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24–602 PDF 2005

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: BUILDING A

LAYERED AND COORDINATED APPROACH TO

BORDER SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE 

AND BORDER SECURITY

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 15, 2004

Serial No. 108–51

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, MississPpi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

STEPHEN DEVINE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

THOMAS DILENGE, Chief Counsel and Policy Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MARK T. MAGEE, Democrat Deputy Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY

DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman 

KAY GRANGER, Texas, Vice Chairwoman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST ISTOOK, Oklahoma 

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

JOHN SWEENEY, New York 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex officio 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JIM TURNER, Texas, ex officio

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border 

Security ................................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Infrastructure 

and Border Security ............................................................................................. 11

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland Security .... 20

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 16

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Washington ....................................................................................................... 21

The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 13

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 22

The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona .................................................................................................... 18

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Indiana .................................................................................................... 15

WITNESSES 

Panel I 

Chief David Aguilar, Tucson Sector Border Patrol Chief, Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8

Mr. Victor X. Cerda, Acting Director of Detention and Removal Operations, 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of 

Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

Panel II 

Mr. T.J. Bonner, President, National Border Control Council 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 43

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 45

Dr. James Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland 

Security, Heritage Foundation 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26

Mr. Randel K. Johnson, The United States Chamber of Commerce and 

Americans for Better Borders 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 32

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 34

Mr. Sergio Ugazio, Secretary, Local 1944 National INC Council, American 

Federation of Government Employees 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48

(1)

HEARING ON PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: 

BUILDING A LAYERED AND COORDINATED 

APPROACH TO BORDER SECURITY. 

Tuesday, June 15, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE

AND BORDER SECURITY, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., in Room 

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Camp, Dunn, Smith, Diaz-Balart, Shadegg, Souder, Sanchez, Dicks, Slaughter, Jackson-Lee, and Turner. 

Mr. CAMP. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Infrastructure and 

Border Security hearing will come to order. Today’s hearing is on 

Protecting the Homeland: Building a Layered and Coordinated Approach to Border Security. This hearing will examine the level of 

cooperation within the Department of Homeland Security in preventing terrorists and others from entering the United States illegally. 

Today, we will hear from two panels. Panel I is Mr. Victor Cerda, 

Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. 

David Aguilar, Tucson Sector Border Patrol Chief, Bureau of Customers and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security. 

Panel II is Dr. James Carafano, Senior Research Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation; Mr. 

Randel K. Johnson, Vice President for Labor, Immigration and Employee Benefits at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Mr. T.J. 

Bonner, President of the National Border Patrol Council, AFL–

CIO; and Mr. Sergio Ugazio, Secretary for the National INS Council Local 1944 of the American Federation of Government Employees. 

Thank you all for your participation. We have agreed at this 

meeting among the members to waive all opening statements in 

order to provide sufficient time for both panels and for questions. 

Members may submit their opening statements for the record. The 

record will remain open for 10 days after the close of the hearing. 

We will divide the hearing time with 1 hour for each panel. 

I would now recognize Ms. Sanchez to offer her welcome to the 

witnesses. 
2

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. 

Thank you again to all of our witnesses for coming before us today. 

I think this is one of the most important topics that we have on 

our subcommittee to explore. Once again, in the interests of time 

because I know we have a long agenda, I welcome and I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

We will begin with panel I. I want to again welcome Mr. Victor 

Cerda and Mr. David Aguilar. We will ask you to briefly summarize your statement in 5 minutes or less. You may begin. 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR X. CERDA, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 

ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. CERDA. Good morning, Chairman Camp and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. My name is Victor Cerda. Currently, I am the Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of the 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It is my privilege to 

appear before you to discuss our agency’s immigration enforcement 

efforts. 

ICE is the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, charged with the mission of preventing terrorist and 

criminal activity by targeting the people, money and materials that 

support terrorists and criminal organizations. In that mission, U.S. 

immigration and customs laws are among our most important enforcement tools. Our goal in enforcing these laws is to restore integrity to our nation’s immigration system. The key to this effort 

is prioritization. We attack the most critical threats first. 

Our first order of business is to address the serious threats to 

our communities and our nation posed by violent criminal aliens, 

individuals with possible terrorist associations, fugitive alien absconders, and sexual predators. We are getting results. Since 

March 2003, ICE has removed more than 85,000 criminal aliens 

and we expect to exceed last year’s numbers. Similarly, ICE has 

been involved in several cases regarding foreign nationals who 

posed a threat to our national security, such as the case announced 

yesterday regarding Mr. Abdi. 

Under DHS, ICE combines the once separate legal authorities 

and law enforcement resources of the former INS and the U.S. Customs Service to create a more powerful enforcement agency. For example, we have combined resources from both agencies to develop 

a unified smuggling division, enabling us to hit smuggling organizations of all kinds much more effectively. Likewise, the financial 

investigation capabilities we gained from Customs, housed in Cornerstone, our comprehensive economic security initiative, allows us 

to more effectively follow the money trails that support smuggling, 

criminal and terrorist organizations. 

All of these tools were brought together in Operation ICE Storm, 

an ICE interagency task force we launched last year in Phoenix, 

Arizona in response to a violent crime wave led by rival smuggling 

gangs. ICE brought our expertise in human smuggling, weapons 

and drug trafficking, and money laundering investigations into a 

partnership with other stakeholders at the Arizona border, includ-
3

ing Customs and Border Protection, to disrupt and dismantle these 

smuggling organizations. Since we launched ICE Storm, we prosecuted more than 190 defendants for human smuggling, kidnapping, money laundering and weapons and drug violations, and we 

have seized over $5.2 million. 

This is just one example of how we work with other agencies to 

better coordinate our efforts in this new homeland security mission. 

We are also working with our counterparts at CBP, Custom and 

Border Protection, in efforts to construct a unified enforcement 

front at the Arizona border, for example. We are strengthening relationships with state and local law enforcement through a variety 

of innovative initiatives. We have developed groundbreaking agreements with law enforcement agencies in Florida and Alabama to 

delegate immigration enforcement authorities to state officers, providing us with a valuable force multiplier on the frontlines of law 

enforcement. 

ICE is also deploying our information-sharing assets such as the 

Law Enforcement Support Center, to provide our partners at the 

federal, state and local levels with timely and accurate immigration 

information to aid in enforcement. In March alone, for example, the 

LESC fielded over 60,000 calls from law enforcement and placed 

over 2,100 detainers on aliens. Finally, our Compliance Enforcement Unit is a valuable tool for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information on immigration violations, drawing on the data 

from national databases. 

With each of these initiatives, we are working towards restoring 

and maintaining integrity in our immigration system, ensuring 

that a potential vulnerability is sealed from those who would do us 

harm. Mr. Chairman, today I focused on only a small part of what 

ICE contributes to the coordinated effort to secure our borders and 

homeland. With the enforcement and investigative capabilities of 

ICE it has brought together, and by working with our colleagues 

at the federal, state and local levels, we have developed an effective 

new approach to border security and immigration enforcement. 

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and 

members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Cerda follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTOR X. CERDA

I. INTRODUCTION 

Good morning, Chairman Camp and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

My name is Victor Cerda, currently I am the Acting Director for Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It is my 

privilege to appear before you to discuss the immigration enforcement mission of 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). I am here today to testify you 

because of my knowledge and professional role both with the former INS and currently with ICE. Over the course of the last year, I have been in several different 

leadership positions including the Acting Chief of Staff, Principal Legal Advisor, 

Special Counsel to the Assistant Secretary and currently, the Acting Director of Detention and Removal Operations. These positions have provided me with the Operational and Administrative knowledge needed to testify before you today. As the 

largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE is 

charged with the mission of preventing terrorist and criminal activity by targeting 

the people, money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal organizations. 
4

One of our key objectives within that larger mission is to detect and address 

vulnerabilities in our border security. 

We know that criminal and terrorist organizations have exploited—or attempted 

to exploit—gaps and vulnerabilities in our border and our immigration systems to 

gain entry to our country. With ICE’s enhanced ability to investigate both immigration and customs violations, we are uniquely positioned to enforce our homeland security missions in ways never before possible. Our nation’s immigration laws are 

among our most important law enforcement tools in that effort.

II. ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES 

ICE’s goal in enforcing these laws is to restore integrity to our nation’s immigration system. The key to this effort is prioritization—systematically attacking the 

most serious threats first. Specifically, ICE has made the apprehension and removal 

of dangerous criminal aliens and national security threats our top enforcement priority. This is not to suggest that ICE does not fully and consistently enforce the law 

in other situations. It is simply to suggest that our first order of business is to address the serious threats that individuals with possible terrorist associations, fugitive alien absconders, violent criminal aliens, sexual predators, and others pose to 

our communities, our families, and our nation. Our objective is to strategically target our resources and authorities on the most dangerous aliens in order to remove 

them from the streets before they can do harm. 

It’s a strategy that is getting results. Since March 1, 2003, ICE’s Detention and 

Removal Office (DRO) has removed more than 85,730 criminal aliens and we expect 

to exceed last year’s numbers. The DRO has more than 18 fugitive absconder teams 

across the nation and has created a ‘‘Most Wanted’’ list of the most dangerous criminal aliens, which has been a valuable tool for generating tips and leads. From the 

original list, nine of the ten were captured within a few weeks, and the tenth was 

determined to have already left the country. Under ICE’s ‘‘Operation Predator,’’ 

which targets pedophiles, child sex tourists, and child pornographers we have arrested 3,023 child sex predators who exploit children for pleasure or profit. Approximately 40 percent of the predators we’ve arrested under this program have entered 

the United States illegally, while an additional 20 percent have been visitors who 

have violated the terms of their visa by either overstaying or violating the terms 

of their visas.

III. BACKGROUND 

ICE was formed on March 1, 2003, by combining the investigative, detention and 

removal, and intelligence arms of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the former U.S. Customs Service, including Customs’ Air and Marine 

Operations (AMO), along with the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Federal 

Air Marshal Service (FAMS). Prior to being restructured as part of the Department 

of Homeland Security, the INS was a ‘‘dual mission’’ agency, responsible for granting citizenship services and benefits to new arrivals to our country while being simultaneously responsible for enforcing immigration law. This dual mission resulted 

in difficulties for the agency, which often struggled with the challenge of how to best 

execute two missions that did not always complement one another. The reorganization into DHS, which split the dual INS missions into separate agencies, was a commitment on the part of our government to help our people better execute the missions with which they have been charged. 

While our sister agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), focuses its attention on providing immigration services, ICE is a law enforcement 

agency. By combining the once separate legal authorities and law enforcement resources of the former INS and former Customs, we have created a more powerful 

enforcement agency better capable of dealing with ICE’s legacy agencies’ jurisdictions. 

Consider, for example, ICE’s creation of a unified smuggling division. Prior to our 

reorganization into DHS, enforcement authorities for drug and contraband smuggling were the province of the Customs Service, while enforcement authorities for 

human smuggling were the exclusive province of INS. Unfortunately, criminal 

smuggling organizations are less fastidious in their division of labor. Motivated by 

profit and profit alone, they might move drugs one day and human ‘‘cargo’’ the 

next—shifting their tactics in response to demand, profit margins, and enforcement 

patterns. By combining these two units, we can now hit these organizations much 

more effectively, whether they are trafficking in drugs, weapons, or illegal aliens. 

Moreover, with the financial investigations capabilities we gained from legacy 

Customs, ICE is now able to follow the money trails that support these criminal 

smuggling organizations more effectively than ever before. Under Cornerstone, our 

comprehensive financial investigations initiative, ICE has the ability to follow the 

money trails that support smuggling, criminal, and terrorist organizations. We know 
5

that criminal and terrorist organizations must earn money to fund their ongoing operations, and we also know that they move and store that money through a variety 

of illicit schemes. With Cornerstone, we bring to bear one of the most sophisticated 

financial investigations shops in law enforcement to detect these financial schemes, 

disrupt the flow of money, and put these organizations out of business. These enforcement abilities help disrupt the illegal aliens ability to access the United States 

by using these criminal smuggling organizations.

IV. COORDINATED/COOPERATIVE EFFORTS 

All of these tools were brought to bear in one of our agency’s most striking successes: ‘‘Operation ICE Storm,’’ an initiative we launched last year in Arizona. Over 

the course of several months, our agents and their state and local counterparts in 

the Phoenix area began to track increasing and alarming levels of violence related 

to human smuggling operations. Rival smuggling gangs were engaging in violent 

confrontations and bloody shootouts in and around the metropolitan area. The victims were not only gang members. In some cases, the human beings who were the 

smugglers’ ‘‘cargo’’ were kidnapped and held for ransom, sexually assaulted, or simply executed outright in order to deny profit to rival gangs. 

In response to this violent crime wave, ICE assembled ‘‘Operation ICE Storm,’’ an 

interagency task force to combat violent crime in the Phoenix metropolitan area. We 

brought our expertise in human smuggling, drugs, weapons smuggling, and money 

laundering investigations into a comprehensive partnership with other stakeholders 

at the Arizona border, with the specific goal of disrupting and dismantling the operations of these smuggling organizations. We saw rapid results. Since we launched 

‘‘ICE Storm,’’ we’ve prosecuted more than 190 defendants for human smuggling, kidnapping, money laundering, and weapons and drug violations. We’ve seized over 100 

weapons and over $5.2 million. Every time we confiscate an assault weapon or a 

bundle of cash from these criminal organizations, and every time we trace back and 

shut down one of their funding streams, we make it harder for these criminals to 

conduct business. Furthermore, our efforts are producing additional positive results. 

For example, the Phoenix Police Department credits ICE Storm with a 17 percent 

decline in homicides and an 82 percent decline in migrant-related kidnappings in 

the final quarter of 2003. These decreases are a direct result of ICE’s ability to coordinate resources and combined authorities to disrupt the alien smuggling organizations along the border to improve immigration enforcement. 

Moreover, in this new homeland security mission we are working more effectively 

with our counterparts in the federal government—notably Customs and Border Protection (CBP), our partners at DHS—as well as with state and local law enforcement agencies in a coordinated effort to leverage our law enforcement capabilities. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s recently introduced Arizona Border Control 

(ABC) initiative, for example, builds upon the success of Operation ICE Storm. In 

this new initiative, ICE, working in conjunction with CBP and other federal, state, 

and local agencies, is aggressively applying the pressure of immigration laws, antimoney laundering laws, and other federal and state statutes to deprive smuggling 

organizations of their funding, disrupt their operations, and dismantle their organizations, both in the United States and abroad. We are working closely with our 

partners at CBP, combining our investigative and detention resources, expertise, 

and authorities to construct a unified enforcement front at the Arizona border, to 

fight illegal immigration and its associated criminal activity.

V. COORDINATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 

ICE is also committed to working more effectively with our counterparts at the 

state and local levels, particularly in tracking down alien absconders. ICE is acutely 

aware of the critical role state and local law enforcement plays in the broad homeland security mission. Officers at the state and local level are not only the first responders when there is an incident or attack against the United States, but, also, 

during the course of their daily duties they may encounter foreign-born criminals 

and immigration violators who pose a threat to our national security or to public 

safety. Recognizing that critical role, ICE partners with state and local law enforcement agencies nationally and locally through a variety of arrangements to enhance 

the overall effectiveness of our collective law enforcement efforts and our joint ability to protect the homeland. 

For example, ICE’s Institutional Removal Program targets criminal aliens who 

are serving sentenced in federal and state jails, to ensure that, upon their release, 

these aliens are taken directly into ICE custody for deportation from the United 

States—before they can be released into the community. Obviously, the success of 

this program depends upon communication, coordination, and cooperation with 

other agencies, to ensure that criminal aliens cannot exploit this potential gap. This 

fiscal year alone, ICE has removed 28,109 criminal aliens through this program. 
6

ICE is also fostering innovative new relationships through our 287(g) program, 

which recognizes a role in immigration enforcement for state and local law enforcement. Under the terms of Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, sec. 113, Sept. 30, 

1996), Congress has authorized ICE to enter into written agreements with state and 

local authorities to define the full extent of this partnership. A state or local law 

enforcement agency works with ICE to develop a Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU), which details each party’s specific responsibilities under the agreement. 

Once this agreement is in place, ICE provides officers with a five-week training program in immigration issues, and provides supervision and support for state and 

local officers engaged in immigration enforcement. We see this as a valuable ‘‘force 

multiplier’’ program for more effective immigration enforcement. These authorities, 

which are initiated by the states or local jurisdictions, are currently in effect in Florida and Alabama.

VI. INFORMATION-SHARING 

ICE also maintains a number of powerful information-sharing tools that we use 

to provide critical feedback to our federal, state, and local counterparts in the field. 

Our Forensic Documents Laboratory (FDL), for example, is a critical investigative 

tool in the battle against immigration fraud, the only federal crime laboratory dedicated almost exclusively to the forensic examination of documents. The lab is staffed 

365 days a year to provide a full range of services to law enforcement agencies, including handwriting analysis, foreign and domestic document examinations, fingerprint analysis, and training in the detection of fraudulent documents. Another key 

ICE asset, the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), maintains a vast store of 

information related to immigration, which we provide to state and local law enforcement when appropriate. In fiscal year 2003, the LESC responded to nearly 600,000 

queries, an increase of over 175,000 from the previous fiscal year. These phone queries allow ICE to place detainers or detention holds on illegal aliens who may be 

in the custody of local law enforcement based on information that they may receive 

from the phone query. The FDL and LESC are just two examples of how ICE is 

providing critical information and training services to our state and local law enforcement partners, contributing to officer safety, community safety, and national 

security. 

Finally, ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) is a valuable tool for collecting, gathering, and disseminating information on immigration violators. The 

CEU examines data from several databases—the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 

(NSEERS), and the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status and Indicator Technology 

program (US-VISIT). Through analysis of the databases, the CEU identifies possible 

immigration violators and assigns these cases to ICE investigators for action. Since 

its creation in June 2003, the CEU has vetted tens of thousands of leads compiled 

from these databases. Many of these leads have resulted in the arrest of individuals 

with egregious criminal convictions.

VII. CONCLUSION 

Mr. Chairman, today I have focused on just a few of the immigration enforcement 

capabilities that ICE contributes to the DHS effort to secure our borders and homeland. The United States has always welcomed with open arms those who would 

enter our nation by legal means. Our nation’s great diversity, and our willingness 

to accept newcomers from all around the world, strengthens our freedoms and our 

prosperity. At the same time, ours is a nation of laws and we are responsible for 

targeting those who would exploit vulnerabilities in the border and immigration systems to illegally enter the United States. By aggressively enforcing our immigration 

laws and targeting criminal aliens, we seek to deter criminal and terrorist organizations who threaten our way of life, and we seek to strengthen the legal immigration 

process for worthy applicants. With the expansive enforcement capabilities and innovative investigative techniques that ICE has brought together, our agency is 

uniquely positioned to protect our homeland. By working with our colleagues at the 

Federal, state, and local levels, we have developed an effective new approach to border security and immigration enforcement. By taking a proactive approach to preventing future terrorist attacks and criminal activity, ICE will continue to align our 

investigative priorities with the critical role of protecting our homeland. 

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the men and women of 

ICE, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Aguilar, you have 5 minutes. 
7

STATEMENT OF DAVID AGUILAR, TUCSON SECTOR BORDER 

PATROL CHIEF, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you and good morning. Chairman Camp, 

Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished subcommittee members, it is an honor to have the opportunity to appear before you 

to discuss the level of cooperation within the Department of Homeland Security, specifically through the operations and law enforcement initiatives of the United States Border Patrol in preventing 

terrorists from entering and remaining in the United States. 

My name is David Aguilar and I am currently the Chief of the 

Tucson Sector Border Patrol. It has now been over a year that immigration inspectors and U.S. Border Patrol agents from INS, agricultural inspectors from the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, and customs inspectors from the U.S. Customs Service merged 

to form the U.S. Customs and Border Protection within the Border 

and Transportation Security Directorate at DHS. With a unified 

presence, focus and determination, we have combined our skills 

and resources to be far more effective than as separate agencies. 

The mission of CBP’s Border Patrol is to provide homeland security along our nation’s borders between our ports of entry, patrolling and securing over 4,000 miles of international land and water 

border with Canada, and 2,000 miles of international border with 

Mexico. We also patrol roughly 2,000 miles of coastal waterways 

surrounding the Florida Peninsula and Puerto Rico. 

We work hand in hand with CBP officers to inspect people and 

cargo entering the country through ports of entry. While the priority mission of the Border Patrol is to detect and prevent terrorist 

weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the 

United States, we still take on our traditional missions of interdicting illegal immigrants, drugs, currency and other contraband. 

Historically, major Border Patrol initiatives such as Operation 

Hold the Line in El Paso, Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, and 

Operation Rio Grande in our McAllen Sector have had great border 

enforcement impact on illegal migration patterns along our nation’s 

southwest border. 

Today, new DHS initiatives such as the Arizona Border Control 

Initiative will continue to have a significant affect on illegal migration. These initiatives have sought to bring the proper balance of 

personnel, equipment, technology and infrastructure into areas experiencing the greatest level of cross-border illegal activity on the 

southwest border. Efforts have been established and are being improved upon to build better liaison with agencies across the southwest and northern borders of the United States. 

One example is our participation with the Integrated Border Enforcement Team with Canada. Another, similarly, along the southwest border with Mexico, are our Border Patrol–Mexico Liaison 

Units, which have worked to achieve the same goals. The program 

has already achieved successes with the cooperation between the 

two countries on issues such as information-sharing, cooperative 

enforcement efforts, and border safety initiatives, to name a few. 

Shortly after the transfer of the Border Patrol into CBP in March 

of 2003, it was recognized that CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of Investigations would need to coordinate closely 
8

on transferring the Border Patrol’s anti-smuggling units to ICE’s 

Office of Investigations in order to properly address various administrative and operational issues. A working group consisting of CBP 

and ICE representatives undertook efforts to transfer the administrative functions of our anti-smuggling units to ICE’s Office of Investigations. It also addressed operational issues related to roles 

and responsibilities between the Border Patrol and ASUs. This was 

a critical step in organizing the relationship between the Office of 

Investigations and the Office of Border Patrol in that it ensured coordination of operations, as well as the sharing of information and 

intelligence, by clearly outlining roles and responsibilities. 

A resulting joint CBP and ICE memorandum accomplished the 

goals. It was signed by Commissioner Bonner and ICE Assistant 

Secretary Michael Garcia on April 14, 2003 and was immediately 

disseminated to respective field offices. This effort is but one major 

component of a mutual, ongoing and very comprehensive effort to 

appropriately link and create what we call a synergistic foundation 

for enforcement between DHS interdiction and investigations agencies. 

Another important area is the area of detention issues. On the 

southern border, detention of illegal aliens from Mexico is short in 

duration, as a majority are given the opportunity to voluntarily return to Mexico. Long-term detention is required of aliens that fall 

into specific types of categories. These categories include criminal 

aliens other than Mexicans, other than Canadians, asylum seekers, 

and since 9–11, special interest aliens. If an alien requires longterm detention, it is standard operating procedure to turn the alien 

over to ICE’s detention and removal operations branch after the 

alien has been initially processed by Border Patrol. 

As the chief patrol agent of the Tucson Sector, I can offer a fresh 

perspective about collaborative efforts by DHS, non–DHS, and 

state and local and tribal agencies under the Arizona Border Patrol 

Initiative. This initiative began on March 16,2004 and brought together an unprecedented working relationship among various federal, state and local agencies to include the tribal Tohono O’Odham 

Nation. There are a number of operations that are happening out 

there where our people are working very closely together. 

Mr. Chairman, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very complex, 

sensitive and difficult job, which historically has presented immense challenges. The challenge is huge, but one which the men 

and women of the United States Border Patrol face every day with 

vigilance, dedication to service and integrity. I would like to thank 

you again, Mr. Chairman, and the entire subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony, and for your past support of 

CBP and the Department of Homeland Security. 

I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you might 

have at this time. 

[The statement of Mr. Aguilar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID AGUILAR

Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Distinguished Subcomittee 

Members, it is my honor to have the opportunity to appear before you to discuss 

the level of cooperation within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), specifically through the operations and law enforcement initiatives of the United States 

Border Patrol, now a component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
9

in preventing terrorists from entering and remaining in the United States. My name 

is David Aguilar, and I am currently the Chief of the Tucson, Arizona Sector, CBP 

Office of the United States Border Patrol (OBP). I would like to begin by giving you 

a brief overview of our agency and mission. 

It has been over a year now that Immigration Inspectors and the U.S. Border Patrol from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Agricultural Inspectors 

from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and Customs Inspectors from the U.S. Customs Service merged to form the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) within the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate 

of the Department of Homeland Security. With a unified presence, focus and determination, we have combined our skills and resources to be far more effective than 

as separate agencies. 

The mission of CBP’s Border Patrol is to provide Homeland Security along our 

Nation’s borders, between ports of entry, patrolling and securing 4,000 miles of 

international land and water border with Canada and 2,000 miles of international 

border with Mexico. We also patrol roughly 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida Peninsula and Puerto Rico. We work hand in hand with CBP 

Officers, who inspect people and cargo entering the country through ports of entry. 

While the priority mission of the Border Patrol is to detect and prevent terrorist 

weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States, 

we also interdict illegal immigrants, drugs, currency and other contraband. 

Historically, major Border Patrol initiatives such as Operation Hold the Line, in 

our El Paso Sector, Operation Gatekeeper in our San Diego Sector, and Operation 

Rio Grande in our McAllen Sector have had great border enforcement impact on illegal migration patterns along the Southwest Border. Today, newer DHS initiatives, 

such as the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABC) will continue to have a significant effect on illegal migration. These initiatives have sought to bring the proper 

balance of personnel, equipment, technology and infrastructure into areas experiencing the greatest level of cross border illegal activity on the southwest border. 

Efforts have been established and are being improved upon to build better liaison 

with agencies across the southwest and northern borders of the United States. One 

example is our participation with the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 

(IBETs) with Canada, whose mission is to enhance border integrity and security at 

our shared border by identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or are engaged in other organized 

criminal activity. Some of our northern border IBET resources are collocated with 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), ICE and other law enforcement agencies. 

Similarly, along the southwest border with Mexico, Border Patrol Mexican Liaison 

Units have worked to achieve the same goals. The program has already achieved 

successes with cooperation between the two countries on issues such as information 

sharing, cooperative enforcement efforts, and border safety initiatives to name a 

few. 

Shortly after the transfer of the Border Patrol into CBP in March of 2003, it was 

recognized that CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of Investigations (ICE/OI) would need to coordinate closely on transferring the Border Patrol’s Anti–Smuggling Units (ASUs) to ICE/OI in order to properly address various 

administrative and operational issues. A working group consisting of CBP and ICE 

representatives undertook efforts to transfer the administrative functions of ASU to 

ICE OI, but it also addressed operational issues related to roles and responsibilities 

between the Border Patrol and the ASU. This was a critical step in organizing the 

relationship between ICE/OI and CBP/OBP in that it ensured coordination of operations, as well as the sharing of information and intelligence—by clearly outlining 

roles and responsibilities. 

The resulting joint CBP and ICE memorandum accomplished these goals. It was 

signed by CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner and ICE Assistant Secretary Michael 

Garcia on April 14, 2003, and was immediately disseminated to respective field offices. It will optimally enhance the security of our nation’s borders. This effort is 

but one major component of a mutual, ongoing comprehensive effort to appropriately 

link and create a synergistic foundation for enforcement between DHS interdiction 

and investigations agencies. 

Another important area is on detention issues. On the Southern Border, detention 

of illegal aliens from Mexico is short in duration, as the majority are given the opportunity to voluntarily return to Mexico. Long-term detention is required of aliens 

that fall into specific types of categories. These categories include criminal aliens, 

Other Than Mexican (OTM) or Canadian, Asylum Seekers, and since 9/11, ‘‘Special 

Interest Aliens’’ (SIA’s). 

If an alien requires long-term detention, it is standard operating procedure to 

turn the alien over to ICE’s Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) Branch, after 
10

the alien has been initially processed by OBP. The long term detention of SIA’s is 

critical due to the fact that these aliens are from countries that have been deemed 

by the Department of Homeland Security as countries of interest since 9/11 due to 

the possibility of links to terrorist activities from a particular SIA country. Both 

CBP and ICE are continuously working together to ensure that no SIA, or aliens 

identified as a danger to the American public are released. 

As the Chief Patrol Agent of the Tucson Sector, and I can offer a perspective of 

our collaborative efforts by DHS, non–DHS, and state, local, and tribal agencies 

under the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABC). This initiative began on March 

16, 2004, and brought together an unprecedented working relationship among various federal, state, and local agencies to include cooperation with the Tohono 

O’Odham Nation. 

This effort includes co-locating ICE and CBP units to expedite the transition from 

interdiction to investigations. Through the coordination center of the Arizona Partnership of the Southwest Border HIDTA, other law enforcement agencies will support the ABC targeted areas with upcoming collaborative enforcement operations, 

targeting criminal enterprises involved in cross border incursions. 

Transportation hubs at Tucson and Phoenix airports are being staffed by personnel from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), ICE, and CBP. Information and intelligence gathered at these hubs is fed into the ABC intelligence 

task force and made available to all appropriate BTS and law enforcement partners. 

ICE/Air and Marine Operations (AMO), and CBP/OBP Air Operations are cooperatively scheduling flights to maximize available air assets in targeted areas. Members of the Border Patrol Search and Rescue Team (BORSTAR) and the Border Patrol Tactical Team have been assigned to AMO flights for interdiction and rescue 

operations. 

Increased cooperation for access to public lands has been coordinated with Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture entities. This cooperation ensures that the best interest of enforcement and the protection of our natural resources are maintained. Joint enforcement efforts are also being conducted with the 

National Park Service. 

Nationally, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very complex, sensitive and difficult 

job, which historically has presented immense challenges. The challenge is huge, but 

one which we face everyday with vigilance, dedication to service, and integrity. I 

would like to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and the entire Subcommittee, for the 

opportunity to present this testimony today, and for your past support of CBP and 

the Department of Homeland Security. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you might have at this time.

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. Thank you both for your statements. We will now go to questioning. Members will be recognized 

and the 5-minute rule will apply. 

As you are aware, Mr. Cerda, there was more disturbing news 

yesterday involving Al-Qa‘ida operatives living in the United States 

and their plan to attack an Ohio shopping mall. I think it is important to point out the indictment involved in that came out as a result of an arrest some months ago on basic immigration and document fraud charges. Could you describe how the day-to-day investigative and enforcement functions of the Immigration and Customs enforcement unit impact our ability to fight terrorism here at 

home? 

Mr. CERDA. Yes. The arrest which was announced yesterday I 

think first demonstrates the important partnership the Department of Homeland Security has with the Department of Justice. I 

also think it highlights the importance of the unique immigration 

enforcement authorities which are encompassed in DHS in our efforts to thwart potential acts of terrorism. 

ICE investigators form the largest partnership with the FBI in 

our national joint terrorist task forces and serve as a critical component in ongoing investigations throughout the country day to 

day. As part of that membership, we are constantly looking, whether it is criminals using the customs enforcement authorities we in-
11

herited, or again as in the abdicates, utilizing immigration enforcement authorities to remove a potential threat from the streets of 

America. That is exactly what happened. 

It is a good example, where based on information of a potential 

threat in Thanksgiving weekend, ICE agents working through the 

JTTF took action, apprehended the individual, detained him and 

placed him into removal proceedings, during which time as we proceeded with the administrative procedures, the JTTF was also able 

to continue working its criminal investigation which was announced yesterday. So again, it is a day-to-day effort that we have 

using the important immigration enforcement authorities, using 

our customs enforcement authorities, and partnering with the Department of Justice. 

Mr. CAMP. Could you both comment on the structure in DHS and 

the division of responsibilities in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and how that either helps or hurts our ability to 

apprehend and prosecute terrorists in the United States? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things 

that has come about as we became DHS and that strengthens the 

ability of all the enforcement entities within DHS is the ability to 

integrate intelligence, interdiction efforts and investigative efforts. 

By that, I mean the following, in that we are now able to integrate 

a lot of the intelligence databases that in the past were not necessarily shared in the most effective and efficient means possible. 

Today, there is not only the integration of databases, but there is 

also the collaborative effort. There are co-location of offices of say 

for example Border Patrol and investigative assets. As an example, 

in Tucson, Arizona we have ICE investigators co-located and working side-by-side with Border Patrol agents, side-by-side with TSA 

assets at the airports. 

Then of course we have opportunities to work with the FBI 

through JTTF and other agencies that are heavily involved in the 

defense of our nation. It is this collaborative effort, these integrated 

databases that are built into the structure that have facilitated, 

and in fact I believe have greatly enhanced our opportunities to 

thwart any kind of terrorist activity against our country. 

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Aguilar, can you discuss the status of the 

geospatial tracking program on the southern border that is being 

developed in El Paso and how that is linked to the larger integrated border intelligence system? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, sir. At the present time, as I said, I am the 

Chief over in Tucson so I am not totally familiar with the 

geospatial program that is being worked on in El Paso, but I have 

been briefed on it. Basically what that geospatial program will be 

doing for us is give us a situational awareness of what is happening on the border close to real time. In addition to that, it will 

of course be able to articulate where the resources are and actually 

define the threat based on threat assessments done by a multiple 

agency picture that will be drawn up as a part of this program out 

there. 

Mr. CAMP. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Sanchez may inquire. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you both 

for being here. 
12

I have a question about the way your agencies work together 

now that you are under the same agency. Let’s say that ICE knows 

that there is a direct shipment coming across Nogales or someplace 

like that, and you want to have a controlled delivery, where you 

allow the shipment to go through so that you see where it ends up 

and maybe you catch the big fish, rather than just the person 

bringing the drugs over. How do you coordinate with the Border 

Patrol? 

I have been told by a lot of guys down on the border that, especially from ICE, that when you are trying to work together, that 

that is not happening, that things are being caught at the border 

instead or the delivery is being stopped, rather than this ability to 

let it go through and control it and figure out where it goes. I want 

to find out from both of you, do you think that you are actually 

working together in those kind of situations or that you are actually impeding each other from getting that kind of work done? 

Mr. CERDA. As Chief Aguilar here noted, one of the key elements 

that we have at the border with the presence of the Border Patrol 

there, but in addition the alien smuggling units that work handin-hand with the Border Patrol, we have taken the transition, and 

given the importance of this integration, of that mission and of the 

situations he noted, to be able to control the deliveries of individuals to come in and try to determine whether there is a large organization behind that. 

We have worked and focused on the transition of the ASU units 

that previously were with the Border Patrol stations. That involves 

working and looking at the logistical aspects of it, too, to include 

the controlled deliveries, the staging at the border. We will continue to be working on that until it is perfected. We believe we are 

on the right track there. While you may have occasionally a situation of communication, locally we are working together; nationally, 

again, we have these working groups up here to ensure that such 

situations do not occur so that our law enforcement mission is not 

impeded. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Cerda, your answer was a little complicated, 

I did not really did not get a ‘‘yes, we are working well together, 

and most often when we ask for a controlled delivery it actually 

gets past the border and we are able to try to track it down,’’ or 

‘‘no, we have instances where this is being impeded.’’ What is the 

answer to that? 

Mr. CERDA. The answer is yes, we are working together. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you would say the majority of when you call for 

controlled deliveries, it is happening. 

Mr. CERDA. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. When you call for controlled delivery, can the Border Patrol say no to you? How is it that you are working with that? 

Mr. CERDA. It is a mutual understanding because the Border Patrol has an important mission at the border. Both of our missions 

need to be in sync. Clearly, if there is a situation that arises that 

may impede effective enforcement at the border, it is an issue that 

needs to be discussed. We have to prioritize among ourselves, 

among the DHS mission, which one takes priority. It is case by 

case. If that situation does arise, it does arise and it is handled at 

a high level out there at the local sectors with the SAC offices in 
13

ICE, their counterparts, or if necessary elevated to the national. 

But frankly, I have not seen that point arise to that point of bringing a case up at the national level. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And then for the Chief I have a question, because 

your Border Patrol works 24 hours a day. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I think ICE works 9 to 5. 

Mr. CERDA. I would correct that. We are available. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are 24 hours now? 

Mr. CERDA. ICE is 24/7. The law enforcement mission exists 24/

7 and we respond. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Because I hear a lot from the Border Patrol that 

they get some of these people that have no documents to be in our 

country and they have to release them because your people are not 

around. Can you both comment on that? Is that happening? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Let me speak for Tucson. First of all, as the Chief 

of the Tucson Sector, which as you probably know? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. A great city. My family is from there. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, a great city. I completely agree, a great state, 

but it is the most active area that we have in the country right 

now, specifically the cross-border illegal incursions out there. In 

Tucson, we work very closely with ICE. We do not have a major 

problem in any kind of response from ICE to Border Patrol requirements for any kind of support, whether in the area of detention or 

removal, or response to apprehensions or working collaboratively 

with some of the other law enforcement agencies out there. 

There are situations where we will mutually support each other. 

If ICE cannot respond to a call out, for example, from a police department, they will in fact call us and we will respond for them, 

and vice versa. In fact, there will be times when we do not have 

units available say, for example, in Phoenix or in that area to respond for a law enforcement call out. Then, we will call upon them 

and they will typically get out there. It is a good working relationship. It has worked tremendously in Tucson and we are still continuing to build on that. 

I would like to get back to the issue of cross-border passthroughs, if you will. In Tucson, again, as the Chief in Tucson, as 

the most active sector in the nation for narcotics trafficking, we 

work very closely with ICE and the DEA on those situations when 

there is a request and/or requirement from ICE investigators to 

run a load like that through the border. We work closely with SAC. 

The special agent in charge and the Chief have joint agreements 

at the local level that facilitates any of those situations when that 

type of request comes through, in collaboration of course with DEA 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office also. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. Your time has expired. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Ms. Granger may inquire. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. Cerda, you have in your remarks that since March 1, 2003 

ICE has removed more than 85,730 criminal aliens, and you expect 

to exceed that this year. Give me an idea of how that number compares to before ICE was created. Also, give me a profile of who 
14

these people are, where they are found, how long they have been 

there, and that sort of thing. 

Mr. CERDA. The numbers historically have been increasing. I believe you will see a continuing increase under DHS in terms of our 

focus on criminal aliens. The criminal aliens are identified whether 

it is at the POE at the borders or in the interior through the Criminal Apprehension Program, through the Fugitive Absconder Program, or through again the Institutional Removal Program. 

One of the key changes we are making in ICE is to refocus the 

Institutional Removal Program which is a program that works at 

the state facilities, the penal institutions there, identifying people, 

criminal aliens who are amenable to removal while they are serving their sentence, so that at the point of their completion of that 

criminal sentence, they are amenable and already available for removal. It is a way of identifying them early in the process and ensuring that any threats to the community are avoided by taking action immediately upon their release and taking them into ICE custody, and then effectuating their order of removal. 

Again, by this refocus over here, elevating the program, the Institutional Removal Program in detention and removals, I believe you 

are going to be seeing increased numbers, increased efficiencies in 

our capability of identifying criminal aliens. 

Ms. GRANGER. When you said ‘‘they are amenable,’’ do you mean 

they agree to it? I do not understand that process. 

Mr. CERDA. Sometimes we have to go through an immigration 

proceeding where they can seek some forms of relief before the immigration judge, notwithstanding their criminal convictions. So if 

they are granted relief, they would not be removed. They would be 

subject to release at that point in time. So we still have a burden 

to prove under the Immigration Act, to establish the grounds of removability, as well as have an order issued by a judge. 

Ms. GRANGER. Recently, I was able to get some funding for the 

APHIS fingerprinting system for some smaller towns in the 

metroplex. They showed a demonstration of it, and I was so impressed. In one case, literally in a matter of about 5 seconds, they 

went through all the database which would have taken, they said, 

2 1/2 weeks doing it by hand. Are you part of the APHIS system? 

Mr. CERDA. Biometrics is essential throughout the Department of 

Homeland Security. That is one of the changes that has been implemented, is the focus on IDENT–APHIS and the use of data not 

only internally within DHS, but also connecting to the Bureau, 

their wants and warrants system, too, so that again at the POEs 

or when we apprehend an individual, we have the capability of 

running the biometrics and at the same time not only identifying 

immigration violations, but seeing that they are wanted in so-andso state or wanted by the U.S. Marshall Service. We are all part 

of that, and biometrics is going to be a bigger part of our enforcement efforts. 

Ms. GRANGER. Do I still have some time? Mr. Aguilar, recently, 

I think it was in April, there was a town hall meeting in Houston. 

I got some reports of it. There, there seemed to be a question about 

rounding up illegal aliens. The statement was made that, no, we 

are not going to do that; we do not round up illegal aliens; there 
15

is no problem here. Can you give me some more information about 

what happened at that meeting? Are you familiar with it? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Unfortunately, I am not familiar with that meeting. As I said, I am the Chief over in Tucson. But I can tell you 

that these roundups or sweeps, as some people refer to them, are 

not occurring. The Border Patrol focuses its efforts very specifically 

on cross-border illegal incursions in what we refer to in Tucson, for 

example, as a compressed zone of enforcement, where our interdiction efforts are on the immediate border and the primary purpose 

is not only to apprehend what does get across, but also to present 

a high-visibility, high-profile deterrence presence to keep these people from crossing. That is our main focus. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I understand. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Mr. Souder may inquire. 

Mr. SOUDER. I have a couple of questions. From testimony that 

we have had on the border, in Arizona often it is the seventh time 

that somebody has picked up before they are detained longer-term. 

In El Paso, Texas, I think the testimony was twelve. At what point 

when a person commits an illegal activity coming into the United 

States as an illegal alien is it considered a criminal offense? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The question is for me? Yes, a criminal offense basically occurs when the individual crosses into the United States 

for the first time. The criminal prosecution of that individual for 

illegally coming into the United States without inspection has certain thresholds that vary in different parts of the country. They 

vary due to the U.S. Attorney’s capacity to actually handle that 

workload out there. They do work closely with us. And then we 

have in certain areas of the country geographic focuses or focuses 

on criminal activity, for example, that endangers people, not only 

the immigrants, but also the communities where they are crossing. 

Those thresholds, we work hand-in-hand with the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office. In Tucson right now, it will vary anywhere from nine to 

twelve times for prosecution purposes. Of course, anytime that a 

criminal alien is apprehended, then prosecution thresholds drop 

tremendously. 

Mr. SOUDER. I think it is important for both this subcommittee, 

the United States Congress and the American people to realize that 

we can talk about border enforcement and making secure borders, 

but your agents are going to be so discouraged if we do not provide 

the law enforcement to back that up, because what you just said, 

nine to twelve times, and that is assuming we catch them, which 

most people are not caught. That is very demoralizing to the agents 

on the border who work, who take risks, who get shot at, as the 

ranger was killed in Oregon, and then find that it takes nine to 

twelve times to find somebody prosecuted means that we do not 

have enough resources to adequately address this problem in numerous ways. That is very significant testimony. 

Let me ask another thing. Every single state along the southwest 

border, California, New Mexico, Arizona and Texas, I have heard 

from agents of both of your agencies saying that it ranges anywhere from $4,000 to $12,000, you can get a package that in 7 days 

will guarantee you in the United States if you are a Central American or Mexican citizen; anywhere from $25,000 to $40,000 if you 
16

are Middle Eastern. It will guarantee you safe passage or you get 

your money back. 

What are we doing to address those networks? Would that be primarily an ICE function? Why isn’t that a particular heavy focus, 

particularly if we are watching in the homeland security question 

the terrorism question? Are we looking for flyers, for advertising? 

Is the Mexican government helping us? Are the Caribbean islands, 

if they are coming from that direction into the networks? Because 

this is a huge, almost openly defiant challenge to our border security. 

Mr. CERDA. We share the concerns that the smuggling organizations do pose to our national security. Clearly, by the amounts of 

fees that you cited, which are pretty accurate, smuggling is now 

more of a criminal organization endeavor, given the profits that are 

there. One thing we are doing now under DHS, now not only do 

you have the traditional alien smuggling expertise and authorities 

that we had under INS, but we are also utilizing our Customs enforcement authorities, particularly the money laundering aspects, 

the money laundering authorities that we have inherited. 

ICE Storm, for example again, there are not only using our traditional alien smuggling approaches, the intelligence, but we are also 

going after the organizations and their resources. We are going 

after them and trying to identify them through their exchange of 

funds across the border internationally. Once we go across the border, that is where we work internationally with the governments. 

We also have our international attaches out there. But that is a 

new focus, a new approach, not only going after the individuals 

being smuggled, but going after the organizations, in particular 

their resources, their funding, to try to dismantle them not only locally here in the United States, but also as well as overseas. 

Mr. SOUDER. Will we do a deprogramming as we pick up people 

to ask them how they are coming in? What context, the advertising, to try to get access to the flyers or the packages and the networks? 

Mr. CERDA. Yes. That, again, is not only within ICE, but that is 

something we share closely with the Border Patrol. They are the 

eyes and ears out there at the border. They have the interactions. 

We also do similar debriefings in our detention and removal operations offices to identify potential, again, third country national 

risks that are going across the border that we have apprehended 

interior; or also looking at the intelligence that we gain from our 

own investigations, sharing that, setting up systems so that there 

is more communication within ICE as well as across the Bureau. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. 

And now Mr. Dicks may inquire. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chief Aguilar, what is the legal authority for Border Patrol to 

conduct interior enforcement of civil immigration law? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The Border Patrol can operate anywhere within 

the United States under Section 287 and 235 of the INA. We have 

the authority to approach any individual who we believe to be in 

the country illegally. 

Mr. DICKS. I raise this point just because 2 weeks ago the Border 

Patrol engaged in street sweeps and checkpoints in Ontario, Cali-
17

fornia, a city which is east of Los Angeles, well away from the 

U.S.–Mexican border. The Border Patrol has also been helping ICE 

with some interior arrests that involve a large number of aliens on 

the southwest border. We were under the impression that you had 

said that the Border Patrol was not involved in sweeps. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Right. The Border Patrol, again sir, concentrates 

its efforts along the nation’s borders, but we can operate by statute 

anywhere within the United States. In working with either ICE or 

any other law enforcement agencies, in collaboration with them in 

the interior, there are occasions when we will unify with them. For 

example, in Phoenix right now, we operate at the Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport in a high-visibility, high-profile deterrence posture out 

there, and we will make arrests out there. We do not conduct 

sweeps, residential or anything of that nature. 

Referring to the operations that you mentioned of about a week 

ago, there were no checkpoints conducted. The only other thing 

that I would add to that, again this happened within San Diego 

Sector. I am not completely familiar or intimate with those operations. But we do not conduct sweeps. We do work hand-in-hand 

with state and local law enforcement agencies in conducting operations relative to the criminal aspects of either human smuggling, 

narcotics smuggling or any other type of quality of life issues that 

a police department will concentrate on. 

Mr. DICKS. Who would you say is in charge of interior immigration enforcement? 

Mr. AGUILAR. That is one of the issues that are being worked out 

right now between CBP and ICE. The interior enforcement as it 

stands now is actually in the purview of ICE, with collaborative efforts with CBP when it is necessary. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Cerda, would you agree with that? 

Mr. CERDA. I would agree with that. I also note that there are 

collaborative efforts. Clearly, we are one Department and where 

there are major enforcement initiatives, we use all Department resources to include, again, ICE supporting CBP at the border or conversely CBP supporting ICE in the interior. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield to the Ranking 

Member. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Dicks very much. 

I have a question because going back to this issue of the Ontario 

sweep, and I realize that you are over in the Arizona area, but that 

did occur. It not only occurred there, but it occurred in my area of 

Santa Ana, California just last Thursday. So we are trying to figure 

out, many members, where we see these sweeps going on. What do 

you mean when you say you do not conduct a sweep? I do not know 

if you know the details of the Ontario situation, but what would 

you say that was, and who would you say has jurisdiction over 

doing something where Border Patrol and others come into a neighborhood, a shopping area, let’s say, and start to ask people for their 

papers? What is that called if that is not a sweep? 

Mr. AGUILAR. First of all, let me begin by saying the operation 

last week was in fact an intelligence-based operation that was conducted due to numerous telephone contacts and phone calls from 

the local police departments on quality of life issues that were occurring within those areas of operation. 
18

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you are telling me that local law enforcement 

in Ontario called you and said, hey, we have problems over here? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. In the areas that the Border Patrol presence 

was at, yes, ma’am. That is my understanding of it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are you telling you that my Santa Ana police 

chief, in order for you all to come into Santa Ana and do what you 

did on Thursday, my Santa Ana police chief, Chief Walters, who 

does not even want you guys in town, called you up and said please 

come? 

Mr. AGUILAR. I cannot speak to Santa Ana. I am not familiar 

with that one. The one I was referring to was the one that I was 

briefed on. That was Ontario, I believe, was one of the locations. 

That is the only one that I am familiar with. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you know of any other reason why your Border 

Patrol or anybody else would come and do this type of thing, other 

than local law enforcement calling and saying please come in? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Intelligence-based operations where there is intelligence that criminal activity is occurring, that there is a need for 

us to respond out there. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chief. 

Mr. DICKS. I was under the impression that ICE was doing intelligence work? Do you still do intelligence work? I thought that was 

moved from you over to ICE. That is not true? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The intelligence responsibility was moved over to 

ICE, but intelligence-gathering, analysis? 

Mr. DICKS. It is part of the deal. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Everybody does it. Every law enforcement department does intelligence, especially the operations. 

Mr. DICKS. Are you rebuilding your intelligence capability now 

that it was transferred over to ICE? 

Mr. CAMP. I will let you answer that question, and the time is 

expired, and we will go on to another. 

Mr. AGUILAR. By intelligence, I am referring to tactical intelligence. 

Mr. DICKS. My time is up. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Mr. Shadegg may inquire. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome Chief Aguilar. We have worked with him a lot 

in Arizona. I have been down to the border with him a number of 

times. I appreciate your being here. 

Mr. Cerda, today both of you are putting forward a very happy 

face. Things are going well. The agencies are working well together. Quite frankly, I understand that, but it seems to me the 

purpose of this hearing is for us to figure out how we can help the 

situation. By dint of my experience on the border in the past and 

my experience on the border since the creation of the new Department, I am disinclined to believe that everything is hunky-dory and 

that the agencies are working well together. 

What can you tell me, as concrete examples of things that are 

working well, and can you give me some examples of things that 

are not working well with the new integrated Department? 

Mr. CERDA. The concrete examples, again, and paramount is the 

focus on immigration enforcement that previously did not exist 
19

under INS. It was a split mission there. So that is definitely working and I think we are seeing the results. Focus at the border, on 

border enforcement, extending the border, and at the same time in 

terms of investigations, focus on immigration enforcement, plus the 

additional use of the tools that Customs enforcement now brings to 

us, the customs investigations, the money laundering aspects. That 

is going to be a new positive aspect that we have under DHS that 

I believe will continue to produce better results. 

Clearly, as we transition, and it is still in early transition, I will 

be the first to say, at DHS, that we will continue to identify issues 

that previously under one umbrella at INS were coordinated 

through internal policies, revisitation of those policies, identifying 

where we can enhance them, the fact that they existed in the past, 

we are still taking a new eye to everything to see whether in fact 

this does now go in accord with the DHS mission, does it fit the 

BTS’s overall enforcement picture strategic goals. 

That is where we are going. We identify issues. As we have mentioned, the ASU issue, we are working towards that because previously under one umbrella, it was with the Border Patrol station. 

Now, with the different roles that we have here, we add the focus, 

consolidate the expertise, but clearly there are going to be some instances where there are going to be coordination issues that arise. 

Frankly, the answer to that is coordination and leadership within 

DHS, communication consistently. We are seeing the benefits of the 

cross-sharing of intelligence that is being gathered. It is not only 

within BTS, but also as part of DHS’s IAIP Office, and hopefully 

we will gain really effective intelligence that will assist us in targeting our limited resources towards those critical missions that 

exist. 

Mr. SHADEGG. With regard to your relationship with Border Patrol, are there any areas that are not going as well as you think? 

Or is there anything that this Congress could do to facilitate the 

relationship and coordination between ICE and BCDS? 

Mr. CERDA. On that point, clearly, as was mentioned, there is 

some frustration at times with respect to the inability to get a prosecution, similarly, with respect to the ability to continuously detain 

everyone that is apprehended. We have resources that we have to 

manage and prioritize. That requires constant communication at 

the local level. We continue to do that. One of my hats that I wear 

as Acting Director of Detention and Removals, and I have heard at 

times locally some frustration with the inability to detain everyone, 

but at the same time I think nationally, as well as locally, it is understood we are an enforcement mission. Clearly, we want to be as 

effective as possible, but we also have to manage within our resources. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Chief Aguilar, what would you cite? 

Mr. AGUILAR. I would say that things are working very well, 

again speaking from the perspective of Arizona, Tucson specifically. 

One of the great successes we have had out there is in fact the Arizona Border Control Initiative, which takes in the ICE’s ICE Storm 

operation in Phoenix. The mutually supportive effort of all the BTS 

entities of the state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, are 

working together out there, working collaboratively from all aspects of the enforcement field, primarily intelligence, interdiction 
20

and investigation. All of those agencies coming together, sharing 

the information, and applying their resources in a very focused 

manner has made some tremendous impacts out there. 

Mr. SHADEGG. There were some pay-grade issues that existed 

when the two were melded together. ICE had a different set of paygrades and steps and how you move through the steps, versus Border Patrol. Can you describe what those issues were and have they 

been resolved, or are they being resolved? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Within the Border Patrol, all of our journeyman 

agents are now GS–11s, which was one of the points that you refer 

to. That has been resolved. All of our Border Patrol agents are now 

GS–11s. The investigators that used to be under Border Patrol 

have now changed over to ICE, and I believe, and I will let Mr. 

Cerda speak to that, but I believe that has also been addressed. 

Mr. CERDA. We did have a disparity with respect to the Customs 

investigator journeyman level and the former INS journeyman 

level, and that has been now consolidated. They have journeymen 

level 13 and that addressed that issue. 

Mr. SHADEGG. And the line agents are happy with that? 

Mr. CERDA. I believe so, yes. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. AGUILAR. GS–11s across the board, yes, sir. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner may inquire. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate both of you 

being with us today. 

I wanted to take this opportunity to mention an item that I do 

not expect either of you to respond to, but I wanted to mention that 

as I think we are all aware, ICE has had some budget and financial problems. As you recall, there was a suggestion that there was 

$1.2 billion shortfall which led to a hiring freeze in the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Although I think it was 

later explained to be an accounting error, but our staff, the Democratic staff, has received numerous reports regarding efficiencies in 

the financial management of the Bureau. I have requested by letter 

dated yesterday that the Inspector General of the Department conduct an audit of the financial management of the Bureau. 

Specifically, some of the reports indicate that there may be potential violations of the Anti–Deficiency Act, which is the federal 

law that prevents an agency from over-obligating appropriated 

funds. So I have requested that the Inspector General conduct an 

audit of the federal financial management system at ICE, as well 

as to look at the larger budget issues, particularly any potential 

violations of the Anti–Deficiency Act. I wanted our witnesses to be 

aware of that, that that request had been made. 

One of the issues that I think I heard raised earlier in some of 

the questions was this issue of how are you making progress in integrating a lot of these databases. I believe Chief Aguilar made reference to that. More specifically, one of the reports that we have 

received on our staff as we visited the southwest border and talked 

to some of the folks at ICE and at Border Patrol, what we find is 

that Border Patrol, ICE and CBP are using different country of interest lists. As you know, those are the lists that identify citizens 

from countries that present a possible terrorist threat. It seems to 
21

me that this was something that long ago should have been harmonized. 

So I would like to ask perhaps Mr. Cerda, are you aware that 

your agencies’s work off different countries of interest lists? And if 

so, how many countries are on each of the lists and where do we 

get the lists from? Are we taking any steps to make sure that all 

of our DHS agencies are working off the same country of interest 

list? It seems like a very basic fundamental effort that should have 

been long since coordinated. 

Mr. CERDA. I am not aware of us working off of different types 

of lists here. Our intelligence is coordinated, particularly when it 

comes to intelligence regarding potential threats arising from certain countries, through the Department, through the Administration, through T–TEC, and also in coordination with the Bureau. I 

am not aware of separate disparate country lists out there. I can 

tell you that we do at the POEs and in the interior, queries off the 

same databases, particularly the IBIS checks that we fun, which 

serves as a feed. We do those queries. We also look at the basic 

data that we have where we can enter any terms of watch areas 

of concern. Again, the intelligence units within ICE, the intelligence-gathering at CBP, and again in coordination with IAIP is 

aimed at producing intelligence that is uniform across the board, 

based on what is available out there. But my short answer is that 

I am not aware of? 

Mr. TURNER. If you do not mind, follow-up on that, because that 

information was provided to us in our visits to the southwest border. If that is occurring, obviously it needs to be fixed. I would appreciate if you would follow up and finding out if we are correct on 

that, or did we get bad information. 

Mr. CERDA. I will do that. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Ms. Dunn may inquire. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, 

thank you for being with us today. 

I wanted to ask you a question about the Arizona Border Control 

Initiative. It is being referred to as a model actually for the coordination among agencies. I am wondering how this is working; how 

we can encourage and create incentives for this sort of partnership 

in other parts of the country. I am from Washington State and we 

have the Canadian border that we share with other states. I am 

wondering how much the success of ABC depends on the priorities 

of the leadership who are involved. I am wondering also how you 

work with the communities, the farmers for example, or the ranchers down there, and how they feel about our progress. Could you 

talk a bit about ABC please? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am. Again, I am the Chief down there in 

Tucson, and as the Chief, Under Secretary Hutchinson also named 

me as the integrator for the BTS entities within Arizona out there. 

As the integrator, the rest of the special agents in charge and BTS 

entity heads work collaboratively in order to primarily have a mission focus. In our case, it is kind of broad, and that is cross-border 

interdiction of anything coming across that border illegally. 

One of the things that we do in support of that is focus our resources, our finite resources. As an example, AMO, air and marine 

interdiction units now, for example, have Border Patrol agents as 
22

back-seaters, as we call it, in those air and marine helicopters to 

augment our Border Patrol flights across that border, both for an 

interdiction and deterrence posture out there. In addition to that, 

we work very closely with the Department of Interior, the Department of Agriculture, to broaden our ability to operate on publicly 

managed lands, something that in the past posed a real challenge. 

We work hand-in-hand with the tribal nation out there, with their 

police departments. Some of the main players out there are the 

state, local and other federal non–BTS entities that now focus their 

enforcement efforts under their own statutes and jurisdictions, on 

the criminal organized smuggling groups that are working in that 

area. 

So taking everything from intelligence, interdiction and investigation and cohesively applying those enforcement efforts, we have 

made some tremendous impacts out there. As an example, if you 

would allow me to quote just one. In the Tohono O’Odham Nation, 

for example, there has been a reduction of over 83 percent of abandoned vehicles since the Arizona Border Control Initiative began. 

That is a tremendous number, because abandoned vehicles translate to smuggling capacity for narcotics and aliens out there. 

One other of them that I will quote very quickly is that prior to 

the commencement of the Arizona Border Control Initiative, there 

was an average of two to five high-speed pursuits within that area 

of operation. Since we began, we are now down to one or two a 

week. So again, those are some of the impacts that have been made 

by that collaborative effort. 

Outreach to the community out there is constant. That is one of 

the major things that we do, to the Native American Nations out 

there, to the ranchers out there, so that they know how we are operating, what the rationale is, what the deployments are, and especially the impacts. And they have seen the benefits of that collaborative efforts among all the BTS and other federal agencies out 

there also. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Ms. Jackson-Lee may inquire. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the Chairman very much. 

It is interesting, to the gentlemen that are here, one thing that 

we noted in the Homeland Security Committee is the overlapping 

jurisdiction of a number of committees, and the ability of the 

Homeland Security Committee to focus. I serve on the Judiciary 

Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, and I have 

had the opportunity to have Mr. Garcia before me. The interest 

that I think we all have is how do we collaboratively and cooperatively secure our borders, both north and southern border. An issue 

that I am working on, and I would pose this question to you, the 

backdrop of the issue is that on the southern border, from where 

I come from, Texas, many of the individuals coming into the United 

States are obviously economic opportunists, if you will, or people 

who are seeking greater opportunity from what they consider a 

devastating economy. So it is a difference in what I would perceive 

to be the threat, though we know that the borders being open, 

opens the doors to many different types of threats. 
23

Would you be kind enough to elaborate on what you think the 

distinction is in terms of securing the border when you are dealing 

mostly with economic entrants? What kind of resources are needed 

in that vein? 

The other question that I would offer is that I have authored legislation dealing with helping stem the tide of smuggling. One aspect of it is a law enforcement tool that has been very effective, and 

that is a rewards program in order to get the large smugglers and 

to encourage those who may be victims to provide information. Any 

experience that you may have with that concept? I would appreciate your answers on both of those. 

Mr. AGUILAR. I will take the one on the border, northern and 

southern. As the Border Patrol deploys its resources out there on 

the southern border, one of the things that we concentrate on is because of the element of flows of illegal immigration into the country 

through there, is what we call in Tucson basically reducing the 

flow, reducing the flow in those areas so that the real criminal, the 

terrorist, the potential weapons of mass destruction can be addressed by those enforcement assets once they are deployed and 

that flow is reduced out there. 

Essential to reducing that flow out there, of course, and key, are 

going to be the Border Patrol agents that are being deployed out 

there. In addition to that is the force-multiplier effect of the infrastructure and technology that is being deployed out there literally 

as we speak. The continual building of accessibility to the border, 

mobility upon the border, the remote video surveillance cameras we 

are deploying out there, the sensors, the aerial platforms, all of 

those things combined bring together the components that will reduce that clutter and give us greater operational control of that 

border. By operational control, I am talking about knowing what is 

coming at our border and within a reasonable amount of time being 

able to interdict, confront, interview, detain, arrest or turn back 

that threat that has just crossed that border. 

On the northern border, the threat remains the same, that potential incursion by people coming into this country with either a 

means or a desire to do harm to our country. The fortunate thing 

on our northern border is we do not have the elevated flow. That 

is where the technology and the infrastructure plays a much bigger 

part on that northern border. Our ability to have eyes and ears out 

there, not necessarily human, but electronic or technology-wise to 

again have that operational control. 

So the means by which we are looking to gain that operational 

control remains the same. It is just the flow that is different out 

there, again, reducing that flow. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. What happens when we have new initiatives 

and new programs, and we take intelligence officers and experts 

away from one area and put them in another area. Does that 

maybe increase the enforcement in one area, but decrease it in another? Would you suggest that we need more resources to balance 

out the needs, particularly in intelligence-gathering, which is part 

of what my smuggling legislation focuses on; that when you are 

able to pierce a smuggling operation, the more information you get 

to talk about what others exist, the more helpful you are. And if 

you can get it for those who are victims, it is very helpful. What 
24

happens when you move one from the other? It is like borrowing 

from Peter to pay Paul. Isn’t it necessary to provide more resources 

in order to gather the intelligence and enforce evenly, not only on 

the southern border, but on the northern border, which is very 

large as well? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely. Intelligence-gathering capabilities, analytical capabilities and evaluative capabilities are absolutely essential to any enforcement operation out there. The force-multiplier effect that we got when we came together as DHS is that all of those 

agencies that before literally stovepiped a lot of the intelligence, 

that intelligence is now melding out there. It is melding because 

all these agencies have access to all of these databases that we 

spoke about previously. So we have magnified our intelligence capabilities, both gathering, analytic and evaluative. More work 

needs to be done in that area, and of course the human aspect, the 

personnel is a big part of that, yes, ma’am. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. The time has expired and the 

time for this panel has concluded. I want to thank you, Chief 

Aguilar and Mr. Cerda, for your testimony today. I appreciate your 

being here. 

Now we would call panel II: Dr. James Carafano, Mr. Randel 

Johnson, Mr. Bonner and Mr. Ugazio. Please come forward. 

Welcome and thank you for being here. We will begin each of you 

on 5 minutes to summarize your testimony. Why don’t I start with 

Dr. Carafano? Thank you. 

STATEMENT JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW, DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE 

HERITAGE FOUNDATINO 

Mr. CARAFANO. I will submit a statement for the record. I would 

like to just make a few opening comments to briefly put those in 

context. I will use my best New York speed to get through that. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Mr. CARAFANO. The Heritage Foundation has taken a strategic 

approach to looking at the area of homeland security. My particular background is in the area of strategy and history, and that 

is how I approach this issue. I think there are a lot of lessons in 

that respect that we can learn from the Cold War. The Cold War 

was a long, protracted conflict. I think this will be a long, protracted conflict. I think when Eisenhower became President, he 

really kind of set the strategy for the entire Cold War. I think that 

there is a lot we can learn from that. 

He really said we need three things. He said you have to have 

some security. You have to have some combination of offense and 

defense. That is exactly right. The Homeland Security Department 

is an important part of the defense. You also have to have continued economic growth. The whole notion of protracted strategies is 

you want to grow and flourish while you hound the enemy into history. You want to be strong and then have the resources to provide 

the security. 

The third thing is you have to protect civil liberties and privacy, 

because that is really the foundation that allows you to function 

and allows you to compete. You really need to do all three simultaneously. It is not really a question of tradeoffs. I think that is a 
25

very appropriate strategy for this war. I think it is a great measure 

to look at what we are doing in all our areas of homeland security. 

If you do not have solutions that provide all three, security, economic growth and privacy, you really have the wrong answer. 

I think no issue is more appropriate than the issue of border security. I think that you cannot have a border security strategy that 

also does not incorporate just border control, but it also have to be 

holistic in looking at it, maritime security, immigration, 

transnational transportation security, and the transnational supply 

train. The victory of border security is not just on the border. I 

think no issue is more important than that, than immigration. I do 

not think there is a solution to immigration that looks specifically 

at border control. If you do not have a comprehensive answer that 

includes immigration enforcement, workplace enforcement addressed as quotas, economic development in Latin America, international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and really look at 

the economic consequences of all these programs, I simply do not 

think you can address this in a strategic way. 

In my opening statement, I have suggestions for a number of initiatives, but in a sense what they all are is helping contribute, I 

hope, to a more holistic approach to this. I think, for example, if 

you notice a lot of my recommendations do not deal with border security per se, but they are more in areas that in the strategy talk 

about critical missions of domestic counterterrorism and intelligence and early warning. I think in some respects, you get a lot 

bigger bang for the buck in terms of enhancing border security by 

looking at those areas. 

I would just like to point out very quickly that I have great respect for what the Department of Homeland Security has done. I 

think it is an enormous challenge that they face. I think the Congress in many respects has provided the right legislative foundation for addressing border security issues. I think that DHS has 

been responsible in the sense that a lot of things that they have 

done is really trying to take a crawl, walk, run approach to these 

things, and look at the implications in terms of security, economic 

development, civil liberties, as they look at programs. Things like 

the Arizona Border Initiative, the way they have approached looking at UAVs on the border, I think these are the right approach 

to test things out, to experiment, do trial and error. And then from 

them, broaden, because I think that is the only way you develop 

programs that are going to be sustainable over the long term. 

Just the final point I would like to make, very briefly. I looked 

at this issue for 2 years now in some depth, and I just do not know 

how you really adapt a strategic approach to this problem unless 

you can create within the Congress oversight in a central committee that can really look across the board at these issues. My 

background is in defense. Could you imagine if we had a Department of Defense that was being supervised by 88 committees? 

What kind of defense structure or national security strategy would 

we have? 

I think, particularly in the area of border security, I do not think 

we are ever going to achieve a holistic approach, which I think is 

the only way we are ever going to see quantum improvements in 

border security, unless we can consolidate oversight in the commit-
26

1The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating 

under Section 501(C)(3). It is privately supported, and receives no funds from any government 

at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2003, it had more than 200,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2003 income came from the following sources: 

Individuals 52%

Foundations 19%

Corporations 8%

Investment Income 18%

Publication Sales and Other 3%

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 5% of its 2003 income. 

The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the national accounting firm of 

Deloitte & Touche. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position 

for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 2 In addition, 28 countries are part of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, allowing their citizens 

to enter the U.S. for 90 days without a visa. For a list of countries and program details, see 

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, ‘‘Visa Waiver Program (VWP),’’ 

attravel.state.gov/vwp.html (October 16, 2003). 3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened as an 

Antiterrorism Tool, GAO–03–132NI, October 2002, p. 6. 4Steven A. Camarote, The Open Door: How Militant Terrorists Entered and Remained in the 

United States, 1993–2001 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, 2001), p. 19. 

tees in the House and the Senate. I think, for example, the committee’s effort in drafting an authorization is a great example of that. 

Some of the suggestions that I have, that is just a perfect approach 

for implementing some of those things, is through a well-crafted 

authorization bill. I do not know how you get a good authorization 

bill for the Department of Homeland Security by having it authored in multiple committees. 

With that, I will end my statement. 

[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO

Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members, I am honored to testify before 

the committee today.1 National efforts to enhance the security of the goods, people, 

and services that everyday cross the thousands of miles of land borders and tens 

of thousands of miles of coastline ringing the United States are a vital component 

of protecting the homeland. In my testimony, I would like to reaffirm the importance of this task as an essential component of the national homeland security strategy, assess the progress that has been made so far, make the case for further initiatives that will help create a more sustainable and integrated approach to protecting 

the flow of human and material capital transiting America’s borders, and suggest 

some additional building blocks for creating a national system of systems for protecting the nation from transnational terrorist threats as well as other criminal and 

environmental dangers that may be carried through the crossroads of global commerce and travel. 

The Terror War’s Front Line 

There are four reasons why border security must remain an essential element of 

national security. 

• First, in the global war waged by terrorists, visas can be deadly weapons. One 

ready means available to enemies wishing to enter the United States is the nonimmigrant visa, which can be obtained from any of the 211 American consulates 

around the world.2 Travelers holding nonimmigrant visas represent the overwhelming majority of individuals entering the U.S. Nonimmigrant visas are 

ideal for supporting attacks that require brief or repeated trips to the United 

States. In fact, all of the September 11 hijackers entered the United States in 

this manner. The 19 terrorists received a total of 23 visas from five different 

consular posts over a four-year period.3 Terrorists can also enter the United 

States through the permanent immigration system, obtaining a ‘‘green card’’ to 

live in the country or become a naturalized citizen. One study of 28 known militant Islamic terrorists found that 17 of them were in the country legally, either 

as permanent residents or as naturalized citizens.4 The prevalent use of iden-
27

5 U.S. General Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal Activity,

GAO–02–830T, June 25, 2002, p. 7. 6 U.S. Department of Justice, The Potential for Fraud and INS’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks 

of the Visa Waiver Program, Inspection Report I–99–10, March 1999. 7The potential for diseases to spread rapidly is increasing. There are number of factors driving this trend including the growth of global trade that spreads diseases, the rise of pathogens 

resistant to antibiotics and other antimicrobial drugs, demographic changes, population growth 

and migration, and deteriorating public health infrastructure worldwide. Executive Office of the 

President, Office of Science and Technology, National Science and Technology Council, Global 

Microbial Threats in the 1990s (September 13, 2000) p. 2, at www.ostp.gov/CISET/html/3.html.

See also George Fidas remarks before the International Disease Surveillance and Global Security Conference, Stanford University, Stanford, California, May 11–12, 2001, p. 8; David F. Gordon, et al., The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States

(Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2000), passim. 8David Pimentel, et al., ‘‘Environmental and Economic Costs Associated with Non-Indigenous 

Species in the United States,’’ June 12, 1999, np, at www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Jan99/specieslcosts.html. 9The maritime sector is a preferred option for drug smugglers, as well as the smuggling and 

trafficking of people. The voluntary or involuntary movement of people across national boundaries has become the world’s fastest growing criminal activity and its continued growth will ensure its prominence in the future maritime environment. U.S. National Intelligence Council, 

Growing Global Migration and its Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, March 2001). In addition, drug smuggling frequently employs noncommercial vehicles such as small, fast, private boats with concealed compartments capable of 

storing 30–70 kilograms of material and delivers payloads over the shore rather than using conventional port facilities. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Measuring the Deterrent Effect 

of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991–1999 (August 2001), p. 1. 10For an introduction to just-in-time supply management, see B. Modarress and Abdolhossein 

Ansari, Just-in-Time Purchasing (New York: The Free Press, 1990). 

tity theft and false travel documents makes the current system particularly vulnerable to abuse. In 2001, officials at border crossing points seized over 100,000 

falsified documents. Over 50 percent of these documents were border crossing 

cards, alien registration cards, and fraudulent visas and passports.5 Such materials have been used by terrorists. For example, one of the perpetrators of the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing entered the country with a doctored passport.6 Thus, intelligence is critical not only to keep suspected terrorists from legitimately obtaining and using passports, but also to prevent them from easily 

using falsified documents to travel into the United States. 

• Second, infectious diseases,7 invasive species, other environmental threats 

pose Health risks and could cause environmental degradation, and economic 

damage by the inadvertent or intentional introduction of diseases; non-indigenous species, including animals, plants, insects, and single-cell organisms; or 

other environmental hazards. One study estimated that damages and efforts to 

control invasive non-indigenous species already cost the United States $137 billion per year, more than the cost of recovery from the 9/11 attacks.8

• Third, as a component of America’s borders, we cannot over estimate the importance and vulnerability of the maritime domain. About 95 percent by volume 

of U.S. overseas trade transits the waterways and the exclusive economic zone 

bounding the United States. In addition, many major population centers and 

critical infrastructure are in close proximity to U.S. ports or are accessible by 

waterways. Equally troubling are the prospects for criminals and terrorists to 

use the maritime domain for the conveyance of illicit goods and services. Nor 

are just the hundreds of ports of entry into the United States a concern. Coastal 

areas between the ports are perhaps even more vulnerable to exploitation.9 Finally, as land borders and commercial air transport become more secure, criminals and terrorists will increasing look to the maritime domain as an attractive 

means to bring bad things to America’s shores. 

• Fourth, securing the transport of material goods, services, and people across 

the border is not only important for keeping out terrorists and the instruments 

of terror. Equally vital to national security is maintaining the free-flow of legitimate commerce. Many American industries, for example, rely on ‘‘just in time’’ 

movement of goods and services. Quick and responsive delivery lessens the need 

to have large stockpiles on hand, thus reducing operating costs.10 Increased security that delays the delivery of products can negate the advantages of inventories that are managed by the speed that orders are filled rather the size of 

a company’s warehouse. For instance, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks security 

at the borders and Canada was significantly upgraded. As a result, many truckers were delayed at border crossings for several hours. Since many truckers are 

only permitted to drive 10 hours per day, significant delays at the border can 

add an extra day to delivery time. After the attacks on the World Trade Center, 
28

11 Joseph Martha, ‘‘Just-in-Case Operations,’’ Warehouse Forum, Vol. 17, No. 2 (January 

2002), np, at www.warehousing-forum.com/news/2002l01.pdf. 12The National Criminal Investigation Center (NCIC) is a computerized index of criminal justice information that is maintained by the FBI and available to federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies. The database includes the agency’s Interstate 

Identification Index (criminal history information); Wanted Persons File; Missing Persons File; 

Unidentified Persons File (to cross-reference unidentified bodies against records in the Missing 

Persons File); Foreign Fugitive File; and Violent Gang/Terrorist File (used to identify criminal 

gangs and their members to local, state, and federal law enforcement). The database also includes the U.S. Secret Service (now part of the Department of Homeland Security) Protective 

File, which maintains names and other information on individuals who are believed to pose a 

threat to the President. The law directs the agency to share information in the Interstate Identification Index and the Wanted Persons File as well as other files as agreed to by the Attorney 

General and the agency. 13 Biometrics are methods of identifying a person based on a physiological or behavioral characteristics, including the person’s face, fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, iris, retina, 

veins, and voice. 14The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 reduces from two years (as enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act) to 15 months the period after which the President must certify 

biometric standards for identifying aliens seeking admission into the U.S. and from 18 months 

to one year the period after which the President must first report to Congress on the progress 

in implementing the use of biometrics. 

Ford Motor Company idled five U.S. manufacturing plants because of slow delivery from parts suppliers in Canada.11 The increased cost of transporting or 

stockpiling goods is not the only concern. Many commercial enterprises, such as 

farming and tourism, rely on the import of foreign nationals for seasonal work. 

Any screening process that slows the flow of people and material will add to 

the cost that threats impose on the United States. 

Moving in the Right Direction 

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress and the Administration have 

made significant efforts to enhancing the security of commerce and travel across 

U.S. borders. The following initiatives are particularly noteworthy: • First, the USA PATRIOT Act required the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) to share information in its National Crime Information Center with immigration services and the U.S. Department of State.12 It also instructs the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to develop a biometric 13 standard for 

verifying the identity of visa applicants and bearers of visas and passports, as 

well as querying law enforcement databases.14

• Second, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

The act places the responsibility for providing immigration-related services and 

benefits under the DHS’s Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(BCIS) while the DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has assumed 

the border security functions of the INS. The act also established an integrated 

investigative force, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

• Third, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act called for 

intelligence sharing and visa issuance and monitoring through several important measures including requiring law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 

share relevant information with State and the BCIS; directing BCIS to integrate its data systems into an interoperable, interagency system; assigning the 

DHS the primary responsibility for developing an overarching information architecture to share immigration and intelligence data; and requiring the implementation of an integrated entry and exit database. 

• Fourth, the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) required the 

establishment of maritime security committees and security plans for facilities 

and vessels, and strengthened and standardized security measures for domestic 

port security teams including federal, state, local, and private authorities. 

• Fifth, the Administration’s establishment of two intelligence integration centers—the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—will help to consolidate terrorist information into centralized 

databases so that the information can be accessed by local, state, and federal 

authorities. 

Among all the ongoing activities to improve border security these initiatives are 

particularly important because they recognize that border security means much 

more than securing the border. They provide the foundation for building a layered 

and coordinated approach to the challenge of protecting the border. 

The Bush Administration’s approach to homeland security rightly eschews the notion that there is a single, ‘‘silver bullet’’ solution to stopping terrorism. Rather, the 

President has adopted a multi-layered system that assumes no one security initia-
29

15 James Jay Carafano and Ha Nguyen, ‘‘Better Intelligence Sharing for Visa Issuance and 

Monitoring: An Imperative for Homeland Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 

1699, October 27, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1699.cfm. 

tive will suffice. This strategy provides multiple opportunities to thwart or mitigate 

terrorist acts. Security is not provided by a single initiative, but by the cumulative 

effect of all the homeland security programs. For example, a terrorist might be discovered by an overseas intelligence operation while applying for a visa, by screening 

an international flight manifest, during inspection at a port of entry, or during a 

domestic counterterrorism investigation. Thus, improving security requires ensuring 

that each layer of the system is sufficient to do its part of the job and that efforts 

are complementary.

The Next Steps 

Great strides in improving the security of the border will only be made when the 

components supporting border security are wedded into a ‘‘system of systems’’ or 

network-centric approach to homeland security. Network-centric operations generate 

increased operational effectiveness by networking activities, decision makers, and 

field officers to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher 

tempo of operations, greater efficiency, increased security, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, it means linking knowledgeable entities in an effort to coordinate a comprehensive national border security plan. Such a system might 

produce significant efficiencies in terms of sharing skills, knowledge, and scarce 

high-value assets; building capacity and redundancy in the national border security 

system; and gaining the synergy of providing a common operating picture to all involved and being able to readily share information. 

In building a ‘‘system of systems’’ approach to border security, both Congress and 

the Administration must work toward integrating border control functions, immigration enforcement, transnational supply chain security, and maritime domain awareness into a more seamless web of homeland security activities. 

There are measures that Congress and Administration should consider now for 

building toward a ‘‘systems of systems’’ approach to border security. Our research 

at The Heritage Foundation suggests some initiatives that should be considered as 

building blocks toward a more integrated system for protecting the homeland. They 

include the following: 

Rethink Responsibilities for Visa Services. Congress should consolidate all 

visa activities in a single government organization. While the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 gave the Secretary of the DHS exclusive authority to issue regulations 

and administer the visa program, consular officers remained part of the Department 

of State. This was a mistake. For the DHS to fulfill its responsibilities in the visa 

process and because of the national security aspect of visa approvals, the Bureau 

of Consular Affairs Office of Visa Services should be placed under the DHS. Moving 

the Visa Office to the DHS would enable the DHS to focus on tightening, improving, 

and more broadly utilizing the visa function to meet the exigencies of homeland security.15

Improving Innovations in Intelligence Sharing. The Administration should 

consolidate the TTIC and the TSC under the DHS. Since May 2003, two intelligence-sharing centers have been established by the Administration. The TTIC is 

designed to be a central location where all terrorist-related intelligence—both foreign and domestic—is gathered, coordinated, and assessed. It is composed of elements of the FBI, CIA, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, 

Department of State, and other intelligence agencies. The TSC has responsibility for 

coordinating information from all terrorist watch lists and provide around-the-clock 

access to local, state, and federal authorities. Although the establishment of the 

TTIC and the TSC are significant steps in the integration of intelligence data, these 

centers have been placed under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the 

FBI respectively. This locates the centers away from the agency that is most in need 

of the information they provide—the DHS. 

The structure for intelligence sharing between agencies should be based on a consumer-driven model. The DHS was designed as the biggest consumer of intelligence 

information and has the most at stake in terms of intelligence sharing and dissemination, particularly in the areas of visa issuance and monitoring. The current arrangement leaves the DHS as little more than just another intelligence end user, 

competing with other members of the national security community to ensure that 

its priority requirements are met. Thus, the TTIC and the TSC should be placed 

under the DHS both to ensure the best possible establishment and operation of 
30

16 James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Terrorist Intelligence Centers Need Reform Now,’’ Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 930, May 10, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/

HomelandDefense/em930.cfm. 17 James Jay Carafano, ‘‘No Need for the CLEAR Act: Building Capacity for Immigration 

Counterterrorism Investigations,’’ Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 925, April 

21, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em925.cfm. 

these centers and to make certain that the DHS has the tools and ability to fulfill 

its responsibilities.16

Improving State and Local Support for Counterterrorism Immigration Investigations. The DHS and the states should pursue, and Congress should support, 

the use of Section 287 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) as a mechanism for state and local law enforcement to enforce the immigration aspect of border 

security. Section § 287(g) of the INA provides authority for state and local enforcement to investigate, detain, and arrest aliens on civil and criminal grounds. Officers 

governed by a § 287(g) agreement must receive adequate training and operate under 

the direction of federal authorities. In addition, in a civil lawsuit, the state law enforcement officers would be considered to have been acting under federal authority, 

thereby shifting liability to the federal government and providing additional immunity for the state law enforcement officers enforcing federal laws.17

The existing § 287(g) pilot program with the State of Florida could serve as a national model. Under § 287(g), Florida signed a memorandum of understanding 

(MOU) in 2002 to allow a small group of Florida law enforcement officers to conduct 

federal immigration investigations. Florida specifically limits its officers’ civil immigration enforcement to situations in which they are part of a security or 

counterterrorism operation that is supervised by ICE. As the Florida MOU demonstrates, § 287(g) provides adequate protection to states and their law officers while 

requiring that well-trained officers conduct immigration investigations. It also allows states to tailor the use of their officers to essential domestic counterterrorism 

missions. 

Three initiatives would further enhance state and federal counterterrorism efforts 

through § 287(g) programs: 

1. The DHS should encourage other states to adopt programs based on the Florida model, 

2. Congress should appropriate funds for the DHS to expand § 287(g) initiatives, 

and 

3. States should use the Florida initiatives as a model for expanding their own 

domestic counterterrorism programs and improving cooperation with federal authorities. 

Expanding the DHS Law Enforcement Capacity. The DHS needs more aggressive programs to expand law enforcement capacity within the agency, establish 

closer coordination within the components of ICE, and expand the Coast Guard’s 

law enforcement capabilities. In the end, investments in domestic counterterrorism 

programs and intelligence and early warning may provide much greater security for 

value than physical security at the border or additional critical infrastructure protection at ports-of-entry. Key to enhancing the DHS capability to performing these 

functions will be growing its capacity to perform law enforcement operations. 

It is not clear that Coast Guard and ICE law enforcements programs are being 

developed in tandem to create the objective law enforcement corps needed for border 

security. In fact, it is not apparent that the DHS has defined its long-term strategic 

needs in this area or that they dovetail with other ongoing federal and state efforts 

to expand the national capacity to conduct domestic counterterrorism. 

One area that warrants particular attention is the future plans for the Coast 

Guard’s marine investigative services and its sea marshall assets. Since 9/11, many 

of the local investigation and inspections arms of the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety 

Offices have significantly shifted their focus to supporting domestic counterterrorism 

efforts. In addition, the Coast Guard created the sea marshals program to create 

a cadre of specially trained law enforcement officers to escort high-risk vessels into 

port. While the Coast Guard law enforcement initiatives are a positive effort, there 

is little sign that the service is creating a comprehensive human capital plan, including the leader development training and education that are needed to fully exploit the potential of these programs. 

Consolidate and Integrate DHS Aviation Support Activities. To achieve 

greater efficiency, flexibility, and coordination for domestic airspace security and 

support operations, ICE’s Office of Air and Marine Interdiction (OAMI) should be 

merged with Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) aviation assets. Additionally, the aviation support requirements and acquisition for the OAMI and the 

U.S. Coast Guard should be integrated to the maximum extent possible. Building 
31

18 Richard L. Kugler, ‘‘The Defense Budget: Meeting Requirements with Constrained Resources,’’ in QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, ed. Miche ́le A. Flournoy 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), pp. 125–129. 

greater aviation support capacity and flexibility into the DHS is critical to the border security missions, as well as supporting other federal law enforcement activities, 

and lessening Defense Department requirements for reserving air defense assets of 

missions related to homeland defense protection. 

The OAMI and the CBP already work closely together in a number of aviation 

missions. The OAMI currently has a Northern Border Initiative that established five 

OAMI air unites at strategic locations along the Northern Border. This initiative 

melds assets and operations with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) and will provide a law enforcement presence within one hour of being notified, 24x7, of suspected incursions along the Northern Border. Integrating OAMI 

with other CBP assets would only further enhance the DHS’s capabilities to conduct 

these kinds of operations. 

Over the long term, fiscal concerns will no doubt play the significant role in determining the extent to which the DHS aviation component can be expanded to meet 

a range of mission requirements. Aviation support and acquisition requirements invariably consume a significant portion of operations and maintenance budgets. 

Here, the department can profitably learn a lesson from the Department of Defense 

(DOD), which maintains four air forces optimized for different tasks at great expense. As a result, today the lion’s share of defense procurement will be for modernizing its air fleet of combat, transport, and support craft.18 In addition to the cost 

of developing and maintaining separate air arms, the DOD has had to invest considerable resources in creating the capacity to integrate these arms effectively. Effective consolidation now will enable the DHS to avoid similar challenges in the coming 

years. 

Place Greater Emphasis on Private-Sector Solutions for Supply Chain Security. The DHS should pursue additional initiatives to encourage the private sector to improve security in transnational supply chains. As much as possible, the 

DHS needs to move away from making the border a bottleneck by using passage 

of the border as the place to screen the vast amounts of commerce entering and 

leaving the United States. Current efforts to achieve this goal rely heavily on two 

programs, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT). It may not, however, be strategically prudent to 

pursue the current combination of measures alone. Layered security, after all requires not placing all the eggs in ‘‘one security basket.’’ 

The MTSA required the Secretary of Transportation to establish a program to 

evaluate and certify secure systems of intermodal transportation. It did not direct 

that these programs would have to necessarily be conceived or implemented by the 

federal government. In order to reduce risk, as well as exploit the capacity of the 

marketplace to create innovative and effective solutions, the DHS might consider establishing mechanisms to allow the private sector to develop and implement its own 

alternatives to the CSI/CTPAT regime. 

Improving Congressional Oversight. Congress should create permanent committees in both houses to provide oversight for the Department of Homeland Security. While security remains a cooperative government effort, we needed a dedicated 

Homeland Security Department. The rationale for the initiative paralleled the 

thinking behind the formulation of the 1947 National Security Act, consolidating 

key assets into one big, powerful organization and creating the means to orchestrate 

that department’s efforts with other federal activities. Large, centralized organizations have drawbacks, the most obvious being the problems encountered in managing a vast bureaucracy. But big organizations can also have great strengths, providing unity of purpose, a wealth of capabilities, and economies of scale, and fostering a common institutional culture and practices that build trust and confidence 

and facilitate coordinated action. 

The department now also faces the same challenges that confronted the Pentagon 

in 1947. In terms of efficiencies and improved coordination, the low-hanging fruit 

of corralling over 180,000 employees into one agency has been picked. What is left 

to be done is the hard work, the nuts and bolts of building a real department—implementing human capital, acquisition, and information technology programs; building security systems that match the national strategy; and standing watch every 

day against terrorist attacks. Oversight of these activities requires standing committees with the expertise and experience to see the big picture and dig into the details. 

No area demands more attention to ensuring that disparate programs work together 

than the complex challenges of border security. 
32

The House Select Committee on Homeland Security has already demonstrated 

that there could be value added in consolidating oversight in a single committee. 

They’ve held productive hearings and rapidly assembled a capable staff with the energy, expertise, and dedication that make for good congressional oversight. The global war against terrorism will be a long, protracted conflict. We need a Department 

of Homeland Security that is built and run to protect Americans today, tomorrow, 

and 10 and 20 years from now. We need a Congress that is properly organized to 

support this effort. Leaving jurisdiction for the department’s homeland security programs fragmented among a dozen committees runs counter to the intent behind the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002: Either merge functions, change cultures, and focus 

the federal government on homeland security or turn the initiative over to the terrorists. 

Both houses of Congress should establish permanent homeland security committees.

Conclusion 

A layered and coordinated approach is the only strategic solution that promises 

long-term success for protecting the U.S. borders. Congress and the Administration 

must work together to turn a number of promising initiatives into a comprehensive 

system of systems that will serve to deter, disrupt, and prevent acts of transnational 

terrorism upon the United States. I believe several of the building blocks suggested 

here could be important contributions to that effort.

Ms. GRANGER. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. 

Mr. Johnson? 

STATEMENT OF RANDEL JOHNSON, THE UNITED STATES 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND AMERICANS FOR BETTER 

BORDERS 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I would like to 

thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to talk about a wide 

range of issues, of which there are many in this area. Let me simply note with regard to my background that I am Vice President 

at the U.S. Chamber for Immigration, Labor and Employee Benefits, but more particularly I did represent the Chamber on the Data 

Management Improvement Act Task Force which studied issues at 

the borders for over 2 years. We did submit two separate reports 

to Congress. Unfortunately, they were probably longer than most 

people would care to look at, but they do hold a lot of interesting 

data there for the subcommittee. 

My written testimony is quite lengthy. It covers issues ranging 

from cargo processing to the need for low-risk prescreened traveler 

programs such as SENTRI and NEXUS, to problems that the business community is encountering in visa processing, to frankly concerns that we have over the upcoming land port deadlines under 

US–VISIT in December, 200. I do also wish to note our strong support for the legislation that just passed the House, which would extend the October deadline under the visa waiver program for biometric encoded passports. 

With regard to low-risk, prescreened traveler programs, I just 

want to emphasize that obviously these have to be part of any solution to our border security, if that solution is also going to take into 

consideration our need to keep commerce moving. The volume of 

our traffic at our borders, which I think astounds people who have 

not been there before, I think on its face indicates that this is really an unquestionable element of any program. We strongly support 

the committee’s efforts to expand and implement things like 

NEXUS and SENTRI. 
33

Obviously, technology must play a part, but I think we are kidding ourselves if we are going to look at it as a magic panacea. 

There is always going to be human error involved, and I think we 

are a long ways off from any kind of technology which will allow 

us to thoroughly check every traveler equally. Therefore, we have 

to have some kind of low-risk, prescreened traveler program to separate out the stream of most travelers from those who have to be 

looked at more carefully than others. Technology is great, but it is 

not going to be a solution, and we should not kid ourselves. 

With regard to visa delays in US–VISIT, I just want to say that 

we have tried to document the problems the business community 

is having with visa delays. We are very encouraged by the fact that 

both Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge recently have acknowledged that there are glitches in the system. Secretary Ridge has 

kicked off a system of review to try and see where those glitches 

are and see where they can be resolved without impairing security. 

Considering US–VISIT, let me just say that with regard to our 

border communities, there is a lot of concern out there still with 

regard to the December deadline. Things are going fairly well at 

the airports. There are some complaints, but they are going fairly 

well. But at the land ports, as the December 2004 deadline approaches, there is just a skepticism out there when they hear officials from DHS talking about how the system will work and there 

will be no impact on traffic. It sounds great, but when it comes to 

thinking through how that reality is going to be translated to each 

port, and which lanes are going to have to be torn up, how are 

dedicated lanes going to be established, there is a lot of skepticism 

out there. I think the DHS just simply has to get out there community by community and explain how they are going to get this done 

6 months from now. 

I want to emphasize, as you well know, that there is more than 

dollars and cents here involved. If you talk to these border communities, as many of you have, it is a way of life that is involved. It 

is the community structure that is so intertwined with border commerce back and forth that if this is not done right, a lot of these 

communities are going to go down the drain. So the stakes are very 

high, and US–VISIT has to be done right. There is no room for 

error. In that regard, we hope DHS specifically moves beyond the 

rhetoric quickly and moves to pilot projects to test under realistic 

conditions what they intend to implement in December of 2004. 

Let me just note finally that I know the Chamber and other people in the business community will be unfairly criticized at times, 

and inaccurately, for elevating profits, jobs and commerce over national security. That is not the case. We acknowledge we have to 

all work together to get this system done right. Of course, the enabling statute that established the Department of Homeland Security, which we strongly supported, recognizes that the Department 

in achieving national security also must look at economic security. 

It must keep border commerce moving. I believe the word is in a 

‘‘speedy fashion.’’ I am not sure who put the ‘‘speedy’’ in, but in a 

speedy fashion. That is the concept. I think that we all sort of have 

to move together and get the job done. We are willing to work with 

DHS to do that, and the Department of State. 
34

Finally, I just hope that as these issues come rolling out, that the 

Congress can try to treat them in a bipartisan manner, because the 

stakes are really too high to do otherwise. With that, Mr. Chairman, I have 17 seconds left. 

[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PRAPERED STATEMENT OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BY RANDEL K. JOHNSON

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on border security and economic issues. I am Randel K. 

Johnson, Vice President for Labor, Immigration and Employee Benefits at the 

United States Chamber of Commerce. 

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world’s largest business federation, representing more than 3 million businesses. The Chamber’s federation includes state 

and local chambers throughout the United States and also includes 98 American 

Chambers of Commerce abroad (AMCHAMs) located in 86 countries, which represent American companies and individuals doing business overseas as well as foreign companies with significant business interests in the United States. Because of 

their role at the crossroads of international business, we believe the AMCHAMs are 

excellent barometers of the strength of our international relationships. 

Chamber members with interest in the secure and efficient movement of legitimate travel and trade at our borders include companies and organizations in the 

travel and tourism industries, companies that import or export goods and services 

through our ports of entry, companies that do business with international customers 

and clients, and companies that employ an international workforce. Chamber members on both the U.S.–Mexico and U.S.–Canada borders, including local chambers 

of commerce and American Chambers of Commerce abroad that conduct business 

between the United States and other countries, also have a great interest in the implementation and efficiency of our border security. 

I would also like to note that I am the chair of the Americans for Better Borders 

(ABB) coalition, which unites regional business organizations and a wide array of 

companies and national trade associations representing manufacturing, hospitality, 

tourism, transportation, recreation and other industry sectors to work to ensure that 

the efficient flow of commerce and tourism across our borders while addressing national security concerns. 

The Chamber and ABB coalition were instrumental in the creation and passage 

of the Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000, which set the current 

deadlines for implementation of the US–VISIT entry-exit program and established 

the DMIA Task Force, a public-private group chartered in 2001 by the Attorney 

General to evaluate and make recommendations on how the flow of traffic at United 

States airports, seaports, and land border ports of entry (POE) can be improved 

while enhancing security. I was privileged to be named by the Attorney General to 

represent the U.S. Chamber on the Task Force in 2002 and to serve on the Task 

Force and sign its two reports to Congress, one in 2002 and one in 2003. 

We are all aware of the new environment in which not only business, but all of 

us must live. The need for security to protect us from another horror such as September 11 is very real. The U.S. Chamber has pledged its support for the broad 

ranging efforts to secure our homeland, was involved in the shaping of the legislation which created the Department of Homeland Security, and ‘‘key voted’’ in support of the legislation in both the House and the Senate. 

The U.S. Chamber agrees with the Committee’s theme for this hearing, that there 

must be a layered and coordinated approach to our nation’s security to be truly successful. Border security must start before the traveler arrives at our ports of entry, 

and we must use technology to make the best use of our security resources to focus 

on high-risk or unknown travelers and expedite legitimate, low-risk and frequent 

trade and visitors. We need to have both secure borders and an efficient and predictable visa and entry process. The Chamber strongly supports these policies; I only 

wish to emphasize that we are concerned by the way these policies are currently 

being implemented and by the uncertainty of what they will look like in the future. 

When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, it saw fit 

to include two provisions we strongly supported: creating a special office in charge 

of reaching out to the private sector (a particularly important function as the Department got up and running) and making clear that part of the Department’s mission is to include consideration of America’s economic security as the Department 

strives also to protect our national security. These provisions, along with those in 

Title IV of the implementing legislation relating to borders and transportation 

which reflect the need, consistent with national security, to ‘‘ensure the speedy, or-
35

1The NEXUS program issues individual passenger radio frequency (RF)-enabled proximity 

cards for frequent travelers on the northern border. The SENTRI program operates on the 

southern border and provides an RF-enabled vehicle tag with associated data for all passengers 

registered within the vehicle. Over the next couple of years, the two programs will be merged 

and the NEXUS individual passenger-based technology will replace SENTRI on the southern 

border. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Request for Proposals for US–VISIT Program 

Prime Contractor Acquisition, RFP No. HSSCHQ–04–R–0096, November 28, 2003, p. 23. 

derly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce,’’ I believe went a long way 

in addressing concerns at the time that the new Department would pursue a ‘‘fortress America.’’ That is, many were concerned that the new Department would pursue aggressive security measures without weighing the negative economic impact on 

the country as a whole that could result from significant increases in barriers and 

delays at our borders. As Chamber President and CEO Tom Donohue has said, we 

need to ensure ‘‘that in the pursuit of security we don’t lose our mobility and our 

economic freedom. Mobility and security must go hand-in-hand. Sacrifice one for the 

other and we’ll pay a horrific price.’’ 

And, indeed, Secretary Ridge at the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary 

Powell at the Department of State and even President Bush, have repeatedly reassured those of us outside that the government will continue to search for ways to 

both improve security and to expedite, or at least not significantly hinder, legitimate 

international commerce, travel and immigration. 

On the cargo side, we must say that the government has made a great start on 

meeting the dual goals of security and efficiency, through programs such as the Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT), the Free and Secure Trade 

program (FAST), and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). C–TPAT is a voluntary program by which businesses (including importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse operators and manufacturers) can work with Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) to ensure the integrity of their security practices and receive the benefit of 

reduced border processing. The FAST program is a bilateral initiative between the 

United States and Canada that builds on the C–TPAT model and Canada’s similar 

program, the Partners in Protection (PIP). C–TPAT and PIP carriers, drivers and 

importers can receive expedited processing at the U.S.–Canada border. The CSI is 

a program in which teams of CBP officers are deployed to participating foreign sea 

ports to work with officials of the host government to target cargo containers bound 

for the U.S. that might pose a threat. These programs have successfully ‘‘pushed out 

the border,’’ engaged the cooperation of the private sector, and added to the riskbased, layered approach that is the topic of this hearing and we commend CBP for 

their implementation. 

However, not nearly as much progress has been made on the travel side. Only 

a few programs, such as the NEXUS and SENTRI programs, use the same riskbased pre-clearance strategies that have been implemented in the cargo area. 

NEXUS and SENTRI successfully enroll thousands of border crossers, who voluntarily undergo pre-clearance and background checks—in the case of NEXUS by both 

the United States and Canada—and prove themselves to be low-risk crossers.1 By 

doing so, they are able to use dedicated lanes at certain border crossings and speed 

their travel. These two programs are successful models of meeting the dual missions 

of security and efficiency. By identifying these individuals as low-risk, placing them 

through thorough security checks prior to their arrival at the border, and then allowing briefer inspections at the ports of entry, these programs model the layered 

approach that we support. 

In fact, the DMIA Task Force in its 2002 report emphasized the expansion of 

these programs as integral to the eventual success of any entry-exit system at the 

land borders. We understand that a similar program for air travel from Canada 

(NEXUS Air) is in development, and we strongly encourage CBP to speed such a 

program to the traveling public. We also encourage the Committee, as it is considering the first ever authorization legislation for the Department of Homeland Security, to not only encourage these types of programs through specific authorizing language, but also provide resources for their expansion, maintenance and improvement to encourage as many as possible to enroll. 

CBP Commissioner Bonner in March 2004 announced a new initiative that will 

also build on this layered approach, the Immigration Security Initiative (ISI). Based 

on reports from CBP, the ISI will post teams of CBP officers at major international 

airports around the world from which travelers embark to the United States. Much 

like their counterparts in the Container Security Initiative, the ISI teams will work 

with foreign governments and law enforcement, as well as use its own resources to 

target inadmissible persons and prevent them from boarding planes to the U.S. As 
36

2 ‘‘Immigration Security Initiative: New Layer in Homeland Defense,’’ Customs and Border 

Protection Today, May 2004, found at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/May/

isi.xml. 3For a useful overview of various deadlines, see GAO Report 03–563, ‘‘Homeland Security 

Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning,’’ pages 48–50. 4Do Visa Delays Hurt U.S. Businesses, Prepared by the Santangelo Group for the Aerospace 

Industries Association, the American Council on International Personnel, the Association for 

Manufacturing Technology, the Coalition for Employment through Exports, the National Foreign 

Trade Council, the U.S.–China Business Council, U.S.-Russia Business Council, and the U.S.-

Vietnam Business Council, June 2, 2004, available at www.nftc.org. 5Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Balance of Payments (International Transactions) data, 1960-present at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/home/bop.htm. 6Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Department of Transportation, available at 

http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/borderlcrossinglentryldata/. 

a ‘‘middle layer’’ of security between the consular post and the port of entry, this 

program has the promise to further ‘‘push out our borders’’ for passengers.2

We support the concepts underpinning the ISI; however, the success of this program to facilitate legitimate travelers and reduce unnecessary inspections and 

screening at the ports of entry will depend heavily on the validity and detail of the 

targeting information, data and intelligence used to flag inadmissible persons. We 

would want to be sure that travelers will have an expedited means of clearing up 

any ‘‘false’’ negatives, to ensure their continued travel to the United States as quickly as possible. As important as such partnerships and targeting may be, the best 

assurance of stopping inadmissible persons is full pre-inspection, where actual U.S. 

inspections and admissions are recorded at foreign airports prior to departure. 

These programs are currently in place in several airports in Canada, Ireland, the 

Caribbean and elsewhere, and we would encourage CBP to evaluate expansion of 

these programs as well. 

However, in spite of these successes and new initiatives for travelers, they are 

still quite limited. For the majority of travelers, there is a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach to screening and security. That is, everyone is seen as a risk. I believe there 

is concern among those of us in the private sector, the traveling public and border 

communities, that we are not much closer to finding the right balance between security and facilitation. Constantly tightening policy responses and approaching deadlines for still greater changes only increase the concern. These changes include: increased visa referrals for security checks, requirements for in-person visa interviews, upcoming deadlines in October of this year for Machine Readable Passports 

and biometrics for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) visitors, the inclusion of these visitors in September in the US–VISIT system at air and seaports, which includes 

fingerprinting more than 13 million visitors annually from countries around the 

world, and full implementation of US–VISIT at the 50 busiest land borders in December 2004 and the remaining land ports in 2005.3

Indeed, there is a growing perception abroad and in border communities that, in 

spite of the rhetoric, America is turning into a fortress. And this perception, based 

on reality, is hurting American businesses. A recent study by eight business organizations estimated that visa problems alone have cost more than $30 billion to the 

economy in lost revenues and other indirect costs.4 And recent Department of Commerce data shows a drop of more than $17 billion in services trade surplus from 

2000 to 2002, with a drop of $17.3 billion in travel exports between 2000 and 2003, 

and a more than $5 billion drop in passenger fares.5 Cross border visits along our 

land borders are also down. According to Department of Transportation data, inbound passenger vehicle crossings were down almost 20 million between 2000 and 

2002 on the Canadian border, and down over 40 million across the U.S.-Mexico border. Between 2000 and 2002 inbound truck crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border decreased almost 100,000, with a decrease of more than 220,000 between 2000 and 

2001. On the Canadian border, inbound truck crossings decreased almost 300,000 

between 2000 and 2001, and are down 100,000 from 2000 to 2002.6 And, as anyone 

in these border communities can tell you, fewer crossings means less business and 

heavy impacts to the economy. 

We have met in the last year, and continue to meet with representatives from 

many stakeholders in border communities, including local chambers of commerce, 

businesses and community representatives both as part of my work on the DMIA 

Task Force and on behalf of the Chamber. As the December 2004 deadline for US–

VISIT land border implementation approaches, there is a very strong feeling that 

the local communities and businesses have made their serious concerns about entryexit procedures known to various people in the government (and us) but are wondering if there is a real understanding of the challenge and stakes involved. Although recent official descriptions of how the US–VISIT system will be implemented 
37

7Data Management Improvement Act Task Force Second Annual Report to Congress, Department of Homeland Security, December 2003. 

at land borders does indicate that the Department of Homeland Security is at least 

listening to these concerns, the border communities are still skeptical that the 

entry-exit procedures embodied by US–VISIT can be put in place by December without a significant and negative impact on cross border traffic. 

This adverse impact is already being felt on the visa front. Our American Chambers of Commerce around the world report they are actually losing business to European and other competitors because of the difficulties in obtaining visas for their 

customers and clients, supporting the results of the study mentioned above. Impending changes to the VWP will disproportionately affect key American allies and trading partners such as the United Kingdom and Japan, both of whose governments 

have stated that, in spite of their best efforts, they will not be able to meet the October 26, 2004, deadline which will require VWP countries to begin issuing passports 

with biometric identifiers. In fact, the Department of State has stated it will not 

be able to issue U.S.-biometric passports until next year. We strongly support legislation to be voted on in the House this week that would extend the VWP deadline. 

This is an issue of the highest importance for U.S. companies doing business in the 

27 countries in the VWP. 

Turning back to the borders, the DMIA Task Force submitted two reports to Congress, one in 2002 and one in 2003. The 2002 report focused on what was then the 

entry-exit system and detailed numerous challenges to implementing such a system, 

including the differentiation required for the modes of entry (land, sea, and air) and 

differences between the northern and southern land border environments. In 2003, 

the Task Force report detailed the significant challenges facing our ports of entry 

in terms of infrastructure and technology and the need for greater cooperation and 

coordination among federal agencies with border responsibilities, with state and 

local governments, and the private sector. Significantly, in reviewing the progress 

to date on the US–VISIT system in 2003, the Task Force report included the following recommendation: 

That the first phase at air and sea [Ports of Entry] be reviewed and evaluated 

no later than 6 months after implementation by an independent body. This 

evaluation must consider the program’s effect on national and economic security 

and international trade and travel. Congress should consider any recommendations from the independent review and evaluation and also reconsider deadlines 

for all other entry-exit statutory requirements. It is further recommended that 

any mandates in this area receive appropriate funding.7

We note that no thorough evaluation of the air and sea implementation of US–

VISIT has yet been done to our knowledge—and the deadlines for land implementation are fast approaching. 

The Chamber, its members, and the ABB coalition fully support the efforts of the 

Department of Homeland Security to improve the security at our ports of entry and 

borders and we recognize that the Department faces many difficult challenges. We 

do not oppose the US–VISIT system; the Department has worked hard over the last 

year to listen to the concerns of business and has made significant strides in adopting systems that attempt to balance the need for security and the continued facilitation of legitimate travel at our ports of entry. However, the U.S. Chamber and its 

members remain very concerned that, if the US–VISIT system is implemented improperly, we risk serious economic harm by impeding the billions of dollars in crossborder trade (particularly at our land borders) and deterring the millions of legitimate visitors to our country, who also spend billions of dollars within our borders. 

Frankly, there is a concern that the government may be acting without sufficient 

planning and testing to ensure the systems will not adversely impact commerce and 

travel. And it is not an overstatement, given the enormity of our cross-border traffic, 

to say that there is literally no room for error. In fact, the recent GAO report on 

the US–VISIT expenditure plan noted the lack of sufficient testing plans or structures. 

DHS has not employed rigorous, disciplined management controls typically associated with successful programs, such as test management, and its plans for 

implementing other controls, such as independent verification and validation, 

may not prove effective. More specifically, testing of the initial phase of the implemented system was not well managed and was completed after the system 

became operational. In addition, multiple test plans were developed during testing, and only the final test plan, completed after testing, included all required 

content, such as describing tests to be performed. Such controls, while signifi-
38

8 ‘‘First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed,’’ General Accounting Office Report GAO–04–586, May 2004. 9 Approximately 13 million Visa Waiver Program entries would be included in the system, according to DHS data. 10 ‘‘Finally, DHS’s plans for future US–VISIT resource needs at the land ports of entry, such 

as staff and facilities, are based on questionable assumptions, making future resource needs uncertain.’’ Ibid. 

cant for the initial phases of US–VISIT, are even more critical for the later 

phases, as the size and complexity of the program will only increase.8

We submitted comments to the Department of Homeland Security on its interim 

final rule implementing the US–VISIT requirements for visa travelers at air and 

seaports on February 4, 2004. Some of these comments have been echoed in the recent GAO report just cited. I would briefly like to highlight some of our concerns 

regarding the air implementation here today. 

First, although major delays in international arrivals have not been reported from 

the implementation at US–VISIT at airports so far (we do not have information 

about the sea port implementation), we are extremely concerned about the capacity 

of the system to absorb additional travelers and additional data, as we enter the 

peak travel season, particularly with the inclusion of Visa Waiver travelers by the 

end of September.9 This concern arises on the technology, personnel, and infrastructure level. The US–VISIT program has so far been operational only during the lowest period for international travel to the United States during the year. As travel 

season picks up this summer, we expect additional travelers to arrive requiring enrollment in US–VISIT. 

We also noted that CBP, as an insurance against delays, deployed additional personnel to airports in the initial days of the US–VISIT implementation. Yet GAO further noted that the US–VISIT office does not project any increased personnel requirements for the US–VISIT program.10 If additional travelers during peak season 

or additional classes of travelers are required to be enrolled in the US–VISIT system, it is hard to imagine that additional staff will not be necessary to avoid delays. 

We would strongly urge CBP to devote adequate staff to ensure expeditious processing of all international travelers. 

We also have concerns about the proposed exit system for airports, which is still 

in the development phases. The current system of exit confirmation is the testing 

of self-service kiosks located near the passenger security checkpoints at airports. 

While the concept of a self-service checkout is appealing, and certainly is the least 

likely to cause disruption or additional backups for departing travelers, the lack of 

information provided to travelers and the seeming ‘‘voluntariness’’ of the system 

may, in fact, reduce the effectiveness of the exit system in actually recording departures. The self-service kiosk also provides the traveler with no documentary evidence that he or she has complied with the exit verification, and, therefore, should 

any discrepancy arise, the traveler will be at a loss to prove compliance. 

Given these discrepancies, any method of exit verification must include clear directions to the traveler upon entry as to the need to ‘‘check out’’ upon departure and 

the means by which to do so. Since initially the exit capability will not be available 

at all airports, we predict a great deal of confusion by travelers as to the exit requirement. We have already received questions via our American Chambers of Commerce overseas regarding whether travelers must exit from designated airports, and 

if they do not, how their exit will be registered and whether it will impact their ability to return to the United States in the future. A great deal of outreach to travelers 

(in multiple languages) must be made to avoid inadvertent noncompliance with any 

requirements for exit verification. We would strongly urge a period of time during 

which any negative impacts from failure to register are waived until it is clear that 

most travelers understand and are able to comply with the exit requirements. 

Of course, the largest challenge to the US–VISIT program remains the land borders. The circumstances of travel at land borders are monumentally different than 

at air and seaports and the hurdles are immeasurably higher. The unique situation 

of the land borders was discussed extensively in the 2002 DMIA Task Force Report 

to Congress. The report stated: 

There is a marked difference between an inspection conducted at an air or sea 

POE [port of entry] and one conducted at a land border. Because of their varied 

status, divergent points of origin, unfamiliarity with requirements and regulations, and the increased risk to the U.S., most applicants for admission at seaports and airports receive a comprehensive inspection that includes mandatory 

data systems checks. In contrast, the great majority of persons arriving at land 

border POEs are residents of the border area who cross frequently and are familiar with requirements concerning their entry into the U.S. and receive an 
39

11Data Management Improvement Act Task Force First Annual Report to Congress, December 

2002, p. 11. 12Source: PAS G–22.1 INS Statistics, cited in Data Management Improvement Act Second Annual Report to Congress, December 2003, p. 15. 13 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation, North American 

Merchandise Trade by U.S. State and All Land Modes, 2002, www.bts.gov/ntda/tbscd/reports/

annual02/state/usltradel2002lall.html. 14We have attached to this testimony the results of a recent survey we conducted of local 

chambers of commerce in communities along the borders with Canada and Mexico which give 

detail regarding the economic and social impact of border changes on their communities. The 

results include economic impact studies, resolutions of concern by local chambers of commerce, 

and other statements regarding the border. 15Tom Donohue, the President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber, has written to both Secretaries 

Ridge and Powell regarding visa processing and has suggested that a private sector advisory 

committee be created on this issue. The Chamber will soon be submitting detailed suggestions 

to the Department of Homeland Security to improve visa processing. 

inspection that may include data systems checks. The vast majority of all border crossings into the U.S. occur at land border POEs. . . . Border traffic includes U.S. citizens who leave and reenter the U.S. multiple times daily, permanent residents who make multiple entries, and aliens who hold non-immigrant 

visas or border crossing cards and commute back and forth daily or weekly from 

Canada or Mexico. Individuals can cross land borders as pedestrians, on bicycles, in cars, rails, buses, trucks, or other vehicles.11

In fact 80% of all inspections take place at the land borders; over 358 million inspections in 2002 were conducted at land borders, compared to 78 million at airports 

and 12 million at seaports.12 The land borders also see the crossing of $540 billion 

in surface trade between the United States, Canada and Mexico.13 As these facts 

and statistics reveal, the land borders represent a significantly larger challenge for 

the Department in order to ensure that the implementation of US–VISIT does not 

impede legitimate commerce and travel. 

I do wish to emphasize that there is more at stake here than dollars and cents. 

The way we go about securing our nation has a profound impact on how other countries view us. It is also about a way of life that is intrinsic at our borders. These 

communities are so intertwined with those across the border that not just jobs, but 

whole lives, could be changed along with the fabric and social underpinnings of 

these communities if we are not careful about our approach.14

Therefore we also urge that as the US–VISIT program is developed it be coordinated with other programs at the land borders, including NEXUS, SENTRI and the 

FAST clearance for truck operators. But especially we urge that DHS actively, and 

quickly, provide the border communities with a detailed description of the programs 

to be implemented and how, so that inaccuracies, rumors and fears may be quelled. 

The time for generalities has passed and communities need a detailed explanation, 

port-by-port as to how US–VISIT will be up and running by December 2004. These 

communities, which know the day-to-day realities, should be given the chance to 

comment both formally and informally on the proposed implementation, and provide 

input and feedback to ensure that their, and our, worst fears are not realized. 

In conclusion, we know that our borders and ports of entry cannot be our first 

line of defense, but the last in a series of layers, that begins when a foreign traveler 

decides to visit the U.S. at our embassies and consulates abroad. Many necessary 

changes have already been made in our visa process, but not without impact. 

America’s trade relationships, our diplomatic relationships, our cultural relationships and our academic relationships with the rest of the world depend a great deal 

on the ability of people to travel to the United States. The ability of any of these 

transactions to happen depends on the timeliness, predictability and efficiency of 

our visa and immigration system. Unfortunately, these qualities have been sorely 

lacking. Specifically, the changes to the visa system over the last year have strained 

many of our business and international relationships, and have created problems 

and costs for our economy, as described above. We need to be pro-active in quickly 

correcting these negative perceptions, and further refining our necessary procedures. 

Once patterns of travel, trade and educational and cultural exchange are reestablished with other nations, it will be difficult for the United States to get them back. 

We understand that the Department of Homeland Security is currently undertaking 

a thorough review of the visa system, with an eye toward these goals of security, 

efficiency and timeliness and we welcome that review, and hope we will have an 

opportunity to participate with the Department in reengineering this process.15

Let me reiterate that we understand the concern for security, and the Chamber 

fully supports efforts to improve our screening of persons who wish to come to this 

country. However, as stated above, we must look for those processes that can 
40

16 Response to survey by Miguel A. Conchas, President and CEO of the Laredo Chamber of 

Commerce, February 2004. 17Patrick, Dr. Michael, ‘‘The Price of Security,’’ Inlandport: The Laredo Chamber’s Business 

and Trade Magazine, January/February 2004. 

achieve that objective without sacrificing the efficiency and timeliness of our system. 

Our largest concern is that new policies seem to have been put in place with inadequate consideration of the need for coordination and communication with the private sector, or the real resource needs to efficiently carry out these changes. 

We are also aware that many of these changes are being prompted by Congressional mandates, with tight deadlines. We believe that Congress must take a realistic look at what it hopes to accomplish in such a short time, and the costs, to the 

taxpayers, to our economy and our foreign relations of moving forward without adequately gauging the impacts. While deadlines may impart the seriousness of the imperative, deadlines that cannot be met provide a false sense of security. 

None of this is to discourage efforts within the government agencies to deal with 

the very difficult questions of how to ensure that the next terrorist cannot penetrate 

our border protections—whether at the consulates overseas or at the ports of entry. 

In the end, it is the quintessential job of government to protect its citizens, and 

progress has been made. But we urge those with this responsibility to listen to the 

very real concerns of those who must live with the decisions they make. 

I wish to thank you for this opportunity to share the views of the U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce and I look forward to your questions. 

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BORDER SURVEY MARCH 2004 

The following represents a sampling of the responses we received to an informal 

survey of local chambers of commerce on the Canadian and Mexican borders in 

March 2004 regarding the potential impact of border security measures, including 

the proposed US–VISIT system, on their communities and economies. 

Texas 

The Laredo Port of Entry is the busiest commercial crossing on the U.S.-Mexico 

border, handling more than 9,000 trucks and over 900 rail cars each day. The Port 

of Laredo processed more than $32 million in exports and almost $47 million in imports from Mexico in 2002. In addition, the crossings in Laredo process almost 

25,000 pedestrians and more than 43,000 passenger cars daily. According to the Laredo Chamber, ‘‘[A]ny delay, no matter how small per entry, multiplies into major 

congestion.’’16 The Laredo Chamber estimates that at least 50% of local business is 

directly or indirectly tied to cross-border trade and traffic. 

A recent study by Dr. Michael Patrick, Director for the Texas Center for Border 

Economic and Enterprise Development at Texas A&M University concluded that a 

1% decrease in border crossings would cost the Laredo economy $19 million in annual sales, and increase local unemployment by 7.2%. Sales taxes alone would decline by $133,000. Across all of the major Texas ports, Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, 

and El Paso a 1% decline in crossings would cost the border region $76 million in 

sales and 1,500 jobs, and decrease the Gross State Product by $1.2 billion.17

The Brownsville, Texas Chamber of Commerce reported an additional concern: 

Mexican citizens own approximately 50% of the resort condominiums at South 

Padre Island. Because the majority of Mexican border crossers hold so-called ‘‘laser 

visas,’’ Border Crossing Cards that also serve as visitor (‘‘B–1/B–2’’) visas that generally restrict their period of stay to 72 hours, the Chamber is extremely concerned 

that if border crossings become more difficult, many of these owners will divest of 

their real estate, costing the local economy millions of dollars. If the period of stay 

for ‘‘laser visas’’ is not extended, long border delays will limit the time that these 

vacationers can use their homes, making these investments less attractive. 

The El Paso international bridges handle almost one-fifth of all trade along the 

U.S.-Mexico border, more than $38 million in 2002. Local economists estimate between 15% and 20% of the city’s retail sales are derived from Mexican nationals. 

According to the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, Mexican nationals 

purchased approximately $170 million in retail goods in San Antonio last year. Two 

major malls in the area report that as much as 35% of all sales go to Mexican nationals. Further, according to Visa International, San Antonio has the second largest 

usage of their credit cards by Mexican nationals in the United States (second to 

McAllen), with 8.29% of total U.S. purchases. 

The Free Trade Alliance of San Antonio, the Greater San Antonio Chamber of 

Commerce and the communities of Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, Del Rio, and El 

Paso have agreed to work together to address these issues. One common goal is to 

obtain a change to the limitation on the ‘‘laser visa’’ to allow Mexican nationals to 
41

18Department of Homeland Security, US–VISIT Industry Day Briefing, July 2003, http://

www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVISITlIndustryConfBrief.pdf. 19 Response to survey of border chambers, February 2004. 20 Ibid. 

stay for longer periods of time and to be exempt from US–VISIT enrollment, since 

they have already submitted to extensive background checks to obtain the cards, 

which contain the biometric identifiers required under the US–VISIT system. 

Washington 

Whatcom County, Washington has four border crossings, Peace Arch, Pacific 

Highway, Lynden, and Sumas, accounting for more than 2 million crossings per 

quarter. The region had almost a one-third drop in crossings since the fall of 2002. 

While some of this continued the downward trend since the Canadian dollar weakened in the 1990s, it is worth noting that border activity has not increased in recent 

years as the Canadian dollar has strengthened. 

A survey conducted by Western Washington University in the summer of 2003 revealed that Canadian shoppers make approximately 10% of all retail sales in 

Whatcom County, estimated at over $35 million. In 2002 the total trading relationship between Washington and Canada was nearly $11.3 billion. The Blaine, Washington border crossings are the sixth largest crossing in value of trade on the Canadian border at $9.9 billion. 

According to Department of Homeland Security estimates, an additional nine seconds of inspection time will result in over 700 additional minutes of cumulative vehicle wait time at the Blaine crossing.18 Delays at the border after September 11 

and during periods of heightened security alert have caused Canadian residents, 

particularly in the Vancouver metropolitan area, to believe that border crossing is 

a hassle. There is discussion in British Columbia of running commercials on Vancouver area television encouraging Canadians to return north. Canadian press has 

reported stories about US–VISIT expressing great concern that it will cause additional delays when implemented. The local chamber of commerce in Bellingham, 

Washington reports hearing very little about how the Department is intending to 

implement US–VISIT and is very eager for local community outreach. 

Arizona 

The Yuma County, Arizona chamber has concerns about the impact of US–VISIT 

on the more than 20,000 agricultural workers that visit daily at the San Luis Port 

of Entry during the agricultural season. Yuma is a county of 170,000 people in the 

southwest of the state called ‘‘the lettuce capital of the country’’ and depends on this 

agricultural workforce for its more than $500 million agricultural industry. According to Ken Rosevear, Executive Director of the Yuma Chamber of Commerce: 

It is extremely important that [these workers] are able to cross within a short 

window of time to be able to coordinate with the busses that transport them 

to their work areas. These areas may be as far as 50 miles and require another 

two hours of travel. Waiting times at the border during the season can reach 

2+ hours and that delay can cause shortages for that day’s labor force in the 

fields. . . .[T]hese delays can cost millions of dollars in lost revenue per day.19

According to the Yuma chamber, a new port of entry at San Luis East is in the 

early stages of development because of existing congestion at the port of entry, including a new highway to run from the port to Interstate 8. According to Mr. 

Rosevear, ‘‘As far as ability to absorb any further delay in either commercial, auto, 

or pedestrian traffic, absolutely NONE. This will bring total gridlock to our current 

port.’’ 20

The Douglas, Arizona Chamber of Commerce reports similar concerns. Douglas estimates that more than 60% of its retail volume is from Mexican customers, and 

it underpins the entire local economy. Currently crossing times coming into the 

United States range from 20 minutes to 2 hours, with lines backing up more than 

10 blocks into the town. This traffic backup creates air pollution problems. The regular crossers include employees of the more than 26 maquiladora plants across the 

border, and farm workers. These workers regularly cross the border each way daily, 

and sometimes several times. 

The Nogales Chamber of Commerce reports that 80% to 90% of business in the 

town is tied to the border. The largest employers include the more than 300 

maquiladora plants, produce companies, government agencies (most tied to the border) and merchants, who estimate that 80% of their revenue is from Mexican customers. Crossing times at the Nogales Port of Entry range from 20 to 40 minutes 

on average with longer waits during morning and afternoon commute times. According to Department estimates, a nine second increase in inspection times at the 

Nogales Port of Entry would result in an additional 500 minutes of vehicle wait 
42

21Department of Homeland Security, US–VISIT Industry Day Briefing, July 2003, http://

www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVISITlIndustryConfBrief.pdf. 

time.21 Of significance is the fact that the Nogales Chamber was not aware of US–

VISIT or its pending implementation until informed by the U.S. Chamber. Apparently, there had been no outreach by the border agencies to the local Nogales business community. 

New York 

The Watertown Chamber of Commerce recently conducted a study of the Thousand Islands bridge crossing. The Thousand Islands crossing, which connects Interstate 81 to Highway 404 in Ontario is one of the fastest growing travel routes between Ontario, Quebec and the U.S. southern and mid–Atlantic states and cities, 

handling more than 2 million passenger cars per year, and forecasting 80% increase 

in traffic in the next 30 years. What makes this crossing unusual is that almost twothirds of crossings are for recreation, and 63% of the visits are for more than two 

nights. Commuter crossings dominate the other major ports of entry on the U.S.-

Canada border. As a major gateway between the recreational areas of upstate New 

York and the ‘‘cottage’’ areas of Ontario and Quebec, Thousand Islands is potentially 

more susceptible to declines in crossings due to delays, as vacationers may choose 

to spend their holidays on their own side of the border. The crossing also accommodates more than 1,500 commercial vehicles daily, comprising $29 million in trade 

per day, with more than 165,000 jobs in the U.S. and Canada dependent on this 

trade. 

According to the Plattsburgh-North Country Chamber of Commerce, the total economic impact of Canada on the Clinton County, New York area, surrounding the 

Champlain/LaColle border crossing, is more than $1.3 billion, including more than 

14% of all county jobs, almost $300 million in annual visitor spending on tourism 

and retail, and $8.7 million in county sales tax generated. The Champlain/LaColle 

border crossing is the only crossing in the eastern half of the continent that does 

not cross water, and is currently undergoing a major expansion. Yet, still, at the 

height of the summer vacation season, backups at this crossing can be over two 

hours. 

California 

The San Ysidro Port of Entry in California is the busiest border crossing in the 

world, processing over 40 million passengers and 15 million trucks and busses annually over the past three years. Its sister port at Otay Mesa, primarily a commercial 

port, handles more than $20 billion in two-way surface trade annually, averaging 

more than 5 million vehicles and 11 million people crossing annually in the last five 

years. 

According to the San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, more than 60,000 people 

cross the border daily, and two-thirds of this volume are regular crossers, presumably workers. Inbound waits for crossing are often more than two hours, and the 

chamber estimates that if each car is stopped only 10 seconds longer more than nine 

hours of delay could result. In the days following September 11, businesses along 

Main Street in San Ysidro reported more than 90% lost business. Further, there is 

no infrastructure in place for exit inspections, and no room for expansion; the town 

of Tijuana starts literally adjacent to the port of entry. Even so, outbound traffic 

is often backed up more than one hour, even though Mexican customs usually 

waives most traffic through. 

At Otay Mesa, the local chamber of commerce estimates that 95% of business in 

the town is generated by cross-border trade, both directly and indirectly, much of 

it the maquila industries that operate facilities on both sides of the border, including Sanyo, Honeywell, Hitachi, Parker Hannifin, and others. One of the main appeals of the area is the availability of a skilled, legal workforce that enters from 

Tijuana daily. 

The El Centro Chamber of Commerce, located just north of the Calexico border 

crossing, is concerned with the impact on its retail economy. El Centro has a population of about 150,000, but the adjoining town of Mexicali has more than 500,000 

‘‘laser visa’’ holders. The local Costco and Wal-Mart retail outlets depend on this 

cross-border shopping, and ground has recently been broken on a large new regional 

mall with numerous national retailers to serve this Mexican market. Further, businesses in El Centro and farms throughout the Imperial Valley depend on Mexican 

labor. The El Centro chamber expressed concerns similar to the Yuma chamber of 

the impact of US–VISIT on the entry of agricultural workers to this vibrant growing 

center in California. 

The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce reports that total sales to Mexican 

citizens represented $3 billion in retail sales for San Diego in 2000 and 2001. After 
43

22Testimony of Dan Cherrin, former Director of Federal Public Policy of the Detroit Regional 

Chamber before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology of the Parliament 

of Canada, November 1, 2001. 23Letter to Claudia Berry, Public Affairs Group, Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, from 

Neal Belitsky, Executive Vice President, Detroit and Canada Tunnel Corporation, February 26, 

2004..

9/11, increased border security resulted in decreases in sales of up to 80% for several months. 

The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce, along with the City of Chula 

Vista, the City of San Diego, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG), 

San Diego Dialogue, Sand Diego Regional Economic Development Corporation, the 

San Diego World Trade Center, San Ysidro Business Association, San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, and the South San Diego Economic Development Council, has 

formed the San Diego Alliance for Border Efficiency. One of its goals is to mitigate 

the impact of US–VISIT on southbound border congestion by ensuring the development of necessary infrastructure prior to implementation. 

Michigan 

The Detroit/Windsor border crossings account for more than 27 million inspections 

annually and almost $100 billion in trade. These crossings account for almost 40% 

of all U.S.-Canada trade, with the Ambassador Bridge being the single busiest border crossing along the northern border, handling 25% of U.S.-Canada trade itself. 

The automotive industry alone accounts for more than $300 million of this daily 

trade. More than 160,000 jobs in Michigan and 1.8 million jobs nationwide are tied 

to the export of manufactured goods to Canada. Thirty-eight states and Puerto Rico 

have Canada as their primary trading partner, and half of U.S. exports to Canada 

are produced in 14 states. Of the passenger crossings, the majority of noncommercial crossings are locals. More than 10,000 people cross the border in Michigan to 

work, including more than 1,600 nurses in the city of Detroit. One hospital estimates that 15% of its nursing staff, and 20% of its critical care nursing staff, cross 

the border from Canada.22

The efficiency of these border crossings is extremely fragile. Following the September 11 attacks, additional security at the Detroit border crossings resulted in 20 

mile delays on the Canadian side, taking five hours to enter the U.S. However, 

delays as little as 20 minutes for just-in-time parts deliveries can result in assembly 

line shutdowns, increased costs to reroute trucks or ship cargo by rail, barge, or air, 

and create emergency inventory stockpiles (the exact costs that just-in-time was 

supposed to replace). 

In a June 1998 Senate Judiciary Report on the original entry-exit system proposed by Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Dan Stamper of the Detroit International Bridge Company is 

cited as estimating that additional entry and exit procedures that would add only 

30 seconds per vehicle (for only half of the daily crossings) would still add 3,750 

minutes of extra processing time per day. Since there are only 1,440 minutes in a 

day, this effect would essentially shut down the border. In a February 26, 2004, letter to the Detroit Regional Chamber, Neal Belitsky, Executive Vice President of the 

Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corporation (which operates the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel), 

stated: 

Our facility is typical of those at the other major crossings between Michigan 

or New York and Ontario. The Bridge & Tunnel Operator’s Association (BTOA) 

represents these crossings. Plazas were not designed for today’s traffic volumes 

or the post 9–11 environment. . . .We are concerned that the system may not 

be fully field tested prior to installation. This could lead to significant disruptions in cross border traffic and trade. Has an assessment been completed that 

will indicate both anticipated volumes and risk?’’23

Mr. CAMP. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. Bonner, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF T.J. BONNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BORDER 

CONTROL COUNCIL 

Mr. BONNER. Thank you. It is a pleasure to present the views 

and concerns of 10,000 front-line Border Patrol employees regarding the level of coordination and cooperation between the various 

agencies responsible for different aspects of homeland security, as 
44

well as to make specific recommendations for improving these important interactions. 

Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 

coordination within the agencies with primary jurisdiction for enforcing immigration, customs and agriculture laws was generally 

very good. Unfortunately, this same level of cooperation did not extend beyond each branch. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 attempted to improve coordination by placing the agencies responsible for enforcing these laws under one umbrella and creating two 

separate components: the Bureau of Border Security for enforcement, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services for 

service. 

A subsequent political compromise, however, replaced the Bureau of Border Security with two separate enforcement entities, the 

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In retrospect, this was a mistake. This artificial bifurcation of the enforcement functions of the 

Department has created needless barriers to the cooperation and 

coordination that is so essential in law enforcement, replicating 

and exacerbating some of the very problems that led to the call for 

a consolidated agency. 

The merger also created another set of challenges relating to the 

effective enforcement of the various laws under the jurisdiction of 

the new Department. Instead of the relatively narrow focus of the 

previous entities, the two new bureaus are both responsible for enforcing customs, immigration and agriculture laws. Each of these 

areas of law are extremely complex and require a great deal of 

training and experience to master. It is unrealistic to expect employees to be fully competent in these three complex areas of law. 

In the war against terrorism, mediocrity is simply not an acceptable standard. 

To remedy these deficiencies, the following solutions are recommended. One, consolidate the Bureaus of Customs and Border 

Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement into a single Bureau of Border Security, as envisioned by the Homeland Security Act, ensuring that the Border Patrol remains a separate entity within that Bureau. Two, ensure that the three main areas of 

law within the jurisdiction of the consolidated bureau are administered and enforced by specialists who are comprehensively trained 

in a single discipline. Finally, ensure that all of the components 

within the consolidated bureau, including the Border Patrol, have 

their own investigative branches that report directly up the chain 

of command to the head of their respective division. 

While the need for these reforms is obvious to everyone who regularly deals with these issues, managers and other employees without collective bargaining rights and protections are constrained 

from publicly acknowledging it. The recent decision to remove such 

protections from all the criminal investigators in the Department 

will deprive Congress and the public of their invaluable perspective. Likewise, the new human resources management system currently being developed will have the same chilling effect on the 

ability of the Department’s remaining employees to speak out on 

issues of public concern. Deliberately stifling the voice of those who 
45

can warn us of problems and recommend solutions is not only counterproductive, it is an open invitation to disaster. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF T.J. BONNER, 

On behalf of the 10,000 Border Patrol employees that it represents, the National 

Border Patrol Council thanks you for the opportunity to present our views and concerns regarding the level of coordination and cooperation between the various agencies responsible for different aspects of homeland security, as well as our recommendations for improving these important interactions. 

Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, all of the agencies 

with primary jurisdiction for enforcing immigration, customs, and agriculture laws 

employed various classifications of enforcement personnel, including criminal investigators, responsible for those matters within their areas of jurisdiction. Coordination within these agencies was generally very good. For example, the criminal investigators in the Border Patrol’s Anti-Smuggling Unit worked very closely with uniformed Border Patrol Agents to uncover and break up alien smuggling rings. This 

close internal coordination was a result of all of the various operations being overseen by the same management structure and sharing the same organizational culture and values. Unfortunately, this same level of cooperation did not extend beyond 

each branch. 

The lack of cooperation and coordination between the agencies responsible for enforcing the laws at our Nation’s borders and beyond was understandably a matter 

of concern even before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Additionally, there 

was a great deal of support for the concept of separating the enforcement and service functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS). In fact, the National Border Patrol Council endorsed that idea. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 embodied those principles, authorizing the 

creation of separate components for enforcement and service, the Bureau of Border 

Security and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. For reasons that 

are not entirely clear, a subsequent political compromise replaced the Bureau of 

Border Security with two separate enforcement entities, the Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

In an attempt to appease those who supported the existing bureaucracies, inspections and patrol functions were placed into one bureau, and investigation, detention, 

and removal functions in another. Although proponents claimed that this new structure would create a clear demarcation between border enforcement and interior enforcement, this naive perspective is at odds with reality. By definition, every case 

involving the smuggling of people or goods into the United States originates at the 

border. This artificial bifurcation of the enforcement functions of the Department 

has created needless barriers to the cooperation and coordination that is so essential 

in law enforcement, replicating and exacerbating some of the very problems that led 

to the call for a consolidated agency. 

The merger also created another set of challenges relating to the effective enforcement of the various laws under the jurisdiction of the new Department. Instead of 

the relatively narrow focus of the previous entities, the two new bureaus are both 

responsible for enforcing customs, immigration, and agriculture laws. Each of these 

areas of law are extremely complex, and require a great deal of training and experience to master. 

Although the creation of the Department of Homeland Security has been compared to a corporate merger, a more apt analogy would be that of a hostile takeover. 

While it certainly would have been unwise to incorporate the mistakes of the beleaguered I&NS into the new Department, it was equally inadvisable to ignore the vast 

amount of knowledge and wisdom possessed by countless individuals who had dedicated their careers to enforcing immigration laws. The dominance of a single program in managing and setting the priorities of the bureaus that are now responsible 

for enforcing these three broad areas of law has resulted in a decreased emphasis 

on the enforcement of immigration and agriculture laws. This is not so much a conscious decision at the highest levels of the organization, but rather a normal subconscious predilection on the part of field managers who are primarily familiar with 

customs laws. Training and directives will not cure this problem; a revised structure 

is necessary. The new structure must recognize that it is unrealistic to expect employees to be fully competent in three complex areas of law. In the war against terrorism, mediocrity is simply not an acceptable standard. 
46

The implementation of the following recommendations would correct these deficiencies: 

(1)Consolidate the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement into a single bureau of Border Security, ensuring that 

the Border Patrol remains a separate entity within that bureau. 

(2)Ensure that the three main areas of law within the jurisdiction of the consolidated bureau are administered and enforced by specialists who are comprehensively 

trained in a single discipline. 

(3)Ensure that all of the components within the consolidated bureau, including 

the Border Patrol, have their own investigative branches that report directly up the 

chain of command to the head of their respective division. 

While the need for these reforms is obvious to everyone who regularly deals with 

these issues, managers and other employees without collective bargaining rights 

and protections are constrained from publicly acknowledging it. The recent decision 

to remove such protections from all of the criminal investigators in the Department 

will deprive Congress and the public of their invaluable perspective. Likewise, the 

new human resources management system currently being developed will have the 

same chilling effect on the ability of the Department’s remaining employees to speak 

out on issues of public concern. Deliberately stifling the voice of those who can warn 

us of problems and recommend solutions is not only counter-productive, it is an 

open invitation to disaster.

Mr. CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Bonner. 

Mr. Ugazio, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SERGIO UGAZIO, SECRETARY, NATIONAL INS 

COUNCIL LOCAL 1944, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 

Mr. UGAZIO. Good morning, members, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Sanchez, distinguished members of this committee. My 

name is Sergio Ugazio. I am Secretary of Local 1944, National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council. I am also an immigration enforcement agent with the Bureau of Immigration’s Custom Enforcement within the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. I have been an immigration agent for almost 10 

years, and prior to that I was a corrections officer at a maximum 

security penitentiary within the Federal Bureau of Prisons. I am 

a former United States Marine and veteran of Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm. 

This morning, I will touch on three points of interest within the 

Department of Homeland Security. They are as follows: the relationship between the Bureau of Customs and Border Protections 

and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, specifically the way that special agents, Border Patrol agents, and detention personnel interact; a widespread morale problems in both bureaus; and finally, everyone’s favorite topic, pay banding and payfor-performance systems. 

First, with regard to staffing, while it is true DHS has increased 

the number of Border Patrol agents, like my colleague here, and inspectors to put on the borders since the events of September 11, 

2001, in my line of work, detention and deportation, there have not 

been enough new hires to ensure proper execution of deportation 

procedures, nor to ensure adequate personnel for immigration court 

and final disposition. There is also a lack of detention space. 

What this means is CBP officers, special agents and other law 

enforcement agencies are making arrests, but no one is taking care 

of these criminals. I am talking about criminals. Who is going to 

deport these people? And most importantly, how and where are 

these illegal aliens going to be housed? You can catch all of the ille-
47

gal immigrants you want, but please consider what is to be done 

with them once they are caught and in custody. 

Illegal aliens apprehended in the U.S. have to be processed for 

immigration court and final disposition procedures, and reviewed 

for possible criminal activity, or most importantly, terror connections. If the number of arresting agents increases, then the number 

of agents preparing cases for final disposition must be increased as 

well, which is me. If you have a lot of these guys here, I am the 

guy that has to deal with what they do. I am the one that clean 

up everything that they do and makes sure that the rules and regulations of this Congress are followed. 

In fact, it is on a daily basis in this country, aliens are caught 

crossing the border illegally and released and paroled in because of 

the lack of detention bed space. Where are you going to put these 

people once they are captured? Okay? They have to go somewhere. 

Once an alien is in custody, he must be offered due process. In 

South Texas, we have hundreds of agents and inspectors arresting 

people, but only 22 deportation officers oversee thousands of cases 

while ensuring an alien’s rights are not violated, and the agency 

is protected from Habeas actions and lawsuits. This is an enormous 

undertaking and responsibility. The bottom line is clear: We need 

more detention and removal staff, which is what I do, not what he 

does. He catches them. I deal with the end result. 

As to the second point, there is a morale problem within the 

DHS. A minute ago, a gentleman sitting over there says, how is the 

pay. The Chief said, hey, it is great; we all got GS–11s. But that 

is a temporary fix. We are going to go to a situation called pay 

banding. We had the largest budget in the history of the INS, Border Patrol, U.S. Customs, U.S. Agriculture, and yet we are under 

a hiring freeze. How are you going to catch these terror connections 

if you are under a hiring freeze? If the U.S. faces the threats it 

does, why are we not hiring more personnel? Why isn’t there any 

money for overtime? There are people who want to do the job, but 

there is no money for overtime. 

These are the kinds of questions being asked and this is why a 

morale problem exits. Also, the proposed new personnel system for 

the Department shifts the balance of power from unions to management so dramatically that it is causing great fear among employees. Pay banding, for instance, is part of the new system. This 

system has not worked for federal air marshals. What makes you 

all think it is going to work for us? This is demoralizing, and under 

this plan supervisors can unfairly reward their friends, and lessfavored agents better not complain. 

In closing, I know the agency and its executive staffs have a 

daunting task in making this successful, and I know it is a difficult 

deal. I know that many people at all levels are doing their best. All 

I ask is that you keep the concerns expressed by the agents and 

officers and administrative support staff and all others about the 

proposed personnel system. All of these people that responded to 

the crumbling towers in New York on 9–11, they were all union 

members, every single one of them. They never complained about 

the working conditions that day, because I do not think there were 

any working conditions. 

That is it. My time ran out. 
48

[The statement of Mr. Ugazio follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SERGIO UGAZIO

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished Members of this Committee. My name is Sergio A. Ugazio and I am the Secretary for 

Local 1944 of the National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council. I am 

also an Immigration Enforcement Agent with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) within the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I have been an Immigration Agent for almost 10 years and prior to that 

I was a Corrections Officer at a maximum security prison within the Federal Bureau of Prisons. I am also a former U.S. Marine and veteran of Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm. 

This morning I am going to discuss three points of interest concerning the Department of Homeland Security. They are as follows: 

(1.) The relationship between the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 

(BCBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and specifically the way that Special Agents, Border Patrol Agents, and the Detention personnel interact; 

(2.) The widespread morale problem in both Bureaus; 

(3.) And finally everybody’s favorite topic, Pay Banding and Pay for Performance 

systems. 

First, with regard to the Border Patrol. While it is true that DHS has increased 

the number of agents deployed along the borders since the events of September 11, 

2001, in my line of work—deportation—there have not been enough new hires to 

to ensure proper execution of deportation procedures, nor to endusre adequate personnel for immigration court and final disposition, and there is a lack of detention 

space. . What this means is CBP, Special Agents and other law enforcement agencies are making arrests but no one is taking care of the criminals. Who is going to 

deport these people? And most importantly, how and where are these illegal aliens 

going to be housed? You can catch all of these folks you want, but please, consider 

what is to be done with them once they in custody. 

Illegal aliens apprehended in the U.S. have to be processed for immigration court 

and final deportation procedures and interviewed for possible criminal activity and 

terror connections. If the number of arresting agents increases, then the number of 

agents preparing cases for final disposition must be increased as well. The fact is 

that on a daily basis in this country, aliens are caught crossing the border illegally 

and released (paroled in) because of the lack of detention bed space. Once an alien 

is in custody he or she must be afforded due process. In South Texas, we have hundreds of Agents and Inspectors arresting people but only 22 Deportation Officers 

who must oversee thousands of cases while ensuring aliens rights are not violated 

and the agency is protected from Habeas actions and lawsuits. This is an enormous 

undertaking and responsibility. The bottom line is clear: We need more detention 

and removal staff. 

As to the second point, there is a morale problem within DHS. We have the largest budget in the history of legacy INS, Border Patrol, US Customs, US Agriculture 

and yet we under a hiring freeze. With the U.S. facing the threats it does, why are 

we not hiring more personnel? Why isn’t there any money for overtime? These are 

questions the kinds of questions being asked and why a morale problem exists. Also, 

the proposed new personnel system for the Department shifts the balance of power 

from unions to management so dramatically that it is causing great fear among employees. 

Pay banding, for instance, is a part of the new system. If this system of has not 

worked for the Federal Air Marshals, what makes the Department believe that it 

will work for us? I cannot find one agent that wants this pay system. NOT ONE! 

I have read about the proposed system, and to be quite honest, it’s demoralizing! 

Under the plan, supervisors can unfairly reward their friends, and less favored 

agents better not complain. THIS IS NOT FAIR! I am against it, and it is my opinion that DHS will lose a lot of highly skilled professionals because of the pay banding system. Just read the comments from employees; the overwhelming number oppose this system. Let the numbers speak for themselves 

In closing, I know the agency and its executive staff have a daunting task in making DHS successful. I know that many people at all levels are doing their best. All 

I ask is that you hear the concerns expressed by Agents, Officers, administrative 

and support staff, and others about the proposed new personnel system. All of those 

first responders, firemen, NYPD, FEMA, and all the other law enforcement officers 

that put aside their personal well-being and ran into those burning and crumbling 

towers on that infamous day. . . THEY WERE ALL UNION MEMBERS! 
49

When President Bush went to ground zero and grabbed the loud speaker, he was 

addressing union workers. Please don’t attack the very people that defend this nation with union busting and personnel procedures that eliminate so many important 

employee rights. Instead, support us in our effort to be the dedicated, committed 

and vigilant employees so many of us want to be. Help us attack terrorism, identify 

sleeper cells in the U.S. and work to keep America great. Thank you

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Ms. Sanchez may inquire. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all the witnesses before us today. 

I want to direct just a couple of questions to Mr. Ugazio and to 

T. J. Bonner. In the earlier panel, I am sure you heard all the rosy 

testimony from our DHS people. I want to find out. I asked them 

a couple of questions. I want to find out about the controlled delivery situation, or even broader than that, how are the different 

pieces working together? Do your people feel that there is the cooperation in between ICE and the Border Patrol, for example? 

Secondly, the other question is about the issue of having an immigration specialist around when the Border Patrol does get people, and whether they can be processed, or what you do with them. 

So I would ask both of you to speak to that. They told me there 

was no problem. They were working together; that everything was 

great. What do your people feel? You are representing the on-theground troops there, if you will. 

Mr. UGAZIO. Basically, ma’am, the way the situation works is an 

alien is captured. They are processed by the Border Patrol. There 

is a 24-hour situation. They are interviewed by the Border Patrol 

personnel for criminal activity, to be categorized into a situation 

where they are just border crossers or if they are criminals or if 

they have terrorist connections. Once that is established, then they 

give a call to where I am stationed at the facilities. They talk to 

the supervisors. It is more like on a case-by-case basis. There really 

is not a situation where there is a policy, this is the way it will 

be done. It is just the Border Patrol supervisor at that time calls 

us and says, do you have bed space; we have this situation here; 

can you come pick this up. And a guy like me will go get them. I 

will apprehend this individual and he will come into my custody 

and he will be held with us. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What if you do not have bed space? 

Mr. UGAZIO. If I do not have bed space, ma’am, that individual 

is going to be paroled. Once it has been established that he is just, 

let’s say, a border-crosser, the individual is paroled into the U.S. 

which means he is still actually in custody, but he has to report 

back to the immigration court for final disposition. They do or do 

not. I do not know. Sometimes they do. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Bonner? 

Mr. BONNER. It is interesting that they chose to put Mr. Aguilar 

up here because the Tucson Sector is the only one that has embarked on a so-called integrated effort between ICE and CBP. And 

even at that, it is not working nearly as well as it could be. 

On the issue of controlled loads, we simply do not have that 

many occurring now because the level of cooperation is much less 

than it used to be when we had our own internal anti-smuggling 

unit. Typically on drug loads, we interface with the Drug Enforce-
50

ment Agency, which is still part of the Department of Justice. So 

that level of cooperation never was really great, and that aspect 

has not changed. 

What has changed is the emphasis has shifted from immigration 

violations to customs violations, because most of the people who are 

running the ICE agency are former Customs people. I cannot really 

blame them for wanting to not repeat the mistakes made in the 

INS and not to bring over poor managers from that area, but there 

were a lot of good people who had a lot of knowledge about immigration, and they have been pushed out of the picture. So all of the 

emphasis, or the majority of it is now on customs violations. So we 

do not get those calls anymore, because most customs violations are 

coming through the ports of entry, not around the ports of entry. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The last question I have is on the performancebased pay system. It seems to me if we are asking people to cooperate, like in the controlled situation for example, doesn’t the performance-based system maybe not make you want to cooperate as 

much? Maybe you want to do a drug bust, if you are in charge of 

doing a drug bust at the actual border, wouldn’t you rather do that 

if it was going to be performance-based, than let it go through and 

get somebody else further up in the system to go after that drug 

bust, for example? 

Mr. BONNER. Absolutely. If you are being paid based on your performance, which is rated by your first-line supervisor, there is absolutely no incentive for you to cooperate outside that chain of command, because you will not be recognized and rewarded for it. Another problem that would come up is if you get intelligence about 

something happening, you are going to hang on to that because you 

will be rewarded if you are the agent who makes the big bust. So 

why on earth would you give the information to the next agent to 

let them take money out of your pocket? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Your time has expired. 

Ms. Granger may inquire? 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. Ugaziao, you said there is a hiring freeze. When was that 

hiring freeze instituted? 

Mr. UGAZIO. Ma’am, it is currently ongoing. It has been going on 

for quite some time. I can provide you that information. I do not 

have it with me. I have e-mails from headquarters stating so. I 

have that information. 

Ms. GRANGER. Good. Thank you. You talked about pay banding. 

I am sorry. I do not know what pay banding is. 

Mr. UGAZIO. This is exactly the situation that we are talking 

about. If there are not people like us, you are never going to know 

about that. Union personnel, we are not against the system. We 

want to work with you. We want to do the job. 

Ms. GRANGER. What is pay banding? 

Mr. UGAZIO. Pay banding is a pay-for-performance system that 

rewards people that supposedly do a good job and do the right 

thing on a daily basis. 

Ms. GRANGER. Fine. 

Mr. UGAZIO. Here I am addressing Congress, but last month I 

got a fully successful, which is a middle rating, for my inter-
51

personal skills. And I am a union representative. People come to 

me with their problems and I deal with them. I am the liaison between the managers and the problem. It is a buffering system and 

I am the guy that does it, and I get a fully successful, which is a 

minimum rating. I should be getting outstanding. 

Ms. GRANGER. Okay. I was not familiar with that term. 

Mr. Johnson, you talked about US–VISIT. My question is, is your 

question, can it be done? Your concern is, can it be done at all or 

can it be done in that time frame? 

Mr. JOHNSON. US–VISIT, I think DHS has recognized they have 

to phase-in the system over time, rather than plop it into place in 

December 2004. Frankly, I share the skepticism of border communities, at least the ones we hear from, like Laredo, which is, are 

they going to be able to get out there in December, only 6 months 

out, and do it in time. 

Ms. GRANGER. Your concern is the time, the deadline. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is. If they can do it, our hat is off to them, but 

we are talking about ripping up streets and installing equipment, 

without hopefully delaying traffic while it is all being done. We are 

talking about installing radio frequency responders, where the idea 

is that people will be exiting the country, and that when they exit, 

that will be picked up by the radio frequency responder with no errors, and then the next time that person comes back into the country, it will be faithfully recorded that they in fact exited on time. 

What if that is not recorded and what happens when they come 

back? There is a big question. Did you exit on time? Did you exit 

illegally? 

Ms. GRANGER. You question the deadline, and also whether it 

will even work. Right? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, they all go together. It is just that we are 

skeptical as to whether they can meet it. We are not questioning 

the need for US–VISIT and the fact a system has to be put in 

place, but there are lots of pieces to this puzzle. What DHS at a 

minimum needs to do is get down there to the border communities, 

each one individually, and say, this is what we plan to install, and 

how to do it, and here is our timeline at your port of entry. Right 

now, there are a lot of generalities at the top, and reassurances 

that we will get it done, do not worry. But we have to reflect the 

concerns of our local Chambers and that is what I am trying to do. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Dicks may inquire. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you, Mr. Bonner, does the Border Patrol 

have the same problems, morale-wise, as does Mr. Ugazio’s people? 

Mr. BONNER. Absolutely. I have been a Border Patrol agent for 

26 years and I can tell you that I have never seen morale lower. 

Mr. DICKS. Again, is it pay banding? Is it the anti-union approach of the Administration? 

Mr. BONNER. I think that is a significant part of the problem. I 

think another part, in addition to the pay-for-performance, is the 

whole notion that collective bargaining is going to go away; that 

employees will lose a meaningful voice. But another aspect that is 

very troubling to the agents and is very demoralizing, is this strategy of deterrence, the notion that you can sit there for 10 hours 

and your mere presence will deter people from coming into the 
52

country. The agents see people streaming by on either side, and 

they are thinking to themselves, I signed up for this, to sit here? 

This is even worse because they see these recruiting videos where 

agents you are on horseback, and there are helicopters, et cetera. 

Mr. DICKS. So none of that is occurring? Is that what you are 

saying? 

Mr. BONNER. I am saying, depending on the part of the country 

and depending on your work assignment, you might be told you are 

going to sit here all week, 10 hours a day, and you will do nothing 

but be a mannequin. That is very demoralizing. 

Mr. DICKS. That is more on the northern border, right? 

Mr. BONNER. No, that is on both borders. 

Mr. DICKS. Both borders? 

Mr. BONNER. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. And nobody else is going out to stop these people 

from coming in? 

Mr. BONNER. That is the reason that we have a minimum of 

eight million people in the country illegally. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the explanation for that? What is the strategy? 

Mr. BONNER. The explanation is that if you leave your position, 

then other people can come in through the void that you have created. The philosophy behind the strategy is that if you have a lot 

of high-visibility positions, that this will somehow deter people 

from coming into the country. Well, you have people in Mexico 

where for example, the average wage is $4 a day, and in the 

United States it is at least 10 times that much, and they have the 

choice between living in abject poverty or making a better life for 

themselves and coming across. Of course, they are going to do that. 

I would do that if I were in their situation. 

Mr. DICKS. So you personally disagree with the strategy. You do 

not think the deterrent policy is working and that we ought to be 

out trying to stop these people from coming in. 

Mr. BONNER. Absolutely. We should be out there enforcing laws 

the way we did for the first 70 years of the Border Patrol. 

Mr. DICKS. This has all changed since the Department of Homeland Security was created? 

Mr. BONNER. No, this dates back to about 1994 when they 

launched Operation Hold the Line. Actually, Hold the Line I believe was initiated in 1992. It was a gradual transition, but it 

swept across the whole Border Patrol by the mid–1990s. It has had 

a very demoralizing effect. I think that strategically it has been a 

mistake. It has resulted in higher numbers of people eluding apprehension. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Johnson, go back to US–VISIT. I understand the 

part of it dealing with the airlines. Tell us what this actually 

means? What is required at the ports of entry? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, right now if you hold a visa, and you come 

into a port of entry, either airports or come December at land 

ports, you have to come into primary, and then you will be referred 

to what they call secondaries, as these gentlemen know better than 

I, and your index fingerprints will be taken and you will be photographed, and that information will be put into a database. 
53

Of course, you are also checked at that same time, as everyone 

else is, against INS’s databases like IDENT and NAILS. Now, the 

visa waiver program, individual travelers are going to be added 

come September, and that is an estimated 13 million additional 

travelers to the program. So obviously, that is a huge chunk of a 

number of people who are going to be now under US–VISIT. Can 

the government handle that additional volume and still get the 

lines processed quickly? We think it is a big question. Obviously, 

if they poured the resources needed there, then they can, but I 

think the government is going to have to acknowledge that additional resources are going to be needed in this case. 

Mr. DICKS. Does the hiring freeze affect this as well, Mr. Bonner? 

Mr. Ugazio? 

Mr. BONNER. It is going to affect every program out there because we are simply not allowed to bring new people on board. 

While the Border Patrol claims that it is not operating under a hiring freeze, it has not hired anybody since March. They claim that 

they have reached their hiring goals for the year. Well, given the 

fact that we are so hopelessly outnumbered? 

Mr. DICKS. How many Border Patrol people are you short? 

Mr. BONNER. We have 11,000 uniformed Border Patrol agents to 

cover 6,000 miles of land border, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 

365 1/4 days a year. 

Mr. DICKS. There is no way. 

Mr. BONNER. There is no way we can do that, especially up along 

the northern border where we have 1,000 agents to cover 4,000 

miles of border 24/7. 

Mr. DICKS. We are aware of that in the State of Washington. We 

certainly are. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Ms. Dunn may inquire. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask a couple of questions. Mr. Carafano, in your written 

testimony you advocated expanded use of Section 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act which provides authority for state and 

local law enforcement to investigate, detain and arrest aliens on 

civil and criminal grounds. Is this because you believe that state 

and local law enforcement should play a greater role in 

counterterrorism immigration investigations? How do you envision 

expansion of the involvement of state and local law enforcement? 

What problems such as jurisdiction do you think might be encountered by increasing the role of non-federal law enforcement? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Most of my experience is with looking at the pilot 

program in the State of Florida. There, what you had was a case 

where you had very few, I cannot remember the exact number, but 

a handful of immigration investigative agents to cover a very large 

area. They have a very large immigration problem. What they developed in the State of Florida was a series of state-local 

counterterrorism task forces. Some of those eventually merged with 

a state joint terrorism task force. 

What they did was they wanted to expand the capacity of the 

federal agents to do counterterrrorism investigations related to immigration in the State of Florida. So the program that they adapt-
54

ed under Section 287(g) guidelines is that state and local officers 

who are serving on the state counterterrorism task forces can receive training from the ICE investigators. They are certified by the 

ICE investigators and then they can conduct, and they have certain 

federal arrest jurisdictions and federal authorities as part of that, 

and then they can conduct investigations under the supervision of 

an ICE agent. 

So what it allows you to do is significantly expand the federal capacity to conduct counterterrorism investigations in the immigration area, and leverage the knowledge of the state and local areas 

where they no better and they operate. The advantage to the state 

and local guys is that not only are they receiving the federal authorities, but also access to the federal databases. That knowledge 

enhances their capacity to do their own counterterrorism investigations. So it benefits both sides. It is a very appropriate way. There 

are no question sin terms of liability. It is a very low-cost program. 

It is a very controlled way. 

I think one of the great successes in the State of Florida is, as 

you know there is always a lot of reticence on the part of local communities when state and local investigators are involved in immigration law. Now, they went out to each of the communities and 

they briefed them on the scope of the program and how they are 

going to enforce it. I think they did receive a lot of support from 

the communities because it was limited in focus. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you. 

Let me ask you, too, Mr. Carafano, you suggested in your testimony that securing our nation’s maritime borders is becoming 

more and more of a concern, actually relatively, because we spend 

so much time and energy on our ports and on our land borders. We 

all appreciate that the layered security system can be very effective. We currently have the Container Security Initiative. We have 

C–TPAT. We have the Maritime Transportation Security Act to 

talk about ports. Is that enough to get us the layered security system that we are concerned about? I speak specifically because I am 

from a state with 120 maritime miles that borders with Canada. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Ma’am, my greatest concern is really in the future of the Coast Guard, because I think all of those are good layers. The Coast Guard is significant in virtually every single one of 

the layers in one aspect or another, whether it is an investigative 

or monitoring commerce or providing domain awareness. As you 

look to the future, and if you want to expand maritime security, 

which I think there is broad consensus we need to do, there are 

simply not resources to do that. Their modernization program simply not get them there from here. To me, it is the real linchpin that 

is risking falling apart. 

This is the hard thing. It is just like the border. You do not enhance maritime security by fortifying ports. You enhance maritime 

security by improving maritime security. So you look where can 

you get the biggest bang for the buck? Where can you increase security among all the layers? You always come back to, if you ramp 

up the Coast Guard’s capabilities and sustainability to do the multiple missions over the long term, I really think at the end of the 

day in terms of enhancing maritime security and its linkages with 
55

border security, that is where the biggest bang for the buck is always going to be. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you. 

Do I have a little more time? I cannot tell. 

Mr. CAMP. Fifteen seconds. 

Ms. DUNN. Great. I will ask it quick. 

I would like to know from you about your comments on having 

a specific focused committee both in the House and the Senate to 

oversee the Department of Homeland Security? Could you tell us 

a little of your thinking behind your recommendation? 

Mr. CARAFANO. A lot of this is based on my experience of growing 

up in the Department of Defense and looking at how the Department of Defense has evolved. There is a critical period in the history between when it was created in 1947 and the early 1950s. The 

real issues are really kind of in the unglorious nuts and bolts kinds 

of things. Some of the programs we have talked about here, like 

personnel programs, organization, administrative programs. You 

have to get that right, and to get that right, you have to get the 

mission set right, and all these multiple different requirements 

right. 

So unless you can look at it in a holistic way, and make sure you 

have the right strategy and the right programmatics, you are going 

to wind up with a very flawed agency which, like when we did not 

get the Department of Defense right, it took us another 40 years 

to break down fundamental flaws. I think without oversight now 

in a holistic way, from a single committee in each Congress, we are 

going to find up with a Department of Defense, which will have 

similar flaws and stovepipes which will take years to break, because once they get set, then they never disappear. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Your time has expired. 

Mr. Bonner, I just have a question. I appreciate much of your 

testimony. We authorized 1,000 new agents at the border, which I 

understand have been implemented. DHS tells us that they are 

there, that they were hired. Is that your understanding, that the 

1,000 new agents did come into the Department? 

Mr. BONNER. In this past year? I think that dates back several 

years. 

Mr. CAMP. Within the last 2 years. 

Mr. BONNER. I believe that over the last 2 years, maybe it approaches that much, but I believe it is closer to about 600. I think 

they are at the level that they are authorized, but I do not believe 

that that level is high enough. 

Mr. CAMP. I understand that, but we authorized 1,000 and the 

1,000 have been there. I appreciate that. 

The other issue that they are telling us, and I wanted your comment on that, is that the attrition rates have not been as high as 

were anticipated or were assumed when the authorization went 

through, so that people are not leaving the agency as rapidly as 

they thought. So therefore the staffing levels have not declined as 

they thought they would. What is your comment on that? 

Mr. BONNER. That is the information that I have been given from 

them, and I have no reason to doubt it. I think that there are a 

couple of reasons that attrition has fallen off, and the primary one 

is the fact that state and local jurisdictions are facing some of the 
56

same financial shortfalls that the federal government is, and that 

is where most of our agents are gravitating towards, law enforcement careers in the state and local jurisdictions. They tend to pay 

more and offer more job satisfaction. I think once they start hiring 

again, you will see a mass exodus of employees. 

Mr. CAMP. Lastly, I just wanted your comment, we have had a 

lot of testimony, not necessarily today, but over the last couple of 

years, on new technology at the border and the help that that may 

give. I did not hear much from you about that, and I just wanted 

to hear your comment on the developing new technologies and the 

help or lack of help they may give at the border. 

Mr. BONNER. I think in certain areas they can be very useful 

tools, but I do not think that you replace hands with electronic eyes 

and ears because ultimately it is those hands that apprehend people. For example, in the President’s Budget request for the upcoming fiscal year budget, they want to reallocate a total of about $75 

million out of the budget for sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles. 

I think it is a mistake to take away from the ability to outfit the 

agents on the border and to staff the border, because at the same 

time they are calling for reductions in the number of Border Patrol 

agents. 

Mr. CAMP. All right. Thank you. 

Ms. Jackson-Lee may inquire. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you very much. Bells are ringing, but 

I thank you gentlemen very much for your testimony. 

I would like to go first immediately to Mr. Ugazio and thank you 

for your service as well. My understanding is that you have cited 

the numbers of immigration arresting agents and inspectors who 

arrest people, but that there are only 22 deportation officers who 

must oversee thousands of cases, while ensuring obviously that 

rights are protected. Are you suggesting that we are imbalanced in 

the resources and that we need additional resources to make that 

more even-handed? 

Mr. UGAZIO. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. The situation is, if I can just use a quick analogy, if you have a small town 

and you have 15 officers arresting all the bad guys, but you have 

one guy at the end processing and the jailer, and he is out catching 

15 bad guys are even more, they are going to come to that jail, and 

immigration where I am at is that jail. So basically, the situation 

is you are going to have one guy doing the work of all these different people and it is going to be a difficult situation if you do not 

have an even number of people on my end interacting with these 

guys. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. In actuality, what you are saying is we need 

to have a greater input from the local community as to the need 

of resources. Might I just say this in addition to overburdening you, 

I think a lot of times it eliminates your ability to use discretion in 

some of the cases that we have dealing with deportation. For example, two cases I am dealing with in Houston, an individual whose 

baby is dying is not a threat, not a terrorist, and would probably 

be able to be handled on supervised leave, if you will, from the detention center, but because of I guess some issues dealing with 

being overworked, it does not allow you to make a decision on these 

individual cases. Would you suggest that? 
57

Mr. UGAZIO. Yes, ma’am, I would. It is difficult for the deportation officers in my section to properly analyze every case and understand exactly. They do what they can. They do a great job, but 

it is difficult to look at every case and say this is a situation that 

needs attention ASAP. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Bonner, why don’t you respond to that, 

about getting local input? Then I also just would follow up with my 

last question, which I am very concerned about, is the deaths that 

are occurring out in the Arizona desert, and particularly how that 

is impacted by the Arizona initiative. We have not seen any response, as I understand it, from those tragic deaths that are occurring, and being able to give relief both in terms of the victims who 

are coming in, who I know may be coming in illegally, but they are 

human beings and should be treated as such. So Mr. Bonner, what 

about taking in local input and balancing those resources between 

what Mr. Ugazio has said and what we are doing here in Washington. 

Mr. BONNER. I agree with him wholeheartedly. You absolutely 

have to have enough resources to accomplish, all aspects of the job. 

You cannot just hire a lot of enforcement agents and then neglect 

the support functions such as detention and removal. 

As far as the Arizona Border Control Initiative, back when they 

launched the initiatives, such as Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper, they should have foreseen that it was going to 

result in desperate people taking desperate measures. They made 

a serious miscalculation believing that people would stay away 

from the deserts and the mountains, and that if they just enforced 

the law with a great concentration of agents in the heavily populated areas that that would solve the problem. 

As we have seen, it is simply not the case. These people are very 

desperate and they will cross in 120-degree weather carrying two 

jugs of water. It becomes very deadly for them. And the smugglers 

do not tell them any differently. They say, oh, this is a piece of 

cake. You are going to walk for a couple of hours and then you are 

going to be at a place where you are going to be picked up, when 

in fact they know that it is going to be a 12-hour walk and you cannot possibly humanly carry enough water with you to survive that 

journey. 

It is a tragedy and it is something that we need to address by 

getting more personnel out there to stop people from coming 

through those areas. It is a large border. It is going to take a lot 

of personnel. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I think this committee and our subcommittee 

should really look to that issue, because people are still dying. Officers are in jeopardy, and even with the Initiative, it probably has 

not reached the point where we are seeing a difference. So I am 

very interested in that. 

Let me finish by just simply saying I indicated that we have put 

forward a smuggling legislative initiative that includes a reward 

component to it in order to break some of these large smuggling operations. We have seen it work in other law enforcement efforts. 

What would be your thought about that sort of legislative initiative? 
58

Mr. CAMP. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. We do have a 

vote on. 

I want to thank the panel for their testimony. I want to thank 

both panels. I note that with additional questions, members may 

wish to submit them in writing. Without objection, the hearing 

record will remain open for 10 days. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, would you just yield for a moment? 

Mr. CAMP. I am going to conclude the hearing now. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Let me just make sure that Mr. Bonner would 

be happy to provide me that in writing, and I would appreciate it. 

Mr. BONNER. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner. 

Mr. CAMP. There being no further business, I again thank the 

subcommittee members and our witnesses today. The panel is dismissed and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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