UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENWANIEE VONTORIAN TATE, a/k/a Keno,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00265-RJC-DCK-1)

Submitted: December 29, 2017 Decided: January 10, 2018 

Before TRAXLER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ross Hall Richardson, Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kenwaniee Vontorian Tate appeals his convictions and sentence of 480 months of 

imprisonment for sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a)(1), 

(b)(1), (2) (West 2015 & Supp. 2017), and committing a felony offense involving a minor 

while under a duty to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A (2012). 

He challenges the sufficiency of evidence on his § 1591 conviction, the district court’s 

jury instruction regarding consent, and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. We 

affirm.

We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction. 

United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2014). A defendant challenging 

evidentiary sufficiency carries “a heavy burden.” United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 

630 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will uphold a conviction if, 

“view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government . . . [,] any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Barefoot, 754 F.3d at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

reviewing court “does not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses,” United 

States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2010), and must examine the evidence “in [a]

cumulative context” rather than “in a piecemeal fashion,” United States v. Burgos, 94 

F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Consequently, “reversal for insufficient evidence 

is reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. 

Said, 798 F.3d 182, 194 (4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Ample evidence showed that Tate used force, fraud, or coercion to cause the 

victim to engage in commercial sex acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2)(A), (B) (2012) 

(defining coercion for purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4) (2012) 

(defining serious harm in definition of coercion). For example, the victim stated that Tate 

slapped and punched her, flung her to the ground, and slammed her head against a wall 

when she made him mad and did not make enough money for him. Tate, however, was 

careful not to bruise the victim’s face, or else she would not be able to make any money. 

The victim also testified that Tate did not allow her to keep any of the money she made 

and that she never hid any money because she was scared Tate would slap her. In 

addition, Tate controlled the rates the victim charged and all aspects of her everyday life. 

Furthermore, although Tate told the victim that she would not have to work if she 

returned from a weekend visit with family, she resumed working the day after she 

returned. Thus, we conclude that a rational juror could find the evidence sufficient to 

show that Tate used force, fraud, or coercion to cause the victim to engage in commercial

sex acts. See Barefoot, 754 F.3d at 233.

Next, Tate contends that the jury instruction regarding consent conflicted with the 

statutory language because it essentially removed the requirement that the defendant’s 

action caused a minor to engage in a commercial sex act. We review de novo a claim that 

the jury instructions incorrectly stated the law. United States v. Blankenship, 846 F.3d 

663, 670 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, No. 16-1413, 2017 WL 2311890 

(U.S. Oct. 10, 2017). “In conducting such a review, we do not view a single instruction 

in isolation” but instead “consider whether taken as a whole and in the context of the 
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entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law.” Id. at 670-

71 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district court accurately 

stated the controlling law in the challenged instruction. See United States v. Elbert, 561 

F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that minor cannot consent to be sexually 

trafficked); accord United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074, 1081 (6th Cir. 2015).

Finally, Tate contends that the district court committed procedural error by failing 

to address his nonfrivolous argument for a downward variance in light of his age. “We 

review a sentence for reasonableness ‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” 

United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). A district court “need not robotically tick through the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]here the defendant . . . presents 

nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that set forth in the advisory

[Sentencing] Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s arguments and 

explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 

220 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may not presume that “the 

district court has silently adopted arguments presented by a party” and “may not guess at 

the district court’s rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or 

defense counsel or for any other clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Here, the court took into account Tate’s age when it questioned the Government 

about whether a 25-year sentence would accomplish the goals of sentencing, yet deemed 
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age not compelling when weighed against other § 3553(a) factors. The court focused 

particularly on the egregious nature of Tate’s offenses and his lengthy criminal history. 

See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that “district 

courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of 

the § 3553(a) factors”). We conclude that the district court committed no procedural 

error. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED