. This “worst case” approach had driven Air Force 

planners to accept substantially degraded operations as an unavoidable 

consequence of a CW attack. Considering this an unacceptable result, Air 

Force Senior Leaders directed a re-examination of these threats and the 

associated concepts of operation to mitigate the effects of a CW attack.5

Subsequently, tests, studies, and analyses sponsored by the USAF, 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Joint Service Materiel Group 

(JSMG), West Desert Test Center (WDTC), and the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center (NSWC) at Dahlgren, Virginia, provided a greater 

understanding of chemical effects on air base operating surfaces. These 

results, coupled with a more detailed understanding of the threat and the 

delivery environment, including the real world limitations of the delivery 

systems, overlaid on the operations at a fixed site, revealed that by 

improving tactics, techniques, and procedures and adding several new
4 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

technologies, aircraft sortie rates could be maintained even after CW

strikes. As highlighted in the Air Force Senior Leaders Guide Update

2002, a revised understanding of the CW threat was evident. Many of the 

previous passive defense measures underpinning the USAF Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense concept of operations 

(CONOPS) and procedures were disproportionate to the actual threats, 

risks and hazards, even in worst case scenarios. 

Perhaps the most significant conclusion to emerge from the past 

several years of testing and analysis is the realization that an Air Force 

Counter-Chemical Warfare concept of operations (C-CW CONOPS) must 

be tailored to address a range of potential contamination environments. 

The extensive analyses suggested that developing CONOPS designed to 

exploit less severe environments, while retaining the ability to survive and 

operate in “worst case” environments, provided the potential for

significant operational payoff. This approach was consistent with the 

common operational philosophy of protecting against the “worst case” but 

planning for the “expected case.” See Figure 1 for a graphic 

representation of this shift in thinking from the traditional (“worst case”)

assessment to the current (“expected case”) assessment. This adaptable 

and responsive philosophy (current assessment) underlies the approach the 

USAF recently has taken in developing a revised CONOPS for air base 

operations in a chemically contaminated environment. 

The C-CW CONOPS includes procedures and risk-based decision

aids that are designed to improve leadership’s ability to determine the 

specific nature of contamination following a CW attack. While it requires 

new guidance and training, the CONOPS is expressly designed to be 

institutionalized throughout the existing doctrine, organization, training, 

material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) readiness 

domains of the Air Force.6

With a properly trained force, this knowledge allows appropriate 

post-attack actions to be taken that increase operational capability. The 

ultimate effectiveness of the C-CW CONOPS is driven by an installation’s

ability to implement and manage a decentralized split-MOPP7

environment, the availability and employment of chemical contamination 

avoidance mechanisms, and tailored, site-specific procedures that balance

force (personnel and equipment) survivability and mission production.8

 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 5

Figure 1. Range of Potential Contamination Environments 

From “Worst Case” to the “Expected Case” 

Extended Hazard Duration

Base-wide Contamination

Impervious Surfaces

Traditional Assessment (“Worst Case”) Current Assessment (“Expected Case”)

Limited Hazard Duration

Partial Contamination

UNCERTAINTY Porous Surfaces

Severe Sortie Degradation Reduced Sortie Degradation

u

eeks)

azard

Vapor hazard 

dominates 

(hours to a day)

Surface-dependent

hazard environment

Uniform h

environment

Long-term liq id

hazard

(days to w

 



Opportunity to leverage prospect of

less than worst case outcomes

Requires integration of concepts into all

aspects of base operations

- Expect it, prepare for it, go look for it

Take steps to quickly recognize and 

effectively respond to actual

environment

-

Drives extended MOPP 4 O 

e

perations

- Bas -wide performance quickly

Extensive decon is not a solution fo

the Air Force

-

degraded



 r

Technology does not exist f

airbase surfaces

or

AF s capability to operate i

nvironment -- Degraded

 maintain n

this e



NOTE: The uncertainty in the ability of an air base to complete its mission in the 

event of a CW attack is driven by the level to which that air base is able to

implement and leverage the C-CW CONOPS

Although the primary focus over the last few years has been directed 

at understanding and quantifying the chemical threat, the Air Force is 

beginning to apply that same rigor to understanding the biological, 

nuclear, radiological, and high-yield explosive threats that exist in today’s 

battlespace. While the C-CW CONOPS is approved and is being 

implemented throughout the USAF, the development of counterbiological, radiological, nuclear, and (high-yield) explosives CONOPS

elements should ultimately lead to a singular, unified C-CBRNE 

CONOPS. This is the goal of the Air Force C-CBRNE Master Plan and

its roadmaps. 

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 7

III. Background: History of the Air Force Counter 

Chemical-Warfare Readiness Initiative 

In the mid-to-late 1990s, a series of high-level war games and 

exercises9

 raised concerns about the Air Force’s ability to fly strategic 

airlift into an air base contaminated with chemical warfare agents.10 In

1998, DTRA and USAF Headquarters, Nuclear and Counterproliferation 

Directorate (HQ USAF/XON) co-sponsored a study to address this issue. 

This analysis, commonly referred to as the “Aerial Port of 

Debarkation (APOD) study,”11 found little basis for the generalized

assumptions regarding the impact of chemical weapons on airlift 

operations. The relatively limited agent payload and inaccuracy of theater 

ballistic missile-delivered chemical weapons made it unlikely that the

threat could contaminate an entire air base on a repeated basis. Moreover, 

the existing hazard duration estimates which came from existing manuals 

did not address concrete, asphalt, and painted metal equipment used at air 

bases. Existing test data suggested significantly shorter liquid contact and 

vapor hazard duration than traditional estimates. The APOD study 

quantified the operational opportunities that the expected shorter hazard 

duration period created in terms of risk to aircraft contamination and 

impact on deployment flow. This, in turn, raised the operational 

importance of developing a better understanding of the fate of chemical 

agent on different surfaces. 

The results of subsequent live agent testing12 at Dugway, the Czech

Republic, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center confirmed that the liquid 

contact and vapor hazard duration is likely to be significantly shorter than 

previously assumed.13

Based on this new understanding and the comprehensive

reexamination of historical test results, the Commander of the Pacific Air 

Forces (COMPACAF), General Pat Gamble, in June 1999, directed 

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) to develop revised 

procedures for air base operations in a chemically contaminated 

environment. 

The Pacific Air Forces C-CW CONOPS14 was built on the premise

that it was possible to achieve dramatic improvements to mission-critical 

measures of success (i.e., sorties flown) while simultaneously 

strengthening the overall force protection posture of the air base. This 
8 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

called for a “holistic” approach that took an end-to-end look at current and

emerging threats, conducted thorough hazard analyses, and applied the 

best available science to determine the safest, most effective passive 

defense measures consistent with the operational imperative of continuing

the mission.15

In December 2000, COMPACAF sent out a memorandum that 

directed his forces to implement the revised C-CW CONOPS and 

recommended its implementation throughout the Air Force. In January 

2002, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF) directed its

implementation Air Force-wide.16
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 9

IV. The USAF C-CW CONOPS

The Air Force C-CW CONOPS has four major tenets based on a risk 

management approach that recognizes there are gaps in the underlying 

empirical knowledge base. (See Figure 2.) The CONOPS articulates this

better understanding of the hazard environment in an operationally 

meaningful way. It provides procedures and tools that enable 

commanders to determine the specific nature of the contamination after an

attack and take appropriate pre-attack (contamination avoidance 

procedures) and post-attack (command and control decision-making) 

actions to leverage opportunities to increase operational capability. 

Figure 2. Four Major Tenets of the USAF C-CW CONOPS 

A B K L

R Q

P

O

N

M

I

G

H

F

E

C D

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Better Understanding of the

Hazard Environment

14+ DAYS

VX

MOPP4

More Sophisticated Procedures

VX

Minutes

to Hours

Contamination Avoidance:

Protection of Key Assets

Command and Control with Risk 

Management Tools 

...war fighting goal...make asymmetric NBC attack irrelevant...

A B K L

R Q

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Better Understanding of the

Hazard Environment

14+ DAYS

VX

MOPP4

More Sophisticated Procedures

VX

Minutes

to Hours

Contamination Avoidance:

Protection of Key Assets

Command and Control with Risk 

Management Tools 

...war fighting goal...make asymmetric NBC attack irrelevant...

A B K L

R Q

P

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C D

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Better Understanding of the

Hazard Environment

14+ DAYS

VX

MOPP4

More Sophisticated Procedures

VX

Minutes

to Hours

Contamination Avoidance:

Protection of Key Assets

Command and Control with Risk 

Management Tools 

...war fighting goal...make asymmetric NBC attack irrelevant...

A B K L

R Q

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Better Understanding of the

Hazard Environment

14+ DAYS

VX

MOPP4

More Sophisticated Procedures

VX

Minutes

to Hours

Contamination Avoidance:

Protection of Key Assets

Command and Control with Risk 

Management Tools 

...war fighting goal...make asymmetric NBC attack irrelevant...
10 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

USAF C-CW CONOPS Execution

When warning of attack is received, it will be disseminated across the

base, and personnel will don their protective equipment (MOPP 4), seek 

cover, and the basic flow of C-CW CONOPS (Figure 3) will be followed. 

Personnel will remain under cover in MOPP 4 until directed to resume

operations. In all but the most time-sensitive, critical mission operations, 

it is prudent to limit operations outside until the droplet deposition period

is complete to minimize the risk of direct liquid contamination. Once the 

attack is over, post-attack reconnaissance activities will be conducted to

determine the extent of contamination across the base. The results of this 

reconnaissance will allow the commander to direct portions of the base 

that were not contaminated during the attack to reduce MOPP levels while 

operations in contaminated areas will continue in MOPP 4.17

Figure 3. Basic Flow of Operations on an Air Base 

under the USAF C-CW CONOPS 

Clean

Operations

Reduced 

MOPP

Operations

Movement

Transfer

Transfer

MOPP 4 

Operations

Post Attack 

Recon

Split MOPP

Decision

Asset Protection

Considerations

• Dispersal vs. 

Consolidation

• Complexity of 

Operations

• Outsized

Equipment

• Existing

Infrastructure

Pre Attack

Clean

Operations 

Reduced 

MOPP

Operations

Movement

Transfer

Transfer

MOPP 4 

Operations 

Post Attack 

Recon 

Split MOPP

Decision

Asset Protection

Considerations

• Dispersal vs. 

Consolidation

• Complexity of 

Operations

• Outsized

Equipment

• Existing

Infrastructure

Asset Protection

Considerations

• Dispersal vs. 

Consolidation

• Complexity of 

Operations

• Outsized

Equipment

• Existing

Infrastructure

Pre Attack
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 11

Due to the lack of automated liquid agent detectors or vapor detectors 

sufficiently sensitive to detect liquid deposition of low volatility agents, 

like VX, pre-positioned M8 paper18 must be used to determine where the 

contamination occurred. Follow-on monitoring of surfaces known to have

been contaminated enables the base to determine for itself whether or not 

the agent has sorbed19 into the operating surfaces. Again, using M-8 paper, 

base personnel can determine the contamination status of vehicles, 

equipment, and aerospace ground equipment/materials handling equipment

(AGE/MHE). 

Operations in contaminated areas will continue in MOPP 4 until the 

hazard from the concrete and asphalt operating surfaces no longer requires 

this level of protection. This timeframe, when personnel will be required to 

wear MOPP 4, will be driven by the vapor hazard generated by the offgassing of agent sorbed into the operating surfaces. This determination will 

initially be based on detector readings.20 In most cases, existing detectors 

will not be sufficiently sensitive to detect low levels of off-gassing agent, 

requiring the commander to assess his/her mission requirements against the 

risks associated with reducing MOPP levels in these areas. The range of 

hazard times depend on height of burst of the missile, wind speed, air 

temperature, and air stability. This range of hazard times illustrates the 

uncertainty that commanders must be aware of when reducing MOPP levels

since it represents a time of rapidly decreasing risk, where the agent is 

below acute lethal or incapacitating effects and designed to protect

personnel from the lowest level eye effects.21

Even after MOPP levels in contaminated areas have been reduced, 

MOPP 4 operations will continue when operating in or directly around 

vehicles, equipment, AGE/MHE, and munitions that were contaminated 

during the attack. These items represent both painted and bare metal

surfaces that are expected to support a longer-term hazard than the 

surrounding concrete and asphalt operating surfaces. The C-CW CONOPS 

provides procedures for limited operational decontamination to remove any 

liquid that may be remaining on these surfaces. These expedient

decontamination actions will not be sufficient to reduce MOPP levels solely 

because of their completion. Rather, expedient decontamination of these 

specific surfaces can minimize the risks and probabilities of inadvertent 

personal contact and cross-contamination. The inability of any fielded 

decontamination technique to neutralize all chemical hazards is primarily 
12 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

due to the porous quality of most surfaces found on an air base, to include 

the paint used on most USAF assets.22 Much like the operating surfaces,

these paints sorb agent within minutes. While the liquid contact and 

transfer hazard dissipates quickly, a vapor hazard will remain for some

period. The ability of an air base to have vehicles, equipment, AGE/MHE,

and munitions covered at the time of attack is an important element of

contamination avoidance, because of the inability to completely neutralize 

chemical agents once they have sorbed into most surfaces. The benefits of 

covering critical assets pre-attack are increased personnel safety, the 

absence of cross-contamination through inadvertent agent transfer, and 

reduced MOPP 4 timelines. 

Procedures for managing operations in MOPP 4 must be maintained.

These include: capabilities for shelter management, contamination control 

areas, and chemical exposure control activities. These procedures remain 

in place to ensure the air base can continue to safely operate in MOPP 4 

for as long as the hazard warrants. If the hazard is of relatively short 

duration, the air base is positioned to determine this and take advantage of 

the opportunities afforded. If, on the other hand, the hazard is of a longer

duration, then all the procedures to sustain MOPP 4 operations are 

provided.23
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 13

V. Understanding and “Operationalizing” the Science 

As mentioned previously, the APOD family of studies24 offered an 

alternative view to the Air Force’s long-held assumptions and practices. 

The study concluded that chemical attacks are likely to affect a much

smaller portion of fixed sites than originally believed. Likewise, pick-up 

and transfer hazards to equipment are likely to be of much shorter duration 

than previously assumed. While the chemical effects data on which these 

findings rest remain limited, all the available data points strongly to the 

conclusion that chemical agents will sorb quickly into porous concrete and 

asphalt surfaces of fixed facilities. While this will not eliminate the 

hazard posed by agents deposited on non-porous surfaces, it does suggest 

that with the appropriate command level understanding, command and 

control, CONOPS, and training, the operations tempo should be 

sustainable and war plans executable. 

Building on the APOD family of studies, recent analysis of air base 

operations in a chemically contaminated environment as well as exercise 

results from Osan Air Base (AB) in the Republic of Korea, show that the 

negative impact on sortie generation under the C-CW CONOPS could be

less than 10% after a CW attack rather than the expected degrade of 40% 

or more when using traditional approaches.25 (See Figure 4.) The 51st 

Fighter Wing (FW) at Osan AB achieved this through a process that took 

the risk management guidance, tools, and procedures provided in the

PACAF Counter-Chemical Warfare Commanders Guide and Technical

Report, and with the assistance of a team of technical experts provided by 

the HQ USAF, tailored them to the Osan AB infrastructure and functional 

operations. The analytic results were most recently validated through 

operational exercise results during the Air Force-led, DTRA-executed 

Restoration of Operations Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

(RestOps ACTD) at Osan in February of 2001.26 Key to the 51 FW success 

in reducing the negative impact of CW attack on sortie generation was their 

ability to assess operations across all wing functionals within the context of 

the new understanding of the air base CW environment as well as ability to 

identify which operations, if contaminated, posed greatest risk to full

operational recovery, and develop strategies for mitigating those risks. 
14 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

Figure 4. Potential Operational Buy-back Gained from 

Understanding and Implementing the C-CW CONOPS27

Air Force

CONOPS

 Based on USAF operations at multiple installations

 Degradation due to CW effects only

Traditional 

Approach

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Percent of Required Operatio

n

al

Capability

99%

Potential “Warfighter” Impact

82%

96%

64%Fighter Ops

Fighter Ops

Strategic Airlift

Strategic Airlift

It is important to note that the Air Force C-CW CONOPS is a passive

defense approach against chemical weapons. The Air Force must take an 

integrated and comprehensive approach across the counterproliferation 

spectrum, including proliferation prevention, counterforce/attack 

operations, active defense, and passive defense in order to achieve the 

maximum potential effectiveness in countering chemical weapons. This is 

critical to mitigating the threat. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 15

VI. The Chemical Threat and Current Air Force C-CW

CONOPS Implementation Initiatives 

Comparison of Efforts from 1993 to present 

The Air Force has made dramatic improvements in CW defense over 

the past decade. As a result, Air Force personnel have demonstrated the 

ability to significantly improve mission accomplishment while using 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that are much safer than those 

utilized circa 1993. Additionally, the Air Force has upgraded protective 

equipment and initiated and sustained a Mask Fit Validation Program. 

The following are some of the major differences between CW defense 

operations in 1993 versus those of today. 

Evaluation of probable threat environment at air base (rear area fixed sites)

While in 1993 the Air Force understood that tactical ballistic missiles 

were the primary threat, versus manned fighters/bombers, the knowledge 

essentially stopped there. Over the past six years the Air Force conducted 

a scientific and analytical review to quantify the types and extent of 

probable chemical threats to the typical air base. Specifics of the review 

included missile payloads, missile accuracy, SOF delivery methods, and 

CW agent droplet sizes at time of release, deposition patterns, and more. 

Use of split-MOPP operations 

In 1993, while not a new concept, no Air Force-level guidance existed 

for split-MOPP operations, and the practice was not widespread. 

Consequently, a chemical attack would have resulted in an ineffective oneMOPP level attack response methodology. A split-MOPP response allows 

personnel in uncontaminated areas to rapidly reduce their protective posture 

and return to full operational capability with a minimum of risk. 

De-masking techniques

In 1993, the standard de-masking technique was to use available 

chemical detectors to check for the presence of contamination, and then, 
16 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

direct de-masking once chemical contamination ceased to register on the 

instruments. Upon further study, the Air Force determined this practice 

was unsafe. Although the liquid contact and transfer hazard dissipates 

quickly (most detection instruments only read liquid hazard), a potential

vapor hazard will still remain thereafter for a certain amount of time

depending on such factors as surface and weather conditions, during 

which masks will still be required until directed by the commander. The 

commander can use guidance in the USAF C-CW CONOPS to assist in

this decision process. 

Hazard duration projections 

In 1993, the only document used throughout the Air Force that

contained chemical hazard duration projections was the Allied Tactical

Publication (ATP) 45, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Chemical and 

Biological Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards 

and Hazard Areas. The hazard duration table in ATP 45 is very general in 

nature, giving estimations such as three to ten days in the hazard area and 

four to six days downwind of the hazard area. Upon further study, the

USAF determined these projections were extremely conservative and did 

not provide operationally-useful information. Consequently, the Air Force 

departed from the ATP 45 table and began to follow Persist 2, a chemical 

persistency program used by USAF Civil Engineer Readiness (CEX) 

personnel. As more information was provided and additional test results 

became available, the USAF then transitioned from Persist 2 to today’s 

hazard duration charts. 

Automated Hazard Prediction Plotting 

In 1993, the Air Force did not possess an automated chemical hazard 

prediction plotting capability. Since that time, the Air Force has 

distributed an automated CW hazard prediction plotting capability to each 

CEX flight. This automated plotting capability is contained within the 

Vapor Liquid Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK) software package included as

part of the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) program. 

The Air Force provided training at each major command (MAJCOM) 

regarding automated CW hazard prediction plotting during C-CW

CONOPS training sessions.28
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 17

De-emphasis of M17 Decontamination Apparatus and Specialized 

Contamination Control (Decontamination) Teams 

In 1993, the Air Force had not finished reviewing the studies and test 

results that facilitated the removal of the M17 decontamination apparatus 

from wartime chemical-biological equipment sets.29 The Air Force also

still maintained a requirement for area (Civil Engineer), munitions, vehicle

(Transportation), and aircraft (Maintenance) decontamination teams. Over

the past decade, the futility of using the M17 decontamination apparatus 

for chemical decontamination hours after an attack has been clearly 

established30 and studies have shown that large-scale decontamination

efforts do not significantly reduce contamination in the expected threat 

environment. The subsequent Air Force elimination of the 

decontamination requirements has led to increased productivity and 

lessened the manpower requirement for wartime operations. 

Matching equipment and resources to the threat 

In 1993, the individual protective equipment (IPE) authorizations 

existed only for high chemical and biological warfare (CBW) threat areas.

The concept of a medium threat area did not exist. Consequently, people 

were in an “all or nothing” condition in regard to IPE authorizations. The 

introduction of authorizations designed for areas that required some, but 

not all, IPE rectified this shortfall. 

Further, in 1993, the Air Force’s collective protection, or shelter 

program was essentially non-existent. The collective protection facilities

in Korea were unserviceable and those in Europe were in the process of 

being removed or placed into long-term storage. Today, the collective 

protection facilities have been repaired and transportable collective 

protection systems have been introduced. 

Incorporation of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Conventional 

(NBCC) Defense Training into Basic Military Training (BMT) 

The Air Force recognized that all airmen required basic NBCC 

Defense Training, regardless of whether or not they were going to be 

assigned to a mobility position at their first installation. Consequently, 
18 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

NBCC Defense Training is now part of the Warrior Week segment of 

enlisted Basic Military Training. 

Incorporation of automated chemical detectors into a base-wide network 

In 1993, all chemical detectors were stand-alone units – there was no 

system available that integrated the detectors into a single network that 

could be monitored and controlled from the Wing Operations Center. 

Today, those Air Force installations equipped with the Portal Shield 

biological detection system also have the M22 ACADA31 included as part 

of a single, integrated chemical-biological detection network. 

Operational Effectiveness Assistance 

In addition to revisions to Air Force Publications (AFI 10-2501, AFH 

10-2502, AFMAN 10-2602, AFMAN 32-4005 and AFMAN 32-4006) and 

the Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan 10-2, an important piece of the CCW CONOPS implementation process, particularly for units forward 

deployed or responsible for contingency operating locations, is

Operational Effectiveness Assistance (OEA). 

Optimum C-CW CONOPS implementation benefits are realized when 

installations are able to manage a split-MOPP environment and identify

and resolve vulnerabilities to chemical attack. Generally, such 

vulnerabilities may include a lack of infrastructure or barrier materials (or 

plans and procedures to use such contamination avoidance measures) to 

protect key assets prior to and during an attack. Examples of potential key

assets may include munitions build and delivery equipment and vehicles 

as well as flight line maintenance equipment, etc. Additionally,

inadequate command and control attack response procedures and timelines 

or lack of proper plans and procedures for establishing base sectors for 

split-MOPP operations can be other examples of vulnerabilities that are 

likely to require operations to be conducted in MOPP 4 unnecessarily. 

Resolving such issues can greatly improve both the timeliness and 

accuracy in understanding and resolving the actual contamination 

environment. The specific operational vulnerabilities are unique to each 

installation and are addressed accordingly through the OEA process. An 

Operational Effectiveness Assistance visit is performed by a team of 

subject matter experts. The OEA provides a detailed analysis of CW 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 19

vulnerabilities at an installation and quantifies the impact of mitigation

techniques to minimize the effects of a CW attack. This is accomplished 

by developing a quantitative “operations baseline” of the installation’s

capability, key infrastructure, threats, and mission critical assets and then

running models such as EXPEDITER, to identify high leverage, sitespecific actions and mitigation strategies to improve mission capability in 

a contaminated environment. This offers the installation a tailored 

strategy for the C-CW CONOPS TTPs. 

It is wise to tailor such TTPs to specific installations to achieve

maximum operational pay-off in sortie generation and airlift operations. 

An example of this tailored approach can be seen in Figure 5, where 30% 

of the operational capability at a notional air base was regained by 

implementing the C-CW CONOPS and resolving specific operational 

vulnerabilities. 

Figure 5. Example of the Impact of Base-specific Tailoring of the 

C-CW CONOPS on Sortie Generation Capabilities 

Potential Buyback 37%Æ 7%Operational Degrade

Total of 37% of 

Sorties are lost during 

extended MOPP

CONOPS

Recovered

Sorties lost due to

Attack even with new

AF CONOPS

7%

Functional Contribution of Sorties

Recovered with C-CW CONOPS

Fix Second

Vulnerability

Fix First 

Vulnerability

13%

Fix Third

Vulnerability

24%

63%

CONOPS recovered

with new AF

CONOPS

30%

In this example, the base lost its ability to generate 37% of its sorties

using the traditional CONOPS, but by introducing the USAF C-CW

CONOPS, 30% of the sorties were recovered, leaving a total degradation 
20 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

of only 7% of the sorties. What was required to gain back the 30%? In 

this example, three vulnerabilities were identified and each had a different 

level of improvement when the vulnerability was mitigated.

Education and Training 

Successful implementation of the C-CW CONOPS in the Air Force

requires a comprehensive program of education and training. This 

education and training regime must focus on the individual, his/her unit 

and the larger wing organization. (See Figure 6.) 

Figure 6. Levels of Training Necessary for the Full Benefits 

of the C-CW CONOPS to be realized 

At the individual level, airmen need to have a basic understanding of 

the C-CW CONOPS, the significance of various surfaces to potential 

contamination and the basic concepts behind split-base and split-MOPP 

operations. The airman must be able to use and care for his/her chemical 

protection equipment.32 Finally, the airman must receive C-CW CONOPS
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 21

training relevant to his/her technical skill. This is best done during 

technical training. For example, a munitions specialist must understand

the CONOPS in the context of munitions storage area operations. 

At the unit level (flight/squadron) training must be provided in postattack contamination assessment and reporting procedures. 

At the wing level, within the command post, training needs to focus 

on assimilating reports and on assessing contamination and the associated 

impact on operations. Finally, the decision process to determine splitbase/split-MOPP must be exercised using the various tables available. 

During exercises, the wing commander must assess the responsiveness of 

all subordinate units to the direction provided. 

In a host of professional military education courses, the C-CW

CONOPS must be taught and understood. Efforts are underway to infuse 

this course of instruction into Air War College, Air Command and Staff

College, the Squadron Officer’s Course, Basic Military Training, and a 

variety of commander’s courses. 

Finally, the Air Force needs to accommodate C-CW CONOPS 

training within the context of the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). “Justin-time” training at fixed locations and the use of mobile training teams

will facilitate meeting this need. Additionally, training at the Air Mobility 

Warfare Center at Fort Dix, NJ, provides a basis of knowledge to future 

AEF support teams. 

Command and Control (C2) 

Successful implementation of the Air Force C-CW CONOPS requires

a robust command and control structure from the Joint Force Air 

Component Commander level through the wing level. (See Figure 7.) 

First, early detection of a theater missile launch is essential in order to 

start the theater warning process. Timely launch warning is fundamental to

passive defense. Rapid dissemination of the launch warning throughout the

theater command and control structure (and civil defense) requires a robust, 

redundant, C2 system. 
22 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

Figure 7. Critical Areas of a Robust Command and Control with 

regard to Post-attack C-CW CONOPS Operations 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Once warning is received at the wing level, the alert must be

disseminated quickly and efficiently throughout the base. In established 

forward bases, this may involve Giant Voice (a base-wide loud speaker

system), closed circuit TV, Theater Battle Management Computer 

Simulation, and telephone alerting. At expeditionary bare bases, the 

alerting requirement is no less real, but the means available to the wing 

commander may be limited. Base deployment kits need to accommodate 

this requirement. Base personnel must be able to receive the warning, don 

protective equipment, and take shelter within the remaining time of flight of 

the theater missile. 

At the wing level, the wing commander must have the command and 

control tools to facilitate upward post-attack reporting in order to efficiently 

make the necessary operational decisions needed to restore combat 

capability. The C2 architecture must then support the dissemination of 

those decisions. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 23

VII. Areas Still Being Addressed in the C-CW CONOPS33

Despite great strides in reducing degradation of operational capability

through C-CW CONOPS implementation, there is significant room for

improvement. The following items represent some examples of additional 

work to be done: 

• Additional de-masking guidance is needed. 

- Tools specifically designed to assist in determining when it 

is safe to de-mask inside facilities that had chemical and/or 

biological contamination drawn in through the heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems should be 

created. 

- An automated tool that factors in diurnal weather patterns into

chemical hazard duration projections should be developed. 

- Criteria for determining when it is safe to de-mask when an

overt release of CW agents has been detected, factoring in 

agent, weather, terrain, etc., should be established. 

- Tools specifically designed to assist in determining when it 

is safe to reuse tents and other temporary living/working 

quarters after they have been directly exposed to chemical 

or biological contamination should be considered. 

• Contamination Control Area (CCA) activities require additional 

attention. A CCA is an area in which chemically contaminated

individual protective equipment is removed; people, equipment, and 

supplies are decontaminated to allow processing between a toxic 

environment and a toxic free area (TFA); and people exiting a TFA 

may safely don IPE.

34

- Streamlined CCA procedures for ground crew, medical, 

and aircrew processing should be cultivated. 

- Clear guidance on ‘who’ must process through chemical 

CCAs does not exist (e.g., should everyone in a known 

contaminated area process through a CCA or only those 

with physical contamination on their ensembles?). 
24 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

- Definitive guidance does not exist in regard to the specific

steps required for processing people (in IPE and/or civilian 

clothes) that have been exposed to a CW environment

through a CCA. 

- Chemical mask refurbishment activities may not be costeffective, especially when the availability of “required

resources” is considered. 

• All aspects of aircrew operations in a chemical and biological (CB) 

environment require additional attention. 

- Given aircraft environmental and life support systems, what 

protection is actually required to be furnished by CB IPE?

- What individual protective equipment should aircrew have 

available during each phase of mission operations (i.e., 

preparing to fly in MOPP 2, preparing to fly in MOPP 4, 

post engine start, landing, etc.?) 

- Are current NBCC Defense and flying (in CB IPE)

requirements sufficient? 

• Standardized performance criteria should be developed for use at 

all levels of the Air Force in the Research, Development and 

Acquisition program to ensure adequate specifications are included

as key performance parameters in Joint Operational Requirements

Documents. An example would be that all chemical vapor 

detectors have the ability to detect and measure agents (to include 

known foreign variants) down to a level where miosis would not 

be reached after two hours of continuous exposure. 

• All aspects of reconstitution operations require attention. 

- What specific special handling procedures are required for 

resources that were contaminated during hostilities?

- What specific decontamination procedures will be used 

(resource by resource) to achieve the lowest possible level 

of contamination?
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 25

- What will be done if detectors do not possess the sensitivity

required to verify that contamination has been reduced to 

peacetime exposure standards?

• Specific guidance is required for contaminated waste disposal. 

• Development and utilization of standardized Inspector General 

(IG) criteria for core CBRNE items should be implemented Air 

Force-wide, regardless of where the unit is located. 

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 27

VIII. The Biological Threat and Current Initiatives 

Biological weapons also pose a serious concern to national security. 

Recognizing this threat, the Air Force has made several great strides in the 

challenging area of biological defense since 1993. 

Vaccination Programs 

In 1993, the Air Force population as a whole was not vaccinated 

against BW agents. As seen in Operation Desert Storm, the response

technique when entering a threat environment was to vaccinate personnel

at the time of contingency plan execution. In most cases, Air Force 

personnel were vaccinated during deployment at the forward location 

rather than in the pre-deployment phase. 

For the past several years, until late 2004, target populations received

BW vaccinations based on their job and assignment/deployment status. 

However, in late 2004 and early 2005, anthrax vaccinations were halted 

due to a restraining order by a federal judge who mandated further safety 

tests. As of this writing the DoD is appealing this case, petitioning for the

restarting of this important program. Up to the time when the vaccination 

program was stopped, it had become routine for personnel stationed in or 

deployable to BW high threat areas to receive anthrax vaccinations, 

regardless of the current defense condition level. Further, many medical 

care providers across the Air Force have been vaccinated for smallpox, 

regardless of whether or not they were stationed in or deployable to a BW

high threat area. Given the shortcomings of BW agent detectors, these 

vaccination programs, if permitted, will provide the backbone of the 

personnel protection program, although many U.S. vaccines are either 

ineffective or are in very short supply against biological agents other than 

anthrax and smallpox, which are considered the top two BW threats. 

Recognition that response to BW agents is not the same as response to 

chemical warfare (CW) agents 

In 1993, there was little guidance available for how to respond to a 

BW attack. As a result, the conventional wisdom among leadership was to 

respond to BW attacks in the same manner as CW attacks. Over the last 

ten years, the Air Force has come to realize that chemical and biological
28 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

agents are very different from one another. For example, biological agents

are very difficult to detect, and delayed symptoms may complicate 

medical detection. Further, the contagious nature of some BW agents and 

the toxicity of BW agents in comparison to CW agents lead to different 

considerations for BW versus CW. Due to these factors and others, the 

Air Force recognized that BW response should differ from CW attack 

response protocols in several key areas. For example: 

• Recognition of BW attacks will likely occur as a result of trigger

events that do not involve the actual detection of a BW agent 

through the use of a machine. These trigger events include 

intelligence warning, weapons event, and/or sentinel casualties. 

This use of trigger events differs from CW attack scenarios in that 

the use of detectors such as M8 paper will provide confirmation in 

most cases that CW agents were used in an attack. 

• The use of split-MOPP procedures is generally not recommended

for BW attack situations. Conversely, the effective use of splitMOPP procedures is one of the cornerstones of CW attack response.

• Use of personal equipment (M291/M295 kits35) to accomplish

operational decontamination of resources and work areas is not a

useful technique in the majority of BW attack situations because of 

the delay expected between attack and detection. This differs from

CW attack scenarios where operational decontamination can be 

very useful if the personnel were unable to adequately protect their 

assets in the pre-attack phase. 

• Biologically contaminated remains must be separated from 

chemically contaminated and uncontaminated remains. Further, 

biologically contaminated remains are separated into three distinct

categories while they are temporarily stored: non-contagious 

pathogen (anthrax for example), contagious pathogen (smallpox 

for instance), and toxin (ricin would be an example).36

• The ongoing concern regarding the transportation of biological 

warfare casualties or contaminated remains across national or

international boundaries complicates base response to biological 

events due to the contagion factor in many biological agents. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 29

• Crisis management is a more important component of response to a 

biological event due to the latency of biological agents. Further, 

the requirement to identify and track those possibly exposed to a 

biological agent and the potential need to restrict or quarantine 

these individuals reiterates the importance of maintaining an 

accurate and continuous flow of information to the targeted

populace. This is not necessarily the case when dealing with a CW

attack. 

• The likelihood of individuals in the surrounding base community 

to be exposed to a biological agent as the result of an attack against 

the base increases the need for a regularly exercised, integrated 

command and control (C2) structure for civilian-military

interagency cooperation and resource sharing. 

• Inhalation of BW is generally the greatest hazard concern and 

simple/inexpensive individual and collective protection measures

may go a long way toward reducing risk. The Air Force has begun 

some analysis and experimentation on expedient BW protection. 

Biological Detection 

In the 1993 time frame, the Air Force had not developed or fielded a 

biological detector that could be used in a field environment to sample and 

provide early warning of airborne or surface contamination. It was a

virtual certainty that BW detection would occur at a medical treatment 

facility through the exhibition of symptoms and/or slow (several hours to 

days) laboratory tests. Today, while not every installation possesses a full

suite of BW agent detectors, and there are still significant issues in the area 

of BW agent detection, most air bases have some biological detection 

capability outside of the laboratory. Figure 8 provides a summary of the 

types of BW detectors commonly found at many Air Force installations. 
30 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

Figure 8. BW Detectors Currently in use at USAF installations 

Type BW Detector Purpose Location 

DoD Sampling Kits (aka

Hand-Held Assays) 

Sampling of surface 

areas 

Most CEX and BEE offices in

the Air Force*

Portal Shield Network 

Sampling of air at

multiple places around 

installation

Several selected locations in

high CB threat areas (Korea 

and SWA**); some

CONUS*** units scheduled 

to receive system

Portable Collector

Concentrators (Spincon, Dry

Filter Units, Portable Biological 

Aerosol Sampler, etc.) 

Sampling of air at

location where portable 

collector concentrator 

is positioned (normally

1 – 3 per installation) 

Selected locations in medium

and high CB threat areas; 

some CONUS sites 

Ruggedized Advanced 

Pathogen Identification 

Device (RAPID) 

Identification of BW

agent contained in

environmental or fluid 

samples 

Several medical facilities 

(normally maintained by BEE 

or laboratory personnel)

throughout Air Force 

*CEX – Civil Engineer; BEE – Bioenvironmental Engineer

**SWA - Southwest Asia 

***CONUS - Continental United States 

Automated Hazard Prediction Plotting 

In 1993, the Air Force did not possess an approved biological hazard 

prediction plotting capability. In essence, since no guidance materials 

existed, the ad-hoc response of most CEX personnel was to plot BW agents

in the same manner as the farthest reaching CW agents. Since that time, the

Air Force has published manual BW hazard prediction plotting 

procedures.

37 More importantly, the Air Force distributed an automated 

BW hazard prediction plotting capability to each CE Readiness Flight. This

automated plotting capability is contained within the VLSTRACK software

package included as part of the Joint Warning and Reporting Network 

(JWARN) program. The Air Force provided training regarding automated 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 31

BW hazard prediction plotting at each Major Command C-CW CONOPS 

training session, to include provisions for a detailed step-by-step checklist. 

Initiation of Joint Service Installation Pilot Program and Weapons of 

Mass Destruction First Responders Program 

In 1993, the Air Force did not have a program that was specifically

designed to provide installations with the equipment and training required to

effectively respond to terrorist use of WMD. Although in its early stages, 

the Air Force has actively participated in Joint Service and Air Force-wide

programs that are ultimately designed to significantly increase force 

protection at air bases. In the case of the Joint Service Installation Pilot 

Project (JSIPP), networked BW sensors (Portal Shield) are scheduled to be

placed at three CONUS bases initially, with follow-on installations 

identified if the program is proven to be cost-effective. First Responders

and other Disaster Response Force members are scheduled to receive 

specialized terrorist attack response equipment as part of both the JSIPP and 

WMD First Responder’s programs. The specific equipment items are 

contained on the Baseline Equipment Data Assessment List (BEDAL). 

Further, both programs possess a training component that highlights BW 

response actions and includes field and table top exercise events. 

Availability of information

As stated earlier, in 1993 there was very little guidance available 

regarding response to BW attack situations. Since then, the Air Force, 

DoD, and other United States government agencies have developed and 

published a wide range of reference and procedural guidance documents. 

While much work remains to be done, the following list provides some

insight into how much more information is readily available today as 

compared to 1993. 

• Interim Biological Defense Plan. Prepared by an Air Force level 

Biological Defense Task Force (BDTF), distributed to the major 

commands, and posted on the AF/XOS-FC website.38 The

execution tasks within this document are being combined into the

standardized Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) 10-2 

template. NOTE: This document did not exist in 1993. 
32 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

• FSTR 10-2 template. This template is used by all Air Force 

installations as the starting point for developing the installation

FSTR 10-2 plan. Installation responses to BW attack and terrorist 

use of BW agents are required portions of this plan, with the 

information being located in Annex C (Enemy Attack) and Annex 

D (Terrorist Use of WMD) respectively. NOTE: This

standardized template did not exist in 1993. In fact, in 1993, it was 

not a requirement for the installation Disaster Preparedness 

Operations Plan to have an Annex outlining response procedures 

for a terrorist attack involving WMD. 

• AFMAN 10-2602 and AFMAN 32-4017 both contain 

informational segments regarding BW agents and delivery 

systems. NOTE: These documents did not exist in 1993. 

• AF Handbook 10-2502, USAF WMD Threat Planning and 

Response Handbook, contains information outlining how to tell if a 

BW attack has occurred, what response actions are appropriate, 

and agent-specific material. NOTE: This document did not exist 

in 1993. 

• The current NBCC Defense Course contains far more BW-related

information than the corresponding course in 1993. In 1993, the 

course material was constrained to limited protective actions 

individuals should take before, during, and after a BW attack. The 

current course discusses agent characteristics, delivery methods, 

recognition of trigger events, and decontamination methods in 

addition to containing information that addresses protective 

actions. 

• In 1993, few had access to the Internet, and the Web was just

coming into existence. Since then, it has become a valuable

conduit for distributing information about biological defenserelated activities. A few examples of information available on the 

Web are: 

- USAF Counterproliferation Center: http://www.au.af.mil/ 

au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm.
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 33

- DoD Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program: http://www. 

anthrax.osd.mil. 

- The AF/XOS-FC Commanders’ ChemBio Website is a 

repository for all current Air Force guidance on chemical 

and biological warfare response: https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/ 

af/xo/xos/xosf/xosfc/ccbrne_resource/index.ays. 

- BW agent technical information and fact sheets from the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC): http://www.bt.cdc.gov/ 

Agent/Agentlist.asp. 

- The Medical Management of Biological Casualties 

handbook from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute 

of Infectious Diseases can be downloaded from:

http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebook.html. 

Development and initiation of specific handling and packaging 

criteria for BW samples 

In 1993, the Air Force did not have published procedures or criteria 

for the handling and packaging of BW samples, to include chain-ofcustody requirements. This information is now contained in documents 

such as AFMAN 10-2602 and the Interim Biological Defense Plan, with 

Air Force personnel (mostly CEX and BEE) taking courses and receiving 

certification for handling/packaging activities through the International

Air Transport Association. 

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 35

IX. Nuclear and Radiological Threat and Current 

Initiatives 

The biggest differences between the 1993 time period and the present

in regard to nuclear attack response techniques involve the following items. 

Detection Equipment

The Air Force has replaced up to four separate radiation instruments 

with the ADM 300, a detector with far superior capabilities. The largest 

improvements are the ADM 300’s ability to detect all types of radiation of 

interest, the digital readings versus scale depictions – which provides 

increased accuracy, and the ability to set audio warning alarms. (See 

Figure 9.) In addition to directly translating to operational advantages, 

this has lessened the maintenance times required, reduced the numbers and 

types of consumable supplies (such as batteries on hand,) simplified the 

training requirements, etc. 

Figure 9. Various Radiation Instruments and their Individual 

Operational Capabilities 

TYPE OF 

INSTRUMENT

TYPE OF RADIATION 

DETECTED/MEASURED 

SPECIFICITY OF 

READING 

AN/PDR 56F Alpha, X-Ray Needle on Scale

PAC 1S Alpha Needle on Scale 

AN/PDR 27 Beta, Gamma (low range) Needle on Scale 

AN/PDR 43 Beta, Gamma (high range) Needle on Scale

ADM 300 Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Neutron, XRay 

Specific digital 

reading 
36 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

Awareness of Hazards Associated with Depleted Uranium (DU) 

As a result of exposures that personnel received during and after 

Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force instituted a DU awareness training

program. This training was made a mandatory part of the NBCC Defense 

courses that everyone “in or deployable to a medium or high CB threat 

area” is required to receive. This training segment consists of information 

that defines addressing what DU is, the specific sources that personnel 

may come into contact with, the hazards associated with the material, and 

protective actions that can be taken. 

Awareness and ability to respond to attacks involving Radiation 

Dispersal Devices (RDD) 

Radiation weapons were not considered a mainstream threat within 

the Air Force in 1993. Consequently, there was no specific training on the 

subject for Air Force personnel unless they were assigned to a highly 

specialized, national-level team such as the Nuclear Emergency Search 

Team (NEST). At the present time, more information is available to the 

Air Force population regarding the characteristics of radiation weapons 

and additional information has been incorporated into hazardous material 

training courses and in Air Force policy and guidance.39

• Deployable units have an automated RDD plotting capability 

available in every CEX Flight. The Hazard Prediction and

Assessment Capability (HPAC) software can predict areas and 

intensities of radiation contamination that was distributed as part of

the JWARN program. 

• The Full-Spectrum Threat Response plan contains requirements for 

all Air Force installations to develop procedures for response to 

situations where the air base is in the downwind hazard plume of a 

radiation weapon.40

Modification of installation response mechanisms regarding enemy 

attacks involving nuclear weapons 

The Air Force NBCC defense programs remain focused on the 

dominant threat(s) at the time. Consequently, there has been a de-
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 37

emphasis on nuclear warfare response activities from 1993 to the present, 

with a corresponding increase focusing on other threats. For example, the 

historically nuclear-oriented shelter management training requirements in 

Table 9.3 of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501 state that “installations 

assessed as low threat areas will train only upon increase in threat posture 

or as directed by Air Staff, with the exception of covering natural disaster 

sheltering.” This shift in philosophy is also contained in such AFMAN 

32-4005 items as: 

• In addition to response to nuclear attack, installation protective 

shelters can be used for major accidents, natural disasters, and 

other civil emergency relief operations. This includes specifying

that Air Force units are allowed to use War Reserve Materiel 

(WRM) supplies to support shelter operations for major accidents, 

natural disasters, and other civil emergency relief operations. 

• Differing numbers of required shelter management team members

for nuclear attack, CB attack, and natural disaster/major accident

response situations need to be specified. 

• Radiological exposure control procedures need only be developed 

for each shelter if the threat warrants.

Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 39

X. Summary and Way Ahead 

The Air Force has made dramatic improvements in countering WMD 

over the past decade. In the area of chemical warfare, results from testing 

and analyses showed quite convincingly that many previously accepted 

operational concepts were based on inaccurate assumptions and were 

largely ineffective. Whereas previously a “worst case” operating 

environment had been assumed, new information about the physical 

characteristics of chemical agents, agent sorption, and the expected 

delivery methods led to the conclusion that the “worst case” scenario was 

unlikely. While the effects of a CW attack are still not trivial, 

commanders implementing the C-CW CONOPS can now make risk 

assessments and informed decisions in order to continue the war fight. At 

the operational level, through active defense, counterforce operations, and 

passive defense, much of the current CW threat can be negated. 

The Air Force needs to continue to capitalize on this momentum, 

especially in the area of testing. Additional testing in agent fate is still 

needed in order to validate and extend the results of the existing testing and 

analyses. Due to uncertainties inherent in the data, operational commanders 

must understand the risks inherent in the hazard durations ranges and take a

conservative approach to ordering measures (e.g., reductions in MOPP 

levels) to restore operational capability and reduce the physical stress placed 

on personnel. Sustainment requirements, such as institutionalized training, 

are also still necessary at all levels of the Air Force. Further research and 

analysis is also needed to determine the proper attack response procedures

when considering fourth generation chemical agents and other possible 

future improvements in chemical warfare.

In the area of biological warfare defense, the Air Force has begun to 

make great strides in recognizing that, although the same or greater rigor 

applied to the chemical warfare threat is necessary, responding to 

biological threats is very different and more challenging. As a result, the 

Air Force has implemented a vaccination program, bio-specific hazard 

prediction plotting, and has also published a wide range of reference and 

procedural guidance documents for understanding and responding to a 

biological warfare event.

The Air Force has also continued to hone response procedures to 

counter nuclear and radiological threats. As a result of the re-emergence 
40 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

of nuclear and radiological warfare as realistic threats, the Air Force has 

dramatically improved its capability to detect these types of weapons and 

has significantly increased its training and education in the area of 

hazardous exposure to nuclear and radiological material. 

In the future, the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of

adversaries will continue to grow and become more sophisticated. To

counter them, the Air Force must continue its significant material and 

operational investment in command and control, passive defense, active

defense and attack operations as well as training, education and CONOPS 

development to fight and help win the nation’s wars. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 41

Notes 

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee, 28 June 2001. 

2. MOPP level 4 is the highest level of MOPP gear and requires the wearing of 

overgarment, field gear (helmet, web belt, canteen and, if used, body armor (worn over

the overgarment)), footwear covers (overboots), mask, hood, and gloves. It is used when 

the highest degree of CB protection is required, such as Alarm Black notification and also

post-attack reconnaissance-until the actual hazard has been determined. Only the

installation commander can direct the change in MOPP levels. Notional MOPP levels for

forces ashore are presented as follows in Joint Doctrine for Operations in NBC 

Environments, 11 July 2000:

Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 

Overgarment Readily

available 

Worn Worn Worn Worn

Overboots Readily

available 

Carried Worn Worn Worn

Mask & Hood Carried Carried Carried Worn Worn 

Gloves Readily

available 

Carried Carried Carried Worn

3. Col Glenn Burgess, USMC (ret), “Counter Chemical Warfare CONOPS

Now...Survive and Operate,” Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, 

Quantico, VA, December 2002, 47. 

4. “Senior Leader’s Guide,” Update 2002, 5. Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer

Support Agency HQ AFCESA/CEXR Tyndall AFB, FL. 

5. USAF Counter-Chemical Warfare Concept of Operations, XONP/ILEX,

Washington D.C., 2 Jan 2002.

6. “Senior Leader’s Guide,” Update 2002, 8.

7. In the past, MOPP postures were largely binary—which meant the entire base

populace was generally in either a MOPP 2 or MOPP 4 posture following an attack. The 

C-CW CONOPS includes procedures for determining which areas of a base are 

contaminated and which are clean so that personnel operating in clean areas can reduce

MOPP levels according to sectors. It also includes procedures for split-MOPP within a

sector. Personnel adopt the appropriate MOPP, as directed by installation leadership, 

based on their proximity to contaminated areas or surfaces. 
42 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

8. “Senior Leader’s Guide,” Update 2002, 7.

9. Some of these include: CORAL BREEZE (Summer 1996 – Spring 1997), 

CHEMWAR 2000 (Fall 1997), and TAEBEK’97 (Fall 1997). 

10. Some examples of nerve agents include GA (Tabun), GB (Sarin), GD (Soman),

GF (Cyclosarin), and VX. Nerve agents attack the nervous system and affect muscle

control, vision, heart, and lung functions. Some examples of blister agents include H

(Sulphur Mustard), HD (Distilled Mustard), HN-1 (Nitrogen Mustard), and L (Lewisite). 

Blister agents attack and destroy cell tissue. They cause skin and eye irritation, 

inflammation, and severe blisters. This tissue damage increases the chance of infection 

and may ultimately cause death. In most cases, pain and blisters may not occur until long

after exposure.

11. In 1997, the Air Force and DTRA conducted an operational study of strategic

air mobility operations in a chemically contaminated environment (it is referred to

commonly as the APOD Study.) Based on the results of the study, other “excursion 

studies” were conducted, the total of which are referred to as the “APOD family of

studies.” 

12. Live agent testing: testing using actual chemical warfare agents on actual air 

base operating surfaces. 

13. Results from live agent testing on duration: The first tests were sponsored by the 

Air Staff and DTRA between August 1998 and May 1999, and held at Dugway, West 

Desert Test Center in Utah. These tests examined the persistence of VX and two of its 

isomers as liquid and vapor hazards on concrete and asphalt (samples taken from air bases) 

at three temperatures. The second test was conducted in two phases from May 1998 

through August 1999. This test was sponsored by the Joint Service Materiel Group 

(JSMG) Decontamination Commodity Area Manager, and held in the Czech Republic. 

This test examined persistence of VX (nerve), GD (nerve), and HD (blister) agents on

grass, sand, concrete, and asphalt. A third live-agent test was conducted by the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, during the spring of 1999, focusing on the 

liquid and vapor hazard generated over time from VX, HD, and thickened GD agents

sorbed into surfaces. Each of these tests concluded that liquid agents rapidly sorb into a

wide range of porous surfaces, quickly removing the liquid pickup and transfer hazard.

The Dugway results were robust and held true for dry and wet surfaces, surfaces with paint 

and rubber deposits, as well as surfaces contaminated with petroleum, oil, and lubricants. 

All shed light on two primary issues affecting air base operations in wake of a chemical 

attack: persistence of the liquid contact hazard and duration of the vapor hazard of agent 

sorbed into surfaces. 

14. PACAF C-CW CONOPS: The risk assessment methodologies, command and

control tools, and detailed information on the tactics, techniques and procedures
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 43

associated with this C-CW CONOPS can be found in USAF publications, including 

AFMAN 10-2602, NBCC Defense Operations and Standards, and AFMAN 10-2603,

Counter-NBCC Defense Commander’s Guide, NBCC Commander’s Guide. 

15. “Senior Leader’s Guide,” Update 2002, 7.

16. The CSAF directed that COMPACAF operating procedures become the USAF

Counter-Chemical Warfare concept of operations. 

17. See note 7.

18. See note 20 on detectors. 

19. The term “sorb” is a term of art within the community reflecting the various 

interactions that occur between liquid agents and surfaces with which they come into 

contact. This includes the traditional absorption (the wholesale soaking in of a substance)

and adsorption (sticking of individual molecules to a surface, like activated charcoal 

scavenging poisonous gases in gas masks) as well as the more complicated chemical

interactions of physisorption and chemisorption. 

20. Some examples of detectors include: M8 and M9 paper, M256 A1, and the

Chemical Agent Monitor. The M8 paper will detect liquid G and V nerve agents and H 

blister agents. M8 paper provides the user with a manual liquid detection capability. 

Technical Order (T.O.) 11H2-14-5-1 is the technical reference. M9 paper, like M8 paper,

contains agent sensitive dyes that change color in the presence of liquid chemical agent. 

M9 paper will turn different colors if liquid agent comes in contact with paper. Color 

changes to M9 paper identify agent presence, not agent type. T.O. 11H2-2-21 is the 

technical reference. The M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit manually detects and

classifies nerve, blister, and blood agents in vapor or liquid form. The M256A1 samplerdetectors are capable of detecting and identifying vapors only. T.O. 11H2-21-1 is the

technical reference. The Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) is a hand-held point monitor 

capable of detecting and identifying nerve and mustard agent vapors. CAMs are intended

for use to search out clean areas, and to identify contaminated personnel, equipment,

aircraft, vehicles, buildings, and terrain. CAMs can help determine the effectiveness of 

decontamination and can be used in collective protection shelters. The CAM is a 

monitor, not a detector, and can become contaminated or overloaded (saturated) if not

used properly. The CAM can only detect vapors at the inlet nozzle. It will not give the 

vapor hazard over an area. The CAM is currently the best fielded device we have to at

least approximate the concentrations of chemical agent vapors present at any given time. 

While it does not provide a digital readout with exact chemical concentrations, the 

CAM’s individual bars do equate to intensity ranges. T.O.11H2-20-1 is the technical

reference for inspection and use. Endnote 31 provides additional detection information. 
44 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

21. There are many tables based on varying agent-surface-environmental conditions

listed in the NBC Detection Guide published by HQ AFCESA, 21 on March 2003. These 

tables are based on static weather conditions throughout the entire hazard duration listed;

uncertainty in actual hazard durations lies with real-time variance in these conditions. 

22. Air bases use primarily alkyd- or polymer-based paints, including latex, epoxy,

polyurethane, and acrylic. Each paint, including Chemical Agent Resistant Coating 

(CARC), exhibits unique characteristics in different situations. These include the 

diffusion and transport of the agents across the surface, the vapor evaporation rates based 

on the wetted surface area, the rate at which agent penetrates the surface as a function of 

time, the transferability of agent from the painted surface to materials that contact the

paint surface (dependent on the two surfaces, the type of agent, and type of contact), and 

the rate at which agents off-gas after they are sorbed into the paint. The USAF does own 

some CARC-painted equipment; however, the CARC-painted vehicles (usually operated

by Security Forces) have not received the maintenance necessary to maintain CARC’s

anti-absorbent capability. 

23. For additional information, please refer to AFMAN 10-2602, NBCC Defense

Operations and Standards, Interim Change, 23 May 2003, Attachment 2. 

24. See note 11.

25. Based on compilation of results of 8 air bases from the Operational

Effectiveness Assessment studies, which include the completed analysis of operations at 

15 USAF installations. 

26. Restoration of Operations (RestOps) Advanced Concept Technology

Demonstration (ACTD): RestOps was a collaborative initiative between United States

Pacific Command (PACOM), United States Central Command (CENTCOM), United 

States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), United 

States Forces Korea (USFK), United States Air Force (USAF), Defense Threat Reduction

Agency (DTRA), West Desert Test Center (WDTC) at Dugway Proving Ground (DPG),

Detachment 1, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (Det 1, AFOTEC), Joint 

Service Materiel Group (JSMG) (Joint NBC Defense Program), Joint Service Integration

Group (JSIG) (Joint NBC Defense Program), Center for Counterproliferation Research, 

National Defense University (NDU), Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), 

Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Joint Program Office - Biological

Defense (JPO-BD), Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and the Department of Energy 

(DOE). The Air Force was the lead service and DTRA was the executing agent. 

As written in the March 2000 Management Plan, the RestOps ACTD was designed

to demonstrate mitigating actions taken before, during and after an attack to protect

against and immediately react to the consequences of a Chemical/Biological attack. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 45

These actions aim to restore OPTEMPO in mission execution and the movement of

individuals and materiel to support combat operations at a fixed site. 

27. See note 25. 

28. VLSTRACK training sessions were conducted at each MAJCOM Orientation 

C-CW CONOPS training (Jan 02 – Dec 02). CW and Biological Warfare (BW)

VLSTRACK checklists were provided as handouts to walk the student through the 

plotting sessions. 

29. Three years of analysis and testing, sponsored by AF/XON, the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency, the Joint Service Materiel Group, and the Navy Surface Warfare 

West Desert Center at Dahlgren, provided a greater understanding of chemical effects on 

air base operating surfaces. 

30. The M17A/A2 Decontamination Apparatus provides the user with a portable

decontaminating capability. The system consists of a pump/heater assembly, two spray

wands, each with 20 meters of high pressure hose, 12 shower points, 10 meters of suction

hose with filter, and an injector for chemical decontaminant. T.O. 11D1-3-9-1, 11D1-3-9-

2, and 11D1-3-9-1CL-1 are the technical references. 

31. While serious deficiencies still exist, the Air Force fielded two improved 

chemical agent detectors over the past decade. The additions were the Improved 

Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) and the M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and

Alarm (ACADA). The ICAM’s primary enhancements over the original Chemical Agent 

Monitor (CAM) were the ability to automatically switch scales from nerve to blister and

the ability to provide an audio alarm when a specified concentration (3 bars) was 

achieved. The M22’s primary enhancement over the M8A1 is the ability to

simultaneously detect nerve and blister agents; the M8A1 was a nerve agent only 

detector. 

32. The issue surrounding Air Force-wide IPE supply requirement shortfall is

gaining attention by the USAF, as noted in the 2003 Annual Report to Congress Vol I,

April 2003. This document may be referenced for further information on this topic. 

33. The issues listed are the main issues and do not represent the full spectrum of 

issues requiring further attention. For additional reading on such issues, documents such

as: AFMAN 10-2602 Paras 1.18; AFJMAN 44-151 –NATO Handbook on Medical

Apects of NBC Defense and Operations; AFMAN 44-156(I) – Treatment of Biological

Warfare Agent Casualties. 

34. AFMAN 32-4005, Personnel Protection and Attack, 30 October 2001, HQ

AFCESA/CEXR, Tyndall AFB, FL. 
46 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations

35. The M291 Skin Decontaminating Kit provides the user capability to completely 

decontaminate through physical removal, absorption, and neutralization of chemical 

agents on the skin. This wallet-sized kit contains six separately packaged laminated pads

soaked with the nontoxic decontaminant AMBERGARD XE-555. Ambergard absorbs 

and neutralizes chemical agent. M291 pads are to be used to wipe skin, clothing, masks, 

gloves, personal equipment, and weapons. The six pads of an M291 kit should be 

sufficient for three personal decontaminations. The kit operates in ranges from -50°F to

120°F. Technical Order (T.O.) 11D1-1-131 is the technical reference. The M295

Equipment Decontamination Kit allows the individual to decontaminate their equipment 

through physical removal and absorption of chemical agents. Each M295 Kit consists of

a carrying pouch containing four individual decon packets. Each packet contains a decon 

mitt filled with decon powder. The packet is designed to fit comfortably in the pocket of 

the ground crew ensemble. Each individual mitt is comprised of absorbent resin 

contained within a nonwoven polyester material. The kit operates in ranges from -25°F 

to 180°F. TM-3-4230-235-10 is the technical reference.

36. Per AFMAN 44-156 (I), Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties. 

37. Contained in Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 32-4005, CE Readiness Technician’s

Manual for NBC Defense.

38. AF/XOS-FC website. On-line, Internet, available from https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/

xos/xosf/xosfc/.

39. Reference Attachment 2 of AFMAN 10-2602, NBCC Defense Operations and

Standards, and Attachment 13 of AFMAN 32-4005, Personnel Protection and Attack 

Actions. 

40. Air Force installations are required to include a section on responding to

situations where the air base is in the downwind hazard plume of an RDD in Annex C of 

their Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Plan 10-2. This requirement is specified in 

Attachment 3 of AFI 10-2501, FSTR Planning and Operations. 
Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations . . . 47

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538)
48 . . . Counter-WMD Concepts of Operations