The Honor able Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern * District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 08 -45 69 -cv Ch en kin v. 8 0 8 Co lu m

b u s LLC 

### UNI TED S TATES COURT OF AP P EALS FO R TH E SEC O N D C IRC U IT SU MM ARY ORDER
RULING S B Y SUM M ARY O RDER D O NOT HAV E P RECEDENTI AL EFF ECT. CITATIO N TO A S UM M ARY O RDER FILED ON O R AFTER JANUA RY 1, 20 07 , IS P ERM ITTED AN D IS G OV ERNED BY FEDERAL R ULE OF APPELLATE PROCED URE 32 .1 AND THIS C OURT’S LO CAL RU LE 32. 1.1 . W HEN C ITING A SUM M ARY ORDER I N A D OCUMENT FILED W ITH TH IS COURT, A

PARTY MUST CITE EITH ER THE FEDERAL APPEND IX OR A N ELECTRO NIC D ATABASE (WITHTHE NOTATI ON “S U MMAR Y O RD E R ”) . A PA R T Y C I T I N G A SU MMAR Y O RD E R MU ST SE R V E A C O PY O F IT ON ANY PARTY NO T REPRESENTED BY COU NSEL.

At a stat ed ter m of the United S tate s Court of App eals for the Second Circuit, he ld a t t he Da nie l P at r ic k M oy niha n Un it e d St at e s C our th ous e , 5 00 P e ar l St r e e t, in th e Ci tyof N e w Yo r k, o n t he 2 dayof M ar c h, t wo t hous and t e n. nd PRES ENT: AMALYA L . KEARSE,

P E T E R W
. H A LL, Circuit Judges , J ED S . RAKO FF, * District Judge.

__________________________________________________ Michae l Chenkin,

Plaintif f-Appellant , Ba rbar a Chenkin,

Plain tif f , v. Docke t No. 08-4569-c v 808 Columbus L L C, 775 Colum bus L L C, 795 Colum bus L L C, 80 5 Co lum

bu s L L C, 8 01 Am ste rd am L L C, PWVAc qu isi tio n L L C, Defendants-A

ppellees
.

____________________________________________________2

FOR APPEL L ANT: Michae l Chenkin, pr o s e , New Y ork, Ne w York. F O R A P P E LLE E S : J e f f r e y L. B r a un , K r am e r Le v i nN a f

t a l i s & F r an k e l LLP (Jonathan Frie d and Jessica J . Glass, on the brief ), Ne w York, New Y ork. Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Chin, J. ). UP ON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, ADJUD GED, AND DECREED that the judg ment of the district cour t be AF F IRM ED
. Mic ha e l Ch e nk in a

pp e a ls a jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nti ngthe De fe nd ants ’ motion to di smiss hi s complaint, which alleg ed violations of (1) T itle Iof the HousingAct of 1949, codifie d as ame nded at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. ; (2) a 1952 c ontrac t betwee n the United States and the City of Ne w York f

or a c apital g rant, issued pursua nt to the Housing Ac t , fo r t h e r ed ev el o p m en to f a nar eai nM an h at t an n o w k n o wn as P ark W es tVi l l age (“PWV”); and ( 3) the “ Project Redeve lopment Plan” for PWV. The De fenda nts are
curr ently constructingfive ne w re sidential buildings within PW V, and Chenkin opposes the construction. Chenkin also appe als from the district c ourt’s denia l of his motion for
rec onsideration of the judgme nt. We assume the par ties’ familiarity

with the underly

ing fac ts, the proce dural history of the c ase, a

nd the issues on appe al. As an initial matter, the D e f e n d an t s ’ r e c e n t l y- f

i l e d m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s th e a

p p e a l i s h e r e b y DENIED. The Park West Vill ag e Te nants’ Association’s motion for leave to f ile, as amicus c uriae , a
me mor and

um o f l aw i n o pp os iti on

to D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

is DE NI ED a s mo ot. Although the district court, conc luding that the H ousing A ct of 1949 doe s not provide a private r ight of

action, dismissed the complaint both for lac k of subject matter3

jurisdiction and for f

ailure to state a

claim on which r elief c an be grante d, we a ffirm on the latter g round. See, e .g. , Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-83 (1946) ( wher e the c omplaint “is so drawn as to seek r ecove ry direc tly under the Constit ution or laws of the United State s, ” the dis tr ic t c ourt

mus t e nte rt a in t

he su it u nle ss t he fe de ra l c la im “ c le arl y

a pp e ars to be immateria l and made sole ly for the pur

pose of obtainingjurisdiction or where such a
c la im i s w ho lly

ins ub sta nti a l and fr ivo lou s” ); Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. De

Buono , 175 F.3d 227, 233 ( 2d Cir. 1999) (the que stion of whether a private rig ht of ac tion can be imp lie d f ro m a fe de ra l st atut e is i tse lf

a su ff ic ie nt f e de ra l qu e sti on

to m e e t th e mod e st
re qu ir e me nts fo r s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n und e r 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 31 ); Schwartz v. Gordon , 761 F.2d 864, 867 n.4 ( 2d Cir. 1985) (dismissal for inapplica bility of fe dera l statute to the fac ts alleg ed is more a

ptly termed one for f

ailure to state a

claim than one f

or lac k of jurisdiction if question presented w as nonfr ivolous). Be cause we a g ree that the Housing Act of 1949 doe s not provide a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion, we af firm the dismissal of Chenkin’s Housing Act cla im for fa ilure to state a c laim on which re lief ca n be g rante d. To the e xtent th at Ch e nk in a lso purp or ts t o a sse rt

“ fe de ra l c on tr a c t c la ims ,” his complaint fails to state a c laim as he is not a par ty to, or an intende d third-par ty benef iciary of, the c ontrac t he see ks to enforc e. Ins of ar a s Ch e nk in a

rgue s o n a

pp e a l th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de c lin ingto
acc ept as true the “a lleg ations” in his complaint reg ardingthe leg islative intent of the Housing Act or the meaningof the fe dera l contrac t at issue, a cour t is not required to ac cept as true suc h “leg al conc lusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1949-50 (2009)
. Insofar as Chenkin ar g ues that the district cour t erre d in failing to gr ant him leave to amend his complaint, Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (1) pr ovides that a plaintiff ma y amend4

his complaint once a s a matter of course befor e the f

iling of a responsive ple ading . Her e, no responsive ple adingwas filed a nd Chenkin theref

ore c ould have f

iled an ame nded complaint as of r ight, but he f ailed to do so. See F

earon v. H

enderson , 756 F.2d 267, 268 (2d Cir. 1985), ov e rru le d o n o the r g ro un ds by Cam po s v . Le Fe v re , 825 F.2d 671 ( 2d Cir. 1987) (“ Appellant’s r ight to ame nd as a matter of c ourse e nded with the entr y of the jud g me nt o f d ism iss a l.” ). In a dd iti on , w hil e thi s Co ur t ha s st a te d th a t di str ic t c ourt s sh ou ld g e ne ra lly no t di smi ss pr o s e complaints without gra nting lea ve to amend where a libera l
rea ding of

the complaint “g ives any indication that a valid cla im might be stated,” Shomo v. City of N e w York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 ( 2d Cir. 2009) (interna l quotation marks omitted), Chenkin has identified no c laim outside of his Housing Ac t and fe dera l contrac t claims, and there fore there is no indication that he could state in an a mended c omplaint a claim over which the district cour

t has jurisdiction. Wit h respe ct to the district court’s de nial of Chenkin’s motion for re consideration of the judg ment, we f

ind no abuse of disc retion in that dec ision. See Harris v. Kuhlmann , 346 F .3 d 3 30 , 3 57 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fue rza Aerea Boliviana , 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998). We have c onsidered Che nkin’s rema ining a rguments and conc lude that they are wi tho ut m e ri t. F o r th e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , th e j u d g m e n to f th e d i s tr i c tc o urti s h e r e b y AF F IRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk